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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAKBOE ATTACK
C0NGEES8 OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGKESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 1
NOVEMBER 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
o.n^.^^JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGEESS or THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
79th Congress
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 1
NOVEilLJER 13, IG, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STAl'KS
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
767115 WASHINGTON : 1946
*2>7(.7
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(^»^')
a-'
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOI'ER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BRE^VSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan
, BAYARD CL.
Nortla Carolina
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAY'ARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
Wii.LiAJi D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. Ha.nxaford, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Coimsel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Ko.
10
11
Pages Transcript ^ Hearings
pages
1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4. 1945.
983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13. 1945.
1585-2083 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No. Exhibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 ISO through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Pieports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
IV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5269-5291
381-4-3826
3450-3519
"""5089-5122
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
« 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1
^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(^ 1 1 'i 'i 'i 'i 'i I 1 1 1 1 1 1 'i 'iF:; 1 1 1 1 ! 1 I
II 1 1 1 lr}^ 1 1 1 i 1 1 1
! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 : ! 1 : 1 i 1 ; 1 ! !
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
---
194
59-63
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1(N
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
""660-688"
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Hoard,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1914)
Pages
3105-3120"
2479-2491
4022-4027"
148-186
2567-2580'
3972-3988
2492-2515
1575-1643"
3720-3749"
1186-1220
1413-1442"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
1 1 1 1 CO 1 itH
1 i 1 iCT> 1 1 1 CO
willlCOl r-llllllll
^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
e 1 1 1 1 --1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
►iiiiiiO II.-1IIIIIII
1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1 IrH 1 1 1 1 I 1 1
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Doc. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
203-209
1127-1138
1033-1038
1719-1721'
1219-1224'
"886-951'
1382-1399
"377-389'
1224-1229
"314-320'
Allen, Brooke E., Maj
Allen, Riley H
Anderson, Edward B., Maj
Anderson, Ray
Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adni
Anstev, Alice
Arnold, H. H., Gen
Asher, N. F., Ens
Ball, N. F., Ens
Ballard, Emma Jane
Barber, Bruce G
Bartlctt, George Francis
Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr
Beardall, John R., Rear Adm
Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens
Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm •
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm
Benny, Chris J
Benson, Henry P
Berquist, Kenneth P., Col
Berry, Frank M., S 1/c
Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen
Bieknell, George W., Col
Bissell, John T., Col
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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VI
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 194.5,
to Mav 31,
1940
Pages
5080-5089
3826-3838
Joint
Committee
E.vhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
Mav 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
163-181
'"418-423'
"451-464'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
'8'7-'b"
205
"B223-224"
B6.5-66
B229-231
49-51
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^1 iiiiii i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
1 llllll III 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
14f)
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
495-510
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
4125-4151
1695-1732
2745-2785
4186-4196
3190-3201'
1928-1965
3642-3643
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
Juno 15, 1941)
Pages
""179-184"
""105-114"
96-105
74-85
""368-378"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
478-483,
301-310
1171-1178"
1178-1180"
1659-1663,
170-198
"'812-843,'
1538-1571
504-509
2-32'
365-368
1747-1753'
Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col
Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)
Crosley, Paul C, Comdr
Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)
Curts, M. E., Capt., USN
Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN
Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen
Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm
Dawson, Harry L
Deane, John R., Maj. Gen
DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm
Dickens, June D., Sgt
Dillingham, Walter F
Dillon, James P
Dillon, John H., Maj
Dingeman, Ray E., Col
Donegan, William Col
Doud, Harold ,■ Col
Dunlop, Robert H., Col
Dunning, Mary J
Dusenbury, Carlisle Clyde, Col
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN
Earle, Frederick M., W/0
Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN
INDEX OF WITNESSES
VII
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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
4797-4828
463-457,
551-560,
605-615,
5367-5415 1
4221-4366
26-34, 36-38,
40-49, 55-73,
75-79, 82-92,
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
428-432
414-417
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
iiiiiiieoi— iiNiiiii-Hi iiii
iiiiiiii-HiOXiiiiiOi IIII
»llllllllNl.-l--tlllll'-Hl IIII
0, 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 IIII
e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 IIII
tin 1 1 1 . 1 1 1^ lO 0 1 IIII
lINlT-H .-HI IIII
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1941: July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
;oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
1070-1076
461-469
"763-772'
816-851
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
iO.-ii-*iiO(Miiii^t^iii lOOii
1 C2 t>. 1 t^ 1 1 TTl -^ 1 1 1 1 ^ r-l 1 1 1 It-, 1 1
»iOC»iiMii(N05iiii(MC5iil il-ii
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„e 1 1 1 1 r-^ 1 1 f, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 m 1 1
tiiiOt^i^J^iiO'^iiiiO-^iii 1^*11
iCOLi.cOiiCOCOiiiiO^iii ii>ii
1 0 0 1 1 1 Ci 1 1 1 1 C^5 Cl 1 1 1 1 11
1 CO CO 1 1 1 01 1 1 1 1 C^ -H 1 1 1 1 11
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 lO 1
1111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ICO 1
» 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 1
C:, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 1
^ ; ; ; ; 1 ; ; : ! ; : ; : : 1 1 ; 1 ! ;^ ;
III IIII 1 1 TT* 1
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan.23, 1942)
Pagei
1571-1574"
1664-1676
"469-473~
1
Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept
Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen
Harrington, Cyril J
Hart, Tliomas Charles, Senator
Hayes, PhiHp, MaJ. Gen
Heard, William A., Capt., USN
Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA
Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen
Hill, William H., Senator
Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN
Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr
Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col
HornVjeck, Stanley K
Home, Walter Wilton
Howard, Jack W., Col
HubbeU, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr
Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN
Hull, CordelL-
Humphrey, Ricliard W. RM 3/c
Hunt, John A., Col
Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm
Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
IX
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77 J. J,777 I
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d
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525 Ex; -is
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73 o
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K> k> ►^ v,> ^v* K/^ ^> K.^ *sx<
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bC iC bt. bC b£i_2 :
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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
194G
0 1 1 1 1 1 lO 00 1 1 Ill i_- -0 1 1
CO 1 1 1 1 1 loco 1 1 1 1 1 '^Z^o 1 1
•o 1 1 1 1 1 loco 1 1 1 1 1 2^0'^ ' '
lOlllll'Tt<| llllllllll.^^lOII
IJ: 1 1 1 1 1 Ick^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Jj 1 !
I'O 1 1 . 1 1 '(NCO 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 . 1 1 i2?^S 1 1
^10 < 1 ' < < ^yj III. ^S-Hii
lOiiiiii-* iiiiiiiiiii«^iOii
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Intjuiry,
Mav 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
541-553
182-292
"'140^142'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
103
107-112
186
219-222
102
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
IG, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ ' ' 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' ' ' ' ' '
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No
14G
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 00 1 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1 0 lie II
lllllll^ tl||IITt<lOO II
M 0 coiiiit^ioo II
a 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 ^ ' ' ' ' 1 ' 1 ' '
0 '^ 00 1 1 1 1 TtH 1 (N II
ftiiliiliiO (NiiiiCOiiC II
iiiiii.OiiiiiCOiiiit^.CO 11
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harfcor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2665-2695'
3028-3067
1161-1185'
2787-2802'
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374'
2-54'
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1913
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
144
(ITart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
Juno 15, 1944)
Pages
214-225
363-367
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 2:3, 1942)
Pages
1146-1156'
1156-1171'
4-32'
1068-1095
1272-1285'
"500-504'
1793-1805'
"320-352,"
1648-
1659
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landretli, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, William S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN
Leahy, William D., Adm
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, Jr
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA
Lorence, Walter E., Col
Lumsden, George, Ma]
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr
MacArthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, Morrill W., Col
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen
IXDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
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XII
CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION TEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
194G
Pages
5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1915)
00 1 III 1 1 1 1
II CO 1 III 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 III 1 ICO 1 1 1
^ 1 1 111 1 1 1 1
e l> 1
^11 (X) 1 III 1 1 1 1
1 1 iCO 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sei)t. 12,
1945)
oil 111 1^ 1 (Mil it^ii
TtHii III iioo 1 (^3ll it>ii
Z \ • ^ < (Mil 'III
g,iO 11 111 III 1 II 1 (O 1 1
c^-* ; 1 1 1 1 1 ig ! i i i"^ i i
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
IG, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1915)
^ i i i ; i i i i i i i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
14G
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 lio III III r-„-„-~=^'''^'c<i 1 lo 1 loo 00
1 Id III III ^^JPoocoio 1 iTt< 1 lOC
1 ; IT III III 7^1^2::;: i it I m -
g'ilr^ 111 111 ^^l|l^''^ ' '^^
C^iit-. Ill III jTgl'-HO'-iii— 1 lll>^
\ [^ 111 III c^^§2!2 1 1^ ; I'^g
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Tearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1160,"
1240-1252
3636^3640
2375-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2923-2933
3885-3915
1968-1988"
1035-1070
778-789
.Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
147-169
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. IS, 1941.
to Jan. 23, 1942)
1 1 fj-i>. Tt< 1 1 o 1 ,_-,_-oo 1 1 1 ci-rr 1 1 1 1
ii£rccc5ii 101,212^1 iiooooiiii
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^ 1 \^i^ ; I i igg ! 1 i^ig 1 1 1 1
1 l^^g : ; ;5 ;SS ; 1 Ig^ 1 1 1 1
s
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Col
Pierson, Millard, Col
Pine, Willard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj
Powell, C. A., Col
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
Prather, Louise
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, William S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS XVII
LIST OF DOCUMENTS APPEAEING IN THE JOINT
COMMITTEE'S HEARINGS NOT INTRODUCED AS
EXHIBITS
PART 1
Senate Concurrent Resolution 27, establishing the Joint Committee on the Page
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 3
Corresi)oudence between joint committee and State, War, Navy Depart-
ments, and between committee and President Truman and estate of
former President Roosevelt, concerning liaison ofHcers and records to
assist committee 5
Presidential directive of August 28, 1945, concerning disclosure of crypt-
analytic technique or procedures 8
Presidential order of October 23, 1945, lifting ban of August 28, 1945, di-
rective for benefit of committee S
Presidential order of November 7, 1945, concerning information given by
service personnel 9
Presidential memorandum of November 9, 1945, enlarging on order of No-
vember 7, 1945 9
Excerpts from the Congressional Record of September 6, 1945, including
the discussion and adoption by the Senate of Senate Concurrent Resolu-
tion 27 establishing the joint committee 10
I'aragraph from "I Fly for Vengeance," by Commander Clarence Earl Dick-
inson, appearing in Saturday Evening Post of October 10, 1942 114
Tentative order of proof submitted by committee counsel 125
Paraphrase of message of October 6, 1945, from Secretary of War to Gen-
eral MacArthur 176
Statement by Japanese officer who participated in Pearl Harbor attack 179
Order issued by Navy Section of Japanese Imperial General Headquarters
concerning attack 179
Statement of Japanese officer on information concerning ship movements
reaching Japanese task force from Honolulu commercial broadcast-
ing stations 182
Japanese Naval General Staff Instruction of December 2, as contained in
MacArthur report 205
Letter received by Navy regarding FBI check of Honolulu programs 215
Prepared statement by Admiral Richardson on meeting with Admiral Leahy
and President on October S, 1940 265
Memorandum of October 9, 1940, by Admiral Richardson on his conference
with the President 268
Messages between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Bloch concerning War
Department 1940 alert 271
Statement of Admiral Richardson's view on security of fleet in Hawaiian
area '. 286
Admiral Leahy's statement on function of Navy before Naval Affairs
Committee 294
Admiral Richardson's statement concerning patrol line from Hawaii to
Asiatic coast _. 3()5
79716— 46— pt. 1 2
XVIII LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Admiral Richardson's dispatch of June 22, 1940, to Chief of Naval Oper- Page
ations concerning War Department alert 312
Answer of Chief of Naval Operations to Richardson's dispatch of June
22, 1940 312
Letter of January 25, 1941, from Admiral Richardson to Chief of Naval
Operations, regarding air-defense conditions at Pearl Harbor 368
Excerpts from war and defense plans 372
PART 2
Article of August 13, 1941, sent to New York Times by Otto D. Tolischus,
on American and British stand in far eastern crisis 487
Prime Minister Churchill's statement in House of Commons on January
27, 1942, relating to United States entry into the war 489
Memorandum of November 30, 1941, on conference between Secretai-y of
State and Lord Halifax, on United States position if Britain should resist
Japanese move on Kra Isthmus 491
Winant telegram of December 2, 1941, to Secretary of State, concerning
Japanese moves toward Kra Isthmus 493
Winant cable of December 6, 1941, to Secretary of State, concerning Japa-
nese convoy movement 493
Welles-Halifax discussion of November 28, 1941, concerning Japanese
situation 495
Memorandum of December 2, 1941, by Under Secretary Welles to British
Ambassador, transmitting documents handed to Japanese Ambassador-- 508
New York Times article of August 25, 1941, giving text of Prime Minister
Churchill's address on meeting with President 524
Letter of November 12, 1945, from Mr. Grew to committee counsel, regard-
ing assistance to committee 623
Letters exchanged between Mr. 'Grew and the President, December 14,
1940, and January 21. 1941 630
Telegram of December 5, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull,
regarding opinion in Japan of the "ten point" note of November 26, 1941- 686
Quotations from New York Times of December 5, 1941, on possibility of
closing Japanese consulates in United States 688
Conversation of February 14, 1941, between Mr. Dooman and Mr. Ohashi — 726
Dispatch No. 796, dated November 28, 1941, from State Department to the
American Embassy, Tokyo, concerning the proposed modus vivendi
studied by the Department 742
Campaign address of October 30, 1940, at Boston by President Roosevelt— 750
Dispatch of December 4, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to naval
attaches at Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, and Shanghai, concerning destruc-
tion of codes 765
Memorandum of September 6, 1941, from General Fielder for G-2, regard-
ing Summaries of Information 846
Excerpt from m^norandum from Maj. Gen. H. A. Drum, commanding gen-
eral, Hawaiian Department, to The Adjutant General, War Department,
dated September 21, 1935, concerning defense mission, Hawaiian De-
partment 868
Excerpts from Colonel Montague's memorandum of November 2, 1945,
on function of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee 911
PART 3
Stimson-Kuox letter of June 2, 1941, to the President transmitting Joint
Army and Navy Basic War Plan— Rainbow No. 5, and ABC-1, recom-
mending approval 994
LIST OF DOCUMENTS XIX
Memorandum of June 9, 1941, from Colonel Scobey to Chief of Staff, Page
explaining the President's position as to approval of ABC-1 and Joint
Army and Navy Rainbow No. 5 995
Stimson-Knox memorandum of August 20, 1941, to the President, transmit-
ting ABC-22 and recommending approval 997
Memorandum of August 29, 1941, from Colonel Scobey to Chief of StafE,
stating President's approval of ABC-22 997
Letter of November 28, 1945, from Admiral Eichardson to committee
counsel, covering dispatches between himself and Admiral Stark on
Army alert in 1940 1055
Corrected memorandum of July 17, 1941, for the commanding general,
United States Air Forces from Col. Orlando Ward, concerning Chief of
Staff's request for study of air situation in Hawaii 1105
Excerpt from letter of December 20, 1941, from General Marshall to Gen-
eral Emmons regarding unity of command in Hawaii 1122
Letter of September 25, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey__ 1128
Letter of September 27, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey__ 1129
Excerpt from telegram of August 30, 1941, from General MacArthur to
General Marshall expressing appreciation for War Department support
of his command 1161
Excerpt from United States Code, 1940 edition, page 491, paragraph 33, re-
garding duties of Chief of Staff 1201
Minutes of Joint Board meeting of November 3, 1941 1253
Admiral Hart's proposal that the United States photograph islands of Far
East and Western Pacific 1291
Memorandum of December 11, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel, answering questions on November 5 and 27, 1941, memoranda by
General Marshall and Admiral Stark, and on November 27, 1941, Marshall
warning . 1307
Admiralty dispatch of December 7, 1941, to Chief of Naval Operations,
concerning Far East conferences 1341
Dispatch of December 7, 1941, from commander in chief, China, to com-
mander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning Japanese convoy movement — 1341
Dispatch of December 7, 1941, from special naval observer, London, to Naval
Operations, concerning landing at Khotabahru 1342
Extract from congressional directive to Secretary of War and Navy to con-
duct Pearl Harbor investigations 1359
Memorandum of December 1, 1941, from Stanley K. Hornbeck to Secretary
Stimson, enclosing memoranda on far eastern situation 1394
Memorandum from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, transmitting
dispatch (probably of June 19, 1940) from Admiral Stark to Admiral
Richardson, concerhing movement of Pacific Fleet 1409
Top secret report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and top secret memo-
randa of the Judge Advocate General 1443
Cable of December 16, 1941, signed "Marshall," concerning relief of Gen-
eral Short 1529
Questions for General Marshall submitted by counsel for General Short- __ 1536
Letter of July 3, 1941, from Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations to
special naval observer, London, commenting on report of Singapore
Conference ^^ 1542
General Short's endorsement of August 20, 1941, Martin Air Study 1545
Headline of Washington News for December 3, 1941 1569
Quotation from article stated to have appeared in newspapers on Novem-
ber 29, 1941, concerning statement by Prime Minister Tojo 1570
XX LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Letter of November 25, 1941, from First Secretary, Japanese Embassy, I'age
Washington, to Mr. Herbert S. Mills 1570
Advertisement in Honolulu Advertiser for August 24, 1941, concerning war
risk insurance 1572
PART 4
Article in Honolulu Advertiser of August 13, 1944 (1941?) on vpar bom-
bardment insurance 1573
Quotation from page 213 of Hawaii — Restless Rampart by Joseph Barber,
Jr., concerning statement l)y General Herron on fortification of Oahu 1606
Excerpt from Field Manual 100-15, W. D., Field Service Regulations, June
29, 1942, on method of transmitting orders to theater commanders 1645
Excerpts from Stafe Officers' Field Manual 1645
Field Manual 100-5, May 22, 1941, Field Service Regulations, VV. D., Opera-
tions, concerning forms of orders for tactical situations 1649
Chart on Arrivals of vessels in Port [Pearl Harbor] just prior to Decem-
ber 7, 1941 1676
Memorandum from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, dated
December 13, 1945, reporting on recall of United States merchant ships
to west coast after attack and on dispatch of December 7, 1941 1680
Executive orders establishing defensive sea areas around Pearl Harbor
and other areas 1681
Memorandum of December 13, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel, listing naval planes in Pacific Fleet on January 6, 1940, and
February 1, 1941, and sectors and distances from Oahu covered 1687
Memorandum of November 25, 1941, to Secretary Hull from Dutch Ambas-
sador Loudon, concerning Japanese proposals 1692
Department of State memorandum of conversation with Dr. Loudon con-
cerning modus Vivendi 1693
Memorandum of December 10, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel, enclosing intercepts between No. 836 and No. 841 of Exhibit
No. 1 1716
Memorandum of December 12, 1940, by Chief of Naval Operations on Fort-
nightly Summary of Current National Situation, to be prepared and
distributed regularly 1731
Memorandum of March 11, 1941, from Admiral Kirk for Chief of Naval
Operations on Admiral Kimmel's request for advice on diplomatic
activities 1739
Excerpts from United States News of September 1, 1945, page 34, concerning
movements from Japan to Tankan Bay 1803
Letter of November 17, 1945, from committee counsel to Senator Ferguson
concerning request for information on Japanese knowledge of reading
of their codes by the United States 1817
March 11, 1941, memorandum of Admiral Kirk to Chief of Naval Opera-
tions 1885
Letter of August 19, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, regard-
ing information on Pacific situation 1838
Intercepts of Japanese messages relating to suspicion of American code-
reading activities 1860
Statement of Admiral Wilkinson on responsibility for development of
enemy intentions ; memorandum of December 19, 1945, from Admiral
Kirk, same subject; two cables (to and from Admiral James), same
subject 1925
Memorandum of December 12, 1940, from Admiral Stark to commander in
chief, Asiatic Fleet, on Instructions Concerning Preparation of United
States Asiatic Fleet for War under War Plan Rainbow 31, and relating
to American-Dutch-British conversations 1929
LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXI
Note of April 13, 1941, from British military mission giving instructions to Page
representative at Singapore confex-ence 19S3
Report of December 7, 1941 (Philippine time), from commander in Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, to Chief of Naval Operations, concerning discussions at
conference with Admiral Phillips, and reply by Chief of Naval Operations
on December 7, 1941 1933
Report from Admiral Kimmel on December S, 1941, concerning damage to
ships in Pearl Harbor attack 2023
PART 5
Memorandum of December 19, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel on Japanese messages relating to suspicions that their code mes-
sages were being read 2069
Copy of December 1, 1941, United Press dispatch and of report of December
2, 1941, from United States military observer in Singapore, relating to
status of Singapore alerts 2071
Memorandum of December 27, 1945, from Colonel Root to Lieutenant
Colonel Duncombe, on Philippine plane situation 2073
Cable of December 17. 1941, to General Short from General Bryden con-
cerning oi'ders for relief of General Short; cable of January 6, 1942,
to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, from Adams, on relief
of Generals Short and Martin : 2076
Memorandum of December 21, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel on Japanese intercepts containing code word "Haruna" 2077
War Department memorandum of December 31, 1945, giving information
on Japanese ships moving southward and on cable of December 6, 1941,
from Winant to State Department concerning Japanese ship movements. 2078
Information from documentary evidence on messages at pages 14-29 of
Exhibit No. 2 2082
Memorandum of October 31, 1941, by Dr. Hornbeck, read to joint board
meeting of November 3, 1941, on far-eastern situation 2085
Telephone calls from outside through White House switchboard on Novem-
ber 25, 26, 27, and 28, 1941, as shown by operator's notes 2093
Memorandum of December 31, 1940, from Chief of Naval Operations to
Director of Naval Districts Division, signed "R. E. Ingersoll," regard-
ing defense of Pearl Harbor by the Army 2138
Memorandum of January 9, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to Chief
of Staff, signed "R. E. Ingersoll," concerning installation of aircraft
detection equipment 2138
Dispatch of November 26, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral
Kimmel, concerning removal of planes from Hawaii to Wake and Mid-
way 2155
Dispatch of November 27, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral
Kimmel, concerning Army making available to Navy infantry units for
defense battalion 2156
Message of November 28, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark,
on sending planes to Wake and Midway, and Army troop reinforcement- 2157
Dispatch of October 17, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac,
on reinforcement of Philippines, and precautions at Wake and Midway. 2160
Memorandum from CinCUS Fleet to Commander Aircraft, Battle Force
and Commander Patrol Wing 2, concerning basing of aircraft at naval
air station at Wake and Midway 2160
Memorandum of November 28, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to
CinCPac, concerning defenses and reinforcements 2161
Dispatch of November 28, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to his subordinates;
orders to local aircraft units, Wake, Midway, and Pearl Harbor 2161
XXII LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Dispatch of December 4, 1941, from CinCPac to ComTaskFor 3, Com- Pfge
fourteen, and ComPatWing 2, concerning local unit orders Wake, Mid-
way, and Pearl Harbor 2162
Memorandum of December 2, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark,
on defense of outlying bases 2167
Memorandum of November 6, 1945, giving names of major vessels in Pacific
Ocean on December 7, 1941 2210
Memorandum of May 1, 1941, from commandant. Fourteenth Naval District,
to Chief of Naval Operations, on plans for air defense of Pearl Harbor- 2239
Memorandum of June 20, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to com-
mander In chief, Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic fleets and commandants
of all naval districts, on joint security measures for protection of the
fleet and Peai'l Harbor base 2240
Table submitted by Admiral Stark on dispositions of Atlantic, Asiatic, and
Pacific fleets on December 7, 1941 2249
Letter of December 19, 1945, signed by Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of
State concerning memoranda prepared by Lawrence Salisbury 2250
Dispatch of November 26, 1941, from commandant. Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, to OPNAV, concerning information there on Japanese Fleet lo-
cations 2256
Dispatch of November 26, 1941, from Comfourteen, on location of Jap-
anese Fleet 2256
Dispatch of December 1, 1941, from special naval observer in London to
Chief of Naval Operations, on French and German ships believed to be
sailing from East to Europe, and United States Navy interception 2311
Dispatch of December 2| 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to special
naval observer in London, denying our right to intercept vessels 2311
Excerpt from speech by President Roosevelt on October 27, 1941, relating to
our pledge to help destroy Hitlerism 2313
Excerpt from Washington Post, November 27, 1941, page 4, on activities of
Secretary Hull and conference with Kurusu and Nomura 2323
Report by Secretary of the Navy to President on Pearl Harbor attack 2338
Memorandum of March 17, 1942, for Admiral Draemel, giving views of Cap-
tain Zacharias 2354
Dispatch of November 7, 1941, from Admiral Hart, concerning ABD-2 2369
Admiral Stark's reply of November 11, 1941 2369
Letter of July 22, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Mr. Sumner Welles, con-
cerning embargoes and July 19, 1941, study by Admiral Turner on em-
bargo problems 2382
Letter of commendation from Secretary Knox to Admiral Stark, dated
March 21, 1942 2402
Citation from President to Admiral Stark, dated April 9, 1942 2403
Dispatch from commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, to OPNAV December 2,
1941, giving Admiral Hart's views on Japanese situation 2417
Dispatch from Secretary of Navy to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet,
dated December 16, 1941, concerning relief of Admiral Kimmel 2430
Table on time of transmission to Honolulu by Radio of Navy dispatches 2439
Memorandum from Superintendent of Naval Observatory concerning dawn
at Honolulu on December 7, 1941 2439
Message of August 11, 1945, from General Eisenhower to Admiral Stark,
expressing appreciation for latter's efforts in European theater 2442
Army citation of July 15, 1944, to Admiral Stark for Distinguished Service
Medal 2442
Excerpt from Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935, Chapter V, Coastal
Frontier Defense 2455
LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXIIl
Excerpt from an article "I Fly for Vengeance," Saturday Evening Post, ^»se
October 10, 1942, by Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson 2471
Memorandum of January 2, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel, concerning all-out alert at airfields in Hawaii from December
1 to 6, 1941 - 2490
Memorandum of December 27, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel, on all-out alert in Hawaii from December 1 to 6, 1941 2491
PART 6
Memorandum of December 21. 1945, from committee counsel to Miss Grace
Tully, concerning photostatic copy of original signed Roberts report and
drafts of report in President Roosevelt's files 2493
Memorandum from Miss Grace Tully to committee counsel, concerning
Roberts report —^ 2494
Memorandum of January 2, 1946, from committee counsel to Mr. Justice
Roberts, concerning submission of Roberts report 2494
Letter of January 4, 1946, from Mr. Justice Roberts to committee counsel,
concerning delivery of Roberts report to President Roosevelt 2494
Excerpt from Admiral Kimmel's letter of January 12, 1941, to Chief of
Naval Operations, concerning assignment as commander in chief,
Pacific Fleet 2498
Excerpt from report by Admiral King on Our Navy at War dated March 27,
1944, regarding strength of Pacific Fleet prior to Pearl Harbor 2504
Excerpt from joint action of Army and Navy, 1935, concerning security
of fieet base 2505
Excerpt from Admiral Bloch's memorandum of October 17, 1941, request-
ing planes, equipment, and forces 2506
Endorsement by Admiral Kimmel to Bloch memorandum of October 17,
1941 2506
Excerpt from memorandum of November 25, 1941, from Chief of Naval
Operations to commandant. Fourteenth Naval District, on inability of
Navy Department to assign planes to district 2507
Memorandum of September 23, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral
Bloch on security of aircraft, Hawaiian area, from air attacks at fields
or stations 2577
Order issued by Admiral Kimmel on November 28, 1941, after receipt
of war warning 2662
Memorandum on January 14, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel, on establishment of Pearl Harbor 2665
Letter from Admiral Stark enclosing dispatch of August 28, 1941, con-
cerning Southeast Pacific 2666
Letter of January 14, 1946, from Admiral Stark enclosing dispatch of
October 9, 1941, advising CinCPac of issuance of shooting orders
in Atlantic 2668
Dispatches of December 2 and 3, 1941, from OPNAV to CinCAf, relating
to patrol in Western Pacific 2670
Table comparing actual damage to fleet at Pearl Harbor and damage
as stated in report by Secretary of Navy, released December 15, 1941 2674
Table showing times when various points in Pacific were attacked 2675
Memorandum of December 11, 194.5, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel, on water-tight integrity of vessels 2676
C B. Munson report of January 11, 1946, concerning Japanese on west
coast 2680
Dispatch of November 28, 1941, from CinCPac to Admiral Halsey 2702
XXIV LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Editorial in Chicago Tribune of October 27, 1941, entitled "Mr. Knox Spies ^'ago
a War" 2751
Report of House Committee on Naval Affairs concerning establishment of
a naval base at Pari Harbor, dated 1908 2768
Headline from Honolulu Advertiser, November 30, 1941 2806
Table showing times of attack at various locations in Pacific 2819
Photostat of front page of Christian Science Monitor for September 28,
1944 2820
Memorandum of January 18, 1946, from Dean Acheson to Mr. Gearhart,
concerning copy of Tripartite Pact enclosing Department of . State
translation 2853
Quotation from Black's Law Dictionary on interpretation of ejusdem
generis rule 2858
Quotation from volume 14, Words and Phrases (permanent edition) p. 135,
on ejusdem generis 2858
Excerpt from The Situation in the Far East, a general summary on Novem-
ber 26, 1941, to the Secretary of State, concerning strengthening defense
of Dutch Guinea 2862
Quotation from New York Times of December 6, 1942, on time of attack
on Pearl Harbor 2892
Letter of November 18, 1941, from Mr. Hamilton to the Secretary of State,
concerning exchange of certain territories in Pacific for Japenese ships. 2912
Telegram of February 7, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to the Secretary of
State, taking stock of political and military situation in the Far East 2917
PART 7
Cable of November 29, 1941, from Adjutant General, War Department, to
commanding general, Hawaii, on reinforcement of outlying islands 2938
Memorandum from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, concerning
message of December 5, 1941, from G-2 War Department, to G-2
Panama 2991
Report of December 20, 1941, by Fifty-third CA Brigade (AA) on action
during Pearl Harbor attack S002
Telegram of January 22, 1946. from Maj. George Leask, former assistant
signal ofticer, San Francisco Port of Embarkation to General Short,
concerning radar towers shipped from Oakland to Hawaii 3033
Memorandum of January 24, 1946, from Army -liaison officer to committee
counsel, with enclosures relating to General Marshall's message of De-
cember 7, 1941, to General Short 3091
Radiogram of December 7, 1941, from General Short to Adjutant General,
War Department, Washington, reporting attack on Pearl Harbor 3096
Memorandum of January 24, 1946, from Colonel Lawton, concerning the
budget estimate for 1941-42 for radar operation 3114
Letter of January 25, 1942, from General Short to General Marshall, en-
closing application for retirement 3134
Memorandum of January 26, 1943, from General Marshall to Secretary of
War, concerning retirement of General Short 3139
Memorandum of January 28, 1942, from General Marshall to Adjutant
General, concerning General Short's retirement application 3139
Handwritten note by General Marshall to G-1, on opinion of Judge Advocate
General, concerning General Short's retirement 3140
Memorandum of February 13, 1942, from Secretary of War to Chief of
Staff concerning General Short's retirement 3140
LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXV
Memorandum, undated, from Secretary of War to President, concerning Pag*
retirement of General Short and Admiral Kimmel and handwritten note
on Secretary of War's proposed wording 3140
Memorandum of February 14, 1942, from Assistant Chief of Staff to Attor-
ney General, concerning General Short's and Admiral Kimmel's retire-
ment applications 3140
Memorandum, undated, from General Marshall to Secretary of War, for
decision concerning General Short and Admiral Kimmel 3141
Memorandum of February 14, 1942, from Attorney General to Secretary
of War, concerning retirement applications of General Short and Admiral
Kimmel 3141
Order of February 17, 1942, directing retirement of General Short 3142
Undated memorandum from Secretary of War to Judge Advocate General,
requesting further opinion on General Short's retirement 3144
Undated memorandum to Secretary of War, signed "G. 0. M.," referring to
Judge Advocate General's recommendations concerning General Short 3144
Memorandum of January 27, 1942, from Judge Advocate General for Chief
of Staff, on course of action with respect to General Short 3145
Memorandum of January 31, 1942, from Judge Advocate General to Secre-
tary of War on course of action with respect to General Short 3146
Memorandum of September IS, 1943, from Secretary of War to General
Short, concerning waiver of statute of limitations 3151
Waiver of statute of limitations signed by General Short, dated September
20, 1943 3151
Memorandum of July 4, 1944, from Acting Secretary of War to the Presi-
dent, asking his approval or disapproval of a request from General Short
for a copy of Roberts Commission proceedings 3153
lietter of October 20, 1944, from Secretary of War to General Short, con-
cerning General Short's request for information from records 3154
Message of December 9, 1941, from War Department to commanding gen-
eral, Hawaii, requesting report on time of receipt of War Department
message No. 529 3163
Memorandum on time of receipt of No. 529 and reply to December 9,
1941, message 3164
Memorandum for AC/S, G-2, concerning supplementary Pearl Harbor in-
vestigation by Major Clausen 3198
Memorandum for Major Clausen from General Cramer, on unexplored
leads in Pearl Harbor investigation 3198
Letter of December 16, 1941, to the President from the Secretary of War,
on commission for Pearl Harbor investigation 3260
Letter of January 27, 1942, to Mr. Justice Roberts from Secretary of War,
concerning report on Pearl Harbor 3261
Letter of January 31, 1942, from Mr. Justice Roberts to Secretary of War,
acknowledging January 27 letter 3261
Report of January 23, 1942, from the Roberts Commission to the President- 3285
Memorandum of March 17, 1942, for Admiral Draemel from Captain
Zacharias, on Hawaiian situation 3307
Memorandum of January 26, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel, on comparison of Army and Navy intercepts December 2, 3, 4,
1941 3324
PART 8
Memorandum of January 7, 1946, from committee counsel, to Senator
Ferguson, enclosing Army and Navy liaison officers' memoranda on Japa-
nese intercepts in Exhibit No. 1 3423
XXVI LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Memorandum of January 22, 1946, from committee counsel, for Senator Page
Ferguson, enclosing memorandum from Army liaison oflScer, concerning
part 2 of message No. 985 3423
Letter of December 22, 1943, from Captain SafEord to Captain Kramer, on
winds message 3698
Memorandum of December 28, 1943, from Captain Kramer to Captain
SafEord, replying to December 22 letter 3699
Personal letter of January 22, 1944, from Captain SafEord to Captain
Kramer, using code, concerning Pearl Harbor and winds message 3700
Memorandum of January 26, 1946, from Army liaison otflcer, to committee
counsel, on comparison of Army and Navy intercepts December 2-4, 1941_ 3779
Memorandum of February 1, l&i6, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel, on Alusna Batavia dispatch 03.1030 December 1941 3779
Memorandum of December 6, 1941, for Colonel Holbrook from Lieutenant
Perry, reporting burning of codes and ciphers at Japanese Embassy
in Washington 3780
Memorandum of December 13, 1945, from Army liaison officer, to committee
counsel, enclosing certificates of search for communications between the
President and the Prime Minister during period November 24-December
7,1941 3840
Memorandum of December 13, 1945, from Lieutenant Commander Baecher
to Captain SailCord, enclosing "Presidential Directives for Witnesses be-
fore the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack" — 3883
Excerpt from memorandum of Admiral R. S. Edwards on Presidential Se-
curity Directive Regarding Cryptanalytic Discussions 3884
PART 9
Letter of January 15, 1946, from Captain Welker to Captain SafEord, an-
swering inquiry about winds message 4009
Memorandum of January 14, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel, on duty officers in offices of Chief of Staff and General Gerow
on night of December 6, 1941 4010
Memorandum of January 31, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel, replying to request by Senator Ferguson on working hours in
Admiral Turner's office December 6-7, 1941 ; circular letter from Secre-
tary of Navy, dated November 10, 1941, prescribing duty hours 4010
Memorandum of February 11, 1946, from Army liaison officer, on message
No. 900, dated December 6, 1941 4188
Message of December 5, 1941, from Berlin to Tokyo, requesting that Ger-
many and Italy be advised of contents of Konoye message 4199
Berlin to Tokyo message of December 3, 1941, reporting status of German-
Russian hostilities 4199
Berlin to Tokyo message of December 3, 1941, reporting on interview with
Ribbentrop 4200
Washington to Tokyo message of December 5, 1941, from Kurusu, request-
ing retention of Terasaki until end of negotiations 4202
Memorandum from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, giving infor-
mation on handling of Alusna Batavia dispatch 031030 December 1941 — 4214
Memoi-andum of January 29, 1946, Navy liaison officer to committee coun-
sel, on transmission and receipt of OPNAV dispatch 061743 December
1941 4288
Secret memorandum of June 10, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to
Secretary of the Navy, discussing strategic situation in Pacific Ocean__ 4299
Excerpt from statement of December 1. 1944, by Secretary of AVar that his
investigation would be continued 4306
LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXVII
Page
Summary of interrogation of Captain Takahaslii, dated October 20, 1945— 4439
SafEord citation for Legion of Merit, dated February 11, 1946 4461
Message from Merle Smith to War Department and Hawaii dated Decem-
ber 6, 1941, on Dutch activation of plan A-2 because of Japanese naval
movements out of Palau 4566
Letter of July 14, 1943, from President Roosevelt requesting military
attache dispatches after January 1, 1937, indicating possibility of war 4588
PART 10
Message of March 25, 1941, from OPNAV to commandant of the Sixteenth
Naval District, on exchange of Army and Navy intercepts 4721
Message of March 25, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of
Staff, commanding general of the Philippine Department, and comman-
dant of the Sixteenth Naval District, authorizing exchange of informa-
tion 4721
Excerpt from instructions to staff of commander in chief. Pacific Fleet,
July 14, 1941 4829
Letter of April 22, 1941, from Captain McCollum to Captain Layton, on
dissemination of diplomatic traffic 4845
Memorandum of February 12, 1946, from Army liaison officer, on planes
and guns sent to foreign countries from February 1 to December 7, 1941_ 4873
Memorandum of February 14, 1946, from Army liaison officer, enclosing
memorandum on transfers of antiaircraft weapons before December 7,
1941 4874
Letter of January 16, 1946, from Mr. Robert Shivers, concerning Japanese
language broadcasts 4912
Telegram of November 29, 1941, from Panama Canal Zone, reporting de-
fensive measures taken 4976
Confidential letter of November 10, 1941 from CinCPac, on emergency
basing of aircraft at Wake and Midway 5014
Citations of John F. Sonnett by Secretary of Navy and Admiral Hewitt,
dated July 17, 1945 5023
Memorandum of May 18, 1945 from Admiral Hewitt to Secretary of the
Navy, on further investigation of Pearl Harbor attack 5025
Testimony of Lieutenant Lockhart at special Signal Corps investigation,
concerning detection of Japanese planes approaching Pearl Harbor on
the morning of December 7, 1941 5076
Message of December 6, 1941, from American Naval Observer Singapore
to Admiral Hart, concerning reported pledge of American armed support
of British in case of Japanese attack 5082
Letter of February 5, 1946, from Honolulu Star-Bulletin and sworn state-
ment of Porter Dickinson dated February 1, 1946, concerning Jumbo
silk advertisement 5115
List of newspaper headlines in Hawaiian and Honolulu daily papers 5123
Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 2CL^1 of February 15, 1941, on Se-
curity of fleet at base and in operating areas 5128
Navy Department table giving relative strength of Japanese and United
States Fleets and Air Forces in 1932 5133
Memorandmn of January 26, 1946, on B-17 flights to Hawaii after De-
cember 7, 1941 5134
Memorandum of February 15, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel, concerning microfilms received from General MacArthur's head-
quarters ^,— --- .-_„ ^ „, ^-__„ ^ 5136
XXVIII LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Memorandum of February 20, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee Page
counsel, inclosing February 1, 1946, report from General MacArthur's
headquarters on pre-Pearl Harbor transmission of coded messages from
Hawaii 5138
Memorandum of February 6, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel, concerning planes sent through Hawaii to Philippines from
July to December 7, 1941 5142
Memorandum of January 24, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel, on search for dispatches sent from Navy Department to naval
commanders in field on December 6 or 7, 1941 5146
Memorandum of January 25, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel, on governmental authority of United States and Great Britain
during 1941 over Johnston, Canton, and Christmas Islands 5147
State Department reply to Senator Ferguson's inquiry whether memoran-
dum of Mr. Max Hamilton on proposal to transfer Borneo to Japanese
reached the President 5147
Message of December 5, 1941, from Washington to American Legation in
Budapest, requesting transmission of note verbale to Hungarian Govern-
ment 5148
Memorandum of May 18, 1945, from Admiral Hewitt to Lieutenant Com-
mander Baecher, concerning preliminary investigation at Pearl Harbor
and July 6, 1945, modification of precept 5149
PART 11
Undated letter from State Department to committee counsel, replying to
counsel's request of February 23, 1946, re proposed message from British
and Dominion Governments to Japan, warning her against invasion
of Thailand 5165
Memorandum dated December 7, 1941, from British Embassy, for President,
for comment to Prime Minister on attached proposed message from
British and Dominion Governments to Japan warning her against in-
vasion of Thailand .' 5165
Paraphrase of telegram (undated) from Australian Minister for External
Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United King-
dom, which refers to proposed message to Japan warning her against
invasion of Thailand and mentions decision of President of United States
to send message to Jap Emperor, and subsequent intentions if it was not
answered, including a warning from President to Japan 5166
Message from OPNAV to CinCAF, December 7, 1941, 071722 re request of Jap
Government for safe conduct of S. S. Madison on trip to Chingwangtao
to arrive December 10, 1941 5202
Message from CinP&c to OPNAV dated December 1, 1941, 010300, sug-
gesting ship might be sent to Chingwangtao to evacuate marines and
civilians 5203
Message from Secretary Navy to CinCAF dated December 1, 1941, 012359,
granting authority to charter President Madison for trip from Manila to
Chingwangtao for evacuation of citizens 5203
Message from CinCAF to Commander, United States Marine Corps forces.
North China, dated December 2, 1941, 021634, re instructions to withdraw
marines via President Harrison due to arrive Chingwangtao December
10 5204
Message from CinCAF to OPNAV, December 3, 1941, 021820, reporting
evacuation of Fourth Marines, President Harrison departing Manila
December 4 for Chingwantao 5204
Message from OPNAV to CinCAF dated December 8, 1941, 072230. can-
celing OPNAV 071722 asking CinCAF to give appropriate instructions to
the President Harrison 5206
LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXIX
Memorandum from Admiral O. S. Colclongh to committee counsel, dated Page
December 10, 1945, re two dispatches in "White House File" of messages
maintained at Navy Department for messages sent by President over
Navy facilities 5213
Dispatch 261854 dated November 26, 1941, from OPNAV to CinCAF trans-
mitting message from the President to the Philippine High Commis-
sioner 5214
Dispatch 280228 dated November 28, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV trans-
mitting message from Philippine High Commissioner to the Presi-
dent - 5214
Memorandum dated December 4, 1941, from R. E. Schuirmann, Navy Depart-
ment, for Secretary of State, summing up the situation with reference
to the Japanese advance as it affected the Netherlands East Indies,
including CNO recommendation on Davao-Waigeo line 5215
Message from Foote at Batavia to Secretary of State, dated September 22,
1941, commenting on press conference held by Rt. Hon. Duff Cooper in
which he stated he considered the ABCD bloc a reality 5257
Message dated November 2, 1941, from Ambassador Winant. London, to
Secretaiy of State, transmitting message from Prime Minister Churchill
to President on transfer of large British ship to Indian Ocean 5292
Memorandum dated November 30, 1&45, from Navy liaison officer for com-
mittee counsel, re time of receipt of message from U. S. S. Ward, by
Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel, and attached brief of testimony
appearing in prior proceedings on that point 5293
Memorandum dated April 2, 1946, from Army liaison officer for committee
counsel, re testimony as to why B-17's arrived at Oahu from the west
coast on December 7, 1941, without ammunition, citing testimony appear-
ing this and prior proceedings on the proposition 5294
Memoi'andum dated January 25, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for com-
mittee counsel, re draft and notes made in connection with Admiral
Inglis' statement of the attack on Pearl Harbor 5294
Memorandum dated February 19, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for com-
mittee counsel, re conditions of radio silence in effect in Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets on December 7, 1941 5294
Memorandum dated April 2, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee
counsel, re conditions of radio silence in Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and
date conditions made effective 5295
Memorandum dated January 22, 1946, from Army liaison officer for com-
mittee counsel, re description of notations appearing on radio message
No. 489, dated January 29, 1941, from The Adjutant General to the com-
manding general, Hawaii 5296
Memorandum dated February 27, 1946, from Army liaison officer for com-
mittee counsel, re number of priority dispatches sent to Hawaii by War
Department on December 7, 1941, and re priority messages decoded in
Hawaii before the December 7, 1941, warning from General Marshall 5297
Message dated December 7, 1941, from General Marshall to commanding
general, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., No. 529 Seventh,
text omitted, on original Signal Corps record 5297
Message appearing on page 14077, as received at Hawaiian Department,
or original sheet after decoding 5297
Western Union Telegraph Co. Tariff Book No. 73 for 1941 (cover only)___ 5298
Western Union regulations for handling United States Government
messages 5298
RCA Communications, Inc., Telegraph Tariff, Effective April 1, 1940
(cover only) 5300
RCA regulations for handling Government telegrams 5301
Message dated December 7, 1941, from Colton, acting, for Fort Shafter,
T. H. No. 530 5301
XXX LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Memorandum dated February 21, 1946, from Army liaison officer for com- Paee
mittee counsel, re operation of radar stations at New York City,
San Francisco, and Seattle on December 7, 1941 5302
Message dated January 31, 1946, from commanding general, Eastern De-
fense Command, to War Department, re operation of radar at Atlantic
Highlands, N. J., Mount Cadillac, Maine, and Fort Hancock on Decem-
ber 7, 1941 5302
Memorandum dated February 8, 1946, from commanding officer, head-
quarters Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, Bradley Beach, N. J.,
for chief. Engineering and Technical Service, War Department, in
operation of radar on east coast on December 7, 1941 5302
Memorandum dated February 18, 1946, from adjutant general, headquar-
ters, First Air Force, Mitchell Field, N. Y., to War Department special
staff, re photostatic copy of logs of radar sets in operation on December
6 and 7, 1941, in New York area 5303
Message dated February 4, 1946, from commanding general, Fourth Air
Force, San Francisco, Calif., to War Department, re operation of radar
stations on west coast on Deceml)er 7, 1941 5303
Copy of letter dated November 25, 1941, from Admiral Nimitz, then Chief
of Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, to Admiral Kimmel, on
general subject of radar for fleet 5304
Memorandum dated Februai-y 6, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for com-
mittee counsel, re false weather messages intercepted on December 4 and
5, 1941, by the FCC 5304
Letter undated, from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner, Office of
Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State, to committee
counsel, giving history of lend-lease procedure prior to December 7,
1941 5305
Memorandum dated February 25, 1946, from Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes for
committee counsel, re typographical errors noted in record of his testi-
mony and his suggestion re possible message he discussed with Colonel
Sadtler on December 5, 1941 5306
Memorandum dated February 25, 1946, from Admiral Noyes for Navy
liaison officer, re typographical errors reported in his testimony 5307
Letter dated February 27, 1946, from John F. Sonnett to committee coun-
sel, re typographical errors reported in his testimony 5308
Letter, undated, from Cordell Hull to committee counsel, re typographical
errors reported in his testimony and clarification of two answers to
questions in his testimony 5308
Memorandum dated March 11, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel, transmitting requested corrections in testimony of Capt. A. D.
Kramer, United States Navy 5309
Memorandum dated March 3, 1946, from Capt. A. D. Kramer, United
States Navy, to committee counsel, forwarding requested corrections
in his testimony ^ 5309
Memorandum dated April 1, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel, forwarding requested corrections in testimony of Capt. A. H.
McCollum, United States Navy 5313
Letter dated March 18, 1946, from Capt. A. H. McCollum, United States
Navy, to committee chairman, forwarding suggested corrections in
his testimony 5313
Memorandum dated April 4, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee
counsel, re source material used in preparation of a timetable of Japa-
nese attacks at outbreak of war in Pacific 5315
Memorandum dated February 21, 1946, from Army liaison officed for com-
mittee counsel, re authority of Lieutenant Colonel Clausen to administer
oaths during the investigation which he conducted regarding the Pearl
Harbor attack at the direction of the Secretary of War, citing Article
of War 114 5316
LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXXI
Memorandum dated February 1, 1946, from Army liaison officer for com- Page
mittee counsel, re additional information relating to the initial Japanese
attack against the Philippines 5316
History of the Fifth Air Force (and its predecessors), part 1, December
1941 to August 1942— December 1941 installment 5318
History of Thirtieth Bombardment Squadron (H) and Nineteenth Bom-
bardment Group (H), December 7, 1941, to December 31, 1942, includ-
ing reports by Maj. W. P. Fisher 5330
History, Twenty-fourth Pursuit Group in the Philippines from November
1, 1940, through December S, 1941 5333
Record of interview with Major Heald, communications officer. Fifth Air
Force Service Command, re activity of Fifth Air Base Group in Philip-
pines from November 15 to December 8, 1941 5335
Memorandum dated January 15, 1946, from Lt. Col. Joseph B. Mitchell,
General Staff Corps, for Army liaison officer, re organization of the Far
East Air Force, with enclosures 5336
Letter dated February 11, 1946, from G. E. Sterling, Assistant Chief Engi-
neer, Federal Communications Commission, to committee counsel, trans-
mitting statements of FCC employess re monitoring for "winds" mes-
sage at Hawaii 5340
Memorandum dated February 7, 1946, from Lee R. Dawson to Chief, Radio
Intelligence Division, FCC re "winds messages" 5340
Memorandum dated February 4, 1946, from Lee R. Dawson to Chief, Radio
Intelligence Division, FCC x"e "winds messages" 5340
Memorandum dated February 5, 1946, from Earl A. Nielsen to Chief, Radio
Intelligence Division, FCC i*e "winds message" 5340
Letter dated February 5, 1946, from John H. Homsy to George E. Sterling,
FCC, re "winds messages" 5341
Memorandum dated February 7, 1946, from Tom B. Wagner to Chief, Radio
Intelligence Division, FCC, re "winds messages" 5341
Message dated February 6, 1946, from monitoring officer, Theodore H.
Tate, Koloa Kauai, T. H., to Chief, Radio Intelligence Division, FCC
re monitoring for "winds messages" 5341
Memorandum dated February 5, 1946, from Waldemar M. Klima to Chief,
Radio Intelligence Division, FCC, re "winds message" 5342
Letter dated February 14, 1946, from G. E. Sterling, FCC, to committee
counsel, re "winds message" and transmitting an affidavit by A. Prose
Walker, an FCC employee 5342
Affidavit dated February 13, 1&46, from A. Prose Walker to Mr. George E.
Sterling, FCC, re "winds message" 5343
Letter dated February 18, 1946, from G. E. Sterling, FCC, to committee
counsel, transmitting information received from Hawaii re "winds
message" 5343
Letter dated February 11, 1946, from supervisor, Hawaiian monitoring
area, to Chief, Radio Intelligence Division, FCC, re "winds message" 5343
Memorandum dated January 9, 1946, from State Department liaison officer
to committee counsel, re telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary
of State, dated August 16, 1941 5344
Memorandum dated January 9, 1946, from State Department liaison officer
to committee counsel, re telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary
of State, dated August 16, 1941 (five sections) 5344
Memorandum dated December 11, 1945, from Navy liaison officer to com-
mittee counsel, re watertight integrity of major vessels in Pearl Harbor
December 7, 1941, transmitting table of inspection 5347
Memorandum dated December 11, 1945, from Navy liaison officer to com-
mittee counsel, re condition of watertight integrity of major vessels in
Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, transmitting statement compiled from
ships logs of various ship insijections on December 5 and 6, 1941 5347
XXXII LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Memorandum dated January 29, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to com- Page
mittee counsel, re further check of logs of ships in Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941, concerning watertight integrity 5350
Memorandum dated April 8, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel, re official notification to Navy Department of air raid on Pearl
Harbor and orders sent by Navy Department to fleets, re execution of
war plans against Japan 5351
Memorandum dated February 28, 1946, from Army liaison officer for com-
mittee counsel, re microfilm received from General MacArthur's head-
quarters in Tokyo, containing material from Japanese files on United
States-Japanese negotiations prior to the Pearl Harbor attack 5352
Memorandum dated April 5, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel, re document presented to Secretary of State Byrnes, contain-
ing information of Japanese plans leading up to the attack on Pearl
Harbor, based on subsequently obtained information 5352
Reconstruction of Japanese plans leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor
(based on information obtained subsequent to December 7, 1941), which
is the document presented to Secretary of State Byrnes and referred
to at transcript page 5852
Memorandum dated February 8, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for com-
mittee counsel, re report of Japanese air reconnaissance over Philip-
pines or other United States possessions prior to December 7, 1941, en-
closing message dated November 23, 1941 (220228) from Alusna Singapore
to OPNAV re Gilbert Islands, message dated November 24, 1941 (240610)
from Governor, Guam, to OPNAV, re Guam, and memorandum on inter-
rogation of Captain Takahashi on October 20, 1945, re Philippines ; and
mentions interview with Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga, re Guam and
dispatch from marines on Wake Island, re report of Pan-American clipper
sighting Jap planes east of Guam 5359
Memorandum dated March 7, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee
counsel, re testimony of Vice Adm. T. S. Wilkinson, and letter from
Admiral Ingersoll to Admiral Wilkinson, re scope of activity of Office
of Naval Intelligence prior to Pearl Harbor attack 5361
Letter dated May 20, 1946, from Senator Homer Ferguson to committee
counsel concerning War Department documents relating to the develop-
ment of long-range heavy bombers as proposed by General Andrews and
Colonel Knerr 5464
Letter dated February 4, 1941, from commander in chief. Pacific Fleet, H.
E. Kimmel to his task force commanders concerning aircraft in Hawaiian
area, maximum readiness of 5471
Memorandum dated December 5, 1941, of conversation between the Secre-
tary of State and the British Ambassador concerning cooperation with
Dutch East Indies against Japan 5472
Dispatch No. 1906 dated December 8, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo,
to State Department advising of the delivery to the Japanese Foreign
Minister of the President's message of December 6, 1941, to the Japanese
Emperor 5473
Dispatch No. 286 dated December 6, 1941, from State Department to Ameri-
can Embassy, Chungking, advising of the delivery of the President's
message that date to the Japanese Emperor, with instructions to repeat
the message to Chiang Kai-Shek for his information 5473
Dispatch No. 823 dated December 7, 1941, from State Department to Ameri-
can Embassy, Tokyo, relating the attack on Pearl Harbor and delivery by
the Japanese Ambassador of the 14-part note 5473
Memorandum dated May 3, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel concerning orders purporting to delay the return to Pearl Harbor
in December 1941 of Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey, as mentioned
in testimony of Captain Zacharias, p. 8734 5474
Memorandum dated January 31, 1946, from committee counsel to Navy
liaison officer requesting information set forth above 5474
LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXXIII
Memorandum dated May 23, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee Page
counsel concerning memorandum dated November 12, 1941, prepared
by Capt. A. D. Kramer, United States Navy, regarding dissemination
of Magic material to the White House, enclosing a copy of such paper ob-
tained from Capt. L. S. SafEord, United States Navy 5475
Memorandum dated May 23, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel in respect of statements made by Lt. Clarence E. Dicliinson in
the October 10, 1942, issue of the Saturday Evening Post, concerning
orders under which he flew a plane from the U. S. S. Enterprise from
November 28 to December 7, 1941 5476
Memorandum dated May 22, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel concerning the winds code as referred to in the so-called history
written in 1942 of the activity of the Navy Department Communications
Unit, about which Admiral Hart testified was involved in his conversation
with Captain Safford, and messages quoted therein 5477
Memorandum dated May 16, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel and attached copy of study made by Captain Kramer of the
times of delivery to the White House of certain translations of Japanese
intercepts 5480
Memorandum dated April 26, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel, enclosing two Navy communications with Rear Adm. Cato D.
Glover, United States Navy, concerning notation in OPNAV watch officers
log on December 6, 1941 of contact with Admiral H. R. Stark, and second
memorandum to counsel dated May 7, 1946, concerning compilation of
location of naval forces requested by Secretary of War 5482
Memorandum dated May 8, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel concerning report that reconnaissance was not being carried
out at Hawaii due to wear on planes and crews 5484
Memorandum dated May 10, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel concerning search of Navy files for message from Capt. John
Creighton, Singapore, to Admiral T. C. Hart on December 4, 5, or 6,
1941, concerning sighting of Japanese convoy 5484
Memorandum dated May 2, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel concerning air patrols operating from Oahu prior to December
7, 1941, enclosing Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 2CL— 41 dated
February 15, 1941, and Pacific Fleet confidential memorandum No.
lCM-41 dated February 25, 1941 5485
Memorandum dated May 9, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel concerning report in exhibit No. 160 of information from a
Captain Smith, mentioned by the President 5491
Memorandum dated May 1, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel concerning intercept and translation of message No. 1405 from
Berlin to Tokyo, and memo dated April 15, 1946, from Navy liaison
officer on the same subject 5492
Memorandum dated May 3, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel concerning monthly reports of Navy intercept stations at Winter
Harbor, Maine, and Cheltenham, Md 5493
Memorandum dated April 26, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee
counsel concerning exchange of corresix»ndence between President Tru-
man and Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel, retired, enclosing copies of the cor-
respondence 5493
Memorandum dated April 26, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning
any report of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy on the report
of the Roberts Commission 5495
Draft of proposed charge against Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, United
States Navy, retired, for a general court martial 5495
Memorandum dated April 23, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning
cards prepared in Navy Department relating to execute message for the
winds code 5497
79716— 46— pt. 1 3
XXXIV LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Memoraudum dated April 18, 1946, from Navy liaison officer correcting Page
memorandum dated January 25, 1946, concerning the destruction of
drafts and work materials used in preparation of statement made by
Admiral Inglis before the committee 5498
Memorandum dated December 13, 1945, from Army liaison officer to com-
mittee counsel concerning production and distribution of B-17 bombers
as of September 1, 1941 5498
Memorandum dated April 16, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning
transmission of dispatch 061743 of December 1941 from OPNAV to
CINCPAC for action and to CINCAF for information. (This dispatch
authorized destruction of secret and confidential documents in outlying
islands) 5498
Memorandum dated April 17, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning
phrase "CINCPAO and CINCAF provide necessary escort" appearing in
dispatch 252203 of November 1941 (exhibit No. 3) 5499
Memorandum dated April 17, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning
time table of Japanese attacks — source of material, relating to time of
attacks at Clark Field and Nichols Field in the Philippines 5499
Memorandum dated April 15, 1946, from Navy liaison officer enclosing four
intercepted Japanese messages relating to Japanese news broadcasts — 5500
Memorandum dated May 1, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning
memorandum mentioned in letter dated April 4, 1941, from Admiral
Stark to Admiral Kimmel 5502
Memorandum dated May 1, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning copies
of orders transferring ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and vice
versa from May to December 1941 enclosing letter dated April 7, 1941,
from OPNAV to CINCPAC 5502
Memorandum dated April 30, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning
identity of ship on chart dated December 5, 1941 (exhibit No. 109) located
to north of Oahu 5504
Memorandum dated April 29, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning
transfers of ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific betvpeen May 1, 1940,
and December 7, 1941 5505
Memorandum dated April 23, 1946, from Army liaison officer concerning
duty officer log^ kept for offices of Secretary of War and Chief of Staff
between November 1 and December 7, 1941 5506
Memorandum dated May 21, 1946, from Army liaison officer concerning
Japanese estimate of United States air strength in Hawaiian area prior
to the attack on December 7, 1&41 5507
Memoranda dated from April 9 to May 23, 1946, concerning information
obtained by the Australian Minister as to proposed action of the Presi-
dent in the event the Japanese did not reply to his message of December
6, 1941, to the Emperor 5508
Letter dated November 2, 1941, from committee chairman to President
Truman's secretary, suggesting Presidential memorandum to executive
offices regarding scope of committee inquiry, and reply dated November
7, 1945 5510
Suggested corrections in his testimony by Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias 5511
Suggested corrections in his testimony by Admiral H. R. Stark 5512
Suggested corrections in his testimony by Rear Adm. John R. Beardall 5513
Suggested corrections in his testimony by Henry C. Clausen 5513
Interrogations and answers by Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink, United
States Army 5514
Interrogations and answers by Vice Adm. William A. Glassford, United
States Navy 5516
Memorandum for committee counsel's tiles concerning exhibits Nos. 1
and 2 5522
LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXXV
Letter dated November 15, 1945, from Senator Ferguson to committee Page
counsel concerning intercepted Japanese messages from January l to
July 1. 1941 5523
Letter dated December 17, 1945, from Tyler Kent to committee chairman— 5524
Correspondence relating to State Department papers concerning the Tyler
Kent affair 5524
Correspondence relating to all messages between this Government and the
Bi-itish Government for November 25, 26, and 27, 1941 5530
State Department memorandum of conversation dated November 27, 1941,
concerning British parallel action desired re our export policy to French
Indo-China 5532
Dispatch No. 5727 dated November 27, 1941, from Ambassador Winant,
London, to State Department concerning British economic study of
Japanese industrial potential 5533
Copy of letter dated November 25, 1941, from Dean Acheson to Mr. R. J.
Stopford, financial counselor, British Embassy 5534
Memorandum dated May 22, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel concerning former Secretary Stimson's diary 5535
Letter dated May 26, 1946, from Admiral H. R. Stark to committee chair-
man concerning information which was furnished by Capt. H. D. Krick,
USN, regarding the activities of Admiral Stark on December 6, 1941 — 5543
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
W PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. G.
The joint committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a. m., in the
caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W.
Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M, Hiinnaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
[2] The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
AH those in the auditorium will please be seated.
Before we start, the Chair desires to admonish the audience that
we are glad to have them here, but in view of the difficult acoustics in
this room, it will make it necessary for the committee to use these
microphones. We must ask the audience to refrain from any sort of
conversation or any sort of demonstration during these hearings, any
applause or otherwise.
Also I think it is advisable to say to our friends, the photographers,
we are glad to cooperate with you in getting all the pictures you may
wish to take so long as it does not interfere with these hearings.
During the testimony, while the witnesses are on the stand, the
photographers will not be permitted to occupy this space here iij
front of the committee.
Take whatever pictures you want to take and then leave this con-
gested area here.
The last time I sat on a committee in this room, I could not see
the witness half the time, because of the photographers standing
between me and the witness, trying to take him with his hands up,
or something like that.
We must insist that during these hearings, while the witness is on
the stand and testifying, that the photogi*aphers will not occupy this
space between the committee and the [3] witness and counsel.
I want to make the announcement in advance so that there will
not be any misunderstanding. It applies to everybody alike.
I believe the members of the committee are all here.
Mr. Mitchell, as counsel for the committee, we are ready to proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman
' Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript
of testimony.
2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before you proceed, I would like
to make one comment for myself and others. I want to record my
regret and protest, at the start of the hearings at this time, and as
has previously been said, and I would like to have that entered in
the record, and that is this :
It has only been within the past week that the members of the
Executive Department have had the permission, under notification of
the President's order to submit the exhibits so they will be in the best
order, and I have been given a stack of papers, over a thousand pages,
which it is essential to go over in order to conduct any intelligent
cross-examination.
I hope my fears will be disappointed, my fears that this will
result in confusion and delay, but I do think it ought to be made a
matter of record at this time that we regret this somewhat premature
beginning of this inquiry.
[4] The Chairman. The Chair desires to be reasonable in re-
gard to that. The committee at one time, some 2 or 3 weeks ago, I for-
get the date, unanimously decided to begin hearings today; that is,
those who voted.
Senator Ferguson. I would like the record to show that
The Chairman. Those who voted in the committee, voted without
dissent to begin the hearing today. Two members were absent and two
were present and not voting.
At a meeting later, a week ago, or a week or 10 days ago, a motion
was made to postpone the hearings from today until the 23d day of
November, which is the day following Thanksgiving, and that motion
was voted down.
The situation that confronts us, that confronts all the members of
the committee, is that documents have been given to us as quickly and
as practicably as counsel obtained them. Inasmuch as these hearings
will probably last several weeks, it occurred to the Chair that we will
have, as we go along, ample opportunity to familiarize ourselves with
the testimony brought before us today, without attempting to read any
documents before we begin.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a statement
on the record.
Tlie Chairman. Yes, go ahead.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I had made a request [5]
previously that the committee be furnished these exhibit copies at least
10 days prior to the hearing. If I had had some assistance, I would
have been able to have carried down the exhibits that had been given to
me on Wednesday and on Tuesday. Over a thousand of them have
been placed in our hands. Many of them it is impossible to read be-
cause of the job of photostating them. Therefore, it is just a physical
impossibility to go over the papers prior to this hearing.
Wliile I will do my very best, I do want the record to show that we
have not had these exhibits in this form properly indexed.
Here is the first one. It is over 200 pages, and no index to it. It
has been just a physical impossibility to go over them intelligently,
although I want to say on the record, I will do my best to go over
them as the hearing goes along, and it may be essential that we recall
witnesses in order that we may properly examine and obtain all of
the facts.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 6
The Chairman. Of course, if I may say so, there would be no objec-
tion to recalling any witness by the committee. The exhibits were
given to all members at a given time. They have been given to mem-
bers as soon as it was possible, and as fast as it was possible to obtain
them. There are large quantities of them. We are all laboring under
the same handicap, that we have not been able to read them all since
[6] we got them.
As I said a moment ago, I think as the hearings go on, we can famil-
iarize ourselves with them sufficiently to permit us to know each day
what would be expected in the way of testimony, and prepare for that
day.
Senator Ferguson. The record ought to also show that I have made
many requests for other things. We do not have all the files here at
the present time.
The Chairman. In order that the record may be correct, as the re-
quests have been made, the records have been sought, and have been
either delivered, or are in the process of preparation. It is manifestly
impossible to provide all the exhibits at one time. As soon as they
were ready, they were delivered to the committee, as soon as they
could be obtained.
Senator Ferguson. May I understand that it is a fact as to the
exhibits that have been requested, that the staff has them but they
are not at the present time ready for delivery? That is my under-
standing.
[7] The Chairman. The committee has no way to know what
personal requests have been made either in writing or orally by mem-
bers of the committee to the counsel, by individual members. Counsel
explained to the committee that as fast as these exhibits could be ob-
tained and could be copied for each member and for others, that they
would be supplied.
Now, Mr. Mitchell, will you proceed ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, to open the record, there are some
informal matters. I have some documents
Senator Brewster. Before he proceeds I renew my motion.
The Chairman. Let's have order, please, in the committee room.
Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, to open the record formally, there
are a few documents that should be entered.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Mitchell. First is the concurrent resolution of the Senate un-
der which the committee was organized.
(S. Con. Res. 27 follows:)
[S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Cong., 1st sess.]
[S] CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) , That there
is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor
attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of
whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President
pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than
three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the
Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall
not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the
committee, and shall bo filled in the same manner as in the case of the original
4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
selection. The committee sliall select a chairman and a vice chairman from
among its members.
Sec. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the
facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the
attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of
Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation,
together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.
[9] Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact
that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall
not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining
his military status for credits in the service to wliich he belongs.
Sec. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is
authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses,
and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946),
to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the
production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths,
to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such
expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report
such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.
(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such
experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems neces-
sary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation pre-
scribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties.
(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall be
paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the
contingent fund of [10] the House of Representatives, upon vouchers
signed by the chairman.
Passed the Senate September 6, 1945.
Attest :
Leslie L. BiFi-LE, Secretary.
Passed the House of Representatives September 11, 1945.
Attest :
Souxp Trimble, Clerk.
Mr. Mitchell. Then there is the record of the members of the
committee.
(The list of the committee members is as follows :)
MEMBEES OF THE COMMITTEE
Alben W. Barkley, Kentucky (chair- Jere Cooper, Tennessee (vice chairman).
man). J. Bayard Clark, North Carolina.
Walter F. George, Georgia. John W. Murphy, Pennsylvania.
Scott W. Lucas, Illinois. Bertrand W. Gearhart, California.
Owen Brewster, Maine. Frank B. Keefe, Wisconsin.
Homer Ferguson, Michigan.
[11] Mr. Mitchell. Next is a list of all counsel, including coun-
sel for a number of witnesses who will be called.
(The list of counsel for the committee is as follows :)
Counsel for the committee :
Chief counsel, William D. Mitchell.
Chief assistant counsel, Gerhard A. Gesell.
Assistant counsel, Jule M. Hannaford.
Assistant counsel, John E. Masten.
Executive secretary for the committee :
Mrs. Flo E. Bratten ; office, 357 Senate Office Building ; telephone extensions
1159 and 1189.
Counsel for General Short :
Capt. Patrick H. Ford. 2601 Munitions Building, Wnr Dopartment, exten-
sion 7-8109.
Counsel for Admiral Kimmel :
Charles Rugg, Building N. Room l-N-90. Navy Department, extension
3292; Lt. Edward B. Hanify, Navy Department, extension 6-3036.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5
[12] Counsel for Admiral Stark:
Hugh H. Obear, Southern Building, "Washington, D. C, telephone National
2155.
Lt. Conulr. David Richmond, Navy Department, extension 2326.
Mr. Mitchell. Then there is the correspondence, with which you are
familiar, between the chairman of the committee and the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the White
House, asking for the appointment of the liaison officers and the
responses from those Departments and the President,
There is also a letter here from the estate of Franklin D. Roosevelt
respecting the late President's files in the Archives Building.
(The correspondence referred to follows :)
OCTOBEE 5, 1945.
The Honorable .James F. Byrnes,
The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
Deae Me. Seceetaey: On behalf of the joint congressional committee to investi-
gate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate
someone in the State Department to whom counsel for the committee may apply
at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records
and to arrange for the attendance before the committee of [13] witnesses
from the State Department. We believe such an arrangement should expedite
the work of the committee.
Now that the war is ended, we hope tliat reasons of national security should
not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from
the committee or their counsel, and that the committee will be free to use any
pertinent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings and all
evidence material to our inquiry will thus be made public.
Respectfully,
Alben W. Baekley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.
The Seceetaey of State,
Washington, October IS, JOJfS.
The Honoi-able Alben W. Barkley,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Deae Alben : Replying to your letter, I have asked Under Secretary Acheson to
make available any information the State Department may have which is desired
by the committee with reference to the investigation referred to by you.
[Ilf] Sincerely yours,
James F. Byenes,
OCTOBEE 5, 1945.
The Honorable Robeet P. Patteeson,
The Secretary of War, Washington, D. G.
Deae Mr. Seceetaey : On behalf of the joint congressional committee to inves-
tigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate
someone in the "War Department to whom counsel for the committee may apply
at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records and
to arrange for the attendance before the committee of witnesses from the armed
forces. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the work of the
committtee.
Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should not
require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from the
committee or their counsel and that the committee will be free to use any i)erti-
nent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings, and all evidence
material to our inquiry will thus be made public.
Respectfully,
Alben W. Baekley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.
6 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[15] WAB DEaPAETMENT,
Washington, October 10, J9^f5.
Hon. Alben W. Bakkley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harlor Attack, United States Senate.
Deak Senator Baeicley : In accordance with the suggestion in your letter of
October 5, Lt. Col. Harmon Buncombe has been designated as the representative
of the War Department for the purpose of assisting the joint congressional com-
mittee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor. He will have full access to
all pertinent files and records of the War Department and will arrange for the
attendance before the committee of witnesses from the Army.
The War Department is prepared to furnish the committee and their counsel all
information in its possession material to the investigation and to have the com-
mittee make free use of any pertinent evidence. Also, the War Department will
be glad to assist the committee in its desire to hold public hearings.
Sincerely yours,
Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War.
OCTOBEE 5, 1945.
[16] The Honorable James Forrestal,
The Secretary of the Navy, Washington, B. C.
Dear Mr. Secretary : On behalf of the joint congressional committee to in-
vestigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you desig-
nate someone in the Navy Department to whom counsel for the committee may
apply at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's
records and to arrange for the attendance before the committee of witnesses
from the armed forces. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the
work of the committee.
Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should
not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from
the committee or their counsel, and that the committee will be free to use any
pertinent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings and all evi-
dence material to our inquiry will thus be made public.
Respectfully,
Alben W. Barkley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.
\_17] The Seceetaey oe the Navy,
Washington, October 11, 1945.
The Honorable Alben W. Barkley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack, United States Senate.
Deae Senator Barkley : Reference is made to your letter dated October 5,
1945, suggesting the designation of a Navy Department representative with
whom counsel for the committee may deal in matters concerning information
and witnesses desired by the committee.
In accordance with your request, Rear Adm. O. S. Colclough, USN, the Assistant
.Judge Advocate General of the Navy, is designated to receive and act upon
counsel's request for information from the Navy Department's records and for
the attendance of naval witnesses.
In addition to the foregoing suggestion, your referenced letter expresses the
hope that, by virtue of the war's end, reasons of national security do not require
the withholding from the committee, or its counsel, any information material
to the investigation, and that the committee, whose hearings will be public, will
be free to use any pertinent evidence. Please be assured that the Navy De-
partment stands ready to render full assistance to the committee and its counsel,
[18] making available from its records nil information material to the
investigation.
Sincerely yours,
James Forrestal.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 7
[19] October 5, 1945.
The Honorable Hahby S. Tkuman,
The White House, Washington, D. C.
Deab Mk. Peesident : On behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, I respectfully suggest for your con-
sideration that someone in the Executive Offices be named by you, to whom the
committee and its counsel may go to obtain information from the files in the
Executive Office bearing on the matter under investigation, and that the com-
mittee may be free to disclose at its public hearings information so obtained.
Respectfully,
Alben W. Bakkley.
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack.
[20] The White House,
Washington, October 13, 194^/.
Hon. Alben W. Bakkley
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Barkley: Replying to your letter of the 5th, regarding the
appointment of someone in the Executive Offices to consult with the committee
and its counsel, I am appointing Judge Latta, who has been in charge of all the
files in the White House for the past 28 years.
Any information that you want will be cheerfully supplied by him.
For your information all the files of the previous administration have been
moved to the Archives Building and Hyde Park. If there is any difficulty about
your having access to them I'll be glad to issue the necessary order so that you
may have complete access.
Sincerely yours,
Harry S. Truman.
[21] Estate of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
J20 Broadway, New York 5, October 31, 1945.
Dr. Solon J. Buck.
Archivist of the United States,
National Archives Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir: On behalf of the executors of the estate of the late Franklin D.
Roosevelt, it is hereby requested that you permit Miss Grace G. TuUy to withdraw
from the files of the late Mr. Roosevelt, now at the National Archives for storage
and safekeeping, and make available to the Senate-House Joint Committee
Investigating the Pearl Harbor Disaster such papers relating to the subject of
the investigation as it may request.
This is to certify that such papers are being withdrawn and made available to
said committee at the instigation of the President of the United States and with
the approval of the executors of the estate.
Tours very truly,
Earle R. Koons.
[^2] Mr. Mitchell. Then there is a list of liaison officers who
have been designated by the various departments, with their addresses
and telephone numbers, which may be of service to the members of
the committee.
(The list of liaison officers follows :)
[2S] List of Liaison Officers, Appointed by Agencies
War Department :
Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe ; telephone, extension 2335 ; room 4D761, Pentagon.
Capt. R. M. Diggs ; telephone, extension 2335 ; room 4D757, Pentagon.
Capt. C. Roger Nelson ; telephone, extension 73157 ; room 2G686, Pentagon.
Lt. Bennett Boskey ; telephone, extension 71470 ; room 4D757, Pentagon.
8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Navy Department:
Rear Adm. Oswald S. Colcough, Assistant Judge Advocate General; tele-
phone, extension 3365 ; room 2307.
Lt Comdr. John Ford Baecher, United States Naval Reserve; telephone,
extension 2451 ; room 1083A.
[2^] State Department:
Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson ; telephone, extension 2101 ; room
2031/2.
Edward Miller ; telephone, extension 2210 ; room 280.
Joseph Ballantine; telephone, exten.sion 2210; room 288.
White House :
Judge Maurice C. Latta.
Miss Grace Tully (Roosevelt papers).
FBI :
D. M. Ladd, Assistant Director ; telephone, Executive 7100, extension 2121 ;
room 1742, Justice.
[25] Mr, Mitchell, Tlien there follows the directive of August
28, 1945, by the President forbidding the disclosure of technique or
procedures or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit, the
agencies that break codes.
(The directive of August 28, 1945, follows :)
[2C] [Copy]
August 28 1945.
Memorandum for —
The Secretary of State.
Tlie Secretary of War.
The Secretary of the Navy,
The Attorney General.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Director of the Budget.
The Director of the Office of War Information.
Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent release to the
public, except with the specific approval of the President in each case, of:
Information regarding the past or present status, technique, or procedures, degree
of success attained, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit acting under
the authority of tlie United States Government or any Department thereof,
Habby S. Teuman.
[^7] Mr. Mitchell, There is the order of October 23, 1945, by
the President lifting the ban of that directive for the benefit of this
commit tee,
(The memorandum follows:)
[28] Memorandum for —
The Secretary of State.
The Secretary of War.
The Secretary of Navy,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In order to assist the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of
tlie Pearl Harbor Attack in its desire to hold public hearings and make public
pertinent evidence relating to the circumstances of that attack, a specific excep-
tion to my memorandum dated August 28, 1945, relating to the release of informa-
tion concerning cryptanalytic activities, is hereby made as follows :
The State, War, and Navy Departments will make available to the Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, for such use as the
committee may determine, any information in their possession material to the
investigation, and will respectively authorize any employee or member of the
armed services whose testimony is desired by the committee to testify publicly
before the committee concerning any matter pertinent to the investigation.
(Signed) Harry S. Truman
HARRY S. Teuman.
Approved October 23. 1945.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 9
[29] Mr. Mitchell. There is another order, of November 7,
1945, by the President respecting leave for men in the services to talk
freely with the committee and vohmteer information.
(The memorandum of November 7, 1945, follows:)
[30] The White House,
Washington, November 7, IOj^S.
Memorandum for the Chief Executives of all Executive Departments, Agencies,
Commissions, and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Section 3 of the concurrent resolution creating the Joint Congressional Com-
mittee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack reads as follows :
"Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that
such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not
be used against him in any court proceeding or held against him in examining
his military status for credits in the service to vphich he belongs."
In order to assist the joint committee to make a full and complete investiga-
tion of the facts relating to the events leading up to or following the attack, you
are requested to authorize every person in your respective departments or
agencies, if they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel, to give any
information of which they may have knowledge bearing on the subject of the
committee's investigation.
You are further requested to authorize them whether or [Sll not they
are interrogated by the committee or its counsel to come forward voluntarily
and disclose to the committee or to its counsel any information they may have
on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think may not
already have been disclosed to the committee.
This directive is applicable to all persons in your departments or agencies
whether they are in the armed services or not and whether or not they are called
to testify before the joint committee.
Haeky S. Truman.
[32] Mr. Mitchell. Then there is a memorandum by the Presi-
dent under date of November 9, 1945, enlarging on the last-mentioned
memorandum.
(The memorandum of November 9, 1945, follows:)
[SS] Memorandum for the chief executives of all executive departments,
agencies, Commissions, and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
With further reference to my letter of November 7. 1945, addressed to the
above executives, you are requested further to authorize every person in your
respective departments or agencies, whether or not they are interrogated by the
committee or its counsel, to come forward and disclose orally to any of the
members of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack any information they may have on the subject of the in-
quiry which they may have any reason to think has not already been disclosed
to the committee.
This does not include any files or written material.
[Handwritten:] O. K.
H. S. T.
[34.] Mr. Mitchell. Those formal documents I hand to the re-
porter to open the record in that way.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I think it would also be proper
and helpful if the record of the original presentation of the resolu-
tion by the chairman, and the discussions on the floor at that time —
not subsequent — at that time, be inserted in the record so that there
may be a full interpretation of what was the purport of the hearings.
The Chairman. There being no objection in connection with the
introduction of the joint resolution, the statement made by the author
of the resolution, and the discussion that took place at that time, will
be inserted in the record.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that the full
discussion that took olace at that time be inserted in the record.
10 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. That is what I intended.
The Chairman. That is what I understood the Senator from Maine
requested.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
I would like also to have the request of the committee to the Presi-
dent, the final draft of the order, inserted, in connection with the order
which was made. I think you are familiar with that, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Without objection, that will be inserted in con-
nection with these papers.^
[-5^(2] (Excerpts from the Congressional Record of September G,
1945, including the discussion and adoption of S. Con, Res. 27, ordered
to be printed at this point, follow :)
Mr. Baekley. Mr. President, inasmuch as I shall be compelled to leave the
Chamber shortly on an important matter and may not be present during the en-
tire call of the morning hour's business, I ask unanimous consent that I may be
permitted at this time to make a brief statement and, following that, to introduce
a concurrent I'esolution.
The President pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and
the Senator from Kentucky may proceed.
Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor occurred
on December 7, 1941.
On December IS, President Roosevelt appointed by Executive order a board
or commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by
Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.
This commission was composed of Justice Owen J. Roberts, as chairman, Ad-
miral William H. Standley, Admiral J. M. Reeves, Gen. Frank H. McCoy, and
Gen. Joseph T. McNarney.
The commisison made its report to the President on January 29, 1942, and this re-
port was immediately made public.
In June 1944, by joint resolution approved June 13, Congress in effect di-
rected the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to designate ap-
propriate boards or courts of inquiry "to ascertain and report the facts relating
to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on
December 7. 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper."
The board appointed on behalf of the War Department was composed of Lt.
Gen. George Grunert, as president, Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen.
Walter H. Frank.
This board made its report to the Secretary of War on October 20, 1944, and
the report was released to the public on Wednesday, August 29, 1945. The re-
port consists of more than 300 pages of typewritten matter detailing the cir-
cumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack, indulges in criticisms of certain military
and other officials, and makes no recommendations to the Secretary of War.
The board appointed on behalf of the Navy consisted of Admiral Orin G. Mur-
fin, as president. Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, and Vice Admiral Adolphus
Andrews.
This board finished its inquiry on October 19, 1944, then adjourned to await
the action of the convening authority.
The report of the Navy board went into some detail concerning the circum-
stances of the Pearl Harbor attack, and recommended that no further proceed-
ings be had in the matter.
This report was also made public by the President on August 29, 1945.
Since these reports were made public, I have spent a large portion of my time
studying them, and also, in connection with them, I have reread the report of the
Roberts commission.
The official report of the board appointed by the Secretary of War I have here,
and, as I have said, it consists of 304 pages of typewritten matter on what we
call legal size paper, not letter size. The report of the board appointed by the
Secretary of the Navy contains various divisions, all of which add up to something
like 100 pages of typewritten matter.
Reading these reports and studying them, insofar as I could in the limited time
Bt my disposal, requii'ed my attention not only during the daytime since the
^ See the suggested memorandum approved by the President in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5510.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 11
reports were made public on last Wednesday, but required practically all of two
nights, in order that I might read not only the reports, but the statement or
summary made by the Secretary of War based upon the report of the Army
board and the statement made by the Secretary of the Navy based upon the
report of the naval board of inquiry, as well as other documents pertaining thereto.
I have not been away from the city of Washington during the entire adjournment
since the 1st day of August, when the Senate adjourned.
Mr. President, I shall not at this time attempt to discuss these various reports
in detail, but after studying them to the extent possible in the time at my
disposal, I am convinced that a further searching inquiry should be made under
the authority and by the direction of the Congress of the United States.
In forming this opinion, Mr. President, I cast no reflections upon the ability,
the patriotism, the good faith, or the sincerity of the boards which have thus far
investigated and reported upon the Pearl Harbor disaster, nor on any member
of these various boards. They are all outstanding American citizens and officials,
who have rendered signal service to their country over a long period of time in
various capacities. That includes the members of the Roberts commission,
the War Department board, and the Navy Department board, as well as all those
officials who have commented upon these reports or are in any way involved
in them.
But the.se reports, Mr. President, are confusing and conflicting when compared
with one another, and to some extent contain contradictions and inconsistencies
within themselves.
Under these cii-cumstances it is not strange that wide.spread confusion and
suspicion prevail amoing the American people and among the Members of
Congress.
In these several reports men in the armed services and in civilian positions
of executive responsibility and authority are subjected to criticism, and the
defenses are themselves inconsistent and contradictory. It would be easy now,
if time allowed and if it were necessary, to point out these inconsistoncies between
the report made by the naval board and the report made by the Army board, and
both of them as compared to the Roberts report. I do not deem it necessary to go
into that at this time.
It is my belief, therefore, Mr. President, arrived at immediately upon the
conclusion of my study of these reports, that under all the circumstances Congress
itself should make its own thorough, impartial, and fearless inquiry into the
facts and circumstances and conditions prevailing prior to and at the time of the
Pearl Hai'bor attack, no matter how far back it may be necessary to go in order
to appraise the situation which existed prior to and at the time of the attack.
This inquiry. Mr. President, should be of such dignity and authenticity as to
convince the Congress and the country and the world that no effort has been
made to shield any person who may have been directly or indirectly responsible
for this disaster, or to condemn unfairly or unjustly any person who was in
authority, military, naval, or civilian, at the time or prior thereto.
Ever since the day of Pearl Harbor there have been discussions of courts
martial in the Army and in the Navy. We have here extended from time to
time the statute of limitations pertaining to courts martial. The report of
neither the naval nor the military board of inquiry recommends any further
proceedings in these matters. It is my xmderstanding that the law is that in the
Army no man has a legal right to demand that he be court-martialed. Charges
must be filed against an Army officer or an enlisted man setting out the offense
which he is alleged to have committed. He has no right, as I understand the law,
to go into the War Department and demand that he be court-martialed upon
any accusation or any charge of misconduct on his part.
[34&] I understand that in the Navy any officer or man who is charged with
an offense that would constitute a violation of the Articles of War or Navy Regu-
lations has the right to demand or request — I am not certain that he has the
right to demand, but has the right to request, and it may be to demand — that he
be given a court martial.
So that as it applies to any Army officer who may have been responsible prior to
or at the time of this attack, as I understand, he has no right to demand that
he be given a trial in order that he may be vindicated or that the facts may be
brought out. Whether in the Navy formal request has been made by any naval
officer for a court martial I am not in position to say, though the newspapers
have cai'ried stories that such a request has been made.
But if it were possible or appropriate, Mr. President, to subject high-ranking
military or naval officers to courts martial, tbe trials might be conducted iu
12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
secret, and would relate themselves principally, if not entirely, to the guilt or
innocence of the person against whx)m the specific charges were leveled. I do
not here feel called upon or competent to determine whether court martial
should be inaugurated in any case involving any officer of the Army or Navy
or any person in the armed forces.
But I am convinced that the Congress and the country desire an open, public
investigation which will produce the facts, and all the facts, so far as it is
humanly possible to produce them.
Such an investigation should be conducted as a public duty and a public
service.
It should be conducted without partisanship or favoritism toward any respon-
sible official, military, naval, or civilian, high or low, living or dead.
It should be conducted in an atmosphere of judicial responsibility, and it
ought to be so complete and so fair that u,o person could doubt the good faith of
the report and the findings made in it, or those who make it.
It ought not to be conducted or undertaken for the purpose or with the sole
view of vindicating or aspersing any man now in office, or who has been in office
during the period involved.
It ought not to be undertaken or conducted for the purpose of enhancing or
retarding the welfare of any political party, or any person now in office, or any
person who desires or aspires to hold public office.
It should not be conducted for the purpose of attempting to bedaub the escut-
cheon of any innocent man, high or low, living or dead, with the infamy of
Imputed wrong.
It should not be conducted with the purpose of gratifying the misanthropic
hatreds of any person toward any present or past public servant, high or low,
living or dead.
It should not be conducted for the purpose of casting aspersions upon the
names and records of men who have rendered outstanding service to their coun-
try and to the world ; nor should it be conducted for the purpose of whitewashing
any person who may have been guilty of wrongdoing in connection with the
whole affair.
Such an investigation should look solely to the ascertainment of the cold, un-
varnished, indisputable facts so far as they are obtainable, not only for the
purpose of fixing responsibility, whether that responsibility be upon an individual
or a group of individuals, or upon a system under which they operated or co-
operated, or failed to do either. It should be conducted with a view of ascertain-
ing whether, in view of what happened at Pearl Harbor and prior thereto, or even
subsequent thereto, it might be useful to us in legislating in regard to the oper-
ations of our military and naval forces and the executive departments having
control of them, or which are supposed to work with them.
In my opinion this investigation should be a joint effort of the two Houses of
Congress. If the two Houses should undertake separately to investigate, going
their separate ways, the result might be divergent reports made by the two
Houses, which would .contribute to further confusion in the minds of the public,
as well as in the minds of Members of Congress. Whatever the findings may
be, they will carry more weight and bear greater authority if both Houses of
Congress jointly and concurrently conduct the investigation.
For these reasons, Mr. President, acting in my capacity as a Member of the
Senate and in my capacity as majority leader of this body, I am submitting a
concurrent resolution directing such an investigation by a joint committee of the
two Houses, consisting of five Members from each House, no more than three of
whom shall be members of the majority party, to be appointed by the respective
Presiding Officers of the two Houses, with all the authority they will need ; and,
in order that there may be no unnecessary delay in making the investigation and
the report to Congress, directing that such report be made not later than Janu-
ary 3, 1946.
It is now nearly 4 years since disaster occurred at Pearl Harbor. During
the war, for certain military reasons, it was deemed inexpedient to do what I am
now proposing. I believe that that decision on the part of the Congress and the
Government as a whole was a wise decision. But the war is now over, and there
is no military reason of which I am cognizant which would make it advisable
any longer to delay a complete revelation of all the facts and circumstances
leading up to this disaster, and the events which occurred while it was in progress.
Mr. Pi-esident, I am submitting this resolution with the full knowledge and
approval of the President of United States. After I had studied the reports
and made up my own mind as to what ray duty was, I called upon the President
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 13
and discussed the matter with him, because obviously I would uot waut to take
such a step without discussing it with him or at least letting him know what I had
in mind and what I thought about it. He not only approved but urged that I be not
dissuaded for any reason from my purpose to submit the resolution calling for this
investigation.
Also, since the preparation of the resolution, I have discussed the matter with
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and I have his assurance that if
and when the Senate acts upon the concurrent resolution, it will receive prompt
consideration by the House.
Mr. President, I express the earnest hope, which the President shares, that
the two Houses may promptly agree to the resolution ; that the investigation
may proceed forthwith, without further delay ; and that the Congress and the
country may expect a full and impartial report, without regard to the conse-
quences, within the time limit designated in the I'esolution. I send the resolution
to the desk and ask that it be read and appropriately referred.
[S^c] Mr. Fekguson. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. Bakkxet. I yield.
Mr. Febguson. I think it would be appropriate to ask that the concurrent reso-
lution be immediately considered and agreed to.
Mr. Baekley. That is what I had in mind. I should like to ask that that be
done. Under the rule, a resolution providing for an investigation and calling
for the expenditure of funds is supposed to be referred to a standing committee,
reported back, and then referred to the Committee to Audit and Control the
Contingent Expenses of the Senate. Personally I should like to obviate those
necessities, and I suppose it could be done by unanimous consent. I make the
parliamentary inquiry now as to whether, notwithstanding the rule, the Senate
could, by unanimous consent, proceed to consider and agree to the concurrent
resolution.
The PBEsmENT pro tempore. It will be done by unanimous consent.
Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?
Mr. Baekley. I yield.
Mr. Febguson. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the
concurrent resolution.
Mr. Bakkley. I think it would be appropriate to read the resolution first, for
the information of the Senate. If I could obtain unanimous consent for its
present consideration, I should be extremely happy.
The Pbesident pro tempore. The concurrent resolution will be read for the
information of the Senate.
The concurrent resolution ( S. Con. Res. 27) was read as follows :
"Resolved by the Senate {the House of Representatives concurring) , That there
is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor
attack to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of
whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President
pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than
three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the
Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall
not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the
committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original
selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from
among its members.
Sec. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the
facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor
in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate
and the House of Representatives not later than .January 3, 1946, the results of
its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.
"Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that
such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not
be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining
his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.
"Sec. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is
authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses,
and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946),
to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the
production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to
take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such
expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report
such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.
70716— 46— pt. 1 4
14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of
such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems
necessary, but the compensation so fixed sliall not exceed the compensation
prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable
duties.
"(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,0(X), shall be
paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the
contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the
chairman."
Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, in view of the Chair's ruling that the concurrent
resolution may now be considered by unanimous consent, without reference to
a committee, I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the con-
current resolution and for its immediate adoption.
The PitEsiDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator
from Kentucky?
Mr. White, Mr. Ferguson, and Mr. Lucas addressed the Chair.
The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Kentucky yield; and if
so. to whom?
Mr. Baukley. I yield to the Senator from Maine. I have promised to yield
to the Senator from Michigan, and later I shall yield to the Senator from
Illinois.
Mr. WHrrE. Mr. President, in all ordinary circumstances I should be moved
to object to such a request as has been made, for I think that by and large we
progress most wisely if we observe the rules of the Senate as to procedure in
this body. But I believe there is so nearly unanimous sentiment of approval
in this Chamber in respect to a resolution similar, if not identical, to that offered
by the Senator from Kentucky that I have no purpose to object.
I do wish to say, Mr. President, that I know of at least one resolution of
similar purport prepared by a Senator uimmi this side of the aisle whose pur-
pose it was to introduce it at some proper time, but I take it that the two
resolutions are not dissimilar in their object. Their purpose is the same; and
so far as I am concerned, I am not going to object to the request made by the
Senator from Kentucky. I think the Senate overwhelmingly approves the
purpose of his resolution and of his request.
Mr. Bakkley. I thank the Senator.
Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President
Mr. Barkley. I yield now to the Senator from Michigan.
Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, I had prepared to offer a concurrent resolu-
tion nearly identical in terms to the concurrent resolution which is now befdre
the Senate. I merely had in mind that probably seven Members from each
House would be better becau.se of the question of attendance, but I should like
in the time of the Senator from Kentucky to say a few things now in relation
to why I believe a resolution such as the one which has just been read should
[S^d] immediately be adopted.
Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me to do so, I shovdd
like to make a remark in regard to his attitude and situation. I appreciate his
attitude and his cooperation. I did not know that he contemplated the in-
troduction of a resolution until I saw mention of it in the newspapers last
night. But in the meantime I had already prepared mine and, as I have said,
I had conferred with the President and with others about it. So it was not
prepared and offered in any way for the purpose of interfering with the in-
troduction of any other resolution. But I felt probably it should be offered and
considered and, if possible, adopted immediately. So that the country will un-
derstand that the Senate, and. I am sure, the House of Representatives, feel
that they owe a public duty to go into this whole matter; and I wish the
Senator from Michigan and all other Senators to know that I deeply appreciate
the cooperation which seems evident in regard to the matter.
Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, I appreciate and I understand the situation.
It is not a question as to who introduces or offers the resolution, but it is a
matter of having the job done. I should like to make a few remarks at this
time regarding why I believe such a resolution should be adopted.
At the very outset I want to make clear precisely what I think should be
investigated. The question is why our Army and Navy were not able either
to avoid or to cope with the initial attack launched by the Japanese at Pearl
Harbor. Everybod.v — those who opposed the war and those who favored it
— was shocked at the swift liquidation of our Pacific naval strength ; I ahi
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 15
sure that everybody, men of every point of view — will agree that we ought to
have the whole truth about this unfortunate event. The only question is as to
how this inquiry should be made.
I am sure that no one will question that some inquiry is necessary. The
President of the United States dispatched Secretary Knox to Hawaii immedi-
ately after the battle to investigate, because he felt the people ought to know
the truth. In 5 days the Secretary of the Navy was back with his report.
He said:
■'The United States services were not on the alert against the surprise air
attack on Hawaii. This fact calls for a formal investigation which will be
initiated immediately by the President. Further action Is, of course, dependent
on the facts and recommendations made by this investigating board. We are
all entitled to know it if (a) there was any error of judgment which con-
tributed to the surprise, (b) if there was any dereliction of duty prior to the
attack."
Only a few days later, the President named a commission of five, headed
by Justice Owen J. Roberts, to go to Hawaii and make a fuller investigation.
However, the Executive order for the Roberts inquiry read as follows :
"The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for
sound decisions whether any dereliction of duty or errors of judgment on the
part of the United States Army or Navy personnel" —
We in the Senate must note that it referred just to Army or Navy personnel —
"contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion
mentioned; and, if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were
responsible therefor."
That meant that the commission could go only into the question of dereliction of
duty or error of judgment of the Army and Navy personnel.
The report of that commission became a subject of endless discussion and
questioning.
The last report of the War Department said that their Board had made a
careful review of the record and exhibits of the Roberts commission. It further
said that the Board had been materially helped and enlightened by the report and
record of the Roberts commission, and that "we append to this report a section
indicating the additional information and documents which have been made
available as a result of our extended investigation, and which probably did not
come to the attention of the Roberts commission ; or at least were not mentioned
in either the testimony, documents, or report of the Roberts commission."
In June 1944 Congress by resolution directed the Army and Navy to proceed
forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe of
December 7, 1941. Under that aiithority the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the
Navy Court of Inquiry filed their reports in October 1944. That was 9 months
ago. But the nature of their findings was not made known until last week. This
delay in turn created the impression in many minds that something wajs being
suppressed. I do not wish to make any criticism of this myself. It can be argued
that it would have been unwise to publish these findings while we were still
engaged in active warfare and when unity of purpose and spirit against the
enemy was essential. Some persons even claimed military security was involved.
Nevertheless, men — being what they are — had their curiosity and their suspi-
cions whetted about the contents of these reports by the very act of withholding
them.
I am sure the officers charged with the investigations have performed their
duties with a full sense of their responsibilities. Now that they have made
known their conclusions the whole situation remains more clouded than ever.
Returning to the Army report, it says fiu'ther :
"We have not had the opportunity, nor the organization, to comb personally
and exhaustively the ofiicial files, but we have called for the pertinent letters,
documents, and memoranda. We believe that practically all of them have been
secured."
We note that they do not say that all have been secured, but that "practically"
all have been secured, "although we have found a few files from which important
and vital papers are missing. In many instances we have found these docu-
ments elsewhere, or we were able to prove them through copies in other hands."
This quite clearly shows that the Army board felt the investigation was not
complete. Neither the Secretary of the Navy nor the Secretary of War was
16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
satisfied with the report from the respective boards. When the Navy report was
delivered to him last October, Secretary Forrestal said :
"The Secretary is not satisfied that the investigation has gone to the point of
exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that his own
investigation should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in
possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted."
[SJfe] Last October, when the Army report was delivered to him, the Secre-
tary of War said :
"In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have de-
cided that my o^\^l investigation should be further continued until all the facts
are made as clear as possible, and until the testimony of every witness in jws-
session of material fact can be obtained, and I have given the necessary direc-
tion to accomplish this result.
Thex-eafter the Army detailed Lieutenant Colonel Clausen of the United
States Army to continue an ex parte investigation into the Pearl Harbor catas-
trophe, and the Navy Department detailed Vice Adm. Henry K. Hewitt to continue
the Navy Department investigation as an ex parte investigation into the catas-
trophe.
While Admiral Kimmel was entitled to counsel and to take part in the pro-
ceedings before the Navy Board of Inquiry, General Short was entitled to
counsel but had no right to take part in any of the proceedings. These con-
tinued investigations made by the Secretaries of War and Navy have not been
given to the public. There is no evidence that the continued investigations
dispose of the conflict between the two reports and fix the responsibility on the
basis of persuasive evidence. That being true. Congress must try to find out
the facts for the public and for itself. The two boards are quite far from being
in agreement, and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have
each issued critical opinions of the findings of their own boards.
The last published findings have added to the list of the accused names which
are still more eminent than those of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. As
matters now stand Admiral Stark, who was Chief of Naval Operations at the
time of the Pearl Harbor attack, and General Marshall, who led our armies
through the great struggle just crowned with victory, and former Secretary of
State Cordell Hull, have been held to share in the guilt of the defeat. The
President of the United States has agreed with some of the findings and has
disagreed with others.
Certainly no responsible statesman will quarrel with the curiosity of the
people about this now badly confused episode. The curiosity of the people
about their public affairs is the scfle bulwark of a republican government. There
are too few nations left in which there is a public opinion. This court of public
opinion is a valuable institution in the United States, and must be able to
function.
It is a citizen's duty to be curious. But it is also his right to have the whole
truth about even small matters, and, of course, for a greater reason to have
the whole truth about a subject which has cost so much in the blood of our
sons, and the treasure of our people.
But there is still another force to be recognized here. I refer to the Ameri-
can's sense of fair play. It is a powerful feature of our national character.
First, we had two distinguished officers who were accused of neglect of duty,
and removed from their commands. Everyone expected they would be tried.
But they have never been tried. And because they are officers of the armed serv-
ices they are not at liberty to talk up with the same freedom possessed by an
accused private citizen. They have not had a trial and they have not even
had the opportunity of defending their honor in the public press. I do not
want to enter into a discussion of the conditions which may have made this
possible.
The only point I want to make is that our Government cannot behave in this
way without creating in the minds of the masses of our people a feeling of
sympathy for these men. Our Government cannot afford to do this sort of
thing. To do so violates a fundamental principle of conduct which our boys and
girls learn in the very first years of their schooling, namely, the great prin-
ciple of American fair play. It violates the fundamental principle of the right
of the accused to a fair trial with the opportunity of presenting his side in
public.
Every consideration — the demands of public policy, the obligation of justice to
the men who fell in the battle, the duty of fair play to those who have been
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 17
accused— cries out for some foi-m of inquiry which will bring to light the
whole truth.
Here we have Cordell Hull, a distinguished former Member of this body,
publicly and officially charged with a dereliction of duty, partly responsible for
the loss of thousands of lives. We cannot subject him to a court martial, but
we must not permit that stain to remain on his name without invoking all the
powers of the Government to uncover all the facts. He is entitled to have those
facts produced. He is entitled to more than mere conclusions based on part of
the facts. All the facts cannot be produced by an Army court martial of Gen-
eral Short, or a naval court martial of Admiral Kimmel. The Pearl Harbor
tragedy was a single great episode in which many services, such as the Army,
the Navy, and the State Department participated. The controversy relating to
the subject cannot be settled by a group of trials and inquiries in which each
service will be the judge of its own actions. There is in the Government no
agency capable of examining the whole chapter and compelling the production
of all the facts, except the Congress of the United Stntes.
What is true of Mr. Hull is true of General Marshall. He has presided over
our military forces in the greatest war of our history, and has, in the public mind,
managed that great task with courage and ability, and certainly with success.
On the very day of final victory he is confronted with the judgment of an
Army board that the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, which began the war, was
due in part to his failure to perform his duty. We cannot leave that slur upon
the name of General Marshall without giving him the full benefit of a complete
and unprejudiced publication of every fact. Here again we cannot do it in a
court martial. General Marshall ought not to have to submit to a court martial,
For if he escapes the judgment of any Army court martial he may run into n
verdict of guilty against him in the eyes of the public by a Navy court martial of
Admiral Kimmel, where he would have no right to defend himself.
All these men. Secretary Hull, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Kim-
mel, and General Short, have an inescapable claim upon the conscience of
the American people for a full and honest inquiry into the whole incident, and
tliat such inquiry be conducted by a Congress which will proceed in the opeii.
with full opportunity for every side to participate in the proceedings.
I do not see how Congress can ignore the things that are being said through-
out the country about all this subject. Newspapers and magazines have offered
their versions of this distressful event, and millions of people have read The
accounts. Whether they are true or false is not the question here. Some of f hen^
are certainly not true, because the numerous versions themselves contradict
each other quite as freely as do the official versions. But this subject is one
which must be set straight, and I can think of no way to do so except by a con-
gressional investigation, and because it is so important, nothing less than a com-
mittee which represents both Houses of Congress should make the inquiry.
The reason why this inquiry is needed is as I have pointed out. The Roberts
inquiry was limited by the Executive order. The Army report covers 304 pages,
but when we reach page 241 it jumps suddenly to page 294. A whole chapter
of 52 pages of the Army board's findings has been omitted by order of Secretary
Stimson. The Navy report contains a clause which indicates that the Navy
board of inquiry was directed to leave out certain testimony. In fact, the Navy
board said :
[34n "The details of this information are not discussed or analyzed in
these findings, the court having been informed that their disclosure would militate
against the successful prosecution of the war."
This tells us plainly that the Army board of review and Navy court of inquiry
left these details out not on their own motion but under orders from the Secre-
tary of War and Secretary of the Navy. Let us concede that there may have been
a reason for omitting this testimony during the war ; there is certainly no reason
for hiding it now. It is unthinkable that the Congress and the public shall not
have access to this testimony in order to appraise justly the correctness of the
findings of the Army board and Navy court of inquiry.
There are points of serious difference between the Army and Navy board re-
ports. For example, one of them fixes the date when General Marshall and Ad-
miral Stark petitioned the President that no ultimatum be issued to Japan as of
November 5, the other as of November 27 — a very vital dilTerence.
A congressional investigation is the only means of producing all the facts.
All we have now are the conclusions of the Roberts commission and the conclu-
18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sions of the Army and Navy commissions, but the public has been denied all the
facts and testimony on which these are based.
There is a feature of these reports which is certain to impair public confi-
dence in them regardless of their internal soundness. In this whole episode
not only the conduct of the leading commanders but of the Secretary of War, the
Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of State is involved. The press has al-
ready caught the significance of who was responsible for appointing the Army
board and the Navy court of inquiry. It has been noted that neither report
makes any criticism of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, bur
that the Army report goes out of its way to castigate the Secretary of State, who
had no hand in appointing his judges. These are reasons why neither the Army,
the Navy, nor the State Department, or any tribunals within them, should make
the final investigations. It is also a reason why courts martial cannot properly
determine all the facts of this case. Actually this is no longer a case where Kim-
mel and Short, Marshall and Stark, Stimsou and Knox and Hull, along with
various subordinate commanders of both services, are on trial. Stated more cor-
rectly, the case brings in the responsibilities of so many that what we have on
trial is the Army, the Navy, and the State Department, and only Congress has
the authority to find all the facts.
The Army report puts blame on General Marshall and Secretary Hull. The
Secretary of War criticizes the findings of his own board and disagrees with the
verdict against General Marshall. The President of the United States approved
the verdict in part and criticized it in part. He dissented from the criticism of
Secretary Hull and General Mai-shall. As disclosed by the Army report, Mr.
Stimson furnished most of the testimony against Secretary Hull. Secretai'y
Stimson declares that Hull gave the Japanese an ultimatum on November 26,
while Secretary Hull stoutly denies this.
Whatever point there may be in these differences, which are merely samples
which come to mind, the fact remains that a great deal of information which has
been withheld because the war was raging at top height 9 months ago must now
be made public.
If we, the Congress, do not do this, history will do it, and will also appraise our
neglect.
Mr. Lucas and Mr. White addressed the Chair.
The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Kentucky yield, and if so,
to whom?
Mr. BAKKI.EY. I yield to the Senator from Illinois.
Sir. Lucas. Mr. President, I should like to make an inquiry with respect to the
concurrent resolution. In section 2 I find the following :
"The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relat-
ing to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Terri-
tory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941."
I should like to ask the able majority leader whether or not he considers that
under this resolution the committee would have the power to investigate, let us
say, what took place at Wake Island on the morning of the 7th of December 1941,
or what took place in the Philippines on December 7, 1941, or the following day.
In other words, are we going into the investigation of what transpired in the
Pacific on December 7, 1941, or does the concurrent resolution confine the investi-
gation solely to what happened at Pearl Harbor? Would the committee be able
to make further investigation as to what happened in the Pacific at that time?
Mr. Baekley. In answer to the question .propounded by the Senator, in my
opinion the language of the concurrent resolution is broad enough to permit the
committee to investigate anything which happened prior to the attack at Pearl
Harbor, or led up to it, the circumstances which produced it, as well as the conse-
quences of the attack. I realize that it would be impossible to include in a single
resolution reference to all the islands in the Pacific which were attacked either
concurrently with the attack on Pearl Harbor or shortly thereafter. The attack
on Pearl Harbor was the attack which precipitated the war, which brought us into
the war, and all the controversy has revolved around the attack on Pearl Harbor.
But I use the language "relating to the attack" so as to make it possible for the
committee to investigate anything which took place prior to it, or any of the con-
sequences which may have fiowed from the attack. The Philippine attack, the
Guam attack, and the Wake Island attack were all within a radius of a few liours,
and they were related to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So I think the language is
sufiiciently broad to cover those attacks.
Mr. White. What the Senator from Kentucky has just said about the language
"relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor" in
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 19
part answers the question I had in mind. The language '"relating to the attack
made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941"' is in
itself rather restricting. But the Senator has said it is his intention, and lie
thinks it is within the authority of the resolution, to have an investigation of all
the facts and all the circumstances and all the events preceding the day of the
attack upon Pearl Harbor which had any relation to that tragic day's events, and
also anything which may have happened subsequent thereto which throws any
light upon the occurrences preceding December 7 and happening on that day.
Mr. Barkley. The Senator from Maine is absolutely correct. Anything which
relates itself to the attack, whether it occurred prior to the attack or whether it
grew out of tlie attack, all has to do with the attack, because without that attack
presumably we would not at that time have been involved in the war, we would
not have declared war on the following day. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the
key attack of the Japanese armed forces in that area,, and these other attacks were
incidental to it. So I think they all relate to the attack on Pearl Harbor, whether
they happened prior to it or after that attack.
Mr. White. And the resolution gives practically plenary powers of investiga-
tion with respect to all matters which occurred before the time of Pearl Harbor
or thereafter, which relate in any way to the occurrence of the attack?
Mr. Barkley. Yes. Whether those things happened in Washington, or whether
they happened in the Philippine Islands, or whether they happened in Japan,
or whether they happened anywhere else in the world — if they relate themselves,
prior to or subsequently, to the attack, the committee can go into them. I think
the language is broad enough to permit that,
Mr. Taft. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
[34ff] Mr. Barkley. I yield.
Mr. Taft. I have some doubt whether the resolution should not be amended
to be somewhat broader, to include the Philippines ; to include, so to speak, the
Japanese attack on the United States. I assume that the Senator's remarks,
however, will be brought to the attention of the House of Representatives when
it considers the resolution, and if the language is too narrow that his remarks
may have the effect of broadening it.
Mr. Barkley. Of course, the Senator realizes that I have no pride of language.
I consulted with our experts in the framing of the resolution, and it was thought
that its terms were broad enough to cover anything that had any connection
with Pearl Harbor. Inasmuch as the attack on Pearl Harbor constituted the
key event or episode around which all this investigation revolves, it seems to me
that the committee would have plenary authority to go into any matter anywhere
in the world that had anything to do with it. But if anyone can offer better
language I certainly would not stand in opposition to it. I think, however,
the language is broad enough. If we name Wake Island, the Philippines, and
some other place, we run a risk, by naming more than the Pearl Harbor incident,
of by inference excluding other things that the committee would undoubtedly
want to go into.
Mr. Taft. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?
Mr. Barkley. Yes.
Mr. Taft. Does the Senator consider that the language is broad enough to go
back to the beginning of the war, that is, I mean to the general policy, the appli-
cation of the Neutrality Act. the shipment of scrap, and so forth?
Mr. Barkley. Yes. I think it is broad enough to go back to the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria or to any other period in past history that can in any
way be connected with or related to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Taft. l\Ir. President, since the Senator is the author of the concurrent
resolution, and since that is his interpretation of it. I am willing to accept that
interpretation.
I\Ir. Ferguson. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. Barkley. I yield.
Mr. Ferguson. "The language I had prepared was that "the committee shall
make a full and complete investigation of the facts surrounding the attack and
the events and circumstances leading to the attack made by the Japanese armed
forces on the Territory of Hawaii December 7. 1941." But I am glad to have
the explanation of the able majority leader that his language is intended to cover
this entire field. I think that the battles of the Philippines and of Guam and
elsewhere were merely battles in our war.
Mr. Barkley. We were practically at war when those things happened.
IMr. Ferguson. Yes; that is right. The .spark was ignited, or the button was
pushed, as was said in the report, by the attack at Pearl Harbor.
20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Baekley. That is correct.
Mr. FEaiGusoN. That was the initial attack.
Mr. Baeklet. Yes.
Mr. Brewster. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. Babkley. I yield.
Mr. Brewstehj. I wish to associate myself completely with what the Senator
from Kentucky has stated today, and I think he has rendered a very great public
service to his country. I do not mean to intimate any doubt as to the concurrent
resolution .containing language properly calculated to implement what the Senator
has said.
I recognize, however, the very great importance of what we are doing, and
that, under well-settled rules of parliamentary construction, the language of
the concurrent resolution, if unambiguous, must control, irrespective of the
very illuminating discussions here, and of anything which the Senator himself
may have said.
I do feel that, having delayed 4 years the consideration of this matter by the
Congress, certainly the public interest will not be seriously prejudiced if we
should delay 24 hours, and send the concurrent resolution to an appropriate
standing committee which may consider this whole question as to whether or
not the language is calculated to carry out what is obviously the unanimous
desire of the Senate.
I hesitate to be the only Member who apparently is concerned, but I frankly
do feel that this matter should go to the appropriate standing committee.
Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator that I hope nothing
will happen today in the Senate which will create the impression that we are
quibbling over the adoption of the concurrent resolution. If any broadening or
any change might have to be made to the language, since the measure must go
to the House, I myself will take the responsibility of conferring with the Members
of the House who will be interested in the matter, with the view of broadening
the language as may seem necessary ; and I hope the Senator, under those cir-
cumstances, will not object to the present consideration of the concurrent
resolution.
Mr. Brewster. Mr. President, I frankly do not possess the agility of mind
which is possessed by the 95 other Members of the Senate to render an opinion
from the very hasty consideration given this matter on the floor of the Senate
today, as to whether or not this concurrent resolution implements the mar-
velously adequate speech of the Senator from Kentucky. I do think that not
only his interest but that of the country and of the Senate will be served by at
least pausing to consider whether or not this concurrent resolution is well cal-
culated to carry out what is obviously our unanimous purpose. I think the
suggestion that the 24 hours delay, which is all that would be required to send
the matter to an appropriate standing committee, cannot have great weight.
Mr. Barkley. Of course I do not know how long it would take a standing com-
mittee to meet and deliberate about the matter.
Mr. Brewster. To which committee does the Senator from Kentucky consider
the matter should go?
Mr. Barkley. It would go, according to the advice I have received from the
parliamentarian, to the Committee on Naval Affairs. It might go to either the
Committee on Military Affairs or to the Committee on Naval Affairs, but inas-
rrtuch as Pearl Harbor was a naval base, and the greater proportion of the
damage was done to the Navy, it has seemed appropriate that it go to the
Committee on Naval Affairs.
Mr. Brewster. Well, I feel that certainly that committee could meet quickly.
Mr. BARKLEY. There is another matter Involved. If the concurrent resolution
is sent to the Committee on Naval Affairs under the rule and comes back to
the Senate it must then go to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent
Expenses of the Senate, which would involve further delay. I think no sub-
stantial loss, either in the matter of broadening the resolution, or anything
connected with it, would be incurred by allowing it to be adopted now without
having to go through the routine of two committees before we can secure action.
Mr. Brewster. What I anticipate will ahnost inevitably occur, if the proposed
action is taken, is that when it goes to the House the scope of the resolution will
there be broadened, and I will much prefer that the Senate should now undertake
to place in the concurrent resolution language which will carry out what is
obviously now the unanimous desire of the Senate, rather than to rely on the
House to amend language which may be deemed as not entirely clear, particularly
as the Members of the House will not have the benefit of the very splendid
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 21
explanation made by the Senator from Kentucky as to what he intends by the
[34h] resolution.
Mr. Baekley. I entertain no jealousy on my part toward the House in the
matter of amending anything the Senate may adopt. We frequently exercise
that right in the Senate. If the House should see lit to broaden the language,
unless it, by broadening the language, thinned it out and watered it down, I
certainly would have no objection. But I think it important that we get to
work on this job at once without creating the impression that we are seeking
to cause delay, through any technicalities, or through any effort of evasion,
or in any other way.
Mr. Brewster. I certainly share the desire of the Senator from Kentucky
for expedition, but as I said before, having waited 4 years, I am certain that
we can safely wait 4 days more, and I think the country will be much more im-
pressed with the deliberateness of our consideration if that course is taken.
Mr. Baekley. I do not think the country will have any doubt about our
deliberateness. We have been talking about this matter ever since it occurred.
We have debated it on the floor of the Senate time and time again in connection
with the extension of the statute of limitations. I do not think that any impres-
sion of hasty action on our part, can be gotten from the adoption of the concurrent
resolution now. I think it would be a wholesome example to the country and to
every one concerned if we could handle it in the way now proposed.
Mr. Beewstek. There is one thing about the language which gives me concern,
and which I should certainly like to consider. The language is, "the facts
relating to the attack by O'apanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Terri-
tory of Hawaii." As I understand, a very intimate part of that attack involved
two silk-hatted gentlemen who spent the time during the attack with Secretary
Hull. Whether they were a part of the armed forces may perhaps be a matter
of debate. I believe that what occurred in connection with all those events is
very intimately concerned with the attack, and I should not want any language
to be calculated to limit our inquiry.
Mr. Baejkxey. The Senator is too good a parliamentarian and too good a
draftsman to assume that the language ought to be amended so as to mention
specifically the silk-hatted gentlemen to whom he has reference.
Mr. Brewstee. But I do not like to exclude them by saying "Japanese armed
forces."
Mr. Baeklet. They are not excluded.
Mr. Beewsteb. They are certainly not included in that language.
Mr. Baekley. The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred while they were here carry-
ing on negotiations with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State received
notice of the attack while they were in his office. Certainly that circumstance is
related to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Brewster. I think it might well be a debatable question as to whether they
are included within the term "Japanese armed forces."
Mr. Baekley. These things are all related to that attack. Whether they were
members of the armed forces or not is not very important, because they certainly
did not themselves make the attack in person when they were conferring with the
Secretary of State in Washington.
Mr. Brewstee. I should say that they were a most essential element.
Mr. Vande2^berg. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. Baekley. I yield.
Mr. Vandenberg. The language contained in the resolution submitted by the
able junior Senator from Michigan [Mr. Ferguson] was given very careful
consideration, and from our point of view it has had the sort of study which
the Senator from Maine has indicated. I am sure the language fully meets the
purpose of the Senator from Kentucky. Would there be any objection to chang-
ing the first sentence in section 2, which now reads, "The committee shall make a
full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the attack made by
Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii" so as to
read "The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts
surrounding the attack and the events and circumstances leading up to the at-
tack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of
Hawaii?
Mr. Barkley. I see no substantial difference between the words "relating to"
and the word "surrounding." However, I have no objection to the remainder
of that language. I believe that the words "relating to" are more appropriate
than the word "surrounding," but I certainly would have no objection to including
the phrase "leading up to," which could be inserted after the words "relating to."
Mr. FE3KOU80N. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Babklby. I yield.
Mr. FEBGtjsoN. I was somewhat concerned as to whether to use the words
"relating to" or the word "surrounding." I think they mean the same thing in
relation to this event. If the able senior Senator from Michigan would use the
words "relating to," and then add the words "the events and circumstances,"
I think that would cover the objection of the Senator from Maine.
Mr. Barkley. I had in mind also the question as to whether additional lan-
guage, which would specifically apply to previous events leading up to the attack,
should be included; but I did not include it for the reason, as I have explained,
that I thought the words "relating to" covered it fully, and included events both
prior to and subsequent to the attack. However, I have no objection to inserting,
after the words "relating to" the language suggested by the Senator from
Michigan.
Mr. VANDENBH31G. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?
Mr. Bakkley. I yield.
Mr. Vandbnbehg. The language would then i-ead :
"The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts
relating to the events and circumstances leading up to the attack made by Japa-
nese armed forces on Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii."
Mr. Barkley. I have no objection to that language.
Mr. Lucas. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. Barkley. I yield.
Mr. Lucas. May I ask whether or not that language would prevent us from
investigating anything subsequent to the attack? We talk about everything
leading up to the attack.
Mr. Vandenbbrg. And subsequent.
Mr. Lucas. The word "subsequent" is not in there.
Mr. Barkley. "We can say "leading up to or following the attack."
Mr. Vandenbero. I believe that would cover it.
Mr. Barkley. I have no desire to cut off the investigation at any particular
date if it has any relationship to this attack, or the consequences of it.
The President pro tempore. The Senator has the right to modify his con-
current resolution.
Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, I will modify the concurrent resolution by in-
serting after the words "relating to," the words "the events and circumstances
leading up to or following."
Mr. Walsh. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. Barkley. I yield.
Mr. Walsh. Before the vote is taken on the resolution, which I hope will
be unanimous, I wnsh to take occasion to compliment the distinguished majority
leader upon the magnificent and generous manner in which he has responded
to the overwhelming popular sentiment of the country. He has not only done
that, but he has relieved us all of many hours of anxiety, lifted this question
above partisanship, and made an appeal for what the country wants— a high-
minded, clean, judicial investigation of all the facts connected with the Pearl
Harbor disaster. I wish to say to him that he has exercised statesmanlike
judgment on manv occasions in the past, but never of a loftier character than
todav. He has never rendered a better public service. He has not only rendered
a service by responding to the public demand, but he has removed all doubts or
questions as to the sincerity of our present Government and of the Navy De-
partment in their willingness to have the whole story told truthfully aiid can-
didly. As chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, before which this prob-
lem "has been pending bv reason of petitions filed with us, I wish to compliment
the Senator from Kentucky and thank him for the service which he has rendered
the country. ,, , ^ ^^ c, ^
Mr Barkley. Mr. President, I deeply appreciate the remarks of the Senatoi.
The President pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator
from Kentucky that the concurrent resolution, as modified, be immediately
considered, without reference to a cominittee? The Chair hears none.
[SUl The question is on agreeing to the concurrent resolution, as modified.
The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 27). as modified, was agreed to, as
follows : . . ^ ml i. j.1^
"Resolved hij the Senate (the House of RepresentatWes concurnhg), That there
is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor
attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three ot
whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appovnted by the President
pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Rep rt>senlrt lives (not more than
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 23
three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the
Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the conimittee shall not
affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the com-
mittee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selec-
tion. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among
its members.
"Sec. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the
facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the
attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of
Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation,
together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.
•'Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that
such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not
be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining
his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.
"Sec. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof,
is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses,
and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946),
to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the
production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to
take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such
expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report
such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.
"(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of
such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems
necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation
prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as a mended, for comparable
duties.
"(c) The exj)enses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall be
paid one-half from the contingent funds of the Senate and one-half from the
contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the
chairman."
Mr. Babkley. Mr. President, I did not intend, at the outset, to take so much
time at this hour, but I hope it has been well spent.
[SS] (Discussion off the record.)
The Chairman. Counsel may go ahead.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think if counsel spoke into the
microphone we could better hear, rather than if he stood up.
Mr. Mitchell. I have never tried a case with my nose in a micro-
phone, but I will do my best.
The Chairman. I am sure you will do all right, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. You would like me to keep my seat ?
Senator Brewster. I think so.
Mr. Mitchell. There are two master exhibits which have been dis-
tributed to the committee. They will be referred to by innumerable
witnesses on the stand, and I think this the appropriate time to pre-
sent them.
One is a document, printed in the Government Printing Office, en-
titled "Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Govern-
ment Between July 1 and December 8, 1941." These were messages, in
code, intercepted by our services, decoded and translated. They were
exchanged between the Japanese Government and its Embassy at
Washington, and include the responses from Washington to Tokyo.
There are a few of them that are diplomatic messages from Japan to
their Ambassadors in other nations.
They are arranged chronologically in the order in which [36]
they were sent. We will not refer to them this morning, I think, but
will shortly. The document, of course, will be supported later au-
24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
thentically by detail witnesses, but for the present we present it to the
reporter as Exhibit 1.
The Chairman. Are those to be printed at this point in the record ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, they are ah-eady printed by the Government
Printing Office, and they are available in this form to the committee.
We will mark it "Exhibit 1," but the reporter will not have to tran-
scribe it.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1")
The Vice Chairman. That is one of the documents that was supplied
to the committee ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, not long ago ; I think yesterday.
Senator Brewster. Are copies of that now available to the press?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. This is being received in evidence as exhibit 1 ?
The Chairman. Yes. It is filed with the committee as exhibit 1,
and will be referred to specifically, as I understand it, by witnesses
later.
Mr. Mitchell. And it is wide open once it is offered.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted to be sure of. It is a part
of the record.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
[^7] Senator Brewster. That was the one that was received by
us yesterdaj^ ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
The next exhibit, I have marked "Exhibit 2." This is another volume
of Japanese messages from their Government and their people around
the world relating to military installations, ship movements, and so
forth. The first exhibit we will call the diplomatic messages, because
they related to diplomatic negotiations, but this one is concerned with
the military installations, reports from their espionage people in dif-
ferent places, and matters of that kind. That volume also includes
documents in code, intercepted, decoded, and translated by our crypt-
analytic units, and they are arranged in chronological order.
I present that as Exhibit 2 so that it may be available to every witnss.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 2.")
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry as to
whether counsel claims that is all the information : are these two ex-
hibits now complete ?
Mr. Mitchell. There may be additional information. I do not
claim. Senator, that anything we have is final or complete. We will see
after we get going whether you are satisfied with what is produced.
Senator Ferguson. I wanted to have the record show as to whether
or not it is purported that these are complete.
[<?<§] Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. These are selected messages that
seem pertinent to the case, and it is always open, if there is any inquiry
by anybody on the committee that we are asked to pursue, why, we
will pursue it further.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not copies
of Exhibit 2 have been supplied the individual members of this com-
mittee ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Were they included in the packet given us yesterday ?
Mr. Mitchell, They are earlier than that.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 25
Senator Brewster. That was delivered to us on November 13, I
think.
Mr. Gesell. I think it was early this week.
Senator Brewster. Yes ; Tuesday of this week, I think.
The Chairman. All right. You may go ahead, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, in the previous investigations that
have been held, scores of witnesses and thousands of pages of testi-
mony were taken on piecing together the story of the situation at
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and to describe the incidents of
the attack.
If this committee were to pursue that same course, it might take
2 or 3 weeks for that kind of testimony.
We have, in an effort to save time of the committee, [-39] had
prepared by the Army and the Navy jointly, under our direction, a
narrative and detailed statement, based upon reports and material
available in those departments, of the conditions prevailing at Pear]
Harbor on that day, and the events that took place. We have tried to
eliminate, and I think we have, every question that is in controversy,
every matter of fact that hasn't clearly been established, and any ques-
tion of responsibility.
I think the officers who are presenting that for us have followed
that schedule.
This isn't intended to foreclose the fact on anything. It is a picture
of the conditions that existed on the 7th and things that happened,
and if there is any question that arises later as to whether it is ac-
curate or not, of course, it will be open to the taking of eyewitness
testimony. And there are also many questions, doubtless, that aren't
covered by the statement, because they are not yet fully established,
or in controversy, that will have to be filled in by eyewitnesses.
The officers who have done this work for us are Kear Adm. T. B.
Inglis, of the Navy, and Col. Bernard Thielen, of the Army, and we
would like to have them sworn.
The Chairman. Which one do you want first ?
Mr. Mitchell. The narrative statement is a consolidated one. It
is not a Navy or an Army statement. It is all [4^] woven to-
gether, and these gentlemen ought to be sworn together, and they will
pick up portions of it and pass the ball as they go along.
The Chairman. Will the two witnesses referred to arise, and be
sworn ?
(The witnesses were sworn by the Chairman.)
The Chairman. Be seated.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I will ask that the men taking pic-
tures complete their work before we get started.
The Chairman. The photographers may get their pictures and
then clear this space in here.
The committee, in executive session, decided that the order of pro-
cedure, so far as the examination of witnesses is concerned, shall be
that counsel should be first permitted to examine the witnesses without
interruption ; that upon the conclusion of his examination, members
of the committee will alternate from the Chair right and left between
the members from the Senate and the House, and they will ask such
questions as they have, and following that, counsel for any witness
who has counsel will be permitted to examine the witness himself.
So, gentlemen, we will now proceed.
26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[41] TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS, UNITED STATES
NAVY, AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN, UNITED STATES ARMY
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Inglis, what is your status in the Navy now ?
Admiral Inglis. I am attached to the Office of Naval Operations as
Chief of Naval Intelligence.
Mr. Mitchell. How long have you been in that post ?
Admiral Inglis. I have had that particular post for about 1 week,
Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. What were you doing before that ?
Admiral Inglis. Before that I was Deputy Director of Naval In-
telligence.
Mr. Mitchell. Have you had in your naval work the task at times
to prepare material and documents and I'eview the facts and do work
of that kind ?
Admiral Inglis. I have had something over 31 years of naval ex-
perience, and during this time I have served on several admirals'
staffs. More recentl}^, my duties in the Navy Department do require
that I prepare evaluations and studies somewhat comparable to this
we are discussing this morning.
Mr. Mitchell. What duty were you engaged in on December 7,
1941?
Admiral Inglis. I was commanding officer of the [4^]
U. S. S. Algerab, which was a ship in the Atlantic Ocean at that time.
Oil that particular date, my ship and I were in port in New York.
Mr. Mitchell. Had you been stationed at the Pearl Harbor base
previously to that?
Admiral Inglis. I have never had shore duty at Pearl Harbor. I
have visited Pearl Harbor on numerous occasions on board ships.
Mr. Mitchell. So you are familiar with the locality ?
Admiral Inglis. I am generally familiar with the locality ; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You prepared here, in connection with Colonel
Thielen, a narrative statement from the official records and other
data available to you?
Admiral Inglis. I have, sir, with the assistance of officers under my
control.
Mr. Mitchell. You were instructed, or asked by counsel to elimi-
nate matters that were in dispute or questions of responsibility, or
questions where your reports and records showed a point of fact had
not been clearly established?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, and we have done our best to carry
out that directive.
Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Thielen, what is your status in the Army
today ?
[4^] Colonel Thielen. I am a member of the War Department
General Staff, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Have you been stationed at Pearl Harbor?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I was stationed there from 1934 through
1936.
Mr. Mitchell. Where were you on duty on December 7, 1941 ?
Colonel Thielen. I was instructor at the United States Military
Academy.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 27
144] Mr. Mitchell. Have you had occasion in your work to do
the sort of thing that I asked Admiral Inglis about, preparing docu-
ments and related material?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. That is my normal duty.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, you gentlemen proceed as you have prepared
your work and give us this narrative statement of the conditions at
Pearl Harbor on December 7, and what occurred there.
Admiral Inglis. I propose to start this presentation with a brief
description
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, do we have copies of this state-
ment ?
Mr. Gesell. No, Senator; there are no mimeographed copies of the
statement. There are before each member of the committee two basic
folders which I show you now, the Navy folder of exhibits and charts,
and the Army folder, which is the red envelope, large red envelope.
I suggest that those are the two basic documents that each member of
the committee will wish to have before him to follow this presentation.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, it was my understanding that if
there were any prepared statements we would have them 24 hours
in advance. Was that not the understanding?
The Chairman. Well, it wasn't the Chair's understanding that that
rule applied at this preliminary testimony here.
[4'5] The witnesses who were to testify after this groundwork
was laid as to what happened on that day would present to the com-
mittee copies of their written statements in advance.
Senator Brewster. It is equally essential here. I think. Do you
have prepared statements we can have now?
Mr. Gesell. We haven't considered these were prepared statements,
Senator. The charts and schedules which contain the basic informa-
tion are all before the members of the committee. There is going to
be a good deal of ad libbing on the charts. It is not quite in the
nature of a prepared statement. For that reason it is not before the
committee.
Senator Ferguson. Has counsel had a copy of this prepared state-
ment, and if so, when did he get it?
Mr. Gesell. We have no copy, Senator, and we have never had a
copy of any prepared statements from either of these witnesses.
Senator Brew\ster. Mr. Chairman, will it be understood that after
today the rule will apply?
The Chairman, It will apply to witnesses. Whether it will apply
after today I don't know. I can't tell how soon these witnesses will be
through.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. We didn't miderstand that this type of prepared
statement came within the rule, but we will have it mimeographed and
furnish it to the members of the committee as [46] rapidly as
possible, and if you Avant the witnesses recalled we will be happy to
recall them.
The Chairman. The Chair might also state that arrangements have
been made with the reporters taking this testimony to provide each
member a copy of the day's testimony on the following morning, and
I think they will be able to furnish it to the members on tlie evening
the testimony has been brought forward.
28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. Fine.
'TT'he Chairman. We will have it as soon as possible.
Mr. Mitchell. You may ])roceed, Admiral.
Admiral Inglis. I propose to start this presentation with a brief
description of the geography of the Hawaiian Islands and their re-
lation to the whole Pacific Ocean area.
Commander Biard has a chart which has the title up in the upper
right-hand corner "Disposition of United States Pacific Fleet on
December 7, 1941."
I will ask the committee to refer to that chart and also to item No. 1,
which is a reproduction of that chart, and which is contained in the
white folder which has been given to each member of the committee.
It will be seen that Pearl Harbor is on the southern or lee side of
the island of Oahu, which is one of the eight principal islands of the
Hawaiian chain. These eight Hawaiian Islands lie in a strategically
and commercially important [47] position in the North Pacific
Ocean approximately 2,000 nautical miles west to southwest of San
Francisco.
Commander Biard is pointing out these distances and directions as
we proceed.
Oahu is the most important of the islands because of the excellent
enclosed fleet anchorage at Pearl Harbor and the commercial port
of Honolulu. It is 3,430 nautical miles southeast of Tokyo, 4,685
nautical miles northwest of Panama, 1,990 nautical miles south of
Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands and 4,767 nautical miles east
of Manila.
[48] A table of distance from Pearl Harbor and other impor-
tant points in the Pacific is item 2 of the Navy folder. In this con-
nection, it must be remembered that a nautical mile is approximately
11/^ land miles.
The islands have a mild subtropical climate with moderate seasonal
changes of temperature. They lie in the path of the steady north-
easterly trade winds ; therefore, the northern portions of Oahu and the
immediate adjacent waters are characterized by fresh winds from a
northerly direction. The force of the trades is broken by the configura-
tion of the lands so that to the south of Oahu the seas are relatively
smooth.
Commander Biard, will you point to the other chart, please, showing
the island of Oahu? That is the lee of the island, where the winds
and seas are more moderate than on the windward side.
Much of the moisture of the trade winds is deposited on the high
peaks to the north forming mist and clouds. Because of this, the
visibility to the south of the islands is better than to the north. Fur-
ther, the northern fringe of the trade belt lies roughly about 300
to the north of Oahu — will you point that out ? Three hundred miles
to the north of Oahu there is a belt characterized by low ceilings, poor
visibility, squalls, and rain.
[49] The Hawaiian chain of islands and adjacent waters are
shown in item 3 of the Navy folder. It may be seen from this chart
that the sea area around the Hawaiian Islands was on December 7,
1941, divided into certain restricted fleet training areas where units
and aircraft of the fleet might carry out exercises and target practices.
This same chart also shows two defensive sea areas off Pearl Harbor
and Kaneohe. These defensive sea areas were designated by the Presi-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 29
dent of the United States and entry of all merchant ships, both United
States and foreign, and of all foreign men-of-war was prohibited
unless specific permission for sucli entry had been granted by the Sec-
retary of the Navy.
The next item is a rather puzzling question of time, difference of
time, in different parts of the world.
Time varies throughout the world. For instance, when going from
Washington, D. C, to Chicago it is necessary for a traveler to adjust
his watch upon arrival in Chicago, because Chicago time is 1 hour
behind that in Washington. Comparable changes of time occur when-
ever the traveler moves about the world.
Wlien'the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor at 7 : 55 on the morning of
December 7, 1941, it was 1 : 25 in the afternoon of the same day in
Washington, D. C, and was 3 : 25 a. m., December 8, in Tokyo.
[SO] Item 4 of the Xavy folder is a table showing comparative
times and dates for Greenwich, England, Washington, D. C, San
Francisco, Hawaii, Tokyo, and Manila on December 6, 7, and 8, 1941.
The time of sunrise on the morning of December 7, 1941, the begin-
ning of morning twilight was 5 : 06 a. m., Hawaiian time, and sunrise
was 6 : 26 a. m., Hawaiian time. That is an hour and twenty minutes
before sunrise.
Proceeding next to the composition of the Atlantic and Pacific
Fleets, on the 7th of December 1941 the Pacific Fleet was numerically
two-thirds the size of the Atlantic Fleet but the Pacific Fleet contained
more modern and more heavily armed vessels.
Next, the commanders of major units of the United States Pacific
Fleet:
The commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, who
was also the commander in chief of the United States Fleet, was
Admiral H. E. Kimmel.
The force commanders were commander, battle force, Vice Adm.
W. S. Pye; commander, scouting force, Vice Adm. Wilson Brown;
commander, base force, Rear Adm. W. L. Calhoun.
The type comanders, and by "type" I mean the type or classification
of the ships which they comanded :
[51] Commander aircraft, battle force. Vice Adm. W. F. Halsey.
Commander battleships, battle force. Rear Adm. W. S. Anderson.
Commander cruisers, battle force. Rear Adm. H. F. Leary.
Commander mine craft, battle force, Rear Adm. W. R. Furlong.
Commander cruisers, scouting force. Rear Adm. J. H. Newton.
Commander destroyers, battle force. Rear. Adm. M. J. Draemel.
Commander submarines, scouting force, Rear Adm. Thomas Withers.
Commander aircraft, scouting force. Rear Adm. J. S. McCain.
Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, Rear Adm. C. C.
Bloch.
And in explanation of the relationship between tlie Fourteenth
Naval District and the commander in chief, the Fourteenth Naval
District was a subordinate command of the commander in chief Pacific
Fleet and in this respect differed from the then uswal practice in the
continental United States.
The Fourteenth Naval District included the Hawaiian Islands,
[52] Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton Islands.
79716 — 46 — pt. 1 5
30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Biard, will you just draw an imaginary line about the
Fourteenth Naval District ? Just circle it with your wand, will you ?
The disposition of the United States Pacific Fleet outside of the
continental United States at 8 a. m., December 7 was roughly as
follows :
The main body of the fleet in Pearl Harbor comprised 8 battleships,
2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 30 destroyers, and 49 other vessels
such as submarines, mine craft, tenders, transports, and miscellaneous
small craft.
Those are the ships that were in Pearl Harbor. We will go into
greater detail on that a little fui-ther along in the discussion.
You may also refer to the chart in item No. 1, Navy folder, for the
location in detail and the naming of these ships.
In addition to that, item 5 of the Navy folder contains a complete
list of every ship in the Pacific Fleet.
Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey consisted of one aircraft carrier
{Entet'pnse) , three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers. It was about
200 miles west of Oahu, en route to Pearl Harbor after having ferried
Marine Corps fighter planes to AVake Island.
[63^ That task force was coming back from Wake Island to
Pearl Harbor.
Task Force 12 under Admiral Newton consisted of one aircraft
carrier {Lexington) , three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. It was
about 460 miles southeast of Midway, en route to Midway from Pearl
Harbor with a squadron of Marine Corps scout bombers.
Task Force 3 under Admiral Wilson Brown consisted of one heavy
cruisers and five destroyer minesweepers. It had just arrived off
Johnston Island to conduct tests of a new type landing craft.
One heavy cruiser, with four destroyer minesweepers, was in the
fleet operating area about 25 miles south of Oahu conducting exercises.
The heavy cruiser Pensacola with an eight-ship convoy west-bound
was in the Samoan area. More will be said about convoys later.
The heavy cruiser Louisville with a two-ship convoy east-bound was
near the Solomons.
Two submarines and a cargo ship were in the Midway area and a
similar group in the Wake area.
Two tankers were about half way between Hawaii and the west coast
of the United States.
Some smaller units of the fleet were in positions as [■5^] fol-
lows: One destroyer {Ward), concerning, which more will be said
later, was patrolling off the entrance of Pearl Harbor ; one destroyer
in company with a submarine was about 60 miles southwest ; three sub-
marines were 200 miles east of Oahu ; the seaplane tender Wright was
300 miles west, and four auxiliaries were in Honolulu and Lahina
Roads.
The remaining units of the United States Pacific Fleet are shown on
the chart as item 1 of the Nav\^ folder.
A detailed list giving the names and locations of United States naval
ships of the Pacific Fleet is item 5 of the Navy folder.
Turning next to the location of cargo ships and troop carriers :
About 25 cargo and troop carriers which were United States owned
or chartered were west of Hawaii at the time of the attack on Pearl
Harbor. As shown on the chart (item 1, Navy folder) , eight of these,
in-cluding one Navy and thi-ee Army troop transports and four ships
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 31
carrying general cargo bound for the Philippines, were in the Samoan
area, escorted by the heavy cruiser Pensacola. Two Army troop trans-
ports were in the Solomons area bound for Pearl Harbor, escorted by
the heavy cruier Louisville. Four independently routed ships without
escorts carrying general cargo were between 700 and 1,200 miles south-
west of Hawaii westward bound, while [<5<5] another, east-
bound, was in the same area. One vessel was at Canton Island, four
in Australia, one in New Guinea, one in Java, and three in the Manila
area. All troop carriers were being escorted.
All of the west-bound ships had left Honolulu from 2 to 9 days prior
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, routed and dispatched from there by
the port director. Fourteenth Naval District.
A detailed list of these ships and their locations is item 6 of the Navy
folder.
There was no United States or Allied shipping of consequence along
the North Pacific trade routes west of the 180th meridian on December
7,1941.
Those thin black lines represent the great circle course to the Orient
from Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Puget Sound.
Mr. Mitchell. You mean the regular ship lanes ?
Admiral Inglis. The regular, normal shipping lanes used in time of
peace.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. Those great circle courses are the shortest distances
between those points. That is because of the Mercator projection on
the chart. A straight line is not the shortest distance between two
points on such a chart.
[J^] The Chief of Naval Operations, on November 25, 1941,
directed that all trans-Pacific shipping be routed through the Torres
Strait between Australia and New Guinea.
Senator Ferguson. May I have that date again, please ?
Admiral Inglis. The name ? Torres.
Senator Ferguson. No, the date.
Admiral Inglis. Oh, the date? November 25, 1941.
Therefore, the usual shipping lanes, as shown on the maps of tlie
North Pacific, were not being followed, but rather all ships were being
routed as indicated — from Honolulu via Suva in the Fijis and thence
to Australia, or via the Torres Strait to the Philippines. Ships
destined for Guam were routed via the Philippines, thus avoiding
as much as possible the sea area controlled by the Japanese mandated
islands in the Pacific.
Trans-Pacific shipping lanes, both the usual lanes and those being
followed just prior to and on December 7, 1941, are shown in item 1
in thin black lines.
Passing next to a description of the Navy installations ashore in
the Hawaiian Islands; except for Pearl Harbor itself these are all
classified as minor United States naval installations and were
naturally integrated in the over-all defense of the islands, of which
Pearl Harbor was the focal point.
[57] I will ask the committee now to refer to item 3-A of the
folder and Commander Biard is going to point to the Army chart, on
which we have a Navy overlay.
32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On the island of Molokai there was the Homestead Field Naval Air
Base, which consisted of a runway, a warming-up platform and sup-
porting installations.
On the island of Maui there was the Puunene Naval Air Base, which
consisted of runways, a warming-up platform, and a CAA Terri-
torial landing field.
Also on Maui was the INIaalaea naval emergency landing field, which
consisted of two runways and other supporting installations.
On the island of Hawaii, the largest island in the group, there was
tlie naval radio station at Hilo.
On the most important island of the group, Oahu, although not the
largest, there was a naval air station at Ewa, which consisted of a
mooring mast, a landing mat, and supporting installations.
At tlie naval air station, Kaneohe, on the opposite side of the island,
was a landing mat and warming-up platform and supporting installa-
tions and also a seaplane base.
At Kaliuku Point, up at the north end of the island, there was an
emergency landing field.
At Lualualei, a naval radio station, transmitting station.
[S8] At Wahiawa, in the interior, a naval radio receiving
station.
At Heeia, a naval radio transmitting station, and at Wailupe a
naval radio receiving station.
I would like to make it quite clear at this point that these radio
stations were radio stations for transmitting and receiving messages
and were not radar stations.
Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, was a major fleet base capable
of berthing the entire Pacific Fleet. If the committee will now turn
to item 7 in the Navy folder you will find a chart of the approaches
to Pearl Harbor.
, That is a reproduction of the smallish chart that has just been
mounted on the easel.
You will see that the only entrance is from the south via an entrance
cliannel blasted through the fringing coral reef which had formerly
blocked the entrance to the harbor. This channel extending to the
harbor entrance proper was 375 yards wide and 3,500 yards long,
Avith a minimum depth of 45 feet. The entrance proper to Pearl
Harbor is between Keahi Point and Holokahiki Point. From here
the channel leads to the various lochs and passages which form
the harbor.
I think I should explain at this time that the word "1-o-c-h" is used
occasionally throughout this presentation and indicates an arm of the
harbor, or perhaps tlie Scotch [59] would call it a "wake,"
although it is not fresh water. It is not a "lock" as used in connection
with canals.
The ramifications of the harbor are shown on the chart, item 8 of
the Navy folder, and also on the chart which has just been mounted
on the left-hand easel.
You will see on that chart that the water surface is illustrated by a
blue color and the land surface by a white color. The positions of
certain ships are marked in red, but I will ask you to disregard that
for the moment. We will come back to those later on.
There were varying depths in the harbor, as shown by soundings
on the chart. Those tiny black figures show the soundings.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 33
The major channels or the main channels and water m the vicinity
of the major ships' berths had a depth of 40 feet. From the sea buoys
to the large drydocks a portion of the channel had a minimum depth
of 45 feet to provide for the entrance and docking of damaged vessels.
The entrance to the harbor was closed by two protective nets. Here
the channel through the coral reefs was about 400 yards wide and the
depth was from 41 to 50 feet. The nets themselves consisted of a
combined antitorpedo net and antiboat boom to seaward and an inner
antitorpedo net without the boat boom.
[60] You see, there are two nets there. The barrier one has anti-
boat booms, which are usually cross-armed with spikes to prevent
surface craft from sliding up over the boom. Of course, the nets
down below the booms are to stop torpedoes and also submarines pro-
ceeding under water.
The standard net is 30 feet deep and when suspended covers a depth
of 35 feet. Because the channel was of a greater depth, the Chief of
Naval Operations instructed the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, to suspend the inner net 15 feet, making a total coverage of 45
feet.
The Pearl Harbor fleet base included every type of naval activity.
Many of the installations operable at that time were new, having been
built subsequent to August 1939. Major installations in operation
were, at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor: One battleship dock, built
1928; one battleship dock, under construction; one floating dry dock,
18,000 tons; one large repair basin, supporting industrial establish-
ments for repairs to anything afloat; one fuel depot with two tank
farms above ground — as you all know, a tank farm is a collection of
fuel-oil storage tanks; one submarine base — all services for war condi-
tions; [61] one section base — inshore patrol and harbor en-
trance control post.
And then, of course, there was the administrative office of the Four-
teenth Naval District which was inside the navy yard.
At the naval air station — Ford Island, which is the large island at
the center of the harbor — there was a large flying field, warming-up
platform, seaplane parking areas, and supporting installations.
Next we come to the ships present at Pearl Harbor on December
7, 1941. You can refer again to item 8 in the white folder.
Eight battleships of between 29,000 and 33,000 tons each were among
the ships of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941.
Units of the fleet were located as follows :
The battleships Nevada — Commander Biard is pointing those out
now; those battleships are shown in red and they are as precisely as
we can make them to scale.
The Nevada, Anzona, West Virginia^ Tennessee, Ohlahovia, Mary-
land, and California were moored on the southeast side of Ford
Island ; the Pennsylvania in drydock No. 1 at the navy yard.
Two heavy cruisers. New Orleans and &an Francisco, of the 10,000-
ton type, were at docks in the navy yard repair basin.
[62] Four light cruisers of the 10,000-ton type were berthed as
follows : St. Louis, Honolulu, Helena at navy yard clocks, and Phoenix
moored northeast of Ford Island.
Two light cruisers of the 7,000-ton type, Raleigh and Detroit, were
moored on the northwest side of Ford Island.
34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Twenty -nine destroyers (all but three of which had been completed
since 1933) were moc/ed to the north and west of Ford Island.
There were five submarines, four of which were tied up at the
submarine base, and the fifth at Ten-ten dock in the navy yard.
That dock is called Ten-ten dock because it is 1,010 feet long.
One gunboat was tied lip at a navy yard dock. Nine minelayers
(eight of which were converted flush-deck destroyers) w^ere located
at navy yard docks and in middle loch.
Eleven minesweepers (five of which were converted flush-deck de-
stroyers) moored in middle loch and at navy yard docks.
Twenty-three fleet auxiliaries, such as repair ships, oilers, tenders,
store ships, and tugs were located at various berths throughout the
harbor.
There were ni^ aircraft carriers in port.
All battleships of the Pacific Fleet except the Colorado^ [_63^
which was in the Navy 3(^ard, Puget Sound, were present, in Pearl
Harbor.
Item 9 of the white fodder gives a list of the vessels present at the
time of the attack.
In accordance with e;^isting fleet orders, the vessels of the Pacific
Fleet except those uhde/going navy ^^ard overhaul maintained condi-
tion of readiness 3 while in the harbor. This condition at that time
varied according to the armaments of the various types of ships but, in
general, required that about one-fourth of the antiaircraft batteries
and necesssary control stations be manned and that ready ammunition
be at the guns. Vessels likewise were limited in the degree to which
they could disable their propulsive machinery. In general, most ves-
sels were on 12 hours' notice.
By "12 hours' notice" I mean that the ships w'ere required to be able
to get under way 12 hours after receiving the order to get under way,
I will ask Colonel Thielen to pick up from this point.
Colonel Thielen. Very well,
[6Ji] The Army's report, of course, roughly parallels that which
Admiral Inglis has just completed for the Navy. That is, it takes
up the Army organization in that area and the disposition of Army
units, with their strength indicated.
The Hawaiian Islands were organized for joint defense as the Ha-
waiian Coastal Frontier. The Army command was designated as
the Hawaiian Department. On February 7, 1941, Maj. Gen. Walter
C. Short relieved Maj, Gen, Charles D, Herron as commanding general
of the Hawaiian Department,
The principal elements of the Department were two infantry divi-
sions and supporting ground troops composing the beach and land
defense forces ; the Coast Artillery command, consisting of the seacoast
and antiaircraft defense forces ; and the Hawaiian Air Force.
On December 6, 1941, General Short had approximately 43,000 troops
under his command, disposed as shown in detail on pages 1 to 5 of the
Army exhibit which the committee has and which lists the unit loca-
tions by district, with an indication of the strength of each unit and
the station at which located.
Mr. Mitchell. The Army exhibits are in the brown folder.
Mr. Gesell. It is the mimeographed folder in a brown folder, I
think,
Mr, Mitchell, Go ahead.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 35
[6S] Colonel Thielen. On the small chart there is the indication
of the major units as distributed in the various islands of the group. A
reproduction of that chart, is in the hands of each member of the
committee.
In the Kauai district we had the Third Battalion, Two Hundred and
ninety-ninth Infantry — less Companies K and L — and attached troops ;
Company C, Two Hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry ; First Platoon,
Signal Company Aircraft Warning ; Air Corps Detachment.
In the Maui district we had the First Battalion, Two Hundred and
Ninety-ninth Infantry, less Company C, and attached troops; Com-
pany K, Two Hundrecl and Ninety-ninth Infantr}^, Molokai ; Fourth
Platoon Signal Comj^any, Aircraft Warning Air Corps Detachment.
In the Hawaii district we had the Second Battalion, Two hundred
and Ninety-ninth Infantry and attached troops: Camp Detachment,
Kilauea Military Camp; Fifth Platoon Signal Company, Aircraft
Warning Air Corps Detachment.
On the principal island of Oahu we had the following lesser units:
The Twenty-fourth Infantry Division — less Two Hundred and Ninety-
ninth Infantry Regiment: Twenty-fifth Infantry Division; Hawaiian
Coast Artillery Commancl ; [66] Hawaiian Air Force ; Thirty-
Fourth Engineers; Eight Hundred and Fourth Engineer Battalion,
Aviation ; Eleventh Tank Company ; Company A, First Separate
Chemical Battalion, and Hawaiian Pack Train.
The Twenty-fourth Infantry Division was responsible for the
ground defense of the northern half of Oahu, and the Twenty-fifth
Division for that of the southern sector. Most of the components of
these divisions were located at Schofield Barracks.
The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, under Maj. Gen. Henry
T. Burgin, consisted of the following harbor defense units : Fifteenth
Coast Artillery Regiment, harbor defense ; Sixteenth Coast Artillery
Regiment, harbor defense ; Forty-first Coast Artillery Regiment, rail-
way; Fifty-fifth Coast Artillery Regiment, 155 millimeter, tractor-
drawn; and of these antiaircraft units: Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery
Regiment, semimobile; Ninety-seventh Coast Artillery Regiment,
semimobile; Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery Regiment, semimobile;
Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery Regiment, mobile.
The principal weapons of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command
were as shown on page 6 of Army exhibit.
[67] Other large-caliber guns available for defense but manned
by field artillery were two 240-millimeter howitzers and thirty-two
155-millimeter howitzers. The seacoast guns were installed prin-
cipally in permanent fortifications. The fixed antiaircraft guns were
emplaced generally to defend the seacoast artillery, and the mobile
antiaircraft units were normally stationed at Fort Shaffer, Schofield
Barracks, and Camp Malakole.
Liaison between the Coast Artillery command and the Navy was
maintained prior to December 7 by one Army officer and one enlisted
man stationed at the harbor patrol station at Pearl Harbor. The
harbor patrol station was controlled and operated by the Navy. The
plirpose of this liaison was to coordinate identification of waterborne
craft and other possible targets.
The principal units of Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin's Hawaiian
Air Force were the Fifth and Eleventli Bombardment Groups, the
Fifteenth and Eighteenth Pursuit Groups, the Eighty-sixth Obser-
36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
vation Squadron, and the Air Corps Services. The Air Force was
generally disposed on four fields, Hickam, Wheeler, Haleiwa, and
Bellows.
Prior to the attack on December 7, alert No. 1 of the local defense
plan set up by the Hawaiian Department was [68] in effect.
This alert, one of three provided in the plan, was therein defined as a
"defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands,
with no threat from without." Military installations and equipment,
planes, hangars, ammunition, communication centers, highway bridges,
and the like were protected by standing guards and patrols.
I will now explain the dispositions as indicated on the chart, on the
large map of Oahu, mider alert No. 1.
The two divisions, as I have already indicated, had alL their princi-
pal elements located in Schofield Barracks. There were, however, a
number of patrols and standing guards primarily on the road around
Kakanoe Island from Honolulu, around to the east, up past Kaena
Point, and back down the central valley. These patrols were located
at intersections, highway bridges, and other critical points.
The yellow squares indicate antiaircraft weapons, and, as I re-
marked, it will be noted that in general they are situated down on the
south coast, protecting the seacoast installations, except for concen-
trations of these weapons at Schofield Barracks, the regiment at Fort
Shafter, as previously mentioned, and several mobile batteries out at
Camp Malakole.
Most of the white squares are either seacoast weapons of various
types, those that have the general appearance of [dd] cannon,
and the aircraft installations at the field which I have mentioned.
That concludes the Army's indication of organization and strength
and I believe the Navy will now resume.
[70] Admiral Inglis. The next topic is "Offshore reconnaissance."
There is no written record available of any searches having been
made on December 6, either from the Hawaiian area or from Midway.
However, Midway had orders to have one squadron of aircraft search
daily a circular area with a radius of 100 miles. Patrol squadrons
from Midway were also ordered to perform searches wherever sea
forces were operating — that is, surface forces. In general, the oper-
ating areas for fleet units were south of a line drawn from Midway to
Oahu.
I would like now to invite the attention of the committee to item
10 of the Navy folder, which is a reproduction of the large chart that
is on display on the right-hand easel. That chart shows in green and
wdiite diagonal lines the air searches conducted on the 6th of December
and in black and white horizontal lines the searches conducted just
prior to the Japanese attack on the 7th of December and then in red
and white vertical lines the searches after the attack on the 7th of
December.
Of course, in reproducing that chart for your folders the colors do
not show, but the identity is preserved by the direction of the stripes —
horizontal, vertical, and diagonal.
[71] Patrol squadrons from Midway were also ordered to per-
form searches wherever sea forces were operating. In general, the
operating areas for fleet units were south of a line drawn from Mid-
wav to Oahu.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 37
Although there is no record of regular reconnaissance flights being
made on this date, the U. S. S. Enterprise^ 375 miles west of Pearl
Harbor and traveling due east, did at 1 in the afternoon launch 15
torpedo bombers which searched, ahead of the ship, an arc of 110°
to a distance of 150 miles. At the time of the above search, the Enter-
prise had six other planes in the air as an antisubmarine patrol ahead
of the ship.
On the morning of December 7 there were three patrol planes of the
PBY-5 type from Kaneohe Air Station engaged in a routine search
of the fleet operating areas approximately 120 miles south of Oahu.
That is shown in the black and white horizontal stripes.
According to the operations plan then current, each plane was to
be fueled with 1,000 gallons of gasoline which would give it a patrolling
range of 800 miles. The planes were to take off at dawn, 5 : 27
Hawaiian time on the 7th, carrying two depth charges and with all
machine guns fully armed. However, these planes did not take off
until about 6 : 40. Later, when the attack took place, these planes
were [7£] diverted to the northwest to search for the Japanese
forces.
Four patrol planes were also in the air when the attack came, en-
gaged in intertype tactical exercises with United States submarines
near Lahaina Roads. They also were diverted after the attack to
search for Japanese forces. All their machine guns were fully armed
but they carried no depth charges. Thus there were a total of seven
Navy patrol planes employed in the search.
In addition to regular scheduled reconnaissance flights, the U. S. S.
Enterprise^ 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, launched 18 scout bombers
armed with machine guns, shortly after 6 a. m., which searched to the
eastward ahead of the ship an arc of 110° to a distance of 150 miles.
The mission of these planes was to search an area around and ahead
of the Enterprise and then to land at Ewa where thej^ were to be based
while the ship was in port. They arrived there during the attack on
Pearl Harbor and engaged Japanese aircraft. Three of these planes
landed at 9 : 40 and 10 at 10 : 15. The other five never arrived.
There is no written report available of any inshore reconnaissance
"and by "inshore" I mean a distance up to only 30 miles — flown by
the Navy off Oahu the afternoon and evening of December 6 or the
morning of December 7, 1941.
From neighboring islands on the morning of December 7 [7.5]
there was a reconnaissance of five patrol planes armed with machine
guns and a full allowance of ammunition, which took off from the
naval air station, Midway, at 7 : 50 Hawaiian time. Their mission
was to patrol the area to the south and southeast of Midway to a
distance of 450 miles. Although this reconnaissance was scheduled
before, it actually occurred after the attack and is shown on the chart
in vertical stripes.
Two additional planes of the same type took off at the same time
to rendezvous with the U. S. S. Lexington at a point 400 miles from
Midway in a southeasterly direction. These planes were to escort the
18 marine scout bombing planes being brought in by the Lexington as
reinforcements for Midway. This marine flight was canceled after
news was received of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Five additional planes, armed with two 500-pound bombs each, were
on the alert at Midway ready to take off on 10-minutes' notice.
38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I will ask Colonel Thielen to take up from here again.
[74] Colonel Thielen. As for Army reconnaissance, there is no
evidence that any inshore patrol was maintained by the Army Air
Forces on December 7 or on the days preceding the attack. Neither
is there evidence that Army bombers were patrolling offshore on
December 7 prior to the attack.
Closely related to this subject, however, is the flight of B-17's being
ferried from the mainland, which arrived in Oahu about the time of
the attack.
Beginning at 9 : 30 p. m., December 6, 1941, six B-17's of the Eighty-
eighth Keconnaissance Squadron and six B-17's of the Thirty-eighth
Reconnaissance Squadron took off from Hamilton Field, Calif., at 2-
minute intervals. These airplanes were to travel to the Philippines
via Oahu. They were not armed.
The aircraft did not maintain formation or visual contact with
each other, and made landfall at Oahu at various places. The course
from the mainland followed the arc of a great circle which would bring
the planes into Oahu from the northeast. However, one plane ap-
proached Oahu from about 100 miles north-northwest of the island
and another from Kauai, about 75 miles west-northwest of Oahu.
All planes landed on Oahu between 8 : 30 and 9 a. m.. December 7.
One landed at Wheeler Field, one at Bellows Field, one on a golf
course, two at Haleiwa and the remainder at Hickaaii Field. Three
planes were badly damaged and one was [75] destroyed dur-
ing landing.
As to the air warning service which was in effect at this time, this
air warning service included the vadar detecting stations and related
equipment and was under the control of the Hawaiian Department
signal officer. The warning net did not include any system of ground
observers.
By December 7, the Hawaiian Department had received all compo-
nents for three fixed detector stations ( SCR 271) . At the time of the
attack, construction work had not been completed on the fixed instal-
lations at Mount Kaala (Oahu), Kokee (Kaua|i) and Haleakala
(Maui), for the use of this equipment. Six mobile, long-range radar
sets (SCR 270) had been deceived, five of which were in operation
early on December 7 at the following points on Oahu — Fort Shafter,
Koko Head, Kaaawa, Opana and Kawailoa. This mobile set (SCR
270) has a normal range up to 150 miles, depending upon the height of
the station and height of aircraft. Detection of planes at a distance of
150 miJes and flying at 20,000 feet may be expected from sea-level
positions. The set consists essentially of four large, heavy truck units.
It takes at least 4 hours to place the set in operation. Its full operat-
ing complement requires four crews of six trained men to each crew.
The equipment is accurate to within 2 miles in range and 3° in azimuth,
that is, in direction.
[7'^] As a matter of interest, the range and other characteristics
of the fixed sets were substantial]}- the same as those of the mobile
sets.
In use radar indicates the presence of an airplane by a luminous pip
on a dark screen. A large number of airplanes at a great distance fly-
ing in formation would appear as an abnormally wide pip. At the
radar station one of the crew observes the indication of the airplanes
on the screen and periodically calls off the distance. Another reads
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 39
direction from an azimuth scale. From these data are plotted posi-
tions on a chart. There was no way on December 7, 1941, of distin-
guishing between the images formed by enemy planes and by friendly
planes.
When he placed alert No. 1 in effect, General Short also directed
that the Aircraft Warning Service operate all mobile aircraft-warning
stations from 2 hours before dawn to 1 hour after dawn — speciJ&cally,
from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning. Thus, the operating schedule of
the mobile radar detector stations was daily from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m.,
routine training from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m. except Sundays, and daily
except Saturday and Sunday from 12 to 4 p. m. for training and main-
tenance work.
May I call your attention to the chart which represents a consolida-
tion of the recorded plots at the Opana station [77] before and
after the attack ; also, in the Army exhibit, page 7, is a reproduction
of a photostatic copy of the record of early flights on December 7,
1941, obtained by the Opana detector station. This chart on the easel
is taken from the photostatic chart.
On page 8 of the exhibit is a reproduction of a photostatic copy of
mobile detector-station records obtained prior to 7 a. m. on December 7,
1941. The dots indicate the location of aircraft. Going back to the
chart on the easel, the blue arrow represents the direction of approach
of the B-l7's previously mentioned as being ferried from the main-
land.
I perhaps should mention that those planes were not recorded by
the radar station. Their direction is put on the chart merely as a
matter of orientation.
At 7 a. m., December 7, 1941, all radar detector stations closed down
except the Opana station at Kahuku Point, which remained in opei'a-
tion in order to continue the training of a new man, Pvt. George E.
Elliott, who had volunteered to remain on the job for this purpose.
[78] At 7 : 02 a. m. this station, manned by Private Elliott and
Pvt. Joseph L. Lockard, picked up an indication of airplanes at 132
miles, bearing 3° east of north, indicated by that pip at the top of the
chart marked with the time 7 : 02.
The soldiers kept tracking the target. At 7 : 20 a. m. Private Loc-
kard called to inform Lieutenant Tyler, the watch officer at the infor-
mation center. Fort Shaffer, of his observations, but that officer decided
to take no action.
Shortly after 8 a. m. Lieutenant Tyler received a telephone message
that Wheeler Field was under attack. Lieutenant Tyler thereupon
directed that all radar crews be recalled to their stations.
Sound detectors: In the Coast Artillery Antiaircraft Regiment
there were generally two battalions of guns, each of which included
three gun batteries and a battery of ten 60-inch searchlights.
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute, Colonel. Will you put the map back
there ? I would like to ask him a question.
Colonel Thielen. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you have anything to say about those purple ink
marks on your exhibit, ''6 : 45" and ''6 : 48" ?
Mr. Keefe. I can't hear your question, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. I am sorry. I have to put my nose in [79]
the instrument.
40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Have you anything to say about those indications of interception
at earlier hours to the left of that, as you pointed out ?
Colonel Thielen. As I mentioned, that chart was taken from the
historical plot, so-called, of which the committee has a photostatic
copy. I reproduced the information in those pips on the chart for the
sake of accuracy, but I am not in a position to interpret them.
Mr. Mitchell. That is, the Army hasn't any information, from its
records, to interpret what the radar station showed, what the record of
the radar station showed, to the left, I mean ?
Colonel Thielen. Any interpretation would be speculation, I think,
on my part, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I just wondered, as it is shown there, whether some-
thing ought to be said about it.
Colonel Thielen. They are taken, as I said, for the sake of com-
pleteness from the historical plot. They do appear on the plot. They
were plotted on the Opana station. As I indicated, with the state of
radar at that time, it could not be definitely stated whether any image
was that of a friendly or hostile aircraft.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman
[80] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I am going to raise the
point of order. If we are going to have a rule it ought to be followed.
Senator Ferguson. Since the point of order is raised
The Chairman. I think we have a point of order that we agreed to
follow, otherwise we will be breaking down the rules before we start.
Go ahead.
Mr. Mitchell. Go ahead, Colonel.
Colonel Thielen. As for the sound detectors
Senator Ferguson. I assumed, Mr. Chairman, when the counsel
asked questions and no one else asked questions, that it would naturally
come around to ask him a question.
The Chairman. The Chair's interpretation of the rule is that the
committee members are not to ask questions until the counsel has
finished with the witness.
Senator Ferguson. That means completely finished with the witness
and he turns him over to the committee ?
The Chairivian. Yes.
Senator Brewster. It might be quite in order for the committee
members to suggest questions, so if they have any suggestions to make
they make written suggestions. I think it might clarify the record
as to procedure.
The Chairman. Certainly.
[81] Mr. Mitchell. Colonel, may I ask you also if there is any-
thing you have to say about the purple arrow going from 10 : 39 to
10 : 27 on that map ? Wliat does that mean ? Why is that on there ?
Colonel Thielen. Because those two points were plotted by the
Opana station at that time.
Mr. Mitchell. After the attack ?
Colonel Thielen. That is correct. We could see definitely that
they were going away, those at 10 : 27 having been plotted earlier
than that at 10 : 39.
Mr. Mitchell. That is all. You may go ahead.
Colonel Thielen. As for the sound detectors, in the Coast Artillery
Anti-Aircraf t Kegiment there were generally two battalions of guns,
each of which included 3 gun batteries and a battery of 10 GO-inch
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 41
searchlights. One sound detector generally worked with each search-
light. The primary purpose of the sound detector was to pick up an
airplane by its sound and then to point the searchlight ; consequently
detectors were employed only at night.
The sound detector in use at the time had an optimum range of
about 10,000 yards.
I believe the Navy will now discuss their radar.
Admiral Inglis. Before discussing Navy radar I would like to
reconcile one point that might seem inconsistent to [83] the
members of the committee.
You will recall, in describing the search of the patrol planes, I
said that the planes were to take off at sunrise, 5 : 27 Hawaiian time.
That word "sunrise" was taken out of the report, but I think it was a
typogi-aphical error because sunrise was actually an hour later,
at 6 : 26.
It is my understanding that the j)lan did call for the planes to
take off at 5 : 27, an hour before sunrise, which is usually considered
as dawn in those latitudes.
With that explanation, I would like to pass on now to the Navy's
radar equipment. The only ships in Pearl Harbor equipped with ship
search radar at that time, on December 7, 1941, were the battleships
Pennsylvania, California, West Virginia, and the seaplane tender
Curtiss. The radar equipment on these ships was not manned since
the height of the land around the harbor would have made it ineffec-
tive. The equipment on the Curtiss was put into operation at the
beginning of the first attack and that on the Pennsylvania began to
operate 15 minutes later, both with negative results.
Facilities for aircraft spotting: On board the naval vesselsat Pearl
Harbor, aircraft spotting was a function of the crews manning their
stations at condition of readiness then existing. Every ship's organi-
zation bill provided for certain members of the watch [83] at
the gun and control stations to act as aircraft lookouts. There were
no naval air lookout stations ashore. However, crews of the signal
tower at Pearl Harbor had certain air lookout duties as part of their
general signal duties.
Character of antisubmarine patrol operations, December 7, 1941 :
On the morning of December 7, 1941, the United States destroyer
Ward was assigned and was carrying out an inner antisubmarine
patrol off the Pearl Harbor entrance. Commander Biard is pointing
to that locality. This patrol searched the navigable waters between
bearings 100° to 250° (true) from entrance buoy No. 1 to a distance
of 2 miles.
The mission of this patrol was to detect and prevent unidentified
submarines and unauthorized vessels from entering the approaches
to the Pearl Harbor entrance channel.
Although not part of the antisubmarine patrol, the United States
minesweepers Condor and Crosshill were conducting minesweeping
operations in the channel and approaches thereto.
The fleet units at sea were screened by both a surface and air anti-
submarine patrol.
Account of Japanese attack on ships and installations at Pearl Har-
bor, December 7, 1941 : Possibly the first Japanese contact off Oahu
was made at 3 : 50 a. m. Pearl Harbor time — 9 : 20 a. m. Washington
time — [SJ^] when the United States coastal minesweeper Con-
42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
dor sighted the periscope of a submerged submarine. At that time the
Condor was conducting minesweeping operations approximately 1%
miles southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. At 3 : 57 a. m.
the Condor, by visual signal, informed the destroyer Ward, then
patroling off the Pearl Harbor entrance, of this contact.
The Ward thereupon immediately instituted a search and at about
6 : 40 a. m. sighted the periscope of an unidentified submarine appar-
ently trailing the United States target repair ship Antwres, then en
route to Honolulu Harbor.
Commander Biard, will you show the relationship between Hono-
lulu Harbor and Pearl Harbor entrance ?
That is Pearl Harbor [indicating] and that is Honolulu Harbor,
about 10 miles apart.
{85^ Upon sighting the submarine, the Ward ordered all hands
to battle stations, increased her speed from 5 to 25 knots, and started
the attack. The Ward opened fire with her guns at 6 : 45 a. m. and a
depth charge attack was commenced. The second gun salvo scored a
direct hit upon the conning tower of the Japanese submarine. As a
result of these attacks, the submarine is believed to have gone down in
1,200 feet of water. A large amount of oil came to the surface.
At 6 : 54 a. m., the Wai'd sent the following dispatch by voice trans-
mission to the commandant. Fourteenth Naval District :
We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped charges upon submariue operating
in defensive sea area.
At 7 : 15 a. m. — 12 : 45 p. m. Washington time — this message was
reported delivered to the district officer, Lt. Comdr. Harold Ka-
minski. In turn, at 7 : 16 a. m., Lieutenant Commander Kaminski no-
tified the duty officer of the commander-in-chief, United States Fleet.
This was the first information received at the Pearl Harbor head-
quarters of the commander-in-chief. United States Fleet, that un-
identified forces might be in the Hawaiian area. Twenty-five minutes
after this telephone report, a second was received at the headquarters,
commander-in-chief, United States Fleet, from the operations officer
of patrol wing two relaying a report received at [5^] 7 : 32
a. m. to the effect that a patrol plane had sunk an unidentified subma-
rine south of Pearl Harbor channel entrance buoy. This was the same
submarine reported by the Ward. This report was followed by an-
other telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District duty officer
in which it was stated that the Ward was towing a sampan into Hono-
lulu. This last report was undoubtedly erroneous since there is no
mention in the Wardh administrative log of her towing a sampan.
Upon receipt of the Ward''s report by the commandant. Fourteenth
Naval District, the commandant ordered the ready-du<:y destroyer
U. S. S. Monaghan to proceed to sea, to close the net gate, to attempt to
verify the contact report giving full details, and to notify the com-
mander in chief's staff duty officer. A dispatch was sent to the Ward
at 7 : 37 a. m., asking verification of the report and details of the attack
on the enemy submarine.
After the Ward'^s message and prior to the Japanese raid, no other
reports indicating or verifying the enemy's presence were received at
the headquarters, commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
At about 7:55 a. m. Pearl Harbor time — 1 : 25 p. m, Washington
time— the navy yard signal tower telephoned the comniander in chief,
Pacific Fleet, as follows :
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 43
[87] Enemy air raid — not drill.
Almost simultaneously, Japanese torpedo planes attacked the battle-
ships. From then on until 9 : 45 a. m., Pearl Harbor time — 3 : 15 p. m.
Washington time — there was almost continuous enemy air activity of
some kind over the harbor. However, there seemed to be separate
periods of greatly intensified activity. On this basis, the narrative of
the attack may be divided into five phases.
The five phases of the attack are :
Phase I : Combined torpedo plane and dive bomber attacks lasting
from 7 : 55 a. m. to 8 : 25 a. m.
Phase II : Lull in attacks lasting from 8 : 25 a. m. to 8 : 40 a. m.
Phase III : Horizontal bomber attacks extending from 8 : 40 a. m.
to 9 : 15 a. m.
Phase IV: Dive bomber attacks between 9: 15 and 9:45 a. m.
Phase V : Waning of attacks and completion of raid after 9 : 45 a. m.
The primary objectives of the Japanese during the raid were the
heavy combatant ships and aircraft. Damage to the light forces and
the industrial plant was incidental to the destruction or disablement
of the heavy ships and aircraft based ashore.
[88] Phase I — 7:55-8:25 a. m. — Combined torpedo and dive-
homber attacks
The beginning of the attack coincided with the hoisting of the
preparatory signal for 8 o'clock colors. At this time — namely 7 : 55
a. m. — Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, and within
the next few seconds enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers swung
in from Various sectors to concentrate their attack on the heavy ships
moored in Pearl Harbor. It is estimated that nine planes engaged
in the attack on the naval air station on Ford Island, concentrated
on the planes parked in the vicinity of hangar No. 6.
At the time of the attack, our planes — patrol flying boats, flbat
planes, and scout bombers, carrier type — were lined up on the field.
These planes caught fire and exploded. Machine-gun emplacements
were set up hastily and manned, although the return fire from shore
on Ford Island was pitifully weak. Then as suddenly as they had
appeared, the Japanese plaiies vanished. No further attack on this
air station was made during the day. Except for a direct hit oil
hangar No. 6 resulting from a bomb which was apparently aimed at
the battleship California and which fell short, the damage to the
station itself was comparativel}'^ slight. However, 33 of our best
planes out of a total of 70 planes of all types were destroyed or
damaged.
\89] As soon as the attack began, commander. Patrol Wing 2
broadcasted from Ford Island the warning : "Air raid. Pearl Harbor — ■
This is not a drill." This warning was followed a few minutes
later by a similar message from the commander in chief, United
States Fleet.
At approximately the same time that the Japanese dive bombers
appeared over Ford Island, other low-flying planes struck at the
Kaneohe Naval Air Station on the other side of the island. The
attack was well executed, with the planes coming down in shallow
dives and inflicting severe casualties on the seaplanes moored in the
water. Machine guns and rifles wei-e brought out, and men dispersed
to fire at will at the low-flying planes. After a period of 10 to 15
44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
minutes, the attacking planes drew off to the north at a low altitude
and disappeared from sight. Several other contingents of bombers
passed over, but none dropped bombs on Kaneohe Bay.
About 25 minutes after the first attack, another squadron of planes
similar to one of our light bomber types, appeared over Kaneohe and
commenced bombing and strafing. Number 3 hangar received a
direct hit during this attack and four planes in the hangar were
destroyed. The majority of the casualties suffered at Kaneohe
resulted from this attack:. Most of the injured personnel were in
the squadrons attempting either to launch their planes or to save
those [90] planes not as yet damaged. When the enemy
withdrew, some 10 to 15 minutes later, salvage operations were com-
menced, but it was too late to save No. 1 hangar, which burned until
only its steel structural work was left. Only 9 out of the 35 planes
at Kaneohe escaped destruction in this attack. Six of these were
damaged and three were in the air on patrol south of Oahu as pre-
viously described.
Meanwhile, the Marine air base at Ewa was undergoing similar
attack. Apparently the attack on Ewa preceded that at Pearl Harbor
by about 2 minutes. It was delivcTed by two squadrons of 18 to 24
single-seater fighter planes using machine-gun strafing tactics, which
came in from the northwest at an altitude of approximately 1,000
feet. These enemy planes would descend to within 20 to 25 feet
of the ground, attacking single planes with short bursts of gunfire.
Then they would f)ull over the tree tops, reverse their course, and
attack from the opposite direction. Within less than 15 minutes, all
the Marine tactical aircraft had been shot up or set on fire. Then the
guns of the enemy fighters were turned upon our utility aircraft,
upon planes that had been disassembled for repair, and upon the
Marines themselves.
Effective defense measures were impossible until after the first raid
had subsided. Pilots, aching to strike at the enemy in the air, viewed
the wreckage which until a [91] few minutes before had been
a strong air group of Marine fighters and bombers. All together 33
out of the 49 planes at Ewa had gone up in smoke. Some marines,
unable to find anythmg more effective, had tried to oppose fighter
planes with pistols, since the remaining 16 planes were too badly
damaged to fly.
Although in phase I of the attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor
Japanese dive bombers were effective, the torpedo planes did the most
damage. They adhered strictly to a carefully laid plan and directed
their attacks from those sectors which afforded the best avenues of
approach for torpedo attack against selected heavy ship objectives.
Thus they indicated accurate knowledge of harbor and channel depths
and the berths ordinarily occupied by the major combatant units of
our fleet. At least in the'great majority of cases, the depth of water in
Pearl Harbor did not prevent the successful execution of this form of
attack. Shallow dives of the torpedoes upon launching were assured
by the use of specially constructed wooden fins, remnants of which
were discovered on enemy torpedoes salvaged after the attack.
Four separate torpedo-plane attacks were made during phase I.
The major attack was made by 12 planes which swung in generally
from the southeast over the tank farm and the vicinity of Merry
Point. After splitting, they launched their torpedoes at very low al-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 45
titudes (within 50 [92] to 100 feet of the water), and from
very short distances, aiming for the battleships berthed on the south-
east side of Ford Island. All the outboard battleships, namely, the
Nevada, Arizo7ia, West Virginia, Oklahoma, and California, were ef-
fectively hit by one or more torpedoes. Strafing was simultaneously
conducted from the rear cockpits. A recovered unexploded torpedo
carried an explosive charge of 1,000 pounds.
During the second of these attacks, the Oklahoma was struck by
three torpedoes on the port side and heeled rapidly to port, impeding
the efforts of her defenders to beat off the attackers.
The third attack was made by one torpedo plane which appeared
from the west and was directed against the light cruiser Helena and
the minelayer Oglala, both of which were temporarily occupying the
berth previously assigned to the battleship Pennsylvania, flagship of
the Pacific Fleet. One torpedo passed under the Oglala and exploded
against the side of the Helena. The blast stove in the side plates of
the Oglala. Submersible pumps for the Oglala were obtained from
the Helena, but could not be used since no power was available because
of damage to the ship's engineering plant.
The fourth wave of five planes came in from the northwest and
attacked the seaplane tender Tangier, the target \PS] ship
Utah, and the light cruisers Raleigh and Detroit. The Raleigh was
struck by one torpedo, and the Utah received two hits in succession,
capsizing at 8 : 13 a. m. At first it was feared that the Raleigh would
capsize. Orders were, therefore, given for all men not at the guns
to jettison all topside weights and put both airplanes in the water.
Extra manila and wire lines were also run to the quays to help keep
the ship from capsizing.
The Utah, an old battleship converted into a target ship, had re-
cently returned from serving as a target for practice aerial bombard-
ment. As soon as she received her torpedo hits, she began listing
rapidly to port. After she had listed to about 40°, the order was
given to abandon ship. This order was executed with some difficulty
as the attacking planes strafed the crew as they went over the side.
Remnants of the crew had reached Ford Island safely. Later knock-
ing was heard within the hull of the Utah. With cutting tools ob-
tained from the Raleigh, a volunteer crew succeeded in cutting
through the hull and rescuing a fireman second class who had been
entrapped in the void scape underneath the dynamo room.
An interesting sidelight on Japanese intentions and advance knowl-
edge is suggested by the fact that berths F-10 and F-11 in which the
Utah and Raleigh were placed were [P^] designated carrier
berths and that a carrier was frequently moored in nearby F-9.
The Detroit and Tangier escaped torpedo damage, one torpedo
passing just astern of the Detroit and burying itself in the mud. An-
other torpedo passed between the Tangier and the Utah.
It is estimated that the total number of torpedo planes engaged in
these four attacks was 21.
In the eight dive-bomber attacks occurring during phase I, three
types of bombs were employed — light, medium, and incendiary.
During the second of these attacks, a bomb hit exploded the forward
14-inch powder magazine on the battleship Arizona and caused a rav-
aging oil fire, which sent up a great cloud of smoke, thereby inter-
79716 — 46 — pt. 1 ^6
46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fering with antiaircraft fire. The battleship Tennessee in the adja-
cent berth was endangered seriously by the oil fire.
The West Virginia was hit during the third of these attacks by two
heavy bombs as well as by torpedoes. Like the California^ she had to
be abandoned after a large fire broke out amidships. Her executive
officer, the senior survivor, dove overboard and swam to the Ten-
nessee^ where he organized a party of West Virginia survivors to
help extinguish the fire in the rubbish, trash, and oil which [P-5]
covered the water between the Tennessee and Ford Island.
The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase is esti-
mated at 30. While a few fighters were reported among the attackers
in the various phases, they were no doubt confused with light bombers
and accordingly are not treated as a distinct type.
Although the major attack by high-altitude horizontal bombers
did not occur until phase III, 15 planes of this type operating in four
groups were active during phase I.
Most of the torpedo damage to the fleet had occurred by 8 : 25
a. m. All the outboard battleships had been hit by one or more
torpedoes ; all the battleships had been hit by one or more bombs with
the exception of the Oklahoma^ which took four torpedoes before it
capsized, and the Pennsylvania^ which received a bomb hit later. By
the end of the first phase, the West Virginia was in a sinking con-
dition ; the California was down by the stern ; the Arizona was a flam-
ing ruin; the other battleships were all damaged to a greater or
lesser degree.
Although the initial attack of the Japanese came as a surprise, de-
fensive action on the part of the fleet was prompt. All ships immedi-
ately went to general quarters. Battleship ready machine guns like-
wise opened fire at once, and within an estimated, average time of
less than 5 minutes \_96'] practically all battleships and anti-
aircraft batteries were firing.
The cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average
time of about 4 minutes. The destroyers, although opening up with
"machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all
antiaircraft guns into action.
During this phase of the battle there was no movement of ships
within the harbor proper. The destroyer Helni^ which had gotten
under way just prior to the attack, was outside the harbor entrance
when at 8: 17 a submarine conning tower was sighted to the right of
the entrance channel and northward of buoy No. 1. The submarine
immediately submerged. The Helm opened fire at 8 : 19 a. m. when the
submarine again surfaced temporarily. No hits were observed.
[57] Phase II — S:^5-8:Jfi a. m. — Lull in attacks
This phase is described as a lull only by way of comparison. Air
activity continued during this phase although somewhat abated, with
sporadic attacks by dive and horizontal bombers. During this phase
an estimated total of 15 dive bombers participated in 5 attacks upon
the ships in the navy yard, the battleships Maryland^ Oklahoma^
Nevada^ and Pennsylvania^ and various light cruisers and destroyers.
Although three attacks by horizontal bombers occurred during the
lull, these appear to have overlapped into phnse III and are con-
sidered under that heading.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 47
At 8 : 32 a. m. the battleship Oklahoma took a heavy list to star-
board and capsized.
During phase II, there was still relatively little ship movement
within the harbor. The ready-duty destroyer Monaghan had re-
ceived orders at 7: 51 a. m. (Pearl Harbor time) to "proceed immedi-
ately and contact Ward in defensive sea area." At about 8 : 37, ob-
serving an enemy submarine just west of Ford Island under fire from
both the Curtiss and Ta/ngie7\ the Monaghan proceeded at high speed
and at about 8 : 43 rammed the submarine. As the enemy vessel had
submerged, the shock was slight. The Monaghan thereupon reversed
engines and dropped two depth charges.
The Curtiss had previously scored two direct hits on [P5] the
conning tower. This submarine was later salvaged for inspection and
disposal. The Monaghan then proceeded down the channel and con-
tinued her sortie. At the same time that the Monagham got under-
way, the destroyer Henley slipped her chain from buoy X-11 and
sortied, following the Monaghan down the channel.
Phase III — 8: If.0-9: 15 a. m. — Horizontal honiber attacks
The so-called lull in the air raid was terminated by the appearance
over the fleet of eight groups of high-altitude horizontal bombers
which crossed and recrossed their targets from various directions,
inflicting serious damage. Some of the bombs dropped were con-
verted 15- or 16-inch shells of somewhat less explosive quality, marked
by very little flame. According to some observers, many bombs
dropped by high-altitude horizontal bombers either failed to explode
or landed outside the harbor area.
During the second attack (at 9:06 a. m.) the Pennsylvania was
hit by a heavy bomb which passed through the main deck amidships
and detonated, causing a fire, which was extinguished with some
difficulty.
The third group of planes followed very closely the line of battle-
ship moorings. It was probably one of these planes that hit the
California with what is believed to have been a 15-inch projectile
equipped with tail vanes which [PP] penetrated to the second
deck and exploded. As a result of the explosion, the armored hatch
to the machine shop was badly sprung and could not be closed, result-
ing in the spreading of a serious fire.
Altogether, 30 horizontal bombers, including 9 planes which had
participated in earlier attacks, are estimated to have engaged in phase
III. Once more it was the heavy combatant ships, the battleships
and cruisers, which bore the brunt of these attacks.
Although phase III was largely devoted to horizontal bombing,
approximately 18 dive bombers organized in 5 groups also participated.
It was probably the second of these groups which did considerable
damage to the Nevada^ then proceeding down the South Channel, and
also to the Shaw, Cassin, and Downes, all three of which were set afire.
During the fifth attack, a Japanese dive bomber succeeded in drop-
ping 1 bomb on the seaplane tender Curtiss which detonated on the
main-deck level, killing 20 men, wounding 58, and leaving 1 other
unaccounted for.
During this same phase, the Curtiss took under fire one of these
bombers, which was pulling out of a dive over the naval air station.
Hit squarely by the Curtiss'' accurate gunfire, the plane crashed on the
48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ship, spattering burning [100] gasoline and starting fires so
menacing that one of the guns had to be temporarily abandoned.
Considerable ship movement took place during phase III. At 8 : 40
a. m. the Nevada cleared berth F-8 without assistance and proceeded
down the South Channel. As soon as the Japanese became aware
that a battleship was trying to reach open water, they sent dive bomber
after dive bomber down after her and registered several hits. In
spite of the damage she had sustained in the vicinity of floating dry-
dock No. 2, and although her bridge and forestructure were ablaze,
the ship continued to fight effectively. At 9 : 10, however, while she
was attempting to make a turn in the channel, the Nevada ran aground
in the vicinity of buoy No. 19.
Meanwhile the repair ship Vestal, also without assistance, had got-
ten underway at about 8: 40, had cleared the burning Arizona, and at
abfiat 9 : 10 anchored well clear northeast of Ford Island.
Soon after the Nevada and Vestal had cleared their berths, tugs
began to move the Oglala to a position astern of the Helena at "Ten-
ten" Dock. The Oglala was finally secured in her berth at about 9 : 00,
but shortly thereafter she capsized.
At 8 : 42, the oiler Neosho cleared berth F-4 unaided and stood
toward Merry Point in order to reduce fire hazard to her cargo and
to clear the way for a possible sortie by the battleship Mari/land.
[101'\ Next, phase IV, from 9 : 15 to 9 : 45, dive-bomber at-
tacks
The CliAiRMAisr. Under the program of the committee, 12 o'clock
having arrived, I think we should now recess until 2 p. m., and com-
plete your testimony then.
Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, if I may have 30 seconds longer, I
could finish this particular part.
The Chairman. Just a moment. You might as well come back at 2.
(Whereupon, at 12 m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2
p. m., of the same day.)
[102'\ AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 P. M.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Admiral, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF REAE ADM. T. B. INGIIS AND COL. BERNARD
THIELEN (Resumed)
Admiral Inglis. In this morning's portion of the presentation I
finished phases I, II, and III. I propose now to take up the story with
phase IV, which lasted from 9 : 15 to 9 : 45 and was characterized by
dive-bomber attacks.
Phase IV — 9: 15-9: 1^5 a. m. — Dive hoiiiber attacks
During phase IV an estimated 27 dive bombers conducted 9 strafing
attacks directed against ships throughout the entire harbor area. In
all probability the planes were the same ones that had conducted pre-
vious attacks. These attacks overlapped by about 10 minutes the
horizontal bomber attacks previously described in phase III.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 49
Phase V — 9:4S — Waning of attacks and convpletion of raid
By 9 : 45 all enemy planes had retired. Evading our aerial searches,
both shore-based and from carriers at sea, the Japanese striking force
retired to its home waters without being contacted by any of our units.
For summary of Japanese planes participating in attack see item 11
in the white folder.
The foregoing has been a discussion of the attack phase only. The
details of our aircraft and antiaircraft action will be given later.
{103'\ Summary of percentage of personnel mustered on, sta-
tion : Fleet orders at the time of Pearl Harbor directed that one-fourth
of the officers and one-half of the enlisted personnel be on board at all
times.
Excerpts from a summarized report of personnel actually on board
at the commencement of the attack on December 7, 1941, are as follows :
On hoard
Commanding officers of battleships 5 out of 8
Commanding officers of cruisers 6 out of 7
Commanding officers of destroyers percent 63
Damage-control officers of battleships 6 out of 8
Average percentage of officers :
Battleships (approximate) percent 60-70
Cruisers, battle force (approximate) do 65
Destroyers, battle force (approximate) do 50
Average percentage of men :
Battleships do 95
Cruisers, battle force do 98
Destroyers, battle force do 85
There were ample personnel present and ready to man all naval
shore installations.
I will ask Colonel Thielen to take up from here.
[lOJi-'] Colonel Thielen. In presenting the Army's story of the
attack, I propose to describe what happened at each of the three
major airfields, Hickam Field, Wlieeler, and Bellows, and after that
to describe the action taken by our ground forces, and our coast ar-
tillery command in response to the attack.
Our planes on Hickam Field at the time of the attack were lined up
on the warming-up aprons three or four abreast, with approximately
10 feet between wing tips, and approximately 135 feet from the tail
of one plane to the nose of another.
If you will note the plan of the Hickam Feld as displayed on the
easel, you may be able to distinguish the aircraft on the warming-up
apron. They are actually drawn to scale. They may not be legible.
However, each member of the committee has a photograph of the plan
of each of these airfields.
Hickam Field observers report that the first indication of an attack
was at 7 : 55 a. m. when nine enemy single-engine, low-wing mono-
planes, carrying torpedoes, were observed southeast of Hickam Field
hangar line, flying at an altitude of about 50 feet toward Pearl Harbor.
They were in two echelons, five ])]anes in the first and four in the
second. These airplanes did not attack Hickam Field..
\_105'] At almost the same time, however, nine dive bombers at-
tacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and Hickam Field hangar
line from the south, and three additional planes attacked the same ob-
jectives from the northwest. Several minutes later nine additional
dive bombers bombed Hickam Field hanger line from the southeast.
Immediately thereafter, seven additional dive bombers attacked the
50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hickam Field hangar line from the east. All planes dived at approxi-
mately 45 to 50 degrees from altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 feet. Bombs
were released at about 1,000 feet with the planes pulling out of dives
from 800 to approximately 300 feet. Machine gun fire was employed
before and after bomb release. This attack lasted about 10 minutes.
The second attack on Hickam Field occurred at about 8 : 25 a. m.,
when between six and nine planes approached from the south and at-
tacked No. 1 aqua system, which is a hydrostatic pass for the fuel pump-
ing system, and also the technical buildings immediately behind the
hangar lines, and the consolidated barracks. These planes when first
observed were flying level and released their bombs from level flight at
an altitude of about 150 feet. During and immediately after this
bombing attack our planes on the parking apron were attacked with
gun fire. About 1 minute later (8 : 26) a formation of five or six planes
bombed the baseball diamond 1^06] from a high altitude, pos-
sibly believing the gasoline storage system to be in that area. The
second attack lasted between 10 and 15 minutes.
The third attack at Hickam occurred about 9 a. m., when six to nine
planes (presumably those that had previously bombed from level flight
at 150 feet at 8 : 25) attacked with machine gun fire the technical build-
ings behind the hangar lines and certain planes which by then were
dispersed.
These attacks came from four directions almost simultaneously. At
the same time a formation of from seven to nine planes, flying in V
formation at an altitude estimated at 6,000 feet approached from the
south, releasing bombs which struck the consolidated barracks, the
parade ground, and post exchange. The third attack lasted about 8
minutes. All enemy planes observed at low altitudes were single en-
gine, low-wing monoplanes. The tj^pe of high altitude bombers was
not definitely established. Largest bombs used were believed not to
exceed 600 pounds. Gun ammunition was identified as 7.7 and 20 milli-
meter ammunition.
At Wheeler Field, our planes were parked in the space between the
aprons in front of the hangars, generally in a series of parallel lines
approximately wing tip to wing tip, the lines varying from 15 to 20
feet apart.
[107] About 25 Japanese planes approached at 8 : 02 a. m., gener-
ally from the southeast, at about 5,000 feet altitude. They passed well
to the east of the field, circled counter-clockwise, losing altitude and
approached for attack from the north at about 3,000 feet, generally per-
pendicular to the hangar line. The formation of the entire ^roup was
roughly a V — with five sections of four planes each forming the V
formation — that is indicated on the chart and on the photographic
leproductions thereof — with a fourth plane extending the right leg
of the V.
A single odd plane flew slightly to the rear of the formation. They
dived at an angle of about 45° and struck the hangar line and vicinity
over a length of about 900 yards, starting from the engineering hangar
which is at the extreme southwest of the hangar line. Out of approx-
imately 35 bombs dropped, 4 were about 600 pounds, 3 were about 250
pounds, 8 were about 100 pounds, and the remainder were smaller,
some of them appearing to be oil or other type incendiary bombs.
Machine gun fire was employed during the dive bombing attack.
Practically all bombs struck the hangar line and points in the rear
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 51
and were released at altitudes of 200 and 250 feet. After releasing
bombs, the planes continued to dive for a short distance and pulled
out at about the same angle as at the [^08] start of the dive.
After the first dive bombing the formation broke, apparently in all
directions, with individual planes continuing gun fire without regard
to the possibility of collision. This phase of the attack was carried on
from altitudes of approximately 200 feet and the only semblance of
order appeared to be that planes circled counterclockwise. Principal
targets for this gim fire were our planes on the hangar line and build-
ings, and personnel in the immediate vicinity. All planes in the first
attacking formation appeared similar and were single-engine, low-
wing monoplanes. While not positively established, it is presumed
from evidence of 20 millimeters fire that this attack included fighters in
support of dive bombers. The entire attack lasted approximately 15
minutes.
Another attack struck Wheeler Field a few minutes after 9 a. m.
This attack consisted of seven enemy planes which approached from
the south, flying roughly in line at an altitude of about 500 feet. They
fired machine guns at planes being taxied onto the airdrome, but it is
believed that no plane fired more than 25 to 50 rounds. All seven
planes were single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, two-seaters. They
withdrew to the north. The whole second attack lasted less than 5
minutes and could very reasonably have been [^09] made by a
group of planes expending the remainder of their ammunition.
During the first raid at Wheeler Field, personnel were employed in
rescuing the wounded, fighting the numerous fires and in removing
airplanes from danger. As soon as undamaged aircraft had been
rolled away to a safe place, the crews began arming them.
On Bellows Field at the time of the attack the P— iO's were parked
in line at 10 to 15 feet intervals. The reconnaissance planes were also
parked in a line at slightly greater intervals.
I might point out that those aircraft on the white squares represent
the original formation as it was at the time of the first attack. We have
also represented aircraft in blue squares dispersed over the field.
Those are the same aircraft represented as being initially in line.
After the first attack they were all over the field.
A single Japanese fighter plane initiated the attack at approxi-
mately 8:30 a. m. It came directly from the east and employed
machine-gun fire on the tent area apparently expending all its ammu-
nition in this one attack.
At about 9 a. m., the nine fighters attacked Bellows Field from the
north in three groups of three planes each in V formation. This
attack lasted about 15 mhmtes and [ii^] consisted of gim fire
only. It was initiated with a diving attack of all nine planes, after
which the three formations of three each peeled olf and attacked from
various directions. The antiaircraft defense during this attack on
Bellows Field consisted of small-arms fire by elements of the Two
Hundred and Ninety-eighth Infantry.
After the single plane, tent-area attack, one of the B-17's which
had arrived from the mainland and which had been unable to land
at Hickam Field, attempted to land at Bellows Field but rolled off
the runway. And that can be seen on the chart in the orange circle,
the approximate position where it left the runway. This plane was
repeatedly machine-gunned by the nine attacking planes.
52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The attack at Bellows Field appeared to be well planned, rehearsed,
and well executed. One plane was reported shot down by the Infantry
troops defending the area but no part of it was recovered from the
sea for identification.
At Haleiwa — you might point that out, Captain, on the big map —
the planes of the Forty-seventh Pursuit Squadron were parked in the
open in close formations. However, Haleiwa Field was not attacked.
In all these attacks on Oahu airfields, strafing planes came down to
a very low altitude. Thej^ used .50 caliber, 7.7 millimeter and 20
millimeter ammunition. Rigid flight discipline was [-?-?-?]
demonstrated by the enemy and accurate bombing was evidenced.
Such attacks could not have been performed without numerous and
detailed rehearsals. Every movement was well executed. The evi-
dence indicates that the attacks on the airfields were made by a maxi-
mum of 105 airplanes ; the number may have been less since some of
the planes may have taken part in more than one attack.
After 9 : 45 a. m., December 7, there were no further attacks on
Oahu installations. Despite numerous false reports, no landings
were attempted.
A few bombs were dropped in Honolulu, but probably this was the
result of individual planes clearing their bomb racks before departing.
There was some strafing and a few bombs were dropped on Schofield
Barracks and Fort Shafter, Several bursts of machine-gini fire were
delivered at targets other than military objectives.
When the first bombs were dropped and machine-gun fire com-
menced, practically all observers were so surprised that for a few
minutes the real situation was not grasped. Perhaps 2 or 4 minutes
elapsed before General Short was informed by his chief of staff that
an attack was in progress. General Short immediately directed that
all troops be turned out under alert No. 3.
This alert required all units to occupy battle positions shown on this
map — [-?-?^] which I will explain in a moment — in the short-
est possible time and to defend Oahu. All troops accordingly moved
to their prescribed positions. The advance command post of the
Hawaiian Department was operating in Aliamanu Crater by 8 : 45
a. m. with limited personnel, and the advance command posts of the
Twenty-fifth Division and of the Hawaiian Air Force by 11 a. m.
Rear echelons remained at their normal locations — which, for the
department, was Fort Shafter; for the division, Schofield Barracks.
At Schofield Barracks, Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, commanding
the Twenty-fourth Division, first heard the sounds of an attack at
about 8 : 05 a. m. Within a few minutes his chief of staff had issued
instructions to the units to get their machine guns into the antiaircraft
positions, to increase the standing guard and to send patrols through-
out the division sector — which was the northern half of the island —
to observe the beaches. Before he had left his quarters, General Wil-
son heard some of our machine guns in operation. About 8 : 50 a. m.
the division received word from department headquarters that alert
No. 3 would go into effect at once. Approximately 90 percent of the
Twenty-fourth Division troops were present for duty on the morning
of December 7, according to a report made shortly after by the Ha-
waiian Department. The division was in position in [-?-?'5] the
north sector by 5 p. m. with ammunition except for the 240's, 240-
millimeter howitzers.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 53
The disposition of the division, Twenty-fourth Division, as shown
on the map, can be picked up by the crossed rifles for Infantry posi-
tions, by the cannon for Field Artillery battalions, and the main line
of resistance on the east coast can be seen following the ridge line of
the Koolau Range on the east and the Waianae Kange on the west.
Maj. Gen. Maxwell Murray, commanding the Twenty-fifth Infantry
Division, stated that the attack began about 7 : 53 a. m. Some machine
guns were in firing positions on the roofs within 10 minutes. Alert
No. 3 was placed in etf ect at about 9 o'clock. Some ammunition — other
than high explosive — had been moved into the barracks which meant
that most of the men had as much as 30 rounds. About 85 percent
of the Twenty -fifth Division troops were reported present for duty at
the time of the attack. By 4 p. m., on the Ttli all units of the Twenty-
fifth Infantry Division were in war positions in the south sector with
ammunition, except for the 240-millimeter howitzers. Map shows
sectors and subsectors of responsibility in the south sector.
The yellow squares, the antiaircraft, which I will discuss in a mo-
ment, of course, were not under division control. Again, the crossed
rifles indicate the Infantry [^^4-] and the w-heel cannon the
Field Artillery, indicating the disposition under alert No. 3.
Under alert No. 1, the harbor defense troops of the Coast Artillery
Command were at their gun positions while the antiaircraft units
remained at their home stations and guarded against sabotage. On
December 7, some of the AA units got into position in 15 or 20 minutes,
but others had to go to the other side of the island and were not in
position until afternoon. A detailed account of the movement of anti-
aircraft units is given on pages 11 and 12 of the Army exhibit. An
estimated 87 percent of the Coast Artillery personnel were present for
duty at 8 a. m., December 7. No Coast Artillery Command oihcers
were reported absent at the time of the attack except one who was
killed trying to get back to his place of duty.
Maps captured from planes shot down in the attack indicated that
the enemy had complete and up-to-date information concerning the
exact dispositions of military forces, depots, and engineering
establishments.
ir*ercent mustered : A summary of a report compiled by the adjutant
general of the Hawaiian Department indicates that at least 85 percent
of the officers and men were present with their units at 8 a. m., Decem-
ber 7.
[US] Now, going back to the subject of aircraft, and the results
of the attack, also the condition of aircraft before the attack, at the
time of the attack the Hawaiian Air Force, in common with other
units of the Hawaiian Department, was operating under alert No. 1.
General jSIartin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, had informed
his subordinates that it was a real and not a practice alert. He had
further instructed that aircraft would not be dispersed and that all
units would continue training under condition "Easy 5."
"Easy" being phonetic for "E."
"Eas3^ 5'' — E-5 under the standing operating procedure — meant that
all aircraft would continue to conduct routme training operations,
with none in readiness for combat operations, and with 4 hours' time
allowed for the first plane of each unit to be in the air, armed, and
prepared for combat.
54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page 10 of the Army exhibit shows when and in what numbers planes
took off from Oahu Army airfields after the attack, and page 9 of the
same exhibit shows the status of all combat planes before and after the
attack as reported by the Hawaiian Air Force. In this connection
attention is invited to the fact that final reports to the War Depart-
ment show that total plane losses was somewhat greater than initially
reported. In explanation of the disparity it [li(>] should be
stated that to meet the emergency created by the attack certain dam-
aged planes which normally might have been repaired were stripped
for parts and destroyed.
The attention of the committee is invited to the chart which has just
been placed on the easel and which is a blowup of the exhibit previously
referred to, the status of combat planes before and after the attack.
The color code is applied to the number of planes in each column. The
blue indicating planes in commission, the buff' out of commission, and
finally the total on hand, and at the head of each column where the
numerical designation of the plane is given, if that designation is on
the green background, that plane was considered obsolete by the Air
Force.
The yellow code, which occurs only in the columns "After Attack,"
indicates those aircraft which were destroyed.
At Hickam Field, prior to the attack, 6 heavy bombers — B-17 — 20
nonmodern medium bombers — B-18 — and 5 modern light bombers —
A.-20 — were in commission but were not ready for immediate use be-
cause they were not loaded with bombs and ammunition. The follow-
ing planes were on hand but out of commission for reasons indicated :
Six B-l7's — engine repair, fuel tank repair, 60-hour inspection, 200-
hour inspection, and carburetor repair ;
Twelve B-lS's, overhaul, damaged landing gear, damaged [^^7]
elevator, and first echelon maintenance ;
Seven A-20's — damaged wing flaps, repair and first echelon mainte-
nance.
First echelon maintenance is maintenance of a nature which can be
performed by the crew of the plane ; 50-hour inspection is an inspection
and overhaul of each plane which is required to be made after each 50
hours of flight ; and 200-hour inspection is a more thorough overhaul
made after 200 hours of flight.
After the attack, 8 B-17"s were on hand of which 4 were usable ; 20
B-18's were on hand of which 10 were usable ; 10 A-20's were on hand
with 5 usable. Eighteen of our combat planes were lost on Hickam
Field. It was 11 : 27 a. m. — as shown in another exhibit — when the
first four A-20's took off from the field for combat.
At Wheeler Field and Haleiwa prior to the attack, the following
planes were in commission but not ready for immediate use since they
were unarmed ; 82 pursuit, 52 P-40's, 20 P-36's, 10 P-26's ; 2 medium
bombers, 1 B-12A, 1 B-18 ; 2 light bombers, A-12 ; 5 reconnaissance
1 0-47, 1 OA-8, 3 OA-y's; and o advanced trainers, AT-6; which are
not shown on the chart, the chart including only combat aircraft.
On hand but out of commission for maintenance work were [i^S]
these additional planes : 2 B-12's, 35 P-40's, 19 P-36's, 4 P-26's and
1 AT-6 — not shown on the chart.
After the attack, the number of usable planes by type were as follows :
27 out of a total of 57 P-40's, 16 out of 35 P-36's, 4 out of 8 r-26's, 1
B-18, 1 out of 3 B-12's, 1 of 2 AT-6's, 1 0-47, 1 OA-8 and 1 OA-9.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 55
Forty-two combat planes were lost in the attack in this airdrome. At
8 : 30 a. m. the first aircraft, four P-40's and two P-36's took off for
combat.
Planes assigned to the Forty-seventh Pursuit Squadron, which was
in training at Haleiwa Airfield — and they have been included in this
Wheeler chart— consisted of 17 pursuit, 13 P-40's, 2 P-36's, 2 P-26's,
and 1 medium bomber, B-12. That is the table of organization
strength of the unit.
The exact number of planes at Haleiwa on the morning of Decem-
ber 7 is not known. The field was alerted at 8 : 15 a. m. Between 8 : 15
and 10 a. m. two flights were made, each consisting of four P-40's
and one P-36. Four enemy planes were downed by the first flight
while the second flight downed three. One pilot was lost over Sclio-
field Barracks.
At Bellows Field 12 pursuit planes, P-40; and 6 reconnaissance
planes, 4 0-47's, 2 0-49's; were in commission prior to the attack.
However, none of these were ready L^-?^] for immediate use
because their weapons were not loaded with ammunition. An addi-
tional two reconnaissance planes, 0^7, were located at Bellows Field
but were out of commission for engine change. It was 9 : 50 a. m.
before the first 0-47 took off. Three of our combat aircraft were
destroyed on this field.
After the attack on December 7, about 11 :40 a. m., four A-20's and
two B-l7's took off. Also at 3 :20 p. m., three B-l7's were dispatched,
as a result of a request of the Navy, to search for an enemy carrier.
The search was unsuccessful and they returned at 6 :25 p. m.
As for the antiaircraft their activities subsequent to the attack,
shown as previously mentioned on pages 11 and 12 of the Army
exhibit, show the time required for the various units of the Fifty-third
Coast Artillery Brigade, Antiaircraft to take battle positions after
the attack of December 7 and the extent to which they engaged the
enemy.
Under alert No. 1 only a limited amount of ammunition was in the
hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast Artillery
command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn,
ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft. How-
ever, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order to
keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammuni-
tion for the [120] mobile guns and batteries was in storage
chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks. The Infantry
and Artillery units of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Divisions
had only a small amount of machine-gun and rifle ammunition. All
divisional artillery ammunition, grenades, and mortar shells were in
the ordnance storage depots, principally at Schofield Barracks.
The 3-inch antiaircraft gun issued to units in Hawaii at that time
had a maximum effective range of about 10,000 yards. It had a mini-
mum effective range of about 2,000 yards.
The 37 millimeter antiaircraft gun had a maximum horizontal range
of 9,300 yards, and a maximum vertical range of approximately 6,300
yards.
This concludes the Army's story of the attack.
[121] Admiral Inglis. Turning now to the Navy's aircraft and
state of readiness of aircraft and antiaircraft guns, the committee will
find in item 12 of the white folder the locations, squadrons, numbers
56
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of planes in commission, types, numbers available, numbers in oper-
ating condition, readiness in operating; condition, readiness of crews,
numbers participating in combat and service assigned to land based
naval and Marine planes in the Hawaiian area.
Item 13 of the white folder contains this information summarized on
a chart showing location of the fields and stations.
The planes in flight at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor were
armed for combat as follows :
The 7 patrol flying boats in the air, 3 from Kaneohe and 4 from Ford
Island, all carried machine guns and were fully supplied with ammuni-
tion. In addition to machine guns and ammunition, the three planes
from Kaneohe searching the fleet operating areas south of Oahu were
armed with two depth charges each for use against submarines. These
planes were working with the destroyer Ward. One of these aircraft
dropped one depth chnrge in an attack on a submarine in the defensive
sea area off Pearl Harbor at 6 : 45 Hawaiian time. Utility Squadron 3,
stationed at Maui Airport, which was the new naval air station at
Puunene. seems to have had some {122'] planes in the air prior
to 7 : 50, Hawaiian time, on the day of the attack. These planes are
not combat planes and do not normally carry armament. Available
reports do not indicate the state of armanipnt of the scout bombers
from the Enterprise that arrived over Pearl Harbor during the attack.
As they engaged the enemy, it appears that machine guns were
equipped and ammunition provided.
Next, antiaircraft: There were no naval antiaircraft shore batteries
in or around Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack. All
naval antiaircraft batteries were ship-based, and were composed of the
following types and number of guns :
Gun types
Number
Maximum range
Maximum
eflective
range yards
Ceiling-feet
Yards
136
96
121
427
37, 200
26, 300
21, 700
15,900
13,500
11,000
12,000
7,000
5,000
6-lnch, 38 caliber antiaircraft
5-inch, 26 caliber antiaircraft -
3-inch, 50 caliber antiaircraft
Antiaircraft machine guns from J.l inch to .30 caliber
« Effective ranges of 500 to 2,500 yards.
Effective range is that range at which fire should be opened with
reasonable chance that fire would produce damage on the target.
{l^S] ^ Antiaircraft guns by ship classes and types of guns is
shown in item 14 of Navy folder.
Official reports indicate that all naval antiaircraft batteries were
in operating condition. The number of temporary gun stoppages
during action was so low as to be negligible and when such momentary
stoppages occurred, except as guns were knocked out in battle casual-
ties, they were quickly remedied.
All ships had the full service allowance of ammunition on board
except in a few cases where removal was necessary because of repairs
in progress.
All ships had ready ammunition at the guns in accordance with
existing directives. Battleships and cruisers had 15 rounds per gun
for two guns of the 5-inch antiaircraft batterv and 300 rounds per
gun for half of the 50-caliber machine guns. The destroyers present
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 57
all had 50-caliber ammunition available and some o-iiich ammunition.
Although the initial attack -^as launched as a surprise, ready machine
guns opened fire at once and all batteries except those on ships under-
gomg overhaul took up the fire within approximately 7 minutes after
the attack was initiated.
The considerable amount of ammunition available is shown by a
tabulation of all romids expended.
There were 1,665 rounds of 5-inch 38-caliber antiaircraft [i^-^]
ammunition fired.
There were 1,523 rounds of 5-inch 25-caliber antiaircraft ammuni-
tion fired.
There were 1,741 rounds of 3-inch 50-caliber antiaircraft ammuni-
tion fired.
There were 275,807 rounds of machine-gun ammunition fired.
At the time of the attack, rouglily one- fourth of all shipboard anti-
aircraft gmis were manned, and within 7 to 10 minutes, all anti-
aircraft batteries were manned and firing.
Keady antiaircraft machine guns opened fire immediately and
within an average estimated time of under 5 minutes practically all
battleship antiaircraft batteries were firing; cruisers were firing all
antiaircraft batteries within an average time of 4 minutes; and
destroyers, though opening up with machine guns almost immediately,
averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action.
Minor combatant types had all joined in the fire within 10 minutes
after the beginning of the attack.
Turning next to the question of sabotage, there is no record of
any sabotage during the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Next the subject of first aid : The dead and wounded were handled
by a number of naval medical activities ; battle dressing stations and
sick bays of [i^5] the warships; hospital ship /So/ace/ United
States Naval Hospital; dispensaries of the two naval air stations;
Marine Corps air station at Ewa; defense battalions of the Fleet
Marine Force ; navy yard dispensary ; section base dispensary ; ammu-
nition depot dispensary, and at a ''field hospital" which was set up in
the officers' club of the navy yard shortly after the attack.
Three hundred thirty dead and 1,113 wounded were brought to
naval hospital stations during the period December 7-10. Many
others died who were trapped in capsized or sunken sliips.
Colonel Thielen will take up from here.
[1£6^ Colonel Thielex. As to the miscellaneous subjects of
hostile agents, sabotage, and civilian protection I have a few remarks.
Prior to the attack, all known Japanese, Italian, and German agents
had been listed by Army G-2, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
Naval Intelligence. Within a few hours after the attack the Japanese
agents were being apprehended and assembled in the Immigration
Station, Honolulu. All agents were subsequently assembled in the
Quarantine Station on Sand Island, the total being 370 Japanese, 98
Germans, and 14 Italians.
There are no proven instances of sabotage before, during, or after
the attack, although the jamming of radio frequencies which occurred
immediately after the attack and which made communication difficult
may have been due, in part, to sabotage.
By noon the roads were becoming jammed with traffic going in every
direction. Under the direction of Mr. Addison Kirk and his civilian
58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
relief committee, the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., which operates a
large number of busses, immediately moved into Hickam Field and
Fort Kamehameha, and started evacuating civilians from these areas.
All during Sunday afternoon and the following day the evacuation of
civilians continued, most of them being quartered in schools and homes
[1^7] throughout the city. At Fort Shafter, where the head-
quarters of the Interceptor Command was being constructed in a spur
of the Koolau Mountains, the women and children of Fort Shafter
and a few from Schofield barracks were accommodated. Slit trenches
were being dug at all the posts and in parks, school grounds, and all
open places accessible to civil communities.
Admiral Inglis will take on from here.
[12S] Admiral Inglis. With respect to damage to Navy ships,
a general description of the damage to naval vessels has been given
in the narrative. In item 15 of the Navy folder the members of the
committee will find a complete detailed description of this damage,
with the first sheet being a summary.
Item 16, Navy folder, describes the loss of 87 nonairborne naval air-
craft, and the loss of five airborne planes from the carrier Enterprise,
for a total of 92 planes, and itemizes also the damage to installations
at Ford Island Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Naval Air Station, and
the Marine Air Base at Ewa.
Now, turning to the damage to Japanese, it was estimated that the
Japanese lost a total of 28 planes, most of which were dive bombers
and torpedo planes, due to Navy action.
Three Japanese submarines of 45 tons each and carrying two tor-
pedoes were accounted for; two were destroyed by Navy action and
one was grounded off Bellows Field and recovered.
From reports available to the commander in chief, it is estimated
that the Japanese lost, due solely to Navy action, a minimum of 68
killed. An estimate of wounded cannot be made. One officer, an
ensign, was taken prisoner when he abandoned the small submarine
which grounded off Bellows Field.
[129] The above report on the Japanese damages or losses does
not include operational losses, only losses in combat.
With respect to efforts to track the Japs after the attack, air
searches to track the Japanese striking force were ordered and carried
out without result.
Colonel Thielen will take over now.
[ISO] Colonel Thielen. As to the Army casualties and the dam-
age suffered by Army installations, on page 13 of the Army exhibit
there is a list of Army casualties in the Hawaiian Department on
December 7, 1941. They were :
Killed in action 194
Wounded in action 360
Missing in action 22
Died, nonbattle 2
Declared dead (Public Law, 490) 1
Died of wounds 21
Total 600
In addition to the extensive damage to installations on airfields
shown by the various photographs submitted herewith, final reports
show that 96 Army planes were lost as a result of enemy action on
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 59
December 7. This figure includes aircraft destroyed in depots and also
those damaged planes which were stripped for parts.
As to the damage done to Japanese, General Short reported that 11
enemy aircraft were shot down by Army pursuit planes and antiair-
craft fire.
[ISl] Admiral Inglis. The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a
total of 2,835 casualties, of which 2,086 officers and men were killed
or fatally woimded. Seven hundred and fifty-nine wounded survived.
None were missing.
Next with respect to the conduct and behavior under fire of the
personnel.
In the accounts of some 90 ships under attack, commanding officers
have recorded hundreds of acts of heroism in keeping with the highest
traditions of the naval service. No instance is recorded in which the
behavior of crews or individuals left anything to be desired.
References to individual valor are replete with such acts as —
(1) Medical officers and hospital corpsmen rendering aid and treat-
ment while they themselves needed help.
(2) Officers and men recovering dead and wounded through flame
and from flooded compartments.
(3) Fighting fires while in actual physical contact with the flames.
(4) Handling and passing ammunition under heavy fire and
strafing.
(5) Repairing ordnance and other equipment under fire.
(6) Remaining at guns and battle stations though wounded or
while ships were sinking.
[1S£] (7) Reporting for further duty to other ships after being
blown off their own sinking vessels.
For deeds of extreme heroism on December 7, 15 Medals of Honor
have been awarded and 60 Navy Crosses.
Colonel Thielen will now take over.
[133] Colonel Thielen. On the Army side, too, acts of heroism
were numerous. Five Distinguished Service Crosses and 65 Silver
Stars were awarded to Army personnel for heroism displayed during
the December 7 attack.
That concludes the Army's narrative of the attack.
Admiral Inglis. That also concludes the Navy's formal presentation.
[ISi] Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, the Navy had the Fourteenth
Naval District and the Pacific Fleet. This story you have developed
covered both ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. As I pointed out, the Fourteenth Naval
District in this particular instance was under the command of the
commander-in-chief and the presentation that I have given covers the
activities of both the forces afloat and the forces ashore in the Four-
teenth Naval District.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, as I understand it, the Navy commands had for
antiaircraft defense only the antiaircraft guns based on the ships?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell, You said something about marines on shore setting
up machine guns. I was not so clear about that.
Admiral Inglis. The marines that I mentioned ashore as firing back
at the Japanese planes during the attack were the personnel of the
Marine air squadrons at Ewa and those machine guns, I think in most
cases, were stripped from the — perhaps not stripped, but taken from
60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the armory and comprised the guns which normally would be used
by the aircraft themselves.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, the only other defense the naval com-
mand had when under attack was in the airplane defense ?
[JSS] Admiral Inglis. That is correct, to the best of my knowl-
edge.
Mr. Mitchell. And those planes, as I understood you, were carrier
planes that came in and became land based at Ford Island as their
carriers came into port, except for some that were on the cruisers, two
or three per cruiser ?
Admiral Inglis. The planes that I mentioned from the carriers were
en route — no, I take that back. They were sent out by the Enterprise
on search and then when the attack developed they were diverted in an
attempt to repel the Japanese attack.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you sum up and state how many naval planes
of the fighter type capable of fighting enemy planes got into the air
before the attack was over?
Admiral Inglis. Before the attack was opened
Mr. Mitchell. Over.
Admiral Inglis. Oh, before the attack was over ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, after it commenced and before it ended. I am
not interested in those which got into the air after it was over.
Admiral Inglis. I have a table here which I think will give you the
information that you asked for.
At the naval station, Ford Island, there was a total of 70 planes
before the attack started. Of these 19 were destroyed, [ISSl 14
were damaged and 37 were left undamaged. Of those 37 planes, 31
were utility planes, not designed for combat, 4 were the patrol planes
already in flight and 2 were in the shop under repairs, so that there
were no planes at Ford Island available to engage in combat except the
four which were already in flight. That is from the Ford Island
Station.
Mr. Mitchell. And you say none of them got into the air at all?
Admiral Inglis. None except four which were already in the air.
They were in the air before the fight started.
Mr. Mitchell. They were in the air before the fight started?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
At Kaneohe 37 planes were attached to the air station. 28 of those
were destroyed, 6 were damaged, 3 were undamaged and those 3 which
were undamaged were in the air before the attack.
At Ewa 49 Marine planes were based at that naval air station and
of those 49, 33 were destroyed and 16 damaged, leaving none in oper-
ating condition.
At Maui there were a total of eight planes but all of those planes
were utility planes and not designed for combat operations. None of
those, of course, were damaged.
At Johnston Island there were two PBY's undamaged. I have
[137] no information on the employment of those, but Jolinston
Island is a long way from Hawaii.
Mr. Mitchell. A PB Y is an observation plane ?
Admiral Inglis. The PBY is a long range airplane.
Mr. Mitchell. Not a fighter?
Admiral Inglis. Not a fighter; no, sir; but equipped with fairly
respectable armament.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 61
At Midway there were 12 PBY's. None of these 12 was damaged,
of course, because Midway was not attacked, but these jdanes were
on the search, as has already been described.
Now, in addition to that the Northampton^ a heavy cruiser,
launched two or her observation planes which are not very effi-
cient as fighters but, nevertheless, they did succeed in shooting down
one Japanese plane off the Island of Niihau.
That is about the extent of my information in answer to your
question, sir.
\^138^ Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Thielen, as I understand it, the
Army exhibit, in accordance with the statement on page 10, covers that
information from the Army standpoint, does it? Is that complete?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; that is complete to the best of my knowl-
edge and belief.
Mr. Mitchell. According to that, on Hickam Field the first plane
that got into the air was at 11 : 27 ?
Colonel Thielen. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. The attack was over by that time?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; the attack was well over.
Mr. Mitchell. At Wheeler Field you got some P-40's up at 8 : 34 ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. That is a figliter group ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I believe that is a significant point.
The airplanes at Hickam Field were bombers and those at Wheeler
Field were pursuit ships, as they called them in those days, fighters
as we call them now, which did get up all right.
Mr. Mitchell. You got some up at 8 : 20, some at 8 : 55, an hour
after the attack started, some at 9 : 15 and some at 9 : 30. Those
were all the planes at "VVlieeler Field that had gotten into the air?
\^139'] Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, since 9 : 35 is taken as the
definite termination of the attack.
Mr. Mitchell. What are those at 7 : 47 at Bellows Field and that one
that you say got up at 9 : 15 ?
Colonel Thielen. Those are observation airplanes.
Mr. Mitchell. Have you a summary of your figures to show how
many planes of fighting type the Army forces had in commission and
how many of them got into the air before the attack was over ? Could
you secure that for us? Could 3^011 sum that \\\^ for us without too
much trouble ?
Colonel Thielen. I think the exhibit on the preceding page, taken in
connection with that which you cited, sir, on page 10 do tell a complete
story. The exhibit on page 9 is that which I have displa}' ed on a chart.
I will be glad to recall the chart.
Mr. Mitchell. No. Ithought maybe you had a total. Well, that is
satisfactory; the committee can see it.
Will the committee inquire?
The Chairman. Senator George?
Senator George. I have no questions.
The Chairman. Congressman Cooper?
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly.
I^IJ^O'] Admiral, as I understood you, on December 7, 1911, the
Pacific Fleet was about three-fourths the size of the Atlantic Fleet,
but I understood you to say the Pacific Fleet was more modern and
stronger or had larger vessels ? Is that correct ?
79716 — 46— pt. 1 7
62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR A^rTACK
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, Mr. Congressman, except that the
figure was two-thirds.
The Vice Chairman. Two-thirds ?
Admiral Inglis. Rather than three-fourths.
The Vice Chairman. And I also understood you to say that there
were no searches made on December 6, 1941, by aircraft.
Admiral Inglis. That is not correct. We have no written record of
any searches except the search from the Enterprise which is shown on
the chart.
Tiie Vice Chairman. Were there any searches made the day before
that anywhere near this approximate time ?
Admiral Inglis. I am not prepared to answer that specifically. I
might hazard an opinion that there were.
The Vice Chairman. Then one other question, if I may, while along
the line of General Mitchell's inquiry.
According to item 11 of the Navy exhibit presented here, it is shown
that the Japanese aircraft participating in this attack totaled 105.
Is that correct? Item 11 of your white exhibit here, the second page of
that, it shows there, total {,1-^1^ number of planes making at-
tack, including those which repeated, and out at the right hand column,
"Total 156.". Then under that, "Total number of planes, exclusive
of those which repeated," it totals 105.
Admiral Inglis. I have those figures now, sir. I must say that that
number — that is the number of planes which repeated their attacks
and, therefore, are counted as more than once in the first figure,
is necessarily an estimate but our best estimate, according to the
records that wo have available, is 105 as the total number of planes
which actually attacked.
The Vice Chairman. As far as the Navy and Army can ascer-
tain
Admiral Inglis. No, these are only Navy figures.
The Vice Chairman. Well, I understood the colonel to give the
same figure in his statement. You agreed on that. So far as the
x^rmy and Navy knew at that time there were 105 Japanese planes
that participated in the attack?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, then, are you prepared to tell us what
the United States air strength in Hawaii was at that time ?
Admiral Inglis. I can tell you what the Navy air strength was.
That is contained in one of the exhibits.
[i^] In item 12 in the Navy folder you will find a table giving,
among other things, the number of planes attached to the various
squadrons and stationed at the various naval air stations.
The Vice Chair3Ian. I have examined that, Admiral, in an effort to
get the information I am now requesting. At least, it is not put up
in the same form as the Jap planes and I was wondering what the
total was.
Admiral Inglis. I would have to qualify any answer that I might
make to your question by pointing out that a large number of those
planes given in item 12 are utility types and not suitable for combat.
For instance, all of those marked "VJ" are utility type planes
and that takes out a large proportion of the total as being suitable
for combat operations. Those planes are used for towing target
sleeves for antiaircraft fire and for transport and things of that
nature, duties other than combat.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 63
The Vice CHAiRiiAiSr. Well, in an effort to not detain you unduly
as I am sure other members of the committee want to inquire, could
you gentlemen give me a figure that would compare with the 105
Jap planes which made the attack?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; if you will bear with me just a moment
while I add them up. I come out with the answer 52.
Mr. Gesell. That is Navy planes?
[14^] Admiral Inglis. Those are Navy planes.
The Vice Chairman. Navy planes 52 ?
Admiral Inglis. 52 Navy planes comparable in design to the Japa-
nese planes which made the attack. That excludes the utility planes
and the PBY's.
The Vice Chairman. In other words, this 52 would be the number
of combat Navy planes ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
Admiral Inglis. I think I should add, to make the story complete,
that that does not include the planes from the carriers, that is, the
Enterprise and Lexington. These are only the planes based on
Hawaii.
The Vice Chairman. W^I^j ^ow many carrier planes were in a
position that they could have been used ?
Admiral Inglis. The Enterprise was 200 miles away from Pearl
Harbor at the time and any planes that she might have had available
to participate in the attack would have been nearly at the extreme
limit of their radius of action. However, there were 18 Enterprise
planes which did get into the general area of the attack.
The Vice Chairman. Eighteen?
Admiral Inglis. So if you cared to 3'ou could add the 18 to the 52,
making a total of 70.
\_llfjf] The Vice Chairman. Now, at what stage of the attack
did these 18 get into it ?
Admiral Inglis. Those planes took off from the Enterprise shortly
after 6 a. m. The attack was launched at 7:55 a. m. and 3 of the
planes landed at 9 : 40 and 10 at 10 : 15. I would gather from that
that the Enterprise planes reached the scene of the attack at an esti-
mated time of perhaps 9 o'clock.
The Vice Chairman. Would that be during the time the attack
was in progress?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Were there any other carrier planes that were
available there, such as you have described about the Enterprise?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; no other carrier planes.
The Vice Chairman. And no others that did participate?
Admiral Inglis. The only other planes that we have not already
covered were the two planes from the Northampton and, again, those
planes are not of combat type. Thej^ were observation planes but they
did shoot down one Japanese plane in spite of their comparative
weakness.
The Vice Chairman. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the
colonel for the same type of information so far as the Army is
concerned.
\_lh5^ Colonel Thielen. First, sir, I would like to correct what
I believe is your impression that only 105 planes were involved in
attacks on both Army and Navy installations. Is that correct?
64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. That is the way I understood it.
Colonel Thielen. I want to say that is not the Army view. We
consider that 105 airplanes is our estimate of the number that were
involved in the attacks only on Army installations and I believe it is
a mere coincidence that the Navy has the same figure.
The Vice Chairman. Well, the figure is the same in both state-
ments. Does that mean, then, that there were just exactly 105 planes
that attacked the Army and just exactly 105 planes that attacked the
Navy?
Colonel Thielen. I am not prepared to say how many attacked
the Navy, but our estimate is 105 aircraft attacking Army installa-
tions only.
Mr. Mitchell. We will give you later the Japanese story showing
how many planes they sent. This is only confusion and guesswork,
these figures that are given here.
Colonel Thh:len. It is purely an estimate. It is obtained by add-
ing up the total number of aircraft reported by observers at the three
Army fields attacked. It is entirely possible that there is considerable
duplication, as no one [^4^] was in a position to observe more
than one airfield at a time.
The Vice Chairman. Well, I had this figure. I had just assumed
from what I heard you both say that there were 105 Japanese planes
engaged in the attack and I had assumed that that was the total num-
ber of Japanese planes.
Colonel Thielen. As I say, the Army considers that 105 aircraft
attacked Army installations.
The Vice Chairman. What do you have to say about that, Ad-
miral ?
Admiral Inglis. I have the same thing, Mr. Cooper. The figure
of 105 is just an estimate.
The Vice Chairman. I understood that.
Admiral Inglis. It is just impossible to arrive at a precise figure
because, as you know, there was a great deal of confusion at that time
and this is just the best that we can make of the reports that we have
and the estimate is 105 planes engaged in the attacks against naval
ships and naval shore installations.
You remember that in answer to your question I tried to bring out
that these were Navy figures. These presentations that the colonel
and I have been making were made up separately. There is no, if I
may use the term, collusion between us except insofar as we have
arranged for certain portions L-?-^^] of the presentation to go
to the Army side and then certain portions to go to the Navy side, but
we have not tried to reconcile our figures.
The Vice Chairman. It had not occurred to me. Admiral, that
there was any collusion but I was rather in the position of hoping to
congratulate you gentlemen if the Army's estimate of the number of
Jap planes and the Navy's estimate of the number of Jap planes hap-
pened to be the same. I thought you were doing remarkably good
estimating if you were both estimating the same.
Admiral Inglis, I am afraid in all modesty I will have to admit
that that is a pure coincidence.
The Vice Chairman. What I was trying to find out was how many
Jap planes were attacking us.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 65
Admiral Inglis. As Mr. Mitchell has said, Mr. Cooper, a later pres-
entation will give the Japanese side of the story and I think we will
get much more accurate figures from that.
The Vice Chairman. All right. I was hoping to ascertain, so far
as you could tell us, the number of Jap planes that were attacking us.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And the strength of the United States air-
craft in Hawaii at that time, combat planes that might have been
used in meeting or repelling that attack.
114^1 Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. That is what I was hoping to get.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. I think you have the whole figure. It is
70 in the case of the Navy.
The Vice Chairman. Seventy in the case of the Navy?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, and our best estimate of the Japanese
planes that were making the attack, that is, from the American point
of view, without the Japanese intelligence before us, was 105 against
naval targets.
The Vice Chairman. Now, let me see if I can get some help from
you, Colonel.
Colonel Thlelen. I would like to point out first that no aircraft
were armed and equipped for combat against these Japanese, but of
the pursuit aircraft in commission on Oahu at the time of the attack
we had 94 pursuit aircraft before the attack and 53 after the attack.
The Vice Chairman. Ninety-four before the attack?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And your total number was what. Admiral?
Admiral Inglis. My total was 52 shore-based planes, plus the 18
from the Enterprise, making 70.
The Vice Chairman. That is 164 for the Army and Navy.
A question to both of you gentlemen. Are you prepared to
[i4^] give us some estimate of the number of Japanese planes that
attacked both Army and Navy installations ?
Admiral Inglis. Tlie only way I could answer that would be to add
Colonel Thielen's figures to mine and that would be 210, but there
again, Mr. Cooper, we must qualify that by saying that some of these
reports have been duplicated. Perhaps the same plane attacked both a
Navy ship and an Army air station.
[150] The Vice Chairman. I can well understand that. I
would expect that to be the best guess.
Admiral Inglis. I would say the best estimate we can come out with
would be 210.
The Chairman. Senator George would like to ask a question.
Senator George. Admiral, I believe you stated this morning that
United States shipping along the northern route had been discon-
tinued as of November 25, 1941 ; is that correct ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Senator George. Did you assign any reason for that order for dis-
continuing the shipping on that route?
Admiral Inglis. This presentation that we have made' has omitted
all reference to any reasons for action taken.
Senator George. I merely wanted to get clear in my mind what you
said. You did not assign any reasons?
Admiral Inglis. I did not; no, sir.
66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. All right, Senator Lucas,
Senator Ltjcas. Admiral, in the earlier part of your testimony
you gave to the committee some facts with respect to the reconnais-
sance planes which took off on the morning of December 7. I am not
sure that I thoroughly understood just why the delay existed there,
or whether the evidence, or the records of the Navy disclose the reason
for that hour's delay of these planes taking off for reconnaissance work.
[ISl] Admiral Inglis. That, as I recall it, was the case of the
planes taking off from Midway
Senator Lucas. No ; not from Midway.
Admiral Inglis. You remember, Senator Lucas, I corrected that
word "sunrise" to make it read "dawn." The plan was to have these
planes take off at dawn, which is usually considered as 1 hour before
sunrise. That was the standing order, that they were to take off at
dawn, which was 5 : 27.
However, these planes did not actually take off until about 6 : 40,
which is even more than hour late. Those were the three patrol
planes from Kaneohe air station.
Senator Lucas. That is right. Are there any records which dis-
close the reason for the delay in taking off?
Admiral Inglis. There again, Senator, in our presentation we have
purposely avoided
Senator Lucas (Interposing) . I am not asking for your conclusion,
I am asking you whether or not you have discovered any records in
the Navy Department giving or disclosing any reasons why these three
reconnaissance planes were over an hour late in taking off on the dawn
patrol.
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I do not know the reason.
Senator Lucas. One other question with respect to those recon-
naissance planes: Do the records disclose the distances that these
reconnaissance planes covered on their usual dawn [ISB] pa-
trol flight?
Admiral Inglis. Those patrol planes were described in the exhibit
which is number — do you remember the zebra stripes?
Mr. Mitchell. Item 10.
Admiral Inglis. Item 10. Item 10 in the Navy folder, you will
find the horizontal stripes due south of Oahu. As I recall it that
distance was 120 miles.
Senator Lucas. 120 miles?
Admiral Inglis. 120 miles.
Senator Lucas. Now one other question. Do the records disclose
as to how long that patrol had been in existence previous to Decem-
ber 7? ^
Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question, sir. I do not know
whether they do or not.
Senator Lucas. Will counsel please take these questions that I am
asking and supply, if he can, the answer for the record? ^
You also discussed the sighting of the submarine at 3 : 50 in the
morning on the morning of December 7. You also stated that the com-
mander of that ship notified the comlmander of the destroyer Ward
that at 3 : 57 he had sighted the periscope of the submarine.
It is my understanding of your testimony that the Ward [ISS]
opened fire at 6 : 45 on that submarine, after sighting it at 6 : 40, and
' See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1887 et seq. ; see also Part 11, p. 5484 et seq.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 67
then the commander of the Ward reported to the commanding officer
at 6 : 54 that the submarine had been sunk.
Now who was the commanding officer at that time ?
Admiral Inglis. The name of the commanding officer of the Ward ^
Senator Lucas. Yes; the name of the commanding officer of the
Ward — or, I mean the name of the commanding officer to whom the
commander of the Ward reported.
Admiral Inglis. The Ward sent the dispatch to the office of the com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Senator Lucas. Who was in charge of it at that time ?
Admiral Inglis. The dispatch was delivered to the district duty
officer, who was Lt. Comdr. Harold Kaminski.
Senator Lucas. It was delivered to Lieutenant Commander Kamin-
ski, but who was in charge of the Fourteenth Naval District at that
time ?
Admiral Inglis. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict was Admiral Bloch.
Senator Lucas. Do the records show where Admiral Bloch was at
the time this message was delivered?
Admiral Inglis. To the best of my knowledge and belief, he was
in his quarters.
Senator Lucas. Do the records show whether or not he [i5^]
was notified by Lieutenant Commander Kaminski with respect to the
sinking of this submarine ?
Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I cannot answer that question.
Senator Lucas. Do the records show whom Kaminski — or whatever
his name is — notified about the sinking?
Admiral Inglis. Kaminski was notified and he in turn passed the
message to the headquarters of the commander in chief of the United
States Fleet.
Senator Lucas. Who received that message at the headquarters ?
Admiral Inglis. I haven't got that information. I can get it for
you-
Senator Lucas. I wish you would get it. Admiral Kimmel, of
course, was the gentleman in charge of the fleet at that time.
Admiral Inglis. Admiral Kimmel was commander in chief of the
United States Fleet and the Pacific Fleet.
Senator Lucas. Does the record show whether or not Admiral Kim-
mel received the message at any time before the attack ?
Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question either, sir.
Senator Lucas. According to your testimony the attack took place
at 7: 55.
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
\_166^ Senator Lucas. The submarine was sunk by the Ward at
6 : 54. I should like to know whether or not, during that hour's time,
Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel received any direct notice of the
sinking of that submarine.
Now of course we will ask the officer who made the report on the
sinking of the submarine to have it with him in the morning, to see
what importance was attached to the sinking of this submarine, as far
as the attack on Pearl Harbor is concerned.
Admiral Inglis. Senator, I would not expect that any of those
authorities or officials would have received the report that the sub-
68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
marine had been sunk, because the report of the Ward was "We have
attacked"
Senator Lucas. Whatever the report was — I do not care for the
report itself, but whatever the report was that went in.
Admiral Inglis. I will get that information for you.
Senator Lucas. I want to know why it happened, and if they made
a report on it, and whatever the report is, and to whom it went, and
especially would I like to know at what time — if there is any time —
that Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel received that report.
Admiral Inglis. We will get that information and insert it in the
record, if it is available.^
Senator Lucas. One other question and then I will be [^^6]
through.
When you say that the Fourteenth Naval District was under the
commander in chief, you mean the commander in chief of the Pacific
Fleet?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; Admiral Kimmel.
Senator Lucas. That is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Clark.
Senator Lucas. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman, before
you go to Congressman Clark ?
Do the records disclose as to whether or not those on patrol duty
around Pearl Harbor looking for submarines discovered at any time
previous to the morning of December 7 anything that would direct
their attention that submarines were in that area previous to the morn -
ing of December 7 ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; the records on that subject are completely
negative.
Senator Lucas. That is, up to that time, up to the morning of
December 7, as far as the record is concerned, there is no record that
shows that there was any danger from the standpoint of looking for
submarines, or a submarine attack, even though they were on guard
and the boys were looking for submarines ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, to the best of my knowledge.
[JS7] Senator Lucas, That is all. Admiral Inglis.
The Chairman, Congressman Clark.
Mr. Clark. Admiral, you showed a diagram this morning on the
extent of the plane patrol. The impression I gained was the extent
of the patrol immediately after the attack is shown in red.
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.
Mr. Clark. Would you mind having that map put back ?
Admiral Inglis. Commander Biard, will you put up the chart show-
ing the patrols,
Mr, Clark. Now what I was trying to get clear in ni}^ own mind, if
the red diagram there shows the extent of the patrols by the planes
around Pearl Harbor subsequent to the attack — is that right?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr, Clark. Is that a larger or a smaller area of patrol than had
been the case immediately prior to the attack ?
(The roll call buzzer sounded.)
The Chairman. I might say to the committee that that is a roll-
call vote in the Senate on the substitute offered by Senator Byrd to
the amendment offered by Senator Donnell to the reorganization bill,
' See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5293.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 69
The committee has been excused from attendance during the hearing
here.
Senator Ferguson. Without waiving my right to examine the
[i'5<§] witness, might I be excused just long enough to vote on that ?
I think it is an important matter.
The Chaikman. Yes, if the Senator wishes to, and if any other Sena-
tors wish to vote I think they may also be excused.
Senator Lucas. I am willing to give you one vote here.
The Chairman. What is the wish of the committee ?
Senator Brewster. I am willing to stay here and allow Senator
Ferguson to go.
Senator Ferguson. That is a very important vote. That is the only
reason why I ask to be excused.
The Chairman. The Senator may be excused. The Chair will
ask the Vice Chairman to take the Chair while he goes and votes.
The Vice Chaieman. The committee will please be in order.
You may proceed, Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark. You have my question.
Admiral Inglis. I believe your question was : Did the patrol which
was ordered immediately after the attack cover a greater area than
that which had normally been covered before the attack ?
Mr. Clark. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. To the best of my knowledge, the answer to that
question is "yes."
Mr. Ci-ARK. Now you gave us a very graphic picture of Pearl Harbor,
and the military establishment there, including [i^9] every-
thing on the airport and so forth. I am interested to know, and I as-
sume you would be the proper witness to ask, how that establishment
on the Hawaiian Islands, the military establishment, compares with
any other base or military establishment we may have had in the Pacific
area at that time, including the Philippine Islands, as to size and
strength and equipment, and munitions of war.
Admiral Inglis. You wish me to compare Hawaii with any other
United States base or establishment, military installation ?
Mr. Clark. In the Pacific area.
Admiral Inglis. In the Pacific area ?
Mr. Clark. Yes, sir.
Admiral Inglis. Of course that perhaps is a matter of opinion, but
my opinion is that it was by far the strongest United States base in the
Pacific area.
Mr. Clark. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster.
Senator Brewster. I will waive questions at this time.
The Vice Chaikman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, in answer to Mr. Clark's question as to
whether or not the patrol afterward, after the attack, was larger than
before, your answer was, in your opinion, "yes."
Isn't it true that the black lines indicate the patrol before and the red,
which includes the area of the black, was [^^0] afterward, and
therefore the necessity much larger than it was before ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Murphy. All right. Now then, it is my understanding that you
and Colonel Thielen are prepared only to discuss the details of the
attack and not to go into the whys and wherefores.
70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir, speaking for myself.
Colonel Thielen. I concur in that.
Mr. MuRPHT. I would like to know from someone in the Navy, and I
assume you are not the one, I would like to record to show that I want to
know whether or not there was any inspection order within a week prior
to Pearl Harbor, the ejBfect of which would be to put the ships out of
commission.
One member of the committee has intimated that such an inspection
was ordered. I would like to meet it squarely just as soon as we
possibly can.
Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question, but perhaps I can
throw a little light on your inquiry, and that is this, that a careful study
of the damage sustained by the ships at Pearl Harbor on that day was
made by some competent officers in the Bureau of Ships, and as a result
of that study they concluded that the California was the only ship
where the opening of the compartments had any effect or was in any
way a contributing factor to the damage suffered by the ship.
[i^i] Mr. MuEPHY. Now then, so far as the other ships are
concerned, they were not under a condition of inspection that would
call for open compartments and other conditions that would disable
them in case of combat ; is that right ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I did not intend to give that impression in
my answer. I do not know the answer to that specific question. All I
can say is any openings did not contribute to the spread of the damage
or the flooding of the ships, except on the California.
Mr. Murphy. May I indicate to counsel on the record, and to the
Navy, that I hope some witness will be called who will be able to give
any details of what inspection, if any, was ordered within a week of
December 7 ; what effect, if any, that had on the ships on the morning
of December 7, 1941.
Mr. Mitchell. I would say, Mr. Congressman, that we are hard at
work on that now.
Mr. Murphy. All right.
Mr. Mitchell. We haven't the story here today because we haven't
gotten to the bottom of it.
Mr. Murphy. All right.
Mr. Mitchell. We are cutting out of this statement anything that
has not been definitely established.
Mr. Murphy. All right.
Mr. Mitchell. That very point is under inquiry now. [i^^]
We have some information about it, but it is not complete.^
Mr. Murphy. My next question. Admiral, is that in your exhibit you
have given a list of the ships that were sunk, damaged, and capsized.
That was Exhibit No. 17.
Admiral Inglis. That is item 15.
Mr. Murphy. Item 15. That contains a list of battleships, light
cruisers, destroyerSj repair ships, mine layers, seaplane tenders, and
miscellaneous auxiliaries.
The Navy did make a public statement, did they not, through Secre-
tary Knox, within a few days subsequent to December 7, 1941, as to the
damage to ships at Pearl Harbor, including those sunk and those
damaged ?
1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5347, for all couimunications on the subject of water-tiglit
iutegrity of vessels at Pearl Harbor.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 71
Admiral Inglis. I believe that is correct, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to have some witness from the Navy
testify on the record as to how the list given today compares with the
public notice given immediately after Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Inglis. I will have to get that for you, sir, and insert it in
the record.^
Mr. Murphy. The next thing I would like to ask, Admiral, and
I would like to ask of you, Colonel Thielen, and that is what recon-
naissance was ordered by Admiral Kimmel or by General Short sub-
sequent to the messages received by them on November 27 down to
and including December 7, 1941, and I [163] assume that
neither of you are prepared to answer those questions at the present
time.
Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer.
Colonel Thielen. I cannot give a definitive answer, I can only
point out the condition of alert that was placed in effect at that time,
which did not envisage the possibility of attack from without.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to have a specific answer. In addition
to the fact that alert No. 1 as to sabotage was ordered, I would like
to have a specific answer as to what reconnaissance, if any, was ordered
by the Navy and Army immediately subsequent to November 27 and
prior to the morning of December 7, 1941.
Mr. IVIiTCHELL. We have other witnesses that are going to be
brought on that will cover that, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Murphy. All right. Now then, the two figures of 105, they,
of course, would make 210, but neither of you, as I take it, would
attempt to say that the planes that were used in the Army attack
were not also used in the Navy attack?
Admiral Inglis. Speaking for myself, I see no way of unscrambling
those figures.
[164] The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson would be next
but he has been temporarily excused. Mr. Geartiart, of California.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Inglis
The Vice Chahuvian. Here is Senator Ferguson. He is your turn,
Senator Ferguson. Will you defer, Mr. Gearhart?
Mr. Gearhart. I defer.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, can I inquire as to when you first
knew that you were to be the witness to give these facts ?
Admiral Inglis. At 3 o'clock last Friday afternoon, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And up to that time, what did you have to do
with assembling the facts ? Up until 3 o'clock Friday, what did you
have to do in relation to assembling the facts ?
Admiral Inglis. As Acting Chief of Naval Intelligence, my officers
had been engaged for perhaps a week before that in getting up this
presentation.
Senator Ferguson. From whom did you get your instructions as
to what was desired by the committee?
Admiral Inglis. The instructions were relayed to us through the
Judge Advocate General's office.
[i^<5] Senator Ferguson. Are they in writing?
Admiral Inglis. Are they what, sir ?
1 See Hearings, Part 6, p. 2674 for a table submitted by the Navy Department showing
a "Comparison of actual damage suffered by the fleet at Pearl Harbor and that stated in
the report that was released by Secretary Knox on 15 December 1941."
72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Are they in writing?
Admiral Inglis. 1 believe not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What were the instructions you were given
by the Judge Advocate General's office ?
Admiral Inglis. The instructions were to be prepared to make a
presentation before the committee of the factual evidence concerning
the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7.
Senator Ferguson. Were you instructed to give no conclusions,
or no orders ?
Admiral Inglis. Those instructions evolved in the course of time,
I don't believe that they were specifically stated in that form when
the instructions were first passed along to us.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first get the instructions not to
draw any conclusions or not to give any orders; that is, to cite any
orders?
Admiral Inglis. We were given an outline of the subjects which
were to be covered.
Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the outline? Was it in
writing ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to read it off, sir?
[166] Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. It is two pages.
Mr. Mitchell. That is the same outline we gave the committee.
Senator Ferguson. Could I see it?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
(A copy was handed to Senator P erguson.)
Admiral Inglis. The Senator may keep that copy if he wishes.
Senator Ferguson. You have others?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Who selected you, Admiral, to be the spokes-
man?
Admiral Inglis. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Edwards, gave me the directive.
Senator Ferguson. Can I inquire from the colonel as to when he
first learned that he was to be a witness ?
Colonel Thielen. I didn't receive positive information until just
before the past week end, Friday or Saturday. I had been told be-
fore that time that I might be called upon to actually present the
story.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when did you first know that you were
to present the story ?
Colonel Thielen. As I say, I was informed positively [^^7]
on Friday or Saturday last.
Senator Ferguson. Who drew up your presentation ?
Colonel Thielen. I belong to a section of the Operations Division,
War Department General Staff, which is continuously engaged in
research of this type, in examination of after-action reports, and
other such first sources, to prepare digests similar to this. We work
together. We have a procedure whereby a number of researchers,
both officers and enlisted personnel, are given their task, and the
material is assembled and edited.
Senator Ferguson. When was your report assembled ?
Colonel Thielen. The first draft, a week or 6 days ago.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 73
Senator Ferguson. A week or 6 days ago. When did you fii-st
furnish counsel of the committee with a copy of your draft?
Colonel Thielen. No such copy has been furnished to this time, to
the best of my knowledge.
Senator Ferguson. Up until the present time. Admiral, when did
you first furnish the committee or any counsel with a copy of your
draft?
Admiral Inglis. I beg pardon ?
Senator Ferguson. Wlien did you first furnish the committee or
counsel with a copy of your draft ?
[168] Admiral Inglis. I don't believe I have given the counsel
a copy of the draft. I have given the committee, I mean the counsel,
copies of the exhibits, but as far as I know, not of the draft of this
script.
Senator Ferguson. Of what you read to the committee ?
Admiral Inglis. I don't believe so ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I noticed one conclusion that you drew, and that
was in relation to the radar, that the man was practicing after 7
o'clock.
Admiral Inglis. No ; that was the Army.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Colonel, will you give us what information you
have on that ?
Colonel Thielen. Would the Senator care to have me repeat the
story ?
Senator Ferguson. No ; I don't want the story repeated. I would
like to have what information was given to you that he was actually
practicing. Who told you that?
Colonel Thielen. You mean my sources on that, sir? This copy is
documented. The fact that these two enlisted men picked up an in-
dication of hostile aircraft by radar at 7 : 02 a. m. on the morning of
December 7 comes from the Roberts report, page 116, affidavit of
Private McDonald.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you examined [-?^5]
the Roberts report in order that you might give us this summary ?
Colonel Thielen, That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat other reports did you examine?
Colonel Thielen. I have a rather long list here. Senator. I did not
examine that all personally. It so happens I did examine the Roberts
report personally. I examined the Grunert report personally, and
various other sources. There is a list of some 74 documents which
were examined by the various members of the section of which I am
a part.
Senator Ferguson, Well, now, when you examined these various
reports, were they in conflict with the reports on the items which you
have given us ?
Colonel Thielen. None came to my attention, sir. I was not look-
ing for any conflicts. I was deliberately omitting any conflicts or
controversial subjects from my report.
Senator Ferguson, Will you tell us if these witnesses testified in
any other hearing besides the Roberts, as to whether or not this man
was actually practicing?
Colonel Thielen. I don't believe I am the best witness on that, sir.
I don't know. I am not an authority on all of the various reports.
74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AITACK
[170] Senator Ferguson. Why would you give us the conclusion
out of the Eoberts report when you know that that was a cursory
report ?
Colonel Thxelen. Because there is, apparently, no conflict, as far
as our researchers were able to determine.
Senator Ferguson. You say there is no conflict at all on that ques-
tion?
Colonel Thielen. Apparently not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand your statement is
hearsay on that?
Colonel Thielen. Everything that I have said today is hearsay, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Everything that you have said here today is
hearsay ?
Colonel Thielen. That is correct, and none of this material — I was
not present at Pearl Harbor, nor was I in the War Department on
December 7.
Senator Ferguson. How much comes out of the Roberts report on
Elliott's training?
Colonel Thielen. On his training?
Senator Ferguson. On Elliott bemg in training at that particular
moment.
Colonel Thielen. I believe merely the statement.
Senator Ferguson. To whom did he telephone ?
[171] Colonel Thielen. I won't say to whom Elliott telephoned.
I will say, as I said in the script, that the telephone report was made
by the Opana radar station to Lt. Kermit Tyler, the watch officer at the
information center, Fort Shafter.
Senator Ferguson. What was his title at that time ?
Colonel Thielen. He was known as the watch officer.
Senator Ferguson. At what particular station?
Colonel Thielen. At the information center for the various radar
stations.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know how many people were present
at that community ceffiter on that morning ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Does the Roberts report show, oi- any other
report that you examined?
Colonel Thielen. I have no recollection of that being given.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the Navy had a watch
there at that time ?
Colonel Thielen. I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not either Tyler or
Elliott, or the other man with Elliott knew that B-l7's were coming
in that morning?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I don't know what the extent [17^]
of their knowledge was.
Senator Ferguson. Did you give us the exact plan of what was
shown on the radar design plan!
Colonel Thielen. It was a copy, as faithful as we could make it.
It was not a mechanical reproduction. It was done by an artist.
It was as good a copy as we could make of the so-called historical
plot.
Senator Ferguson. Have you the original?
Colonel Thielen. I have an original.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 75
Senator Ferguson. Will you produce it for the committee ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
(The document was handed to Senator Ferguson.)
Senator Ferguson. Do you know who made this original ?
Colonel Thielen. It is authenticated by an ofiicer named Murphy.
Senator Ferguson, Back to the Admiral, now. I have to keep
skipping back and forth.
Admiral, you said that about two-thirds of our fleet was in the
Pacific; is that correct?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I said that the numerical strength of the
Pacific Fleet was two-thirds that of the Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific
Fleet was smaller than the Atlantic Fleet.
Senator Ferguson. I beg your pardon. One third was [J7S'\
in the Pacific and two-thirds in the Atlantic?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. We still haven't got our fractions right.
Senator Ferguson. ^Yhat is that ?
Admiral Inglis. We still haven't got our fractions right.
Senator Ferguson. Well, how many capital battleships were in the
Atlantic?
Admiral Inglis. In the Atlantic Fleet were 6 battleships. In the
Pacific Fleet were 9 battleships. Six in the Atlantic and 9 in the
Pacific.
Senator Ferguson. And eight out of the nine were destroyed, or
damaged ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How many were ?
Admiral Inglis. Well, I have to distinguish between damaged and
destroyed.
Senator Ferguson. How many were hit. Put it that way.
Admiral Inglis. Well, the Colorado, of course, was the ninth one,
and she was not present at Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Were all the others hit ?
Admiral Inglis. All the others were hit to a greater or lesser degree.
Senator Ferguson. Then there was only one battleship [i?"^]
in the Pacific that was not hit?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, how many battleships were in the Atlanitc ?
Admiral Inglis. Six.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I read from Battle Report, Pearl Harbor
to Coral Sea, which is supposed to be an official record, page 6 :
In the Atlantic there were eight battleships.
Reading from pasre 6.
Admiral Inglis. I can't recognize that book as being official. I have
here a list of the specific ships
Senator Ferguson. I read you the first part of this book :
Notes on the background and writing of this book. When the authors of this
book were directed b.v the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to begin a prepara-
tion, a few months before his death, the instructions were brief and to the
point —
indicating that he had something to do with the preparation of this
Battle Report, and the Navy officers that wrote this book.
It says :
Prepared from official sources by Commander Walter Karig, and Lt. Welbourn
Kelley.
76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. I personally still don't recognize that as being offi-
cial, except what you have told me now, [i?'<^] but, if I may,
Senator Ferguson, I will read the list of ships that were in the At-
lantic Fleet, and the list of those in the Pacific Fleet.
Senator Fekguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. In the Atlantic were the New York^ the Idaho^
Mississippi^ New Mexico^ Arkansas, and Texas.
In the Pacific, the Pennsylvania^ California, West Virginia, Arizona,
Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Colorado, and Maryland.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the Secretary of the
Nav}' Knox's memorandum or report that he drew up or had drawn
up at the time of — after the incident?
Admiral Inglis. You mean immediately after the attack?
Senator Ferguson. No. Did you use anything from that report in
making up your report here ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. He gave a report at that time; did he not?
Admiral Inglis. I read such a report in the newspapers. You mean
about a month after Pearl Harbor?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Didn't you try to get that as a part of
your source ?
Admiral Inglis. Well, I am not too familiar with the sources that
were used by my researchers, but I don't [77^] believe that was
used.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the report the President
used sometime after was used in making up this report?
Admiral Inglis. I am not familiar with the President's report.
Senator Ferguson. How are we going to check the accuracy of this
report ?
Admiral Inglis. All I can is that my presentation was made from
the official reports, not those that were prepared for the President,
but from the original reports of the Roberts inquiry, and the Murfin
board inquiry, and documents of that nature. Wherever possible, they
were documents that contained sworn testimony.
Senator Ferguson. How many battleships did we have in December
1941?
Admiral Inglis. Fifteen, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Fifteen ?
Admiral Inglis. Fifteen that were attached to the Fleets. There
were two or three that had just been completed, or were on their
shake- down duty.
Senator Ferguson. Where were they ?
Admiral Inglis. It is my recollection that the Washington and New
Mexico were on shake-down duty in the Atlantic. [i77] One
of those ships, I am sure, from personal observation was in the navy
yard at New York — Brooklyn.
Senator Ferguson. Two of those then were in \X\q, Atlantic even
though on shake-down duty ?
Admiral Inglis. That probably accounts for the discrepancy be-
tween the six and eight.
Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that this hook was a little
more accurate than your figures.
Admiral Inglis. That would indicate my figures contain the num-
ber of ships attached to the Atlantic Fleet and the number attached to
the Pacific Fleet.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 77
Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long after the attack came
at Pearl Harbor, it came at the Philippines? Will you name the
attacks that were had by the Japs on the date of the Tth, or if
it was across the international date line, on the 8th, and give us
the hours of those attacks?
Admiral Inglis. I have confined my studies to the attack on Pearl
Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands. I can get that information for
you.
Senator Ferguson. Would you get us that? Get us the hours of
the attacks.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.^
Senator P erguson. Now, have you any knowledge of what recon-
naissance there was on or about December 1, from Pearl [1781
to Johnston to Midway ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; 1 have nothing earlier than December 6
readily at hand.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know that on or about the 3d that
there was some reconnaissance from Wake to Midway to Pearl, ar-
riving on the 5th?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have no information readilj^ at hand
earlier than the 6th of December.
Senator Ferguson. Do you laiow each flight was with at least
1 squadron and 12 PB Y's ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I have no information readily at hand
earlier than the 6th of December.
Senator Ferguson. On the 5th or 6th, did the Lexington proceed
to Pearl from Midway?
Admiral Inglis. The Lexington was en route to Midway from
Pearl.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Who was in charge of the Lexington%
Admiral Inglis. The Lexington was in a task group commanded
by Admiral Newton.
Senator Ferguson. What did Halsey have charge of — Admiral
Halsey?
Admiral Inglis. Just a minute, sir. I want to be sure I have got
those correct.
[17 ff] Senator Ferguson. Did he have the Enterprise?
Admiral Inglis. The Lexington group was under Admiral Newton.
Senator Ferguson. It was going from Pearl to what? Midway?
Admiral Inglis. It was going from Pearl to Midway with a squad-
ron of Marine Corps scout bombers.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether they did any recon-
naissance ?
Admiral Inglis. I understand because of the additional Marine
Corps planes on board, tlie flight deck was so cluttered that they
weren't able to launch any.
Senator Ferguson. So there was no reconnaissance from that?
Admiral Inglis. Not from the Lexington.
Senator F'erguson. Was there from the Enterprisel
> A table showing "Time of Jap attacks in the Pacific 7 and 8 December 1941, supplied
br the Navy Department, appears in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2675.
79716— 46— pt. 1 8
78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What reconnaissance was there from the En-
terprise?
Admiral Inglis. As given in the presentation, the Enterprise
launched a squadron of 18 planes to scout through a sector of 110°
immediately forward of the ship's course to a distance of 150 miles.
[180'] Senator Ferguson. How far south would that be of the
line where the Jap planes were supposed to have been ?
Admiral Inglis. The Japs what, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. Planes ; the carriers of the Japs.
Admiral Inglis. You mean the carriers ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. How far would this reconnaissance be
south of that?
Admiral Inglis. That will come out in the Japanese presentation,
but I would say about 200 miles, sir.
Senator Ferguson. About 200 miles.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever read the article in the Saturday
Evening Post by Lieutenant Richardson about his orders?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. From the Enterprise ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know anything about those orders ?
Admiral Inglisv No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what caused the delay in having
the planes leave the ground on the various occasions that you have
mentioned, that they were an hour or two late, they were also late at
Midway ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; I do not know the reason.
[ISl] Senator Ferguson. Did you look it up or try to find out?
Admiral Inglis. I didn't personally. Perhaps some of my research-
ers may have.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether anj^ transports left our
west coast on the 6th ?
Admiral Inglis. In answer to that question — whether they left the
west coast of the United States ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; I don't.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether one had left and came
back because of the assault on F'earl Harbor ?
Admiral Inglis. I have no positive knowledge of that.
Senator Ferguson. Will you find out ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.^
Senator Ferguson. Senator George asked you about why the trajflic
was diverted from the north route. Have you that data or did you ever
see it?
Admiral Inglis. I ha^^n't got it ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. From whom did you get your information that it
was diverted on the 25th ?
Admiral Inglis. I have got the source right here, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the source?
1 See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1680, for a report, dated Dec. 13, 1945, from the Navy Depart-
ment showing the recall of merchant ships to the West Coast, by names of ships, rintos
thev sailed, and dates they retnrned.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 79
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. That was a dispatch from the Chief of
Naval Operations dated November 25, 1941.
[IS^] Senator Ferguson. I didn't hear you.
Admiral Inglis. That source is a dispatch originated by the Chief
of Naval Operations on the 25th of November 1941, carrying the
reference number 252203.
Senator Ferguson. That was Admiral Stark?
Admiral Inglis. Admiral Stark was the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions at that time ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That came out in Washington ; is that true ?
Admiral Inglis. That is true.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether a copy of that was ever
sent to the admiral in charge of the Fourteenth District?
Admiral Inglis. I am practically certain that it was addressed to
him among others, but I am not positive of it.
Senator Ferguson. Have you the order with you ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you get me the order ?
Admiral Inglis. I will, sir.^
Senator Ferguson. Why did you use that in your report and not
bring us the order?
Admiral Inglis. The material from which this presentation was
made is tremendously bulky. I haven't got it all here.
Senator Ferguson. Who determined to put that in ?
Admiral Inglis. Who determined what?
[183] Senator Ferguson. Who determined to put that item in
the report ?
Admiral Inglis. That was presented to me by the researchers and
I made the decision to include it in the presentation. I felt that it
was quite pertinent.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know who gave the order for the B-17's
to leave Hamilton Field, San Francisco ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; I do not know. That is an Army activity.
Senator Ferguson. Going back to the colonel, do you know who
gave the orders for the B-l7's to leave Hamilton Field, Colonel ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Did you look into that ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know when the orders were given?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time they left?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What time?
Colonel Thielen. At 9 : 30 p. m., 6th December, San Francisco time.
Senator Ferguson. And what field were they destined for ?
Colonel Thielen. They were destined for the Philippines [i^4]
by way of Oahu.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat was their destination at the Hawaiian
Islands?
Colonel Thielen. I could only guess that it would be Hickam Field,
the biggest field, a bomber field, and therefore suitable for BlT's.
Senator Ferguson. Were they equipped with radio?
' The dispatch, subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 3," was read into
the record ; see p. 82, infra.
80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel TiiiELEN". I can't answer that definitely. Presumably they
were.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any information that they had been
in touch with any radio station on the islands prior to the flight of
Japs coming in?
Colonel TiiiELEN. I have only the negative information that they
flew without contact with Hawaii.
Senator Ferguson. Were they flying blind or without contact ?
Colonel TiTiELEN. Apparently they were, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why they were iniarmed at that
time ?
Colonel Ttiielen. They were being ferried to the Philippines.
They were not on a combat mission.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand from that that [^86] all
planes not on combat missions are unarmed ? Have you any personal
knowledge of that, Colonel?
Colonel Thielen. That is a rather broad generalization, sir. A
state of war did not exist at the time of their departure. They were
on a ferrying mission. In time of peace it would be normal for them
to be unarmed.
Senator Ferguson. I will ask you why it was that on the Enterprise
that, as the lieutenant says, they had war orders ?
Colonel Thielen. I have no knowledge.
Senator Ferguson. That was just 200 miles west of the Hawaiian
Islands. Can you tell why the B-l7's didn't have any orders and
those from the Enterprise did have orders ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I cannot.
Senator Ferguson. Will you look that up and try to find out ?
Colonel Thielen. I believe that is outside my scope, but I will be
glad to do it.^
Senator Ferguson. Do you mean that you are limited in what
information you will be able to get for the committee ?
Colonel Thielen. I have not been designated by the War Depart-
ment to coordinate all witnesses who are to appear before the com-
mittee.
Senator Ferguson. I am not asking you that. I am asking you to
get that particular order, if you can, why one didn't [iS6'\ have
and one did have.
Colonel Thielen. Very well, I will make an effort to get that order.
Mr. Mitchell. I might say we have witnesses on the list for all
these things.
The Chairman. We have reached the hour of 4 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson. I have considerable more, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I think, in view of the fact that we cannot finish
with these witnesses this afternoon, we might as well recess until
10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
Mr. Gesell. Senator, I have something for each member of the
committee before we break up.
(Documents were handed to the committee.)
The Chairman. Very well.
(Wliereupon, at 4 p. m., the committees recessed until 10 a. m., Fri-
day, November 16, 1945.)
1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5293-5294. ,"^31
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 81
[187-] PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation of
THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. G.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m.,
in the caucus room (room 318) , Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson; and Eepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masteai, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
[188] The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
The Chair understands that counsel wishes to make a brief observa-
tion before we proceed with the further examination.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, there is a little confusion in regard,
I think, to these requests of witnesses to produce information and
documents.
Now, Admiral Inglis and Colonel Thielen had a special job to do,
simply to prepare a narrative statement compiled from records of the
Departments. We have a liaison staff, as the committee knows, whose
job it is to respond to every request from the committee or counsel
for documents, and, of course, it is a little confusing to a witness
who isn't on that liaison staff to be asked to produce something.
Counsel is delighted to have the members of the committee state
in the open hearings here anything they want produced, but we
would like to have it understood that when a request of that kind
is made for information to the Navy, for instance, that the people
that have been set apart by the Secretarj^ of the Navy to respond to
those requests are the ones supposed to dig it up.
For instance. Admiral Inglis has the custody of these records and
all he could do would be to pass it on to the secretary of the staff.
So we would like to have it understood that when a member of
the committee makes a request while the witness is testify- [189]
ing, a request to have matters produced, why, we will have to channel
it througli the liaison staff, because the witness isn't in that category.
If he is, all right. If h© has personal custody of that document.
I am not suggesting that the committee not make requests but I
want them to understand that to avoid confusion it will have to be
handled that way.
82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. In other words, any requests made of these wit-
nesses will be ■
Mr. Mitchell. It is a request to the Navy Department.
The Chairman. The documents will be furnished but it will be
furnished by the staff that is charged with looking up the documents?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. The witness will have to turn the request
over to the proper people in the respective Departments.
The Chairman. The main object is to get the documents.
Mr. Mitchell. There is no difficulty about that. Simply the witness
is sometimes embarrassed a little bit in being asked to produce things
personally.
Among the things asked for yesterday which we have already been
able to obtain, one of the members of the committee requested a copy
of the order which routed shipping to the south. We have already
obtained that and I will read it into the record to have it out of the
way, if it is agreeable.
[^90] This is a dispatch dated November 25, 1941, from the Chief
of Naval Operations. The commander to whom it was directed for
action is the commander of the Twelfth Naval District. I understand
that is San Francisco. Copies were sent to four commanders. The
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, the commander in chief of
the Asiatic Fleet, the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District —
that is at Honolulu — and the commander of the Sixteenth Naval Dis-
trict. I understand that is at Manila.
And the dispatch reads in this way :
Route all trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits. The commander in
chief, Pacific Fleet ; commander in chief Asiatic Fleet, providing necessary escort.
Refer your dispatch 230258.
It is marked "Top Secret" in purple. Certified to be a true copy by
Ralph W. Lundberg, lieutenant commander.
Mr. Gearhart. What is the date of that?
Mr. Mitchell. November 25, 1941.
The Chairman. The Chief of Naval Operations at that time was
Admiral Stark?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right.
The Chairman. And who was the commander in the Twelfth Naval
District at San Francisco, does the record show ?
Mr. Mitchell. It doesn't.
Admiral Inglis. I think it was Admiral Greenslade.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I have the exhibit?
IJ91] I requested it.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Do you want it offered in evidence?
Senator Ferguson. I will offer it in evidence after I have identified
it with the witness.
The Chairman. Is that all, Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is all.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Ferguson.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 83
TESTIMONY OF REAE ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BERNARD
THIELEN (Resumed)
Senior Ferguson. Admiral, this exhibit which has just been read —
Route all trans-Pacific shipping througli Torres Straits, Cincpac and Cincaf
provide necessary escort, refer your dispatch 230258 — •
when did you first see that ?
Admiral Inglis. The dispatch you have in your hands?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
[192] Admiral Inglis. I first saw that piece of paper this morn-
ing at about 9 : 30.
Senator Ferguson. What did you see to give us the information
yesterday ?
Admiral Inglis. The information that I gave you yesterday was
from a brief or script which was prepared by my research staff with
the notation that that dispatch that you have in your hand was the
source.
Senator Ferguson. You had your staff go over the files?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did any counsel sit with you to prepare your
script ?
Admiral Inglis. I have no personal counsel. Is that what you
mean?
Senator Ferguson. I am not figuring that you personally are inter-
ested here. You are acting as an admiral of the Navy.
Admiral Ingus. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. As an admiral, did you have any counsel with
you?
Admiral Inglis. The Judge Advocate General's office had repre-
sentatives at various times when we were going over this script.
Senator Ferguson. Did the committee have a counsel [193]
member present?
Admiral Inglis. On one or two occasions the script was discussed
with the committee counsel.
Senator Ferguson. With whom did you discuss it ?
Admiral Inglis. With Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell.
Senator Ferguson. Did they see this exhibit ?
Admiral Inglis. Not until this morning.
Senator Ferguson. Not until this morning. Do you know why it
was not delivered to the committee before?
Admiral Inglis. I do not, sir. It wasn't asked for.
Senator Ferguson. Well, do I understand they only get what they
ask for?
Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I can't answer that. I was only given
a specific job, Senator Ferguson. I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see these instructions ?
Story of the actual attack and Japanese plans will be presented by an Army
and a Navy officer who will summarize all available data. The summary will
be prepared under the direction of counsel along the lines suggested by the fol-
lowing outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of opinion and question
of individual responsibility.
84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. I did not see that paper.
Senator Ferguson. Did yon ever see that ?
[194] Admiral Inglis. I did not see that paper. I did have an
outline, and I was told pretty much the gist of the material you have
just read, but it was given to me verbally.
Senator Ferguson. In preparing the conclusions that you prepared,
did you furnish to the committee the data upon which it was founded ?
For instance, you gave the substance of this message. You said it
was routed, but you didn't give the committee the exhibit. Do you
know why they were not furnished with the exhibits so that the com-
mittee might draw the conclusion ?
Admiral Inglis. I didn't feel that that was part of my function.
Senator Ferguson. What was your function ?
Admiral Inglis. My function was to prepare a presentation for this
committee, giving the facts that were not controversial, and were sub-
stantiated rather conclusively, in my opinion, by the documents we
had available in the Navy Department.
Senator Ferguson. Well now, were you to furnish the documents,
or just the narrative form?
Admiral Inglis. I personally was furnished with a narrative pre-
pared by my researchers. In certain cases I asked them to produce
the source of the data for my own inspection. Also we produced the
folder which has been [10S~\ called the Navy folder, in the
white cover, and which does contain certain factual material, but that
again has been digested from the basic documents.
[196] Senator Ferguson. You furnished me yesterday a blue
sheet with information ?
Admiral Inglis. That is the outline.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. And that differs somewhat from the one
that was handed to the committee by the counsel ?
Admiral Inglis. That outline was subject to modification from time
to time as we worked up this presentation.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, who modified it?
Admiral Inglis. I would say it was probably a joint effort. The
Judge Advocate General and I might have had a little something to
do with it. We collaborated with the Army in arranging the sequence
of presenting the various items.
Senator Ferguson. How many times did you confer with Mr.
Mitchell?
Admiral Inglis. I would say three ; three times.
Senator Ferguson. And how many with Mr. Gesell ?
Admiral Inglis. About the same number of times.
Senator Ferguson. Did they change anj- thing that you had in your
exhibit ?
Admiral Inglis. They did not change anything. They suggested
a few changes.
Senator Ferguson. What did they suggest?
Admiral Inglis. Well, wherever there was anything that was con-
troversial or that might have been interpreted
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 85
[197] Senator Ferguson. Tell us some of the things that they
took out.
Admiral Inglis. They did not take out anything. Senator Ferguson,
I want to make that quite clear. They only suggested that
Senator Ferguson. All right, what did tiiey suggest that you take
out?
Admiral Inglis. There was one paragraph, for example, that I
remember that I had in suggesting that the country as a whole was not
unified just before Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Now, who told you that?
Admiral Inglis. That was my own opinion and, therefore, I agreed
that it was not proper to put in the presentation. There were some
other items.
Senator Ferguson. Had you talked over with anyone the fact that
you wanted to put that in ?
Admiral Inglis. I talked it over with my staff ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And who was your staff ?
Admiral Inglis. Captain Davis, Captain Phelan and Commander
Hindmarsh and a number of others.
Senator Ferguson. How did that happen to come into this question
of what actually happened at Pearl Harbor? Were you tryin^g to fix
responsibility ?
[J98] Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, then, why would you suggest even putting
in that the people were not prepared ?
Admiral Inglis. I thought that it might give a little background
that would be good for the
Senator Ferguson. You used the word "united," that the people were
not united ?
Admiral Inglis. The people of this country were not united.
Senator Ferguson. I understand the President said something to
that effect about the time that the reports were issued. You did not get
the suggestion from that, did you?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I got it from my own understanding of the
psychology of this country at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Of the American people?
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, with whom did you discuss that item ?
Admiral Inglis. I discussed it Mith Captain Davis, with Captain
Phelan. I am quite sure, with both jMr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell.
Senator Ferguson. What did they say about it?
Admiral Inglis. After considerable discussion it was agreed, and I
concurred in the decision, that it should be [^99] omitted.
Senator Ferguson. What was the discussion ?
Admiral Inglis. The discussion was whether or not that was ap-
propriate to put in a factual presentation of this kind.
Senator Ferguson. What did it have to do with the attack on
Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Inglis. Well, we all agreed
Senator Ferguson. Do you think the people were to blame?
Admiral Inglis. Are you asking for my opinion ?
Senator Ferguson. Well, you put it in the memo and they per-
suaded you to take it out. T am asking you whether that is your
opinion ?
86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. My opinion is that they did contribute to some
extent to the Pearl Harbor attack.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you explain how that contributed
to the Pearl Harbor attack.
Admiral Inglis. Because the armed forces were not as strong as
they might have been had the country been unified and had the
appropriations been larger for the Army and Navy.
Senator Ferguson. All right; now, do you know anything about
the appropriations'^
Admiral Inglis. I only know that the Navy kept asking for more
than they could get.
[200] Senator Ferguson. Did you know this, that when the
Navy asked for an item that on many occasions the Budget Director
and the Executive branch of the Government cut it down ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And Congress often put them up ?
Admiral Inglis. I did not know about the latter. I did know
about the former.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the people, the Congress
for the people, did put those up ?
Admiral Inglis. Now that you mention it I believe very likely
that there were certain specific instances where the Congress did
increase appropriations.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, how could you blame the people
for not getting armament?
Admiral Inglis. I am not blaming them. Senator. I am just
saying that that was my opinion, that that was the frame of mind
that this country was in at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you furnish to the committee
your original drafts where you had that in and I would like to see
all the other things that were taken out, and will you now give
us the other things that were taken out ?
Admiral Inglis. I will furnish that if I can. I am afraid that
was destroyed. Now, the other things that were taken out
[201] Senator Ferguson. Why would you destroy anything
like that afterward ?
Admiral Inglis. I did not see any reason to keep it if it was not
to be presented.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any notes or any memorandum in rela-
tion to the preparing of your memo ?
Admiral Inglis. I am not sure, sir. I will have to look through
my papers ; I am not sure.
Senator Ferguson. Well, will you furnish to the committee, so that
the committee may have them, all your notes and all your memoranda?
Admiral Inglis. I will furnish anything I have.^
Senator Ferguson. All right ; now, what else was taken out ?
Admiral Inglis. The other things that were taken out were historical
items dating back to 1931.
Senator Ferguson. What were they?
Admiral Inglis. An outline of the Japanese aggression in Man-
churia, the Marco Polo Bridge incident, of the aggression of Italy
toward Ethiopia, of Germany towards Austria, the Saar, and showing
the rise of nazism and fascism.
1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5294.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 87
Senator Ferguson. Will you just take this outline and tell me how
many of the items, including the blame on the American people, are
included in the request?
[203] Admiral Inglis. They are not in the outline and, there-
fore, they were taken out.
Senator Ferguson. Well, how did you come to put them in at all ?
The Navy was not going to make a defense, were they ?
Admiral Inglis. That is why they were taken out. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Because the Navy was attempting to make a
defense, is that right ?
Admiral Inglis. That was my own personal, idea and I soon saw
that it was not sound and, therefore, they were taken out.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you discuss it with the Judge
Advocate?
Admiral Inglis. I believe I did, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And he consented to put it in ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; no, sir; I was advised by everyone that I
talked to that it should come out.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you show it to Mr. Mitchell?
Admiral Inglis. I am not sure whether it was Mr. Mitchell or Mr.
Gesell that I talked to about it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you show them your memo?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have a memo prepared of that?
[£03] Admiral Inglis. I had a rough draft of this material.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you try and look to see whether
you have your rough draft ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; I have already agreed to get anything
that I have available.
Senator Ferguson. Did you talk with Admiral King
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson, (continuing) about preparing it?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of the Navy Forrestal ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; that was my own idea, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you discuss it with anyone ?
Admiral Ingus. I discussed it with the people whom I have already
enumerated.
Senator Ferguson. Where did you get that data?
Admiral Inglis. From my own recollection of the history of the
world from 1931 on.
Senator Ferguson. "What did you think that had to do with the
actual physical facts at Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Inglis. It was only background material that I thought
might be of some value.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, on this exhibit, we will call it exhibit
1 — Mr. Chairman, I now offer it in evidence.
Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 3.
[204] Senator Ferguson. What?
Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 3.
Senator Ferguson. I offer Exhibit 3.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 3".)
88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATl^ACK
Senator Ferguson. The first that you saw of this particular exhibit
was this morning ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you got your testimony before you ? Have
you got your page where were referring to the shipping route ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read it ?
Admiral Inglis. I quote from the testimony of yesterday.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis (reading) :
The Chief of Naval Operations on November 25, 1941 directed that all trans-
pacific shipping be routed through the Torres Strait between Australia and New
Guinea.
Senator Ferguson. Now, that is all you said about it ?
Admiral Inglis. That is all I said about it except under cross-exam-
ination.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, and I asked you some questions [20S]
on cross examination. I asked you to get the original.
Now I will ask you why you did not put in the part that was to
provide for escorts ?
Admiral Inglis. I think that was perhaps omitted by my staff be-
cause it might have been somewhat controversial.
Senator Ferguson. You think that this part of the message is con-
troversial, "Provide necessary escort"?
Admiral Inglis. It might lead to controversy because of the word
"necessary." That would be a difference of opinion as to the disposi-
tion of ships for escorts as opposed to the need for keeping them con-
centrated for combat.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did any member of this staff, of this com-
mittee staff, check your memorandum that you were going to write
here prior to its writing ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir, not the draft. There was some discussion
about it.
Senator Ferguson. There was some discussion. Did any member
read it prior to the time that you gave it here?
Admiral Inglis. Not to the best of my knowledge.
Senator Ferguson. Did they ever see the exhibits upon which it was
founded ?
Admiral Inglis. Do you mean by "exhibits" these things in the
folder or that
Senator Ferguson. No ; I mean such as Exhibit 3.
[206] Admiral Inglis. I don't know what they saw, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any idea whether they ever saw it ?
Admiral Inglis. I think that a great many records were available
to the counsel.
Senator Ferguson. What do you mean "available" ?
Admiral Inglis. Were turned over to them.
Senator Ferguson. Why was this not turned over?
Admiral Inglis. Perhaps it was.
Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel now, when did counsel get
this Exhibit 3?
Mr. Mitchell. I first saw it about 10 minutes ago.
Mr. Gesell. Well, I think, to make the record clear
Senator Ferguson. -That is what we would like to have.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 89
Mr. Gesell. (continuing) There is in the file of counsel a very
substantial number of dispatches.
Senator Ferguson. No, no, let us keep the record clear.
Mr. Geseljl. I beg your pardon. Senator. I am answering your
question, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When did you get Exhibit 3 ?
Mr. Gesell. That particular dispatch is very likely among the
group of dispatches which we have had in our office for a considerable
period of time. If you are talking about the piece of paper in your
hand, we saw that this morning.
[£07] Senator Ferguson. Well, did he make the statement of
yesterday based on very likely whether this was in your file or not ?
The Chairman. Is there any dispute about the authenticity of this
Exhibit No. 3?
Admiral Inglis. None whatsoever.
The Chairman, Is there any dispute on the part of any member
of the committee?
Senator Ferguson. Am I to take that that I am not supposed to
examine the witness about that? .
The Chairman. Not at all ; I just want to know whether there is
any dispute about the authenticity of this document that you are talk-
ing about.
Senator Ferguson. The question is why it has not been produced
to the committee, that we are on right now.
Will you give me all the information in the Navy in relation to the
part of this message that says, "Provide necessary escort?"
Admiral Inglis. I am authorized to say that the Navy Depart-
ment— or to say for the Navy Department that any information re-
quested by the committee which is available to the Navy will be
produced.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, but do you take that request as not
from one of the committee?
[W8] Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; from the committee as a request
which will be complied with to the best of our ability.^
Senator Ferguson. Have you any information, personal informa-
tion, on this "Provide necessary escort?"
Admiral Inglis. I have not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know at any time that there was any
message including this "Provide necessary escort?"
Admiral Inglis, The only information that I had was what I gave
the committee yesterday, until I saw that message which you have in
your hand.
Senator Ferguson. You gave us a list yesterday of the location of
all ships in the Pacific, did you not?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson, I will ask you where the Boise was between
the 23d of November 1941, and the 6th of December 1941 ?
Admiral Inglis, The Boise'^.
Senator Ferguson, Yes.
Admiral Inglis. My recollection is that the Boise was in the Asiatic
Fleet,
Senator Ferguson. Do you know where the American Leader ship
was?
* See memorandum from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5499.
90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; never heard of that ship.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the American Leader
[209] left Honolulu on November 23, 1941 ?
Admiral Inglis. I do not, sir. I rather gather from the name of
the ship that she is a merchant ship.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is right.
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. My information
Senator Ferguson. What is your information on the Boisel
Admiral Inglis. On the Boise'i
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. I haven't anything in writing here, but my recol-
lection is that she was attached to the Asiatic Fleet out in the Philip-
pines at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I will ask you whether or not she
was not convoying many other ships, or, at least, convoying the Ameri-
can Leader?
Admiral Inglis. I don't know that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You don't know that?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I don't know anything about the Ameri-
can Leader.
Senator Ferguson. Well, so that the record may show, what we
would like to get the information on, as to who was the captain of the
American Leader., whether or not she left Honolulu on November the
20th and arrived in Manila on December the 6th, whether she was in
a convoy or not, in convoy during any of that time. Do you have any
information on that ?
[^i6>] Admiral Inglis. If we have any we will produce it, sir.^
Senator Ferguson. Well, have you 'I
Admiral Inglis. I have not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And whether or not one of the convoying ships,
at least one was the Boise; whether or not the ships were blacked out
at night. Do you know whether that was true ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the definition of what was
meant by "a convoy" in this message of November the 25th ?
Admiral Inglis. In its common term a convoy is a collection of
ships steaming together as a group under escort.
Senator Ferguson. Did any ships leave the Pacific coast after the
25th in convoy?
Admiral Inglis. I believe my presentatidn described two convoys.
Senator Ferguson. Where were they?
Admiral Inglis. The heavy cruiser Pensacola with an eight-ship
convoy was west-bound, located in the Samoan area.
Senator Ferguson. When did she start on convoy ?
Admiral Inglis. All of those ships left between 2 and 7 days prior
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, as I recall it, but I cannot give you the
precise date. I will get it [2ii] for you, though ; at least, the
Navy Department will get it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I would like to have on that American
Leader and also on the Boise a record of orders for blackouts and
when they were given and how they were distributed.
* See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127, for a statement re the American Leader based on infor-
mation received from the Navy Department.
See also "Exhibit No. 68," the log of D. S. S. Boise.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 91
Admiral Inglis. The Navy Department, I am sure, will make all
that information which they have available also.
Senator Ferguson. And when the first order of convoying was in
the Pacific.
By the way, had you any evidence when you were getting this up,
or any evidence that there were German submarines in the Pacific ?
Admiral Inglis. I know of no evidence.
Senator Ferguson. Or battleships ?
Admiral Inglis. I know of no evidence ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You know of no such evidence. As one of the
Intelligence officers do vou know of any reason for convoys in the
Pacific on the 25th of November 1941 ?
Admiral Inglis. Of course, I was not an Intelligence officer at that
time and all I can do is express an opinion that the
Senator Ferguson. Well, will you furnish to counsel for the com-
mittee all the information that you have as to the [^-?^] con-
voying, whether there were German subs or German battleships or
other instruments, or anything that would be of danger ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. The Navy Department will make that
information available.
Senator Ferguson. Did you prej^are your statement from original
data?
Admiral Inglis. My staff did ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see all the data ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then you did not check it with your statement ?
Admiral Inglis. Only in certain cases.
Senator Ferguson. Will j'ou state some of the cases that you did
check it ?
Admiral Inglis. I checked some of the distances from Oahu to
other strategical and geographical points on the chart. I asked the
staff to verify several points that came up.
Senator Ferguson. What are some of those points?
Admiral Inglis. The relationship between the Fourteenth Naval
District and the commander in chief was one of them. There was
some argument about the spelling of some of these Hawaiian words
and their pronunciation; the depths of water in Pearl Harbor and
in the channels approaching, I think.
[^13] Senator Ferguson. Did you say anything in that report
about torpedo nets ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; that is another thing I questioned my
staff very closely on, because I wanted to be sure I had the basis for it.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us what you were talking about
when you referred to torpedo nets ?
Admiral Inglis. A torpedo net.
Senator Ferguson. Will you get me the part in your testimony ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, if I may quote from my yesterda^^'s state-
ment.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis (reading) :
The entrance to the harbor was closed by two protective nets ; into the channel
through the coral reefs it was about 400 yards and the depth was from 41 to 60
feet, and the nets themselves consisted of a combined antitorpedo and antiboat net.
92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Fergctson. Just a minute now. You were then referring
only to torpedo nets at the entrance to the harbor ?
Admiral Inglis. The two torpedo nets ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. At the entrance to the harbor ?
Admiral Inglis. At the entrance to the harbor.
Senator Ferguson. How far would they be from ships?
[^J4] Admiral Inglis. We can get that from the chart, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well- -
Admiral Inglis. About 2 miles.
Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the torpedo nets in relation
to the ships.
Admiral Inglis. Oh, no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you refer to them in your report ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; the torpedo nets I referred to were across
the channel entrance, as shown on the chart.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see a message that was intecepted at
Fort Hunt in Virginia ?
Admiral Inglis. A message about what, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. That was translated on the 6th.
Admiral Inglis. A message from whom ?
Senator Ferguson. A message from Japan — Honolulu.
Admiral Inglis, No, sir ; I have not had- —
Senator Ferguson. From Honolulu to Japan, rather, or Tokyo.
Admiral Inglis. Japanese message ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. I have not had access to any of those messages.
Senator Ferguson. Did you refer in your statement to barrage
balloons above Pearl Harbor ?
[215] Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were there any ?
Admiral Inglis. I do not know, sir. That would be an Army ques-
tion.
Senator Ferguson. You would not know that?
Admiral Inglis. I would not know that.
Senator Ferguson. Were there any torpedo nets close to the ships,
the battleships ?
Admiral Inglis. Not to the best of my knowledge. There were no
nets, to the best of my knowledge.
Senator Ferguson. Did you try to check on that, as to whether or not
there were any nets ?
Admiral Inglis. As long as nobody said there were, I did not see any
reason to check it. It was my personal understanding that there were
no nets about the battleships at that time.
[216] Senator Ferguson. Going to the colonel. Colonel, in your
testimony yesterday, on page 168 you referred to page 116, arid you
say [reading] :
You mean my sources ou that, sir? This copy is documented. The fact that
these two enlisted men picked up an indication of hostile aircraft by radar at 7 : 02
a. m. on the morning of December 7 comes from the Roberts' report, page 116,
affidavit of Private McDonald.
I have the Roberts' report before me liere, and the last page in my
copy of the report is No. 21.
Colonel Thielen. I think I can clarify that, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 93
Senator Ferguson. Will you give me the item of the report that you
were referring from?
The Chairman, Let the witness clarify his answer to that question,
Senator Ferguson. He is entitled to do that.
Colonel Thielen. The reference which I gave was to the testimony,
not to the report itself. I was not referring to the conclusions, the
findings, or any element of the Roberts' report other than the transcript
of the testimony of the witnesses.
Senator Ferguson. Now were you talking about the page in. the
transcript of the testimony in the Roberts' report ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; I believe that is the reference.
Senator Ferguson. Is there an individual in thei-e, a [^17]
man by the name of McDonald?
Colonel Thielen. I do not have that transcript of testimony before
me so I cannot answer the question.
Senator Ferguson. Have you got something before you there ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; I have some extracts which I had made
last night of testimony given before the Roberts commission relative to
the radar question.
Senator Ferguson. Will you give us that testimony?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now this is what you founded your statement on ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Colonel Thielen. General Short's testimony before the Roberts
commission, page 65 of the transcript.
Senator Ferguson. You had read that before you made up your
report ?
Colonel Thielen. jMy researchers had read it. I had also read the
Roberts report, but not closely, with the view to incorporating it into
the statement which was prepared, merely by way of acquiring some
background for this assignment.
Senator Ferguson. Were you instructed to avoid any controversial
matters or matters of opinion?
[^i<§] Colonel Thielen. I was instructed to avoid them in the
statement ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Pardon?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; I was instructed to avoid them in the
statement which I was to present to the committee.
Senator Ferguson. \Vlien did you first show the counsel for the
committee, or any member of the committee, your report ?
Colonel Thielen. I never showed the counsel or any member of the
committee my report.
Senator Ferguson. Did you confer with anyone ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Whom did you confer with?
Colonel Thielen. I conferred with counsel for the committee.
Senator Ferguson. Who was the counsel?
Colonel Thielen. Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell.
Senator Ferguson. And did they make any suggestions as to what
should go in or come out?
Colonel Thielen. Their only suggestions, as far as the Army pres-
entation was concerned, had to do with bringing the presentation
79716—46 — pt. 1 9
94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
within the scope of the directive; in other words, of eliminating
controversial material. Also some mechanical suggestions, such as
eliminating tedious lists of equipment that could be transferred from
the oral presentation [219] to the exhibit.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us some of the controversial mat-
ters that they suggested that you take out ?
Colonel Thielen. I recall none, sir. I believe they were very
minor. I do not remember any body of testimony. It may have been
a word which could be improved here and there.
Senator Ferguson. When did you last confer with them ?
Colonel Thielen. On last Monday, sir. That was the only con-
ference I had.
Senator Ferguson. That is Monday of this week ?
Colonel Thielen. The past Monday.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have your statement finished at that
time?
Colonel Thielen. I had a statement finished ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you give it to them to read ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I did not.
Senator Ferguson. How did you confer on it if they did not
read it?
Colonel Thielen. It was discussed with them. I told them orally
what I was going to say. I quoted pages from my script.
Senator Ferguson. Have you got your original script?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not have it. It has been revised
since then, largely in a mechanical way, to [220] improve co-
ordination with the Navy, as far as the presentation is concerned,
and to eliminate tedious details which were later incorporated in the
Army exhibits.
Senator Ferguson. Did you show it to them after you revised it?
Colonel Thielen. No, I did not ; nor did I discuss it with them after
revision.
Senator Ferguson. Now going back to that item that you w^ant to
read from General Short, will j^ou read it ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. General Short's testimony before the
Roberts Commission, page 65 of the transcript, and I quote :
This Opana station is along the ridge here, somewhere along in here [indicating].
It is not marked on the map ; up to the north. That station, just on its own —
they work normally for training from 7 to 11 every day and apparently they just
thought they would not knock off just because it was Sunday, and the staff went
ahead and worked.
And I close the quotes there.
I have also the testimony of Colonel Powell, who was the Hawaiian
Department signal officer, before the Roberts Commission, page 358 of
the transcript, and I quote :
It is almost fantastic the way these things operate, and the men are all anxious
to learn about them. This [221] particular one wanted to work longer
to get more training, because we were to put control sets on the other islands,
and he wanted, I suppose, to become one of the operators on the other islands.
That he did not say, but that is what they were working for, to be able to operate
those sets on the other islands.
That closes the quotation of Colonel Powell.
I have also an extract from the testimony of Sergeant Elliott before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 95
Senator Ferguson. Now he did not testify before the Roberts Com-
mission— Elliott did not, did he ?
Colonel Thielen. I cannot answer that question offhand.
Senator Ferguson. All right, go ahead.
Colonel Thielen. This is page 1001 of the transcript and I quote:
Well, that, sir, is : After our problem was over at seven o'clock, I was to get
further instruction in the operation of the oscilloscope, and at that time I was at
the controls. However, Lockard was instructing me as to the different echoes
that I would see, and it was at that time that the flight was noticed by Private
Lockard.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know at what time they started work that
morning ?
Colonel Thielen. I know what the schedule called for. [^^S]
It called for work from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m.
Senator Ferguson. Three hours ?
Colonel Thielen. That would be correct ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you find in the Army report that it was 4
hours ?
Colonel Thielen. I do not believe I thoroughly understand that ques-
tion, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, Icok at page 1029, where it says :
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, each group had four hours on, and — let's see — we
were divided into three groups, four hours on and eight hours off; but we had
four hours on the 'scope, then four hours guards, then we had four hours off.
Colonel Thielen. That was the weekday schedule, I believe. Sena-
tor.
Senator Ferguson. Was there a different schedule on Sunday?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I can review the schedule as I gave
it in my testimony yesterday. On weekdays other than Saturday
and Sunday the schedule was specifically from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m.
actually tracking aircraft.
Senator Ferguson. What time does the record show that they
actually shut down the radar ?
Colonel Thielen. On 7 December?
[^^S] Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Colonel Thielen. I doubt that the Opana station was shut down,
sir. They continued operation at 7 a. m., as indicated on the historic
plot, so-called. That plot indicates echoes well into the morning,
and we have the testimony of Lieutenant Tyler that he recalled,
or states, that after he was notified at, I believe, about 8 a. m., that
Wheeler Field was under attack.
Senator Ferguson. You examined all of the Army and Roberts
report before you brought in your conclusion about the practice,
and so forth ?
Colonel Thielen. I did that.
Senator Ferguson. Now do you say that anything that was brought
in here is beyond dispute, that it is not disputed in any way?
Colonel Thielen. That is a relative term, I believe. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Well
Colonel Thielen. Any statement could be disputed. We have
tried to confine it to statements concerning which there has been no
controversy.
96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, let me review page 1105 from, the
Army report in relation to Colonel Tyler ; let me read General Grun-
ert's remark. [Reading:]
[224] General Geuneet. And there was nothing for you to do, there, between
7 and 8, but twiddle your thumbs?
Colonel Tyler. No, sir ; there was nothing to do.
General GRtiNEKT. Then it appears that the organization seemed to be faulty,
and if instruction faulty, and there seemed to be a lack of organization and
common sense and reason on this. You went up there to do duty as a pursuit
oflBcer in the information center. There was nobody to do the work with,
because the controller was not there, and the Navy liaison man wasn't there,
and probably some others were missing, so you couldn't do your duty, as a
pursuit officer, because there was nobody to do duty with ; and then, at the
end of the tour, at 7 o'clock, everybody disappeared except the telephone
operator and you ; and the telephone operator remained there for apparently
no reason. You had no particular duty, did you?
Colonel Tylee. No, sir ; we hadn't.
General Geuneet. It seems all cockeyed to me — and that, on the record,
too.
Did you read that part of General Grunert's statement there in the
testimony ?
Colonel Thielen. I did not personally read that, sir. I believe I
can clarify a possible faulty impression in that the testimony which
you just read refers to the information [^£5] center, which was
located at Fort Shafter and not to the radar unit at Opana, out at
Kahuku Point.
Will you point that out, please, Captain ?
Senator Ferguson. Will you say that the reason these boys were
at the radar station after 7 that morning was that the truck did not
come to pick them up? That is the reason they were there?
Colonel Thielen. The evidence I have indicates that Private Elliott
volunteered for additional training. I know nothing about the delay
of the truck in picking them up.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know the reason that they were not
picked up was that the truck did not pick them up ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I did not know that.
Senator Ferguson. Did you read all this testimony ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I did not read it all. Perhaps I should
explain my position is very similar to that of Admiral Inglis. I did
not perform any appreciable quantity of research on this testimony.
It was done by other staff officers.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Will you permit Mr. Murphy to interpose?
Senator Ferguson. For what purpose ?
Mr. Murphy. I was wondering whether or not the witness had
finished the question that you asked 15 minutes ago. He read three
paragraphs. In my impression, that question is still [££6] not
answered.
Senator Ferguson. I will go back to that.
Colonel Thielen. I have some further testimony.
Senator Ferguson. All right. You read what you claim you
founded your statement on.
Colonel Thielen. After reading the testimony of Sergeant Elliott
that he wanted to get some instruction on the use of the oscilloscope
on which Lockard was instructing him, and that the flight was noticed
by Private Lockard, I go on to further testimony by the same witness.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 97
In response to a question by General Frank, "\Vlio wanted to shut
it down?" Sergeant Elliott replied:
Private Lockard wanted to shut the unit down, and since I was to get the
instruction on it I wanted to continue operation. Finally, after insisting on that,
we did continue the flight and completing the flight on this chart which you have
just shown me before, sir, and we followed the flight all the way in until it was
approximately 15 or 25 miles from the island of Oahu, and the flight was lost.
That concludes the testimony which I wish to quote.
Captain, put the radar plot up, please.
Senator Ferguson. Have you got the testimony there? Look on
page 1004.
Colonel TiiiELEN, No, sir ; I do not have that.
• r^^] Senator Ferguson. What?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not have the testimony, I have only
the pertinent extracts.
Senator Ferguson. He says this [reading] :
The oscilloscope, from the beam tliat is sent out, has a back echo, and at that
particular spot the oscilloscope is blank, and it is impossible to pick up any
flight whatsoever at that particular point, and that was as far as we could
follow the flight, and at approximately 7 : 39 is when we started to shut down
the unit, and at 7 : 45 our truck came from our camp (incidentally, which was 9
miles away from the unit) to pick us up to take us to breakfast, and upon
arriving at the camp, why, we had found out what had happened at Pearl
Harbor.
Does not that indicate the reason that they were there with the
machine, that they were waiting on their truck?
Colonel Thielen, No, sir. May I point out the time that that flight
was picked up, at 7 : 02, as indicated on the chart, and it was tracked
continuously to, I believe, the testimony that you quoted said 7 : 45.
Senator Ferguson, 7 : 45 is when the truck picked them up.
Colonel Thielen. Wlien it actually picked them up?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. He says [reading] :
At 7 : 45 our truck came from our camp to pick us up.
Colonel Thielen. What opinion did I give you on that, [228}
Senator ?
Senator Ferguson. In answer to this question, "What time did the
center close up where Tyler was?"
Colonel Thielen. I do not know that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Taking Sergeant Elliott's other statement [read-
ing] :
No, sir ; there was no time. I am sure there wasn't. Another point, sir, that
I might bring out, our clock at the unit I said showed 7 : 02 at the time that we
sent in the first plot. However, when I was ordered, over the plotting set while
we were operating the problem, to shut down, the time by the clock there was
6 : 54, and I can't remember as to whether we had made any time check what-
soever that morning.
Do you know whether or not the main board closed down at 6 : 54?
Colonel Thielen. I believe that is highly controversial, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. You say that is highly controversial. Is that
the reason it is not in your i-eport ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; that would account for it.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not these controversial
matters are going to be presented to the committee ?
Mr. Mitchell. I could answer that. We have all the evidence on
this radar report, the witness is prepared to [£29] testify about
98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it. It is one of those things that we are going into fully. This witness
was instructed to keep out of fields where that situation existed.
Senator Ferguson. Colonel, do you know anything about the op-
erations of the radar after the attack ?
Colonel Thielen. Only the statement which I gave in my script
yesterday, that Lieutenant Tyler, after receiving word from Wheeler
Field of the attack, recalled all crews to their stations. What the
results of that call were I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, there is a vacuum here then, as
far as we are concerned with any information as to the operations
of the radar after the attack. I am talking about the movable sets.
The permanent sets were not completed. The movable sets we are
talking about ; are we not ?
Colonel Thielen. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Is there any information you obtained or you
can give us in relation to the operation of these sets after the attack?
Colonel Thielen. Only those Opana plots which show on the
radar chart which is on the easel.
Senator Ferguson. From what set did those come ?
Colonel Thielen. Those are Opana plots.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know who was operating that set at
10:27?
[^SO] Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any records to show whose infor-
mation this is? I cannot see because of the light. Between 9 and
1027, 651, 652, and 648.
Colonel Thielen. That entire record is authenticated by Lieuten-
ant Colonel Murphy.
Senator Ferguson. From what machine?
Colonel Thielen. From the Opana station.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why these machines were not
used to get the enemy going out ? When you knew they would come
in on the machine, why were not the machines used to get the enemy
going out?
Colonel Thielen. I do not know that they were not, nor if not,
why not.
Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know of any information or any
place that the committee can get information on that?
Colonel Thielen. I am sure that the committee can, through coun-
sel, obtain the best available witnesses on that.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what general — was it General
Powell?
Colonel Thielen. Colonel Powell.
Mr. Mitchell. He is on the list of witnesses.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what he stated in relation to that?
[^■31] The Chairman. Colonel Powell, I will say, is on the list
of witnesses to appear here in person. Wliatever he stated, or what-
ever he has to state, will be brought before the committee by him in
person.
Senator Ferguson. I was just trying to get at what might be in their
files in relation to this.
Colonel Thielen. I am not a very good authority on what is in the
War Department files, sir. Another procedure has been set up for
obtaining any information which the War Department has.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 99
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the B-l7's had radar in
them ?
Colonel Thxelen. I do not know. My opinion would be that they
did not. I do not believe that radar
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not they had radio ?
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I submit, the witness ought to have
an opportunity to answer.
Senator Ferguson. Did you answer that question ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I have not completed my answer.
Senator Ferguson. Then you may complete your answer.
Colonel Thielen. The presumption would be that they were not
equipped with radar, considering the status of development of radar
at that time.
[23£] Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether they had radio
upon them ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I do not know definitely. Presumably
they would have.
Senator Ferguson. Did you look into that?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not any station on
Hawaii operated all night with Hawaiian music that night, the 6th ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not it was played for
the purpose of these B-17's tuning on it ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether at the same time the Jap
planes tuned on it too?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I have no information on that whatso-
ever.
Senator Ferguson. Did you read all of Tyler's testimony ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have any information in relation to
whether or not these radars would pick up whether it was enemy
planes or friendly planes?
Colonel Thielen. That, as I testified yesterday, is not practicable,
for that type of radar, at least. They could [2-33~\ not distin-
guish between hostile aircraft and friendly aircraft.
Senator Ferguson. Who has charge of the submarines? That
would be the admiral, would it not ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, did you state yesterday anything
about what submarines had been in the Harbor?
Admiral Inglis. The submarines that were in the Harbor, the
United States submarines that were in the Harbor were listed in the
script.
Senator Ferguson. How many Japs got into the Harbor?
Admiral Inglis. The best evidence we have indicates that only
one got in. There was some evidence that might lead to the supposi-
tion that a second submarine got in, but on further research my people
told me they did not think there was more than one.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that the one sub came in at
4 : 30 in the morning and went out at 5 : 30 ?
Admiral Inglis. I do not know about that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any information on that?
100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. Nothing conclusive; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did 3^ou find any maps, or have you any maps
in your possession showing the log ?
Admiral Inglis. I was told there was no log, and I was told that
there was a chart wdiich was recovered f rorn — I [2341 believe it
was the submarine that went aground at Bellows Field, showing the
track around Ford Island, but that we thought was only a prospective
course and not one which was actuall}^ taken by the submarine.
There is a little confusion that comes in in translating the Japanese
characters. Some of their tenses are hard to distinguish between
the present tense and future tense.
Senator Ferguson. Then that is a disputed item, is it, as to whether
or not a sub came in and went around Pearl Harbor, around Ford
Island, and came out ?
Admiral Inglis. The evidence on that is certainly not conclusive.
Senator Ferguson. That would be one of the reasons why it would
not be put in your statement ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. I would like to add, Senator, to that
that our best evaluation of the information is that only one submarine
entered Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. We have in this battle report, at one point on
this chart, to bolster the evidence of his better vision he wrote in
Japanese, "I saw it with my own eyes." Did you read that?
Admiral Inglis. I did not ; no. No, I did not read it.
Senator Ferguson. What about it? Do you know whether that is
in your evidence, in your Navy Department ^
[235] Admiral Inglis. I presume
Senator Ferguson (interposing). That is on the log, isn't it, that
you recovered?
Admiral Inglis. If you are talking about the submarine that went
ashore at Bellows Field, I do not believe that that is in the log.
Senator Ferguson. Well, is there any evidence at all in the Navy
Department on that item ?
Admiral Inglis. The only evidence that I know about is what one
of my officers told me, which is to the effect that they recovered a chart
in that submarine showing, as I said, a track around Ford Island and
out again. They think, from the translation of the Japanese charac-
ters on that chart now that is what it was.
Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield at that point?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Chairman. I think the witness might finish his answer.
Mr. ICeefe. I thought he did.
The Chairman. He did not.
Admiral Inglis. The translation of the Japanese characters were
somewhat confusing. A great deal of time was spent on that chart
trying to determine whether or not the submarine actually entered
the harbor or only planned to enter the [236] harbor, and the
conclusion which the experts came out with was that the submarine
did not probably enter the harbor.
[237] Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that we are taking
the opinion of the expert here ?
Admiral Inglis. Perhaps I should not have used the word "ex-
perts." I will correct that to "translators."
PROCEEDINGS OE JOINT COMMITTEE 101
The Chairman. If I may say there, that would be another matter
that would be left out, because it is speculative and controversial.
Admiral Inglis. Exactly, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further on that?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Chairman. Mr. Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Might I say, Senator, while you are questioning with
respect to this item, my understanding is that these two officers from
this grounded submarine were captured by the Army.
Mr. Murphy. Now, will the gentleman yields
Mr. Keefe. And that the information obtained from those officers
was obtained by the Army and not by the Navy. I Avish you would
inquire into that question from the Army, because there seems to be
a sharp line of cleavage between the two services.
Colonel Tiiielen. No, sir ; I have no information on that.
The Chairman. I might suggest to the committee
[£38] Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire — you captured those
men, did you not, with these charts^ The officer you captured on the
sub, and the opei-ator you took, with the charts, did you not^
Mr. Murphy, Will the gentlemtm yield?
The Chairman. Just a minute. Let the witness answer this ques-
tion.
Colonel Thielen. I do not know, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Haven't you any information that he was cap-
tured and the sub was captured ?
Colonel Thielen. I personally have no such information.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral Inglis
Mr. Murphy. My request for the gentleman to yield is that we have
been given an outline as to what the testimony is going to be that will
be gone into subsequently, and it is on that very subject.
Senator Ferguson. I want to find out what information these gen-
tlemen have.
Mr. Murphy. You are anticipating the statement of the witness.
The Chairman. Go ahead. Let us make progress.
Senator Ferguson. Going to the admiral, did Admiral Halsey's
ships have radar ?
Admiral Inglis. The carrier did, yes, sir.
[239] Senator Ferguson. The carriers had radar ■?
Admiral Inglis. His carrier had radar ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. On the memo that went to you. Admiral, on
page 2 [reading] :
Summarize percentage personnel mustered various departments — -summary tes-
timony showing no drunkenness.
Was that on yours ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; that was scratched off.
Senator Ferguson. Why A\as it scratched off? Did you go into
that question at all?
Admiral Inglis. It was discussed just very briefly, and the opinion
seemed to be that there was not any drunkenness that had anything
to do with the case.
Senator Ferguson. Whose opinion was that ?
Admiral Inglis. Of the researchers.
102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. As I understand it then, we are getting the
opinions of your researchers, that do not come up here. Is that right?
Admiral Inglis. Senator, I would like to make again the same
statement that I made several times, that this presentation which
Colonel Thielen and I have given is an attempt to give the committee
just the high lights of the attack on Pearl Harbor, we only covering
those matters which are not controversial, and which are fairly well
1^4^] substantiated by the evidence available to us.
Senator Ferguson. Well now, you say "fairly well." Is anything
controversial if it is only fairly well shown ?
Admiral Inglis. May I delete the word "fairly" then?
Senator Ferguson. You want to take the word "fairly" and leave
only the word "well" in ; is that right?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, or conclusively.
Senator Ferguson. How well ?
Admiral Inglis. Conclusively.
Senator Ferguson. And in whose opinion is it conclusive ?
Admiral Inglis. Well, it is a combination of the opinions of the
people that are working on the statement.
Senator Ferguson, Well, now, can you give us from your evidence
why it took from 9 a. m. — or until 9 a. m. to put No. 3 alert into effect ?
. Admiral Inglis. That is an Army question, I believe.
Senator Ferguson. Colonel, did you ever put the No. 3 alert in for
the Navy ?
Admiral Inglis. We did not have No. 1, 2, and 3, alerts. That is an
Army term.
Senator Ferguson. What do j^ou have ?
Admiral Inglis. We have condition 1, 2, and 3.
Condition 1 is general quarters with all battle stations [2^i]
manned. It is just the opposite with the Army. They have 1, 2, and
3 in the opposite order.
Senator Ferguson. Now, at 6 o'clock in the morning, at Pearl
Harbor, on the 7th, what alert was in effect, as far as the Navy was
concerned ?
Admiral Inglis. It is my recollection that condition 3 was in effect.
That, as I have described, calls for, roughly, one-half of the antiair-
craft battery to be manned — or one-fourth.
Senator Ferguson. At 6 o'clock ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What was the condition on the 6th?
Admiral Inglis. On the 6th ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. Well, I would assume that the same condition pre-
vailed. It is my understanding that condition No. 3 was the routine
condition that applied at that time.
Senator Ferguson. That was the routine condition ?
Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When did that alert change?
Admiral Inglis. Of course there are routine drills at scheduled
times during every day, when they go to condition 1. But for the
purpose of this inquiry, I think, to answer your question, I should say
that that condition changed at [242] the time of the attack.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long it took to put another
alert in at that time ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 103
Admiral Inglis. It probably would — of course, it would vary with
different ships, but I would say on the average, about 3 minutes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you look into the question of inspection
Sunday morning, whether or not there was inspection of the ships?
Admiral Ixglis. Inspection of what nature, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. Any inspection. Were any of the bulkheads
open, or any of the doors ?
Admiral Inglis. You mean inspection of watertight integrity?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. That question was raised by one of the other mem-
bers yesterday. It is being looked into now, and I am sure complete
information on that subject will be made available.
Senator Ferguson. Up to date have you looked into it ?
Admiral Inglis. I have not personally, but some of my people have
worked on it last night.
Senator Ferguson. You cannot give us an answer on that?
[243] Admiral Inglis. No, sir; but that information
Senator Ferguson (interposinng). As I understand
The Chairman. Wait a minute. The witness was about to say
something else. Let him finish.
Admiral Inglis. I cannot give you anything at this time, but that
information will be available.^
Senator Ferguson. As I understand it now, the alert changed then
from No. 3 to No. — what ?
Admiral Inglis. One.
Senator Ferguson. In about how many minutes?
Admiral Inglis. I estimate 3 minutes.
[^44-] Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask the colonel why it took
until 9 o'clock to change their alert, when the Navy said they changed
theirs in 3 minutes.
Colonel Thielen. I cannot answer why, but I would like to review
this much of my testimony yesterday. [Beading :]
When the first bombs were dropped and machine gun fire commenced
Senator Ferguson. By the way, will you give us the time of the first
report of a bomb dropped ?
Colonel Thielen. The first report of a bomb dropped was at 7 : 55
a. m.
The Chairjian. Go ahead now.
Senator Ferguson. Go ahead.
Colonel Thielen (reading) :
When the first bombs were dropped and machine gun fire commenced, prac-
tically all observers were so surprised that for a few minutes the real situation
was not grasped. Perhaps 3 or 4 minutes elapsed before General Short was in-
formed by his chief of staff that an attack was in progress. General Short
immediately directed that all troops be turned out under alert No. 3.
Later, in speaking of the two divisions, I say :
At Schofield Barracks, Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, commanding the Twenty-
fourth Division, first heard the sounds of an attack at about 8 : 05 a. m. Within
a few minutes his [245] chief of staff had issued instructions to the units
to get their machine guns into the antiaircraft positions, to increase the standing
guard, and to send patrols throughout the division sector — which was the northern
half of the island — to observe the beaches. Before he had left his quarters, Gen-
eral Wilson heard some of our machine guns in operation. About 8 : 50 a. m. the
division received word from department headquarters that alert No. 3 would
go into effect at once.
^ See footnote 1, p. 70, supra.
104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. What time was that?
Colonel Thielex. What is that, sir?
Senator Ferguson. What time was that again ?
Colonel Thielen. At 8 : 50 the division received word.
Senator Ferguson. My question was about 9 o'clock.
Colonel Thielen. In the case of the other division, it was the figure
given, as 9 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson. That is all the information there is in the Pearl
Harbor file, is in the Army file here in Washington ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir. There is unquestionably additional tes-
timony on that subject. Of course the actual extent of the alert is a
question of debate. The reason I referred to my testimony is to point
out that action was taken immediately on hearing the sounds of fire.
Senator Ferguson. Have you prepared any other reports, Colonel,
on the Pearl Harbor matter ?
['24j6] Colonel Thielen. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. This is the only one ?
Colonel Thielen. This is — I would like to point out that I did not
personally prepare this report. I am presenting it.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand you were just sent here to
read it?
Colonel Thielen. That is not exactly true. I had a hand in the
preparation of the report, but I did not do the research into the first
sources. ■
Senator Ferguson. Are you through?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Who would you say prepared it?
Colonel Thielen. A number of officers in my group in the War
Department General Staff.
Senator Ferguson. Will you give their names; all the people wlio
worked on it that you know of ?
Colonel Thielen. I can give the name of Lieutenant Colonel Car-
roll, Lieutenant Colonel Root, as the two principal researchers under
whose direction various enlisted personnel looked up specific points.
[^^7] Senator Ferguson. Admiral, have you prepared any other
reports on the Pearl Harbor incident ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; I have a report which, I understand, is
scheduled for presentation as soon as this cross-examination is finished,
on the Japanese attack. That is, the attack as viewed by the Japanese,
which is digested.
Senator 1<'erguson. Any others beyond that ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is the only other report that you prepared ?
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir, on this subject.
Senator Ferguson. What time did you. Admiral, first confer with
Colonel Thielen?
Admiral Inglis. Colonel Thielen? Oh, I think it was Monday
morning, this week.
Senator Ferguson. Is that when you had a rehearsal liere in this
room?
Admiral Inglis. It might be described as a rehearsal.
Senator Ferguson. What would jou describe it as ?
Admiral Inglis. It was a discussion.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 105
Senator Ferguson. A discussion?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; and we came to an agreement as to the
sequence in which various items would be presented.
[^48] Senator Ferguson. Were all these maps prepared espe-
cially for this committee hearing?
Admiral Inglis. Speaking for the Navy maps, I believe that is
correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And, Colonel, were your maps prepared espe-
cially for this hearing?
Colonel TiiiELEN. These maps were prepared under my personal
direction for this presentation.
Senator Ferguson. It was stated yesterday, Colonel, that the radio
was jammed. It was said there was no evidence of sabotage, but
the radio was jammed. Wliat do you mean by that?
Colonel Thielen. In general, the jamming of a radio means set-
ting up signals over a frequency band which will interfere with the
transmission of signals from other stations. This can be done in sev-
eral ways mechanically. It can be done by the old-fashioned spark
set. There are any number of ways of obstructing radio channels.
Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know how this was done?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I don't have that information. Per-
Iiaps the Hawaiian Department Signal Corps officer does.
Senator Ferguson. At least you don't know ?
Colonel Thielen. I don't know ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Could it be done from the Japanese [^W]
carriers out at sea ?
Colonel Thielen. That is a technical question which I prefer
not to answer because I don't know definitely.
Senator Ferguson. Have you, Admiral, any orders not to sink
any subs, to Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral Inglis. I have nothing on that ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there were any
orders issued?
Admiral Inglis. I don't know, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know, Colonel, whether or not there
was any limitation on the distance that Army planes could fly to
sea?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I don't know whether there was or
not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there was a 10-
mile limit?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not know that.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not any planes were
diverted and shipped elsewhere than to Hawaii a few weeks or
months before?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I don't know that.
Senator Ferguson. You haven't any information on that?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir.
[250] Senator Ferguson. We spoke yesterday about Kaminski,
Kaminski was a naval or Army man ?
Admiral Inglis. That was Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, who
was the duty officer in the office of the commandant, Fourteenth Naval
District.
106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. I understood that you were to give us the mes-
sage he gave. Was it in writing ?
Admiral Inglis. I was to find out, as I understand, when this
message was delivered personally to Admiral Bloch and Admiral
Kimmel.
Senator Ferguson. Did you find that out?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; not yet.
Senator Ferguson. You mentioned Admiral Bloch. You stated
yesterday that he would make reports to Admiral Kimmel. Is that
true?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I don't recall making that statement.
The normal channel for such a report would be from the comman-
dant. Fourteenth Naval District, duty officer, who was Lieutenant
Commander Kaminski, to the fleet duty officer.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he ever made any report,
directly to Washington, Admiral Bloch?
Admiral Inglis. To Washington?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
[2S1] Admiral Inglis. I don't have that, but I am quite sure
Washington was informed of the attack shortly after the period.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, you spoke yesterday about the aid to
the injured at the time.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not all of the physi-
cians turned out on the island to help the Navy ?
Admiral Inglis. The only information I have on that is just the
impression that I gained from reading reports in the press and other
sources shortly after the attack happened, and my impression is that
the performance of the Medical Department was beyond reproach.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you get any evidence at all that the
supplies were locked up in such a way that they couldn't be obtained
and it was necessary to go to the private physicians to get help?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; I hadn't heard that.
Senator Ferguson. You have no information on that ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the private physi-
cians did render service ?
Admiral Inglis. I don't know ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You haven't any evidence on that, one [^5^]
way or another ?
Admiral Inglis. I have no evidence ; no, sir.
Senator Fesguson. That is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart, I believe, is the next
member of the committee.
Mr. Gearhart. Colonel Thielen, I have listened to some of your tes-
timony with increasing amazement and for that reason I would like to
ask you a few questions.
First, concerning^ the portable radar set at Opana. During the
course of your testimony, you have referred to it is a "practicing
event."
May I ask you if, in your conferences with your staff, in the prepa-
ration of your statement, that you decided to refer to it as a "prac-
ticing event" for the purpose of belittling the report that came from
those men that were there operating the machine on December 7, 1941 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 107
Colonel Thielen. First, I don't place your reference, but I can
assure you that I had no intention of belittling the men.
A "practicing event" was that?
Mr. Gearhakt. You spoke of some men practicing there.
Colonel Thielen. I don't recall using that term. May I check my
script for a moment?
Mr. Gearhart. You have heard the term used by others [2S3]
in this room, haven't you, since you have been testifying?
Colonel Thielen. I recall no instance of that.
Mr. Gearhart. You didn't hear the admiral, your associate there,
and colleague, use the word "practicing" ?
Colonel Thielen. I think the admiral would have no reason to refer
to our use of radar.
Mr. Gearh^vrt. Haven't you testified here these boys continued, these
young men continued, the use of that machine in operation after 7
o'clock because they wanted to practice ?
Colonel Thielen. I did not use that term, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. What term did you use ?
Colonel Thielen. May I quote my testimony on that point?
Mr. Gearhart. I am not only confining myself to your written
testimony, but the other testimony you have given orally. You say
you haven't used the word "practicing."
Colonel Thielen. May I take it from the transcript ?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
The Chairman. Suppose you read what you said from your paper
while somebody is looking it up in the transcript, if that is agreeable.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. [Reading:]
At seven a. m., 7 December, 1941, all radar detector [254] stations closed
down except the Opana station at Kahuku Point which remained in operation in
oi'der to continue the training of a new man. Private George E. Elliott, who had
volunteered to remain on the job for this purpose.
At 7 : 02 a. m. this station, manned by Private Elliott and Private Joseph L.
Lockard, picked up an indication of airplanes at 132 miles, bearing 3 degrees
east of north.
The soldiers kept tracking the target.
I believe that is all that is applicable.
Mr. Ge^\rhart. I will read you from the testimony of Lt. Joseph
Lockard, given on the 30th day of October 1944, at the Pentagon
Building. [Reading:]
Question. In order to operate the machine you had to mount the truck?
Answer (by Lieutenant Lockard). We had to unlock the vans and open them.
Question. There was nothing in this van except the machine itself?
Answer. That is right.
Question. Was Elliott doing the actual computation or were you?
Answer. I was doing the computation. Elliott was doing the plotting and
keeping the log.
Question. What do you mean by "operating the [2551 equipment"?
Answer. Operations consist of controlling the movement of the antenna and
reading the information from the oscilloscope both on the screen and on the
mileage scale.
Question. As you were operating this thing you didn't see anything at all until
about two minutes after seven. When seven o'clock came, what did you say to
Elliott?
Answer. We mentioned the fact that the truck hadn't arrived, and there
was no particular point in closing up and sitting out on the grass when we
could be comfortable inside.
Question. At about two minutes after seven, you were the first to notice
anything on the scope?
Answer. Yes.
108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Does that indicate to you that they continued after 7 because Mr.
Elliott, who had already had instructions, day after day and week
after week, under Lieutenant Lockarcl, because he wanted a little
more training ?
Colonel Thielen. I have already quoted testimony which does
indicate the situation as I testified yesterday, and, by the way, I
find that my oral presentation agrees with that which I gave you.
Mr. Geakhart. Yes; and, as a matter of fact, the truck was late
to take them to breakfast, and didn't come until [£56] 7 : 45 —
you know that to be a fact?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not.
Mr. Gearhaet. Then you testified a moment ago in respect to the
hours in which the radar at Opana was in use. Will you give that
again, please?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. [Eeading :]
When he placed Alert No. 1 in effect, General Short also directed that the
aircraft warning service operate all mobile aircraft warning stations from
two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn, specifically from 4 to 7 o'clock
in the morning. Thus, the operating schedule of the mobile radar detector
stations was daily from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. ; routine training from 7 a. m. to
11 a. m., except Sunday, and daily, except Saturday and Sunday from 12 o'clock
to 4 o'clock p. m. for training and maintenance woi'k.
Mr. Gearhart. Where do you get that information ?
Colonel Thielen. I have that documented, sir. I can look it up
I take that from General Short's testimony before tlie Roberts
commission, vokmie 2, page 43.
Mr. Gearhart. W^ell, do you think Lieutenant Lockard ought to
know when he was working and what his hours of dut}' were, since
he was on the job?
Colonel Thielen. Presumably he would; yes, sir; although
[257] at that time he was a private, and would naturally be under
the orders of someone else.
Mr. Gearhart. He was a rather capable private, to be a lieuten-
ant today; doesn't that demonstrate that he was a capable private?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; but his capabilities, I don't believe,
are the issue. It was his actual position at that time.
Mr. Gearhart. Let's read more of his testimony given when he
was a second lieutenant in the Signal Corps, and after he had been
commissioned. [Reading :]
Answer. There were approximately six men per unit. We had six in ours.
We operated from 7 to 5 o'clock.
Question. Nobody operated at nighttime, so far as you know?
Answer. If there was an alert, or if maneuvers were going on, or some-
thing of that kind, there were not night operations.
Question. From 7 to 5, except for lunch period, you were on daily?
Answer. Yes ; during the week.
Question. Sunday was a day off, normally?
Answer. We had to operate Simdays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the
morning. We took turns. That happened [258] to be my Sunday,
From that it would appear that they worked Sundays and pre-
sumably holidays, from 4 in the morning until breakfast time, 7
o'clock; that on weekdays they woi-ked from breakfast time, 7 o'clock,
until 5 in the afternoon.
How do you account for such a discrepan("y in the testimony that
you have quoted in opposition?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 109
Colonel Thielen. Admitting the discrepancy between my closing
time of 4 p. m. and that testified as 5 p. m., I believe the discrepancy is
in the term "work." I broke that down to actual operation of the
detector in picking up aircraft from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., and training,
which might not actually involve tracking aircraft, from 7 to — I don't
remember the exact time — from 7 to 11, and training and maintenance
from 12 to 4, which agrees, I believe, substantially with
Mr. Gearhart. I think, you. Colonel, picked the wrong word from
the wrong place, when you stress the word "work." It was I that used
the word "work." It doesn't appear in the testimony I read. He
called it operating the machine.
Have you another explanation?
Colonel Thielen. Operating the machine would not necessarily
be "on the alert for the detection of aircraft."
Mr. Gearhart. I want to ask you, Colonel, as a military [259]
man, whether or not you think there is anything significant in the fact
that, according to your orders, this machine should have been turned
off at 7 o'clock, and the further fact that the range of these machines
was about 13G miles and no farther, that the Japanese planes should
fly into that oscilloscope 2 minutes after it ought to have been off
the air?
Colonel Thielen. I draw no conclusion from that, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Does it suggest to you, as a military man, that the
Japanese had knowledge of the orders that we had under which these
machines were operated ?
Colonel Thielen. Not necessarily, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Would you give consideration to that ?
Colonel Thielen. It is a very definite possibility; yes, sir.
Mr, Gearhart. Don't you think it strangely significant that the
Japanese planes flew into the range of that machine just 2 minutes
after it was supposed to be off the air ?
Colonel Thielen. It might have been.
Mr. Gearhart. Who made the order?
Colonel Thielen. The order, sir?
Mr. Gearhart. The order fixing the time for these radars to be
on the air.
Colonel Thielen. General Short was responsible for that [260]
order.
Mr. Gearhart. Have you a copy of that order ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir. I have a reference to it in my testimony.
Mr. Gearhart. I will remind counsel that I asked him wrecks ago for
copies of that order, together with a statement of the history source,
and the name of the person who signed it, and I have not received it.^
Now, radar is operated in the daytime as well as nighttime?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. In daytime they will record the approach of planes
that are far beyond the range of human vision, will they not?
Colonel Thielen. With exception taken to the term "record," yes,
sir ; they indicate.
Mr. Gearhart. Using that distinction, it will indicate on the oscillo-
graph ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
^ Reports from the War Department on orders governing the operation of radar in Hawaii
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor were subsequently introduced as Exhibit No. 137.
79716 — 46— pt. 1 10
110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. On the oscilloscope, that the airplanes are approach-
ing from a very great distance?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And the range of those portables, the only radars
they had on the islands, six of them, was 136 to [£6l] 138
miles ?
Colonel Thielen. My figure is 150.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, there have been many different maneuvers
down through the years in the islands over there in which an air attack
upon the islands was under contemplation, maneuvers in which cups
were bestowed upon attacking forces, simulated attacking forces, for
taking the islands, for instance, in these maneuvers. One was held a
few months before, and at that time it was found by the judges that the
proper time to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor is to ride in on the
rays of the sun ; is that not correct ?
Colonel Thielen. I do not know, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Do you know that, as an Army officer, that that is the
generally accepted thesis among military and naval people?
Colonel Thielen. You refer to coming in on the sun ?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Colonel Thielen. It is a commonly used tactic ; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. In other words, the Japanese didn't have to have any
imagination in planning this attack; all they had to do was to read the
newspapers and listen to speeches, and know that that was the accepted
idea among American officers as to when the islands should be attacked
with the [262] greatest possibility of success, was to ride in
on the rays of the sun, as the Japanese did later; is that correct?
Colonel Thielen. I don't know, sir. I say it is a recognized tactic.
That is as far as I can go as an Army officer.
Mr. Gearhart. Don't you think it was strangely significant that
the order keeping these radars on the air should provide that they
should be off the air at a time that an attack of that kind could be
made with the greatest chances of success, according to the accepted
views of the Army and Navy ?
Colonel Thielen. Do I see significance in that ?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Colonel Thielen. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Does it suggest that possibly somebody was exerting
a tremendous influence over the writing of orders somewhere along
the line, in headquarters at Honolulu or America ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; it suggests nothing of the kind to me.
Mr. Gearhart. Wlien we had six radar machines over there, why
were they all on at once, and all off at once? Wliy wasn't it provided
that they should spell each other off over the 24-hour period of the
day?
[263] Mr. MnRPHT. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Gearhart. No, sir ; I don't think I will.
Colonel Thielen. I am no expert on radar, which is a highly tech-
nical subject. I can suggest an answer to your last question — and he
might drop the chart showing the radio stations. Let me say, each
radar in general covers a certain sector. No one radar detector on the
island could determine an approach from any direction.
Mr. Gearhart. Do you think that answer justifies the taking off of
the air radar during the dangerous hours of the 24-hour period ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 111
Colonel Thielen. By no means, but it accounts for the simultaneous
operation of several radar stations.
Mr. Gearhart. If you were in charge, don't you think you could
think of a way of getting six machines in operation over a period of
24 hours a day ?
Colonel Thielen. I would want complete coverage. It would not
be a solution to alternate the operation of radar around the island.
You would have to have coverage of each sector while that particular
station was operating.
Mr. Gearhart. Considering the terrain of Oahu, there are high
points on the mountains, on the top of which these machines could be
placed, and they could cover larger theaters than assigned to these
fixed machines when you scattered them [264] along the coast ;
isn't that correct?
Colonel Thielen. I believe that is correct in general. There are
technicalities in the field of radar that I wouldn't want to
testify on.
[£6S] Mr. Gearhart. Now., were there any orders from Wash-
ington to General Short or to any other person directing that no fire
be had on any Japanese vessels or any Japanese installations
Colonel Thielen. I do not know, sir.
Mr. Gearhart (continuing). Until the Japanese fired first?
Colonel Thielen. I do not know, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. You know that such an order was issued to General
MacArthur, do you not ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not.
Mr. Gearhart. You know that the provision of the Constitution of
the United States is that war shall be declared by the Congress of the
United States ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; I am familiar with the Constitution.
Mr. Gearhart. You know that is a fact. Was any order issued
from Washington that you know anything about, either to General
MacArthur or to General Short, reminding them that they should
not take any offensive action because of this constitutional provision?
Colonel Thielen. I was in no position to have any such knowledge
and I do not have any.
[£60] Mr. Gearhart. Is that the reason
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ?
Mr. Geiarhart. Is that the reason why they have you people come
up here to read hearsay testimony to us, so that whenever we ask you
a question in connection with that testimony you can always reply,
"I am only here to give you the information I was sent up here to
give you" ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; in my case, at least, that is definitely not
true. I can explain the reason I was sent up here, I think, satisfac-
torily.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, there are admirals and generals available to
subpena by this committee who went through this attack. Why are
they not here to read these statements instead of yourself ?
Colonel Thielen. Because the directive setting up this particular
testimony was merely, I might say, to orient the committee by giving
a narrative of the facts of the Pearl Harbor attack.
112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. And there are others that could ^ive the narrative
from reference to documents, as you have, and also to give testimony
in respect to actual personal experiences and they are not here.
The Chairman. If that kind of thing is going to go on here the
Chairman desires to say for the record that this [267] method
of procedure was unanimously agreed to by the committee as the pro-
cedure to be followed. It was understood that this narrative recital
was to be made by a representative of the Navy and a representative
of the Army. The men who were on the ground and know what
happened will be called, but they cannot all be called en masse.
Mr. Gearhart. With all due respect to the chairman of this com-
mittee, I want to say at this particular time that I never agreed and
neither did any other member of the committee agree that they would
consent to calling the witness in question just to get hearsay
statements.
The Chairman. Counsel for the committee for an hour and a half
explained this procedure to the committee and no member of the com-
mittee, all members being present, raised any objection.
Mr. Gearheart. Yes, but we expected to get witnesses who knew
something about what they were talking, not hearsay.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman the Chairman has stated some-
thing on the record that is not as I understood it at all. There was no
consent given, there was no consent passed about the manner of pro-
ducing this. We were told that this was a tentative outline and I want
the record to emphatically show that I never consented to trying this
matter in this way.
[268] The Chairman. Well, I don't care to get into a contro-
versy here, but I don't want the record to be misrepresented. There
was no objection expressed on the part of any committeeman to having
a representative of the Navy and a representative of the Army come
up and from documents and reports and evidence within the two de-
partments give us a narrative recital of what happened physically
at Pearl Harbor. They did state that evidence would be produced
during the hearings by eye-witnesses and that will be done.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, may I speak
Mr. Gearhart. I yield to the Senator.
The Chairman. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Senator Brewster. I don't want to add to any confusion on this
score, but I certainly do not want to be recorded as one who ever
assented to this method of procedure. I had very grave doubts re-
garding the method when it was proposed, I expressed considerable
concern ; I urged very strenuously, as the record shows, that this mat-
ter be deferred until we could acquire a more proper understanding
of it from the various exhibits and records and twice renewed my
motion for postponement.
I think that the developments to date have amply demonstrated the
inexpediency of this method of procedure, with two men here to occupy
2 days, who had no information what- [269] ever, who had no
connection whatever with Pearl Harbor and who evidently have very
little familiarity with the records and I think it is most unfortunate
that the first 2 days have been so largely wasted by this work.
Mr. Gearheart. Mr. Chairman, may I proceed ?
The Chairman. Yes, Congressman (jearhart, proceed, but as a mat-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 113
ter of information, wliether this is wise or unwise, it is the method
that we agreed to and I hope that it can be speedily accomplished.
Senator FERGUSOisr. Mr. Chairman, I again want to make this
record clear that I did not agree to this method of procedure. My
motion was to adjourn it so that we could get the original records
here and so that we might go over the matter before we brought wit-
nesses in.
The Chairman. Well, neither the Senator nor any other committee-
man objected to these representatives being brought here for a narra-
tive recital, as explained by counsel. The Senator did move to post-
pone it. The Senator from Michigan moved to postpone it on another
ground entirely; but go ahead, Mr. Gearhart.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to
Mr. Gearhart. I want to proceed. It is only a few minutes before
noon.
The Chahiman. Let us go ahead with the witness and let [2701
the committeeman continue without any further interruption.
Mr. Gearhart. Addressing my next question to Admiral Inglis,
I will ask you. Admiral, whether or not there were any orders issued
either from Washington or in the islands, directing the commander
in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commander of the Fourteenth
Naval District not to fire upon Japanese ships or installations until
we were fired on first?
Admiral Inglis. I have no knowledge of such an order.
Mr. Gearhart. You know of orders that were issued by Admiral
Kimmel which were to the opposite effect, do you not ?
Admiral Inglis. I have no personal knowledge of such orders; no,
sir. I would have to look that up.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, I will refer you to the report of the NavaJ
Court of Inquiry wherein they refer to certain orders issued by Ad-
miral Kimmel in violation of Washington instructions, the admiral as-
suming the responsibility on the theory that he would act first and ex-
plain later. Do you remember that part of the report ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, have you read the report?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have not.
Mr. Gearhart. Then you are not giving us [271'\ informa«
tion that is based upon the Naval Court of Inquiry ?
Admiral Inglis. The information which I have given you has been
based on the research work of the people who work for me and I as-
sume that they have read some of those things. I might also say
that, in my opinion, from what I know at this moment, that that is
controversial and also has something to do with fixing the respon-
sibility. We have omitted those subjects from this presentation.
Mr, Gearhart. Do you know a man in the Navy by the name of
Commander Clarence Earl Dickson, or Clarence Earl Dickinson, Jr. ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. A flying naval officer, serial No. 74369?
Admiral Inglis. I do not know him, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, in addition to being a competent flying officer
he is also a very capable author. He wrote a story for the Saturday
Evening Post which appeared in that publication on the 10th of
October issue of 1942, which he entitled "I Fly for Vengeance." I
want to read you just one paragraph. Maybe this will refresh your
114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
memory on some orders that were issued at that time. It is the second
paragraph of the story. [Reading :]
It was not that we pilots did not sense the ten- [212] sion that lit up
the Pacific. You could feel it everywhere all the time. The mission from which
we were returning —
I will interpolate, on December 7 —
had the flavor of impeding action. We had been delivering a batch of 12
Grumman Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron 21 to Wake Island where
they were badly needed. On this cruise we had sailed from Pearl Harbor on
November 28 under absolute war orders. Vice Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr.,
the commander of the aircraft battle force, had given instructions that the
secrecy of our mission was to be protected at all costs. We were to shoot down
anything we saw in the sky and pound anything we saw in the sea. In that
way there could be no leak to the Japanese.
And I might point out to you that at the time that was written
Clarence E. Dickinson was a lieutenant and that the last time I recall
he had been promoted twice and is now a commander, so evidently
there wasn't any objection in the Navy Department to that which
he said.
Now, do you anything about that of which Lieutenant and now
Commander Dickinson wrote?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. We did not attempt to read magazine
articles and things of that character in making up this presentation.
Mr. Gearhart. Will you get me, Mr. Counsel, [273] the or-
ders under which Lieutenant Dickinson flew on that trip and if those
orders were in part verbal will you please ascertain for me what the
verbal part of the orders were?^
Senator Lucas. I would suggest you get the witness also, Mr.
Counsel.
Mr. Gesell. The witness is on our list. Admiral Halsey is on the
list to testify. He was in command of those flyers. He seemed to
us to be the logical person to give the facts that the Congressman is
interested in.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. I merely advert to this because of all of this
being a surprise. Why should anybody be surprised when we are
making war orders?
The Chairman. Does any member of the committee think that this
is argumentative matter that should appeal to the committee and not to
the witness?
Mr. Gearhart. That is to the entire country, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, I have no doubt of that.
Mr. Gearhart. And that will, accordingly, include our distin-
guished Chairman as well.
The Chairman. No doubt and I accept my part of the responsi-
bility.
Mr. Gearhart. It is a very heavy burden for you to bear, I admit
that.
[^74] Now, Admiral Inglis, do you know where the United
States cruiser Boise was about that week of December 1 to December
7? _
Admiral Inglis. I understand the Boise was in the Philippines.
Mr. Gearhart. In the Philippines?
^ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5476 for a letter from the Navy Department.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 115
Admiral Ikglis. She was attached to the Pacific Fleet, but actually
present in the Philippines if my information is correct. I just ob-
tained this information just this moment.
Mr. Gearhart. "\Anio \\'as commander of that ship ?
Admiral Inglis. What is that ?
Mr, Gearhart. Who was commander of that ship at that time?
Admiral Inglis. Captain Robinson. I am not sure of his initials.
Mr. Gearhart. Do you know w^ho is commander at the present time ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Do you know a Commander or Captain Moran?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. ]\Iike Moran?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. He at one time was in command [275^ of
that ship and at one time preceding that was executive officer of that
ship ; is that not correct ?
Admiral Inglis That is correct.
Mr. Gearhart, Can you tell me whether or not the Japanese fleet,
the attacking force that was proceeding to rendezvous 200 miles
north of Oahu — if that ship did not sight the Japanese fleet?
Admiral Inglis. I know of no sighting of the Japanese fleet at
all. My information is that the Japanese fleet which attacked Pearl
Harbor was not sighted.
Mr. Gearhart. Will you make an investigation and determine
whether or not there is a report on file indicating that the officers
and crew, somebody in an official position on the cruiser Boise, sighted
the Japanese attacking fleet during the first week of December?
Admiral Inglis. If there is any evidence, either written or from
witnesses, I am authorized to state that the Navy Department will
make that available to you and the committee, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. It will not be forgotten now that I have raised the
question, I trust.
Admiral Inglis. It will not be forgetten.^
Mr. Gearhart. Now, there is another thing that I would like to
ask you about.
[£76] Were any orders issued from Hawaii or from Washington
or from any other place placing restrictions upon the use of ship ra-
dios, radios of the type, for instance, on the cruiser Boise? I am now
referring to the fatal week in December.
Admiral Inglis. I am answering that question now from my own
personal memory, Mr. Gearhart, and I have a recollection that I
am not too sure of, because this was nearly 5 years ago, that there
was a general order in effect about that time which applied to both
the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets, instructing them to maintain
radio silence. I cannot be positive that that applied to the Pacific
Fleet, but my recollection is that it applied to the Atlantic Fleet
and in all probability it applied also to the Pacific Fleet.
Mr. Gearhart. When was that order enjoining silence upon ships
at sea made ?
Achniral Inglis. I haven't got that information available. The
Navy will try to get it for you, sir.-
1 The log of U. S. S. Boise was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 68."
2 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5294.
116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Geaehart. As a matter of fact, it was made just shortly be-
fore, around the latter part of November or the early part of De-
cember, 1941, wasn't it?
Admiral Inglis. It is my recollection that the order was issued
long before that, sir, but my recollection may be faulty.
Mr. Gearhart. By the way, was that phrase, [S??] "task
force" used in 1941 ?
Admiral Inglis. I believe it was, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. I was told that it came into use and was borrowed
from the Japanese nomenclature on or well along in 1942.
Admiral Inglis. That is not my understanding.
Mr. Gearhart. Don't you think it is strangely significant that there
should be an order directing all of our ships to sail south of Hawaii,
that there should be a radio beam directed to be held on all night for
the benefit of B-17's which the Japanese availed themselves of?
Don't you think it is rather significant that there were naval orders
enjoining silence upon all of our ships at sea, which would forbid
them from reporting anything that they might obtain by way of in-
formation on the liigh seas ? Don't you think it is strangely significant
that the radar should be turned off the air during the danger hours
of the day?
What effort has been made by the Intelligence Service to break down
and ascertain how all these strangely significant things could occur,
all of which, every one of them, operating to the benefit of our enemy
and to the vulnerability of our own crews and ships ?
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I object to that on the ground that
the witness has been asked five different [B78] questions and
I think they should be propounded one at a time.
The Chairman. Let him answer all the five.
Mr. Gearhart. I think the five together is what makes it signifi-
cant.
The Chairman. The question of significance will not be gone into
at the moment, but answer, if you can, Admiral, all five together or
ad seriatim.
Admiral Inglis. Congressman Gearhart, that covers a lot of
territory. Two of these questions, if I recall them, refer to Army
matters, the B-l7's and the radar going off the air at T o'clock.
Now, you ask me my opinion of the significance of those five things ?
I am not sure that I understand what the point is that you are making,
but I will do the best I can to give you my opinion of the significance.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, you say you don't understand why I have
raised this question, or what I mean by it?
Admiral Inglis. I don't understand what
Mr. Gearhart. I understand that the Intelligence Service is an
agency of the Army and an agency of the Navy, created for the pur-
pose of taking these strange circumstances and finding out what they
mean. Therefore I asked you have you made any investigation to
determine why this long list of events, all of which tied the hands of
America and ' [279] all of which benefited the Japanese, why
they should all occur at one time, in one picture? Has that been a
study of the Intelligence Bureau of which you are a part ?
Admiral Inglis. I would like to leave out, if I may, from the record
any discussion of the functions or success of the Intelligence Service
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 117
at present. Insofar as it affected Pearl Harbor I think I can answer
the gentleman's question.
My opinion is that the significance of those three things is accounted
for by the tense relationship which existed in world politics at that
time and it was only natural, for instance, that under the circum-
stances information concerning the movements of our fleet should be
denied to any country with which our relations were strained. That
is the only significance that I can read into the five items that the
gentleman has just given me.
Mr. Geaehart. In your testimony yesterday you said that there
was a condition existing on the battleship Calif ornki which prevented
it from performing its best service under the crisis. You said you
had a report from the Chief of Naval Yards and Docks.
Admiral Inglis. The report came from some officers in the Bureau
of Ships who had made a study of that and the gist of the report that
I gave yesterday was that the California was the only ship where any
openings or lack of closures, let \280^ us say, of watertight
doors and hatches contributed in any way to the damage which
resulted.
Mr. Gearhart. The words which caught my attention was that —
in any way contributed to the inability of that ship to fight.
Now, were there other ships that had their doors opened, other ships
that had themselves in such a condition that they could not fight in the
most efficient manner ?
Admiral Inglis. The openings, of course, would not stop the ship
from fighting but might possibly lessen the ability of the ship to stay
afloat.
Now, as I said earlier this morning, we are getting that material
together for you in response to that question and the Navy Depart-
ment will make available to you and to the committee everything
that they have on the subject.
Mr. Gearhart. Very well, but why put it off when you have right
in your hands a report from which you can give us that.
Admiral Inglis. I haven't got it right in my hands.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, 3^011 read this report of the Yards and Docks,
the Bureau of Ships or Yards and Docks, whichever it was?
Admiral Inglis. I read no report. This is the Bureau of Ships,
Mr. Congressman, that is responsible for that sub- \^81\ ject,
not the Bureau of Yards and Docks ; the Bureau of Ships.
Mr. Gearhart. The Bureau of Ships ^
Admiral Inglis. I haven't got a report, in response to your question.
I was told by my staff that they have received verbally this informa-
tion that I have given you about the California being the only ship
where the openings contributed in any way to the damage which was
suffered by any of the ships there.
Mr. Gearhart. Did your staff tell you what the conditions were
on the California?
Admiral Inglis. Not in detail, no, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Generally what did they tell you ?
Admiral Inglis. They told me that because of some difficulty in
closing the watertight doors and hatches after general quarters were
sounded, which changes the conditions of readiness from three to one,
because of that difficulty that the flooding and perhaps resulting fire
spread more rapidly than otherwise might have been the case.
118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. Why were the doors and hatches of the California
opened on that day ?
Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question at present, but we
will get that information.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, this is one of these [^5^]
things we are going into and it lias got to the point where we feel we
have to call witnesses who were actually on those ships to be sure to
know what the conditions were and we are going to do so and I hope
we will get it all here.
Mr. Gearhart. Counsel will recall that I have asked for all written
orders which might have produced that condition or a similar con-
dition on our ships, verbal orders, ship orders or district orders or
commander in chief orders or Washington orders.
Mr. Mitchell. My impression is that things of that kind are indi-
vidual ship matters. As the matter stands we may have to call oflficers
or men who were on the vessels themselves, but we are going ahead to
try to get the facts.
Mr. Gearhart. It is now past 12, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Is that all, Mr. Gearhart ?
Mr. Gearhart. No. I say it is now past 12. We have reached our
adjournment hours.
The Chairman. Well, then, we will stand in recess until 2 o'clock
this afternoon.
( Whereux^on, at 12 : 05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the
same day.)
\283'\ ATTERNOON SESSION 2 : 00 P. M.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Before proceeding further with the witness, in view of the discussion
that took place this morning among members of the committee, the
Chair feels that in the interest of accuracy there ought to be placed
in the record at this point a memorandum prepared and submitted to
the committee by Mr. Mitchell, the general counsel, which is described
as a "Tentative order of proof." Then a
Preliminary statement, covering committee procedure, relations witli agencies
concerned, and introduction of letters exchanged with Secretaries Forrestal,
Patterson, President Truman, Roosevelt estate, plus Truman directives —
which was done previously, when we started.
Then on the following page of this memorandum it is stated [read-
ing] :
Tlie story of the actual attack and the Japanese plans for attack will be pre-
sented by an Army and a Navy officer, who will summarize all available data.
The summary will be prepared under direction of counsel along the lines sug-
gested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of
opinion and questions of individual responsibility. The summary will be subject
to amendment if proved in error through subsequent witnesses. This procedure
will save calling scores of witnesses and will give to the committee and the
i28Sa'^ public the first organized comprehensive account of the attack.
And following that there is subdivision "A," under the heading
of "The Attack," and under that subdivision "A" there are 17 points,
outlined by the counsel, and discussed in the committee. That memo-
randum is dated November 7, and which is a revision of a previous
memorandum dated November 1 and distributed to all members of
the committee on the 1st of November.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 119
Mr. Mitchell. I think it was the 2d. I think the meeting took
place on the 2d. The memorandum is dated the 1st.
The Chairman". The memorandum is dated the 1st, yes and the
meeting took place on the 2d, and the following meeting probably
on the 8th, because the following memorandum was dated the 7th,
which was the day before.
Under subdivision "A" there are 17 different points which were
discussed with the committee in a session that lasted from 10 : 30 in
the morning to about 1 : 30 in the afternoon.
Then there is a subdivision "B," which is "The Jap Plan." That is,
the plan of the Japanese as discovered from the records since obtained
from Japanese sources, captured Japanese ships, and so on, and which
is to come later under Admiral Inglis' testimony.
These 17 points were thoroughly discussed by the committee and the
list of witnesses was gone over and what they would testify to, or a
general outline of their testimony was &S4] discussed, and
there were three or four or five witnesses added to the list, including
Sumner Welles, Mr. Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, Mr.
Tyler, whose name has been mentioned here, and Mr. Lockard, whose
name has been mentioned here, and also Captain Zacharias, whose
name was suggested by Congressman Keefe of Wisconsin.
The only other changes made to this tentative suggestion of pro-
cedure was that under Item No. 12, which was headed as follows,
"Summarize Percentage Personnel Mustered Various Departments,"
and then in parentheses "perhaps here summary testimony showing
no drunkemiess" — the committee decided to strike out No. 12 and not
go into that in this preliminary statement because that would be a
matter that would have to be testified to, probably, by witnesses who
were on the ground and in addition it was thought in any preliminary
statement it would not be wise to go into that phase of the question.
Outside of those changes, this memorandum was discussed at length
and no objection was raised to it, and every name, every additional
name suggested by the members of the committee was added to the
list of witnesses, and has been published.
I ask that this document, with these additions and corrections, be
printed at this point.
(The document appears in full at pp. 125-129, inclusive.)
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to it being print-
ed in the record, but I don't want my cross- [285] examination
interrupted with it. I ask unanimous consent that it go in the record
immediately after the conclusion of my remarks.
The Chairman. Yes ; that is entirely satisfactory.
Mr. Gearhart. I have only two or three questions to ask anyway,
and I don't want my remarks interrupted.
The Chairman. That is entirely satisfactory.
Mr. Gearhart. I want to say in explanation, if that is offered to
establish any point, that there is no objection to that order of proof,
that the only objection I have raised has been against the people who
have been brought here to establish the things that are set forth in that
document.
I objected to it on the ground that they are hearsay witnesses and
I have never been in a court room where they allowed hearsay evidence
when there were live witnesses to furnish direct evidence,
120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. It was understood during this whole discussion
that this presentation, this preliminary presentation, was not to be
made by eyewitnesses, that it was to be made by a representative of
the Army and a representative of the Navy, and that that relation and
that delineation and narrative recital of what happened, the physical
situation surrounding it, was to be given by a representative of the
Army and of the Navy from the records in the War and Navy Depart-
ments, and [286] not by eyewitnesses, which would require, as
everybody understood, as the committee understood, and as counsel
explained, probably 2 or 3 weeks, to get eyewitnesses to everything
that transpired out at Pearl Harbor.
I think it is due the committee, and the public, to say that there was
no objection to this procedure, and that every suggestion of additional
witnesses or modification of procedure was agreed to at the time.
Senator Breavster. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to amend your
statement.
In the first place, as to the extent of the discussion, it is my very
clear recollection that most of our discussion was centered, in all of
our recent meetings, on much more controversial matters, which have
been fully aired on the floor, and need not be discussed here.
This matter was brought up, this memorandum you speak of was
submitted, and I recall very distinctly — which, apparently, the chair-
man does not recall — that I urged the point of view of Representative
Keefe, of Wisconsin, who, out of a considerable experience as a trial
lawyer, preferred to approach this in chronological order, starting
back and bringing the events in in chronological order, in order that
we might make a proper record for posterity.
It was the recommendation of counsel, and it was, we [287]
gathered, the opinion of the majority, that this was the way to proceed.
This discussion of which you speak followed three or four votes in
which there had been a sharp difference between the majority and the
minority and there was no reason to think that any further agitation
would have resulted differently.
I am not prepared — I was not prepared, at any rate — to hold too
strong an opinion as to which course was better and I so stated, but I
do feel that events have demonstrated that it has not been as fortunate
as, perhaps, was anticipated. I think that is a fair statement of the
attitude.
[288] Tlie Chairman. I might add to that that it was discussed
in the committee and presented by the counsel as probably the most
logical way to proceed so as to describe the actual attack, what took
place on the day of the attack and the conditions which surrounded it
and then bring it out in that method. It was the general understand-
ing that that would be the course pursued.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan.
Senator Ferguson. I want the record to be clear. Mr. Chairman,
it IS true that item No. 12 was discussed and the question of drunken-
ness was taken out. The discussion was not as full as indicated by the
chairman. I distinctly remember protesting doing it in this manner
because I asked the committee to have counsel give us the exhibits at
least 10 days in advance so that the members of the committee would
be fully acquainted with all of the facts.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 121
It was stated then that we would get the exhibits either that Friday
or Saturday or possibly Monday. As a matter of fact, I received
mine on the Tuesday and Wednesday, the day before the hearing.
Now, it appears that we have not received all of the exhibits. I want
this record to show that there was no vote taken on this method of
handling the matter ; there was no consent, as far as I know, of any
member concerned. We were [289~\ given this outline, it is
true. There was no vote taken as to whether that was to be the method
or not and I protested, as I did on the floor, that this method of trial
would be a trial such as the Army and Navy and the various services
wanted it to be.
The Chairmax. Unfortunately, there was no stenographic record
taken in any of the executive sessions of what discussion took place.
Any Senator or any Congressman or any member of the committee
could have moved that this method not be adopted as the procedure,
and that we should adopt any other method of procedure. No motion
being made, no vote was taken. The whole thing was discussed, each
item was read by the counsel, Mr. Mitchell, item by item and discussed,
each witness that was to be called and what he was expected to testify
to in the various divisions of the tentative procedures of proof and the
fact that no vote was taken on whether this should be the procedure
was due to the fact that nobody made any motion about it, and it was
generally accepted as the procedure which would be followed.
Senator Brewstee. Well, I don't think it is proper, Mr. Chairman,
to carry this discussion to any great extent, but I am quite sure that
you are correct in stating that each item was read. That is not my
recollection as to what was done. We had it for 2 or 3 days to examine
it.
[290] The Chairman. You had it for a week before that meet-
ing, every member of the committee had it for a week before the meet-
ing and that memorandum was dated the 1st of November. Every
committeeman was given a copy of that and had it a week before we
had the following meeting.
There was this new revision which had come about by the considera-
tion of the November 1 memorandum and that was discussed, as I said
a little while ago, in a meeting which lasted for about 3 hours. I
don't say that that was the exclusive thing that was discussed. There
were motions made to postpone the hearing that were voted upon also,
but this memorandum was read and explained by the counsel to those
present and that means all the members of the committee.
Put this in the record.
Mr. Murphy. At a previous meeting when the plan was before
the committee certain members asked that it be put over to
the following meeting because they did not have enough opportunity
to study it ; that was the meeting previously to the November 8 meet-
ing. And after the meeting on November 8 I dictated to my secretary
a memorandum of what actually took place there, and I have that
memorandum that was made that afternoon, and it is in accord with
what the chairman outlined except as to the 3 hours of discussion. I
have a record here of what each member brought up at that time.
[291] Senator Brewster. I trust that the Secretary's records
will be presented to the committee and that they will be more accurate
than the only other one that was presented to the Chairman and that
we had to ask to have corrected because it was inaccurate.
122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. That is not correct. The Senator had demanded a
roll call, which was not taken in the committee by a vote ; it was taken
by a show of hands, and I asked the Senator from Maine that if there
was any way by which the Government Printing Office could indicate
a vote by showing of hands that I would accept it. The vote was later
taken as if it was by a show of hands, and it was put in the record that
way. That is why that mistake was made.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few words.
The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.
Senator Lucas. I haven't said very much in this hearing, and I am
not going to say much now. It seems to me this is much to do about
nothing anyway.
There is just one thing that I want to direct to the attention of the
committee and that is this : This case is being prepared by General
Mitchell anyway, but the committee employed him and unanimously
accepted him as general counsel. I doubt if there is any individual
here that would probably try the case the same way that he is trying
it. However, we [£9£] selected him to do it, and I am thor-
oughly satisfied with the way he is handling this case.
The Chairman. Well, go ahead, Mr. Gearhart and finish your inter-
rogation.
Mr. Gearhart. Let me conclude this discussion by pointing out
that the principle for which I contend, the ^dolation of which I will
constantly protest, is the calling of hearsay witnesses to prove facts
when there are eyewitnesses available to the same point. I am not
questioning what is in that paper at all; I never have, and this is
not in the nature of impeachment to offer it in the record. For that
reason I will welcome it at the conclusion of my cross-examination.
The Chairman. I will be glad to have it put in at the end of the
Congressman's examination. Go ahead.
Mr. Gearhart. There is just one thing, Admiral Inglis, that I
want to conclude my cross-examination by asking you about, and
that has to do with the order of ISIay 194:1 transferring three battle-
ships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers to the
Atlantic. Then there was much discussion about two-thirds and one-
third which left me with confusion confounded.
Before any of the ships were transferred to the Atlantic you would
say that that was a hundred percent of our fleet. What you mean is
when they transferred these ships that numer- [£93\ ically, at
least, the Pacific Fleet was reduced one-third, is that it ?
Admiral Inglis. I will try to make that just as clear as I can,
Mr. Gearhart. I cannot give you the precise dates when various
specific ships were transf eirred from one fleet to another.
Mr. Gearhart. By that you mean that the ships were, at different
times, under different orders ?
Admiral Inglis. I presume so.
Mr. Gearhart. Did that all occur during the month of May 1941,
or was it over a larger period than that ?
Admiral Inglis. It would be my impression and understanding that
it was over a considerable period of time. There was some shifting
of ships around from one fleet to another for — well, as a matter of
fact, that has been going on forever, but as of the 7th of December
1941 the numerical strength of the ships of the Pacific Fleet was
roughly two-thirds that of the numerical strength of the ships of the
Atlantic Fleet.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 123
Now, the question has been raised about several ships which were
not a part of either the Athmtic or the Pacific Fleet. Those ai^
the battleships North Carolina and Washington and the aircraft
carrier Wasp^ in particular. Those ships had recently been completed
and commissionecl, they were still on their shake-down periods.
[^P^] I have a personal recollection of one, the North Carolina^
which was in the Brooklyn Navy Yard undergoing some repairs, hav-
ing some very serious defects remedied. Those defects show up on a
shake-down cruise and must be corrected before the ships are ready in
all respects to join the fleet.
Those ships I did not count in my numerical summary and they
have no effect on these proportions which I have given you of two-
thirds numerical strength.
I think I should also say again that that is numerical strength and
not necessarily battle efficiency or battle fighting efficiency or power,
because it so happens that the numbers in the Atlantic Fleet were
increased to a good extent by the preponderance of destroyers in the
Atlantic Fleet. On the other hand, there were more battleships in
the Pacific Fleet, but I have counted each ship by one regardless of
whether it was a battleship or a submarine or a destroyer.
In other words, of the aircraft carriers there were three assigned to
each fleet and that again does not count the Wasp which had not yet
joined either fleet and was still in the shake-down period.
Does that answer your question, sir?
Mr. Gearhart. It clears it up considerably.
Now, what was left in the Pacific Fleet when the ships that I have
just enumerated were transferred to the Atlantic?
[295'] Admiral Inglis. I have the list of ships that were in the
Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941. Is that what you wish, sir?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Are you going to draw a distinction between
the Asiatic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet ?
Admiral Inglis. I have the figures for the Asiatic Fleet also if you
wish those.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, give those separately so that the record will be
clear on it.
Admiral Inglis. I can give those by ships, that is, so many battle-
ships, or I can give them by names of specific ships. Wliich way would
you prefer it?
Mr. Gearhart. By ships.
Admiral Inglis. All right, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Have you the record in the other way, that is, by
name ?
Admiral Inglis. I have it any way you want it ; yes, sir. It is much
longer by names of ships. It runs into seven pages of tabulated data.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, let us have it by type then.
Admiral Inglis. Taking first the battleships : There were six as-
signed to the Atlantic Fleet, nine assigned to the Pacific Fleet, and none
assigned to the Asiatic Fleet.
In the case of the aircraft carriers, there were four [296] as-
signed to the Atlantic Fleet, three to the Pacific Fleet, and none to the
Asiatic Fleet.
Well, I might add parenthetically that I have not counted the Long
Island in my ad lib testimony. The Long Island was a very inferior
^Subsequently corrected to Hornet. See p. 199, infra.
124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
type of carrier. She was assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and makes the
fourth one.
Heavy cruisers : 5 assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, 12 to the Pacific
Fleet, and 1 to the Asiatic Fleet.
Light cruisers : 12 to the Atlantic Fleet, 10 to the Pacific Fleet, and
1 to the Asiatic Fleet.
Destroyers : 97 to the Atlantic Fleet, 54 to the Pacific Fleet, and 13 to
the Asiatic Fleet.
Submarines : 58 to the Atlantic Fleet, 23 to the Pacific Fleet, 29 to
the Asiatic Fleet.
Minelayers : None to the Atlantic Fleet, nine to the Pacific Fleet,
and none to the Asiatic Fleet.
Mine sweepers : 37 to the Atlantic Fleet, 26 to the Pacific Fleet, and
6 to the Asiatic Fleet.
Patrol vessels : 5 to the Atlantic Fleet, 13 to the Pacific Fleet, 14 to
the Asiatic Fleet.
Now, the numerical totals of all of those are Atlantic Fleet 224,
Pacific Fleet 159, Asiatic Fleet 64.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, prior to May 1941, which was prior to the
transfer of any of the ships that I have listed [2971 from the
Pacific to the Atlantic, was the American Navy in the Pacific nu-
merically stronger than the Japanese Navy?
Admiral Inglis. Prior to May 1941 ?
Mr. Gearhart. That is a date that I take from the Navy court of
inquiry report as the date when the transfer of these ships occurred.
Admiral Inglis. I haven't those figures readily available. Again
will be very happy to get them for you.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, did you have the list of ships that were trans-
ferred ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. I thought by one order and you tell me by several
orders, to the Atlantic.
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I haven't got that readily available.
What I have here is a list of the ships and the assignment of those
ships to their respective fleetvS as of December 7.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, I will ask the question in this way: You are
an expert in naval affairs. If you would add to the Pacific Fleet
on December 7, 1941, three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four
cruisers, and nine destroyers, would you say that the American Fleet
in the Pacific would be numerically superior to the Japanese?
Admiral Inglis. If you will give me those figures again [^98]
I will answer that definitely.
Mr. Gearhart. Three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers,
and nine destroyers.
Admiral Inglis. That would give our battleship strength in the
Pacific Fleet as 12 opposed to 10 Japanese battleships ; aircraft car-
riers 4 opposed to 8 Japanese aircraft carriers; 16 heavy cruisers
as compared to 18 Japanese heavy cruisers ; 10 light cruisers as com-
pared to 17 Japanese light cruisers ; and 63 destroyers as compared to
109 Japanese destroyers.
On balance I would say that the Japanese Fleet was superior to the
Pacific Fleet with the increments which the Congressman has just
given me.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 125
Mr. Gearhart, So while we were inferior in May of 1941, we re-
duced our relative position to the Japanese Navy still further, that is
the effect of it.
Admiral Inglis. Any transfer of ships from the Pacific Fleet
resultino; in a reduction would, of course, result in a deterioration of
our own position.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, where do the orders effecting a transfer from
the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet emanate ?
Admiral Inglis. That would be Chief of Naval Operations. Just
what reasons would bring about those I am not prepared to say. I
don't know whether they would come from any higher [^99]
source or not, but the orders would be issued by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, whatever that higher authority would be the
orders would probably come in the name of the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations ?
Admiral Inglis. As far as the fleet is concerned that is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Do you know anything about these particular
orders ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. May I ask counsel to endeavor to secure them? I
would like to look at them.
Mr. Mitchell. That is the order transferring ships to the Atlantic
Fleet in May 1941 ?
Mr. Gearhart. Beginning in May of 1941,
Mr. Gesell. I take it you want transfers both ways.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. If there are any transfers indicated from the
Atlantic to the Pacific I would like to see those, too ; that is, the orders
providing for them.^
The Chairman. Is that all the cross examination ?
Mr. Gearhart. I am through; yes.
(Tentative order of proof — Preliminary statement covering com-
mittee procedure, submitted by Mr. Mitchell and referred to at p. 119,
follows:)
[300] TENTATIVE ORDER OF PROOF
(Draft of November 7, 1945)
Preliminary Statement Covering Committee Procedure, Relations with
Agencies Concerned, and Introduction of Letters Exchanged — Secretaries
Foreestal, Patterson, President Truman, Roosevelt Estate, Plus Tbuman
Directives
[301] The story of the actual attack and the Japanese plans for attack will
be presented by an Army and a Navy officer, who will summarize all available
data. The summary will be prepared under direction of counsel along the lines
suggested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of
opinion and questions of individual responsibility. The summary will be subject
to amendment if proved in error through subsequent witnesses. This procedure
will save calling scores of witnesses and will give to the committee and the public
the first organized comprehensive account of the attack.
A. the attack
1. Disposition Pacific Fleet 12/7. Show in map form.
2. Description :
(a) Transports west of Hawaii on 12/7.
(b) Fleet base and Oahu ground and harbor installations— J/ap.
1 See Hearings, Part 13, pp. 5502 and 5504 et seq. for documents supplied by the Navy
Department in this connection.
79716 — 46— pt. 1 11
126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(c) Harbor nets and topedo baffles.
(d) Depth of harbor and channel.
(e) Absence barrage balloons.
3. Brief notes installations neighboring islands.
4. Time differentials and distances.
5. Detailed map showing fleet in Pearl Harbor 12/7 —
(List of vessels — class and type.)
Estimates of time required 12/7 to get fleet under steam and out of harbor.
6. Reconnaissance :
Extent of offshore reconnaissance evening 12/6.
Extent of offshore reconnaissance morning 12/7.
[302] Extent of inshore reconnaissance evening 12/6.
Extent of inshore reconnaissance morning 12/7.
Missions of all other friendly planes in air morning 12/7, including Halsej
fliers, B-17's from the mainland, P-40's on submarine exercise, etc.
Extent reconnaissance from neighboring islands.
7. Radar:
Hours operating 12/7, scheduled and actual.
Description facilities available :
Location.
Range, high flight or low flight.
Inability to distinguish friendly planes.
Presentation of historical plot.
Summary testimony re qualifications of operators and handling of infor-
mation obtained before and during attack.
Reasons ship radar not useful.
8. Sound detectors:
Facilities for underwater — extent operating and manned.
Facilities for airplane spotting — extent operating and manned.
9. Submarine contacts :
Indicate character of any submarine patrol operating 12/7.
Summarize reported contacts 11/27-12/6, inclusive.
Summarize contacts morning 12/7 giving detail of messages sent to
shore and action taken.
10. Present account various phases of attack, working in general picture
of defensive action taken.
(Note Jap objectives, idications advance knowledge.)
11. Efforts to track the Japs after attack.
12. //////////////////////////
//////////////////////////
13. Aircraft:
Disposition planes on ground by fields at time of attack and service
assignments.
Number and types available.
[303] Number and types in operating condition.
Headlines of aircraft in operating condition.
Note specific reasons for lack of readiness such as engines dis-
mounted, guns dismounted, gas tanks empty, ammunition not loaded.
Readiness of aircraft crews.
Number and types aircraft participating in combat.
Time required by type.
Summarize state preparedness for combat of planes in flight time attack.
Extent types and equipment up to date.
14. Antiaircraft :
Number of ship and shore units available.
Number of ship and shore units operating condition.
Availability ammunition and proximity to guns.
Number ship and shore units manner and in action.
Time required for various units.
Defective ammunition.
Extent gun tj-pes up to date.
15. Brief summary work done in such departments as antisabotage, first aid,
civilian control, canteens, etc. Heroism.
16. The damage to United States ships, installations, and personnel (photo-
gi-aphs and supporting statistics).
Note extent damage self-inflicted.
Indicate extent of sabotage, if any.
17. The damage to the Japs.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 127
B. THE JAP PLAN
1. Chronology:
Date plan completed.
Date left port.
Date Dec. 8 fixed.
Date instructed carry-out plan.
[304 1 2. Route taken to and from :
Fix position various key days before and after attack.
MAP — noting mileages from possible reconnaissance points, shipping
lanes, etc.
3. Details of execution.
4. Projected losses compared actual losses.
5. Sources data used in planning.
Note. — The Jap Plan will be reconstructed from captured plans and
statements made by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack.
[305] Tektativ-e Order of Witnesses
washington*
Witness Principal subject examination
Admiral Richardson Re Complete story of the reasons why the fleet
was based at Pearl Harbor, his trips to Wash-
ington in July and October, 1940, his discus-
sions and disagreement with President Roose-
velt and conversations with other officials, his
relief, his part in tlie Bloch report of Decem-
ber 30, 1940, endorsed January 7, which led to
the Knox-Stimson correspondence, and other
matters pertaining to his Hawaiian command.
(At this point introduce Knox letter to Stimson dated Jan. 24, 1941, Stimson
letter to Knox dated Feb. 7, 1941, plan for employment of long-range bombard-
ment aviation in the defense of Oahu, Martin memo, of Aug. 20, 1941, and read
into record excerpts from defense plans. )
Witness Principal subject examination
Mr. Hamilton, formerly Chief, Re Jap negotiations, details of information
Far Eastern Division, State a\ailable to State Department, exchange of
Department information with Army-Navy representatives,
and State Department attitude toward basing
fleet Pearl Harbor.
Captain McCollum* Re Information available Army and Navy con-
Captain Safford* cerning Far Western developments, Jap mili-
Colonel Bratton* tary preparations, fleet loca [3061 tion,
etc., reports made to responsible officers. State
Department and White House, handling of
"magic" intercepts and distribution of messages
generally.
General Miles* Re Function and organization of intelligence
Admiral Wilkinson* units ; information available to these officers
and action taken thereon except as to events
of 12/6 and 12/7 to be considered later ; warn-
ings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of mes-
sages, conferences held, agencies and persons
consulted, action taken on replies received to
warnings, related conferences at White House,
Marshall-Stark joint messages on military
situation.
General Gerow* Re Function and organization of War Plans
Admiral Turner* units ; information available to these officers
and action taken thereon (except as to events
of 12/6 and 12/7 to be considered later) ;
warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of
messages, conferences held, agencies and per-
sons consulted, action taken on replies re-
ceived to warnings, related conferences at
White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages
on military situation.
♦Whenever witness will be recalled for further examination on additional subjects, this
is indicated by asterisk.
128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Witness
General Arnold
Admiral Ingersoll*
[307] FCC monitoring report
Commander Safford
Commander Kramer*
Admiral Noyes
Colonel Bratton
Colonel Sadtler
Colonel Clausen
Monitoring witnesses
Commander Kramer
Commander Safford
Captain McCollum
Admiral Turner
Admiral Schuirmann
Admiral Wilkinson
Admiral Ingersoll
Colonel Bratton
Colonel Dusenbury
General Miles
General Gerow
Colonel French
Admiral Bearsdall
[3081 Miss Grace Tullv
Admiral Stark
General Marshall
Mr. Thomas E. Dewey
Mr. Hull
Mr. Stimson
[309] Knox papers
Principal subject examination
Re Warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of
messages, conferences held, agencies and i)er-
sons consulted, action taken on replies re-
ceived to warnings, related conferences at
White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages
on military situation.
Re Winds message. Interception and decoding
of original message giving winds code and sec-
ond message Nov. 19. Steps then taken to
monitor the Jap weather broadcasts. All
available proof as to whether the "execute"
message was ever heard or obtained. Also any
information developed on hidden word mes-
sages. Exhibits may include excerpts testi-
mony of officers at various points.
Re The events of 12/6 and 12/7 including han-
dling of final 14-part Jap message and mes-
sages re code burnings and 1 : 00 o'clock de-
livery, Marshall warning message, conferences
among Cabinet officers and others, ti'ansmis-
sion of messages to White House and State
Department.
Re Presidential files. Any documents which
may be found in the Roosevelt papers bearing
on the Pearl Harbor situation will be intro-
duced through Miss Tully.
Re All events, including information available
to him, conferences with Cabinet oflScers and
President Roosevelt, handling of warning
messages, extent of knowledge of impending
attack, conferences with War Department, etc.
Re All events, including information available to
him, conferences with Cabinet officers and
President Roosevelt, handling of warning mes-
sages, extent of knowledge of impending at-
tack, conferences with Navy Department, etc.,
and Dewey incident of 1944.
Re Communications with General Marshall and
any additional information available to him.
Re All events, with particular reference to con-
versations and meetings with President Roose-
velt and other Cabinet officers. General Mar-
shall and Admiral Stark, the question of bas-
ing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, information
available to him and handling of crucial mes-
sages, participation in warnings, and the
events leading up to the Nov. 26th note to the
Japanese Government.
Re All events, with particular reference to in-
formation available to him, his part in the
warning messages, and his conferences with
President Roosevelt and Cabinet officers.
We are advised by the Knox estate that the
only papers which may be available are at
the Navy Department, and this is being in-
vestigated.
(Note. — Throughout the testimony in this branch of the presentation, particu-
larly that directed to high-ranking officials, a detailed inquiry will be made
•Whenever witness •will be recalled for further examination on additional subjects, this
is indicated by asterisk.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
129
into just what information was available to President Roosevelt and the Depart-
ment of State as to impending attack, and what part, if any, either took in
giving or withholding warnings to Pearl Harbor.)
PEARL HARBOR
Principal subject examination
Re Condition of Pearl Harbor defenses prior to
Short's appointment, earlier alerts, and gen-
eral background information.
Re Delay construction fixed radar and additional
airfields.
Re All classes of information including ship lo-
cation reports and intelligence bulletins, mes-
sages of various classes intercepted before and
after Dec. 7, activities of Jap consular agents,
Mori tap, Merle Smith cable to Short, Wilkin-
son Manila report, etc.
Re Pearl Harbor air defense, reconnaissance,
and all points bearing on air aspects of situa-
tion, including details of Martin-Bellinger
annex.
Re Radar installations, efficiency of information
center, adequacy of equipment and personnel.
Re All events, including plans made to meet sur-
prise attack, knowledge of information avail-
able Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken
in response to warning messages.
Re All events, including plans made to meet sur-
prise attack, knowledge of information avail-
able Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken
in response to warning messages.
Re All events, including plans made to meet sur-
prise attack, knowledge of information avail-
able Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken
in response to warning messages.
Re All events, including plans made to meet sur-
prise attack, knowledge of information availa-
ble Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken
in response to warning messages.
[Sll] The Chairman. Mr. Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I have had no occasion to say anything
up to date.
The Chairman. You have been very quiet, I will say that.
Mr. Keefe. May I say, as one member of the committee, I presume
I am correct in the assumption that the weight to be extended to the
testimony given by these two witnesses who have testified in behalf
of the Army and Navy will be governed by the sources of their infor-
mation, the character of the information, whether it is of their own
knowledge, hearsay, or what not.
Does the Chair so understand the situation ?
The Chairman. The committee will, of course, consider the nature
of the testimony, the source from which it comes, and the weight to
be given to it.
Mr. Keefe. Yes, sir.
Now, I understand from both the Admiral and the Colonel that you
have heretofore testified that your evidence, in the main, is purely
hearsay; you have no definite knowledge from personal observation
of any of the events which occurred at Pearl Harbor immediately
before the attack, or immediately after and that the sources of your
Witness
General Herron
(To be determined)
Captain Layton
Commander Rochefort
Admiral Mayfiield
Mr. Shivers, FBI
Colonel Fielder
Colonel Bicknell
Admiral McMorris
[310] Admiral Bellinger
General Martin
General Davidson
Commander Taylor
Colonel Powell
Colonel Phillips
Admiral Smith
Admiral Bloch
General Short
Admiral Kimmel
130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
information are based entirely on material which you have discovered
as a result [312] of searches made, and analyses made by those
working for you on your respective staffs ; is that right ?
Admiral Inglis. Speaking for the Nuvy, that is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Is that correct also for the Army ?
Colonel Thielen. That is essentially correct; yes, sir. I have been
asked a few questions on cross-examination in my professional capac-
ity, which I answered to my own knowledge.
Mr. Keeee. Do you qualify as an expert on all matters relating to
the Army ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not.
Mr. KJEEFE. Do you qualify as an expert on all matters relating to
the Navy, Admiral ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So that neither of you qualify as experts in the accepted
sense of the term "expert witnesses."
Now, I have a few questions that I would like to ask which have
apparently not been heretofore developed in connection with the
cross-examination. I direct my attention first to the statement made
by you, Admiral, to the effect that certain orders were issued declaring
certain waters — they were issued as the result of the Executive order
of the President — around the Hawaiian Islands to be defensive
[SIS] borders, as I understood it.
Admiral Inglis. That order, if that is your point, sir, was, as far
as the Navy was concerned, contained in a general order issued by the
Secretary of the Navy, and it defined two defiensive sea areas which
were outlined on the chart in the course of the prepared statement.
Mr. Keefe. Will you refer to your prepared statement and see if I
am in error, that you referred to it as an Executive order of the
President designating certain prohibited areas?
Admiral Inglis. It is not in my prepared statement. I gave that ad
lib, because general orders of that nature usually derive from Execu-
tive orders, and I personally assumed, as I gave that statement, that
it was derived from an Executive order.
Mr. Keefe. Is that a mere assumption on your part ?
Admiral Inglis. If that is a question at issue, I will be very happy
to verify that. I still think it did derive from the Executive order.
Mr. Keefe. You have not seen the Executive order?
Admiral Inglis. Not recently ; no, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Did you ever see it ?
Admiral Inglis. I cannot say whether I ever did or not.
[314] Mr. I^JEEFE. Do you know the content of that order ?
Admiral Inglis. Not now, no sir. I can look it up.
Mr. Keefe. Do you know the date of the general order, if any was
issued pursuant to the Executive order ?
Admiral Inglis. Not at this time ; no, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Have you a copy of that general order in your possession
now?
Admiral Inglis. No. "We will get it for you, though.
Mr. Keefe. Now, may I state, Mr. Counsel, that I would like to
have, for purposes of identification, the Executive order issued by the
President, if any, establishing the prohibited waters around the
Philippine Islands.
Mr. Gesell. The Philippine, or the Hawaiian Islands ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ^ 131
Mr. Keefe. I mean the Hawaiian Islands. Pardon me.
Well, if there is one relating to the Philippine Islands it might pos-
sibly be included in the same order, I don't know.
1 would also like to have a copy of the order issued by the Navy,
I he general order, if such an order was in fact issued, including the
date of that order.
Admiral Inglis. The Navy Department will produce that.^
Mr. IvEEFE. Now, what is your present recollection, from the source
of the material which you have, and which you studied, as to the
purpose and intent of that order ^ What [old] did it gen-
erally establish ?
Admiral Inglis. My recollection is that it established a defensive
sea area. It gave the boundaries of this area, and it required that no
merchant vessels, either foreign or U. S., be permitted to proceed
through that area, nor no foreign men-of-war be permitted to proceed
through that area without the approval of the Secretary of the
Navy.
Mr. Keefe. Do you know how extensive the area was ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. That was outlined on the chart during
yesterday's presentation. It was not very extensive. It did cover the
approaches to Pearl Harbor and the Kaneohe air station.
[S16] Mr. Keefe. Was that a secret order ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Was it published to the world ?
Admiral Inglis. I am morally certain it was ; yes, sir.
Mr. Iveefe. So foreign ships would have notice of the existence of
such an order ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Did the order provide as to what action the Navy was
to take in the event any foreign ships entered that prohibited area?
Admiral Inglis. I do not believe the specific action was prescribed,
but certainly the Navy was to prevent any movement of that kind
with all resources at its command.
Mr. KJEEFE. Your evidence, as I recall, indicates that the Navy
did so on the morning of December 7 before the Japanese attack.
Admiral Inglis. That is a fair assumption.
Mr. Keefe. In the matter of sinking the submarine by the destroyer
Ward.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Is that right ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Do you have, as the result of the search which you have
conducted, any knowledge of any other ships or [317] vessels
of any character having been sunk other than those which you have
testified to ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. You mean prior to December 7, on or
prior to December 7?
Mr. Keefe. On or prior to December 7.
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now I believe you testified that the aircraft carrier
E7iterprise on December 7 was proceeding eastward.
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Do your records indicate what that group of ships
was composed of?
1 Copies of the orders appear in Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1681-1686.
132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That were escorting t\\&^ Enterprise f
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Will you identify them, please?
Admiral Inglis. That task force consisted of the aircraft carrier
Enterprise^ the heavy cruisers Northampton^ Chester^ Salt Lake City;
the destroyers Batchy Mamry, Graven^ Gridley^ McGall, Dunlap^
Benham, Fanning^ and Ellet. The total was one aircraft carrier, three
heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers.
Mr. Keefe. That task force had been taking some material out to
Wake Island?
Admiral Inglis. It had been taking airplanes to Wake Island ; yes,
sir.
[SIS'] Mr. Keefe. Do I understand that the cruisers and de-
stroyers were acting as convoys for the Enterprise?
Admiral Inglis. The word that we used for it is "escort," sir.
Mr. Keefe. Escort?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. The convoy is or are the ships which
the escort escorts.
Mr. Keefe. Pardon me. I am not very familiar with Navy prac-
tice. The convoy is the whole works and the escort are those that
escort the convoy ; is that right ?
Admiral Inglis. We usually speak of a convoy as the ships to pro-
tect.
Mr. KJEEFE. In this case the convoy was what? The Lexington or
the Enterprise?
Admiral Inglis. The flagship was the Enterprise.
Mr. Keefe. What were the ships that were being protected on
their way along from Wake Island ?
Admiral Inglis. In this particular case it was called a task force
rather than either a convoy or an escort. However, I will try to
clarify that by saying that the Enterprise
Mr. Keefe (interposing). Let us get it right there.
The Chairman. Let him complete the answer.
Mr. Keefe. On the way out, when we were taking planes out to
Wake, and other material was that a convoy?
\319\ Admiral Inglis. We would call it a task force in that case,
because there were no noncombatant ships in that group of ships.
Mr. Keefe. So on both occasions then this group of ships that left
Pearl Harbor and went out to Wake was a task force ?
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And it was a task force on the way back ?
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Is that correct?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
Mr. KJEEFE. All right, we will strike the word "convoy" out of this
discussion then.
Now what time did that task force leave Wake on the way back to
Pearl Harbor? Do your records indicate that?
Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I cannot give you that offhand. We
will find it.
Mr. Keefe. Do you have available the log of the Enterprise?
Admiral Inglis. We can get it. It may take some time, though.
These logs are not readily available. We will try to get them.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 133
Mr. Keefe. In connection with your examination of the facts im-
mediately before and after Pearl Harbor, did you have [320]
access to the logs of the Enterprise f
Admiral Inglis. The log itself was not available, but a number of
extracts from the log were included in the court of inquiry and the
Roberts Board report, and war diaries, things of that nature.
Mr. Keefe, What do you mean when you say the log of the Enter-
prise is not available? Do you mean it cannot be obtained?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I do not mean that. I mean it was not
readily available in the time we had to conduct this research.
Mr. Keefe. Now in order that this record may be clear — because
I am a boy from the country and do not understand all these things —
will you explain in the record just what the log of a ship is supposed
to contain?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
The log of a ship in the Navy consists in general of two types of
information. One is contained in columns which tabulate meteorolog-
ical data such as temperature, humidity, height of the barometer, such
data as the speed which the ship is making, the number of miles, nau-
tical miles that have been steamed during each hour of the day, the
drills that have been held, the ship's position at 8 o'clock in the morn-
ing, at noon, and at 8 p. m.
Then the other classification is under the term "remarks," [321]
and the remarks in the log contain a journal of events of interest, and
those are divided into the various watches, that is the midwatch is from
midnight to 4 a. m., the morning watch from 4 a. m. to 8 a. m., and so
forth.
The watch officer, the officer of the deck, signs in person the remarks,
or the diary pertinent to his particular watch. That signature is also
taken as an authentication of the corresponding data which appears
in the columns, such as the meteorological data and the speed and
mileage that the ship has covered.
Mr. IvEEFE. Does the log ordinarily contain information as to orders
received b}^ the ship ?
Admiral Inglis. The log would probably contain the briefest sort
of reference to the reason for the ship getting under way. I do not
think for the purposes of this comimittee that would be particularly
v^aluable, because it usually is couched something like this :
"In accordance with signal from division commander got under
way and stood out of the harbor."
That would not give the source of the division commander's order.
Mr. Keefe. Would it contain information, for example, as to when
a flight of scout bombers or planes left the deck of a ship ?
[o^^l Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Would it contain memoranda as to any orders relating
to the conduct of those planes after they left the ship ?
Admiral Inglis. Will you repeat that question?
Mr. Keefe. Read the question, please.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
Admiral Inglis. In general; no, sir.
Mr. KJEEFE. Then if the Enterprise, either on the 6th of December
1941, as it proceeded from Wake to Pearl Harbor, toward Pearl
Harbor, or on the early morning of the 7th of December, had escort
planes in the air patrolling the area ahead of this task force, would
that information be found in the log of the Enterprise?
134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. I would expect tlie information as to the time
and number of planes which were launched would appear in the log;
also the time and the number of planes which returned to the ship
would appear in the log, and probably a brief word or two about the
mission of those planes would appear in the log.
[■3£3] Mr. I^EFE. Would the log also indicate whether those
planes were armed or unarmed ?
Admiral Inglis. Under those circumstances, on December 6 and 7, 1
would be inclined to think that it would not contain that information.
Mr. Keefe. I have indicated, I believe, that I would like to have the
log of the Enterprise available.^
Well, now, you testified, as I recall, in your general statement as it
appears in our record of the testimony, page 72, that in addition to
regular scheduled reconnaissance flights, the U. S. S. Enterprise 200
miles west of Pearl Harbor launched scout bombers armed with ma-
chine guns shortly after 6 a. m. which searched to the eastward ahead of
the ship, an arc of 110° to a distance of 150 miles.
Where did you get that information ?
Admiral Inglts. That information was taken from the action report
of the Enterprise, and from various other original sources. I would
hazard a guess that some of that came from the interrogation of the
pilots on those planes.
Mr. Keefe. You say the action report of the Enterprise. What is
that?
Admiral Inglis. "W^ienever a ship of the Navy is in action involving
any shooting, the commanding officer is required to submit a report of
the action, which contains numerous details, [■^^•^1 such as the
number of rounds of ammunition fired, the damage to his own ship, the
estimated damage to the enemy, a narrative of the events.
Mr. Keefe. Was the Enterp7ise in action that morning at 6 a.m.?
Admiral Inglis. Her planes were in action at that time.
Mr. ICeefe. In action against whom ?
Admiral Inglis. Against the Japanese planes that attacked Pearl
Harbor. Not at 6 o'clock, but in the course of that flight.
Mr. Keefe. Well, but, my dear sir, let us make this clear. The
attack on Pearl Harbor occurred at 7 : 55, according to your testimony.
These ships left the Enterprise, these planes, according to your testi-
mony, shortly after G a. m., nearly 2 hours before the attack on Pearl
HarlDor. They certainly were not engaged in any action at that time,
were they, against the Japs ?
Admiral Inglis. They were engaged in action against the Japs
sometime after 7 : 45 and before they landed at Ewa Field at times
varying from 9 : 15 to 10 : 15, which I believe were the figures.
Mr. Keefe. When they left the Enterprise, they were equipped and
ready for action, were they not, at 6 o'clock [3^5] that
morning ?
Admiral Inglis. I think that is a fair assumption, because they were
firing at Japanese planes on their way into Ewa landing field.
Mr. Keefe. You stated in your general statement that they were
armed.
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And after leaving the Enterprise they were supposed to
proceed on and land at Ewa ; is that right ?
1 The log of the U. S. S. Enterprise was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit
No. 101.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 135
Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. As they were coming east that morning, and finally
came over the island, they engaged the Japs who were then attacking
Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Inglis. That is the story as I have it ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Do you deduce from any of the information you have
been able to obtain, that the commander of that task force had any
knowledge that there was likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor that
morning at 6 o'clock?
Achniral Inglis. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Where is the action report of the Enterprise? Have you
seen it?
Admiral Inglis. It is now in the archives and records of the Navy
Department.
Mr. KJEEFE. Have you seen it ?
[3£6-7] May I ask, Mr. Mitchell, that that action report of the
Enterp?'ise be produced?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. For use in connection with this examination.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.^
Mr. Keefe. Now, may I ask you this question :
So far as the world knew, and the people of America knew, and so
far as the records show, this country was at peace with Japan at 6
o'clock on the morning of the Tth day of December; was it not?
Admiral Inglis. I cannot speak for the people of the world, but
speaking for myself, that was my impression, that we were technically
at peace ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. We were technically at peace?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Is that the way you want to say it ?
Admiral Inglis. That is the way I want to say it, because with a
task force approaching Pearl Harbor for the purpose of making a sur-
prise attack on the Navy and Army at that location, I would say it
was highly technical.
Mr. Keefe. All right. Do your records disclose, in the action report
of the Enterprise^ as to why these planes were launched in making
reconnaissance on the morning of the Tth at 6 o'clock?
\328'\ Admiral Inglis. I am advised that the purpose given
was routine flight training.
Mr. Keefe. Routine flight training?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir ; I hope you will not try to pin me down
too closely on that, because I am really not too well informed.
Mr. Keefe. Very well ; we will try to go into that maybe at the time
when Admiral Halsey, or someone who was on the job, testifies to it,
perhaps.
Then, am I to understand that so far as the information available
that you have from the record, the log of the Enterprise, the action
report of the Enterprise^ or whatever record you may have examined,
or your researchers may have examined, that while we were technically
at peace at 6 o'clock on the morning of the Tth day of December, the
Enterprise, returning as part of the task force from Wake Island
with the ships which you have described and enumerated, did have out
^ The action report of the U. S. S. Enterprise was subsequently admitted to the record as
Exhibit No. 103.
136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in front of that task force a patrol of planes, 18 scout bombers fully
armed, ready for action ?
Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And that those bombers, as they proceeded east, learned
of the attack at 7 :50, and proceeded then to Pearl Harbor and engaged
the enemy ?
Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
[S£8a:] Mr. Keefe. Is that right?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Ml". Keefe. Now, then, at 7:55 when this attack came on Pearl
Harbor, where do j^ou locate this task force of Admiral Halsey
specifically?
Admiral Inglis. Two hundred miles west of Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Keefe. Directly west ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. All right.
Now, there was another task force, was there not, in which was in-
cluded the aircraft carrier Lexington^
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. AVho was in command of that escort ?
Admiral Inglis. Admiral John Henry Newton.
Mr. Keefe. Where was that task force on the 6th of December 1941 ?
Admiral Inglis. I have that as 460 miles from Midway, en route to
Midway.
Mr. Keefe. Well, where was it with respect to Pearl Harbor, and
with respect to Halsey's task force?
Admiral Inglis. Will you get the other chart. No. 1, giving the
disposition of the task fleet ?
I make it as roughly, 350 miles, a little north of west [329]
of Admiral Halsey's Task Force 8.
Mr. Keefe. Will you point on the map, just for the purpose of
observation, about where the Halsey task force was, and where the
Newton task force was.
Admiral Inglis. There is Task Force 12, that blue dot, at which
Commander Biard is pointing. And then he is going to draw his
wand in the direction immediately south of east to Task Force 8. I
just made a very hasty estimate here of the distance between the two,
and it comes out about 350 miles.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Now the task force commanded by Admiral Newton was on the
way to Wake Island, was — or Midway ?
Admiral Inglis. Midway.
Mr. Keefe. Midway ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. To deliver certain Marine planes ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. To Midway ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Will you enumerate the ships that composed the task
force commanded by Admiral Newton ?
Admiral Inglis. The ships were the aircraft carrier Lexington^
the heavy cruisers Chicago^ Portland and Astoria [330] and
destroyers Porter, Drayton, Flusser, Lamson, and Mahan. A total of
one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, nine
altogether.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 137
Mr, Keefe. Do you have any information as to whether recon-
naissance was conducted by Admiral Newton by the use of planes ?
Admiral Inglis. The evidence on that, Mr. Congressman, is a little
bit — in fact, it is very vague. In the testimony of Admiral Newton
I believe he said that planes were out scouting, but he did not say
what planes they were. They may have been planes from the Lexing-
ton^ or they may have been planes from the heavy cruisers.
There is also something to indicate that the Lexington carried a
heavy deck load of these Marine planes, which cluttered up her flight
deck, making the launching of planes difficult.
Mr. Keefe. I want to clear this situation up if I can.
On page 179 of the testimony which you gave yesterday, under cross
examination by Senator Ferguson, referring to the Lexington group
under the command of Admiral Newton, Senator Ferguson asked you
this question :
Do you know whether they did any reconnaissance?
Your answer was :
I understand, because of the additional Marine Corps planes on board, the
flight deck was so cluttered \_S31 ] that they were not able to launch any.
Senator Ferguson. So there was no reconnaissance from that?
Admiral Inglis. Not from the Lexington.
Is that your testimony?
Admiral Inglis. I presume it is, sir; and that was my understand-
ing yesterday. My attention was invited last night to
Mr. Keefe (interposing). Well, that
Mr. Gesell. Wait a minute. Congressman. Let him finish.
Admiral Inglis. Because of this cross examination of Senator Fer-
guson's, my staif attempted to look this matter up a little more thor-
oughly, and the best they could give me this morning was there was
some doubt as to just what planes there were in the air. So I would
prefer Admiral Newton to answer that.
Mr. Keefe. After you so testified, Admiral — which, of course, I
understand you are testifying just from your recollection of the ma-
terial and papers and files, so on and so forth — you were not there,
and necessarily you have no personal recollection of it.
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. As a matter of fact, when you got through your testi-
mony yesterday, some of your staff called your at- \^332'\ tention
to the testimony of Admiral Newton himself given before Admiral
Hewitt, did they not?
Admiral Inglis. I am not sure to whom the testimony was given,
but that is correct, sir.
Mr, Keefe. I now call your attention to the testimony of Admiral
Newton himself given before Admiral Hewitt in the so-called Hewitt
investigation which appears on page 318, questions 29, 30, and 31 on
that page. This question was asked of Admiral Newton by Admiral
Hewitt :
Do you recall having any particular concern over the fact that the mission was
advancing your course over 1,000 miles towards Japan?
Answer. I consider that I was going into waters that had not been fre-
quented by our ships for some time, and there might be more danger from sub-
marines than we had considered in the past. I set a speed of 17 knots in daylight,
and zigzagging. I also had scouting flights made by planes to cover our
advance.
Did you read that testimony of Admiral Newton himself ?
138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. That was invited to my attention either late last
night or early this morning, the very selection you just read.
Mr. KJEEFE. Then, as a matter of fact, whether the planes came
from the flight deck of the Lexington^ the \333\ carrier, or
whether they came from some other ship that was part of that task
force, the record, as given in the testimony of Admiral Newton himself,
said that he had not only scout planes covering his advance, but that
also because he was in waters that our ships had not theretofore been
traveling for some time, zigzagging his ships to avoid possible attack
by submarines.
Did you gather that from the testimony ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir ; that is precisely what the testimony says.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, then, what submarines would be liable to
attack at that time ?
Admiral Inglis. I am afraid that is a conjectural question which I
am not prepared to answer.
Mr. Keefe. Now, I would like, for a moment, to address my re-
marks to the Colonel, and I would like to have placed back on the easel
that map or plot showing the —
Colonel Thielen. The radar, sir?
Mr. Keefe. The radar chart.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a ques-
tion while the testimony is waiting ?
Mr. Keefe. A question of whom ?
Mr. Murphy. The gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. Keefe. You want to ask me a question?
\33Ii\ Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.
I wonder if the gentleman is reading from the Hewitt report, or
the Hart report ?
Mr. Keefe. When I said Hewitt I meant Hart. Will you correct
the record ? I am reading from the Hart report.
Mr. Murphy. That is not the Hewitt report at all. It is page 318
of the Hart report.
Mr. Iveefe. Thank you very much for your diligence in correcting
me.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire as to the date of
the Hart report?
Mr. I^EFE. It is dated February 12, 1941, to June 15, 1944.
Senator Ferguson. Is it the report or the testimony ?
Mr. Kj:efe. It is testimony in the hearing conducted by Admiral
Hart.
Senator Ferguson. Do you want to correct the record in any way,
making it show it is testimony rather than report %
Mr. Keefe. Well, it is all included. The testimony is included in
the report.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, can I inquire whether or not
Admiral Hart filed a report ?
The Chairman. Does the Congressman know whether he {SSd'X
did or not?
Mr. Murphy. May I suggest it would be better to call it the Hart
record.
Mr. Gesell. I think the confusion comes because the transcript,
which is the record, is called the report. As I undeirstand it, that is
the reason for the confusion.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 139
Mr. Keefe. That is what I have understood it to be. In reading
references to it in other parts of these very voluminous records, it is
referred to as the Hart report.
In this report, of course, is contained the testimony of innumerable
witnesses, and I quoted from the testimony of Admiral Newton.
Now, I call your attention particularly to this chart. I will get
over here so I can see it myself. My eyesight is not good.
As I understood from your testimony, colonel, this streak that you
have indicated on the exhibit
Is this going to be an exhibit? The record will not be very good,
because the record will not show what I am pointing to unless we
have it as an exhibit.
The ChxVirman. It is an exhibit that has been submitted to all of
us here, which is not in color.
Mr. Keefe. What is the number of the exhibit? Army exhibit
No. 10.
[3S6] Mr. JSIiTCHELL. That is going to be offered.
Colonel Thielex. That is page 8 of the Army exhibit, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Just so the record will indicate what we are talking
about.
[337] Mr. MuKPHY. May I suggest that is the exhibit that has
been verified by Colonel Murphy.
Mr. Keefe. And further authenticated by Congressman Murphy.
That ought to make it unanimous.
At least here is a map blown up, as you testified, from an Army
exhibit, showing what I understood you to say was information that
was obtained from this mobile radar unit located, on the morning of
the 7th of November, up here at Opana, is that right ?
Colonel Thielen. The 7th of December, sir. Otherwise your
statement is correct.
Mr. Keefe. All right. Now these dots in the center starting at
7 : 02 and going down through 7 : 39, 7 : 40, 7 : 43, indicate a flight of
planes coming in ?
Colonel Thielex. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Coming in Pearl Harbor?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Mr. IvEEFE. Is that right ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; that is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And that is taken from the chart made out there at this
radar detecting apparatus, is that right ?
Colonel Thielen. I do not know exactly how that record was made.
We have it as an authorized record of the plot of the Opana radio
station, signed by the assistant signal [S3S] officer of the Ha-
waiian Department.
Mr. Keefe. "V^Hiat are these dots over here on the purple arrow point-
ing toward the island ? Wliat do they indicate ?
Colonel Thielen. Those are plots which were made at the times
indicated by the Opana station.
Mr. IvEEFE. W^ell, the times of those are 6 : 45, 6 : 48, 6 : 51, so on and
so forth.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. There is no implication that those were
Japanese planes.
140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. They may have been our own planes, so far as the evi-
dence shows ?
Colonel Thielen. They may have been.
[3S9] Mr. Keefe. There is no evidence to show what those planes
were then ?
Colonel Thielen. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Keefe. I notice also, to the left of the large purple arrow point-
ing toward the island, two streaks, with an arrow pointing in the
opposite direction, and two times indicated, 10 : 39 and 10 : 27.
What does that arrow indicate ?
Colonel Thielen. That is taken from the plot. That was indicated
on the plot as an arrow. The clear arrow is an attempt to reproduce
the arrow shown on the basic document, an original of which was
offered to the committee yesterday afternoon.
Mr. Keefe. My question related to this arrow to the left. What
does that indicate?
Colonel Thielen. It is the blue arrow. I am explaining the blue
arrow which lies within the purple arrow. That is the arrow formed
by the mask which was placed over the purple arrow.
Mr. Keefe. I am talking about the arrow which has to the left of it
the time 10 : 39 and 10 : 27. What does that arrow indicate ?
Colonel Thielen. It indicates a plot. That is the way it was given
on the document from which that exhibit was taken, l^^O^ as
an arrow rather than as a succession of pips.
Mr. Keefe. Does that indicate, if the pips were on here, would it
indicate planes flying away from the island?
Colonel Thielen. It appears to indicate one or more aircraft flying
away from the island.
Mr. Keefe. Why aren't the pips on here the same as on the other
arrow ?
Colonel Thielen. I can't answer that. That is the way it was on the
original.
Mr. Keefe. At least, so far as your testimony is concerned, then, the
arrow to which I have referred which is pointed toward the top of the
exhibit, and to the left of which appears the times 10 : 39 and 10 : 27,
refers to planes that were leaving the island ?
Colonel Thielen. Two or more planes.
Mr. Keefe. Going away?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, then, I would like to know this : In your examina-
tion of the files relating to this aircraft attack on Pearl Harbor, did
you find a record of the transmission to any authority in the island of
the planes as they left?
Cglonel Thielen. There is no such statement in my testimony nor
did I encounter any such statement in any other testimony.
Mr. Keefe. Do you know whether or not the records [34^]
contain information furnished from this mobile unit which was ulti-
mately given to the authorities out there at Pearl Harbor which indi-
cated the flight of planes away from the island ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir. All I know about the outgoing flight is
that it appeared on the historical plot, so-called.
Mr. Keefe. And you have no knowledge as to when that informa-
tion appearing on the historical plot may have been given to the
authorities on the island ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 141
Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I have no such information.
Mr. Keefe. Have you ever checked the records to ascertain whether
there was in fact any such transmittal of information as to this out-
going flight ?
Colonel Thielen. I have not personally done so. I know that this
whole Opana station question was gone into very thoroughly by the
researchers working with me.
Mr. Keefe. Well, from your knowledge and the information gained
from your gleanings of this material that you went over and that your
researchers went over, could you say whether or not when information
was obtained at this mobile station whether that information was
transmitted to the commanding officer. General Short, or anybody else
in command out there at that time?
Colonel Thielen. It divides itself into two parts, sir. I have testi-
fied concerning that long inward plot which starts [^4^] at
7 : 02, which was reported to the watch officer at Fort Shaf ter, and I
have further testified that the watch officer took no action in that con-
nection.
Mr. Keefe. Well now, in order that I might be perfectly clear, I
understood that this particular radar station had shut down some time
after 7 o'clock.
Colonel Thielen. I didn't say that, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Well, was it in continuous operation all during the
attacks ?
Colonel Thielen. The plot indicates that it was in operation from
7 : 02 to 7 : 43. We have the testimony of Lieutenant Tyler that when
he received notification of the attack at 8 o'clock he recalled all radar
personnel to their stations. Whether they actually so returned or not
I do not know. What happened after 8 o'clock I have only the knowl-
edge indicated by the plot which we have been discussing.
Mr. Keefe. Then the historical plot which gives you the information
that certain planes were spotted leaving the island, certainly would
indicate that that radar station was in operation at the times indicated
on the exhibit, 10 :39 and 10 :27?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; that would so indicate.
Mr. Kj:efe. So if this station was in operation at 10 : 39 and 10 : 27
and picked up flights of planes, one or more, [343] leaving the
island, going away, would that information normally have been im-
mediately transmitted to General Short's office, or somebody in com-
mand on that island?
Colonel Thielen. It would unquestionably have been transmitted
as far as the information center in order that the proper action could
be taken by the Air Forces. Whether or not it would have come to
General Short's personal attention or not I can't say.
Mr. Keefe. The plotting also indicates the direction that those
planes were taking and the distance they were away at the time the
radar picked them up.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So if they had had the information they would have
known that these returning planes were flying away from the island
in this direction, would they not?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And the task forces at sea, both of them were out there
for the purpose of going into action, weren't they ?
79716 — 46— pt. 1 12
142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Thielen. They were out there for that purpose?
Mr. Keefe. You can't answer that. You are from the Army.
Pardon me.
Do you know whether or not in the search of your records and all
of the material that came to your attention — radar [W] be-
ing on land under the control and jurisdiction of the Army and the
Navy not having any land-based radar — do you know whether or not
there are any records available as to when General Short's office, or
anybody else in command, was notified of this plot showing these
planes leaving the island ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I have no such information. I should,
however, like to point out in this connection that we have no definite
information that those were hostile planes.
The Chairman. Are you through, Mr. Keefe?
Mr. Keefe. Just a moment, please.
I would like to ask the Admiral, if I may.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Keefe. Do you have available — strike that out.
Colonel, may I have your attention a moment, please.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. There has been offered the duly certified record of the
plotting of these planes, an instrument which is certified to by Lieu-
tenant Murphy — Lieutenant Colonel, I guess
Senator Brewstek. Mr. Chairman, I think that should be offered.
I understood it was.
Mr. Keefe. I would like to have it identified and offered in evidence
now.
Mr, Murphy. That will be Exhibit 4, Mr. Chairman.
[34-5] The Chairman. This is the one that was asked for yester-
day and obtained. It was not put in the record as an exhibit.
Mr. Keefe. Will you have it identified as an exhibit?
Mr. Mitchell. We will make it Exhibit 4 and offer it in evidence.
Exhibit 4 will be this chart showing the plotting by the radar station
at Opana on the morning of December 7. That is enough, isn't it,
Colonel?
Colonel Thielen. That is a sufficient description.
Mr. Mitchell, Exhibit No. 4, Mr. Congressman.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 4.")
Mr. Keefe. Now, Colonel, this exhibit 4 is supposed to be a correct
record. I note that you have, in preparing the big chart which has
been exhibited to the committee, you have left off two words that
appear in red ink opposite the numbers giving the time 10 : 39 and
10:27, the words being "enemy return."
Did you see those?
Colonel Thielen. I did, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Who put that on there ?
Colonel Thielen. Presumably Lieutenant Colonel Murphy. May
I explain the omission from this chart at this time?
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Colonel Thielen. In addition to the words "enemy return" appears
a question mark. I have deliberately omitted from ['346] my
testimony all questionable material.
Mr. Keefe. That is why it was left out ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 143
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. I would like to point out that on the exhibit which Ave
have f)repared to offer the words "enemy return" and the question
mark appear. Item 7 of the Army exhibit.
Mr. Keefe. We have offered this and this shows the same thing.
This is the original.
That is all of this witness. I want to talk for a moment to the
admiral.
Do you have a printed phamphlet known as, I think it is 2CL-41,
a certain security order ?
Admiral Inglis. That is in the arcliives of the Navy Department.
We haven't got it at hand but again we will produce it.
Mr. Keefe. Well, in preparing your statement for the Navy did you
examine this security order issued by Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral Inglis. My staff did ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Are you f amaliar with what it contains ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir, not personally.
Mr. Keefe. Beg pardon?
Admiral Inglis. I am not personally familiar with that document.
[347'] 1 have just been informed by my helper here that he did
look at that and decided that it was outside of the scope of the outline
handed to us.
Mr, Keefe. Well, it related, did it not, to the manner in which these
ships were to be berthed and moored in the harbor at Pearl Harbor for
security purposes ?
Admiral Inglis. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman, I am not familiar
with the order.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I am sorry that in making your presentation you
have omitted this very, very important and highly important matter.
Mr. Gesell. It is controversial.
Mr. Keefe. Is there anything controversial about it, Mr. Gesell ? Is
there anything controversial about the fact that such an order was
issued ? It is a printed order.
Mr. Gesell. If that is the order that has to do with the disposition
of vessels in the harbor, so as to effect the maximum antiaircraft oppo-
sition, and matters of that sort — we felt that should be taken up with
the officers who ordered the disposition of the fleet so they could give
their reason and explain what was done, when it was done, and why
it was done.
Mr. Keefe. Well, the order was issued by Admiral Kimmel, wasn't
it?
[348] Mr. Gesell. I believe so.
Mr. Keefe. And, which I understand is in a printed pamphlet, al-
though I haven't been able to get it yet. As a member of the
committee I am interested in it.
Mr. Gesell. We have it ; if you ask for it we will be glad to give
it to you.
Mr. Keefe. Well, we are going to ask for a lot of things as we go
along in this matter, and maybe we will get them. We hope so.
I am now making the request that I be furnished with this order.
And are there additional copies available so that the committee may
have copies ?
144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. I believe it is a printed order. Therefore there should
be copies.
Mr. Keefe. There shouldn't be anything controversial about the
fact. Here is an order which is printed. What could be contro-
versial about it ?
Mr. Gesell. Are you asking me, Mr. Congressman ?
Mr. Keefe. You said it was controversial.
Mr. Gesell. The question of why it was ordered and who it was
ordered by is controversial.
Mr. Keefe. So that I may understand, wasn't it an order issued
by Admiral Kimmel?
Mr. Geseix. I so understand.
[349] Mr. Keefe. Then there is nothing controversial.
Mr. Gesell. As to the content of the order, I take it not.
Mr. Keefe. Did you discuss that matter, Admiral, with our
counsel ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; not personally. This is the first time I
ever heard of it.
The Chairman. The Chair will ask counsel to attempt to secure
sufficient copies of that printed order to furnish each member with a
copy.
Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, a couple of other questions.
You gave some testimony as to the reconnaissance of planes around
the Fourteenth Naval District. That includes Wake, doesn't it;
Midway, Johnston ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, there were 12 PBY's that left Pearl Harbor on
the 30th of November, were there not ?
Admiral Inglis. My presentation did not go back before the 6tli
of December in that connection.
]\Ir. Kf^fe. So you have no knowledge of that ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
[360] Mr. Keefe. You didn't make any examination of any-
thing prior to the Cth of December?
Admiral Inglis. Not in connection with reconnaissance; no, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So you are not in position to testify as to any recon-
naissance that took place on the 5th or 4th or any other time except
the 6th and 7th ; is that right?
Admiral Inglis. That is right.
Mr. Keefe. That is all.
The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask a question or two.
In regard to this map — will you put that radar map back, the one
that was just there? I guess Colonel Thielen can answer this question.
This long purple line in the center indicating an arrow, as far as
the radar is concerned, shows the direction in which planes were flying?
Colonel Thielen. That is a graphical representation which we made
to indicate that fact.
The Chairman. That arrow indicates what was recorded from 2
minutes after until 7 : 30 ; is that correct ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. The white squares actually indicate
that.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 145
The Chairmax. Those white squares were put in to indicate
[351] the time that synchronizes with the particular portion of
that arrow ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir. More accurately, the white squares are
the basic data. They represent the plots which were made. The pur-
ple arrow was added to indicate, make it more graphic to the com-
mittee, the direction of the attack.
The Chairman. In other words, the purple arrow, the long purple
arrow, indicates incoming planes?
Colonel Thielen. For the purpose of that attack ; yes sir.
The Chairman. Yes. I understand you to say that there is nothing
on the plot, as you call it, which indicates whether they were friendly
or hostile planes?
Colonel Thielen. That is correct.
The Chairman. How close would they have to get to the point of
attack before those in charge of the radar station would know whether
or not they were enemy or fi'iendly planes ?
Colonel Thielen. As I understand the development of radar at
that time there would be no indication whatsoever purely by radar.
It would have to be either by visual recognition, or by an identification
signal sent out by the plane radio independent of the radar.
[352] The Chairman. Now, some question has been raised about
these radar operators remaining at this Opana station after 7 o'clock,
in view of the fact that their duty required them to stay until only 7
o'clock. Would you be able to say from the records, whether the
reason they remained there was because the truck was late, or whether
they wanted to get some more training.
Colonel Thielen. Well, it appears to me immaterial why. They
had the option of resting while the truck arrived, or actually contin-
uing to conduct training. They took the latter alternative.
The Chairman. Some importance seems to be attached to the fact
that the truck was late, and I am wondering whether, if the truck had
been on time, if they would have been there between 7 : 02 and 7 : 39
and would have made these records which you have exhibited.
Colonel Thielen. I don't think anybody could answer that.
The Chairman. That is speculative.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And while they were waiting for the truck they
decided to operate a little ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. They showed commendable zeal.
The Chairman. The small purple arrow pointing the other
[353] way indicating the direction of the planes being at 10 : 27 —
is it?
Colonel Thielen, Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And going down to 10:39
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. That is 12 minutes.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Which was nearly an hour after the attack had
ceased, as I understand it from your testimony, the attack having been
over at 9:45.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. So, if that is a correct representation of the flight
of enemy planes — which could still be unidentified, I suppose, so far as
the radar was concerned
146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Thielen. Even more likely because of the range — the range
is greater.
The Chairman. That would have indicated that 45 minutes or an
hour, 45 minutes approximately, after the attack was over, the de-
parture of these planes was caught on the instrument at that time?
Colonel Thielen. An outgoing flight was picked up.
The Chairman, Now, I don't know whether you testified, Colonel,
or whether the admiral testified yesterday, stating that on the 6th of
December there were no searches made by [354] airplanes
from Pearl Harbor ; is that true ?
Admiral Inglis. My testimony was that we had no written record of
any searches.
The Chairman. No record — no written record of any searches, and
that is limited to the searches that would have been made from Pearl
Harbor as a base, is it ? The reason I ask, on your item No. 10, which
is the reproduction of that map there [indicating] in your black space,
you say "Air searches flown in Hawaiian area." Then you have in that
diagonal square, "6th of December, 1941," indicating that in that square
there was some air flight in progress. Was that the airplanes from
the Enterprise?
[355] Admiral Inglis. Those were the airplanes from the En-
terprise. My statement that there was no written record of any recon-
naissance flights applied to shore-based planes, but there were aircraft
in flight from the Enterprise., as shown on the diagonal stripes.
The Chairman. So that there is no contradiction between your
statement yesterday that there were no flights from shore bases on the
6th of December and this indication that from the Enterprise., which
was 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, that there were these flights
participated in by the 18 planes that attacked from it?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir; no contradiction.
The Chairman. All right. Now, at the time that these planes took
off from the Enterprise in what direction was it going?
Admiral Inglis. The Enterprise was traveling almost due east.
The Chairman. Toward Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Inglis. Toward Pearl Harbor.
The Chairman. Now, in what direction was the Lexington
traveling ?
Admiral Inglis. The Lexington was going a little north of west —
a little north and west.
The Chairman. Toward
\S56] Admiral Inglis. Midway.
The Chairman. Midway?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
The Chairman. And they were about how far apart ?
Admiral Inglis. At the time of the attack, as we have just brought
out, they were approximately 350 miles apart and rapidly drawing
further apart.
The Chairman. Yes. One of them was going northwest and the
other coming east ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 147
The Chairman. Yes, Well, now, do the records from which you
have taken your statement and upon which your statement is based
indicate whether these planes that were armed, apparently, when they
left the deck of the Enterprise had any knowledge of an attack or
impending attack at Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Inglis. The record is completely negative in that respect
and I would certainly assume that the pilots had no knowledge of that
at all.
The Chairman. Now, let me ask you about these planes that left
Hamilton Field, is it, San Francisco, Hamilton Field? That, I be-
lieve, is the colonel's statement ; it is in the colonel's statement.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. At what time did you say they left on the [357'\
night of the 6th?
Colonel Thielen. 9 :30 p. m. the 6th December.
The Chairman. 9 :30 p. m. ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Unarmed and without radar, as you said?
Colonel Thielen. Unarmed ; presumably without radar.
The Chairman. And probably having radio sets?
Colonel Thielen. Probably, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Probably, but you have no positive evidence on that
score ?
Colonel Thielen. No positive evidence. It would be extremely
unlikely that they did not have.
The 'Chairman. They were headed for the Philippine Islands but
were to stop at Hawaii for what purpose — for refueling or do you
know ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that would unquestionably be one of
the purposes of the stop.
The Chairman. Yes. And when they got there they found this
attack in progress, is that right ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that is correct.
The Chairman. And being unarmed they had no facilities with
which to engage very effectively in the battle, did they ?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir. They all attempted to land.
[358^ The Chaikvian. They all attempted to land?
Colonel Thielen. Yes.
The Chairman. And some of them were destroyed in that process ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Your testimony, the testimony of both of you
gentlemen has been referred to here as hearsay evidence. I suppose
that you knew when you were asked to present this chronological nar-
rative or physical narrative of what happened out there, not being
there yourself, understood that you were not to testify from personal
knowledge but from records that you were able to obtain in these
various departments and that there is no misunderstanding that what
you were to say here is, technically speaking from the standpoint of
a lawyer, hearsay evidence.
Is that true, Admiral?
Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is that yours also?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that is my understanding.
148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. Of course, as a matter of law we all understand
what you do not see yourself and testify about is legally referred to as
hearsay, and there was no misunderstanding about that. Nobody ex-
pected it to be anything else, so far as I know.
[3S9] Is that your understanding of it?
Admiral Inglis. That was my understanding, yes, sir.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I think that is all I want to ask him.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I did neglect to ask one or two ques-
tions that I had in mind, that I would like to complete if I may do
so at this time.
The Chairman. Yes, Mr. Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Colonel, I would like to ask you this : How many fixed
antiaircraft batteries were there on Oahu at the time of this attack?
Colonel Thielen. That will take a little counting, sir. There
were a good many of them and in the Army exhibit, section 1, page
1 — or, rather, beginning on page 2, we have a list of Coast Artillery
units. In general this could be narrowed down to the gun, I am sure,
and made very accurate with a little further study, but, in general,
units other than the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery JRegiment — the six
batteries at Schofield Barracks and the seven batteries at Camp
Malakole — all of those other yellow squares situated at Fort Weaver,
at Fort De Russy and Fort Ruger and at Black Point, which is down
at the top of Diamond Head, are fixed batteries situated to protect
the coastal defenses, the seacost defense guns in that sector,
[360] Mr. Keefe. Now, how many mobile batteries were there
on the island that day ?
Colonel Thielen. The only fully mobile unit was the Sixty-fourth —
let me check that — the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery
Kegiment which would contain 3 batteries having 3 gun batteries, a
total of 9 — well, wait a minute; the Third Battalion, with semiauto-
matic weapons, has 4 batteries. That would give us 10 full mobile
batteries.
The seanimobile armaments had three Coast Artillery regiments
with weapons which could be transported but for which the prime
movers, as we call them, the trucks to tow them, were not available
in sufficient quantity to move the entire regiment at one time.
Mr. Keefe. Now, I assume in making up your statement you had
opportunity to and did read the Army Board's report?
Colonel Thielen. I read it, sir, not as closely as did my researchers.
I read it not with the idea of extracting anything but for the purpose
of acquainting myself with the background.
Mr. KJEEFE. Who was General Burgin?
Colonel Thielen. General Burgin commanded the Hawaiian Coast
Artillery Command, which embraced two major divisions, the seacoast
regiments and the antiaircraft regiments.
Mr. Keefe. Now, on the morning of December 7, [361] 1941,
when the attack took place, how many of these fixed batteries were
ready for action?
Colonel Thielen. I believe that that could be figured out. May I
invite your attention to section 7 of the Army exhibit, from which
we can probably deduce those facts ? None, of course, were loaded.
Mr. Keefe. None were loaded?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 149
Mr, Keefe. Was the ammunition available?
Colonel Thielen. The ammunition was, in general, in boxes at
the position.
Mr. Keefe. It had to be unboxed and taken out of the boxes to the
guns to be loaded?
Colonel Thielen. That is for the 3-inch guns, the primary arma-
ment, that is true.
Mr. Keefe. That is after the so-called No. 3 alert went into eilect?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; no fixed guns were in position with
ammunition at the gun positions under alert No. 1.
Mr. Keefe. Yes, but I mean they were not loaded, you said.
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; they were not loaded.
Mr. Keefe. In order to put them in position to fire, the ammuni-
tion would have to be taken out of the boxes in places where it was
adjacent to the battery; is that right?
[362] Colonel Tiiielex. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Now, where was the ammunition for the mobile units ?
Colonel Thielen. That was located at Aliamanu Crater.
Mr. Keeefe. And how far away from the mobile batteries?
Colonel Thielen. That was quite close. That was near Fort Shaf-
ter, which is the nerve center of the island defense and the inter-
section of the road net which goes down along the south sector and
critical area. There was also antiaircraft ammunition at Schofield
Barracks.
Mr. Keefe. "Well, the ammunition for the mobile gun batteries
was in Aliamanu Crater, which is about a mile from Fort Shafter,
up in an old volcano ; is that right ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes. sir; that is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And all the mobile batteries,* wherever they were lo-
cated, had to send up to this crater to get their ammunition ; is that
correct ?
Colonel Thielen. Well, not all. As I pointed out, some was at
Schofield Barracks, where some of the mobile batteries were situated.
May I review my brief, which I believe covered that? Would
you care^ to hear it, sir, hear the discussion that I gave yesterday
directly pertaining to this question ?
Mr. Keefe. Well, if you care to repeat it. I haven't [363]
asked for it, but I haven't any objection to it if you want to do it.
Colonel Thielen. It is directly responsive to your question, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Very well.
Colonel Thielen. Under alert No. 1 only a limited amount of
ammunition was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment. The Coast Artillery Command had previously been author-
ized to draw, and had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only,
including antiaircraft. However, at these installations, the shells
were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition from damage
and deterioration. The ammunition for the mobile guns and bat-
teries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Bar-
racks.
Mr. Iveefe. Now, in connection with your testimony, did you
read the testimonv of General Burgin as he gave it to the Army
Board?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir : I do not recollect it.
150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. May I call your attention to the fact that General
Burgin testified before the Army Board, which is cited and referred
to in the Board's report, and I quote :
They were all ready to get into action immediately with the exception that the
mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the
sea [364] coast, those batteries imbedded in concrete, had the ammunition
nearby. I had insisted on that to General Short in person and had gotten his
permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition moved up into the seacoast to
the battery positions and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however,
boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out.
Ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which
you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter up iu the old
volcano. The mobile batteries had to .send there to get ammunition. In addi-
tion to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their
field positions. They were not in field positions.
Is that correct ?
Colonel TuiELEN. Yes, sir, as applied to the mobile batteries. As
I pointed out, they were located at Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks,
and Camp Malakole.
Mr. K^EFE. Did you ascertain the facts with reference to the issu-
ance of ammunition and why it was that ammunition had not been
issued to these mobile batteries ?
Colonel TiiiELEN. I am not prepared to give a why, to give an an-
swer as to why that was not done, sir. I may say that I have had a
discussion with the people who were doing the researching on tliis sub-
ject and they assured me that testimony, [365] including that
of ordnance officers, places us on very firm ground in the testnnony
which I gave yesterday and which I just repeated.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I call your attention to the testimony of General
Burgin on that issue, in which he testified :
They didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition and, besides, we would
get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise. It was almost
a matter of impossibility to get your amunition out because in the minds of a
person who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged,
comes back in and has to be renovated. Tlie same was especially true here.
It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazine. We tried
the ordnance people without result. General Max Murray and myself went
personnally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for
the Field Artillery ; I asked for ammunition for antiaircraft. We were put
off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time
and that we would have warning before any attack ever sprung up.
Did you find that, review that testimony before you made your
statement to the committee here?
Colonel TiiiELEN". I was generally familiar with that testimony
and I know that my researchers knew it in detail.
[366] Mr. Keefe. Well, then, it is safe to say, is it not, that so
far as the mobile units were concerned after the attack came they had
to be dispersed to their positions and had to send to this crater in order
to get their ammunition before they could enter the fight ?
Colonel Thielen. To the crater and to Schofield Barracks.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. The ammunition was centrally located.
Mr. Keei'E. How long did it take to get it, to get that done after the
attack came, normally?
Colqnel Thielen. That would, of course, depend upon the location
of the various batteries. May I point out that the bulk of the anti-
aircraft not in position, the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery, was located
at Fort Shafter, which was only a mile from Aliamanu Crater.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 151
Mr. Keete. Well, then, let me ask you this question: In your
research and in your examination to present this situation you have
disclosed a good many other pertinent and very technical facts. Do
the records any place disclose how long it actually did take?
Colonel Thiei.en-. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And how long did it take?
Colonel Thielex. We have a schedule of that in the Army exhibit.
[367] Mr. Gessell. It is right in the exhibit for each particular
battery.
Colonel Thielen. For every battery.
Mr. Keefe. Well, you may have seen it, Mr. Gesell.
Mr. Gessell. It is before you, Congressman. It is the schedule that
was discussed yesterday. I was calling your attention to it. It gives
the time intervals.
Colonel Thielen. That is on page 11 of the Army exhibit.
The Vice Chairman. We went over that.
Mr. Keefe. He went over that ?
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
The Chairman. Is that all?
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
The Chairman. Admiral, I want to ask one or two questions;
maybe you testified about it yesterday. If you did, I don't want to
repeat.
You stated, I think, that there was a net strung across the mouth
of this channel into Pearl Harbor but that notwithstanding that net
a Japanese submarine did get in. Is that true?
Admiral Inglis. That is true ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Does that record show when the net was spread
and when the submarine got in?
Admiral Inglis. The record does not show when the sub- [368]
marine got in and the record is not clear as to when the net was opened.
You see, those nets have a gate, as we call it, which usually can
be opened to allow the passage of friendly ships, and I am not prepared
to give the information as to just when that gate was opened and
when it was closed. I would say from the construction of the net
that the submarine must have gone through that net at some time
when the gate was open because the net seems to be very effective in
stopping the passage of any ship eixcept when the gate was open.
The Chairman. Do you know whether it was customary to open
the gate in the daytime or at night or both?
Admiral Inglis. I don't know what the custom was at that place
at that time.
Tlie Chairman. How far was it from the mouth where the net
was that this channel that had been chiseled out, how many miles is it
to, we will say, the Ford Island ?
Admiral Inglis. Roughly about 2 miles, sir.
The Chairman. About 2 miles ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
The Chairman. Now, one other question and I think that is all.
You testified here that the Pacific Fleet — which is independent of
the Asiatic Fleet, I believe ?
[369] Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I have no reference to that. The Pacific Fleet,
based at Pearl Harbor, was about two-thirds the size of the Atlantic
Fleet. Now, how much of the Pacific Fleet was in Pearl Harbor?
152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis, You will find that in the statement.
The Ch AXEMAN. Well, I do not want to repeat.
Now, yesterday yon said that there were six battleiships in the
Atlantic Fleet and attention was called to two others that were doing
what you call
Admiral Inglis. Shake-down.
The Chairman. Shake-down.
Is that a naval term for practicing or try-out? Were they new
ships that had not yet joined the Atlantic Fleet?
Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, I did not include in my statement
any ships that were in the blueprinting stage, that were befjng built
and had not yet been launched, or that had been launched but were not
commissioned, or that were commissioned but had not been ordered
to join the fleet. The ships are in various stages of completion from
the time the blueprints are drawn until the shake-down cruise is com-
pleted.
Now, after a ship goes into commission with her full crew and her
ammunition allowance and become a working organization, a period
called a shake-down cruise or shake-down period is allowed the ship
to work out all the kinks in the machinery and [370] in the
organization, to teach the crew their ships, and that, depending on the
type of ship, may take anything from perhaps a month to some times
as much as 6 months or even, in cases where they run into a great
deal of difficulty with the machinery, perhaps as much as a year.
Now, those two battleships, the Woshingfon and North CarolincL,
were of that status. They had been commissioned, they had their
crews and their ammunition on board, but they were still under
shake-down and had not yet joined the fleet.
The Chairman. In other words, notwithstanding the fact that they
were in the Atlantic Ocean or in some body of water adjacent to it,
they were not a part of the Atlantic Fleet?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. That is all. I understand that Senator Brewster
\Tants to ask you a question or two.
Senator Brewster. I have said I wanted to ask some questions.
You said I wanted to ask a question. I would like to ask some ques-
tions. I haven't asked any questions so far.
I think 4 o'clock has rung.
Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman jdelcl to get some information here,
Mr. Chairman?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. We are constantly referring to Army exhibits, which I
now have before me, and reference was made to the place- [371]
ment of the various iDatteries and the time they got into action. Has
that exhibit been offered in evidence in this case, or do you intend to
offer it?
Mr. Mitchell. I was just waiting for a chance, Mr. Congressman.
At the close of their testimony I was going to make a formal offer.
You have copies of it, but I was going to put it into the record by a
formal offer.
Mr. Keefe. I want to concern myself with that. I understand,
then, that you are going to offer this Army exhibit formally ?
Mr. Mitchell. We will do it now, if I may. I would like to get it
over with before I forget it.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 153
The Cpiairmax. And also the Navy.
Mr. Mitchell. I offer as Exhibit 5 the Army folder of documents,
maps, and so forth, that ^vas produced by Colonel Thielen in connec-
tion with his part in the narrative statement.
I also offer as Exhibit 6 the Navy folder, with all papers therein
contained, which are those produced by Admiral Inglis in connection
with his statement, and that includes the document that j^ou just have
in your hand. They are all offered.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of information:
Of course, the testimony given by these gentlemen went right through
these exhibits that were presented to each member of the committee.
That is correct, isn't it?
Mr. Mitchell. That is true, but I am offering the exhib- [372]
its complete so that they will be formal parts of the record.
(The documents referred to were marked ''Exhibits Xos. 5 and 6,"
respectively.)
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I make a request from
counsel ?
The CiiAiRMAX. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to request counsel to get the origi-
nal plotting chart made by Private Elliott at the Opana station on the
morning of the 7th of December 1941.
As I understand it, they have been talking about originals here and
this seems to be a photostatic copy and at the next session I will want
to ask some questions upon that plotting.
Mr. Mitchell. Where would that be. Colonel ? Is it in Washing-
ton?
Colonel Thielex. No, sir ; I think not. We have never come across
that, the plotting that was actually made on the plotting board at the
station.
Senator Ferguson. Are you talking about the station at Opana or
the main station? I am talking about the one that Elliott plotted,
that he actually plotted.^
Colonel Thielen. I have never encountered any — this is one point
that I have gone into in some detail. I have never encountered any
reference to the plot that was made by the enlisted men when they
were tracking a plane. We have heard of Colonel Murphy's authen-
ticated document which presents the plot that was made.
[373] Mr. Mitchell. Who is he?
Senator Ferguson. Where was ISlurphy when this plot was being
made ? Why can't we get the original plot to show the line of flight
and whether or not planes came in at six something and whether or
not they went out at 10 : 45 and 10 : 25 ? What I want is the original
plotting made by Elliott, that he describes in his testimony.
Colonel Thielen. I am sure the War Department will make every
effort to get it.
Senator Brewster. Will the counsel indicate in connection with
the presentation of the Navy and Army exhibits the number of items
included which, as I think, were illustrated nmnerically, so that they
can be identified in that way ?
Mr. Mitchell. In the Navy folder they are itemized as items 1 to 20.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
'The plot referred to was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 155.
154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. And in the Army folder I don't think they are.
I doubt if it had a list. The mimeographed part of it is a document
divided into sections, with 13 pages. In addition to that there are six
charts.
Senator Brewster. Can the radar records of any one distinct station
from the other stations for this period from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock at
all the stations on Hawaii and during the later part of the morning,
whenever they were in operation, be made available, or copies of it?
[S74] Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; anything that is in existence
will be made available. I will give you my personal opinion as an
artilleryman, though, that ordinary computations made at the time by
personnel in the operation of such a device would not ordinarily be a
matter of permanent record.
Senator Brewster. Do you think, Colonel, and would it be likely
that records of the morning of December 7 would be destroyed ?
Colonel Thielex. I believe, and again I am giving you a personal
opinion based on professional experience, that Colonel Murphy, fore-
seeing the situation and the possible demands for information of this
type, deliberately made this historic plot of information that was
available.
Senator Brewster. Colonel Murphy was in charge of all the radar
stations, was he ?
Colonel Thielen. He was a signal officer in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment. The chief signal officer, Colonel Powell, was in charge of the
aircraft warning system.
Senator Brewster. Are either of those officers available here now ?
Colonel Thielen. I believe Colonel Powell is. I understand Colo-
nel Murphy has since died.
Senator Brewster. Colonel Powell, is he expected to appear, do you
know?
[37S] Mr. Mitchell. He is on the list.
Mr. Gesell. He is on the list.
Senator Ferguson. Was Murphy a witness before any of the boards?
Mr. Gesell. No, not that I know of.
Colonel Thielen. I believe he died shortly after that time. I can-
not state definitely.
Senator Brewster. Would you, Mr. Mitchell, advise Colonel Powell
that we would be interested in whatever original as well as transcript
of those records are available of those records ?
Mr. Mitchell. I will ask Colonel Duncombe to get ahold of him.
Even if he hasn't these records here he can xeplain to you where he
saw them and what was done with them.
Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, may I make one brief correction in
the statement that I made yesterday ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. It won't take but a moment.
In my original statement I said that the three patrol planes from
Kaneohe were to take off at sunrise, 5 : 27 Hawaiian time on the 7th,
but that they did not take off until about 6 : 40. I later corrected that
by saying that the plan was that they take off at dawn, 1 hour before
sunrise.
I have since found that I was mistaken in both cases and the facts
are that the order was for them to take off at sun- [376] rise.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 155
which was at 6 : 26. They actually took off at 6 : 40. In other words,
they were 14 minutes late instead of 1 hour and 13 minutes late.
Senator Lucas. Will you produce those records that show that also ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. I have two requests to make: One, that I be fur-
nished with a copy of the summary of far eastern documents, the G-2
and Signal CorjDs documents as I understand, and I would like to
have a copy of the log of the cruiser Boise for the last 5 days of Novem-
ber 1941 and, say, the first 10 days of December 1941.^
The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, if there is nothing further we will
recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow and the chairman will express the
hope that we will conclude with the testimony of Admiral Inglis and
Colonel Thielen before 12 o'clock.
(Wliereupon, at 4: 10 o'clock p. m., Friday, November 16, 1945, an
adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock a. m., Saturday, November
17, 1945.)
1 Exhibit No. 68.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 157
[377^ PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1945
CONGBESS OF THE UnITED StATES, .
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the
caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W.
Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, ancl Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
[^75] The Chairman. The committee will be in session.
When the committee adjourned yesterday the Senator from Maine,
Mr. Brewster, was on the verge of cross-examining the witnesses.
Senator Brewster ?
The Chair just announced that when we adjourned yesterday the
Senator from Maine was on the verge of cross-examining the witnesses.
You may now proceed.
Senator Brewster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I would like to hear what you said. I
cannot hear you.
The Chairman. I said that when the committee adjourned yesterday
the Senator from Maine was on the verge of cross-examining the wit-
nesses and that he would now proceed.
Mr. Keefe. Before he proceeds may I inquire from the Chairman ?
There has been a lot of inquiry directed to me. May I inquire as to
whether it is contemplated to hold hearings this afternoon ?
The Chairman. Well, the Chair would hope not, we hope we can
finish these witnesses by noon, but if we do not finish them we will try
to finish them by going as late as 1 o'clock if necessary and not adjourn
at 12 as we have been. Neither house is in session today.
Go ahead, Senator,
Senator Brewster. Admiral Inglis, covering one or two points
which you have not fully developed in connection with [^STff]
the hypothetical submarine entrance into Pearl Harbor at 4 : 30 on the
morning of December 7, have you any further naval theory or record
to that eifect? You intimated that' you did not consider the maps
which were shown of the so-called battle area were, possibly, authentic.
I assume that you have made some explorations of that situation.
Admiral Inglis. I cannot add anything to what I said yesterday.
I am not sure that I have the map which you have just mentioned
79716 — 46— pt. 1- 13
158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in the book of battle reports precisely identified as identical with that
map that I had in mind. I am not sure that we are talking about the
same map.
Senator Brewster. So when you intimated that the entry — I saw
it with my own eyes — was not on the map, did you find another map ?
Admiral Inglis. It may have been a different map than the one in
that book.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. But all I can do is repeat the general statement
that I made yesterday, that the best picture or estimate that we can
make from the evidence available to us is that one submarine definitely
did enter Pearl Harbor.
Senator Brewster. Well, that is not a matter of anybody's opinion,
is it? You got the submarine, didn't you, that you captured or sank
at the time ?
[380] Admiral Inglis. That is right.
Senator Brewster. So that there isn't any dispute about that.
Admiral Inglis. If the Senator will permit me, I was just reviewing
what I said yesterday, which was that one submarine did definitely
enter Pearl Harbor. A second one may possibly have entered Pearl
Harbor but we rather think it did not.
Senator Brewster. And what became of the map which was cap-
tured with the submarine at Barbers Point ?
Admiral Inglis. I think that that, or a photostatic copy of it, is in
the Navy archives.
Senator Brewster. And you do not agree with the interpretation of
that by the Army or FBI, or by the so-called battle report account?
Admiral Inglis. I am not personally familiar with the opinion of
the Army or FBI on battle reports. My own translators, after con-
siderable research and considerable study of the Japanese symbols
on that map, have decided that the evidence tends to be against the
conclusion that that submarine entered the harbor.
Senator Brewster. And what is your theory of how the submarine
did enter into the harbor that actually did get in there ?
[381] Admiral Inglis. Well, that is in the realm of speculation,
Mr. Senator, but if you wish me to speculate I would speculate that the
submarine probably followed a United States ship through the gate,
the gate having been opened for the admission of a United States
naval vessel.
Senator Brewster. What are the records on the ships coming in that
morning ?
Admiral Inglis. We haven't got that. We tried to find it and we
haven't got that and I suggest that that material could better be ob-
tained from some of the witnesses who were present at the time.
Senator Brewster. What was the arrangement between the Army
and Navy about offshore patrol ; what was the understanding between
them?
Admiral Inglis. I don't know what the understanding was. So
far as I know there was no off-shore patrol conducted by the Army.
There was an off-shore patrol conducted by the Navy, as I have de-
scribed in my previous testimony.
Senator Brewster. And what was the nature of that ?
Admiral Inglis. The Navy's off-shore patrol?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 159
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. It consisted of the searches by aircraft that were
shown on the charts.
Senator Brewster. I am speaking now of the routine, not {382}
of the ones which you have described, but of the routine throughout
the weeks or months preceding that. Were there any regulations cov-
ering that in that period ?
Admiral Inglis. We did not attempt to cover that prior to the 6th
of December. Our presentation only took up from the 6th of Decem-
ber and from then on, because that is all that was in the outline.
Senator Brewster. And you are not, then, prepared to testify as
to what the understanding was between the Army and Navy as to the
patrol around the waters of Hawaii ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Brewster. What was the range of the PBY's ? What was
the range of the PBY bombers ?
Admiral Inglis. I am just speaking off the cuff now, but as I
recall it the figure was 800-mile radius of action. It would be some-
thing more than twice that much for the range. They would go
out 800 miles generally on the course followed and then back again,
making a triangular track.
Senator Brewster. You had some of those PBY's there at Hawaii,
did you not? :• j
Admiral Inglis. I did not hear your question.
Senator Brewster. You had some of those PBY's there at Hawaii,
did you not ?
ySS] Admiral Inglis. Oh, yes.
Senator Brewster. How many of them, do you recall ?
Admiral Inglis. I am not certain. Referring to item 12 of the
Navy exhibit, at Kaneohe there was a total of 36 PBY's. At Ford
Island a total of 31 — I beg your pardon, 33.
Senator Brewster. Thirty-three ; that makes a total of 69 PBY's.
Admiral Inglis. I believe that is substantially correct, yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Those were suitable at that time for this long-
range patrol ?
Admiral Inglis. That type of plane was suitable for that type of
patrol, yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. How long have you been in Intelligence,
Admiral ?
Admiral Inglis. How long have I been in Intelligence?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. Since the 1st of June of this year.
Senator Brewster. Has your experience before that been any in
that field or in operations?
Admiral Inglis. More in operations and communications, general
service that most of us have, no unusual type of duty, except that I was
a specialist in communications for a while.
Senator Brewster. And it would not require any special training to
know that the Japanese had in previous wars in- [384-] dulged
in these sneak attacks, would it ?
Admiral Inglis. I believe that is a matter of history.
Senator Brewster. So that if there were likely to be trouble between
the Japanese and the United States, provoked by the United States,
160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it was altogether likely that it would be started in that way, wouldn't
that be right ?
Admiral Ixglis. I think that would be a safe conclusion to draw,
yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. And that it is rather accepted in military and
naval strategy to aim at the jugular?
Admiral Inglis. I did not get the last part.
Senator Brewster. To aim at the jugular. You try to strike at the
strongest spot, where you can do the most damage?
Admiral Inglis. Well, I
Senator Brewster. Let me put it this way : Hasn't that been what
the Japs have always done ? In their previous wars didn't they always
hit the enemy where they would do the enemy the most damage at
one time in those sneak attacks ?
Admiral Inglis. Of course, that is a pretty broad, general state-
ment, Senator. I guess I could agree with you as a general statement.
Senator Brewster. Yes ; so that if there were to be trouble it would
be reasonable to anticipate that it might [385] come in Pearl
Harbor, would that be a fair statement ?
Admiral Ixglis. I am afraid 3^ou are going out of my field now,
sir.
Senator Brewster. Well, you are the Director of Intelligence for
the Navy, so 3^ou are assumed to have a certain competency in this
field. You are handling this responsibility now and you must be
looking to the future.
Admiral Ixglis. Well, I feel flattered at your compliment, Senator.
Senator Brewster. Well, I am quite serious. I have a very high
respect for your accomplishments, I think 3'ou have exhibited them
already and we are trying to learn, of course, by experience to avoid
trouble hereafter.
What I am coming to is this, that if there were any reason to antic-
ipate trouble at Pearl Harbor, where most of our Pacific fleet was
concentrated, most of its striking power, it would have been possible
by the use of the PBY patrol bombers readily to have ascertained
whether an}' striking force or carrier force were approaching, would
it not, by a patrol ?
Admiral Ix'glis. I am not sure whether the number of planes avail-
able for that type of search at that time was sufficient to allow a con-
tinual search all day every day.
Senator Brewster. Well, would it have required anything more
than an 800-mile patrol from Pearl Harbor over [386] the
areas which were not covered by your shipping each day to have made
it impossible for a hostile fleet to have approached ?
Admiral Ixglis. I think again you are getting a little bit out of my
field and more into the field of aviation officers, but from my broad
general experience as a naval officer I would say that probably that
number of planes was not sufficient to cover all possible avenues of
approach of a hostile force 24
Senator Brewster. That is not what I asked you and you are intelli-
gent enough to answer my question.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I am going to object to the questions
of the Senator from Maine.
. The Chairmax. Let the Senator from Maine proceed in order.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 161
Admiral Inglis. Will the Senator please repeat the question?
Senator Brewster. You ask the question — read it.
(The question referred to was read by the reporter as follows:)
Well, would it have required anything more than an 800-mile patrol from
I'earl Harbor over the areas which were not covered by your shipping each
day to have made it impossible for a hostile [387] fleet to have ap-
proached?
Admiral Ixglis. I beg your pardon. I did not understand the
question.
Senator Brewster. I thought you did not.
Admiral Ixglis. The answer to that question is "Yes," with this
qualification, that again speaking now in general terms, the areas
which would be hjq^othetically covered by your own shipping could
probably not be counted upon. In other words, to carry out such a
thorough search as the one you have in mind we would have to cover
almost the whole 360° arc.
Senator Brewster. Well, that may be true, Admiral, but isn't it also
true that, exactly as the Japanese planned, they would not be likely
to approach through areas where our shipping was frequenting the
courses ?
Admiral Ixglis. That is right.
Senator Brewster. They would be desirous of avoiding us.
Admiral Ix-^glis. That is correct.
Senator Brewster. So that if at the time we abandoned our ship-
ping on the northern route patrols had been carried out on the northern
area, with the limited range of the battle planes from carriers, it would
have been, let us say, at least exceedingly difficult for the Jap force to
have approached?
[388] Admiral Ixglis. That is correct.
Senator Brewster. And, of course, that is one of the things which
I think is of serious concern and in my visits to Pearl Harbj^r before
and after it occurred there was always great discussion, the Army
feeling that if it had been permitted to carry out these patrols with
their long range bombers they could have detected this and the Navy
holding the Army strictly accountable for the defense of Hawaii ; but,
as I understand — and I will ask the counsel or you to have this veri-
fied— it was a matter of agreement and orders that the Army was not to
participate in a patrol beyond a very limited area, a hundred miles or
so, I believe, while the Navy was to take care of the longer range
patrol because of the existing controversy at that period which, I am
sure, both of you gentlemen are thoroughly familiar, as to the control
of long-range aircraft and the function and the mission which they
were to perform.
Mr. Mitchell. It may help the Senator if I say that at a very
early stage of the case, in fact, within the next day or two if we take
the normal course, we will produce all the defense plans that show
the respective duties of the Army and Navy about that reconnaissance
and we have a very splendid document here prepared by General
Martin, I think, in the summer of 1941 that answers every question
that you [389] have asked about the patrols that could have
been carried on, how many planes were required to do it and quite a
complete picture of the thing that you are interested in.
162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We have that and it is coming in with the defense plans which
show the respective duties of the Army and Navy and what was
required in the way of equipment to execute it.
Senator Brewster. Well, I should be glad to have that. I did not
assume that this was a matter which was in controversy in any way,
as to what were the Army and Navy arrangements, so I think it is
a little regrettable that the Army and Navy did not agree to give
us what were the actual arrangements, unless it was at the suggestion
of counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, these gentlemen were only giving the facts
as to the actual conditions on the day of the attack and the available
equipment, and the Army and Navy plans for defense prepared
during the summer of 1941, over the months prior to Pearl Harbor,
being a series of plans, each of them all arranged, with these things
in them that you are interested in and you will get a more accurate
story from those than you would from possibly a witness who was
called on another matter and has not studied it lately.
Senator Brewster. Very well, I will be very happy to waive the
presentation of that until the proper time.
Admiral, I want to take one other phase, which is all I [SOO]
care, I think, to examine you about, and that is the matter of the dis-
tribution of the fleet.
You have realized, I presume, in your position that that has been
one of the matters that has been much agitated in connection with
this matter, as to the allocation of the fleets between the Atlantic and
the Pacific, have you not. Admiral? There has been considerable
discussion as to whether or not there was a good disposition.
Admiral Inglis. There has been considerable discussion, yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. And also as to the reasons for it and where the
orders were developed, so that speaking from that background and
your position you would gather also that that is one of the questions
that will very likely be considerably discussed in this case.
Admiral Inglis. I would expect that.
Senator Brewster. Now, when the matter came up you spoke of
the Pacific Fleet as being two-thirds of the Atlantic Fleet in strength.
Admiral Inglis. That is numerical strength, yes.
Senator Brewster. That is based on the unit. And you were then
asked further by Senator Ferguson about the allocation of the units.
I want to read you your evidence and ask you your comment on it. I
read quotations from your [S91] evidence on page 172:
Admiral, you said —
this is Senator Ferguson speaking —
Admiral, you said that about two-thirds of our fleet was in the Pacific ; is that
correct ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I said that the numerical sti-ength of the Pacific
Fleet was two-thirds that of the Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific Fleet was smaller
than the Atlantic Fleet.
And then after some other colloquies, turning to page 173, Senator
Ferguson again:
Well, how many capital battleships were in the Atlantic?
Admiral Inglis. In the Atlantic Fleet were six battleships. In the Pacific
Fleet were nine battleships. Six in the Atlantic and nine in the Pacific.
Now, at that point it seems to me, Admiral, you were a little less(
than careful. Your first statement was absolutely correct. Your ad-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 163
dition was absolutely incorrect and it occurs to me that hearing of
this colloquy you must have been rather well aware of what Senator
Ferguson, at least, was asking.
I will read the next page, after some further colloquies :
Senator Febguson. Now, how many battleships were in Atlantic?
[392] Admiral Inglis. Six.
On the basis of the subsequent evidence which was finally extracted
from you that statement was unqualifiedly false ; is that not correct?
Admiral Inglis. I think the Senator is drawing some conclusions
with respect to the
Senator Brewster, I am quoting your testimony before this tribunal
and that statement, as you have now admitted after we finally elicited
the information, was unqualifiedly false.
The Chairman. If the Senator will permit
Senator Brewster. The chairman can do anything he likes. I am
making a statement of fact.
The Chairman. Well, the Chair feels that this inquiry ought to be
conducted with decorum and respect and for a member of this com-
mittee to charge a witness with making an unqualifiedly false state-
ment seem to the Chair, whether it seems to other members of this
committee proper, to be out of order.
Senator Brewster. I will continue the quotation :
Senator Ferguson. Well, I read from battle report. Pearl Harbor to Coral
Sea, which is supposed to be an official record, page 6 :
"In the Atlantic there were eight battleships."
[S9S] Eeading from page 6 :
Admiral Inglis. I can't recognize that book as being official. I have here a list
of the specific ships —
I go on :
Admiral Inglis. I personally still don't recognize that as being official, except
what you have told me now, but, if I may, Senator Ferguson, I will read the list
of ships that were in the Atlantic Fleet, and the list of those in the Pacific Fleet.
Still it is apparently contemplated that we were wishing to discover
the truth.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
You then proceeded to read the list of the two fleets. I want to go
now to another page and quote. This has gone on now for five pages
trying to extract the simple facts as to the disposition of our fleets, of
our battleships, which is what Senator Ferguson repeatedly asked you,
and he finally, and I might say at my suggestion, because I was com-
pletely bewildered by what you were trying to tell us, on page 176
Senator Ferguson says :
How many battleships did we have in December 1941?
Admiral Inglis. Fifteen, sir.
There again is a statement which, on your subsequent [394]
evidence when you finally admitted the existence of the Washington
and the North Carolina ready for their cruises and shake-downs, is a
statement that does not correspond with what up in our part of the
country would be considered as the truth.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. No ; let the Senator proceed without interruption.
164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster (reading) :
Senator Fekguson. Fifteen?
Admiral Inglis. Fifteen tlaat were attached to tlie fleets. Tliere were two or
three that had just been completed, or were on their shake-down duty.
At last we are permitted to lind out what is the answer to this-
conundrum.
Senator Ferguson. Where were they?
You then testified as to the Washington and the North Carolina on
shake-down in the Atlantic.
All I have to say is this, Admiral, and I say it in all charity. I have
served on the Naval Affairs Committee during my period in Congress ;
I have been interested in the Navy ; we have the Navy up in Maine in
large measure and everybody else is interested in it and, of course,
for 4 years we have been dealing very definitely with preparedness and
defense and I speak not only from observation but the thoughts
\^395~\ of most of the members of our committee involved in that
task and of its distinguished chairman. President Truman,^ in regret-
ting profoundly that there has developed an attitude of mind on the
part, particularly of the Navy, that does not seem to recognize the
rights and interests of this Congress to receive full, frank, and fair
answers to the questions that have come up and I say particularly
in the process of this hearing for yourself and your fellow officers and
for the future welfare of the Navy, which is the great problem in this
country in building up the confidence that it wants to command, by a
freer and a franker approach to the aims of myself and other members
of the connnittee it would do much to increase that confidence that
I think we all want to establish.
[^396~\ Senator Lucas. Is this going to be a lecture school, Mr.
Chairman ?
The Chairman. Whatever it is, it will speak for itself.
Go ahead. Admiral, if you want to comment on that dissertation
you are at liberty to do so.
Admiral Inglis. May I comment in full, sir?
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Maine has im-
pugned my honesty and my motives. I resent that. I gave the facts
to the best of my knowledge and belief.
The point he has brought up about the Washington and North Caro-
lina^ and the other ships which had not joined the fleets was fully
covered in a statement which I made yesterday afternoon. I said in
that statement that, of course, you might count battleships or other
ships which were still in the blueprint stage, you might count battle-
ships or other ships still in the building ways, you might count battle-
ships or other ships which had been launched l3ut which had not been
completed, you might count battleships or other ships which had been
commissioned but had not joined the fleet, but I was counting the
ships that had joined the fleet, and I thought I made that quite clear
in my statement.
I have done my very best in this presentation to give all the facts
to the best of my knowledge and ability. I [,?57] don't be-
lieve the Navy, and certainly not the organization, is attempting to
withhold any evidence whatsoever. I repeatedly stated I was author-
1 Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 165
ized for the Navy to state that we would produce any facts that we
were asked to produec.
Senator Brewster. I think the record Avill speak for itself.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions, Senator?
Senator Brewster. No.
The Chairman. Does any other member of the committee wish to
ask Admiral Inglis any questions?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan.
Senator Ferguson. I want to ask the colonel some questions.
Colonel, I show you the exhibit that is in evidence here, this map
of the radar.
Colonel Thielen : Will you put the radar plot up. Captain Barnes ?
Senator Ferguson. Was the chart that is on the board here made
from the exhibit that you have ?
Colonel Thielen. It was made from an exhibit which I believe was
identical.
Senator Ferguson. Have you looked for the original charting done
of the Opana station ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; a radiogram was dispatched to [398]
the Hawaiian Department since the last meeting asking for the original
plots from all radar stations on December 7, 1941.
Senator Ferguson. I show you a photostat that is exhibit 3-B in
evidence, and I ask you what that is.
Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 3-B in evidence where ?
Mr. KJEEFE. Mr. Chairman, 3-B of what?
Senator Ferguson. The exhibit itself does not show, but I am of
the opinion it is of the Army exhibits. Does counsel agree with that?
I shall just identify it from the mark on the paper itself.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, just as a matter of informa-
tion, I understood the Senator to say it was in evidence.
Senator Ferguson. I was reading what was on the sheet. That is
on the sheet.
The Chairman. That was a part of the Army file which was
yesterday put in evidence along with the Navy white folder.
Senator Ferguson. No, no.
Mr. Mitchell. Let me clear that up. The document which the
Senator just produced is not in evidence in this hearing.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. I understood him referring to it as having been in
evidence in some other investigation.
Senator Ferguson. I merelv read off the identification numbers,
what is on the blueprint itself. It is only for the [399] pur-
pose of identification. That expression I used is on the sheet itself.
The Chairman. If there is a memorandum on the sheet showing
it is in evidence, it ought to show in what proceeding it is in evidence.
Senator Ferguson. It does not show that. I would like to make
that clear for the record. Will the colonel read what is on the corner
of the sheet so the record will be clear?
Colonel Thielen. I see the statement "Exhibit 3-B in evidence."
Senator Ferguson. That is exactly what I read. That is for
identification purposes.
Have you examined it?
Colonel Thielen. For the first time now.
166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Will you compare it with the board and with
the exhibit now in evidence ?
Colonel Thtelen. I have compared it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Are they alike ?
Colonel Thielen. Exhibit 3-B, so-called, appears to include the
information on the board.
Senator Ferguson. That is not what I asked you. Are they alike ?
The Chairman. Let the witness explain in what particular they
differ, if they do differ.
[400] Senator Ferguson. Cannot I have an answer to my ques-
tion first ? Are they alike ?
The Chairman. He was in the process of answering your question.
Senator, when you interrupted.
Go ahead and give your answer.
Colonel Thielen. The exhibit 3-B in evidence, so-called, appears
to include the plots referred to on the board and on the exhibit which
3^ou handed me previously, sir, and in addition appears to have other
plots which were made later in the day.
Senator Ferguson. Now will you tell us how they differ? Will
you give us all that is on the exhibit that I gave you this morning,
exhibit 3-B in evidence, the way it is marked ?
Colonel Thielen. It contains numerous additional plots.
[401] Senator Ferguson. Will you give them to us ?
Colonel Thielen. It would be very difficult to do that orally, sir.
I see pips and plots all over the area.
Senator Ferguson. You mean to say you cannot give us any of
them ? Are your eyes not able to read them ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I start up in the upper left-hand
corner and I see a spot
Senator Ferguson. What is the time marking?
Colonel Thielen. 10 : 3 — and the final digit is illegible. Below
that is 10 : 35. Below that is 10, and then illegible and the digit 3.
Below that is 10 : 30. Below that is 10 : 2 and an illegible digit. Be-
low that is 10 : 27 and an illegible digit. About an inch below that
is a spot with illegible digits. Below that about a half inch is a
spot 10: 31.
Senator Ferguson. Now, are not they illegible just simply because
the photostat is not clear ?
Colonel Thielen. I believe that is true, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right, go ahead.
Colonel Thielen. That appears to conclude that plot of the 10 : 00
series.
Senator Ferguson. Give us the other plots.
Colonel Thielen. Wliich are you referring to ?
Senator Ferguson. On the map, that is not on the one [402]
shown to us.
Colonel Thielen. About 3 inches due north of Kaena Point, I find
a single spot, and to the southeast is a dotted line, about an inch,
and another spot surrounded by numerals, some of them illegible, one
of which I make out as 7 : 50 or 7 : 56.
Senator Ferguson. They are to the left of what is on the chart
here, 7:39?
Colonel Thielen. It would be in the neighborhood of a point
on the chart marked 6 : 59.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 167
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Colonel Thielen. Below the broad arrow.
Senator Ferguson. What is the mark on this chart I gave you?
6:30?
Colonel Thielen. I read 7 : 50 here.
Senator Ferguson. 7 : 50.
Colonel Thielen. There is no indication, however, that that is the
same plot as the one on the board.
Senator Ferguson. Now what else is on that chart that is not on
the one on the board ?
Colonel Thielen. There are
Senator Ferguson (interposing). I am talking about the Opana
chart, 3-B in evidence, so marked.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, this is marked "Opana" down in [4031
the lower left-hand corner. Out to the east-northeast — or west-north-
west of Kaena Point is a series — I should estimate the distance on this
scale of about 50 miles — is a series of arrows pointing out spots, no one
of which, as near as I can make out, has a time indicated on it. South
of that, in the general area off the Hawaiian coast of the island are
a number of white dots which may be caused by faults in the photostat,
or may be plots.
Senator Ferguson, Just there it is very important then to get all
of the facts that we should have the original instrument and not be
depending upon a photostat which can be so defective that you cannot
read it ; is that right ?
Colonel Thielen. Since the last meeting, sir, the War Department
has dispatched a radiogram to the Hawaiian Department asking for
the originals of the plots of all stations on December 7, 1941.
[4^4J Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us why you produced the
plot you did and did not give us the one in the Army board records ?
I understood the evidence was to be evidence not disputed, that you
were to bring in. How do you account for that ?
Colonel Thielen. For one thing, sir, this appears to include all plots
made during the day and not those made during the attack, with which
I was dealing.
Senator Ferguson. Wliy did you bring in your 10 : 39 then ?
Colonel Thielen. Because that occurs on Exhibit 4, which I clearly
specified was the one from which I had taken the chart.
Senator Ferguson. Is not Exhibit 4 a plot made up by an individual
and not the original evidence ?
Colonel Thielen. Both plots are authenticated by Lieutenant Colo-
nel Murphy.
Senator Ferguson. I ask you whether the one I gave you, 3-B, the
Opana photostat, is not purporting to be from an original ?
Colonel Thielen. That appears to be, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I show you another photostat,
exhibit 3-A in evidence — and I take it for granted that means it was
in evidence at the Army board, and I just use that for identification
purposes — and ask you if you [4^<5] ever saw that ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I have not only seen that but I have
had it reproduced as an Army exhibit on page 8.
Senator Ferguson. That one is reproduced. Did you use that infor-
mation on the chart that you gave us ?
168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Thielen. Not on the chart of the Opana station, sir, because
the chart to which you have last referred is not the chart of the Opana
station.
Senator Ferguson. I will ask you to read the notes down in the
cornej' and see whether part of it is not of the Opana station.
Colonel Thieleis^. This says :
Detector station records at Kaena, Opana, Kaala, Shatter, Kokohead on Decem-
ber 7, 1941, prior to 7 : 00 a. m.
Senator Ferguson. Did you think we only wanted, in your verbal
evidence here, the Opana station?
Colonel Thielen. As I pointed out. Senator, the chart to which
you refer was offered in evidence as Army exhibit, page 8.
Senator Ferguson. I realize that. Why did not you include the
showings on this map ?
Colonel Thielen. The only significance I see in this chart is that it
confirms the plots earlier in the day of the Opana station, indicating
that that station was tracking [406] correctly.
Senator Ferguson. Do we understand then that we have received
here on the board a corrected chart ?
Colonel Thielen. By no means.
Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you to look at page 116, that you
gave me the other clay as the page from which you got the evidence on
this radar, about Avhat Elliott was doing. Do you find anything on
that? That is the Roberts evidence. You gave me page 116 as the
report as I told you I could not find it in the report because the report
did not haA^e so many pages and then you said it was in the evidence.
Now I sliow you page 116 of the evidence and ask you if you find
anything on that?
Colonel Thielen. I will check my documentation on that, sir. It is
entirely possible that my documentation is incorrect ; but I read them
correctly. It is exhibit S of the Roberts report, page 116, affidavit of
Private McDonald.
Senator Ferguson. Have you got the affidavit of Private McDon-
ald?
Colonel Thielen. It is in the files of the War Department ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How could he give what Elliott was doing when
he was the telephone operator down at the center? Why would you
rely upon his affidavit?
[40/] Colonel Thielen. Let me check that to see just what that
referred to, sir. I see that that evidence refers to the location of the
aircraft as picked up by Private Elliott and Private Lockard, which
was presumably reported to Private McDonald.
Senator Ferguson. Now might I inquire from counsel whether or
not they have the affidavit in the Roberts report ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I haven't them in court this minute.
Senator Ferguson. I am asking you whether you have them.
Mr. Mitchell. We have the Roberts record, if that is what you
mean, all the exhibits in the War and Nav}^ that the Roberts commis-
sion is presumed to have had.
Senator Ferguson. Will counsel try and locate that affidavit for
the committee?
Mr. Mitchell. My chief assistant suggested that j^ou may have the
Roberts record. We were passing these things out.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 169
Senator Ferguson. I do not have the affidavit. I did not know
there were any affidavits until the witness lias been giving affidavits.
Mr. Mitchell. We will look up our records and see who has that
information. What is it exactly you want, Senator Ferguson?
Senator Ferguson. I want the affidavit in the Roberts investigation.
Mr. Mitchell. All the affidavits ^
[408] Senator Ferguson. All the affidavits in the Roberts in-
vestigation.
Colonel Thielen. I learn that my citation in my document was
incorrect originally, page 116. I should have cited volume 2 of the
Roberts report, pages 66 and 67, General Short's testimony, as to the
facts mentioned.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now on this' map that you have
given us the Opana station shows 6 : 45, 6 : 48, 6 : 50, 6 : 51, 6 : 58, 6 : 48,
6:51,6:52, and 6: 59.
Now referring to the testimony of Elliott on page 997, transcript
of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board on Thursday,
August 17, 1944, and reading back one question :
General Frank. What I am trying to ascertain is whether on the morning of
December 7 there was more activity than usual or whether there was less
activity than usual, or was it average?
Sergeant Eixiott. Well, sir, during our problem on Sunday there was practi-
cally no activity at all.
General Frank. Prior to this time?
Sergeant Eluott. Prior to 7 o'clock; yes, sir. We had no plots to send in
to our information center and had no targets.
Now how do you reconcile that evidence with what you are giving
the committee ? I show you the original.
Colonel Thielen. I consider this evidence of the plot [^OO]
authenticated by a signal officer responsible at this station to be evi-
dence that is worthy of being presented to the committee, under my
directive of giving them the facts, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Over and above the sworn testimony of the man
who did the charting, is that correct?
Colonel Thielen. There is no evidence that he was on the set at
that particular time.
Senator Ferguson. I am talking about Elliott.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Are we then going to get from the Army the
conclusions of some officers later on and not the eyewitnesses to these
facts? Is that what we are getting here?
Mr. Mitchell. That is a question for counsel, I think.
Senator Ferguson. I am asking the witness.
The Chairman. The witness cannot answer what we are o-oino- to
get hereafter. As everybody has been advised, Mr. Lockard and Mr.
Tyler are both on the list of witnesses. They were in charge, makino-
these records, and certainly their testimony will be produced here.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I correct my statement, but I
cannot speak for the future. I am talking about what we did get.
Is that correct, that it was the conclusions of officers rather than the
testimony of eyewitnesses ?
[4^0] Colonel Thielen. I see no conclusion in what purports to
be and is authenticated as the record of the plots of the Opana station.
Senator Ferguson. You do not see any
Colonel Thielen. I do not say it is a conclusion to reproduce a plot.
170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Wliere the witness himself, who made the chart,
says there were no other targets that morning, in the statement, and
you bring in the conclusion of an officer that there were ?
Colonel Thielen. I do not consider it a conclusion, sir. It is a
plot.
Senator Ferguson. What is it?
Colonel Thielen. It is a written record, sir. It is a plot.
Senator Ferguson. Who made it?
Colonel Thielen. Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.
Senator Ferguson. What did he make it from? Did he make it
from the one I gave you ?
Colonel Thielen. From the records of the Opana station. I cannot
say what he saw when he made this record.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account for two records of that
station then ?
Colonel Thielen. One of them covers the entire day, sir, [4-^-?]
and one covers the critical period.
Senator Ferguson. How could the one that followed, that covered
the entire day, be any different than the one that gave them the exact
period, and that is up to 7 : 39 ?
Colonel Thielen. In what way, sir?
Senator Ferguson. How could they differ? The one that covered
all day, how could it be different from the one that coveired it up
to 7 : 39 ? I take it the 7 : 39 chart up to that point, would be complete
up to that time, would it not ?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that would be the supposition.
Senator Ferguson. Then it would not have any thing on that was
not on this chart. Now where do you get this 6 : 50 and 6 : 45, if this
man who made the chart said he did not have any other targets on
that day?
Colonel Thielen. Where do I get it, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Colonel Thielen. I get it from the so-called historic plot.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now will you give us when the first
bomb was dropped again ?
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman suspend a minute
until I can look at the report and the exhibit on which he questioned
the witness ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
[4i^] Mr. Murphy. Will you pass them over, please ?
The Chairman. Will we have to suspend in order to do that ?
Mr. Murphy. No ; I just made the request.
Senator Ferguson. I want them back. I have some other ques-
tions.
Mr. Murphy. All right, in just a minute.
The Chairman. Go ahead. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read my last question ?
(The question was read by the reporter.)
Senator Ferguson. What do your records show ?
Colonel Thielen. The observers at Hickam Field saw aircraft at
7:55 a. m. and the attack was initiated immediately, presumably the
first bomb dropped within a matter of seconds after 7 : 55 a. m.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 171
Senator Ferguson. 7 : 55 a. m. All right. How do you account for
the planes that came in at 7 : 39 to 7 : 55 ? How do you account for their
action from 7 : 39 to 7 : 55 ?
Colonel Thielen. Well, I am not prepared to state positively that
those planes appearing at 7 : 39 ol! Kahuku Point were the planes that
appeared at Hickam Field at 7 : 55.
Senator Ferguson. How far is the point 7 : 39 from Hickam Field ?
Colonel Thielen. I should estimate that at approximately 60 miles.
[41S] Senator Ferguson. About 60 miles. Do you know what
Elliott said about how far he followed these planes in? Fifteen to
twenty miles, did not he say ?
Colonel Thielen. I do not recall.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the radar was doing at that
time ?
Colonel Thielen. What the radar was doing, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Colonel Thielen. I do not believe I understand the question, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read it ?
Colonel Thielen. I understood the words sir, but not the intent. I
do not understand what is wanted.
Senator Ferguson. Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
Senator Ferguson. Do you know how the radar would function at
that time ?
Colonel Thielen. How it would function ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, whether it would take it 15 or 20 miles from
the radar itself.
Colonel Thielen. No, sir. I know that the lobe, so-called, sent out
by the radar, behaves very erratically. I am not technically qualified
to state how it would behave at that short range.
[4^4] Senator Ferguson. Have you examined Lockard's or
Elliott's testimany about these targets before 7 : 02, during their so-
called, as you call it, regular shift?
Colonel Thielen. I did not direct their attention specifically to
that; no, sir. They have unquestionably read that testimony in re-
searching this particular phase.
Senator FeKguson. As I understand it, instead of what the testi-
mony shows you gave us a plot that was made up by Colonel Murphy.
Colonel Thielen. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. That is the way you leave the record, and that
is the way it stands, is it not?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just one
observation.
The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. On Exhibit No. 4 which was offered in evidence there
is a statement "Record of early flights December 7, 1941, obtained
by Opana detector", and then the signature of Lieutenant Colonel
Murphy.
On the exhibit which the gentleman from Michigan questioned
the witness about there is a notification "Opana detector" and then
some word that is illegible, "Record of early flights", [4^^] and
then a notation which would seem to bear the initials of some other
witness.
172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[416] So this record, Exhibit 4, is of the early flights, and this
other notation by someone else appeal's not to be on the record in
question, and I wish the witness would find out what the last of this
notation on the lower right-hand corner of exhibit 3-B is, so we might
see what the difference between the two exhibits is.
Colonel Thielen. I will endeavor to find that out, sir. I learned
that my researchers are familiar with that, consulted radar experts
on it, and determined that it was generally illegible.
The Chairman. All right. Any further questions ?
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, may I ask for information from
Admiral Inglis 'i He has been very accommodating up to now. I
want to follow up the naval strength in both the Pacific and Atlantic.
I have in my hands a rough draft of what I would like to see in
the record in tlie form of a chart. It asks for the strength of the Ger-
man Navy as of May 1, additions from the then Vichy France, the
Italian strength, and for the augmentation from Axis, Allies, or from
other sources.
Then, in the last column, the total naval strength from all sources
in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
I ask for that same information as of December 7, 1941.
Then, information to the same effect of Japanese strength [4-?^]
as of May 1, 1941, and as of December 7, 1941, in the Pacific, and for
American strength in the Pacific with Allied augmentation both in
respect to the Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet.
If you can have that prepared. Admiral, and insert it in the record
of today's proceedings, I would appreciate it very much. But if that
is too short a time, I hope you can get it in by Monday.
Mr. Mitchell. We will hand it to the Navy Department.^
Admiral Inglis. We can have it ready for you by Monday, I am
afraid we cannot by today.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Have you concluded, Mr. Gearhart?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I ask now to put into evidence
these two exhibits that I handed to the witness for identification, and
I ask now that they be part of the record.
Mr. Counsel, will you tell us what numbers they will be ?
Mr. Mitchell. I will mark them as soon as I have them.
Senator Ferguson. So they will get the correct numbers.
Mr, Gesell. One of them is already in evidence.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you want them both ? We already have [4^8]
one.
Senator Ferguson. Just the large one.
Mr. Mitchell. At the request of Senator Ferguson, the document
he has produced, which for identification has on it the words "Exhibit
3-B in evidence," apparently from some earlier proceedings, is now
marked Exhibit 7, and offered in evidence.
The Chairman. All right.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 7.")
The Chairman. Any further questions?
The Vice Chairman. Mr, Chairman, in fairness to myself, as a
member of the committee, I just simply want to say I do not share the
views expressed or the remarks made to the admiral who has been
' Admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 86.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 173
appearing before us as a witness. I think both of these gentlemen
have acquitted themselves with great credit and distinction, and are a
distinct credit to the great services they represent.
The Chairman. Counsel will proceed now with anything further
he has.
Senator Lucas. I would like to make a statement along the same
line as Mr. Cooper.
The Chairman. Let me suggest that these two witnesses will be
here for a while longer and at the conclusion of their testimony, it
might be appropriate to have a testimonal [4^9] meeting with
respect to the opinions of the committee with regard to this very
testimony.
Senator Lucas. I want to be the first one to testify when the testi-
monial meeting starts.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to join in that too.
The Chairman. The Chairman wants to be in that too. Go ahead.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Inglis, one question. You spoke about
Jap submarines entering Pearl Harbor. Are you referring to the
midget submarines, so-called ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Not the large seagoing submarines?
Admiral Inglis. Not the large seagoing submarines; no, sir.
Mr, Mitchell. As to those midget submarines, what does the record
show as to how many men were in the crew ?
Admiral Inglis. I believe they were manned by a crew of two men —
that is, two persons, I should say.
Mr. Mitchell. A very small vessel?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, I ask you if you have brought here,
at my request, all of the documents in the Navy from Japanese sources
relating to the Japanese account of the attack at Pearl Harbor?
[4^0'] Admiral Inglis. Substantially everything except the
communication intelligence material which I believe counsel has from
other sources and not from me.
The Chairman. A little louder. We could not hear the last remark.
(The answer was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Mitchell. I do not understand, I thought you produced here
all of the material from Jap sources which have made any disclosure
as to what they did in respect to this attack.
Admiral Inglis. I wanted to be quite meticulous.
Mr. Mitchell. You mean the espionage documents, do you?
Admiral Inglis. I mean the material you referred to as cryptic
analytical.
Mr. Mitchell, Yes.
Admiral Inglis, I think you have that. You did not get it from me,
Mr. Mitcpiells That is right. Now, let us look at this material
and see what it is. I hand you a bundle of loose sheets in the Japanese
language. What is that ?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, does the record show clearly when
counsel received these papers? Have you made clear on the record
when you received these papers, counsel ?
[^i] Mr. Mitchell, I think T received tliese original docu-
ments within the last 24 hours,
79716 — 46— pt. 1 14
174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
i^enator Ferguson. About when did you get them ?
Mr, Mitchell. You mean the exact hour ?
Senator Ferguson. When? There are two sets of them and I
would just like to know when counsel got them.
Mr. Mitchell. My assistants says these documents reached me ap<
proximately 2 p. m. yesterday afternoon.
Senator Ferguson. Two p. m. yesterday afternoon.
Has counsel had time to examine each one of them ?
Mr. Mitchell. We went over them in a rough way. 1 have not
spent much time on this document in the Japanese language, but we
thought we would get back to the original source here.
Senator Ferguson. Did they give you translations?
Mr. Mitchell. They are in the papers here.
Senator Ferguson. They are among the papers ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. May I ask him about what these are, Senator ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. I do not know.
Mr. Mitchell. I want you to know.
What is this document, this bundle of photostats here in the Jap-
anese language ? Will you state generally what that is ?
Admiral Inglis. There are photostat copies of two docu- [^v"^^]
ments in the Japanese language which my translators inform me are
Japanese top secret operation orders No. 1 and No. 2.
Mr. Mitchell. That is a staff plan, do you mean, a staff order?
Admiral Inglis. It is a plan and an order, in effect.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you look over these other documents and just
generally describe what they are.
Admiral Inglis. This first one I have is a translation of a captured
document; the title is "Submarine School Notes Concerning Early
War Experiences Off Hawaii."
Senator Ferguson. Could I inquire from counsel when counsel re-
quested these documents from the Navy?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think these particular documents I asked
him to bring in here sometime jj-esterday, because I understood the
c^ommittee wanted all the original material on which any testimony
was based.
Senator Ferguson. I understand it has not been requested by coun-
sel prior to yesterday.
Mr. Mitchell. We had the operational order in English, the trans-
lation of it, but I did not have the Japanese rendition, if that is
what you mean. I had a translation of it for some days, I think.
Senator Lucas. You should have translated them right, ]Mr.
Mitchell.
[4^3] Mr. INIiTCHELL. I could not swear to that.
Senator Lucas. I know there are going to be a lot of questions
about that.
]\Ir. Mitchell. I do not suppose anybody can settle that question.
Will you go on, Admiral — if I may proceed uninterruptedly.
The Chairman. Yes, go ahead, gentlemen.
Admiral Inglis. Are you ready, sir?
Mr. Mitchell. All right. Go head.
Admiral Inglis. The next dociuneiU is entitled "Translation of a
Captured Japanese Document. The professional notebook of an
ensign in the Japanese Navy," The date is February 25, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 175
Perhaps I should go back to the second document and say that the
date on that is January 12, 1941.
The next document that I have is dated March 2, 1943. The subject
is Kuboaki, Takeo. Tliat is obviously the name of a Japanese.
"Superior class engineer petty officer, interrogation of," That is the
subject.
[4-"34] The next document that I have is entitled "Japanese Sub-'
marine Operations at Pearl Harbor." This is an evaluation prepared
by intelligence officers.
Mr, Keefe. Jap intelligence officers ?
Admiral Inglis. United States intelligence officers.
The next document is entitle;! 'Tntelligence Report." The subject
is "Japan Navy submarines." The date on this is April 22, The
vear is not given. It might be deduced, however, that the year is
i944.
The next document is 16 August 194-3. It is marked "Interrogation
Report No, 148 of Yokota, S." Yokota is the family name and S
the initial of the given name.
The next document is entitled "United States Pacific Fleet and
Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December
1944."
The next document is dated 30 June 1943. The subject is "ICPOA
Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 472, Submarine
School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences off Hawaii.
'TCPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No.
473, Instructions to the Yatsumaki Butai."
"ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemj'- Documents, Item No.
474, Places of Military Importance in the Kurile Islands."
The next document is dated 25 July 1945, Translation [4^S]
No. 290. Subject, "The Southern Cross by Kuramoti, Iki", Kuramoti
being the family name and Iki the given name.
The next document is a translation of combined fleet top seci-et
operation order No, 1,
Mr. Mitchell. Is that a translation of the Jap script we have here,
or is supposed to be?
Admiral Inglis. This is a translation of the Japanese script. I
am informed by my translators that there are a few corrections which
they feel should be made in this document here, and those corrections
will be produced at the proper time.
We haven't got the photostatic copies now.
The next document is entitled, "Enemy Lists of Sorties by Sub-
carried Planes." There is no date on this. Its precise source is not
indicated.
The next document is a memorandum dated October 13, 1945,
addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the fifth Marine
Amphibious Corps. The subject is "Prewar Espionage in the
Hawaiian Island," and it pertains to an interview with Yoshio
Shiga, lieutenaut commander. Imperial Japanese Navy. In this
case Yoshio is the given name and Shiga is the family name. That
memorandum is signed by Robert N. Tate, special agent of the
Counter-intelligence Corps, attached to the Four Hundred Ninety-
sixth CIC Detachment of the Fifth Marine Division, and contains
several endorsements through official channels, sliowing its [4^^]
176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
receipt in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations yesterday, No-
vember 16. I believe counsel ought to have the copy, which is not
included in these papers, of reports submitted by the General Head-
quarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, from
headquarters at Tokyo.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. At this point I will read into the record
a paraphrase of a message dated October 6, 1945, from the Secretary
of War to General MacArthur, as follows :
The War Department has been requested to provide the joint congressional
committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack vpith information concerning
the attack available in Japanese files and records, to include Japanese agencies
involved or informed of plans, date the attack was first planned, sources and
nature of information on which plans and operation based, details of plans as
they developed, composition of attack force, Japanese losses, routes followed by
attack force before and after attack, and Japanese Ivnowledge of damage inflicted.
Request suitable measures be taken to obtain above information. Advise by
cable information now available, steps open to you to obtain desired material with
estimate of time required, summary of additional information as available. Air
mail pertinent documents.
Now in response to that message the AVar Department has produced
three documents: One, cables from General MacArthur, [4^'/]
dated the 14th of October — this is a preliminary report — and a further
detailed report dated October 26, 1945.
Then you just spoke of another one. That last one came in last
night, that was a Navy report, is that right?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. That came from the Marines
through Navy channels.
Mr. MiTciTELL. Have you had this report from General MacArthur's
headquarters in this message before you ?
Adniiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And examined that ?
Admiral Inglis. Y^es, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now the War Department handed me last night, or
early this morning, another message from General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. That means General
MacArthur, Tokyo. That is dated November 8, 1945. Have you
examined that?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, we have also examined that.
Mr. Mitchell. How would you classify this material, as to the type
of material it is? First there is an operational order and other
captured documents from the Japs, is that it ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you have also a number of documents recording
interviews of captured Japanese prisoners ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
[4^8] Mr. Mitchell. Then you have the report from General
MacArthur?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, and those are interviews of Japa-
nese officers who were not in the status of prisoners of war.
Mr. Mitchell. Is there anything else in that file that is classified
in a different way, that you can think of ?
Admiral Inglis. The only remaining item is the report which
originated with the Marine detachment and which was forwarded
through Navy channels, and that is largely the interrogation of Lieu-
tenant Commander Shiga, Imperial Japanese Navy.
Mr. Mitchell. Is not he a prisoner of war ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 177
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; he is in more or less the same category as
the others, an officer v\ho was interviewed after VJ-day.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. That is the document that came in last night, isn't
it?
Admiral Inglis. That is the document that came in last night.
Mr. Mitchell. Now previous to the receipt of that document, and
the one of November 8 from General Macx^rthur, have you prepared
a summary digest of these documents ?
Admiral Inglis. I had, sir. I would like to add to my [4^9]
answer to your former question that this last document which has just
been presented, the one that was received last night
ilr. Mitchell. By the Navy?
Admiral Inglis. Through Navy sources, through Navy channels —
also contains an endorsement, or rather a carbon copy of an endorse-
ment from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, which
pertains to some investigations we have made out there, in an effort
t o corroborate or contradict some of the testimony of this Lieutenant
Commander Shiga.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, since the receipt of these last tAvo documents
tliat came through Navy sources and Army sources within the last
few hours, have v'ou gone through them to see whether your digest
requires any additions?
Admiral Inglis. I have, sir; and it does require some substantial
clianges and additions. ,
Mr. Mitchell. Have you made those ?
Admiral Inglis. I have, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You had to do that last night and this morning, is
that correct ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And you have already put in motion mimeographic
machines so that copies of them may be supplied?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now I would like to ask the Admiral if [4301
you will please give your digest of these original documents that you
have there. '
Admiral Inglis. I w^ould like to say, first of all, that throughout
this presentation which is to follow, the dates will be expressed in
Japanese time. Thus the date of the attack will be given as Decem-
ber 8, which is Japanese time, rather than December 7, which is
Hawaiian time. Wherever I deviate from that practice I will
specifically so state, as I proceed.
With respect to that difference, we should add 191^ hours to Hon-
olulu time in order to get Tokyo time; we should add 51^ hours to
Honolulu time in order to get Washington time, and we should adtl
14 hours to Washington time in order to get Tokyo time.
I would also like to make the preliminary comment that some of
the phraseology used in this presentation may sound a little strange
to American ears. That is because of peculiar Japanese usage, where
the Japanese are directly quoted.
The first item concerns the formulation of the plan for the attack
on Pearl Harbor. It is reported that a surprise attack
Mr. Mitchell (interposing). When you say "it is reported" you
mean it is disclosed in tliese documents? Is that what 5''ou mean?
[4^1] Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. That expression
178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"it is reported" is used advisedly, to indicate that it has not been con-
firmed by other sources, and we cannot guarantee its accuracy. All
we have is the report.
Mr. Mitchell. You are not guaranteeing the Japs?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
[4^2] It is reported that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was
originally conceived and proposed in the first part of January 1941 by
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief combined fleet, who,
at that time, ordered Rear Adm. Takijiro Onishi, then chief of staff
of the Eleventh Air Fleet, to study the operation. In the latter part
of August 1941, Admiral Yamamoto ordered all fleet commanders and
other ke}^ staff members to Tokyo for war games preliminar}^ to a
final formulation of operation plans for a Pacific campaign which in-
cluded a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. A war plans conference was
lield continuously at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2
to September 13. On September 13 an outline containing essential
points of a basic operation order, which was later to be issued as Com-
bined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, was completed. This
operation order, which included detailed plans for the surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor, was promulgated to all fleet and task force command-
ers on November 5. 1941. Therefore, this date, November 5, 1941, is
to be regarded as the date on which the plan for the attack on Pearl
Harbor was completed.
Operation orde^- No. 1 under heading of "Preparations for the Out-
break of War" states that —
When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders
will be WS] issued establishing the approximate date (Y-Day) for
commencement of operations and announcing "First Preparations for War."
That completes that quotation.
The operation order continues to say that —
The time for the Outbreak of War (X-Day) will be given in an Imperial General
Headquarters Order.
The details of the plan of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as set forth
in operation order No. 1, were worked out by members of the naval
general staff operations feection, combined fleet operations staff and
first air fleet operations staff.
III. Determination of December 8 as day of attack; under elate of
November 7, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto issued combined fleet top se-
cret operation order No. 2 saying "First preparations for war. Y-day
will be December 8." In accordance with the definition of Y-day as
given in operation order No. 1, this establishes December 8 onl}^ as the
approximate date for commencement of operations. An Imperial
naval order issued from the Imperial general headquarters under date
of December 2, 1941 states :
The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on
8 December.
This order is in effect the announcement of X-clay as defined in
operation order No. 1. Thus it becomes apparent that the tentative
approximate elate for the attack [^■^4] selecteel on November 7
and defined as Y-day is reafiirmed on December 2 as X-clay. In other
words, the original tentative date — Y-day — and the final precise
elate — X-day — are in fact the same date.
Mr. Mitchell. That is December 7, our time?
Admiral Inglis. The date of attack is December 7.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 179
Mr. Mitchell. You explained in the beginning that Japanese times
were given, but to just point it up, I am asking if that December 8 was
December 7 Honohilu time.
Admiral Inglis. That is correct. Unless I make some parentheti-
cal, all times will be Tokj^o time.
To repeat, in other words, the original tentative date — Y-day — and
the final precise date — X-day — are, in fact, the same date.
In discussions prior to November 7, the Imperial headquarters navy
section generally recognized December 8 as suitable from an opera-
tional standpoint and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders
of the combined fleet. For a dawn attack in the Hawaiian area in
December, the 10th would have been suitable from the standpoint of
the dark of the moon.
Mr. Mitchell. That you are taking from the documents; it is
Japanese opinion?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct. This is all oriented [4^5]
to the Japanese point of view.
However, it was expected that the United States Pacific Fleet, in
accordance with its custom during maneuvers, would enter the harbor
on Friday and leave on Monday — Hawaiian dates.
That is Friday and Monday, Hawaiian dates.
Therefore, Sunday — Hawaiian date — was decided on. In order to
assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the
take-off time of the attacking planes was to be set as near to dawn
as possible — approximately 1 hour after sunrise.
Here I come to the deviation from the original script.
Mr. Mitchell. A deviation resulting from these last documents?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct.
The following statement is made by a Japanese officer pilot who
participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor :
On October 5, 1941, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the carriers,
aboard the Akayi in Shibushi Bay, by the chief of staff of the carriers. Rear
Admiral Rynosuke Kosaka. About 100 attended. They were told, very secretly,
that on "December 1941 (Japan time), a Japanese naval air force would strike
the American Fleet at Hawaii." Grand Admiral of the Japanese Navy, Isoi-aku
Yamamoto, also addressed the group, saying that, "Although Japan never wanted
to fight Uo6'\ the United States, they were forced to because they would
be defeated regardless, if the United States continued its aid to China and its oil
embargo. The United States Fleet," he said, "was Japan's strongest enemy, so
if they could strike it unexpectedly at Hawaii it would be 2 or "S months before it
could maneuver. By that time occupation of Borneo, the Philippines, Singapore.
Java, and Sumatra would be complete."
The next title has to do with the date of leaving port.
It is reported that on or about November 14 CINC of the combined
fleet ordered the units of the Pearl Harbor attacking force to assemble
in Hitokappu Bay.
Commander Biard, will you point to Hitokappu Bay? That is the
Island of Etorofu.
It is further reported that about November 21 the situation seemed
to be approaching a stage where commencement of hostilities were
inevitable. The navy section of the Imperial general headquarters
therefore issued the following order :
The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to
advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station
Ihem in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such [JfSl]
that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet the
situation promptly.
180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I would like to say at this time that upon introducing the subject
of "Date of leaving port," I went back to the original script as pre-
' pared a few days ago.
On November 25 the commander in chief, combined fleet, issued the
following order to the striking force, which had, since November 22,
been assembled at Hitokappu Bay.
(a) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining
close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters
and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United
States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first aid raid is planned
for dawn of X-day — exact date to be given by later order.
Upon completion of the air raid the task force, keeping close coordination
and guarding against enemy counter attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters
and then return to Japan.
(b) Should it appear certain that Japanese- American negotiations will reach
an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the
forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their
bases.^
[^38] (c) The task force shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of
November 26 and advance to 42° N. and 170° E. — standing by position — on the
afternoon of December 4, Japan time, and speedily complete refueling.
Commander Biard, will you point to that position?
The actual time of departure was 9 : 00 a. m., November 26, Japan
time — 1 : 30 p. m., November 25, Hawaii time.
V. Date of instructions to execute plan : Combined fleet top secret
operation order No. 2, issued by Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in-
chief of the combined fleet, and dated November 7, 1941 is the basic
order or instruction to execute the detailed plan for the attack on
Pearl Harbor.
On December 1 the Cabinet Council approved the commencement of
hostilities against the United States. On the same day, an Imperial
naval order issued on instruction by the Imperial general headquarters
stated :
Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached
a position (sic) to declare war on the United States of America.
On December 2 an Imperial naval order issued under instruction
from the Imperial general headquarters stated :
The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced
on December 8.
There is no copy of this order available nor is there conclusive evi-
dence that [4^9] it constitutes the formal X-day order re-
ferred to in operations order No. 1. Its .effect, however, is clearly
equivalent to the final determination of a specific time for the outbreak
of the war, and it may be regarded therefore as a final determination
of X-day.
VI. Details of plan: Hitokappu Bay was selected as the point of
departure from Japan because it was recognized as the most suitable
place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new developments
in the situation as well as to keep its location and movements secret.
In formulating final plans, it was decided that a torpedo attack
against anchored ships in Pearl Harbor was the most effective method
^ See p. 205, infra, for correction by Adm. Inglis.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 181
of putting the main strength of the United States Pacific Fleet in the
Hawaii area out of action for a long period of time. The following
two obstacles were considered :
(a) The fact that Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow.
(b) The fact that Pearl Harbor was probably equipped with torpedo
nets.
In regard to point (a) it was planned to attach stabilizers to the
torpedoes and launch thean from an extremely low altitude.
In regard to point (b), since success could not be [44-01
counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.
I must deviate again from the text prepared the other day and
refer to this last source received just yesterday.
Evidence indicates that as late as 29 November — Japan time —
the Japanese force expected to find six United States carriers in
Hawaiian waters; they were aware that the U. S. S. Saratoga was,
in late November, on the west coast of the United States and also
that the U. S. S. Enterpiise would be "two or three days out of the
attack." On 31 November, Japan time, when the striking force was
well out to sea, it received a report that only one or two carriers were
in Pearl Harbor. On December 6, Japan time, word was received
that no carriers were in Pearl Harbor, but that 8 battleships and 15
cruisers were in the harbor. At a briefing, which took place on or
about December 5, Japan time, each pilot was furnished a photograph
of a map of Pearl Harbor on which each pilot made notes on courses,
anchorage areas, or missions.
Now I return to the script of 2 or 3 days ago.
Three courses were considered for the Hawaii operation : The
northern course which was actuall}'^ used, a central course which
headed east following the Hawaiian Islands, and a southern route
passing through the Marshall Islands and approaching from the south.
[44i] Commander Biard, would you roughly indicate those
three routes ?
That would be the northern route (following Commander Biard's
pointer), that would be the central route, through the Mandated Is-
lands and the Hawaiian chain and the southern group just out of the
Mandated Islands, up to Hawaii.
On the northern route, although it Avas far from the enemy, United
States, patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little
chance of meeting- commercial vessels, the influences of weather and
topography were important. Refueling at sea and navigation were
difficult. On the central and southern routes the advantages and dis-
advantages were generally just the opposite to those of the northern
route. Although it may be assumed tliat the central and southern
routes would be preferable for the purposes of refueling at sea, the
chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the
routes lie near Wake, Midway, Palmyra, Johnston Islands, and so
forth. Consequently, it was hardl}^ expected that a surprise attack
could be made. The ability to refuel and the necessity of surprise
were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed, the execution
of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling
problem could be overcome by training. On tlie other hand, a surprise
attack under all circumstances could not be as- [44-^] sured by
Japanese strength alone. Therefore, the northern route was selected.
182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
By routing the striking force to pass between Midway and the
Aleutians, it was expected to pass outside the patrol zones of United
States patrol planes. Moreover, screening destroyers were sent ahead
of the fleet, and in the event any vessels were encountered the main
body of the force would make a severe change of course and endeavor
to avoid detection. If the striking force had been detected prior to
X-2-clay, it was planned to have the force return without executing
the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-l-clay, the ques-
tion of whether to make an attack or to return would have been de-
cided in accordance with the local conditions. If the attack had failed,
it was planned to send the main force in the Island Sea out to the
Pacific in order to bring in the task force.
I would like to remark again, that this is Japanese phraseology^
and may api^ear a little strange in its reasoning processes.
Returning now to the prepared script, item 7 is entitled "Sources
of data used in planning the Pearl Harbor attack were as follows."
These sources — I am speaking now from the point of view of the
Japanese — were :
[44^] (A) American public broadcasts from Hawaii.
(B) Reports of Japanese naval attaches in "Washington, D. C.
(C) Reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters prior to the
attack. A Japanese pilot states that at no time were visual land sig-
nals used from Hawaii.
(D) Information obtained from ships which had called at Hawai-
ian ports in mid-November.
Those are the onh' four sources which the Japanese have admitted.
We know, however, that there is a fifth source :
(E) Espionage network in Hawaiian Islands, being uncensored
cable communications with Japan.
That last is from an American source, not from the Japanese source.
Mr. Keefe. Under (C), with respect to signals, I didn't quite catch
that. It doesn't appear here.
Admiral Inglis. I beg your pardon. I am glad you brought that up.
That last sentence "a Japanese pilot states" came from this last source
which we just received last night. That was a change in the script.
Mr. Keefe. That will be included in the mimeographed corrected
statement which we will receive later ?
Admiral Inglis. That is right.
The Vice Chaikman. And that goes under what? .
[444] Admiral IxGLis. Under source (C).
Now, again I must deviate from the original script and quote this
last document which was just received yesterday.
A Japanese oflBcer pilot lias reported his belief "that information concerning all
movements of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor was transmitted to the fleet
through coded messages broadcast over a Honolulu commercial broadcasting
station." Source was certain "that there was a Hawaiian Nisei" — a second-
generation American of Japanese descent — "who was a Japanese naval officer,
aboard the flagship Akagi, whose specific job was listening to these broadcasts
and decoding them." Source said "that in his opinion the codes were many and
varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast the German attache lost one
dog, it might mean that a carrier left Pearl Harbor. If the German attachi6
wanted a cook or houseboy, it might m.ean that a battleship or cruiser had entered
the harbor."
Source states "that the information was conveyed on radio programs just
following the news broadcasts, which he stated were at 6: 30 a. m., 12 noon, and
7 p. m. He was prone to think that time following the 7 p. m., broadcast was
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 183
used since the Japanese agents would then have had an opportunitj- to convey
information concerning a whole day's activities.
[44-5] I would like to say at this time that the endorsement which
the authorities at Hawaii, the FBI, ONI, and MIS, have placed on this
Last document indicates that they cannot find any substantiation for
this plan to use Honohdu commercial broadcasting stations to convey
information to the Japanese task force. They also pointed out that
this procedure would not have been necessary since the Japanese
consul, who was the center of the espionage network, had full access
to a direct connection via cable uncensored directly from Honolulu
to Tokyo.
That completes the deviation from the original script, and I return
now to item 8, which is "Details of execution."
[440] VIII. Details of execution: Study of the Japanese plan
of operation indicates the Japanese high command made the follo\v-
-ing assumptions with regard to the United States Fleet :
(a) That the main body of the United States Pacific Fleet would be
at anchor within Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Sunday, Hawaii
time.
(b) That a carrier force could be moved from home waters across
the Pacific to within striking distance of the main islands of the
Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by Americar
defensive reconnaissance.
(c) That should assumptions (a) or (h) be in error, a reserve grouj)
of heavy naval units could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support
to the carrier striking force in a decisive engagement with the American
Fleet. The other task forces of the Japanese Fleet (southern force,
northern force, and the south seas force) would be available for this
purpose. Implied in the plan is the assumption that, in the event of
such an engagement, the combined strength of the bulk of available
Japanese major fleet units would be sufficient to defeat the American
Fleet.
(d) A powerful carrier air strike directed against the American
forces based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were efi!ected, achieve
the strategic result of crippling the American Fleet; that such a
strike would achieve also the [44'^] destruction of American
land-based air power and thus permit the Japanese striking force to
withdraw without damage.
The omission from the Japanese plans of provision for landings on
Oahu was decided upon during discussions held on September 6 and 7
when operation order No. 1 was being put together. It was, decided
that no landing operation should be included because it would have
been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than
a month after the opening of hostilities; it was further recognized
that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy
would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could be ac-.
complished without detection; it was further recognized that insuper-
able logistic problems rendered landings on the island impractical.
The complete plan of the Pearl Harbor attack was known in advance
to members of the Navy General Staff, the commanders in chief and
Chiefs of Staff, and staff members of the combined fleet headquarters
and first air fleet headquarters. Part of the plan w-as known in advance
to the Navy Minister, Navy Vice Minister, and other ranking naval
officers.
184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It is also reported — again I use that expression advisedly — it is also
reported that the Emperor knew in advance onl^'^ the general outline
of the plan and that none of the Japaneses officials who were in the
United States, including [44^] Ambassadors Nomura and
Kurusu, knew anything about the plan in advance.
Parenthetically again, that last sentence, referring to the knowledge
or lack of knowledge of the Emperor and Nonnira and Kurusu, is only
based on a single report purely from recollection of a Japanese officer.
[44^] The aims of the entire Japanese campaign, including the
attack on Pearl Harbor, were predicated on the desire for military
conquest, security', and enhancement of the Empire by occupation of
areas rich in natural resources. With regard to the Pearl Harbor
attack, operation order No. 1 says that :
In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of opera-
tion, and supply lines to the Orient, will be out. Enemy forces will be inter-
cepted and annihilated. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will
to fight.
Since the American Fleet and air power based in the Hawa^iian
area were the only obstacles of consequence, a major task force built
around a carrier striking group was considered essential to conducting
a successful surprise attack. Accordingly, the following allocation of
forces for the Pearl Harbor attack was made :
Refer now, please, to item 17 in the Navy folder, which gives the
composition of the forces in some detail.. I will summarize by saying
that it consisted of :
Striking force: Commanding Officer: CinC 1st Air Fleet, Vice
Admiral Chuichi Nagnmo.
[4S0] BatDiv 3 ( 1st Section) (Hiei, Kirishima) , 2 BB.
CarDiv 1 (Kaga) (Akagi).
CarDiv 2 (Hiryu, Soryu).
CarDiv 5 (Shokaku, Zuikaku) , 6 CV.
CruDiv 8 (Tone, Chikuma) , 2 CA.
DesRon 1 ( Abukuma, 4 DesDivs) , 1 CL, 16 DD.
11 train vessels.
ADVANCE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Commanding Officer: CinC 6th Fleet, Vice Admiral Mitsumi
Shimizu.
Isuzu, Yura, 2 CL.
Katori, 1 CL-T.
I-cla*s submarines (including SubRons 1, 2, 3), 20 SS.
(I-l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 68, 69, 74)
Midget submarines, 5 M-SS.
6 train vessels.
Of the 11 train vessels allotted to the striking force only 3 tankers
and 1 supply ship actually accompanied the force. In addition, 3
submarines of the advance expeditionary force accompanied the strik-
ing force, the other submarines having proceeded from the Inland
Sea independently of the striking force.
The striking force departed Hitokappu Bay at 9 a. m., November 26,
and in accordance with orders from CinC Combined [4^ J]
Fleet, proceeded to its destination 200 miles due north of Oahu. It
was fueled en route.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 185
At this time I would like to pause to advise the committee that the
reproduction of this chart to which Commander Biard is pointing is'
included in the Navy folder as item 18.
On leaving the harbor, the striking force was joined by three sub-
marines which, with several of the destroyers, took station as scouting
screen. Held down by the low speed of the train vessels and the )ieed
for fuel economy, the force cruised eastward at 13 knots. Lookouts
were posted but no searches or combat air patrols were flown. It had
been anticipated that North Pacific weather would cause difficulty in
refueling at sea and those ships whose capacity in relation to consump-
tion was small were loaded with oil in drums for emergency use.
Now, off the script, the next paragraph is modified somewhat by this
document which we just received yesterday through the naval channels.
The weather, however, proved unifoi-mly calm, and fueling from the
tankers was carried out as planned. A participating pilot states that
the weather was foggy part of the time. On or about December 2, all
ships were darkened and condition two (second degree of readiness,
gun crews stationed) was set.
That condition of readiness was set about December 2.
\4S"2] On December 4, Japan time, the rendezvous point (42° W.,
170° E.) was reached and the combat ships of the force fueled to capac-
ity from the tankers, which were dropped that night. The task force
t hen turned southeast, probably at increased speed. The carriers Iliiyn
and Soryu^ whose fuel capacity was small, had been oiled daily while
in company with the tankers and now had to be fueled by bucket
brigade from the oil drums taken on board. The cruise up to this date
had been uneventful; no sliii^s or planes had been sighted and no false
alarms had been sounded. When the force was 800 miles due north of
Hawaii, on December fi, Japan time, it received from the Japanese
Navy Department a radio message "Climb Mount Niitaka"; this was
the signal for the attack and the force proceeded south at 24 knots to its
destination. On the niglit of the 7-8th of December, Japan time, the
run in was made at top speed, 26 knots.
Again I would like to say that radio message concerning "Climb
Mount Niitaka" was derived from this last source which we just
received yesterday.
Returning now to the original script :
The problem of defeating enemy — United States — radio intelligence
was met by a program of deceptive traffic — false assumption of call
signs, padding of circuits, and so forth — to simulate the presence of a
striking force, carriers and carrier air groups {-k^S^ in the
Inland Sea. In contrast, no effort was made to mask the movements
or presence of the naval forces moving southward, because jjhysical
observation of that movement were unavoidable and the radio activity
of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of normalcy.
Again ad libbing, just to be sure that there is no misunderstanding;,
the movement southward that the Japanese are speaking of in this
connection was a movement of other forces from Japanese Empire
waters south toward the French-Indochina coast, and not the move-
ment of the task force, the Japanese task force, from its position 400
miles north of Hawaii to its position 200 miles north of Hawaii.
Returning to the script:
186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Upon arrival at their destination, 200 miles due north of Oahu, the
carriers of the striking force launched on schedule a total of 361 planes
in three waves, commencing at 6 a. m. and ending at 7 : 15 a. m,^
December 7, Hawaii time.
I might add here at this point, which is not in either script, the note
that I have : "It was planned that the force be protected during the
attack by a combat patrol of 18 fighters to be launched about 0545 — ■
5 : 45. That, presumably, is in addition to the 361 planes forming
the attack group.
Returning now to the script :
[4^41 The planes rendezvoused to the soutli and then flew in for
coordinated attacks. In addition to the attack planes launched at this
time, it was planned to launch two type Zero reconnaissance seaplanes
to execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage
just before the attack.
I must deviate again from the script which was distributed 2 or 3
days ago and say that from the source just received yesterday we
derived this additional information.
Apparently, one seaplane from a cruiser took off at about 0430
Hawaii time for observation purposes at 16,404 feet altitude.
Returning now to the original script :
Upon completion of the launchings, the force withdrew at high
speed, 26 or 27 knots, to the northwest. Plane recovery was effected
between 10 : 30 a. m. and 1 : 30 p. m., December 7, Hawaii time. The
striking force then proceeded by a circuitous route to Kure, arriving
December 23, Japan time. En route carrier division two — Hhyu,
Soryu — Cruiser Division Eight — Tone^ Chikuina — and two destroy-
ers— Tanikaze, Yurakaze — were detached on December 15, Japan time,
to serve as reinforcements for the Wake Island operation. Original
plans called for the retiring task force to strike at Midway if possible,
but, probably because of the presence of a United States task force
south of Midway, that strike was not made.
[^5] Until completion of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
by the striking force, the advance expeditionary force of submarines
was under command of the striking force commander. The precise
movements of the participating submarines are not known, but it is
believed that most of these units departed from home waters in late
November and proceeded to the Hawaiian area via Kwajalein; a few
of these submarines, delayed in leaving Japan, changed course and
proceeded directly to Hawaii.
The functions assigned to the submarines of the advance expedi-
tionary force were carried out as planned in operations order No. 1,
namely:
{a) Until X-3 some of the submarines were to reconnoiter impor-
tant points in the Aleutians, Fiji, and Samoa, and were to observe and
report on any strong American forces discovered.
{h) One element was assigned to patrol the route of the striking
force in advance of the movement of that force to ensure an unde-
tected approach.
{c) Until X-5 the remaining submarines were to surround Hawaii
at extreme range while one element approached and reconnoitered
without being observed.
PROCEEDINCS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 187
(d) On X day the submarines in the area ^ere to —
observe and attack the American Fleet in tlie Hawaii area; make a surprisf
attack on the channel leading into Pearl Harbor and attempt to close it; if tlie
enemy moves out to fight, he will [-^56] be pursued and attacked.
During the evening of December 7 (the day before the actual at-
tack), the force of I class submarines took up scouting positions in
allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of Pearl
Harbor; these submarines were ordered not to attack until the task
force strike was verified.
Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, 5 midget submarines
were launched from specially fitted fleet submarines as a special at-
tacking force to conduct an offensive attack against American ships
within the harbor and to prevent the escape of the American Fleet
through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air strike. Avail-
able data indicates that only one of the five midget submarines pene-
trated into the harbor; it inflicted no damage on American units and
none of the five rejoined the Japanese force.
After the actual attack, the I class submarines maintained their
])artols in the Hawaiian area and at least one of the group (the 1-7)
launched its aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to
ascertain the status of the American fleet and installations. The op-
eration plan provided that, in the eveut of virtual destruction of the
American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, one submarine division or less would
be placed between Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic;
in fact, at least one submarine (the 1-17) was dispatched to the
[4^7] Oregon coast on or about December 14. One large subma-
rine (pilot rescue) was stationed east of Kaui.
That last also comes from this latest source, about the rescue sub-
marine stationed east of Kaui. Kaui is northwest of Oahu. I might
also say parenthetically that this is the first information we have
ever had that the Japanese used the submarine rescue tactics which
were later so successfully employed by our own forces.
The next subheading is "Projected Losses Compared with Actual
Losses."
During the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo,
from September 2 to 13, 1941, it was assumed that the Pearl Harbor
striking force would suffer the loss of one-third of its participating
units; it was specifically assumed that one Ahagi class carrier, and
one Soryu class carrier would be lost. No mention is made of prob-
able plane losses. A very slight expectation was held that some of
the five midget submarines would be retrieved but all midget sub-
marine ])ersonnel were prepared for death. The losses actually in-
curred were 27 aircraft and all of the 5 midget submarines.
The Japanese assessment of damage inflicted on the American forces
was made from reports of flight personnel upon their return and from
studies of photographs taken by flight personnel. No reconnaissance
planes were used during the [4-58^ attack to assess results, al-
though one plane was launched from a submarine for this purpose
well after the attack had been completed; one element of fighter
planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as pos-
sible to make observations. The official Japanese estimate of damage
inflicted and the contrastiug actual damage inflicted is as follows:
188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In this table I give material both from Japanese sonrces and Ameri-
can sources. In the left-hand table is the Japanese estimate. In the
right-hand table is the actual damage as reported from American
sources.
The Japanese estimated that they had suidv four battleships, two
cruisers, and one tanker.
Actually thej^ sank four battleships, a converted battleship, the
Utah, and also one mine layer, the Oghihi.
The Japs estimated that they had heavily damaged four battleships
and five cruisers.
Actually they had heavily damaged one battleship, two light
cruisers, three destroyers, and one repair ship.
The Japanese estimated that they had lightly damaged one battle-
ship. Actually they had slightly damaged three battleships.
I beg your pardon. Three battleships, one light cruiser, and one
aircraft tender.
The Japanese estimated that they had destroyed a total [45P]
of 450 aircraft. Actually they destroyed 92 Navy planes.
Perhaps the colonel can give the number of Army planes destroyed
and then we will have it all at this point.
Colonel Thielen. Yes ; we have some figures on that.
The Vice Chairman. You have 10.5 here, Admiral.
Admiral Inglis. You mean Navy planes?
The Vice Chairmax. One hundred and five Navy.
\I{60i\ Admiral Inglis. That figure of Navy damage has been
bandied about among my staff, and we have liad reports all the way
from something down in the 80's up to 136. The other day we gave as
our best estimate 105. We have revised that to our best estimate of 102.
Colonel TiiiELEX. Our figure was 96 Army planes lost, and I should
explain that is greater than the initial reports primarily because some
of the planes were cannibalized to put other aircraft in the air. But
the final figure is 96 Army planes lost as the result of enemy action.
Admiral Inglis. I think it is fair to state that the Japanese esti-
mated that they had destroyed 450 planes: that they actually de-
stroyed, in round numbers, 200 planes, perhaps a little less than 200.
Finally, it may thus be concluded that the Japanese estimate of
damage to United States ships was highly conservative, whereas their
estimate of damage to United States aircraft was grossly exaggerated.
Mr. Mitchell, Do you want to put up the map there. Admiral, that
shows the reconnaissance?
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I note the time, and before any
cross-examination, as far as we are coiicerned, we would wish to have
an opportunity to look at tlie exhibits, other than the Japanese lan-
guage ones — we would not be able to \_hGl\ I'ead thenu There
will perhaps be opportunity during the recess.
The Chairman, The Chair announced a while ago that we might run
to 1 o'clock. What is the wish of the committee ?
The Vice Chairman. Let us hear from counsel.
Mr. Mitchell, We are willing to stop or go on, as you please.
The Chairman, What is the desire of the committee with respect
to an afternoon session ?
Senator Brewster. I think we better go over to Monday morning.
Mr. MuEPHT, Mr, Chairman, might I suggest that the witness lias
not yet concluded his direct testimony.
Senator Brewster. He has completed the statement.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 189
Mr. Murphy. I understand counsel is now referring to some charts.
The Chairman. He had finished his statement.
Senator George. I suggest we go over to Monday.
The Chairman. He had finished reading his statement, whereupon
counsel was going to ask him some questions.
Admiral Inglis. I have just two more charts.
Senator Ferguson. Could we have counsel ask his questions and
then recess?
The Chairman. We can determine about the recess, but I [46'2'\
think in the meantime counsel should be permitted to conclude.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is what I mean.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Admiral Inglis. I would like, before concluding my direct state-
ment, to invite the attention of the committee to two charts, which
are also included in the folder which has been presented to you, in
reduced form.
The first one is an outline of the island of Oahu and shows the
track or path of the two attacking units. I think you can see by the
chart, without any great amount of explanation from me, the track
which the Japanese pilot reported that the attacking units took. That
is the first one there.
The first wave is on the left. It shows how it is split up into
several parts to attack various objectives.
Then, the other arrows, on the right, show the second wave. It
shows how it is split up to attack three different objectives.
Now, if we could have the other chart showing the searches.
That chart is item 19 in the folder, and the next is item 20 — I beg
your pardon. It is the other way around.
Mr. Murphy. In order to keep the record straight may it be noted
that the witness is now referring to item 20 in the Xavy folder.
Admiral Inglis. I have just completed referring to item 20.
[463] Item 19 is a reproduction of searches that Avere shown in
the previous testimony but now we have added to it, superimposed on
it, the track of the Japanese task force, and you will notice there is one
point where the track of the Japanese force overlaps a searched sector.
However, the best evidence that we have is that by the time the search
planes got out to that point the Japanese task force had left the area
and was on its way northwestward at high speed and no contact was
made.
That concludes my statement.
Mr. Gesell. One or two questions. Admiral, on the statement.
You stated that the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was com-
pleted on November 5, Jap time. I gather from that j^ou were talking,
at that point, about the war plan as opposed to the operational deci-
sion to put the plan into execution ; is tJiat right.
Admiral Ingijs. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gesell. In other words, by the 5th of November, Jap time, the
Japs had worked out how they were going to accomplish this attack,
but you did not mean to indicate that by that time they had reached a
decision of a final and binding nature to attack; is that correct.
Admiral Inglis. That is correct.
[464-] Mr. Gesell. Coming over to the order of November 25, to
which you referred I think on page 4 of your statement, where you said
the commander in chief of the combined fleet issued an order to the
79716 — 46 — pt. 1 15
190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
striking force, and directing your attention particularly to subpara-
graph B, which reads as follows :
Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an
amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action all the forces
of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.
I want to ask you whether there is any evidence in any of this mate-
rial that that order, and specifically the portion I just read, was ever
revoked by any Japanese authorities prior to the attack ?
Admiral Inglis. That order was not revoked. By inference it
might be perhaps assumed that the order to climb Mount Niitaka was,
in effect, a final firm commitment.
Mr. Gesell. And when was that order received, did you say, by the
striking force, to climb Mount Niitaka?
Admiral Ingijs. That was on the 6th of December Japanese time,
or the 5th of December United States time.
Mr. Gesell. Now, what time of day ; does your information disclose
what time of day ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
[465] Mr. Gesell. Will you point to the chart and indicate
approximately what distance from Pearl Harbor you would estimate
tliat the Japanese Fleet was at the time that order was received ^
Admiral Inglis. That will take a minute to figure out.
Mr. Gesell. All right.
The Vice Chairman: While we are waiting, could you spell that
name, the name of the mountain, for us?
Admiral Inglis. Niitaka. That is N-i-i-t-a-k-a.
The best estimate that I can make is the point where that track
intersects the 160 meridian.
Will you point to that, 160 west.
That is, necessarily, just pretty much of a guess, but I would say
that it was at about this location, where the Japanese striking force is
alleged to have received the message to climb Mount Niitaka.
Mr. Gesell. I didn't understand whether that message was pur-
ported to have come from Tokyo.
Admiral Inglis. We understood that message came from Tokyo.
Mr. Gesell. At the point you estimated the message was received
the striking force was about ready to start its direct run toward Oahu ;
is that correct ?
Admiral Inglis. Almost; yes, sir.
[466] Mr. Gesell. Now, with reference to the sources of data
used in planning by the Japanese. You stated that source "E," espio-
nage network in Hawaiian Islands, using uncensored cable communi-
cations with Japan, was a source which you had added from your
own knowledge of Jap sources ; is that not correct ?
Admiral Inglis. Not from my own personal knowledge but from
the United States records.
Mr. Gesell. You were referring, were you, to intercepted Japanese
messages concerning military installations, which were classified as
the "magic" material or the "ultra" material by the Navy and Army?
Admiral Inglis. The sources that I have indicated here are the
FBI and ONI. These are derived from investigation reports of our
agents in the Hawaiian area, not cryptanalytical material.
Mr. Gesell. I thought I understood you to use the word "crypt-
analytical" material vA\en discussing that paragraph?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 191
Admiral Inglis. Not intentionally. I said using uncensored cable
connnunications with Japan. That would be to forward the results
of the Japanese espionage. They would use uncensored cable com-
munications.
Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, we would like to direct the committee's
attention to Exhibit 2 at this time, which is already in evidence, con-
taining the Japanese messages concerning [467] military in-
stallations and ship movements, and particularly to the section con-
cerned with Hawaii. The committee will there see a series of messages
between Tokyo and Honolulu, some of them translated after December
7, mau}^ of them before, all of them concerned with the disposition of
the fleet in the harbor, the nature of the reconnaissance, questions as
to whether or not torpedo nets were down, the area in which the fleet
conducted its regular maneuvers, and other information of a direct
military espionage nature.
I think subsequent testimony will indicate that at least most of these
messages were sent by cable facilities from Hawaii to Tokyo or vice
versa.
The Chairmax. May I ask, do you mean commercial cable facilities?
Mr. Gesell. Commercial cable facilities ; yes, sir.
We. would like particularly to call attention to a message which
appears at page 117 under the heading of "Other Messages of Particu-
lar Interest," which indicates that on February 15, 1941, general no-
tification was sent out concerning the nature of the espionage data
that was wanted from various points by the Japanese authorities.
Now, you referred, Admiral, to "train vessels." What are "train
vessels?"
Admiral Inglis. Train vessels are what we call auxiliary [468]
types, such as tankers, supply ships, repair ships.
Mr. Gesell. Now, in discussing the actual activities of the Japanese
aircraft at the time of the commencement of the attack you stated that
the planes rendezvoused to the south and then flew in for coordinated
action. Did yoii mean to indicate by that that the planes came to Oahu
from points in the south ?
Admiral Inglis. By no means. Of course, this is Japanese language,
that I have been quoting, or translations of it, but the intent of that
statement was that the Japanese planes would rendezvous south of the
carriers v,'hich were north of Oahu, and then pi'oceed from that ren-
dezvous on farther south to Oahu itself.
Mr. Gesell. In other words, they would simply gather south of
where the carriers were, but still north of Oahu, to make their forma-
tion for the attack?
Admiral Inglis. Correct.
Mr. Gesell. As a matter of fact, your item No. 20 sketch indicates
plainly, does it not, that, at least according to those records, the planes
did come into Oahu from the north ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. I was somewhat puzzled by the time shown on item 20
and I wanted to see if you could verify those times with the times that
we have been discussing heretofore. The [469] times that
appeared on the radar maps that the committee has been considering
were, of course, all Hawaiian times, starting with the early pick-ups
at 6 and 7 o'clock.
192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, the times that appear on this map, if I read it correctly, say
3 : 10, 4 : 10, 3 : 20, 4 : 25, and some of the notes indicate other times in
about that area.
I wonder if you cohld reconcile that difference for us ?
Admiral Ixglis. As I understand it, this sketch is a reproduction of
one drawn bv the Japanese officer who was interrogated and the best
we can make out of that is that that time given was Tokyo time.
If you substract 191/2 hours from 3 : 10, that should convert it into
Hawaiian Honolulu time.
Senator Ferguson. What would that be, will counsel inquire ?
Mr. Gesell. I was going to make the computation. Senator.
Senator Brewster. It is on the map, I understand.
Admiral Inglis, Another way is to add 4^4 hours in 1 day. That
would make it at 7 : 40. That would make the figure on the left-hand
arrow 7 : 40 instead of 3 : 10.
Mr. Gesell. Where it appears as 3 :10, that was 7 : 40.
Admiral Inglis. That is the best we could make out of it; yes, sir.
[470] Mr. Gesell. Now, that somewhat closely coincides, does
it not, witli the information contained on the historical plot that we
have been discussing?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, it does.
Mr. Gesell. That showed that the planes were in fairly close to
the northern tip of the island by, I believe, 7 : 39?
Admiral Inglis. Right, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Now, this tract does not show any Japanese air activ-
ity earlier than 3 : 10 or 7 : 40, does it ?
Admiral Inglis. That tract does not, no, sir..
Mr. Gesell. Have you given in your statement all the information
which is available as to the preliminary scouting activities of Jap
planes prior to diis main flight that actually made the attack?
Admiral Inglis. I think we have quoted verbatim the statements
that these two pilots made.
Mr. Gesell. Now, with respect to the discussion of the submarine
movements — —
Admiral Inglis. Mr. Gesell, may I interrupt a minute ?
Mr. Gesell. Certainly.
Admiral Inglis. I don't think that I gave you a final definitive
answer to j^our question. My answer was that to the best of my
knowledge and belief we have quoted precisely the translations of
the statements made by the two pilots [4^^} and also, to the
best of my knowledge and belief, that is the only evidence which we
have.
Mr. Gesell. I did not mean to interrupt ; I am sorry.
Now, with respect to the disposition of the submarine forces which
you have considered, you reported that at least one body of the sub-
marines went to Hawaii via Kawajalein, did you not?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. That is in the Marshall group of islands, is it not ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Have you any information as to when those sub-
marines arrived in the areas of the Marshall Islands?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Mr. Gesell. In discussing whether or not midget submarines pene-
trated into the harbor you again indicated that your data pointed
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 193
to the fact that only one submarine had penetrated into the harbor
but that involved, did it not, the same qualitative judgments on your
part as have already been considered by the committee in connection
with your previous statement concerning submarines in the harbor?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. I have nothing to add re-
garding submarines than I stated in m}^ previous statement.
[472] Mr. Gesell. This is merely a repetition of your statement
on this score ?
Admiral Inglis. Tliat is right.
Mr. Gesell. Did the Japanese in any way report how many sub-
marines got in the harbor ?
iVdmiral Inglis. We have no such report.
Mr. Gesell. It is known, is it not, that none of the submarines re-
turned, none of the Jap submarines returned ?
Admiral Inglis. Tlie Japanese admit that.
The Chaerman. That is midgets.
Mr. Gesell. We are talking about the midget submarines.
The Chairman, That is right.
Admiral Inglis. The five midgets did not return,
Mr. Gesell. Now, you say that they were these midget submarines
from a mother ship. You mean that the small submarine was inside
a larger submarine, or just how did it work ?
Admiral Inglis. Those midget submarines are carried as a deck
load on the larger submarine,
Mr. Gesell. Under water or on the surface ?
Admiral Inglis. Under water or on the surface.
Mr, Gesell, In other words, the mother submarine can submerge
taking the midget submarines with it?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. Of course, with some loss of
military effectiveness because of the unusual [W3] load.
Mr. Geseix. Yes, I imagine so.
Now, I wanted to ask one question of you concerning the recon-
naissance map item which we had, oi^ which the track of the Jap strik-
ing force was presented.
You stated that there was one overlap of the radius sliown there,
I am not clear whether the reconnaissance as shown on that chart is
the actual distance flown by the reconnaissance airplanes or whether
it takes into account the visual reconnaissance which would be possible
from the end of the radius of a flight.
Do you understand what I mean ?
Admiral Inglis. I understand, what you mean and I am not clear
on that either,
Mr. Gesell. The question, of course, arises, if it is the former rather
than the latter, whether from the terminal points of the actual flight
it would have been possible to see the departing or incoming Jap
forces. I take it the incoming clearly no ; the question only relates to
the departing Jap forces.
Admiral Inglis. Of course, that is a highly speculative matter from
my point of view, as to just what the visibility was, what the altitude
of the planes was and how far they could see and I am afraid I cannot
answer that question except [4741 fo say again that no sight
contact was obtained,
Mr, Gesell, Could you, when you get to it, also let us know whether
the chart has charted the flight of the planes or whether it has taken
194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
into account the additional reconnaissance possible by eyesight from
the extremity of the reconnaissance?
Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the chart was only intended
to show the actual flifTht of the planes and not the extension because of
unj radius of visibility.
' Air. Gesell. Have you any opinion as to what the maximum area
of visibility might be ?
Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I cannot answer that.
Mr. Gesell. That would depend on the height of the planes and the
atmospheric condition at tlie time, I take it.
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gesell. As well as the eyesight of the pilots ?
Admiral Inglis. Correct.
Mr. Mitcpiell. Just one question, Admiral.
This reconnaissance we have just been talking about on the vertical
lines was the reconnaissance made after the attack in an effort to locate
the carriers ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. The horizontal lines west of Pearl Harbor represent
the only reconnaissance, I understand, that was li^S^ made on
the 7th, prior to the attack?
Admiral Inglis. Tliat is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And that reconnaissance, whether you can see 50
miles beyond the liniits of the plane's flight, was obviously nowhere
near the Jap fleets or the Jap carriers or the incoming planes?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I think that is all.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Mitchell, I wonder if you would inquire from
the witness what the initials "GMT" mean in connection with time ?
Mr. Mitchell. Greenwich meridian time; over in England some-
where.
Mr. Gearhart. Of course.
Mr. Mitchell. That is the starting point of all time.
Mr. Gesell. Congressman, you will find all times transposed from
tliat base in one of the schedules in the Navy folder.
Mr. Gearhart. I see the exhibit here. In one of the items here they
classify the time as "GMT December 8." What would that mean
in United States, what would that mean in Hawaii and what would
that mean in Japan ?
Mr. Mitchell. There is a table that gives all that. We can look
it up for you. It is in an exhibit in evidence.
[476'\ Mr. Gesell. Item 4, Mr. Gearhart, of the Navy exhibit.
It is transposed into our time for the fifth, sixth and seventh, so that
we can tell from any time we have what time it was at the key points,
any different kind or type of time we want.
Mr. Gearhart. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gesell. I think that will prove helpful as the hearing goes along.
Mr. Gearhart. Thank jou.
Mr. Gesell. All right.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have another exhibit of that
Opana marked "15," in evidence. This may be clearer than the one I
put in. I wonder whether we should also put this exhibit in? The
other one was not so clear.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 195
Mr. Mitchell. Is it a photostat of that other one?
Senator Ferguson. I cannot tell without comparing the two.
Mr. Mitchell. Suppose we look at it over the week end and see
what it is.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, for the record, in view of the fact that
the witness was asked about the other one I would say that they both
should go in.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I had in mind, that they both go in.
The Chairman. I' see no objection to them both going [4'^'7\
in, but counsel say they want to see over the week end what it is.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire if the witness over the week end
will compare it, compare the three to show the differences? I think
this is much clearer and it will be helpful and he will be able to see
the differences between them.
Mr. Mitchell. That is what I had in mind.
Admiral Inglis. This is not mine.
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, this is the Army's ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Senator Brewster asked about these sources
of material exhibits on the last statement. Would you like to have
them over the week end ?
Senator Brewster. I would like over the week end and for the
convenience of counsel to have them for 2 or 3 hours. I will send them
back to counsel.
Mr. ISIitciiell. We will turn them over to you and leave them in
your office and if any of the other members of the committee want to
see them they can do so.
The Chairman. Is the English translation on the exhibit?
Mr. Mitchell. We will give him one with the English translation
on.
The Chairman. I think the Senator from ]\Iaine wanted the
English translation. I thought if the Senator from Maine [P'S]
wanted the English translation I would take the one in Japanese
home with me over the week end.
Senator Brewster. I might comment that I think probably the ex-
amination would be as much as the Senator has made of any of thei
other exhibits.
The Chairman. The Senator from Maine has no information on
that subject.
Senator Brewster. Well, the Chairman had no information from
me either.
The Chairman. As is the similar case on many subjects which he ^
discusses.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire when Senator Brewster will get
them, so that we may be able to see them in Senator Brewster's office?
Mr. Gesell. Why doesn't he put them under his arm and take i^^
right now ?
Senator Ferguson. That is a good suggestion.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question of the Senator
from Maine?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. May I be permitted (o see tlu> ilewitl re}>ort?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. There is one question that I am not quite clear on and
I would like to have the witness give the information. He may have
given it but I am not quite clear on it, [P'd] and that is the
question as to the approximate mileage distance from Pearl Harbor of
this task force, the Japanese task force, at the time the message was
received.
Admiral Inglis. I gave it as closely as I could estimate it and you
will remember, Congressman Keefe, that they were 800 miles north
of Oahu at the time they turned due south. That was 800 miles
north of Oahu.
Now, the point at which — I just guessed and I must insist that it is
only a guess — at which the}' probably recei^^ed that radio message
is where that track crosses the one hundred and sixtieth meridian,
and again just guessing, I would say that was 200 miles further
back toward Japan or, let vis say, a thousand miles roughly.
Mr. Keeee. About a thousand miles north of Oahu when this mes-
sage was received ?
Admiral Inglis. Well, a thousand miles back along their track.
Of course, that was not due north because it was a zigzag course.
Mr. Keeee. All right.
The Chairman. Well, is there any further clarification desired by
anybody of the Admiral's testimony before we recess ?
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have one more initial
clarified. "GCT", what does that mean 'i
Admiral Inglis. Greenwich civil time.
[4-^0] Mr. Gearhart. What is the diif erence ?
Admiral Inglis. I am a little rusty on my navigation at the moment,
but as I recall it Greenwich meridian time starts at midnight and
Greenwich Civil Time starts at noon, or just the other way around.
Mr. Gearhart. I would like to ask you to help me in deciding what
kind of time we have got here.
The Chairman. We don't want any two-timers.
Mr. Gearhart. But the message was broadcast over the I'adio in
Japan at 2 o'clock, I think it was GMT December 8, 1941. Do you
know whether that refers to Japanese time or to time within the
United States ? _
Admiral Inglis. If it is expressed in that way that would be
London time.
Mr. Gearhart. London time?
Admiral Inglis. That would be London time, when it savs "GMT".
That is what it says, isn't it, "GMT ? "
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. GMT would be that time in London with the base
point noon rather than midnight.
INIr. Gearhart. Then if I should look at the chart in the Navy folder
and find London time, in a moment's calculation I can take the time
for London and determine what it is in the United States and what
it was in Japan ?
[481'\ Admiral Inglis. I think you can, sir.
The Chairman. If there is nothing further, the committee will re-
cess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.
(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., November 17, 1945, an adjournment
was taken until 10 a. m., Monday, November 19, 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 197
im'\ PEAKL HAEBOR ATTACK
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
W ashington^ I). C.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m.,
in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator
Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson, and Eepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
\_IiS3~\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
General Mitchell and Mr. Gesell, you apparently concluded your
examination of the witnesses on Saturday. Is there anything further
vou wish to ask them this morning before the committee examines
them?
Mr. Mitchell. Xo, Mr. Chairman, but the committee ought to say
whether they want Colonel Thielen to take up the radar chart business
that one of the Senators asked him about, or whether we should go on
with the Japanese attack. Would 3^ou like to have the radar matter
come up first ?
Senator Ferguson. Personally, I would like to go along with the
Japanese attack, to keep the sequence.
Mr. Mitchell. Then counsel have no further questions at this time
about the Japanese attack.
Mr. Murphy. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I want to go into
the radar matter, but I will postpone it mitil later.
The Chairman. We will let the radar matter slide until we get
through with Admiral Inglis.
The Chair wishes to make this statement. In the committee a few
days ago, when we decided the order in which the examination of
witnesses would take place, the Chair, as a matter of courtesy to all the
other members, suggested that he postpone any examination on his
part until all the members of the \_k-^h'\ committee had an
opportunity to examine the witnesses. The Chairman had no thought
that there would be any advantage or disadvantage in whether he
asked any questions at the beginning or waited until the examina-
tion was over to ask such questions as had not been covered bj^ other
members of the committee.
However, in view of the fact that that may be regarded as an effort
to get the last word — which no member of this committee really has.
198 CONCRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
because even after formal examination, and after committee members
have examined the witnesses, if a Senator or a Member of the House
thinks he has some other question to ask, he can do it freely — but in
order that there may not be any question about it, the Chair will
exercise the right to proceed to examine the witnesses before he alter-
nates among other members of the committee.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that, I should
like to make clear there is no objection, as far as the ranking minority
member is concerned, to the Chairman making the final examination.
The suggestion which I made was that I, as a member of the minority,
would not like to precede you, that is all. That would be probably
helpful all around, as the Chairman himself originally conceded.
The Chairman. I want to say to the Senator from Maine, it is
entirely immaterial to me, as a member of the committee, [4^5 \
and as Chairman, whether I examine the witness first, or wait until all
other members have examined the witnesses. I personally see no ad-
vantage or disadvantage in the particular position that any member
uf the committee occupies in examining the witnesses. I do not know
that the ranking minority member or the ranking majority member,
if it is divided up into minority and majority, in the interrogation of
witnesses, has any particular significance. But for the time being, in
regard to this witness, the Chair will go ahead and ask only a few
questions, if that is agreeable to the committee.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, the acoustics are so bad, I can hardly
hear at this end of the bench what you are saying.
The Chairmax. The Chairman thought he was talking loud enough
to be heard. He will elevate his voice and move the microphone in
more proximity to his mouth.
TESTIMONY OF REAE ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BEENAED
THIELEN (Eesumed)
The Chairman. Admiral, the information which you have given us
in your statement of Saturday is based entirely upon the captured
documents since the end of the war with Japan, the documents cap-
tured by American forces and also conversa- [4S6] tions had
with captured Japanese?
Admiral Inglis. Not necessarily since the end of the war. Senator
Barkley. Some of those documents were captured during the progress
of the war. Some of the interrogation was made of prisoners of war
who were captured during the war, and who were interrogated during
the war.
The Chairman. So that your statement as outlined here is based
upon captured documents before and since the surrender of Japan
and conversations had with prisoners of war captured before the end
of the war, but who were still in custody of the American forces ?
Admii'al Inglis. Yes.
The Chairman. Up to the end of the war ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. And also statements made by Japanese officers, or
men who were not prisoners of war; is that trne?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir, with one exception; tliere is
one statement in the prepared statement which was based on i'e{)oris
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 199
of FBI and ONI investigators, just one sentence. Aside from that,
all of this material came from Japanese sources.
The Chairman. For the record, will you explain — of course the
FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation — [-^7] what is
the ONI?
Admiral Ixglis. The FBI stands for the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, and the ONI stands for Oflico of Naval Intelligence.
The Chairman. I do not think I care to ask any further questions.
Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, may I make one correction of the
testimony that I gave on the 16th of November?
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. On page 293, line 23, and on page 294, line 19, I
would like to correct ''■Wasp''' to read '•^Horiiet.''' ^
The Chairman. Well, both of them have quite some stingers.
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.
The Chairman. Senator George?
Senator George. I have no questions at present, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Cooper?
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly.
Admiral, you are familiar with this document here, containing
messages, reports, and information forwarded by General MacArthur ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
[4-38] The Vice Chairmax. As I understood it, anything con-
tained in this document was included in your statement presented here
on Saturday.
Admiral Inglis. The gist of that document, which is dated October
20, 1945, was considered in preparing the statement, and we feel
that all of the pertinent and essential material contained in there was
incorporated into the statement where it was appropriate, and where
we felt it was properly confirmed or where it was not contradicted
in some other document.
[4-89] The Vice Chairman. This material was handed to me and
other members of the committee by counsel on Saturday and I under-
stood that you had had the benefit of this material and that your testi-
mony Saturday embraced the information contained in this.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. One other question, if I may, please. Admiral.
In your statement presented to the committee on Saturday, I would
like to invite your attention to the bottom of page 11, the last sentence,
continuing to the top of page 12, in which it is stated :
In addition to the attaclv planes launched at this time it was reported that
two type zero reconnaissance seaplanes w-ere launched at approximately .5:00
a.m. 7 December, Hawaiian time, to execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor
and Lahaina anchorage just before the attack.
Now, especially this sentence :
Available evidence indicates that these reconnaissance planes reached their
destination one hour before the arrival of the attack planes.
Admiral Inglis. I believe that was in the former draft and was not
presented Saturday. That was corrected later on — or changed later
on.
[4^0] The Vice Chairman. I know you called attention to some
changes in that paragraph and I didn't know whether that sentence
was supposed to be changed or not.
> p. 123, supra.
200 CONGRESSIONAL, INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. That sentence was struck out and another one sub-
stituted for it. If the Congressman desires I will read the statement
that was made Saturda}^ morning.
The Vice Chairman. Well, we have been provided with a copj'
this morning of your statement as you gave it with the necessary
changes and corrections included.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. So the correction would appear in this draft.
Admiral Inglis. It should appear, yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Then that sentence to which I have invited
attention, or, rather, two sentences, that did not reflect the situation
then, is that correct?
Admiral Inglis. We think that the statement as made in the cor-
rected draft which was given Saturday more truly reflects the in-
formation that we had.
The Vice Chairman. Then the information that \the reconnais-
sance planes reached their destination an hour before the attack
planes, is that accurate or not?
Admiral Inglis. We have no proof of that, sir.
The Vice Chairiman. No proof of that ?
[iO^] Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
The Vice Chairivian. All right. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. Admiral, just one or two questions.
The draft which was submitted by the Navy and presented to the
rommittee on Saturday last was prepared, as I understand it, by the
Navy officials?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lucas. That draft, as I understood it, was based upon,
primarily upon captured documents by the United States Navy?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. United States Navy and in
some cases Army.
Senator Lucas. Now, in the main, the investigation in the first in-
stance was made by the officials of the United States Navj^?
Admiral Inglis. Some of the interrogations were made by Army
officers, as well as Navj' officers.
Senator Lucas, I understand that. I am talking primarily about
the captured documents. That was a Navy undertaking?
Admiral Inglis. The study of those which transposed that into
this prepared statement was made by Naval officers, yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Then you have prepared a draft to submit to the
committee before you learned of the last information [4^^]
which came from General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo?
Admiral Inglis. There were " several drafts prepared, Senator
Lucas. The last of them, the one that was used was altered, as com-
pared to the one just before that, by the receipt of a document for-
warded through naval channels. Not from the Senior Commander
for the Allied Powers in Tokyo.
Senator Lucas. That was the first alteration and that was based on
additional information which was received by the Navy?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. Then a third alteration was made and that was
based upon information received from the Allied headquarters in
Tokyo?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 201
Admiral Ixglis. No, sir. Just the other wny around.
Senator Lucas. Will you just make it clear for me?
Admiral Inglis. I will try to make it as clear as I can. The first
draft was prepared without the benefit of the material which was
received from the Tokyo headquarters of General jMaCxA.rthur. The
second draft was prepared with the benefit of that material. And the
third and final draft was prepared with the benefit of a paper which
was received throufrh naval channels Itite Friday afternoon.
Senator Lucas. Thank you.
Xow, the Army and the Navy both have been working [W^^
independently upon this, have they !?
Admiral Inglis. The Army has had no direct connection with the
preparation of this script.
Senator Lucas. But insofar as the examination of witnesses and
talking with prisoners, and any other thing in connection with the
investigation, the Army followed the course that they thought was
correct and the Navy followed the course that they thought was
correct in working up this case ?
Admiral Inglis. Throughout the war the interrogation of prison-
ers was a joint effort of Army oihcers and Navy officers, and also in
some cases enlisted men, working together in the interrogation of
Japanese prisoners. Also there was a complete interchange generally
of documentary information and intelligence as between the Army
and Navy throughout the war.
Senator Lucas. Insofar as the information which came which
caused you to make some changes in the second draft, that was infor-
mation which was received by the Navy from the Army operating
under MacArthur in Japan?
Admiral Inglis. That information was obtained by officers attached
to General MacArthur's headquarters.
Senator Lucas. And the Navy had nothing to do with that ?
Admiral Inglis. I would be morally certain that naval officers
assisted in the interrogation but they were attached to General
MacArthur's command.
[4'94-] Senator Lucas. Let me ask you one further question.
Is there any material difference between what the Navy originally
found, upon which the draft was prepared, and wliat General Mac-
Arthur and his forces found and sent to the Navy, upon which this
second draft was prepared? If so. please state.
Admiral Inglis. Speaking in general terms, the material obtained
from General MacArthur merely confirmed information which we had
previously received from other sources. There are a very few cases
where there was a conflict between the two. Wherever there was a
conflict we tried to resolve, the staff tried to resolve, the conflict in
favor of the most credible evidence.
However, I think, speaking in general terms, that the conflict was
not particularly significant.
Senator Lucas. Upon all major points, as I understand it, the two
reports more or less agreed ?
Admiral Inglis, That is correct, sir.
Senator Lucas. I think that is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Clark.
Mr, Clark. No questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Brewster.
202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. I understand, Admiral, that the translations
which yon presented on Saturday covered all of the Japanese docu-
ments which you turned over?
[495] Admiral InCxLIS. That is correct, sir.
Senator Brewster. Well, in what examination I was able to make
over the week end there was some 300 pages of Japanese material that
was not translated. Can you explain that discrepancy ?
Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the translation is complete.
Senator Brewster. Well, have you the exhibits there?
[Pause.] •
Admiral Inglis. Senator Brewster, I am informed by the translator
who is sitting at my elbow that this material was received by micro-
film and that at the end of the microfilm there was some additional
Japanese documents which had nothing to do with the Pear Harbor
case but in the mechanical process of turning it out that is included
with the material which has to do with Pear Harbor.
Senator Brewster. That would mean there were approxhnately 118
pages of material bearing on this and 300 pages bearing on other
matters.
Admiral Inglis. I am informed that is correct, sir.
Senator Brewster. Well, that would explain the discrepancy.
That other material, what did it have to do with ?
Admiral Inglis. Those were combined fleet orders which were
issued subsequent to the attacks and had nothing to do with [4^6']
the attack itself; concerning Japanese operations after Pearl Harbor.
Senator Brewster. Now, you, in the summary which you gave, cited
the Japanese estimate of damage as 450 planes. From what examin-
ation I was able to make there appeared to be an estimate of 250 planes
that were damaged, plus 10 ; another estimate of 157. They appar-
ently were different estimates. Estimates of different pilots. I didn't
find the figure of 450. Was that a cumulation, or what was the basis
of it?
Admiral Inglis. The source of that figure of 450 is a combination
of sources A, B, and C. There was one statement that 250 planes were
known to have been destroyed plus an indeterminate number of others
presumably in the hangars, and therefore not subject to photographic
reconnaissance and observation.
Senator Brewster. Two hundred and fifty plus ten.
Admiral Inglis. Some of the other sources increased the figure and
said specifically that their estimate was 450.
Senator Brewstkr. That specific figure appeared somewhere
didn't it?
Admiral Inglis. That figure is in the diary of a Japanese ensign
captured at Tarawa. The committee has that exhibit.
Senator Brewster. Yes, I have that. What is the citation on that?
[4-9/] Admiral Incilis. I am sorry, that we haven't got.
Senator Brewster. What I have is page 15, showing this estimate
of 157.
Admiral Inglis. The only copy of any of those documents in
existence are in the hands of the committee.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, for the record may we have what the
Senator is reading from, page 15 of what?
The Chairman. Will the Senator state what that was that he was
reading from?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 203
Senator Brewster. It was the document the witness now has.
Admiral Inglis. I have before me a document entitled "Translation
of Captured Document, Professional Notebook of an Ensign in the
Japanese Navy, Captured Tarawa, 24 November, 1943."
Senator Brewster. Is that the diary to which you are referring?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. And that shows, on the page I pointed out, the
figure of 157?
Admiral Inglis. On page 4 of that document, at the top of the
page, fifth line, is the figTire "shot down, 450 planes".
Senator Brewster. That is right. What was the later record, how
did he distinguish between tliese two? What is the [4^8'] dis-
crepancy between them?
Admiral Inglis. The official figure which the Japanese announced
shortly after the attack was 450 planes. I am informed that later
(;n, in a more detailed analysis of the evidence which, apparently,
was available to the Japanese, that they became more conservative
and cut this down to 157, but that was never incorporated into a
subsequent official announcement. As far as the public knew they
stood by their original announcement of 450._
Senator Brewster. What does that purport to be, on page 115,
where the figure of 157 was used ?
Admiral Inglis. I am informed that this purports to be just the
ensign's recollection, apparently, of an order from the Navy Ministry,
but the text is so obscure that I wouldn't like to state just what the
significance of that is.
Senator Brewster. Now, tibout the records of the Hawaii broad-
casting stations to check up on the report as to espionage, are those
station records available for that period ?
Admiral Inglis. I believe that the Army will have those, if any,
and I would like to inform the Senator that I only had about 5 minutes
to look at this last document which came in, and I am not too familiar
with the substance contained in that document; and, of course, with
respect to any intelligence or counter-intelligence material that the
Senator may be interested [W^] in? I would like to refer him
to the then district intelligence officer out in the Fourteenth District,
naval district. Admiral Mayfield, who is listed as a witness, and also
Admiral Wilkinson, who was then the Director of Intelligence, and
who is also listed as a witness.
I am not prepared to answer questions on that.
[SOO] Senator Brewster. Well, as I understand, this possible
tip as to the broadcasting from Hawaii to inform the Japanese fleet
came on October 13. that they made this extension "Tokyo" at the
suggestion of the authorities here and tliat an immediate check was
made then to find out whether transcripts of those Hawaiian broad-
casts during the period just preceding Pearl Harbor, December 7,
were available.
That, I assume, came under your office.
Admiral Inglis. From a very hasty look at tliat document I would
have that same impression.
Senator Brev/ster. Yes; and <hat it then appeared that those rec-
ords were missiug. Is that also your impression ?
Admiral Inglis. That is luy impression.
Senator Brewster. Yes; so that the records for that period appar-
ently disappeared. The suggestions were made that some of them
204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
think that might possibly have been turned over to the Army or the
FBI.
Admiral Inglis. I believe that is what the paper says, yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Now, can the Army find out? Colonel, have
you any information about this ?
Colonel Thtelen. No, sir ; I have no knowledge of that whatsoever.
Senator Brewster, Well, the matter will be followed up.
[501] Under which jurisdiction would that matter come?
Admiral Inglis. Well, 1 would suggest that the Senator address a
question of that nature to Admiral Mayfield and Admiral Wilkinson.
Senator Brewster. Well, no, I am speaking to the Director of Naval
Intelligence now, as this is apparently a current matter. It apparently
is obvious that there are no past records about this and the question is
to determine what did become of those records and not under whose
authority they were destroyed.
Admiral Inglis. According to our records, those documents were
turned over to a Major Putnam, an Army major, who was on duty
in Hawaii at that time.
Senator Brewster. Well, I know you don't want to do an injustice
to the Army, but I think there is great doubt on that score. I think
Major Plitnam expressed some doubt as to Avhether he got them. In
any event, the station claims it did not turn over any but limited ones,
Avhich may or may not have had any relation to this particular episode,
but would it come within your purview now as Director of Naval
Intelligence to pursue that matter and to find out as fully as possible
whether or not there may have been any relation?
Admiral Inglis. The Office of Naval Intelligence has already in-
quired into that matter and the best information [502] that we
have is that these documents were turned over to Major Putnam of the
Army,
Senator Brewster. In connection with the message of — or the battle
orders of November 25 and December 2 as appear in your evidence on
page 437 in our text, it may not be particularly material, although
it has sufficient significance so that I am sure you would want the
record correct.
According to the exhibits which we examined, the battle order which
3^ou cited on November 25 was actually the one of December 2. The
phraseology was somewhat different in those two orders.
Have you those there? That is subhead B on page 437, at the bot-
tom of the page. You will find that under the transcript that you
presented to all the members of the committee from General Mac-
Arthur's headquarters on complying with your orders of October 26th.
Admiral Inglis. Is the Senator referring to the quotation :
"Japan now understands her self-preservation and self-defense has reached" —
".Tapan under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense has reached
a decision to declare war on the United States of America"?
Senator Brewster. No; have you the transcript of the evidence?
Well, yes, it is after that order,^but it is 4-A, [503] and in
your testimony there cited as "B" at the bottom of page 437.
Admiral Inglis. I have that, sir. Your question is, what is the
source of that?
Senator Brewster. Well, yes.
Admiral Inglis. The source of that is the material from headquar-
ters in Tokyo.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 205
Senator Breavster. Well, my point was that the language which you
used — I think you have transposed them between the 2oth of November
and December 2.
Admiral Ixglis. If the Senator will refer to the so-called Mac-
Arthur paper on
Senator Brewster. Yes ; I have it before me.
Admiral Inglis. Sir?
Senator Brewster. I have it before me.
Admiral Inglis. On page 3, at the bottom of the page, subpara-
graph 4-A.
Senator Brewster. Tha^ is right.
Admiral Ikglis. Issued in December.
iSIr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, is there a copy of that
to be made available to all the other members of the committee?
Senator Brewster. Yes, you have that.
Mr. Murphy. You are reading from the copy ?
[■'^OJf] Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Ixglis. Then the
Senatoi- Brewster. I have it before me.
Admiral Ixglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. That was issued on December 2, is that right ?
Admiral Ixglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Now. you show that in your testimony on page
4o7 as issued on the 22d of November.
Admiral Ixglis. Now, if the Senator will bear with me and refer
to page 8 of that same document, down near the bottom of the page,
there is a shorter version of that same paragraph.
Senator BREW^STER. That is right.
Admiral Ixglis. Now^, that version on page 8 was issued on the 22d
of November.
Senator Brewster. That is right, and that is the one which should
a):)pear at the bottom of page 437 as the 22d of November order, is
tliat right?
Admiral Ixglis. To be chronologically correct, I believe that is the
case, yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. I don't know that there will ever be any mate-
rial distinction betAveen them but I think it woidd be well if you would
see that the record is corrected so that [-^Oo] whatever varia-
tion there is in language between the order of the 22d of November —
on the 25th of November, that i^ the date, the 25th of November and
the December 2 order is clarified in the record in whatever way you
find most practicable.
Admiral Ixglis. ]May I ask the reporter uoav to make this correc-
tion on the record? At the bottom of l)age 437, lines 21 to 25. inclu-
sive, substitute the following:
(b) Should the negiUiafioiis with the United States prove successful the task
foi-ce sluill hold itselt in ivadiness forthwith to retniu aud reassemble.^
Senator Breavster. Noav, the other is on page 464, which is the
order of — Avell, that refers again to the erroneous order. You subse-
quently put in the message of December 2. It seemed to me it might
haA-e some importance that on December 2 they did issue the order
which you haA-e erroneously quoted. Perhaps you can put it in at
' 1'. IKO, SIIIHJI.
79716 — 46— pt. 1 16
206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that same point, at page 437, if you wish to, and substitute for that
on December 2 that further language was used in the battle order.
Admiral Inglis. Yes ; will the reporter please add to that previous
quotation that on the 2d of December the longer version, as shown in
the original transcript, volume 3, was issued as an Imperial naval
order.
Senator Brew^ster. I don't know what the significance is. [■506]
They call it a Naval General Staff instruction. Does that have any
significance in your documents.
Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the Japanese procedure in a
case of that nature is for the Imperial General Headquarters to issue
instructions to the Navy section. The Navy section then converts
those instructions into an order.
Senator Brewster. Now, will you properly complete the text as
shown in the MacArthur report of that December 2 Navy General
Staff instruction?
Admiral Ixglis. The version as contained in the so-called Mac-
Arthur paper is:
Naval Genei-al Staff instruction (issued 2 December) Bear in mind that isliould
it apppar cejtain that the Japanese- American negotiations will reach an amica-
l)le settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of ihe
combined fleet are to be ordered to re-assemble and to return to their bases.
Senator Brewster. Now, the only other comment I have. Admiral,
and I don't want to seem too meticulous, but it did seem, at least, Ave
are dealing in connection with the question of visual hand signals.
You remember that was a matter of discussion, as to whether or
not that ever occurred and you reported from the Japanese manu-
scripts reports that the Japanese pilots stated [507] that no
visual signals Avere received.
I rjoted in the report of it that he added — it may or may not be
significant — the words "to his knowledge," and it seemed to me it
might be illuminating as indicating that he did not presume to say as
to whether anybody else might have received them but as far as he
knew none were received. I am sure that was simply
Admii'al Ixglis. I agree with the Senator and think that the same
reservation should be applied to nearly all of the verbal testimony
given by these prisoners of war.
Senator Brewster. Thank you.
The Chairman. Is that all?
Senator Brew^ster. That is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Inglis, as I understand it in the printed
testimony at page 422 you outlined in the record the sources of ma-
terial u])on which you based the summary which you gave to the com-
mittee, is that correct?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, as I also understand it, the committee
were furnished with a group of papers, the first one dated November 8.
1945, and headed "General Headquarters Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers", continuing dov/n to a paper which appears to be
a questionnaiiC, all of these papers [508] apparently having
beeu forwarded to us from tlie General Headquarters of the Supreme
Conunander for the Allied Powers.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 207
Are there any of these papers that are not covered by the ori^rinals
or the i)hotostats of orio;iiials ir;iveu to the gentleman from Maine?
In order to make myself clear, have you seen these papers which we
were handed as comin_<r from the Allied headquarters?
Admii'al Ixcjlis. I am quite sure that is the same document as this,
although this is mimeograjDhed and mine is not.
Mr. MuRpiiY. Now, may I inquire of counsel of these papers are to
be put into the record so that they will be available to whoever reads
the record ? Are they going to be offered as an exhibit ?
Mr. MrrciiELL. We will offer them.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, when the Navy Board sat in order to go
into this question of the Jap invasion they had in that record, as I
understand it, the testimony of the Japanese ensign, or the reports of
the Japanese ensign's testimony, as well as the prisoner at Pearl Har-
bor, did they not ?
Admiral Ixglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And they had the major part of the material which
you have supplied to the committee, with the exception of the addi-
tions which were furnished by General MacArthur during the recent
several weeks since October, is that right?
[o09] Admiral Ixglis. This plus the letter that was received
Friday night through naval channels ; yes, sir. •
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the prisoner who was captured at Pearl
Harbor, is he still living and available?
Admiral Ixglis. We have been trying to find the answer to that
question and so far we have been unable to.
Mr. ]\IuEPiiY. But there was some testimony in the several reports,
were there not, concerning his version of the map that was taken from
the submarine?
Admiral Ixglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And there are two maps, are there not, two submarine
maps or charts?
Admiral Ix'glis. There is only one, sir.
Mr. Mltrphy. Well, the submarine that was beached at Pearl Har-
bor, was there a chart taken from that ?
Admiral Ix'glis. There was no chart taken from the submarine that
was destroyed in Pearl Harbor. The chart was taken from the sub-
marine which beached itself near Kaneohe.
Mr. Mi'rphy. Well, there was one beached — I mean there was one
map taken from that submarine; you got the chart out of that, didn't
Admiral Ixglis. That is right, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And then there was another beached in the bay area,
or did that approach Pearl Harbor?
[SIO] Admiral Ix^glis. That submarine that was beached or de-
stroyed inside Pearl Harbor had no — I .shouldn't say it had no chai't
because I don't know, but they did not obtain a chart from that sub-
marine.
Mr. ]\Iurphy. My recollection is that there was testimony concern-
ing two different chart •. Am I correct in that? You say there was
only one ?
Admiral Ixglis. The other one, I think thfit w^as a chart that was
made by aviators.
208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr, Murphy. No^Y, then, the operational orders and the plans con-
cerning Avhich you testified and concerning which we have photostatic
copies here, now where are the originals?
Admiral Ixglis. The best evidence that we have indicates that after
that original was photostated it v/as purloined by a souvenir hunter.
Mr. Murphy. Well, on page 422 you referred to a captured docu-
ment. The title is, "Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War
Experiences Off Hawaii."
Admiral Ixolis. Yes, sir.
]Mr. Murphy. Where is that docimient, do you know?
Admiral Inglis. The original of that document,- 1 understand is
in the files of the Joint Intelligence Section of the Pacific Ocean area
at Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Murphy. Nov.-. the operational order about which you ['5ii]
testified on page 422. where is that, the original ?
Admiral Ixglis. The committee has the original of that docume?it.
Mr. Murphy. Is that one of the papers that was handed to the
gentleman from Maine?
Admiral Inglis. That was handed to counsel, I guess. It was in
that sheaf of papers.
Mr. Murphy. To the Senator from Maine?
Mr. Gesell. That is right.
Mr. ISIuRPHY. Now, the next document on page
Mr. Mitchell. Let us straighten that out.
Senator Fergusox. Just a moment. Mr. Chairman, I think we
ought to clear that up, as to whether or not that was a photostat or
the original instrument.
Admiral Ixglis. I am informed that that particular document was
the original.
Senator Fergusox. Would you identify it here?
Admiral Ixglls. Yes, sir, if you will pass the papers to me.
I will have to correct the statement that I made. The original
was not turned over to the committee. A copy of that which was
turned over to the committee is photostated but the original itself is
here in Washington but it is in such bad shape physically that it
cannot be handled. It will [512] disintegrate if handled.
]Mr. Murphy. And was it in the same shape as it is now when the
photostat was made?
Admiral Ix^glis. Approximately, yes. I am informed it was under
water for 4 months.
Mr. Murphy. The next document you testified about was on page
423, "Translation of a Captured Japanese Document. The profes-
sional notebook of an ensign in the Japanese Navy." The date is
February 25, 1944.
Where is that notebook ?
Admiral Ix^glis. The original of that document is also in the Joint
Intelligence Section of the Pacific Ocean area at Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Murphy. For the record I want to note that the witness cor-
rected the date of the second document and said it was January 12,
1941.
Is that the date you were correcting at that time? You said "the
f.econd dociiment."' Now, were you referring to the Japanese ensign's
notebook or were you referring to some other document? I am
talking about page 423.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 209
Admiral Inglis. The document which is referred to on page 42o
carries the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean area's letterhead
with their date February 25, 1944. The document was captured at
Tarawa on November 24, 1943. It it [■^^■^l the same document.
Mr. Murphy. But what I am trjdng to clear up, that in your testi-
mony on page 423 — and do you have a copy there before you?
Admiral Inglis. I have, sir.
Mr. Murphy. You said :
Perhaps I should go back to the second document and say that the date on
that is January 12, 1941.
Yon were speaking about some other document, other than the
.notebook, were you ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. That is a different document
that I had inadvertently entered previously without giving the date.
Mr. Murphy, Now, the next document you talked aborit you said
was dated March 2, 1943, and the subject is: "Kuboaki, Takeo," and
you said, "That is obviously the name of a Japanese." ''Superior
Class Engine or Petty Officer, interrogation of."
Where is the original of that?
Mr. Geskll. Is this it. Admiral, here? He is handing you another
one now.
Admiral Inglis. No. That document is a photostat of a letter
from the Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Forces.
I am not sure where the original would be [-^-?4] but I presume
that it is in Pearl Harbor with the files of Commander, South Pacific
Area.
Mr. Murphy. Well, when my examination is concluded. Admiral,
I am going to have the Navy liaison oflicer that is Avorking with the
■committee to see that every one of these originals and every one of
tliese documents are made availalde for the inspection of the commit-
tee in Washington get in touch with you.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. INIuRPHY. Now, you say that you concluded on that. Admiral,
as to where the original was?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, the next document that you referred to on page
424, "Japanese Submarine Operations at Pearl Harbor." You said
that was an evaluation prej^ared by United States intelligence officers.
Where is the original of that?
Admiral Inglis, This document is the original of an evaluation.
It is undated.
Mr. Murphy. And that is before the committee?
Admiral Inglis. It is before the connnittee. It is und:ited and un-
signed but I am informed that it was pre))ared by Captain Pearson.
Mr. IMuRPHY. Now, the next one you referred to is entitled, "Intelli-
gence Report on the Subject of Japan Navy \ol5] Sub-
marines," Where is the original of that ( That was a paper prepared
by American intelligence, wasn't it ?
Admiral Incjlis. I have the ])aper here: yes, sir. I am trying to
examine it. The document in question was prepared, was mimeo-
graphed from a stencil and this is as close an approach to an oi'iginal
as we could provide. The stencil itself was destroyed.
Mr. MuRPiiY. I see. The next document you referred to was dated
August 16, 1943, marked, "Interrogation Eeport No. 148 of
Yokota, S."
210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Where is the original of that document?
Admiral Ixglis. Presumably the original of that document is in
the files of Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.
Mr. Murphy. The next docume-nt you talked about was. "United
States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence
Bulletin of December -S, 1944."
Do you have the original copy of that here?
Admiral Inglis. The document which the connnittee has is as close
to an original as could be produced, as that is a periodical.
Mr. ISIuKPHY. The next document you spoke of was dated June
oO, 1943. The subject is, "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy
Documents, Item. No. 472, Submarine. School Notes Concerning Early
AVar Experiences off Hawaii."
\ol6] Whei-e is the original of that document?
Admiral Inglis. The Japanese version of that document is in the
Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean area. Pearl Harbor. This
document which the committee has, the translation is a mimeograph
and, tlierefore, as close an approach as could be made to tliG original
of the English translation.
Mr. MuRPiiY. Then you also testified about an 'TCPOA Transla-
tion of Captured Enemy Documents, Item. No. 473, Instructions to
the Yatsumaki Butai."
Where is the original of that?
Admiral Inglis. 472, 473, and 474 are all included in the same
document.
Mr. Murphy. The next document you spoke of is dated July 25,
1945, translation No. 290. Subject : "The Southern Cross bv Kuramoti,
Iki."
Where is the original of that ?
Admiral Inglis. May I ask, Congressman Murphy, whetlier you
want any of the Japanese version or the English translation ?
Mr. ]\Iup.PMY. The original source.
xVdmiral Inglis. The original source is in Japanese and is here in.
Washington. The committee has been given a mimeographed copy
of the English translation, which is as close an approach to the original
as could be provided.
[-57/1 Mr. ]MuEPHT. Now, the next document referred to is a
translation of combined fleet top secret operation, order No. 1. W^here
is the original of that. I mean the original Japanese version i
Admiral Inglis. The original in Japanese of that document is here
in Washington but it is in such an advanced state of deterioration that
it could not be handled.
Is the photostat presented as a photostat of it in the condition in
which it now is?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. MuKPHY. The next document referred to is: "Enemy Lists of
Sorties by Sub-carried planes."
Where is the original of that ? You stated, "Its precise source is not
indicated."
Admiral Inglls. The original is ])robably in the Joint Int (diligence
Center. Pacific Ocean area at Pearl Harbor, althonuh I am Tiot certain
of that.
Mr. MiRpiiY. The next document vou referred to is a memorandum
dated October 13, 1945, addressed to "the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 211
of the Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps on the subject, Prewar
Espionage in the HaAvaiian IsUinds,
Is the paper you have an original copy of that?
Admiral Inglis. The paper that has been submitted to the commit-
tee is the original copy. In fact, it is the only [-5^5] copy in
Washington.
Mr. Murphy. Now, there was some testimony concerning the para-
phrase of a message dated October 6. 1945, from the Secretary of War
to General MacArthur and, as I understand it, all committee members
have been furnished a copy of that.
Mr. Mitchell. They have it. It is a paraphrasing for the protec-
tion of our codes.
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
jMr. Mitchell. The committee understands that.
Mr. Murphy. All right.
And then there was testimony on the bottom of page 426 concerning
cables from General MacArthur dated the 14th of October and a fur-
tlier detailed report dated October 2G, 1945, and then the report of the
night preceding your testimony.
As I understand it, all of those are originals in here, is that right ?
JMr. Mitchell. Well, those are copies furnished by the War Depart-
ment.
Mr. Murphy. To the committee?
JNIr. Mitchell. To us and to the connnittee. They were reproduced
so that everybody would have copies of them.
Mr. Murphy. All right.
Mr. Mitchell. The original dispatch from MacArthur may be in
the files of the War Department.
\5W] Mr. JNIuKPHY. At any rate, the committee have a copy of it.
Mr. Gesell. The originals are right here, Congressman, if there is
any question as to whether they were correctly reproduced.
Mr. Murphy. All right. And would that hold true, too, as to the
message from General MacArthur dated November 8, 1945?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. Congressman Murphy, I have just been handed a
note here that says :
There were several charts recovered from the submarine that was beached at
Bellows Field. These are now held and will be produced by Captain Layton.
Mr. Murphy. I understand there was more than one there, that
was why I asked about it.
There were certain corrections, Admiral, made in the record as a
result of the testimony of the previous questioner, the Senator from
Maine, and do we have in the exhibit which will be offered a copy of
each of the papers from which you read, each of the orders?
Admiral Inglis. The basis of those corrections are contained in the
headquarters Tokyo report.
Mr. Murphy, Which is part of the exliibit, as I under- lo'^O']
stand it.
Admiral Inglis. Which is part of the exhibit,
Mr. Murphy. And, coun.sel, it will be offered?
Mr. Gesell. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy, Now, then, I have no other questions, Admiral, ex-
cept to say that I expect and hope that all of the originals will, insofar
212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
as possible, be made available for the inspection of the entire com-
mittee.
Admiral lasroLis. Yes, sir; they will, sir.
Mr. MuEPHT. No other questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chatpjman. Senator Ferguson ?
Senator Fer(;uson. Admiral Inglis, when you received this present
data — now, I am talking about the data prior to the ]\[acArthur
(hit a — who evaluated it so that you might put it in your statement?
Admiral Inglis, Commander Hindmarsh and Lieutenant Kurts,
wlio are now sitting at my right elbow, did most of the work on that.
Senator Ferguson. Who else worked on it ?
Admiral Inglis. A LieutenaiU Ebb also worked on these and much
of the source material was in the form of translations received from
the Soutliwestern Pacific area headquarters.
Senator Ferc-f-ion. Was it ev:diiated out in the field at [-^•2-?]
all?
Admiral Inglis. It receiA^ed an evaluation in the field and then a
second evaluatitm here in Washington.
Senator Ferguson. Now, what evaluaticm are we getting in your
statement, the one that was made in the field or the one that was made
here ?
Admiral Inglis. Fimdamentalh^ you are getting the evaluation
made here. However, there is no conflict of significance between the
two evaluations.
Senator Ferguson. When was it evaluated ?
Admiral Incjlis. The people who have been doing this work have
been working on it since the middle of June of this year.
Senator Ferguson. I see by the press tliat Mr. Byrnes. Secretary
of State, made a statement iLsing some of this informatioiL Do you
know who evaluated it for jNIr. Byrnes ?
Let the record show Admiral Inglis is conferring with his aides.
T]ie Chairman. He might also give the names of his aides and their
qualifications, that he conferred with.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. The evalution which has been presented to tlie
committee, that is, the evaluation before it was affected by the last
tAvo documents, in substance was [-^■--] presented to the Sec-
retary of the Navy — I mean the Secretary of Stn.te, some time ago.
Senator Ferguson. I notice also b}^ the press that the Secretary of
the Xavy used a certain amount of this data. Who evaluated his
information ?
Admiral Inglis. He received a copy of the same document that was
presented to the Secretary of State.
Senator Ferguson. And when was that document presented to the
Secretary of State ?
Admiral Inglis. I haven't got that date at hand, but we can get it.
Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Would you be able to get the document itself
that was given to the Secretary of State as well as to the Secretarv
of the Navy?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Counsel General Mitchell, will you get
that then for the committee ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.^
» See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5352.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 213
Senator Fer'jusox. Now. I will at^k you, Admiral, when these gen-
tlemen, your aides here, evaluated this information did they use the
diplomatic messages between Japan and America^
Admiral Ixglis. No, sir. I want to make that quite clear, that none
of the material contained in this presenta- [J;^JJ tion was ob-
tained from crypt analytical sources.
Senotor Fekgusox. That was not my question. Did they use in
order that they may evaluate the evidence that they obtained from
the Japanese prisoners and evidence that they obtained from maps,
and so forth, did they also check it with the diplomatic messages^
Admiral In({i.is. No, sir.
Seuator Fergusok'. Do you know as an initelligence officer how you
could evaluate that and not check it with the diplomatic messages
from Japan?
Admiral Ixglis. We evaluated it by checking witli all of the source
material which we had available. We did not have available to us
the crypt analytic material which the Senator has just mentioned.
[-5^4] Senator Ferguson. In other words, you did not have in
your possession, wlien you evaluated this for the committee. Japanese
messages concerning military installations, ship movements, and so
forth, which is the instrument with the yellow cover on it^
Admiral Ixglis. No, sir; we did not have them.
Seuat()r Ferguson. It is Exhibit No. 2 in this case. Have you ever
had this ?
Admiral Ixglis. No, sir.
Senator Fergusox. Then you made this evaluation of the Ja[>anese
information from prisoners when you had in your files at least, direct
evidence from the Japanese officials, and did not use this official infor-
mation to evaluate evidence?
xVdmiral Ixglis. No. sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I call the Senator's attention to the fact that Ex-
hibit 2 does not contain any Japanese intercepts; this Exhibit 2 coii-
taiiis messages passing to and from Tokyo.
Senator Fergusox. I appreciate that, but they gave au outline of
the source of their information, and they intimated that certain
sources were used, aiul certain sources were not used.
Now, I Avant to refer you to this instrument which is marked
"Exhibit No. 2," and call your attention to page 22. Have you got a
copy f)f it ?
[J.v-'] Arhniral Ixglis. I have not got a copy of it. I have never
seen a copy. Thosi^ messages were not in the files of Naval Intelligence.
Senator Fergi'sox, Will you refer to page 22?
Admiral Ixglis. If I may have a copy ; yes, sir.
Mr. ^Mitchell. Here is one.
. Mr. Gesell. "\"\liat page is that?
Senator Fergusox. Page 22.
(A document was handed to Admiral Inglis.)
Senator Fergusox. This is from Honolulu to Tokvo, December 3,
1941.
Admiral Ixglis. I have it before me.
Senator Fergusox. You have it?
Admiral Ixglis. Yes.
Senator Fergusox. Now. \y\\] yon make inquiry to se«> whether or
not that instrument was not translated in the rough and in the posses-
214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sion of the Navy by 1 : 30 and not [S26] later than 2 o'ch)ck on
December 6, 1941 ^ Do you know whether that is a fact ■
Admiral Inglis. I do liot understand your question, Senator
Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. I want to know from your aides whether or not
that instrument was not translated in the rough and in the possession
of the Navy at 1 : 30 and not later than 2 o'clock on December 6, 1941 ?
Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer tJiat question, Senator.
Senator Feegusox. I am trying to ask if your aides know.
Admiral Inglis. They cannot either. If you will let me complete
mv answer
Senator Ferguson. I will let you complete it.
Admiral Inglis. Sir ?
Senator Ferguson. I will let you complete it. Go ahead.
Admiral Inglis. I would like to say all of this crypt analytical
material comes in the cognizance of Naval Communications, rather
than Naval Intelligence. There are several witnesses who are listed
to appear before the committee who can give first-hand knowledge or
evidence along this line. I cannot.
Senator Ferguson. You cannot?
Admiral Inglis. No.
['527] Senator Ferguson. Look on page 23, to the KGMB want
ads. Was that considered by the evaluators when you gave your
statement?
Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the material was obtained by
us from another source.
Senator Ferguson. As a matter of fact, it was obtained from the
Army staff here in Virginia, was it not, at Fort Knox ?
Admiral Inglis. Our source was a man by the name of Otto Kuhn
^vho was interrogated on this subject.
Senator Ferguson. He was later tried, was he not, in Hawaii ?
Admiral Inglis. I understand that he was ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now you say that the Navy's source of this
information was Kuhn and not a translation?
Admiral Inglis. I say that the source available to my staff was
Kuhn.
Senator Ferguson. Kulin was not apprehended until after the Tth
of December, was he ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did your staff use that instrument or that in-
formation in evaluating the Japanese information ?
Admiral Inglis. It was considered. That was considered, but it
was also understood from another source that that [J53S] par-
ticular scheme or systeiui vvas not actually used, and therefore it was
not considered.
Senator Ferguson. Give us that source.
Mr. Murphy. While they are looking for it, will the gentleman yield
for one observation ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, the exhibit says it was not trans-
lated until 12/11/41, and then in parentheses (7) . I do not know what
that (T) means.
Senator Ferguson. We will develop later it was translated on the
6th at noon.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 215
Admiral InOxLTS. In reply to the Senator's question I would like
to quote from a carbon copy of an enclosure to nn endorsement which
is contained in a letter received through naval channels originating
in the Fourteenth Naval District.
On page 10, paragi'aph 13, of this carbon copy appears the fol-
lowing :
The KG^NIB want ads morning programs from November 24 to December 8,
1941, were checked by FBI Honolulu with negative results in locating any coded
phrases regarding the Chinese rug, chicken farm, or beauty-parlor operator. It
appears unlikely that phrases regarding the German attache, had they appeared
on this program during the period in question, would have gone unnoticed by
the agency conducting that investigation.
[5.29'] Senator Ferguson. Did they examine the original broad-
casts or scripts ?
Admiral Inglis. I do not know, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do w'e understand then there is quite a bit of
controversy on these items you have given us? Are we to under-
stand that you evaluated it without using any of these codes or the
coded messages?
xVdrniral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And we also understand that the}^ did not use
in anj' way diplomatic messages?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether more weight was given
to the information obtained from the so-called prisoners of war than
was given to the MacArthur information, that came directly from
the Navy in Tokyo?
Admiral Inglis. There was very little conflict between the two.
Where there was conflict, all I can say is we resolved the conflict and
gave the material which in our judgment most accuratel^^ presented
the case.
Senator Ferguson. Now will you look on page 452 of our tran-
script— I will withdraw that.
Are the ads that you cannot substantiate from the same evidence
as this message "Climb Mount Niitaka"' ?
Admiral Inglis. Are the ads from tlie same evidence as [SSO]
the message "Climb Mount Niitaka"?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. What is the Senator's question ?
Senator Ferguson. Is it from the same source as the rug ads and
the climb the mountain?
Admiral Inglis. It is mentioned in the same document but not
from the same source.
Senator Ferguson. Isn't it in the same interview ?
Admiral Inglis. No, Sir. The want ad, the paragraph about the
KGMB want ads is derived from the FBI investigation in Honolulu.
The "Climb Mount Nittaka" material is derived from one [)risoner
of war and one Japanese who was interrogated after VJ-da_y.
[o31] Senator Fercjuson. Was not the clue, though, "from the
same source, tlie information that you were investigating?
Admiral Inglis. The pilot Shiga, who was interrogated at Sasibo,
and the report of his interrogation contained in this last document
which we just received Friday, did mention a want ad code.
Senator Ferguson. He mentioned the want ad code, did he not?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Now, why did you accept, at his suggestion,
the climbing of the mountain and not the want ad proposition? Do
you have any reason for that?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. The item about climbing the mountain
was also mentioned by another Japanese prisoner of war, and had
some confirmation. The item about the KGMB want ads had been
investigated by the FBI in Honolulu and could not be corjfirmed.
In fact, the information seemed to be negative. Therefore, the
•'climb Mount Niitaka" was included and the KGMB want ads was
not.
Senator Ferguson. In the United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific
Ocean Area Weekly Intelligence, the one you gave to the committee,
states the information as to climbing Mount Xiitaka wiis in Order
No. 1, combined fleet secret order No. 1, that is. that was his memory
of it?
['5S2'] Admiral Inglis. We have no positive evidence of that.
Senator. If I may give you as complete a story as possible on that, I
would like to do it. at this point, sir. on this "climb Mount Niitaka,"
Senator Ferguson. Will you wait until I get through, and then
give A^our version of it.
Admiral Inglis. Certainly.
Senator Ferguson. Will you look on page 11 of the analysis there
of the lieutenant, and see what he says about this Mount Niitaka?
Admiral Inglis. "\^'liat page?
Senator Ferguson. Page 11.
Admiral Inglis. Can you identify the document?
Mr. Mitchell. Page 11 of what document, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. I am trying to point it out. There [indicat-
ing].
Admiral Inglis. Paragraph 14, about the Japanese consulate gen-
eral?
Senator Ferguson. No ; paragi'aph 15.
Admiral Inglis. I have that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read it?
Admiral Inglis (reading) :
Inasmuch as Shiga's information was reportedly given to him by another oflBcer
aboard the Akagi following the attack, its accuracy is subject to some doubt.
[S33] Senator Ferguson. And who says that? Is that Lieu-
tenant Peterson of the United States Navy ?
Admiral Inglis. K. H. Peterson, lieutenant. United States Navy
Reserve, signed that report ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. With that doubt in mind, then, and with Mac-
Arthur's information as to order No. 1, do you still place much
credence to that information? Order No. 1, as far as the Mac-
Arthur information is concerned, does not include that at all, does it ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. We still think
Senator Ffj^guson (interposing). Did you analyze it with that
in mind ?
Mr. MuRPHT. Mr. Chairman, let the witness answer the question.
The Chairman. Let the witness complete his answer.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Admiral Inglis. We still think that the statement made in the pres-
entation is the best estimate that we can make, sir, because it was
partially confirmed from another source.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 217
Senator Ferguson. Where is that source?
Admiral Inglis. That source was a Japanese prisoner of war, who
was captured at Saipan in the Marianas campaign.
In his interrogation — remember, please, this was a year ['5o4^]
before VJ-day — in his interrogation, he said it had beeii planned to
use that phrase "climb Mount Xiitaka" to confirm the launching of the
attack. However, he did not say. and was not able to say, that that
phrase was ever actually used. He did not know whether or not it
had ever been received.
So in the first draft all mention of "climb Mount Niitaka" was
omitted, because it could not be confirmed. . Then later on when we
got this other report from Shiga which said he had been out with the
Japanese striking force, and that the message had been received, we
then felt there was sufficient confirmation of that to incorporate it
into the presentation.
Senator Fergusox. But operational order No. 1, that is, what pur-
ports to be operational order No. 1, does not contain it?
Admiral Ixglis. No, sir. There were a number of things from
operation order No. 1 which had been deleted. Presumably the Japa-
nese did not give operation order No. 1 in full to any ships except those
which were in the striking force. I presume that would be for secur-
ity reasons. There was no need to give it to those who did not need
to know it. Therefore operation order No. 1, which we had and which
was captured in the Nachi, which was not in the striking force, had
some deletion from the operational order, and it is quite possible
"climb iSIount Niitaka" was one of the deletions since [53o] the
Xachi was not one of the striking force.
Senator Ferguson. Why do you say it was possible? Was there
anything in there about climbing the mountain?
Admiral Inglis. There was nothing in the operation order No. 1
which we received that mentioned "climb Mount Niitaka."
Senator Ferguson. You received it from two sources, one from the
ship and one from the MacArthur source, is that correct ?
Admiral Inglis. You are referring to "climb Mount Niitaka"?
Senator Ferguson. No; I am talking about operation order No. 1.
Admiral Inglis. Operation order No. 1 that we had was received
before VJ-day. It was translated from a document captured from
the Japanese cruiser Nachi.
Senator Ferguson. Did you also get a copy of it, or information
concerning it, from MacArthur?
Mr. Mitchell. Mac Arthur's report does not contain it. His report
states that the documents in Japan, in Tokyo, had been destroyed.
Admiral Inglis. The MacArthur report contains some reference
to operation order No. 1. but does not contain the operation order
itself.
Senator Ferguson. Did it give any information or anj' \p-^(^]
intimation that the information given about climbing the mountain
was on the same day ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Fi:rguson. Can you account why our Navy has not the
record at least of receiving the messages sent to this fleet?
Admiral Inglis. I have no specific information on that. Again,
that Avould come from Naval Communications rather than from m&
218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Did you make any check to ascertain whether
or not we intercepted the radio at the time it was sent, and this infor-
mation is in line with that radio interce])tion ?
Admiral Ixglis. I made no such check, because the instructions wei'e
to exclude from my presentation anything from a cryptanalytical
source.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
Senator Ferguson. Will you state that again? Is your answer that
you were supposed to exclude from your presentation any decoded
messages ?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir, on the understanding it would
be brought before the committee by later witnesses.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator ^deld?
[5S7] The Chairman. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to make the observation that Captain
Layton is coming, and that he will be available on the very subject
about which he is asking the witness.
Senator Ferguson. I am concerned now with one thing, and that is
about the instructions to the admiral, not to use in his information
anything that was decoded.
Mr. Mitchell. I can answer that.
Senator Ferguson. I wish you would.
Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. The instructions to the admiral were to prepare a
statement of the Japanese attack from Japanese sources, and confine
liimself to that, and that is what I think he has tried to do. These
things you refer to are not Japanese sources at all. The full informa-
tion about all these intercepts is going to be covered by other witnesses.
The admiral was asked not to present anything except what he had
obtained from the Japanese.
Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, the decoded messages
are certainly from Japanese sources.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I did not so treat them in my instructions to
the admiral.
[•538] The CnATrniAN. Decoded messages would be messages de-
coded by the War or Xavy Department. As far as the Navy Departr
ment is concerned, they would be here in the possession of the Navy
and not in the possession r)f Japanese prisoners of war; isn't that true ?
Admiral Inglts. That is true, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now going back, Admiral, have you any reason
why you did not use the source of information that came from the Japs
prior to the outbreak of the war, the bombing, that we decoded and
which came from the prisoners after the attack?
Admiral Inglis. We used all the information from the prisoners.
We did not use any of the information from cryptanalytical sources,
because we did not have access to the latter, and it was not within the
scope of the instructions which we received.
Senator Ferguson, And vras it also because of the instructions from
counsel ?
Admiral Inglis. It was the instructions which my staff received. I
suppose they originated with counsel.
Senator Ferguson. And did the exclusion, that you were not to use
the information also exclude the so-called diplomatic intorcppts?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 219
Admiral Ixglis. It did, sir.
[o39] Senator Ferguson. And also the infoinuiliuu in our Avliite
papers, our messages? Did it exclude that, that j^on were not to con-
sider that Avhen you were giving us an evaluation of the evidenc' ?
Admiral Ixglis. I do not know what the Senator refers to as the
^'white paper."
Senator Ferguson. You do not know what the wliite papers are?
Admiral Inglis. Not by that name, no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The papers that have been printed, the informa-
tion by the State Department that may be known to you as peace or
war.
Admiral Inglis. I think the Senator refers to a State Department
paper which did not contain any reference to deciphered or crypt-
analytical material.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct.
Admiral Inglis. And that material was used in making up this
presentation, or at least it was considered.
Senator Ferguson. Was that from Japanese sources ?
Admiral Inglis. That was from the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. Was the original source the Japanese? Will
you find out ? In other words, the messages on the diplomatic rela-
tions, November 20, to our State Department, was that considered in
evaluating any of this information ?
[540] Admiral Inglis. I am informed by my staff that that was
considered by them as background, but no quotations were made
from it.
Senator Ferguson. I see one statement in the MacArthur informa-
tion, and I want to know what credit they gave, and what value they
gave this question No. 12.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman give the page number?
Senator Ferguson. They are not paged. It is under November 1.
1945.
When was the final confirmation of this plan made?
Answer. 1 December, IWl.
Have you got it before you ?
Admiral Inglis. I have that ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And now will you turn to operational order
under October 26, 1945. the letter of transmittal, and then read under
"(a)" the information? Will you read that? Have you got the in-
strument I am talking about ?
Admiral Inglis. I will read it, if I can find it. Senator Ferguson.
I have the first reference which you made, December 1, 1941. You
say this is the other document?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
[■^1] Admiral Inglis. The first reference which the Senator
made
Senator Ferguson. Read the imperial order.
Admiral Inglis. On page 3, paragraph 1 (a), 3 (a) :
Imperial Naval Order, issued 2 December :
The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British
Empire
Senator Ferguson. No. Read No. 1, the imperial naval ordei",
No. 1.
220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Inglis. No. 1 :
Imperial Naval Order, issued 1 December. Japan under the necessity of
her self-pi'eservation and self-defense has reached a decision to declare war on
the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to
start action will be given later.
Senator Ferguson. Xow, going over to 12. that I read into tlie
record, when was the final confirmation of this plan made, the 1st
of December 1941, is that correct ?
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Will the Senator from Michigan yield to the
Congressman from Pennsylvania '?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. In the broadcast of the 5th of December, which might
be what the gentleman is looking for, there was a [-543] mes-
sage:
In reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important
at this end, but proceed witli what you are doing, specific orders will be issued
soon.
That seems to be pointing to some additional order. That is on
page 234 of the examination of Captain Layton in the Hewitt report.
Senator Ferguson. Have you, Admiral, any information as to what
the Congressman from Pennsylvania, iSIr. Murphy, is speaking about ^
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have not had that message available.
Senator Ferguson. Have 5^ou had the privilege of talking with
Captain La\i:on ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You haven't discussed this with him?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What date do you say that the fleet left the
ba}'' in Japan ?
Admiral Inglis. The actual time of departure was 9 a. m., November
26, Japan time.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar in the diplomatic messages
that there had been a time limit of the 25th put on the negotiations,
that they had to be. ended by the 25th?
[-543] Admiral Inglis. No, sir, I am not familiar witli that.
Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with that?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. W^ere ,you familiar with the fact that then it
was extended to the 29th ?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with that?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I may have some vague recollection of
reading something like that in the newspapers.
Senator Fergit.son. Would you know of anything that would make
the date of leaving, which is the 26th, being the 25th here— is it not?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The same date as the order from CNO to divert
all shipping south and to start convoys — is there any relation between
those two?
Admiral Inglis. There is no relationship that I know of; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you tried to analyze those dates, that they
are on the same date?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; that hadn't occurred to me.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 221
Sentitor Ferguson. Will yon ask your aides and see if they put any
'significance on those dates?
Admiral Inglis. I am sorry I can't be helpful, Senator. [S44]
The staff who prep;u-ed the .Japanese plan are not the staff' who pre-
pared the American plan and the staff who prepared the Japanese plan
felt that that Avas not relevant to their plan and wouldn't attempt to
make any evaluation.
Senator Ferguson. Do you knoAV whetlier or not — when was the
time, what was the date of tlie order to "Climb ]Mount Niitaka"?
Admiral Inglis. Climb Mount Niitaka?
Senator Ferguson. The 3d of December?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; that was later than that. Our informa-
tion is that that messag-e was received by the Japanese striking force
on the 5th of December. Hawaiian time.
Senator Fer(;us()N. 5th of December, Hawaiian time?
Admiral Ingijs. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That would be on the Gth, oiu- time?
Admiral Inglis. On the 6th, Japan time.
Senator Fercjuson. Japan time?
Admiral Inglis. Not our time. On the 5th. Hawaiian time.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. Which would lie tlie 6th, Japanese time.
Senator FERifUSON. Well, now, have you made a search to ascertain
whether or not an}" of our monitor systems, any of our radios picked
that message up?
Admiral Inglis. No. sir. That again would come under communi-
cations rather than intelligence. I think that later [^-4-^] wit-
nesses can give a better answer than I on that.
Mr. Mitchell. May I interrupt. Senator?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe we quite understand what these
gentlemen have been asked do. In the outline of the case and the
nature of the proof which was furnished to the committee on the 2d
of November is found first an analysis of the attack from the Amer-
ican point of view and second the attack from the Jap point of view
and it contains this statement :
The Jap plan will be veconsti-ucted from captured plans and statements made
by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack.
Now, these gentlemen haveii't been asked to go into the other fields,
crypt analytical things, and they are really not prepared to do it,
because their instructions were to confine themselves to a reconstruction
of the Jap plan as far as they could from captured plans and statements
made by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack.
All this material, about the diplomatic intercepts and exchanges,
and other crypt analytical material, was all listed on our analysis here
for presentation by other witnesses.
Senator Ferguson. I am not going to spend much time on it.
Mr. Mitchell. I think your questions are pertinent, Senator, but 1
think other proof will cover it.
Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out what weight we [^4^]
should give, as a committee, to this testimony, and since we have the
General ]\IacArthur statements, I ask, Mv. Chairman, I note from what
79716— 46— pt. 1 17
222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
counsel has said that they were not asked for, therefore I ask that the
information from General MacArthur be made a part of the record.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. That request was made 15 or 20 minutes ago by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Senator Ferguson. Has it been made a part of the record ?
Mr. Murphy. Counsel said he would offer it and make it a part of
the record.
Mr. Mitchell. I proposed to do that several days ago.
The Chairman. I am quite certain it wasn't necessary for either of
the members of the committee to ask counsel to make that a part of
the record but now that it is done it will be done.
Senator Ferguson. That is all I have at the present time.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I have just a few questions.
Admiral, when I had you under examination on Friday last, I asked
you to supply any evidence that might be available in reference to the
condition of the ships in Pearl Harbor.
[S4.7] Admiral Inglis. You asked that, I believe, to be furnished
through the usual Navy liaison channels, and I would like to recom-
mend at this time to the Congressman that Captain Kniskern, of the
Bureau of Ships, I believe, is best informed on that subject.
Mr. Gearhart. K-i-s-k-e-r-n?
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Was Captain Kniskern at Pearl Harbor at the time
of the catastrophe and before ?
Admiral Inglis. I don't think so, but he has made a detailed study
of all the reports for the Bureau of Ships.
Mr. Gearhart. I wonder if I could have those reports upon which
which he has based his conclusions ; is that possible ? ^
Aclmiral Inglis. Yes, sir; I presume it is, although I would hazard
a guess they are very voluminous.
Mr. Gearhart. "\V1io Avas commander of the Task Force No. 1 on
that day?
Admiral Inglis. Admiral Pye.
Mr. Gearhart. May I inquire of counsel if Admiral Pye will be one
of the witnesses?
]SIr. Mitchell. He is on the list.
Mr. Gearhart. Who was the executive officer of Task Force No. 1?
Admiral Inglis. We don't have an executive officer of the [^4^]
task force commander. The chief of staff, I think, was then Captain
Train, although I am not positive.
Mr. Gearhart. Is the chief of staff second in command?
Admiral Inglis. He is the chief of staff. Very often another officer
in the task force may be senior to the chief of staff and would succeed
to the command in case of disability of the commander. But Ih.e chief
of staff is the senior staff' officer and next senior to the admiral on his
own personal staff in his official family.
iSIr. Gearhart. Who is the officer in such a fighting contingent who
would have possession of all orders, written and unwritten, which
would have to do with the management of the task force?
1 See Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2677-2678 ; see also Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 223
Admiral I^^GLIS. I would think that the flag secretary would prob-
ably come closest to that.
Mr. Gearhakt. May I ask counsel if he will be a witness^
Mr. Mitchell. I don't know vrho he was. What task force are you
referiing to?
Mr. Geariiart, Task Force No. 1, under th.e command of Vice
Aihuiral Pye.
Mr. Mitchell. We haven't listed him.
Mr. Geariiart. Can you tell me the name of the officer you liave
just mentioned?
Admiral Ixglis. No, sir. The Navy will try to find that [-54^]
out for you.
Mv. Gi-:ariiart. Have you received any report or. why tJie one bat-
tleship was in drydock?
Admiral Ixglis. I haven't got the information as to why she was
in dock; no, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. The battleship that was in drydock on December 7,
1941, was the battleship Pennsylvania; is that correcF?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Who issued the orders for the lining up of the bat-
tleships in Pearl Harbor opposite Ford Island in pairs?
Admiral Ixglis. That was contained in a circular letter issued by
the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and contained the berth-
ing plan for the ships in Pearl Harbor,
Mr. Gearhart. Has that order been supplied for the record yet ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, Your Honor.
Mr. Gesell. Talking about 2CL41, Security of Fleet at Base in
Operating Areas? I think that is tlie one you are talking about.
jMr. Mitchell. That is not in port, is it ? That is in operating areas.
Admiral Ixglis. In order to save time, I will say this \^ooO'\
in response to the Congressman's questions, that if that has not already
been furnished the committee, it will be furnished.^
Mr. Gearhart. What is the date of it?
Admiral Ixglis. I don't know, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Wh.o issued it ?
[ool'\ Such an order would come from the commander in chief of
the Pacific Fleet rather than the commander in chief of the Fourteenth
Naval District?
Admiral Ix'Glis. You will remember that the Fourteenth Naval
District at that time was under the command of the commander in
chief. I think that in all probability the plan issued by Admiral
Kimmel would be an outline : the details probably would be carried
out by the Fourteenth Naval District. But without the document, I
can't discuss that too accurately.
Mr. Gearhart. Have you recently read the order to which you
have just referred?
Admiral Ixglis. No, sir.
Mr. Ge-\rhart. Now, I would like to ask you professionally, not so
much about what transpired there, but what could transpire there.
What is the descriptive Uiime or term that is applied when the
ships are under the highest form of inspection?
Admiral Ixglis. I am sorrv. Congressman.
1 See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127.
224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. Did you ever hear of a military inspection, that
phrase being used ?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; there is a military inspection and a
material inspection.
Mr. Ge.\rhart. All right, military inspection, is that the term
under which you have the most complete inspection of [6-52]
vessels ?
Admiral Inglis. They cover two different subjects. The material
inspection covers a very searching inspection of the material condition
of the ship. Its state of corrosion, or lack of corrosion, the struc-
tural strength of the ship and condition of machinery. Military
inspection is directed more toward inspection of the efficiency or
effectiveness of the ship as a fighting unit of the fleet and includes
such factors as the state of discipline among the crew, and the
effectiveness of the battery, matters of that kind.
Mr. Gearhart. You can have a military or a material inspection
of an entire contingent, or it can be directed to special ships within
the contingent ; is that correct ?
Admiral Inglis The usual practice is to have a progressive schedule
of inspections. In general, the division commander would inspect
the ships of his own division, and it is quite possible that inspection
of two ships might coincide on the same day, but as a general rule
they probably would be staggered throughout the year.
Mr. Gearhart. What are the names of the ships, the battleships,
which were in Pearl Harbor on the day of the catastrophe, that did
not belong to Task Force No. 1 ?
Admiral Inglis. I haven't that information readily available, sir.
[odS] Mr. Gearhart. You know as a matter of fact that Task
Force No. 1 had six battleships, did you not ?
Admiral Inglis. I don't know, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. As regular contingents?
Admiral Inglis. I don't know ; I haven't got that information.
]\Ir. Gearhart. Do you happen to know from other sources that
there were three battleships in the harbor at the time of the attack
which belonged to Task Force No. 2?
Admiral Inglis. I am sorry ; I don't know the organization of the
task forces by ships.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, when Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor and
the Hawaiian Islands on his missions, or task, leaving behind three
battleships in the harbor, under whose command would those three
battleships be during his absence?
Admiral Inglis. In the case which the Congressman has cited, I
believe they would be under Commander of Battleships, who was Ad-
miral Anderson.
Mr. Gearhart. Where was Admiral Anderson headquartered at
that time? Where was he stationed?
Admiral Inglis. His headquarters would be on a battleship. We
haven't the information here as to which battleship it was. Prob-
ably the West Virginia.
Mr. Gearhart. In the harbor?
[oo4] Admiral Ingias. The West Virginia was in the harbor,
yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, when Admiial Halsey left with his Task
Force No. 2, leaving behind his three battleships in the harbor, where
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 225
Task Force No. 1 was anchored, would those three battleships become
attached to Task Force No. 1 sulDJect to the orders of Admiral Pye?
Admiral Ixglis. Not necessarily, sir ; the organization by task forces
differs from the administrative organization, and in this case that you
cite, the battleships would have fallen under the commander, the ad-
ministrative commander, rather than the task force commander.
Mr. Gearhart. May I inquire of distinguished counsel, whether
there will be a witness here who can give testimony on that subject?
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes, these gentlemen have only been prepared
within narrow Innits to testify here. Of course they can't furnish all
of the information that the committee ought to have and is anxious
to have.
Mr. Gesell. And which we are anxious to present.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, and which we are anxious to present, but we
can't try the whole case with one witness. We have a lot more down
the line, witnesses who have personal knowledge of these things.
[Sdo] Mr. Gearhakt. I am very anxious to know the details.
Mr. Mitchell. I appreciate that.
Mr. Gearhart. I am hoping I can get them a little in advance.
Now, referring to your statement of yesterday, to your description of
Operational Order No. 1, and Operational Order No. 2
The Chairman. If the Congressman will permit, the hour of 12
o'clock has arrived, and unless he can conclude very soon, we might
recess here.
Mr. Gearhart. Very well.
The Chairman. Until 2 o'clock, then.
(Wliereupon at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 : 00 p. m., of
the same day.)
[■5o6^ afternoon session — 2 p. m.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
When the committee recessed, Congressman Gearhart was exam-
ining the witness. He may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. IKGLIS AND
COL. BERNARD THIELEN (Resumed)
Mr, Gearhart. I notice. Admiral, from your report, that in your
leport given to this committee, I find the following words, which I
will read :
Under date of 7 November, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto issued Combined Fleet
Top Secret Operation Order No. 2, saying "First Preparations for War. Y Day
will be December 8." In accordance with the definition of Y Day as given in
Operation Order No. 1, this establishes December 8 only as the approximate
date for commencement of operations. An Imperial Naval Order issued from
the Imperial General Headquarters under date of 2 December 1941 states:
"The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced
on 8 December." This order is in effect the announcement of X Day as defined
in Operation Order No. 1. Thus it becomes apparent that the tentative approxi-
mate date for the attack selected on 7 November and defined as Y Day is
reaffirmed on 2 December as X Day. In other words, the original tentative
date (Y Day) and the final precise date (X Day) are in fact the same date.
[SS7] That is the end of your statement.
In the light of that testimony, and substantiation of it, I desire to
read an abstract of certain decoded or cracked Japanese messages,
which are referred to in the memorandum of the Judge Advocate
General for the Secretary of War.
226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Report.
Board Report dated 25 November, 1944.
The first one is :
5 November translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy,
setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging renewed effort.
The next one I desire to read is the following:
16 November translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington. Referring to
impossibility to change deadline to 25 November and to press negotiations with
the United States.
The third one, 19 Xovember, translated 20 November. Tokyo to
Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the
United States consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will
have to be broken off."
The next one, I call the committee's attention to is the following :
22. November translated 22 November, Tokyo to Washington. [558] Ex-
tends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is
absolute deadline. After that things are automatically going to happen.
The next one I desire to read from this same summary of the Judge
Advocate General is the following :
26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and
yamamoto. Kurusu stating United States will not yield, that he could make
no progress.
Now, I read one more :
28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. States that
in spite of Ambassador's superhuman efforts the United States has "presented a
humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as a basis for negotiations."
Therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days. After that
negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to give im-
pression negotiations are broken off.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlemen yield?
Mr. Gearhart. And finally, and in conclusion of my readings from
the summary of the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, I
read this one :
29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing
Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach.
I thought it would be very interesting, because it [559] abso-
lutely sustains the position here.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield to a question?
Mr. Gearhart. I have concluded.
The Chairman. Was that a question or a statement?
Mr. Murphy. I am making a request, asking the gentleman from
California whether he will yield.
The CHAiRrMAx. The Chair would like to inquire of the gentleman
from California whether what he read was in the nature of a question
or a statement on his part.
Mr. Gearhart. As I read it, it is a statement, but I can convert it
very quickly into a question by asking the witness :
Are you familiar with those documents?
Admiral Ixglis. Officially, no; but they do sound strangely familiar
to my ears. I may have read them in the newspapers or certain por-
tions of them.
[560] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 227
The Chair3cax. Will the gentleman yield to his colleague?
Mr. Gearhart. I have concluded.
The Chairman. You decline to yield ?
Mr. Gearhart. No, I don't; I said I have concluded. If the gentle-
man "wants to make a statement he can be recognized in his own right.
Mr. Murphy. This time is in the hands, as I understand it, of the
gentleman from California.
What I wanted to say was that the paper to which he referred,
the Army Pearl Harbor Board report from which he read, those very
same messages are already in evidence in this case in Exhibit No. 2.
Mr. Gesell. Exhibit No. 1, 1 believe.
Mr. Murphy. Exhibit No. 1.
Mr. Gearhart. I wanted them at this point.
Mr. Murphy. I also wanted to make this request before the gentle-
man concluded his questioning, if he would j'ield.
There has been a request made for the log and certain other papers
from the Boise. According to the newspapers it is in connection with
whether or not the Boise had sighted the enemy force on the way to
Pearl Harbor.
In connection with that I want to make the request that the officer
in charge of the Boise be produced at the time of [_^61^ the log-
ging and that the general officer of the ship who was the informant of
the gentleman from California also be produced so that we might have
the information first-hand.^
The Chair3ian. Give the name to counsel.
Mr. JMuRPHY. I don't know the name, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mitchell. We have already taken steps to get the log of the
Boise. I don't know who her commander was, but if he is still alive
he will be produced.
Mr. Murphy. I understand the log itself will show certain nota-
tions, but since the gentleman from California has raised the issue
I think Ave ought to have before us the informant, who was an officer
of the Boise and the officer in command of the Boise., so that we might
give the American people a full picture.
The Chairman. Will the Navy furnish the committee the name
of the commander of the Boise?
Admiral Ixglis. The committee has been furnished the names of
Commander Robertson and Commander Moran. Perhaps the gentle-
man from California can repeat the name of his informant. I am
not sure that I know that, sir.
Mr. Murphy. May I request the gentleman from California, Mr.
Cliairman, to state the name of the officer who was his informant
about the Boise incident so that the committee, and the American
people, might have all the facts ?
\d62^ Mr. Gearhart. I will have to obtain the name from my
files in my office.
Furthermore, I am not a witness on the stand and I am not subject
to cross-examination by any member of the committee, unless called
as a witness.
If you think that I am going to divulge of my informants you have
seven or eiglit guesses coming. Anybody who gives me information
can rely on the fact tliat their confidences will be kept.
1 The log was subsociuuntly fKUiiittcd to tliu rceDril as Exliiljit Nn. (J8.
228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. The Chair woukl simply observe that if members
of the committee do not wish to be put in the attitude of witnesses
they ought not to testify.
Mr. Gearhakt. I hope the Chairman follows his own admonition.
The Chairman. I have done so up to now and will try to do so in
the future, Con<rressman.
Con^rressman Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions by anj^ member
of the committee of Admiral Ingiis?
Senator Ferguson. One question. I think Admiral Ingiis, when
I was examining him, wanted to make a statement, and I suggested
that he wait. I would like to have him make that statement now. 1
don't want him to feel that he was not [S63] allowed to make it.
The Vice Chairman. I made a note at the time. The Admiral
indicated that he wanted to make some further statement about the
"Climb Mt. Niitaka" message.
Senator Ferguson. I wanted him to have the privilege of making
any statement for the record that he desired.
Admiral Inglis. Thank you, Seinitor. I have already cleared up
that point to my own satisfaction.
Senator Ferguson. By the questioning?
Admiral Inglis. Yes; just following that question.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.
Senator Lucas. I should like to make one observation in view of the
colloquy between Congressman Mur{>hy and Congressman Gearhart.
It does seem to me that if we are going to obtain all the facts, that
any informant, or any individual who has any knowledge about Pearl
Harbor, the full connnittee should know about that individual. The
name of that individual should be given to counsel in order that he,
that individual, may be requested to come and testify, and if he does
not want to testify, and we think his evidence is pertinent and material,
he should be subpenaed. That is the only way you are going to get
all of the facts which, as one member of the conmiittee, ['50'.l] I
want.
These rumors that are being spread by individuals and are occasion-
ally used, at least as a portion of the truth, we should be able to get to
the bottom of those rumors.
The Congressman from California says that anyone wlio wants to
tell him anything will have his confidence, which means that he is not
going to give to the committee the name of that individual, and yet we
are asking, all of us are asking the l^avy and the Army witnesses to
give us the facts completely.
That is what we want and certainly if any member of the committee
has the name of an important witness about Pearl Harbor, who hasn't
the courage to come before the committee and tell his story, then, it
seems to me, such information, or statements, should be seriously
discounted.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions?
Mr. Gearhart. ISIr. Chairman
The CHAIR:^rAIN. Mr. Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. I want to say for the benefit of the distinguished
Senator from Illinois that I intend to exercise a wise discretion in tlie
PROCEEDINGS (3F JOINT COMMITTEE 229
matter of revealing the names of those who give me information, and
if any citizen of this country con)es to me and gives me valuable infor-
mation which will lead me to believe he is a proper witness to be placed
upon the stand I will call that witness' name to the attention of the
l')65] committee and I Avill keep the cfmfidence of the man who
tells me of that Avitness and the testimony that he will give.
If I am to be deprived of the right, or if any member of the commit-
tee is to be denied the right of receiving information from people by
reason of the necessity of revealing their name, that means that you
have closed the door of investigation in our face. I can't think of
anj' better way of discouraging people from coming forward than to
announce in advance that any information they convey will result in
their oAvn subjection to publicity and perhaps to personal embarrass-
ment. I will keep their confidence, if it should be kept.
The Chairmax. Has the Congressman from California concluded?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman
The Chairmax. Just a moment. The Chair wishes to make this
observation, that the record will show that in order to obtain the full-
est infoi-mation from those in the Government services, whether they
are in the military services or in ciA'ilian life, the President issued an
order lifting any ban against them coming forward and giA'ing to the
committee, or to its counsel, or to individual members of the commit-
tee, an}' information they had in their possession, or thought they had,
[■566li which had not otherwise been disclosed.
It has been the understanding, at least it has been my understand-
ing, that when any such person came forward and gave to the com-
mittee or its counsel information, that that information would be
divulged and the name of the informer would be brougb.t to the atten-
tion of the committee, so that it might determine whether to call such
person as a witness.
There was no need for lifting of the ban so far as persons not in the
Government services are concerned. Not only are they free, but I
think it is their duty to come forward and give to the committee, or
any member of the committee, or committee counsel, any information
that they have that will shed light upon this Pearl Harbor situation.
In view of the fact that it was understood that any person in the
Government of the United States, in any capacity, who came forAvard
with information to the members of the committee, the member re-
ceiving such information Avould make it known to the committee.
The Chair, of course, has no desire to regulate the attitude of any
member on that subject. The very object of lifting the ban, so far
as Government employees was concerned, was so that the committee
might have all the information.
[■567] iMr. MuRPHT. Mr. Chaii-man
The Chairmax. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MuRPrrY. I might say the only reason I brought up the subject
is that I understand from reading the paj^ers that the gentleman from
California was informed by someone of the crew, an officer of the
Baise, as to something relative to the .Japanese force having been
sighted. That is a question now that we have to decide and certainly
that is pertinent evidence; it is important evidence.
230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
If there is an eye-witness in the workl, we ought to have him, and
if the gentleman from California knows of that eye-witness, I think
he ought to put his name on the record.
Mr. Keei-^e. Mr. Chairman
The Chairman. Mr. Keefe.
IMr. Keefe. As one member of this committee, down at the tail end,
the last one, may I suggest that I am interested in getting on with this
proceeding. Let's call the witnesses and get the facts. I would like
to get on with this hearing.
The Chair^ian. The Chair wishes enthusiastically to confirm and
commend the gentleman from Wisconsin in that desire.
Are there any further questions b}' any member of the committee
of Admiral Inglis?
(No response.)
[S68] The Chairman. Is there any further question any mem-
ber desires to ask Colonel Thielen ?
(No response.)
The Chairman. If not, the Chair will —
Does the admiral wish to make any further statement ?
Admiral Ingeis. I think I can make one statement that may be help-
ful to the committee. It concerns the Japanese operation order No. 1.
I just want to clear up one point that might be confusing.
The copy of this order which we have does not specifically direct
the striking force to attack Pearl Harbor. An examination of the
document shows that an attempt was made by the Japanese to delete
all reference to the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Apparently this was done before the document was forwarded by
the Japanese to the heavy cruiser Nachi, because the Nachi was not
allocated to the Pearl Harbor striking force.
However, apparently, due to an oversight by the Japanese official
A\ ho forwarded this to the Nachi, several brief references to the plan
for the attack on Pearl Harbor were left in the document as recovered
from the Nachi.
That is all I have.
The Chairman. The Chair wishes to thank Admiral Inglis
\dG9] and Colonel Thielen on behalf of the committee for the
diligence with which 3^ou have carried out the assignment given you,
in undertaking to bring to the attention of the committee a vivid pic-
ture of what happened at Pearl Harbor on December T, 1941, and the
circumstances surrounding it.
The Chair fefels that you are entitled to have it said that you have
both had a very distinguished career in the armed services of the
United States.
I understand that you, Admiral, were appointed to Annapolis, the
Naval Academy, from the State of Michigan, by Congressman Wood-
ruff, who is still a member of the House of Representatives, and that
you have had, in service in World War I, and World War II, an out-
standing record, that you have been cited numerous times,
decorated for that service. It is a matter about which I know you
would not speak, but I want to commend your enthusiasm and your
diligence and commend you for the patriotic service that you have
rendered the United States in World War No. I and in World ^\'ar II.
To you, Colonel Thielen, I wish to say that the committee thanks
you.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 231
YoiT were appointed, as I understand it, to West Point by com-
petitive examination from the Armj'^, and that yon have \o70\
also had a distinguished career in the Army and have rendered
outstanding service in this war, have been decorated and cited a num-
ber of times for heroic service, evidence of which you bear upon your
bosom, and on behalf of the committee I wish to thank you and com-
mend 3'OU for the task Avhich you undertook and for what seems to the
Chair to be a successful accomplishment of that task.
Admiral Inglis. Thank you very much.
Colonel TniELEisr. Thank you.
The Cpiairman, Who is the next witness, Mr. Counsel?
Mr. Mitchell. We will first offer in evidence us exhibit 8, the
material from the War Department, which contributed to the sum-
mai-y of the Japanese attack. This includes the preliminary mes-
sage from General MacArthur's headquarters, dated October 14, the
follow-up message of October 15, and then the other documents which
he sent along by air mail, and which have been referred to by the
witnesses.
Now, there are many other documents which have been used as the
basis of this summary of the story of the Japanese attack, and unless
some members of the committee have a different view, I would sug-
gest that instead of being put into the record, and making a big
printing job, these documents be just held for the use of the committee
members here. If you want them in the record, I will offer them.
[-57i] The Chairman. Are they sufncienth^ numerous thrtt each
member may have a copy i'
Mr. Mitchell. There is only one copy here. We could have a set
made of all of them, and if you want them in the record later, we
can offer them.
The Chairman. The Chair suggests that for the time being they not
be printed as a part of the record, but if members of the committee
desire them individually, they can have them.
The Vice Chairman. I didn't quite . understand Mr. IMitcheHV
statement. Are these additional messages, or additional inforr.iation
received from General MacArthur?
Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 8 I offered, because one of the members of
the connnittee rec{uested I do so. It includes everything that came
from MacArthur.
The Vice Chairman. That is the same one that all of us were given
a copy of ?
Mr. jMitchell. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Is there anything in addition to that ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.
Senator Brewster. I thought you were referring to these Japanese
exhibits. Were those the documents you were referring to?
[S73] Mr. M'tchell. Exhibit 8 includes all the documents tiiat
came from the War Department through General MacArthur's head-
quarters on which the Japanese story of tlie attack is based.
I offer that separateh^, because some members of the connnittee
requested me to do so.
If that request had not been made, I would have made the request
as to all of this material, both Ai-my and Navy, that Ave not put it in
the record at present, unless somebody wants it, but have it copied and
distributed among the members.
232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The committee already has copies of the MacArthur material.
Senator Brewster. I understood that the request was that tlie
MacArthur material should be in the record. I thought you were now
referring to the other exhibits which offered all of these translated
Japanese 'documents, which I think certainly wouldn't be at all
necessary to put in the record, but simply have available.
[S7S] The Vice Chairman. That is just what I am thinking.
The CiiAiRMAX. That is right. As the Chair understands it, the
MacArthur information has already been made part of the record.
Senator Brewster. Is that correct ? '
The Chairman. Is that correct ?
Mr. Mitchell. I have just offered it as Exhibit 8. Tliat is the
INIacArthur material and I offer it because some members of the com-
mittee wanted it in. Now, the Navy material, I have not offei-ed that.
Senator Brewster. Just a minute. I thought that was going in the
record.
The Chairman. It is.
Senator Brewster. He is offering it as an exhibit and it is a part of
this record and is going to be in the record, is it not?
Mr. ISIitchell. Not according to a lawyer's point of view.
The Chairman. Well, the exhibit may or may not be printed in the
hearings and it is my understanding that this exhibit is to be printed
in the printed record.
Mr. Mitchell. Maybe the Senator, when he speaks of the record, is
referring to documents being read in the room and transcribed by the
reporter. Is that what you have in mind ?
Senator Brewster. When I referred to the record I meant [57^]
to the typed record Avhich we are receiving as opposed to any exhibits
which are. of course, part of the record, but are not incorporated in
the printed records.
Mr. Mitchell. This exhibit will not be written out at lai-ge in the
reporters' transcript, but when the record is made u]), the whole record,
the exhibit will appear as a part of the record of the committee.
The Chairman. You are speaking now about exhibit 8 i
Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 8.
The Chairman. Yes. Now, the other exhibit that you referred to,
which you suggested not be printed as a part of the hearing, what is
that?
Mr. Mitchell. Now, unless some member of the committee thinks
it necessary
The Chairman. What was that exhibit ?
Mr. Mitchell. This was the material, the captured documents,
statements from captured Japanese war prisoners, that the Navy
received.
The Chairman. Is it agreeable then that that be held for the in-
formation of the committee subject to later action if it is desired to
have them made a part of the hearing?
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think they should be made part of
the record for only this reason. The people of America want to know
all the facts and this hearing is being held for the people of America
as well as for the conunittee l-^'^'^l and. certainly, these docu-
ments are such that in order for the ordinary citizen to judge the
record thev ought to be ^Diead on the record for them.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 233
Mr. Mitchell. Well, if the Congressman feels that, way I would
have all the material, both Army and Navy, on which the story of the
Jap attack has been based, introduced in evidence and I am doing that
in Exhibit 8.
Now, Senator, do you want this MacArthur material transcribed at
length in the daily transcript, is that what you want?
Senator Brewster. That was my understand hig. You say "at
length." It is not, of course, at all at length compared with what we
have, but this, it seems to me, to be a most excellent sununary, com-
parable, certainly, to the summary which we received.
The Chairman. Is it the wish of the committee that these exhibits
referred to, the MacArthur information, and also the Japanese exhibits
upon which the statement has been based, as has been already detailed
by Admiral Inglis, be printed now as a part of the daily record of the
hearing?
Senator Breavster. As far as I am concerned, I sense, counsel's
distinction between the MacArthur report and the captured Japanese
documents. I think that liepresentative Murphy's suggestion is that
it might be well to have those printed as exhibits as well, but I think
t h'cit we may want to ['576] put them in the transcripts as well.
Mr. Mitchell. Let me see if I can settle it this way :
I offer in evidence as Exhibit 8 all of the material, Army and Navy,
on which the story of the Jap attack has been forjnulated here, with
the understanding that that part of Exhibit 8 which came from
MacArthur's headquarters will be copied into t]ie daily transcript
by the reporter and the Navy material will not, but will be printeij
later on as a part of the exhibits. That is what j-ou want, is it i
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. That is agreeable.
The Chairman. Is that satisfactory ?
Senator Brewster. Now, then, that includes the captured Japanese
personnel material in the later part of the record, is Ihat correct?
Mr. Mitchell. The Japanese captured material will not be written
in tlie daily typewritten transcript.
Senator Brewster. No.
Mr. Mitchell. But it will be attached to the record as an exhibit.
The Chairman. That is understood then.
(The documents referred to above were marked "Exhibit No. 8,"
and in part follow herewith.)
[577] confidential
Paiuphbase of Message Dated 14 October From I^IagArthtjr's Headquaktek.s
TO War Depart jfENT
Japanese say ruauy records were burned. However, complete report, with
chart of task force, now being written and to be sent by air. I'reliniinary
information received from the Jai)anese Navy is as follows: On 5 November
1!)41, plan for attack on Pearl Harbor was adopted, and on 1 December 1941
Cabinet Council decided on commencement of hostilities. Order that hostile
action should open on 8 December was issued by Imperial General Headquarters
(m 2 December. Navy section of Injperial General Headquarters and Combined
Fleet Headquarters were involved in discussions and decisions to make attack.
Commander in Chief Combined Fleet on 2') November ordered task force to
leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North — 170° East by
afternoon .3 December for complete refueling. Attaci? force was organized as
follows: 1st Air Squadron (Kaga and Alagi (Akagi), 2nd Air Squadron (Hiryu
234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and Soryu), 5th Air Squadron (Zuikaku and Shokaku), 3rd Squadron (Hiel and
Kongo), Sth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma), 4 destroyer divisions making one
squadron, S ti'ansports and 2 suhnir.rines.
Japanese lost 27 aircraft; estimate damage to U. S. Navy at 2 battleships
(Oklahoma and West Virginia) sunk, [578] 4 battleships and 4 heavy
cruisers damaged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned
or shot down.
Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from
Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance sub-
marines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of vrar and, (d) things heai-d '
from ships AAhich called at Hawaii mid-Novemlser.
[579] confidential
Paraphrase of INIessages Dated 15 October 1945 From jNIacArtkur's
Headquarters to War Department
1. We are continuing local investigation.
2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence
Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of partial
coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on way to
Tokyo from 3ilanila. Documents on which collation is based have already been
sent to Washington.
[580] General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander For Thei Allied Powers,
S November, J9-'i5.
AG 350.05 (8 Nov 45) GB
Subject : Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)
1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945) GB, and
AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with
your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945,
requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect
to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an addirinnal partial report,
is forwarded herewith.
2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question
48 of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army
and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our connnunication
of 26 October referred to above.
FOU THE SUPltEXfE COMMANDEU :
/S/ H. W. Allen,
H. W. Allen,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.
1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.
[581] Doc. No. 1668
Allied Translator and Inteepreiteb Section United States Army Forces,
Pacific
Note: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
pearl harbor questionnaire
26 October 1945
The answers to questions 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19. 20 and 48 of Colonel MUNSON'S
questionnaire of 17 October, the PEARL HARBOR Attack, are contained
herein.
Note: Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshlhira (28
December 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August 1943), who were
staff oflicers in the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and
because of the pertinent records have been burned, these answers are based
upon the recollections of Commander TACHIBANA, Itaru, who was on duty
in the Intelligence Department at that time.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 235
14. Sources of intelligence?
Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES FLEET in the HAAVAII
area, the coudition of military installations, the days upon which the fleet
moved out of and into port, the location and coudition of moorages, waters in
which maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc. ; were used as basic intelligence
material. This material was collated by th^ Intelligence Department of the
Naval General Staff [582] and used as the basis for the operation plan.
Tlie primary sources were :
1. Naval attache to the Japauese Embassy in Washington.
■2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES.
'S. American radio broadcasts (public).
4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at HONOLULU.
5. General information.
lucll
15. Cliaiacteristics of intelUgencc?
Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of
years.
16. How and from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel
oi the air units obtained?
A. The location of the anchorages .shown on the maps was determined on
the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in "14", beginning
in the early pai-t of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages
in PEARL HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet
Headquarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly.
B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled
trum the sources listed in "14".
C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force
and the air units were determined [oSS] from information provided by
tlie previously named source. Factors taken into consideration in the choice
v>-ere American air patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were judged to
be those upon which there was slight chance of encountering a patrol, merchant
ships, etc.
17. in what way did the Attack Force check on information while it was
underway?
As information was gathered from the sources mentioned in "14" it was for-
warded to the Attack Force.
18. V,'hat role teas played by agents in HAWAII?
None.
19.-20. Photographing of ships in the harbor and opportunities for same.
Applicable facts not available.
48. What pertinent informatioyi icas received frO'in merchant ships prior to
flic attack?
Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on. moorages in PEARL
HARBOR, .ship and air unit maneuvers, the names of vessels encountered in
the HAWAII area, etc. This information was used in the statistical collation
oi information mentioned in "14".
[58.'f] General Headquarters
SuPiiEME Commander for the Allied Pov/eks
AG S.jO.Or. (1 Nov 45) GB 1 Novcnihrr V.}',',.
Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To : Chief of Staff, War Detiartment, Washington, D. C.
(Attention : A. C. of S., G-2)
1. Reference our communication AG 350.0."; (2G October 1945), GB, same
subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec,
7 October 1945 and WX 7.5.j61, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information
to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor
on 7 December 1941, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith.
2. 'I'his reiiort was compiled by the Liaison Conunittee (Tokyo) for the Im-
jierial Japanese Army and Navy in re-sponse to our Qeustionnaire furnished
the Liai.son Committee on 17 October, a copy of wliicli was forwarded as Incl.
No. 4 to our communication of 20 October (referred to above) and includes
236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
detailed information in answer to questions 1-13 inclusive, 21-28 inclusive, and
30-47 inclusive, thereof.
3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have
been largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by inter-
rogation of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Estab- [5So j
lishments of the time. Sources of "such items of information are stated in the
text.
4. The Japanese report that answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and ques-
tion 48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which opera-
tional plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in
progress. Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the
time of surrender; however, efforts to reconstruct it, at least partially, from
memory and from fragmentary soui'ces, are being continued. This additional
information will be forwarded as soon as received and translated.
Fob the Supbeme Commander :
/s/ H. W. Atxen.
Colonel, A. G. D..
Asst. Adjutant General.
1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.
[586] Doc. 1032
Allied Tuansi-ator and Inteepeeter Section
United States Abmy Forces, Pacific
Note: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical
Investigation Section, G-3, 17 October-20 October 1945.
REPLY TO A questionnaire CONCIERNING PEARL H ABHOR ATTACK
[587] Doc. #1032 DRM/FMO/HDP
[Pp. 1] I. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16. 17, IS, 19. 20 and 48 (that is. the informa-
tion therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be forwarded
later.
II. The reply to Paragraphs 20 (concerning orders) will be delayed because
all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the surrender. A de-
tailed report based on the recollections of the peoijle concerned and on frag-
mentary sources, without the aid of documents which should be available, is in
iireparation.
[Pp. 2] (Note: The following Paragraphs 1, 2. 3, and 4 are based on the
recollections of Chief of Oi)erations Section Naval General StiifE, Gapt TOMIOKA,
Sadatoshi ; member of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Conidr. MIYO,
Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and
Comdr WATANABE, Yasuji.)
1. Who eonceivcd and proposed the PEARL HARBOR surprise atlach?
Adm YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then CinC, Combined Fleet.
2. When ira.s' this done?
The first part of January 1941. (CinC YAMMOTO ordei-ed Rear Adm ONISHI,
Takijiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to study the operation.)
3. Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipalion of a uiir against
the UNITED STATES) included in JAPAN'S [5SS] prcicar plans?
No.
4. If this is so. icriie the facts shoicn in the pretoar plans.
(No statement.)
[Pp. 3] (Note: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are basea <;n the recol-
lections of Adm NAGANO, Osami. then Chief of the Naval General Staff.)
5. When was it decided to attack PEARL HARBOR?
3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO,
when CinC. Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO came to TOKYO.
6. Who made the foregoing decision?
Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO.
7. // the decision vas made in conference, give time of said conference and
names of all persons present.
It was not made in conference.
4. (Note: The following Paragraphs 8, 0, 10, 11 and 12 are based upon the
recollections of Chief of the Operations Section Naval Geiieral Staff, Capt
TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, Comdr IMIYO, Tatsukichi, a luemlH'r of the Operation Sec-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 237
tional Naval General Staff; and Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, a member of the
Combined Fleet Staff.)
8. What important factors were considered in reaching this decision?
The factors considered were: (1) rendering impotent [o6'9] the
UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of
action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPI^■E Islands),
and (2) the defense of our mandated islands.
9. Who were the persons who icorked out the details of the actual plan?
Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet Operations
Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff".
10. When was the above undertaking started?
In the first part of September 1941.
11. Who made the final confirmation of this plan when it was completed?
CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.
[Pp. 5] 12. When teas the final confirmation of this plan made?
1 Dec 41.
13. Who were the people and organizations loho Jcnetc of this plan?
(Note: This answer is based on the recollections of the Chief of the Naval
General Staff, Adm NAGANO, Osami ; Chief of the Operations Section Naval
General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi ; and Comdr MIYO, Takkichi, a mem-
ber of the Operations Section Naval General Staff.)
Those connected with the Navy are as follows :
(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance :
[590] Chief of the Naval General Staff
Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff
Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff
Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff
The Commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff members
of the Combined Fleet Hq and 1 Air Fleet Hq
(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance :
Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff
Navy Minister
• Navy Vice-Minister
Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry
Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval Affairs, and some of their
personnel
Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their chiefs of
staff and some of the staff members.
(3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance :
The Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking the main
strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet with a task force
after the last ultimatum to the UNITED STATES Government [591 ]
had been delivered.)
(Note: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are unknown.
However, it is certain that none of the Japanese ofiicials who were in the UNITED
STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador NOMURA, Ambassador
KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached to the embassy in the UNITED
STATES and the Imperial Consul in HONULULU, knew anything about this
plan in advance.)
[Pp. 7] (Note: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the
recollections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt
TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi ; Comdr MIYO, Takkichi, a meml)er of the Operations Sec-
tion Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt KUROSHIMA,
Kameto, and Comdr WATANABE, Yasuji ; and the commanding officer of the
AKAGI Air Unit, Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.)
21. Write a detailed report on hoio this plan could have been improved.
a. 27ie obstacles ichich were considered and hoio they were overcome.
(1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was considered.
To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruising range were deck-
loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was stowed in open spaces inside
the ship. In the eventuality that there were no opportunity to refuel at sea,
all the ships except the [592] destroyers had a cruising radius extending
to approximately E. Long. 160°. In the event the destroyers were unable to
refuel there was a plan to have them separate and return. In actual fact, how-
ever, the sea was comparatively calm and the scheduled refueling was possible.
79716 — 46 — pt. 1 18
238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was, the
most effective method or putting the main strength of the UNITED STATES
PACIFIC Fleet in the HAWAII area out of action for a considerably long period
of time. Hence, the following two obstacles were considered :
(a) The fact that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and shallow.
(b) The fact that PEARL HARBOR was probably equipped with torpedo nets.
(c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torjpe-
does and launch them from an extremely low altitude.
(d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing
attack was also employed.
b. Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom? There were none.
c. How were the units and commanding officers who were to participate se-
lected {surface forces and air forces) f
[Pp. 9] Air forces: The basic unit was organized by attaching the flight
personnel of Car Div 4 (RYUJO and RYUHO) to Car [593] Div 1
(AKAGI, KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time
the most highly trained units in the combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because it had
just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight personnel from
every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated training, it was planned to
bring them to peak efficiency.
Surface forces : As far as possible, vessels with a long cruising range were
selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers.
d. What iccre the reasons for the actual course selected?
Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The northern
course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following
along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route passing through the
MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the south. On the northern route,
although it was far from the enemy patrol screen of land-based airplanes and
there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather
and topography were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult.
On the central and southern routes the advantages and disad- [Pp. 10]
vantages are generally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route.
Although it may be assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes
of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great
because the routes near WAKE, MIDWAY, PALMYRA, JOHNSTON [5941
Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a surprise attack
could be made.
The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation.
If either of them failed the execution of the operation would have been impossible.
However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other
hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be assured by our own
strength. Therefore, the northern route was selected.
e. M^hat preparations were made for the prevention of discovery en route?
(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the ALEU-
TIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol planes.
(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and in the
event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet would make a
severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection.
[Pp. 11] (3) Complete radio silence was carried out.
f. In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have been
taken f ,
The day of the attack was designated as X-day.
If discovered prior to X-2 Day, we would have returned without executing the
air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1 Day, the question of whether
to make an [595] attack or to return would have been decided in accord-
ance with the local conditions.
g. What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention of the
UN f TED STATES elseivherc?
The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Area and the land-based air units in
the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures
were taken to indicate that the Task Force was still in training in the KYUSHU
Area.
h. // the attack had failed, what countermeasures tcould have been taken?
In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main Force in
the INLAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean.
OT««r»d to deploy «t 0
SlT* bODtl&e unit
Attack nir. or4»r«-
ttdl BoBblii« Onlt
79716 O— 46— pt. 1 (Pmep. 239) No. 3
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
239
[Pp. 12] 22. Btate reasons for and particulars of the selection of tlie date
of 7 December.
(1) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged 8 De-
cember (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational standpoint and made
the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the Combined Fleet.
(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth would
have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon. However, since
it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet, in accordance with
its habits during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday [596] and
leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so as to hit between these days.
[Pp. 13] 23. How was the time for the attack selected and for what reasons?
In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the
take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as possible. The attack
time was set at 0330 hours (JAPAN time). (Sunrise that day was at 0230
hours.)
1598] [Pp. 15] (2) Air Strength: (a) Reconnaissance Unit.
Type
Type of airpianes
Number
of
airplanes
Ships on which based
Duty
Airplanes for reron-
naissance just be-
Type Zero Reconnais-
sance Seaplanes.
2
/TONE (1).-
fReconnaissance of
PEARL HARBOR
\CHIKUMA (1)
choraee Just before
I the attack.
Type 95 Reconnais-
sance Seaplanes.
4
fHIEI (1)
1
Search-patrol planes..
KIRISHIMAd)
TONE (1).. . .
1 Patrolling waters
1 around OAHU.
CHIKUMA (1)
[601] [Pp. 18] 25. During this operation were any of the fleet units or
air forces diverted to attack secondary targets?
(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr.
FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, wlio was in command of the AKAGI Air Unit at tliat time.)
(1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEBONO, USHIO) left TOKYO
Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 8 December,
bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part of the INLAND Sea.
The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served as a supply ship.
(2) On 16 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two aircraft car-
riers (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHIKUMA), and two
destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted to WAKE Island. They
were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support the WAKE Invasion Operation.
[Pp. 19] 26. (Note: These answers are based on the recollections and in-
quiries of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI Air Unit at
that time.)
a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air attack,
giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target
(1) FjU-st Attack.
(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).
Target : Battleships.
[602] Reasoning :
(1) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effectively
Gripped by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an altitude of 3,000
meters or more.
(2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was esti-
mated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had, an 80% ratio
of hits could be expected against stationary battleships if formations of Ave
airplanes were employed from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more. Therefore,
it was concluded that about four battleships could be effectively crippled
with 10 formations of bombers.
240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(S) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use as many
of them as possible, however, both bombing attacks and torpedo attacks
were used for the following reasons :
(a) If torpedo nets were layed, the attack would otherwise be
unsuccessful.
(&) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in
PEARL HARBOR requires special techniqua
(c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs [60S] abreast
each other. Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective
method against the inside ships.
b. Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).
Target : Battleships and aircraft carriers.
Reasoning :
Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most skillful at
shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an attempt made to put
as many battleships and carriers temporarily out of action due to underwater
damage as the conditions previously related in "(c)" would permit. (Be-
cause the carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the
airplanes concentrated on the battleships.)
c. Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).
Target : Air bases.
15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes) — Hangars and grounded airplanes at FORD
Island.
16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes) — Hangars and grounded airplanes at
WHEELER.
Reasoning:
(1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the UNITED
STATES PACIFIC Fleet [60 i] temporarily out of action, the attack
was directed at the battleships and carriers. However, fighter plane bases
were attacked first because it was necessary to prevent a counterattack by
American fighter planes against our main attack units — the horizontal bomb-
ing and torpedo bombing units.
(2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED STATES
Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the UNITED STATES
PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD Island.
d. Fighter striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters).
Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.
2 Fighter Striking Unit— FORD Island and HICKHAM.
4 Fighter Striking Unit— WHEELER and BARBERS POINT.
6 Fighter Striking Unit— KANEOHB.
Reasoning:
(1) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to main-
tain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any enemy fighter
planes which got into the air.
[605] (2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to
split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the varrious
airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack.
(2) Second Attack.
(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).
Target : Air bases.
6 Attack Unit — Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM.
5 Attack Unit— Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANEOHE, FORD
Island and BARBERS POINT.
Reasoning :
By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of action, a
counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented.
(b) Dive Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).
Target: Aircraft carriers and cruisers.
Reasoning :
[606] (1) Although the 250-kg. bombs which the airplanes were able
to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleships, it was estimated that
they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers and carriers
of that time.
(2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American carriers
operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets of this dive bombing
unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of
the attack, most of the blows were directed against battleships.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 241
(c) Fighter Striking Unit (3G Type Zero Fighters).
Targets : Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.
2 Fighter Striking Unit— FORD Island and HICKHAM.
4 Fighter Striking Unit— WHEELER and KANEOHE.
Reasoning :
Same as stated previously.
b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units followed
from the aircraft carriers to the targets.
[607] Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the
carriers at OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense clouds hung
at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above them.)
The positions of the carrier groups were as follows :
(1) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The
carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANA)
Island.
( 2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours. The
carriers were 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI
Island,
[pp 26] The movements of the airplanes after they came in sight of OAHU is
shown in the appended sketch.
c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target.
First Attack Unit :
Dive Bombing Unit— WHEELER Field— 0325 hours.
Torpedo Attack Unit — Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage — 0327 hours.
Horizontal Bombing Unit — Same as above — 0235 hours.
Fighter Striking Unit — Began ground strafing — 0330 hours.
[60S] Second Attack Unit.
All three units — Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and Fighter
Striking Unit — attacked their targets about 0430 hours. However, details
are not available because the Commanding Officer of the Second Attack Unit,
Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in January 1945.
(Note: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated. Both
First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an hour).
[pp 27] d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their flight back to the
carriers? Why were these courses chosen?
A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical miles bear-
ing 340° from KAENA* Point. From there all units proceeded directly back to
the carriers.
Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to withdrawing on
courses designed to deceive possible opposition.
[pp 29] 27. How were midget submarines used?
(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi,
Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.)
a. Reasons for use :
To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-operation in
the assault by the air forces.
[609] b. How many were used?
Five.
c. Were they expected to return?
While the probability that they would be able to return was very small, it was
not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine personnel, however,
were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. (They were pre-
cursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.)
d. Did any return?
None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were exhausted.
e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this weapon,
[pp 30] The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance
to PEARL HARBOR witnessed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631 hours
8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio report on the
success of the attack was received from one of the midget submarines at 1811
hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December, HAWAII time).
It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there were
no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the daylight attack on
8 December; but it was verified that the night attack [610] on the same
day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great damage was caused to
one or more large war vessels.
242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[pp 31] 28. Was this a well-elaborated plan or one developed, lor the emer-
gency t
(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi,
Chief of Operations Section, Naval General Staff, and of Comdr FUCHIDA,
Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)
a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have been dis-
carded or modified?
(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded.
b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been
modified?
(Replies by FUCHIDA:)
(1) Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or had
there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would have coun-
terattacked.
(2) Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area of
about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the American
fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw.
[pp 32] (Note: The following replies. Paragraphs 30-38, are based on the
recollections of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, 1611^ Commanding OfBcer of
AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)
SO. When did the Task Force begin to form?
The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might be on or
about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or tn small formations and to
rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November.
31. Where was the rendezvoust
TANKAPPU-WAN.
32. When did the Task Force get underway on its tnisslonf
It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 26 November.
S3. Was there any provision to receive icord of a settlement while this Task
Force was underway f What steps would have ieen taken if a compromise had
been reached?
Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TANKAPPU-
WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN.
SJf. Did everything proceed according to plant
Yes.
[pp 33] 35. If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen
and ivhyf
(No statement.)
S6. Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway?
No.
37. Was any shipping, other tJian Japanese, seen while underway?
[612] None.
38. If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures would have been
taken f
(No statement.)
[613] [pp. 34] 39. Why was the air assault not continued, and why was
it not followed up by surface units or by a landing?
(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo,
Commanding OiRcer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)
(1) The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the
UNTED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might
make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished by
air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the American
task forces were unknown, and since the chances of scouting them were
small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the 50-odd
remaining HAWAII-based large airplanes, the advantages of a quick with-
drawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was undertaken.
(2) No landing operation was planned because it would have been impos-
sible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after
the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the problems
of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it
unlikely that the initial attack could have been accomplished without
detection.
[pp 35] (Note: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the
recollections and inquiries of Comdr. FUCHIDA, [61Jt] Mitsuo, Command-
ing Officer of AKAGI Unit at tliat time.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 243
40. What damage did the Japanese receive?
In the First Attack:
Fighter planes 3
Dive bombers .^ — ^ — ,-^ r- 1
Torpedo bombers , , . 5
Total -r ^ — 9
In the Second Attack:
Fighter planes 6
Dive bombers 14
Total . . _20
Grand total 29
41. What was the estimated damage to American forces?
(1) Naval vessels:
Sunk: 4 battleships
1 cruiser
2 tankers
[pp 36] Heavily damaged : 4 battleships
Lightly damaged: 1 battleship
(2) Airplanes
Shot down : Approximately 10 Airplanes.
Burned or destroyed on the ground: Approximately 250 airplanes.
Total: Approximately 260 airplanes.
[615] It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a con-
siderable number were destroyed in the hangars.
42. How was the damage inflicted on the Americans determined?
(1) From reports of flight personnel upon their return.
(2) From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel.
(Note: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results immediately
after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered, after com-
pleting its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the results.)
[Pp 37] 43. Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed
in additional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the
main attack?
(Note: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Comdr
FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit, and
of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet.)
Apart from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of PEARL
HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in follow-up
attacks or in reconnaissance.
[616] [Pp38] (Note: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based
on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time
of the attack.)
45. Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack
on PEARL HARBOR :
Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the day
before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They were
ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified.
46a. If there were, where were these submarines based?
Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at KWAJA-
LEIN, to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed in leaving
JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII.
b. What were their operation orders?
The orders given to the submarines were as follows : Part were to proceed
with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII; the ma-
jority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in Hawaiian waters
by the evening of [pp 39] 7 December, while the midget submarines
were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy fleet as well as
strike into PEARL HARBOR.
At the same time, they were given strict [617] orders not to attack until
the Task Force strike had been verified.
c. Were reports made during and after the attack?
244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
When the Task Force and the midget submarine strikes were completed, the
midget submarines reported as follows:
(1) Report of the attack as observed by a midget submarine on the night
of December 8.
(2) A midget submarine radioed the same night "Surprise attack
succeds".
(3) A report on the departure of midget submarmies and that it was
impossible to recover their personnel though all recovery measures had been
tried.
d. What damage was sustained by the submarines?
One submarine was detected and depth-charged by patrol vessels near the
entrance [pp. 40] to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the
antisubmarine net, it extricated itself, after some damage, and returned safely.
Apart from this case there was one other submarine lost off PEARL HARBOR;
the time and place of its sinking are unknown.
47. How long did the submarines remain in Hawaiian waters?
The submarines continued operations in the vicinity of HAWAII from
8 December, the day of the [618] attack, until early January of the fol-
lowing year. During this time, most of the submarines proceeded to the west
coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy shipping, and part of the submarines
returned to JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the Hawaiian area for the
maximum length of time.
[619] General Headquaetees
SUPBEME Commanded of the Allied Powers
AG 350.05 (26 Oct 45) GB. 26 October 1945.
Subject: Additional data with reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attn: A. C. of S., C-2)
1. Compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 Octoljer 1945, and WX
75561. 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the
Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the
attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1. 2, 3, and 5. are foi-warded in amplifica-
tion of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October 1945.
2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo)
for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which
has been furnislied the Liaison Committe in order to guide their effoi'ts into
the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage pos-
sible is attached hereto as Inclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted
as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated.
Foe the supeeme commandee:
/s/ H. W. Allen.
Colonel. A. G. D.
Ass't Adiutant Oenerul.
[620] 5 incls :
Incl 1 — Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45.
Incl 2 — Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45.
Incl 3 — Report, Liaison Committee, 11 Oct 45.
Incl 4 — Questionnaire to Liaison Committee.
Incl 5 — Map, routes of Jap Fleet.
[621] Liaison Committee (Tokto) fob Tsm Impeeial Japanese Aemt and
Navy
8 October 19^5.
N. D. No. 108
To : Colonel F. P. Munson, USA.
Gr-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii which
has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to Com-
mander Yamaguchi, I. J. N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial
Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945.
K. Nakamuba,
Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.
(Incl. #1)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 245
1622] General Survey of the Attack on Hawaii Prepared in Accordance with
Oral Instructions by Col. Muuson to Commander Yamagiichi of the Liaison
Committee for the Imperial Army and Navy.
I. Operation Orders
A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters
(1) Imperial Naval Order
(a) (Issued 1 December)
Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and
self-defense, has reached a decision to declare war on the
United States of America, British Empire and the Nether-
lands. Time to start an action will be given later.
(2) The Instruction by the Chief of the Naval General staff under
the Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order.
(Later abridged: Naval General Staff Instruction).
(a) (Issued 1 December)
The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shaU,
at the start of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet
in the Hawaiian Area to reduce it to impotency, using the
First Air Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force.
(3) Imperial Naval Order
(a) (Issued 2 December)
[623] The hostile actions against the United States of
America, the British Empire and the Netherlands shall be
commenced on December 8.
(4) Naval General Staff Instruction
(a) (Issued 2 December)
Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Jap-
anese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settle-
ment prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the
forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble
and return to their bases.
B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet
and other Headquarters.
The subject matters are being investigated through memners connected with
the said forces of that period.
II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources.
(1) Reports of Naval Attache in Washington D. C. (Announce-
ments by American Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.)
(2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid-
November.
(3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters
immediately preceding the outbreak of war.
[62Ii] (4) Radio Broadcasts from Hawaii.
III. Organization of Attacking Force
First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga)
Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Iliryu)
Fifth Air Squadron (Shokaku and Zuikaku
Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei)
Eighth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma)
First Destroyer Squadron (Abukuma, 6th Destroyer Division, 17th De-
stroyer Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer Division.)
Supply Force (8 Transports)
Submarine Force (2 Submarines)
IV. Movement of Attacking Force (See attached Map)
v. Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy.
Sunk — 2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma), 1 Destroyer, 1 Trans-
port.
Seriously Damaged — 4 Battleships, 4 Heavy Cruisers.
Aircraft shot down or burned — over 350
VI. Losses of Japanese Navy
Failed to Return — 27 aircrafts.
N. B. As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those
who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be
made.
246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[625] Liaison Committee (Tokyo) fob the Imperial Japanese Abmt and
Navy
10 October 1945.
N. D. No. 123.
To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of the Supi'eme Commander
for the Allied Puvvers.
Re: N. D. No. 1U8, 8 October 1945.
Subject: Additions to the Auswers already given to the questions regarding the
Attack on Hawaii,
1. Additional operational orders:
(a) Units of the attaekiug forces assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Etorofu-jima),
by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Couibined Fleet.
N. ii. — About 14 November the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet is-
sued tiie above order because he recognised Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable
place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new development in the situa-
tion, as'well as to keep its location and movements secret.
(b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by order of the Imperial General
Headquarters.
N. B. — Around 21 November the situation had seemed to be appronching to a
stage where conmiencement [626] of hostilities would be inevitable. The
Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the follow-
ing order (Imperial Niival Order) to the I'onminncler-in-Cliief of the Combined
Fleet: 'The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary
forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall
station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such
that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such
situation promptly."
But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurusu to the United
States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American
negotiations to an amicable settlement, an in.struction had already been issued
by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces
were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United
States proving successful.
2. Inforuuition rega riling the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the force, of
which tlie luicleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one outside of
the Japanese Navy.
Even within the Navy, the only ones who knew of the above fact were in
addition to the attiicking force itself, tiie leading ofBoers of the Navy Section of
the ImperiQl General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and [627]
a certain restricted number of officers intimately concerned with the fleet
opera ti()n.
3. "Radio broadcasts from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source
of information were the broadcasts made to the general public.
K. Nakamura,
Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.
[628] Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and
Navy
11 October 1945.
N. D. No. 130.
To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 General Headquarters of the Supreme
Coumiander for the Allied Powers.
In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby our
report as follows:
1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay.
The following oider was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined
Fleet on 7 November :
"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hito-
kappu I5ay by '-'2 November for re-fueling".
2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces.
The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined
Fleet on 25 November:
(a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining
close guard against submarines and [629] aircraft, shall advance into
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 247
Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main
force of the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii a|ul deal it a mortal blow. Tlie tirst air-raid is
planned for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given l\v Inter order).
"Upon completion of the air-raid, the Tasli Force, l^eepiiig close co-onlination
and guarding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy
waters and then return to Japan". . , .,
(b) "Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the
Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble".
3 Order directing the attacking force to proceed on its mission:
The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined
Fleet on 25 November : . , „, ,-,.x ,
"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu
Bay on the morning of 2G November and advance to 42° N 170° E (standing-by
position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete refuelling".
4 Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon,
(a) Bv way of preparation for the opening of hostilities, the plan of naval
operations against the [630] United States. Great Britain and Netherlands
(including the plan for the attack on I'earl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November.
(b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon Ijy Cabinet Council on 1
December.
(c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that
hostile action was to be opened on 8 December.
5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were con-
cerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor:
The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Headquarters
of the Combined Fleet.
N B.— Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were
connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be made
as a result of further investigation.
K. Nakamt-ba
Jicnr Admiral. JJN,
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.
16X11 Qttestionnaibe
^"^^ n October 1,5.
To be answered completely. Answers to he substantiated by copies of all
plans, orders, maps, photos, reports, and other otticial documents available.
In case a question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and
official position. ^ , „ u «
1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?
(Give names or agencies, e. g. Admiral , General Stuff, Naval
General Staff, War Ministry, etc.)
2. When? .^, ^ ^ „^-
(Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e. g. August 1!)40,
Spring of 1941. year 1022— any time such a proposal firxt was considered either
for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion.)
3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese
plans for possible use in event of war with U. S. ?
4. If so. describe it as given in these pre-war plans.
(State obiectives, forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you expected
to accomplish, etc.)
5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor.
(Give dates as accurately as posdsible, e. g. 1 September [<>52] 1941,
Spring of 1041.) ^ ^ ,,. ,
6. Who made this decision? (e. g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Minis-
try, or some combination of persons or agencies.)
7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate
date) of that conference and the names of all known persons attending.
8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision?
(e. g. Desire to cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against
P. I.?: b'^stroy U. S. main Pacific base?; Gain time for P. I. campaign? Protect
mandated islands? or what? (incl #4)
9. Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed?
(e. g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) Note:
When I say Plan. I differentiate between plana or staff studies and the actual
orders issued to put the plan in effect.
248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
10. When did this work begin?
11. When the plan was completed who finally approved it?
12. When was the plan finally approved?
13. What persons and agencies knew about this plan?
(e. g. the Emperor, the War Ministry, the Central Staff, [633] the Naval
Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at Honolulu, Military Attaches to
The Ambassador at Washington, Kurusu, etc.) Note: Names of individ-
uals and agencies are both desired — for example, the Cabinet as a whole might
not have been informed but the War Minister would. Also, state persons who
had partial knowledge, e. g. the Emperor might have known you planned to
attack but not without declaring war, etc.
14. What sources furnished information on what the plan was based? Give
names, rank and positions.
(e. g. Military attaches, Consuls, Japanese Civilian resident of Honolulu,
Broadcasts, New articles).
15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above-
listed sources?
16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps
carried by your aviator^ obtained?
(e. g. Accurately plotted and named ship berths, barracks, azimuths on
which to approach, etc.).
17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route?
18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play?
[634] 19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units
In the harbor?
20. If so. when (particularly the date of the last taken).
21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed.
Discuss :
a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome.
b. Partial decisions made and by whom.
c. How were the commanders and particular units to (Both fleet
units and air units) selected?
d. Why was the route you selected chosen?
e. What provision was made against discovery en route?
f. What action was to be taken if discovered?
g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were em-
ployed ?
h. What action was to be taken if the attack failed?
22. How was the date of Dpceniber 7 selected and for what reasons?
23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons?
24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units).
25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time
during the operation, e. g. to attack secondary targets?
26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack.
Include:
[635] Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why?
Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why?
Time each group was to strike its target.
Route fs) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes) selected?
27. Discuss use of midget-submarines.
(Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any
back, any other details, conclusions as to usefulness of this weapon).
[636] 28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give de-
tails: (e. g. If the U. S. had made some concessions was it to be abandoned or
changed? If the U. S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have
been made?)
29. Furnish a copy of each of the following:
a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation.
b. Any Staff Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto.
c. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect.
Note : If any document is not available give all details of it you can from
memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked.)
30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force?
31. Where did it assemble?
32. When did it move out on its mission?
33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while
the Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken.
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PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 249
34. Did everything go as planned?
35. If not, wiiat changes or mishaps occurred and why?
36. Was the tasli force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route?
1637] 37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route?
38. If so, what was done about them?
39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a
landing?
40. List your losses.
41. List estimated U. S. Losses.
42. From what sources did you determine U. S. losses?
43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance against
Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately following the
attack.
( e. g. night after attack, following day, etc. )
44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case.
(e. g, "All copies of order burned on surrender", "ads. who is
only person who knew this was killed on (date).").
45. Did you have any submarines operating in the Hawaiian area prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor?
46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation in-
structions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were
there any casualties among these submarines?
47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in Hawaiian area?
48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from
Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor?
[639] Mr. Mitchell. Now, Mr. Chairman, in connection with
the story of the Jap attack I have been awaiting an opportunity to
take a few minutes to read into the record certain of these so-called
diplomatic intercepts that were picked up and decoded.
The Congressman from California has already referred to some,
I think, which are pertinent but he only gave extracts from the Judge
Advocate General's report.
Mr. Geaehart. It was the Judge Advocate General's summary,
not mine.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. And I think there are many obscure state-
ments in these diplomatic decoded messages which you cannot under-
stand except by paralleling them with the movements of the Japanese
attacking force, and with the permission of the committee — I have
just a few pages — I would like to put into the record at this point*
these portions so as to connect them up with the story.
The first one is on page 96 of our exhibit 1, which contains all of
these messages. It is from Tokyo to Washington. That means their
ambassador at Washington. It is their number 727. It is dated
November 4, 1941 [reading] :
Proposal "B" :
This proposal is based upon proposal "A". If there appears to be a remark-
able difference between the Japanese and American views, since the situation
does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to put for- [GJfO] ward some
substitute plan. Therefoi-e, our second formula is advanced with the idea of
making a last effort to prevent something happening. The substance is as
follows :
Then I will omit certain portions which are not pertinent right at
this moment and it follows [reading] :
The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually return—
this is part of his proposal to the United States —
mutually return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets
and the Government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan with the
petroleum she needs.
250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Turning over on page 98, if the committee wants to follow me on
this, of Exhibit 1, we have another message, No. 731, Tokyo to Wash-
ington, November 4, li)41 [reading] :
In tiiese negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and
has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this pro-
posal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Brit-
ain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also as interested parties, to put into
effect the terms of the understanding in question. If we should proceed without
any definite assurances on this point and reached an accord with Washington
alone, it might very well be that it would never work.
[G41] Consequently, 1 want jou please to impress upon the American ofla-
cials the importance of this essential measure and have them agree to make
Great Britain and the Netherlands both simultaneously sign those tenns in
which they are concerned. Please wire me the results.
Then follows another message from Tokyo to Washington on the
same page, dated November 5, 1941 [reading] :
If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we
would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratihcation of
the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear th:it too much time would be
consumed obtaining this. From the viewpoint of speed and certainty, we would
like to avoid having to follow this course. From the gist of the U. S. proposals,
we fee! tiiat the U. S. Government is also desirous of not having to await Senate
ratitication.
We have been led to believe that it is the U. S. Government's intention to use
this instrument as a basis for some future treaty, and tliat it would be classified
as one type of an "Executive Agreement" as the President is authorized to do.
We have been proceeding in the past on this assumption. Will you please
ascertain the U. S. attitude on this point?
In any event, it is of utmost importance that an agreement be entered into
along the lines given in the loV/iJ message referred to in the heading at the
earliest possible moment. Under present conditions, speed is an absolute essen-
tial factor.
Then on page 99, a message from Tokj'o to Washington dated No-
vember 5, 1941. The hrst two paragraphs I will not read at present.
The third [reading] :
If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A
and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to
submit our absolutely tiual proposal. Proposal B. Please, therefore, ascertain
the U. S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be
sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States.
As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's tinal step.
Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely
no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish
to stress this point over and over.
We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that
this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them
that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal.
[043] On page 100, from Tokyo to Washington, a message of
November 5, 1941. That is numbered 736. [Reading] :
Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange-
ments for the signing of tliis agreement be comi)]eted by the 25th of this month-
I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoid-
able one. Please understand this thorougiily and tackle the problem of saving
the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with
great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
On page 116 of Exhibit 1, Tokyo to Washington, November 11, 1941
[reading] :
Judging from the progress of the
PROCEEDINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 251
The Chairman. When you say "from Tolcyo to Washington," do you
mean from the Japanese Government to their Ambassador in Wash-
ington ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. [Eeading] :
Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications
that the United Stiites is still not fully a\\ are uf the exceedingly criticalness of the
situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth iu my message #736. —
that is on the 25th —
Is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and
therefore it is essential [<>Ji'i] that n settlement be reached by about that
time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th according to the schedule.
The government must have a clear pictui-e of things to come, in presenting its case
at the session. You can see. therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax,
and that time is indeed becoming short.
I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the
above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secre-
tary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your
power to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time.
At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy
approval to our final proposal.
Page 122 of Exhibit 1. I only have two or three of these. This is
from Washington, from Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, under date
of November 12, 1941. [Reading] :
Departmental secret.
Continuing he said. ".Japan does not like to exercise force — not by any means.
If we could get petroleum and other raw materials from the United States and
the Netherlands Indies, we would not have to use force, would we? Then, when
we come to the question of non-discrimination in commerce, 1 don't think that
[6^5] the United States will have any objection to our proposal."
Page 137 of Exhibit 1. This is from Tokyo to Washington, Novem-
ber 16, 1941. [Reading]:
For your Honor's own information.
I have read your #1000 and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude
for the efforts you have put forth, hut the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender
thread of a few days, so please fiirht harder than you ever did before.
What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I
have given it already the fullest consiuerntion. but I have only to refer you to the
fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you please try to realize what
that means.
That is the one fixing the 25th as the dead line.
In your opinion, we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain
patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out
of the question. I set the dead line for the solution of these negotiations in my
#736 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see bow
short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and
delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of
our proposals, 1646] and do your best to bring about an immediate
solution.
Page 165 of Exhibit 1
Mr. Kektt3. Mr. Chairiiiitu, may T inquire? I understand counsel
is now reading for the purpose of the record, certainly, these code
cablegrams, the.se decoded cablegrams that are printed at length in an
exhibit already in evidence.
Mr. Mitchell. They are already in evidence, but my point about
them was that you cannot understand the hidden suggestions in here,
particularly the ones I am about to read, unless you parallel it with
the story of the Japanese movements and planning for the Japanese
252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
attack. That is the reason I am putting them in now, sir, in order to
make the comparison for the committee, so they can form their own
judgment about it.
Mr. Keefe. I see.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. Page 165, from Tokyo to Washington, dated Novem-
ber 22, 1941. [Reading] :
To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You
should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed
policy and do your very best. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess
why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within
the next thi'ee or four days you can finish your conversations witli the Americans;
if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out [647] for
you — twenty ninth) ; if the pertinent notes can be exchanges; if we can get an
understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands ; and in short if every-
thing can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we
mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are
automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful considera-
tion and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for
the information of you two Ambassadors alone.
Now, there is just one more. It is a message from Tokyo to Wash-
ington, dated November 24, for both Ambassadors.
The time limit set in my message of 812 —
that is the one I have just read —
is Tokyo time 29th.
Now, Mr. Chairman, will you call Admiral Richardson?
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel one question?
The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.
Senator Lucas. You have read to us decoded messages, continu-
ously referring to Japanese No. 736. Now, I presume that that 736,
of course, is in that exhibit?
Mr. Mitchell. I read that. It is a message from Tokyo to Wash-
ington dated November 5, stating that because of various circum-
stances it is absolutely essential and necessary that all arrangements
for the signing of this agreement be coniDleted [64S] by the
25th.
Senator Lucas. Yes. Well, now, I was going to follow that up with
whether or not the agreement that they discuss in these messages is
now a part of the record ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the terms that they proposed to our Govern-
ment.
Senator Lucas. That is what I mean.
Mr. Mitchell. There never was any yielding to them.
Senator Lucas. Of course, I was wrong in using the word "agree-
ment." I meant to inquire whether or not the terms proposed by the
Japanese Government, upon which they based these messages, are a
part of the record and even so I think it would be apropos at this
time to include them at the end of the messages that counsel read.
_Mr. Mitchell. Well, I will say this. The terms that they trans-
mitted to their ambassadors to "^be submitted to our Government,
about doing away with the freezing and furnishing them oil and
things of that kind are in other intercepted messages in this very
same exhibit 1, but there will be evidence introduced, after Admiral
Richardson, from the State Department, giving the full story of the
negotiations and just what proposals they made.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 253
Senator Lucas. All right. My only thoug^ht was that if it would
come in at this particular point it would clarify the record.
[649] The Chairman. We can hold that up until later.
Senator Lucas. Very well, then, I withdrew the request.
Mr. Mitchell. I was just referring to some vague happenings and
things that would happen and the reason for the deadline.
The Chairtnian. All right, General, call the next witness.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Richardson.
The Chairman. Admiral, will you be sworn ?
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JAMES OTTO EICHAEDSON UNITED
STATES NAVY (EETIRED)
(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, please state your full name.
Admiral Richardson. Admiral James Otto Richardson.
Mr, Mitchell. Admiral Richardson, how long did you serve in the
United States Navy?
Admiral Richardson. I entered the Naval Academy in September
1898 ; graduated in 1902._
Mr. Mitchell. Wliat is your present rank ?
Admiral Richardson. Admiral, United States Navy, retired.
Mr. Mitchell. You were giving us-
Admiral Richardson. Oh, would you like for me to give you
Mr. Mitchell. No. During your Navy service have you spent
[650'] some of your duty time in Asiatic areas and Pacific areas?
Would you give us a brief review of your Asiatic experience?
Admiral Richardson. If it meets the wishes of the counsel to the
committee, I will give a brief summary of my service record using
my own judgment to select those items which might be of interest
to the matter under investigation.
In 1902, in accordance with my request, I was ordered to the
Asiatic station where I remained until 1905. During that time I
served 1 year in the southern Philippines. The remainder of the
time I was on the China coast and in Japan.
It so happened that I arrived in Yokohama in time to see the
Russian Minister depart immediately preceding the beginning of the
Russo-Japanese War. I was in Yokohama when that war was
initiated by the surprise attack of the Japanese on the Russian Fleet
at Port Arthur and the Russian ship at Chemulpo.
I remained in Japan for approximately 3 months. I returned to
Japan again in time to be in Tokyo when the Japanese Government
received the first news on the battle of Tsuschima which in effect
closed the Russo-Japanese War.
I went to the China station again in 1922, where I remained until
1924. During that time I served on the China coast and the last
year I was in command of the south China patrol. I was in Amoy
when the first news of the earthquake [SSI] on the 1st of Sep-
tember 1923 occurred.
From 1924 until 1931 I performed various duties in Washington,
at the Naval Academy, and on the Atlantic coast. In 1931 I placed
the U. S. S. Augusta in commission and she served as flagship for
the scouting force then in the Atlantic and proceeded to the Pacific
when practically all of our combatant ships were concentrated in the
Pacific.
79716— 46— pt. 1 19
254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK
I was detached in 1933 and was a student at the Naval War College
for 1 year.
From 1934 to 1935 I was budget officer of the Navy Department.
From 1935 to 1936 I served for a short period in command of Cruiser
Division 6 and then chief of staff to the commander in chief, United
States Fleet.
From 1936 to 1937 I commanded the destroyers of the scouting
force. From 1937 to 1938 I was the Assistant Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, during which period the China incident started and during
which period the attack on the Panay occurred.
From 1938 to 1939 I was the Chief of what was then called the
Bureau of Navigation, now known as the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
From 1939, the summer, until 1940 I was commander of the battle
force. From 1940 to 1941 I was commander in chief of the United
States Fleet. At that time the United States [_652] Fleet com-
prised all combatant ships in commission that were not assigned to the
Asiatic Fleet or not operating directly under the Chief of Naval Op-
erations.
I reported for duty as commander of battle force on June 24, 1939.
On January 6, 1940, I relieved Admiral Claude C. Bloch as com-
mander in chief of United States Fleet. On the 5th of January 1941
I received a secret dispatch in a code held only by the Chief of Naval
Operations and myself informing me that I would be detached on
the 1st of February.
On February 1, 1941, 1 was relieved by Admiral Husband E. Kim-
mel. At that time the fleet was reorganized, and Admiral Kimmel
became commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and another officer
became commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.
I departed from Honolulu on February 14, 1941, and on March 25,
1941, 1 reported for duty as a member of the General Board.
Mr. Mitchell. At that time when you were commander of the
United States Fleet was there a separate command known as the
commander of the Pacific Fleet?
Admiral Richardson. There was not.
Mr. Mitchell. Who was Chief of Naval Operations while you were
chief in command of the United States Fleet?
Admiral Richardson. Admiral Harold R. Stark, who was my
[_65S'] immediate superior.
Mr. Mitchell. When you were at that time commander of the
United States Fleet at what Pacific city or was it on the Pacific side
or the Atlantic side that you went to?
Admiral Richardson. Wlien I assumed command of the United
States Fleet there was a portion of the fleet serving in the Atlantic.
There was a detachment of the United States Fleet serving in the
Hawaiian area, known as the Hawaiian detachment, which was com-
posed of heavy cruisers and destroyers, and, if my memory serves me
correctly, one aircraft carrier. The Hawaiian detachment was under
the command of Vice Adm. Adolphus Andrews, who was also com-
mander of the scouting force.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, were you located on the Pacific coast?
Admiral Richardson. All the fleet in the Pacific assigned to the
United States Fleet, that did not form a part of the Hawaiian detach-
ment, was based at San Diego and San Pedro, Long Beach.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 255
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is where you made your headquarters
then?
Admiral Richardson. I actually assumed command of the fleet in
the harbor of San Pedro, Long Beach, and I remained there until
approximately the 1st of April, when the fleet departed for their
annual fleet exercises.
[064] Mr. Mitchell. What was your flagship at that time?
Admiral Richakdson. The U. S. S. Pennsylvania.
Mr. Mitchell. You say the Pacific Fleet that you were in command
of out there that was not included in tliese other detachments, that
was based on the Pacific coast, was ordered out to maneuvers in the
spring of 1940 ?
Admiral Richardson. It had been the custom for many years to
have annual fleet exercises, including fleet problems and other exer-
cises under simulated war conditions, where all available ships and
aircraft were employed in training.
Mr. Mitchell. What were the base ports of the Pacific Fleet at that
time other than the Hawaiian detachment and the Asiatic vessels you
spoke of ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, each ship had a home port.
Mr. Mitchell. Generally speaking, I mean what were the principal
points?
Admiral Richardson. They were based practically all the time at
San Pedro and Long Beach but the ships periodically proceeded to
Bremerton and to San Francisco for overhaul, and normal operations
in training and gunnery exercises were otf the coast of southern
California.
Mr. Mitchell. Wlien the fleet vessels under your command made
that movement in the spring of 1940, to what area did they proceed ?
[055] Admiral Richardson. Tiiey proceeded to sea divided into
two task forces representing opposing fleets and conducted a war game
and various exercises and tiien united with the Hawaiian detachment
and proceeded to the Hawaiian area, arriving there on the — I actually
arrived at Lahaina Roads at 1500 on April 10.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you had been ordered to move out into
Hawaiian waters after these exercises, or had you
Admiral Richardson. Each year the fleet exercises were held in a
different part of the world, a different part of the ocean, to familiarize
the officers with the weather conditions and the terrain and everything
else that it was necessary to know and before I became commander in
chief the plans for this exercise had already been drawn up and
approved and I carried out exercises which were planned by my
predecessor. j
When I arrived in Pearl Harbor according to the published plan
the fleet, with the exception of the Hawaiian detachment, was to
depart from the Hawaiian area on the 9th of May — no, the 9th of
April. Wait a minute, let me see. No, the 9th of May.
Mr. Mitchell. This is 1940?
Admiral Richardson. 1940.
Mr. Gearhart. What was the date?
[650] Admiral Richardson. The 9th of May 1940.
Mr. Mitchell. And you say, do you
Admiral Richardson. From the Hawaiian area the return would
normally have been to the Pacific coast.
256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. The point is that when you went to Hawaiian waters
at that time you expected that that would be a temporary arrangement
and that you would shortly return to the Pacific coast?
Admiral Richardson. That was an arrangement the schedule for
which had been prepared and approved and was known to all the
officers and men in the fleet.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you understood it was temporary ?
Admiral Richardson. Oh, yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Now, we have a file of correspondence that
includes some letters between you and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval
Operations, running from January 1940 to January 1941. You have
examined that file and have a copy of it ?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. You have supplied me with a copy
of that file.
Mr. Mitchell. At this point I would like to offer in evidence as
Exhibit 9 the file of correspondence that I have just referred to, of
which each member of the committee has a copy.
(The documents referred to were marked ''Exhibit No. 9.")
[067] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, just so that I will be able
to follow the questioner, is there any way of telling how many parts
there are in particular in Exhibit 9 ? I have seen several groups of
papers.
Mr. Gesell. I think. Congressman, that there are really basically
two parts ; the letters called Stark to Admiral Richardson are mimeo-
graphed and the letters of Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark are
the ones you have there in your hand ; they are photostatic copies.
Senator Brewster: Does this purport to be a complete record of
their correspondence in that period?
Mr. Gesell. No, it does not.
Senator Brewster. How were the eliminations made ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, there are a great many personal letters. I
think these letters were chosen because they relate to the reasons for
the fleet going out there and the objections that Admiral Richardson
later developed as to their staying there. That was, really, what I
think they are mostly pertinent to.
Senator Brewster. Has your staff been over the complete file to
select those which they consider pertinent ?
Mr. Mitchell. These letters were furnished us both by Admiral
Stark and his counsel and by Admiral Richardson. I won't say that
I have seen every letter that passed between them [658] dur-
ing that period.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, has counsel or have any of the
counsel staff seen all of the letters ?
Mr. Gesell. We have seen all the letters that we have been able to
read.
Senator Ferguson. What do you mean that you have been able
to read?
Mr. Gesell. Just exactly that, Senator, the ones we have been able
to find. This correspondence is personal correspondence and we asked
counsel for Admiral Stark to submit to us all of the letters that he
had exchanged with Admiral Richardson and counsel submitted us
a file which they stated was the complete file of correspondence which
they had.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 257
We have also had searches made in the Navy Department for any
correspondence between these two officers.
Admiral Stark and his counsel have reviewed the selection of the
letters made here and we have also shown the file to Admiral Richard-
son and he has double checked the selections, so that we have taken
such precautions as we can to assure that the correspondence is repre-
sentative of the topics that the documents were selected for and have
done everything we can to make sure that we have obtained any letters
that we can find.
[659] Senator Ferguson. Are you through ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Senator Ferguson-. Mr. Chairman, on page 14-0 there seems to be
no beginning to that letter. Can that be explained ?
Mr. Gesell. That is a last sheet which came in there by error and
connects to another letter which is not offered in evidence.
Senator FERGUSOisr. You have the other letter?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have, for submission to the committee,
the other letters?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. How many letters will that be?
Mr. Gesell. A small number. I have not counted them. You are
welcome to see them. Many of them are personal letters that do
not seem to us to be germane.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I make one suggestion?
As these exhibits go into this record it seems to me, in order for
anyone to clearly understand the letters and the answers thereto, the
letters should go in, and then they should be followed by the answers.
Mr. Mitchell. I have mine arranged that way.
Senator Lucas. The exhibits that were given to us were not ar-
ranged that way.
[660] Mr. Mitchell. I know it, so I tore mine down and put
them in chronological order.
The letters I have here are letters that seem to me to be pertinent to
the inquiry that I was going to make of Admiral Richardson here. If
there are any more of those letters that you want to see I will get
them for you.
Admiral Richardson. May I make a statement, Mr. Chairman, in
regard to this correspondence?
The Chairman. Yes, go ahead, Admiral.
Admiral Richardson. Wlien I relieved Admiral Bloch as com-
mander in chief of the United States Fleet I found that quite a little
official business had been conducted in personal correspondence, so
that when I relieved Admiral Bloch it was necessary for me to write
to Admiral Stark for information which I needed. I did not want
that to occur when I was relieved, so before I was relieved I gave my
file of personal letters to my relief.
The Chairman. To whom?
Admiral Richardson. To the officer who relieved me.
The Chairman. Oh, yes.
Mr. Gesell. Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Richardson. Admiral Kimmel, with the request that he and
his prospective chief of staff look over the file of letters and indicate
those that they felt would be useful [661] in the conduct of the
258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
affairs of the fleet, and I would retain them and deliver them to Ad-
miral Kimmel. The majority of the other letters were destroyed by me
because I was unwilling to take away and have in my custody letters
that referred to fleet business, §o that I could not supply counsel with
my file of letters. I have been able to secure some copies from the
Department and from various sources, so that my supply of letters,
which will be essential to refresh my memory on many of these points,
would not have been made available to me except through the counsel.
The Vice Chairman. Just a minute, Mr. Chairman.
I understood you to say. Admiral, those letters that were not being
desirable by your relief you destroyed.
Admiral Richardson. I did. A few found their way into my
papers when my efl'ects were packed up, so I did have a few, but by
no means a complete file.
The Chairman. All right, go ahead.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, Admiral, I have here a letter dated
March 15, 1940.
Admiral Richardson. March what?
Mr. Mitchell. March 15, 1940, addressed to "Dear J. O." and signed
"Betty". Who is "J. O."?
Admiral Richardson. I am J. O.
Mr. Mitchell. Who is "Betty"?
[06£] Admiral Richardson. Admiral H. R. Stark.
Mr. Mitchell. Is that the way you usually addressed each other
in this personal correspondence?
Admiral Richardson. It was.
Mr. Mitchell. I notice in the letter of March 15, 1940 on page 2
there is a paragraph that reads as follows :
I still think that the decision to send the detachment to Hawaii under present
world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence
there may have on the Orange foreign policy.
Wliat did the word "orange" stand for in naval parlance? Was it
Japan?
Admiral Richardson. Japan.
Mr. Mitchell (reading) :
The State Department is strong for the present set-up and considers It bene-
ficial ; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.
That is a letter from Admiral Stark to you ?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, and that was in reply to my letter to
him asking about why the Hawaiian detachment was there, and I
would like to invite your attention to the second paragraph in that
letter of March 15, 1940.
Mr. Mitchell. When you went there you expected to come back
soon and then you found you were not ordered back; that is right,
isn't it?
Admiral Richardson. That is true.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you wanted to know why you were kept out
there ?
[Od-S] Admiral Richardson. That is true.
Mr. Mitchell. And this correspondence started, and you asked
Admiral Stark why you were there, and this reference I just made is
to that discussion, is it?
Admiral Richardson. No; I think not. It is March 15, is it not?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 259
Admiral Eichardson. I was not out there. This 15th of March
letter relates to the presence in the Hawaiian area of the Hawaiian
detachment
Mr. Mitchell. I see.
Admiral Richardson. Which had proceeded to the Hawaiian area
in the fall preceding.
Mr. Mitchell. That is right. Then we pass on to the letter of May
7, 1940, by Admiral Stark to you, and I find that contains this state-
ment:
When the fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two
weeks, but I cannot tell) the President has asked that the fleet schedule be so
arranged that on extremely short notice the fleet be able to return concentrated to
Hawaiian waters. This will present somewhat of a [GGJ/] problem in lug-
ging around more oil with you perhaps than usual and keeping more provisions on
board, because if action is wauled it will be wanted quickly. As far as I can see,
your proposed schedule meets this requirement, and unless you hear to the con-
trary, you may assume it is O. K.
That is on May 7, 1940, and up to that time you expected to come
back in the course of 2 weeks ?
Admiral Richardson. No — oh, yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. I thought it was possible.
[665] Mr. Mitchell. We have here a letter of May 22 that is
written by you to Admiral Stark, May 22, 1940, in which you write
him:
As you no doubt 'well appreciate, I now must plan the Fleet schedule, and
employment for the next few months. To do this intelligently, however, it is
necessary to know more than I know now about why we are here and how long we
will probably stay. I realize that the answer to the second question is largely
depeudent upon the first, and probably also upon further developments, but none-
theless I should have something to go on.
For Instance, carrying out even a curtailed gunnery schedule will require whole-
sale movements of targets, tugs, utility planes, etc., from the Coast. The following
are pertinent questions :
(a) Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other nations by our pres-
ence, and if so, what effect would the carrying out of normal training (insofar as
we can under the limitations on anchorages, airfields, facilities and services) have
on this purpose? Tiie effect of the emergency docking program and the consequent
absence of task forces during the training period must also be considered.
(b) Are we here as a stepping-off phice for belligerent activity? If so, we
should devote all of our [JJGG] time and energies to preparing for war.
This could more effectively and expeditiously be accomplished by an immediate
return to the West Coast, with "freezing" of personnel, fliling up complements,
docking, and all the rest of it. We could return here upon completidn.
As it is now, to try and do both (a) and (b) from here and at the same time is
a diversiflcation of effort and purpose that can only result in the accomplishment
of neither.
If we are here to develop this area as a peacetime operating base, consideration
should be given to the certain decrease in the efliciency of the Fleet and the lower-
ing of morale that may ensue, due to inadequate anchorages, airfields, facilities,
services, recreation conditions, for so large a fleet. If only peacetime training
is involved, should the Bureau of Navigation and I not be advised so we may
remove restrictions on oflicer details?
Now, with that statement before you, will you state to the committee
just what your situation had been up to that time, and how you hap-
pened to write that letter?
Admiral Richardson. Well, a fleet composed of a large number of
ships and men and planes must secure careful planning, in order that
time not be wasted and that something be accomplished. When the
fleet went to the Hawaiian area as a part of the fleet exercises, we had
260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a definite schedule of gunnery exercises, steaming competitions, full
power [067] drives, inspections, and everything else that is
required to keep a fleet busy, and keep them under training.
When the fleet went to the Hawaiian area we did not take with us
tugs, targets, target rafts, target planes, towing planes, repair ships ;
so that if the fleet was to remain m the Hawaiian area, in order that
it could be usefully employed, it was essential that I know that we
remain there long enough to bring out all of the gear that was neces-
sary for training the ship, for fear that I would start all this material
to Hawaii and then, after it once started and got halfway there I would
return, and then have to wait for several weeks for it to get back to
the normal bases on the west coast, so I could continue training.
So that, from my point of view, my efl'ectiveness in the fleet and
continued training in the fleet demanded an early decision, so that plans
could be made.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you first learn, and how, that the decision
had been made here in Washington to base your fleet at Pearl Harbor
instead of on the Pacific coast ?
Admiral Richardson. The first notice that I received was a dispatch
from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief. United
States Fleet, May 4, which reads
Mr. Mitchell. What is the date of it ?
Admiral Richardson. May 4.
[668] Mr. Gearhart. 1940 ?
Admiral Richardson. May 4, 1940.
It looks probable but not final that Fleet will remain Hawaiian waters for
short time after May 9. Will expect to apprise you further Monday or Tuesday
next.
The 4th of May was Saturday. On the 7th of May I received from
the Chief of Naval Operations, addressed to CINCUS— CINCUS
was the abbreviation for commander in chief United States Fleet —
CINCUS make immediate press release instructions as follows :
"I request permission to remain in Hawaiian waters to accomplish some
things I wanted to do while here. The Department has approved this request."
Delay Fleet departure Hawaiian area is for about two weeks prior to the end
of which time you will be further advised regarding future movements. Carry
out regular scheduled overhauls of individual units, movements of base force
units at your discretion.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you issue the press release ?
Admiral Richardson. I did.
Mr. Mitchell. You had not requested or asked to be left out there,
had you ?
Admiral Richardson. I had not.
Mr. KJEETE. I am having difficulty, Mr. Mitchell. I have [669]
the answer but I did not get your full question.
Mr. Mitchell. I probably did not have my nose in the microphone
again. My question was whether he had given the press release, and he
said he did, and I asked him if he had asked to be kept out there at
Hawaii, and he said "No."
Mr. Kepte. Thank you.
Mr. Mitchell. I refer now to a letter of May 27, 1940, which was
written by Admiral Stark to you in response to the letter of May 22
that I just read from, and in which you wanted to know about what
you were supposed to do, and he said, among other things :
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 261
Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by
paragraph.
First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against,
and to tell you that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.
Why are you in the Hawaiian area?
Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought
your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters
I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is
that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take
independent action.
[670J We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that
so far as they are concerned, she, Japan has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.
Then later in the letter :
Along the same line as the first question presented, you would naturally ask —
suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it?
My answer to that is, I don't know, and I think there is nobody on God's green
earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this,
both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the
thought contained in your i-ecent letter.
I would point out one thing, and that is even if the decision here were for
the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the
Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would
completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just
remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do, and so long as
they don't know, they may hesitate or be deterred. These facts I have kept
very secret here.
The above, I think will answer the question "why you are there." It does
not answer, the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured
that the minute I get [671] this information I will rush it to you. Nobody
can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question and also — like you —
I have been unable to get the answer.
I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I
may say that so far as the Department is concerned, you are at liberty to play
with the gunnery schedule in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices
for the time being and substituting others which you may consider important,
and which you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically, if you want
to cut short range battle practice and proceed with long range practices, or
division practices or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc.,
which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain
status — go ahead. Just keep us informed.
Later on, he says :
You ask whether you are there as a stepping-off place for belligerent activity!
Answer: Obviously it might become so under certain conditions, but a definite
answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.
I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast
for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did
return, it might nullify [672] the reasons for your being in Hawaii. This
very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have
authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores,
etc., and this should help in any case.
He says later :
You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating
base, but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are
up against.
As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due
to inadequate anchorages, airfields, service, recreation conditions, for so large a
fleet:
I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval
Academy in the West Indies.
Now, that brings to our minds the question of your attitude about
the basing of the fleet, and I call your attention to a letter you wrote
to Admiral Stark — before we get to that, I have a letter here of June
22j Stark to Richardson.
262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keete. Is that contained in this file ?
Mr. Mitchell. I am not so sure. It is a loose sheet.
Mr. Gesell. It was sent to you subsequently, Congressman Keefe.
There were additional letters discovered after the [673] first
mimeographing, and they were sent to the members of the committee,
and they did not come in the same attachment as the others.
The Chairman. Tliey were put in a folder marked "Additional
Letters Between Stark and Kichardson."
Mr. Keete. All right.
Mr. Mitchell. I am sorry we did not have them all together at the
start.
This letter is from Stark to Kichardson, June 22 ;
Your trip to Washington was held in abeyance because of uncertainty as to
the movement of the Fleet in the immediate future. Tentatively, decision has
been made for the Fleet to remain for the present where it is.
Is that about the first-
Admiral Richardson. What letter is that?
Mr. ISIiTCHELL. June 22, 1940. Maybe the Admiral hasn't got a
copy of it.
Mr. Gesell. I will get him one.
[674] Admiral Eichardson. I have my letter.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. There is one from you dated June 22, but
this is one from Admiral Stark to you dated June 22, which was sup-
plied to us later from the original file.
I am sorry, I thought you had seen it.
Admiral Richardson. All right ; I have that letter.^
Mr. Mitchell. Had you received any information more definite
than that as to the permanency of your station at Pearl Harbor prior
to that letter ? It says :
Tentatively decision has been made for the fleet to remain for the present
where it is. This decision may be changed at any time.
Admiral Richardson. No, I had received no prior information. _
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you had developed by that time very definite
ideas in your own mind in opposition to the advisability of basing the
fleet at Pearl Harbor, had you not? Will you please state in your
own way just what the situation was and what your objections were
grounded upon ?
Admiral Richardson. My objections for remaining there were,
primarily, that you only had one port, secure port, and very crowded,
no recreation facilities for the men, a long distancefrom Pearl Harbor
to the city of Honolulu, inadequate transportation, inadequate airfields.
[675] A carrier cannot conduct all training for her planes from
the carrier deck. In order to launch her planes she must be underway
at substantial speed, using up large amounts of fuel. So that wherever
carriers are training their squadrons there must be flying fields avail-
able, so that while the ship herself is undergoing overhaul, or repair,
or upkeep, the planes may conduct training, flying from the flying
fields.
There were inadequate and restricted areas for anchorages of the
fleet ; to take them in and out of Pearl Harbor wasted time.
Another reason, which was a substantial one: Americans are per-
fectly willing to go anywhere, stay anywhere, do anything when
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 263
there is a job to be done and they can see the reason for their being
there, but to keep the fleet, during what the men considered normal
peacetimes, away from the coast and away from their families, away
from recreation, rendered it difficult to maintain a high state of
morale that is essential to successful training.
For those reasons, and because I believe that the fleet could be
better prepared for war on a normal basis on the west coast, I wanted
to return to the west coast.
Mr. MncHELL. There is also a letter from you — or rather a memo-
randum from the Secretary, it is called, dated September 12, 1940,
Will you please turn to that?
[676] Admiral Eichardson. I have it.
Mr. MrrcHELL. You have it.
Admiral Eichardson. September 12, 1940.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Was that prepared while you were out in
the Hawaiian area?
Admiral Eichardson. It was. At that time I had shifted my
flag and was then flying it from the U. S. S. Enterprise, an aircraft
carrier.
The Secretary of the Navy visited the Hawaiian area from Septem-
ber 6 until September 15. During that time I had him off Lahaina
for dinner aboard the Enterprise with all the flag officers present.
He was aboard the Enterprise for awhile. Then he was shifted to
other types of ships, battleships, destroyers, cruisers.
I did that in order that he might see the operations conducted by
various types of ships and in order that he might meet other flag
officers in the fleet. I was particularly careful to see that he had an
opportunity to talk with Admiral Kimmel, Vice Admiral Andrews,
Admiral Snyder, and a destroyer captain named Binf ord.
I knew that he would hear the news of many officers and I was
anxious that he remember the things that I had said to him ; and in
order that he might not confuse what I had said to him with the
things that had been said to him by others, I [667] prepared a
memorandum setting forth a brief outline of the points that I had
covered in very extensive conversations and I filed a copy of that mem-
orandum with the Chief of Naval Operations, because I endeavored at
all times to let the Chief of Naval Operations know what I was doing,
or what it was my intention to do.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you please turn to that memorandum of the
12th of September 1940. At the bottom of page 2, under "4 (A)"
is the title "Eetention of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area."
Was that statement intended to sum up your views about the reten-
ion of the fleet in the Hawaiian area ?
Admiral Eichardson. It was.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you mind reading that, Admiral?
Admiral Eichardson (reading).
Retention of the fleet in tlie Hawaiian Area.
(a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached
to l)asing the fleet in this area, some of which are :
(1) Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.
(2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security.
(3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due [67S] to
difficulties of entry, berthing and departure of large ships.
264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface.
(5) Inadequate facilities for ileet services, training, recreation and housing,
(6) Prolonged absence from mainland of officers and men in time of peace
adversely afEects morale.
(7) In case of war, necessary for fleet to return to mobilization ports on
West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measure resulting
in confusion and a net loss of time.
Shall I continue ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I think those are pertinent.
Admiral Richardson (reading) :
If the disposition of the fleet were determined solely by naval considerations
the major portion of the fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases be-
cause such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war.
If factors other than purely naval ones are to influence the decision as to
where the fleet should be based at this time, the naval factors should be fully
presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision
on the readiness of the fleet. In other words, is it more important [679] to
lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the fleet in the
Hawaiian area, than to facilitate its preparation lor active service in any area
by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases?
In case our relations with another Pacific nation deteriorate, what is the State
Department's conception of our next move? Does it believe that the fleet is
now mobilized and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii
or safely conduct necessary training from the insecure anchorage at Lahaina
which is 2,000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific
Coast bases?
Mr. Mitchell. Shortly after that you made a visit to Washington,
did you not, Admiral ?
Admiral Richardson. I did.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember when you reached here and when
you left, approximately ? You were here on October 8, were you not ?
Admiral Richardson. Yes. At 07 : 07, on October 7. I talked with
Stark, Nimitz, EJiox. That was my second visit to Washington. I
came at that time because the Secretary said he wanted to talk to me.
I arrived. I found that they were considering increasing the strength
of the Asiatic Fleet, which was under the command of Admiral Hart.
And while here I lunched with the President. Had a long talk with
him. I saw Dr. Stanley [6S0] Hornbeck of the Department of
State, who was at that time, if my memory serves me correctly, the
advisor of the State Department on far eastern affairs.
Mr. Mitchell. In your interviews with the Secretary of the Navy
and Admiral Stark, did you take up this question with them of your
objections, the objections that you just stated, as to the basing of the
fleet in the Hawaiian area ?
Admiral Richardson. I think not, because I had given a memoran-
dum to the Secretary and fully stated my views to him. I had sent
a copy of it to Admiral Stark, w^ho was thoroughly familiar with my
views. And I had sent a copy of part of it to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck
of the State Department who knew what I thought. So, if I remember
correctly, I did not talk about that with Admiral Stark. I talked
primarily about detaching ships from the main fleet to strengthen the
Asiatic Fleet.
And the first day I arrived I was suddenly confronted with the fact
that 5,000 sailors had landed on the west coast to be turned over to me
and I had to find some means of getting them out to Hawaii. So I
had to take a carrier — I think it was the Saratoga — and use her to
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 265
transport the men that I was unable to accommodate in ships that had
come to the coast with me.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the White House records show that on October
8, 1940, you had lunch with the President and with Governor Leahy at
1 p. m. Do you remember that ?
[681] Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Governor Leahy or Admiral Leahy?
Admiral Richardson. Admiral William E. Leahy.
Mr. Mitchell. He was then Governor of Puerto Rico.
Admiral Richardson. Yes. We did not go to the White House
office in company. I was invited by the President through the Chief
of Naval Operations to lunch at 1 o'clock. When I arrived there I
found Admiral Leahy there.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you state in your own way. Admiral, just what
occurred at that meeting and what was said about any of these matters
we have been referring to ?
Admiral Richardson. The President talked to Admiral Leahy about
Puerto Rican affairs, and as I was not interested, I remember little
of what was said; but I have a vague recollection that one subject
under discussion was the question of housing.
The President asked Admiral Leahy his opinion about strengthen-
ing the Asiatic Fleet and my recollection is that Admiral Leahy said
that whatever you sent out will be lost, therefore I would send the
least valuable combatant ships we have, the 7,500 ton cruisers, but I
recommended, I personally recommended that none be sent. A deci-
sion to send none was reached.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Leahy had been Chief of Naval Operations
previously?
[68£] Admiral Richardson. He had been Chief of Naval Opera-
tions. He was Chief of Naval Operations when I was the assistant.
Mr. Mitchell. Then proceed, Admiral, with your statement of
what occurred there.
Admiral Richardson. The following statement, because of its im-
portance, I have written out. I wrote it out several weeks ago when
it appeared certain, in my mind, that I would, unfortunately, be called
before this committee. And with the permission of the Chairman I
would like to read this statement
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. Which I prepared in the quiet of my home,
where I could think and refresh my memory to a maximum extent
possible.
The Chairman. You may proceed, Admiral, to do that.
Admiral Richardson. I took up the question of returning to the
Pacific coast all of the fleet except the Hawaiian detachment.
The President stated that the fleet was retained in the Hawaiian
area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of
•Japan.
I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might
influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military
government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared
for war, and had no train of [OSS'] auxiliary ships without
which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore, the pres-
ence of the fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on
Japanese action.
266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK
I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that
we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned
to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and
fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then
stripped for war operations.
The President said in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that
the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area, has had, and is now
having, a restraining influence on the actions of Japan."
I said, "Mr. President, I still do not believe it, and I know that our
fleet is disadvantageously disposed for preparing for or initiating war
operations."
The President then said, "I can be convinced of the desirability of
returning the battleships to the west coast if I can be given a good
statement which will convince the American people and the Japanese
Government that in bringing the battlesliips to the west coast we are
not stepping backward."
This is embarrassing.
Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war. He
replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula,
or the Dutch East Indies we would not [684] enter the war,
that if they even attacked the Pliilippines he doubted whether we
would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mis-
takes and that as the war continued and the area of operations ex-
panded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter
the war.
Mr. Mitchell. Does that complete your statement of the conver-
sation ?
Admiral Richardson. Tliat is about all of it.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you want to adjourn?
The Chaikman. Four o'clock having arrived, the Chair thinks we
might recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday,
November 20, 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 267
[685] PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318) , Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W.
Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
[686] The Chairman. The committee will be in order.
Mr. Mitchell, you were examining the witness when we adjourned.
You may proceed.
Before you proceed, Mr. Mitchell — this is not necessarily on the
record.
(Discussion off the record.)
The Chairi^ian. All right, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. JSIitghell. Very well.
TESTIMONY OF ADM. JAMES OTTO EICHAEDSON (Resumed)
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Richardson, in the correspondence which
you have there appears to be a memorandum from the Chief of Naval
Operations dated October 9, 1940, made by you. That was the day
following this visit with the President ?
Admiral Richardson. It was.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if counsel will permit me
to interpose.
Last week I requested from Admiral Inglis a chart which he said
he would have ready for me yesterday showing the disposition of the
ships in the Pacific from May 1941 to December 7, 1941. I would like
to have that at this moment, if I could.
Mr. Mitchell. I am informed that they have been working
[687] on it ; they ought to have it any time ; they haven't sent it yet.
Mr. Gearhart. I am most anxious to have it before I am permitted
to examine the witness now on the stand. I want to ask him questions
concerning those figures. So if a chart can be supplied me, I will ap-
preciate it very, very much.
The Chairman. I am satisfied that Admiral Inglis and the Navy
Department will make the chart available as soon as possible, and as
soon as it is available it will be presented here.^
» Exhibit No. 86.
268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Go ahead, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. You made that memorandum of October 9, 1940,
following your visit the day before with the President?
Admiral Richardson. I did. In order that the Chiei of Naval Op-
erations might be informed as to the decisions of the President and
as to his views as expressed to me.
Mr. Mitchell. The first item on that memorandum is : "Go ahead
with assembly of train."
What does that mean?
Admiral Richardson. There had been some discussion as to as-
sembling auxiliary vessels, transports, repair ships, supply ships. I
had urged that it be done as one evidence of our intention to be pre-
pared. The President stated that [688] we would go ahead
with the assembly of a train.
Mr. Mitchell. Item 2 is : ''Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to
fill four old light cruisers?"
Is that a question the President asked, or one you wanted to know
about ?
Admiral Richardson. The President asked me. I knew we did not
have it. So I wanted the Chief of Naval Operations informed that
he might find it necessary or advisable to have a supply of fuel oil in
Samoa.
Mr. Mitchell. Item 3 :
Give me a chart showing British and French bases or possible bases for sur-
face ships, submarines, or airplanes in islands in the Pacific east of the interna-
tional date line.
Was that another request from the President?
Admiral Richardson. No. That was a request by me, as I remem-
ber it.
Mr. Mitchell. Then, in paragraph 4, you stated :
The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley
That is Admiral Ghormley, is it?
Admiral Richardson. It is Admiral R. L. Ghormley.
Mr. Mitchell (reading) :
was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical
materials, and the [69S] British Admirality felt that they should have
offices prepared for staff conferences.
Were you reporting a thing that the President had said to you ?
Admiral Richardson. I was.
Mr. Mitchell. No. 5 :
The British believe the Germans will iitteinpt to oceiipy Dalcar from Spain
overland through Africa.
Under that, in brackets, "F. D. R."
What does that mean?
Admiral Richardson. "F. D. R." belongs to the next paragraph.
The first is a bit of information. The next, the sixth paragraph is
intended to read:
I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, can be convinced of the desirability,
because that is what the President stated to me.
[670] Mr. Mitchell (reading) :
I can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West
Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American peo-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 269
pie, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West
Coast we are not stepping backward.
That was informing the Chief of Naval Operations what the Presi-
dent had said ?
Admiral Richardson. That is true. I was at that time, just before
going to Washington, on board a flagship on the west coast with ap-
proximately one-third of the battleships. We had returned to the
west coast for replenishment and for recreation and for overhaul and,
if my memory serves me correctly, I was at that time flying my flag
on the New Mexico.
Mr. Mitchell. Item 7, the last on the memo, is this [reading] :
The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light
Cruisers to visit Mindinao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed
toward sending a stronger force.
That was just passing on to the Chief of Naval Operations an item
of information ?
\_691'\ Admiral Eichaedson. It was.
Mr. Mitchell. Going back now. Admiral, to July 1940, prior to this
visit in October 1940, j^ou made a visit to Washington in July 1940,
did you ?
Admiral Richardson. At my suggestion, before I left the west coast
for the Hawaiian area, I was ordered to proceed by air to AVashington
for a conference with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Presi-
dent.
I actually started and France capitulated and mj^ trip was delayed.
I later came by air, arriving in Washington on July 8 and departing
from Washington for Honolulu on July 11.
Mr. Mitchell. The appointment book at the White House states
that on July 8 you had a luncheon engagement with the President at
1 p. m. ; on July 11 another appointment with the President at 12 noon.
What is your memory about that ?
Achniral Richardson. As to the appointment on July 8, 1 had lunch
with the President and talked with him for 2 or 3 hours and my mission
at that time was primarily to find the thought back of our retention in
Hawaii, to explore and endeavor to ascertain, if possible, the duration
of our stay and, from my point of view, stress the necessity of in-
creasing the number of men in the Navy because we were at that time
building a very large Navy ; we had on board ship \692'\ ap-
proximately 85 percent of the number of men required to man the
ships.
In normal times, in normal peacetimes, you can build a destroyer
quicker than you can train the men to man them. Therefore, I was
very strongly of the opinion that all the ships in active commission
in the fleet should have on board them all the men that they could carry
in order that the ships themselves might be prepared and that nucleus
crews should be trained for the new ships, because they would be
required whether we had peace or had war. I was also desirous of
securing the retention of officers in the fleet without the normal change
of duty.
Mr. Mitchell. Were those the subjects that you discussed with the
President?
Admiral Richardson. They were.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you want to state in your own way, as near as you
can recollect, what the general tenor of the conversation was?
79716— 46— pt. 1 20
270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Eichardson. Well, the President was rather loath to in-
crease the number of men because he felt, as expressed to me, that men
of mechanical trades in civil life could be quickly inducted and made
adequate sailormen if their services were suddenly required.
Mr. MrrcHELL. What about the second appointment at [693]
12 noon on July 11 with the President? Do you remember about that
and what was said ?
Admiral Richardson. I believe that that— well, I know that that
meeting lasted only a few minutes and I went by to tell the President
good-bye and no subjects of any moment were discussed.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any appointment with Mr. Hull or
Mr. Welles, or both of them, during July 1940 ? Their record shows
an appointment on July 9.
Admiral Richardson. During that visit I saw Secretary Hull and
Under Secretary Welles and talked to both of them at the same time,
or, rather, I talked to Secretary Hull in the presence of Under Secre-
tary Welles for an hour or so,
I saw Senator Byrnes on the 10th of July. I had lunch with Gen-
eral Marshall on the 10th of July. I saw Dr. Stanley Hornbeck on the
11th of July and outside of naval personnel I think those were the only
officials that I saw. I wanted to see the then Congressman Sci-ugham,
who was chairman of the subcommittee of the Appropriations Com-
mittee of the House that handled naval appropriations, but he was not
in town.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember the subject of your discussion with
Mr. Hull on that meeting of the 9th of July, what the general tenor of
it was ?
[694] Admiral Richardson. I saw Mr. Hull to fully explore and
learn all that I could as to why the fleet was retained in Hawaii, how
long they would probably stay there and what the future intentions
were, because I had been directed to retain the fleet in Hawaii and
anounced that it was retained there at my request and naturally, since
I had made no such request, 1 wanted to know what was back of the
whole thing.
I also felt so strongly the need for men that I wanted to impress
on both the Secretary' of State and the Under Secretary of State that
I felt that they should assist insofar as possibly they could in seeing
that the fleet was fully manned.
Mr. Mitchell. In this correspondence file is a letter from you to Ad-
miral Stark dated June 22, 1940, dated at Lahina Roads, is it?
Admiral Richardson. Lahaina Roads.
Mr. MncHELL. Will you please look at that ?
Admiral Richardson. I cannot find that.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I will hand it to you, my cop3^
Admiral Richardson. I have it. My letter ?
Mr. Mitchell. Your letter.
Admiral Richardson. Yes ; I have it.
Mr. Mitchell. Your letter refers to the fact that General Herron,
then commanding the Hawaiian department, had [69S] re-
ceived an alert from the War Department. Do you remember that
incident ?
Admiral Richardson. Vividly.
Mr. Mitchell. Was any alert ordered from W^ashington for the
Navy at the same time ? Just go on in your own way and tell us about
it. Admiral.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 271
Admiral Kichardsox. Lieutenant General Herron, commanding the
Hawaiian department, received from the War Department a dispatch
on July 17, 1940, which read :
Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific
trade to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting
undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Main-
tain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct
with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.
At that time I was at sea. Lt. Gen. Charles D. Herron visited
Admiral Claude C. Bloch on June 17, informed him of the receipt of
these orders and requested the Navy establish a distance reconnais-
sance. This is hearsay and gained from official correspondence.
Admiral Bloch, in company with General Herron, either had Vice
Admiral Andrews come in or visited him and requested him to estab-
lish the long range reconnaissance be- [696] cause the patrol
planes were under Vice Admiral Andrews. Vice Admiral Andrews
was the senior officer afloat in Pearl Harbor.
I was informed of what had been done by both Admiral Andrews
and I believe Admiral Bloch, so I sent to the commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, the following message:
Would like to know whether request of Commanding General Hawaiian De-
partment for additional air patrol is a part of Army exercises or is it based upon
information from the "War Department?
I received at 0945 local time on June 19, 1940 the following reply :
Request of Commanding General was based upon a directive from the War
Department. He has no information as to whether or not it is an exercise.
I had received no information from the Navy Department. There-
fore, despite what anybody else believed, I knew that it could not be
other than a drill.
The Vice Chairman. Other than a what?
Admiral Richaedson. Other than an exercise, because I firmly
believed that no important information would be available to General
Marshall that was not available to Admiral Stark and if the informa-
tion was of such a character as to [697] necessitate alerting the
Army, the Navy would be equally alerted; but in order to be cer-
tain I
Mr. Mitchell. Are you looking for your letter of the 22d ?
Admiral Kichardsox. No. On June 21 I had a plane come out
from Pearl Harbor, pick me up at 0745, take me into Pearl Harbor,
where I had a conference with Admiral Bloch ^nd General Herron.
I read the order. I asked General Herron whether it was a real alert
or a drill. He said he did not know. I assured him that it could not
be anything but an exercise.
I sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations requesting in-
formation. No reply was ever received.
In compliance with General Herron's request to establish a patrol
Vice Admiral Andrews modified the patrol that was then in effect.
I had established a plane patrol centered on Lahaina, wliich covered
the arc from 220 to 335 degrees to a distance of 180 miles. Admiral
Andrews changed this patrol to cover the arc from south, through
west to north to a distance of 300 miles. He also established a dawn
and dusk patrol, reported his action to me in a letter dated June 18
272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and requested that I confirm this action. I sent to Vice Admiral An-
drews the following dispatch :
Affirm patrol.
Do you want me to go on ?
[69S] Mr. Mitchell. That report from Admiral Andrews is the
document in the .correspondence file dated June 18, 1940, "Memor-
andum from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet." You
have it before you, have you ?
Admiral Kichardson. I forwarded that with a letter from Admiral
Bloch to me, with the dispatch exchange between me and the com-
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in my letter to the Chief
of Naval Operations in order that he might be fully informed as to
the whole incident.
Mr. Mitchell. The report of Admiral Andrews states that the
sector you spoke of from south through west to north to a distance of
300 miles would be searched.
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. With what types of planes was that reconnaissance
conducted ?
Admiral Richardson. "Well, the pati'ol planes, a type then known
as VP, which is a seaplane, unarmed, used later in this war, primarily
as a rescue plane.
Mr. Mitchell. How long did you keep that plane reconnaissance
operation on that scale?
Admiral Richardson, In order that the committee may be fully
informed with respect to long-range reconnaissance which prevailed
for a number of months, it will be necessary for me to cover some
correspondence and make a comprehensive [699] statement.
Shall I proceed?
Mr. Mitchell. If you are ready to.
Admiral Richardson. In connection with the annual fleet exercises,
it had always been the custom to simulate war conditions, and there-
fore, when the fleet arrived in the Hawaiian area, about April 10, and
all of the heavy ships anchored off Lahaina Roads, I established, as a
part of the exercises, a dawn and dusk inner patrol of planes, which
extended to a distance of about 80 miles. I established an antisubma-
rine patrol of destroyers at all the entrances to Lahaina Roads, and I
established a long range reconnaissance of approximateh' 180 miles.
This reconnaissance was established solely as an exercise. It was
not adequate either as to the density of the planes or as to the distance
searched to j^rovide warning of any impending attack from a prospec-
tive enemy. Because of the frequent warnings which I had received
from the Chief of Naval Operations in personal letters, because of my
orders to remain in the Hawaiian area with the fleet for reasons
unknown to me, I continued this patrol and gradually the purpose for
which it was maintained was somewhat modified.
It was continued for three purposes: First, for training; next, be-
cause of my knowledge of the Japanese, and the Panay incident.
Although I "felt there was absolute- \700'] ly no danger at that
time of an attack by the Japanese fleet, I feared that there was, at any
time, a possibility that some fanatical, ill-advised officer in command
of a submarine or a ship might attack.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 273
Also I felt — and this may have been Avrong, but I felt that Admiral
Stark might not have all the information that there was available, or
he might not f uUj miderstand the implications of all tlie information
that he had, and that partly as a personal defensive device, he was
warning me to be on the alert against a possible attack, and being an
ofiicer of long experience, I wanted the same protection, and therefore
I flew this patrol so it could not be said of me after the thing happened
that I was warned and did nothing about it.
It was in effect from that point of view a token reconnaissance.
That Avas continued until, in November ^8, 1940, in a letter to
Admiral Stark, I said, in part — that is my letter of the 28th of
November —
Tour last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in
the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the
Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.
With regard to the first of these matters, i will take this [701] up with
Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii.
The third paragraph states :
The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me
greater concern
Mr. Mitchell (interposing). You might read that fully, that sec-
ond paragraph.
Admiral Kighardson. That relates to another item, but I will do
that.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Admiral Richardson (reading) :
With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my
arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great
deal of concern, and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets
within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too re-
stricted and ships at present are not moored within torpedo range of tiie entrance.
The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me
greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for
employment of a great number of fleet units for security alone, which will con-
sume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training
and indoctrination. I feel that the fleet must opei'ate on either of two assump-
tions, i. e., (a) that [702] we are at peace and no security measures are
required ; or (b) that wartime measures of security must be carried out.
Heretofore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis
for training, and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to
bring on a war by an attack on the fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical
nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on fleet units.
Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters, and in view
of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come
to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose tenta-
tive draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor.
It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new
personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes and some degree of extra dis-
comfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted.
Now, Admiral Stark replied to that letter in a letter dated Decem-
ber 23, the third paragraph of which says — have you got it ?
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, I have, but I was wondering if you would
not get the thread of this a little better if you went back to Admiral
Stark's letter to you of November 22, [703] the reply to which
you just read? You refer to that in the reply. That is November
22, 1940.
274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Counsel, there are two points, there are
two lines of thought. There are two chains of action, and I am
pursuing one.
Mr. Mitchell. All right. Go ahead. You may go back to that,
if necessary.
Admiral Richardson. Go back ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. What I am now discussing is long range
reconnaissance. In Admiral Stark's letter of December 23, he stated,
in paragraph 3 :
First, in regard to security, I endeavored to outline to Murphy —
Murphy was at that time Commander Vincent R. Murphy, my war
plans officer, whom I had left in "Washington to discuss matters with
the War Plans Division of Naval Operations. [Reading :]
[704] I endeavored to outline to Murphy my idea as to the extent security
measui'es should be prosecuted, namely, that while the extent of security meas-
ures required his increasing, it has not yet reached the demands of full wartime
security. As I discussed with Murphy, there will be an advantage in making
occasional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft but it is not yet necessary to
make these continuous. I agree with you that the wear and tear on equipment,
and the detrimental effects on training, of full security measures should be
given due weight.
Upon receipt of that letter of December 30, IDttO, in a letter addressed
to the fleet, the number of the letter being "U. S. Fleet Confidential
Letter No. 8CL 1-40; Subject: Security of fleet units operating in
the Hawaiian area", which is the finished product, the tentative draft
of which I sent to Admiral stark
The Vice Chairman. AMiat is the date of that, please ?
Admiral Richardson. December 30, 1940. I doubt whether the
committe has a copy of this letter, because I myself received it just
yesterday, and I secured this letter because the counsel indicated to
me his intention to interrogate me with respect to long range recon-
naissance. Undoubtedly the counsel will supply the members of the
committe with a copy of this letter, if he has not already done so.
[705^ Mr. Gesfxl. It has not been supplied as yet.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, you are not referring to the report of
December 30, 1940, from the commandant ?
Admiral Richardson. No.
Mr. Mitchell. They are different documents ?
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Counsel, there are two chains of circum-
stances and letters originating at about the same time. I am pursuing
one of them.
Mr. Mitchell. This letter you refer to is from you to Admiral
Stark, is it ?
Admiral Richardson. 'N^Hien Admiral Stark informed me that he
felt it was no longer necessary to do other than sweep operating areas
and do what his letter of December 23, said to do, then I had no
concern over doing other than what I thought was necessary. I dis-
continued then long rang reconnaissance of any kind except the sweep-
ing of operating areas.
I present this letter primarily to show that I discontinued patrol
plane reconnaissance. I also issued this directive :
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 275
Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchor-
ages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului
may be considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the en-
trance and ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire
from outside the harbor.
Now if counsel so desires, I will pursue the other [706^ chain
of circumstances.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the precise date that Admiral Kimmel
assumed command there?
Admiral Richardson. After issuing this directive, 8CL-40 of
December 30, 1940, I felt that this letter was not sufficiently compre-
hensive to provide for the security of the fleet, so I immediately
started the preparation of a revision of that document. I was en-
gaged— at least my staff was — in revising that when I received in-
formation of my prospective detachment. So I amplified that very
much. But inasmuch as I was to be relieved in the near future,
I asked that my staff confer with the prospective staff of the pros-
pective commander in chiefs to ascertain their views. So the docu-
ment that was later issued under the title of "Pacific Fleet Con-
fidential Letter No. 2CL-41, date of February 15, 1941" was signed
by Admiral H. E. Kimmel, who was the commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet having relieved me on February 1, 1941.
Had I remained in command of the U. S. Fleet this order would
have borne my signature and it would have been substantially the
same order.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, let us go back for a moment to Admiral
Stark's letter to you of November 22, 1940, which I have before me.
He says :
While you were here early in October we sent a dispatch [707] to Com-
fourteen to ascertain from Admiral Bloch whether or not the protection being
afforded to the vital element of the naval establishment in Hawaii was satisfac-
tory, this in order that, if required, we could make representations to the War
Department to direct more thorough protection on the part of its Hawaiian De-
partment.
Admiral Bloch's answers to this dispatch and to a second dispatch on the
same subject were not very definite, and did not provide bases for further action
by the Department.
Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl
Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both
with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with
the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable
object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based
in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and
imposes on the Commander in Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in
which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and
of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem compre-
hensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy
Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional
equipment and additional protective measures.
[708] For instance, is it desirable to place torpedo nets within the harbor
itself? I will appreciate your comment and those of Comfourteen on this
question.
Anti-aircraft protection can be provided first by units of the Fleet, actually
in Pearl Harbor with guns ready at all times ; by stationing about the Navy
Yard of Army A. A. defense measures including mobile batteries, and possibly
by utilization of Marine Defense Battalion Anti-Aircraft Units now available
in the Pearl Harbor area, or that could be made available. Also by keeping
carrier fighters squadrons alerted and ready to go.
276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
And SO on.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, you responded to that letter on the 28th of
November and you said :
With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Blnch on my
aiTival back in Hawaii.
Now you did take it up with Admiral Bloch ?
Admiral RicHARDSoisr. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Just tell us what you did about that.
Admiral Richardson. The letter of Admiral Stark to me dated
November 22, 1940, is one of a series of letters and incidents about
which at least three witnesses in addition to me will testify, and in
order that that matter may be initially understood I think it advis-
able to cover the whole series.
When I was in Washington the 7th, or the 11th of October [709]
I discussed with Admiral Stark the position of the fleet when in Pearl
Harbor, the inadequate provision that had been made both by the
Army and Navy to protect the fleet, and before I returned to Pearl
Harbor Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Bloch, commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District, a dispatch requesting certain information,
as indicated in his first paragraph of the letter of November 22.
I remained on the A^etv Mexico on the west coast and did not arrive
in Pearl Harbor until the 6th of December. Admiral Bloch was the
commandant of the district, and he was exceedingly busy w^ith work
under construction. I felt that it was essential that I personally know
what we had, and what the Army had, therefore I arranged with Lt.
Gen. Charles D. Herron to inspect everything that the Army had to
defend the Army and Navy installations in Hawaii from all forms
of overseas attack.
I asked General Herron to have the officers who were subordinate
to him, who Avere directly responsible for any part of the defense,
prepared to show me what they had, to give me a list of what they had,
give me a list of what the plans called for them to have, and the best
estimate they could make of when they would receive what they re-
quired.
The flagship was going to sea on individual exercises which did
not require my presence. Therefore, on December 19, [710] in
company witli General Herron, I reviewed the Army equipment and
received the data requested. I delivered this data to Admiral Bloch
and told him that inasmuch as he represented the fleet in relation? with
the Army in Hawaii, because I might be away at any time, that I
wanted him to use this data and prepare a letter to the Navy Depart-
ment setting forth his views and forward the letter through me, which
Admiral Bloch did in a letter dated December 30, 1940. The subject :
"Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Abil-
ity of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks."
[_711~\ That letter was forwarded by me to the Chief of Naval
Operations with the first endorsement dated January 4, 1941. I have
been informed, and I believe that rear admiral, now Admiral Rich-
mond Kelly Turner, then on duty in the War Plans Division of Naval
Operations, prepared, for the signature of the Secretary of the Navy, a
letter dated January 24, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of War.
Reference to this letter appears on page 5, section 7 of the report of
the Roberts Commission.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 277
Mr. Mitchell. This letter, Admiral, of December oO, 1940, signed by
Admiral Bloch and addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, is in
evidence here. Have you it before you ?
Admiral Kichardson. I have.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you mind reading paragraphs 1 and 2 of that
leiter, or shall I read it for you ?
Admiral Richardson. I will read it :
In view of the inquiries contained in references («) — wlaich is Stark's dispatch
of October 1940 — (&) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set
forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile
attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.
Aircraft Raids :
[712] Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be
brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two vpays of repelling attack.
First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Sec-
ond, by driving off attacking bombers with antiaircraft guns and fighters. The
Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant recon-
naissance with which to locate any enemy carriers, and the only planes belonging
to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army
bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area G9 B-18 bombers. All of these are
classified as being obsolete. The model is 6 years old and the planes tliemselves
are 5 years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are
satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing planes are expected some-
time in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance,
requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared
by the fleet.
To drive o£E bombing planes after they have been launched, will require both
fighting planes and antiaircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area, 36
pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are 6 years
old, and some of them are 4 years old. [71S] In numbers and models there
is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in
production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This
does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not
appear adequate.
The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor Base by anti-
aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-
four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more to be delivered
in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50-calibre out of the
projected 120 37-millimeter and 308 .50-calibre machine guns. The Army plans
to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a
few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to in-
crease the number of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblence
of antiaircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the eflicacy of
a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The
Army has made no plans for the antiaircraft defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe ;
furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-
aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in
order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge
of the density of antiaircraft barrages [714] abroad, I am of the opinion
that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient
defense of the Hwaiian area.
This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 calibre machine gims.
[715] In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning
service which will consist of 8 radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed
and 55 are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this
warning net should be adequate.
May I also read the last paragraph ?
Mr. Mitchell. Any part of it that you think is material. Admiral.
Admiral Richardson. This is paragraph 11 :
It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War
Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agree-
ment between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the
officials of the 14th Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do
something in regard to Army matters.
278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then on January 7, 1941, you placed an endorse-
ment on that communication of Bloch's ?
Admiral Kichakdson. I think that is January 4, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Is it?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes. It is blotted up. January 4.
Admiral Richardson. That is Saturday, and I wanted this away
as quickly as I could and I know I would not hold it.
Mr. Mitchell. That expresses directly your individual [716]
views about the situation, did it ?
Admiral Richardson. It did. I think that Admiral Bloch and I
were in complete agreement, because we fully discussed the matter.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you care to read the portions of that that
you think are especially useful ? The first paragraph probably covers
the ground really, and the second — I will read it if you like.
Admiral Richardson. I think, if I may be permitted to suggest it,
that the first and third paragraphs ought to be read, because the third
paragraph contains the matter that has been mentioned several times.
Paragraph 1:
Forwarded. The Coaimander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant
14th Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.
As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the
Commandant 14th Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Com-
mander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant 14th Naval District in the opin-
ion that the Army Pursuit Squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries are inadequate
to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established
the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile
three-inch gunds for this area is not 1717] considered adequate. With
the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater
number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter
liigh altitude bombing attaclis on Pearl Harbor.
[718] Mr. Mitchell. I will read "2" for you, to relieve your
voice, Admiral.
Admiral Richardson. All right.
JVIr. Mitchell (reading) :
2. As neither the increased antiaircraft batteries, nor the augmented pursuit
squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of the Fleet units
within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet
which may be in Pearl Harbor in the event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans
for cooperation with the local defense forces are being made. At present, the
continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is
not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions
does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting en-
tirely the training i*equired by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely
curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required.
Admiral Richardson. Paragraph 3:
There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles
or nets within the Harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo
plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the Harbor, particu-
larly the movement of large ships and the landing and takeoff of patrol squad-
rons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the [7i9] only operating base avail-
able to the Fleet in this ai-ea, any pressure defense measures that will further
restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided.
Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present condi-
tions the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently
near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered it is
necessary to lay such nets.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 279
That paragraph was, in part, based on information from the Navy
Department; insofar as was known torpeclos launched from aircraft
would not operate in water of the depth of Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Mitchell. You spoke. Admiral, of the fact that following that
report of Admiral Bloch of December 30, forwarded with the endorse-
ment you have just read, there resulted the letter from the Secretary
of the Navy, Mr. Knox, to the Secretary of War, which you stated
was prepared for him by Admiral Turner.
Admiral Eichaedson. Admiral Turner so informed me.
Mr. Mitchell. I have that letter here and it hasn't been offered in
evidence yet. Probably I had better read it if the committee is ready.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Will you identify that ?
[7W] Mr. Mitchell. These are letters which we will mark Ex-
hibit 10.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 10.")
Mr. Mitchell. It follows right along logically after this Bloch
report. It is a letter from Secretary Knox, dated January 24, 1941,
addressed to the Secretary of War.
Mr. Keefe. What is the date of it ?
Mr. Mitchell. January 24, 1941.
[721] My Deab Mb. Secbetaky : The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while
in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under
renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several
weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity
of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of success-
ful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates
with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a
surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.
In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or
naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidlj^ as can be done, that will increase
the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character
mentioned above.
The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con-
sidered to be :
(1) Air bombing attack.
(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
(3) Sabotage.
(4) Submarine attack.
[722] (5) Mining.
(6) Bombardment by gun fire.
Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been
provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally
to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution
of which I consider to be of primary importance.
Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively,
simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated.
The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons,
and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of
carriers and their supporting vessels.
The counter measures to be considered are :
(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before
air attack can be launched ;
(2) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their
objectives ;
(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire.
(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.
The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite
possibility, might not be carried out in case [723] of an air attack initiated
without warning prior to a declaration of war.
280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required
for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit
aircraft are at present in Oahn, and that, while the organization and equipping
of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equip-
ment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and
sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.
Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the
standards of the 'war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-air-
craft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56
mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries
are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea
coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun
bombardment, one of the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men.
If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft
guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.
By late summer the defenses wil be considerably strengthened by additions in
guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile,
twenty-four 90-mm., [7241 and one hundred twenty 37-mm. guns will be on
hand ; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149 ; the new
radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of
the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this
augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of
course, affect the critical period immediately before us.
The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest
value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated
some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might
prove most advantageous.
To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals :
(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit air-
craft and antiaircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in
Hawaii.
(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages,
the employment of smoke, and other special services for improving the defenses
of Pearl Harbor.
(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval
and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire,
against surprise aircraft raids.
(4) That the Arniy and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of
joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids
against Pearl Harbor.
[725] (5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces
in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly
so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.
Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures
to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of
the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Depart-
ment.
Then attached to that is the reply of Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Secre-
tary of War, dated February 7, 1941 :
[726] War Department,
Washington, Fel. 7, 1941.
Subject : Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise
attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express com-
plete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our
making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian
Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues
to hold a higli priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the
importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.
2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit
planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these
are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to
have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to
Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 281
will bring the Armv pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-3G type and
seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-F
pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanl^s [727] and modern armor
will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to
3 Tliere are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns,
twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA
machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one
hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .uO AA
machine guns. , ^ ^, *
4 With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor
has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements
for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered.
Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment
cannot be made at an earlier date.
5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give
immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages
and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage
balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be
made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on
hand and eighty-four being manufactured— forty for delivery by June 30, 1941,
and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration
funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke
for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified [728]
opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employ-
ment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the
Commanding General will look into this matter again.
6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding
a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawiian
Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities
in making those measures effective.
Signed by Henry L. Stimson, Seci-etary of War.
[7£9] Attached to that is a letter of transmittal from the Chief of
Naval Operations to the commander in chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
"Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," and copy of
Secretary Knox's letter, and one of Secretary Stimson's letters ; trans-
mitted under date of February 11, 1941.
And another, addressed to the the commanding general, Hawiian
Department, signed by General Dick,- Adjutant General, dated Feb-
ruary 7, 1941, inviting attention to the correspondence I have just
read between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War.
And attached then is a document dated February 13, 1941, signed
by Carl Grosse, Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters, Hawiian
Department, acknowledging receipt of the Adjutant General's letter
of February 7, together with the two enclosures noted.
They are all part of the same exhibit (No. 10) .
[730] Now, Admiral Kichardson, had you left Hawaii before
February 11 and 13 when this Knox-Stimson matter was up?
Admiral Richaedson. I was relieved of command of the fleet on
the 1st of February 1941. Thereafter I knew nothing about fleet
matters, although I did not actually leave the islands until the 14th
of February.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, this correspondence between the Navy
and the War Department that I have just read, that reached there
February 11 and 13, would not have come to your hands?
Admiral Richardson. This is the first time it has come to my
notice.
Mr, Mitchell. Now, going back to your visits with Secretary Hull
and Secretary Knox, which was your first trip here in 1940, along in
282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
July, you said you went to Mr. Hull and others to find out what the
situation was, why you were being kept at Pearl Harbor. I neglected
to ask you what Mr. Hull said, if he gave the reason for it.
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Hull in a very complete and comprehen-
sive manner presented to me his views of the relationships, relations
between the United States and Japan. He felt that we should take a
very strong position with respect to Japan and that the retention
of the fleet in Hawaii was a reflection of that strong attitude.
[7S1] I did not receive this impression from Secretary Hull, and
I cannot state with certainty how I received it, but I left here with the
distinct impression that there was an opinion in Washington that
Japan could be bluffed.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, when you were here during that trip you
visited with Admiral Stark, I suppose ?
Admiral Eichardson. I did. I stayed with Admiral Stark at the
Admiral's house.
Mr. Mitchell. In your contact with him did you gather any differ-
ent impression about his attitude toward basing the fleet at Pearl
Harbor instead of on our west coast than he expressed in these letters?
Admiral Richaedson. It is my belief that had Admiral Stark been
uninfluenced by other considerations he would have wholeheartedly
agreed with me.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, just what did he say about it in your meetings
with him, if you remember.
Admiral Richardson. Well, his letters, I think, in many places
show that he hoped that the fleet would return to the west coast, and
after the fleet had been in Hawaii for some time he authorized me to
return approximately one-third of the fleet to the coast at a time
for recreation and replenislunent and the securing of additional men,
and when he informed me that I might do that he said that he in-
formed me with great [732] pleasure. And I believe that I
came with either the first or the second one of those task forces that
visited the coast.
Mr. JMiTCHELL. During 1940^ when you were in command of the
fleet, did you have fleet war games out in the Hawaiian area ?
Admiral Richardson. We had, wliile I was in command of the fleet,
only one big fleet exercise which involved two fleet propers. They
took place between the first of April and the 9th of May.
Mr. Mitchell. Did any of those exercises involve a simulated air
attack by an enemy carrier force ?
Admiral Richardson. Those exercises did not. The exercises were
planned by my predecessor. They did not include a carrier attack
on Pearl Harbor. And joint exercises with the Army were discussed
by Admiral Stark with me in letters, and it was too late to modify
the plans, and in those exercises the only exercises in which the Army
participated was, I believe, on the 8th or 9th of April. I sent some
heavy cruisers in to simulate an attempted raid in order to exercise
the forces stationed in Hawaii, the Navy patrol planes, in locating the
force and the Army bombers in bombing it, and the submarine stations
normally in Pearl Harbor in attacking the force, which was simulating
an attack, so that there was not a large scale joint exercise between
[73S] the Army and the Navy in which a carrier raid on installa-
tions in Hawaii occurred, although in previous years, when I was in a
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 283
position other than commander in chief, I had been present in the fleet
when such attacks were made.
[734-] Mr. Mitchell, I think we are ready for the committee to
inquire of the witness.
The Chaikman, Admiral, who was your immediate predecessor as
commander of the United States Fleet ?
Admiral Richardson. I relieved Admiral Claude C. Bloch.
The Chairman. Wliat is the technical relationship between the
commander in chief of the fleet, such as that which you were com-
mander of, and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?
Admiral Richardson. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District is a subordinate of the commander in chief. He is also under
the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to other than fleet matters.
The Chairman, ^Vlien the fleet is at sea does the commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District have complete authority within that district
or is he still subject to orders of the commander in chief of the fleet?
Admiral Richardson, He is always subject to the orders of the
commander in chief. Because the commander in chief may not be
present in Pearl Harbor he is the representative of the commander
in chief in dealings with the commanding general.
The Chairsian. Yes. Now, up to the time when you were detached,
the force of which you were commander in chief was [735]
known as the United States Fleet, is that true ?
Admiral Richardson, That is correct, because at that time the
commander in chief of the United States Fleet had command of all
the ships in the Atlantic that were in commission and not operating
directly under the Chief of Naval Operations as a ship would be were
she undergoing shake-down preparatorj' to joining the fleet.
The Chairman, So that during the time when you were com-
mander in chief of the United States Fleet that meant that you were
the commander in chief of the entire fleet ?
Admiral Richardson, That is true.
The Chairman. No matter where it was located ?
Admiral Richardson. That is true.
The Chairman. Now, there was a reorganization that was some-
what coincident with your detachment ?
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely coincident.
The Chairman, And they divided the fleet into the Pacific Fleet and
the Asiatic Fleet?
Admiral Richardson. No.
The Chairman. No?
Admiral Richardson. There had always been a small force known
as the Asiatic Fleet that was not under the command of the commander
in chief of the United States Fleet but passed under his command in
case the United States Fleet moved [736] to the western
Pacific.
The Chahiman. Well, on the 1st of February, then, 1941 approxi-
mately, the Pacific Fleet as such came into existence ?
Admiral Richardson, It did. The title and the position of com-
mander in chief United States Fleet disappeared and in lieu thereof
there was established the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet,
which commanded all the ships in the Pacific Ocean that were not
part of the Asiatic Fleet and were not operating directly under the
284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Chief of Naval Operations, There was a commander in chief Atlan-
tic Fleet, who commanded all the combatant ships in commission in
the Atlantic Fleet except those that were operating directly under
the Chief of Naval Operations.
The Chairman. When did you become commander in chief of the
United States Fleet?
Admiral Eichardson. On January 6, 1940.
The Chairman. So that you were in command of the fleet approxi-
mately 13 months ?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
The Chairman. Was Admiral Kimmel associated with the fleet
under j^our command in the Pacific?
Admiral Richardson. He was. He was in the fleet under the com-
mand of, or the immediate senior under Admiral Stark before I be-
came commander in chief and before Admiral Stark [737] be-
came Chief of Naval Operations. In fact, he relieved Admiral Stark
as commander of the cruisers and from that position he relieved me.
The Chairman. What relationship did he occupy in authority with
respect to you as commander in chief of the fleet? Was he senior
officer under you or how far down the line did he go ?
Admiral Richardson. Admiral Kimmel ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. Well, he was very far down. He was a
rear admiral and under me came first the commander of the battle
force, who was an admiral. Then commander of the scouting force
and commander of battleships, who were both vice admirals. Then
Admiral Kimmel commanded the cruisers and as such he was on the
same level as the commander of the battleships, the commander of
the destroyers and the commander of the aircraft.
The Chairman. And he was commander of all the cruisers then in
the force?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, what we call a type commander.
The Chairman. Yes. Now, in this correspondence between Ad-
miral Stark and you, you continuously emphasized your belief that
the fleet should be based on the Pacific coast rather than in the Hawai-
ian Islands or Oahu?
[738] Admiral Richardson. I did that.
The Chairman. And there were, as I gather from the correspond-
ence, manj' reasons for that opinion on your part, one among them
being that you had larger areas for training of the aircraft force and
the other activities of training the men and also that you believed that
the morale of the men would be improved by being closer to their
homes ?
Admiral Richardson. That is true.
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. I presented solely the naval point of view.
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. There are other considerations that at times
determined the disposition of the fleet or the units thereof.
The Chairman. Yes. And in your correspondence with the Chief
of Naval Operations and in your conversations with him in Washing-
ton and with the Secretary of State and with the President you were
impressed with their belief that in addition to naval reasons that there
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 285
was probably a diplomatic or other, maj^be psychological, reason for
keeping the fleet in that area as a deterrent against activities on the
part of Japan?
Admiral Riciiardsox. Absolutely.
[739] The Chairman. Now, when you were in Washington you
3mphasized the fact that you needed more men and that the Navy was
beign vastly expanded and that men were not coming in as fast as ships
were being built ?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
The Chairman. That you needed more men ?
Admiral Richardson. I did it in and out. of port, everywhere.
The Chairman. Yes. Then you referred to 5,000 men that were
allotted to you on one of your trips here, or while you were here on
one of your trips and that you sent them out to the Hawaiian area on
a carrier, did you say ?
Admiral Ricpiardson. Those that I was unable to accommodate in
the ships that came with me to the west coast I sent out to Pearl Harbor
in a carrier.
The Chairman. Yes. Following 3"our detachment from the fleet
you became a member of the General Board of the Navy here in
Washington ?
Admiral Richardson. That is true.
The Chairman. I think that is all I want to ask at this time. Sen-
ator George?
Senator George. I don't care to ask aii}^ questions at the present
time.
Tlie Chairman. Congressman Cooper?
[740'] The Vice Chairman. I don't think I have any questions
now, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lucas?
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the admiral
two or three questions.
In your memorandum of September 12, 19i0, to the Secretary of
the Navy you submitted a number of pertinent points to be considered,
among which were the operations of the fleet and in that part of the
memorandum you discussed the problems involved if the fleet was
to be retained in Hawaiian waters.
As I understand it, those points of disadvantage that you stressed
in that memorandum were purely problems from a naval standpoint
and nothing else?
Admiral Richardson. Oil, absolutely.
Senator Lucas. All right. Now, you set forth seven points, seven
disadvantages to basing the fleet in that area. Those points have
been gone over by counsel and yourself and I was anxious to determine
from you as to whether or not at that time you considered the question
of the possibility of a hostile air attack from some aggressor nation,
in connection with not basing the fleet in the Hawaiian waters?
Admiral Richardson. I had not considered that it was likely that
the fleet would be attacked by a carrier raid T^^-?] and I so
stated repeatedly in security orders issued to the fleet.
The Chairman. Will the admiral desist for a moment? The Chair
announced at the beginning of these hearings that the photographers
would not be permitted in this areaway. It interferes with the wit-
79716— 46— pt. 1 21
286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
nesses, with the counsel, and with the committee, and I hope that my
friend will observe that rule hereafter. You may proceed, Senator.
Senator Lucas. This memorandum was in June 1940, and if I un-
derstand you correctly. Admiral, the possibility of a hostile air attack
on the fleet was not considered in making up the recommendations
which the authorities here in Washington should study ?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. And the question of a submarine attack was not con-
sidered either in connection with those plans ?
Admiral Richardson. I have difficulty in hearing the Senator.
Senator Lucas. I say the question of a submarine attack by a hostile
force was not considered in 1940 either ?
Admiral Richardson. No. I think my view is clearly presented in
a document before the committee which says :
The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may rea-
sonably be based on two assump- [7^2] tions :
(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present exist-
ing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and mis-
guided nationals of such powers may attempt ;
(1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor,
(2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pear Harbor by sinking an obstruc-
tion in the Channel,
(3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.
So that, actually, before I left the fleet we were sweeping the channel
against magnetic mines.
Senator Lucas. How long was it after you gave your seven points
of disadvantage to keeping the fleet in Hawaii that the order of
Admiral Andrews was issued to start the patrol which you discussed?
Admiral Richardson. Admiral Andrews' order did not start a
patrol .
Senator Lucas. What was that order ?
Admiral Richardson. It modified the patrol that I had in existence.
Senator Lucas. I see, all right. And when did that patrol go into
existence that you had. Admiral ?
[7^] Admiral Richardson. It started the day that the fleet ar-
rived in the Hawaiian area on the 10th of April.
Senator Lucas. 1940?
Admiral Richardson. 1940, purely as a part of the fleet exercise for
training purposes.
Senator Lucas. For training purposes only ?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Lucas. And how long did that continue ?
Admiral Richardson. It continued until, I think, the 30th of
December 1940.
Senator Lucas. Well, how did the admiral's order augment that?
I had just forgotten your statement a moment ago.
Admiral Richardson. Initially the long-range patrol, so-called, but
it was not a long-range patrol, it was to 180 miles centered on Lahaina
between the arc of 220 and 235, as I remember, but I can verify that —
220 to 335 to 180 miles.
Now, when the Army received an alert Admiral Andrews shifted
the center from Lahaina to Pearl Harbor and increased the distance
to 300 miles and changed the arc from 180 through west to north.
Later on I modified that patrol.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 287
Senator Lucas. Yes. Now, before you leave the patrol, how long
did that continue ?
Admiral Kichabdson. The patrol established by Admiral Andrews ?
[744] Senator Lucas. That is right.
Admiral Richardson. I am not certain, but I think it continued as
long as the Army maintained their alert which was, as I remember,
almost a month.
Senator Lucas. Now, how many planes were being used on that
patrol ?
Admiral Richardson. I haven't the faintest idea.
Senator Lucas. That is an Army question ?
Admiral Richardson. I haven't any idea.
Senator Lucas. Did the Navy use any planes ?
Admiral Richardson. Oh, the Army used no planes.
Senator Lucas. But you don't know how many planes the Navy
used on that patrol ?
Admiral Richardson. No.
Senator Lucas. Well, who would know that ?
Admiral Richardson. I doubt if anybody would know
Senator Lucas. Well, weren't you
Admiral Richardson — Because you cannot remember, at least, the
commander in chief cannot remember, details of activities after 5
years.
Senator Lucas. Well, did you make any record of the daily patrols
that were made by these planes from the ships ?
Admiral Richardson. No. You established it in an order and for-
got it, assuming that it would be carried out.
[745] Senator Lucas. You do not recall? You wouldn't want
to make a guess as to how many planes daily went out on this patrol
to cover this arc that was established by the admiral ?
Admiral Richardson. No ; I would not hazarf'. a guess and the only
possible source of information of any reliability would be in the files
of the commander in chief and the files
Senator Lucas. Of the Fourteenth Naval District ?
Admiral Richardson (continuing). Become very voluminous and
are normally retained active only about 2 or 3 years.
Senator Lucas. Do I understand that at that particular time the
planes that were on the sea on the Enterprise, that were making daily
flights in training, that there was no record of the number of planes
that went out and when they came back ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, every ship keeps in her log a record of
everything that it does.
Senator Lucas. Well, that is what I thought.
Admiral Richardson. AncJ in the patrol squadrons there would
undoubtedly be maintained a record of when the planes left and when
they returned.
Senator Lucas. Now, who would have the record of the patrol, of
the men who were making the determination of the number of planes
that were going out on this patrol in line [74(j] with the order
that was augmented by Admiral Andrews ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, Admiral Andrews' order to the officer
in command of the patrol wing would tell him how many planes to
288 CONGRESSIOI^AL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
use, when to start out, how far they would go, when they would
return.
Senator Lucas. Well, was that Admiral Andrews' responsibility
then?
Admiral Kichaedson. What?
Senator Lucas. Would that be Admiral Andrews' responsibility
for issuing the order and for the keeping of the record of the planes?
Admiral Richardson. No ; he- would not keep a record. In con-
sultation with the commander of the patrol wing, which I think was
Patrol Wing 2, he would issue the order in general terms. The com-
mander of Patrol Wing 2 would implement it and record his com-
pliance. .
Senator Lucas. All right. Later on, Admiral, you modified this
order ?
Admiral Richardson. I did.
Senator Lucas. Just how did you do it, now ?
Admiral Richardson. Because of the number of planes that were
available and because of the need for training men, I modified the
patrol to cover periodically an arc between 170°, which is 10° to the
east of south and [74-7] 350°, and I covered daily an iarc, a
sector of that arc and in order that it might not be evident to Japanese
residents of Oahu that I was searching the same sector every day, I
rotated that sector.
Senator Lucas. All right. Now, one further question and then
I will be through.
With respect to the letter that you wrote to Admiral Stark after
General Herron, as I understood you to say, had been notified that
an alert was on in the Hawaiian Islands, you did not receive any in-
formation at that time from anyone in Washington, D. C, about
that?
Admiral Richardson. Not at that time.
Senator Lucas. You later said that you wrote to Admiral Stark
about the type of alert that was on and that you. had never received
any answer from him.
Admiral Richardson. Oh, I telegTaphed him, I mean I sent him
a radio and asked him what it was all about.
Senator Lucas. And you never received any reply to that ?
Admiral Richardson. Never.
Senator Lucas. Did you ever talk to Admiral Stark after that as
to why he did not reply to that important message of yours?
Admiral Richardson. I talked to both Admiral Stark and [748]
General Marshall.
Senator Lucas. What did Admiral Stark say as to the reason he
did not reply after this type of alert went out to the islands ?
Admiral Richardson. He said it was an exercise, an Army exercise.
Senator Lucas. That is what Admiral Stark said ?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Lucas. And he did not think it was sufficiently important,
even though he had received a message from you, he did not think it
was important enough to make reply to you?
Admiral Richardson. Well, he knew that I had enough confidence
in him to know that if it were the real thing he would have told me.
Senator Lucas. But vou did send him a wire ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 289
Admiral Richardson, I did.
Senator Lucas. And asked him about it ?
Admiral Richardson. I did.
Senator Lucas. You wanted to find out for yourself ?
Admiral Richardson. I wanted an answer, too.
Senator Lucas. That is right. One other question, if I may. Over
in one of these letters in reading this correspondence I note this,
Admiral. In your letter of May 13, [749] 1940, addressed to
Admiral Stark — at that time you were then still discussing the reasons
pro and con as to why the fleet should or should not be based in
Hawaiian waters — in this letter you state this :
It seems that under present world conditions the paramount thing for us is
the security of the Western Hemisphere. This, in my opinion, transcends every-
thing, anything, certainly, in the Far East, our own or other interests. South
America is the greatest prize yet remaining to be grabbed.
Who did you expect to grab South America in that letter?
Admiral Richardson. Well, Senator, I haven't a copy of that
letter.
Senator Lucas. It would be interesting to loiow because
Admiral Richardson. May what?
Senator Lucas. This is May 13, 1940.
The Chairman, If the Admiral is in a position to answer that ques-
tion he may do so. We have gone past our adjourning hour.
Admiral Richardson. Oh, I have that.
Senator Lucas, I am sure you and I agree on the same thing, prob-
ably, as to who we thought might grab South America, but it was
just interesting to get your further reactions.
Admiral Richardson. Well, I didn't want anybody to grab [750']
South America.
The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
(Wliereupon, at 12 : 05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p, m. of the
same day.)
[751] AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 : 00 P. M.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
When we recessed Senator Lucas was examining Admiral Richard-
son. You may resume.
Senator Lucas. Admiral Richardson, in one of your statements
made before the committee this morning you stated that you were
certain that the Navy could have been alerted as well as the Army
had it been any other thing than a drill.
Admiral Richardon. Correct,
Senator Lucas. Later on you told the committee, and told me on
examination, that you wired, you radioed, I think you said, Admiral
Stark, asking him directly in this radiogram what the alert meant,
and you received no reply.
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Senator Lucas Later on you had a talk with Admiral Stark here
in Washington and in that conversation with the Admiral he advised
you that it was merely a drill ?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. You also said that while you were here you had a
conversation with General Marshall on that same question.
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Lucas. Will you, give to the committee what General
Marshall said about the alert?
[7S£] Admiral Richardson. I told General Marshall that the
commanding general of the Hawaiian Department had received an
alert, that I was certain that it was a drill, but a situation had been
created where there was some uncertainty and some uneasiness, and
that I would like to know what was the purpose of the alert dispatch
sent by him.
He said :
Oh, that was simply an exercise and I thought if I did not state that it was an
exercise the exercise would be carried out more completely.
Senator Lucas. That is about the end of the conversation, I take it!
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Lucas. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, you stated previously
The Chairman. The Chair will state that Congressman Clark would
be the next in order but he is not here at the moment.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, you stated in your examination that you
and Admiral Stark were close personal friends ?
Admiral Richardson. Had been. Admiral Stark entered the Naval
Academy 1 year after I did.,
Mr. Murphy. When in Washington you stayed at his home?
Admiral Richardson. I did. He served with me when we [753]
were both ensigns.
Mr. Murphy. What was the attitude of Admiral Stark in regard to
the location of the fleet at Hawaii ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, from all that he said to me, and from
all that he wrote to me, I gathered that he was fully in sympathy
with me. Of course, he was more closely in touch with diplomatic
considerations than I was.
Mr. Murphy. Did you receive a message from Admiral Stark dated
March 15, 1940?
Admiral Richardson. A letter ?
Mr. Murphy. I understand that on March 15, 1940, Admiral Stark
sent you a message in which he declared, despite your many doubts,
that the policy of keeping the fleet units in Hawaiian waters was sound,
and that the State Department was very strong for it. Did you re-
ceive such a communication ?
Admiral Richardson. That communication did not refer to the
retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian waters, for the reason that the
fleet had not arrived in the Hawaiian waters at that date. That re-
ferred to( the Hawaiian detachment which was sent to the Hawaiian
area the fall preceding, I think, September or October 1939.
Mr. Murphy. Do you know of any written memorandum, by letter
or otherwise, where at any time Admiral Stark stated his position as
to whether or not the fleet should be assigned [7-54] to Hawaii ?
Admiral Richardson. He stated repeatedly that he hoped we would
return and that our delay in Hawaiian waters would not be unduly
prolonged.
Mr. Murphy. Will you state — give me a reference to any communi-
cation that you know where Admiral Stark made his position clear in
writing?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 291
Senator Brewster. May I be permitted to speak?
Mr. Murphy. Do you want to help me ?
Admiral Richardson. On the 7th of May in a letter to mei he says :
Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this
reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian waters for a
couple of weeks.
When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two
weeks, but I cannot tell) * * *
He said :
Of course, you know* the thought behind the above * * *
Mr. Murphy. Are you following the letter ?
Admiral Richardson. No, I am skipping.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you stopped at "but I cannot tell" in the second
line in the second paragraph, did you?
Admiral Richardson. That is right.
Mr. Murphy. Then you go from there to where ?
[755] Admiral Richardson. The fourth paragraph?
Of course, you know the thoughts behind the above and that is that the Italian
situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded as critical;
then ????? nobody can answer the riddle just now.
Mr. Murphy. Where is Admiral Stark's position in that?
Admiral Richardson. That is all I know.
[756] Mr. Murphy. All right.
Admiral Richardson. It is manifest that he trusted that the fleet
would not remain there long.
Mr. Murphy. Well, where is his position, I mean as to whether
it should or not ? Can you refer to anything in writing at any time,
anywhere, where Admiral Stark states his position to you that he is
in agreement with you, or that he disagTees with the proposition of
having the fleet there ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, whatever he said I firmly believe that
he wholeheartedly agreed with me.
Mr. Murphy. But can you give us a reference to anything in writ-
ing anywhere ? If so, state it.
Senator Brewster. I refer you, Admiral, to the letter of May 22
to you, the first paragraph of which is [reading] :
Replying to your letter of May 13th —
in which I think Admiral Stark made his position very clear.
Admiral Richardson. Unfortunately, I have not a copy of that
letter.
Mr. Murphy. May I suggest to the Chairman that inadvertently
the Chair has overlooked that this would be the turn of Senator
Brewster, the Senator from Maine, to examine the witness.
The Chairman. . Well, the Chairman exercised his right [757]
at the beginning and I examined following the examination of counsel
and did examine the Admiral but not upon this point.
Mr. Murphy. I beg your pardon, you misunderstood me. I meant
that after Mr. Clark it would then have been the turn of Senator
Brewster.
Senator Brewster. I have placed no objection to your examining
the Admiral.
Mr. Murphy. And then I would follow.
292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. That is quite all right, Congressman Murphy,
and I hope you will accept my suggestion which is simply in the in-
terest of saving time.
The Chairman. The Chair is subject to correction. In the absence
of Mr. Clark the next in order by the alternation would have been the
Senator from Maine, Mr. Brewster.
Senator Brewster. I am quite willing to let Mr. Murphy proceed.
The Chairman. I apologize to the Senator from Maine for that
omission.
Senator Brewster. I know that my rights are being saved, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr, Murphy. Now, do you have the letter of May 22 suggested by
the gentleman, the Senator from Maine ?
Admiral Richardson. I doubt if I can find anywhere a specific
statement saying :
I am opposed to retaining the [758] fleet in the Hawaiian area.
Mr. Murphy. Can you find a specific statement saying that he
agrees with you categorically ?
Admiral Richardson. This is what he says on the 22d of May.
[Reading:]
When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy —
that means the dispatch to return —
it looked as if Italy were coming in almost immediately and that a serious
situation might develop in the East Indies, and that there was a possibility of
our being involved. However, the recent "blitzkrieg" events in Europe have
certainly altered the picture for the time being. Personally I think it has
made more remote (for the moment at least) th'e question of a westward move-
ment of the fleet. I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad
to know I had already so expressed myself.
Mr. Murphy. That is the only written memorandum to which you
can refer?
Admiral Richardson. Well, I
Mr. Murphy. I mean is that the only one ?
Admiral Richardson. Congressman Murphy, since the receipt of
this correspondence I have been almost constantly in attendance here.
If I had time to search through all of the papers carefully I have no
doubt that I would find suflB- [7S9] cient evidence of his con-
currence with me as to convince anyone.
Mr. Murphy. If you find it will you produce it, please?
Admiral Richardson. I will, or I shall.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you had a meeting with the President
about which you prepared a memorandum in October of 1940. Did
you prepare any memoranda after the previous meetings?
Admiral Richardson. I did not.
Mr. Murphy. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Brewster ?
Senator Brewster. Pursuing further the question which the Con-
gressman has been asking, I think it should be clear what was the
representation in your letter to which Admiral Stark expressed his
view on. It was, as I understand it, your letter of May 13, in which
you used the following language [reading] :
I feel that any move west means hostilities. I feel that at this time it would
be a grave mi.'^take to become involved in the West where our interests, although
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 293
important, are not vital, and thereby reduce our ability to maintain the security
of the Western Hemisphere which is vital. -,tt„„<.
If the Fleet is to go west it can only start, properly prepared, from the West
Coast where it can be [760] docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a
''^ReSVsS'r'irtS^Luhough I am entirely without information I realize your
position and I want you to know that If the situation becomes such that higher
authority decides we should go West, all of us are ready to give all we have.
That is the end of the quotation from your letter, to which I under-
stand Admiral Stark in his letter of May 22 replied. [Reading : J
I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already
so expressed myself.
Would that lead you to believe, or would that leave you in any
doubt. Admiral Richardson, as to the position of Admiral btark m
this matter? . -, , , , ^ i • -i.- ^
Admiral Richardson. I was never m any doubt about his position.
Senator Brewster. And what was the situation, Admiral, of the
fleet? With the fleet which you had at Pearl Harbor— was it what
would be considered in naval parlance as a fleet?
Admiral Richardson. Well, it was a combatant fleet but it did not
have in company with it the auxiliaries that would be essential to
active operations. , .^.. m'^n
Senator Brewster. So that if there were hostihties [762]
that should develop, what would have been the mission of the fleet
under anv plans that were in existence ?
Admiral Richardson. Under the existing plans it would have been
necessary for the fleet to return to the west coast to mobilize, assemble a
train, fill the ships with the regulation number of personnel, provi-
sions, supplies, stores, fuel, strip the ships of needless articles which
necessarily appear on a ship during a long period of peace and prepare
them for offensive operation. _ . ^
Senator BitEWSTER. State whether or not the fleet on December 7
was in such a condition as would have required its return similarly ?
Admiral Ricpiardson. It had been more comletely prepared for war
action because before I returned to Pearl Harbor with a portion of
the fleet, arriving thereon the 6th of December, we had placed m
storage a lot of inflammable material that we carried m time of peace.
The ships had been degaussed.
The Chairman. Had been what ?
Admiral Richardson. Degaussed.
The Chairman. I don't get that word.
Admiral Richardson. Well, it is a French word which means rmi-
ning a coil of wire around them which energized will probably prevent
the magnetic field of the ship from exploding a magnetic mine.
I'/e^] Senator Brewstek. Under the plans existing prior to
December 7, so far as your own knowledge goes, what was it con-
templated should be the mission of the Navy during the earlier period
of any hostilities with a Western Pacific power ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, the plans then in existence were called
the "Orange" plan or the "0-1" plan and it was, in my opinion, a
fairly sound plan theoretically, but the time element bore no relation
to reality and some time in October I wrote a comprehensive letter to
the Chief of Naval Operations presenting my conception of the then
existing "Orange" plan, which is in the hands of the committee.
294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "
Senator Brewster. That was in 1940 ?
Admiral Richardson. 1940.
Senator Breavster. And did that contemplate some manner of of-
fensive action by the fleet ?
• Admiral Richardson. It did, early action to reconnoiter and attack
some of the mandated islands and a progressive step-by-step movement
westward with the taking, eventually, of Truk in a time stated that
absolutely could not be realized.
Senator Brewster. I want to quote to you, because I think we all are
going to be vitally concerned with this matter of naval defense. You
were Assistant Chief of Naval [76S] Operations during 1937
and 1938 under Admiral Leahy ?
Admiral Richardson. One year.
Senator Brewster. I am quoting from Admiral Leahy's statement
before the Naval Affairs Committee on the function of the Navy, as
I think it will contribute to this matter, and I want to know whether
you would agree with this concept. I quote Admiral Leahy on the
first page of his testimony at the 1938 hearings. [Reading:]
In defending our territory in war, we cannot assume an attitude of passive de-
fense and simply beat off an attack at one place and later at another. In such
a case we would see our coasts blockaded, our outlying possessions seized, our
commerce, both coastwise and foreign, driven off the seas, and we would undergo
the costly experience of finding the war lasting just as long as the enemy willed
it; that is, until he had attained every objective and everything he wanted.
The only way that war, once begun, can be brought to a successful conclusion
is by making the enemy want to stop fighting — ^by injuring him before he reaches
our shores so badly that he will be anxious to make peace. Prompt and effective
injury to an enemy, at a distance from our shores, is the only correct strategy
to be employed.
[764] We have outlying possessions in Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam,
Samoa. Panama, Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The Philip-
pine Islands are still United States territory and will remain so until complete
independence is attained. All of these outlying island possessions are more
or less vulnerable, and their defense depends upon two factors. One is a
local defense by mobile forces and fortifications. The other, and the dominant
factor, is sea power. A superior Navy can prevent powerful attacks being
made on all those island possessions that lie closer to our home territory than
they do to those of an enemy or enemies. A sufficient Navy can keep open
the lines of supply to the defenders of such possessions, and, if they are secure
in their own local defenses against minor attacks, the Navy can use them as
bases from which to operate against the enemy or enemies. Defense of those
possessions — Guam, the Philippines and Alaska — which lie nearer to the home
territory of another power or powers than they do to the continental United
States, is dependent solely upon sea power and the ability of sea jwwer to
support forces in those areas.
[765] I presume you would be in full agreement with that?
Admiral Richardson. Complete accord.
Senator Brewster. Yes. Now, I have here an exhibit which has
been furnished us, which is extracts from the joint Army and Navy
Avar plan, Rainbow No. 1. That is a part of the extracts ftom joint
Army and Navj^ war plan. Orange 1938.
I assume that was in the process of development year by j^ear, but
this does not contain any of the tasks that were assigned under
section 6 and others. In section 6, the presentation apparently con-
fines itself to the defense plans of the Hawaiian area without includ-
ing therein anything regarding the tasks which I assume were the
function of the Navy to carry out, the task forces, or tasks.
Admiral Richardson. That is true. What is the date of that?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 295
Senator Brewster. This one is dated 1938, the Orange plan. I
think that was Orange No. 1. This was approved, it says, by the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy August 14, 1939,
verbally by the President October 14, 1939, by the Joint Board April
10, 1940. That is April 10, 1940, brought down current. That was
finally Rainbow No. 1.
You have that before you, do you?
Admiral Richardson. I have it.
Senator Brewster. Now, whether or not
[766] Admiral Richardson. But, Senator Brewster, these are
copies of extracts from plans that were modified from time to time.
They are not complete ; some of them were made after I left the fleet ;
some of them were in process of being made, so any questions that I
answer with respect to this is certainly to be most confusing because
here is one that is dated March 28, 1941. I know nothing about it.
Senator Brewster. I think my question won't involve, perhaps, any
confusion. The point which I wish to inquire about is whether or not
the appointment of the tasks as they are called, which I assume were
the functions of the Navy, the affirmative tasks, would be essential
to an appraisal of the responsibility of the commanders in that area?
Admiral Richardson. Well, I think it would be but it would not
be anything other than confusing to consider any other plans than
the plans that were in existence on the 7th of December 1941, about
which I know nothing.
Senator Brewster. Well, I don't intend to enter into that field.
My point is in attempting to appraise the responsibility of those who
were in authority at Pearl Harbor, as to whether or not their respon-
sibility in taking aggressive action with the fleet under their charge
must not necessarily be known in order to determine as to the wisdom
of their course at any given time ?
[767] Admiral Richardson. Well, of course, no plans ever made
by the Army or the Navy of the United States visualized their being
put in effect without either a declaration of war or an attack upon us,
so if you take the joint Army and Navy Basic Plan Orange 1938, that
was the basic plan on which the Navy drew its war plan and on which
the Army drew its war plan.
Senator Brewster. Well, reading these excerpts, these extracts I
have given you, which are apparently exclusively of a defensive char-
acter, one might draw the impression that the Navy had no function
than to be there at Pearl Harbor and assist in its defense. That, of
course, would not be a warranted conclusion, would it. Admiral?
The Navy had another job to do under all plans, did it not?
Admiral Richardson. Oh, absolutely, and the Navy's job was to be
aggressive.
Senator Brewster. That is right.
Admiral Richardson. Now, the pages of this refer specifically to
the joint responsibilities of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area
and it does not refer, as I can find here, to anything about what the
fleet is going to do.
Senator Brewster. Well, over on page — I should say it is No. 2.
For instance, on that first page we have section 1. We then have
section 2 on the first page. There is no [768] section 3 ap-
parently. It becomes section 4, then section 5, section 6. Then we
296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
come to extracts of Joint Arni}^ and Navy Basic War Plans, Rainbow
No. 1, section 6. [Reading :]
Tasks * * * Joint Tasks * * *
Now, I take it those refer to omissions as to the naval tasks which
they were supposed to undertake.
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Brewster. It is a part of the function of both the Navy
and the Army to keep in constant preparation for possible war plans
under any eventualities, is it not ?
Admiral Richardson. If you will turn to pa<i;e o, under paragraph
35, "Naval tasks";
(F) Prepai'e to capture and establish control over the Caioline and Marshall
Island areas.
Now, all war plans that I am familiar with for the Navy contained
a task along those lines.
[769] Senator Brewster. What you were reading answers my
question, I guess. It is a function of the Army and Navy to keep in
constant operation Avar plans in the event of any eventualities ?
Admiral Richardson. That is true.
Senator Brewster. When this came up, orders were immediately
issued, were they not, to execute war plan 46 against Japan?
Admiral Rich.virdson. I have no idea.
Senator Brewster. On that date ?
Admiral Richardson. I have no idea.
Senator Brewster. I heard you mention when the order came
through. That was what impressed me. I do not know what it meant.
I assumed it was the plan which had been prepared.
Acbniral Richardson. In every war plan there is a provision for
putting it into effect, and it is defined and known how the plan will
be put into effect, and when that order is received it goes into effect
and everybody knows it is in effect, but during the latter part of 1940
and the early part of 1941, due to changing world conditions, the
Navy war plans were in a constant state of flux, in an effort to have a
plan that was in accordance with the existing situation.
As a matter of fact, there is in this correspondence a [770]
letter from me with respect to the plan that was being developed, in
which it is stated that the plan and that letter was prepared with the
knowledge and approval of my successor. We worked on it jointly
during the week or 10 days before I was relieved.
The numbers of the plans are so numerous and the provision of every
plan is so different, the assumptions are so different, that it would be
impossible for me to recall now the assumptions in Rainbow 1, 2, 3, 4,
or 5.
Senator Brewster. But you would be — had you finished?
Admiral Richardson. No. In fact, there was a plan which was
known, I think, as "plan dog" for a while. "Dog" being the Navy
name of the "D".
The Chairman. "Dog"?
Admiral Richardson. Dog, d-o-g.
The Chairman. Common cur.
Senator Brewster. But all of these plans contemplated aggressive
action by the Navy as contrary to merely defensive action in fixed
positions ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 297
Admiral Richardson. The Navy had always believed that the only
way you could defend the country was by aggressive action.
Senator Brewster. The basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor then
would, of necessity, mean a return to the west [7711 coast, in
time of war, and did inevitably affect the time element very seriously,
the time involved in the return ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, there is a difference of opinion on that
point. I thought it did.
Senator Brewster. What would be the approximate time for the
return to the west coast and making the preparations under the condi-
tion when you were there?
Admiral Richardson. Well, it is about a little over 2,000 miles, and
the fleet would only make about 15 knots, and that is 360 knots a day,
or about a week to get back.
Senator Brewster. In the matter of the patrol reconnaissance, the
difficulty, so far as the air reconnaisance was concerned, was with the
shortage of planes, was it not ?
Admiral Rchardson. That is right.
Senator Brewster. Are you familiar with the naval expansion bill
of 1838, which provided for 3,000 naval aircraft?
Admiral Richardson. Well, I am familiar with it to a very limited
extent.
Senator Brewster. Was that during your period as Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, but the Assistant Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in those days concerned himself primarily with administrative
matters. Relations with the committees [773] of Congress,
with the other executive departments, and with the President were
handled by the Chief of Naval Operations.
Snator Brewster. It was becoming evident, more evident each
year, was it not, as to the part which airplanes would play in naval
as well as land war?
Admiral Richardson. Np doubt about that.
Senator Brewster. That was a constantly expanding activity?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. You spoke about getting the impression while
you were in Washington, but not from Cordell Hull, that Japan could
be bluffed. Do you recall where you gained that impression ? Could
I recall to you, did you confer with Stanley Hornbeck while you were
here ?
Admiral Richardson. I did.
Senator Brewster. Wliether or not you gained any impression of
that through your conferences with him ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, whether T was correct or not, I was
distinctly of the impression that Dr. Hornbeck was exercising a
greater influence over the disposition of the fleet than I was.
Senator Brewster. Could you develop that at all ?
Admiral Richardson. The only way in which I can develop that is
this :
I saw Dr. Hornbeck on July 11. I talked to him from [773]
10 : 30 to noon.
According to my notebook I said he is the strong man on the Far
East and the cause of our staying in Hawaii where he will hold us
as long as he can. And that was an impression that I wrote in my
notebook when it happened.
298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[774-] On October 9 I saw Hornbeck, who was unwilling to ac-
cept the responsibility for retaining the fleet in Hawaii. Now I may
have been entirely wrong, but that was the impression I gained.
Senator Brewster. Did j^ou express to him, Admiral, in your con-
versations, the same opinion that you had expressed to the President
as to the psychology of the Japanese military authorities on the situa-
tion?
Admiral Eichardson. Well, inasmuch as Dr. Hornbeck was the
advisor of the State Department on far eastern affairs and had written
many books on the subject, some of which I had read, I doubt whether
I told him that he was completely wrong, but I expressed my view
fully.
Senator Brew^ster. He was at that time the one in charge of what
they called the far eastern desk in the State Department?
Admiral Richardson. No. I had known Dr. Hornbeck for some
time.
Senator Brewster. His first name is Stanley ?
Admiral Richardson. Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, and I think he had
been relieved as head of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and had
been superseded by Mr. Max Hamilton, if I remember correctly, whom
I had also known for many years. Dr. Hornbeck was the advisor
of the State Department on far [77S] eastern affairs.
Senator Brewster. In connection. Admiral, with your service in
Hawaii, was there a local influence in leaving Hawaii?
Admiral Richardson. If there was it was unknown to me.
Senator Brewster. You did not have any situation of that kind
locally ?
Admiral Richardson. None at all.
Senator Brewster. That is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Clark, when your name was reached
you were temporarily absent. Do you have any questions of the
Admiral ?
Mr. Clark. I have no questions.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. Am I next in order, Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. I think in order to balance between the two sides,
inasmuch as the Chairman has assumed to do the first interrogating
on the Senate side, that you would come next.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, pursuing the questions that have been
asked just a moment ago by the Senator from Maine, I think you
testified that the fleet, as you commanded it in 1940, was under-
manned, undertrained, understaffed, under provisioned and underam-
munitioned.
Admiral Richardson. Well, no American force was ever [776]
underprovisioned. We eat better than anybody in the world.
Mr. Gearhart. But did you have a sufficient supply of edibles to
keep you going for a long time, for instance, through a war engage-
ment, a war responsibility?
Admiral Richardson. Well, normally we carried dry provisions
for about 60 days, if I remember correctly. Insofar as I remember,
there was no question of provisions. The ships did not carry the full
wartime allowance of ammunition because of the needless expendi-
ture of fuel in pushing that much weight through the water. There
was a deficiency in certain types of ammunition.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 299
For example, we had little, if any bombardment ammunition whdch
would be necessary in effecting a landing.
As to enough men, never within my knowledge, except in war, has
the Navy had on board enough men to fight the ship. We have been
lucky if we could secure sufficient appropriations to maintain 85 per-
cent of complement. Men of experience were being removed from
the ships in order to train new men.
Mr, Gearhart, Now to place it on a percentage basis, what would
be the percentage of fighting efficiency of the Navy as you commanded
it?
Admiral Richardson. Well, that would be a highly theoretical
question. No answer would be of any value.
Mr. Gearhart. You consider you were 85 percent manned?
[777] Admiral Richardson. Well, we had 85 percent enough
men to man the battery and steam at full power for more than a xery
short time, and as an instrument of war their value was prospective.
They coulcl be fully realized in a short space of time by the addition of
men, because men in war learn far more rapidly than they do in time of
peace.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, then, the Navy under your command was not
in a condition of readiness to commence the war with Japan?
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely not.
Mr. Gearhart. And if it were the policy of the United States to
commence a war with Japan the ships would have to return first to
the west coast, spending a week in travel and a week in coming back —
and how many weeks being put in shape for striking ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, in my letter, one of my letters, I stated
that in the event active war operations were undertaken it would either
be necessary to return to the coast for mobilization or preparation or
accept the handicaps of preparing m Pearl Harbor. I could not
hazard a guess as to how soon they would be ready from Pearl Har-
bor, returning to the coast and being ready to start again, because
I do not know how quickly you could have assembled the ships, the
tankers, and done the training. Actually it was a year or so, was it
not?
[778] Mr, Gearhart. You say a year or so?
Admiral Richardson. Well, before we really got going well in this
war it was not a matter of weeks.
Mr, Gearhart. Then in order to prepare the fleet to strike, say,
Japan originally, it would have to travel from Hawaii to the United
States, spending a week, then uncertain weeks in the United States
being equipped for war, and then travel back a week, and that would
mean really b}^ leaving it in Hawaii it was 4,500 miles further away
from the enemy than it would be if it had been in the United States ?
Admiral Richardson, Yes, but I think when a'ou consider the
many, many other things that had to be done before active war opera-
tions could be undertaken, the question of whether it was in Hawaii
or whether it was on the west coast would have little effect on the
over-all time, because you had to assemble, train, you might have to
build some, you might have to haA'e drydocks, you might have to have
repair facilities, you had to have a terriffic amount of stores and all
kinds of equipment for building roads and airfields, and everything
else, none of which was ready.
300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. So that the question of whether it was in
Hawaii or whether it was on the west coast, when actual war started
it was a niat,ter of no moment, in my opinion, because [779]
other things controlled the time of getting ready.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, considering the other situation, the one which
actually happened, by having our fleet in Hawaiian waters we had
our fleet 2,500 miles closer to the enemy for their sneak attack?
Admiral Richardson. Do you want an opinion on that?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes, unless it is a question of geograjphy, unless
it is a matter of going over water, or something else.
Admiral Richardson. In my opinion, Congressman Gearhart, a
Japanese fleet that could cross most of the Pacific ocean and deliver
an undiscovered attack on Pearl Harbor would quite likely have
been able to deliver the same attack on Puget Sound.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, that is amazing.
Admiral Richardson. But the whole question is the amount of oil
they have got in the ships.
Mr. Gearhart. Now you have outlined the deficiencies in our
Navy's strength at that time. Were those deficiencies known to the
Japanese? Have you any way of knowing whether they were or
not?
Admiral Richardson. Well, I never had any doubt that the Japa-
nese knew everything they wanted to know about our fleet, and the
Secretary of the Navy told me himself that they knew more about it
than I did.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, then in the light of what you have [780]
just said, do you think that the President was correct when he said he
thought the presence of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters had a I'estrain-
ing effect on the Japanese ?
Admiral Richardson. I did not think so when I was talking to
him, and I have not changed my mind.
Mr. Gearhart. Now while you were in command of the ship — or
of the fleet in 1940, and during the months of 1941 when you were
in charge of the fleet, were any of your battleships, aircraft carriers,
cruisers, destroyers or service vessels transferred to the Atlantic?
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, my memory is not active,
and certainly with changes made during my incumbency as to the
ships in the Atlantic and ships in the Pacific, because new ships were
being built, and joining the fleet, and some ships were being trans-
ferred from that part of the United States Fleet in the Pacific to
that part of it in the Atlantic,, so I have here something that has just
been prepared for me, expecting that this question might be asked
me, from the records of the Navy Department the transfers that were
made.
Before I can answer that I would need about 5 minutes to look
over the data which has been compiled at my request.
Mr. Gearhart. Will you take a minute or two and see if there
were any considerable or important transfers made one [781]
way or the other ?
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, it might be well to have it
incorporated in the record.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 301
Mr. Geseix. We were hoping to get the final answer on that,
Senator.
The Chairmax. The committee will be in order.
Admiral Richaedsox. Mr. Chairman, in lieu of presenting at this
time a hurriedly prepared presentation of this kind, may I request
that the counsel secure that information from the Department and
present it to the committee i
The ChaiemAx. The Chair understands that the counsel is in
process of doing that and it is to go in, as it no doubt should. It
ought to be accurate to the last item. Therefore the Chair, as far
as he is concerned, and I am sure the committee, will be glad to
accede to the Admiral's request.
Mr. Geaehaet. That will be entirely satisfactory.
Senator Lucas. What does that include?
Mr. Geaehaet. With the understanding it will be incorporated in
the record as soon as it can be made available.
The Ctiairmax. That compilation will include the date at the be-
ginning of any transfer and the end, the final date covering the transfer
period.
Admiral Richardson. What I propose is that they give me a list
of the transfer of vessels to and from the Atlantic, [782] the
Pacific and Asiatic Fleets between May 1, 1940, and February 1, 1941.
The Chaiemax. Yes.
Admiral Richaedsox. They might have been numerous, but within
my recollection they were not substantial, except possibly some cruisers
and destroyers.
The Chaiemax. Will that record show the class of ship ?
Admiral Richaedsox. Yes.
The Chairmax. All classes of ships ?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, even show the name of them and the
class.
Senator Brew^ster. Mr. Chairman, can you bring that down to
December 7, 1941 ?
The Chairmax. The Chairman would suggest, from other sources
and under the testimony of other witnesses, it ought to be brought
down to the Ttli of December.
Mr. Gearhart. I have already requested that, Mr. Chairman.
That was promised me yesterday. ' I presume it w^ill be coming along
pretty soon.^
The Vice Chairmax. :Mr. Chairman, I assume the reason the ad-
miral requested the material on February 1 is because that was the time
of the change of his command.
Admiral Richaedsox. Exactly, Mr. Cooper.
The Vice Chaiemax. As the Chairman suggests, of course [783]
for our purposes we will probably want it to come on doAvn to the date
of this happening at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Richaedsox. That has previously been requested.
The Chairmax. You can only speak for the time in which vou were
in command.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
The Chaiemax. That will undoubtedly be furnished.
Mr. Geaehaet. Did you, during your command, have occasion to
protest to the Chief of Naval Operations against tlie detachhient from
' See footnote 1. p. 125, supra.
79716 — 46 — pt. 1 22
302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
your command of ships and their transfer to the Atlantic or any other
place for duty ?
Admiral Kichardson. Not to my present recollection.
Mr. Gearhakt. Can j-ou tell us, as a naval expert, as to whether
or not your fleet, the one you commanded, was numerically inferior to
the Japanese in the Pacific, or superior ?
Admiral Riciiardsox. Well, our knowledge of the Japanese Fleet
and its composition was not complete and, therefoi'e, any answer I
give might later be proved inaccurate, in the light of better informa-
tion. But to the best of my knowledge and belief, the Japanese Fleet
was either equal to or superior to that part of the fleet that I had with
me in the Pacific.
Mr. Gearhakt. Then calling for an opinion answer too, this being
addressed to you as a naval expert, which you undoubtedly are, what
effect would the detachment of three ['^(^4-] battleships, one
aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers in May 1941 have
upon that numerical comparison of strength ?
Admiral Richardson. It would have made the Pacific Fleet rela-
tively weaker than the Japanese Fleet.
Mr. Gearhart. And wasn't it that transfer which caused the change
in the name of the fleet that you have been the commander of, it having
been known as the United States Fleet and because of these detach-
ments it was actually known thereafter as the Pacific Fleet?
Admiral Richardson. I think that had no bearing on it, insofar as
I know.
Mr. Gearhart. When did the change occur, Admiral ?
Admiral Richardson. The change in the name?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. The 1st day of February 1941. In my opin-
ion it was occasioned by the increasing importance of naval activity
in the Atlantic.
Mr. Gearhart. Then really you were the last commander in chief
of the United States Navy ?
Admiral Richardson, Until Admiral King was made one, and a
bigger one.
Mr. Gearhart. Is there a United States Fleet now ?
Admiral Richardson. Admiral King is commander in chief of
[785] the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations —
at least he was during practically all the war.
Mr. Gearhart. That is, he is commander of every naval ship afloat,
is that correct?
Admiral Richardson. He was and is today.
Mr. Gearhart. You, as commander of the United States Fleet,
were commander of all ships afloat except those that composed the
Asiatic detachment?
Admiral Richardson. No, Mr. Gearhart. I will answer that ques-
tion this way: As commander in chief of the United States Fleet I
was in command of every combatant ship in commission in any ocean
that did not belong to the Asiatic Fleet or was not serving direlctly
under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations. Many ships
serve directly under the Chief of Naval Operations, because when a
new ship is built, until she has had some cruising, some target prac-
tice, some training, some tests of new equipment, she is not considered
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 303
worthy of joining a fleet, and she may be in an ocean, but she does not
belong to the fleet in that ocean.
Mr Gearhart. I see. Thank you very much, Admiral.
The Chairman. Is that all?
Mr. Gfarhart. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Richardson, can you tell us when
[786] the fleet went from the west coast to Hawaii in the spring
of 1940, if there was a definite date for its return, or whether there
was not a definite date for its return ?
Admiral Richardson. There was a definite published schedule
available to all officers in the fleet.
Senator Ferguson. And what was that date?
Admiral Richardson. Based upon dates that occur in this cor-
respondence, it is my opinion that it was on May 9.
Senator Ferguson. The 9th of May 1940?
Admiral Richardson. The 9th of May 1940.
Senator Ferguson. Wlio would fix that date ? Would you fix that
date, or would it be fixed here in Washington ?
Admiral Richardson. Actually it had been fixed either by me or
Sossibly by my predecessor and approved by the Chief of Naval
operations.
Seator Ferguson. So it would be really an order of the Chief of
Naval Operations?
Admiral Richardson. A fleet schedule is prepared well in advance
that shows all the exercises planned, all the fleet activities well in
advance. The over-all plan is prepared in the fleet and is approved
by the Chief of Naval Operations and then it is carried out without
any further orders. In accordance with that approved plan all of
the ships participate in the annual fleet exercises and leave the west
coast, and the [787] Hawaiian detachment left Hawaii to
join the fleet in the exercises of the fleet.
Senator Ferguson. Was there any delay, Admiral, in leaving the
west coast at that time to go to Hawaii or did you go on the scheduled
day?
Admiral Richardson. We went on the scheduled day.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first get word that you might
not return in May of 1940 ?
Admiral Richardson. I received it in the dispatch which I put in
the record yesterday, on the 4th.
Senator Ferguson. That is the dispatch that you were to make a
press release?
Admiral Richardson. No. This is the dispatch from OPNAV to
CINCUS :
It looks probable but not final that Fleet will remain Hawaiian waters for
short time after May 9. Will expect to apprise you further Monday or Tuesday
next.
Senator Ferguson. When you received that were you out in the
Hawaiian waters?
Admiral Richardson. No, I had finished the fleet exercises and we
were all, except the big ships, big carriers, in Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.
304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Eichardson. Because at the end of a fleet exercise
[788] all of the senior officers are assembled.
Senator FERGUSOisr. Did you give us the date of that order?
Admiral Richardson. Which order?
Senator Ferguson. The one you just read. I haven't seen it.
Admiral Richardson. May 4.
Senator Ferguson. The 4th of May ?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. What is the date of the memo that you were to
release a press release?
Admiral Richardson. I received that on May 7.
Senator Ferguson. The 7th of May?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever discussed that with Admiral
Stark or anyone here in Washington ?
Admiral Richardson. Before the event?
Senator Ferguson. No, after the event. After you had that paper
asking you to make a press release, did you ever discuss that with
Admiral Stark or anyone else ?
Admiral Richardson. No, sir. No, I never discussed it with any-
one.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever discussed your testimony here
with anyone other than the counsel? You have never written
[789] any books about it, or magazine articles, or anything of
that kind, have you ?
Admiral Richardson. No, I have never talked to anybody about it.
Senator Ferguson. Now when did you first receive definite informa-
tion that the fleet would be kept at Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Richardson. W^e never received any definite information
as to the duration of our stay in Hawaii. We just gradually drifted
into staying.
Senator Ferquson. At that time were you receiving any diplomatic
information between our country and Japan?
Admiral Richardson. No.
Senator Ferguson. Did you, while you were commander in chief,
receive any diplomatic information ?
Admiral Richardson. No.
Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, you came here to Washing-
ton to receive your instructions as far as any diplomatic relations were
concerned.
Admiral Richardson. I came here to find out the background of
our stay, the purposes back of it, and, if possible, how long we would
stay.
Senator Ferguson. And did you get the background from the State
Department or anyone?
Admiral Richardson. Well, I acquired the information that
[790] we would stay there as long as it was considered essential
for us to support diplomatic representations by being there.
Senator Ferguson. Now were you told what the diplomatic repre-
sentations were that you were supporting? Were you taken in on
those ?
Admiral Richardson. No, but I can read it in the paper.
Senator Ferguson. Well, will you state what your opinion was as
to what were the diplomatic relations that were going on at that time ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 305
Admiral Richardson. Well, the United States has always believed
in a strong China, a China that could stand alone, and we were doing
all that we could, without going to war, to induce Japan to cease
what we considered was aggressive action in China. We also were
opposed to the extension of Japanese activities and Japanese influences
further south in Asia.
[JQl] Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss with anyone the
question of a patrol line from Hawaii to the Asiatic coast?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, I did.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us whom you discussed such a
matter with ?
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, may I read a memorandum
on that subject which I prepared several weeks ago, thinking that I
might be asked that question ?
The Chairman. Yes. The committee will be very glad to have it,
Admiral.
May the Chair ask what sort of a line that was you were inquired
about ?
Admiral Richardson. A patrol line.
In presenting this, I would like to state that my war plans officer
accompanied me to Washington, and I discussed with him most of
the things that were talked about. He was a man whose judgment
I held in very high esteem, and when I prepared this he went over it so
that I discussed with him what I might present here as part of my
testimony, and I did it in the interest of accuracy.
On October 10, the day that I had reservations to return to the wesf
coast by plane
The Chahjman. That is 1940?
Admiral Richardson. 1940 ; October 10, 1940.
[792] About 5 p. m. Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy,
sent for me and Admiral Stark to come to his office. I was accom-
panied by Commander Vincent R. Murphy. Admiral Stark was
accompanied by Admiral Ingersoll, and Capt. C. M, Cook, who is
now, I think, perhaps a vice admiral.
The Secretary stated that he had important information bearing on
the employment of the fleet. He stated that he had just talked to the
President, and that the President was concerned as to the Japanese
reaction to the British on the reopening of the Burma Road scheduled
for October 17. In the event the Japanese took drastic action, he, the
President, was considering shutting off all trade between Japan and
the Americas, and to this end was considering establishing a patrol of
light ships in two lines extending from Hawaii westward to the Philip-
])ines, and from Samoa toward the Dutch East Indies.
The question was raised — I do not recall by whom — as to whether
this included stopping Japanese ships as well as others, and the view
was expressed that this would be an act of war, and I asked whether the
. President was considering a declaration of war.
The Secretary stated that the President hadn't said, and that all he,
Knox, knew was what he was told.
I was amazed at the proposal and stated that the fleet [793]
was not prepared to put such a plan into effect, nor for the war which
would certainly result from such a course of action, and that we
would certainly lose many of the ships.
306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Parenthetically, I had seen that thing tried in the war plans, and it
didn't work.
There was some further discussion that a line of light ships as pro-
posed would entail such dispersal as to expose the ships to destruction
in detail, and that the best way to accomplish the President's purpose
was to control the source of the trade by patrol of the relatively few
ports involved.
The Secretary appeared displeased at the general reaction and mine
in particular, and said :
I am not a strategist ; if you don't like the President's plan, draw up one of your
own to accomplish the purpose.
The conference closed with the understanding that Stark and I,
with our w^ar plans officers, would draw up a statement of assumptions,
proposed decisions, and tentative plan of operation in connection with
the reopening of the Burma Road.
An outline plan was drawn up. It envisaged the transfer to the
Pacific of additional patrol planes, an aircraft carrier, some destroyers,
and possibly a cruiser or two.
Admiral Stark was not prepared to approve these transfers,
[794-] and stated that he would talk the matter over with the
President and let me know later what decisions were arrived at.
When the plan was completed, the Secretary and the President were
away from Washington, and I returned to the west coast on the 11th.
Senator Ferguson. Are you through, Admiral, with that answer?
Admiral Richardson. I am ready for another question, sir.
[795] Senator Ferguson. Did you hear anj?^ more about the
plan after you left Washington? You say that the Secretary and
President — you mean the Secretary of the Navy and the President —
were not in Washington when the plans were completed, and you left
Washington.
Now, did you hear anything further about the plan?
Admiral Richardson. I received, after my return to the New
Mexico at Long Beach, a dispatch from Admiral Stark directing me
to send to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet a copy of the
assumptions and the tentative United States Fleet disposition, and
operations to meet the situation, which I did in a letter dated 16 Octo-
ber 1940, and my recollection is that I sent this to Admiral Hart, the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.
The Vice Chairman. Asiatic?
Commander Richardson. Asiatic Fleet. By the commanding offi-
cer of the H(mston^ which was bound out from Long Beach.
I sent this letter out by Captain Jesse B, Olindorf, now either a
rear admiral or vice admiral, and this [indicating] is the paper.
Senator Ferguson. Counsel, do you know what paper the admiral
is referring to ? Have we a copy of it?
Admiral Richardson. Wliat?
Senator Ferguson. I asked counsel if we had a copy, if [796']
they knew what memorandum you were referring to, and if we had
a copy of it.
Admiral Richardson. The date is IG October, 1940, and the subject
is "Liternational Situation Re Enforcement of the Asiatic Fleet."
You had this duplicated.
Mr. Mitchell. Let me see it.
Admiral Richardson. The light paper doesn't belong with it. I
would like to have that.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 307
Mr. Mitchell. All right, sir. I will tear the light paper off.
(A document was handed to Senator Ferguson.)
Mr. Mitchell. The admiral is ri^ht. We do have a copy of it.
This is it, isn't it, Admiral ? [Indicating.]
Admiral Eichardsox. Yes, sir.
The Chairman, Are we ready to proceed?
Senator Ferguson, I haven't'had time to read this, but I will come
back later to it.
Admiral Richardson, If I may add, this plan was never carried out.
Senator Ferguson, Can you give a reason why it was not carried
out?
Admiral Eichardson. Well, it served as a base, I mean [797]
it influenced in some way the development of succeeding plans, but
I never heard any more about it.
Senator Ferguson, Well, at that time we did not have an embargo
on, did we, in October of 1940? That did not come until July 25, was
it not, in 1941 ?
I notice the "B" item here is :
Declaring a complete embargo ou shipments to and from Japan.
C. Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and America.
At that time we did not have an embargo on, did we ?
Admiral Richardson. As far as I know, we did not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any embargo prior to sometime
in July of 1941?
Admiral Richardson. I do not remember when the embargoes, any
embargoes were placed, but there was either a limitation on the ship-
ment of aviation gasoline under consideration or in effect before I
relinquished command of the fleet.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did I understand you to saj^ that you said
something to the Secretary of the Navy about — that this would mean
war or would not mean war, if you put this into effect that he had
suggested ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, I thought it would mean war, and I so
stated to the Secretary,
[795] Senator Ferguson, Will you tell us his reply to that?
Admiral Richardson. Well, he said that he didn't know whether the
President meant war or not. And I further stated that the fleet was
not ready for any such plan — was not ready for war.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, you told the Secretary of the
Navy that you were not in position to put this plan that he was putting
up to you into effect ?
Admiral Richardson. No ; I never stated that I couldn't put it into
effect. I could have tried it.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat was the substance of Avhat you said to him ?
Admiral Richardson. That in my opinion it would mean war; in
my opinion we would lose the ships; and in my opinion we couldn't
stop trade between South America and Japan without being in trouble
with both of them.
Senator Ferguson, Do you know of anything else you can add to
what you have said that took place at that time in relation to this
embargo or patrol of the Navy ?
Admiral Richardson, No; except as I stated before that the Secre-
tary stated, if you are unwilling, deem it inadvisable, highly inadvis-
308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
able to establish this line of ships to shut off trade between Japan and
America, draw up a plan by which you would shut off such trade,
if ordered to do so.
[799] Senator Ferguson. That is the plan?
Admiral Richardson. That is the plan.
Senator Ferguson. I will read this over and come back to it.
Will you refer to your long-hand letter of January 26, 1940, please ?
It is the part where you are talking of Admiral Leahy as "'Bill Leahy."
Do you have your letter, Admiral ?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Where you say :
I use to say to Bill Leahy "be sure to impress on the boss that we do uot
want to be drawn into this unless we have allies so bound to us that they can-
not leave us in the lurch."
There is a possibility that this constant repetition had something to do with
the trip of Ingersoll.
Now, do you remember that part ? Whom were you talking about —
"the boss"?
Admiral Richardson. The President of the United States, who is
also known as the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy by
the Constitution.
Senator Ferguson. Then there is a paragraph in that same letter,
on the first page :
When this understanding was reached it had some value, [800] but
under present conditions it has little value as it alfords us the use of a base in
exchange for an obligation to protect about two and one-half continents.
What were you talking about there?
Admiral Richardson. Well that might be some slight exaggeration.
Senator Ferguson. What were you exaggerating about ?
Admiral Richardson. About the 21/0 continents. But my recol-
lection of that is this, that Rear Admiral Royal R. Ingersoll — I think
that is his initial — Royal Ingersoll anywa}^, then a rear admiral, had
made a trip to London to have some exj^loratory conferences with the
British Admiralty, because if there appears a possibility of nations
being associated, it is always customarj', in my opinion for the miltarj'
or the naval staffs to discuss with each other what might happen if
such association becomes a reality, so they would not be taken by
surprise.
So I was expressing my understanding of the meaning of explora-
tory discussions betwen the Navy Department and the British Ad-
miralty, as what might be considered by them as reasonable steps to
be taken if the United States and Great Britain shoiAld become asso-
ciated in an effort.
Senator Ferguson. At that time Admiral Ingersoll held what posi-
tion in the United States Navy ?
[801] Admiral Richardson. I am not certain, but I believe at
least there is a possibility, that he was Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations.
Senator Ferguson. AYlio was the Chief of Naval Operations at that
time? It was Admiral Stark, was it not?
Admiral Richardson. Admiral Stark ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when you had been saying to Bill Leahy,
as you describe hime — Admiral Leahy — what position did he hold
in the Navy when you were telling him to "impress the boss"?
PKOCEEDINGS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 309
Admiral Richardsox. Well, when the China incident started, Ad-
miral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations and I was Assistant
Chief of Xaval Operations. • .1 ^
Senator Ferguson. Now, what base were you speakmg about in that
letter ?
Admiral Richardson. My recollection is that it was Singapore.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, we were to have the use of the
base at Singapore?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And what were we to do for that use^ lou
expressed it as "protect two and a half continents," which you now
say was a slight exaggeration. But what were we to do?
[8021 Admiral Richardson. What I meant was this, that when
this understanding of what might take place in the event of closer
association between the United States and Great Britain that we
would have the use, in case we were drawn into the war, would have
the use of Singapore, and we would have the assistance of the British
in the Western Pacific.
Senator Ferguson. Assistance to do what ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, this was all
Senator Ferguson (interposing). I understand.
Admiral Richardson. Drawn on the assumption.
Senator Ferguson. In your letter here you stated that we were to,
in case the agreement went through, we were to have Singapore as a
base for at least part of our Fleet; is that correct?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What was our part in that ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, it was all based on the assumption
that we would be drawn into the war as an associate of Great Britain,
and she would be occupied, and we would have the rest of the bag
to hold. , , .,, ,
Senator Ferguson. Well, will you explain what you mean by the
rest of the bag" ? What would we be holding ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, we would be protecting North America,
South America, and Australia.
[SOS] Senator Ferguson. This was in January 1940, was it not i
Admiral Richardson. 1940.
Senator Ferguson. 1940.
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. You say that Admiral Ingersoll did go to
London ; is that correct ?
[8O4.] Admiral Richardson. Oh, yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what month or what time he went
to London ?
Admiral Richardson. I don't remember. I have forgotten.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the war games of 1932
that were discussed in the Reader's Digest, I believe, in an article?
Admiral Richardson. I was in it.
Senator Ferguson. You were in it?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall whether or not he put on a war
game wherein we took airplane carriers north of the Hawaiian Islands
and made an attack from those carriers?
310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Eichardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know the opinion of the judges?
Admiral Eichardson. 1932? I was in command of the U. S. S.
Augusta at that time and I played such a minor part in that that my
memory is not vivid and whatever I might try to say would be wholly
memory, and while I think I have a good memory, it isn't that good.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, when you were commander-in-chief
of the Fleet did you have any enemies — they were not an enemy at that
time — but any submarines that were near 'Pearl Harbor that did not
belong to the United States?
[BOS'] Admiral Eichardson. That is, in my opinion, largely a
matter of opinion. I had several reports from destroyer patrols of
the presence of foreign submarines in that area, their opinion being
derived from underwater or sound of supersonic listening devices and
at one time, particularly on the 16th of December, the presence of a
submarine in the prohibited area right off the entrance to Pearl Har-
bor was reported to me. This report was believed by several officers,
including the connnander of the destroyer, the sound officer, the com-
mander of destroyers, about three-fourths of my staff, but it was not
believed by me and two other officers on my staff and we later proved
to everybody else that all the manifestations of the existence of a sub-
marine at that time could be attributed to something else.
Senator Ferguson. Well, was that reported to Washington, do you
kno^y, or after you decided that you thought it was a false alarm did
you just forget the incident?
Admiral Eichardson. I do not remember whether that was re-
ported or not but at that time I issued an order for the destroyers
to drop depth charges on any such contacts they made and then after
further consideration, without being influ)fenced by any superior
authority, I rescinded that order; but in looking over this corre-
spondence I do find in one letter somewhere that Admiral Stark said
to me that he regretted [SOG} the destrover had not followed
the contact for a longer period and I think that referred to another
reported contact with a submerged submarine, the contact having
been lost after several hours.
Senator Ferguson. I assume, then, that you never had occasion to
use the depth bombs on any subs and that you revoked the order. Now
was a copy of that order sent to Washington ? '
Admiral Eichardson. So far as I know, no ; it was not. Well I am
certain it was not. '
Senator Ferguson. When you gave yesterday the conversation that
you had at the Whii^ House with the President and Admiral Leahy
did you_finish reading your entire statement ?
xidmiral Eichardson. I did.
Senator Ferguson. Can you recall anything more that took place at
that conversation ?
Admiral Eichardson. No. In a conversation of the length of 2
hours, some of it about Puerto Eico, some of it about the fleet, some of
It about a selection system, some of it about retiring officers, it is im-
possible to remember more than what impressed one at the time as being
of grave import.
Senator Ferguson. You had some very definite opinions on the siib-
jert that you were discussing with the President, did you not?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 311
Admiral RicHARDsoisr. I did.
[807] Senator Ferguson. And he had some very definite opin-
ions on the subject that he was discussing with you ?
Admiral Richardson. He did.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you tell us— or, first, you told us,
as near as you can state it, what the President had said. Will you
state, as near as you can, what you said to the President? Did you
make a written memo based on that ? I thought that you
Admiral Richardson. I read that for you yesterday. Shall I read
it again ?
Senator Ferguson. What you said to the President?
Admiral Richardson. I did.
Senator Ferguson. Have you anything to add to that ?
Admiral Richardson. No.
Senator Ferguson. Well, then, did you hear from the President on
that subject again?
Admiral Richardson. I never heard from the President again and.
never saw him again.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when was that conversation at the White
House in relation to your conversation with the Secretary of the Navy
about the convoys — or not convoys— patrols ? Was the White House
conversation prior to the one that you had with the Secretary of the
Navy, Secretary Knox ? This exhibit that you passed to me is dated
October 16, 1940. [808] What was the date you were at the
White House?
Achniral Richardson. I was at the White House on the 8th of
October. The conversation with the Secretary of the Navy with
respect to the opening of the Burma Road and the line of patrol ships
was on the 11th. I left Washington— no, it was on the 10th.
Senator Ferguson. Well, at the time you were at the Wliite House
and talked with Admiral Leahy and the President you did not know
anything about this patrol that the Secretaiy of the Navy discussed
with you on the 10th or the 11th ?
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely not.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. And I was amazed with the presentation of
facts made by the Secretary, but everything is influenced by after-
knowledge. I assume now that the question of fuel oil at Samoa
might have had some relation to the intention to establish this patrol,
or the prospective consideration.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think now that some part of your dis-
cussion with the President brought up this subject of the patrol?
Admiral Richardson. I feel fairly certain that nothing that I said
or did had anything to do with creating the idea that the establishment
of this patrol should be undertaken.
[809] Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss this patrol question
with anyone in the Secretary of the Navy — or no, pardon me, the
Secretary of State's office ?
Admiral Richardson. No.
Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with Dr. Hornbeck?
Admiral Richardson. No; although I saw him after that.
Senator Ferguson. But you did not discuss it with him?
312 CONGRESSIONAL. INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Richardson. Well, insofar as I know, I did not discuss it
with him, but at about that time, and I think — well, I know — on the
10th of October 1940 I had sent Dr. Stanley Hornbeck a part of my
memorandum of September 12, 1940 which I had given to the Secre-
tary of the Navy and it is possible and highly probable that I dis-
cussed with him some of the contents of this memorandum.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire now from counsel whether or not
we have any data or memorandums or any information of Dr. Horn-
beck upon this question, any memo that he may have written after he
talked with Admiral Eichardson? As I understand it, it is the
custom of the State Department after they have a conversation they
record that conversation in a memorandum.
Mr. Mitchell. We have asked for all their material on that, and
nothing of that kind has come forward as yet. We have not re-
ceived all that we have asked for.
[810] Senator Ferguson. Well, will you inquire specifically for
that ? I would like to defer that question for the time being.
Were you ready for a question, Admiral ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I am humili-
ated to be compelled to request that I be permitted to change a state-
ment which I have made here. I made it honestly but it is a mistake.
The Chairman. Go ahead, Admiral.
Admiral Richardson. After a further search of the records of the
dispatches exchanged between me and Admiral Stark I find that
I did receive a reply to my inquiry about the alert of the Hawaiian
Department.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read that?
Admiral Richardson. And this is my dispatch.
Senator Ferguson. Would you give us the date ?
Admiral Richardson. Yes. The dispatch from Admiral Richard-
son to the Chief of Naval Operations dated 22 June 1940 read as fol-
lows [reading:]
Commanding General Hawaiian Department received orders War Department
placing forces on alert against hostile trans-Pacific raid and since no informa-
tion received Navy Department have assumed this exercise. Navy patrol planes
are participating.
[Sn] In testimony that I gave somewhere I stated that I had
received no reply, but it appears that I did receive a reply which reads
[reading :]
War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measure
after consultation with Navy and State Department. Request you continue
cooperation.
Senator Ferguson. That would indicate, Admiral, that it was not a
war game or practice alert, would it ? What would you say about that
reply ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, I will say that I was completely wrong,
because this is the first time
Senator Ferguson. I am asking now. I realize that and we are
glad to have you correct your testimony, but would this order that
you read indicate that it was not a war game that was going on but
it was something that was considered both by the War Department
and the Secretary of State's office?
Admiral Richardson. It indicates that to my mind.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 313
Senator Fergusox. That being true, how do you account for the
Army bemg alerted and the Navy not? What is the date of that
last instrument that you read ?
Admiral Richardson. The dispatches that I have read apparently
are contained in a report of Admiral Hewitt's investigation.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know, Admiral, whether you were
[812] a witness before Admiral Hewitt? His investigation took
place after May of 1945.
Admiral Richardson. I know that I was not a witness.
Senator Ferguson. You were not a witness ?
Admiral Richardson. No ; and this is the first that I have seen of
any part of his report.
Senator Ferguson. Well, would you just make the record clear
now? Wliat refreshed your memory? One of your officers gave you
this information, did he ?
Admiral Richardson. He just handed it to me now.
Senator Ferguson. He just handed it to you?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Now, reading that, can you account for the fact
that the Navy was not alerted and the Army was alerted ?
Admiral Richardson. That passes my comprehension.
The Chairman. You were asked. Admiral, the date of those two
communications.
Admiral Richardson. They are both dated 22 June.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I see that the hour of recess has
come and I have considerably more. Do you want to adjourn at this
time?
The Chairman. Very well, we will stand in recess until 10 o clock
tomorrow morning.
[813] ("\Miereupon, at 4 p. m., Tuesday, November 20, 1945, an
adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, November 21, 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 315
ISUI PEiEL HAEBOE ATTACK
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington., D. C.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a, m., in
the caucus room (Room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M, Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
ISIBI TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JAMES OTTO RICHAEDSON
(Resumed)
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Senator Ferguson, you were in the process of examining Admiral
Richardson. You ma}^ proceed.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Richardson
Admiral Richardson. Could I make an opening statement with
respect to the testimony of yesterday ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. I have not had an opportunity to verify
whatever evidence there is in official records with respect to dispatches
exchanged between me and Admiral Stark regarding the Army alert,
and, therefore, I request that the members of the committee hold in
abeyance their judgment on that subject until I have had an oppor-
tunity to search the original records.
The Chairman. The committee will be glad to grant you that privi-
lege, Admiral Richardson.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Richardson, I want to speak to you
about this instrument that you handed to me yesterday which I did
not have time to read yesterday, dated October the 16th, 1940.
I ask counsel when he received a copy of that, when the committee
received a cop}?^ of it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, the Admiral tells me [816~\
that he handed me not the one you have but this document here, which
is a copy of it, 2 or 3 days ago. I had it in my files. I had not
studied it myself or felt that it was pertinent to what I was inquiring
of him about so I did not pursue it further.
Senator Ferguson. Well, there is no question about that. I just
wanted to know when you had received it.
316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell, I don't think the committee has had it at all yet.
Senator Ferguson. Well, counsel has had it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, yes ; in the way I state.
Senator Ferguson. Now, the Admiral may use the one copy and I
will use the other, so that we will know that we are talking about the
same thing.
Admiral Richardson. I have a copy.
Senator Ferguson. You have a copy?
Admiral Richardson. Yes,
Senator Ferguson. I assume, Admiral Richardson, that that ex-
hibit— and might we have it marked exhibit — what is the last exhibit
number, General?
Mr. Mitchell. This will be Exhibit 11.
Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 11.
Mr. Mitchell. A communication dated October 16, 1940, directed
to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet by [S17^ the
Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Richardson, the first three pages, if
you will refer to it, were written by you ?
Admiral Richardson. It was.
Senator Ferguson. And written about the time of October the 16th,
1940?
Admiral Richardson. Approximately on that date.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know whether it was written on the
flagship New Mexico?
Admiral Richardson. It was.
Senator Ferguson. Now, this is the instrument that you indicated
as being delivered to Admiral Hart, Thomas C. Hart, Commander in
Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And what is the last page on this Exhibit 11
dated ? The same day, October the 11th ? The photostat does not give
the initialling or writing at the top — at least on mine it does not. Does
it on yours?
Admiral Richardson. It says:
Secret, October the 11th, 1940 :
U. S. Fleet Dispositions and Operations to Meet Special Situation in Western
Pacific.
Senator Ferguson. Would you read it?
[8181 Admiral Richardson (reading:)
Assumptions : The gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the
opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.
(2) The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of the Burma Eoad
is an unfriendly act to Japan.
(3) The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce cooperation with
Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.
(4) Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce full cooperation
by the Dutch East Indies.
(5) The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the
United States or United States possessions to Japan and non-intercourse with
Japan.
(6) The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent
Japanese trade in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations with the Western
Hemisphere.
(7) The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific —
in Australia and Singapore — and Dutch forces in the Dutch East Indies in
stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea — Celebes Sea area.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMirPEE 317
(8) The United States is prepared to accept war [819] if the measures
taken cause Japan to declare war. . . *v, w^c^^^r, Atlantic
(9) Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic
against the western Hemisphere by the Axis powers.
(10) The situation and decisions by the United States assumed herein may
arise 17 October 1940.
[820] Senator Ferguson. Let us speak about the last, No 10,
that "The situation and decisions by the United States assumed here-
in may arise 17 October, 19-10."
As i understand it, you wrote this memo that you ]ust read.
Admiral Richardson. Ko ; I did not.
Senator Ferguson. ^Yho did write it ? Where did you get it i
Admiral Richardson. May I explain ? ^
Senator Ferguson. Yes. I want you to explain.
Admiral Ricil\rdson. The Secretary of the Navy directed me and
Stark to draw up a plan of action sheuld decision be reached to stop
trade between Japan and the Western Hemisphere.
In order to draw any war plan, you must start with some assump-
tions as to bases for the plan. This whole document which I have
read is nothing but the assumptions that the officers who drew up
this plan set up as the basis for their plan. It was drawn up by the
officers in the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations
in collaboration with me and Admiral Stark and my war plans officer,
Commander Vincent R. Murphy, now rear admiral.
So that these assumptions, when I left Washington, had not been
seen by the Secretary of the Navy or by the President of the United
States, neither one of whom was in Washington [821] that day.
Senator Ferguson. Was this the substance of what you had received
from the Secretary of the Navy a few days previous ?
Admiral Richardson. It was our joint conception of what the Sec-
retary informed us the day before, on October 10.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; and you made a memo of what he in-
formed you, and this is the memo?
Admiral Richardson. I made no memorandum. I did not write
one word of this. It was drawn up by the War Plans officers of the
Office of Chief of Naval Operations in collaboration with the War
Plans officer of the United States Fleet.
Senator Ferguson. Where did he get the information to put m tins
document ?
Admiral Richardson. He was present— all of them were present
when the discussion was had with the Secretary of the Navy.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say then that this represented a fan-
statement of what the Secretary of the Navy said to you at a previous
date?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir ; this is a more formally stated, com-
prehensive presentation of the assumptions arising from what he did
state to us.
[822] Senator Ferguson. Getting to the date of the 17th of Oc-
tober, can you explain that any more ?
Admiral Richardson. The i7th of October?
Senator Ferguson. It is on the last line, the No. 10 item.
Admiral Richardson. That was the day that Great Britain was to
reopen the Burma Road, and it was thought that the Japs, or the
Japanese, might take some aggressive action in connection Avith the
reopening of the Burma Road.
79716— 46— pt. 1 23
318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Do you know about when Admiral Hart received
this instrument ?
Admiral Richardson. Of my own knowledge, I do not know, but
I think it entirely possible that I may have somewhere among my pa-
pers a letter from Admiral Hart written in December, informing
me that he had received this document.
Senator Ferguson. Now when the document went to Admiral Hart,,
it had the sheet on it which you read ; is that correct ?
Admiral Richardson. Had what?
Senator Ferguson. It had the sheet on that you read? Tlie last
sheet was on it when j^ou sent it to Admiral Hart?
Admiral Richardson. Oh, absolutely. It is Enclosure A in this
letter.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Will you now read your letter which you
wrote on the flagship New Mexico^ October 16, 1940.
\823'\ Admiral Richardson. May I have your cop}' ? That is my
own copy and it is clearer than this photostatic copy.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I will ask you what these things are on the
margin.
Admiral Richardson. You can see them better on that copy.
Senator Ferguson. I will use this one. Before you read it, on the
last page where your signature appears, at the top is 01 in the margin
and a line drawn. Do you know what that means ?
Admiral Richardson. The numbers in the right-hand margin of
the last page of the letter indicate numbers of my staff. 01 is the chief
of staff. The initial which is rather indistinct is "T" for Taffender,
who is rear admiral, who was my chief of staff. 11 is the operations
officer. "B" stands for Beery, !Rear Adm, Bernard H. Beery, then
captain. 16 is the war plans officer. VRM stands for Vincent R.
Murphy.
Senator Ferguson. Now, would those lines crossed through those
numbers indicate that those respective officers had seen this instrument
prior to sending it, or signing it?
Admiral Richardson. Those marks are the initials of the officers,
and the initials I recognize as their own.
Senator Ferguson. Does it indicate, when the line is \S^h^
drawn through their number, that the}' have seen the instrument ?
Admiral Richardson. My memory is not definite on that, but the
line, I think, means that they are to see it, and an initial indicates that
they have seen it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you read that instrument?
Admiral Richardson. This is "CinC File No. A16/01687."
Long Beach, California. October 16, 1940.
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
Subject: International Situation — Reinforcement of the A.siatie Fleet.
Enclosures: (A) Copy of Assumptions. (B) Copy of Tentative Operations.
1. During the recent visit of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet to Washing-
ton and on October 10, the Secretary told the Commander-in-Chief that the Presi-
dent was considering, in connection with possible retaliatory measures taken
against Great Britain upon opening of the Burma Road the following:
[825] (a) Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet as a peacetime move.
(b) Declaring a complete embargo in shipments to and from Japan.
(c) Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and the Americas. To accom-
plish this latter measure, he (the President) proposed establishment of patrol
lines of light forces from Honolulu westward to the Philippines and a second line
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 319
roughly from Samoa to Singapore, "in support of" the flrst line. The impracti-
cability of this and other suggestions was explained to the Secretary, and, after
some further conversations dealing with eventualities and at the direction of the
Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, and his War Plans Officer
in conjunction with the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operation's
office, submitted a memorandum (Enclosure A) of assumptions outlining the
situation presented by the Secretary and a brief outline sketch of operations
(Enclosure B) by the U. S. Fleet to meet the assumptions in a more practicable
manner. This was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 11
for submission to the Secretary and the President as to what the Navy proposed
to do if directed to proceed on the proposed assumptions and tentative decisions.
2. To date, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has had no further word in
regard to the memorandum referred to above, [826] but received a dispatch
today from the Chief of Naval Operations directing that a copy be forwarded to
you via the Houston. It is believed that further study in the Department and in
the Fleet will result in some modifications in the operations proposed for the
Fleet, particularly as regards distribution of patrol planes and cruisers.
3. The further operations indicated in para grab 9 of Enclosure (B) are measures
for the reduction and occupation of the Marshall Islands, or a feint in the
Mid-Pacific which will be initiated when a train is assembled and transports are
ready. Due to the situation in the Atlantic, the Department did not feel that
our main Fleet should get too far in the Pacific, as it might be necessary to call
it back on short notice. It was felt, however, that active operations against
ORANGE possessions might have a deterring effect on ORANGE full scale opera-
tions in the South China Sea and Dutch East Indies.
4. It will be noted that the above operations parallel very closely the present
ORANGE Plan, modified by the dispatch of an Advance Force to the Asiatic and
further modified by the restriction of main Fleet operations in the Mid-Pacific
area.
5. I was further told, in the Department, that no Army forces would be available
and that the British had agreed to the United States' use of Singapore.
[821] 6. In the event that the assumptions are not realized prior to about
January 1, 1941, or decision is not reached to dispatch the Advance Detachment
before that time, there was discussion of assembling a train and transports in West
Coast ports and holding a full dress rehearsal of operations against an atoll,
as a Fleet exercise, utilizing Christmas Island as a site. Steps are being taken
for the acquisition and conversion of the necessary transports, etc., to be ready
around that time. If this is done, the reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet may
take place coincidentally with this exercise, the idea being that Japan will be
impressed by this evidence of United States determination to protect its interests.
I presume you will be further informed of this eventuality as plans are more
fully developed.
7. My secret serial A16/01683 of this date, covering the composition and prepa-
ration of the tentative detachment slated for reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, in
case such a move is ordered, was forwarded to you by clipper locked box, a copy
being sent on the HOUSTON with this letter.
8. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable
to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other
than secret.
J. O. RiCHAEDSON.
Senator Ferguson. Is there anything under your name? I
[^8281 see some marks here which are illegible.
Admiral Kichaedson. "Copy to OPNAV via air mail. This copy
to be acknowledged by dispatch"^-no, "This copy acknowledged by
dispatch 132,000 of October" something blank "1940". It is very
vague.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence
now Exhibit 11, two parts of which have been read, so that the other
part will be in. It is the Enclosure (B). Let it all be contained in
the record.
The Chairman. Without objection it will be inserted at this point
as Exhibit No. 11.
320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 11".)
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Kichardson, do you have any com-
ment to make on this document Exhibit 11 that I may not have cov-
ered, anything that you may want to put in tlie record to clarify it?
Admiral Richardson. No.
Senator Ferguson. You have no comment on it ?
Admiral Richardson. No.
Senator Ferguson. During your tenure as Commander in Chief did
we have any convoys in the Pacific ?
Admiral Richardson. Only on one occasion was a single ship con-
voyed by a ship under my command from Pearl Harbor to [8291
Guam, from Guam to Cavite, by a ship under the command of Ad-
miral Hart, and the ship on her return voyage was convoyed in like
manner from Cavite to Guam and from Guam to Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall the name of that ship? Do you
recall that?
Admiral Richardson. My memory is not certain, but I believe it
was the Chaumont.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the occasions were for con-
voying that ship ?
Admiral Richardson. I received orders to escort her to Guam, to
have the escort await for her return, that she would be escorted from
Guam to Cavite by a ship from the Asiatic Fleet and likewise escorted
from Cavite to Guam by a ship from the Asiatic Fleet, and escorted
from Guam to Honolulu by the escort which accompanied her outward
bound. I have no information or knowledge — or I had no informa-
tion or knowledge at the time as to why she was escorted, what she
was guarded against, or what her cargo was.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you received an order ?
Admiral Richardson. I received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval
Operations directing me to
Senator Ferguson (interposing). From the CNO?
Admiral Richardson. The CNO.
[830'] Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel, do we have a copy
of that dispatch ?
Mr, Mitchell. I doubt it because I have never seen it.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Richardson, do you know where we
could locate a copy of the dispatch to you to convoy that ship, and
could you give us about the date of it?
Admiral Richardson. I have frequently endeavored to recall when
this incident occurred, and I have, unfortunately, no record in any
of my papers as to the time. Any statement I made would be a pure
guess, but I should say around
Senator Ferguson (interposing). After the instrument of October
11 that we just read?
Admiral Rictlvrdson. My guess would be that it was in December
of that year, because I received a dispatch to escort her when I was in
the Hawaiian area. I did not return to the Hawaiian area until the
6th of December 1940, so my guess is that it would be within the
month of December 1940.
{831] Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not you
wrote an}^ letters about it? Is it mentioned in any of this corre-
spondence that we have ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 321
Admiral Richardsox. I wrote no letters about it. I sent a dispatch,
however, to the Chief of Naval Operations and inquired as to whether
the escorting of this ship indicated an intention to escort all U. S.
Government vessels, or an intention later to escort all United States
flag vessels. That is, ships flying the American flag.
I promptly received a reply from the Chief of Naval Operations
saying, "Negative to your inquiry."
Senator Ferguson. That is the only knowledge you have about that
convoy that you have given us, that you recall ?
Admiral Richardson. I have an impression; I cannot state as an
absolute certainty, that after I was relieved and after I returned to
Washington, purely as a matter of curiosity I asked the then Assist-
ant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, as to why I was
ordered to escort this vessel, and he stated that it was rumored that
there were German raiders operating in the mid-Pacific area within
the Marshall Islands or north thereof and that I was directed to
escort this vessel to protect her against possible attack by German
raiders.
Senator Ferguson. Is there anything else you wish to add to that?
[8S2] Admiral Richardson. No. That is as complete an an-
swer as I can give.
Senator Ferguson. I understand that you stated you left the posi-
tion as comander in chief of the fleet February 1, 1941.
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And you at that time were succeeded by Admiral
Kimmel ?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And you also stated that he was a commanding
officer under you in charge of cruisers ?
Admiral Richardson. He was a type commander, not commanding
officer, because with us commanding officers command a single ship.
Senator Ferguson. I see. Now, do you know how Admiral Kimmel
came to succeed you ; have you any information on that you could give
the committee?
Admiral Richardson. When I was in Washington in October 1940,
in conversation with Admiral Stark and Admiral Nimitz, who was
then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, now Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel, I stated that in my opinion they should have in mind the names
of officers whom they would consider favorably as the relief of all
of the important officers in the fleet, as any officer of the age of most
of the flag officers of senior rank might break down in health or might
be detached ^SS] for other reasons, and that in order that
they might not be taken unawares I thought they should have a ten-
tative slate of prospective reliefs, and they agreed with me and
asked me to suggest the names of possible reliefs.
Senator Ferguson. Did you make any suggestions?
Admiral Richardson. After some consideration I submitted a list
of names and in that list was the name of Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us who else was in the list?
Admiral Richardson. I do not remember with certainty, and I
hoped I would not be required to answer that question, because I have
very many friends in the Navy and I would hate for them, any of
them, to feel that their name was not on that list.
322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. I have no desire to press for an answer.
About how many were in the list, so that they may feel that they
were included ?
Admiral Richardson. I think probably five or six.
Senator Ferguson. Now, what was your suggestion
Admiral Richardson. Just a minute.
Senator Ferguson. Pardon me.
Admiral Richardson. Much to my surprise, and as evidence
[834] of how uncertain some testimony may be after 5 years, I
thought that in that letter I stated that I had not included Admiral
King's name, because he was already afloat in the Pacific — I mean
in the Atlantic — but in looking over some old papers I was surprised
to find this entry, 29 October, letter from Nimitz agreeing to King's
shift up if I had to be taken out.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have in mind when you made that sug-
gestion about replacement of officers that you might be replaced in
the very near future ?
Admiral Richardson. Not at all.
Senator Ferguson. Not by one of the names that you mentioned.
Admiral Richardson. When I left Washington in October, Admiral
Stark and Admiral Nimitz informed me that it was their belief that
1 would remain in command until I completed 2 years' service as
commander in chief, and I had no reason for suggesting this excepting
that when a man is over 60, in a strenuous job, he might not hold out.
Senator Ferguson. What was the normal tour of duty is that
how you express it in the Navy ?
Admiral Richardson. That is how we express it, but there is no
such thing, because there have been officers remain Commander in
Chief one year; there have been officers remain two years. My prede-
cessor remained, I think, 2 years.
[SS5] Senator Ferguson. The normal, you would say, then, is
2 years — average ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, it was not normal for a number of
years, and I believe that a feeling grew up in the Navy that a 1-year
tenure of office was too short, and there was a tendency, as exemplified
by actual practice, to extend the cruise of a commander in chief to
2 years.
Senator Ferguson. Was 13 months an average tour of duty?
Admiral Richardson. I know of one or two flag officers who were
detached as commander in chief after 1 year.
Senator Ferguson. When you say the commander in chief, that
would be in the same position as you were ?
Admiral Richardson. Same wav.
Senator Ferguson. Was seniority recognized in the Navy, for in-
stance as it is recognized in the Senate, that the next in fine would
take your position ?
Admiral Richardson. Seniority is recognized in the Navy in the
assignment of officers to duty up to and including that of captain,
but in the selection of officers for flag assignments an effort is made
to base assignments on an estimate of the officer's ability rather than
upon his lineal position on the list.
Senator Ferguson. Now, how long of a notice did you have that
you were going to be removed, when vou were commander in [SSO]
chief of the fleet?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 323
Admiral Richardsox. I received a dispatch on 5 January, about
11 : 30 in the morning Honokiki time, Sunday.
Senator Fergusox. And from whom did j-ou receive that dispatch ?
Admiral Richardson. I am not positive. I think it came from the
Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, who was Admiral Nimitz,
and was charged with the preparation of all orders, but it came to
me in a secret code that was held by no one in the fleet except me,
and the reason it was in a secret code was that the same message in-
volved many other changes of flag officers, and I was directed in
the message to inform all of the officers concerned but to inform
no one else in a public release of the impending changes made.
Senator Fergusox. When was the first public release that you were
retired from that position as commander in chief of the Navy ?
Admiral Richardsox^ Mj^ recollection is tliat it was on the 6th of
January or possibly the 7th, Tuesday.
Senator Fergusox. Do you know who made that release?
Admiral Richardsox^. I haA-e no idea.
Senator Fergusox. Did it come from Hawaii or did it come from
Washington ?
Admiral Richardsox. Well, I read it in the newspapers in [837]
Hawaii.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever discuss your retirement from
that particular position with anyone in the service, I mean in the
Navy ?
Admiral Richardsox. Ma^^ I correct the word. It was not a re-
tirement.
Senator Ferguson. What w^as it ?
Admiral Richardsox. It was relief or detachment.
Senator Ferguson. Detachment. Did you ever discuss that de-
tachment with anyone ?
Admiral Richardsox. I did not — ^}'es. I discussed it with one offi-
cial in the Navy Department.
Senator Fergusox. Will you tell us who that official was?
Admiral Richardson. The Secretary of the Navy,
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us your discussion with him about
your detachment?
Admiral Richardson. Well, I said to the Secretary upon reporting
here
Senator Ferguson. First, will you give us about the date, if joii can.
Admiral.
Admiral Richardsox^ Well, my orders directed me, my orders de-
taching me from command of the United States Fleet directed me to
report to the Secretary of the Navy for duty. I reported, as nearly as
I can remember, on the 24th day of [SSS] March, 1941. I can
verify that date.
Senator Ferguson. Well, it is near enough.
Admiral Richardson, By the Secretary of the Navy I was ordered
on 25 March 1941 to report to duty with the General Boards When I
went in to report to the Secretary of the Navy I said, in effect, in my
experience in the Navy I have never known of a flag officer being-
detached from command of the United States Fleet in the same man-
ner that I was, and I feel that I owe it to myself to inquire why I was
detached, and he stated that the President would send for nio-nnd talk
the matter over with me.
324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[839] Senator Ferguson. Did the President ever send for you
and talk the matter over with you ?
Admiral Richardson. He did not.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever seek to go to the President on the
matter after being told that he would send for you ?
Admiral Richardson. By no means.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any other discussion with the
Secretary of the Navy — the Secretary at that time was Mr. Knox, was
it not?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any other discussion about your
detachment? Will you give us the full story ?
Admiral Richardson. No, I had no more discussion about my de-
tachment. I had some discussion about my duty, to which I was to
be assigned.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us something about the duties?
Was it a promotion that you were going to ; was this general board a
promotion ?
Admiral Richardson. Oh, no.
In accordance with the law, upon detachment from the position
of commander in chief of the United States Fleet, I reverted from the
rank of admiral to that of rear admiral, and from being senior to many
people to whom I had been [S40~\ senior only temporarily
I reverted to my normal position on the Navy list.
Senator Ferguson. What was the duty of this general board ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, it was a board that has been held in
high esteem by many people for many years. It is a board of senior
officers of the Navy that consider matters referred to it by the Secre-
tary of the Navy and advise him on any subject that is referred to
them. The primary duty in time of peace was the consideration and
recommendation as to the building program, and the type and char-
acteristics of the ships to be built.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation with the Secre-
tary of the Navy that would indicate that he knew why you were
detached ?
Admiral Richardson. He said to me, "The last time you were here
you hurt the President's feelings."
Senator Ferguson. Did he say what the occasion was that you had
hurt the President's feelings?
Admiral Richardson. He did not sa.j.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ask him.
Admiral Richardson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know on what occasion you could have
hurt the President's feelings?
[84^1'] Admiral Richardson. Well, it would hurt my feelings if
a senior subordinate under me disagreed with me and I couldn't make
him change his mind.
Senator Ferguson. Then you feel that probably the conversation
that you had then on the — was it the 8th of October at a Imicheon with
Admiral Leahy and the President — was the occasion that you may
have hurt his feelings?
Admiral Richardson. I think so.
Senator Ferguson. That is the occasion that you told us that, you
were rather definite in your opinions?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 325
Admiral Richardson. Unfortunately, I am definite in most of my
°^SmiTtor Ferguson. Did you have any other conversation with the
Secertary of the Navy as to why you were removed— Pardon m^
detached. I want to use that word mstead of ^'removed. Detached.
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, may I say somethnig oil the
record ?
The Chairman. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record).
The Chairman. Go ahead. ^ ,, ^ ^ . i k„
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, in view of the statement made by
the \dmiral, it is apparent that he doesn't think that is material and
pertinent and I seHously doubt whether [Sm ^, >ve should go
fisliino- in every direction here in view of the Admiral's last statement.
Admiral Richardson. I have no humility about making this state-
ment. I am perfectly willing to make it, if it is useful. It is a trivial
* The Chairman. The Chair thinks probably the Admiral had better
^Admiral Richardson. There is a requirement in the Navy that on
every annual fitness— I mean on every fitness report submitted an
officer indicates his preference for duty, and inasmuch as I had been
informed that I would remain at sea longer if that were carried out, i
would have only a short time remaining on the active list when 1 was
detached, and therefore I did not want to move my household effects
from Washington to some naval station. I did not want to be assigned
to a resDonsible position in the Department for only a short time, and
really, as a joke, I entered on my last fitness report that I preferred
duty on the Naval Examining Board.
In all my experience in the Navy— and I have had 4 years m the
Bureau of Navigation, charged with assigning officers to duty, i never
heard of anyone looking at a fitness report of a flag officer to see where
they would assign- him to duty. So before I reported to the Secretary,
I read [8431 in the paper, or heard a rumor, that 1 was to be
assigned to the Naval Examining Board in aocordance with my re-
quest, and when I reported to the Secretary, I said, "Mr. Secretary,
I have reported for duty. I am willing to do any duty that can m
any way contribute to the preparation of the Navy for war but having
heard or read a rumor that I was going to the examining board at my
request I want to tell you that if I am ordered to the examining board,
I am going there gladly, willingly, rather. I will do the ]ob to the
limit of my ability, but"^if a press release is made that I was assigned
to the examining board at my request, I will inform the press that
it is a lie." , .
He said. "Well, Admiral, you, of course, won't go to the examining
board. Where do you want to go ? "
And I said, "Any other place you send me."
So I went to the general board. . r^^ • n .i
The Chairman. That completes that statement? Ihat is all there
is to that?
Admiral Richardson. That is all.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, had you put on a long-distance recon-
naissance at Pearl Harbor?
326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Eichardson, I had, Senator Ferguson, and I think in the
previous testimonv I have covered it as com- [S44] prehen-
sively as I can.
Senator FerCxUSun. You have given us all of the data on that?
Admiral KrcHARosoisr. I have.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have anything to do with the recon-
naissance orders or directives as of 1941, that is what I was getting at.
"Were you consulted in relation to that after you left ?
Admiral Richardson. I discontinued prior to my detachment long-
range reconnaissance of the type that I established upon arrival in the
Hawaiian area, and in lieu thereof I established a search of the oper-
:iting areas and a search off the entrance of Pearl Harbor before ships
left the harbor. That was incorporated in a security order which was
in process of revision when I was detached.
The first order, that revision, that was issued after I was detached,
was issued over the signature of Admiral Kimmel on 15 February, and
I knew what was in that order, and I previously stated that had I
rernained there, while I had not read this order thoroughly, it is my
belief, based on the fact that the officer who prepared it on my staff
remained with Admiral Kimmel until after that order was issued, it is
my belief that had I remained there the order would have been sub-
stantially as it is now, and would have [S4^] been over my
signature.
Senator Ferguson. What were the places that you could anchor
the fleet? What places were there to anchor this fleet at the Hawaiian
Islands ?
Admiral Richardson. The main anchorages were within Pearl Har-
bor, in Lahaina Roads off the Island of Molokai, and for carriers, off
Oahu, between the entrance to Pearl Harbor and Diamond Head, and
small vessels used Hilo and Kahoolawe.
Senator Ferguson. Was all anchorage considered open anchorage
except Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Richardson. All were open anchorages, except that it was
possible for small ships to enter the harbor of Hilo and enter Kahoo-
lawe.
Senator Ferguson. The antiaircraft protection was placed to cover
what anchorage? Lahaina Roads or Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Richardson. There was no antiaircraft protection any
place except Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. At the time that you left did you consider the,
antiaircraft protection sufficient to protect the fleet in Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Richardson. By no means. I so indicated in my endorse-
ment on the letter that was prepared by Admiral [S40]' Bloch
under date of 30 December 1910, my endorsement being dated 4 Janu-
ary 1941.
Senator Ferguson. When we were given maps here, we were shown
that the fleet was — that the battleships were moored in pairs. Do you
know why that would be? Is that the way you kept them ?
Admiral Richardson. That is the only way you could get them in
the Harbor. There wasn't room for putting the ships at individual
berths.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, it was so congested that it was
necessary to put them in pairs ?
Admiral Richardson. That was habitual practice.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 327
Senator Ferguson. Could they have been placed in any other posi-
tion, all the fleet as we have seen it on these plats i
Admiral Richardson. No, there vrere not separate berths adequate to
berth each big ship separately.
Senator Ferguson. Did you start, durinp; the period that you had
the fleet at Pearl Harbor, to place it in shape for active duty, war
duty ?
Admiral Richardson. I did everything within my power to make
the oflicers and men of the fleet become war-minded, and one great
deterrent of my effective accomplisliment of that aim was the fact
that many officers who were long-time friends [84-7] would
say, in effect, "Joe, we cannot be on the verge of war, otherwise they
would give us enough men to man the ships."
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell me who told you that ?
Admiral Richardson. One specifically will be a witness before this
committee, I think, possibly. His name is John Henry Newton. I
think his rank is vice admiral.
Senator Ferguson. Now, would j-ou say that the fleet was a liability
or an asset in the defense of Pearl Harbor, being in the Harbor, was
it a liability or an asset ?
Admiral Richardson. You are not on very safe ground in express-
ing an opinion 5 years or 4 years after the occurrence of an event in
hopes that your mind will not be conditioned by after-knowledge.
Senator Ferguson. You feel that you wouldn't want to give an
opinion on that question at the present time.
Admiral Richardson. I prefer not to=
Senator Ferguson. All right.
You have had considerable experience in the Far East in your
previous years in service, vou stated ?
Admiral Richardson. That is true.
Senator Ferguson. After you were retired as Commander in Chief,
was that experience utilized in any way ?
Admiral Richardson. Not to my knowledge.
[84s] Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted on an}' mat-
ters in the Far East ?
Admiral Richardson. I was not.
Senator Ferguson. After the 5th of January when you received
your first notice of detachment, did you confer with anyone in the
State Department?
Admiral Richardson. Between that time and the time of my detach-
ment ?
Senator Ferguson. No ; after your detachment, did you confer on
any questions with anyone in the State Department officially ?
Admiral Richardson. Oh, no ; I had no official standing that would
entitled me to confer with anybody in the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted by anyone in the State
Department ?
Admiral Richardson. Not on official business; no.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Admiral, I have just one question that I think hasn't
been pursued fully.
You were asked yesterday by Senator Ferguson as to Naval games
or maneuvers early in 1932 or 1936.
Admiral Richardson. In 1932, I think, only.
328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[849] Mr. Keefe. 1932 ?
Admiral Richardson. I think only 1932.
Mr. Keefe. Only 1932.
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Mr. KjiEFE. In which simulated attacks by air power were made
upon Pearl Harbor.
Admijal Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. IvEEFE. But the matter was not pursued so that I have any very
dehnite ideas as to just what the conclusion of those Naval games was
Now, there would be a record maintained, would there not, of the
character of the simulated attack upon Pearl Harbor at that time'^
Admiral Richardson. Undoubtedly. I cannot recall the part that
1 played m fleet exercises of 1932, but I know that at that time I was
the commanding officer of the U. S. S. Augusta, which was the fla<r-
ship of the scouting force, and that ship participated in whatever
exercises we had.
I do not remember what those exercises were in the Hawaiian area,
but I believe there must have been a simulated air raid. I know that
on return to the United States, the task force to which the Auqusta
was assigned, did conduct a simulated air raid on the west coast of
California, somewhat north of Santa Barbara. However I know
that many carrier [SSO] raids against Pearl Harbor have been
simulated previous to the 1941 fleet exercises.
Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, the purpose of conducting those ma-
neuvers and those exercises and simulated attacks is for the benefit of
the fleet in considering the defense of Pearl Harbor, in connection
with the Army?
Admiral Richardson. No; the purpose was primarily to exercise
the Army m Hawaii and the local Naval defense forces which was
composed of submarines, long-range patrol planes, and in the War
Plans
Mr. Keefe. Pardon me. Admiral. What I am getting at is this
.fudges were appointed to judge the effectiveness of the attack in those
cases, were they not ?
Admiral Richardson. My impression is that we did not' have um-
pires to determine the success or the failure of the attack, but at the
conclusion of every fleet exercise, there was what is called a critique
attended by all senior officers and at which those who played an im-
portant part in exercises present their views as to what took place and
what lessons were learned and the commander in chief himself sums
up his conception of how well the job was done and how much was
learned and what mistakes were made.
Mr. Keefe. Now, is a record kept and filed with anybody for future
study?
[SSI] Admiral Richardson. The whole thing is printed.
Mr. Keefe. Printed by whom?
Admiral Richardson. 'Printed in a document and sent to the Naval
War College or the Chief of Naval Operations, or should be.
Mr. Keefe. If there were maneuvers in 1932 and subsequent to that
time when simulated attacks by air were made upon Oahu and Pearl
Harbor within Oahu there would be some place in the Navy Depart-
ment a printed report showing the actual character of those attacks and
the summaries?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 329
Admiral Kichardson. That is my belief.
[85:2] Mr. Keefe. Have we such reports, Mr. Mitchell?
Mr. MrrcHELL. Mr. Congressman, there was laid on my desk this
morning at 10 minutes to 10 from the Xavy Department a document
which I think is the report or material on the 1932 war game.
Mr. IvEEFE. Is it a voluminous report?
Mr, Mitchell. I haven't had time to examine it. I came in only
about 5 minutes before I came to the committee room this morning. I
understand that the Army's report of this game, of some of the 1932
games, is already in the hands of Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. I will be very glad to have it sent from my
office. I just received it recently. I haven't had the time to study it.
Mr. Keefe. May I ask counsel whether or not there are any records
or files in the hands of the committee showing the results of any war
maneuvers or simulated attacks on Pearl Harbor subsequent to 1932
and prior to 1941 ?
Mr. Mitchell. I think not. We have asked for them but we have
not received them. I asked the Admiral about the war games of 1940
when I examined him and his information was not as definite as we
wanted. We have asked for the report of 1940 in so far as, I think,
they relate to attacks on Pearl Harbor.
[853] Mr. Keefe. Will that report be made available to the
individual members of the committee ?
Mr. Mitchell. As soon as we get it we will let you have it.
Senator Brewster. Well, could the Admiral make a statement?
Admiral Kichardson. I know that in the annual fleet exercise
He apparently has one in mind.
while I was commander in chief there was no simulated carrier at-
tack on Pearl Harbor. I also know that many such attacks have
been simulated in preceding j^ears. Some times they have one of
these simulated attacks and some years they do not have them, so
that I could not state which years they had them.
Mr. Keefe. Now, one other question. Admiral. Prior to the time
that you took the fleet from the West coast to conduct manoeuvers
in 1940, I believe in January
* Admiral Kichardson. I think the 1st of April.
Mr. Keefe. The 1st of April?
Admiral Richardson. When I took them out.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Prior to that time the base of the fleet had
always been at San Diego and San Pedro, do I so understand your
testimony, except the Hawaiian detachment and the Asiatic Fleet,
perhaps ?
Admiral Richardson. Well, "always" is a long time. [8S4]
Within my memory we had practicall}^ no ships in the Pacific. I
never served in the Pacific except on the Asiatic station, until I went
out there in the Augusta about 1932, so that in 30 years service I was
never on duty in the Pacific Ocean except when I was on the Asiatic
station.
From 1932 until 1940 the normal bases of the fleet were in the San
Pedro, Long Beach, and San Diego areas.
Mr. Keefe. That is all.
The Chairman. Admiral, T want to ask you a question or two
prompted by other questions.
330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. In this October 10th or 11th memorandum in
which you set out a number of assumptions from which war plans
were based, those were all theoretical assumptions?
Admiral Richardson. Wholly.
The Chairman. And did any of this materialize while you were
in command?
Admiral Richardson. My recollection is that that never materi-
alized. They opened the Burma Road and the Japanese never did
disturb us or the British very much, so that the plan was never
implemented.
The Chairman. Yes. Now, let me ask you this question :( While
you were in command had the practice arisen of having the fleet go
into Pearl Harbor periodically for recreation [8SS] or for
any other reasons ?
Admiral Richardson. Oh, yes. In fact, it is probable that there
were more ships in Pearl Harbor in December 1940 than there were
in December 1941.
The Chairman. So that this was a recognized practice of the fleet
to assemble in Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Richardson. A ship cannot remain at sea or anchored out
in the open roadstead all the time. They must go in now and then
for replenishment of provisions, for recreation, for upkeep, disabling
engines if necessary and for the material maintenance of the ships and
it Avas my custom for ships to go in periodically, all of them, not at
the same time but for every ship to have a turn in Pearl Harbor.
The Chairman. In the correspondence between Admiral Stark and
you, all through it is emphasized the caution in regard to practices
or exercises or maneuvers to do nothing that would create the im-
pression of any offensive step being taken with reference to Orange,
which I understand is Japan.
Admiral Richardson. That is true.
The Chairman. And in your conferences here in Washington with
the Secretary of the Navy and with Admiral Stark and with the Presi-
dent was any further emphasis placed upon that precaution in con-
nection with your exercises and maneuvers ?
[856] Admiral Richardson. No; because I had been so thor-
oughly indoctrinated with that idea over a great many years that
I needed no further instructions.
The Chairman. Yes. That is, of course, I presume, always a pre-
caution that the Navy takes and always takes regardless of circum-
stances under which it exercises and maneuvers, that it is not to be
understood as an offensive action against any country ?
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely.
The Chairman. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question ?
The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, in your statement about the meeting at the
White House October 8, 1940, you quoted the President or said in
effect, and I am reading from tlie record at page 684 [reading] :
That if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would
ehter the war.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 331
You are quite clear that the President said that about the Philip-
pines ?
Admiral Richardson. That is according to m}^ firm conviction, my
best opinion and belief.
Mr, Murphy. Now, at the time that you were at the White House
we did have ships based at Manila, did we not ?
[8-57] Admiral Richardson. They were on an Asiatic station.
They might or might not have been at Manila, but they were in the
Avestern Pacific area. They might have been in the southern Philip-
pines, they might have been in Manila and some of them might have
been on the China coast.
Mr. Murphy. But what I mean is, Manila was the base of the fleet.
That was its home port, wasn't it, of the Asiatic Fleet ?
Admiral Richardson. Quite right.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I notice in the letter of December 23,
1940, a letter from Admiral Stark, apparently, to Admiral Hart, the
following on page 2 [reading] :
In regard to your next paragraph I am completely with you and have sought at
every turn to improve the security of Manila Bay and the Philippines. I might
say, in this connection, that opinion in general, in regard to how far we should
go in maintaining our position in the Philippines seems to be changing upwai'd.
While such a change is going on, it is not always practicable to be definitely final
on questions that arise.
Apparently the view was changing as to the Philippines.
Do you have any other thing on that subsequent to October the 8th,
1940, as to our attitude as to what would have happened if the Philip-
pines were attacked ?
[8S8^ Admiral Richardson. I have not. I liave nothing fur-
ther to add.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions by members of the
committee
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.
Senator Lucas. I would like to ask one or two questions.
Admiral, the question was asked you by one of the members of the
committee as to whether or not in January 1940 the Pacific Fleet, of
which you were in charge, was ready for war duty and you unquali-
fiedly answered "No, it was not."
Now, even though this may be somewhat repetitious I would like
to ask you, Admiral, how many men were in the Navy under your
command at that time, in January 1940, if you know ?
Admiral Richardson. I do not know how many men were there at
that specific time but I would like to further amplify my statement
regarding lack of readiness of the fleet by stating that it was as ready
at that time as it had been ready in many j^ears preceding.
Senator Lucas. Yes. All right. Now, you stated, as I recall, the
percentage of men that were attached to the battleships ?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
[8S9] Senator Lucas. And, as I recall, you said it was about
85 percent of its actual strength.
Admiral Richardson. That had been the long custom in the Navy,
to maintain about 85 percent of the required complonicnt on board
332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ships because the Navy was faced with two alternatives: Based on
the number of men allowed by Congress they must either limit the
number of ships in commission to those that they could fully man,
thereby curtailing the opportunity for officers to acquire experience
in command, or they had to maintain in commission ships that could
not be fully manned for war operations.
Senator Lucas. That is correct. Now, one further question : With
respect to the auxiliary equipment that would have been necessary to
have placed the fleet of which you were in command upon a wartime
basis, will you give to the committee just as near as you can what
you believed in 1940, at that time, would have been necessary in the
way of auxiliary cruisers or whatever ships were necessary and what-
ever implements were necessary to have had it on a war footing basis
in 1940 when you were in command?
Admiral Richardson. I would be unwilling to hazard without a
thorough study a curbstone opinion as to the number of ships, auxil-
iary ships, that would have been required [S60] to accom-
pany the fleet and service it in war operations.
Senator Lucas, Well, whatever would have been necessary in Jan-
uary 1940 in order to put this fleet upon a wartime basis as has been
suggested here by you, that was a matter that was wholly in the
hands of the Congress of the United States as to the supplying of
the men and the supplying of equipment and the tools to put it on
a wartime basis?
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely.
Senator Lucas. Now, one other statement that I want to read into
the record liere from a letter that is already in the record as one of
the exhibits, and it is a letter that you wrote, Admiral, to Admiral
Stark dated September the 18, 1940. The fourth paragraph of that
letter says this [reading] :
During the past six months the Fleet has been visited by two Secretaries.
During the last visit the Secretary made a most favorable impression upon the
officers and men of the Fleet, and I have frequently heard officers say, "I hope
that Colonel Knox remains as Secretary regardless of the outcome of the election."
That is all.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question, please?
The Chairman. Congressman Geai'hart.
[861] Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Richardson, during the early
part of your testimony you testified while you were making one of
your visits to the LTnited States during the days you were commander
in chief that you picked up at San Francisco 5,000 men to take back
to your fleet. Is that correct ?
Admiral Richardson. If I made such a statement it was erroneous.
I did not pick them up at San Francisco. There were 5,000 men made
available to me on the West coast ports. I think the majority of them
were made available to me in the San Pedro, Long Beach, and San
Diego area, although some of the 5,000 might have reported to ships
that had proceeded to Mare Island and those that had proceeded to
Puget Sound for repairs. The point I make is that they were not
made available to me at San Francisco but on West coast ports.
Mr. Murphy. Will tlie gentleman yield ?
Mr. Gkarhart. Wait a minute.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 333
I did not want to insist on the San Francisco and I was not making
any point on that. The point that I want to start from m this exami-
nation, you did obtain 5,000 additional men on the West coasts
Admiral Richardson. That is true. ^ ^ • .i
Mr. Gearhart. And they were taken to your fleet m the
[Se^] Pacific?
Admiral Richardson. That is true.
Mr Gearhart. That suggests to me a question. I would like to
know how many men you had with your fleet before you obtained these
additional 5,000 ? . , -, , • -i i j;
Admiral Richardson. I thmk it would be impossible for anyone
to answer that question at this time.
Mr Gearhart. Without endeavoring to be accurate, can you gi\e
me round figures as to what the complement and manpower would be
of a fleet such as you were commanding at that time?
Admiral Richardson. Congressman Gearhart. the commander m
chief of a fleet, with constant changes in the number of men, with
changes now and then in the number of ships, could not discharge his
responsible position if he burdened his mind with such details.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, you testified that your fleet was about 8o
percent of what it should have been in manpower?
Admiral Richardson. Tliat is true. t i •. ir .
Mr Gearhart. "Wliat I am trying to find out is, how did it aiiect
that percentage that vou have fixed at 85 percent by the addition of
5,000 additional men?"^ That is the point that I am leading up to.
Admiral Richardson. Well, if the committee is willing 1863 \
to accept a wild stab. ,,.,,. xi • • +u
Mr Gearhart. Well, I don't thmk that anything you say m the
way of opinion is wild. I have that much respect for your opinion.
Admiral Richardson. It would be a wild stab.
The Chairman. Well, make a stab. ^ . ^
Admiral Richardson. It would be somewhere between 1 and 7
^^Mr!^ Gearhart. Well, then the 5,000 improved the situation con-
siderably ?
Admiral Richardson. Five men would have improved the situation.
Mr. Gearhart. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Any further questions?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have one question.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Richardson, you were asked by a inom-
ber of the committee as to whether or not it was not Congress whose
duty it was to furnish men for the Navy and I thmk your answer
was that it was.
Admiral Richardson. Well, I would like to
Senator Ferguson. I wish you would elaborate on that.
Admiral Richardson. I would like to change it.
Senator Ferguson. Would you elaborate on it or change L<^o4j
Admiral Richardson. It was not Congress' duty. Congress alone
had the power to do it. . , ,
Senator Ferguson. Do you know. Admiral, what requests were
made to Congress at or about that time for men and materiel for the
Navy '^
"f»716- 4(3 pt. 1 — 24
334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Eichardson. Well, of course, I have no knowledge but
having served as director of the office of personnel, Bureau of Naviga-
tion, for almost 3 years and having been budget officer of the Navy
Department for 1 year, having been assistant chief of naval operations
for 1 year, having been chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel for 1
year, I know that we always asked for more men than we had any
hopes of getting.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, were you acquainted with the fact
that the Navy would make a request and then the Budget Director and
his force would pass on it and then it would come to Congress as an
estimate of the Budget Director ? Are you familiar with that ?
Admiral Richardson. I am.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether the period that you
were talking about, that it was Congress', at least, power to give more
men; do you know what the Navy had requested and how much it
had been reduced or increased by the [8(JS] Budget Director'^
Admiral Richardson. I have no knowledge.
Senator Ferguson. You haven't those figures ?
Admiral Richardson. But I am perfectly willing to volunteer the
statement that I believe that the President had it within his power
by an act of Congress to increase the number of men in the fleet faster
than he did do it.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, you stated som_ething that
you had a conversation with someone relative to the fact that if we
needed men in the Navy we could take machinists or mechanically
inclined people and use them in the Navy.
Will you tell me more about that? Where did you get that idea
and whom did you discuss it with?
Admiral Richardson. Everything that you stated. Senator Fergu-
son, is in accordance with my statement except that you did not add
the name of the President of the United States, which I did.
Senator Ferguson. Then you would say that you got that idea
from the President?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Now, were you at that time discussing with
the President the amount of men that you felt that you needed?
[866] Admiral Richardson. I was. I discussed it Avith every-
hodj. Everybody thought I was a nut on it.
Senator Ferguson. And what month was it that you had that dis-
cussion with the President ?
Admiral Richardson. On both occasions.
Senator Ferguson. That would be when you had luncheon with
Admiral Leahy and the President?
Admiral Richardson. If my memory serves me correctly, I think
that I would never forego the opportunity to urge that additional
men be added to the fleet. Therefore, I think I discussed the matter
with the President at my meeting with him in July and also in
October.
Senator Ferguson. Did j'ou discuss it with the Secretary of the
Navy when 3'ou received the information that is now at least partly
contained in Exhibit 11 in relation to the embargo or the patrol,
whichever you want to call it, in the Pacific ?
[«?^] Admiral Richardsox. No; at that time, in my discus-
sion with the Sccrelaiy of tlic Navy, I cannot state that T said any-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 335
thing with respect to the inadequacies of personnel, but I did state
thatlhe fleet was not ready for action that might involve us in war,
and the Secretary said, "Eichardson, we have never been ready, but
we have always won."
Senator Ferguson. That is all I have.
The Chairmax. May I ask you on that point, the only way to get
men in the Xavy at that time was by voluntary enlistment, is that
true ?
Admiral Richardson. That is true.
The Chairman. And during that period was it true that the Navy,
through posters and recruiting stations and by methods that the
Navy usually adopts, was seeking to urge enlistment in the Navy?
Admiral Richardson. I cannot answer specifically.
The Chairman. Now, Admiral
Admiral Richardson. Do you want me to finish ?
The Chairman. Go ahead, yes. I do not want you to answer unless
you feel free to do so.
Admiral Richardson. When I became chief of the Bureau of Naval
Personnel we had on the waiting list thoroughly acceptable qualified
young men that wanted to enlist in the Navy as apprentice seamen.
We had 8,000 of them. Some of them had been on [868] that
list for 4 or 5 months.
The Chairman. Were they later taken on the ships ?
Admiral Richardson. Th&j were taken on under a quota system
in accordance with their position on the waiting list as funds ap-
propriated by the Congress made it possible for them to do so.
The Chairman. Does counsel wish to ask any further questions?
Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one question.
The Chairman. Congressman Clark.
Mr. Clark. Insofar as the attack on Pearl Harbor is concerned,
what, in your opinion, would have been the difference in the attack,
or the result of the attack if there had been a full complement of
men on each of the ships involved?
Admiral Richardson. I am not now aware of the state of per-
sonnel in the fleet 11 months after my detachment.
Mr. Clark. Assuming it was only 85 percent of the full comple-
ment, what difference would it have made if it were a full complement?
Admiral Richardson. That being the only change ?
Mr. Clark. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. I think the difference would have been
infinitesimal.
[869] Mr. Clark. That is all.
The Chairman. Counsel may proceed.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman,
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman, Does the Senator want to ask any more questions?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Ferguson. I am not quite clear. Admiral, on two of your
statements to reconcile. I understood one of your answers indicated
that the amount of men in the Navy was limited by the money appro-
priated by Congress, and in another statement you indicated that the
President could have put more men on.
336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now I am not undertaking to quote your testimony, but just to
refresh your memory probably as to what you did say on those two
items. How can we reconcile those two? The reporter may be able
to read that to you.
Admiral Richardson. There is no need for him to read me that,
because normally Congress does not, in its annual appropriation, limit
the number of men. It provides so much money.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. But there is a general limitation on the num-
ber of men. Now it is my belief, which I am certain I can verify,
or it can be verified, that under legislation [870] the Congress,
the President, had the authority to increase the number of men
allowed in the Navy, and I believe that there were substantial appro-
priations made available to the President which he could allocate
for purposes that were not specifically stipulated by Congress.
Senator Ferguson. So he could have used it for increasing the
Navy ?
Admiral Richardson. So I think he could have used it had he $een
so fit.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. Now if you wish — and I think it has no
bearing — but if you wish I can go into this further.
Senator Ferguson. That reconciles it.
The Chairman. Is that all?
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the attention of the
Admiral to the fact that subsequent to the short question which I
asked him with relation to the 1932 maneuvers there has been placed
before me what purports to be the report, and the preliminary reports
incident to those maneuvers, consisting of a bundle of perhaps 1,000
or more pages, of the preliminary work done preparing for the maneu-
vers. One is a report, Copy No, 1, entitled "Confidential Report of
the Chief Umpire Joint Army and Navy Exercises, Grand Joint
Exercise No. 4."
[871] There is another large report entitled, "Confidential
Black Report (Army) on Grand Joint Exercise No. 4, February
6-12, 1932."
Then a bound volimie containing many pages which appears also
to be a report, confidential, of Army participation in the grand ex-
ercise No. 4.
Now from these reports that had been furnished a few moments
ago it appears quite clear that in initiating these exercises umpires
were appointed by both the Army and the Navy to observe the results
of those exercises and maneuvers, and to make a full and complete
report, confidential in character.
Now, as commander in chief of the fleet, when you assumed com-
mand, did you have the benefit of the examination of these reports ?
Admiral Richardson. Not those specific ones, but later ones.
Mr. Keefe Then you are sure now. Admiral, that so far as the
record now appears, those exercises were meticulously conducted ap-
parently, according to a long preparation by both the Army and Navy,
and that reports were filed by the umpires appointed ?
Admiral Richardson. I feel sure, I feel sure that I was on perfectly
safe ground when I said that I thought you could find evidence of the
holding of those exercises.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 337
[87£] The Chairman. Is that all?
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, at some time or other m the course of
these proceedings it would be interesting if some of us had time to read
these reports. I do not know when anybody will get time, when they
are presented on such short notice, but I think that question should be
explored, and I assume counsel will explore it, to bring it to us in con-
cise form so we can understand what the report of the umpires was
on those maneuvers. •
Mr. Mitchell. I was going to ask if that is the 1932 maneuvers «
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I am frank to say I have not gone back to 1932 lor
maneuver reports. I sup]3osed we were more directly interested m
war games along a year or two before the Pearl Harbor attack, which
would deal witirsimulated air attacks, and on that is where our inquiry
Avas directed. .
Mr. Keefe. Do you know whether these reports contain the report
of a simulated air attack upon Pearl Harbor ? Are they part of those
maneuvers ?
Mr. Mitchell. I do not know. They were brought in at the request
of one member of the committee who asked for the 1932 maneuver
report. If I thought that were directly involved here I would have
had them long ago, 'I think. ,.,.,. -r i . i
[SrS] Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, Admiral, if I understand
your testimony in response to questions by Senator Ferguson, you at
one time served as Budget Oflticer of the Navy Department.
Admiral Richardson. I did. j. i. -^
Mr. Keefe. And you had experience in coming before subcommit-
tees of the Appropriations Committee.
Admiral Richardson. I have.
Mr. Keefe. To present the Navy's budget estimate.
Admiral Richardson. I have.
Mr. I^EFE. I think in your testimony yesterday you stated that you
made an effort to see the chairman of that subcommittee upon one of
your visits here. jv . ,
Admiral Richardson. I did. I saw one and made an effort to see
the other.
Mr. Keefe. The former Senator from Nevada, I believe.
Admiral Richardson. I saw the then chairman of the Senate sub-
committee, the present Secretary of State. I endeavored to see Gov-
ernor Scrugham, who was at that time a Congressman and chairman
of the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the House.
Mr. Keefe. Now, as a matter of fact, Admiral, when the Navy pre-
pares its request in the first instance for each fiscal year it makes up
the request which is submitted to tlie President's Bureau of the Budget
first, isn't that true? .
[87i'] Admiral Richardson. The preliminary estimate made by
the Navy bureaus and officers of the Navy Department are submitted
to the budget officer of the Navy Department.
Mr. Keefe. I understand that. That is the first step.
Admiral Richardson. And he himself, with the approval of the
Secretary, frequently reduces the estimates, in the hope that his action
will preclude more drastic action by the Bureau of the Budget.'
Mr. Keefe. In any event, following that the procedure is that the
request from the Navy goes then to the Bureau of the Budget? .
338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Richardsox. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And you make a presentation to the Bureau of the
Budget?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. On the Navy's request.
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. E^EEFE. After the individual departments of the Navy have
submitted their request to the budget officer of the Navy he finally
prepares the presentation for the Bureau of the Budget ?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Then when the Bureau of the Budget finally acts, that
budget is then submitted by the President to the [875] Con-
gress ?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. In his annual budget message. That is true, is it not?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
[S76] Mr. Keefe. And during the course of the year there may
be supplementary estimates submitted?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. By the Bureau of the Budget to the Congress?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Now, when you come before the Congressional com-
mittee to present the request, do you have instructions to defend and
present the budget as submitted by the President ?
Admiral Richardson. If my memory serves me correctly, an act
of Congress provides that, as a representative of the Navy Depart-
ment, I would be subject to imprisonment if I asked for funds in
excess of those set up in the budget.
Mr. Keefe. So that, as a matter of law, and as a matter of practice,
the executive officers coming before a Congressional committee to
present a budget support the President's Budget as submitted to
the Congress ?
Admiral Richardson. In accordance with an act of Congress.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, have you ever examined the complete sub-
mission of estimates by the Navy Department to the Bureau of the
Budget?
Admiral Richardson. For what year ?
Mr. KJEEFE. In the fiscal years, say, 1934r-41.
[877] Admiral Richardson. I certainly did, in 1934—35, because
I was the budget officer of the Navy, but that is the only time.
The Chairman. The Chair might suggest that those budget esti-
mates are matters of record which could be obtained from the Depart-
ment and from the budget messages of the President and the Appro-
priations Committee. The Chair doubts whether the admiral could
remember all of them.
Admiral Richardson. I could not.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I have before me, Mr. Chairman, and may I say.
Admiral, figures submitted to me by the Navy Department showing
in each fiscal year the appropriations requested by the Navy Depart-
ment, the budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Con-
gress and the amounts in each fiscal year made aA^ailable by the
Congi'ess.
Now, I assume, of course, that you have no familiarity with those
figures except perhaps the estimates which you examined when you
were budget officer for the Navy.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 339
Admiral Eichardson. That is correct.
The Chaieman. Is that all, Congressman ?
Mr. Keefe. That is all at this time.
The Chairman. Does counsel wish to ask further questions?
Mr. Mitchell. I have one question of the admiral.
Admiral, you testified that following the letter from [878]
Admiral Stark to you of November 22, suggesting you examine mto
the question of security of the fleet in port against a possible an-
raid, and your reply of November 28, when you got back to Pearl Har-
bor, you made that inquiry ?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr, Mitchell. That is the one you described ?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Which led up to the Bloch report and the Knox-
Stimson letter. Had you made any study of the proposition before?
Admiral Richardson. I had not.
Mr. Mitchell. In your memorandum of September 12 to Secretary
Knox in which you listed the objections that you had to basing the fleet
at Pearl Harbor there was no reference there or statement about peril
to the fleet in part, was there ?
Admiral Richardson. That consideration had not arisen in my
mind.
Mr, Mitchell. So it was in your representations about basing, or
your objections about basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor which you had
'in that document and which you presented to other officials of the
Government, including the President, you had not included any point
of that kind in there ?
Admiral Richardson. Not air raids; not protection against air
raids.
[879] Mr. Mitchell. That is the only question I have.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions by the committee ?
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request.
The Chairman. Is it a request of the admiral ?
Mr. Gearhart. A request of the counsel. I would like to have the
log of the U. S. S. Wrif/ht, the war vessel that I think was a part of
Admiral Halsey's task force, the log from the 25th of November on to
the fatal day of December 7.
Mr. Mitchell. If we can get it, it will be made available.^
Mr. Gearhart. Likewise if there is a log available of the cruiser
Helena, which I understand was in the harbor and went through the
attack.-
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask the
admiral one concluding question, and that is, if he has anything now
that he wants to "volunteer to the committee, rather than a direct
question, relative to this issue that he believes to be relevant.
The Chairman. The Chair was about to ask the admiral about the
same thing. If the members of the committee are through with their
questions, and I assume that they are. Admiral, if you have any further
statement that you wish to make, the committee will be glad to re-
ceive it.
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this oppor-
tunity to state that I never bore any resentment toward f^^^l
'■ Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 125.
- Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 163.
340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
President Koosevelt because of my detachment from command of the
United States Fleet.
He was tlie constitutional Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy. I was one of his senior subordinates; there was a difference of
opinion; each of us frankly expressed his views; neither could induce
the other to change his opinion; I was relieved of command of the
Fleet. Had I been constitutional Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy, I would have taken the same action.
Because of this conviction, on January 28, 1941, 4 days before I was
relieved of command of the Fleet with orders to proceed to Washing-
ton for duty, I sent to the Chief of Naval Operations by an officer, the
following oral message :
The day I was made commander in chief I realized then and thereafter that
the same power which made me commander in chief could unmake me at; any
time. When I arrive in Washington I shall keep my lips sealed and my eyes
in the boat and put my weight on the oar in any duty assigned.
Living up to this resolution has resulted in the circulation of many
rumors which bear little relation to fact.
I hope my testimony given here has clarified the situation to some
extent.
The Chairman. On behalf of the committee. Admiral, the Chair
wishes to thank you for your frank and forthright [SSI] testi-
mony and to say that the Chair feels sure that every member of the
committee has undoubted respect for your ability, your opinion, and
yoyr patriotism, in the diligence with which you have sought to
follow your duty before the committee, as well as while you have been
in the Navy of the United States.
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, sir.
(The witness was excused.)
The Chairman. Now counsel may proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Leahy has been waiting
quite a while. His engagement has been quite severe. I wonder if
you could not call him right now? The committee can sit a few
minutes longer.
The Chairman. If it is agreeable to the committee. Admiral Leahy
has been waiting here a couple of days, and counsel desires to call
Admiral Leahy now.
Senator Breavster. Mr. Chairman, I do not know, of course, the
scope of Admiral Leahy's testimony, but I think, in view of the posi-
tion which he held as Chief of Naval Operations during the period
covered today by something contained in Admiral Richardson's tes-
timony, and in view of the importance and magnitude of the issues,
any suggestion of disposing of him in any brief fashion is unjust to
his position, his prestige, and the importance of the issues with which
he was necessarily concerned. I am sure his testimony is worth at
least an afternoon's session.
[8S2] The Chairman. The Chair is not advised as to what par-
ticular point counsel wishes to call Admiral Leahy on now. Admiral
Leahy is on the list of witnesses, I imagine, to testify in a compre-
hensive way. The Chair does not know whether counsel wishes to
interrogate him with respect to this luncheon about which Admiral
Richardson testified.
Mr. Mitchell. Under the circumstances, I think it would be useless
to try to finish his examination before lunch.
l>ROCt:EDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 341
Admiral Leahy, I believe, retired from the Navy in 1939. He was
Governor of Puerto Rico in 1940, and he went to Vichy in the fall of
1940, and he was not serving in the Navy in 1940 and 1941. When I
arranged to call him, I did not suppose he had contacted the Navy
during those 2 years, and it would make his testimony on other matters
particularly wanting, although as an expert witness he might testify
to anything.
I had proposed to ask him as to his attendance at that luncheon at the
White House. I felt if any witness is called to testify to a conversa-
tion with the deceased President, every other person who was present
in the room should properly be called too. That was the reason I
called Admiral Leahy, and his description in that regard would be very
short.
[88S] It is up to the committee to say how much they want to go
into expert matters with him. If they say that they will, then let us
call Admiral Leahy back at 2 o'clock.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I think it is evident from the
scope of Admiral Richardson's examination that the preparedness of
the Navy and of the United States defense forces during the decade
preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor is one of the relevant matters
about which, of course. Governor Leahy speaks with considerable
authority as Chief of Naval Operations for 4 years. How far that may
be gone into I do not know, but I do think it deserves some time.
The Chairman. It is obvious to the Chair that we cannot conclude
with Admiral Leahy, and therefore this committee will recess until 2
o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12: 05 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m.,
of the same day.)
[884-] AFTERNOON SESSION
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Counsel, will
you call the next witness ?
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Leahy.
The Chairman. Admiral Leahy, will you come around and be
sworn ?
(The witness was sworn by the Chairman.)
TESTIMONY OF ELEET ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY, UNITED
STATES NAVY
The Chairman. You ma}^ be seated there, Admiral. You may
proceed, counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, your rank is that of admiral of the fleet?
Admiral Leahy. Fleet admiral.
Mr. Mitchell. Fleet admiral?
Admiral Leahy. Fleet admiral. United States Navy.
The Chairman. Admiral, will you talk into that microphone? The
acoustics in this building are not excellent and Ave have to do that
in order to be heard.
. Mr. Mitchell. How long have you served in the Navy ?
Admiral Leahy. 1 entered the Navy as a midshipman in 1893 and I
have served continuously since except for appi-oxirnately 2 years, from
1939 to 1942, duiing Avhich time 1 was part time (lovernoi- of Puerto
Rico and the rest of the time Ambassador to France,
342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. You were Governor of Puerto Rico during [886]
all of the year 1940 up to December?
Admiral Leahy. I went to Puerto Rico as Governor in the fall of
V.y.VJ and left there in November, about the end of November 1940.
jVfr. Mitchell. And then you went to Vichy and how long were you
there as our Ambassador?
Admiral Leahy. I went to France as ambassador, arriving in
France on January 2, 1941, and I left about the end of April 1942.
Mr, Mitchell. You were Chief of Naval Operations at one time,
Admiral. What was that period ?
Admiral Leahy. I was Chief of Naval Operations from January 2,
1937, mitil August 1, 1939.
Mr. Mitchell. What is your present duty? What duties are you
now performing as Fleet admiral?
Admiral Leahy. I am at present assigned to duty as Chief of Staff
to the Commander in Chief of the Army and NaA^y of the United
States.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you in Washington in October 1940?
Admiral Leahy. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you present at the White House at a lunch-
eon on or about October 8 of that year at which Admiral Richardson
was present?
Admiral Leahy. I did have luncheon with the President [886]
on October 8, 1940, and Admiral Richardson was also present at the
luncheon.
Mr, Mitchell. AVill you state in your own way just what occurred at
that luncheon ?
Admiral Leahy. I was at that time in Washington on duty con-
nected with the Government of Puerto Rico and the President asked
me to have luncheon with him on October 8, I found after I arrived
that Admiral Richardson was also to be at lunch.
Many matters were discussed at the luncheon, some in connection
with my affairs in Puerto Rico and some with Admiral Richardson
in regard to the condition of the fleet.
Perhaps it would be best for this inquiry for me to state as well as I
can remember the discussion that took place between Admiral Rich-
ardson and the President in regard to the condition of the fleet. My
memory in that matter is good, principally because I was exceedingly
surprised to learn that the commander in chief of the fleet did not con-
sider the fleet prepared for war and at that time I was apprehensive
in regard to an early war situation in the Pacific, although I was veiy
far from sources of information and I had no late information in
regard to that matter,
I do not remember how the subject Avas brought up but Admiral
Richardson told the President that the fleet in [887] Honolulu
was not ready for war for numerous reasons.
He said the ships did not have their war complements ; that the facil-
ities in Pearl Harbor were not sufficient to keep the ships in a top con-
dition at all times ; that he had not a sufficient number of fuel ships
to make it possible for him to operate the fleet at any distance from
the Hawaiian Islands ; that the personnel of the fleet, the officers and
the crews, did not know why they were in the Hawaiian Islands ; that
apparently nobody expected to be called upon for war duty; that the
families of Ihe men and officei's were in the continental United States
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 343
and they wanted to get home and see their families ; that the recreation
facilities and the means for taking care of his men when they were on
shore in Honolulu were almost nonexistent, at least they were entirely
insufficient and that he felt that if there was a prospect of calling
upon the fleet for war service it could be done much more advantage-
ously in a port on the Pacific Coast of the United States where he could
clear his ships for action, get the additional things that would be
needed and reinforce his peacetime crews.
I think that covers very well all of the conversation that went on
between the President and Admiral Richardson at this luncheon which
I attended with them in the President's office.
[SSS] Mr. Mitchell. Did the President himself say anything
about basing the fleet there that you heard ?
Admiral Leahy. I do not remember that the President made any
comment whatever as to why the fleet was in Pearl Harbor or as to
whether or not it might be required to remain there. He may have
made a remark of that kind but I have no recollection of it.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you leave the White House with Admiral
Richardson ?
Admiral Leahy. We left the White House together and we rode to
where we were going, he to the Navy Department and I to the Interior
Department, either in a car which I had or in his car.
During this short ride I expressed to Admiral Richardson my sur-
prise to find that the fleet was in the condition which he had stated
to the President and I said that I hoped he would manage to correct
as many of the deficiencies as possible w^ithout any delay because I
had been telling the Congress and the people of this country- for some
time that the Xavy was ready for war and I was distressed to find
that it was not.
Mr. Mitchell. At the meeting at the White House did you partici-
pate with Admiral Richardson in discussing the condition of the
fleet? Did you take part in that conversa- [889] tion or were
you a listener ?
Admiral Leahy, Well, I was very generally a listener, I do not
remember having said anything about it although I may have inter-
jected a remark from time to time, I do not remember anything that
1 may have said in regard thereto at the White House,
Mr, Mitchell. The committee may examine.
The Chairman. The Chairman has no questions at this time. Con-
gressman Cooper?
The Vice Chairman. No questions now, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator George?
Senator George, No; I have no questions at this time, Mr, Chair-
man,
The Chairman, Congressman Clark is not present. Senator
Lucas ?
Senator Lucas. I have no questions.
The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, there was some statement made by Admiral
Richardson to the eflPect that the President said something relative to
what we would do in the event that there was an attack on the Philip-
pines. Do you have any recollection of any such conversation?
Admiral Leahy. I have not.
Mr. Murphy. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
[890] The Chairman. Senator Brewster,
344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. Did you hear all of Admiral Kichardson's
testimony ?
Admiral Leahy. I did not, Senator. I only heard very small parts
during the time I was here waiting to be called as a witness.
Senator Brewster. Did you read in the papers the full account of
his statement as to his conversation with the JPresident ?
Admiral Leahy. I did not, sir.
Senator Brewster. He referred not only to the incident which has
been cited as to the Philippines, but also as to the reasons which seemed
to the President sufficient for a fleet to be stationed in Pearl Harbor,
and the effect that it might have on the Japanese. Do you recall any
conversation along that line ?
Admiral Leahy. I have no recollection of any conversation in the
White House that might have a bearing on that question, Senator.
Senator Brewster. Admiral Richardson said he expressed himself
lather strongly to the President as to what he felt about the effect
on a military-minded government, such as the Japanese, of the location
of an inadequately prepared fleet in Pearl Harbor. Do you have any
recollection of anything [^91] of that kind?
Admiral Leahy. No ; I do not remember. Senator, anything that was
said about that in this conversation at the luncheon.
Senator Brewster. Do you recall as to whether Admiral Richardson
queried at all as to the reasons why the fleet was laying at Pearl
Harbor ?
Admiral Leahy. As I remember he stated none of the officers or
men knew why they were in Pearl Harbor, and that he personally felt
that they could accomplish preparations for war service to much better
advantage in a port on the Pacific coast. That is all I remember.
Senator Brewster. You do not recall that the President made any
rejoinder or any remark as to the reasons why he felt the fleet should
be there ?
Admiral Leahy. No ; I do not. Senator.
Senator Brewster. Did you make any memorandum of the conver-
sation at that time?
Admiral Leahy. I did not. I am spealdng entirely from memory.
The only thing that impressed me was the fact that the commander in
chief, in whom I had great confidence, and have always had, reported
officially to the President that the fleet was not prepared for war, and
I thought at that time that a war was a very likely contingency.
Senator Brewster. You referred to the commander in chief.
[892'] Admiral Leahy. I mean the President — the commander
in chief of the fleet.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Leahy. Admiral Richardson.
Senator Brewster. Admiral Richardson had served under you as
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for a period ?
Admiral Leahy. That is correct, and I, of course, have served with
him in other places in the fleet at various times.
Senator Brewster. You would have considerable confidence in his
recollection of events ?
Admiral Leahy. Well. I would have complete confidence in Ad-
miral Richardson, but whether or not he remembers the conversa-
tion, I could not say.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 345
[893] Senator Brewster. He apparently was rather positive
and rather careful in his statement as to the matters to which he had
given considerable thought, and he had written out the purpose of his
conversation, so his testimony was affirmative, that "I do recall this
as the conversation." Your evidence is apparently of a negative char-
acter, as to not recalling certain items of this testimony, is that
correct?
Admiral Leahy. That is correct, sir. I cannot say the conversa-
tions did not take place, but I do not remember them.
Senator Brewster. You would not have any question if Admiral
Richardson said he recalled it that he did recall it ?
Admiral Leahy. I have no doubt whatever he would be correct.
He may have made notes following the conversation or he may not.
Senator Brewster. In any event it was true that the particular
inatter in discussion was one with which he was very vitally concerned,
was it not ?
Admiral Leahy. He was very serious in his statement to the Pres-
ident, so much so as to definitely make an impression on me so that I
have not forgotten what he said about the fleet.
Senator Brewster. He had come there and he rather definitely in-
dicated that he wanted to find out what the reasons were, or at any
rate, he posed questions which were calculated [S94] to elicit
that information ?
Admiral Leahy. That I do not know, Senator, but I presume so.
Senator Brewster. From his statement that he and the officers of
his fleet did not know the reason why they were there you apparently
implied that he was in Washington to find out if he could?
Admiral Leahy. Well, he made that statement. What his purpose
was, of course, I could not say.
Senator Brewster. As far as you were concerned, it was not a matter
with which you were at that time officially concerned ?
Admiral Leahy. No ; I had nothing whatever to do with it at that
time. Senator, because I had separated myself from the Navy Depart-
ment and I had very little information. Perhaps that accounts for my
surprise.
Senator Brewster. Your presence was in that respect that of a
casual bystander, as far as official relations were concerned ?
Admiral Leahy. That is correct. I think I just happened to be in-
vited to luncheon at the same time that Admiral Richardson was. 1
usually lunched with the President once or twice when I came to
Washington.
Senator Brewster. And there were some Puerto Rican matters
[895] discussed at the luncheon, and he apparently was killing two
birds with one stone ?
Admiral Leahy. We discussed some of the problems before the
Puerto Rican Government at that luncheon.
Senator Brewster. You naturally were interested in the naval
aspects of the matter, as one who had been so long actively associated
with the service?
Admiral Leahy. I was very much interested in it, Senator.
Senator Brewster. And you had been for 4 years Chief of Naval
Operations ?
Admiral Leahy. No; about 214 years, Senator.
Senator Brewster. What period did that cover?
346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Leahy. It was from January 2, 1937, to August 1, 1939.
Senator Bkeavster. And during that period you were the naval of-
ficer primarily responsible for the preparation of our naval defense ?
Admiral Leahy. That is correct, sir.
Senator Brewster. And the development of the fleet ?
Admiral Leahy. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. And were associated with the presentation of
the expansion program of the fleet in the 1938 expansion bill?
Admiral Leahy. That is correct.
[S96] Senator Brewster. Which you submitted before the
Naval Affairs Committee as of that time ?
Admiral Leahy. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. And also the preparation of the budget for the
Navy during that period ?
Admiral Leahy. Yes; I was charged with the preparation, with
I he supervision of the preparation of the budget in the Navy Depart-
ment at that time.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. May I have that time exactly ?
Admiral Leahy. From January 2, 1937, to August 1, 1939.
Senator Brewster. And you heard this morning the outline of the
procedure in the preparation of naval budgets in the discussions be-
tween Congressman Keefe and Admiral Richardson ?
Admiral Leahy. I heard that this morning. Senator.
Senator Brewster. And that was an accurate presentation of the
procedure in the preparation of the budget and submission to the
Congress ?
Admiral Leahy. I think, from what I heard, it is an accurate pre-
sentation of the procedure.
Senator Brewster. The only thing I was not clear about — and per-
haps you may have answered this — was the manner of the Congres-
sional presentation of the question of increased items in the Navy.
I always understood that was a matter of [S97] Executive
order, that the officials in the Navy Department could not testify in
support of items in excess of the Executive budget, and I think
Admiral Richardson spoke of it as a Congressional provision.
Are you familiar with that?
Admiral Leahy. I am unable to answer that, Senator.
I know we were not permitted to introduce items that were in
excess of those that were transmitted^ to Congress by the Budget
Bureau with the President's approval. Whether it is a statutory
provision, or whether it is an Executive order, I am unable to say,
but it is a fact we were not permitted to do it.
Senator Brewster. I am familiar with that fact. I was simply
surprised at that statement. I wanted to clarify it. It was the usual
experience for the Budget Bureau to reduce somewhat your estimate ?
Admiral Leahy. Well, during the time I had the Office of Chief
of Naval Operations, they always reduced our estimates after we
had cut them as much as. we thought we could with sasf ety. They did
it carefully, always, with consultation always, to find out from the
Navy, from me, what damage would be done if they did cut an amount
from the budget, and we always told them, and they said, "We have
only a certain amount of money which can be obtained, and we must
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 347
[S98] divide it amonp; the different departments, so yon will have
to take so much of a cut."
Sometimes they would say, "Where do you want it?"
Then, if they were kincl enough to give us a choice of the lesser
of the evils, we would choose the place where the cut should be made,
if it must be made.
Senator Brewster. Do you recall, admiral, the episode in connec-
tion with the Naval Expansion Program of 1938, the question of the
limitations proposed on naval aircraft to not exceed 3,000?
Admiral Leahy, I would be unable to answer that without looking
at the records. Senator. I remember there was such a limitation,
but beyond that I would not like to make a statement, and probably
it might not be correct.
Senator Brewster. If there were a limitation of 3,000 at that time,
then the later events have demonstrated the wisdom of a very great
increase in naval aircraft that has since occurred ?
Admiral Leahy. That is quite correct, Senator. The Xavy Depart-
ment was quite desirous of a large increase in naval aircraft at that
time. I know at the time I was associated with it, we were extremely
anxious to build up the air arm as much as we could. There was a
limitation in the number of carriers that were available.
[890] Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Leahy. It would not have been worth while to get more
planes than could have been taken on the carriers. Perhaps you
remember well that we were advocating more carriers all the time.
Senator Brewster. Prior to that time, the limitation on naval air-
craft had been whatever was commensurate with a treaty navy, isn't
that correct? That is, there had never been an actual limit at that
time. Is that not correct ?
Admiral Leahy. I do not remember, Senator, that the treaty limita-
tion limited the number of aircraft that we were permitted to have.
Senator Brewster. No; it did not. It simply set forth a number
commensurate with the treaty navy, which might have been am^ num-
ber that the development of the naval art might have made advisasble.
Admiral Leahy. That is correct, sir, and also what we could carry
with the vessels that were permitted to us by the treaty navy.
Senator Brewster. It was after that time that you began to develop
land-based aircraft in the Navy?
Admiral Leahy. No; we had developed land-based aircraft long
before that time. Senator, but in a very limited number. There was
a question as to whether the Navy should have any [900] land-
based aircraft. Finally it was adjudicated with the understanding
that the Navy would have a limited number of land-based aircraft
for the purpose of patrolling about their bases.
Senator Brewster. That was a matter of agreement with the War
Department ?
Admiral Leahy. An agreement between the AVar Department and
a predecessor of mine, as Chief of Naval Operations.
Senator Brewster. Was the custom developed at that time of carry-
ing two or three or four times the number of planes required for the
complement of a carrier?
Admiral Leahy. I do not remember that we had such a policy at
that time, Senator. I doubt it very much. We were having difficulty
348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
getting the planes that we really wanted without getting a multiple of
three in capacity.
Senator Brewster. To refresh your recollection, I have before me
the act of 1938 as presented by you to the committee, which provided
for the authorization of the construction of additional naval airplanes,
the number not exceeding 3,000. That was the increase proposed at
that time. They at the same time imposed a limit. I do not know
whether you recall the circumstances, but on the floor that was amended
by striking out the words so it read "not less than 3,000."
' [901] Admiral Leahy. I remember that, sir.
Senator Brewster. You remember that episode ?
Admiral Leahy. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. So after that you did have the authority for
any number of planes in excess of 3,000, providing you could get the
appropriations ?
Admiral Leahy. I would hazard the guess that the reason for
the limit of 3,000 was a bugetary limit which had been imposed upon
us, but I am not certain. We wanted more than that, I am quite sure,
and we had some friends in the House who arranged it for us.
Senator Brewster. That is all.
'The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Leahy, according to your testimony, when
you left the White House with Admiral Kichardson, you expressed
your surprise over what Admiral Kichardson had said to the President
about the fleet not being ready. You further testified that you were
distressed as you regarded war as "a very likely contingency."
Was anything said by the President at the White House which
caused you to accept that thesis that a war was a very likely con-
tingency ?
Admiral Leahy. I have no recollection of the President saying
anything in regard to that matter, but I had thought [902]
that war was a likely contingency for several years, and I was prac-
tically certain in my own mind that it was going to come at some
time in the reasonably near future.
Mr. Gearhart. Was anything said at that luncheon by Admiral
Kichardson which added to your conviction that war was a very likely
contingency ?
Admiral Leahy. On the contrary, the fact of Kichardson saying
that his fleet was not ready for war should have led me to believe
that many people did not agree with me that war was a contingency —
a likely contingency.
Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, among all Navy and Army
experts, war with Japan had been regarded for many years, perhaps
as long as 30 years, as inevitable, is that not correct ?
Admiral Leahy. Well, I would not like to use the word "inevitable."
It was considered a reasonable probability at some time in the future.
Mr. Gearhart. Army and Navy experts have to keep themselves
informed with respect to the manifested plans of other countries in
respect to expansion, do they not ?
Admiral Leahy. They make every possible effort to get all of the
information that can be obtained in regard to those very questions.
Mr. Gearhart, It was quite apparent to you, and I [903]
presume, to others in a similar position, that Japan's expansion pro-
PROCEEDINGS OB^ JOINT COMMITTEE
i49
gram was bound, in time, to bring her into clash with the interests
of the United States ? ..,-,.
Admiral Leahy. Well it seemed inevitable to me.
I90n Mr. Geariiart. Then, not being airaid ot that word
"inevitable," it really was inevitable to anybody that understood,
even people beyond the exact range of the Army and Navy, that
we were in for trouble with Japan ? i ^ ^i
Admiral Leahy. Of course it is impossible for me to say what other
people thought. I know what I thought myself, and I would think
your statement would be correct.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. ^^ .
Admiral Leahy. But of course what they thougnt I could not say.
Mr Gearh vrt. In other words, you had no reason for believing that
vou alone entertained that opinion, but it was a general opinion-^
" Admiral Leahy. I am quite sure a great many other people enter-
tained that opinion. , .rm •. xt i ^
Mr Gearhart, At the time you were at the White House and at-
tended this luncheon the inevitability of war was becoming more and
more a question of imminency of war in the estimation of people who
were closely watching the events in the Pacific, is that not correct i
Admiral Leahy. I think that is exactly correct, but again I must
say that I cannot tell vou what was in the minds of other people, but
the development in Asia indicated that the difficulty with Japan was
approaching much more rapidly [90S] than it had been m
the past. . ^ , ^ 1111
Mr Gearhart. Now as you got along into 1941 and had become
the Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, vou became informed from day to day, did you
not, of the intercepted messages that were being exchanged between
the Japanese diplomatic and military and naval authorities?
Admiral Leahy. In 1942 I assumed my present office, and subse-
quent to that time I probably received all of the information that was
available to the State, War, and Navy Departments, I probably did.
[906] Mr. Gearhart. Yes. That is, the question is based upon
the assumption that you were there in 1911. What were you doing
there in the year of 1911 ?
Admiral Leahy. I was Ambassador in France.
Mr. Gearhart. While you were in France did you receive any
information in respect to the plans of the Japanese which you trans-
mitted to the White House ?
Admiral Leahy. I received from time to time rumors from my
acquaintances, and so forth, from other countries, as to what their
information was in regard to Japanese activities and I reported
them at once, of course, to the Department of State, under which
I was serving.
I had much information of sharp interest at the time that the Jap-
anese moved into Indochina because they were dealing with the Gov-
ernment of France at that time and the Government of France kept
me fully informed as to their demands and what they proposed to do.
That, of course, was immediately, instantly reported to our Depart-
ment of State.
Mr. Gearhart. It was reported in the pubUc ])rints that the Jap-
anese went into Indochina with the premission of the Vichy Govern-
ment; is that true?
79716 — 46— pt. 1 25
350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Leahy. That is correct ; under pressure from the German
friends of the Japanese.
[907] Mr. Gearhart. Did you ever see any written assurances
from the Japanese Government to the Vichy Government that they,
the Japanese, would withdraw as soon as they had accomplished their
objectives in other spots in the Oi'ient ?
Admiral Leahy. I did not. I was told by Marshall Petain the
details of the agreement with the Japanese. I saw no written com-
munication.
I thought of telling a story but I better not.
Mr. Gearhart. I would be very interested in hearing it, Admiral.
Admiral Leahy. There are too many of my friends in the news
business here.
Mr. Gearhart. The next time I see you at the Army and Navy
Club I will get that story in private.
Admiral Leahy. All right.
Mr. Gearhart. I will ask this concluding question. Admiral.
Did anything occur, or was anything brought to your attention
while you were in Vichy representing the United States to the Vichy
Government, that caused you to feel that a war with Japan had be-
come any less a very likely contingent ?
Admiral Leahy. At the time that the Japanese moved into Indo-
china with the permission of the Government of France I told the
Chief of the Government that that convinced me that we would be
at war with Japan over the Philippines in the near [908]
future.
Mr. Gearhart. And did you advise Washington of that informa-
tion which had come to you leading you to that conviction?
Admiral Leahy. I did.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you, while you were in France, receive any
information w^hich would lead you to believe that there was a danger
of Hawaii coming under attack by the Japanese?
Admiral Leahy. I did not.
Mr. Gearhart. I believe that is all. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Leahy, you were speaking about the
French Vichy Government's agreement with the Japs in their occu-
pation of Indochina. Do you recall whether Marshal Petain, then
acting as head of the Vichy Government, informed you as to what the
agreement provided for in the number of men that the Japs could
put in there under that forced agreement?
Admiral Leahy. He did give me such information. Senator, but I
cannot remember the number. It was a small number of Japanese
that were by agreement to remain in a small part of Indochina.
The French were to be permitted to continue the government of
Indochina and the Japanese were to withdraw as soon as they had
accomplished their purpose, which was to facilitate their movement
to the south. That was related to me [909] by the Marshal.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Leahy. I have no doubt it was true.
Senator Ferguson. Then later did they violate the agreement as
to the number of men they were to send in under the alleged
agreement ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 351
Admiral Leaht. They later sent in more men than they had agreed
to send in and they took more widespread action in seizing control
of the Government than was stated in the original agreement.
Senator Ferguson. Did you, as Ambassador for the United States,
make protest to the Vichy Government that they were doing this,
did you protest that?
Admiral Leahy. No, I did not, because I got my information from
the French Government, It was the only way we could get that
information and they told me about it and expressed their regrets
and I transmitted that to our Government.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I am getting at. They seemed
to be claiming, at least, that they were unable to stop this flow of
Jap troops into Indochina.
Admiral Leaht. They were unable to stop it. It Avas unnecessary
for them to tell me that because I knew that quite well.
Senator Ferguson. And vou notified the State Department
\_910'] here?
Admiral Leahy. That was transmitted to the Department of State
as it came to me.
Senator Ferguson. Did you make more than one protest during
1941, up until Pearl Harbor date?
Admiral Leahy. As I remember it — you are speaking of Indochina
now?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Leahy. As I remember, the only protest
Senator Ferguson. Let me straighten out about the protest. You
notified your own Government, our Government, that they were vio-
lating the agreement and what the French had told you about it ; is
that correct ?
Admiral Leahy. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you get awy information back from
the State Department to take up with the French Government ?
Admiral Leahy. I do not think so, Senator, because I had already
taken it up with the French Government immediately when I got the
information from them.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat did you take up, what was the tenor of
your conversation with tliem^ Did you tell them you thought this
increase would mean war or not ?
Admiral Leahy. No; it was not that, Senator. The tenor of my
conversation with the French Government in regard to [.911]
Indochina was always the same, that the}- should refuse officially and
diplomatically to agree to these things.
Now, I doubt very much if they ever agreed to the increase in the
number of troops that went to Indochina, Japanese troops, but they
knew it, and there wasn't any purpose in disagreeing with it, there
was nothing they could do about it ; it was done by force of arms.
Senator Ferguson. And it was a violation of the original agree-
ment as to the number ?
Admiral Leahy. There is no doubt about that.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, 1 wanted to be a little more
specific than the others have been on what happened at the White
House on the 8th, when you had lunch with the President and Admiral
Richardson.
352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I am going to use the direct quotes from the official record. Admiral
Richardson said:
which I prepared in the quiet of my liorae, where I could thinic and refresh my
memory to a maximum extent possible.
The Chairman said :
You may proceed, Admiral, to do that.
Admiral Richardson.
apparently reading, and was reading, from a memorandum.
I took up the question of returning to the Pacific Coast all of the Fleet except
the Hawaiian detachment.
[91£] Do you know whether or not that was discussed?
Admiral Leahy. I do not remember that it was discussed in that
way. I have already stated, Senator, that Admiral Richardson said
in my hearing that he considered it wise to bring the Fleet back to the
Pacific Coast in order that it could be prepared for war if that was
the purpose.
Senator Ferguson. And that, of course, would include all except the
Hawaiian detachment ?
Admiral Leahy. I would say that Admiral Richardson, having
made these notes on the same day of the conversation, is propably much
more accurate than I am.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Leahy, he does not purport to have
made that memorandum on that day. He made the notes recently.
Admiral Leahy. Oh, recently.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Leahy. Well, stated another way, this was a matter in
which Admiral Richardson was interested in detail. To me it was
only a matter of general interest. And his recollection should be more
accurate than mine.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, he says that he remembers very
little of what you and the President talked about about Puerto Rico,
because that was your problem, about some housing, and you remember
that, do you ?
[91S] Admiral Leahy. I remember that very well.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; because you were directly interested in that
part of the conversation.
Admiral Leahy. But there would be a difference. Senator. I was
also very much interested in the Navy, and perhaps Admiral Richard-
son never heard of Puerto Rico, for all I know.
Senator Ferguson. Well now, I am reading from the official record
Admiral Richardson's language :
The President stated that the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order
to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of Japan.
Are you prepared to say now that that did not take place?
Admiral Leahy. I cannot say that it did not take place. Senator.
I can only say, as I said before, that I do not remember it, but it is
quite likely that that statement was made, because a great many
people, belore I left the Navy Department, had exactly that idea,
that if we would send small forces to various places it would be a
deterrent on the Japanese.
I was in complete disagreement with them always.
[914] Senator Ferguson. You did not agree then with the fact,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 353
the idea, that the fleet being in Hawaii, in the Hawaiian area, would
be a restraining influence on the action of Japan ^
Admiral Leahy. Not if it was unread}^ for battle. Senator, but I
assumed that it had been made ready, and then it would have been
a deterrent and a very useful one.
Senator Fergusox. But you received your first information on
that particular day from Admiral Richardson that it was not ready
for action?
Admiral Leahy. That is correct.
Senator Fergusox. Xow, reading on, and giving you a direct quote
again from Admiral Eichardson's
Mr. MuRPiiY. Will the gentleman cite the page?
Senator Fergusox. Yes. Page 682, "Witness Richardson, questions
by General Mitchell :
I stated that in my opinion the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii might influence
a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which
knew that the Fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no train
of auxiliary ships without which it Cduld not undertake active operations.
Therefore, the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining
influence on Japanese action.
[PiJ] Are you prepared to sa}^ that that was not said at that
meeting ?
Admiral Leahy. I am not prepared to say that it was not said. I
do not remember a statement of that kind.
Senator Fergusox. Do you recall anjthing about the Japanese
being a military government rather than, as it is expressed here, a
civilian political government?
Admiral Leahy. No, sir. Senator ; I do not remember that but that
is the kind of thing I would not remember because I knew that so
thoroughly, so somebody's saying it would make no impression on me.
Senator Fergusox. That was in your mind as an exact fact, that it
was a military government rather than a civilian political govern-
ment ?
Admiral Leahy. That is an exact statement of fact according to
my opinion at that time, and up until the other claj^ wl^en it ceased
being a government.
Senator Fergusox. And that kind of a government, a military
government, is much harder to negotiate with along diplomatic lines
than a civilian political government, isn't it ?
Admiral Leahy. I should think so, unless you have something with
which to negotiate.
Senator Fergusox. You mean by that that unless you have
[916] a military force that you can really use.
Admiral Leahy. Exactly what I mean.
Senator Fergusox. That is exactly what you mean. Now, quoting
Admiral Richardson further from the record, page 683, he further
stated :
I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant
business if a train were assembled and the Fleet returned to the Pacific Coast,
the complements filled, the ships docked and fully supplied with ammunition,
provisions, stores, and fuel and then stripped for war operations.
Now, are you prepared to say that that didn't take place at the
meeting ?
Admiral Leahy. I am not prepared to say that it did not. I doubt
very much if it went that far into detail without its impressing itself
354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
on my memory to some extent, but I should like to say that I am in
complete agreement with the statement.
Senator Ferguson. Now, quoting further Admiral Richardson, and
I have very little more :
The President said, in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that the
presence of the Fleet in the Hawaiian area has had and is now having, a re-
straining influence on the actions of Japan."
[917] Do you recall that, or are you prepared to say that that
did not take place ?
Admiral Leahy. I am not prepared to say that it did not take place,
and I do not recall that statement. I would not be surprised to learn
that it was made, because there was a general impression in this
country that the presence of ships in Honolulu was exercising a
restraining influence on the Japanese.
Senator Ferguson. But from a military viewpoint you differed
with that opinion, knowing, after, at least, after Admiral Richardson,
that it was not prepared ?
Admiral Leahy. I would not say that I was in disagreement with
that line, Senator. I would be in disagreement with the effectiveness
of it, but I would not say it did not exercise a restraining influence.
As a matter of fact, I am inclined to think it did. But it would have
a much more effective restraining influence if it had been prepared
for war.
Senator Ferguson. Then, Admiral, do I understand that you wovild
have anticipated that, if war was coming, that they might attack the
fleet in the harbor at Pearl Harbor if war was coming?
Admiral Leahy. I would have been afraid of that, Senator, because
it was possible — it was a difficult operation for [91S] the Jap-
anese, but it was a possible one, and I would have been afraid of it,
and as a matter of fact, I was always fearful that such a thing might
happen to us, and many other officers were as well.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, you knew the conditions at Pearl
Harbor, the size of Pearl Harbor, and, as the admiral said this morn-
ing, the neces^ty of docking the ships in pairs, and that that did create
a hazard as far as the fleet was concerned?
Admiral Leahy. I was thoroughly familiar with the situation in
Pearl Harbor. I have been there in the fleet myself and I know
exactly what it looks like and how easy it is to hit from the air.
Senator Ferguson. Now, quoting again from page 683, Admiral
Richardson :
I said. "Mr. President, I still do not believe it and I know that our Fleet is
disadvantageously disposed for preparing for our initiating war operations."
Are you prepared to say that that did not take place ?
Admiral Leahy. I am quite prepared to say that I remember that
Admiral Richardson told the President that Honolulu was not a suita-
ble place to prepare the fleet for war service, which is approximately
the same.
Senator Ferguson. Approximately this statement.
[919] Adniiral Leahy. I am only speaking from memory of 3
years ago.
Senator Ferguson. I understand. That is why I am giving the cor-
rect quotes of the admiral.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 355
On page 683, again reading :
The President then said. ''I ran be convinced of the desirability of returniiis:
the battleshii)S to the West Coast if I can be ^jiven a good statement whicli will
convince the American i^eople and the Japanese Government that in bringing the
battleships to the West Coast, we are not stepping backwards."
Are you prepared to say that that did not take phice at that meeting?
Admiral Leahy. I am not prepared to say that it did not take place,
but I do not remember it.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember any conversation about step-
ping backward or taking the fleet out of the Hawaiian area would be a
step backwards?
Admiral Leahy. I have
Senator Ferguson. Or a surrender of something?
Admiral Leahy. I have some kind of recollection, which I cannot
locate at that luncheon, that there was a fear expressed that moving
our ships away from the Hawaiian Islands might be interpreted by
Japan as a withdrawal from our advance into the [9£0] Pa-
cific, but I do not remember where that was, it might have been in the
Navy Department. I do not know whether it was at the talk with
the President.
Senator Ferguson. But it could have been at the President's lunch-
eon?
Admiral Leahy. It could have been.
Senator Ferguson. Because that was a fact as far as you know;
that is, someone had related it, or stood for that proposition ?
Admiral Leahy. There were people in America who had that atti-
tude at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Reading again from page 683 :
Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war.
The sentence before that is :
"This is embarrassing." I didn't quite see how that was in there.
The Chairman. Admiral Richardson made the statement.
Mr. Murphy. That is what the admiral said. I heard him.
Senator Ferguson. It is part of his answer then.
This is embarrassing.
Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war.
Are you prepared to say that that did not take place, [931]
those two sentences, Admiral ?
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. The gentleman has asked the witness about the two
sentences. Certainly you are not asking about "This is embarrassing."
Senator Fj:rguson. Xo; but I had to read that because it is in tlie
record. This is the sentence I wanted an answer on :
Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war.
Are you prepared to say that that did not take place at the luncheon ?
Admiral Leahy. Well, I am inclined to think that that question was
asked but whether it was made in those words or not, I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. That is the substance of what was said ?
Admiral Leahy. I am inclined to think that was made by Admiral
Richardson.
356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGA^TlON PEARL HARBOR ATtACK
Senator Ferguson. What did the President reply?
Admiral Leahy. I do not remember.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I will give you the answer Admiral Kich-
ardson gave, quoting from page 683 :
He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or [922] the Kra
Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they
even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but
that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued
and' the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake
;and we would enter the war.
Are you prepared to say that that did not take place at the meeting ?
Admiral Leahy. I am very much surprised to hear that the Presi-
dent made a statement that he would or would not enter the war under
any conditions, because, of course, I talked the war situation over
with the President many times and at length during the time I was
Chief of Operations, and the President never indicated to me that he
could declare war. That would be a function of other branches of
the Government. He might have said that he would recommend that
we go to war, I am surprised also to hear Richardson's recollection
that the President said he would not go to war if they, if the Japa-
nese, invaded the Philippines.
From my knowledge of the President and my relations with him
in the matter of war for the preceding years I feel quite sure that if
the Japanese had invaded the Philippines, which was then under our
Government, the President would have recommended a declaration of
war.
[92-3] Senator Ferguson. In other words, you had conversa-
tions with the President that brings you now to this answer that if
the Japs had invaded the Philippines he would have recommended
to Congress that we go to war ?
Admiral Leahy. That is my thought from a very intimate knowl-
edge of what the President was thinking about and doing.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Leahy. I cannot believe that he would not have recom-
mended war if the Japanese had invaded our territory.
Mr. Mitchell. May I interrupt for a minute ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I think the witness misunderstood the quotation.
Admiral Eichardson said the President said we will not go to war over
the Kra Peninsula or Thailand. I think the Admiral here today
understood you to ssij "he" would not go to war.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I will read it again.
Admiral Leahy. That is quite all right, then. I have no disagree-
ment. He meant the United States.
Mr. Murphy. So there is no mistake, Mr. Chairman, would it be
permissible to have the stenographer read back the exact words of
the Senator from Michigan.
Senator Ferguson. Does General Mitchell think that I said "he"?
[924-1 Mr. Mitchell. No. I say the Admiral here misunder-
stood.
Admiral Leahy. I misunderstood. I thought you said '"he", the
President.
Senator Ferguson. No. I will read the language again.
Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war. He replied
that if the .Lipanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch Bast
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 357
Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines
he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid
making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations
expanded, sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the
war.
Now, do you understand the quotation ?
Admiral Leahy. I understand it now.
Senator Ferguson. Are you prepared to say that that did not take
place ?
Admiral Leahy. I cannot say that it did not take place or that it
did. I think it is not in discord with the President's ideas, as I under-
stood them, at that time.
Senator Ferguson. That would be in accord with what the Presi-
dent had been thinking as far as he had expressed himself on other
occasions to you, at least?
Admiral Leahy. It would not have been in disaccord, Senator. I
should think it would have been in accord with his [925]
thoughts.
Senator Ferguson. Thank j-ou. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question ?
The Chairman. Well, let the Chair go down the line first.
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Admiral Leahy, in view of the cross-examination of
Senator Brewster, I think it is perhaps proper to place in the record
at this time specific facts with respect to the budget estimates for
appropriations, the amounts requested by the Navy Department and
the appropriations actually made by the Congress.
Now, I have before me, secured as a result of my request of the
Navy Department, a statement prepared by the Navy Department,
signed by E. G. Allen, Bear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Director of Budget
and Reports, which is dated November 14, 1945. It appears that
these reports cover the period covering the fiscal years 1932 to 1941,
inclusive.
The annual appropriation act of the fiscal year 1932, Admiral,
shows that appropriations were requested by the Navy Department
in the sum of $354,809,746.
That request was submitted to the Congress by the President in his
annual budget in the sum of $347,794,248.
The Congress appropriated in that year $358,262,123, plus [926]
contract authority of $7,700,000.
Now, Admiral, do you understand that contract authority is a
vehicle adopted by the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and
the House which authorizes the Department to which contract authority
is granted the authority to go ahead and carry out plans requested even
though the money is not then made imm.ediately available ; do you so
understand that ?
Admiral Leahy. That is my understanding of it, Mr. Keefe. Of
course, that was a matter for legislative, legal decision, but that is my
understanding.
Mr. I^efe. Well, I think, if I may state, as a member of the Appro-
priations Committee of the House, that that has been my understand-
ing of it, while the money itself is not made immediately available
contract authority is granted to the agency so that expenditures may,
358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
or contracts for expenditures may, be incurred and the appropriation
subsequently made to cover it.
Admiral Leahy, It is practically a promise for a future appropria-
tion to cover that authority.
Mr. Keefe. That is ri<rht, generally speaking. I understood Ad-
miral Eichardson to say that, in the preparation of the Navy budgets,
they always anticipated that there would be some cuts by the Bureau
of the Budget and the Congress, perhaps. Did you so understand that
when you were in charge ?
[9B7] Admiral Leahy. I have often heard that statement made,
Mr. Keefe. When I was charged with supervision of the budget prep-
arations I endeavored to cut our requests for money to the lowest point
that was consistent with the preparations of the Navy.
Mr. Keefe. Now, for the fiscal year 1933, the annual appropriation
act, the Navy Department requested of the Bureau of the Budget
$399,139,886.
In that same year they had supplemental and deficiency appropria-
tion requests amounting to $10,000,000; or a total in the fiscal year
1933 of $409,139,886.
For similar items for the regular annual appropriation plus the
supplemental, the budget submitted to the Congress by the President
called for an appropriation in the fiscal year 1933 of $351,677,450.
The Congress actually appropriated for that fiscal year $327,583,591,
plus $5,715,000 contract authority.
In the annual appropriation for the fiscal year 1934 you requested —
rather, the Navy Department requested $352,717,786.
The President's budget submitted to the Congress requested
$308,669,562.
Congress gave to the Navy in response to the President's budgetary
request $308,669,562, plus $8,100,000 of contract authority,
[928] In the annual appropriation act of 1935 the Navy re-
quested during the fiscal year 1945, $335,410,918.
The President's Budget cut that amount to $303,407,649.
The Congress gave in response to the President's Budget estimate
$301,734,056, plus $2,800,000 of contract authority.
In 1936 the Navy requested in its annual appropriation act and
in supplemental and deficiency acts during the fiscal year 1936 a total
of $526,787,542.
The President's Budget submitted to the Congress was $509,375,572.
The Congress appropriated $482,600,230, plus $6,590,000 of con-
tract authority.
In 1937 the annual appropriation requested plus supplemental and
deficiency appropriation acts for that fiscal year, was $586,932,284.
The President's Budget cut that amount to $551,512,599.
The Congress appropriated $528,467,832, plus $13,000,000 of con-
tract authority.
In 1938 the annual appropriation act, plus the supplemental and
deficiency appropriation acts, for the fiscal year 1938, amounted to
$599,035,223.
The President's Budget reduced that amount to $567,191,709.
Congress appropriated $519,139,808, plus $15,000,000 of contract
authority.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 359
[9'29] In the fiscal year 1939 the annual appropriation requested
by the Navy plus the supplemental and deficiencv request amounted to
$719,380,009.
The President's Budget cut that request to $650,246,411.
The Congress appropriated $623,526,194, plus $15,000,000 of con-
tract authority.
In 1940 the annual appropriation and supplemental and deficiency
appropriations requested by the Navy amounted to $1,077,377,889.
Tlie President's Budget cut that budget request of the Navy to
$976,430,769.
Congress appropriated $943,375,249, plus $22,450,000 contract au-
thority.
[930] In 1941, the fiscal year 1941, the requests of the Navy, an-
nual appropriation and supplemental and deficiency appropriation re-
quests amounted to $5,236,629,902. The President s Budget cut those
requests as submitted to the Congress to $3,561,405,919. The Congress
appropriated for the fiscal year 1941 $3,549,383,345, plus $946,098,112
of contract authority.
Now, I have totaled, Admiral, the figures beginning with the fiscal
year 1934 from this statement prepared by the Navy Department and
the total asked by the Navy Department for the fiscal years 1934 to
1941, inclusive, amounts to $9,434,271,533. The amounts submitted
to the Congress in response to those requests by the President in his
annual Budget and supplemental Budget estimates was $7,428,240,190.
The Congress appropriated in the same period $7,256,896,276 plus
$1,029,038,112, or a total of $8,285,934,388.
The estimates indicate that in the period from the fiscal year 1934
to 1941 inclusive, the Budget cut the Navy's requests for appropria-
tions $2,006,031,343 and the Congress exceeded the Budget estimates
in making appropriations and contract authorizations in the same
period $857,694,198.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield ?
Mr. Keefe. I yield.
[9S1] Mr. Murphy. I am just wondering if the gentleman is
going to have the witness swear to the testimony. It seems to me if
it is relevant, and I believe it is, that there ought to be some way to
bring it out so that it might be thoroughly examined. Certainly, we
do not want to examine the gentleman from Wisconsin. If it is rele-
vant and important I am wondering if this is the way to approach it.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I have the figures right here and they
have been submitted to counsel also, may I say, and I think counsel
has the figures and the figures which I am quoting are accurately those
which have been submitted by the Navy Department. Is that not true ?
Mr. Mitchell. I assume 3'ou have got a document directed from
the Navy as to the Navy budget.
Mr. Keefe. I have no objection to submitting the letter from the
Navy Department and other figures which I have before me.
The Chairman. The Chair does not raise any question as to the
accuracy of the figures. The regular way in which it should be pre-
sented, however, would be to present an official copy of the naval bud-
get and the President's budget and the appropriation acts of Congress
for these various years, which would be official documents.
360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I say that that can be [93^]
done. That would require a tremendous amount of work because of
the tremendous number of supplemental estimates that were submitted
during many of these years. I have before me not only the estimates
submitted by the Navy Department but I also have those from the Bu-
reau of the Budget itself.
The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask the Congressman
this question: In your total tabulation of the amount asked by the
Navy for the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, that includes only
appropriations. Does thati include any authority or any contract
authority, or is that the dollars- and-cents figure ?
Mr. Keefe. That includes the actual money appropriations, plus
contract authority, and I so designated it.
The Chairman. I don't think the; Congressman understood my
question. In the Budget estimate requests of the Navy, do they re-
quest an appropriation in money or do they add to that, from your
tabulation also the amount thej wish in contract authority?
Mr. Keefe. If I understand you correctly
The Chairman. In other words, does the recommendation of the
Navy include only appropriations asked for in money, or does it in-
clude also contract authority?
Mr. Keefe. The figures which have been submitted to me by the
Navy Department do not include an}^ submission of [933] con-
tract authority or any requests for contract authority.
The Chairman. So that the contract authority, then, is a figure
that was put into the appropriation bills by the Congress itself ?
Mr. Keefe. That is right.
The Chairman. And is not included in the Navy estimate, and not
included in the President's Budget ; is that true ?
Mr. Keefe. That is true.
The Chairman. So that your last figure there which shows that
the Congress for the total period exceeded the requests of tlie Budget
hj some $800,000,000 includes contract authorizations put in the bill
by Congress, which in your last year were more than a billion dol-
lars ; is that correct ?
Mr. Keefe. No; that is not true. The contract authorizations in
the last year, in the fiscal year 1941, was 797 million in round figures.
The Chairman. What would be the total amount of comparative
appropriations for those years
Mr. Keefe. I gave those figures.
The Chairman (continuing). If you eliminated the contract au-
thority which increased in 1941 and 1940 as the situation developed?
[93^] Mr. Keefe. Well, the situation is perfectly clear, Mr.
Chairman, and you are as familiar with that situation as I am and I am
quite well aware of the fact, as a member of the Appropriations Com-
mittee of the House, that very frequently any department such as the
Navy or the Army may ask for a direct appropriation of money and
the House or the Senate, as the case may be, might take the position,
"You cannot spend that money in this fiscal year as money. We will
give you so much money, but we will give you authority to go ahead and
carry on your program and buy the material or the ships or whatever
you want and we will appropriate the money for you when you need
it ;" and that is the vehicle that has been adopted by both the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees. When they give contract
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 361
authority it is as good as an appropriation because it is an authority
to the agency to whom it is extending the power to go ahead and ex-
pend the money.
The Chairman. The Chair is making no question about that policy
but the point that the Chair wanted to clarify was that the excess to
which you referred is made up in part of contract authority as well as
appropriations.
Mr. Keefe. There isn't any question about that at all. The actual
appropriations of money that were made during that period by the
Congress were $7,256,896,276 and the [935] contract authority
extended to them in that same period was $1,029,000,000.
The Chairman. And that contract authority, if carried out to the
full, would be included in a subsequent year's appropriation, in a sub-
sequent fiscal year's appropriation ?
Mr. Keefe. It might be.
The Chairman. In other words, if contracts were entered into ac-
cording to the authority given, naturally the cost of those contracts
would be presented and paid for in the subsequent fiscal year's appro-
priations.
Mr. Keefe. May I say this, Mr. Chairman. The question is the
Navy comes in and says, "We want so many ships, we want so many
airplanes, we want so much ammunition, we want so many guns," and
so on and so forth, "and we have requested an appropriation for that
amount."
Now, when they come before the House or Senate committees that
committee may find that it is all right for them to have the ships that
they asked for or the guns or what not, or the ammunition, but they
won't be able to spend the money in that fiscal year, so they give them
contract authority to go ahead, which is just as good as money, with
the assurances that it will be provided. That is the fact of the
matter.
The Chairman. The Chair is sure that all members of the [OSd]
committee are familiar with the practice and there is nothing in it that
is subject to criticism. It is a practice that Congi'ess indulges in by
o;iving authority to the Navy and the Army and other departments,
if they see fit, to make contracts for things to be supplied m the future.
Mr. Keefe. Yes ; that is right.
The Chairman. But the actual payment for those things comes in
a later period.
Mr. Keefe. That is right, but the Congress has committed itself,
Mr. Chairman. When it gives contract authority it has committed
itself to so much money toward that.
The Chairman. There is no question about that.
Mr. Keefe. Then I am rather surprised the Chairman would raise
that question.
The Chairman. The Chair was trying to differentiate between the
net amount of appropriations and the amount of contract authority,
that is all the Chair was seeking to do.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know whether the
gentleman has finished.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, if the committee has finished with
the Admiral I would like to have him excused. I have kept him here
on a false alarm twice and he is a busy man.
362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. Are there any more questions ?
[937] Mr. Keefe. I would like to ask in view of this colloquy
that has taken place, Admiral Leahy, you have heard the statement
that I have made with respect to the manner in which these appro-
priations have been made in the past at the request of the Navy and
these contract authorizations. You have heard my statement, have
you not ?
Admiral Leahy. I have heard it, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Do you consider that it is substantially correct ?
Admiral Leahy. Of course, with regard to the figures I have no
knowledge. In regard to the procedure, it is quite correct. When I
was in charge of the business of getting money for the Navy we found
it impracticable to spend in a fiscal year all of the money that was
asked for and the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee
would give contract authorization for so much of the business as they
felt should not be financed within that fiscal year.
Mr. Keefe. Well, that contract authority would permit you to let
the contract
Admiral Leahy. That is quite correct,
Mr. KJEEFE (continuing). For the construction of the ships and what
not and go on with your program, as it were ?
Admiral Leahy. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. The program that vou asked for, isn't that [9'3S]
true?
Admiral Leahy. That is true.
Mr. Keefe. Although the actual money that you asked to pay for
that work might not be needed until the next fiscal year ?
Admiral Leahy. It could not be obtained until the next fiscal year
except by deficiency appropriation.
Mr. Keefe. So that when the authority was given you to enter into
these contracts you were in effect assured that you could go ahead
with your program to that extent?
Admiral Leahy. That is correct, Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Keefe, Well, now, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me in order that
there not be any question, that I would like to ask if the counsel, or I
will offer in evidence this document, if there is any question about it,
the report from the Navy at this point as to these appropriations, so
that it may appear in the record. I have read it in the record, if there
is any question about it.
The Chairman. The Chair understood counsel had some document,
too, on that subject. If you are mistaken about it he can clarify it.
Mr. Mitchell. This comparison between department requests,
budget allowances and appropriations was requested from the War and
Navy Departments at the suggestion of Mr. [PSO] Keefe and
I assume it is in just the form he wanted it and the document itself
is undoubtedly sufficiently authenticated to be offered here as an
exhibit.
The only question I have about the figures — I don't suppose it is
any of my business — is whether or not there may not be a duplication,
because where there is a contract authority and in the very next year
the appropriation, the same figures to pay the bills come in and if you
use the authority in one year and the appropriation in another you
might have a duplication.
Now, suppose we check it and you can offer the exhibit that way and
we will find out whether you need any more figures.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 363
jNIr. KEErE. AVell, I haven't any objection to doing that. I personally
understand what you are talking about, but as to the comparison be-
tween ^Yllat the Navy asks and what the budget gives and what the
Congress gives, that is carried forward year from year, year after
year.
Mr. Mitchell. You have the document. I will offer it as Exhibit 12,
as a report from the Navy. Have you the Army figures, too '?
Mr. Keefe. Well, I have those, too. Those little notes on the bottom
of the page are my notes.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Just a moment. If the counsel have the [9^0]
same document or similar documents from the War Department it
might be well to put them in togetlier.
Mr. I^EFE. Well, I have it.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't know that I have it for the Army.
The CHAuniAN. Well, if there is any occasion to check it and see
whether there is any duplication, it can be done and the figures cor-
rected later.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I find that the Army and Navy have not yet
sent us a copy of these documents. This is dated November 14th and
I have not received it, but let us offer it and we can check it later.
Mr. Keefe. Well, here is the one from the War Department right
here. You can see there is the letter and here is the enclosure, except
that penciled memoranda of mine on there, Mr. Mitchell. I did not
know you were going to offer these. I thought you would offer yours.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, we haven't any.
Mr. Keefe. But you may have my copy. Let me have my letters
back. Do you want those? Those are simply the letters of trans-
mittal.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that they go in with
the exhibit.
Mr. Keefe. Yes ; you can put the letters of transmittal right in with
them.
[94J] The Chx\irman. Minus the personal notations.
Mr. Mitchell. In pencil.
The Chairman. In pencil, all right.
Mr. Mitchell. We will offer in evidence as Exhibit 12 the letters
from the Navy Department to Congressman Keefe dated November 14,
1945, together with the enclosure which is a revised statement on naval
estimates and appropriations for the years 1932 to 1941, inclusive,
and a similar letter from the War Department to Mr. Keefe dated
November 7, 1945, and an enclosure detailing the appropriations for
the War Department Military Establishments for the fiscal years 1932
through 1941, inclusive.
Mr. Keefe. Except the penciled memoranda at the bottom.
Mr. Mitchell. It is understood that the penciled notations on these
exhibits are not offered.
The Chairman. All right. Are they marked as Exhibit No. 12 ?
Mr. Mitchell. 12.
The Chairman. Both as Exhibit 12?
Mr. Mitchell. It is one exhibit.
The Chairman. Tluit iroes into the record.
364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. Do I understand that the figures which are on the ex-
hibit which has been offered will be copied in the record ?
[94^] The Chairman. That is my understanding.
Mr. Keefe. Do we so understand it ?
The Chairmax. It will be printed as a part of the hearing at this
point.
Mr. Mitchell. That is right. The reporter will put the schedules
right in his daily transcript, if you like.
The Chairman. Yes. All right.
(The documents referred to, without Mr. Keefe's penciled nota-
tion, were marked "Exhibit No. 12" and follow herewith.)
Address Reply to
Executive Office of the Secretary
Navy Department,
Washimjton 25, D. C, J 4 November 19Jf5.
And Refer to
EXO S : OBR/G-Tn
Hon. Frank B. Keefe,
House of Representatives, Washington, I). C.
My Dear Mr. Keefe: I am enclosing a revised statement on naval estimates
and appropriations for the years 1932 to 1941 inclusive to be siibstituted for the
one enclosed with the Secretary of the Navy's letter sent you on yesterday.
This revised statement was prepared after collaboration between this office and
the Bureau of the Budget in studying [dJfSI the records of the years in
question, and the figures appearing thereon will agree with those furnished
you by the Bureau of the Budget. While the records concerning the regular
Naval Appropriation Bills for each year were complete, information concerning
deficiency and supplemental estimates i-equested by the Navy Department vi^as
lacking in many cases and required extended search through the files for the
years in question.
Sincerely yours,
E. G. Allen.
Rear Admiral, U. 8. Navy,
Director of Budget and Reports.
(Enclosure.)
[94^] Appropriatio^is, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive
Appropriations
requested by
tbe Navy De-
partment
Budget esti-
mate of appro-
priations sub-
mitted to the
Congress
Amounts made available by
the Congress
Appropriation?
Contract
authority
1932
Annual appropriation act
$354, 809, 746
0
$347, 794, 248
0
$358, 262, 123
0
$7, 700, 000
Suppemental and deficiency appropria-
0
Total
354, 809, 746
347, 794, 248
358, 262, 123
7, 700, 000
1933
Annual appropriation act - . .
Supplemental and deficiency appropria-
399, 139, 886
10,000,000
341, 677, 450
10, 000, 000
317, 583, 591
10, 000, 000
5, 715, 000
0
Total- -.-
409, 139, 886
351, 677, 450
327, 583, 591
5, 715, 000
1934
352, 717, 786
0
308, 669, 562
0
308, 669, 562
0
8, 100, 000
Supplemental" and deficiency appropria-
tion acts - .
0
Total'
352, 717. 786
308, 669, 562
308,669,562
8,100,000
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
365
Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to ISJfl, inclusive — Continued
Appropriations
requested by
the Navy De-
partment
Budget esti-
mate of appro-
priations sub-
mitted to the
Congress
Amounts made available by
the Congress
Fiscal year
Appropriations
Contract
authority
1935
$318, 324, 414
17,086,504
$286, 332, 392
17, 075, 257
$284, 658, 799
17,075,257
.$2,800,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropria-
0
Total --
335, 410, 918
303, 407, 649
.301,734,056
2,800,000
1936
502, 855, 817
23,931,725
485, 443, 847
23, 931, 725
458. 684. 379
23. 915, 851
6, 590, 000
Supplemental and deficiency appropria-
0
Total
526, 787, 542
509, 375, 572
482. 600, 230
6, 590, 000
[9^6] 1937
585, 010, 984
1,921,300
549,591,299
1,921,300
526, 546, 532
1,921,300
13,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropria-
0
Total
586, 932, 284
551,512,599
528, 467, 832
13,000,000
1938
Annual appropriation act .
594, 269, 223
4, 766, 000
562, 425, 709
4, 766, 000
516, 258, 808
2,881,000
15,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropria-
0
Total
599, 035, 223
567,191,709
519, 139, 808
15,000,000
1939
Annual appropriation act
629,665,104
89, 714, 905
564,406,461
85,839.950
546, 866, 494
76,659,700
15,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropria-
0
Total
719,380,009
650,246,411
623, 526, 194
15,000,000
1940
788, 775, 549
288, 602, 340
790, 342, 453
186, 088, 316
773,049,151
170,326,098
20, 000, 000
Supplemental and deficiency appropria-
tion acts .. .-
2,450,000
Total
1, 077, 377, 889
976, 430, 769
943, 375, 249
22,450,000
1941
Annnnl apprnpriatinn ac>t
1, 384, 44?, 202
3, 852, 187, 700
1,337,311,577
2, 224, 094, 342
1, 274, 171, 138
2, 275, 212, 207
148, 741, 612
Supplemental and deficiency appropria-
tion acts
797,356,500
Total
5, 236, 629, 902
3,561,405,919
3, 549, 383, 345
946, 098, 112
[9^6] War Department,
Washington, Novemhcr 7, 19-'t5.
Honorable Fbank B. Keefe,
House of Representatives, Washington. D. C.
Dear Mr. Keefe: Attached is a statement which contains for the War
Department Military Establishment, data on amounts requested of the Bureau
of the Budget, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and funds and
contract autliorizations made available to the War Department for the fiscal
years 1932 through 1941. These data were requested by you on October 19th
for use as a member of the Pearl Harbor investigating committee.
Insofar as can be determined, there is no copy in the files of the War Depart-
ment, of a speech delivered by the President of the Philippine Islands, Mr.
Quezon, in Manila some time in November 1941.
Sincerely yours,
RoBEaiT P. Patterson,
Secretary of War.
Incl. Stmt.
79716— 46— pt. 1 ^26
366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
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-27
368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[94B] The CHAiRMAisr. Any further questions of Admiral
Leahy ?
Admiral, the Charman would like to ask you just one question.
When you were testifying about the agreement between the Vichy
French Government and the Japanese Government, with respect
to certain troops going into Indochina, did I understand you to say
that that was done under pressure of the Government against the
Vichy French Government?
Aclmiral Leahy. At the time that was brought up to the French
Government Marshal Petain sent for me and told me about it and
told me that the pressure from the German invaders of France in
behalf of the Japanese was so heavy that he could not refuse to allow
the Japanese into Indochina in the small number that they asked
for and under an agreement that they would withdraw when they
had accomplished their purpose.
The Chairman. Do you know whether under the same pressure
later they were unable to prevent other numbers from going in in
violation of the agreement?
Admiral Leahy. I do not see how they could have prevented other
numbers going in, Senator, because they had very few troops in
Indochina and they were outnumbered by the Japanese.
The Chairman. At that time, the Vichy Government was [94^]
pretty generally understood to be under pressure constantly from the
German Government ?
Admiral Leahy. I am sure it was constantly under pressure for
whatever the Germans thought they needed to help them with the
war.
The Chairman. Any further questions, Mr. Counsel?
Mr. Mitchell. None.
The Chairman. "Well, the committee thanks you, Admiral, for
your testimony and for your cooperation, and regrets that you were
held so long before you could go on the stand.
Admiral Leahy. Thank you very much, Senator. I am very
pleased indeed to contribute any little thing I had to thi,s very diffi-
cult investigation you have, and my short detention here was no
trouble whatever, sir.
The Chairman. Anything further now, Mr. Counsel?
Mr. Mitchell. I have some documents that ought to go into the
record at this point.
The Chairman. All right, we will receive them.
Mr. Mitchell. First, I would like to read into the record extracts
from a letter dated January 25, 1941, dated at Pearl Harbor, from
the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet — that was
Admiral Eichardson — to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washing-
ton. It follows along this investigation about the air conditions — the
air defense con- [950] ditions at Pearl Harbor (reading :)
1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one
day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor en route to the
Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return
to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander in
Chief as to the new situation.
2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is
considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans there-
for should take priority over the preparation of plans for Rainbow No. 3. Unless
advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 369
3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander in Chief, alters the
assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major ofEen-
sive effort of the United StatPs is to be ex'-ripd in the Atlantic, rather than in
the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending
a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an
overt act against United States' interests nr territory, our attitude in the i'acitic
will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as
situations present themselves or can be [951] created.
4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline,
as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of
the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are :
(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.
(b) War with Japan is imminent.
(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice.
The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.
(d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific.
(e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any
form — even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by
submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German
or Italian.
(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions
or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel,
are possible.
(g) Local sabotage is possible.
[952] 5. Under the foregoing :assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific
will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be
taken under the tasks will be included.
WAITING ATTITUDE
(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and
in port.
In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the
existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces
and equipment, both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in
detail later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed
below may be more clearly understood.
At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to ac-
complish the above task :
(a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reenforcing Patrol Wing
Two with units from Patrol Wing One.
(b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances
and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as
necessary.
(c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit
planes ; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes.
(d) Augment Army A. A. defenses with A. A. batteries [953] of Fleet
units in Pearl Harbor.
(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.
(3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.
This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of
Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become
available to the Commandant.
• (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) I will omit. They relate to operations
away from Pearl Harbor.
6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks
set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available,
especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reenforcements. If a carrier
is to be included in the Atlantic reenforcement, one of the Lexington class should
be selected, due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however,
definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.
7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular
reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out
that the existing deficiencies in the defense of Oahu and in the Local Defense
Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose [95^] a heavy burden
on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford
refuge and rest for personnel as well as an opportunity for maintenance and
370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet
personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the
wear and tear on both men and material cannot but result in impaired readiness
for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this
readiness of the Fleet are :
(a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of Pearl
Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A. A. guns while in port.
(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of laud-based aircraft, neces-
sitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet
planes for local patrols.
(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District,
necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to this
duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels,
but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable char-
acteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is par-
ticularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore
[9551 patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by
submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.
(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.
8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to
correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that
these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the
training program, and material aid to Great Britain.
9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reenforcements re-
ferred to in paragraph 2103 (a) (5) of W. P. L. 44 (advance copy) be dispatched
as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not embarrass
the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations.
10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Com-
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It
represents his, as well as my own, views.
J. O. Richardson.
Copy to : Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel.
[OSS] The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, do I understand
that is a letter from Admiral Richardson to the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations here in Washington ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right, dated January 25, 1941. It is al-
ready in the volume that the committee has. We are occasionally
pulling out the documents and putting them in the record, so it con-
nects up the story.
Mr. Chairman, I have next, if you want to sit and listen to it tonight,
the defense plans having to do with Pearl Harbor. They cover a
wide field beyond that, and we had prepared extracts from that vol-
ume which has reference particularly to the air defense. It is true,
as one of the members said the other day, this book of extracts of de-
fense plans does not cover a great many operations that go far afield
from Pearl Harbor. We think it ought to be brought into the record
at this point, and I will preface that statement by calling the atten-
tion of the committee to the fact that, as the result of Admiral Stark's
letter of November 22, to Richardson asking him to look into the air
defense system, Richardson went back to Honolulu and did that work
in December.
It resulted in the report which has been read in already. That
inspired the letter from Secretary Knox to Stimson which started in
motion the set of revisions of plans, field [9S7] orders, and so
forth, that dealt with air defense at Pearl Harbor.
We have two purposes in bringing that in :
One is to show the extent to which the possibility of an attack at
Pearl Harbor was in the year 1941, in the minds of people here in
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 371
Washington, and people at Honolulu, and the other purpose is to
show, in as brief form as we can, the respective functions that have
been assigned to the Army and Navy forces in Pearl Harbor in con-
nection with air attack.
The Chairman. This document you have here in your hand, the
document you have referred to, is the one which you want to plfice
in the record?
Mr. Mitchell. I do not want to place it all in. The committee has
it, but there are certain paragraphs of it that I would like to read
into the record.
I would say the original plans are here that cover everything.
General Gerow was War Plans Officer of the General Staff at that
time, and I found out he is the most appropriate witness to explain the
plans to the committee as you may require. With the understanding
he will be here shortly to authenticate these plans and explain them
further, and on the assumption he is going to do so, I propose next
to place in the record at this stage certain extracts that I think bring
out the air-defense plans there as they were [958] worked out
locally and in Washington.
The Chairjvian. If it is agreeable to the committee, we might hear
that now.
Mr. Mitchell. It will take you more than 10 minutes, I am sorry
to say.
The Chairman. We might sit a little longer than that.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that, I think
it might be very well to have the extract of which he speaks, but I
think, also, there should be available, as exhibits, the complete plans.
Wliile the extracts that he presents to the committee relate to the
defense of Pearl Harbor, the functions of the Navy went very much
afield. I think for an accurate appraisal of the relative responsi-
bilities of the Navy and Army, it may be very relevant to know what
the Navy was supposed to do in the event of a war, which might have
a very definite bearing on the appraisal of the whole situation.
Mr. Mitchell. Senator, here is the original material from which
these extracts were obtained. Now, would you like to have these
duplicated in the same way, or do you just want to examine them?
Senator Brewster. Are those the only copies which you have ?
Mr. Mitchell. They have not been asked to reproduce [9-59]
them. It might be possible we could get one or two other copies.
Senator Brewster. I think one copy is all that is necessary as an
exhibit in the case.
Mr. Mitchell. I have them here for that purpose, and I was plan-
ning to have General Gerow offer them generally and tell you what
they are. We have not gone to the trouble and expense of copying
this mass of stuff.
Senator Brewster. Will you find out if they will allow us to keep it ?
Mr. Mitchell. I am keeping it now so you will have access to it,
if you want to borrow it. I planned, as I say, to have the general
authenticate them.
The Chairman. Let us go ahead with the reading of these extracts.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. I will do the best I can.
The Chairman. Would it be feasible, gentlemen, to have these ex-
tracts printed in the record without reading them ?
372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. I do not see why not. If the committee does not
want to hear me read them, 1 will hand these to the reporter, and
ask him to transcribe into the daily transcript the sections I have
marked in pencil, that have particular relation to our air defenses.
The Chairman. Each member of the committee has the [960]
document itself ?
Mr. Mitchell. Exactly.
The Chairman. Each member of the committee has the transcript
daily.
If it is agreeable to the committee to have these extracts printed m
the daily transcript of the record, it would be available to us tomor-
row, as well as the documents from which the extracts were taken.
Mr. Mitchell. I am glad to be relieved.
Senator Lucas. That will give the committee an opportunity to
study these over tomorrow, if they desire, and if they want to ex-
plore further any extract that you have here, it may go into the record.
The Chairman. If there is no objection, that will be done.
(The extracts referred to follow :)
[961] ExTEACTs Feom Joint Abmy and Navt Basic Wab Plan — Orange
(1938)
*******
This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN— ORANGE shall con-
stitute the basis upon which all Army Plans— ORANGE, All Navy Plans—
ORANGE, all Joint Plans— ORANGE, and all supporting allocations for an
ORANGE war shall be formulated and developed.
*******
Tliis plan is applicable to any probable situation between UNITED STATES
and ORANGE which requires action by the armed forces. The character of the
particular situation that may arise cannot be predicated, but in general it may
be assumed that : —
1. There will be a period of strained relations preceding the outbreak of war
with ORANGE, during which period preparatory measures prior to mobiliza-
tion can be taken.
2. Active hostilities against the UNITED STATES by ORANGE will be
precipitated without a formal declaration of war.
3. The superiority of the UNITED STATES naval strength over that of
ORANGE will be adequate to permit operations by the UNITED STATES FLEET
to the westward of OAHU ; and any assistance which may be given to ORANGE
or to the UNITED STAT'ES by other powers will not materially reduce this
superiority.
:!.■******
[962] 2. COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE.
*******
6. HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier.
(1) Boundaries.
The HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier consists of OAHU and such adjacent land
and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU.
*******
(3) Missions.
(a) Joint Mission.
To hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect ship-
ping in the Coastal Zone.
(b) Mission for the Army.
To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile
sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.
(c) Mission for the Navy.
To patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein ; to
support the Armed forces.
*******
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 373
EIXTBACTS FBOM JOINT ASMY AND NAVY BaSIC WaE PlAN — RAINBOW NO. 1 ^
:if * ^! * * * *
HOLD OAHU AS A MAIN OUTLYING NAVAL BASE AND CONTROL AND
PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE COASTAL ZONE.
Joint Decisions:
a. Boundaries:
[963] The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such adjacent
land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu.
6. Category of Defense:
Category D, as defined iu Section III, Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army
and the Navy, 1935."
c. Army Task:
To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile
sympathizers ; to support the Naval forces.
d. Navy Task:
To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein ; to
support the Army Forces.
if * * :^ * * *
f. Joint Plant to be Prepared : Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.
ExTBACTs From Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 '
The Pacific Area
33. Army Tasks.
[964] d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense
Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in
paragraph 47.
*******
35. Nary Tasks.
**-::****
, h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified locali-
ties in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.
* , * * * * * *
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Category D
*******
e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations
shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of para-
graph 9 b.
*******
36A. Hawaiian Coastal frontier.
a. Boundaries.
The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the laud and sea
areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance
of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra
Islands and Kingman Reef.
b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
[965] Navy. — The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is desig-
nated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This oflScer also
commands the assigned Naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint
tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.
' Approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, 14 August 1939,
verbally by the President, 14 October 1939 ; revised by the Joint Board, 10 April 1940.
2 Approved by the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1941, and by the Secretary of War,
2 June 1941.
374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ExTRAcrrs FKOM Wab Department Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5*
30. HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.
, Extent.
a. OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense
of OAHU.
b. Category of Defense: D (as defined Section III, Chapter V, J. A. A. & N.,
1935).
c. Missions.
(1) Joint — Hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval base and control and pro-
tect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
(2) Army — Hold OAHU against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and
against hostile sympathizers. Support Naval forces in the protection of the sea
communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea com-
munications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within
tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.
[566] (3) Navy. — Patrol the Coastal Zone: control and protect shipping
therein ; support the Army.
Extracts From Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1040
*******
BRIEF ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
1. a. Missions.
(1) Joint Mission: To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to con-
trol and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
(2) Mission for the Army: To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air
forces and against hostile sympathizers ; and to support the naval forces.
(3) Mission for the Navy: To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and pro-
tect shipping therein; to support the Army forces (Joint Army and Navy Basic
War Plan — Orange).
6. Category off Coastal Frontier Defense: Category "D" defense, prescribed
by the War Department for this department, assumes the possibility, but not
the probability, of a major attack. Defense measures specified envision the em-
ployment of seacoast, air, and antiaircraft elements, and the use of a general i*e-
serve (Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935)
• • ** * * *.
d. Forms of hostile attacks: The basis of the forms of attack listed below is
the War Department Assignment of Category 1967] "D" to this Depart-
ment.
(1) Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability
are:
(a) Submarine — torpedo and mine.
(a) Sabotage.
(c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air
or surface craft.
(d) Air raids, carrier based.
(e) Surface ship raids.
(/) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet.
***** * *
5. a. Basis for Planning.
(1) Missions and Conditions.
(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions:
The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D (see par. 1 b).
The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the
missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Orange (see par. la).
(6) Possible and Probable War Situations are:
*******
(2) That the most probable form of attack is [968] a surprise attack
consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action
by local sympathizers.
' Approved by the Chief of Staff, 19 August 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 375
b. Conclusion.
To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum
effort. This plan is outlined to the next paragraph.
c. Scheme of defense, command organization, and missions assigned to major
echelons upon initial deployment :
(1) The defense of Oahu combines an air, naval, antiaircraft, seacoast and
beach and land defense, together with the supervision and utilization of civilian
activities and utilities and, under martial law, their control. To effectively
accomplish this defense, particularly vphen its elements must be controlled simul-
taneously, the Department Commander decentralizes his command function by
assignment of definite missions of responsibility to major echelon commanders,
as follows :
(a) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division:
The beach and land defense of Oahu. (For details, see paragraph 6.)
The beach and land defense is based upon the principle of the "position in
readiness", which permits concentration of forces in critical areas and assures
flexibility to meet external and internal attacks.
[965] (b) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Sepan^te Coast Artillery
Brigade:
The antiaircraft and seacoast defense of Oahu and in addition furnishing
the necessary support to the beach and land defense and the naval forces.
( See paragraph 6. )
(c) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force:
In carrying out the air defense, he may conduct independent operations or may
operate in conjunction with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or
temporarily under the direction of the Naval Air Force Commander as provided
in Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and will cooi)erate with all
forces in direct defense of Oahu.
[970] HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941 HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.
11 April 1941
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan — Hawaiian Coastal Frontier
HAWAIIAN department AND FOLTRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
Section 1. — Directives
1. ResponsibiUtj/. — This joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared un-
der the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
2. Basis. — This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAIN-
BOW No. 1, and Section V, pages 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy,
1935, and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war proj-
ects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.
3. Method 'of Coordination'. — The Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have deter-
mined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual co-
operation and that this [97i] method will apply to all activities wherein
the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity
of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy,
1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9&.
4. Planning Representatives. — The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning
(G-3), Headquarters HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the War Plans Officer,
Headquarters FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, are designated as planning
representatives respectively for the Army and Navy Commanders in the
HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. (Par. 40 a, page 61, Joint Action of the
Army and the Navy, 1935).
5. Joint Planning Committee. — A Local Joint Planning Committee is estab-
lished to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT and
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT and such other Army and Navy Officers
as may be appointed by the Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPART-
MENT, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (Section VI,
376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Plannnig
Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in
all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint' Defense Plans, HA-
WAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. The senior member thereof is authorized
to designate such standing or special subcommittees as from time to time may
be necessary.
[972] 13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces
is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of
the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, RAINBOW No. 1.
14. TASKS.
a. Joint Task. — To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control
and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
&. Army Task. — To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces,
and against hostile sympathizers ; to support the naval forces.
c. Nax>y Task. — To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping
therein ; to support the Army forces.
15. FORCES.
a. Army Forces. — The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities
to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as
provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.
&. Naval Forces. — Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District,
augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforce-
ments as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.
c. Overseas Reinforcements.
[97S] (1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the HA-
WAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER will be reinforced at the earliest possible date ;
to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.
*******
17. ARMY.— The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall
provide for :
a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with par-
ticular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present
thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD
BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance
of the KANEOHE area is recognized.
b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.
c. Proctection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands con-
sistent with available forces.
d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the
civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage,
except within naval establishments.
e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within
naval shore establishments.
f. Establishment of an inshore aeri&l patrol of the waters of the OAHU
D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval [^74] Inshore Patrol (see par.
IS. a.), and an aerial observation svstem on outlying islands, and an Aircraft
Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea con-
ducted within range of Army bombers.
h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control
post provided for in paragraph 18. e.
i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated
by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint
instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence.
Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by
"Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940."
j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather,
evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of
activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
I. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over
communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and
the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
[575] *******
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 377
18. 2V^^yY.— The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall
provide for :
a. An inshore patrol.
6. An offshore patrol.
c. An escort force.
d. An attack force.
* * * * * ' * *
i. Distant reconnaissance.
;. Attacking enemy naval forces.
* l|: * * * * *
I. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17i, a local
communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of
intelligence.
tf ^: if tf if if *
n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for
the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.
if if * if * if if
(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the
defense of OAHU, all work possible under current appropriations will be done
to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.
if * if * if if *
21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain [976] effective
until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole,
or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Depart-
ment. This HCF^l (JCD^2) supersedes HCF-39 (JCD-IB) except that the
Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII,
inclusive, of this plan.
(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. Bloch,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.
(Signed) Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Shobt,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army, Commanding
Hawaiian Department.
[577] HEADQUARTERS
14th NAVAL DISTRICT
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.
Joint Coastal Frontiee Deifense Plan
HAWAIIAN department AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
1939 28 March 1941.
Annex No. VII
Joint Agreements
Section VI — Joint Agreements
JOINT SECURITY, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE.
I. GENERAL.
1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the
fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or
air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobili-
zation for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of
the HCF-39 (14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect
at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their
378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to
incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both
desirable and necessary.
[978] II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS.
2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the
Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District),
agree that the threat of a hostile raid or "attack is sufficiently imminent to war-
rant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are
necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such propor-
tion of the air forces at his disjposal as the circumstances warrant in order
that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans :
a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine
the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due
consideration to the tactical situation exisiting, thhe number of bombardment
airplanes released to Navy control will be tlie maximum practicable. This
force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until
completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army ocntrol.
ft. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will
be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense
Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to pai'ticipate in these missions.
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter
aircraft released to Army control will be [.07.9] the maximum practicable.
This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for
maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical sit-
uation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th
Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.
c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search
operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under
the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.
d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for
the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will
pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.
III. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS
* • * * * * * *
5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will
operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broad-
casts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly
and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS
are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will
in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be trans-
mitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or move- [980]
ments of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy
channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional
Antiaircraft Brigade.
6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be
made for transmission of infonnation on the location of distant hostile and
friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for
the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation
of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations.
Information relating to the pesence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore
from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without
delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.
7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4
above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service
(after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods,
joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other
periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department
and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temi)orary loan of surplus communica-
tion equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint com-
munication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken
by the service receiving the borrowed [9Si] equipment to obtain replace-
ments for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 379
IV. JOINT' ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES.
S. Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft. — During joint exercises, alert
periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Ha-
waiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth
Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu
or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure
Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except
when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during
exercises) or due to an emergency.
^ if Hf ^ * * *
11. Aircraft Warning Service. — The Army will expedite the installation and
placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior
to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR
and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hosf'e
attacks as may be practicable.
m * * * * * *
Approved : 2 April 1941.
[982] (Signed) Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Shout,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding,
Hawaiian Department.
(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. Bloch,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.
[983] Mabch 31, 1941.
Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force,
Commander Patron Wing TWO, Commanding General
Naval Air Station, Hawaiian Air Force,
Pearl Harbor, T. H. Fort Shafter, T. H.
Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air actiiMi in rhe event of sudden
hostile action against Oahu or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.
I. Summary of the Situation.
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain
and varying.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of
war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on
Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific
for a long period.
(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force
which initiates hostile action.
(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding
force might [984] arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from
our intelligence service.
II. Survey of opposing Strengths.
(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or
more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast crui.sers. For
such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be
capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better.
Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armoured and armed with 10-8"
guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000
treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and char-
acteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the
best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from
20 to 30 planes and the large ones about GO. Probably the best assumption is that
carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and
bomber types. Lacking any [985] information as to range and armament
380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types
There probably exist at least 12 eight iuch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast
modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939)
shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this
area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and
would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at
sea in the Hawaiian area.
(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the
above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-
based air force available to us in a constantly varying quantity which is being
periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also
varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of
the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material [986]
readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate
to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive
enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over
Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condi-
tion to support substained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for
long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited
for this work. If present plans are used to bomb well defended ship objectives the
number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view
of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions
of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be
scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for
planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, [987] can perform functions
that accord with their type.
III. Possible enemy action.
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by :
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most
likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach
inside of three hundred miles.
(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more sub-
marines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been
drawn away by the original thrust.
(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a consider-
able undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied
by a carrier.
[988] (e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be
delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that
it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to
start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a
second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have
all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage
that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next
day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would
be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might
be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disad-
vantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no
olfensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete sur-
prise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages
of the above. After hostilities [989] have commenced, a night attack
would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk
attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for
accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks would be coordinated with
any air attack.
IV. Action open to us.
(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to
reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but
can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a
very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken
unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather
narrow time limits.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 381
(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the oper-
ating areas or on the islands :
1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of
hostile surface craft and whether or not more [990] than one group is
present.
2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force
and its dispatch for attack when information is available.
(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:
1. The immediate dispatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to inter-
cept the attackers.
\_991] 2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long
range shore based aircraft.
3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to
their carrier.
(d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addi-
tion to (b) above:
1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to
counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.
2. Dispatch' armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the
attack area.
3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius
from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight
period.
(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is
known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack
develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum
of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, mis-
sions assigned, conditions of readi [992] ness defined and detailed plans
prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all
elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most ef-
fectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will
be required:
1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.
Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with
very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying
conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be
desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordi-
nated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group
commander. ^
V. Decisions.
1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against
OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from
a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated
retaliatory measures.
2. Subsidiary decisions. — In order to be in all 1993] prepared to promptly
execute the above decision :
(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation
plan:
1. Search and Attack Cfroup (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force [Com-
mander Patrol Wing TWO) ).
The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness :
Patrol squadrons.
Shore-based VO-VS units.
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
Army bombardment squadrons.
Army reconnaissance squadrons.
Navy Utility Squadrons.
2. Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force).
The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness :
Army pursuit squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VP squadrons.
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
One division of shore-based carrier [994] VS planes. (Primarily for
trailing aircraft.)
382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows :
[994a] 1. Seach and Attack Group.— Liocate, report and track all hostile
surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships
by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If
choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved
in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.
2. Air Comhat Group. — Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and
report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier tyi^e planes to carrier
and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary
mission support search and attack group upon request.
(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan
when :
(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.
(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack
is probable.
(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.
[99Jth] (d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows :
Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and num-
ber from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition
of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree
of readiness prescribed for that part.
MATERIAL READINESS
A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for
a task.
[99.5] C. Approximately one quarter of all aircraft of each functional type
available and ready for a task.
D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes
of this plan.
DEGBia: OF READINESS
1. For pursuit and VF types — four minutes. Types other than fighters — fifteen
minutes.
2. All types — 30 minutes.
3. All types — one hour.
4. All types — two hours.
5. All types — four hours.
The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readi-
ness are dependent upn the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and
will be prescribed therein.
[996] (e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be
maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior oflicers present of
the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them.
In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 i-e-
quires a pi-eparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for
only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2
require watch and watch for all personnel and pei'sonnel fitness for air action
will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any condition 1, 2, or
3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or
5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.
* * * * ie ^n m
(Signed) F. L. Martin,
F. L. Martin,
Major General, U. S. Army.
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.
(Signed) P. N. L. Bellinger,
P. N. L. Bellinger,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Co^mmander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 383
[997] Standing Operating Pbocedure
hawaiian department
5 Novt:mber 1941.
Section I — General
4c 4c * * H: 4: H!
10. Antiaircraft Defense. — a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every
unit.
it Hf * * * * *
d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:
(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of
hostile aviation.
* * * * *. if ^
(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion
of personnel and matleriel when in bivouac or in position and by increased
speed during movement.
* * * * . * 0 0
Section II — Alerts
13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts
as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Depart-
ment order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15f (8)
below.
14. Alert No. 1. — a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and
uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.
[998] b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special
Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations,
pending further orders.
c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending in-
structions from this Headquarters.
d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:
(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient
to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
(8) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installa-
tions (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned
sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.
****** 0
15. Alert No. 2. — a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than
Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and air-
craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided
b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will
be required to operate on a 24-liour basis. All other sections of the General and
Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.
[999] c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pend-
ing instructions from this Headquarters.
****** 0
(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that
railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.
(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational
control.
*******
f. THE HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE WILL :
(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this
headquarters. See paragraph 17.
(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and ujKtn arrival
thereat, disi)erse on fields. ^
(4) Disperse bombers with crews.
(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
79716 — 46— pt. 1 ^28
384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(8) In case of surprise hostile attack :
(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of
readiness "A." The bomber [1000] commander will report to the Com-
mander of Patrol Wing TWO.
(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes
in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Com-
mand for operational control.
4: I*: 4: * « * *
(i) The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service
and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for imme-
diate employment.
(j) The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:
Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery
(including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warn-
ing Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-
aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include :
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or
HONOLULU HARBORS.
*******
[1001] 16. Alert No. 3-a. This alert requires the occupation of all field posi-
tions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army
installations on outlying islands.
*******
f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will :
(1) Destroy enemy aircraft.
(2) Can-y out bombing missions as directed.
(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.
(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage,
air and ground attacks.
*******
(8) Disperse bombers with crews.
(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
*******
}. T^he INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations
of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine
Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will
provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military
control to include :
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of [1002] Naval ships in
PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.
(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
[1003] Section III — Condition of Readiness foe Aieckaft
17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of
a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs a and 6 below. The letter in-
dicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned
task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed
for that part.
a. MATERIAL READINESS.
A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a
task.
C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of
this plan.
ft. DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS.
All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of
a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 385
1. For pursuit and VF types : Four minutes. Types other tlian fighters : Fifteen
minutes.
[IOO4] 2. All types: 30 minutes.
3. All types : One hour.
4. A4I types : Two hours.
5. All types : Four hours. '
[1005] Operations Ordeks — Hawaiian Department
PABT VI — ^FIELD OKDEE NUMBER 1 NS (NAVAL SECURITY)
FiBiD Orders! Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
No.— Ins—/ Fort Shafer, T. H.
*******
(2) In the current unsettled international situation, it is assumed that it is
possible that a declaration of war upon the United States may be preceded by a
surprise raid or attack upon the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the
Pacific Fleet by hostile aircraft, submarines, or surface ships with a view to the
destruction or damaging of naval installations, ships, and facilities. Such a
raid or attack may be accompanied by acts of sabotage committed by hostile
sympathizers.
ft. The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District, while continuing nor-
mal training and operations, are taking certain security measures, which include :
(1) By the Pacific Fleet :
(a) Daily air patrols of areas in which elements of the Pacific Fleet are
operating.
(b) The organization of a striking force of cruisers and destroyers to
cooperate with Army and Navy aviation in the attack on hostile surface ships.
(c) The organization of a destroyer attack unit [1006] to locate
and destroy hostile submarines.
(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and dis-
tribution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchoreaJ in Pearl Harbor.
(2) By the Naval Base Defense Force (Fourteenth Naval District and attached
units) :
(a) Establishment of an inshore patrol consisting of a destroyer patrol
at the (jntrance to the Pearl Harbor channel, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol,
and daily mine sweeping operations.
(b) The organization of an air striking force consisting of Patrol Wing
TWO, attached Fleet aircraft, and attached aircraft from the 18th Bombard-
ment Wing to search for and attack hostile surface ships.
2. The Hawaiian Department, supported by Naval Units placed under the tacti-
cal control of the Army, will operate to defend OAHU from attacks by hostile
aircraft and hostile naval vessels, will take prevautionary measures to prevent
acts of sabotage by hostile sympathizers, and will support naval forces conducting
aerial attacks on hostile naval vessels.
* « * * « « *
c. The Hawaiian Air Force, in cooperation with fieet aircraft, will defend
OAHU against attacks by aircraft, [lOOl] will attack hostile Naval
vessels, and in furtherance thereof, will conduct operations as follows:
(1) Offensive Action. — Conduct air operations against hostile naval vessels.
Bombardment and reconnaissance aircraft participating in joint air operations
will be placed under the tactical control of the Navy.
*******
(3) Reconnaissance. — Conduct reconnaissance essential to the combat efficiency
of the Air Force and to supplement, where practicable, that of naval air forces
in securing information of hostile fleet movements.
• ' * * * * * *
(5) Conditions of Readiness. — Aircraft and crews thereof will be maintained
in the condition of readiness directed by this headquarters.
(6) Hostile Air Attack. — Air operations directed above will be instituted with-
out further orders from this headquarters by all aircraft maintained in condi-
tion of readiness therefor upon receipt of information of an air attack upon
OAHU or an attack upon fleet units in Hawaiian waters. All other aircraft and
crews thereof will be alerted and this headquarters advised of action taken.
*******
386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(2) Hostile surface ships and aircraft will not be taken under fire except under
the following conditions •
[1008] (a) After hostile offensive action, such as the use of bombs, tor-
pedoes, mines and other ammunition, has been observed.
(b) After receipt of a verified report of a hostile attack.
(c) Upon orders from this headquarters.
* * * * * * *
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT ;
(S) Philip Hayes,
Philip Hayes,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.
[1009] Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A4-3QL/(13)
Serial 01646
United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. "Pennsylvania." Flagship,
Pearl Harhor, T. H., October I4, 194I.
(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by :
(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pear Harbor,
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
(3) a combination of these two.
*******
(2) Air Patrols:
(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force.
• ••**••
(G) DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK:
(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists
of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circum-
ference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center
in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine
Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns
are located both [1010] inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun
positions.
(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor
plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.
(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the
basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hos-
tile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for
ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any
other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.
(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths
so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector
commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is
authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battle-
ships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available
berths permit.
(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph
(G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his
own sector.
(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense
Officer (N. B. D. O.) . As such he shall :
[1011] (a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the
defense against air attack.
(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.
**•**••
Condition I. — General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as pre-
scribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.
Condition II. — One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector
manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense
Officer.
Condition III. — Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of
at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 387
required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base
Defense Officer.
*******
[1013] Mr. Mitchell. We have a study dated August 20, 1941,
five months before this attack made by General Martin of the Air
Corps and Admiral Bellinger of the Naval Corps, which is a most
voluminous document.
I think the committee have had copies of it, and have had it for some
time. I would like to offer that as Exhibit 13.
The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have the body of that report trans-
scribed into the record, except the diagrams. It is only a few pages.
The Chairman. That will be done. The general counsel will mark
the part to be copied so the reporter will understand.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 13" and fol-
lows herewith:)
[1013] Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force,
Office of the Aib Force Commander (T-3),
Hickam Field, T. H., 20 August W,!.
In reply refer to :
Subject : Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.
To : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
Thru: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shatter, T. H.
1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding
General, Army Air Forces, OCS 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff,
dated July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii",
there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the em-
ployment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This
plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called
to the recommendations therein.
2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is neces-
sary to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength to one group. Under
provisions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated Decem-
ber 1, 1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment airplanes will be required
to provide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes.
This force is so small for the mission to be performed that it is considered en-
tirely inadequate.
3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th [101^] Pur-
suit Group has its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit
aviation is considered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all
times the 14th Pursuit Wing at full combat strength of 80 fighters and 105 intei--
ceptors. It is contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mis-
sion in the defense of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft
in the vicinity of or over the island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate
force to i)erform the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands.
4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly
desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility
when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore recommended as a
component part of the Hawaiian Air Force. (See Study No. 2 in attached
plan.)
5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reach-
ing the shores of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is considered necessary
to assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrating
on denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beach heads. The quick and
accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective for
close-in support on the ground forces and this premise is borne out by informa-
tion contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive
bombers would also be employed against hostile surface craft and submarines
[1015] which had penetrated close to the shores of Oahu.
6. With the addition of the force of medium boml)ardment- torpedo airplanes
and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light
bombardment airplanes is required.
7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian
Air Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian
388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Department which is being re-organized into two triangular divisions. The
ground forces of the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three
observation squadrons. At present there is assigned one observation squadron
(C & D) and one light bombardment squadron which could be diverted to ob-
servation duty.
8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined
in this letter and in the attached pMn it is estimated that approximately 3,871
additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180
maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B-17D type airplanes. SuflS-
cient personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat
crews and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional
personnel equal to the difference above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air
Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made
to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive
bomber [1016] squadron, one additional observation squadron and five
air base squadrons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the
Outlying fields tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons
as indicated. The two Air Base Groups (S) are to be used to maintain Bellows
Field and the site selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group.
Barking Sands 2
Morse Field 2
Hilo 1
Lanai 1
Parker Ranch 1
9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied
services will become, in effect, air support command and will be stationed at
Bellows Field.
10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy bombard-
ment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of fourteen men
will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures as a
basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure No. 2.
11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval
of the War Department, housing for 12,288 enlisted men. This study will require
housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated
personnel. [^0/7] This leaves but 525 men to be cared for in a future
project which will be submitted when this study has been approved. For
detailed analysis of housing see Inclosure No. 3.
12. It is my conviction that by increasing the pi-esent strength of the Hawaiian
Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron,
two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and by
increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 airplanes
a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without any assistance
whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action.
F. Li. Mabtin,
Major General, V. S. Army,
CoTrwianding.
3 Incls:
Incl #1 — Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation
in the Defense of Oahu. (In triplicate.)
Incl #2 — Personnel Requirements Recapitulation. (In triplicate.)
Incl #3 — Air Force Housing Facilities. (In triplicate.)
[1018] Plan fob the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the
Defense of Oahu
i. genixal
1. The key to this plan is found in the provision for first, a complete and
thorough search of the Hawaiian area daily during daylight ; secondly, an attack
force available on call to hit a known objective located as a result of the search
and thirdly, if the objective is a carrier, to hit it the day before it could steam
to a position offshore of Oahu where it could launch its planes for an attack.
2. The most difficult problem presents itself when nt is necessary to search
through 360°. This might occur daily and it is the only one considered in this
study. It is possible, of course, that intelligence obtained from advanced naval
bases and ships at sea might implement this plan and reduce the search area
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
389
to 270°, 180° or even 90°. In this case, the striking force would be augmented
by those planes not required for search.
3. All computations in connection with air operations under this plan are based
on the B-lTD airplane. This type of airplane is considered available for either
a search mission or an attack mission and consequently no reference is made to
reconnaissance or bombardment aviation as such but to the search or the attack
forces. The combat crew training of both will be identical and search and
attack missions will [1019] be rotated for the purpose of resting crews
and maintaining aircraft.
n. THE PBOBI^M
1. To analyze the mission of heavy bombardment aviation in the defense of
Oahu with a view to promulgating a plan in accordance therewith.
III. FACTS BEARING ON THE CASE
1. Facts:
a. The Army mission is : "To defend the Naval Base of Oahu."
b. The bombardment mission is :
(1) When Navy reconnaissance is adequate:
To attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action.
(2) When Navy is absent or not present with equipment in Numbers of
Quality:
To search for, attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of
action.
[1020]
G. Capabilities * of B-17D type airplanes are :
Gal Fuel
used
Miles
flown
(1) Search at 45% Power at 5,000' Altitude (No bombs— 2500 gallons fuel):
One hour full throttle operations _
432
272
30
1766
214
Two hour fuel reserve - -
Climb
10
Cruise at 143 knots at 136 gal/hr . ...
1910
2500
2134
Radius of Action in nautical miles .
1067
(2) Search— Attack at 45% at 5,000' (4-600# bombs— 2100 gallons fuel) :
One hour full throttle operation
432
272
30
1366
214
Two hours fuel reserve
Climb- . ..
10
Cruise at 143 knots at 136 gal/hr
1485
2100
1709
Radius of Action in nautical miles . ._
854
]WtOl (3) Attack at 65% Power— Return at 45% Power at 15,000' {4-600# bombs— 2100
gallons fuel):
One hour full throttle operation
432
272
90
687
612
236
Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power
Climb.. :.
27
65% Power— 193 knots at 208 gal/hr
643
45% Power— 150 knots at 136 gal/hr
643
2093
1549
Radius of Action in nautical miles. . .
775
(4) Attack at 65% Power— Return at 45% Power at 15,000' (8-600# bombs— 1700 gal-
lons fuel) :
One hour full throttle operation . . . . ...
432
272
90
485
408
236
Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power
Climb-
27
65% Power— 193 knots at 208 gal/hr
450
45% Power— 150 knots at 136 gal/hr
450
. . .
1687
1163
Radius of Action in nautical miles
1700
581
1 Note.— The capabilities were taken from
tests.
[1022] curves in the B-17D handbook and checked by
390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
d. To perform its missions, tlie Fleet must have freedom of action without
responsibility for the defense of its base.
e. If the solution to a problem is designed to meet the most adverse condi-
tions, any less adverse condition will facilitate the solution.
f. Army Air Force units at present are not charged with the reconnaissance
mission for the defense of Oahu.
g. The combatant force having the longer range weapon has a basic advantage,
other factors being equal.
h. The bombardment airplane is the longest range weapon which the Depart-
ment Commander has at his disposal.
2. Assumptions:
a. The following are the assumed or known maximum capabilities of enemy
equipment :
(1) Some of his carriers can steam at 30 knots for at least 24 hours. (Best
available intelligence indicates ORANGE has three carriers with this per-
formance. )
(2) His carrier bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise
at 180 knots (based on performance data of the U. S. Navy carrier planes
[1023] and no allowance is made for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle
operation and landing).
ft. The following are the assumed probable capabilities of enemy equipment:
(1) His carriers steam at 27 knots for 24 hours. (28 knots is the mean
top speed of his carriers; 1 knot reduction is made for foul bottoms.)
(2) His carrier bombing planes have 400 nautical miles range and cruise
at 180 knots (reduction in range from 600 to 400 nautical miles is made to allow
for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle operation and landing).
Note. — In the discussion that follows it is assumed that hostile carriers
operating under conditions a and ft above once committed to action will steam
straight in to their launching radius. Any maneuvering by the enemy when
within our search area will simplify our problem for it will give the search
force more time in which to locate the enemy.
c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of
hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu
where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an attack on
Oahu.
[1024] d. An enemy will not venture an attack against the Hawaiian
Islands until control of sea lanes of communication is obtained. Then as the
enemy fleet approaches those islands, raids by surface vessels, submarines and
carrier-based aircraft, may be expected.
e. Our most likely enemy, ORANGE, can probably employ a maximum of
6 carriers against Oahu.
f. A 25-mile visibility is assumed. This assumption is based on standard
U. S. Navy search and patrol methods employed in thisi area.
g. For the purpose of this problem the day is divided into 13 hours of daylight
and 11 hours of darkness. These assumptions are based on the following com-
putations :
(1) June 22, 20° N. Lat. :
Sunrise 0521
Sunset 1842
Hours of daylight 1321
Add:
Morning twilight 25
Evening twilight 24
Total hours of daylight 14:10
[1025] (2) December 21, 20° N. Lat. :
Sunrise 0630
Sunset 1750
Hours of daylight 1120
Add:
Morning twilight * 24
Evening twilight 24
Total hours daylight 12:08
Average (1) and (2) 13:09
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 391
[1026] IV. DISCUSSION
Part 1: The Search.
1. The only manner in which the Hawaiian area can be thoroughly searched
for enemy surface craft, particularly aircraft carriers, in the event of a situation
requiring such action, is to provide a sufficient number of aircraft to conduct
a daily search of a desired area during daylight hours with 100 percent coverage
through 360°. A method of searching 5° sectors through 360° to a radius
of 883 nautical miles from Oahu employing 72 B-17D airplanes is indicated
in Chart No. 1. It will be noted that the out.side lines of visibility for the
diverging tracks cross at the 600 nautical mile circle, the overlap area inside
of that distance becoming a noncovered area beyond that distance. The width
of the noncovered area increases as the distance increases beyond 600 nautical
miles with the corollary that the probability of finding the target decreases as
the search continues out. However, as can be seen on the chart, each search
plane on the search back covers the area not covered between any two planes
on the search out and, in addition, covers the area previously searched by the
plane on its left on the search out but uncovered on the search back, 100 percent
coverage of the area is, therefore, obtained on the search out and back.
[1027] 2. In order to have available for ready reference a means of deter-
mining coverage and noncoverage of areas on the search out using 3°, 4° and 5°
sectors, there is attached Chart No. 2. The method of constructing the curves
thereon is indicated on the chart. It will be observed that, with the assumed
visibility of 25 miles, 100 percent coverage on the search out is obtained to a
radius of :
a. 600 nautical miles with airplanes in 5° sectors.
6. 750 nautical miles with airplanes in 4° sectors.
c. 1,000 nautical miles with airplanes in 3° sectors.
3. Under any given set of operating data for the search planes and enemy
carrier, the radius of action of the search force is determined by :
a. Rate of closure of the carrier and search planes.
6. Minimum distance the carrier can be offshore and allow the search force
to make interception and relay the information to the attack force.
c. Minimum time required for the attack force to make interception beyond
the radius of action of the carrier planes.
4. In developing this plan, all search aircraft take off at daylight. They
might take off during darkness in order to be at a certain location at dawn if
definite information as to the movements of enemy surface vessels is reiwrted
from some source such as our search of a previous day, friendly surface vessels
or Navy patrol.
[1028] Part 2: This part of the discussions deals with the maximum
capabilities of enemy equipment namely his carriers steam at 30 knots and
his bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots. See
Chart No. 3.
1. Section No. 1:
a. An enemy should be primarily interested in obtaining the maximum cover
of darkness for his carrier approach. This section illustrates four possible uses
of darkness by an enemy to cover his approach. In each case the distance out
for dusk and dawn is computed from the most distant aircraft launching circle,
or 350 nautical miles. This figure is based on the fact that after launching, the
carrier planes will be in the air 3 : 20 and during that time the carrier steams
in 100 nautical miles to recover its planes.
b. lA shows a carrier launching its aircraft at midnight, attacking and re-
covering during darkness ; IB shows the launching at dusk with the attack and
recovery during darkness ; IC shows the launching at noon with the attack and
recovery during daylight ; and ID shows the launching at dawn with the attack
and recovery during daylight.
c. It will be noted that each time schedule has a daylight period within the
radius of action of the attack force but that ID permits the least time interval
for our forces to operate against an enemy and requires it to attack [1029]
at the longest range. The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of
action open to the enemy.
d. It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is highly
probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover of darkness.
This presupposes that search operations are impracticable. This headquarters
cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following reasons :
(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical method of
attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.
(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D Day at close
range.
392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) The enemy will be more concerned with delivering a successful attach
than he will be with escaping after the attack. He will have carefully con^
sidered the cost of the enterprise, will probably make a determined attack with
maximum force and will willingly accept his losses if his attack is successful.
2 SiPCtiofh No 2 '
a. This section illustrates a routine daily search by the search force which
will be made in order to prevent an [1030] enemy from making an unde-
tected approach on Oahu.
6. Specifically, with the carrier approaching at 30 knots and the search force
taking ofC at dawn, interception must be made no closer to Oahu than 435 nauti-
cal miles and no later than 3 : 03 after dawn on D Day. This permits 40 minutes
to send a radio message to the home base and get the attack force in the air and
2 : 10 for it to intercept and deliver its attack before the carrier can launch
its planes. The attack force will strike the carrier at its dawn plus 5 : 34 D
Day, 359 nautical miles out.
c. On a time distance basis, dawn D Day for a carrier is 526 nautical miles
from Oahu; dusk D Day— 1 is 856 nautical miles out and dawn D day— 1 is
1,246 nautical miles from Oahu. Solving the rate of closure problem for the two
forces 1,246 nautical miles apart, it is found that contact will be made at 1,030
nautical miles from Oahu at carrier's dawn plus 7 : 12 an D Day— 1.
d. It must be pointed out that this solution is the maximum radius of action
for the search force, yet not necessarily the most difficult problem presented to
our attack force. While a carrier arriving at the 1,030 nautical mile circle at
dawn plus 7 : 12 on D Day— 1 cannot be attacked that day, it can be attacked
the following day as shown in & [1031] above when it must come within
easy range of the attack force if it is to attempt to steam to within its launching
radius.
3. Section No. 3:
a. This section illustrates the most difficult problem which the attack force
has to solve. It is the same problem that is illustrated in Section No. ID. The
critical point here is the carrier's position at his launching radius at dawn.
Under these circumstances he is able to launch his aircraft before we intercept
him and deliver an attack against him on D Day. Therefore, we must hit him D
Day— 1, or the day before he arrives at this position.
&. Specifically, if his dawn position D Day is 350 nautical miles from Oahu,
his dusk position D Day— 1 must be G80 nautical miles out and his dawn posi-
tion D Day— 1 must be 1,070 nautical miles out. If he makes good this schedule,
interception by the search force will be made at 884 nautical miles out at his
dawn plus 6 : 11 on D Day — 1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit a message and
to get the attack force in the air, the attacking force will strike the carrier at
its dawn plus 10 : 43 D Day— 1 at a distance of 748 nautical miles from Oahu
and can operate against it during the remaining 2 : 16 before dusk. Under the
most favoraMe conditions for the enemy the enemy carrier can be subjected to
attack by our attacking force during a period of 2:16 on D Day—1.
[1032] 4. Section No. 4-' This section shows the radius of action of the
B-17D type airplane with full load of bombs and 1700 gallons of fuel.
5. Effect of Visibility (See Chart No. 2):
a. To cover the required search area under the above conditions 120 airplanes,
each covering a 3° sector, would be needed to operate to a distance of 1030 nautical
miles. This number of planes would permit 100% coverage of the entire 360°
otr the search out.
b. Obviously any decrease in the number of planes employed will increase the
sector to be searched by each plane and therefore reduces the probability of finding
the target. Any uncovered area would, however, with a lesser number of search
planes be covered on the search back, and depending upon the location of the
carrier and the hour of the day, might permit an attack to be made on D Day—1
or D Day.
Part 3: This part of the discussion deals with the assumed probable capabilities
of enemy equipment (see Chart No. 4). It is believed that his maximum
capabilities will be reduced from those assumed for Sections 1 to 4, inclusive,
(Chart No. 3) by the following factors:
1. His average carrier top speed will be 27 knots. This statement is predicated
upon the fact that the average top [103S] speed of ORANGE carriers is
28 knots, and the belief that on his run across the Pacific, foul bottoms will
probably further reduce his speed.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 393
2. The cruising range of his carrier aircraft will be 400 nautical miles. No
allowance is made in previous computations for full throttle operation, for fuel
reserve, or for time required to take off from, and land aboard, the carrier.
3. He will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack.
a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection.
[1034] b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meri-
dian materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of detection by
friendly surface vessels. It seems that his most probable avenue of approach is
the hemisphere from 0° counter-clockwise to 180^ around Oahu ; the next most
probable, the quadrant 180° counter-clockwise to 90° ; the least probable, 90° to 0°.
c. The tactical search enunciated above is not the only source of information as
to his movements. Office Naval Intelligence, surface scouting forces, commercial
ships at sea, radio intercept and proposed advance naval line patrol, will tend to
disclose his general location and might, therefore; reduce the search area for
our forces.
d. He will want to take the shortest distance to his objective, although this will
be of minor consideration if his range is sufficient to permit him the long approach.
4. Sectimx No. 5:
a. This section has been drawn to show one possible plan of attack of the
enemy under his assimied probable capabilities. Here consideration has been
given to the factors enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 immediately above,
with the result that his performance characteristics have been reduced to 27
knots speed for his carrier and to 400 nautical miles range for his [1035]
airplanes. Under these conditions it will be necessary for the carrier to approach
within 233 nautical miles of Oahu before it can launch its aircraft ; recovery would
be made at 167 nautical miles. Accoi'dingly, the radius of search can be reduced to
833 nautical miles and still permit the search force to locate the carrier and the
attack force makes its attack before the carrier-based aircraft can be launched.
These assumed characteristics can reduce the required search radius to 833 nauti-
cal miles and still i)ermit the carrier being attacked before it reaches the position
from which aircraft can be launched.
&, If on D Day — 1 the carrier force is at a distance of 991 nautical miles
steaming in at 27 knots and the search force takes off at dawn, interception will
occur at the carrier's dawn plus 5 : 49, S33 nautical miles away, the maximum
radius of search under these conditions. Allowing 40 minutes to order the attack
force out and 3 : 42 for the flight, the carrier can be attacked at its dawn plus
10 : 11 D Day— 1, 715 nautical miles out and can operate against it during the
remaining 2 : 49 before dusk.
c. Further, should the carrier be missed on D Day— 1 there still remains an
opportunity to attack it on D Day. Interception must be made by the search
force not nearer than carrier's dawn plus 2 : 02, 288 nautical miles out on D Day
in order to make an attack prior to launching. This attack would occur at dawn
[1036] plus 3 : 56, 237 nautical miles out.
5. Section No. 6: The problem here is the same as that shown in paragraph 3,
Part 2, above, i. e., the most favorable plan of action open to an enemy. With
the carrier making good its time schedule to arrive at its airplane launching
position at daylight, interception by the search force will be made at dawn plus
5 : 11 of carrier's D Day— 1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit the message to the
home base and for the attack force to take off, the attack force can reach the
carrier at dawn plus 9:08 of carrier's D Day— 1 and can operate against the
carrier during the remaining 3: 42 before dusk. Under the most profitable plan
of action of an enemy carrier, a B-11D attacking force can operate against the
carrier for S: 42 of the day prior to his attack on Oahu.
6. Effect of Visibility:
a. In Section No. 5, a 5° search spread should give adequate coverage. The
search time schedule is such that if interception is not made on the search out
it can be made on the search back in time to transmit the information and to
deliver an attack by the striking force before dusk on D Day— 1. There is 75%
coverage at 800 nautical miles on the search out, but on the search out and back
there is 100% coverage. 72 airplanes would be used for the search.
[1037] b. In Section No. 6, with 5° search sectors, the probability of finding
the target at 740 nautical miles is 85% for the search out and as stated in a above,
100% for the search out and back. 72 airplanes would be sufficient for complete
coverage in this case, for if interception is not made on the way out, it can be
made on the search back in time to transmit information and deliver an attack.
394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
V. CONCLUSION
1. Action by enemy carrier-based bombing planes against Oahu should be
figured on the basis of their having 400 nautical miles range and a speed of 180
knots.
2. a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action
upon which we should base our plans of operation, is the early morning attack
in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule :
(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before the
attack.
(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before the
attack.
(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the
attack.
(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2: 30 after dawn the day
of the attack.
[103S] b. Any variation from the above time schedule permits our attack
force to strike the enemy during daylight of the day before his attack over a
greater time interval and at a shorter range ; or, permits our attack force to strike
him during daylight of the day he attacks but before he is within his radius of ac-
tion of Oahu. If an enemy carrier succeeded in slipping in undetected by our
search force and launched an attack, we could and would, of course, attack as soon
as possible in order to destroy or disable the carrier prior to, or during, the recov-
ery of its planes.
3. The area between the circles with radii 530 nautical miles and 833 nautical
miles from Oahu is the operating area for the solution of this problem under its
most adverse condition.
4. a. With the Army Air Force responsible for its own reconnaissance, 72
B-17D airplanes will be required to search daily the area within the circle of
833 nautical miles radius from Oahu, each plane covering a 5° sector.
ft. Based upon the assumption of visibility used in this study, 72 arplanes em-
ployed to search a 360° sector should result in 100% coverage with some overlap
to 600 nautical miles, 857c coverage at 700 nautical miles and 75% coverage at
800 nautical miles in the search out. In every case, the search out and in
would permit 100% coverage within the time interval which would [1039]
allow the launching of the bombing attack prior to dusk on D Day — 1.
5. If a similar search could be conducted from Dutch Harbor, Midway, John-
ston or Palmyra the possibility of enemy surface ships approacliing Hawaii and
the west coast of the United States undetected would be practically non-existent.
[lO/fO] 6. Search must be conducted during daylight hours because of the
extreme difficulty of locating what will be an unlighted objective proceeding under
cover of darkness. The B-17D airplane is capable of searching for, and attacking,
an enemy force the day prior to its arrival within its striking distance of Oahu.
7. With this plan in actual operation the defenses of these islands can be
assured without assistance from the Navy. This will permit complete freedom
of action of the Pacific Fleet.
8. The B-17D airplane is capable of operating beyond the combat range of
any known enemy carrier-based aviation.
9. Attack must be conducted during daylight hours because it is considered
impracticable to locate and bomb a maneuvering precision target during dark-
ness.
10. Based on the worst situation that could arise, i. e.. the employment of 6
enemy carriers against Oahu simultaneously each approaching on a different
course, an attack force of 36 B-17D's would be required to disable or destroy
the carriers. It is expected that 6 B-17D's with bomb loads of seven 600#
bombs would be sufficient to accomplish the desired result ( see Study No. 1 ) . It
is contemplated that this attack force will be augmented by 36 additional B-17D's
of the maintenance [lOJfl] and reserve force if in commission.
11. This at.tack force should be further augmented by a minimum of 36 long-
range planes of the B-26 or similar tyi>e, capable of carrying torpedoes to be
used as the striking force under conditions of low ceiling and visibility when
high altitude level bombing technique is not practicable. (See Study No. 2).
12. A reserve of 72 planes will be needed to provide for maintenance, replace-
ment and reserve for both the search and attack forces. As was stated in para-
graph 10 above, 36 of this number may be employed as part of the attack force
if in commission.
13. In order to operate the above number of B-17D's, a minimum of 216 combat
crews will be needed as indicated in Chart No. 5.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 395
\I. BECOMMENDATIONS
1. It is recommended that the War Department give immediate consideration
to the allotment of 180 B-17D type airplanes or other four-engine bombers with
equal or better performance and operating range and 36 long-range torpedo-
carrying medium bombers to the Hawaiian Air Force for the performance of
search and attack missions in an area bounded by a circle whose radius is 833
nautical miles and center is [10^2] Oahu, as follows :
72 for daily search missions.
36 for attack missions (these airplanes will be in readiness daily, fully
armed and loaded with bombs, for a mission).
72 for maintenance and reserve from which 36 may be used to augment
the attack force.
180 total B-17D's.
36 torpedo-carrying medium bombers of the B-26 or other suitable type.
2. While this number of bombardment airplanes could not be accommodated
at Hickam Field and there are no other suitable bases available on Oahu, it
should be only a matter of time until projects submitted to the War Depart-
ment for the construction of airdromes on outlaying islands of the Hawaiian
group are completed which, with Hickam Field, will be adequate for operations
of the above number of planes. Existing plans for the dispersion of the 18th
Bombardment Wing (H) provide for units of one and two squadrons to operate
from dispersed airdromes. Modification of the plan to apply to operations
therefrom are anticipated and will be made.
3. It is further recommended that in making future allotments of officers
and enlisted men to the Hawaiian Air [JO^S] Force consideration be given
to providing a minimum of 216 B-17D combat crews and 36 medium bomber-
torpedo combat crews. In this connection, see paragraph 8, basic letter.
4. Our leading tacticians and strategists hei'e concur in the opinion that
this plan will solve the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and that to their
knowledge it is the best and only means that can be devised to locate enemy
carriers and make attacks thereon before said carriers can come within launching
distance of Oahu. The sole purpose of the existence of the military establish-
ment on Oahu, ground and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval
base. The best defense is an aggressive and well-organized offense. The basis
of this plan is offensive action. We have had clearly demonstrated to us in
Europe the fallacy of depending upon passive measures of defense. We must
not base our plans of action on the "Defense of Hawaii", but rather upon a
vigorous offensive. We must ferret out the enemy and destroy him before he
can take action to destroy us.
It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest out-
lying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks
and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak
and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unprepared-
[IO44] ness for offensive action.
In order to initiate offensive action, the Hawaiian Air Force must have at its
immediate command well-organized, equipped and trained combat crews. It
should be remembered that while reinforcements from the Mainland can be
made available on short notice their expeditious presence here ivill not solve
the problem. Upon their arrival they must be given an opportunity to undergo
a certain amount of indispensable indoctrination and training in the plane of
action of the Hawaiian Air Force. If this plan is to be effective the force
recommended above must be made a reality and maintained in existence in
Hawaii for combat at any time. With the United States living and working
under a condition of unlimited National Emergency, Japan making its southward
movement and the world in general in a complete state of turmoil we must be
prepared for D Day at any time. Reinforcements, therefore, must be considered
from the standpoint of replacements for losses only. Any delay in placing
this plan in operation, such as would be necessary for the above reasons, would
mitigate against its success.
It is believed that a force of 180 four-motored aircraft with 36 long-range
torpedo airplanes is a small force when compared with the importance of this
outpost. This force can be provided at less cost to the Government than the
cost [10-'f5] of one modern battleship. It is further believed that this
force should be made avaflable as soon as possible even at the expense of other
units on the Mainland.
396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
STUDY OF THE BOMBS REQtriBED TO DISABLE AN AIKCKAFT GABBIER
1. It is assumed that two direct hits by 500-pound or 600-pound demolition
bombs will be sufficient to disable an aircraft carrier.
2. From the tables of probability of direct hits by bombing, results obtained
by units of the Hawaiian Air Force in bombing sleds towed by Navy surface
craft and from previous experiences by bombardiers who have made attacks
of this nature, it is determined that about 90 percent probability of two direct
hits may be expected from 6 B-17D's or similar type airplanes attacking a
maneuvering carrier from 15,000 feet, each dropping seven 600-pound bombs in
train. Bombardiers are assumed to be capable of at least a 20 mil accuracy.
3. In arriving at the number of bombs and airplanes required, several methods
of attack are considered :
a. Attack by individual airplanes from different directions, attacking in close
succession.
ft. Formation attacks by three plane elements from different directions and
in close succession.
c. Formation attack on a six-plane flight.
[lOJfG] In all cases bombs are assumed to have been dropped in train by each
airplane with a spacing of 80 feet between bombs. The number of bombs (42) and
airplanes (6) required to give a 90 percent probability of two effective hits was
determined to be nearly the same for each tyi)e of attack.
[lO^t] NEED FOR TORPEDO PLANES IN THE HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE
1. a. Any or all of the following factors could be exi)ected to partially or
wholly prevent the successful accomplishment of the bombardment mission :
(1) Inability to find enemy force (navigation).
(2) Lack of bombing accuracy.
(3) Enemy fighter action.
(4) Hostile antiaircraft artillery fire.
(5) Weather obscuring objectives,
ft. Consideration of these factors ;
(1 and 2) Navigational and bombing accuracy are primarily matters of train-
ing and practice. Efficient standards can be and are being attained by the
training of combat crews in the Hawaiian Air Force.
(3) The critical altitude, high speed and defensive armament of the present
heavy bombardment aircraft is such as to provide excellent defense against
enemy fighters. It is not believed that carrier based fighters will be very
effective against the B-17D's at high altitude.
(4) Reports from abroad indicate that antiaircraft fire will be only partially
effective and will not prevent the accomplishment of the [lOlfS] mission.
(5) The weather of the Hawaiian Islands is probably the best in the world from
a standpoint of flying conditions and yet a very definite percentage of bombing
missions fail because of overcast conditions which obscure the objective. Heavy
bombardment as such is useless against surface craft when low ceilings
(200-1,000 feet) prevail, and it is doubtful if it could be used below 5,000 feet
without prohibitive losses from antiaircraft fire before reaching the bomb release
line. Enemy surface craft may be expected to take full advantage of all cloudiness
conditions and even to wait until such conditions occur before launching an
attack. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has no weapon to effectively combat
surface craft under such conditions.
2. The following is submitted as a solution to this problem :
a. The most effective action against surface craft under poor weather condi-
tions is believed to be a torpedo attack from low-flying aircraft. This is sub-
stantiated by results from abroad, i. e., Bismarck sinking, Taranto attack, etc.
A torpedo plane flying just off the water can operate [10Jf9'\ under a very
low ceiling and with guaranteed accuracy against all surface craft. The torpedo
plane should be land-based, of long range, fast and capable of being accurately
navigated. It should operate in conjunction with heavy bombardment.
3. a. The only type airplane that could be adapted to this purpose at present
in the Hawaiian Department is the A-20A. It is believed that this adaptation
can be made and the problem is under consideration and test at present.
b. It is believed that tlie medium bombardment airplane of the B-26 type
will be even more satisfactory because of its longer raAge.
c. It is recommended that adaptation of some such airplane be made, preferably
in such a manner as not to interfere with the normal bombardment mission.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 397
[1050] Mr. Mitchell. Before I forget it, I want as the next ex-
hibit, No. 14, to introduce a letter from Headquarters, Hawaiian
Department, Office of the Department Commander, dated 14 April
1941. Subject : "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor," addressed to the Ad-
jutant General, Washington, D. C., and signed for the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department by Carl Grosse, assistant ad-
jutant general. It has a notation on it, "Copy to Commandant 14th
Naval District."
I will not read that letter. It contains reference to several of these
air defense plans.
The Chairman. You want that printed in the daily transcript?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I want to put that in.
(The letter referred to was marked Exhibit No. 14 and follows
herewith:)
[lOSl] Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commandeb,
Fort Shatter, T. H., H April 1941.
In reply refer to :
AG 3Sl/67a JDP.
Subject : Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.
To : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is invited to secret letter from The Adjutant General to Head-
quarters Hawaiian Department, above subject, dated 7 February IMl, file AG
381 (1-24-41) M. There are enclosed herewith for your information copies of
the principle directives, orders, and estimates which have been issued, in coop-
eration with the local naval authorities, to provide for the joint defense of the
Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters
against surprise raids or air attacks.
2. Inclosure 1, joint letter HHD-14th ND, dated 14 February 1941, initiated
the study by joint committees of Army and Navy ofiicers of the joint problems
of the defense which were mentioned in the correspondence between the Secre-
taries of War and Navy, inclosed in the letter referred to in paragraph 1 above,
and also included study of additional problems Which were raised by Admiral
Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.
[1052] 3. Inclosure 2, Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan (HCF-39) is a new joint agreement with the local naval authorities which
pertains to joint security measures. Attention is particularly invited to Section
II of this document whigh relates to joint air operations. This joint agreement
covers the major points which were studied by the joint committees organized in
inclosure 1. Inclosure A to this Annex No. VII has not yet been completed,
however tests are now being conducted to determine the most effective means
of positive identification of friendly aircraft and insure its protection from anti-
aircraft artillery fire.
4. Inclosure 3, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force and Patrol Wing TWO
(Naval Base Defense Air Force) is self explanatory and will serve as the basis
of joint air operations orders to be issued in the near future. These joint orders
are required since it will be noted that, in the conduct of air operations, aircraft
of one service passes to the tactical control of the other service.
5. Inclosure 4. Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security) is a new operations
order for this Department covering the measures which will be taken during
an alert period and initially upon a sudden raid or air attack. This order has
been coordinated with comparable security orders of [1053] the Pacific
Fleet and the Naval Base Defense Force. This order is in addition to and does not
replace the existing Field Orders No. 1 and No. 1 W which are contained in
OHD-38.
For the Commanding General: Carl Grosse,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant Oeneral.
Copy to Commandant 14th Naval District.
Mr. Mitchell. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Is counsel in a position to advise the committee as
to who will be called next ?
398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Hull is our first witness on Friday morning.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.
Senator Lucas. In the interrogation of Admiral Richardson there
were some facts that he did not know which I would like to have the
Navy liaison officer attempt to discover for me. Here are the questions
I am going to ask :
How many naval planes were attached to the fleet when Admiral
Richardson took it over?
[1054] How many naval planes were attached to the fleet when
Admiral Richardson was relieved of his command?
How many planes were capable of doing reconnaissance duty during
that time ?
How many planes were actually on reconnaissance work every day
after the reconnaissance orders issued by Admiral Richardson were
augmented by Admiral Andrews which directed reconnaissance on
dawn and day patrol 300 miles covering a western semicircle of 180° ?
That is the information I would like to have.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. May I ask a question of counsel ?
In the event Mr. Hull is not able to appear, or for some reason does
not appear, would you be able to give me who the witness will be
to substitute for him ?
Mr. Mitchell. There are a group there : Mr. Sumner Welles, Mr.
Grew, and Mr. Hamilton. Our idea is if Mr. Hull gets tired and has
to retire in order to return later, we will bring on some of these other
witnesses and keep going on with the State Department story as rap-
idly as we can. We had to assure Mr. Hull and his family that the
committee will not detain him for questioning more than 45 minutes
at a time. He tires very rapidly. That upsets our schedule a little.
[JOSS] The Chairman. In connection with that, copies of the
written statement of Mr. Hull have been furnished to all members
of the committee.
Mr. Mitchell. That is right.
The Chairman. I presume it will be read by the committee before
Mr. Hull comes on.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
We have given you copies of it in advance so you can study it before-
hand.
The Chairman. As to whether the other statement should be read
by somebody in the meeting, they do concern matters on which the
committee may want to take action after it has been examined.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. I want to inquire of General Mitchell whether
or not the committee has received all of the exhibits, or all of the writ-
ten information in relation to the State Department witnesses?
Mr. ISIitchell. Mr. Gesell will answer that.
Mr. Gesell. We have received from the State Department all of
the documents which we intended to introduce in connection with the
testimony of the State Department witnesses, with the exception of
one or two documents which are being [10S6] cleared with
other governments, and we expect that the clearance will be obtained
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 399
before we go ahead Friday morning. All of the documents which
we have obtained have been distributed to each of the members of the
committee, I think the bulk of them went to the committee about a
week ago, and we have from time to time, I think, including this morn-
ing, handed additional documents on the subject to the members of
the committee.
Senator Ferguson, So then, at the present moment, we have all of
the documents that the committee counsel desire to use, except those
that you must receive clearance on ? As I understand it, you are being
delayed from getting certain information from the State Department
because other governments will not clear the committee getting those
documents.
Mr. Gesell, There has been no refusal to clear, Senator, by any
Government.
Senator Ferguson. What is the situation?
Mr, Gesell, The situation is this: There is an understanding, I
am informed, which has prevailed between the United States and
other governments with which we are in friendly relations that they
will not give publication to notes and documents they received
from our officials, and we will not give publication to similar material
we received from the officials for a period of 15 years, unless specific
authorization [10S7] is obtained.
Now, we have not received any refusal from any government to
release the documents which we wish to present to the committee.
There are one or two situations where we have not yet heard either
way, and we expect to hear in those situations before Friday morning.
[JOSS] Senator Ferguson. Then if you get the approval we will
receive those copies of those papers prior to the hearing?
Mr. Gesell. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. It would be difficult to examine witnesses on
documents, as I said before, unless we get them sometime before the
witnesses are put on the witness stand.
Mr. Gesell. You are quite right. I can assure the Senator in this
instance the volume of documents to which I refer is extremely small.
We hope it may be even possible to get them to you tomorrow, if the
clearance comes through. We will do the best we can on that, of
course.
Senator Ferguson. As one of the members of the committee, I think
I have quite a few questions on the documents that I have not received.
They are included, I take it, among those that the other governments
must clear.
Mr. Gesell. I do not know about that.
Mr. Mitchell. We will have to check the rest to be sure it is what
you have in mind. They come in pretty fast. We have a system set
up of taking them and trying to keep up with them.
The Chairman. If there is nothing further, the committee will
stand in recess until 10 o'clock Friday morning.
(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Friday
November 23, 1945,)
Part 2— November 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30, and December 3
and 4, 1945 — follows.
X
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