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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAKBOE ATTACK 

C0NGEES8 OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGKESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 




PART 1 

NOVEMBER 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

o.n^.^^JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 
CONGEESS or THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

79th Congress 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 1 

NOVEilLJER 13, IG, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STAl'KS 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
767115 WASHINGTON : 1946 



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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOI'ER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BRE^VSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 
gan 

, BAYARD CL. 
Nortla Carolina 



gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAY'ARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 



COUNSEL 
(Through January 14, 1946) 
Wii.LiAJi D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Ha.nxaford, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Coimsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
Ko. 



10 
11 



Pages Transcript ^ Hearings 

pages 

1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 

401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4. 1945. 

983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13. 1945. 

1585-2083 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 

2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 

2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 

2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 

3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 

3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 

4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 

5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 

No. Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 ISO through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Pieports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5269-5291 

381-4-3826 
3450-3519 

"""5089-5122 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

« 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 

^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

(^ 1 1 'i 'i 'i 'i 'i I 1 1 1 1 1 1 'i 'iF:; 1 1 1 1 ! 1 I 

II 1 1 1 lr}^ 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 

! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 : ! 1 : 1 i 1 ; 1 ! ! 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

--- 

194 
59-63 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1(N 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

""660-688" 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Hoard, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1914) 


Pages 

3105-3120" 

2479-2491 

4022-4027" 
148-186 

2567-2580' 

3972-3988 

2492-2515 

1575-1643" 

3720-3749" 
1186-1220 

1413-1442" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 CO 1 itH 

1 i 1 iCT> 1 1 1 CO 

willlCOl r-llllllll 

^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

e 1 1 1 1 --1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

►iiiiiiO II.-1IIIIIII 

1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1 IrH 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Doc. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
203-209 

1127-1138 
1033-1038 

1719-1721' 

1219-1224' 

"886-951' 
1382-1399 

"377-389' 
1224-1229 

"314-320' 




Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adni 

Anstev, Alice 

Arnold, H. H., Gen 

Asher, N. F., Ens 

Ball, N. F., Ens 

Ballard, Emma Jane 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlctt, George Francis 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm • 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berry, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bieknell, George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 194.5, 

to Mav 31, 

1940 


Pages 
5080-5089 

3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

E.vhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

Mav 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

163-181 

'"418-423' 
"451-464' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

'8'7-'b" 
205 

"B223-224" 
B6.5-66 
B229-231 
49-51 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^1 iiiiii i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 
1 llllll III 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

14f) 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
495-510 


Joint 

Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3190-3201' 
1928-1965 

3642-3643 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
Juno 15, 1941) 


Pages 

""179-184" 
""105-114" 

96-105 

74-85 

""368-378" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
478-483, 
301-310 

1171-1178" 

1178-1180" 
1659-1663, 
170-198 

"'812-843,' 
1538-1571 
504-509 

2-32' 

365-368 

1747-1753' 




Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN) 

Crosley, Paul C, Comdr 

Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM) 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN 

Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen 

Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson, Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

Dillingham, Walter F 

Dillon, James P 

Dillon, John H., Maj 

Dingeman, Ray E., Col 

Donegan, William Col 

Doud, Harold ,■ Col 

Dunlop, Robert H., Col 

Dunning, Mary J 

Dusenbury, Carlisle Clyde, Col 

Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0 

Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 
4797-4828 

463-457, 

551-560, 

605-615, 

5367-5415 1 

4221-4366 
26-34, 36-38, 
40-49, 55-73, 
75-79, 82-92, 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


iiiiiiieoi— iiNiiiii-Hi iiii 

iiiiiiii-HiOXiiiiiOi IIII 

»llllllllNl.-l--tlllll'-Hl IIII 

0, 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 IIII 

e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 IIII 
tin 1 1 1 . 1 1 1^ lO 1 IIII 

lINlT-H .-HI IIII 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1941: July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

;oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1070-1076 

461-469 

"763-772' 

816-851 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


iO.-ii-*iiO(Miiii^t^iii lOOii 

1 C2 t>. 1 t^ 1 1 TTl -^ 1 1 1 1 ^ r-l 1 1 1 It-, 1 1 

»iOC»iiMii(N05iiii(MC5iil il-ii 

^ . (M CO 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 1 C-5 r-H 1 1 1 II 11 

„e 1 1 1 1 r-^ 1 1 f, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 m 1 1 

tiiiOt^i^J^iiO'^iiiiO-^iii 1^*11 

iCOLi.cOiiCOCOiiiiO^iii ii>ii 

1 1 1 1 Ci 1 1 1 1 C^5 Cl 1 1 1 1 11 

1 CO CO 1 1 1 01 1 1 1 1 C^ -H 1 1 1 1 11 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 lO 1 

1111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ICO 1 

» 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 

C:, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 1 

^ ; ; ; ; 1 ; ; : ! ; : ; : : 1 1 ; 1 ! ;^ ; 

III IIII 1 1 TT* 1 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


Pagei 

1571-1574" 

1664-1676 
"469-473~ 


1 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Tliomas Charles, Senator 

Hayes, PhiHp, MaJ. Gen 

Heard, William A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

Hill, William H., Senator 

Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

HornVjeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W., Col 

HubbeU, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, CordelL- 

Humphrey, Ricliard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, John A., Col 

Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

194G 


1 1 1 1 1 lO 00 1 1 Ill i_- -0 1 1 

CO 1 1 1 1 1 loco 1 1 1 1 1 '^Z^o 1 1 

•o 1 1 1 1 1 loco 1 1 1 1 1 2^0'^ ' ' 

lOlllll'Tt<| llllllllll.^^lOII 

IJ: 1 1 1 1 1 Ick^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Jj 1 ! 

I'O 1 1 . 1 1 '(NCO 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 . 1 1 i2?^S 1 1 

^10 < 1 ' < < ^yj III. ^S-Hii 

lOiiiiii-* iiiiiiiiiii«^iOii 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Intjuiry, 

Mav 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

541-553 

182-292 

"'140^142' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

IG, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ ' ' 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' ' ' ' ' ' 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

14G 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 00 1 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1 lie II 

lllllll^ tl||IITt<lOO II 

M coiiiit^ioo II 

a 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 ^ ' ' ' ' 1 ' 1 ' ' 

'^ 00 1 1 1 1 TtH 1 (N II 

ftiiliiliiO (NiiiiCOiiC II 

iiiiii.OiiiiiCOiiiit^.CO 11 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harfcor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2665-2695' 
3028-3067 

1161-1185' 

2787-2802' 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374' 

2-54' 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

144 

(ITart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
Juno 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214-225 
363-367 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 2:3, 1942) 


Pages 

1146-1156' 

1156-1171' 

4-32' 
1068-1095 

1272-1285' 

"500-504' 

1793-1805' 

"320-352," 
1648- 
1659 




Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landretli, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Ma] 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

MacArthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



IXDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XII 



CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION TEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

194G 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1915) 


00 1 III 1 1 1 1 

II CO 1 III 1 1 1 1 

2 1 1 1 III 1 ICO 1 1 1 

^ 1 1 111 1 1 1 1 

e l> 1 

^11 (X) 1 III 1 1 1 1 

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Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sei)t. 12, 

1945) 


oil 111 1^ 1 (Mil it^ii 

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c^-* ; 1 1 1 1 1 ig ! i i i"^ i i 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

IG, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1915) 


^ i i i ; i i i i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

14G 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 lio III III r-„-„-~=^'''^'c<i 1 lo 1 loo 00 

1 Id III III ^^JPoocoio 1 iTt< 1 lOC 

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C^iit-. Ill III jTgl'-HO'-iii— 1 lll>^ 

\ [^ 111 III c^^§2!2 1 1^ ; I'^g 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Tearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160," 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

1968-1988" 
1035-1070 

778-789 


.Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. IS, 1941. 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


1 1 fj-i>. Tt< 1 1 o 1 ,_-,_-oo 1 1 1 ci-rr 1 1 1 1 
ii£rccc5ii 101,212^1 iiooooiiii 

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^ 1 \^i^ ; I i igg ! 1 i^ig 1 1 1 1 

1 l^^g : ; ;5 ;SS ; 1 Ig^ 1 1 1 1 


s 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj 

Powell, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, William S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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LIST OF DOCUMENTS XVII 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS APPEAEING IN THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE'S HEARINGS NOT INTRODUCED AS 
EXHIBITS 



PART 1 



Senate Concurrent Resolution 27, establishing the Joint Committee on the Page 
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 3 

Corresi)oudence between joint committee and State, War, Navy Depart- 
ments, and between committee and President Truman and estate of 
former President Roosevelt, concerning liaison ofHcers and records to 
assist committee 5 

Presidential directive of August 28, 1945, concerning disclosure of crypt- 

analytic technique or procedures 8 



Presidential order of October 23, 1945, lifting ban of August 28, 1945, di- 
rective for benefit of committee S 

Presidential order of November 7, 1945, concerning information given by 

service personnel 9 

Presidential memorandum of November 9, 1945, enlarging on order of No- 
vember 7, 1945 9 

Excerpts from the Congressional Record of September 6, 1945, including 
the discussion and adoption by the Senate of Senate Concurrent Resolu- 
tion 27 establishing the joint committee 10 

I'aragraph from "I Fly for Vengeance," by Commander Clarence Earl Dick- 
inson, appearing in Saturday Evening Post of October 10, 1942 114 

Tentative order of proof submitted by committee counsel 125 

Paraphrase of message of October 6, 1945, from Secretary of War to Gen- 
eral MacArthur 176 

Statement by Japanese officer who participated in Pearl Harbor attack 179 

Order issued by Navy Section of Japanese Imperial General Headquarters 

concerning attack 179 

Statement of Japanese officer on information concerning ship movements 
reaching Japanese task force from Honolulu commercial broadcast- 
ing stations 182 

Japanese Naval General Staff Instruction of December 2, as contained in 

MacArthur report 205 

Letter received by Navy regarding FBI check of Honolulu programs 215 

Prepared statement by Admiral Richardson on meeting with Admiral Leahy 

and President on October S, 1940 265 

Memorandum of October 9, 1940, by Admiral Richardson on his conference 
with the President 268 

Messages between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Bloch concerning War 

Department 1940 alert 271 

Statement of Admiral Richardson's view on security of fleet in Hawaiian 
area '. 286 

Admiral Leahy's statement on function of Navy before Naval Affairs 
Committee 294 

Admiral Richardson's statement concerning patrol line from Hawaii to 

Asiatic coast _. 3()5 

79716— 46— pt. 1 2 



XVIII LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Admiral Richardson's dispatch of June 22, 1940, to Chief of Naval Oper- Page 
ations concerning War Department alert 312 

Answer of Chief of Naval Operations to Richardson's dispatch of June 

22, 1940 312 

Letter of January 25, 1941, from Admiral Richardson to Chief of Naval 

Operations, regarding air-defense conditions at Pearl Harbor 368 

Excerpts from war and defense plans 372 

PART 2 

Article of August 13, 1941, sent to New York Times by Otto D. Tolischus, 

on American and British stand in far eastern crisis 487 

Prime Minister Churchill's statement in House of Commons on January 

27, 1942, relating to United States entry into the war 489 

Memorandum of November 30, 1941, on conference between Secretai-y of 
State and Lord Halifax, on United States position if Britain should resist 
Japanese move on Kra Isthmus 491 

Winant telegram of December 2, 1941, to Secretary of State, concerning 

Japanese moves toward Kra Isthmus 493 

Winant cable of December 6, 1941, to Secretary of State, concerning Japa- 
nese convoy movement 493 

Welles-Halifax discussion of November 28, 1941, concerning Japanese 
situation 495 

Memorandum of December 2, 1941, by Under Secretary Welles to British 

Ambassador, transmitting documents handed to Japanese Ambassador-- 508 

New York Times article of August 25, 1941, giving text of Prime Minister 

Churchill's address on meeting with President 524 

Letter of November 12, 1945, from Mr. Grew to committee counsel, regard- 
ing assistance to committee 623 

Letters exchanged between Mr. 'Grew and the President, December 14, 

1940, and January 21. 1941 630 

Telegram of December 5, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, 

regarding opinion in Japan of the "ten point" note of November 26, 1941- 686 

Quotations from New York Times of December 5, 1941, on possibility of 

closing Japanese consulates in United States 688 

Conversation of February 14, 1941, between Mr. Dooman and Mr. Ohashi — 726 

Dispatch No. 796, dated November 28, 1941, from State Department to the 
American Embassy, Tokyo, concerning the proposed modus vivendi 
studied by the Department 742 

Campaign address of October 30, 1940, at Boston by President Roosevelt— 750 

Dispatch of December 4, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to naval 
attaches at Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, and Shanghai, concerning destruc- 
tion of codes 765 

Memorandum of September 6, 1941, from General Fielder for G-2, regard- 
ing Summaries of Information 846 

Excerpt from m^norandum from Maj. Gen. H. A. Drum, commanding gen- 
eral, Hawaiian Department, to The Adjutant General, War Department, 
dated September 21, 1935, concerning defense mission, Hawaiian De- 
partment 868 

Excerpts from Colonel Montague's memorandum of November 2, 1945, 

on function of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee 911 



PART 3 



Stimson-Kuox letter of June 2, 1941, to the President transmitting Joint 
Army and Navy Basic War Plan— Rainbow No. 5, and ABC-1, recom- 
mending approval 994 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS XIX 

Memorandum of June 9, 1941, from Colonel Scobey to Chief of Staff, Page 
explaining the President's position as to approval of ABC-1 and Joint 
Army and Navy Rainbow No. 5 995 

Stimson-Knox memorandum of August 20, 1941, to the President, transmit- 
ting ABC-22 and recommending approval 997 

Memorandum of August 29, 1941, from Colonel Scobey to Chief of StafE, 

stating President's approval of ABC-22 997 

Letter of November 28, 1945, from Admiral Eichardson to committee 
counsel, covering dispatches between himself and Admiral Stark on 
Army alert in 1940 1055 

Corrected memorandum of July 17, 1941, for the commanding general, 
United States Air Forces from Col. Orlando Ward, concerning Chief of 
Staff's request for study of air situation in Hawaii 1105 

Excerpt from letter of December 20, 1941, from General Marshall to Gen- 
eral Emmons regarding unity of command in Hawaii 1122 

Letter of September 25, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey__ 1128 

Letter of September 27, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey__ 1129 

Excerpt from telegram of August 30, 1941, from General MacArthur to 
General Marshall expressing appreciation for War Department support 
of his command 1161 

Excerpt from United States Code, 1940 edition, page 491, paragraph 33, re- 
garding duties of Chief of Staff 1201 

Minutes of Joint Board meeting of November 3, 1941 1253 

Admiral Hart's proposal that the United States photograph islands of Far 

East and Western Pacific 1291 

Memorandum of December 11, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee 
counsel, answering questions on November 5 and 27, 1941, memoranda by 
General Marshall and Admiral Stark, and on November 27, 1941, Marshall 
warning . 1307 

Admiralty dispatch of December 7, 1941, to Chief of Naval Operations, 

concerning Far East conferences 1341 

Dispatch of December 7, 1941, from commander in chief, China, to com- 
mander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning Japanese convoy movement — 1341 

Dispatch of December 7, 1941, from special naval observer, London, to Naval 

Operations, concerning landing at Khotabahru 1342 

Extract from congressional directive to Secretary of War and Navy to con- 
duct Pearl Harbor investigations 1359 

Memorandum of December 1, 1941, from Stanley K. Hornbeck to Secretary 

Stimson, enclosing memoranda on far eastern situation 1394 

Memorandum from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, transmitting 
dispatch (probably of June 19, 1940) from Admiral Stark to Admiral 
Richardson, concerhing movement of Pacific Fleet 1409 

Top secret report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and top secret memo- 
randa of the Judge Advocate General 1443 

Cable of December 16, 1941, signed "Marshall," concerning relief of Gen- 
eral Short 1529 

Questions for General Marshall submitted by counsel for General Short- __ 1536 

Letter of July 3, 1941, from Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations to 
special naval observer, London, commenting on report of Singapore 
Conference ^^ 1542 

General Short's endorsement of August 20, 1941, Martin Air Study 1545 

Headline of Washington News for December 3, 1941 1569 

Quotation from article stated to have appeared in newspapers on Novem- 
ber 29, 1941, concerning statement by Prime Minister Tojo 1570 



XX LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Letter of November 25, 1941, from First Secretary, Japanese Embassy, I'age 
Washington, to Mr. Herbert S. Mills 1570 

Advertisement in Honolulu Advertiser for August 24, 1941, concerning war 

risk insurance 1572 



PART 4 



Article in Honolulu Advertiser of August 13, 1944 (1941?) on vpar bom- 
bardment insurance 1573 

Quotation from page 213 of Hawaii — Restless Rampart by Joseph Barber, 

Jr., concerning statement l)y General Herron on fortification of Oahu 1606 

Excerpt from Field Manual 100-15, W. D., Field Service Regulations, June 

29, 1942, on method of transmitting orders to theater commanders 1645 

Excerpts from Stafe Officers' Field Manual 1645 

Field Manual 100-5, May 22, 1941, Field Service Regulations, VV. D., Opera- 
tions, concerning forms of orders for tactical situations 1649 

Chart on Arrivals of vessels in Port [Pearl Harbor] just prior to Decem- 
ber 7, 1941 1676 

Memorandum from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, dated 
December 13, 1945, reporting on recall of United States merchant ships 
to west coast after attack and on dispatch of December 7, 1941 1680 

Executive orders establishing defensive sea areas around Pearl Harbor 

and other areas 1681 

Memorandum of December 13, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee 
counsel, listing naval planes in Pacific Fleet on January 6, 1940, and 
February 1, 1941, and sectors and distances from Oahu covered 1687 

Memorandum of November 25, 1941, to Secretary Hull from Dutch Ambas- 
sador Loudon, concerning Japanese proposals 1692 

Department of State memorandum of conversation with Dr. Loudon con- 
cerning modus Vivendi 1693 

Memorandum of December 10, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee 
counsel, enclosing intercepts between No. 836 and No. 841 of Exhibit 
No. 1 1716 

Memorandum of December 12, 1940, by Chief of Naval Operations on Fort- 
nightly Summary of Current National Situation, to be prepared and 
distributed regularly 1731 

Memorandum of March 11, 1941, from Admiral Kirk for Chief of Naval 
Operations on Admiral Kimmel's request for advice on diplomatic 
activities 1739 

Excerpts from United States News of September 1, 1945, page 34, concerning 

movements from Japan to Tankan Bay 1803 

Letter of November 17, 1945, from committee counsel to Senator Ferguson 
concerning request for information on Japanese knowledge of reading 
of their codes by the United States 1817 

March 11, 1941, memorandum of Admiral Kirk to Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions 1885 

Letter of August 19, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, regard- 
ing information on Pacific situation 1838 

Intercepts of Japanese messages relating to suspicion of American code- 
reading activities 1860 

Statement of Admiral Wilkinson on responsibility for development of 
enemy intentions ; memorandum of December 19, 1945, from Admiral 
Kirk, same subject; two cables (to and from Admiral James), same 
subject 1925 

Memorandum of December 12, 1940, from Admiral Stark to commander in 
chief, Asiatic Fleet, on Instructions Concerning Preparation of United 
States Asiatic Fleet for War under War Plan Rainbow 31, and relating 
to American-Dutch-British conversations 1929 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXI 

Note of April 13, 1941, from British military mission giving instructions to Page 
representative at Singapore confex-ence 19S3 

Report of December 7, 1941 (Philippine time), from commander in Chief, 
Asiatic Fleet, to Chief of Naval Operations, concerning discussions at 
conference with Admiral Phillips, and reply by Chief of Naval Operations 
on December 7, 1941 1933 

Report from Admiral Kimmel on December S, 1941, concerning damage to 

ships in Pearl Harbor attack 2023 



PART 5 



Memorandum of December 19, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee 
counsel on Japanese messages relating to suspicions that their code mes- 
sages were being read 2069 

Copy of December 1, 1941, United Press dispatch and of report of December 
2, 1941, from United States military observer in Singapore, relating to 
status of Singapore alerts 2071 

Memorandum of December 27, 1945, from Colonel Root to Lieutenant 

Colonel Duncombe, on Philippine plane situation 2073 

Cable of December 17. 1941, to General Short from General Bryden con- 
cerning oi'ders for relief of General Short; cable of January 6, 1942, 
to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, from Adams, on relief 
of Generals Short and Martin : 2076 

Memorandum of December 21, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee 

counsel on Japanese intercepts containing code word "Haruna" 2077 

War Department memorandum of December 31, 1945, giving information 
on Japanese ships moving southward and on cable of December 6, 1941, 
from Winant to State Department concerning Japanese ship movements. 2078 

Information from documentary evidence on messages at pages 14-29 of 

Exhibit No. 2 2082 

Memorandum of October 31, 1941, by Dr. Hornbeck, read to joint board 

meeting of November 3, 1941, on far-eastern situation 2085 

Telephone calls from outside through White House switchboard on Novem- 
ber 25, 26, 27, and 28, 1941, as shown by operator's notes 2093 

Memorandum of December 31, 1940, from Chief of Naval Operations to 
Director of Naval Districts Division, signed "R. E. Ingersoll," regard- 
ing defense of Pearl Harbor by the Army 2138 

Memorandum of January 9, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to Chief 
of Staff, signed "R. E. Ingersoll," concerning installation of aircraft 
detection equipment 2138 

Dispatch of November 26, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral 
Kimmel, concerning removal of planes from Hawaii to Wake and Mid- 
way 2155 

Dispatch of November 27, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral 
Kimmel, concerning Army making available to Navy infantry units for 
defense battalion 2156 

Message of November 28, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, 

on sending planes to Wake and Midway, and Army troop reinforcement- 2157 

Dispatch of October 17, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, 

on reinforcement of Philippines, and precautions at Wake and Midway. 2160 

Memorandum from CinCUS Fleet to Commander Aircraft, Battle Force 
and Commander Patrol Wing 2, concerning basing of aircraft at naval 
air station at Wake and Midway 2160 

Memorandum of November 28, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to 

CinCPac, concerning defenses and reinforcements 2161 

Dispatch of November 28, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to his subordinates; 

orders to local aircraft units, Wake, Midway, and Pearl Harbor 2161 



XXII LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Dispatch of December 4, 1941, from CinCPac to ComTaskFor 3, Com- Pfge 
fourteen, and ComPatWing 2, concerning local unit orders Wake, Mid- 
way, and Pearl Harbor 2162 

Memorandum of December 2, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, 

on defense of outlying bases 2167 

Memorandum of November 6, 1945, giving names of major vessels in Pacific 

Ocean on December 7, 1941 2210 

Memorandum of May 1, 1941, from commandant. Fourteenth Naval District, 

to Chief of Naval Operations, on plans for air defense of Pearl Harbor- 2239 

Memorandum of June 20, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to com- 
mander In chief, Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic fleets and commandants 
of all naval districts, on joint security measures for protection of the 
fleet and Peai'l Harbor base 2240 

Table submitted by Admiral Stark on dispositions of Atlantic, Asiatic, and 

Pacific fleets on December 7, 1941 2249 

Letter of December 19, 1945, signed by Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of 

State concerning memoranda prepared by Lawrence Salisbury 2250 

Dispatch of November 26, 1941, from commandant. Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict, to OPNAV, concerning information there on Japanese Fleet lo- 
cations 2256 

Dispatch of November 26, 1941, from Comfourteen, on location of Jap- 
anese Fleet 2256 

Dispatch of December 1, 1941, from special naval observer in London to 
Chief of Naval Operations, on French and German ships believed to be 
sailing from East to Europe, and United States Navy interception 2311 

Dispatch of December 2| 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to special 

naval observer in London, denying our right to intercept vessels 2311 

Excerpt from speech by President Roosevelt on October 27, 1941, relating to 
our pledge to help destroy Hitlerism 2313 

Excerpt from Washington Post, November 27, 1941, page 4, on activities of 

Secretary Hull and conference with Kurusu and Nomura 2323 

Report by Secretary of the Navy to President on Pearl Harbor attack 2338 

Memorandum of March 17, 1942, for Admiral Draemel, giving views of Cap- 
tain Zacharias 2354 

Dispatch of November 7, 1941, from Admiral Hart, concerning ABD-2 2369 

Admiral Stark's reply of November 11, 1941 2369 

Letter of July 22, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Mr. Sumner Welles, con- 
cerning embargoes and July 19, 1941, study by Admiral Turner on em- 
bargo problems 2382 

Letter of commendation from Secretary Knox to Admiral Stark, dated 

March 21, 1942 2402 

Citation from President to Admiral Stark, dated April 9, 1942 2403 

Dispatch from commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, to OPNAV December 2, 

1941, giving Admiral Hart's views on Japanese situation 2417 

Dispatch from Secretary of Navy to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, 

dated December 16, 1941, concerning relief of Admiral Kimmel 2430 

Table on time of transmission to Honolulu by Radio of Navy dispatches 2439 

Memorandum from Superintendent of Naval Observatory concerning dawn 

at Honolulu on December 7, 1941 2439 

Message of August 11, 1945, from General Eisenhower to Admiral Stark, 

expressing appreciation for latter's efforts in European theater 2442 

Army citation of July 15, 1944, to Admiral Stark for Distinguished Service 
Medal 2442 

Excerpt from Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935, Chapter V, Coastal 
Frontier Defense 2455 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXIIl 

Excerpt from an article "I Fly for Vengeance," Saturday Evening Post, ^»se 
October 10, 1942, by Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson 2471 

Memorandum of January 2, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee 
counsel, concerning all-out alert at airfields in Hawaii from December 
1 to 6, 1941 - 2490 

Memorandum of December 27, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee 

counsel, on all-out alert in Hawaii from December 1 to 6, 1941 2491 



PART 6 



Memorandum of December 21. 1945, from committee counsel to Miss Grace 
Tully, concerning photostatic copy of original signed Roberts report and 
drafts of report in President Roosevelt's files 2493 

Memorandum from Miss Grace Tully to committee counsel, concerning 
Roberts report —^ 2494 

Memorandum of January 2, 1946, from committee counsel to Mr. Justice 
Roberts, concerning submission of Roberts report 2494 

Letter of January 4, 1946, from Mr. Justice Roberts to committee counsel, 

concerning delivery of Roberts report to President Roosevelt 2494 

Excerpt from Admiral Kimmel's letter of January 12, 1941, to Chief of 
Naval Operations, concerning assignment as commander in chief, 
Pacific Fleet 2498 

Excerpt from report by Admiral King on Our Navy at War dated March 27, 

1944, regarding strength of Pacific Fleet prior to Pearl Harbor 2504 

Excerpt from joint action of Army and Navy, 1935, concerning security 

of fieet base 2505 

Excerpt from Admiral Bloch's memorandum of October 17, 1941, request- 
ing planes, equipment, and forces 2506 

Endorsement by Admiral Kimmel to Bloch memorandum of October 17, 

1941 2506 

Excerpt from memorandum of November 25, 1941, from Chief of Naval 
Operations to commandant. Fourteenth Naval District, on inability of 
Navy Department to assign planes to district 2507 

Memorandum of September 23, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral 
Bloch on security of aircraft, Hawaiian area, from air attacks at fields 
or stations 2577 

Order issued by Admiral Kimmel on November 28, 1941, after receipt 

of war warning 2662 

Memorandum on January 14, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 

counsel, on establishment of Pearl Harbor 2665 

Letter from Admiral Stark enclosing dispatch of August 28, 1941, con- 
cerning Southeast Pacific 2666 

Letter of January 14, 1946, from Admiral Stark enclosing dispatch of 
October 9, 1941, advising CinCPac of issuance of shooting orders 
in Atlantic 2668 

Dispatches of December 2 and 3, 1941, from OPNAV to CinCAf, relating 

to patrol in Western Pacific 2670 

Table comparing actual damage to fleet at Pearl Harbor and damage 

as stated in report by Secretary of Navy, released December 15, 1941 2674 

Table showing times when various points in Pacific were attacked 2675 

Memorandum of December 11, 194.5, from Navy liaison officer to committee 

counsel, on water-tight integrity of vessels 2676 

C B. Munson report of January 11, 1946, concerning Japanese on west 

coast 2680 

Dispatch of November 28, 1941, from CinCPac to Admiral Halsey 2702 



XXIV LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Editorial in Chicago Tribune of October 27, 1941, entitled "Mr. Knox Spies ^'ago 
a War" 2751 

Report of House Committee on Naval Affairs concerning establishment of 

a naval base at Pari Harbor, dated 1908 2768 

Headline from Honolulu Advertiser, November 30, 1941 2806 

Table showing times of attack at various locations in Pacific 2819 

Photostat of front page of Christian Science Monitor for September 28, 

1944 2820 

Memorandum of January 18, 1946, from Dean Acheson to Mr. Gearhart, 
concerning copy of Tripartite Pact enclosing Department of . State 
translation 2853 

Quotation from Black's Law Dictionary on interpretation of ejusdem 
generis rule 2858 

Quotation from volume 14, Words and Phrases (permanent edition) p. 135, 

on ejusdem generis 2858 

Excerpt from The Situation in the Far East, a general summary on Novem- 
ber 26, 1941, to the Secretary of State, concerning strengthening defense 
of Dutch Guinea 2862 

Quotation from New York Times of December 6, 1942, on time of attack 
on Pearl Harbor 2892 

Letter of November 18, 1941, from Mr. Hamilton to the Secretary of State, 

concerning exchange of certain territories in Pacific for Japenese ships. 2912 

Telegram of February 7, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to the Secretary of 

State, taking stock of political and military situation in the Far East 2917 



PART 7 



Cable of November 29, 1941, from Adjutant General, War Department, to 
commanding general, Hawaii, on reinforcement of outlying islands 2938 

Memorandum from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, concerning 
message of December 5, 1941, from G-2 War Department, to G-2 
Panama 2991 

Report of December 20, 1941, by Fifty-third CA Brigade (AA) on action 

during Pearl Harbor attack S002 

Telegram of January 22, 1946. from Maj. George Leask, former assistant 
signal ofticer, San Francisco Port of Embarkation to General Short, 
concerning radar towers shipped from Oakland to Hawaii 3033 

Memorandum of January 24, 1946, from Army -liaison officer to committee 
counsel, with enclosures relating to General Marshall's message of De- 
cember 7, 1941, to General Short 3091 

Radiogram of December 7, 1941, from General Short to Adjutant General, 

War Department, Washington, reporting attack on Pearl Harbor 3096 

Memorandum of January 24, 1946, from Colonel Lawton, concerning the 

budget estimate for 1941-42 for radar operation 3114 

Letter of January 25, 1942, from General Short to General Marshall, en- 
closing application for retirement 3134 

Memorandum of January 26, 1943, from General Marshall to Secretary of 

War, concerning retirement of General Short 3139 

Memorandum of January 28, 1942, from General Marshall to Adjutant 

General, concerning General Short's retirement application 3139 

Handwritten note by General Marshall to G-1, on opinion of Judge Advocate 

General, concerning General Short's retirement 3140 

Memorandum of February 13, 1942, from Secretary of War to Chief of 

Staff concerning General Short's retirement 3140 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXV 

Memorandum, undated, from Secretary of War to President, concerning Pag* 
retirement of General Short and Admiral Kimmel and handwritten note 
on Secretary of War's proposed wording 3140 

Memorandum of February 14, 1942, from Assistant Chief of Staff to Attor- 
ney General, concerning General Short's and Admiral Kimmel's retire- 
ment applications 3140 

Memorandum, undated, from General Marshall to Secretary of War, for 

decision concerning General Short and Admiral Kimmel 3141 

Memorandum of February 14, 1942, from Attorney General to Secretary 
of War, concerning retirement applications of General Short and Admiral 
Kimmel 3141 

Order of February 17, 1942, directing retirement of General Short 3142 

Undated memorandum from Secretary of War to Judge Advocate General, 

requesting further opinion on General Short's retirement 3144 

Undated memorandum to Secretary of War, signed "G. 0. M.," referring to 

Judge Advocate General's recommendations concerning General Short 3144 

Memorandum of January 27, 1942, from Judge Advocate General for Chief 

of Staff, on course of action with respect to General Short 3145 

Memorandum of January 31, 1942, from Judge Advocate General to Secre- 
tary of War on course of action with respect to General Short 3146 

Memorandum of September IS, 1943, from Secretary of War to General 

Short, concerning waiver of statute of limitations 3151 

Waiver of statute of limitations signed by General Short, dated September 
20, 1943 3151 

Memorandum of July 4, 1944, from Acting Secretary of War to the Presi- 
dent, asking his approval or disapproval of a request from General Short 
for a copy of Roberts Commission proceedings 3153 

lietter of October 20, 1944, from Secretary of War to General Short, con- 
cerning General Short's request for information from records 3154 

Message of December 9, 1941, from War Department to commanding gen- 
eral, Hawaii, requesting report on time of receipt of War Department 
message No. 529 3163 

Memorandum on time of receipt of No. 529 and reply to December 9, 

1941, message 3164 

Memorandum for AC/S, G-2, concerning supplementary Pearl Harbor in- 
vestigation by Major Clausen 3198 

Memorandum for Major Clausen from General Cramer, on unexplored 

leads in Pearl Harbor investigation 3198 

Letter of December 16, 1941, to the President from the Secretary of War, 

on commission for Pearl Harbor investigation 3260 

Letter of January 27, 1942, to Mr. Justice Roberts from Secretary of War, 

concerning report on Pearl Harbor 3261 

Letter of January 31, 1942, from Mr. Justice Roberts to Secretary of War, 

acknowledging January 27 letter 3261 

Report of January 23, 1942, from the Roberts Commission to the President- 3285 

Memorandum of March 17, 1942, for Admiral Draemel from Captain 

Zacharias, on Hawaiian situation 3307 

Memorandum of January 26, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee 
counsel, on comparison of Army and Navy intercepts December 2, 3, 4, 
1941 3324 



PART 8 



Memorandum of January 7, 1946, from committee counsel, to Senator 
Ferguson, enclosing Army and Navy liaison officers' memoranda on Japa- 
nese intercepts in Exhibit No. 1 3423 



XXVI LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Memorandum of January 22, 1946, from committee counsel, for Senator Page 
Ferguson, enclosing memorandum from Army liaison oflScer, concerning 
part 2 of message No. 985 3423 

Letter of December 22, 1943, from Captain SafEord to Captain Kramer, on 

winds message 3698 

Memorandum of December 28, 1943, from Captain Kramer to Captain 

SafEord, replying to December 22 letter 3699 

Personal letter of January 22, 1944, from Captain SafEord to Captain 

Kramer, using code, concerning Pearl Harbor and winds message 3700 

Memorandum of January 26, 1946, from Army liaison otflcer, to committee 

counsel, on comparison of Army and Navy intercepts December 2-4, 1941_ 3779 

Memorandum of February 1, l&i6, from Navy liaison officer to committee 

counsel, on Alusna Batavia dispatch 03.1030 December 1941 3779 

Memorandum of December 6, 1941, for Colonel Holbrook from Lieutenant 
Perry, reporting burning of codes and ciphers at Japanese Embassy 
in Washington 3780 

Memorandum of December 13, 1945, from Army liaison officer, to committee 
counsel, enclosing certificates of search for communications between the 
President and the Prime Minister during period November 24-December 
7,1941 3840 

Memorandum of December 13, 1945, from Lieutenant Commander Baecher 
to Captain SailCord, enclosing "Presidential Directives for Witnesses be- 
fore the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
Attack" — 3883 

Excerpt from memorandum of Admiral R. S. Edwards on Presidential Se- 
curity Directive Regarding Cryptanalytic Discussions 3884 



PART 9 



Letter of January 15, 1946, from Captain Welker to Captain SafEord, an- 
swering inquiry about winds message 4009 

Memorandum of January 14, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee 
counsel, on duty officers in offices of Chief of Staff and General Gerow 
on night of December 6, 1941 4010 

Memorandum of January 31, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel, replying to request by Senator Ferguson on working hours in 
Admiral Turner's office December 6-7, 1941 ; circular letter from Secre- 
tary of Navy, dated November 10, 1941, prescribing duty hours 4010 

Memorandum of February 11, 1946, from Army liaison officer, on message 

No. 900, dated December 6, 1941 4188 

Message of December 5, 1941, from Berlin to Tokyo, requesting that Ger- 
many and Italy be advised of contents of Konoye message 4199 

Berlin to Tokyo message of December 3, 1941, reporting status of German- 
Russian hostilities 4199 

Berlin to Tokyo message of December 3, 1941, reporting on interview with 

Ribbentrop 4200 

Washington to Tokyo message of December 5, 1941, from Kurusu, request- 
ing retention of Terasaki until end of negotiations 4202 

Memorandum from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, giving infor- 
mation on handling of Alusna Batavia dispatch 031030 December 1941 — 4214 

Memoi-andum of January 29, 1946, Navy liaison officer to committee coun- 
sel, on transmission and receipt of OPNAV dispatch 061743 December 
1941 4288 

Secret memorandum of June 10, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to 

Secretary of the Navy, discussing strategic situation in Pacific Ocean__ 4299 

Excerpt from statement of December 1. 1944, by Secretary of AVar that his 

investigation would be continued 4306 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXVII 

Page 
Summary of interrogation of Captain Takahaslii, dated October 20, 1945— 4439 
SafEord citation for Legion of Merit, dated February 11, 1946 4461 

Message from Merle Smith to War Department and Hawaii dated Decem- 
ber 6, 1941, on Dutch activation of plan A-2 because of Japanese naval 

movements out of Palau 4566 

Letter of July 14, 1943, from President Roosevelt requesting military 
attache dispatches after January 1, 1937, indicating possibility of war 4588 



PART 10 



Message of March 25, 1941, from OPNAV to commandant of the Sixteenth 

Naval District, on exchange of Army and Navy intercepts 4721 

Message of March 25, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of 
Staff, commanding general of the Philippine Department, and comman- 
dant of the Sixteenth Naval District, authorizing exchange of informa- 
tion 4721 

Excerpt from instructions to staff of commander in chief. Pacific Fleet, 

July 14, 1941 4829 

Letter of April 22, 1941, from Captain McCollum to Captain Layton, on 

dissemination of diplomatic traffic 4845 

Memorandum of February 12, 1946, from Army liaison officer, on planes 

and guns sent to foreign countries from February 1 to December 7, 1941_ 4873 

Memorandum of February 14, 1946, from Army liaison officer, enclosing 
memorandum on transfers of antiaircraft weapons before December 7, 
1941 4874 

Letter of January 16, 1946, from Mr. Robert Shivers, concerning Japanese 
language broadcasts 4912 

Telegram of November 29, 1941, from Panama Canal Zone, reporting de- 
fensive measures taken 4976 

Confidential letter of November 10, 1941 from CinCPac, on emergency 

basing of aircraft at Wake and Midway 5014 

Citations of John F. Sonnett by Secretary of Navy and Admiral Hewitt, 

dated July 17, 1945 5023 

Memorandum of May 18, 1945 from Admiral Hewitt to Secretary of the 

Navy, on further investigation of Pearl Harbor attack 5025 

Testimony of Lieutenant Lockhart at special Signal Corps investigation, 
concerning detection of Japanese planes approaching Pearl Harbor on 
the morning of December 7, 1941 5076 

Message of December 6, 1941, from American Naval Observer Singapore 
to Admiral Hart, concerning reported pledge of American armed support 
of British in case of Japanese attack 5082 

Letter of February 5, 1946, from Honolulu Star-Bulletin and sworn state- 
ment of Porter Dickinson dated February 1, 1946, concerning Jumbo 
silk advertisement 5115 

List of newspaper headlines in Hawaiian and Honolulu daily papers 5123 

Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 2CL^1 of February 15, 1941, on Se- 
curity of fleet at base and in operating areas 5128 

Navy Department table giving relative strength of Japanese and United 

States Fleets and Air Forces in 1932 5133 

Memorandmn of January 26, 1946, on B-17 flights to Hawaii after De- 
cember 7, 1941 5134 

Memorandum of February 15, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee 
counsel, concerning microfilms received from General MacArthur's head- 
quarters ^,— --- .-_„ ^ „, ^-__„ ^ 5136 



XXVIII LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Memorandum of February 20, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee Page 
counsel, inclosing February 1, 1946, report from General MacArthur's 
headquarters on pre-Pearl Harbor transmission of coded messages from 
Hawaii 5138 

Memorandum of February 6, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee 
counsel, concerning planes sent through Hawaii to Philippines from 
July to December 7, 1941 5142 

Memorandum of January 24, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel, on search for dispatches sent from Navy Department to naval 
commanders in field on December 6 or 7, 1941 5146 

Memorandum of January 25, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel, on governmental authority of United States and Great Britain 
during 1941 over Johnston, Canton, and Christmas Islands 5147 

State Department reply to Senator Ferguson's inquiry whether memoran- 
dum of Mr. Max Hamilton on proposal to transfer Borneo to Japanese 
reached the President 5147 

Message of December 5, 1941, from Washington to American Legation in 
Budapest, requesting transmission of note verbale to Hungarian Govern- 
ment 5148 

Memorandum of May 18, 1945, from Admiral Hewitt to Lieutenant Com- 
mander Baecher, concerning preliminary investigation at Pearl Harbor 
and July 6, 1945, modification of precept 5149 



PART 11 



Undated letter from State Department to committee counsel, replying to 
counsel's request of February 23, 1946, re proposed message from British 
and Dominion Governments to Japan, warning her against invasion 
of Thailand 5165 

Memorandum dated December 7, 1941, from British Embassy, for President, 
for comment to Prime Minister on attached proposed message from 
British and Dominion Governments to Japan warning her against in- 
vasion of Thailand .' 5165 

Paraphrase of telegram (undated) from Australian Minister for External 
Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United King- 
dom, which refers to proposed message to Japan warning her against 
invasion of Thailand and mentions decision of President of United States 
to send message to Jap Emperor, and subsequent intentions if it was not 
answered, including a warning from President to Japan 5166 

Message from OPNAV to CinCAF, December 7, 1941, 071722 re request of Jap 
Government for safe conduct of S. S. Madison on trip to Chingwangtao 
to arrive December 10, 1941 5202 

Message from CinP&c to OPNAV dated December 1, 1941, 010300, sug- 
gesting ship might be sent to Chingwangtao to evacuate marines and 
civilians 5203 

Message from Secretary Navy to CinCAF dated December 1, 1941, 012359, 
granting authority to charter President Madison for trip from Manila to 
Chingwangtao for evacuation of citizens 5203 

Message from CinCAF to Commander, United States Marine Corps forces. 
North China, dated December 2, 1941, 021634, re instructions to withdraw 
marines via President Harrison due to arrive Chingwangtao December 
10 5204 

Message from CinCAF to OPNAV, December 3, 1941, 021820, reporting 
evacuation of Fourth Marines, President Harrison departing Manila 
December 4 for Chingwantao 5204 

Message from OPNAV to CinCAF dated December 8, 1941, 072230. can- 
celing OPNAV 071722 asking CinCAF to give appropriate instructions to 
the President Harrison 5206 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXIX 

Memorandum from Admiral O. S. Colclongh to committee counsel, dated Page 
December 10, 1945, re two dispatches in "White House File" of messages 
maintained at Navy Department for messages sent by President over 
Navy facilities 5213 

Dispatch 261854 dated November 26, 1941, from OPNAV to CinCAF trans- 
mitting message from the President to the Philippine High Commis- 
sioner 5214 

Dispatch 280228 dated November 28, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV trans- 
mitting message from Philippine High Commissioner to the Presi- 
dent - 5214 

Memorandum dated December 4, 1941, from R. E. Schuirmann, Navy Depart- 
ment, for Secretary of State, summing up the situation with reference 
to the Japanese advance as it affected the Netherlands East Indies, 
including CNO recommendation on Davao-Waigeo line 5215 

Message from Foote at Batavia to Secretary of State, dated September 22, 
1941, commenting on press conference held by Rt. Hon. Duff Cooper in 
which he stated he considered the ABCD bloc a reality 5257 

Message dated November 2, 1941, from Ambassador Winant. London, to 
Secretaiy of State, transmitting message from Prime Minister Churchill 
to President on transfer of large British ship to Indian Ocean 5292 

Memorandum dated November 30, 1&45, from Navy liaison officer for com- 
mittee counsel, re time of receipt of message from U. S. S. Ward, by 
Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel, and attached brief of testimony 
appearing in prior proceedings on that point 5293 

Memorandum dated April 2, 1946, from Army liaison officer for committee 
counsel, re testimony as to why B-17's arrived at Oahu from the west 
coast on December 7, 1941, without ammunition, citing testimony appear- 
ing this and prior proceedings on the proposition 5294 

Memoi'andum dated January 25, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for com- 
mittee counsel, re draft and notes made in connection with Admiral 
Inglis' statement of the attack on Pearl Harbor 5294 

Memorandum dated February 19, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for com- 
mittee counsel, re conditions of radio silence in effect in Atlantic and 
Pacific Fleets on December 7, 1941 5294 

Memorandum dated April 2, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee 
counsel, re conditions of radio silence in Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and 
date conditions made effective 5295 

Memorandum dated January 22, 1946, from Army liaison officer for com- 
mittee counsel, re description of notations appearing on radio message 
No. 489, dated January 29, 1941, from The Adjutant General to the com- 
manding general, Hawaii 5296 

Memorandum dated February 27, 1946, from Army liaison officer for com- 
mittee counsel, re number of priority dispatches sent to Hawaii by War 
Department on December 7, 1941, and re priority messages decoded in 
Hawaii before the December 7, 1941, warning from General Marshall 5297 

Message dated December 7, 1941, from General Marshall to commanding 
general, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., No. 529 Seventh, 
text omitted, on original Signal Corps record 5297 

Message appearing on page 14077, as received at Hawaiian Department, 

or original sheet after decoding 5297 

Western Union Telegraph Co. Tariff Book No. 73 for 1941 (cover only)___ 5298 

Western Union regulations for handling United States Government 

messages 5298 

RCA Communications, Inc., Telegraph Tariff, Effective April 1, 1940 

(cover only) 5300 

RCA regulations for handling Government telegrams 5301 

Message dated December 7, 1941, from Colton, acting, for Fort Shafter, 

T. H. No. 530 5301 



XXX LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Memorandum dated February 21, 1946, from Army liaison officer for com- Paee 
mittee counsel, re operation of radar stations at New York City, 
San Francisco, and Seattle on December 7, 1941 5302 

Message dated January 31, 1946, from commanding general, Eastern De- 
fense Command, to War Department, re operation of radar at Atlantic 
Highlands, N. J., Mount Cadillac, Maine, and Fort Hancock on Decem- 
ber 7, 1941 5302 

Memorandum dated February 8, 1946, from commanding officer, head- 
quarters Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, Bradley Beach, N. J., 
for chief. Engineering and Technical Service, War Department, in 
operation of radar on east coast on December 7, 1941 5302 

Memorandum dated February 18, 1946, from adjutant general, headquar- 
ters, First Air Force, Mitchell Field, N. Y., to War Department special 
staff, re photostatic copy of logs of radar sets in operation on December 
6 and 7, 1941, in New York area 5303 

Message dated February 4, 1946, from commanding general, Fourth Air 
Force, San Francisco, Calif., to War Department, re operation of radar 
stations on west coast on Deceml)er 7, 1941 5303 

Copy of letter dated November 25, 1941, from Admiral Nimitz, then Chief 
of Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, to Admiral Kimmel, on 
general subject of radar for fleet 5304 

Memorandum dated Februai-y 6, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for com- 
mittee counsel, re false weather messages intercepted on December 4 and 
5, 1941, by the FCC 5304 

Letter undated, from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner, Office of 
Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State, to committee 
counsel, giving history of lend-lease procedure prior to December 7, 
1941 5305 

Memorandum dated February 25, 1946, from Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes for 
committee counsel, re typographical errors noted in record of his testi- 
mony and his suggestion re possible message he discussed with Colonel 
Sadtler on December 5, 1941 5306 

Memorandum dated February 25, 1946, from Admiral Noyes for Navy 

liaison officer, re typographical errors reported in his testimony 5307 

Letter dated February 27, 1946, from John F. Sonnett to committee coun- 
sel, re typographical errors reported in his testimony 5308 

Letter, undated, from Cordell Hull to committee counsel, re typographical 
errors reported in his testimony and clarification of two answers to 
questions in his testimony 5308 

Memorandum dated March 11, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel, transmitting requested corrections in testimony of Capt. A. D. 
Kramer, United States Navy 5309 

Memorandum dated March 3, 1946, from Capt. A. D. Kramer, United 
States Navy, to committee counsel, forwarding requested corrections 
in his testimony ^ 5309 

Memorandum dated April 1, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel, forwarding requested corrections in testimony of Capt. A. H. 
McCollum, United States Navy 5313 

Letter dated March 18, 1946, from Capt. A. H. McCollum, United States 
Navy, to committee chairman, forwarding suggested corrections in 
his testimony 5313 

Memorandum dated April 4, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee 
counsel, re source material used in preparation of a timetable of Japa- 
nese attacks at outbreak of war in Pacific 5315 

Memorandum dated February 21, 1946, from Army liaison officed for com- 
mittee counsel, re authority of Lieutenant Colonel Clausen to administer 
oaths during the investigation which he conducted regarding the Pearl 
Harbor attack at the direction of the Secretary of War, citing Article 
of War 114 5316 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXXI 

Memorandum dated February 1, 1946, from Army liaison officer for com- Page 
mittee counsel, re additional information relating to the initial Japanese 
attack against the Philippines 5316 

History of the Fifth Air Force (and its predecessors), part 1, December 

1941 to August 1942— December 1941 installment 5318 

History of Thirtieth Bombardment Squadron (H) and Nineteenth Bom- 
bardment Group (H), December 7, 1941, to December 31, 1942, includ- 
ing reports by Maj. W. P. Fisher 5330 

History, Twenty-fourth Pursuit Group in the Philippines from November 

1, 1940, through December S, 1941 5333 

Record of interview with Major Heald, communications officer. Fifth Air 
Force Service Command, re activity of Fifth Air Base Group in Philip- 
pines from November 15 to December 8, 1941 5335 

Memorandum dated January 15, 1946, from Lt. Col. Joseph B. Mitchell, 
General Staff Corps, for Army liaison officer, re organization of the Far 
East Air Force, with enclosures 5336 

Letter dated February 11, 1946, from G. E. Sterling, Assistant Chief Engi- 
neer, Federal Communications Commission, to committee counsel, trans- 
mitting statements of FCC employess re monitoring for "winds" mes- 
sage at Hawaii 5340 

Memorandum dated February 7, 1946, from Lee R. Dawson to Chief, Radio 

Intelligence Division, FCC re "winds messages" 5340 

Memorandum dated February 4, 1946, from Lee R. Dawson to Chief, Radio 

Intelligence Division, FCC x"e "winds messages" 5340 

Memorandum dated February 5, 1946, from Earl A. Nielsen to Chief, Radio 

Intelligence Division, FCC i*e "winds message" 5340 

Letter dated February 5, 1946, from John H. Homsy to George E. Sterling, 

FCC, re "winds messages" 5341 

Memorandum dated February 7, 1946, from Tom B. Wagner to Chief, Radio 
Intelligence Division, FCC, re "winds messages" 5341 

Message dated February 6, 1946, from monitoring officer, Theodore H. 
Tate, Koloa Kauai, T. H., to Chief, Radio Intelligence Division, FCC 
re monitoring for "winds messages" 5341 

Memorandum dated February 5, 1946, from Waldemar M. Klima to Chief, 
Radio Intelligence Division, FCC, re "winds message" 5342 

Letter dated February 14, 1946, from G. E. Sterling, FCC, to committee 
counsel, re "winds message" and transmitting an affidavit by A. Prose 
Walker, an FCC employee 5342 

Affidavit dated February 13, 1&46, from A. Prose Walker to Mr. George E. 

Sterling, FCC, re "winds message" 5343 

Letter dated February 18, 1946, from G. E. Sterling, FCC, to committee 
counsel, transmitting information received from Hawaii re "winds 
message" 5343 

Letter dated February 11, 1946, from supervisor, Hawaiian monitoring 

area, to Chief, Radio Intelligence Division, FCC, re "winds message" 5343 

Memorandum dated January 9, 1946, from State Department liaison officer 
to committee counsel, re telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary 
of State, dated August 16, 1941 5344 

Memorandum dated January 9, 1946, from State Department liaison officer 
to committee counsel, re telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary 
of State, dated August 16, 1941 (five sections) 5344 

Memorandum dated December 11, 1945, from Navy liaison officer to com- 
mittee counsel, re watertight integrity of major vessels in Pearl Harbor 
December 7, 1941, transmitting table of inspection 5347 

Memorandum dated December 11, 1945, from Navy liaison officer to com- 
mittee counsel, re condition of watertight integrity of major vessels in 
Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, transmitting statement compiled from 
ships logs of various ship insijections on December 5 and 6, 1941 5347 



XXXII LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Memorandum dated January 29, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to com- Page 
mittee counsel, re further check of logs of ships in Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941, concerning watertight integrity 5350 

Memorandum dated April 8, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel, re official notification to Navy Department of air raid on Pearl 
Harbor and orders sent by Navy Department to fleets, re execution of 
war plans against Japan 5351 

Memorandum dated February 28, 1946, from Army liaison officer for com- 
mittee counsel, re microfilm received from General MacArthur's head- 
quarters in Tokyo, containing material from Japanese files on United 
States-Japanese negotiations prior to the Pearl Harbor attack 5352 

Memorandum dated April 5, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel, re document presented to Secretary of State Byrnes, contain- 
ing information of Japanese plans leading up to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, based on subsequently obtained information 5352 

Reconstruction of Japanese plans leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor 
(based on information obtained subsequent to December 7, 1941), which 
is the document presented to Secretary of State Byrnes and referred 
to at transcript page 5852 

Memorandum dated February 8, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for com- 
mittee counsel, re report of Japanese air reconnaissance over Philip- 
pines or other United States possessions prior to December 7, 1941, en- 
closing message dated November 23, 1941 (220228) from Alusna Singapore 
to OPNAV re Gilbert Islands, message dated November 24, 1941 (240610) 
from Governor, Guam, to OPNAV, re Guam, and memorandum on inter- 
rogation of Captain Takahashi on October 20, 1945, re Philippines ; and 
mentions interview with Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga, re Guam and 
dispatch from marines on Wake Island, re report of Pan-American clipper 
sighting Jap planes east of Guam 5359 

Memorandum dated March 7, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee 
counsel, re testimony of Vice Adm. T. S. Wilkinson, and letter from 
Admiral Ingersoll to Admiral Wilkinson, re scope of activity of Office 
of Naval Intelligence prior to Pearl Harbor attack 5361 

Letter dated May 20, 1946, from Senator Homer Ferguson to committee 
counsel concerning War Department documents relating to the develop- 
ment of long-range heavy bombers as proposed by General Andrews and 
Colonel Knerr 5464 

Letter dated February 4, 1941, from commander in chief. Pacific Fleet, H. 
E. Kimmel to his task force commanders concerning aircraft in Hawaiian 
area, maximum readiness of 5471 

Memorandum dated December 5, 1941, of conversation between the Secre- 
tary of State and the British Ambassador concerning cooperation with 
Dutch East Indies against Japan 5472 

Dispatch No. 1906 dated December 8, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, 
to State Department advising of the delivery to the Japanese Foreign 
Minister of the President's message of December 6, 1941, to the Japanese 
Emperor 5473 

Dispatch No. 286 dated December 6, 1941, from State Department to Ameri- 
can Embassy, Chungking, advising of the delivery of the President's 
message that date to the Japanese Emperor, with instructions to repeat 
the message to Chiang Kai-Shek for his information 5473 

Dispatch No. 823 dated December 7, 1941, from State Department to Ameri- 
can Embassy, Tokyo, relating the attack on Pearl Harbor and delivery by 
the Japanese Ambassador of the 14-part note 5473 

Memorandum dated May 3, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel concerning orders purporting to delay the return to Pearl Harbor 
in December 1941 of Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey, as mentioned 
in testimony of Captain Zacharias, p. 8734 5474 

Memorandum dated January 31, 1946, from committee counsel to Navy 
liaison officer requesting information set forth above 5474 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXXIII 

Memorandum dated May 23, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee Page 
counsel concerning memorandum dated November 12, 1941, prepared 
by Capt. A. D. Kramer, United States Navy, regarding dissemination 
of Magic material to the White House, enclosing a copy of such paper ob- 
tained from Capt. L. S. SafEord, United States Navy 5475 

Memorandum dated May 23, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel in respect of statements made by Lt. Clarence E. Dicliinson in 
the October 10, 1942, issue of the Saturday Evening Post, concerning 
orders under which he flew a plane from the U. S. S. Enterprise from 
November 28 to December 7, 1941 5476 

Memorandum dated May 22, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel concerning the winds code as referred to in the so-called history 
written in 1942 of the activity of the Navy Department Communications 
Unit, about which Admiral Hart testified was involved in his conversation 
with Captain Safford, and messages quoted therein 5477 

Memorandum dated May 16, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel and attached copy of study made by Captain Kramer of the 
times of delivery to the White House of certain translations of Japanese 
intercepts 5480 

Memorandum dated April 26, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel, enclosing two Navy communications with Rear Adm. Cato D. 
Glover, United States Navy, concerning notation in OPNAV watch officers 
log on December 6, 1941 of contact with Admiral H. R. Stark, and second 
memorandum to counsel dated May 7, 1946, concerning compilation of 
location of naval forces requested by Secretary of War 5482 

Memorandum dated May 8, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel concerning report that reconnaissance was not being carried 
out at Hawaii due to wear on planes and crews 5484 

Memorandum dated May 10, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel concerning search of Navy files for message from Capt. John 
Creighton, Singapore, to Admiral T. C. Hart on December 4, 5, or 6, 
1941, concerning sighting of Japanese convoy 5484 

Memorandum dated May 2, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel concerning air patrols operating from Oahu prior to December 
7, 1941, enclosing Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 2CL— 41 dated 
February 15, 1941, and Pacific Fleet confidential memorandum No. 
lCM-41 dated February 25, 1941 5485 

Memorandum dated May 9, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel concerning report in exhibit No. 160 of information from a 
Captain Smith, mentioned by the President 5491 

Memorandum dated May 1, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee 
counsel concerning intercept and translation of message No. 1405 from 
Berlin to Tokyo, and memo dated April 15, 1946, from Navy liaison 
officer on the same subject 5492 

Memorandum dated May 3, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel concerning monthly reports of Navy intercept stations at Winter 
Harbor, Maine, and Cheltenham, Md 5493 

Memorandum dated April 26, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee 
counsel concerning exchange of corresix»ndence between President Tru- 
man and Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel, retired, enclosing copies of the cor- 
respondence 5493 

Memorandum dated April 26, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning 
any report of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy on the report 

of the Roberts Commission 5495 

Draft of proposed charge against Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, United 

States Navy, retired, for a general court martial 5495 

Memorandum dated April 23, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning 
cards prepared in Navy Department relating to execute message for the 
winds code 5497 

79716— 46— pt. 1 3 



XXXIV LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Memoraudum dated April 18, 1946, from Navy liaison officer correcting Page 
memorandum dated January 25, 1946, concerning the destruction of 
drafts and work materials used in preparation of statement made by 
Admiral Inglis before the committee 5498 

Memorandum dated December 13, 1945, from Army liaison officer to com- 
mittee counsel concerning production and distribution of B-17 bombers 
as of September 1, 1941 5498 

Memorandum dated April 16, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning 
transmission of dispatch 061743 of December 1941 from OPNAV to 
CINCPAC for action and to CINCAF for information. (This dispatch 
authorized destruction of secret and confidential documents in outlying 
islands) 5498 

Memorandum dated April 17, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning 
phrase "CINCPAO and CINCAF provide necessary escort" appearing in 
dispatch 252203 of November 1941 (exhibit No. 3) 5499 

Memorandum dated April 17, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning 
time table of Japanese attacks — source of material, relating to time of 
attacks at Clark Field and Nichols Field in the Philippines 5499 

Memorandum dated April 15, 1946, from Navy liaison officer enclosing four 

intercepted Japanese messages relating to Japanese news broadcasts — 5500 

Memorandum dated May 1, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning 
memorandum mentioned in letter dated April 4, 1941, from Admiral 
Stark to Admiral Kimmel 5502 

Memorandum dated May 1, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning copies 
of orders transferring ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and vice 
versa from May to December 1941 enclosing letter dated April 7, 1941, 
from OPNAV to CINCPAC 5502 

Memorandum dated April 30, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning 
identity of ship on chart dated December 5, 1941 (exhibit No. 109) located 
to north of Oahu 5504 

Memorandum dated April 29, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning 
transfers of ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific betvpeen May 1, 1940, 
and December 7, 1941 5505 

Memorandum dated April 23, 1946, from Army liaison officer concerning 
duty officer log^ kept for offices of Secretary of War and Chief of Staff 
between November 1 and December 7, 1941 5506 

Memorandum dated May 21, 1946, from Army liaison officer concerning 
Japanese estimate of United States air strength in Hawaiian area prior 
to the attack on December 7, 1&41 5507 

Memoranda dated from April 9 to May 23, 1946, concerning information 
obtained by the Australian Minister as to proposed action of the Presi- 
dent in the event the Japanese did not reply to his message of December 

6, 1941, to the Emperor 5508 

Letter dated November 2, 1941, from committee chairman to President 
Truman's secretary, suggesting Presidential memorandum to executive 
offices regarding scope of committee inquiry, and reply dated November 

7, 1945 5510 

Suggested corrections in his testimony by Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias 5511 

Suggested corrections in his testimony by Admiral H. R. Stark 5512 

Suggested corrections in his testimony by Rear Adm. John R. Beardall 5513 

Suggested corrections in his testimony by Henry C. Clausen 5513 

Interrogations and answers by Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink, United 

States Army 5514 

Interrogations and answers by Vice Adm. William A. Glassford, United 

States Navy 5516 

Memorandum for committee counsel's tiles concerning exhibits Nos. 1 
and 2 5522 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS XXXV 

Letter dated November 15, 1945, from Senator Ferguson to committee Page 
counsel concerning intercepted Japanese messages from January l to 
July 1. 1941 5523 

Letter dated December 17, 1945, from Tyler Kent to committee chairman— 5524 

Correspondence relating to State Department papers concerning the Tyler 

Kent affair 5524 

Correspondence relating to all messages between this Government and the 

Bi-itish Government for November 25, 26, and 27, 1941 5530 

State Department memorandum of conversation dated November 27, 1941, 
concerning British parallel action desired re our export policy to French 
Indo-China 5532 

Dispatch No. 5727 dated November 27, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, 
London, to State Department concerning British economic study of 
Japanese industrial potential 5533 

Copy of letter dated November 25, 1941, from Dean Acheson to Mr. R. J. 

Stopford, financial counselor, British Embassy 5534 

Memorandum dated May 22, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee 

counsel concerning former Secretary Stimson's diary 5535 

Letter dated May 26, 1946, from Admiral H. R. Stark to committee chair- 
man concerning information which was furnished by Capt. H. D. Krick, 
USN, regarding the activities of Admiral Stark on December 6, 1941 — 5543 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



W PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK 



THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a. m., in the 
caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. 
Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M, Hiinnaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[2] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

AH those in the auditorium will please be seated. 

Before we start, the Chair desires to admonish the audience that 
we are glad to have them here, but in view of the difficult acoustics in 
this room, it will make it necessary for the committee to use these 
microphones. We must ask the audience to refrain from any sort of 
conversation or any sort of demonstration during these hearings, any 
applause or otherwise. 

Also I think it is advisable to say to our friends, the photographers, 
we are glad to cooperate with you in getting all the pictures you may 
wish to take so long as it does not interfere with these hearings. 

During the testimony, while the witnesses are on the stand, the 
photographers will not be permitted to occupy this space here iij 
front of the committee. 

Take whatever pictures you want to take and then leave this con- 
gested area here. 

The last time I sat on a committee in this room, I could not see 
the witness half the time, because of the photographers standing 
between me and the witness, trying to take him with his hands up, 
or something like that. 

We must insist that during these hearings, while the witness is on 
the stand and testifying, that the photogi*aphers will not occupy this 
space between the committee and the [3] witness and counsel. 

I want to make the announcement in advance so that there will 
not be any misunderstanding. It applies to everybody alike. 

I believe the members of the committee are all here. 

Mr. Mitchell, as counsel for the committee, we are ready to proceed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman 



' Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript 
of testimony. 



2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before you proceed, I would like 
to make one comment for myself and others. I want to record my 
regret and protest, at the start of the hearings at this time, and as 
has previously been said, and I would like to have that entered in 
the record, and that is this : 

It has only been within the past week that the members of the 
Executive Department have had the permission, under notification of 
the President's order to submit the exhibits so they will be in the best 
order, and I have been given a stack of papers, over a thousand pages, 
which it is essential to go over in order to conduct any intelligent 
cross-examination. 

I hope my fears will be disappointed, my fears that this will 
result in confusion and delay, but I do think it ought to be made a 
matter of record at this time that we regret this somewhat premature 
beginning of this inquiry. 

[4] The Chairman. The Chair desires to be reasonable in re- 
gard to that. The committee at one time, some 2 or 3 weeks ago, I for- 
get the date, unanimously decided to begin hearings today; that is, 
those who voted. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like the record to show that 

The Chairman. Those who voted in the committee, voted without 
dissent to begin the hearing today. Two members were absent and two 
were present and not voting. 

At a meeting later, a week ago, or a week or 10 days ago, a motion 
was made to postpone the hearings from today until the 23d day of 
November, which is the day following Thanksgiving, and that motion 
was voted down. 

The situation that confronts us, that confronts all the members of 
the committee, is that documents have been given to us as quickly and 
as practicably as counsel obtained them. Inasmuch as these hearings 
will probably last several weeks, it occurred to the Chair that we will 
have, as we go along, ample opportunity to familiarize ourselves with 
the testimony brought before us today, without attempting to read any 
documents before we begin. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a statement 
on the record. 

Tlie Chairman. Yes, go ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I had made a request [5] 
previously that the committee be furnished these exhibit copies at least 
10 days prior to the hearing. If I had had some assistance, I would 
have been able to have carried down the exhibits that had been given to 
me on Wednesday and on Tuesday. Over a thousand of them have 
been placed in our hands. Many of them it is impossible to read be- 
cause of the job of photostating them. Therefore, it is just a physical 
impossibility to go over the papers prior to this hearing. 

Wliile I will do my very best, I do want the record to show that we 
have not had these exhibits in this form properly indexed. 

Here is the first one. It is over 200 pages, and no index to it. It 
has been just a physical impossibility to go over them intelligently, 
although I want to say on the record, I will do my best to go over 
them as the hearing goes along, and it may be essential that we recall 
witnesses in order that we may properly examine and obtain all of 
the facts. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 6 

The Chairman. Of course, if I may say so, there would be no objec- 
tion to recalling any witness by the committee. The exhibits were 
given to all members at a given time. They have been given to mem- 
bers as soon as it was possible, and as fast as it was possible to obtain 
them. There are large quantities of them. We are all laboring under 
the same handicap, that we have not been able to read them all since 
[6] we got them. 

As I said a moment ago, I think as the hearings go on, we can famil- 
iarize ourselves with them sufficiently to permit us to know each day 
what would be expected in the way of testimony, and prepare for that 
day. 

Senator Ferguson. The record ought to also show that I have made 
many requests for other things. We do not have all the files here at 
the present time. 

The Chairman. In order that the record may be correct, as the re- 
quests have been made, the records have been sought, and have been 
either delivered, or are in the process of preparation. It is manifestly 
impossible to provide all the exhibits at one time. As soon as they 
were ready, they were delivered to the committee, as soon as they 
could be obtained. 

Senator Ferguson. May I understand that it is a fact as to the 
exhibits that have been requested, that the staff has them but they 
are not at the present time ready for delivery? That is my under- 
standing. 

[7] The Chairman. The committee has no way to know what 
personal requests have been made either in writing or orally by mem- 
bers of the committee to the counsel, by individual members. Counsel 
explained to the committee that as fast as these exhibits could be ob- 
tained and could be copied for each member and for others, that they 
would be supplied. 

Now, Mr. Mitchell, will you proceed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, to open the record, there are some 
informal matters. I have some documents 

Senator Brewster. Before he proceeds I renew my motion. 

The Chairman. Let's have order, please, in the committee room. 

Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, to open the record formally, there 
are a few documents that should be entered. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Mitchell. First is the concurrent resolution of the Senate un- 
der which the committee was organized. 

(S. Con. Res. 27 follows:) 

[S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Cong., 1st sess.] 
[S] CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) , That there 
is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of 
whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President 
pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than 
three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the 
Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall 
not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the 
committee, and shall bo filled in the same manner as in the case of the original 



4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

selection. The committee sliall select a chairman and a vice chairman from 
among its members. 

Sec. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the 
facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the 
attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of 
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of 
Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation, 
together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable. 

[9] Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact 
that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall 
not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining 
his military status for credits in the service to wliich he belongs. 

Sec. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is 
authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, 
and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), 
to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the 
production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, 
to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such 
expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report 
such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. 

(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such 
experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems neces- 
sary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation pre- 
scribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties. 

(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall be 
paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the 
contingent fund of [10] the House of Representatives, upon vouchers 
signed by the chairman. 

Passed the Senate September 6, 1945. 
Attest : 

Leslie L. BiFi-LE, Secretary. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 11, 1945. 
Attest : 

Souxp Trimble, Clerk. 



Mr. Mitchell. Then there is the record of the members of the 
committee. 

(The list of the committee members is as follows :) 

MEMBEES OF THE COMMITTEE 

Alben W. Barkley, Kentucky (chair- Jere Cooper, Tennessee (vice chairman). 

man). J. Bayard Clark, North Carolina. 

Walter F. George, Georgia. John W. Murphy, Pennsylvania. 

Scott W. Lucas, Illinois. Bertrand W. Gearhart, California. 

Owen Brewster, Maine. Frank B. Keefe, Wisconsin. 

Homer Ferguson, Michigan. 

[11] Mr. Mitchell. Next is a list of all counsel, including coun- 
sel for a number of witnesses who will be called. 

(The list of counsel for the committee is as follows :) 

Counsel for the committee : 

Chief counsel, William D. Mitchell. 
Chief assistant counsel, Gerhard A. Gesell. 
Assistant counsel, Jule M. Hannaford. 
Assistant counsel, John E. Masten. 

Executive secretary for the committee : 

Mrs. Flo E. Bratten ; office, 357 Senate Office Building ; telephone extensions 
1159 and 1189. 

Counsel for General Short : 

Capt. Patrick H. Ford. 2601 Munitions Building, Wnr Dopartment, exten- 
sion 7-8109. 

Counsel for Admiral Kimmel : 

Charles Rugg, Building N. Room l-N-90. Navy Department, extension 
3292; Lt. Edward B. Hanify, Navy Department, extension 6-3036. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5 

[12] Counsel for Admiral Stark: 

Hugh H. Obear, Southern Building, "Washington, D. C, telephone National 

2155. 
Lt. Conulr. David Richmond, Navy Department, extension 2326. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then there is the correspondence, with which you are 
familiar, between the chairman of the committee and the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the White 
House, asking for the appointment of the liaison officers and the 
responses from those Departments and the President, 

There is also a letter here from the estate of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
respecting the late President's files in the Archives Building. 

(The correspondence referred to follows :) 

OCTOBEE 5, 1945. 
The Honorable .James F. Byrnes, 

The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. 
Deae Me. Seceetaey: On behalf of the joint congressional committee to investi- 
gate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate 
someone in the State Department to whom counsel for the committee may apply 
at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records 
and to arrange for the attendance before the committee of [13] witnesses 
from the State Department. We believe such an arrangement should expedite 
the work of the committee. 

Now that the war is ended, we hope tliat reasons of national security should 
not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from 
the committee or their counsel, and that the committee will be free to use any 
pertinent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings and all 
evidence material to our inquiry will thus be made public. 
Respectfully, 

Alben W. Baekley, 
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. 



The Seceetaey of State, 
Washington, October IS, JOJfS. 
The Honoi-able Alben W. Barkley, 

United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
Deae Alben : Replying to your letter, I have asked Under Secretary Acheson to 
make available any information the State Department may have which is desired 
by the committee with reference to the investigation referred to by you. 
[Ilf] Sincerely yours, 

James F. Byenes, 



OCTOBEE 5, 1945. 
The Honorable Robeet P. Patteeson, 

The Secretary of War, Washington, D. G. 
Deae Mr. Seceetaey : On behalf of the joint congressional committee to inves- 
tigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate 
someone in the "War Department to whom counsel for the committee may apply 
at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records and 
to arrange for the attendance before the committee of witnesses from the armed 
forces. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the work of the 
committtee. 

Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should not 
require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from the 
committee or their counsel and that the committee will be free to use any i)erti- 
nent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings, and all evidence 
material to our inquiry will thus be made public. 
Respectfully, 

Alben W. Baekley, 
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. 



6 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[15] WAB DEaPAETMENT, 

Washington, October 10, J9^f5. 
Hon. Alben W. Bakkley, 

Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the 
Pearl Harlor Attack, United States Senate. 
Deak Senator Baeicley : In accordance with the suggestion in your letter of 
October 5, Lt. Col. Harmon Buncombe has been designated as the representative 
of the War Department for the purpose of assisting the joint congressional com- 
mittee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor. He will have full access to 
all pertinent files and records of the War Department and will arrange for the 
attendance before the committee of witnesses from the Army. 

The War Department is prepared to furnish the committee and their counsel all 
information in its possession material to the investigation and to have the com- 
mittee make free use of any pertinent evidence. Also, the War Department will 
be glad to assist the committee in its desire to hold public hearings. 
Sincerely yours, 

Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War. 



OCTOBEE 5, 1945. 
[16] The Honorable James Forrestal, 

The Secretary of the Navy, Washington, B. C. 
Dear Mr. Secretary : On behalf of the joint congressional committee to in- 
vestigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you desig- 
nate someone in the Navy Department to whom counsel for the committee may 
apply at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's 
records and to arrange for the attendance before the committee of witnesses 
from the armed forces. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the 
work of the committee. 

Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should 
not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from 
the committee or their counsel, and that the committee will be free to use any 
pertinent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings and all evi- 
dence material to our inquiry will thus be made public. 
Respectfully, 

Alben W. Barkley, 
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. 



\_17] The Seceetaey oe the Navy, 

Washington, October 11, 1945. 
The Honorable Alben W. Barkley, 

Chairman, Joint Committee on Investigation of the 
Pearl Harbor Attack, United States Senate. 
Deae Senator Barkley : Reference is made to your letter dated October 5, 
1945, suggesting the designation of a Navy Department representative with 
whom counsel for the committee may deal in matters concerning information 
and witnesses desired by the committee. 

In accordance with your request, Rear Adm. O. S. Colclough, USN, the Assistant 
.Judge Advocate General of the Navy, is designated to receive and act upon 
counsel's request for information from the Navy Department's records and for 
the attendance of naval witnesses. 

In addition to the foregoing suggestion, your referenced letter expresses the 
hope that, by virtue of the war's end, reasons of national security do not require 
the withholding from the committee, or its counsel, any information material 
to the investigation, and that the committee, whose hearings will be public, will 
be free to use any pertinent evidence. Please be assured that the Navy De- 
partment stands ready to render full assistance to the committee and its counsel, 
[18] making available from its records nil information material to the 
investigation. 

Sincerely yours, 

James Forrestal. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 7 

[19] October 5, 1945. 

The Honorable Hahby S. Tkuman, 

The White House, Washington, D. C. 
Deab Mk. Peesident : On behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee on the 
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, I respectfully suggest for your con- 
sideration that someone in the Executive Offices be named by you, to whom the 
committee and its counsel may go to obtain information from the files in the 
Executive Office bearing on the matter under investigation, and that the com- 
mittee may be free to disclose at its public hearings information so obtained. 
Respectfully, 

Alben W. Bakkley. 
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
Attack. 



[20] The White House, 

Washington, October 13, 194^/. 
Hon. Alben W. Bakkley 

United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Senator Barkley: Replying to your letter of the 5th, regarding the 
appointment of someone in the Executive Offices to consult with the committee 
and its counsel, I am appointing Judge Latta, who has been in charge of all the 
files in the White House for the past 28 years. 
Any information that you want will be cheerfully supplied by him. 
For your information all the files of the previous administration have been 
moved to the Archives Building and Hyde Park. If there is any difficulty about 
your having access to them I'll be glad to issue the necessary order so that you 
may have complete access. 
Sincerely yours, 

Harry S. Truman. 



[21] Estate of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 

J20 Broadway, New York 5, October 31, 1945. 
Dr. Solon J. Buck. 

Archivist of the United States, 

National Archives Building, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Sir: On behalf of the executors of the estate of the late Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, it is hereby requested that you permit Miss Grace G. TuUy to withdraw 
from the files of the late Mr. Roosevelt, now at the National Archives for storage 
and safekeeping, and make available to the Senate-House Joint Committee 
Investigating the Pearl Harbor Disaster such papers relating to the subject of 
the investigation as it may request. 

This is to certify that such papers are being withdrawn and made available to 
said committee at the instigation of the President of the United States and with 
the approval of the executors of the estate. 
Tours very truly, 

Earle R. Koons. 

[^2] Mr. Mitchell. Then there is a list of liaison officers who 
have been designated by the various departments, with their addresses 
and telephone numbers, which may be of service to the members of 
the committee. 

(The list of liaison officers follows :) 

[2S] List of Liaison Officers, Appointed by Agencies 

War Department : 

Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe ; telephone, extension 2335 ; room 4D761, Pentagon. 
Capt. R. M. Diggs ; telephone, extension 2335 ; room 4D757, Pentagon. 
Capt. C. Roger Nelson ; telephone, extension 73157 ; room 2G686, Pentagon. 
Lt. Bennett Boskey ; telephone, extension 71470 ; room 4D757, Pentagon. 



8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Navy Department: 

Rear Adm. Oswald S. Colcough, Assistant Judge Advocate General; tele- 
phone, extension 3365 ; room 2307. 
Lt Comdr. John Ford Baecher, United States Naval Reserve; telephone, 
extension 2451 ; room 1083A. 

[2^] State Department: 

Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson ; telephone, extension 2101 ; room 

2031/2. 
Edward Miller ; telephone, extension 2210 ; room 280. 
Joseph Ballantine; telephone, exten.sion 2210; room 288. 

White House : 

Judge Maurice C. Latta. 

Miss Grace Tully (Roosevelt papers). 

FBI : 

D. M. Ladd, Assistant Director ; telephone, Executive 7100, extension 2121 ; 
room 1742, Justice. 

[25] Mr, Mitchell, Tlien there follows the directive of August 
28, 1945, by the President forbidding the disclosure of technique or 
procedures or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit, the 
agencies that break codes. 

(The directive of August 28, 1945, follows :) 

[2C] [Copy] 

August 28 1945. 
Memorandum for — 

The Secretary of State. 

Tlie Secretary of War. 

The Secretary of the Navy, 

The Attorney General. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The Director of the Budget. 

The Director of the Office of War Information. 
Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are 
hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent release to the 
public, except with the specific approval of the President in each case, of: 
Information regarding the past or present status, technique, or procedures, degree 
of success attained, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit acting under 
the authority of tlie United States Government or any Department thereof, 

Habby S. Teuman. 

[^7] Mr. Mitchell, There is the order of October 23, 1945, by 
the President lifting the ban of that directive for the benefit of this 
commit tee, 

(The memorandum follows:) 

[28] Memorandum for — 
The Secretary of State. 
The Secretary of War. 
The Secretary of Navy, 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
In order to assist the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of 
tlie Pearl Harbor Attack in its desire to hold public hearings and make public 
pertinent evidence relating to the circumstances of that attack, a specific excep- 
tion to my memorandum dated August 28, 1945, relating to the release of informa- 
tion concerning cryptanalytic activities, is hereby made as follows : 

The State, War, and Navy Departments will make available to the Joint 
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, for such use as the 
committee may determine, any information in their possession material to the 
investigation, and will respectively authorize any employee or member of the 
armed services whose testimony is desired by the committee to testify publicly 
before the committee concerning any matter pertinent to the investigation. 

(Signed) Harry S. Truman 
HARRY S. Teuman. 
Approved October 23. 1945. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 9 

[29] Mr. Mitchell. There is another order, of November 7, 
1945, by the President respecting leave for men in the services to talk 
freely with the committee and vohmteer information. 

(The memorandum of November 7, 1945, follows:) 

[30] The White House, 

Washington, November 7, IOj^S. 
Memorandum for the Chief Executives of all Executive Departments, Agencies, 

Commissions, and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Section 3 of the concurrent resolution creating the Joint Congressional Com- 
mittee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack reads as follows : 

"Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that 
such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not 
be used against him in any court proceeding or held against him in examining 
his military status for credits in the service to vphich he belongs." 

In order to assist the joint committee to make a full and complete investiga- 
tion of the facts relating to the events leading up to or following the attack, you 
are requested to authorize every person in your respective departments or 
agencies, if they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel, to give any 
information of which they may have knowledge bearing on the subject of the 
committee's investigation. 

You are further requested to authorize them whether or [Sll not they 
are interrogated by the committee or its counsel to come forward voluntarily 
and disclose to the committee or to its counsel any information they may have 
on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think may not 
already have been disclosed to the committee. 

This directive is applicable to all persons in your departments or agencies 
whether they are in the armed services or not and whether or not they are called 
to testify before the joint committee. 

Haeky S. Truman. 

[32] Mr. Mitchell. Then there is a memorandum by the Presi- 
dent under date of November 9, 1945, enlarging on the last-mentioned 
memorandum. 

(The memorandum of November 9, 1945, follows:) 

[SS] Memorandum for the chief executives of all executive departments, 
agencies, Commissions, and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

With further reference to my letter of November 7. 1945, addressed to the 
above executives, you are requested further to authorize every person in your 
respective departments or agencies, whether or not they are interrogated by the 
committee or its counsel, to come forward and disclose orally to any of the 
members of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the 
Pearl Harbor Attack any information they may have on the subject of the in- 
quiry which they may have any reason to think has not already been disclosed 
to the committee. 

This does not include any files or written material. 

[Handwritten:] O. K. 

H. S. T. 

[34.] Mr. Mitchell. Those formal documents I hand to the re- 
porter to open the record in that way. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I think it would also be proper 
and helpful if the record of the original presentation of the resolu- 
tion by the chairman, and the discussions on the floor at that time — 
not subsequent — at that time, be inserted in the record so that there 
may be a full interpretation of what was the purport of the hearings. 

The Chairman. There being no objection in connection with the 
introduction of the joint resolution, the statement made by the author 
of the resolution, and the discussion that took place at that time, will 
be inserted in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that the full 
discussion that took olace at that time be inserted in the record. 



10 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. That is what I intended. 

The Chairman. That is what I understood the Senator from Maine 
requested. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

I would like also to have the request of the committee to the Presi- 
dent, the final draft of the order, inserted, in connection with the order 
which was made. I think you are familiar with that, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Without objection, that will be inserted in con- 
nection with these papers.^ 

[-5^(2] (Excerpts from the Congressional Record of September G, 
1945, including the discussion and adoption of S. Con, Res. 27, ordered 
to be printed at this point, follow :) 

Mr. Baekley. Mr. President, inasmuch as I shall be compelled to leave the 
Chamber shortly on an important matter and may not be present during the en- 
tire call of the morning hour's business, I ask unanimous consent that I may be 
permitted at this time to make a brief statement and, following that, to introduce 
a concurrent I'esolution. 

The President pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and 
the Senator from Kentucky may proceed. 

Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor occurred 
on December 7, 1941. 

On December IS, President Roosevelt appointed by Executive order a board 
or commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by 
Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941. 

This commission was composed of Justice Owen J. Roberts, as chairman, Ad- 
miral William H. Standley, Admiral J. M. Reeves, Gen. Frank H. McCoy, and 
Gen. Joseph T. McNarney. 

The commisison made its report to the President on January 29, 1942, and this re- 
port was immediately made public. 

In June 1944, by joint resolution approved June 13, Congress in effect di- 
rected the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to designate ap- 
propriate boards or courts of inquiry "to ascertain and report the facts relating 
to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 
December 7. 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper." 

The board appointed on behalf of the War Department was composed of Lt. 
Gen. George Grunert, as president, Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. 
Walter H. Frank. 

This board made its report to the Secretary of War on October 20, 1944, and 
the report was released to the public on Wednesday, August 29, 1945. The re- 
port consists of more than 300 pages of typewritten matter detailing the cir- 
cumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack, indulges in criticisms of certain military 
and other officials, and makes no recommendations to the Secretary of War. 

The board appointed on behalf of the Navy consisted of Admiral Orin G. Mur- 
fin, as president. Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, and Vice Admiral Adolphus 
Andrews. 

This board finished its inquiry on October 19, 1944, then adjourned to await 
the action of the convening authority. 

The report of the Navy board went into some detail concerning the circum- 
stances of the Pearl Harbor attack, and recommended that no further proceed- 
ings be had in the matter. 

This report was also made public by the President on August 29, 1945. 

Since these reports were made public, I have spent a large portion of my time 
studying them, and also, in connection with them, I have reread the report of the 
Roberts commission. 

The official report of the board appointed by the Secretary of War I have here, 
and, as I have said, it consists of 304 pages of typewritten matter on what we 
call legal size paper, not letter size. The report of the board appointed by the 
Secretary of the Navy contains various divisions, all of which add up to something 
like 100 pages of typewritten matter. 

Reading these reports and studying them, insofar as I could in the limited time 
Bt my disposal, requii'ed my attention not only during the daytime since the 



^ See the suggested memorandum approved by the President in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5510. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 11 

reports were made public on last Wednesday, but required practically all of two 
nights, in order that I might read not only the reports, but the statement or 
summary made by the Secretary of War based upon the report of the Army 
board and the statement made by the Secretary of the Navy based upon the 
report of the naval board of inquiry, as well as other documents pertaining thereto. 
I have not been away from the city of Washington during the entire adjournment 
since the 1st day of August, when the Senate adjourned. 

Mr. President, I shall not at this time attempt to discuss these various reports 
in detail, but after studying them to the extent possible in the time at my 
disposal, I am convinced that a further searching inquiry should be made under 
the authority and by the direction of the Congress of the United States. 

In forming this opinion, Mr. President, I cast no reflections upon the ability, 
the patriotism, the good faith, or the sincerity of the boards which have thus far 
investigated and reported upon the Pearl Harbor disaster, nor on any member 
of these various boards. They are all outstanding American citizens and officials, 
who have rendered signal service to their country over a long period of time in 
various capacities. That includes the members of the Roberts commission, 
the War Department board, and the Navy Department board, as well as all those 
officials who have commented upon these reports or are in any way involved 
in them. 

But the.se reports, Mr. President, are confusing and conflicting when compared 
with one another, and to some extent contain contradictions and inconsistencies 
within themselves. 

Under these cii-cumstances it is not strange that wide.spread confusion and 
suspicion prevail amoing the American people and among the Members of 
Congress. 

In these several reports men in the armed services and in civilian positions 
of executive responsibility and authority are subjected to criticism, and the 
defenses are themselves inconsistent and contradictory. It would be easy now, 
if time allowed and if it were necessary, to point out these inconsistoncies between 
the report made by the naval board and the report made by the Army board, and 
both of them as compared to the Roberts report. I do not deem it necessary to go 
into that at this time. 

It is my belief, therefore, Mr. President, arrived at immediately upon the 
conclusion of my study of these reports, that under all the circumstances Congress 
itself should make its own thorough, impartial, and fearless inquiry into the 
facts and circumstances and conditions prevailing prior to and at the time of the 
Pearl Hai'bor attack, no matter how far back it may be necessary to go in order 
to appraise the situation which existed prior to and at the time of the attack. 

This inquiry. Mr. President, should be of such dignity and authenticity as to 
convince the Congress and the country and the world that no effort has been 
made to shield any person who may have been directly or indirectly responsible 
for this disaster, or to condemn unfairly or unjustly any person who was in 
authority, military, naval, or civilian, at the time or prior thereto. 

Ever since the day of Pearl Harbor there have been discussions of courts 
martial in the Army and in the Navy. We have here extended from time to 
time the statute of limitations pertaining to courts martial. The report of 
neither the naval nor the military board of inquiry recommends any further 
proceedings in these matters. It is my xmderstanding that the law is that in the 
Army no man has a legal right to demand that he be court-martialed. Charges 
must be filed against an Army officer or an enlisted man setting out the offense 
which he is alleged to have committed. He has no right, as I understand the law, 
to go into the War Department and demand that he be court-martialed upon 
any accusation or any charge of misconduct on his part. 

[34&] I understand that in the Navy any officer or man who is charged with 
an offense that would constitute a violation of the Articles of War or Navy Regu- 
lations has the right to demand or request — I am not certain that he has the 
right to demand, but has the right to request, and it may be to demand — that he 
be given a court martial. 

So that as it applies to any Army officer who may have been responsible prior to 
or at the time of this attack, as I understand, he has no right to demand that 
he be given a trial in order that he may be vindicated or that the facts may be 
brought out. Whether in the Navy formal request has been made by any naval 
officer for a court martial I am not in position to say, though the newspapers 
have cai'ried stories that such a request has been made. 

But if it were possible or appropriate, Mr. President, to subject high-ranking 
military or naval officers to courts martial, tbe trials might be conducted iu 



12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

secret, and would relate themselves principally, if not entirely, to the guilt or 
innocence of the person against whx)m the specific charges were leveled. I do 
not here feel called upon or competent to determine whether court martial 
should be inaugurated in any case involving any officer of the Army or Navy 
or any person in the armed forces. 

But I am convinced that the Congress and the country desire an open, public 
investigation which will produce the facts, and all the facts, so far as it is 
humanly possible to produce them. 

Such an investigation should be conducted as a public duty and a public 
service. 

It should be conducted without partisanship or favoritism toward any respon- 
sible official, military, naval, or civilian, high or low, living or dead. 

It should be conducted in an atmosphere of judicial responsibility, and it 
ought to be so complete and so fair that u,o person could doubt the good faith of 
the report and the findings made in it, or those who make it. 

It ought not to be conducted or undertaken for the purpose or with the sole 
view of vindicating or aspersing any man now in office, or who has been in office 
during the period involved. 

It ought not to be undertaken or conducted for the purpose of enhancing or 
retarding the welfare of any political party, or any person now in office, or any 
person who desires or aspires to hold public office. 

It should not be conducted for the purpose of attempting to bedaub the escut- 
cheon of any innocent man, high or low, living or dead, with the infamy of 
Imputed wrong. 

It should not be conducted with the purpose of gratifying the misanthropic 
hatreds of any person toward any present or past public servant, high or low, 
living or dead. 

It should not be conducted for the purpose of casting aspersions upon the 
names and records of men who have rendered outstanding service to their coun- 
try and to the world ; nor should it be conducted for the purpose of whitewashing 
any person who may have been guilty of wrongdoing in connection with the 
whole affair. 

Such an investigation should look solely to the ascertainment of the cold, un- 
varnished, indisputable facts so far as they are obtainable, not only for the 
purpose of fixing responsibility, whether that responsibility be upon an individual 
or a group of individuals, or upon a system under which they operated or co- 
operated, or failed to do either. It should be conducted with a view of ascertain- 
ing whether, in view of what happened at Pearl Harbor and prior thereto, or even 
subsequent thereto, it might be useful to us in legislating in regard to the oper- 
ations of our military and naval forces and the executive departments having 
control of them, or which are supposed to work with them. 

In my opinion this investigation should be a joint effort of the two Houses of 
Congress. If the two Houses should undertake separately to investigate, going 
their separate ways, the result might be divergent reports made by the two 
Houses, which would .contribute to further confusion in the minds of the public, 
as well as in the minds of Members of Congress. Whatever the findings may 
be, they will carry more weight and bear greater authority if both Houses of 
Congress jointly and concurrently conduct the investigation. 

For these reasons, Mr. President, acting in my capacity as a Member of the 
Senate and in my capacity as majority leader of this body, I am submitting a 
concurrent resolution directing such an investigation by a joint committee of the 
two Houses, consisting of five Members from each House, no more than three of 
whom shall be members of the majority party, to be appointed by the respective 
Presiding Officers of the two Houses, with all the authority they will need ; and, 
in order that there may be no unnecessary delay in making the investigation and 
the report to Congress, directing that such report be made not later than Janu- 
ary 3, 1946. 

It is now nearly 4 years since disaster occurred at Pearl Harbor. During 
the war, for certain military reasons, it was deemed inexpedient to do what I am 
now proposing. I believe that that decision on the part of the Congress and the 
Government as a whole was a wise decision. But the war is now over, and there 
is no military reason of which I am cognizant which would make it advisable 
any longer to delay a complete revelation of all the facts and circumstances 
leading up to this disaster, and the events which occurred while it was in progress. 
Mr. Pi-esident, I am submitting this resolution with the full knowledge and 
approval of the President of United States. After I had studied the reports 
and made up my own mind as to what ray duty was, I called upon the President 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 13 

and discussed the matter with him, because obviously I would uot waut to take 
such a step without discussing it with him or at least letting him know what I had 
in mind and what I thought about it. He not only approved but urged that I be not 
dissuaded for any reason from my purpose to submit the resolution calling for this 
investigation. 

Also, since the preparation of the resolution, I have discussed the matter with 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and I have his assurance that if 
and when the Senate acts upon the concurrent resolution, it will receive prompt 
consideration by the House. 

Mr. President, I express the earnest hope, which the President shares, that 
the two Houses may promptly agree to the resolution ; that the investigation 
may proceed forthwith, without further delay ; and that the Congress and the 
country may expect a full and impartial report, without regard to the conse- 
quences, within the time limit designated in the I'esolution. I send the resolution 
to the desk and ask that it be read and appropriately referred. 

[S^c] Mr. Fekguson. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? 

Mr. Bakkxet. I yield. 

Mr. Febguson. I think it would be appropriate to ask that the concurrent reso- 
lution be immediately considered and agreed to. 

Mr. Baekley. That is what I had in mind. I should like to ask that that be 
done. Under the rule, a resolution providing for an investigation and calling 
for the expenditure of funds is supposed to be referred to a standing committee, 
reported back, and then referred to the Committee to Audit and Control the 
Contingent Expenses of the Senate. Personally I should like to obviate those 
necessities, and I suppose it could be done by unanimous consent. I make the 
parliamentary inquiry now as to whether, notwithstanding the rule, the Senate 
could, by unanimous consent, proceed to consider and agree to the concurrent 
resolution. 

The PBEsmENT pro tempore. It will be done by unanimous consent. 

Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield? 

Mr. Baekley. I yield. 

Mr. Febguson. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the 
concurrent resolution. 

Mr. Bakkley. I think it would be appropriate to read the resolution first, for 
the information of the Senate. If I could obtain unanimous consent for its 
present consideration, I should be extremely happy. 

The Pbesident pro tempore. The concurrent resolution will be read for the 
information of the Senate. 

The concurrent resolution ( S. Con. Res. 27) was read as follows : 

"Resolved by the Senate {the House of Representatives concurring) , That there 
is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
attack to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of 
whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President 
pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than 
three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the 
Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall 
not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the 
committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original 
selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from 
among its members. 

Sec. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the 
facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor 
in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate 
and the House of Representatives not later than .January 3, 1946, the results of 
its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable. 

"Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that 
such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not 
be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining 
his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs. 

"Sec. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is 
authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, 
and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), 
to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the 
production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to 
take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such 
expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report 
such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. 

70716— 46— pt. 1 4 



14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of 
such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems 
necessary, but the compensation so fixed sliall not exceed the compensation 
prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable 
duties. 

"(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,0(X), shall be 
paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the 
contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the 
chairman." 

Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, in view of the Chair's ruling that the concurrent 
resolution may now be considered by unanimous consent, without reference to 
a committee, I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the con- 
current resolution and for its immediate adoption. 

The PitEsiDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator 
from Kentucky? 

Mr. White, Mr. Ferguson, and Mr. Lucas addressed the Chair. 
The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Kentucky yield; and if 
so. to whom? 

Mr. Baukley. I yield to the Senator from Maine. I have promised to yield 
to the Senator from Michigan, and later I shall yield to the Senator from 
Illinois. 

Mr. WHrrE. Mr. President, in all ordinary circumstances I should be moved 
to object to such a request as has been made, for I think that by and large we 
progress most wisely if we observe the rules of the Senate as to procedure in 
this body. But I believe there is so nearly unanimous sentiment of approval 
in this Chamber in respect to a resolution similar, if not identical, to that offered 
by the Senator from Kentucky that I have no purpose to object. 

I do wish to say, Mr. President, that I know of at least one resolution of 
similar purport prepared by a Senator uimmi this side of the aisle whose pur- 
pose it was to introduce it at some proper time, but I take it that the two 
resolutions are not dissimilar in their object. Their purpose is the same; and 
so far as I am concerned, I am not going to object to the request made by the 
Senator from Kentucky. I think the Senate overwhelmingly approves the 
purpose of his resolution and of his request. 
Mr. Bakkley. I thank the Senator. 

Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President 

Mr. Barkley. I yield now to the Senator from Michigan. 

Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, I had prepared to offer a concurrent resolu- 
tion nearly identical in terms to the concurrent resolution which is now befdre 
the Senate. I merely had in mind that probably seven Members from each 
House would be better becau.se of the question of attendance, but I should like 
in the time of the Senator from Kentucky to say a few things now in relation 
to why I believe a resolution such as the one which has just been read should 
[S^d] immediately be adopted. 

Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me to do so, I shovdd 
like to make a remark in regard to his attitude and situation. I appreciate his 
attitude and his cooperation. I did not know that he contemplated the in- 
troduction of a resolution until I saw mention of it in the newspapers last 
night. But in the meantime I had already prepared mine and, as I have said, 
I had conferred with the President and with others about it. So it was not 
prepared and offered in any way for the purpose of interfering with the in- 
troduction of any other resolution. But I felt probably it should be offered and 
considered and, if possible, adopted immediately. So that the country will un- 
derstand that the Senate, and. I am sure, the House of Representatives, feel 
that they owe a public duty to go into this whole matter; and I wish the 
Senator from Michigan and all other Senators to know that I deeply appreciate 
the cooperation which seems evident in regard to the matter. 

Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, I appreciate and I understand the situation. 
It is not a question as to who introduces or offers the resolution, but it is a 
matter of having the job done. I should like to make a few remarks at this 
time regarding why I believe such a resolution should be adopted. 

At the very outset I want to make clear precisely what I think should be 
investigated. The question is why our Army and Navy were not able either 
to avoid or to cope with the initial attack launched by the Japanese at Pearl 
Harbor. Everybod.v — those who opposed the war and those who favored it 
— was shocked at the swift liquidation of our Pacific naval strength ; I ahi 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 15 

sure that everybody, men of every point of view — will agree that we ought to 
have the whole truth about this unfortunate event. The only question is as to 
how this inquiry should be made. 

I am sure that no one will question that some inquiry is necessary. The 
President of the United States dispatched Secretary Knox to Hawaii immedi- 
ately after the battle to investigate, because he felt the people ought to know 
the truth. In 5 days the Secretary of the Navy was back with his report. 
He said: 

■'The United States services were not on the alert against the surprise air 
attack on Hawaii. This fact calls for a formal investigation which will be 
initiated immediately by the President. Further action Is, of course, dependent 
on the facts and recommendations made by this investigating board. We are 
all entitled to know it if (a) there was any error of judgment which con- 
tributed to the surprise, (b) if there was any dereliction of duty prior to the 
attack." 

Only a few days later, the President named a commission of five, headed 
by Justice Owen J. Roberts, to go to Hawaii and make a fuller investigation. 
However, the Executive order for the Roberts inquiry read as follows : 

"The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for 
sound decisions whether any dereliction of duty or errors of judgment on the 
part of the United States Army or Navy personnel" — 

We in the Senate must note that it referred just to Army or Navy personnel — 
"contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion 
mentioned; and, if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were 
responsible therefor." 

That meant that the commission could go only into the question of dereliction of 
duty or error of judgment of the Army and Navy personnel. 

The report of that commission became a subject of endless discussion and 
questioning. 

The last report of the War Department said that their Board had made a 
careful review of the record and exhibits of the Roberts commission. It further 
said that the Board had been materially helped and enlightened by the report and 
record of the Roberts commission, and that "we append to this report a section 
indicating the additional information and documents which have been made 
available as a result of our extended investigation, and which probably did not 
come to the attention of the Roberts commission ; or at least were not mentioned 
in either the testimony, documents, or report of the Roberts commission." 

In June 1944 Congress by resolution directed the Army and Navy to proceed 
forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe of 
December 7, 1941. Under that aiithority the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the 
Navy Court of Inquiry filed their reports in October 1944. That was 9 months 
ago. But the nature of their findings was not made known until last week. This 
delay in turn created the impression in many minds that something wajs being 
suppressed. I do not wish to make any criticism of this myself. It can be argued 
that it would have been unwise to publish these findings while we were still 
engaged in active warfare and when unity of purpose and spirit against the 
enemy was essential. Some persons even claimed military security was involved. 
Nevertheless, men — being what they are — had their curiosity and their suspi- 
cions whetted about the contents of these reports by the very act of withholding 
them. 

I am sure the officers charged with the investigations have performed their 
duties with a full sense of their responsibilities. Now that they have made 
known their conclusions the whole situation remains more clouded than ever. 

Returning to the Army report, it says fiu'ther : 

"We have not had the opportunity, nor the organization, to comb personally 
and exhaustively the ofiicial files, but we have called for the pertinent letters, 
documents, and memoranda. We believe that practically all of them have been 
secured." 

We note that they do not say that all have been secured, but that "practically" 
all have been secured, "although we have found a few files from which important 
and vital papers are missing. In many instances we have found these docu- 
ments elsewhere, or we were able to prove them through copies in other hands." 

This quite clearly shows that the Army board felt the investigation was not 
complete. Neither the Secretary of the Navy nor the Secretary of War was 



16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

satisfied with the report from the respective boards. When the Navy report was 
delivered to him last October, Secretary Forrestal said : 

"The Secretary is not satisfied that the investigation has gone to the point of 
exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that his own 
investigation should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in 
possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted." 
[SJfe] Last October, when the Army report was delivered to him, the Secre- 
tary of War said : 

"In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have de- 
cided that my o^\^l investigation should be further continued until all the facts 
are made as clear as possible, and until the testimony of every witness in jws- 
session of material fact can be obtained, and I have given the necessary direc- 
tion to accomplish this result. 

Thex-eafter the Army detailed Lieutenant Colonel Clausen of the United 
States Army to continue an ex parte investigation into the Pearl Harbor catas- 
trophe, and the Navy Department detailed Vice Adm. Henry K. Hewitt to continue 
the Navy Department investigation as an ex parte investigation into the catas- 
trophe. 

While Admiral Kimmel was entitled to counsel and to take part in the pro- 
ceedings before the Navy Board of Inquiry, General Short was entitled to 
counsel but had no right to take part in any of the proceedings. These con- 
tinued investigations made by the Secretaries of War and Navy have not been 
given to the public. There is no evidence that the continued investigations 
dispose of the conflict between the two reports and fix the responsibility on the 
basis of persuasive evidence. That being true. Congress must try to find out 
the facts for the public and for itself. The two boards are quite far from being 
in agreement, and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have 
each issued critical opinions of the findings of their own boards. 

The last published findings have added to the list of the accused names which 
are still more eminent than those of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. As 
matters now stand Admiral Stark, who was Chief of Naval Operations at the 
time of the Pearl Harbor attack, and General Marshall, who led our armies 
through the great struggle just crowned with victory, and former Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull, have been held to share in the guilt of the defeat. The 
President of the United States has agreed with some of the findings and has 
disagreed with others. 

Certainly no responsible statesman will quarrel with the curiosity of the 
people about this now badly confused episode. The curiosity of the people 
about their public affairs is the scfle bulwark of a republican government. There 
are too few nations left in which there is a public opinion. This court of public 
opinion is a valuable institution in the United States, and must be able to 
function. 

It is a citizen's duty to be curious. But it is also his right to have the whole 
truth about even small matters, and, of course, for a greater reason to have 
the whole truth about a subject which has cost so much in the blood of our 
sons, and the treasure of our people. 

But there is still another force to be recognized here. I refer to the Ameri- 
can's sense of fair play. It is a powerful feature of our national character. 
First, we had two distinguished officers who were accused of neglect of duty, 
and removed from their commands. Everyone expected they would be tried. 
But they have never been tried. And because they are officers of the armed serv- 
ices they are not at liberty to talk up with the same freedom possessed by an 
accused private citizen. They have not had a trial and they have not even 
had the opportunity of defending their honor in the public press. I do not 
want to enter into a discussion of the conditions which may have made this 
possible. 

The only point I want to make is that our Government cannot behave in this 
way without creating in the minds of the masses of our people a feeling of 
sympathy for these men. Our Government cannot afford to do this sort of 
thing. To do so violates a fundamental principle of conduct which our boys and 
girls learn in the very first years of their schooling, namely, the great prin- 
ciple of American fair play. It violates the fundamental principle of the right 
of the accused to a fair trial with the opportunity of presenting his side in 
public. 

Every consideration — the demands of public policy, the obligation of justice to 
the men who fell in the battle, the duty of fair play to those who have been 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 17 

accused— cries out for some foi-m of inquiry which will bring to light the 
whole truth. 

Here we have Cordell Hull, a distinguished former Member of this body, 
publicly and officially charged with a dereliction of duty, partly responsible for 
the loss of thousands of lives. We cannot subject him to a court martial, but 
we must not permit that stain to remain on his name without invoking all the 
powers of the Government to uncover all the facts. He is entitled to have those 
facts produced. He is entitled to more than mere conclusions based on part of 
the facts. All the facts cannot be produced by an Army court martial of Gen- 
eral Short, or a naval court martial of Admiral Kimmel. The Pearl Harbor 
tragedy was a single great episode in which many services, such as the Army, 
the Navy, and the State Department participated. The controversy relating to 
the subject cannot be settled by a group of trials and inquiries in which each 
service will be the judge of its own actions. There is in the Government no 
agency capable of examining the whole chapter and compelling the production 
of all the facts, except the Congress of the United Stntes. 

What is true of Mr. Hull is true of General Marshall. He has presided over 
our military forces in the greatest war of our history, and has, in the public mind, 
managed that great task with courage and ability, and certainly with success. 
On the very day of final victory he is confronted with the judgment of an 
Army board that the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, which began the war, was 
due in part to his failure to perform his duty. We cannot leave that slur upon 
the name of General Marshall without giving him the full benefit of a complete 
and unprejudiced publication of every fact. Here again we cannot do it in a 
court martial. General Marshall ought not to have to submit to a court martial, 
For if he escapes the judgment of any Army court martial he may run into n 
verdict of guilty against him in the eyes of the public by a Navy court martial of 
Admiral Kimmel, where he would have no right to defend himself. 

All these men. Secretary Hull, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Kim- 
mel, and General Short, have an inescapable claim upon the conscience of 
the American people for a full and honest inquiry into the whole incident, and 
tliat such inquiry be conducted by a Congress which will proceed in the opeii. 
with full opportunity for every side to participate in the proceedings. 

I do not see how Congress can ignore the things that are being said through- 
out the country about all this subject. Newspapers and magazines have offered 
their versions of this distressful event, and millions of people have read The 
accounts. Whether they are true or false is not the question here. Some of f hen^ 
are certainly not true, because the numerous versions themselves contradict 
each other quite as freely as do the official versions. But this subject is one 
which must be set straight, and I can think of no way to do so except by a con- 
gressional investigation, and because it is so important, nothing less than a com- 
mittee which represents both Houses of Congress should make the inquiry. 

The reason why this inquiry is needed is as I have pointed out. The Roberts 
inquiry was limited by the Executive order. The Army report covers 304 pages, 
but when we reach page 241 it jumps suddenly to page 294. A whole chapter 
of 52 pages of the Army board's findings has been omitted by order of Secretary 
Stimson. The Navy report contains a clause which indicates that the Navy 
board of inquiry was directed to leave out certain testimony. In fact, the Navy 
board said : 

[34n "The details of this information are not discussed or analyzed in 
these findings, the court having been informed that their disclosure would militate 
against the successful prosecution of the war." 

This tells us plainly that the Army board of review and Navy court of inquiry 
left these details out not on their own motion but under orders from the Secre- 
tary of War and Secretary of the Navy. Let us concede that there may have been 
a reason for omitting this testimony during the war ; there is certainly no reason 
for hiding it now. It is unthinkable that the Congress and the public shall not 
have access to this testimony in order to appraise justly the correctness of the 
findings of the Army board and Navy court of inquiry. 

There are points of serious difference between the Army and Navy board re- 
ports. For example, one of them fixes the date when General Marshall and Ad- 
miral Stark petitioned the President that no ultimatum be issued to Japan as of 
November 5, the other as of November 27 — a very vital dilTerence. 

A congressional investigation is the only means of producing all the facts. 
All we have now are the conclusions of the Roberts commission and the conclu- 



18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sions of the Army and Navy commissions, but the public has been denied all the 
facts and testimony on which these are based. 

There is a feature of these reports which is certain to impair public confi- 
dence in them regardless of their internal soundness. In this whole episode 
not only the conduct of the leading commanders but of the Secretary of War, the 
Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of State is involved. The press has al- 
ready caught the significance of who was responsible for appointing the Army 
board and the Navy court of inquiry. It has been noted that neither report 
makes any criticism of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, bur 
that the Army report goes out of its way to castigate the Secretary of State, who 
had no hand in appointing his judges. These are reasons why neither the Army, 
the Navy, nor the State Department, or any tribunals within them, should make 
the final investigations. It is also a reason why courts martial cannot properly 
determine all the facts of this case. Actually this is no longer a case where Kim- 
mel and Short, Marshall and Stark, Stimsou and Knox and Hull, along with 
various subordinate commanders of both services, are on trial. Stated more cor- 
rectly, the case brings in the responsibilities of so many that what we have on 
trial is the Army, the Navy, and the State Department, and only Congress has 
the authority to find all the facts. 

The Army report puts blame on General Marshall and Secretary Hull. The 
Secretary of War criticizes the findings of his own board and disagrees with the 
verdict against General Marshall. The President of the United States approved 
the verdict in part and criticized it in part. He dissented from the criticism of 
Secretary Hull and General Mai-shall. As disclosed by the Army report, Mr. 
Stimson furnished most of the testimony against Secretary Hull. Secretai'y 
Stimson declares that Hull gave the Japanese an ultimatum on November 26, 
while Secretary Hull stoutly denies this. 

Whatever point there may be in these differences, which are merely samples 
which come to mind, the fact remains that a great deal of information which has 
been withheld because the war was raging at top height 9 months ago must now 
be made public. 

If we, the Congress, do not do this, history will do it, and will also appraise our 
neglect. 

Mr. Lucas and Mr. White addressed the Chair. 

The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Kentucky yield, and if so, 
to whom? 

Mr. BAKKI.EY. I yield to the Senator from Illinois. 

Sir. Lucas. Mr. President, I should like to make an inquiry with respect to the 
concurrent resolution. In section 2 I find the following : 

"The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relat- 
ing to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Terri- 
tory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941." 

I should like to ask the able majority leader whether or not he considers that 
under this resolution the committee would have the power to investigate, let us 
say, what took place at Wake Island on the morning of the 7th of December 1941, 
or what took place in the Philippines on December 7, 1941, or the following day. 
In other words, are we going into the investigation of what transpired in the 
Pacific on December 7, 1941, or does the concurrent resolution confine the investi- 
gation solely to what happened at Pearl Harbor? Would the committee be able 
to make further investigation as to what happened in the Pacific at that time? 

Mr. Baekley. In answer to the question .propounded by the Senator, in my 
opinion the language of the concurrent resolution is broad enough to permit the 
committee to investigate anything which happened prior to the attack at Pearl 
Harbor, or led up to it, the circumstances which produced it, as well as the conse- 
quences of the attack. I realize that it would be impossible to include in a single 
resolution reference to all the islands in the Pacific which were attacked either 
concurrently with the attack on Pearl Harbor or shortly thereafter. The attack 
on Pearl Harbor was the attack which precipitated the war, which brought us into 
the war, and all the controversy has revolved around the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
But I use the language "relating to the attack" so as to make it possible for the 
committee to investigate anything which took place prior to it, or any of the con- 
sequences which may have fiowed from the attack. The Philippine attack, the 
Guam attack, and the Wake Island attack were all within a radius of a few liours, 
and they were related to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So I think the language is 
sufiiciently broad to cover those attacks. 

Mr. White. What the Senator from Kentucky has just said about the language 
"relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor" in 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 19 

part answers the question I had in mind. The language '"relating to the attack 
made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941"' is in 
itself rather restricting. But the Senator has said it is his intention, and lie 
thinks it is within the authority of the resolution, to have an investigation of all 
the facts and all the circumstances and all the events preceding the day of the 
attack upon Pearl Harbor which had any relation to that tragic day's events, and 
also anything which may have happened subsequent thereto which throws any 
light upon the occurrences preceding December 7 and happening on that day. 

Mr. Barkley. The Senator from Maine is absolutely correct. Anything which 
relates itself to the attack, whether it occurred prior to the attack or whether it 
grew out of tlie attack, all has to do with the attack, because without that attack 
presumably we would not at that time have been involved in the war, we would 
not have declared war on the following day. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the 
key attack of the Japanese armed forces in that area,, and these other attacks were 
incidental to it. So I think they all relate to the attack on Pearl Harbor, whether 
they happened prior to it or after that attack. 

Mr. White. And the resolution gives practically plenary powers of investiga- 
tion with respect to all matters which occurred before the time of Pearl Harbor 
or thereafter, which relate in any way to the occurrence of the attack? 

Mr. Barkley. Yes. Whether those things happened in Washington, or whether 
they happened in the Philippine Islands, or whether they happened in Japan, 
or whether they happened anywhere else in the world — if they relate themselves, 
prior to or subsequently, to the attack, the committee can go into them. I think 
the language is broad enough to permit that, 

Mr. Taft. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? 
[34ff] Mr. Barkley. I yield. 

Mr. Taft. I have some doubt whether the resolution should not be amended 
to be somewhat broader, to include the Philippines ; to include, so to speak, the 
Japanese attack on the United States. I assume that the Senator's remarks, 
however, will be brought to the attention of the House of Representatives when 
it considers the resolution, and if the language is too narrow that his remarks 
may have the effect of broadening it. 

Mr. Barkley. Of course, the Senator realizes that I have no pride of language. 
I consulted with our experts in the framing of the resolution, and it was thought 
that its terms were broad enough to cover anything that had any connection 
with Pearl Harbor. Inasmuch as the attack on Pearl Harbor constituted the 
key event or episode around which all this investigation revolves, it seems to me 
that the committee would have plenary authority to go into any matter anywhere 
in the world that had anything to do with it. But if anyone can offer better 
language I certainly would not stand in opposition to it. I think, however, 
the language is broad enough. If we name Wake Island, the Philippines, and 
some other place, we run a risk, by naming more than the Pearl Harbor incident, 
of by inference excluding other things that the committee would undoubtedly 
want to go into. 

Mr. Taft. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further? 

Mr. Barkley. Yes. 

Mr. Taft. Does the Senator consider that the language is broad enough to go 
back to the beginning of the war, that is, I mean to the general policy, the appli- 
cation of the Neutrality Act. the shipment of scrap, and so forth? 

Mr. Barkley. Yes. I think it is broad enough to go back to the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria or to any other period in past history that can in any 
way be connected with or related to the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Taft. l\Ir. President, since the Senator is the author of the concurrent 
resolution, and since that is his interpretation of it. I am willing to accept that 
interpretation. 

I\Ir. Ferguson. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? 

Mr. Barkley. I yield. 

Mr. Ferguson. "The language I had prepared was that "the committee shall 
make a full and complete investigation of the facts surrounding the attack and 
the events and circumstances leading to the attack made by the Japanese armed 
forces on the Territory of Hawaii December 7. 1941." But I am glad to have 
the explanation of the able majority leader that his language is intended to cover 
this entire field. I think that the battles of the Philippines and of Guam and 
elsewhere were merely battles in our war. 

Mr. Barkley. We were practically at war when those things happened. 

IMr. Ferguson. Yes; that is right. The .spark was ignited, or the button was 
pushed, as was said in the report, by the attack at Pearl Harbor. 



20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Baekley. That is correct. 

Mr. FEaiGusoN. That was the initial attack. 

Mr. Baeklet. Yes. 

Mr. Brewster. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? 

Mr. Babkley. I yield. 

Mr. Brewstehj. I wish to associate myself completely with what the Senator 
from Kentucky has stated today, and I think he has rendered a very great public 
service to his country. I do not mean to intimate any doubt as to the concurrent 
resolution .containing language properly calculated to implement what the Senator 
has said. 

I recognize, however, the very great importance of what we are doing, and 
that, under well-settled rules of parliamentary construction, the language of 
the concurrent resolution, if unambiguous, must control, irrespective of the 
very illuminating discussions here, and of anything which the Senator himself 
may have said. 

I do feel that, having delayed 4 years the consideration of this matter by the 
Congress, certainly the public interest will not be seriously prejudiced if we 
should delay 24 hours, and send the concurrent resolution to an appropriate 
standing committee which may consider this whole question as to whether or 
not the language is calculated to carry out what is obviously the unanimous 
desire of the Senate. 

I hesitate to be the only Member who apparently is concerned, but I frankly 
do feel that this matter should go to the appropriate standing committee. 

Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator that I hope nothing 
will happen today in the Senate which will create the impression that we are 
quibbling over the adoption of the concurrent resolution. If any broadening or 
any change might have to be made to the language, since the measure must go 
to the House, I myself will take the responsibility of conferring with the Members 
of the House who will be interested in the matter, with the view of broadening 
the language as may seem necessary ; and I hope the Senator, under those cir- 
cumstances, will not object to the present consideration of the concurrent 
resolution. 

Mr. Brewster. Mr. President, I frankly do not possess the agility of mind 
which is possessed by the 95 other Members of the Senate to render an opinion 
from the very hasty consideration given this matter on the floor of the Senate 
today, as to whether or not this concurrent resolution implements the mar- 
velously adequate speech of the Senator from Kentucky. I do think that not 
only his interest but that of the country and of the Senate will be served by at 
least pausing to consider whether or not this concurrent resolution is well cal- 
culated to carry out what is obviously our unanimous purpose. I think the 
suggestion that the 24 hours delay, which is all that would be required to send 
the matter to an appropriate standing committee, cannot have great weight. 

Mr. Barkley. Of course I do not know how long it would take a standing com- 
mittee to meet and deliberate about the matter. 

Mr. Brewster. To which committee does the Senator from Kentucky consider 
the matter should go? 

Mr. Barkley. It would go, according to the advice I have received from the 
parliamentarian, to the Committee on Naval Affairs. It might go to either the 
Committee on Military Affairs or to the Committee on Naval Affairs, but inas- 
rrtuch as Pearl Harbor was a naval base, and the greater proportion of the 
damage was done to the Navy, it has seemed appropriate that it go to the 
Committee on Naval Affairs. 

Mr. Brewster. Well, I feel that certainly that committee could meet quickly. 

Mr. BARKLEY. There is another matter Involved. If the concurrent resolution 
is sent to the Committee on Naval Affairs under the rule and comes back to 
the Senate it must then go to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent 
Expenses of the Senate, which would involve further delay. I think no sub- 
stantial loss, either in the matter of broadening the resolution, or anything 
connected with it, would be incurred by allowing it to be adopted now without 
having to go through the routine of two committees before we can secure action. 

Mr. Brewster. What I anticipate will ahnost inevitably occur, if the proposed 
action is taken, is that when it goes to the House the scope of the resolution will 
there be broadened, and I will much prefer that the Senate should now undertake 
to place in the concurrent resolution language which will carry out what is 
obviously now the unanimous desire of the Senate, rather than to rely on the 
House to amend language which may be deemed as not entirely clear, particularly 
as the Members of the House will not have the benefit of the very splendid 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 21 

explanation made by the Senator from Kentucky as to what he intends by the 
[34h] resolution. 

Mr. Baekley. I entertain no jealousy on my part toward the House in the 
matter of amending anything the Senate may adopt. We frequently exercise 
that right in the Senate. If the House should see lit to broaden the language, 
unless it, by broadening the language, thinned it out and watered it down, I 
certainly would have no objection. But I think it important that we get to 
work on this job at once without creating the impression that we are seeking 
to cause delay, through any technicalities, or through any effort of evasion, 
or in any other way. 

Mr. Brewster. I certainly share the desire of the Senator from Kentucky 
for expedition, but as I said before, having waited 4 years, I am certain that 
we can safely wait 4 days more, and I think the country will be much more im- 
pressed with the deliberateness of our consideration if that course is taken. 

Mr. Baekley. I do not think the country will have any doubt about our 
deliberateness. We have been talking about this matter ever since it occurred. 
We have debated it on the floor of the Senate time and time again in connection 
with the extension of the statute of limitations. I do not think that any impres- 
sion of hasty action on our part, can be gotten from the adoption of the concurrent 
resolution now. I think it would be a wholesome example to the country and to 
every one concerned if we could handle it in the way now proposed. 

Mr. Beewstek. There is one thing about the language which gives me concern, 
and which I should certainly like to consider. The language is, "the facts 
relating to the attack by O'apanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Terri- 
tory of Hawaii." As I understand, a very intimate part of that attack involved 
two silk-hatted gentlemen who spent the time during the attack with Secretary 
Hull. Whether they were a part of the armed forces may perhaps be a matter 
of debate. I believe that what occurred in connection with all those events is 
very intimately concerned with the attack, and I should not want any language 
to be calculated to limit our inquiry. 

Mr. Baejkxey. The Senator is too good a parliamentarian and too good a 
draftsman to assume that the language ought to be amended so as to mention 
specifically the silk-hatted gentlemen to whom he has reference. 

Mr. Brewstee. But I do not like to exclude them by saying "Japanese armed 
forces." 

Mr. Baeklet. They are not excluded. 

Mr. Beewsteb. They are certainly not included in that language. 

Mr. Baekley. The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred while they were here carry- 
ing on negotiations with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State received 
notice of the attack while they were in his office. Certainly that circumstance is 
related to the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Brewster. I think it might well be a debatable question as to whether they 
are included within the term "Japanese armed forces." 

Mr. Baekley. These things are all related to that attack. Whether they were 
members of the armed forces or not is not very important, because they certainly 
did not themselves make the attack in person when they were conferring with the 
Secretary of State in Washington. 

Mr. Brewstee. I should say that they were a most essential element. 

Mr. Vande2^berg. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? 

Mr. Baekley. I yield. 

Mr. Vandenberg. The language contained in the resolution submitted by the 
able junior Senator from Michigan [Mr. Ferguson] was given very careful 
consideration, and from our point of view it has had the sort of study which 
the Senator from Maine has indicated. I am sure the language fully meets the 
purpose of the Senator from Kentucky. Would there be any objection to chang- 
ing the first sentence in section 2, which now reads, "The committee shall make a 
full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the attack made by 
Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii" so as to 
read "The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts 
surrounding the attack and the events and circumstances leading up to the at- 
tack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of 
Hawaii? 

Mr. Barkley. I see no substantial difference between the words "relating to" 
and the word "surrounding." However, I have no objection to the remainder 
of that language. I believe that the words "relating to" are more appropriate 
than the word "surrounding," but I certainly would have no objection to including 
the phrase "leading up to," which could be inserted after the words "relating to." 

Mr. FE3KOU80N. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? 



22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Babklby. I yield. 

Mr. FEBGtjsoN. I was somewhat concerned as to whether to use the words 
"relating to" or the word "surrounding." I think they mean the same thing in 
relation to this event. If the able senior Senator from Michigan would use the 
words "relating to," and then add the words "the events and circumstances," 
I think that would cover the objection of the Senator from Maine. 

Mr. Barkley. I had in mind also the question as to whether additional lan- 
guage, which would specifically apply to previous events leading up to the attack, 
should be included; but I did not include it for the reason, as I have explained, 
that I thought the words "relating to" covered it fully, and included events both 
prior to and subsequent to the attack. However, I have no objection to inserting, 
after the words "relating to" the language suggested by the Senator from 
Michigan. 

Mr. VANDENBH31G. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield? 

Mr. Bakkley. I yield. 

Mr. Vandbnbehg. The language would then i-ead : 

"The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts 
relating to the events and circumstances leading up to the attack made by Japa- 
nese armed forces on Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii." 

Mr. Barkley. I have no objection to that language. 

Mr. Lucas. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? 

Mr. Barkley. I yield. 

Mr. Lucas. May I ask whether or not that language would prevent us from 
investigating anything subsequent to the attack? We talk about everything 
leading up to the attack. 

Mr. Vandenbbrg. And subsequent. 

Mr. Lucas. The word "subsequent" is not in there. 

Mr. Barkley. "We can say "leading up to or following the attack." 

Mr. Vandenbero. I believe that would cover it. 

Mr. Barkley. I have no desire to cut off the investigation at any particular 
date if it has any relationship to this attack, or the consequences of it. 

The President pro tempore. The Senator has the right to modify his con- 
current resolution. 

Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, I will modify the concurrent resolution by in- 
serting after the words "relating to," the words "the events and circumstances 
leading up to or following." 

Mr. Walsh. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? 

Mr. Barkley. I yield. 

Mr. Walsh. Before the vote is taken on the resolution, which I hope will 
be unanimous, I wnsh to take occasion to compliment the distinguished majority 
leader upon the magnificent and generous manner in which he has responded 
to the overwhelming popular sentiment of the country. He has not only done 
that, but he has relieved us all of many hours of anxiety, lifted this question 
above partisanship, and made an appeal for what the country wants— a high- 
minded, clean, judicial investigation of all the facts connected with the Pearl 
Harbor disaster. I wish to say to him that he has exercised statesmanlike 
judgment on manv occasions in the past, but never of a loftier character than 
todav. He has never rendered a better public service. He has not only rendered 
a service by responding to the public demand, but he has removed all doubts or 
questions as to the sincerity of our present Government and of the Navy De- 
partment in their willingness to have the whole story told truthfully aiid can- 
didly. As chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, before which this prob- 
lem "has been pending bv reason of petitions filed with us, I wish to compliment 
the Senator from Kentucky and thank him for the service which he has rendered 

the country. ,, , ^ ^^ c, ^ 

Mr Barkley. Mr. President, I deeply appreciate the remarks of the Senatoi. 

The President pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator 
from Kentucky that the concurrent resolution, as modified, be immediately 
considered, without reference to a cominittee? The Chair hears none. 

[SUl The question is on agreeing to the concurrent resolution, as modified. 

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 27). as modified, was agreed to, as 

follows : . . ^ ml i. j.1^ 

"Resolved hij the Senate (the House of RepresentatWes concurnhg), That there 
is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three ot 
whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appovnted by the President 
pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Rep rt>senlrt lives (not more than 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 23 

three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the 
Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the conimittee shall not 
affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the com- 
mittee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selec- 
tion. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among 
its members. 

"Sec. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the 
facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the 
attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of 
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of 
Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation, 
together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable. 

•'Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that 
such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not 
be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining 
his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs. 

"Sec. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, 
is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, 
and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), 
to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the 
production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to 
take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such 
expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report 
such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. 

"(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of 
such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems 
necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation 
prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as a mended, for comparable 
duties. 

"(c) The exj)enses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall be 
paid one-half from the contingent funds of the Senate and one-half from the 
contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the 
chairman." 

Mr. Babkley. Mr. President, I did not intend, at the outset, to take so much 
time at this hour, but I hope it has been well spent. 

[SS] (Discussion off the record.) 

The Chairman. Counsel may go ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think if counsel spoke into the 
microphone we could better hear, rather than if he stood up. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have never tried a case with my nose in a micro- 
phone, but I will do my best. 

The Chairman. I am sure you will do all right, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. You would like me to keep my seat ? 

Senator Brewster. I think so. 

Mr. Mitchell. There are two master exhibits which have been dis- 
tributed to the committee. They will be referred to by innumerable 
witnesses on the stand, and I think this the appropriate time to pre- 
sent them. 

One is a document, printed in the Government Printing Office, en- 
titled "Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Govern- 
ment Between July 1 and December 8, 1941." These were messages, in 
code, intercepted by our services, decoded and translated. They were 
exchanged between the Japanese Government and its Embassy at 
Washington, and include the responses from Washington to Tokyo. 
There are a few of them that are diplomatic messages from Japan to 
their Ambassadors in other nations. 

They are arranged chronologically in the order in which [36] 
they were sent. We will not refer to them this morning, I think, but 
will shortly. The document, of course, will be supported later au- 



24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

thentically by detail witnesses, but for the present we present it to the 
reporter as Exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. Are those to be printed at this point in the record ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, they are ah-eady printed by the Government 
Printing Office, and they are available in this form to the committee. 
We will mark it "Exhibit 1," but the reporter will not have to tran- 
scribe it. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1") 

The Vice Chairman. That is one of the documents that was supplied 
to the committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, not long ago ; I think yesterday. 

Senator Brewster. Are copies of that now available to the press? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. This is being received in evidence as exhibit 1 ? 

The Chairman. Yes. It is filed with the committee as exhibit 1, 
and will be referred to specifically, as I understand it, by witnesses 
later. 

Mr. Mitchell. And it is wide open once it is offered. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted to be sure of. It is a part 
of the record. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

[^7] Senator Brewster. That was the one that was received by 
us yesterdaj^ ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

The next exhibit, I have marked "Exhibit 2." This is another volume 
of Japanese messages from their Government and their people around 
the world relating to military installations, ship movements, and so 
forth. The first exhibit we will call the diplomatic messages, because 
they related to diplomatic negotiations, but this one is concerned with 
the military installations, reports from their espionage people in dif- 
ferent places, and matters of that kind. That volume also includes 
documents in code, intercepted, decoded, and translated by our crypt- 
analytic units, and they are arranged in chronological order. 

I present that as Exhibit 2 so that it may be available to every witnss. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 2.") 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry as to 
whether counsel claims that is all the information : are these two ex- 
hibits now complete ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There may be additional information. I do not 
claim. Senator, that anything we have is final or complete. We will see 
after we get going whether you are satisfied with what is produced. 

Senator Ferguson. I wanted to have the record show as to whether 
or not it is purported that these are complete. 

[<?<§] Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. These are selected messages that 
seem pertinent to the case, and it is always open, if there is any inquiry 
by anybody on the committee that we are asked to pursue, why, we 
will pursue it further. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not copies 
of Exhibit 2 have been supplied the individual members of this com- 
mittee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Were they included in the packet given us yesterday ? 

Mr. Mitchell, They are earlier than that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 25 

Senator Brewster. That was delivered to us on November 13, I 
think. 

Mr. Gesell. I think it was early this week. 

Senator Brewster. Yes ; Tuesday of this week, I think. 

The Chairman. All right. You may go ahead, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, in the previous investigations that 
have been held, scores of witnesses and thousands of pages of testi- 
mony were taken on piecing together the story of the situation at 
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and to describe the incidents of 
the attack. 

If this committee were to pursue that same course, it might take 
2 or 3 weeks for that kind of testimony. 

We have, in an effort to save time of the committee, [-39] had 
prepared by the Army and the Navy jointly, under our direction, a 
narrative and detailed statement, based upon reports and material 
available in those departments, of the conditions prevailing at Pear] 
Harbor on that day, and the events that took place. We have tried to 
eliminate, and I think we have, every question that is in controversy, 
every matter of fact that hasn't clearly been established, and any ques- 
tion of responsibility. 

I think the officers who are presenting that for us have followed 
that schedule. 

This isn't intended to foreclose the fact on anything. It is a picture 
of the conditions that existed on the 7th and things that happened, 
and if there is any question that arises later as to whether it is ac- 
curate or not, of course, it will be open to the taking of eyewitness 
testimony. And there are also many questions, doubtless, that aren't 
covered by the statement, because they are not yet fully established, 
or in controversy, that will have to be filled in by eyewitnesses. 

The officers who have done this work for us are Kear Adm. T. B. 
Inglis, of the Navy, and Col. Bernard Thielen, of the Army, and we 
would like to have them sworn. 

The Chairman. Which one do you want first ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The narrative statement is a consolidated one. It 
is not a Navy or an Army statement. It is all [4^] woven to- 
gether, and these gentlemen ought to be sworn together, and they will 
pick up portions of it and pass the ball as they go along. 

The Chairman. Will the two witnesses referred to arise, and be 
sworn ? 

(The witnesses were sworn by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Be seated. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I will ask that the men taking pic- 
tures complete their work before we get started. 

The Chairman. The photographers may get their pictures and 
then clear this space in here. 

The committee, in executive session, decided that the order of pro- 
cedure, so far as the examination of witnesses is concerned, shall be 
that counsel should be first permitted to examine the witnesses without 
interruption ; that upon the conclusion of his examination, members 
of the committee will alternate from the Chair right and left between 
the members from the Senate and the House, and they will ask such 
questions as they have, and following that, counsel for any witness 
who has counsel will be permitted to examine the witness himself. 

So, gentlemen, we will now proceed. 



26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[41] TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS, UNITED STATES 
NAVY, AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN, UNITED STATES ARMY 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Inglis, what is your status in the Navy now ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am attached to the Office of Naval Operations as 
Chief of Naval Intelligence. 

Mr. Mitchell. How long have you been in that post ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have had that particular post for about 1 week, 
Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. What were you doing before that ? 

Admiral Inglis. Before that I was Deputy Director of Naval In- 
telligence. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you had in your naval work the task at times 
to prepare material and documents and I'eview the facts and do work 
of that kind ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have had something over 31 years of naval ex- 
perience, and during this time I have served on several admirals' 
staffs. More recentl}^, my duties in the Navy Department do require 
that I prepare evaluations and studies somewhat comparable to this 
we are discussing this morning. 

Mr. Mitchell. What duty were you engaged in on December 7, 
1941? 

Admiral Inglis. I was commanding officer of the [4^] 
U. S. S. Algerab, which was a ship in the Atlantic Ocean at that time. 
Oil that particular date, my ship and I were in port in New York. 

Mr. Mitchell. Had you been stationed at the Pearl Harbor base 
previously to that? 

Admiral Inglis. I have never had shore duty at Pearl Harbor. I 
have visited Pearl Harbor on numerous occasions on board ships. 

Mr. Mitchell. So you are familiar with the locality ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am generally familiar with the locality ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You prepared here, in connection with Colonel 
Thielen, a narrative statement from the official records and other 
data available to you? 

Admiral Inglis. I have, sir, with the assistance of officers under my 
control. 

Mr. Mitchell. You were instructed, or asked by counsel to elimi- 
nate matters that were in dispute or questions of responsibility, or 
questions where your reports and records showed a point of fact had 
not been clearly established? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, and we have done our best to carry 
out that directive. 

Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Thielen, what is your status in the Army 
today ? 

[4^] Colonel Thielen. I am a member of the War Department 
General Staff, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you been stationed at Pearl Harbor? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I was stationed there from 1934 through 
1936. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where were you on duty on December 7, 1941 ? 

Colonel Thielen. I was instructor at the United States Military 
Academy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 27 

144] Mr. Mitchell. Have you had occasion in your work to do 
the sort of thing that I asked Admiral Inglis about, preparing docu- 
ments and related material? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. That is my normal duty. 
Mr. Mitchell. Now, you gentlemen proceed as you have prepared 
your work and give us this narrative statement of the conditions at 
Pearl Harbor on December 7, and what occurred there. 

Admiral Inglis. I propose to start this presentation with a brief 

description 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, do we have copies of this state- 
ment ? 

Mr. Gesell. No, Senator; there are no mimeographed copies of the 
statement. There are before each member of the committee two basic 
folders which I show you now, the Navy folder of exhibits and charts, 
and the Army folder, which is the red envelope, large red envelope. 
I suggest that those are the two basic documents that each member of 
the committee will wish to have before him to follow this presentation. 
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, it was my understanding that if 
there were any prepared statements we would have them 24 hours 
in advance. Was that not the understanding? 

The Chairman. Well, it wasn't the Chair's understanding that that 
rule applied at this preliminary testimony here. 

[4'5] The witnesses who were to testify after this groundwork 
was laid as to what happened on that day would present to the com- 
mittee copies of their written statements in advance. 

Senator Brewster. It is equally essential here. I think. Do you 
have prepared statements we can have now? 

Mr. Gesell. We haven't considered these were prepared statements, 
Senator. The charts and schedules which contain the basic informa- 
tion are all before the members of the committee. There is going to 
be a good deal of ad libbing on the charts. It is not quite in the 
nature of a prepared statement. For that reason it is not before the 
committee. 

Senator Ferguson. Has counsel had a copy of this prepared state- 
ment, and if so, when did he get it? 

Mr. Gesell. We have no copy, Senator, and we have never had a 
copy of any prepared statements from either of these witnesses. 

Senator Brew\ster. Mr. Chairman, will it be understood that after 
today the rule will apply? 

The Chairman, It will apply to witnesses. Whether it will apply 
after today I don't know. I can't tell how soon these witnesses will be 
through. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. We didn't miderstand that this type of prepared 
statement came within the rule, but we will have it mimeographed and 
furnish it to the members of the committee as [46] rapidly as 
possible, and if you Avant the witnesses recalled we will be happy to 
recall them. 

The Chairman. The Chair might also state that arrangements have 
been made with the reporters taking this testimony to provide each 
member a copy of the day's testimony on the following morning, and 
I think they will be able to furnish it to the members on tlie evening 
the testimony has been brought forward. 



28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. Fine. 

'TT'he Chairman. We will have it as soon as possible. 

Mr. Mitchell. You may ])roceed, Admiral. 

Admiral Inglis. I propose to start this presentation with a brief 
description of the geography of the Hawaiian Islands and their re- 
lation to the whole Pacific Ocean area. 

Commander Biard has a chart which has the title up in the upper 
right-hand corner "Disposition of United States Pacific Fleet on 
December 7, 1941." 

I will ask the committee to refer to that chart and also to item No. 1, 
which is a reproduction of that chart, and which is contained in the 
white folder which has been given to each member of the committee. 

It will be seen that Pearl Harbor is on the southern or lee side of 
the island of Oahu, which is one of the eight principal islands of the 
Hawaiian chain. These eight Hawaiian Islands lie in a strategically 
and commercially important [47] position in the North Pacific 
Ocean approximately 2,000 nautical miles west to southwest of San 
Francisco. 

Commander Biard is pointing out these distances and directions as 
we proceed. 

Oahu is the most important of the islands because of the excellent 
enclosed fleet anchorage at Pearl Harbor and the commercial port 
of Honolulu. It is 3,430 nautical miles southeast of Tokyo, 4,685 
nautical miles northwest of Panama, 1,990 nautical miles south of 
Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands and 4,767 nautical miles east 
of Manila. 

[48] A table of distance from Pearl Harbor and other impor- 
tant points in the Pacific is item 2 of the Navy folder. In this con- 
nection, it must be remembered that a nautical mile is approximately 
11/^ land miles. 

The islands have a mild subtropical climate with moderate seasonal 
changes of temperature. They lie in the path of the steady north- 
easterly trade winds ; therefore, the northern portions of Oahu and the 
immediate adjacent waters are characterized by fresh winds from a 
northerly direction. The force of the trades is broken by the configura- 
tion of the lands so that to the south of Oahu the seas are relatively 
smooth. 

Commander Biard, will you point to the other chart, please, showing 
the island of Oahu? That is the lee of the island, where the winds 
and seas are more moderate than on the windward side. 

Much of the moisture of the trade winds is deposited on the high 
peaks to the north forming mist and clouds. Because of this, the 
visibility to the south of the islands is better than to the north. Fur- 
ther, the northern fringe of the trade belt lies roughly about 300 
to the north of Oahu — will you point that out ? Three hundred miles 
to the north of Oahu there is a belt characterized by low ceilings, poor 
visibility, squalls, and rain. 

[49] The Hawaiian chain of islands and adjacent waters are 
shown in item 3 of the Navy folder. It may be seen from this chart 
that the sea area around the Hawaiian Islands was on December 7, 
1941, divided into certain restricted fleet training areas where units 
and aircraft of the fleet might carry out exercises and target practices. 
This same chart also shows two defensive sea areas off Pearl Harbor 
and Kaneohe. These defensive sea areas were designated by the Presi- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 29 

dent of the United States and entry of all merchant ships, both United 
States and foreign, and of all foreign men-of-war was prohibited 
unless specific permission for sucli entry had been granted by the Sec- 
retary of the Navy. 

The next item is a rather puzzling question of time, difference of 
time, in different parts of the world. 

Time varies throughout the world. For instance, when going from 
Washington, D. C, to Chicago it is necessary for a traveler to adjust 
his watch upon arrival in Chicago, because Chicago time is 1 hour 
behind that in Washington. Comparable changes of time occur when- 
ever the traveler moves about the world. 

Wlien'the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor at 7 : 55 on the morning of 
December 7, 1941, it was 1 : 25 in the afternoon of the same day in 
Washington, D. C, and was 3 : 25 a. m., December 8, in Tokyo. 

[SO] Item 4 of the Xavy folder is a table showing comparative 
times and dates for Greenwich, England, Washington, D. C, San 
Francisco, Hawaii, Tokyo, and Manila on December 6, 7, and 8, 1941. 

The time of sunrise on the morning of December 7, 1941, the begin- 
ning of morning twilight was 5 : 06 a. m., Hawaiian time, and sunrise 
was 6 : 26 a. m., Hawaiian time. That is an hour and twenty minutes 
before sunrise. 

Proceeding next to the composition of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Fleets, on the 7th of December 1941 the Pacific Fleet was numerically 
two-thirds the size of the Atlantic Fleet but the Pacific Fleet contained 
more modern and more heavily armed vessels. 

Next, the commanders of major units of the United States Pacific 
Fleet: 

The commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, who 
was also the commander in chief of the United States Fleet, was 
Admiral H. E. Kimmel. 

The force commanders were commander, battle force, Vice Adm. 
W. S. Pye; commander, scouting force, Vice Adm. Wilson Brown; 
commander, base force, Rear Adm. W. L. Calhoun. 

The type comanders, and by "type" I mean the type or classification 
of the ships which they comanded : 

[51] Commander aircraft, battle force. Vice Adm. W. F. Halsey. 

Commander battleships, battle force. Rear Adm. W. S. Anderson. 

Commander cruisers, battle force. Rear Adm. H. F. Leary. 

Commander mine craft, battle force, Rear Adm. W. R. Furlong. 

Commander cruisers, scouting force. Rear Adm. J. H. Newton. 

Commander destroyers, battle force. Rear. Adm. M. J. Draemel. 

Commander submarines, scouting force, Rear Adm. Thomas Withers. 

Commander aircraft, scouting force. Rear Adm. J. S. McCain. 

Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, Rear Adm. C. C. 
Bloch. 

And in explanation of the relationship between tlie Fourteenth 
Naval District and the commander in chief, the Fourteenth Naval 
District was a subordinate command of the commander in chief Pacific 
Fleet and in this respect differed from the then uswal practice in the 
continental United States. 

The Fourteenth Naval District included the Hawaiian Islands, 
[52] Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton Islands. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 1 5 



30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Biard, will you just draw an imaginary line about the 
Fourteenth Naval District ? Just circle it with your wand, will you ? 

The disposition of the United States Pacific Fleet outside of the 
continental United States at 8 a. m., December 7 was roughly as 
follows : 

The main body of the fleet in Pearl Harbor comprised 8 battleships, 
2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 30 destroyers, and 49 other vessels 
such as submarines, mine craft, tenders, transports, and miscellaneous 
small craft. 

Those are the ships that were in Pearl Harbor. We will go into 
greater detail on that a little fui-ther along in the discussion. 

You may also refer to the chart in item No. 1, Navy folder, for the 
location in detail and the naming of these ships. 

In addition to that, item 5 of the Navy folder contains a complete 
list of every ship in the Pacific Fleet. 

Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey consisted of one aircraft carrier 
{Entet'pnse) , three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers. It was about 
200 miles west of Oahu, en route to Pearl Harbor after having ferried 
Marine Corps fighter planes to AVake Island. 

[63^ That task force was coming back from Wake Island to 
Pearl Harbor. 

Task Force 12 under Admiral Newton consisted of one aircraft 
carrier {Lexington) , three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. It was 
about 460 miles southeast of Midway, en route to Midway from Pearl 
Harbor with a squadron of Marine Corps scout bombers. 

Task Force 3 under Admiral Wilson Brown consisted of one heavy 
cruisers and five destroyer minesweepers. It had just arrived off 
Johnston Island to conduct tests of a new type landing craft. 

One heavy cruiser, with four destroyer minesweepers, was in the 
fleet operating area about 25 miles south of Oahu conducting exercises. 

The heavy cruiser Pensacola with an eight-ship convoy west-bound 
was in the Samoan area. More will be said about convoys later. 

The heavy cruiser Louisville with a two-ship convoy east-bound was 
near the Solomons. 

Two submarines and a cargo ship were in the Midway area and a 
similar group in the Wake area. 

Two tankers were about half way between Hawaii and the west coast 
of the United States. 

Some smaller units of the fleet were in positions as [■5^] fol- 
lows: One destroyer {Ward), concerning, which more will be said 
later, was patrolling off the entrance of Pearl Harbor ; one destroyer 
in company with a submarine was about 60 miles southwest ; three sub- 
marines were 200 miles east of Oahu ; the seaplane tender Wright was 
300 miles west, and four auxiliaries were in Honolulu and Lahina 
Roads. 

The remaining units of the United States Pacific Fleet are shown on 
the chart as item 1 of the Nav\^ folder. 

A detailed list giving the names and locations of United States naval 
ships of the Pacific Fleet is item 5 of the Navy folder. 

Turning next to the location of cargo ships and troop carriers : 

About 25 cargo and troop carriers which were United States owned 
or chartered were west of Hawaii at the time of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. As shown on the chart (item 1, Navy folder) , eight of these, 
in-cluding one Navy and thi-ee Army troop transports and four ships 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 31 

carrying general cargo bound for the Philippines, were in the Samoan 
area, escorted by the heavy cruiser Pensacola. Two Army troop trans- 
ports were in the Solomons area bound for Pearl Harbor, escorted by 
the heavy cruier Louisville. Four independently routed ships without 
escorts carrying general cargo were between 700 and 1,200 miles south- 
west of Hawaii westward bound, while [<5<5] another, east- 
bound, was in the same area. One vessel was at Canton Island, four 
in Australia, one in New Guinea, one in Java, and three in the Manila 
area. All troop carriers were being escorted. 

All of the west-bound ships had left Honolulu from 2 to 9 days prior 
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, routed and dispatched from there by 
the port director. Fourteenth Naval District. 

A detailed list of these ships and their locations is item 6 of the Navy 
folder. 

There was no United States or Allied shipping of consequence along 
the North Pacific trade routes west of the 180th meridian on December 
7,1941. 

Those thin black lines represent the great circle course to the Orient 
from Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Puget Sound. 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean the regular ship lanes ? 

Admiral Inglis. The regular, normal shipping lanes used in time of 
peace. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. Those great circle courses are the shortest distances 
between those points. That is because of the Mercator projection on 
the chart. A straight line is not the shortest distance between two 
points on such a chart. 

[J^] The Chief of Naval Operations, on November 25, 1941, 
directed that all trans-Pacific shipping be routed through the Torres 
Strait between Australia and New Guinea. 

Senator Ferguson. May I have that date again, please ? 

Admiral Inglis. The name ? Torres. 

Senator Ferguson. No, the date. 

Admiral Inglis. Oh, the date? November 25, 1941. 

Therefore, the usual shipping lanes, as shown on the maps of tlie 
North Pacific, were not being followed, but rather all ships were being 
routed as indicated — from Honolulu via Suva in the Fijis and thence 
to Australia, or via the Torres Strait to the Philippines. Ships 
destined for Guam were routed via the Philippines, thus avoiding 
as much as possible the sea area controlled by the Japanese mandated 
islands in the Pacific. 

Trans-Pacific shipping lanes, both the usual lanes and those being 
followed just prior to and on December 7, 1941, are shown in item 1 
in thin black lines. 

Passing next to a description of the Navy installations ashore in 
the Hawaiian Islands; except for Pearl Harbor itself these are all 
classified as minor United States naval installations and were 
naturally integrated in the over-all defense of the islands, of which 
Pearl Harbor was the focal point. 

[57] I will ask the committee now to refer to item 3-A of the 
folder and Commander Biard is going to point to the Army chart, on 
which we have a Navy overlay. 



32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

On the island of Molokai there was the Homestead Field Naval Air 
Base, which consisted of a runway, a warming-up platform and sup- 
porting installations. 

On the island of Maui there was the Puunene Naval Air Base, which 
consisted of runways, a warming-up platform, and a CAA Terri- 
torial landing field. 

Also on Maui was the INIaalaea naval emergency landing field, which 
consisted of two runways and other supporting installations. 

On the island of Hawaii, the largest island in the group, there was 
tlie naval radio station at Hilo. 

On the most important island of the group, Oahu, although not the 
largest, there was a naval air station at Ewa, which consisted of a 
mooring mast, a landing mat, and supporting installations. 

At tlie naval air station, Kaneohe, on the opposite side of the island, 
was a landing mat and warming-up platform and supporting installa- 
tions and also a seaplane base. 

At Kaliuku Point, up at the north end of the island, there was an 
emergency landing field. 

At Lualualei, a naval radio station, transmitting station. 

[S8] At Wahiawa, in the interior, a naval radio receiving 
station. 

At Heeia, a naval radio transmitting station, and at Wailupe a 
naval radio receiving station. 

I would like to make it quite clear at this point that these radio 
stations were radio stations for transmitting and receiving messages 
and were not radar stations. 

Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, was a major fleet base capable 
of berthing the entire Pacific Fleet. If the committee will now turn 
to item 7 in the Navy folder you will find a chart of the approaches 
to Pearl Harbor. 

, That is a reproduction of the smallish chart that has just been 
mounted on the easel. 

You will see that the only entrance is from the south via an entrance 
cliannel blasted through the fringing coral reef which had formerly 
blocked the entrance to the harbor. This channel extending to the 
harbor entrance proper was 375 yards wide and 3,500 yards long, 
Avith a minimum depth of 45 feet. The entrance proper to Pearl 
Harbor is between Keahi Point and Holokahiki Point. From here 
the channel leads to the various lochs and passages which form 
the harbor. 

I think I should explain at this time that the word "1-o-c-h" is used 
occasionally throughout this presentation and indicates an arm of the 
harbor, or perhaps tlie Scotch [59] would call it a "wake," 
although it is not fresh water. It is not a "lock" as used in connection 
with canals. 

The ramifications of the harbor are shown on the chart, item 8 of 
the Navy folder, and also on the chart which has just been mounted 
on the left-hand easel. 

You will see on that chart that the water surface is illustrated by a 
blue color and the land surface by a white color. The positions of 
certain ships are marked in red, but I will ask you to disregard that 
for the moment. We will come back to those later on. 

There were varying depths in the harbor, as shown by soundings 
on the chart. Those tiny black figures show the soundings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 33 

The major channels or the main channels and water m the vicinity 
of the major ships' berths had a depth of 40 feet. From the sea buoys 
to the large drydocks a portion of the channel had a minimum depth 
of 45 feet to provide for the entrance and docking of damaged vessels. 

The entrance to the harbor was closed by two protective nets. Here 
the channel through the coral reefs was about 400 yards wide and the 
depth was from 41 to 50 feet. The nets themselves consisted of a 
combined antitorpedo net and antiboat boom to seaward and an inner 
antitorpedo net without the boat boom. 

[60] You see, there are two nets there. The barrier one has anti- 
boat booms, which are usually cross-armed with spikes to prevent 
surface craft from sliding up over the boom. Of course, the nets 
down below the booms are to stop torpedoes and also submarines pro- 
ceeding under water. 

The standard net is 30 feet deep and when suspended covers a depth 
of 35 feet. Because the channel was of a greater depth, the Chief of 
Naval Operations instructed the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict, to suspend the inner net 15 feet, making a total coverage of 45 
feet. 

The Pearl Harbor fleet base included every type of naval activity. 
Many of the installations operable at that time were new, having been 
built subsequent to August 1939. Major installations in operation 
were, at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor: One battleship dock, built 
1928; one battleship dock, under construction; one floating dry dock, 
18,000 tons; one large repair basin, supporting industrial establish- 
ments for repairs to anything afloat; one fuel depot with two tank 
farms above ground — as you all know, a tank farm is a collection of 
fuel-oil storage tanks; one submarine base — all services for war condi- 
tions; [61] one section base — inshore patrol and harbor en- 
trance control post. 

And then, of course, there was the administrative office of the Four- 
teenth Naval District which was inside the navy yard. 

At the naval air station — Ford Island, which is the large island at 
the center of the harbor — there was a large flying field, warming-up 
platform, seaplane parking areas, and supporting installations. 

Next we come to the ships present at Pearl Harbor on December 
7, 1941. You can refer again to item 8 in the white folder. 

Eight battleships of between 29,000 and 33,000 tons each were among 
the ships of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941. 

Units of the fleet were located as follows : 

The battleships Nevada — Commander Biard is pointing those out 
now; those battleships are shown in red and they are as precisely as 
we can make them to scale. 

The Nevada, Anzona, West Virginia^ Tennessee, Ohlahovia, Mary- 
land, and California were moored on the southeast side of Ford 
Island ; the Pennsylvania in drydock No. 1 at the navy yard. 

Two heavy cruisers. New Orleans and &an Francisco, of the 10,000- 
ton type, were at docks in the navy yard repair basin. 

[62] Four light cruisers of the 10,000-ton type were berthed as 
follows : St. Louis, Honolulu, Helena at navy yard clocks, and Phoenix 
moored northeast of Ford Island. 

Two light cruisers of the 7,000-ton type, Raleigh and Detroit, were 
moored on the northwest side of Ford Island. 



34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Twenty -nine destroyers (all but three of which had been completed 
since 1933) were moc/ed to the north and west of Ford Island. 

There were five submarines, four of which were tied up at the 
submarine base, and the fifth at Ten-ten dock in the navy yard. 

That dock is called Ten-ten dock because it is 1,010 feet long. 

One gunboat was tied lip at a navy yard dock. Nine minelayers 
(eight of which were converted flush-deck destroyers) w^ere located 
at navy yard docks and in middle loch. 

Eleven minesweepers (five of which were converted flush-deck de- 
stroyers) moored in middle loch and at navy yard docks. 

Twenty-three fleet auxiliaries, such as repair ships, oilers, tenders, 
store ships, and tugs were located at various berths throughout the 
harbor. 

There were ni^ aircraft carriers in port. 

All battleships of the Pacific Fleet except the Colorado^ [_63^ 
which was in the Navy 3(^ard, Puget Sound, were present, in Pearl 
Harbor. 

Item 9 of the white fodder gives a list of the vessels present at the 
time of the attack. 

In accordance with e;^isting fleet orders, the vessels of the Pacific 
Fleet except those uhde/going navy ^^ard overhaul maintained condi- 
tion of readiness 3 while in the harbor. This condition at that time 
varied according to the armaments of the various types of ships but, in 
general, required that about one-fourth of the antiaircraft batteries 
and necesssary control stations be manned and that ready ammunition 
be at the guns. Vessels likewise were limited in the degree to which 
they could disable their propulsive machinery. In general, most ves- 
sels were on 12 hours' notice. 

By "12 hours' notice" I mean that the ships w'ere required to be able 
to get under way 12 hours after receiving the order to get under way, 

I will ask Colonel Thielen to pick up from this point. 

Colonel Thielen. Very well, 

[6Ji] The Army's report, of course, roughly parallels that which 
Admiral Inglis has just completed for the Navy. That is, it takes 
up the Army organization in that area and the disposition of Army 
units, with their strength indicated. 

The Hawaiian Islands were organized for joint defense as the Ha- 
waiian Coastal Frontier. The Army command was designated as 
the Hawaiian Department. On February 7, 1941, Maj. Gen. Walter 
C. Short relieved Maj, Gen, Charles D, Herron as commanding general 
of the Hawaiian Department, 

The principal elements of the Department were two infantry divi- 
sions and supporting ground troops composing the beach and land 
defense forces ; the Coast Artillery command, consisting of the seacoast 
and antiaircraft defense forces ; and the Hawaiian Air Force. 

On December 6, 1941, General Short had approximately 43,000 troops 
under his command, disposed as shown in detail on pages 1 to 5 of the 
Army exhibit which the committee has and which lists the unit loca- 
tions by district, with an indication of the strength of each unit and 
the station at which located. 

Mr. Mitchell. The Army exhibits are in the brown folder. 

Mr. Gesell. It is the mimeographed folder in a brown folder, I 
think, 

Mr, Mitchell, Go ahead. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 35 

[6S] Colonel Thielen. On the small chart there is the indication 
of the major units as distributed in the various islands of the group. A 
reproduction of that chart, is in the hands of each member of the 
committee. 

In the Kauai district we had the Third Battalion, Two Hundred and 
ninety-ninth Infantry — less Companies K and L — and attached troops ; 
Company C, Two Hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry ; First Platoon, 
Signal Company Aircraft Warning ; Air Corps Detachment. 

In the Maui district we had the First Battalion, Two Hundred and 
Ninety-ninth Infantry, less Company C, and attached troops; Com- 
pany K, Two Hundrecl and Ninety-ninth Infantr}^, Molokai ; Fourth 
Platoon Signal Comj^any, Aircraft Warning Air Corps Detachment. 

In the Hawaii district we had the Second Battalion, Two hundred 
and Ninety-ninth Infantry and attached troops: Camp Detachment, 
Kilauea Military Camp; Fifth Platoon Signal Company, Aircraft 
Warning Air Corps Detachment. 

On the principal island of Oahu we had the following lesser units: 
The Twenty-fourth Infantry Division — less Two Hundred and Ninety- 
ninth Infantry Regiment: Twenty-fifth Infantry Division; Hawaiian 
Coast Artillery Commancl ; [66] Hawaiian Air Force ; Thirty- 
Fourth Engineers; Eight Hundred and Fourth Engineer Battalion, 
Aviation ; Eleventh Tank Company ; Company A, First Separate 
Chemical Battalion, and Hawaiian Pack Train. 

The Twenty-fourth Infantry Division was responsible for the 
ground defense of the northern half of Oahu, and the Twenty-fifth 
Division for that of the southern sector. Most of the components of 
these divisions were located at Schofield Barracks. 

The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, under Maj. Gen. Henry 
T. Burgin, consisted of the following harbor defense units : Fifteenth 
Coast Artillery Regiment, harbor defense ; Sixteenth Coast Artillery 
Regiment, harbor defense ; Forty-first Coast Artillery Regiment, rail- 
way; Fifty-fifth Coast Artillery Regiment, 155 millimeter, tractor- 
drawn; and of these antiaircraft units: Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery 
Regiment, semimobile; Ninety-seventh Coast Artillery Regiment, 
semimobile; Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery Regiment, semimobile; 
Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery Regiment, mobile. 

The principal weapons of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command 
were as shown on page 6 of Army exhibit. 

[67] Other large-caliber guns available for defense but manned 
by field artillery were two 240-millimeter howitzers and thirty-two 
155-millimeter howitzers. The seacoast guns were installed prin- 
cipally in permanent fortifications. The fixed antiaircraft guns were 
emplaced generally to defend the seacoast artillery, and the mobile 
antiaircraft units were normally stationed at Fort Shaffer, Schofield 
Barracks, and Camp Malakole. 

Liaison between the Coast Artillery command and the Navy was 
maintained prior to December 7 by one Army officer and one enlisted 
man stationed at the harbor patrol station at Pearl Harbor. The 
harbor patrol station was controlled and operated by the Navy. The 
plirpose of this liaison was to coordinate identification of waterborne 
craft and other possible targets. 

The principal units of Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin's Hawaiian 
Air Force were the Fifth and Eleventli Bombardment Groups, the 
Fifteenth and Eighteenth Pursuit Groups, the Eighty-sixth Obser- 



36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

vation Squadron, and the Air Corps Services. The Air Force was 
generally disposed on four fields, Hickam, Wheeler, Haleiwa, and 
Bellows. 

Prior to the attack on December 7, alert No. 1 of the local defense 
plan set up by the Hawaiian Department was [68] in effect. 
This alert, one of three provided in the plan, was therein defined as a 
"defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, 
with no threat from without." Military installations and equipment, 
planes, hangars, ammunition, communication centers, highway bridges, 
and the like were protected by standing guards and patrols. 

I will now explain the dispositions as indicated on the chart, on the 
large map of Oahu, mider alert No. 1. 

The two divisions, as I have already indicated, had alL their princi- 
pal elements located in Schofield Barracks. There were, however, a 
number of patrols and standing guards primarily on the road around 
Kakanoe Island from Honolulu, around to the east, up past Kaena 
Point, and back down the central valley. These patrols were located 
at intersections, highway bridges, and other critical points. 

The yellow squares indicate antiaircraft weapons, and, as I re- 
marked, it will be noted that in general they are situated down on the 
south coast, protecting the seacoast installations, except for concen- 
trations of these weapons at Schofield Barracks, the regiment at Fort 
Shafter, as previously mentioned, and several mobile batteries out at 
Camp Malakole. 

Most of the white squares are either seacoast weapons of various 
types, those that have the general appearance of [dd] cannon, 
and the aircraft installations at the field which I have mentioned. 

That concludes the Army's indication of organization and strength 
and I believe the Navy will now resume. 

[70] Admiral Inglis. The next topic is "Offshore reconnaissance." 

There is no written record available of any searches having been 
made on December 6, either from the Hawaiian area or from Midway. 
However, Midway had orders to have one squadron of aircraft search 
daily a circular area with a radius of 100 miles. Patrol squadrons 
from Midway were also ordered to perform searches wherever sea 
forces were operating — that is, surface forces. In general, the oper- 
ating areas for fleet units were south of a line drawn from Midway to 
Oahu. 

I would like now to invite the attention of the committee to item 
10 of the Navy folder, which is a reproduction of the large chart that 
is on display on the right-hand easel. That chart shows in green and 
wdiite diagonal lines the air searches conducted on the 6th of December 
and in black and white horizontal lines the searches conducted just 
prior to the Japanese attack on the 7th of December and then in red 
and white vertical lines the searches after the attack on the 7th of 
December. 

Of course, in reproducing that chart for your folders the colors do 
not show, but the identity is preserved by the direction of the stripes — 
horizontal, vertical, and diagonal. 

[71] Patrol squadrons from Midway were also ordered to per- 
form searches wherever sea forces were operating. In general, the 
operating areas for fleet units were south of a line drawn from Mid- 
wav to Oahu. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 37 

Although there is no record of regular reconnaissance flights being 
made on this date, the U. S. S. Enterprise^ 375 miles west of Pearl 
Harbor and traveling due east, did at 1 in the afternoon launch 15 
torpedo bombers which searched, ahead of the ship, an arc of 110° 
to a distance of 150 miles. At the time of the above search, the Enter- 
prise had six other planes in the air as an antisubmarine patrol ahead 
of the ship. 

On the morning of December 7 there were three patrol planes of the 
PBY-5 type from Kaneohe Air Station engaged in a routine search 
of the fleet operating areas approximately 120 miles south of Oahu. 
That is shown in the black and white horizontal stripes. 

According to the operations plan then current, each plane was to 
be fueled with 1,000 gallons of gasoline which would give it a patrolling 
range of 800 miles. The planes were to take off at dawn, 5 : 27 
Hawaiian time on the 7th, carrying two depth charges and with all 
machine guns fully armed. However, these planes did not take off 
until about 6 : 40. Later, when the attack took place, these planes 
were [7£] diverted to the northwest to search for the Japanese 
forces. 

Four patrol planes were also in the air when the attack came, en- 
gaged in intertype tactical exercises with United States submarines 
near Lahaina Roads. They also were diverted after the attack to 
search for Japanese forces. All their machine guns were fully armed 
but they carried no depth charges. Thus there were a total of seven 
Navy patrol planes employed in the search. 

In addition to regular scheduled reconnaissance flights, the U. S. S. 
Enterprise^ 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, launched 18 scout bombers 
armed with machine guns, shortly after 6 a. m., which searched to the 
eastward ahead of the ship an arc of 110° to a distance of 150 miles. 
The mission of these planes was to search an area around and ahead 
of the Enterprise and then to land at Ewa where thej^ were to be based 
while the ship was in port. They arrived there during the attack on 
Pearl Harbor and engaged Japanese aircraft. Three of these planes 
landed at 9 : 40 and 10 at 10 : 15. The other five never arrived. 

There is no written report available of any inshore reconnaissance 
"and by "inshore" I mean a distance up to only 30 miles — flown by 
the Navy off Oahu the afternoon and evening of December 6 or the 
morning of December 7, 1941. 

From neighboring islands on the morning of December 7 [7.5] 
there was a reconnaissance of five patrol planes armed with machine 
guns and a full allowance of ammunition, which took off from the 
naval air station, Midway, at 7 : 50 Hawaiian time. Their mission 
was to patrol the area to the south and southeast of Midway to a 
distance of 450 miles. Although this reconnaissance was scheduled 
before, it actually occurred after the attack and is shown on the chart 
in vertical stripes. 

Two additional planes of the same type took off at the same time 
to rendezvous with the U. S. S. Lexington at a point 400 miles from 
Midway in a southeasterly direction. These planes were to escort the 
18 marine scout bombing planes being brought in by the Lexington as 
reinforcements for Midway. This marine flight was canceled after 
news was received of the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Five additional planes, armed with two 500-pound bombs each, were 
on the alert at Midway ready to take off on 10-minutes' notice. 



38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I will ask Colonel Thielen to take up from here again. 

[74] Colonel Thielen. As for Army reconnaissance, there is no 
evidence that any inshore patrol was maintained by the Army Air 
Forces on December 7 or on the days preceding the attack. Neither 
is there evidence that Army bombers were patrolling offshore on 
December 7 prior to the attack. 

Closely related to this subject, however, is the flight of B-17's being 
ferried from the mainland, which arrived in Oahu about the time of 
the attack. 

Beginning at 9 : 30 p. m., December 6, 1941, six B-17's of the Eighty- 
eighth Keconnaissance Squadron and six B-17's of the Thirty-eighth 
Reconnaissance Squadron took off from Hamilton Field, Calif., at 2- 
minute intervals. These airplanes were to travel to the Philippines 
via Oahu. They were not armed. 

The aircraft did not maintain formation or visual contact with 
each other, and made landfall at Oahu at various places. The course 
from the mainland followed the arc of a great circle which would bring 
the planes into Oahu from the northeast. However, one plane ap- 
proached Oahu from about 100 miles north-northwest of the island 
and another from Kauai, about 75 miles west-northwest of Oahu. 

All planes landed on Oahu between 8 : 30 and 9 a. m.. December 7. 
One landed at Wheeler Field, one at Bellows Field, one on a golf 
course, two at Haleiwa and the remainder at Hickaaii Field. Three 
planes were badly damaged and one was [75] destroyed dur- 
ing landing. 

As to the air warning service which was in effect at this time, this 
air warning service included the vadar detecting stations and related 
equipment and was under the control of the Hawaiian Department 
signal officer. The warning net did not include any system of ground 
observers. 

By December 7, the Hawaiian Department had received all compo- 
nents for three fixed detector stations ( SCR 271) . At the time of the 
attack, construction work had not been completed on the fixed instal- 
lations at Mount Kaala (Oahu), Kokee (Kaua|i) and Haleakala 
(Maui), for the use of this equipment. Six mobile, long-range radar 
sets (SCR 270) had been deceived, five of which were in operation 
early on December 7 at the following points on Oahu — Fort Shafter, 
Koko Head, Kaaawa, Opana and Kawailoa. This mobile set (SCR 
270) has a normal range up to 150 miles, depending upon the height of 
the station and height of aircraft. Detection of planes at a distance of 
150 miJes and flying at 20,000 feet may be expected from sea-level 
positions. The set consists essentially of four large, heavy truck units. 
It takes at least 4 hours to place the set in operation. Its full operat- 
ing complement requires four crews of six trained men to each crew. 
The equipment is accurate to within 2 miles in range and 3° in azimuth, 
that is, in direction. 

[7'^] As a matter of interest, the range and other characteristics 
of the fixed sets were substantial]}- the same as those of the mobile 
sets. 

In use radar indicates the presence of an airplane by a luminous pip 
on a dark screen. A large number of airplanes at a great distance fly- 
ing in formation would appear as an abnormally wide pip. At the 
radar station one of the crew observes the indication of the airplanes 
on the screen and periodically calls off the distance. Another reads 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 39 

direction from an azimuth scale. From these data are plotted posi- 
tions on a chart. There was no way on December 7, 1941, of distin- 
guishing between the images formed by enemy planes and by friendly 
planes. 

When he placed alert No. 1 in effect, General Short also directed 
that the Aircraft Warning Service operate all mobile aircraft-warning 
stations from 2 hours before dawn to 1 hour after dawn — speciJ&cally, 
from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning. Thus, the operating schedule of 
the mobile radar detector stations was daily from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., 
routine training from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m. except Sundays, and daily 
except Saturday and Sunday from 12 to 4 p. m. for training and main- 
tenance work. 

May I call your attention to the chart which represents a consolida- 
tion of the recorded plots at the Opana station [77] before and 
after the attack ; also, in the Army exhibit, page 7, is a reproduction 
of a photostatic copy of the record of early flights on December 7, 
1941, obtained by the Opana detector station. This chart on the easel 
is taken from the photostatic chart. 

On page 8 of the exhibit is a reproduction of a photostatic copy of 
mobile detector-station records obtained prior to 7 a. m. on December 7, 
1941. The dots indicate the location of aircraft. Going back to the 
chart on the easel, the blue arrow represents the direction of approach 
of the B-l7's previously mentioned as being ferried from the main- 
land. 

I perhaps should mention that those planes were not recorded by 
the radar station. Their direction is put on the chart merely as a 
matter of orientation. 

At 7 a. m., December 7, 1941, all radar detector stations closed down 
except the Opana station at Kahuku Point, which remained in opei'a- 
tion in order to continue the training of a new man, Pvt. George E. 
Elliott, who had volunteered to remain on the job for this purpose. 

[78] At 7 : 02 a. m. this station, manned by Private Elliott and 
Pvt. Joseph L. Lockard, picked up an indication of airplanes at 132 
miles, bearing 3° east of north, indicated by that pip at the top of the 
chart marked with the time 7 : 02. 

The soldiers kept tracking the target. At 7 : 20 a. m. Private Loc- 
kard called to inform Lieutenant Tyler, the watch officer at the infor- 
mation center. Fort Shaffer, of his observations, but that officer decided 
to take no action. 

Shortly after 8 a. m. Lieutenant Tyler received a telephone message 
that Wheeler Field was under attack. Lieutenant Tyler thereupon 
directed that all radar crews be recalled to their stations. 

Sound detectors: In the Coast Artillery Antiaircraft Regiment 
there were generally two battalions of guns, each of which included 
three gun batteries and a battery of ten 60-inch searchlights. 

Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute, Colonel. Will you put the map back 
there ? I would like to ask him a question. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you have anything to say about those purple ink 
marks on your exhibit, ''6 : 45" and ''6 : 48" ? 

Mr. Keefe. I can't hear your question, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sorry. I have to put my nose in [79] 
the instrument. 



40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Have you anything to say about those indications of interception 
at earlier hours to the left of that, as you pointed out ? 

Colonel Thielen. As I mentioned, that chart was taken from the 
historical plot, so-called, of which the committee has a photostatic 
copy. I reproduced the information in those pips on the chart for the 
sake of accuracy, but I am not in a position to interpret them. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is, the Army hasn't any information, from its 
records, to interpret what the radar station showed, what the record of 
the radar station showed, to the left, I mean ? 

Colonel Thielen. Any interpretation would be speculation, I think, 
on my part, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I just wondered, as it is shown there, whether some- 
thing ought to be said about it. 

Colonel Thielen. They are taken, as I said, for the sake of com- 
pleteness from the historical plot. They do appear on the plot. They 
were plotted on the Opana station. As I indicated, with the state of 
radar at that time, it could not be definitely stated whether any image 
was that of a friendly or hostile aircraft. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman 

[80] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I am going to raise the 
point of order. If we are going to have a rule it ought to be followed. 

Senator Ferguson. Since the point of order is raised 

The Chairman. I think we have a point of order that we agreed to 
follow, otherwise we will be breaking down the rules before we start. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. Mitchell. Go ahead, Colonel. 
Colonel Thielen. As for the sound detectors 

Senator Ferguson. I assumed, Mr. Chairman, when the counsel 
asked questions and no one else asked questions, that it would naturally 
come around to ask him a question. 

The Chairman. The Chair's interpretation of the rule is that the 
committee members are not to ask questions until the counsel has 
finished with the witness. 

Senator Ferguson. That means completely finished with the witness 
and he turns him over to the committee ? 

The Chairivian. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. It might be quite in order for the committee 
members to suggest questions, so if they have any suggestions to make 
they make written suggestions. I think it might clarify the record 
as to procedure. 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

[81] Mr. Mitchell. Colonel, may I ask you also if there is any- 
thing you have to say about the purple arrow going from 10 : 39 to 
10 : 27 on that map ? Wliat does that mean ? Why is that on there ? 

Colonel Thielen. Because those two points were plotted by the 
Opana station at that time. 

Mr. Mitchell. After the attack ? 

Colonel Thielen. That is correct. We could see definitely that 
they were going away, those at 10 : 27 having been plotted earlier 
than that at 10 : 39. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is all. You may go ahead. 

Colonel Thielen. As for the sound detectors, in the Coast Artillery 
Anti-Aircraf t Kegiment there were generally two battalions of guns, 
each of which included 3 gun batteries and a battery of 10 GO-inch 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 41 

searchlights. One sound detector generally worked with each search- 
light. The primary purpose of the sound detector was to pick up an 
airplane by its sound and then to point the searchlight ; consequently 
detectors were employed only at night. 

The sound detector in use at the time had an optimum range of 
about 10,000 yards. 

I believe the Navy will now discuss their radar. 

Admiral Inglis. Before discussing Navy radar I would like to 
reconcile one point that might seem inconsistent to [83] the 
members of the committee. 

You will recall, in describing the search of the patrol planes, I 
said that the planes were to take off at sunrise, 5 : 27 Hawaiian time. 
That word "sunrise" was taken out of the report, but I think it was a 
typogi-aphical error because sunrise was actually an hour later, 
at 6 : 26. 

It is my understanding that the j)lan did call for the planes to 
take off at 5 : 27, an hour before sunrise, which is usually considered 
as dawn in those latitudes. 

With that explanation, I would like to pass on now to the Navy's 
radar equipment. The only ships in Pearl Harbor equipped with ship 
search radar at that time, on December 7, 1941, were the battleships 
Pennsylvania, California, West Virginia, and the seaplane tender 
Curtiss. The radar equipment on these ships was not manned since 
the height of the land around the harbor would have made it ineffec- 
tive. The equipment on the Curtiss was put into operation at the 
beginning of the first attack and that on the Pennsylvania began to 
operate 15 minutes later, both with negative results. 

Facilities for aircraft spotting: On board the naval vesselsat Pearl 
Harbor, aircraft spotting was a function of the crews manning their 
stations at condition of readiness then existing. Every ship's organi- 
zation bill provided for certain members of the watch [83] at 
the gun and control stations to act as aircraft lookouts. There were 
no naval air lookout stations ashore. However, crews of the signal 
tower at Pearl Harbor had certain air lookout duties as part of their 
general signal duties. 

Character of antisubmarine patrol operations, December 7, 1941 : 
On the morning of December 7, 1941, the United States destroyer 
Ward was assigned and was carrying out an inner antisubmarine 
patrol off the Pearl Harbor entrance. Commander Biard is pointing 
to that locality. This patrol searched the navigable waters between 
bearings 100° to 250° (true) from entrance buoy No. 1 to a distance 
of 2 miles. 

The mission of this patrol was to detect and prevent unidentified 
submarines and unauthorized vessels from entering the approaches 
to the Pearl Harbor entrance channel. 

Although not part of the antisubmarine patrol, the United States 
minesweepers Condor and Crosshill were conducting minesweeping 
operations in the channel and approaches thereto. 

The fleet units at sea were screened by both a surface and air anti- 
submarine patrol. 

Account of Japanese attack on ships and installations at Pearl Har- 
bor, December 7, 1941 : Possibly the first Japanese contact off Oahu 
was made at 3 : 50 a. m. Pearl Harbor time — 9 : 20 a. m. Washington 
time — [SJ^] when the United States coastal minesweeper Con- 



42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

dor sighted the periscope of a submerged submarine. At that time the 
Condor was conducting minesweeping operations approximately 1% 
miles southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. At 3 : 57 a. m. 
the Condor, by visual signal, informed the destroyer Ward, then 
patroling off the Pearl Harbor entrance, of this contact. 

The Ward thereupon immediately instituted a search and at about 
6 : 40 a. m. sighted the periscope of an unidentified submarine appar- 
ently trailing the United States target repair ship Antwres, then en 
route to Honolulu Harbor. 

Commander Biard, will you show the relationship between Hono- 
lulu Harbor and Pearl Harbor entrance ? 

That is Pearl Harbor [indicating] and that is Honolulu Harbor, 
about 10 miles apart. 

{85^ Upon sighting the submarine, the Ward ordered all hands 
to battle stations, increased her speed from 5 to 25 knots, and started 
the attack. The Ward opened fire with her guns at 6 : 45 a. m. and a 
depth charge attack was commenced. The second gun salvo scored a 
direct hit upon the conning tower of the Japanese submarine. As a 
result of these attacks, the submarine is believed to have gone down in 
1,200 feet of water. A large amount of oil came to the surface. 

At 6 : 54 a. m., the Wai'd sent the following dispatch by voice trans- 
mission to the commandant. Fourteenth Naval District : 

We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped charges upon submariue operating 
in defensive sea area. 

At 7 : 15 a. m. — 12 : 45 p. m. Washington time — this message was 
reported delivered to the district officer, Lt. Comdr. Harold Ka- 
minski. In turn, at 7 : 16 a. m., Lieutenant Commander Kaminski no- 
tified the duty officer of the commander-in-chief, United States Fleet. 
This was the first information received at the Pearl Harbor head- 
quarters of the commander-in-chief. United States Fleet, that un- 
identified forces might be in the Hawaiian area. Twenty-five minutes 
after this telephone report, a second was received at the headquarters, 
commander-in-chief, United States Fleet, from the operations officer 
of patrol wing two relaying a report received at [5^] 7 : 32 
a. m. to the effect that a patrol plane had sunk an unidentified subma- 
rine south of Pearl Harbor channel entrance buoy. This was the same 
submarine reported by the Ward. This report was followed by an- 
other telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District duty officer 
in which it was stated that the Ward was towing a sampan into Hono- 
lulu. This last report was undoubtedly erroneous since there is no 
mention in the Wardh administrative log of her towing a sampan. 

Upon receipt of the Ward''s report by the commandant. Fourteenth 
Naval District, the commandant ordered the ready-du<:y destroyer 
U. S. S. Monaghan to proceed to sea, to close the net gate, to attempt to 
verify the contact report giving full details, and to notify the com- 
mander in chief's staff duty officer. A dispatch was sent to the Ward 
at 7 : 37 a. m., asking verification of the report and details of the attack 
on the enemy submarine. 

After the Ward'^s message and prior to the Japanese raid, no other 
reports indicating or verifying the enemy's presence were received at 
the headquarters, commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

At about 7:55 a. m. Pearl Harbor time — 1 : 25 p. m, Washington 
time— the navy yard signal tower telephoned the comniander in chief, 
Pacific Fleet, as follows : 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 43 

[87] Enemy air raid — not drill. 

Almost simultaneously, Japanese torpedo planes attacked the battle- 
ships. From then on until 9 : 45 a. m., Pearl Harbor time — 3 : 15 p. m. 
Washington time — there was almost continuous enemy air activity of 
some kind over the harbor. However, there seemed to be separate 
periods of greatly intensified activity. On this basis, the narrative of 
the attack may be divided into five phases. 

The five phases of the attack are : 

Phase I : Combined torpedo plane and dive bomber attacks lasting 
from 7 : 55 a. m. to 8 : 25 a. m. 

Phase II : Lull in attacks lasting from 8 : 25 a. m. to 8 : 40 a. m. 

Phase III : Horizontal bomber attacks extending from 8 : 40 a. m. 
to 9 : 15 a. m. 

Phase IV: Dive bomber attacks between 9: 15 and 9:45 a. m. 

Phase V : Waning of attacks and completion of raid after 9 : 45 a. m. 

The primary objectives of the Japanese during the raid were the 
heavy combatant ships and aircraft. Damage to the light forces and 
the industrial plant was incidental to the destruction or disablement 
of the heavy ships and aircraft based ashore. 

[88] Phase I — 7:55-8:25 a. m. — Combined torpedo and dive- 
homber attacks 

The beginning of the attack coincided with the hoisting of the 
preparatory signal for 8 o'clock colors. At this time — namely 7 : 55 
a. m. — Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, and within 
the next few seconds enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers swung 
in from Various sectors to concentrate their attack on the heavy ships 
moored in Pearl Harbor. It is estimated that nine planes engaged 
in the attack on the naval air station on Ford Island, concentrated 
on the planes parked in the vicinity of hangar No. 6. 

At the time of the attack, our planes — patrol flying boats, flbat 
planes, and scout bombers, carrier type — were lined up on the field. 
These planes caught fire and exploded. Machine-gun emplacements 
were set up hastily and manned, although the return fire from shore 
on Ford Island was pitifully weak. Then as suddenly as they had 
appeared, the Japanese plaiies vanished. No further attack on this 
air station was made during the day. Except for a direct hit oil 
hangar No. 6 resulting from a bomb which was apparently aimed at 
the battleship California and which fell short, the damage to the 
station itself was comparativel}'^ slight. However, 33 of our best 
planes out of a total of 70 planes of all types were destroyed or 
damaged. 

\89] As soon as the attack began, commander. Patrol Wing 2 
broadcasted from Ford Island the warning : "Air raid. Pearl Harbor — ■ 
This is not a drill." This warning was followed a few minutes 
later by a similar message from the commander in chief, United 
States Fleet. 

At approximately the same time that the Japanese dive bombers 
appeared over Ford Island, other low-flying planes struck at the 
Kaneohe Naval Air Station on the other side of the island. The 
attack was well executed, with the planes coming down in shallow 
dives and inflicting severe casualties on the seaplanes moored in the 
water. Machine guns and rifles wei-e brought out, and men dispersed 
to fire at will at the low-flying planes. After a period of 10 to 15 



44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

minutes, the attacking planes drew off to the north at a low altitude 
and disappeared from sight. Several other contingents of bombers 
passed over, but none dropped bombs on Kaneohe Bay. 

About 25 minutes after the first attack, another squadron of planes 
similar to one of our light bomber types, appeared over Kaneohe and 
commenced bombing and strafing. Number 3 hangar received a 
direct hit during this attack and four planes in the hangar were 
destroyed. The majority of the casualties suffered at Kaneohe 
resulted from this attack:. Most of the injured personnel were in 
the squadrons attempting either to launch their planes or to save 
those [90] planes not as yet damaged. When the enemy 
withdrew, some 10 to 15 minutes later, salvage operations were com- 
menced, but it was too late to save No. 1 hangar, which burned until 
only its steel structural work was left. Only 9 out of the 35 planes 
at Kaneohe escaped destruction in this attack. Six of these were 
damaged and three were in the air on patrol south of Oahu as pre- 
viously described. 

Meanwhile, the Marine air base at Ewa was undergoing similar 
attack. Apparently the attack on Ewa preceded that at Pearl Harbor 
by about 2 minutes. It was delivcTed by two squadrons of 18 to 24 
single-seater fighter planes using machine-gun strafing tactics, which 
came in from the northwest at an altitude of approximately 1,000 
feet. These enemy planes would descend to within 20 to 25 feet 
of the ground, attacking single planes with short bursts of gunfire. 
Then they would f)ull over the tree tops, reverse their course, and 
attack from the opposite direction. Within less than 15 minutes, all 
the Marine tactical aircraft had been shot up or set on fire. Then the 
guns of the enemy fighters were turned upon our utility aircraft, 
upon planes that had been disassembled for repair, and upon the 
Marines themselves. 

Effective defense measures were impossible until after the first raid 
had subsided. Pilots, aching to strike at the enemy in the air, viewed 
the wreckage which until a [91] few minutes before had been 
a strong air group of Marine fighters and bombers. All together 33 
out of the 49 planes at Ewa had gone up in smoke. Some marines, 
unable to find anythmg more effective, had tried to oppose fighter 
planes with pistols, since the remaining 16 planes were too badly 
damaged to fly. 

Although in phase I of the attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor 
Japanese dive bombers were effective, the torpedo planes did the most 
damage. They adhered strictly to a carefully laid plan and directed 
their attacks from those sectors which afforded the best avenues of 
approach for torpedo attack against selected heavy ship objectives. 
Thus they indicated accurate knowledge of harbor and channel depths 
and the berths ordinarily occupied by the major combatant units of 
our fleet. At least in the'great majority of cases, the depth of water in 
Pearl Harbor did not prevent the successful execution of this form of 
attack. Shallow dives of the torpedoes upon launching were assured 
by the use of specially constructed wooden fins, remnants of which 
were discovered on enemy torpedoes salvaged after the attack. 

Four separate torpedo-plane attacks were made during phase I. 
The major attack was made by 12 planes which swung in generally 
from the southeast over the tank farm and the vicinity of Merry 
Point. After splitting, they launched their torpedoes at very low al- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 45 

titudes (within 50 [92] to 100 feet of the water), and from 
very short distances, aiming for the battleships berthed on the south- 
east side of Ford Island. All the outboard battleships, namely, the 
Nevada, Arizo7ia, West Virginia, Oklahoma, and California, were ef- 
fectively hit by one or more torpedoes. Strafing was simultaneously 
conducted from the rear cockpits. A recovered unexploded torpedo 
carried an explosive charge of 1,000 pounds. 

During the second of these attacks, the Oklahoma was struck by 
three torpedoes on the port side and heeled rapidly to port, impeding 
the efforts of her defenders to beat off the attackers. 

The third attack was made by one torpedo plane which appeared 
from the west and was directed against the light cruiser Helena and 
the minelayer Oglala, both of which were temporarily occupying the 
berth previously assigned to the battleship Pennsylvania, flagship of 
the Pacific Fleet. One torpedo passed under the Oglala and exploded 
against the side of the Helena. The blast stove in the side plates of 
the Oglala. Submersible pumps for the Oglala were obtained from 
the Helena, but could not be used since no power was available because 
of damage to the ship's engineering plant. 

The fourth wave of five planes came in from the northwest and 
attacked the seaplane tender Tangier, the target \PS] ship 
Utah, and the light cruisers Raleigh and Detroit. The Raleigh was 
struck by one torpedo, and the Utah received two hits in succession, 
capsizing at 8 : 13 a. m. At first it was feared that the Raleigh would 
capsize. Orders were, therefore, given for all men not at the guns 
to jettison all topside weights and put both airplanes in the water. 
Extra manila and wire lines were also run to the quays to help keep 
the ship from capsizing. 

The Utah, an old battleship converted into a target ship, had re- 
cently returned from serving as a target for practice aerial bombard- 
ment. As soon as she received her torpedo hits, she began listing 
rapidly to port. After she had listed to about 40°, the order was 
given to abandon ship. This order was executed with some difficulty 
as the attacking planes strafed the crew as they went over the side. 
Remnants of the crew had reached Ford Island safely. Later knock- 
ing was heard within the hull of the Utah. With cutting tools ob- 
tained from the Raleigh, a volunteer crew succeeded in cutting 
through the hull and rescuing a fireman second class who had been 
entrapped in the void scape underneath the dynamo room. 

An interesting sidelight on Japanese intentions and advance knowl- 
edge is suggested by the fact that berths F-10 and F-11 in which the 
Utah and Raleigh were placed were [P^] designated carrier 
berths and that a carrier was frequently moored in nearby F-9. 

The Detroit and Tangier escaped torpedo damage, one torpedo 
passing just astern of the Detroit and burying itself in the mud. An- 
other torpedo passed between the Tangier and the Utah. 

It is estimated that the total number of torpedo planes engaged in 
these four attacks was 21. 

In the eight dive-bomber attacks occurring during phase I, three 
types of bombs were employed — light, medium, and incendiary. 

During the second of these attacks, a bomb hit exploded the forward 
14-inch powder magazine on the battleship Arizona and caused a rav- 
aging oil fire, which sent up a great cloud of smoke, thereby inter- 

79716 — 46 — pt. 1 ^6 



46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

fering with antiaircraft fire. The battleship Tennessee in the adja- 
cent berth was endangered seriously by the oil fire. 

The West Virginia was hit during the third of these attacks by two 
heavy bombs as well as by torpedoes. Like the California^ she had to 
be abandoned after a large fire broke out amidships. Her executive 
officer, the senior survivor, dove overboard and swam to the Ten- 
nessee^ where he organized a party of West Virginia survivors to 
help extinguish the fire in the rubbish, trash, and oil which [P-5] 
covered the water between the Tennessee and Ford Island. 

The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase is esti- 
mated at 30. While a few fighters were reported among the attackers 
in the various phases, they were no doubt confused with light bombers 
and accordingly are not treated as a distinct type. 

Although the major attack by high-altitude horizontal bombers 
did not occur until phase III, 15 planes of this type operating in four 
groups were active during phase I. 

Most of the torpedo damage to the fleet had occurred by 8 : 25 
a. m. All the outboard battleships had been hit by one or more 
torpedoes ; all the battleships had been hit by one or more bombs with 
the exception of the Oklahoma^ which took four torpedoes before it 
capsized, and the Pennsylvania^ which received a bomb hit later. By 
the end of the first phase, the West Virginia was in a sinking con- 
dition ; the California was down by the stern ; the Arizona was a flam- 
ing ruin; the other battleships were all damaged to a greater or 
lesser degree. 

Although the initial attack of the Japanese came as a surprise, de- 
fensive action on the part of the fleet was prompt. All ships immedi- 
ately went to general quarters. Battleship ready machine guns like- 
wise opened fire at once, and within an estimated, average time of 
less than 5 minutes \_96'] practically all battleships and anti- 
aircraft batteries were firing. 

The cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average 
time of about 4 minutes. The destroyers, although opening up with 
"machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all 
antiaircraft guns into action. 

During this phase of the battle there was no movement of ships 
within the harbor proper. The destroyer Helni^ which had gotten 
under way just prior to the attack, was outside the harbor entrance 
when at 8: 17 a submarine conning tower was sighted to the right of 
the entrance channel and northward of buoy No. 1. The submarine 
immediately submerged. The Helm opened fire at 8 : 19 a. m. when the 
submarine again surfaced temporarily. No hits were observed. 

[57] Phase II — S:^5-8:Jfi a. m. — Lull in attacks 
This phase is described as a lull only by way of comparison. Air 
activity continued during this phase although somewhat abated, with 
sporadic attacks by dive and horizontal bombers. During this phase 
an estimated total of 15 dive bombers participated in 5 attacks upon 
the ships in the navy yard, the battleships Maryland^ Oklahoma^ 
Nevada^ and Pennsylvania^ and various light cruisers and destroyers. 
Although three attacks by horizontal bombers occurred during the 
lull, these appear to have overlapped into phnse III and are con- 
sidered under that heading. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 47 

At 8 : 32 a. m. the battleship Oklahoma took a heavy list to star- 
board and capsized. 

During phase II, there was still relatively little ship movement 
within the harbor. The ready-duty destroyer Monaghan had re- 
ceived orders at 7: 51 a. m. (Pearl Harbor time) to "proceed immedi- 
ately and contact Ward in defensive sea area." At about 8 : 37, ob- 
serving an enemy submarine just west of Ford Island under fire from 
both the Curtiss and Ta/ngie7\ the Monaghan proceeded at high speed 
and at about 8 : 43 rammed the submarine. As the enemy vessel had 
submerged, the shock was slight. The Monaghan thereupon reversed 
engines and dropped two depth charges. 

The Curtiss had previously scored two direct hits on [P5] the 
conning tower. This submarine was later salvaged for inspection and 
disposal. The Monaghan then proceeded down the channel and con- 
tinued her sortie. At the same time that the Monagham got under- 
way, the destroyer Henley slipped her chain from buoy X-11 and 
sortied, following the Monaghan down the channel. 

Phase III — 8: If.0-9: 15 a. m. — Horizontal honiber attacks 

The so-called lull in the air raid was terminated by the appearance 
over the fleet of eight groups of high-altitude horizontal bombers 
which crossed and recrossed their targets from various directions, 
inflicting serious damage. Some of the bombs dropped were con- 
verted 15- or 16-inch shells of somewhat less explosive quality, marked 
by very little flame. According to some observers, many bombs 
dropped by high-altitude horizontal bombers either failed to explode 
or landed outside the harbor area. 

During the second attack (at 9:06 a. m.) the Pennsylvania was 
hit by a heavy bomb which passed through the main deck amidships 
and detonated, causing a fire, which was extinguished with some 
difficulty. 

The third group of planes followed very closely the line of battle- 
ship moorings. It was probably one of these planes that hit the 
California with what is believed to have been a 15-inch projectile 
equipped with tail vanes which [PP] penetrated to the second 
deck and exploded. As a result of the explosion, the armored hatch 
to the machine shop was badly sprung and could not be closed, result- 
ing in the spreading of a serious fire. 

Altogether, 30 horizontal bombers, including 9 planes which had 
participated in earlier attacks, are estimated to have engaged in phase 
III. Once more it was the heavy combatant ships, the battleships 
and cruisers, which bore the brunt of these attacks. 

Although phase III was largely devoted to horizontal bombing, 
approximately 18 dive bombers organized in 5 groups also participated. 

It was probably the second of these groups which did considerable 
damage to the Nevada^ then proceeding down the South Channel, and 
also to the Shaw, Cassin, and Downes, all three of which were set afire. 

During the fifth attack, a Japanese dive bomber succeeded in drop- 
ping 1 bomb on the seaplane tender Curtiss which detonated on the 
main-deck level, killing 20 men, wounding 58, and leaving 1 other 
unaccounted for. 

During this same phase, the Curtiss took under fire one of these 
bombers, which was pulling out of a dive over the naval air station. 
Hit squarely by the Curtiss'' accurate gunfire, the plane crashed on the 



48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ship, spattering burning [100] gasoline and starting fires so 
menacing that one of the guns had to be temporarily abandoned. 

Considerable ship movement took place during phase III. At 8 : 40 
a. m. the Nevada cleared berth F-8 without assistance and proceeded 
down the South Channel. As soon as the Japanese became aware 
that a battleship was trying to reach open water, they sent dive bomber 
after dive bomber down after her and registered several hits. In 
spite of the damage she had sustained in the vicinity of floating dry- 
dock No. 2, and although her bridge and forestructure were ablaze, 
the ship continued to fight effectively. At 9 : 10, however, while she 
was attempting to make a turn in the channel, the Nevada ran aground 
in the vicinity of buoy No. 19. 

Meanwhile the repair ship Vestal, also without assistance, had got- 
ten underway at about 8: 40, had cleared the burning Arizona, and at 
abfiat 9 : 10 anchored well clear northeast of Ford Island. 

Soon after the Nevada and Vestal had cleared their berths, tugs 
began to move the Oglala to a position astern of the Helena at "Ten- 
ten" Dock. The Oglala was finally secured in her berth at about 9 : 00, 
but shortly thereafter she capsized. 

At 8 : 42, the oiler Neosho cleared berth F-4 unaided and stood 
toward Merry Point in order to reduce fire hazard to her cargo and 
to clear the way for a possible sortie by the battleship Mari/land. 

[101'\ Next, phase IV, from 9 : 15 to 9 : 45, dive-bomber at- 
tacks 

The CliAiRMAisr. Under the program of the committee, 12 o'clock 
having arrived, I think we should now recess until 2 p. m., and com- 
plete your testimony then. 

Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, if I may have 30 seconds longer, I 
could finish this particular part. 

The Chairman. Just a moment. You might as well come back at 2. 

(Whereupon, at 12 m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 
p. m., of the same day.) 

[102'\ AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 P. M. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Admiral, you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF REAE ADM. T. B. INGIIS AND COL. BERNARD 
THIELEN (Resumed) 

Admiral Inglis. In this morning's portion of the presentation I 
finished phases I, II, and III. I propose now to take up the story with 
phase IV, which lasted from 9 : 15 to 9 : 45 and was characterized by 
dive-bomber attacks. 

Phase IV — 9: 15-9: 1^5 a. m. — Dive hoiiiber attacks 

During phase IV an estimated 27 dive bombers conducted 9 strafing 
attacks directed against ships throughout the entire harbor area. In 
all probability the planes were the same ones that had conducted pre- 
vious attacks. These attacks overlapped by about 10 minutes the 
horizontal bomber attacks previously described in phase III. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 49 

Phase V — 9:4S — Waning of attacks and convpletion of raid 

By 9 : 45 all enemy planes had retired. Evading our aerial searches, 
both shore-based and from carriers at sea, the Japanese striking force 
retired to its home waters without being contacted by any of our units. 
For summary of Japanese planes participating in attack see item 11 
in the white folder. 

The foregoing has been a discussion of the attack phase only. The 
details of our aircraft and antiaircraft action will be given later. 

{103'\ Summary of percentage of personnel mustered on, sta- 
tion : Fleet orders at the time of Pearl Harbor directed that one-fourth 
of the officers and one-half of the enlisted personnel be on board at all 
times. 

Excerpts from a summarized report of personnel actually on board 
at the commencement of the attack on December 7, 1941, are as follows : 

On hoard 

Commanding officers of battleships 5 out of 8 

Commanding officers of cruisers 6 out of 7 

Commanding officers of destroyers percent 63 

Damage-control officers of battleships 6 out of 8 

Average percentage of officers : 

Battleships (approximate) percent 60-70 

Cruisers, battle force (approximate) do 65 

Destroyers, battle force (approximate) do 50 

Average percentage of men : 

Battleships do 95 

Cruisers, battle force do 98 

Destroyers, battle force do 85 

There were ample personnel present and ready to man all naval 
shore installations. 

I will ask Colonel Thielen to take up from here. 

[lOJi-'] Colonel Thielen. In presenting the Army's story of the 
attack, I propose to describe what happened at each of the three 
major airfields, Hickam Field, Wlieeler, and Bellows, and after that 
to describe the action taken by our ground forces, and our coast ar- 
tillery command in response to the attack. 

Our planes on Hickam Field at the time of the attack were lined up 
on the warming-up aprons three or four abreast, with approximately 
10 feet between wing tips, and approximately 135 feet from the tail 
of one plane to the nose of another. 

If you will note the plan of the Hickam Feld as displayed on the 
easel, you may be able to distinguish the aircraft on the warming-up 
apron. They are actually drawn to scale. They may not be legible. 
However, each member of the committee has a photograph of the plan 
of each of these airfields. 

Hickam Field observers report that the first indication of an attack 
was at 7 : 55 a. m. when nine enemy single-engine, low-wing mono- 
planes, carrying torpedoes, were observed southeast of Hickam Field 
hangar line, flying at an altitude of about 50 feet toward Pearl Harbor. 
They were in two echelons, five ])]anes in the first and four in the 
second. These airplanes did not attack Hickam Field.. 

\_105'] At almost the same time, however, nine dive bombers at- 
tacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and Hickam Field hangar 
line from the south, and three additional planes attacked the same ob- 
jectives from the northwest. Several minutes later nine additional 
dive bombers bombed Hickam Field hanger line from the southeast. 
Immediately thereafter, seven additional dive bombers attacked the 



50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Hickam Field hangar line from the east. All planes dived at approxi- 
mately 45 to 50 degrees from altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 feet. Bombs 
were released at about 1,000 feet with the planes pulling out of dives 
from 800 to approximately 300 feet. Machine gun fire was employed 
before and after bomb release. This attack lasted about 10 minutes. 

The second attack on Hickam Field occurred at about 8 : 25 a. m., 
when between six and nine planes approached from the south and at- 
tacked No. 1 aqua system, which is a hydrostatic pass for the fuel pump- 
ing system, and also the technical buildings immediately behind the 
hangar lines, and the consolidated barracks. These planes when first 
observed were flying level and released their bombs from level flight at 
an altitude of about 150 feet. During and immediately after this 
bombing attack our planes on the parking apron were attacked with 
gun fire. About 1 minute later (8 : 26) a formation of five or six planes 
bombed the baseball diamond 1^06] from a high altitude, pos- 
sibly believing the gasoline storage system to be in that area. The 
second attack lasted between 10 and 15 minutes. 

The third attack at Hickam occurred about 9 a. m., when six to nine 
planes (presumably those that had previously bombed from level flight 
at 150 feet at 8 : 25) attacked with machine gun fire the technical build- 
ings behind the hangar lines and certain planes which by then were 
dispersed. 

These attacks came from four directions almost simultaneously. At 
the same time a formation of from seven to nine planes, flying in V 
formation at an altitude estimated at 6,000 feet approached from the 
south, releasing bombs which struck the consolidated barracks, the 
parade ground, and post exchange. The third attack lasted about 8 
minutes. All enemy planes observed at low altitudes were single en- 
gine, low-wing monoplanes. The tj^pe of high altitude bombers was 
not definitely established. Largest bombs used were believed not to 
exceed 600 pounds. Gun ammunition was identified as 7.7 and 20 milli- 
meter ammunition. 

At Wheeler Field, our planes were parked in the space between the 
aprons in front of the hangars, generally in a series of parallel lines 
approximately wing tip to wing tip, the lines varying from 15 to 20 
feet apart. 

[107] About 25 Japanese planes approached at 8 : 02 a. m., gener- 
ally from the southeast, at about 5,000 feet altitude. They passed well 
to the east of the field, circled counter-clockwise, losing altitude and 
approached for attack from the north at about 3,000 feet, generally per- 
pendicular to the hangar line. The formation of the entire ^roup was 
roughly a V — with five sections of four planes each forming the V 
formation — that is indicated on the chart and on the photographic 
leproductions thereof — with a fourth plane extending the right leg 
of the V. 

A single odd plane flew slightly to the rear of the formation. They 
dived at an angle of about 45° and struck the hangar line and vicinity 
over a length of about 900 yards, starting from the engineering hangar 
which is at the extreme southwest of the hangar line. Out of approx- 
imately 35 bombs dropped, 4 were about 600 pounds, 3 were about 250 
pounds, 8 were about 100 pounds, and the remainder were smaller, 
some of them appearing to be oil or other type incendiary bombs. 
Machine gun fire was employed during the dive bombing attack. 
Practically all bombs struck the hangar line and points in the rear 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 51 

and were released at altitudes of 200 and 250 feet. After releasing 
bombs, the planes continued to dive for a short distance and pulled 
out at about the same angle as at the [^08] start of the dive. 

After the first dive bombing the formation broke, apparently in all 
directions, with individual planes continuing gun fire without regard 
to the possibility of collision. This phase of the attack was carried on 
from altitudes of approximately 200 feet and the only semblance of 
order appeared to be that planes circled counterclockwise. Principal 
targets for this gim fire were our planes on the hangar line and build- 
ings, and personnel in the immediate vicinity. All planes in the first 
attacking formation appeared similar and were single-engine, low- 
wing monoplanes. While not positively established, it is presumed 
from evidence of 20 millimeters fire that this attack included fighters in 
support of dive bombers. The entire attack lasted approximately 15 
minutes. 

Another attack struck Wheeler Field a few minutes after 9 a. m. 
This attack consisted of seven enemy planes which approached from 
the south, flying roughly in line at an altitude of about 500 feet. They 
fired machine guns at planes being taxied onto the airdrome, but it is 
believed that no plane fired more than 25 to 50 rounds. All seven 
planes were single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, two-seaters. They 
withdrew to the north. The whole second attack lasted less than 5 
minutes and could very reasonably have been [^09] made by a 
group of planes expending the remainder of their ammunition. 

During the first raid at Wheeler Field, personnel were employed in 
rescuing the wounded, fighting the numerous fires and in removing 
airplanes from danger. As soon as undamaged aircraft had been 
rolled away to a safe place, the crews began arming them. 

On Bellows Field at the time of the attack the P— iO's were parked 
in line at 10 to 15 feet intervals. The reconnaissance planes were also 
parked in a line at slightly greater intervals. 

I might point out that those aircraft on the white squares represent 
the original formation as it was at the time of the first attack. We have 
also represented aircraft in blue squares dispersed over the field. 
Those are the same aircraft represented as being initially in line. 
After the first attack they were all over the field. 

A single Japanese fighter plane initiated the attack at approxi- 
mately 8:30 a. m. It came directly from the east and employed 
machine-gun fire on the tent area apparently expending all its ammu- 
nition in this one attack. 

At about 9 a. m., the nine fighters attacked Bellows Field from the 
north in three groups of three planes each in V formation. This 
attack lasted about 15 mhmtes and [ii^] consisted of gim fire 
only. It was initiated with a diving attack of all nine planes, after 
which the three formations of three each peeled olf and attacked from 
various directions. The antiaircraft defense during this attack on 
Bellows Field consisted of small-arms fire by elements of the Two 
Hundred and Ninety-eighth Infantry. 

After the single plane, tent-area attack, one of the B-17's which 
had arrived from the mainland and which had been unable to land 
at Hickam Field, attempted to land at Bellows Field but rolled off 
the runway. And that can be seen on the chart in the orange circle, 
the approximate position where it left the runway. This plane was 
repeatedly machine-gunned by the nine attacking planes. 



52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The attack at Bellows Field appeared to be well planned, rehearsed, 
and well executed. One plane was reported shot down by the Infantry 
troops defending the area but no part of it was recovered from the 
sea for identification. 

At Haleiwa — you might point that out, Captain, on the big map — 
the planes of the Forty-seventh Pursuit Squadron were parked in the 
open in close formations. However, Haleiwa Field was not attacked. 

In all these attacks on Oahu airfields, strafing planes came down to 
a very low altitude. Thej^ used .50 caliber, 7.7 millimeter and 20 
millimeter ammunition. Rigid flight discipline was [-?-?-?] 
demonstrated by the enemy and accurate bombing was evidenced. 
Such attacks could not have been performed without numerous and 
detailed rehearsals. Every movement was well executed. The evi- 
dence indicates that the attacks on the airfields were made by a maxi- 
mum of 105 airplanes ; the number may have been less since some of 
the planes may have taken part in more than one attack. 

After 9 : 45 a. m., December 7, there were no further attacks on 
Oahu installations. Despite numerous false reports, no landings 
were attempted. 

A few bombs were dropped in Honolulu, but probably this was the 
result of individual planes clearing their bomb racks before departing. 
There was some strafing and a few bombs were dropped on Schofield 
Barracks and Fort Shafter, Several bursts of machine-gini fire were 
delivered at targets other than military objectives. 

When the first bombs were dropped and machine-gun fire com- 
menced, practically all observers were so surprised that for a few 
minutes the real situation was not grasped. Perhaps 2 or 4 minutes 
elapsed before General Short was informed by his chief of staff that 
an attack was in progress. General Short immediately directed that 
all troops be turned out under alert No. 3. 

This alert required all units to occupy battle positions shown on this 
map — [-?-?^] which I will explain in a moment — in the short- 
est possible time and to defend Oahu. All troops accordingly moved 
to their prescribed positions. The advance command post of the 
Hawaiian Department was operating in Aliamanu Crater by 8 : 45 
a. m. with limited personnel, and the advance command posts of the 
Twenty-fifth Division and of the Hawaiian Air Force by 11 a. m. 
Rear echelons remained at their normal locations — which, for the 
department, was Fort Shafter; for the division, Schofield Barracks. 

At Schofield Barracks, Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, commanding 
the Twenty-fourth Division, first heard the sounds of an attack at 
about 8 : 05 a. m. Within a few minutes his chief of staff had issued 
instructions to the units to get their machine guns into the antiaircraft 
positions, to increase the standing guard and to send patrols through- 
out the division sector — which was the northern half of the island — 
to observe the beaches. Before he had left his quarters, General Wil- 
son heard some of our machine guns in operation. About 8 : 50 a. m. 
the division received word from department headquarters that alert 
No. 3 would go into effect at once. Approximately 90 percent of the 
Twenty-fourth Division troops were present for duty on the morning 
of December 7, according to a report made shortly after by the Ha- 
waiian Department. The division was in position in [-?-?'5] the 
north sector by 5 p. m. with ammunition except for the 240's, 240- 
millimeter howitzers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 53 

The disposition of the division, Twenty-fourth Division, as shown 
on the map, can be picked up by the crossed rifles for Infantry posi- 
tions, by the cannon for Field Artillery battalions, and the main line 
of resistance on the east coast can be seen following the ridge line of 
the Koolau Range on the east and the Waianae Kange on the west. 

Maj. Gen. Maxwell Murray, commanding the Twenty-fifth Infantry 
Division, stated that the attack began about 7 : 53 a. m. Some machine 
guns were in firing positions on the roofs within 10 minutes. Alert 
No. 3 was placed in etf ect at about 9 o'clock. Some ammunition — other 
than high explosive — had been moved into the barracks which meant 
that most of the men had as much as 30 rounds. About 85 percent 
of the Twenty -fifth Division troops were reported present for duty at 
the time of the attack. By 4 p. m., on the Ttli all units of the Twenty- 
fifth Infantry Division were in war positions in the south sector with 
ammunition, except for the 240-millimeter howitzers. Map shows 
sectors and subsectors of responsibility in the south sector. 

The yellow squares, the antiaircraft, which I will discuss in a mo- 
ment, of course, were not under division control. Again, the crossed 
rifles indicate the Infantry [^^4-] and the w-heel cannon the 
Field Artillery, indicating the disposition under alert No. 3. 

Under alert No. 1, the harbor defense troops of the Coast Artillery 
Command were at their gun positions while the antiaircraft units 
remained at their home stations and guarded against sabotage. On 
December 7, some of the AA units got into position in 15 or 20 minutes, 
but others had to go to the other side of the island and were not in 
position until afternoon. A detailed account of the movement of anti- 
aircraft units is given on pages 11 and 12 of the Army exhibit. An 
estimated 87 percent of the Coast Artillery personnel were present for 
duty at 8 a. m., December 7. No Coast Artillery Command oihcers 
were reported absent at the time of the attack except one who was 
killed trying to get back to his place of duty. 

Maps captured from planes shot down in the attack indicated that 
the enemy had complete and up-to-date information concerning the 
exact dispositions of military forces, depots, and engineering 
establishments. 

ir*ercent mustered : A summary of a report compiled by the adjutant 
general of the Hawaiian Department indicates that at least 85 percent 
of the officers and men were present with their units at 8 a. m., Decem- 
ber 7. 

[US] Now, going back to the subject of aircraft, and the results 
of the attack, also the condition of aircraft before the attack, at the 
time of the attack the Hawaiian Air Force, in common with other 
units of the Hawaiian Department, was operating under alert No. 1. 
General jSIartin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, had informed 
his subordinates that it was a real and not a practice alert. He had 
further instructed that aircraft would not be dispersed and that all 
units would continue training under condition "Easy 5." 

"Easy" being phonetic for "E." 

"Eas3^ 5'' — E-5 under the standing operating procedure — meant that 
all aircraft would continue to conduct routme training operations, 
with none in readiness for combat operations, and with 4 hours' time 
allowed for the first plane of each unit to be in the air, armed, and 
prepared for combat. 



54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Page 10 of the Army exhibit shows when and in what numbers planes 
took off from Oahu Army airfields after the attack, and page 9 of the 
same exhibit shows the status of all combat planes before and after the 
attack as reported by the Hawaiian Air Force. In this connection 
attention is invited to the fact that final reports to the War Depart- 
ment show that total plane losses was somewhat greater than initially 
reported. In explanation of the disparity it [li(>] should be 
stated that to meet the emergency created by the attack certain dam- 
aged planes which normally might have been repaired were stripped 
for parts and destroyed. 

The attention of the committee is invited to the chart which has just 
been placed on the easel and which is a blowup of the exhibit previously 
referred to, the status of combat planes before and after the attack. 
The color code is applied to the number of planes in each column. The 
blue indicating planes in commission, the buff' out of commission, and 
finally the total on hand, and at the head of each column where the 
numerical designation of the plane is given, if that designation is on 
the green background, that plane was considered obsolete by the Air 
Force. 

The yellow code, which occurs only in the columns "After Attack," 
indicates those aircraft which were destroyed. 

At Hickam Field, prior to the attack, 6 heavy bombers — B-17 — 20 
nonmodern medium bombers — B-18 — and 5 modern light bombers — 
A.-20 — were in commission but were not ready for immediate use be- 
cause they were not loaded with bombs and ammunition. The follow- 
ing planes were on hand but out of commission for reasons indicated : 

Six B-l7's — engine repair, fuel tank repair, 60-hour inspection, 200- 
hour inspection, and carburetor repair ; 

Twelve B-lS's, overhaul, damaged landing gear, damaged [^^7] 
elevator, and first echelon maintenance ; 

Seven A-20's — damaged wing flaps, repair and first echelon mainte- 
nance. 

First echelon maintenance is maintenance of a nature which can be 
performed by the crew of the plane ; 50-hour inspection is an inspection 
and overhaul of each plane which is required to be made after each 50 
hours of flight ; and 200-hour inspection is a more thorough overhaul 
made after 200 hours of flight. 

After the attack, 8 B-17"s were on hand of which 4 were usable ; 20 
B-18's were on hand of which 10 were usable ; 10 A-20's were on hand 
with 5 usable. Eighteen of our combat planes were lost on Hickam 
Field. It was 11 : 27 a. m. — as shown in another exhibit — when the 
first four A-20's took off from the field for combat. 

At Wheeler Field and Haleiwa prior to the attack, the following 
planes were in commission but not ready for immediate use since they 
were unarmed ; 82 pursuit, 52 P-40's, 20 P-36's, 10 P-26's ; 2 medium 
bombers, 1 B-12A, 1 B-18 ; 2 light bombers, A-12 ; 5 reconnaissance 
1 0-47, 1 OA-8, 3 OA-y's; and o advanced trainers, AT-6; which are 
not shown on the chart, the chart including only combat aircraft. 

On hand but out of commission for maintenance work were [i^S] 
these additional planes : 2 B-12's, 35 P-40's, 19 P-36's, 4 P-26's and 
1 AT-6 — not shown on the chart. 

After the attack, the number of usable planes by type were as follows : 
27 out of a total of 57 P-40's, 16 out of 35 P-36's, 4 out of 8 r-26's, 1 
B-18, 1 out of 3 B-12's, 1 of 2 AT-6's, 1 0-47, 1 OA-8 and 1 OA-9. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 55 

Forty-two combat planes were lost in the attack in this airdrome. At 
8 : 30 a. m. the first aircraft, four P-40's and two P-36's took off for 
combat. 

Planes assigned to the Forty-seventh Pursuit Squadron, which was 
in training at Haleiwa Airfield — and they have been included in this 
Wheeler chart— consisted of 17 pursuit, 13 P-40's, 2 P-36's, 2 P-26's, 
and 1 medium bomber, B-12. That is the table of organization 
strength of the unit. 

The exact number of planes at Haleiwa on the morning of Decem- 
ber 7 is not known. The field was alerted at 8 : 15 a. m. Between 8 : 15 
and 10 a. m. two flights were made, each consisting of four P-40's 
and one P-36. Four enemy planes were downed by the first flight 
while the second flight downed three. One pilot was lost over Sclio- 
field Barracks. 

At Bellows Field 12 pursuit planes, P-40; and 6 reconnaissance 
planes, 4 0-47's, 2 0-49's; were in commission prior to the attack. 
However, none of these were ready L^-?^] for immediate use 
because their weapons were not loaded with ammunition. An addi- 
tional two reconnaissance planes, 0^7, were located at Bellows Field 
but were out of commission for engine change. It was 9 : 50 a. m. 
before the first 0-47 took off. Three of our combat aircraft were 
destroyed on this field. 

After the attack on December 7, about 11 :40 a. m., four A-20's and 
two B-l7's took off. Also at 3 :20 p. m., three B-l7's were dispatched, 
as a result of a request of the Navy, to search for an enemy carrier. 
The search was unsuccessful and they returned at 6 :25 p. m. 

As for the antiaircraft their activities subsequent to the attack, 
shown as previously mentioned on pages 11 and 12 of the Army 
exhibit, show the time required for the various units of the Fifty-third 
Coast Artillery Brigade, Antiaircraft to take battle positions after 
the attack of December 7 and the extent to which they engaged the 
enemy. 

Under alert No. 1 only a limited amount of ammunition was in the 
hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast Artillery 
command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn, 
ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft. How- 
ever, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order to 
keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammuni- 
tion for the [120] mobile guns and batteries was in storage 
chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks. The Infantry 
and Artillery units of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Divisions 
had only a small amount of machine-gun and rifle ammunition. All 
divisional artillery ammunition, grenades, and mortar shells were in 
the ordnance storage depots, principally at Schofield Barracks. 

The 3-inch antiaircraft gun issued to units in Hawaii at that time 
had a maximum effective range of about 10,000 yards. It had a mini- 
mum effective range of about 2,000 yards. 

The 37 millimeter antiaircraft gun had a maximum horizontal range 
of 9,300 yards, and a maximum vertical range of approximately 6,300 
yards. 

This concludes the Army's story of the attack. 

[121] Admiral Inglis. Turning now to the Navy's aircraft and 
state of readiness of aircraft and antiaircraft guns, the committee will 
find in item 12 of the white folder the locations, squadrons, numbers 



56 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



of planes in commission, types, numbers available, numbers in oper- 
ating condition, readiness in operating; condition, readiness of crews, 
numbers participating in combat and service assigned to land based 
naval and Marine planes in the Hawaiian area. 

Item 13 of the white folder contains this information summarized on 
a chart showing location of the fields and stations. 

The planes in flight at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor were 
armed for combat as follows : 

The 7 patrol flying boats in the air, 3 from Kaneohe and 4 from Ford 
Island, all carried machine guns and were fully supplied with ammuni- 
tion. In addition to machine guns and ammunition, the three planes 
from Kaneohe searching the fleet operating areas south of Oahu were 
armed with two depth charges each for use against submarines. These 
planes were working with the destroyer Ward. One of these aircraft 
dropped one depth chnrge in an attack on a submarine in the defensive 
sea area off Pearl Harbor at 6 : 45 Hawaiian time. Utility Squadron 3, 
stationed at Maui Airport, which was the new naval air station at 
Puunene. seems to have had some {122'] planes in the air prior 
to 7 : 50, Hawaiian time, on the day of the attack. These planes are 
not combat planes and do not normally carry armament. Available 
reports do not indicate the state of armanipnt of the scout bombers 
from the Enterprise that arrived over Pearl Harbor during the attack. 
As they engaged the enemy, it appears that machine guns were 
equipped and ammunition provided. 

Next, antiaircraft: There were no naval antiaircraft shore batteries 
in or around Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack. All 
naval antiaircraft batteries were ship-based, and were composed of the 
following types and number of guns : 



Gun types 



Number 


Maximum range 


Maximum 

eflective 

range yards 


Ceiling-feet 


Yards 


136 
96 
121 
427 


37, 200 
26, 300 
21, 700 


15,900 
13,500 
11,000 


12,000 
7,000 
5,000 



6-lnch, 38 caliber antiaircraft 

5-inch, 26 caliber antiaircraft - 

3-inch, 50 caliber antiaircraft 

Antiaircraft machine guns from J.l inch to .30 caliber 



« Effective ranges of 500 to 2,500 yards. 

Effective range is that range at which fire should be opened with 
reasonable chance that fire would produce damage on the target. 

{l^S] ^ Antiaircraft guns by ship classes and types of guns is 
shown in item 14 of Navy folder. 

Official reports indicate that all naval antiaircraft batteries were 
in operating condition. The number of temporary gun stoppages 
during action was so low as to be negligible and when such momentary 
stoppages occurred, except as guns were knocked out in battle casual- 
ties, they were quickly remedied. 

All ships had the full service allowance of ammunition on board 
except in a few cases where removal was necessary because of repairs 
in progress. 

All ships had ready ammunition at the guns in accordance with 
existing directives. Battleships and cruisers had 15 rounds per gun 
for two guns of the 5-inch antiaircraft batterv and 300 rounds per 
gun for half of the 50-caliber machine guns. The destroyers present 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 57 

all had 50-caliber ammunition available and some o-iiich ammunition. 
Although the initial attack -^as launched as a surprise, ready machine 
guns opened fire at once and all batteries except those on ships under- 
gomg overhaul took up the fire within approximately 7 minutes after 
the attack was initiated. 

The considerable amount of ammunition available is shown by a 
tabulation of all romids expended. 

There were 1,665 rounds of 5-inch 38-caliber antiaircraft [i^-^] 
ammunition fired. 

There were 1,523 rounds of 5-inch 25-caliber antiaircraft ammuni- 
tion fired. 

There were 1,741 rounds of 3-inch 50-caliber antiaircraft ammuni- 
tion fired. 

There were 275,807 rounds of machine-gun ammunition fired. 

At the time of the attack, rouglily one- fourth of all shipboard anti- 
aircraft gmis were manned, and within 7 to 10 minutes, all anti- 
aircraft batteries were manned and firing. 

Keady antiaircraft machine guns opened fire immediately and 
within an average estimated time of under 5 minutes practically all 
battleship antiaircraft batteries were firing; cruisers were firing all 
antiaircraft batteries within an average time of 4 minutes; and 
destroyers, though opening up with machine guns almost immediately, 
averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action. 
Minor combatant types had all joined in the fire within 10 minutes 
after the beginning of the attack. 

Turning next to the question of sabotage, there is no record of 
any sabotage during the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Next the subject of first aid : The dead and wounded were handled 
by a number of naval medical activities ; battle dressing stations and 
sick bays of [i^5] the warships; hospital ship /So/ace/ United 
States Naval Hospital; dispensaries of the two naval air stations; 
Marine Corps air station at Ewa; defense battalions of the Fleet 
Marine Force ; navy yard dispensary ; section base dispensary ; ammu- 
nition depot dispensary, and at a ''field hospital" which was set up in 
the officers' club of the navy yard shortly after the attack. 

Three hundred thirty dead and 1,113 wounded were brought to 
naval hospital stations during the period December 7-10. Many 
others died who were trapped in capsized or sunken sliips. 

Colonel Thielen will take up from here. 

[1£6^ Colonel Thielex. As to the miscellaneous subjects of 
hostile agents, sabotage, and civilian protection I have a few remarks. 

Prior to the attack, all known Japanese, Italian, and German agents 
had been listed by Army G-2, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
Naval Intelligence. Within a few hours after the attack the Japanese 
agents were being apprehended and assembled in the Immigration 
Station, Honolulu. All agents were subsequently assembled in the 
Quarantine Station on Sand Island, the total being 370 Japanese, 98 
Germans, and 14 Italians. 

There are no proven instances of sabotage before, during, or after 
the attack, although the jamming of radio frequencies which occurred 
immediately after the attack and which made communication difficult 
may have been due, in part, to sabotage. 

By noon the roads were becoming jammed with traffic going in every 
direction. Under the direction of Mr. Addison Kirk and his civilian 



58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

relief committee, the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., which operates a 
large number of busses, immediately moved into Hickam Field and 
Fort Kamehameha, and started evacuating civilians from these areas. 
All during Sunday afternoon and the following day the evacuation of 
civilians continued, most of them being quartered in schools and homes 
[1^7] throughout the city. At Fort Shafter, where the head- 
quarters of the Interceptor Command was being constructed in a spur 
of the Koolau Mountains, the women and children of Fort Shafter 
and a few from Schofield barracks were accommodated. Slit trenches 
were being dug at all the posts and in parks, school grounds, and all 
open places accessible to civil communities. 

Admiral Inglis will take on from here. 

[12S] Admiral Inglis. With respect to damage to Navy ships, 
a general description of the damage to naval vessels has been given 
in the narrative. In item 15 of the Navy folder the members of the 
committee will find a complete detailed description of this damage, 
with the first sheet being a summary. 

Item 16, Navy folder, describes the loss of 87 nonairborne naval air- 
craft, and the loss of five airborne planes from the carrier Enterprise, 
for a total of 92 planes, and itemizes also the damage to installations 
at Ford Island Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Naval Air Station, and 
the Marine Air Base at Ewa. 

Now, turning to the damage to Japanese, it was estimated that the 
Japanese lost a total of 28 planes, most of which were dive bombers 
and torpedo planes, due to Navy action. 

Three Japanese submarines of 45 tons each and carrying two tor- 
pedoes were accounted for; two were destroyed by Navy action and 
one was grounded off Bellows Field and recovered. 

From reports available to the commander in chief, it is estimated 
that the Japanese lost, due solely to Navy action, a minimum of 68 
killed. An estimate of wounded cannot be made. One officer, an 
ensign, was taken prisoner when he abandoned the small submarine 
which grounded off Bellows Field. 

[129] The above report on the Japanese damages or losses does 
not include operational losses, only losses in combat. 

With respect to efforts to track the Japs after the attack, air 
searches to track the Japanese striking force were ordered and carried 
out without result. 

Colonel Thielen will take over now. 

[ISO] Colonel Thielen. As to the Army casualties and the dam- 
age suffered by Army installations, on page 13 of the Army exhibit 
there is a list of Army casualties in the Hawaiian Department on 
December 7, 1941. They were : 

Killed in action 194 

Wounded in action 360 

Missing in action 22 

Died, nonbattle 2 

Declared dead (Public Law, 490) 1 

Died of wounds 21 

Total 600 

In addition to the extensive damage to installations on airfields 
shown by the various photographs submitted herewith, final reports 
show that 96 Army planes were lost as a result of enemy action on 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 59 

December 7. This figure includes aircraft destroyed in depots and also 
those damaged planes which were stripped for parts. 

As to the damage done to Japanese, General Short reported that 11 
enemy aircraft were shot down by Army pursuit planes and antiair- 
craft fire. 

[ISl] Admiral Inglis. The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a 
total of 2,835 casualties, of which 2,086 officers and men were killed 
or fatally woimded. Seven hundred and fifty-nine wounded survived. 
None were missing. 

Next with respect to the conduct and behavior under fire of the 
personnel. 

In the accounts of some 90 ships under attack, commanding officers 
have recorded hundreds of acts of heroism in keeping with the highest 
traditions of the naval service. No instance is recorded in which the 
behavior of crews or individuals left anything to be desired. 

References to individual valor are replete with such acts as — 

(1) Medical officers and hospital corpsmen rendering aid and treat- 
ment while they themselves needed help. 

(2) Officers and men recovering dead and wounded through flame 
and from flooded compartments. 

(3) Fighting fires while in actual physical contact with the flames. 

(4) Handling and passing ammunition under heavy fire and 
strafing. 

(5) Repairing ordnance and other equipment under fire. 

(6) Remaining at guns and battle stations though wounded or 
while ships were sinking. 

[1S£] (7) Reporting for further duty to other ships after being 
blown off their own sinking vessels. 

For deeds of extreme heroism on December 7, 15 Medals of Honor 
have been awarded and 60 Navy Crosses. 

Colonel Thielen will now take over. 

[133] Colonel Thielen. On the Army side, too, acts of heroism 
were numerous. Five Distinguished Service Crosses and 65 Silver 
Stars were awarded to Army personnel for heroism displayed during 
the December 7 attack. 

That concludes the Army's narrative of the attack. 

Admiral Inglis. That also concludes the Navy's formal presentation. 

[ISi] Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, the Navy had the Fourteenth 
Naval District and the Pacific Fleet. This story you have developed 
covered both ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. As I pointed out, the Fourteenth Naval 
District in this particular instance was under the command of the 
commander-in-chief and the presentation that I have given covers the 
activities of both the forces afloat and the forces ashore in the Four- 
teenth Naval District. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, as I understand it, the Navy commands had for 
antiaircraft defense only the antiaircraft guns based on the ships? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell, You said something about marines on shore setting 
up machine guns. I was not so clear about that. 

Admiral Inglis. The marines that I mentioned ashore as firing back 
at the Japanese planes during the attack were the personnel of the 
Marine air squadrons at Ewa and those machine guns, I think in most 
cases, were stripped from the — perhaps not stripped, but taken from 



60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the armory and comprised the guns which normally would be used 
by the aircraft themselves. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, the only other defense the naval com- 
mand had when under attack was in the airplane defense ? 

[JSS] Admiral Inglis. That is correct, to the best of my knowl- 
edge. 

Mr. Mitchell. And those planes, as I understood you, were carrier 
planes that came in and became land based at Ford Island as their 
carriers came into port, except for some that were on the cruisers, two 
or three per cruiser ? 

Admiral Inglis. The planes that I mentioned from the carriers were 
en route — no, I take that back. They were sent out by the Enterprise 
on search and then when the attack developed they were diverted in an 
attempt to repel the Japanese attack. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you sum up and state how many naval planes 
of the fighter type capable of fighting enemy planes got into the air 
before the attack was over? 

Admiral Inglis. Before the attack was opened 

Mr. Mitchell. Over. 

Admiral Inglis. Oh, before the attack was over ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, after it commenced and before it ended. I am 
not interested in those which got into the air after it was over. 

Admiral Inglis. I have a table here which I think will give you the 
information that you asked for. 

At the naval station, Ford Island, there was a total of 70 planes 
before the attack started. Of these 19 were destroyed, [ISSl 14 
were damaged and 37 were left undamaged. Of those 37 planes, 31 
were utility planes, not designed for combat, 4 were the patrol planes 
already in flight and 2 were in the shop under repairs, so that there 
were no planes at Ford Island available to engage in combat except the 
four which were already in flight. That is from the Ford Island 
Station. 

Mr. Mitchell. And you say none of them got into the air at all? 

Admiral Inglis. None except four which were already in the air. 
They were in the air before the fight started. 

Mr. Mitchell. They were in the air before the fight started? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes. 

At Kaneohe 37 planes were attached to the air station. 28 of those 
were destroyed, 6 were damaged, 3 were undamaged and those 3 which 
were undamaged were in the air before the attack. 

At Ewa 49 Marine planes were based at that naval air station and 
of those 49, 33 were destroyed and 16 damaged, leaving none in oper- 
ating condition. 

At Maui there were a total of eight planes but all of those planes 
were utility planes and not designed for combat operations. None of 
those, of course, were damaged. 

At Johnston Island there were two PBY's undamaged. I have 
[137] no information on the employment of those, but Jolinston 
Island is a long way from Hawaii. 

Mr. Mitchell. A PB Y is an observation plane ? 

Admiral Inglis. The PBY is a long range airplane. 

Mr. Mitchell. Not a fighter? 

Admiral Inglis. Not a fighter; no, sir; but equipped with fairly 
respectable armament. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 61 

At Midway there were 12 PBY's. None of these 12 was damaged, 
of course, because Midway was not attacked, but these jdanes were 
on the search, as has already been described. 

Now, in addition to that the Northampton^ a heavy cruiser, 
launched two or her observation planes which are not very effi- 
cient as fighters but, nevertheless, they did succeed in shooting down 
one Japanese plane off the Island of Niihau. 

That is about the extent of my information in answer to your 
question, sir. 

\^138^ Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Thielen, as I understand it, the 
Army exhibit, in accordance with the statement on page 10, covers that 
information from the Army standpoint, does it? Is that complete? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; that is complete to the best of my knowl- 
edge and belief. 

Mr. Mitchell. According to that, on Hickam Field the first plane 
that got into the air was at 11 : 27 ? 

Colonel Thielen. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. The attack was over by that time? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; the attack was well over. 

Mr. Mitchell. At Wheeler Field you got some P-40's up at 8 : 34 ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is a figliter group ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I believe that is a significant point. 
The airplanes at Hickam Field were bombers and those at Wheeler 
Field were pursuit ships, as they called them in those days, fighters 
as we call them now, which did get up all right. 

Mr. Mitchell. You got some up at 8 : 20, some at 8 : 55, an hour 
after the attack started, some at 9 : 15 and some at 9 : 30. Those 
were all the planes at "VVlieeler Field that had gotten into the air? 

\^139'] Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, since 9 : 35 is taken as the 
definite termination of the attack. 

Mr. Mitchell. What are those at 7 : 47 at Bellows Field and that one 
that you say got up at 9 : 15 ? 

Colonel Thielen. Those are observation airplanes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you a summary of your figures to show how 
many planes of fighting type the Army forces had in commission and 
how many of them got into the air before the attack was over ? Could 
you secure that for us? Could 3^011 sum that \\\^ for us without too 
much trouble ? 

Colonel Thielen. I think the exhibit on the preceding page, taken in 
connection with that which you cited, sir, on page 10 do tell a complete 
story. The exhibit on page 9 is that which I have displa}' ed on a chart. 
I will be glad to recall the chart. 

Mr. Mitchell. No. Ithought maybe you had a total. Well, that is 
satisfactory; the committee can see it. 

Will the committee inquire? 

The Chairman. Senator George? 

Senator George. I have no questions. 

The Chairman. Congressman Cooper? 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly. 
I^IJ^O'] Admiral, as I understood you, on December 7, 1911, the 
Pacific Fleet was about three-fourths the size of the Atlantic Fleet, 
but I understood you to say the Pacific Fleet was more modern and 
stronger or had larger vessels ? Is that correct ? 

79716 — 46— pt. 1 7 



62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR A^rTACK 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, Mr. Congressman, except that the 
figure was two-thirds. 

The Vice Chairman. Two-thirds ? 

Admiral Inglis. Rather than three-fourths. 

The Vice Chairman. And I also understood you to say that there 
were no searches made on December 6, 1941, by aircraft. 

Admiral Inglis. That is not correct. We have no written record of 
any searches except the search from the Enterprise which is shown on 
the chart. 

Tiie Vice Chairman. Were there any searches made the day before 
that anywhere near this approximate time ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am not prepared to answer that specifically. I 
might hazard an opinion that there were. 

The Vice Chairman. Then one other question, if I may, while along 
the line of General Mitchell's inquiry. 

According to item 11 of the Navy exhibit presented here, it is shown 
that the Japanese aircraft participating in this attack totaled 105. 
Is that correct? Item 11 of your white exhibit here, the second page of 
that, it shows there, total {,1-^1^ number of planes making at- 
tack, including those which repeated, and out at the right hand column, 
"Total 156.". Then under that, "Total number of planes, exclusive 
of those which repeated," it totals 105. 

Admiral Inglis. I have those figures now, sir. I must say that that 
number — that is the number of planes which repeated their attacks 
and, therefore, are counted as more than once in the first figure, 
is necessarily an estimate but our best estimate, according to the 
records that wo have available, is 105 as the total number of planes 
which actually attacked. 

The Vice Chairman. As far as the Navy and Army can ascer- 
tain 

Admiral Inglis. No, these are only Navy figures. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I understood the colonel to give the 
same figure in his statement. You agreed on that. So far as the 
x^rmy and Navy knew at that time there were 105 Japanese planes 
that participated in the attack? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, are you prepared to tell us what 
the United States air strength in Hawaii was at that time ? 

Admiral Inglis. I can tell you what the Navy air strength was. 
That is contained in one of the exhibits. 

[i^] In item 12 in the Navy folder you will find a table giving, 
among other things, the number of planes attached to the various 
squadrons and stationed at the various naval air stations. 

The Vice Chair3Ian. I have examined that, Admiral, in an effort to 
get the information I am now requesting. At least, it is not put up 
in the same form as the Jap planes and I was wondering what the 
total was. 

Admiral Inglis. I would have to qualify any answer that I might 
make to your question by pointing out that a large number of those 
planes given in item 12 are utility types and not suitable for combat. 

For instance, all of those marked "VJ" are utility type planes 
and that takes out a large proportion of the total as being suitable 
for combat operations. Those planes are used for towing target 
sleeves for antiaircraft fire and for transport and things of that 
nature, duties other than combat. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 63 

The Vice CHAiRiiAiSr. Well, in an effort to not detain you unduly 
as I am sure other members of the committee want to inquire, could 
you gentlemen give me a figure that would compare with the 105 
Jap planes which made the attack? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; if you will bear with me just a moment 
while I add them up. I come out with the answer 52. 

Mr. Gesell. That is Navy planes? 

[14^] Admiral Inglis. Those are Navy planes. 

The Vice Chairman. Navy planes 52 ? 

Admiral Inglis. 52 Navy planes comparable in design to the Japa- 
nese planes which made the attack. That excludes the utility planes 
and the PBY's. 

The Vice Chairman. In other words, this 52 would be the number 
of combat Navy planes ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Inglis. I think I should add, to make the story complete, 
that that does not include the planes from the carriers, that is, the 
Enterprise and Lexington. These are only the planes based on 
Hawaii. 

The Vice Chairman. W^I^j ^ow many carrier planes were in a 
position that they could have been used ? 

Admiral Inglis. The Enterprise was 200 miles away from Pearl 
Harbor at the time and any planes that she might have had available 
to participate in the attack would have been nearly at the extreme 
limit of their radius of action. However, there were 18 Enterprise 
planes which did get into the general area of the attack. 

The Vice Chairman. Eighteen? 

Admiral Inglis. So if you cared to 3'ou could add the 18 to the 52, 
making a total of 70. 

\_llfjf] The Vice Chairman. Now, at what stage of the attack 
did these 18 get into it ? 

Admiral Inglis. Those planes took off from the Enterprise shortly 
after 6 a. m. The attack was launched at 7:55 a. m. and 3 of the 
planes landed at 9 : 40 and 10 at 10 : 15. I would gather from that 
that the Enterprise planes reached the scene of the attack at an esti- 
mated time of perhaps 9 o'clock. 

The Vice Chairman. Would that be during the time the attack 
was in progress? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Were there any other carrier planes that were 
available there, such as you have described about the Enterprise? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; no other carrier planes. 

The Vice Chairman. And no others that did participate? 

Admiral Inglis. The only other planes that we have not already 
covered were the two planes from the Northampton and, again, those 
planes are not of combat type. Thej^ were observation planes but they 
did shoot down one Japanese plane in spite of their comparative 
weakness. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the 
colonel for the same type of information so far as the Army is 
concerned. 

\_lh5^ Colonel Thielen. First, sir, I would like to correct what 
I believe is your impression that only 105 planes were involved in 
attacks on both Army and Navy installations. Is that correct? 



64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. That is the way I understood it. 

Colonel Thielen. I want to say that is not the Army view. We 
consider that 105 airplanes is our estimate of the number that were 
involved in the attacks only on Army installations and I believe it is 
a mere coincidence that the Navy has the same figure. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, the figure is the same in both state- 
ments. Does that mean, then, that there were just exactly 105 planes 
that attacked the Army and just exactly 105 planes that attacked the 
Navy? 

Colonel Thielen. I am not prepared to say how many attacked 
the Navy, but our estimate is 105 aircraft attacking Army installa- 
tions only. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will give you later the Japanese story showing 
how many planes they sent. This is only confusion and guesswork, 
these figures that are given here. 

Colonel Thh:len. It is purely an estimate. It is obtained by add- 
ing up the total number of aircraft reported by observers at the three 
Army fields attacked. It is entirely possible that there is considerable 
duplication, as no one [^4^] was in a position to observe more 
than one airfield at a time. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I had this figure. I had just assumed 
from what I heard you both say that there were 105 Japanese planes 
engaged in the attack and I had assumed that that was the total num- 
ber of Japanese planes. 

Colonel Thielen. As I say, the Army considers that 105 aircraft 
attacked Army installations. 

The Vice Chairman. What do you have to say about that, Ad- 
miral ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have the same thing, Mr. Cooper. The figure 
of 105 is just an estimate. 

The Vice Chairman. I understood that. 

Admiral Inglis. It is just impossible to arrive at a precise figure 
because, as you know, there was a great deal of confusion at that time 
and this is just the best that we can make of the reports that we have 
and the estimate is 105 planes engaged in the attacks against naval 
ships and naval shore installations. 

You remember that in answer to your question I tried to bring out 
that these were Navy figures. These presentations that the colonel 
and I have been making were made up separately. There is no, if I 
may use the term, collusion between us except insofar as we have 
arranged for certain portions L-?-^^] of the presentation to go 
to the Army side and then certain portions to go to the Navy side, but 
we have not tried to reconcile our figures. 

The Vice Chairman. It had not occurred to me. Admiral, that 
there was any collusion but I was rather in the position of hoping to 
congratulate you gentlemen if the Army's estimate of the number of 
Jap planes and the Navy's estimate of the number of Jap planes hap- 
pened to be the same. I thought you were doing remarkably good 
estimating if you were both estimating the same. 

Admiral Inglis, I am afraid in all modesty I will have to admit 
that that is a pure coincidence. 

The Vice Chairman. What I was trying to find out was how many 
Jap planes were attacking us. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 65 

Admiral Inglis. As Mr. Mitchell has said, Mr. Cooper, a later pres- 
entation will give the Japanese side of the story and I think we will 
get much more accurate figures from that. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. I was hoping to ascertain, so far 
as you could tell us, the number of Jap planes that were attacking us. 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And the strength of the United States air- 
craft in Hawaii at that time, combat planes that might have been 
used in meeting or repelling that attack. 

114^1 Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. That is what I was hoping to get. 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. I think you have the whole figure. It is 
70 in the case of the Navy. 

The Vice Chairman. Seventy in the case of the Navy? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, and our best estimate of the Japanese 
planes that were making the attack, that is, from the American point 
of view, without the Japanese intelligence before us, was 105 against 
naval targets. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, let me see if I can get some help from 
you, Colonel. 

Colonel Thlelen. I would like to point out first that no aircraft 
were armed and equipped for combat against these Japanese, but of 
the pursuit aircraft in commission on Oahu at the time of the attack 
we had 94 pursuit aircraft before the attack and 53 after the attack. 

The Vice Chairman. Ninety-four before the attack? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And your total number was what. Admiral? 

Admiral Inglis. My total was 52 shore-based planes, plus the 18 
from the Enterprise, making 70. 

The Vice Chairman. That is 164 for the Army and Navy. 

A question to both of you gentlemen. Are you prepared to 
[i4^] give us some estimate of the number of Japanese planes that 
attacked both Army and Navy installations ? 

Admiral Inglis. Tlie only way I could answer that would be to add 
Colonel Thielen's figures to mine and that would be 210, but there 
again, Mr. Cooper, we must qualify that by saying that some of these 
reports have been duplicated. Perhaps the same plane attacked both a 
Navy ship and an Army air station. 

[150] The Vice Chairman. I can well understand that. I 
would expect that to be the best guess. 

Admiral Inglis. I would say the best estimate we can come out with 
would be 210. 

The Chairman. Senator George would like to ask a question. 

Senator George. Admiral, I believe you stated this morning that 
United States shipping along the northern route had been discon- 
tinued as of November 25, 1941 ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Senator George. Did you assign any reason for that order for dis- 
continuing the shipping on that route? 

Admiral Inglis. This presentation that we have made' has omitted 
all reference to any reasons for action taken. 

Senator George. I merely wanted to get clear in my mind what you 
said. You did not assign any reasons? 

Admiral Inglis. I did not; no, sir. 



66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. All right, Senator Lucas, 

Senator Ltjcas. Admiral, in the earlier part of your testimony 
you gave to the committee some facts with respect to the reconnais- 
sance planes which took off on the morning of December 7. I am not 
sure that I thoroughly understood just why the delay existed there, 
or whether the evidence, or the records of the Navy disclose the reason 
for that hour's delay of these planes taking off for reconnaissance work. 

[ISl] Admiral Inglis. That, as I recall it, was the case of the 
planes taking off from Midway 

Senator Lucas. No ; not from Midway. 

Admiral Inglis. You remember, Senator Lucas, I corrected that 
word "sunrise" to make it read "dawn." The plan was to have these 
planes take off at dawn, which is usually considered as 1 hour before 
sunrise. That was the standing order, that they were to take off at 
dawn, which was 5 : 27. 

However, these planes did not actually take off until about 6 : 40, 
which is even more than hour late. Those were the three patrol 
planes from Kaneohe air station. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. Are there any records which dis- 
close the reason for the delay in taking off? 

Admiral Inglis. There again, Senator, in our presentation we have 
purposely avoided 

Senator Lucas (Interposing) . I am not asking for your conclusion, 
I am asking you whether or not you have discovered any records in 
the Navy Department giving or disclosing any reasons why these three 
reconnaissance planes were over an hour late in taking off on the dawn 
patrol. 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I do not know the reason. 

Senator Lucas. One other question with respect to those recon- 
naissance planes: Do the records disclose the distances that these 
reconnaissance planes covered on their usual dawn [ISB] pa- 
trol flight? 

Admiral Inglis. Those patrol planes were described in the exhibit 
which is number — do you remember the zebra stripes? 

Mr. Mitchell. Item 10. 

Admiral Inglis. Item 10. Item 10 in the Navy folder, you will 
find the horizontal stripes due south of Oahu. As I recall it that 
distance was 120 miles. 

Senator Lucas. 120 miles? 

Admiral Inglis. 120 miles. 

Senator Lucas. Now one other question. Do the records disclose 
as to how long that patrol had been in existence previous to Decem- 
ber 7? ^ 

Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question, sir. I do not know 
whether they do or not. 

Senator Lucas. Will counsel please take these questions that I am 
asking and supply, if he can, the answer for the record? ^ 

You also discussed the sighting of the submarine at 3 : 50 in the 
morning on the morning of December 7. You also stated that the com- 
mander of that ship notified the comlmander of the destroyer Ward 
that at 3 : 57 he had sighted the periscope of the submarine. 

It is my understanding of your testimony that the Ward [ISS] 
opened fire at 6 : 45 on that submarine, after sighting it at 6 : 40, and 



' See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1887 et seq. ; see also Part 11, p. 5484 et seq. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 67 

then the commander of the Ward reported to the commanding officer 
at 6 : 54 that the submarine had been sunk. 

Now who was the commanding officer at that time ? 

Admiral Inglis. The name of the commanding officer of the Ward ^ 

Senator Lucas. Yes; the name of the commanding officer of the 
Ward — or, I mean the name of the commanding officer to whom the 
commander of the Ward reported. 

Admiral Inglis. The Ward sent the dispatch to the office of the com- 
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

Senator Lucas. Who was in charge of it at that time ? 

Admiral Inglis. The dispatch was delivered to the district duty 
officer, who was Lt. Comdr. Harold Kaminski. 

Senator Lucas. It was delivered to Lieutenant Commander Kamin- 
ski, but who was in charge of the Fourteenth Naval District at that 
time ? 

Admiral Inglis. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict was Admiral Bloch. 

Senator Lucas. Do the records show where Admiral Bloch was at 
the time this message was delivered? 

Admiral Inglis. To the best of my knowledge and belief, he was 
in his quarters. 

Senator Lucas. Do the records show whether or not he [i5^] 
was notified by Lieutenant Commander Kaminski with respect to the 
sinking of this submarine ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I cannot answer that question. 

Senator Lucas. Do the records show whom Kaminski — or whatever 
his name is — notified about the sinking? 

Admiral Inglis. Kaminski was notified and he in turn passed the 
message to the headquarters of the commander in chief of the United 
States Fleet. 

Senator Lucas. Who received that message at the headquarters ? 

Admiral Inglis. I haven't got that information. I can get it for 

you- 

Senator Lucas. I wish you would get it. Admiral Kimmel, of 
course, was the gentleman in charge of the fleet at that time. 

Admiral Inglis. Admiral Kimmel was commander in chief of the 
United States Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. 

Senator Lucas. Does the record show whether or not Admiral Kim- 
mel received the message at any time before the attack ? 

Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question either, sir. 

Senator Lucas. According to your testimony the attack took place 
at 7: 55. 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

\_166^ Senator Lucas. The submarine was sunk by the Ward at 
6 : 54. I should like to know whether or not, during that hour's time, 
Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel received any direct notice of the 
sinking of that submarine. 

Now of course we will ask the officer who made the report on the 
sinking of the submarine to have it with him in the morning, to see 
what importance was attached to the sinking of this submarine, as far 
as the attack on Pearl Harbor is concerned. 

Admiral Inglis. Senator, I would not expect that any of those 
authorities or officials would have received the report that the sub- 



68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

marine had been sunk, because the report of the Ward was "We have 
attacked" 

Senator Lucas. Whatever the report was — I do not care for the 
report itself, but whatever the report was that went in. 

Admiral Inglis. I will get that information for you. 

Senator Lucas. I want to know why it happened, and if they made 
a report on it, and whatever the report is, and to whom it went, and 
especially would I like to know at what time — if there is any time — 
that Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel received that report. 

Admiral Inglis. We will get that information and insert it in the 
record, if it is available.^ 

Senator Lucas. One other question and then I will be [^^6] 
through. 

When you say that the Fourteenth Naval District was under the 
commander in chief, you mean the commander in chief of the Pacific 
Fleet? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; Admiral Kimmel. 

Senator Lucas. That is all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark. 

Senator Lucas. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman, before 
you go to Congressman Clark ? 

Do the records disclose as to whether or not those on patrol duty 
around Pearl Harbor looking for submarines discovered at any time 
previous to the morning of December 7 anything that would direct 
their attention that submarines were in that area previous to the morn - 
ing of December 7 ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; the records on that subject are completely 
negative. 

Senator Lucas. That is, up to that time, up to the morning of 
December 7, as far as the record is concerned, there is no record that 
shows that there was any danger from the standpoint of looking for 
submarines, or a submarine attack, even though they were on guard 
and the boys were looking for submarines ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, to the best of my knowledge. 

[JS7] Senator Lucas, That is all. Admiral Inglis. 

The Chairman, Congressman Clark. 

Mr. Clark. Admiral, you showed a diagram this morning on the 
extent of the plane patrol. The impression I gained was the extent 
of the patrol immediately after the attack is shown in red. 

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Would you mind having that map put back ? 

Admiral Inglis. Commander Biard, will you put up the chart show- 
ing the patrols, 

Mr, Clark. Now what I was trying to get clear in ni}^ own mind, if 
the red diagram there shows the extent of the patrols by the planes 
around Pearl Harbor subsequent to the attack — is that right? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr, Clark. Is that a larger or a smaller area of patrol than had 
been the case immediately prior to the attack ? 

(The roll call buzzer sounded.) 

The Chairman. I might say to the committee that that is a roll- 
call vote in the Senate on the substitute offered by Senator Byrd to 
the amendment offered by Senator Donnell to the reorganization bill, 

' See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5293. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 69 

The committee has been excused from attendance during the hearing 
here. 

Senator Ferguson. Without waiving my right to examine the 
[i'5<§] witness, might I be excused just long enough to vote on that ? 
I think it is an important matter. 

The Chaikman. Yes, if the Senator wishes to, and if any other Sena- 
tors wish to vote I think they may also be excused. 

Senator Lucas. I am willing to give you one vote here. 

The Chairman. What is the wish of the committee ? 

Senator Brewster. I am willing to stay here and allow Senator 
Ferguson to go. 

Senator Ferguson. That is a very important vote. That is the only 
reason why I ask to be excused. 

The Chairman. The Senator may be excused. The Chair will 
ask the Vice Chairman to take the Chair while he goes and votes. 

The Vice Chaieman. The committee will please be in order. 

You may proceed, Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Clark. You have my question. 

Admiral Inglis. I believe your question was : Did the patrol which 
was ordered immediately after the attack cover a greater area than 
that which had normally been covered before the attack ? 

Mr. Clark. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. To the best of my knowledge, the answer to that 
question is "yes." 

Mr. Ci-ARK. Now you gave us a very graphic picture of Pearl Harbor, 
and the military establishment there, including [i^9] every- 
thing on the airport and so forth. I am interested to know, and I as- 
sume you would be the proper witness to ask, how that establishment 
on the Hawaiian Islands, the military establishment, compares with 
any other base or military establishment we may have had in the Pacific 
area at that time, including the Philippine Islands, as to size and 
strength and equipment, and munitions of war. 

Admiral Inglis. You wish me to compare Hawaii with any other 
United States base or establishment, military installation ? 

Mr. Clark. In the Pacific area. 

Admiral Inglis. In the Pacific area ? 

Mr. Clark. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Inglis. Of course that perhaps is a matter of opinion, but 
my opinion is that it was by far the strongest United States base in the 
Pacific area. 

Mr. Clark. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. I will waive questions at this time. 

The Vice Chaikman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, in answer to Mr. Clark's question as to 
whether or not the patrol afterward, after the attack, was larger than 
before, your answer was, in your opinion, "yes." 

Isn't it true that the black lines indicate the patrol before and the red, 
which includes the area of the black, was [^^0] afterward, and 
therefore the necessity much larger than it was before ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now then, it is my understanding that you 
and Colonel Thielen are prepared only to discuss the details of the 
attack and not to go into the whys and wherefores. 



70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir, speaking for myself. 

Colonel Thielen. I concur in that. 

Mr. MuRPHT. I would like to know from someone in the Navy, and I 
assume you are not the one, I would like to record to show that I want to 
know whether or not there was any inspection order within a week prior 
to Pearl Harbor, the ejBfect of which would be to put the ships out of 
commission. 

One member of the committee has intimated that such an inspection 
was ordered. I would like to meet it squarely just as soon as we 
possibly can. 

Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question, but perhaps I can 
throw a little light on your inquiry, and that is this, that a careful study 
of the damage sustained by the ships at Pearl Harbor on that day was 
made by some competent officers in the Bureau of Ships, and as a result 
of that study they concluded that the California was the only ship 
where the opening of the compartments had any effect or was in any 
way a contributing factor to the damage suffered by the ship. 

[i^i] Mr. MuEPHY. Now then, so far as the other ships are 
concerned, they were not under a condition of inspection that would 
call for open compartments and other conditions that would disable 
them in case of combat ; is that right ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I did not intend to give that impression in 
my answer. I do not know the answer to that specific question. All I 
can say is any openings did not contribute to the spread of the damage 
or the flooding of the ships, except on the California. 

Mr. Murphy. May I indicate to counsel on the record, and to the 
Navy, that I hope some witness will be called who will be able to give 
any details of what inspection, if any, was ordered within a week of 
December 7 ; what effect, if any, that had on the ships on the morning 
of December 7, 1941. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would say, Mr. Congressman, that we are hard at 
work on that now. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. We haven't the story here today because we haven't 
gotten to the bottom of it. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. We are cutting out of this statement anything that 
has not been definitely established. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. That very point is under inquiry now. [i^^] 
We have some information about it, but it is not complete.^ 

Mr. Murphy. My next question. Admiral, is that in your exhibit you 
have given a list of the ships that were sunk, damaged, and capsized. 
That was Exhibit No. 17. 

Admiral Inglis. That is item 15. 

Mr. Murphy. Item 15. That contains a list of battleships, light 
cruisers, destroyerSj repair ships, mine layers, seaplane tenders, and 
miscellaneous auxiliaries. 

The Navy did make a public statement, did they not, through Secre- 
tary Knox, within a few days subsequent to December 7, 1941, as to the 
damage to ships at Pearl Harbor, including those sunk and those 
damaged ? 

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5347, for all couimunications on the subject of water-tiglit 
iutegrity of vessels at Pearl Harbor. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 71 

Admiral Inglis. I believe that is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to have some witness from the Navy 
testify on the record as to how the list given today compares with the 
public notice given immediately after Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Inglis. I will have to get that for you, sir, and insert it in 
the record.^ 

Mr. Murphy. The next thing I would like to ask, Admiral, and 
I would like to ask of you, Colonel Thielen, and that is what recon- 
naissance was ordered by Admiral Kimmel or by General Short sub- 
sequent to the messages received by them on November 27 down to 
and including December 7, 1941, and I [163] assume that 
neither of you are prepared to answer those questions at the present 
time. 

Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer. 

Colonel Thielen. I cannot give a definitive answer, I can only 
point out the condition of alert that was placed in effect at that time, 
which did not envisage the possibility of attack from without. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to have a specific answer. In addition 
to the fact that alert No. 1 as to sabotage was ordered, I would like 
to have a specific answer as to what reconnaissance, if any, was ordered 
by the Navy and Army immediately subsequent to November 27 and 
prior to the morning of December 7, 1941. 

Mr. IVIiTCHELL. We have other witnesses that are going to be 
brought on that will cover that, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now then, the two figures of 105, they, 
of course, would make 210, but neither of you, as I take it, would 
attempt to say that the planes that were used in the Army attack 
were not also used in the Navy attack? 

Admiral Inglis. Speaking for myself, I see no way of unscrambling 
those figures. 

[164] The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson would be next 
but he has been temporarily excused. Mr. Geartiart, of California. 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Inglis 

The Vice Chahuvian. Here is Senator Ferguson. He is your turn, 
Senator Ferguson. Will you defer, Mr. Gearhart? 

Mr. Gearhart. I defer. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, can I inquire as to when you first 
knew that you were to be the witness to give these facts ? 

Admiral Inglis. At 3 o'clock last Friday afternoon, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And up to that time, what did you have to do 
with assembling the facts ? Up until 3 o'clock Friday, what did you 
have to do in relation to assembling the facts ? 

Admiral Inglis. As Acting Chief of Naval Intelligence, my officers 
had been engaged for perhaps a week before that in getting up this 
presentation. 

Senator Ferguson. From whom did you get your instructions as 
to what was desired by the committee? 

Admiral Inglis. The instructions were relayed to us through the 
Judge Advocate General's office. 

[i^<5] Senator Ferguson. Are they in writing? 

Admiral Inglis. Are they what, sir ? 

1 See Hearings, Part 6, p. 2674 for a table submitted by the Navy Department showing 
a "Comparison of actual damage suffered by the fleet at Pearl Harbor and that stated in 
the report that was released by Secretary Knox on 15 December 1941." 



72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Are they in writing? 

Admiral Inglis. 1 believe not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What were the instructions you were given 
by the Judge Advocate General's office ? 

Admiral Inglis. The instructions were to be prepared to make a 
presentation before the committee of the factual evidence concerning 
the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you instructed to give no conclusions, 
or no orders ? 

Admiral Inglis. Those instructions evolved in the course of time, 
I don't believe that they were specifically stated in that form when 
the instructions were first passed along to us. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first get the instructions not to 
draw any conclusions or not to give any orders; that is, to cite any 
orders? 

Admiral Inglis. We were given an outline of the subjects which 
were to be covered. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the outline? Was it in 
writing ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to read it off, sir? 

[166] Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. It is two pages. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the same outline we gave the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I see it? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

(A copy was handed to Senator P erguson.) 

Admiral Inglis. The Senator may keep that copy if he wishes. 

Senator Ferguson. You have others? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Who selected you, Admiral, to be the spokes- 
man? 

Admiral Inglis. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
Edwards, gave me the directive. 

Senator Ferguson. Can I inquire from the colonel as to when he 
first learned that he was to be a witness ? 

Colonel Thielen. I didn't receive positive information until just 
before the past week end, Friday or Saturday. I had been told be- 
fore that time that I might be called upon to actually present the 
story. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when did you first know that you were 
to present the story ? 

Colonel Thielen. As I say, I was informed positively [^^7] 
on Friday or Saturday last. 

Senator Ferguson. Who drew up your presentation ? 

Colonel Thielen. I belong to a section of the Operations Division, 
War Department General Staff, which is continuously engaged in 
research of this type, in examination of after-action reports, and 
other such first sources, to prepare digests similar to this. We work 
together. We have a procedure whereby a number of researchers, 
both officers and enlisted personnel, are given their task, and the 
material is assembled and edited. 

Senator Ferguson. When was your report assembled ? 

Colonel Thielen. The first draft, a week or 6 days ago. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 73 

Senator Ferguson. A week or 6 days ago. When did you fii-st 
furnish counsel of the committee with a copy of your draft? 

Colonel Thielen. No such copy has been furnished to this time, to 
the best of my knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Up until the present time. Admiral, when did 
you first furnish the committee or any counsel with a copy of your 
draft? 

Admiral Inglis. I beg pardon ? 

Senator Ferguson. Wlien did you first furnish the committee or 
counsel with a copy of your draft ? 

[168] Admiral Inglis. I don't believe I have given the counsel 
a copy of the draft. I have given the committee, I mean the counsel, 
copies of the exhibits, but as far as I know, not of the draft of this 
script. 

Senator Ferguson. Of what you read to the committee ? 
Admiral Inglis. I don't believe so ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I noticed one conclusion that you drew, and that 
was in relation to the radar, that the man was practicing after 7 
o'clock. 

Admiral Inglis. No ; that was the Army. 
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Colonel, will you give us what information you 
have on that ? 

Colonel Thielen. Would the Senator care to have me repeat the 
story ? 

Senator Ferguson. No ; I don't want the story repeated. I would 
like to have what information was given to you that he was actually 
practicing. Who told you that? 

Colonel Thielen. You mean my sources on that, sir? This copy is 
documented. The fact that these two enlisted men picked up an in- 
dication of hostile aircraft by radar at 7 : 02 a. m. on the morning of 
December 7 comes from the Roberts report, page 116, affidavit of 
Private McDonald. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you examined [-?^5] 
the Roberts report in order that you might give us this summary ? 
Colonel Thielen, That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat other reports did you examine? 
Colonel Thielen. I have a rather long list here. Senator. I did not 
examine that all personally. It so happens I did examine the Roberts 
report personally. I examined the Grunert report personally, and 
various other sources. There is a list of some 74 documents which 
were examined by the various members of the section of which I am 
a part. 

Senator Ferguson, Well, now, when you examined these various 
reports, were they in conflict with the reports on the items which you 
have given us ? 

Colonel Thielen. None came to my attention, sir. I was not look- 
ing for any conflicts. I was deliberately omitting any conflicts or 
controversial subjects from my report. 

Senator Ferguson, Will you tell us if these witnesses testified in 
any other hearing besides the Roberts, as to whether or not this man 
was actually practicing? 

Colonel Thielen. I don't believe I am the best witness on that, sir. 
I don't know. I am not an authority on all of the various reports. 



74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AITACK 

[170] Senator Ferguson. Why would you give us the conclusion 
out of the Eoberts report when you know that that was a cursory 
report ? 

Colonel Thxelen. Because there is, apparently, no conflict, as far 
as our researchers were able to determine. 

Senator Ferguson. You say there is no conflict at all on that ques- 
tion? 

Colonel Thielen. Apparently not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand your statement is 
hearsay on that? 

Colonel Thielen. Everything that I have said today is hearsay, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Everything that you have said here today is 
hearsay ? 

Colonel Thielen. That is correct, and none of this material — I was 
not present at Pearl Harbor, nor was I in the War Department on 
December 7. 

Senator Ferguson. How much comes out of the Roberts report on 
Elliott's training? 

Colonel Thielen. On his training? 

Senator Ferguson. On Elliott bemg in training at that particular 
moment. 

Colonel Thielen. I believe merely the statement. 

Senator Ferguson. To whom did he telephone ? 

[171] Colonel Thielen. I won't say to whom Elliott telephoned. 
I will say, as I said in the script, that the telephone report was made 
by the Opana radar station to Lt. Kermit Tyler, the watch officer at the 
information center, Fort Shafter. 

Senator Ferguson. What was his title at that time ? 

Colonel Thielen. He was known as the watch officer. 

Senator Ferguson. At what particular station? 

Colonel Thielen. At the information center for the various radar 
stations. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how many people were present 
at that community ceffiter on that morning ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Does the Roberts report show, oi- any other 
report that you examined? 

Colonel Thielen. I have no recollection of that being given. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the Navy had a watch 
there at that time ? 

Colonel Thielen. I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not either Tyler or 
Elliott, or the other man with Elliott knew that B-l7's were coming 
in that morning? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I don't know what the extent [17^] 
of their knowledge was. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you give us the exact plan of what was 
shown on the radar design plan! 

Colonel Thielen. It was a copy, as faithful as we could make it. 
It was not a mechanical reproduction. It was done by an artist. 
It was as good a copy as we could make of the so-called historical 
plot. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you the original? 

Colonel Thielen. I have an original. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 75 

Senator Ferguson. Will you produce it for the committee ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

(The document was handed to Senator Ferguson.) 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who made this original ? 

Colonel Thielen. It is authenticated by an ofiicer named Murphy. 

Senator Ferguson, Back to the Admiral, now. I have to keep 
skipping back and forth. 

Admiral, you said that about two-thirds of our fleet was in the 
Pacific; is that correct? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I said that the numerical strength of the 
Pacific Fleet was two-thirds that of the Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific 
Fleet was smaller than the Atlantic Fleet. 

Senator Ferguson. I beg your pardon. One third was [J7S'\ 
in the Pacific and two-thirds in the Atlantic? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. We still haven't got our fractions right. 

Senator Ferguson. ^Yhat is that ? 

Admiral Inglis. We still haven't got our fractions right. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, how many capital battleships were in the 
Atlantic? 

Admiral Inglis. In the Atlantic Fleet were 6 battleships. In the 
Pacific Fleet were 9 battleships. Six in the Atlantic and 9 in the 
Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. And eight out of the nine were destroyed, or 
damaged ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How many were ? 

Admiral Inglis. Well, I have to distinguish between damaged and 
destroyed. 

Senator Ferguson. How many were hit. Put it that way. 

Admiral Inglis. Well, the Colorado, of course, was the ninth one, 
and she was not present at Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. Were all the others hit ? 

Admiral Inglis. All the others were hit to a greater or lesser degree. 

Senator Ferguson. Then there was only one battleship [i?"^] 
in the Pacific that was not hit? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, how many battleships were in the Atlanitc ? 

Admiral Inglis. Six. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I read from Battle Report, Pearl Harbor 
to Coral Sea, which is supposed to be an official record, page 6 : 

In the Atlantic there were eight battleships. 

Reading from pasre 6. 

Admiral Inglis. I can't recognize that book as being official. I have 

here a list of the specific ships 

Senator Ferguson. I read you the first part of this book : 

Notes on the background and writing of this book. When the authors of this 
book were directed b.v the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to begin a prepara- 
tion, a few months before his death, the instructions were brief and to the 
point — 

indicating that he had something to do with the preparation of this 
Battle Report, and the Navy officers that wrote this book. 
It says : 

Prepared from official sources by Commander Walter Karig, and Lt. Welbourn 
Kelley. 



76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. I personally still don't recognize that as being offi- 
cial, except what you have told me now, [i?'<^] but, if I may, 
Senator Ferguson, I will read the list of ships that were in the At- 
lantic Fleet, and the list of those in the Pacific Fleet. 

Senator Fekguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. In the Atlantic were the New York^ the Idaho^ 
Mississippi^ New Mexico^ Arkansas, and Texas. 

In the Pacific, the Pennsylvania^ California, West Virginia, Arizona, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Colorado, and Maryland. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the Secretary of the 
Nav}' Knox's memorandum or report that he drew up or had drawn 
up at the time of — after the incident? 

Admiral Inglis. You mean immediately after the attack? 

Senator Ferguson. No. Did you use anything from that report in 
making up your report here ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He gave a report at that time; did he not? 

Admiral Inglis. I read such a report in the newspapers. You mean 
about a month after Pearl Harbor? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Didn't you try to get that as a part of 
your source ? 

Admiral Inglis. Well, I am not too familiar with the sources that 
were used by my researchers, but I don't [77^] believe that was 
used. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the report the President 
used sometime after was used in making up this report? 

Admiral Inglis. I am not familiar with the President's report. 

Senator Ferguson. How are we going to check the accuracy of this 
report ? 

Admiral Inglis. All I can is that my presentation was made from 
the official reports, not those that were prepared for the President, 
but from the original reports of the Roberts inquiry, and the Murfin 
board inquiry, and documents of that nature. Wherever possible, they 
were documents that contained sworn testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. How many battleships did we have in December 
1941? 

Admiral Inglis. Fifteen, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Fifteen ? 

Admiral Inglis. Fifteen that were attached to the Fleets. There 
were two or three that had just been completed, or were on their 
shake- down duty. 

Senator Ferguson. Where were they ? 

Admiral Inglis. It is my recollection that the Washington and New 
Mexico were on shake-down duty in the Atlantic. [i77] One 
of those ships, I am sure, from personal observation was in the navy 
yard at New York — Brooklyn. 

Senator Ferguson. Two of those then were in \X\q, Atlantic even 
though on shake-down duty ? 

Admiral Inglis. That probably accounts for the discrepancy be- 
tween the six and eight. 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that this hook was a little 
more accurate than your figures. 

Admiral Inglis. That would indicate my figures contain the num- 
ber of ships attached to the Atlantic Fleet and the number attached to 
the Pacific Fleet. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 77 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long after the attack came 
at Pearl Harbor, it came at the Philippines? Will you name the 
attacks that were had by the Japs on the date of the Tth, or if 
it was across the international date line, on the 8th, and give us 
the hours of those attacks? 

Admiral Inglis. I have confined my studies to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands. I can get that information for 
you. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you get us that? Get us the hours of 
the attacks. 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.^ 

Senator P erguson. Now, have you any knowledge of what recon- 
naissance there was on or about December 1, from Pearl [1781 
to Johnston to Midway ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; 1 have nothing earlier than December 6 
readily at hand. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know that on or about the 3d that 
there was some reconnaissance from Wake to Midway to Pearl, ar- 
riving on the 5th? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have no information readilj^ at hand 
earlier than the 6th of December. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you laiow each flight was with at least 
1 squadron and 12 PB Y's ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I have no information readily at hand 
earlier than the 6th of December. 

Senator Ferguson. On the 5th or 6th, did the Lexington proceed 
to Pearl from Midway? 

Admiral Inglis. The Lexington was en route to Midway from 
Pearl. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Who was in charge of the Lexington% 

Admiral Inglis. The Lexington was in a task group commanded 
by Admiral Newton. 

Senator Ferguson. What did Halsey have charge of — Admiral 
Halsey? 

Admiral Inglis. Just a minute, sir. I want to be sure I have got 
those correct. 

[17 ff] Senator Ferguson. Did he have the Enterprise? 

Admiral Inglis. The Lexington group was under Admiral Newton. 

Senator Ferguson. It was going from Pearl to what? Midway? 

Admiral Inglis. It was going from Pearl to Midway with a squad- 
ron of Marine Corps scout bombers. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether they did any recon- 
naissance ? 

Admiral Inglis. I understand because of the additional Marine 
Corps planes on board, tlie flight deck was so cluttered that they 
weren't able to launch any. 

Senator Ferguson. So there was no reconnaissance from that? 

Admiral Inglis. Not from the Lexington. 

Senator F'erguson. Was there from the Enterprisel 

> A table showing "Time of Jap attacks in the Pacific 7 and 8 December 1941, supplied 
br the Navy Department, appears in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2675. 

79716— 46— pt. 1 8 



78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What reconnaissance was there from the En- 
terprise? 

Admiral Inglis. As given in the presentation, the Enterprise 
launched a squadron of 18 planes to scout through a sector of 110° 
immediately forward of the ship's course to a distance of 150 miles. 

[180'] Senator Ferguson. How far south would that be of the 
line where the Jap planes were supposed to have been ? 

Admiral Inglis. The Japs what, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Planes ; the carriers of the Japs. 

Admiral Inglis. You mean the carriers ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. How far would this reconnaissance be 
south of that? 

Admiral Inglis. That will come out in the Japanese presentation, 
but I would say about 200 miles, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. About 200 miles. 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever read the article in the Saturday 
Evening Post by Lieutenant Richardson about his orders? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. From the Enterprise ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know anything about those orders ? 

Admiral Inglisv No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what caused the delay in having 
the planes leave the ground on the various occasions that you have 
mentioned, that they were an hour or two late, they were also late at 
Midway ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; I do not know the reason. 

[ISl] Senator Ferguson. Did you look it up or try to find out? 

Admiral Inglis. I didn't personally. Perhaps some of my research- 
ers may have. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether anj^ transports left our 
west coast on the 6th ? 

Admiral Inglis. In answer to that question — whether they left the 
west coast of the United States ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; I don't. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether one had left and came 
back because of the assault on F'earl Harbor ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have no positive knowledge of that. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you find out ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.^ 

Senator Ferguson. Senator George asked you about why the trajflic 
was diverted from the north route. Have you that data or did you ever 
see it? 

Admiral Inglis. I ha^^n't got it ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. From whom did you get your information that it 
was diverted on the 25th ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have got the source right here, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the source? 



1 See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1680, for a report, dated Dec. 13, 1945, from the Navy Depart- 
ment showing the recall of merchant ships to the West Coast, by names of ships, rintos 
thev sailed, and dates they retnrned. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 79 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. That was a dispatch from the Chief of 
Naval Operations dated November 25, 1941. 

[IS^] Senator Ferguson. I didn't hear you. 

Admiral Inglis. That source is a dispatch originated by the Chief 
of Naval Operations on the 25th of November 1941, carrying the 
reference number 252203. 

Senator Ferguson. That was Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Inglis. Admiral Stark was the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions at that time ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That came out in Washington ; is that true ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is true. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether a copy of that was ever 
sent to the admiral in charge of the Fourteenth District? 

Admiral Inglis. I am practically certain that it was addressed to 
him among others, but I am not positive of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you the order with you ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you get me the order ? 

Admiral Inglis. I will, sir.^ 

Senator Ferguson. Why did you use that in your report and not 
bring us the order? 

Admiral Inglis. The material from which this presentation was 
made is tremendously bulky. I haven't got it all here. 

Senator Ferguson. Who determined to put that in ? 

Admiral Inglis. Who determined what? 

[183] Senator Ferguson. Who determined to put that item in 
the report ? 

Admiral Inglis. That was presented to me by the researchers and 
I made the decision to include it in the presentation. I felt that it 
was quite pertinent. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who gave the order for the B-17's 
to leave Hamilton Field, San Francisco ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; I do not know. That is an Army activity. 

Senator Ferguson. Going back to the colonel, do you know who 
gave the orders for the B-l7's to leave Hamilton Field, Colonel ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you look into that ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when the orders were given? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time they left? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What time? 

Colonel Thielen. At 9 : 30 p. m., 6th December, San Francisco time. 

Senator Ferguson. And what field were they destined for ? 

Colonel Thielen. They were destined for the Philippines [i^4] 
by way of Oahu. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat was their destination at the Hawaiian 
Islands? 

Colonel Thielen. I could only guess that it would be Hickam Field, 
the biggest field, a bomber field, and therefore suitable for BlT's. 

Senator Ferguson. Were they equipped with radio? 

' The dispatch, subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 3," was read into 
the record ; see p. 82, infra. 



80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel TiiiELEN". I can't answer that definitely. Presumably they 
were. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you any information that they had been 
in touch with any radio station on the islands prior to the flight of 
Japs coming in? 

Colonel TiiiELEN. I have only the negative information that they 
flew without contact with Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. Were they flying blind or without contact ? 

Colonel TiTiELEN. Apparently they were, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why they were iniarmed at that 
time ? 

Colonel Ttiielen. They were being ferried to the Philippines. 
They were not on a combat mission. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand from that that [^86] all 
planes not on combat missions are unarmed ? Have you any personal 
knowledge of that, Colonel? 

Colonel Thielen. That is a rather broad generalization, sir. A 
state of war did not exist at the time of their departure. They were 
on a ferrying mission. In time of peace it would be normal for them 
to be unarmed. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you why it was that on the Enterprise 
that, as the lieutenant says, they had war orders ? 

Colonel Thielen. I have no knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. That was just 200 miles west of the Hawaiian 
Islands. Can you tell why the B-l7's didn't have any orders and 
those from the Enterprise did have orders ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I cannot. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look that up and try to find out ? 

Colonel Thielen. I believe that is outside my scope, but I will be 
glad to do it.^ 

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean that you are limited in what 
information you will be able to get for the committee ? 

Colonel Thielen. I have not been designated by the War Depart- 
ment to coordinate all witnesses who are to appear before the com- 
mittee. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking you that. I am asking you to 
get that particular order, if you can, why one didn't [iS6'\ have 
and one did have. 

Colonel Thielen. Very well, I will make an effort to get that order. 

Mr. Mitchell. I might say we have witnesses on the list for all 
these things. 

The Chairman. We have reached the hour of 4 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. I have considerable more, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. I think, in view of the fact that we cannot finish 
with these witnesses this afternoon, we might as well recess until 
10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

Mr. Gesell. Senator, I have something for each member of the 
committee before we break up. 

(Documents were handed to the committee.) 

The Chairman. Very well. 

(Wliereupon, at 4 p. m., the committees recessed until 10 a. m., Fri- 
day, November 16, 1945.) 

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5293-5294. ,"^31 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 81 



[187-] PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK 



FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of 

THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., 
in the caucus room (room 318) , Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson; and Eepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masteai, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[188] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

The Chair understands that counsel wishes to make a brief observa- 
tion before we proceed with the further examination. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, there is a little confusion in regard, 
I think, to these requests of witnesses to produce information and 
documents. 

Now, Admiral Inglis and Colonel Thielen had a special job to do, 
simply to prepare a narrative statement compiled from records of the 
Departments. We have a liaison staff, as the committee knows, whose 
job it is to respond to every request from the committee or counsel 
for documents, and, of course, it is a little confusing to a witness 
who isn't on that liaison staff to be asked to produce something. 

Counsel is delighted to have the members of the committee state 
in the open hearings here anything they want produced, but we 
would like to have it understood that when a request of that kind 
is made for information to the Navy, for instance, that the people 
that have been set apart by the Secretarj^ of the Navy to respond to 
those requests are the ones supposed to dig it up. 

For instance. Admiral Inglis has the custody of these records and 
all he could do would be to pass it on to the secretary of the staff. 

So we would like to have it understood that when a member of 
the committee makes a request while the witness is testify- [189] 
ing, a request to have matters produced, why, we will have to channel 
it througli the liaison staff, because the witness isn't in that category. 
If he is, all right. If h© has personal custody of that document. 

I am not suggesting that the committee not make requests but I 
want them to understand that to avoid confusion it will have to be 
handled that way. 



82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. In other words, any requests made of these wit- 
nesses will be ■ 

Mr. Mitchell. It is a request to the Navy Department. 

The Chairman. The documents will be furnished but it will be 
furnished by the staff that is charged with looking up the documents? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. The witness will have to turn the request 
over to the proper people in the respective Departments. 

The Chairman. The main object is to get the documents. 

Mr. Mitchell. There is no difficulty about that. Simply the witness 
is sometimes embarrassed a little bit in being asked to produce things 
personally. 

Among the things asked for yesterday which we have already been 
able to obtain, one of the members of the committee requested a copy 
of the order which routed shipping to the south. We have already 
obtained that and I will read it into the record to have it out of the 
way, if it is agreeable. 

[^90] This is a dispatch dated November 25, 1941, from the Chief 
of Naval Operations. The commander to whom it was directed for 
action is the commander of the Twelfth Naval District. I understand 
that is San Francisco. Copies were sent to four commanders. The 
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, the commander in chief of 
the Asiatic Fleet, the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District — 
that is at Honolulu — and the commander of the Sixteenth Naval Dis- 
trict. I understand that is at Manila. 

And the dispatch reads in this way : 

Route all trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits. The commander in 
chief, Pacific Fleet ; commander in chief Asiatic Fleet, providing necessary escort. 
Refer your dispatch 230258. 

It is marked "Top Secret" in purple. Certified to be a true copy by 
Ralph W. Lundberg, lieutenant commander. 

Mr. Gearhart. What is the date of that? 

Mr. Mitchell. November 25, 1941. 

The Chairman. The Chief of Naval Operations at that time was 
Admiral Stark? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

The Chairman. And who was the commander in the Twelfth Naval 
District at San Francisco, does the record show ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It doesn't. 

Admiral Inglis. I think it was Admiral Greenslade. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I have the exhibit? 
IJ91] I requested it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Do you want it offered in evidence? 

Senator Ferguson. I will offer it in evidence after I have identified 
it with the witness. 

The Chairman. Is that all, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is all. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 83 

TESTIMONY OF REAE ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BERNARD 
THIELEN (Resumed) 

Senior Ferguson. Admiral, this exhibit which has just been read — 

Route all trans-Pacific shipping througli Torres Straits, Cincpac and Cincaf 
provide necessary escort, refer your dispatch 230258 — • 

when did you first see that ? 

Admiral Inglis. The dispatch you have in your hands? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[192] Admiral Inglis. I first saw that piece of paper this morn- 
ing at about 9 : 30. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you see to give us the information 
yesterday ? 

Admiral Inglis. The information that I gave you yesterday was 
from a brief or script which was prepared by my research staff with 
the notation that that dispatch that you have in your hand was the 
source. 

Senator Ferguson. You had your staff go over the files? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did any counsel sit with you to prepare your 
script ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have no personal counsel. Is that what you 
mean? 

Senator Ferguson. I am not figuring that you personally are inter- 
ested here. You are acting as an admiral of the Navy. 

Admiral Ingus. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. As an admiral, did you have any counsel with 
you? 

Admiral Inglis. The Judge Advocate General's office had repre- 
sentatives at various times when we were going over this script. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the committee have a counsel [193] 
member present? 

Admiral Inglis. On one or two occasions the script was discussed 
with the committee counsel. 

Senator Ferguson. With whom did you discuss it ? 

Admiral Inglis. With Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they see this exhibit ? 

Admiral Inglis. Not until this morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Not until this morning. Do you know why it 
was not delivered to the committee before? 

Admiral Inglis. I do not, sir. It wasn't asked for. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do I understand they only get what they 
ask for? 

Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I can't answer that. I was only given 
a specific job, Senator Ferguson. I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see these instructions ? 

Story of the actual attack and Japanese plans will be presented by an Army 
and a Navy officer who will summarize all available data. The summary will 
be prepared under the direction of counsel along the lines suggested by the fol- 
lowing outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of opinion and question 
of individual responsibility. 



84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. I did not see that paper. 

Senator Ferguson. Did yon ever see that ? 

[194] Admiral Inglis. I did not see that paper. I did have an 
outline, and I was told pretty much the gist of the material you have 
just read, but it was given to me verbally. 

Senator Ferguson. In preparing the conclusions that you prepared, 
did you furnish to the committee the data upon which it was founded ? 
For instance, you gave the substance of this message. You said it 
was routed, but you didn't give the committee the exhibit. Do you 
know why they were not furnished with the exhibits so that the com- 
mittee might draw the conclusion ? 

Admiral Inglis. I didn't feel that that was part of my function. 

Senator Ferguson. What was your function ? 

Admiral Inglis. My function was to prepare a presentation for this 
committee, giving the facts that were not controversial, and were sub- 
stantiated rather conclusively, in my opinion, by the documents we 
had available in the Navy Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Well now, were you to furnish the documents, 
or just the narrative form? 

Admiral Inglis. I personally was furnished with a narrative pre- 
pared by my researchers. In certain cases I asked them to produce 
the source of the data for my own inspection. Also we produced the 
folder which has been [10S~\ called the Navy folder, in the 
white cover, and which does contain certain factual material, but that 
again has been digested from the basic documents. 

[196] Senator Ferguson. You furnished me yesterday a blue 
sheet with information ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is the outline. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And that differs somewhat from the one 
that was handed to the committee by the counsel ? 

Admiral Inglis. That outline was subject to modification from time 
to time as we worked up this presentation. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, who modified it? 

Admiral Inglis. I would say it was probably a joint effort. The 
Judge Advocate General and I might have had a little something to 
do with it. We collaborated with the Army in arranging the sequence 
of presenting the various items. 

Senator Ferguson. How many times did you confer with Mr. 
Mitchell? 

Admiral Inglis. I would say three ; three times. 

Senator Ferguson. And how many with Mr. Gesell ? 

Admiral Inglis. About the same number of times. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they change anj- thing that you had in your 
exhibit ? 

Admiral Inglis. They did not change anything. They suggested 
a few changes. 

Senator Ferguson. What did they suggest? 

Admiral Inglis. Well, wherever there was anything that was con- 
troversial or that might have been interpreted 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 85 

[197] Senator Ferguson. Tell us some of the things that they 
took out. 

Admiral Inglis. They did not take out anything. Senator Ferguson, 
I want to make that quite clear. They only suggested that 

Senator Ferguson. All right, what did tiiey suggest that you take 
out? 

Admiral Inglis. There was one paragraph, for example, that I 
remember that I had in suggesting that the country as a whole was not 
unified just before Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, who told you that? 

Admiral Inglis. That was my own opinion and, therefore, I agreed 
that it was not proper to put in the presentation. There were some 
other items. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you talked over with anyone the fact that 
you wanted to put that in ? 

Admiral Inglis. I talked it over with my staff ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And who was your staff ? 

Admiral Inglis. Captain Davis, Captain Phelan and Commander 
Hindmarsh and a number of others. 

Senator Ferguson. How did that happen to come into this question 
of what actually happened at Pearl Harbor? Were you tryin^g to fix 
responsibility ? 

[J98] Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, why would you suggest even putting 
in that the people were not prepared ? 

Admiral Inglis. I thought that it might give a little background 
that would be good for the 

Senator Ferguson. You used the word "united," that the people were 
not united ? 

Admiral Inglis. The people of this country were not united. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand the President said something to 
that effect about the time that the reports were issued. You did not get 
the suggestion from that, did you? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I got it from my own understanding of the 
psychology of this country at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Of the American people? 

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, with whom did you discuss that item ? 

Admiral Inglis. I discussed it Mith Captain Davis, with Captain 
Phelan. I am quite sure, with both jMr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell. 

Senator Ferguson. What did they say about it? 

Admiral Inglis. After considerable discussion it was agreed, and I 
concurred in the decision, that it should be [^99] omitted. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the discussion ? 

Admiral Inglis. The discussion was whether or not that was ap- 
propriate to put in a factual presentation of this kind. 

Senator Ferguson. What did it have to do with the attack on 
Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Inglis. Well, we all agreed 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think the people were to blame? 

Admiral Inglis. Are you asking for my opinion ? 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you put it in the memo and they per- 
suaded you to take it out. T am asking you whether that is your 
opinion ? 



86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. My opinion is that they did contribute to some 
extent to the Pearl Harbor attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you explain how that contributed 
to the Pearl Harbor attack. 

Admiral Inglis. Because the armed forces were not as strong as 
they might have been had the country been unified and had the 
appropriations been larger for the Army and Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. All right; now, do you know anything about 
the appropriations'^ 

Admiral Inglis. I only know that the Navy kept asking for more 
than they could get. 

[200] Senator Ferguson. Did you know this, that when the 
Navy asked for an item that on many occasions the Budget Director 
and the Executive branch of the Government cut it down ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And Congress often put them up ? 

Admiral Inglis. I did not know about the latter. I did know 
about the former. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the people, the Congress 
for the people, did put those up ? 

Admiral Inglis. Now that you mention it I believe very likely 
that there were certain specific instances where the Congress did 
increase appropriations. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, how could you blame the people 
for not getting armament? 

Admiral Inglis. I am not blaming them. Senator. I am just 
saying that that was my opinion, that that was the frame of mind 
that this country was in at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you furnish to the committee 
your original drafts where you had that in and I would like to see 
all the other things that were taken out, and will you now give 
us the other things that were taken out ? 

Admiral Inglis. I will furnish that if I can. I am afraid that 
was destroyed. Now, the other things that were taken out 

[201] Senator Ferguson. Why would you destroy anything 
like that afterward ? 

Admiral Inglis. I did not see any reason to keep it if it was not 
to be presented. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you any notes or any memorandum in rela- 
tion to the preparing of your memo ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am not sure, sir. I will have to look through 
my papers ; I am not sure. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you furnish to the committee, so that 
the committee may have them, all your notes and all your memoranda? 

Admiral Inglis. I will furnish anything I have.^ 

Senator Ferguson. All right ; now, what else was taken out ? 

Admiral Inglis. The other things that were taken out were historical 
items dating back to 1931. 

Senator Ferguson. What were they? 

Admiral Inglis. An outline of the Japanese aggression in Man- 
churia, the Marco Polo Bridge incident, of the aggression of Italy 
toward Ethiopia, of Germany towards Austria, the Saar, and showing 
the rise of nazism and fascism. 

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5294. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 87 

Senator Ferguson. Will you just take this outline and tell me how 
many of the items, including the blame on the American people, are 
included in the request? 

[203] Admiral Inglis. They are not in the outline and, there- 
fore, they were taken out. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, how did you come to put them in at all ? 
The Navy was not going to make a defense, were they ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is why they were taken out. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Because the Navy was attempting to make a 
defense, is that right ? 

Admiral Inglis. That was my own personal, idea and I soon saw 
that it was not sound and, therefore, they were taken out. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you discuss it with the Judge 
Advocate? 

Admiral Inglis. I believe I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And he consented to put it in ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; no, sir; I was advised by everyone that I 
talked to that it should come out. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you show it to Mr. Mitchell? 

Admiral Inglis. I am not sure whether it was Mr. Mitchell or Mr. 
Gesell that I talked to about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you show them your memo? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a memo prepared of that? 

[£03] Admiral Inglis. I had a rough draft of this material. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you try and look to see whether 
you have your rough draft ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; I have already agreed to get anything 
that I have available. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk with Admiral King 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, (continuing) about preparing it? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of the Navy Forrestal ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; that was my own idea, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you discuss it with anyone ? 

Admiral Ingus. I discussed it with the people whom I have already 
enumerated. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get that data? 

Admiral Inglis. From my own recollection of the history of the 
world from 1931 on. 

Senator Ferguson. "What did you think that had to do with the 
actual physical facts at Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Inglis. It was only background material that I thought 
might be of some value. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, on this exhibit, we will call it exhibit 
1 — Mr. Chairman, I now offer it in evidence. 

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 3. 

[204] Senator Ferguson. What? 

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 3. 

Senator Ferguson. I offer Exhibit 3. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 3".) 



88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATl^ACK 

Senator Ferguson. The first that you saw of this particular exhibit 
was this morning ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you got your testimony before you ? Have 
you got your page where were referring to the shipping route ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it ? 

Admiral Inglis. I quote from the testimony of yesterday. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis (reading) : 

The Chief of Naval Operations on November 25, 1941 directed that all trans- 
pacific shipping be routed through the Torres Strait between Australia and New 
Guinea. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that is all you said about it ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is all I said about it except under cross-exam- 
ination. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and I asked you some questions [20S] 
on cross examination. I asked you to get the original. 

Now I will ask you why you did not put in the part that was to 
provide for escorts ? 

Admiral Inglis. I think that was perhaps omitted by my staff be- 
cause it might have been somewhat controversial. 

Senator Ferguson. You think that this part of the message is con- 
troversial, "Provide necessary escort"? 

Admiral Inglis. It might lead to controversy because of the word 
"necessary." That would be a difference of opinion as to the disposi- 
tion of ships for escorts as opposed to the need for keeping them con- 
centrated for combat. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did any member of this staff, of this com- 
mittee staff, check your memorandum that you were going to write 
here prior to its writing ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir, not the draft. There was some discussion 
about it. 

Senator Ferguson. There was some discussion. Did any member 
read it prior to the time that you gave it here? 

Admiral Inglis. Not to the best of my knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they ever see the exhibits upon which it was 
founded ? 

Admiral Inglis. Do you mean by "exhibits" these things in the 
folder or that 

Senator Ferguson. No ; I mean such as Exhibit 3. 

[206] Admiral Inglis. I don't know what they saw, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you any idea whether they ever saw it ? 

Admiral Inglis. I think that a great many records were available 
to the counsel. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean "available" ? 

Admiral Inglis. Were turned over to them. 

Senator Ferguson. Why was this not turned over? 

Admiral Inglis. Perhaps it was. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel now, when did counsel get 
this Exhibit 3? 

Mr. Mitchell. I first saw it about 10 minutes ago. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, I think, to make the record clear 

Senator Ferguson. -That is what we would like to have. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 89 

Mr. Gesell. (continuing) There is in the file of counsel a very 

substantial number of dispatches. 

Senator Ferguson. No, no, let us keep the record clear. 

Mr. Geseljl. I beg your pardon. Senator. I am answering your 
question, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you get Exhibit 3 ? 

Mr. Gesell. That particular dispatch is very likely among the 
group of dispatches which we have had in our office for a considerable 
period of time. If you are talking about the piece of paper in your 
hand, we saw that this morning. 

[£07] Senator Ferguson. Well, did he make the statement of 
yesterday based on very likely whether this was in your file or not ? 

The Chairman. Is there any dispute about the authenticity of this 
Exhibit No. 3? 

Admiral Inglis. None whatsoever. 

The Chairman, Is there any dispute on the part of any member 
of the committee? 

Senator Ferguson. Am I to take that that I am not supposed to 
examine the witness about that? . 

The Chairman. Not at all ; I just want to know whether there is 
any dispute about the authenticity of this document that you are talk- 
ing about. 

Senator Ferguson. The question is why it has not been produced 
to the committee, that we are on right now. 

Will you give me all the information in the Navy in relation to the 
part of this message that says, "Provide necessary escort?" 

Admiral Inglis. I am authorized to say that the Navy Depart- 
ment — or to say for the Navy Department that any information re- 
quested by the committee which is available to the Navy will be 
produced. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, but do you take that request as not 
from one of the committee? 

[W8] Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; from the committee as a request 
which will be complied with to the best of our ability.^ 

Senator Ferguson. Have you any information, personal informa- 
tion, on this "Provide necessary escort?" 

Admiral Inglis. I have not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know at any time that there was any 
message including this "Provide necessary escort?" 

Admiral Inglis, The only information that I had was what I gave 
the committee yesterday, until I saw that message which you have in 
your hand. 

Senator Ferguson. You gave us a list yesterday of the location of 
all ships in the Pacific, did you not? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, I will ask you where the Boise was between 
the 23d of November 1941, and the 6th of December 1941 ? 

Admiral Inglis, The Boise'^. 

Senator Ferguson, Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. My recollection is that the Boise was in the Asiatic 
Fleet, 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know where the American Leader ship 
was? 

* See memorandum from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5499. 



90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; never heard of that ship. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the American Leader 
[209] left Honolulu on November 23, 1941 ? 

Admiral Inglis. I do not, sir. I rather gather from the name of 
the ship that she is a merchant ship. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is right. 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. My information 

Senator Ferguson. What is your information on the Boisel 

Admiral Inglis. On the Boise'i 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. I haven't anything in writing here, but my recol- 
lection is that she was attached to the Asiatic Fleet out in the Philip- 
pines at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I will ask you whether or not she 
was not convoying many other ships, or, at least, convoying the Ameri- 
can Leader? 

Admiral Inglis. I don't know that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't know that? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I don't know anything about the Ameri- 
can Leader. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, so that the record may show, what we 
would like to get the information on, as to who was the captain of the 
American Leader., whether or not she left Honolulu on November the 
20th and arrived in Manila on December the 6th, whether she was in 
a convoy or not, in convoy during any of that time. Do you have any 
information on that ? 

[^i6>] Admiral Inglis. If we have any we will produce it, sir.^ 

Senator Ferguson. Well, have you 'I 

Admiral Inglis. I have not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And whether or not one of the convoying ships, 
at least one was the Boise; whether or not the ships were blacked out 
at night. Do you know whether that was true ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the definition of what was 
meant by "a convoy" in this message of November the 25th ? 

Admiral Inglis. In its common term a convoy is a collection of 
ships steaming together as a group under escort. 

Senator Ferguson. Did any ships leave the Pacific coast after the 
25th in convoy? 

Admiral Inglis. I believe my presentatidn described two convoys. 

Senator Ferguson. Where were they? 

Admiral Inglis. The heavy cruiser Pensacola with an eight-ship 
convoy was west-bound, located in the Samoan area. 

Senator Ferguson. When did she start on convoy ? 

Admiral Inglis. All of those ships left between 2 and 7 days prior 
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, as I recall it, but I cannot give you the 
precise date. I will get it [2ii] for you, though ; at least, the 
Navy Department will get it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I would like to have on that American 
Leader and also on the Boise a record of orders for blackouts and 
when they were given and how they were distributed. 



* See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127, for a statement re the American Leader based on infor- 
mation received from the Navy Department. 

See also "Exhibit No. 68," the log of D. S. S. Boise. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 91 

Admiral Inglis. The Navy Department, I am sure, will make all 
that information which they have available also. 

Senator Ferguson. And when the first order of convoying was in 
the Pacific. 

By the way, had you any evidence when you were getting this up, 
or any evidence that there were German submarines in the Pacific ? 

Admiral Inglis. I know of no evidence. 

Senator Ferguson. Or battleships ? 

Admiral Inglis. I know of no evidence ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You know of no such evidence. As one of the 
Intelligence officers do vou know of any reason for convoys in the 
Pacific on the 25th of November 1941 ? 

Admiral Inglis. Of course, I was not an Intelligence officer at that 
time and all I can do is express an opinion that the 

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you furnish to counsel for the com- 
mittee all the information that you have as to the [^-?^] con- 
voying, whether there were German subs or German battleships or 
other instruments, or anything that would be of danger ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. The Navy Department will make that 
information available. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you prej^are your statement from original 
data? 

Admiral Inglis. My staff did ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see all the data ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you did not check it with your statement ? 

Admiral Inglis. Only in certain cases. 

Senator Ferguson. Will j'ou state some of the cases that you did 
check it ? 

Admiral Inglis. I checked some of the distances from Oahu to 
other strategical and geographical points on the chart. I asked the 
staff to verify several points that came up. 

Senator Ferguson. What are some of those points? 

Admiral Inglis. The relationship between the Fourteenth Naval 
District and the commander in chief was one of them. There was 
some argument about the spelling of some of these Hawaiian words 
and their pronunciation; the depths of water in Pearl Harbor and 
in the channels approaching, I think. 

[^13] Senator Ferguson. Did you say anything in that report 
about torpedo nets ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; that is another thing I questioned my 
staff very closely on, because I wanted to be sure I had the basis for it. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us what you were talking about 
when you referred to torpedo nets ? 

Admiral Inglis. A torpedo net. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you get me the part in your testimony ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, if I may quote from my yesterda^^'s state- 
ment. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis (reading) : 

The entrance to the harbor was closed by two protective nets ; into the channel 
through the coral reefs it was about 400 yards and the depth was from 41 to 60 
feet, and the nets themselves consisted of a combined antitorpedo and antiboat net. 



92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Fergctson. Just a minute now. You were then referring 
only to torpedo nets at the entrance to the harbor ? 

Admiral Inglis. The two torpedo nets ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. At the entrance to the harbor ? 

Admiral Inglis. At the entrance to the harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. How far would they be from ships? 

[^J4] Admiral Inglis. We can get that from the chart, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well- - 

Admiral Inglis. About 2 miles. 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the torpedo nets in relation 
to the ships. 

Admiral Inglis. Oh, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you refer to them in your report ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; the torpedo nets I referred to were across 
the channel entrance, as shown on the chart. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see a message that was intecepted at 
Fort Hunt in Virginia ? 

Admiral Inglis. A message about what, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. That was translated on the 6th. 

Admiral Inglis. A message from whom ? 

Senator Ferguson. A message from Japan — Honolulu. 

Admiral Inglis, No, sir ; I have not had- — 

Senator Ferguson. From Honolulu to Japan, rather, or Tokyo. 

Admiral Inglis. Japanese message ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. I have not had access to any of those messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you refer in your statement to barrage 
balloons above Pearl Harbor ? 

[215] Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were there any ? 

Admiral Inglis. I do not know, sir. That would be an Army ques- 
tion. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not know that? 

Admiral Inglis. I would not know that. 

Senator Ferguson. Were there any torpedo nets close to the ships, 
the battleships ? 

Admiral Inglis. Not to the best of my knowledge. There were no 
nets, to the best of my knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you try to check on that, as to whether or not 
there were any nets ? 

Admiral Inglis. As long as nobody said there were, I did not see any 
reason to check it. It was my personal understanding that there were 
no nets about the battleships at that time. 

[216] Senator Ferguson. Going to the colonel. Colonel, in your 
testimony yesterday, on page 168 you referred to page 116, arid you 
say [reading] : 

You mean my sources ou that, sir? This copy is documented. The fact that 
these two enlisted men picked up an indication of hostile aircraft by radar at 7 : 02 
a. m. on the morning of December 7 comes from the Roberts' report, page 116, 
affidavit of Private McDonald. 

I have the Roberts' report before me liere, and the last page in my 
copy of the report is No. 21. 

Colonel Thielen. I think I can clarify that, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 93 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give me the item of the report that you 
were referring from? 

The Chairman, Let the witness clarify his answer to that question, 
Senator Ferguson. He is entitled to do that. 

Colonel Thielen. The reference which I gave was to the testimony, 
not to the report itself. I was not referring to the conclusions, the 
findings, or any element of the Roberts' report other than the transcript 
of the testimony of the witnesses. 

Senator Ferguson. Now were you talking about the page in. the 
transcript of the testimony in the Roberts' report ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; I believe that is the reference. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there an individual in thei-e, a [^17] 
man by the name of McDonald? 

Colonel Thielen. I do not have that transcript of testimony before 
me so I cannot answer the question. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you got something before you there ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; I have some extracts which I had made 
last night of testimony given before the Roberts commission relative to 
the radar question. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us that testimony? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now this is what you founded your statement on ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Colonel Thielen. General Short's testimony before the Roberts 
commission, page 65 of the transcript. 

Senator Ferguson. You had read that before you made up your 
report ? 

Colonel Thielen. jMy researchers had read it. I had also read the 
Roberts report, but not closely, with the view to incorporating it into 
the statement which was prepared, merely by way of acquiring some 
background for this assignment. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you instructed to avoid any controversial 
matters or matters of opinion? 

[^i<§] Colonel Thielen. I was instructed to avoid them in the 
statement ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; I was instructed to avoid them in the 
statement which I was to present to the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. \Vlien did you first show the counsel for the 
committee, or any member of the committee, your report ? 

Colonel Thielen. I never showed the counsel or any member of the 
committee my report. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you confer with anyone ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Whom did you confer with? 

Colonel Thielen. I conferred with counsel for the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was the counsel? 

Colonel Thielen. Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell. 

Senator Ferguson. And did they make any suggestions as to what 
should go in or come out? 

Colonel Thielen. Their only suggestions, as far as the Army pres- 
entation was concerned, had to do with bringing the presentation 

79716—46 — pt. 1 9 



94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

within the scope of the directive; in other words, of eliminating 
controversial material. Also some mechanical suggestions, such as 
eliminating tedious lists of equipment that could be transferred from 
the oral presentation [219] to the exhibit. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us some of the controversial mat- 
ters that they suggested that you take out ? 

Colonel Thielen. I recall none, sir. I believe they were very 
minor. I do not remember any body of testimony. It may have been 
a word which could be improved here and there. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you last confer with them ? 

Colonel Thielen. On last Monday, sir. That was the only con- 
ference I had. 

Senator Ferguson. That is Monday of this week ? 

Colonel Thielen. The past Monday. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have your statement finished at that 
time? 

Colonel Thielen. I had a statement finished ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you give it to them to read ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you confer on it if they did not 
read it? 

Colonel Thielen. It was discussed with them. I told them orally 
what I was going to say. I quoted pages from my script. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you got your original script? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not have it. It has been revised 
since then, largely in a mechanical way, to [220] improve co- 
ordination with the Navy, as far as the presentation is concerned, 
and to eliminate tedious details which were later incorporated in the 
Army exhibits. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you show it to them after you revised it? 

Colonel Thielen. No, I did not ; nor did I discuss it with them after 
revision. 

Senator Ferguson. Now going back to that item that you w^ant to 
read from General Short, will j^ou read it ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. General Short's testimony before the 
Roberts Commission, page 65 of the transcript, and I quote : 

This Opana station is along the ridge here, somewhere along in here [indicating]. 
It is not marked on the map ; up to the north. That station, just on its own — 
they work normally for training from 7 to 11 every day and apparently they just 
thought they would not knock off just because it was Sunday, and the staff went 
ahead and worked. 

And I close the quotes there. 

I have also the testimony of Colonel Powell, who was the Hawaiian 
Department signal officer, before the Roberts Commission, page 358 of 
the transcript, and I quote : 

It is almost fantastic the way these things operate, and the men are all anxious 
to learn about them. This [221] particular one wanted to work longer 
to get more training, because we were to put control sets on the other islands, 
and he wanted, I suppose, to become one of the operators on the other islands. 
That he did not say, but that is what they were working for, to be able to operate 
those sets on the other islands. 

That closes the quotation of Colonel Powell. 

I have also an extract from the testimony of Sergeant Elliott before 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 95 

Senator Ferguson. Now he did not testify before the Roberts Com- 
mission — Elliott did not, did he ? 

Colonel Thielen. I cannot answer that question offhand. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, go ahead. 

Colonel Thielen. This is page 1001 of the transcript and I quote: 

Well, that, sir, is : After our problem was over at seven o'clock, I was to get 
further instruction in the operation of the oscilloscope, and at that time I was at 
the controls. However, Lockard was instructing me as to the different echoes 
that I would see, and it was at that time that the flight was noticed by Private 
Lockard. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know at what time they started work that 
morning ? 

Colonel Thielen. I know what the schedule called for. [^^S] 
It called for work from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. 

Senator Ferguson. Three hours ? 

Colonel Thielen. That would be correct ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you find in the Army report that it was 4 
hours ? 

Colonel Thielen. I do not believe I thoroughly understand that ques- 
tion, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, Icok at page 1029, where it says : 

Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, each group had four hours on, and — let's see — we 
were divided into three groups, four hours on and eight hours off; but we had 
four hours on the 'scope, then four hours guards, then we had four hours off. 

Colonel Thielen. That was the weekday schedule, I believe. Sena- 
tor. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there a different schedule on Sunday? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I can review the schedule as I gave 
it in my testimony yesterday. On weekdays other than Saturday 
and Sunday the schedule was specifically from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. 
actually tracking aircraft. 

Senator Ferguson. What time does the record show that they 
actually shut down the radar ? 

Colonel Thielen. On 7 December? 

[^^S] Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Colonel Thielen. I doubt that the Opana station was shut down, 
sir. They continued operation at 7 a. m., as indicated on the historic 
plot, so-called. That plot indicates echoes well into the morning, 
and we have the testimony of Lieutenant Tyler that he recalled, 
or states, that after he was notified at, I believe, about 8 a. m., that 
Wheeler Field was under attack. 

Senator Ferguson. You examined all of the Army and Roberts 
report before you brought in your conclusion about the practice, 
and so forth ? 

Colonel Thielen. I did that. 

Senator Ferguson. Now do you say that anything that was brought 
in here is beyond dispute, that it is not disputed in any way? 

Colonel Thielen. That is a relative term, I believe. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Well 

Colonel Thielen. Any statement could be disputed. We have 
tried to confine it to statements concerning which there has been no 
controversy. 



96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, let me review page 1105 from, the 
Army report in relation to Colonel Tyler ; let me read General Grun- 
ert's remark. [Reading:] 

[224] General Geuneet. And there was nothing for you to do, there, between 
7 and 8, but twiddle your thumbs? 

Colonel Tyler. No, sir ; there was nothing to do. 

General GRtiNEKT. Then it appears that the organization seemed to be faulty, 
and if instruction faulty, and there seemed to be a lack of organization and 
common sense and reason on this. You went up there to do duty as a pursuit 
oflBcer in the information center. There was nobody to do the work with, 
because the controller was not there, and the Navy liaison man wasn't there, 
and probably some others were missing, so you couldn't do your duty, as a 
pursuit officer, because there was nobody to do duty with ; and then, at the 
end of the tour, at 7 o'clock, everybody disappeared except the telephone 
operator and you ; and the telephone operator remained there for apparently 
no reason. You had no particular duty, did you? 

Colonel Tylee. No, sir ; we hadn't. 

General Geuneet. It seems all cockeyed to me — and that, on the record, 
too. 

Did you read that part of General Grunert's statement there in the 
testimony ? 

Colonel Thielen. I did not personally read that, sir. I believe I 
can clarify a possible faulty impression in that the testimony which 
you just read refers to the information [^£5] center, which was 
located at Fort Shafter and not to the radar unit at Opana, out at 
Kahuku Point. 

Will you point that out, please, Captain ? 

Senator Ferguson. Will you say that the reason these boys were 
at the radar station after 7 that morning was that the truck did not 
come to pick them up? That is the reason they were there? 

Colonel Thielen. The evidence I have indicates that Private Elliott 
volunteered for additional training. I know nothing about the delay 
of the truck in picking them up. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know the reason that they were not 
picked up was that the truck did not pick them up ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I did not know that. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you read all this testimony ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I did not read it all. Perhaps I should 
explain my position is very similar to that of Admiral Inglis. I did 
not perform any appreciable quantity of research on this testimony. 
It was done by other staff officers. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 

The Chairman. Will you permit Mr. Murphy to interpose? 

Senator Ferguson. For what purpose ? 

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering whether or not the witness had 
finished the question that you asked 15 minutes ago. He read three 
paragraphs. In my impression, that question is still [££6] not 
answered. 

Senator Ferguson. I will go back to that. 

Colonel Thielen. I have some further testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. You read what you claim you 
founded your statement on. 

Colonel Thielen. After reading the testimony of Sergeant Elliott 
that he wanted to get some instruction on the use of the oscilloscope 
on which Lockard was instructing him, and that the flight was noticed 
by Private Lockard, I go on to further testimony by the same witness. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 97 

In response to a question by General Frank, "\Vlio wanted to shut 
it down?" Sergeant Elliott replied: 

Private Lockard wanted to shut the unit down, and since I was to get the 
instruction on it I wanted to continue operation. Finally, after insisting on that, 
we did continue the flight and completing the flight on this chart which you have 
just shown me before, sir, and we followed the flight all the way in until it was 
approximately 15 or 25 miles from the island of Oahu, and the flight was lost. 

That concludes the testimony which I wish to quote. 

Captain, put the radar plot up, please. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you got the testimony there? Look on 
page 1004. 

Colonel TiiiELEN, No, sir ; I do not have that. 
• r^^] Senator Ferguson. What? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not have the testimony, I have only 
the pertinent extracts. 

Senator Ferguson. He says this [reading] : 

The oscilloscope, from the beam tliat is sent out, has a back echo, and at that 
particular spot the oscilloscope is blank, and it is impossible to pick up any 
flight whatsoever at that particular point, and that was as far as we could 
follow the flight, and at approximately 7 : 39 is when we started to shut down 
the unit, and at 7 : 45 our truck came from our camp (incidentally, which was 9 
miles away from the unit) to pick us up to take us to breakfast, and upon 
arriving at the camp, why, we had found out what had happened at Pearl 
Harbor. 

Does not that indicate the reason that they were there with the 
machine, that they were waiting on their truck? 

Colonel Thielen, No, sir. May I point out the time that that flight 
was picked up, at 7 : 02, as indicated on the chart, and it was tracked 
continuously to, I believe, the testimony that you quoted said 7 : 45. 

Senator Ferguson, 7 : 45 is when the truck picked them up. 

Colonel Thielen. Wlien it actually picked them up? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. He says [reading] : 

At 7 : 45 our truck came from our camp to pick us up. 

Colonel Thielen. What opinion did I give you on that, [228} 
Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. In answer to this question, "What time did the 
center close up where Tyler was?" 

Colonel Thielen. I do not know that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Taking Sergeant Elliott's other statement [read- 
ing] : 

No, sir ; there was no time. I am sure there wasn't. Another point, sir, that 
I might bring out, our clock at the unit I said showed 7 : 02 at the time that we 
sent in the first plot. However, when I was ordered, over the plotting set while 
we were operating the problem, to shut down, the time by the clock there was 
6 : 54, and I can't remember as to whether we had made any time check what- 
soever that morning. 

Do you know whether or not the main board closed down at 6 : 54? 

Colonel Thielen. I believe that is highly controversial, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. You say that is highly controversial. Is that 
the reason it is not in your i-eport ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; that would account for it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not these controversial 
matters are going to be presented to the committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I could answer that. We have all the evidence on 
this radar report, the witness is prepared to [£29] testify about 



98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

it. It is one of those things that we are going into fully. This witness 
was instructed to keep out of fields where that situation existed. 

Senator Ferguson. Colonel, do you know anything about the op- 
erations of the radar after the attack ? 

Colonel Thielen. Only the statement which I gave in my script 
yesterday, that Lieutenant Tyler, after receiving word from Wheeler 
Field of the attack, recalled all crews to their stations. What the 
results of that call were I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, there is a vacuum here then, as 
far as we are concerned with any information as to the operations 
of the radar after the attack. I am talking about the movable sets. 
The permanent sets were not completed. The movable sets we are 
talking about ; are we not ? 

Colonel Thielen. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there any information you obtained or you 
can give us in relation to the operation of these sets after the attack? 

Colonel Thielen. Only those Opana plots which show on the 
radar chart which is on the easel. 

Senator Ferguson. From what set did those come ? 

Colonel Thielen. Those are Opana plots. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who was operating that set at 
10:27? 

[^SO] Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you any records to show whose infor- 
mation this is? I cannot see because of the light. Between 9 and 
1027, 651, 652, and 648. 

Colonel Thielen. That entire record is authenticated by Lieuten- 
ant Colonel Murphy. 

Senator Ferguson. From what machine? 

Colonel Thielen. From the Opana station. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why these machines were not 
used to get the enemy going out ? When you knew they would come 
in on the machine, why were not the machines used to get the enemy 
going out? 

Colonel Thielen. I do not know that they were not, nor if not, 
why not. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know of any information or any 
place that the committee can get information on that? 

Colonel Thielen. I am sure that the committee can, through coun- 
sel, obtain the best available witnesses on that. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what general — was it General 
Powell? 

Colonel Thielen. Colonel Powell. 

Mr. Mitchell. He is on the list of witnesses. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what he stated in relation to that? 

[^■31] The Chairman. Colonel Powell, I will say, is on the list 
of witnesses to appear here in person. Wliatever he stated, or what- 
ever he has to state, will be brought before the committee by him in 
person. 

Senator Ferguson. I was just trying to get at what might be in their 
files in relation to this. 

Colonel Thielen. I am not a very good authority on what is in the 
War Department files, sir. Another procedure has been set up for 
obtaining any information which the War Department has. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 99 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the B-l7's had radar in 
them ? 

Colonel Thxelen. I do not know. My opinion would be that they 
did not. I do not believe that radar 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not they had radio ? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I submit, the witness ought to have 
an opportunity to answer. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you answer that question ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I have not completed my answer. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you may complete your answer. 

Colonel Thielen. The presumption would be that they were not 
equipped with radar, considering the status of development of radar 
at that time. 

[23£] Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether they had radio 
upon them ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I do not know definitely. Presumably 
they would have. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you look into that? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not any station on 
Hawaii operated all night with Hawaiian music that night, the 6th ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not it was played for 
the purpose of these B-17's tuning on it ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether at the same time the Jap 
planes tuned on it too? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I have no information on that whatso- 
ever. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you read all of Tyler's testimony ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any information in relation to 
whether or not these radars would pick up whether it was enemy 
planes or friendly planes? 

Colonel Thielen. That, as I testified yesterday, is not practicable, 
for that type of radar, at least. They could [2-33~\ not distin- 
guish between hostile aircraft and friendly aircraft. 

Senator Ferguson. Who has charge of the submarines? That 
would be the admiral, would it not ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, did you state yesterday anything 
about what submarines had been in the Harbor? 

Admiral Inglis. The submarines that were in the Harbor, the 
United States submarines that were in the Harbor were listed in the 
script. 

Senator Ferguson. How many Japs got into the Harbor? 

Admiral Inglis. The best evidence we have indicates that only 
one got in. There was some evidence that might lead to the supposi- 
tion that a second submarine got in, but on further research my people 
told me they did not think there was more than one. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that the one sub came in at 
4 : 30 in the morning and went out at 5 : 30 ? 

Admiral Inglis. I do not know about that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you any information on that? 



100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. Nothing conclusive; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did 3^ou find any maps, or have you any maps 
in your possession showing the log ? 

Admiral Inglis. I was told there was no log, and I was told that 
there was a chart wdiich was recovered f rorn — I [2341 believe it 
was the submarine that went aground at Bellows Field, showing the 
track around Ford Island, but that we thought was only a prospective 
course and not one which was actuall}^ taken by the submarine. 

There is a little confusion that comes in in translating the Japanese 
characters. Some of their tenses are hard to distinguish between 
the present tense and future tense. 

Senator Ferguson. Then that is a disputed item, is it, as to whether 
or not a sub came in and went around Pearl Harbor, around Ford 
Island, and came out ? 

Admiral Inglis. The evidence on that is certainly not conclusive. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be one of the reasons why it would 
not be put in your statement ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. I would like to add, Senator, to that 
that our best evaluation of the information is that only one submarine 
entered Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. We have in this battle report, at one point on 
this chart, to bolster the evidence of his better vision he wrote in 
Japanese, "I saw it with my own eyes." Did you read that? 

Admiral Inglis. I did not ; no. No, I did not read it. 

Senator Ferguson. What about it? Do you know whether that is 
in your evidence, in your Navy Department ^ 

[235] Admiral Inglis. I presume 

Senator Ferguson (interposing). That is on the log, isn't it, that 
you recovered? 

Admiral Inglis. If you are talking about the submarine that went 
ashore at Bellows Field, I do not believe that that is in the log. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, is there any evidence at all in the Navy 
Department on that item ? 

Admiral Inglis. The only evidence that I know about is what one 
of my officers told me, which is to the effect that they recovered a chart 
in that submarine showing, as I said, a track around Ford Island and 
out again. They think, from the translation of the Japanese charac- 
ters on that chart now that is what it was. 

Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield at that point? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

The Chairman. I think the witness might finish his answer. 

Mr. ICeefe. I thought he did. 

The Chairman. He did not. 

Admiral Inglis. The translation of the Japanese characters were 
somewhat confusing. A great deal of time was spent on that chart 
trying to determine whether or not the submarine actually entered 
the harbor or only planned to enter the [236] harbor, and the 
conclusion which the experts came out with was that the submarine 
did not probably enter the harbor. 

[237] Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that we are taking 
the opinion of the expert here ? 

Admiral Inglis. Perhaps I should not have used the word "ex- 
perts." I will correct that to "translators." 



PROCEEDINGS OE JOINT COMMITTEE 101 

The Chairman. If I may say there, that would be another matter 
that would be left out, because it is speculative and controversial. 

Admiral Inglis. Exactly, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further on that? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Might I say, Senator, while you are questioning with 
respect to this item, my understanding is that these two officers from 
this grounded submarine were captured by the Army. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, will the gentleman yields 

Mr. Keefe. And that the information obtained from those officers 
was obtained by the Army and not by the Navy. I Avish you would 
inquire into that question from the Army, because there seems to be 
a sharp line of cleavage between the two services. 

Colonel Tiiielen. No, sir ; I have no information on that. 

The Chairman. I might suggest to the committee 

[£38] Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire — you captured those 
men, did you not, with these charts^ The officer you captured on the 
sub, and the opei-ator you took, with the charts, did you not^ 

Mr. Murphy, Will the gentlemtm yield? 

The Chairman. Just a minute. Let the witness answer this ques- 
tion. 

Colonel Thielen. I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Haven't you any information that he was cap- 
tured and the sub was captured ? 

Colonel Thielen. I personally have no such information. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral Inglis 

Mr. Murphy. My request for the gentleman to yield is that we have 
been given an outline as to what the testimony is going to be that will 
be gone into subsequently, and it is on that very subject. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to find out what information these gen- 
tlemen have. 

Mr. Murphy. You are anticipating the statement of the witness. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. Let us make progress. 

Senator Ferguson. Going to the admiral, did Admiral Halsey's 
ships have radar ? 

Admiral Inglis. The carrier did, yes, sir. 

[239] Senator Ferguson. The carriers had radar ■? 

Admiral Inglis. His carrier had radar ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. On the memo that went to you. Admiral, on 
page 2 [reading] : 

Summarize percentage personnel mustered various departments — -summary tes- 
timony showing no drunkenness. 

Was that on yours ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; that was scratched off. 

Senator Ferguson. Why A\as it scratched off? Did you go into 
that question at all? 

Admiral Inglis. It was discussed just very briefly, and the opinion 
seemed to be that there was not any drunkenness that had anything 
to do with the case. 

Senator Ferguson. Whose opinion was that ? 

Admiral Inglis. Of the researchers. 



102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it then, we are getting the 
opinions of your researchers, that do not come up here. Is that right? 

Admiral Inglis. Senator, I would like to make again the same 
statement that I made several times, that this presentation which 
Colonel Thielen and I have given is an attempt to give the committee 
just the high lights of the attack on Pearl Harbor, we only covering 
those matters which are not controversial, and which are fairly well 
1^4^] substantiated by the evidence available to us. 

Senator Ferguson. Well now, you say "fairly well." Is anything 
controversial if it is only fairly well shown ? 

Admiral Inglis. May I delete the word "fairly" then? 

Senator Ferguson. You want to take the word "fairly" and leave 
only the word "well" in ; is that right? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, or conclusively. 

Senator Ferguson. How well ? 

Admiral Inglis. Conclusively. 

Senator Ferguson. And in whose opinion is it conclusive ? 

Admiral Inglis. Well, it is a combination of the opinions of the 
people that are working on the statement. 

Senator Ferguson, Well, now, can you give us from your evidence 
why it took from 9 a. m. — or until 9 a. m. to put No. 3 alert into effect ? 
. Admiral Inglis. That is an Army question, I believe. 

Senator Ferguson. Colonel, did you ever put the No. 3 alert in for 
the Navy ? 

Admiral Inglis. We did not have No. 1, 2, and 3, alerts. That is an 
Army term. 

Senator Ferguson. What do j^ou have ? 

Admiral Inglis. We have condition 1, 2, and 3. 

Condition 1 is general quarters with all battle stations [2^i] 
manned. It is just the opposite with the Army. They have 1, 2, and 
3 in the opposite order. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, at 6 o'clock in the morning, at Pearl 
Harbor, on the 7th, what alert was in effect, as far as the Navy was 
concerned ? 

Admiral Inglis. It is my recollection that condition 3 was in effect. 
That, as I have described, calls for, roughly, one-half of the antiair- 
craft battery to be manned — or one-fourth. 

Senator Ferguson. At 6 o'clock ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the condition on the 6th? 

Admiral Inglis. On the 6th ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. Well, I would assume that the same condition pre- 
vailed. It is my understanding that condition No. 3 was the routine 
condition that applied at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. That was the routine condition ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did that alert change? 

Admiral Inglis. Of course there are routine drills at scheduled 
times during every day, when they go to condition 1. But for the 
purpose of this inquiry, I think, to answer your question, I should say 
that that condition changed at [242] the time of the attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long it took to put another 
alert in at that time ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 103 

Admiral Inglis. It probably would — of course, it would vary with 
different ships, but I would say on the average, about 3 minutes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you look into the question of inspection 
Sunday morning, whether or not there was inspection of the ships? 

Admiral Ixglis. Inspection of what nature, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Any inspection. Were any of the bulkheads 
open, or any of the doors ? 

Admiral Inglis. You mean inspection of watertight integrity? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. That question was raised by one of the other mem- 
bers yesterday. It is being looked into now, and I am sure complete 
information on that subject will be made available. 

Senator Ferguson. Up to date have you looked into it ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have not personally, but some of my people have 
worked on it last night. 

Senator Ferguson. You cannot give us an answer on that? 

[243] Admiral Inglis. No, sir; but that information 

Senator Ferguson (interposinng). As I understand 

The Chairman. Wait a minute. The witness was about to say 
something else. Let him finish. 

Admiral Inglis. I cannot give you anything at this time, but that 
information will be available.^ 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it now, the alert changed then 
from No. 3 to No. — what ? 

Admiral Inglis. One. 

Senator Ferguson. In about how many minutes? 

Admiral Inglis. I estimate 3 minutes. 

[^44-] Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask the colonel why it took 
until 9 o'clock to change their alert, when the Navy said they changed 
theirs in 3 minutes. 

Colonel Thielen. I cannot answer why, but I would like to review 
this much of my testimony yesterday. [Beading :] 
When the first bombs were dropped and machine gun fire commenced 

Senator Ferguson. By the way, will you give us the time of the first 
report of a bomb dropped ? 

Colonel Thielen. The first report of a bomb dropped was at 7 : 55 
a. m. 

The Chairjian. Go ahead now. 

Senator Ferguson. Go ahead. 

Colonel Thielen (reading) : 

When the first bombs were dropped and machine gun fire commenced, prac- 
tically all observers were so surprised that for a few minutes the real situation 
was not grasped. Perhaps 3 or 4 minutes elapsed before General Short was in- 
formed by his chief of staff that an attack was in progress. General Short 
immediately directed that all troops be turned out under alert No. 3. 

Later, in speaking of the two divisions, I say : 

At Schofield Barracks, Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, commanding the Twenty- 
fourth Division, first heard the sounds of an attack at about 8 : 05 a. m. Within 
a few minutes his [245] chief of staff had issued instructions to the units 
to get their machine guns into the antiaircraft positions, to increase the standing 
guard, and to send patrols throughout the division sector — which was the northern 
half of the island — to observe the beaches. Before he had left his quarters, Gen- 
eral Wilson heard some of our machine guns in operation. About 8 : 50 a. m. the 
division received word from department headquarters that alert No. 3 would 
go into effect at once. 

^ See footnote 1, p. 70, supra. 



104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. What time was that? 

Colonel Thielex. What is that, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. What time was that again ? 

Colonel Thielen. At 8 : 50 the division received word. 

Senator Ferguson. My question was about 9 o'clock. 

Colonel Thielen. In the case of the other division, it was the figure 
given, as 9 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all the information there is in the Pearl 
Harbor file, is in the Army file here in Washington ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. There is unquestionably additional tes- 
timony on that subject. Of course the actual extent of the alert is a 
question of debate. The reason I referred to my testimony is to point 
out that action was taken immediately on hearing the sounds of fire. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you prepared any other reports, Colonel, 
on the Pearl Harbor matter ? 

['24j6] Colonel Thielen. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. This is the only one ? 

Colonel Thielen. This is — I would like to point out that I did not 
personally prepare this report. I am presenting it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand you were just sent here to 
read it? 

Colonel Thielen. That is not exactly true. I had a hand in the 
preparation of the report, but I did not do the research into the first 
sources. ■ 

Senator Ferguson. Are you through? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Who would you say prepared it? 

Colonel Thielen. A number of officers in my group in the War 
Department General Staff. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give their names; all the people wlio 
worked on it that you know of ? 

Colonel Thielen. I can give the name of Lieutenant Colonel Car- 
roll, Lieutenant Colonel Root, as the two principal researchers under 
whose direction various enlisted personnel looked up specific points. 

[^^7] Senator Ferguson. Admiral, have you prepared any other 
reports on the Pearl Harbor incident ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; I have a report which, I understand, is 
scheduled for presentation as soon as this cross-examination is finished, 
on the Japanese attack. That is, the attack as viewed by the Japanese, 
which is digested. 

Senator 1<'erguson. Any others beyond that ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the only other report that you prepared ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir, on this subject. 

Senator Ferguson. What time did you. Admiral, first confer with 
Colonel Thielen? 

Admiral Inglis. Colonel Thielen? Oh, I think it was Monday 
morning, this week. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that when you had a rehearsal liere in this 
room? 

Admiral Inglis. It might be described as a rehearsal. 

Senator Ferguson. What would jou describe it as ? 

Admiral Inglis. It was a discussion. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 105 

Senator Ferguson. A discussion? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; and we came to an agreement as to the 
sequence in which various items would be presented. 

[^48] Senator Ferguson. Were all these maps prepared espe- 
cially for this committee hearing? 

Admiral Inglis. Speaking for the Navy maps, I believe that is 
correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And, Colonel, were your maps prepared espe- 
cially for this hearing? 

Colonel TiiiELEN. These maps were prepared under my personal 
direction for this presentation. 

Senator Ferguson. It was stated yesterday, Colonel, that the radio 
was jammed. It was said there was no evidence of sabotage, but 
the radio was jammed. Wliat do you mean by that? 

Colonel Thielen. In general, the jamming of a radio means set- 
ting up signals over a frequency band which will interfere with the 
transmission of signals from other stations. This can be done in sev- 
eral ways mechanically. It can be done by the old-fashioned spark 
set. There are any number of ways of obstructing radio channels. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know how this was done? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I don't have that information. Per- 
Iiaps the Hawaiian Department Signal Corps officer does. 

Senator Ferguson. At least you don't know ? 

Colonel Thielen. I don't know ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Could it be done from the Japanese [^W] 
carriers out at sea ? 

Colonel Thielen. That is a technical question which I prefer 
not to answer because I don't know definitely. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you, Admiral, any orders not to sink 
any subs, to Admiral Kimmel ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have nothing on that ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there were any 
orders issued? 

Admiral Inglis. I don't know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, Colonel, whether or not there 
was any limitation on the distance that Army planes could fly to 
sea? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I don't know whether there was or 
not. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there was a 10- 
mile limit? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not know that. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not any planes were 
diverted and shipped elsewhere than to Hawaii a few weeks or 
months before? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I don't know that. 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't any information on that? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. 

[250] Senator Ferguson. We spoke yesterday about Kaminski, 
Kaminski was a naval or Army man ? 

Admiral Inglis. That was Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, who 
was the duty officer in the office of the commandant, Fourteenth Naval 
District. 



106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. I understood that you were to give us the mes- 
sage he gave. Was it in writing ? 

Admiral Inglis. I was to find out, as I understand, when this 
message was delivered personally to Admiral Bloch and Admiral 
Kimmel. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you find that out? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; not yet. 

Senator Ferguson. You mentioned Admiral Bloch. You stated 
yesterday that he would make reports to Admiral Kimmel. Is that 
true? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I don't recall making that statement. 
The normal channel for such a report would be from the comman- 
dant. Fourteenth Naval District, duty officer, who was Lieutenant 
Commander Kaminski, to the fleet duty officer. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he ever made any report, 
directly to Washington, Admiral Bloch? 

Admiral Inglis. To Washington? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[2S1] Admiral Inglis. I don't have that, but I am quite sure 
Washington was informed of the attack shortly after the period. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, you spoke yesterday about the aid to 
the injured at the time. 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not all of the physi- 
cians turned out on the island to help the Navy ? 

Admiral Inglis. The only information I have on that is just the 
impression that I gained from reading reports in the press and other 
sources shortly after the attack happened, and my impression is that 
the performance of the Medical Department was beyond reproach. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you get any evidence at all that the 
supplies were locked up in such a way that they couldn't be obtained 
and it was necessary to go to the private physicians to get help? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; I hadn't heard that. 

Senator Ferguson. You have no information on that ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the private physi- 
cians did render service ? 

Admiral Inglis. I don't know ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't any evidence on that, one [^5^] 
way or another ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have no evidence ; no, sir. 

Senator Fesguson. That is all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart, I believe, is the next 
member of the committee. 

Mr. Gearhart. Colonel Thielen, I have listened to some of your tes- 
timony with increasing amazement and for that reason I would like to 
ask you a few questions. 

First, concerning^ the portable radar set at Opana. During the 
course of your testimony, you have referred to it is a "practicing 
event." 

May I ask you if, in your conferences with your staff, in the prepa- 
ration of your statement, that you decided to refer to it as a "prac- 
ticing event" for the purpose of belittling the report that came from 
those men that were there operating the machine on December 7, 1941 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 107 

Colonel Thielen. First, I don't place your reference, but I can 
assure you that I had no intention of belittling the men. 

A "practicing event" was that? 

Mr. Gearhakt. You spoke of some men practicing there. 

Colonel Thielen. I don't recall using that term. May I check my 
script for a moment? 

Mr. Gearhart. You have heard the term used by others [2S3] 
in this room, haven't you, since you have been testifying? 

Colonel Thielen. I recall no instance of that. 

Mr. Gearhart. You didn't hear the admiral, your associate there, 
and colleague, use the word "practicing" ? 

Colonel Thielen. I think the admiral would have no reason to refer 
to our use of radar. 

Mr. Gearh^vrt. Haven't you testified here these boys continued, these 
young men continued, the use of that machine in operation after 7 
o'clock because they wanted to practice ? 

Colonel Thielen. I did not use that term, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. What term did you use ? 

Colonel Thielen. May I quote my testimony on that point? 

Mr. Gearhart. I am not only confining myself to your written 
testimony, but the other testimony you have given orally. You say 
you haven't used the word "practicing." 

Colonel Thielen. May I take it from the transcript ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

The Chairman. Suppose you read what you said from your paper 
while somebody is looking it up in the transcript, if that is agreeable. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. [Reading:] 

At seven a. m., 7 December, 1941, all radar detector [254] stations closed 
down except the Opana station at Kahuku Point which remained in operation in 
oi'der to continue the training of a new man. Private George E. Elliott, who had 
volunteered to remain on the job for this purpose. 

At 7 : 02 a. m. this station, manned by Private Elliott and Private Joseph L. 
Lockard, picked up an indication of airplanes at 132 miles, bearing 3 degrees 
east of north. 

The soldiers kept tracking the target. 

I believe that is all that is applicable. 

Mr. Ge^\rhart. I will read you from the testimony of Lt. Joseph 
Lockard, given on the 30th day of October 1944, at the Pentagon 
Building. [Reading:] 

Question. In order to operate the machine you had to mount the truck? 

Answer (by Lieutenant Lockard). We had to unlock the vans and open them. 

Question. There was nothing in this van except the machine itself? 

Answer. That is right. 

Question. Was Elliott doing the actual computation or were you? 

Answer. I was doing the computation. Elliott was doing the plotting and 
keeping the log. 

Question. What do you mean by "operating the [2551 equipment"? 

Answer. Operations consist of controlling the movement of the antenna and 
reading the information from the oscilloscope both on the screen and on the 
mileage scale. 

Question. As you were operating this thing you didn't see anything at all until 
about two minutes after seven. When seven o'clock came, what did you say to 
Elliott? 

Answer. We mentioned the fact that the truck hadn't arrived, and there 
was no particular point in closing up and sitting out on the grass when we 
could be comfortable inside. 

Question. At about two minutes after seven, you were the first to notice 
anything on the scope? 

Answer. Yes. 



108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Does that indicate to you that they continued after 7 because Mr. 
Elliott, who had already had instructions, day after day and week 
after week, under Lieutenant Lockarcl, because he wanted a little 
more training ? 

Colonel Thielen. I have already quoted testimony which does 
indicate the situation as I testified yesterday, and, by the way, I 
find that my oral presentation agrees with that which I gave you. 

Mr. Geakhart. Yes; and, as a matter of fact, the truck was late 
to take them to breakfast, and didn't come until [£56] 7 : 45 — 
you know that to be a fact? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not. 

Mr. Gearhaet. Then you testified a moment ago in respect to the 
hours in which the radar at Opana was in use. Will you give that 
again, please? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. [Eeading :] 

When he placed Alert No. 1 in effect, General Short also directed that the 
aircraft warning service operate all mobile aircraft warning stations from 
two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn, specifically from 4 to 7 o'clock 
in the morning. Thus, the operating schedule of the mobile radar detector 
stations was daily from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. ; routine training from 7 a. m. to 
11 a. m., except Sunday, and daily, except Saturday and Sunday from 12 o'clock 
to 4 o'clock p. m. for training and maintenance woi'k. 

Mr. Gearhart. Where do you get that information ? 

Colonel Thielen. I have that documented, sir. I can look it up 

I take that from General Short's testimony before tlie Roberts 
commission, vokmie 2, page 43. 

Mr. Gearhart. W^ell, do you think Lieutenant Lockard ought to 
know when he was working and what his hours of dut}' were, since 
he was on the job? 

Colonel Thielen. Presumably he would; yes, sir; although 
[257] at that time he was a private, and would naturally be under 
the orders of someone else. 

Mr. Gearhart. He was a rather capable private, to be a lieuten- 
ant today; doesn't that demonstrate that he was a capable private? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; but his capabilities, I don't believe, 
are the issue. It was his actual position at that time. 

Mr. Gearhart. Let's read more of his testimony given when he 
was a second lieutenant in the Signal Corps, and after he had been 
commissioned. [Reading :] 

Answer. There were approximately six men per unit. We had six in ours. 
We operated from 7 to 5 o'clock. 

Question. Nobody operated at nighttime, so far as you know? 

Answer. If there was an alert, or if maneuvers were going on, or some- 
thing of that kind, there were not night operations. 

Question. From 7 to 5, except for lunch period, you were on daily? 

Answer. Yes ; during the week. 

Question. Sunday was a day off, normally? 

Answer. We had to operate Simdays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the 
morning. We took turns. That happened [258] to be my Sunday, 

From that it would appear that they worked Sundays and pre- 
sumably holidays, from 4 in the morning until breakfast time, 7 
o'clock; that on weekdays they woi-ked from breakfast time, 7 o'clock, 
until 5 in the afternoon. 

How do you account for such a discrepan("y in the testimony that 
you have quoted in opposition? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 109 

Colonel Thielen. Admitting the discrepancy between my closing 
time of 4 p. m. and that testified as 5 p. m., I believe the discrepancy is 
in the term "work." I broke that down to actual operation of the 
detector in picking up aircraft from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., and training, 
which might not actually involve tracking aircraft, from 7 to — I don't 
remember the exact time — from 7 to 11, and training and maintenance 
from 12 to 4, which agrees, I believe, substantially with 

Mr. Gearhart. I think, you. Colonel, picked the wrong word from 
the wrong place, when you stress the word "work." It was I that used 
the word "work." It doesn't appear in the testimony I read. He 
called it operating the machine. 

Have you another explanation? 

Colonel Thielen. Operating the machine would not necessarily 
be "on the alert for the detection of aircraft." 

Mr. Gearhart. I want to ask you, Colonel, as a military [259] 
man, whether or not you think there is anything significant in the fact 
that, according to your orders, this machine should have been turned 
off at 7 o'clock, and the further fact that the range of these machines 
was about 13G miles and no farther, that the Japanese planes should 
fly into that oscilloscope 2 minutes after it ought to have been off 
the air? 

Colonel Thielen. I draw no conclusion from that, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Does it suggest to you, as a military man, that the 
Japanese had knowledge of the orders that we had under which these 
machines were operated ? 

Colonel Thielen. Not necessarily, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Would you give consideration to that ? 

Colonel Thielen. It is a very definite possibility; yes, sir. 

Mr, Gearhart. Don't you think it strangely significant that the 
Japanese planes flew into the range of that machine just 2 minutes 
after it was supposed to be off the air ? 

Colonel Thielen. It might have been. 

Mr. Gearhart. Who made the order? 

Colonel Thielen. The order, sir? 

Mr. Gearhart. The order fixing the time for these radars to be 
on the air. 

Colonel Thielen. General Short was responsible for that [260] 
order. 

Mr. Gearhart. Have you a copy of that order ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. I have a reference to it in my testimony. 

Mr. Gearhart. I will remind counsel that I asked him wrecks ago for 
copies of that order, together with a statement of the history source, 
and the name of the person who signed it, and I have not received it.^ 

Now, radar is operated in the daytime as well as nighttime? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. In daytime they will record the approach of planes 
that are far beyond the range of human vision, will they not? 

Colonel Thielen. With exception taken to the term "record," yes, 
sir ; they indicate. 

Mr. Gearhart. Using that distinction, it will indicate on the oscillo- 
graph ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 



^ Reports from the War Department on orders governing the operation of radar in Hawaii 
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor were subsequently introduced as Exhibit No. 137. 

79716 — 46— pt. 1 10 



110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. On the oscilloscope, that the airplanes are approach- 
ing from a very great distance? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And the range of those portables, the only radars 
they had on the islands, six of them, was 136 to [£6l] 138 
miles ? 

Colonel Thielen. My figure is 150. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, there have been many different maneuvers 
down through the years in the islands over there in which an air attack 
upon the islands was under contemplation, maneuvers in which cups 
were bestowed upon attacking forces, simulated attacking forces, for 
taking the islands, for instance, in these maneuvers. One was held a 
few months before, and at that time it was found by the judges that the 
proper time to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor is to ride in on the 
rays of the sun ; is that not correct ? 

Colonel Thielen. I do not know, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know that, as an Army officer, that that is the 
generally accepted thesis among military and naval people? 

Colonel Thielen. You refer to coming in on the sun ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Colonel Thielen. It is a commonly used tactic ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, the Japanese didn't have to have any 
imagination in planning this attack; all they had to do was to read the 
newspapers and listen to speeches, and know that that was the accepted 
idea among American officers as to when the islands should be attacked 
with the [262] greatest possibility of success, was to ride in 
on the rays of the sun, as the Japanese did later; is that correct? 

Colonel Thielen. I don't know, sir. I say it is a recognized tactic. 
That is as far as I can go as an Army officer. 

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you think it was strangely significant that 
the order keeping these radars on the air should provide that they 
should be off the air at a time that an attack of that kind could be 
made with the greatest chances of success, according to the accepted 
views of the Army and Navy ? 

Colonel Thielen. Do I see significance in that ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Does it suggest that possibly somebody was exerting 
a tremendous influence over the writing of orders somewhere along 
the line, in headquarters at Honolulu or America ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; it suggests nothing of the kind to me. 

Mr. Gearhart. Wlien we had six radar machines over there, why 
were they all on at once, and all off at once? Wliy wasn't it provided 
that they should spell each other off over the 24-hour period of the 
day? 

[263] Mr. MnRPHT. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. Gearhart. No, sir ; I don't think I will. 

Colonel Thielen. I am no expert on radar, which is a highly tech- 
nical subject. I can suggest an answer to your last question — and he 
might drop the chart showing the radio stations. Let me say, each 
radar in general covers a certain sector. No one radar detector on the 
island could determine an approach from any direction. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you think that answer justifies the taking off of 
the air radar during the dangerous hours of the 24-hour period ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 111 

Colonel Thielen. By no means, but it accounts for the simultaneous 
operation of several radar stations. 

Mr. Gearhart. If you were in charge, don't you think you could 
think of a way of getting six machines in operation over a period of 
24 hours a day ? 

Colonel Thielen. I would want complete coverage. It would not 
be a solution to alternate the operation of radar around the island. 
You would have to have coverage of each sector while that particular 
station was operating. 

Mr. Gearhart. Considering the terrain of Oahu, there are high 
points on the mountains, on the top of which these machines could be 
placed, and they could cover larger theaters than assigned to these 
fixed machines when you scattered them [264] along the coast ; 
isn't that correct? 

Colonel Thielen. I believe that is correct in general. There are 
technicalities in the field of radar that I wouldn't want to 
testify on. 

[£6S] Mr. Gearhart. Now., were there any orders from Wash- 
ington to General Short or to any other person directing that no fire 
be had on any Japanese vessels or any Japanese installations 

Colonel Thielen. I do not know, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). Until the Japanese fired first? 

Colonel Thielen. I do not know, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. You know that such an order was issued to General 
MacArthur, do you not ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not. 

Mr. Gearhart. You know that the provision of the Constitution of 
the United States is that war shall be declared by the Congress of the 
United States ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; I am familiar with the Constitution. 

Mr. Gearhart. You know that is a fact. Was any order issued 
from Washington that you know anything about, either to General 
MacArthur or to General Short, reminding them that they should 
not take any offensive action because of this constitutional provision? 

Colonel Thielen. I was in no position to have any such knowledge 
and I do not have any. 

[£60] Mr. Gearhart. Is that the reason 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Mr. Geiarhart. Is that the reason why they have you people come 
up here to read hearsay testimony to us, so that whenever we ask you 
a question in connection with that testimony you can always reply, 
"I am only here to give you the information I was sent up here to 
give you" ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; in my case, at least, that is definitely not 
true. I can explain the reason I was sent up here, I think, satisfac- 
torily. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, there are admirals and generals available to 
subpena by this committee who went through this attack. Why are 
they not here to read these statements instead of yourself ? 

Colonel Thielen. Because the directive setting up this particular 
testimony was merely, I might say, to orient the committee by giving 
a narrative of the facts of the Pearl Harbor attack. 



112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. And there are others that could ^ive the narrative 
from reference to documents, as you have, and also to give testimony 
in respect to actual personal experiences and they are not here. 

The Chairman. If that kind of thing is going to go on here the 
Chairman desires to say for the record that this [267] method 
of procedure was unanimously agreed to by the committee as the pro- 
cedure to be followed. It was understood that this narrative recital 
was to be made by a representative of the Navy and a representative 
of the Army. The men who were on the ground and know what 
happened will be called, but they cannot all be called en masse. 

Mr. Gearhart. With all due respect to the chairman of this com- 
mittee, I want to say at this particular time that I never agreed and 
neither did any other member of the committee agree that they would 
consent to calling the witness in question just to get hearsay 
statements. 

The Chairman. Counsel for the committee for an hour and a half 
explained this procedure to the committee and no member of the com- 
mittee, all members being present, raised any objection. 

Mr. Gearheart. Yes, but we expected to get witnesses who knew 
something about what they were talking, not hearsay. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman the Chairman has stated some- 
thing on the record that is not as I understood it at all. There was no 
consent given, there was no consent passed about the manner of pro- 
ducing this. We were told that this was a tentative outline and I want 
the record to emphatically show that I never consented to trying this 
matter in this way. 

[268] The Chairman. Well, I don't care to get into a contro- 
versy here, but I don't want the record to be misrepresented. There 
was no objection expressed on the part of any committeeman to having 
a representative of the Navy and a representative of the Army come 
up and from documents and reports and evidence within the two de- 
partments give us a narrative recital of what happened physically 
at Pearl Harbor. They did state that evidence would be produced 
during the hearings by eye-witnesses and that will be done. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, may I speak 

Mr. Gearhart. I yield to the Senator. 

The Chairman. The Senator from Maine is recognized. 

Senator Brewster. I don't want to add to any confusion on this 
score, but I certainly do not want to be recorded as one who ever 
assented to this method of procedure. I had very grave doubts re- 
garding the method when it was proposed, I expressed considerable 
concern ; I urged very strenuously, as the record shows, that this mat- 
ter be deferred until we could acquire a more proper understanding 
of it from the various exhibits and records and twice renewed my 
motion for postponement. 

I think that the developments to date have amply demonstrated the 
inexpediency of this method of procedure, with two men here to occupy 
2 days, who had no information what- [269] ever, who had no 
connection whatever with Pearl Harbor and who evidently have very 
little familiarity with the records and I think it is most unfortunate 
that the first 2 days have been so largely wasted by this work. 

Mr. Gearheart. Mr. Chairman, may I proceed ? 

The Chairman. Yes, Congressman (jearhart, proceed, but as a mat- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 113 

ter of information, wliether this is wise or unwise, it is the method 
that we agreed to and I hope that it can be speedily accomplished. 

Senator FERGUSOisr. Mr. Chairman, I again want to make this 
record clear that I did not agree to this method of procedure. My 
motion was to adjourn it so that we could get the original records 
here and so that we might go over the matter before we brought wit- 
nesses in. 

The Chairman. Well, neither the Senator nor any other committee- 
man objected to these representatives being brought here for a narra- 
tive recital, as explained by counsel. The Senator did move to post- 
pone it. The Senator from Michigan moved to postpone it on another 
ground entirely; but go ahead, Mr. Gearhart. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to 

Mr. Gearhart. I want to proceed. It is only a few minutes before 
noon. 

The Chahiman. Let us go ahead with the witness and let [2701 
the committeeman continue without any further interruption. 

Mr. Gearhart. Addressing my next question to Admiral Inglis, 
I will ask you. Admiral, whether or not there were any orders issued 
either from Washington or in the islands, directing the commander 
in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commander of the Fourteenth 
Naval District not to fire upon Japanese ships or installations until 
we were fired on first? 

Admiral Inglis. I have no knowledge of such an order. 

Mr. Gearhart. You know of orders that were issued by Admiral 
Kimmel which were to the opposite effect, do you not ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have no personal knowledge of such orders; no, 
sir. I would have to look that up. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I will refer you to the report of the NavaJ 
Court of Inquiry wherein they refer to certain orders issued by Ad- 
miral Kimmel in violation of Washington instructions, the admiral as- 
suming the responsibility on the theory that he would act first and ex- 
plain later. Do you remember that part of the report ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, have you read the report? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have not. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then you are not giving us [271'\ informa« 
tion that is based upon the Naval Court of Inquiry ? 

Admiral Inglis. The information which I have given you has been 
based on the research work of the people who work for me and I as- 
sume that they have read some of those things. I might also say 
that, in my opinion, from what I know at this moment, that that is 
controversial and also has something to do with fixing the respon- 
sibility. We have omitted those subjects from this presentation. 

Mr, Gearhart. Do you know a man in the Navy by the name of 
Commander Clarence Earl Dickson, or Clarence Earl Dickinson, Jr. ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. A flying naval officer, serial No. 74369? 

Admiral Inglis. I do not know him, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, in addition to being a competent flying officer 
he is also a very capable author. He wrote a story for the Saturday 
Evening Post which appeared in that publication on the 10th of 
October issue of 1942, which he entitled "I Fly for Vengeance." I 
want to read you just one paragraph. Maybe this will refresh your 



114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

memory on some orders that were issued at that time. It is the second 
paragraph of the story. [Reading :] 

It was not that we pilots did not sense the ten- [212] sion that lit up 
the Pacific. You could feel it everywhere all the time. The mission from which 
we were returning — 

I will interpolate, on December 7 — 

had the flavor of impeding action. We had been delivering a batch of 12 
Grumman Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron 21 to Wake Island where 
they were badly needed. On this cruise we had sailed from Pearl Harbor on 
November 28 under absolute war orders. Vice Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr., 
the commander of the aircraft battle force, had given instructions that the 
secrecy of our mission was to be protected at all costs. We were to shoot down 
anything we saw in the sky and pound anything we saw in the sea. In that 
way there could be no leak to the Japanese. 

And I might point out to you that at the time that was written 
Clarence E. Dickinson was a lieutenant and that the last time I recall 
he had been promoted twice and is now a commander, so evidently 
there wasn't any objection in the Navy Department to that which 
he said. 

Now, do you anything about that of which Lieutenant and now 
Commander Dickinson wrote? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. We did not attempt to read magazine 
articles and things of that character in making up this presentation. 

Mr. Gearhart. Will you get me, Mr. Counsel, [273] the or- 
ders under which Lieutenant Dickinson flew on that trip and if those 
orders were in part verbal will you please ascertain for me what the 
verbal part of the orders were?^ 

Senator Lucas. I would suggest you get the witness also, Mr. 
Counsel. 

Mr. Gesell. The witness is on our list. Admiral Halsey is on the 
list to testify. He was in command of those flyers. He seemed to 
us to be the logical person to give the facts that the Congressman is 
interested in. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. I merely advert to this because of all of this 
being a surprise. Why should anybody be surprised when we are 
making war orders? 

The Chairman. Does any member of the committee think that this 
is argumentative matter that should appeal to the committee and not to 
the witness? 

Mr. Gearhart. That is to the entire country, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Well, I have no doubt of that. 

Mr. Gearhart. And that will, accordingly, include our distin- 
guished Chairman as well. 

The Chairman. No doubt and I accept my part of the responsi- 
bility. 

Mr. Gearhart. It is a very heavy burden for you to bear, I admit 
that. 

[^74] Now, Admiral Inglis, do you know where the United 
States cruiser Boise was about that week of December 1 to December 
7? _ 

Admiral Inglis. I understand the Boise was in the Philippines. 

Mr. Gearhart. In the Philippines? 



^ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5476 for a letter from the Navy Department. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 115 

Admiral Ikglis. She was attached to the Pacific Fleet, but actually 
present in the Philippines if my information is correct. I just ob- 
tained this information just this moment. 

Mr. Gearhart. "\Anio \\'as commander of that ship ? 

Admiral Inglis. What is that ? 

Mr, Gearhart. Who was commander of that ship at that time? 

Admiral Inglis. Captain Robinson. I am not sure of his initials. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know w^ho is commander at the present time ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know a Commander or Captain Moran? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. ]\Iike Moran? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. He at one time was in command [275^ of 
that ship and at one time preceding that was executive officer of that 
ship ; is that not correct ? 

Admiral Inglis That is correct. 

Mr. Gearhart, Can you tell me whether or not the Japanese fleet, 
the attacking force that was proceeding to rendezvous 200 miles 
north of Oahu — if that ship did not sight the Japanese fleet? 

Admiral Inglis. I know of no sighting of the Japanese fleet at 
all. My information is that the Japanese fleet which attacked Pearl 
Harbor was not sighted. 

Mr. Gearhart. Will you make an investigation and determine 
whether or not there is a report on file indicating that the officers 
and crew, somebody in an official position on the cruiser Boise, sighted 
the Japanese attacking fleet during the first week of December? 

Admiral Inglis. If there is any evidence, either written or from 
witnesses, I am authorized to state that the Navy Department will 
make that available to you and the committee, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. It will not be forgotten now that I have raised the 
question, I trust. 

Admiral Inglis. It will not be forgetten.^ 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, there is another thing that I would like to 
ask you about. 

[£76] Were any orders issued from Hawaii or from Washington 
or from any other place placing restrictions upon the use of ship ra- 
dios, radios of the type, for instance, on the cruiser Boise? I am now 
referring to the fatal week in December. 

Admiral Inglis. I am answering that question now from my own 
personal memory, Mr. Gearhart, and I have a recollection that I 
am not too sure of, because this was nearly 5 years ago, that there 
was a general order in effect about that time which applied to both 
the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets, instructing them to maintain 
radio silence. I cannot be positive that that applied to the Pacific 
Fleet, but my recollection is that it applied to the Atlantic Fleet 
and in all probability it applied also to the Pacific Fleet. 

Mr. Gearhart. When was that order enjoining silence upon ships 
at sea made ? 

Achniral Inglis. I haven't got that information available. The 
Navy will try to get it for you, sir.- 

1 The log of U. S. S. Boise was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 68." 

2 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5294. 



116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Geaehart. As a matter of fact, it was made just shortly be- 
fore, around the latter part of November or the early part of De- 
cember, 1941, wasn't it? 

Admiral Inglis. It is my recollection that the order was issued 
long before that, sir, but my recollection may be faulty. 

Mr. Gearhart. By the way, was that phrase, [S??] "task 
force" used in 1941 ? 

Admiral Inglis. I believe it was, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. I was told that it came into use and was borrowed 
from the Japanese nomenclature on or well along in 1942. 

Admiral Inglis. That is not my understanding. 

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you think it is strangely significant that there 
should be an order directing all of our ships to sail south of Hawaii, 
that there should be a radio beam directed to be held on all night for 
the benefit of B-17's which the Japanese availed themselves of? 
Don't you think it is rather significant that there were naval orders 
enjoining silence upon all of our ships at sea, which would forbid 
them from reporting anything that they might obtain by way of in- 
formation on the liigh seas ? Don't you think it is strangely significant 
that the radar should be turned off the air during the danger hours 
of the day? 

What effort has been made by the Intelligence Service to break down 
and ascertain how all these strangely significant things could occur, 
all of which, every one of them, operating to the benefit of our enemy 
and to the vulnerability of our own crews and ships ? 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I object to that on the ground that 
the witness has been asked five different [B78] questions and 
I think they should be propounded one at a time. 

The Chairman. Let him answer all the five. 

Mr. Gearhart. I think the five together is what makes it signifi- 
cant. 

The Chairman. The question of significance will not be gone into 
at the moment, but answer, if you can, Admiral, all five together or 
ad seriatim. 

Admiral Inglis. Congressman Gearhart, that covers a lot of 
territory. Two of these questions, if I recall them, refer to Army 
matters, the B-l7's and the radar going off the air at T o'clock. 

Now, you ask me my opinion of the significance of those five things ? 
I am not sure that I understand what the point is that you are making, 
but I will do the best I can to give you my opinion of the significance. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you say you don't understand why I have 
raised this question, or what I mean by it? 

Admiral Inglis. I don't understand what 

Mr. Gearhart. I understand that the Intelligence Service is an 
agency of the Army and an agency of the Navy, created for the pur- 
pose of taking these strange circumstances and finding out what they 
mean. Therefore I asked you have you made any investigation to 
determine why this long list of events, all of which tied the hands of 
America and ' [279] all of which benefited the Japanese, why 
they should all occur at one time, in one picture? Has that been a 
study of the Intelligence Bureau of which you are a part ? 

Admiral Inglis. I would like to leave out, if I may, from the record 
any discussion of the functions or success of the Intelligence Service 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 117 

at present. Insofar as it affected Pearl Harbor I think I can answer 
the gentleman's question. 

My opinion is that the significance of those three things is accounted 
for by the tense relationship which existed in world politics at that 
time and it was only natural, for instance, that under the circum- 
stances information concerning the movements of our fleet should be 
denied to any country with which our relations were strained. That 
is the only significance that I can read into the five items that the 
gentleman has just given me. 

Mr. Geaehart. In your testimony yesterday you said that there 
was a condition existing on the battleship Calif ornki which prevented 
it from performing its best service under the crisis. You said you 
had a report from the Chief of Naval Yards and Docks. 

Admiral Inglis. The report came from some officers in the Bureau 
of Ships who had made a study of that and the gist of the report that 
I gave yesterday was that the California was the only ship where any 
openings or lack of closures, let \280^ us say, of watertight 
doors and hatches contributed in any way to the damage which 
resulted. 

Mr. Gearhart. The words which caught my attention was that — 

in any way contributed to the inability of that ship to fight. 

Now, were there other ships that had their doors opened, other ships 
that had themselves in such a condition that they could not fight in the 
most efficient manner ? 

Admiral Inglis. The openings, of course, would not stop the ship 
from fighting but might possibly lessen the ability of the ship to stay 
afloat. 

Now, as I said earlier this morning, we are getting that material 
together for you in response to that question and the Navy Depart- 
ment will make available to you and to the committee everything 
that they have on the subject. 

Mr. Gearhart. Very well, but why put it off when you have right 
in your hands a report from which you can give us that. 

Admiral Inglis. I haven't got it right in my hands. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, 3^011 read this report of the Yards and Docks, 
the Bureau of Ships or Yards and Docks, whichever it was? 

Admiral Inglis. I read no report. This is the Bureau of Ships, 
Mr. Congressman, that is responsible for that sub- \^81\ ject, 
not the Bureau of Yards and Docks ; the Bureau of Ships. 

Mr. Gearhart. The Bureau of Ships ^ 

Admiral Inglis. I haven't got a report, in response to your question. 
I was told by my staff that they have received verbally this informa- 
tion that I have given you about the California being the only ship 
where the openings contributed in any way to the damage which was 
suffered by any of the ships there. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did your staff tell you what the conditions were 
on the California? 

Admiral Inglis. Not in detail, no, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Generally what did they tell you ? 

Admiral Inglis. They told me that because of some difficulty in 
closing the watertight doors and hatches after general quarters were 
sounded, which changes the conditions of readiness from three to one, 
because of that difficulty that the flooding and perhaps resulting fire 
spread more rapidly than otherwise might have been the case. 



118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Why were the doors and hatches of the California 
opened on that day ? 

Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question at present, but we 
will get that information. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, this is one of these [^5^] 
things we are going into and it lias got to the point where we feel we 
have to call witnesses who were actually on those ships to be sure to 
know what the conditions were and we are going to do so and I hope 
we will get it all here. 

Mr. Gearhart. Counsel will recall that I have asked for all written 
orders which might have produced that condition or a similar con- 
dition on our ships, verbal orders, ship orders or district orders or 
commander in chief orders or Washington orders. 

Mr. Mitchell. My impression is that things of that kind are indi- 
vidual ship matters. As the matter stands we may have to call oflficers 
or men who were on the vessels themselves, but we are going ahead to 
try to get the facts. 

Mr. Gearhart. It is now past 12, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Is that all, Mr. Gearhart ? 

Mr. Gearhart. No. I say it is now past 12. We have reached our 
adjournment hours. 

The Chairman. Well, then, we will stand in recess until 2 o'clock 
this afternoon. 

( Whereux^on, at 12 : 05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the 
same day.) 

\283'\ ATTERNOON SESSION 2 : 00 P. M. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Before proceeding further with the witness, in view of the discussion 
that took place this morning among members of the committee, the 
Chair feels that in the interest of accuracy there ought to be placed 
in the record at this point a memorandum prepared and submitted to 
the committee by Mr. Mitchell, the general counsel, which is described 
as a "Tentative order of proof." Then a 

Preliminary statement, covering committee procedure, relations witli agencies 
concerned, and introduction of letters exchanged with Secretaries Forrestal, 
Patterson, President Truman, Roosevelt estate, plus Truman directives — 

which was done previously, when we started. 

Then on the following page of this memorandum it is stated [read- 
ing] : 

Tlie story of the actual attack and the Japanese plans for attack will be pre- 
sented by an Army and a Navy officer, who will summarize all available data. 
The summary will be prepared under direction of counsel along the lines sug- 
gested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of 
opinion and questions of individual responsibility. The summary will be subject 
to amendment if proved in error through subsequent witnesses. This procedure 
will save calling scores of witnesses and will give to the committee and the 
i28Sa'^ public the first organized comprehensive account of the attack. 

And following that there is subdivision "A," under the heading 
of "The Attack," and under that subdivision "A" there are 17 points, 
outlined by the counsel, and discussed in the committee. That memo- 
randum is dated November 7, and which is a revision of a previous 
memorandum dated November 1 and distributed to all members of 
the committee on the 1st of November. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 119 

Mr. Mitchell. I think it was the 2d. I think the meeting took 
place on the 2d. The memorandum is dated the 1st. 

The Chairman". The memorandum is dated the 1st, yes and the 
meeting took place on the 2d, and the following meeting probably 
on the 8th, because the following memorandum was dated the 7th, 
which was the day before. 

Under subdivision "A" there are 17 different points which were 
discussed with the committee in a session that lasted from 10 : 30 in 
the morning to about 1 : 30 in the afternoon. 

Then there is a subdivision "B," which is "The Jap Plan." That is, 
the plan of the Japanese as discovered from the records since obtained 
from Japanese sources, captured Japanese ships, and so on, and which 
is to come later under Admiral Inglis' testimony. 

These 17 points were thoroughly discussed by the committee and the 
list of witnesses was gone over and what they would testify to, or a 
general outline of their testimony was &S4] discussed, and 
there were three or four or five witnesses added to the list, including 
Sumner Welles, Mr. Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, Mr. 
Tyler, whose name has been mentioned here, and Mr. Lockard, whose 
name has been mentioned here, and also Captain Zacharias, whose 
name was suggested by Congressman Keefe of Wisconsin. 

The only other changes made to this tentative suggestion of pro- 
cedure was that under Item No. 12, which was headed as follows, 
"Summarize Percentage Personnel Mustered Various Departments," 
and then in parentheses "perhaps here summary testimony showing 
no drunkemiess" — the committee decided to strike out No. 12 and not 
go into that in this preliminary statement because that would be a 
matter that would have to be testified to, probably, by witnesses who 
were on the ground and in addition it was thought in any preliminary 
statement it would not be wise to go into that phase of the question. 

Outside of those changes, this memorandum was discussed at length 
and no objection was raised to it, and every name, every additional 
name suggested by the members of the committee was added to the 
list of witnesses, and has been published. 

I ask that this document, with these additions and corrections, be 
printed at this point. 

(The document appears in full at pp. 125-129, inclusive.) 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to it being print- 
ed in the record, but I don't want my cross- [285] examination 
interrupted with it. I ask unanimous consent that it go in the record 
immediately after the conclusion of my remarks. 

The Chairman. Yes ; that is entirely satisfactory. 

Mr. Gearhart. I have only two or three questions to ask anyway, 
and I don't want my remarks interrupted. 

The Chairman. That is entirely satisfactory. 

Mr. Gearhart. I want to say in explanation, if that is offered to 
establish any point, that there is no objection to that order of proof, 
that the only objection I have raised has been against the people who 
have been brought here to establish the things that are set forth in that 
document. 

I objected to it on the ground that they are hearsay witnesses and 
I have never been in a court room where they allowed hearsay evidence 
when there were live witnesses to furnish direct evidence, 



120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. It was understood during this whole discussion 
that this presentation, this preliminary presentation, was not to be 
made by eyewitnesses, that it was to be made by a representative of 
the Army and a representative of the Navy, and that that relation and 
that delineation and narrative recital of what happened, the physical 
situation surrounding it, was to be given by a representative of the 
Army and of the Navy from the records in the War and Navy Depart- 
ments, and [286] not by eyewitnesses, which would require, as 
everybody understood, as the committee understood, and as counsel 
explained, probably 2 or 3 weeks, to get eyewitnesses to everything 
that transpired out at Pearl Harbor. 

I think it is due the committee, and the public, to say that there was 
no objection to this procedure, and that every suggestion of additional 
witnesses or modification of procedure was agreed to at the time. 

Senator Breavster. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to amend your 
statement. 

In the first place, as to the extent of the discussion, it is my very 
clear recollection that most of our discussion was centered, in all of 
our recent meetings, on much more controversial matters, which have 
been fully aired on the floor, and need not be discussed here. 

This matter was brought up, this memorandum you speak of was 
submitted, and I recall very distinctly — which, apparently, the chair- 
man does not recall — that I urged the point of view of Representative 
Keefe, of Wisconsin, who, out of a considerable experience as a trial 
lawyer, preferred to approach this in chronological order, starting 
back and bringing the events in in chronological order, in order that 
we might make a proper record for posterity. 

It was the recommendation of counsel, and it was, we [287] 
gathered, the opinion of the majority, that this was the way to proceed. 
This discussion of which you speak followed three or four votes in 
which there had been a sharp difference between the majority and the 
minority and there was no reason to think that any further agitation 
would have resulted differently. 

I am not prepared — I was not prepared, at any rate — to hold too 
strong an opinion as to which course was better and I so stated, but I 
do feel that events have demonstrated that it has not been as fortunate 
as, perhaps, was anticipated. I think that is a fair statement of the 
attitude. 

[288] Tlie Chairman. I might add to that that it was discussed 
in the committee and presented by the counsel as probably the most 
logical way to proceed so as to describe the actual attack, what took 
place on the day of the attack and the conditions which surrounded it 
and then bring it out in that method. It was the general understand- 
ing that that would be the course pursued. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan. 

Senator Ferguson. I want the record to be clear. Mr. Chairman, 
it IS true that item No. 12 was discussed and the question of drunken- 
ness was taken out. The discussion was not as full as indicated by the 
chairman. I distinctly remember protesting doing it in this manner 
because I asked the committee to have counsel give us the exhibits at 
least 10 days in advance so that the members of the committee would 
be fully acquainted with all of the facts. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 121 

It was stated then that we would get the exhibits either that Friday 
or Saturday or possibly Monday. As a matter of fact, I received 
mine on the Tuesday and Wednesday, the day before the hearing. 

Now, it appears that we have not received all of the exhibits. I want 
this record to show that there was no vote taken on this method of 
handling the matter ; there was no consent, as far as I know, of any 
member concerned. We were [289~\ given this outline, it is 
true. There was no vote taken as to whether that was to be the method 
or not and I protested, as I did on the floor, that this method of trial 
would be a trial such as the Army and Navy and the various services 
wanted it to be. 

The Chairmax. Unfortunately, there was no stenographic record 
taken in any of the executive sessions of what discussion took place. 
Any Senator or any Congressman or any member of the committee 
could have moved that this method not be adopted as the procedure, 
and that we should adopt any other method of procedure. No motion 
being made, no vote was taken. The whole thing was discussed, each 
item was read by the counsel, Mr. Mitchell, item by item and discussed, 
each witness that was to be called and what he was expected to testify 
to in the various divisions of the tentative procedures of proof and the 
fact that no vote was taken on whether this should be the procedure 
was due to the fact that nobody made any motion about it, and it was 
generally accepted as the procedure which would be followed. 

Senator Brewstee. Well, I don't think it is proper, Mr. Chairman, 
to carry this discussion to any great extent, but I am quite sure that 
you are correct in stating that each item was read. That is not my 
recollection as to what was done. We had it for 2 or 3 days to examine 
it. 

[290] The Chairman. You had it for a week before that meet- 
ing, every member of the committee had it for a week before the meet- 
ing and that memorandum was dated the 1st of November. Every 
committeeman was given a copy of that and had it a week before we 
had the following meeting. 

There was this new revision which had come about by the considera- 
tion of the November 1 memorandum and that was discussed, as I said 
a little while ago, in a meeting which lasted for about 3 hours. I 
don't say that that was the exclusive thing that was discussed. There 
were motions made to postpone the hearing that were voted upon also, 
but this memorandum was read and explained by the counsel to those 
present and that means all the members of the committee. 

Put this in the record. 

Mr. Murphy. At a previous meeting when the plan was before 
the committee certain members asked that it be put over to 
the following meeting because they did not have enough opportunity 
to study it ; that was the meeting previously to the November 8 meet- 
ing. And after the meeting on November 8 I dictated to my secretary 
a memorandum of what actually took place there, and I have that 
memorandum that was made that afternoon, and it is in accord with 
what the chairman outlined except as to the 3 hours of discussion. I 
have a record here of what each member brought up at that time. 

[291] Senator Brewster. I trust that the Secretary's records 
will be presented to the committee and that they will be more accurate 
than the only other one that was presented to the Chairman and that 
we had to ask to have corrected because it was inaccurate. 



122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. That is not correct. The Senator had demanded a 
roll call, which was not taken in the committee by a vote ; it was taken 
by a show of hands, and I asked the Senator from Maine that if there 
was any way by which the Government Printing Office could indicate 
a vote by showing of hands that I would accept it. The vote was later 
taken as if it was by a show of hands, and it was put in the record that 
way. That is why that mistake was made. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few words. 

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois. 

Senator Lucas. I haven't said very much in this hearing, and I am 
not going to say much now. It seems to me this is much to do about 
nothing anyway. 

There is just one thing that I want to direct to the attention of the 
committee and that is this : This case is being prepared by General 
Mitchell anyway, but the committee employed him and unanimously 
accepted him as general counsel. I doubt if there is any individual 
here that would probably try the case the same way that he is trying 
it. However, we [£9£] selected him to do it, and I am thor- 
oughly satisfied with the way he is handling this case. 

The Chairman. Well, go ahead, Mr. Gearhart and finish your inter- 
rogation. 

Mr. Gearhart. Let me conclude this discussion by pointing out 
that the principle for which I contend, the ^dolation of which I will 
constantly protest, is the calling of hearsay witnesses to prove facts 
when there are eyewitnesses available to the same point. I am not 
questioning what is in that paper at all; I never have, and this is 
not in the nature of impeachment to offer it in the record. For that 
reason I will welcome it at the conclusion of my cross-examination. 

The Chairman. I will be glad to have it put in at the end of the 
Congressman's examination. Go ahead. 

Mr. Gearhart. There is just one thing, Admiral Inglis, that I 
want to conclude my cross-examination by asking you about, and 
that has to do with the order of ISIay 194:1 transferring three battle- 
ships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers to the 
Atlantic. Then there was much discussion about two-thirds and one- 
third which left me with confusion confounded. 

Before any of the ships were transferred to the Atlantic you would 
say that that was a hundred percent of our fleet. What you mean is 
when they transferred these ships that numer- [£93\ ically, at 
least, the Pacific Fleet was reduced one-third, is that it ? 

Admiral Inglis. I will try to make that just as clear as I can, 
Mr. Gearhart. I cannot give you the precise dates when various 
specific ships were transf eirred from one fleet to another. 

Mr. Gearhart. By that you mean that the ships were, at different 
times, under different orders ? 

Admiral Inglis. I presume so. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did that all occur during the month of May 1941, 
or was it over a larger period than that ? 

Admiral Inglis. It would be my impression and understanding that 
it was over a considerable period of time. There was some shifting 
of ships around from one fleet to another for — well, as a matter of 
fact, that has been going on forever, but as of the 7th of December 
1941 the numerical strength of the ships of the Pacific Fleet was 
roughly two-thirds that of the numerical strength of the ships of the 
Atlantic Fleet. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 123 

Now, the question has been raised about several ships which were 
not a part of either the Athmtic or the Pacific Fleet. Those ai^ 
the battleships North Carolina and Washington and the aircraft 
carrier Wasp^ in particular. Those ships had recently been completed 
and commissionecl, they were still on their shake-down periods. 

[^P^] I have a personal recollection of one, the North Carolina^ 
which was in the Brooklyn Navy Yard undergoing some repairs, hav- 
ing some very serious defects remedied. Those defects show up on a 
shake-down cruise and must be corrected before the ships are ready in 
all respects to join the fleet. 

Those ships I did not count in my numerical summary and they 
have no effect on these proportions which I have given you of two- 
thirds numerical strength. 

I think I should also say again that that is numerical strength and 
not necessarily battle efficiency or battle fighting efficiency or power, 
because it so happens that the numbers in the Atlantic Fleet were 
increased to a good extent by the preponderance of destroyers in the 
Atlantic Fleet. On the other hand, there were more battleships in 
the Pacific Fleet, but I have counted each ship by one regardless of 
whether it was a battleship or a submarine or a destroyer. 

In other words, of the aircraft carriers there were three assigned to 
each fleet and that again does not count the Wasp which had not yet 
joined either fleet and was still in the shake-down period. 

Does that answer your question, sir? 

Mr. Gearhart. It clears it up considerably. 

Now, what was left in the Pacific Fleet when the ships that I have 
just enumerated were transferred to the Atlantic? 

[295'] Admiral Inglis. I have the list of ships that were in the 
Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941. Is that what you wish, sir? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Are you going to draw a distinction between 
the Asiatic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have the figures for the Asiatic Fleet also if you 
wish those. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, give those separately so that the record will be 
clear on it. 

Admiral Inglis. I can give those by ships, that is, so many battle- 
ships, or I can give them by names of specific ships. Wliich way would 
you prefer it? 

Mr. Gearhart. By ships. 

Admiral Inglis. All right, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Have you the record in the other way, that is, by 
name ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have it any way you want it ; yes, sir. It is much 
longer by names of ships. It runs into seven pages of tabulated data. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, let us have it by type then. 

Admiral Inglis. Taking first the battleships : There were six as- 
signed to the Atlantic Fleet, nine assigned to the Pacific Fleet, and none 
assigned to the Asiatic Fleet. 

In the case of the aircraft carriers, there were four [296] as- 
signed to the Atlantic Fleet, three to the Pacific Fleet, and none to the 
Asiatic Fleet. 

Well, I might add parenthetically that I have not counted the Long 
Island in my ad lib testimony. The Long Island was a very inferior 

^Subsequently corrected to Hornet. See p. 199, infra. 



124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

type of carrier. She was assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and makes the 
fourth one. 

Heavy cruisers : 5 assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, 12 to the Pacific 
Fleet, and 1 to the Asiatic Fleet. 

Light cruisers : 12 to the Atlantic Fleet, 10 to the Pacific Fleet, and 
1 to the Asiatic Fleet. 

Destroyers : 97 to the Atlantic Fleet, 54 to the Pacific Fleet, and 13 to 
the Asiatic Fleet. 

Submarines : 58 to the Atlantic Fleet, 23 to the Pacific Fleet, 29 to 
the Asiatic Fleet. 

Minelayers : None to the Atlantic Fleet, nine to the Pacific Fleet, 
and none to the Asiatic Fleet. 

Mine sweepers : 37 to the Atlantic Fleet, 26 to the Pacific Fleet, and 
6 to the Asiatic Fleet. 

Patrol vessels : 5 to the Atlantic Fleet, 13 to the Pacific Fleet, 14 to 
the Asiatic Fleet. 

Now, the numerical totals of all of those are Atlantic Fleet 224, 
Pacific Fleet 159, Asiatic Fleet 64. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, prior to May 1941, which was prior to the 
transfer of any of the ships that I have listed [2971 from the 
Pacific to the Atlantic, was the American Navy in the Pacific nu- 
merically stronger than the Japanese Navy? 

Admiral Inglis. Prior to May 1941 ? 

Mr. Gearhart. That is a date that I take from the Navy court of 
inquiry report as the date when the transfer of these ships occurred. 

Admiral Inglis. I haven't those figures readily available. Again 
will be very happy to get them for you. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, did you have the list of ships that were trans- 
ferred ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. I thought by one order and you tell me by several 
orders, to the Atlantic. 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I haven't got that readily available. 
What I have here is a list of the ships and the assignment of those 
ships to their respective fleetvS as of December 7. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I will ask the question in this way: You are 
an expert in naval affairs. If you would add to the Pacific Fleet 
on December 7, 1941, three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four 
cruisers, and nine destroyers, would you say that the American Fleet 
in the Pacific would be numerically superior to the Japanese? 

Admiral Inglis. If you will give me those figures again [^98] 
I will answer that definitely. 

Mr. Gearhart. Three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, 
and nine destroyers. 

Admiral Inglis. That would give our battleship strength in the 
Pacific Fleet as 12 opposed to 10 Japanese battleships ; aircraft car- 
riers 4 opposed to 8 Japanese aircraft carriers; 16 heavy cruisers 
as compared to 18 Japanese heavy cruisers ; 10 light cruisers as com- 
pared to 17 Japanese light cruisers ; and 63 destroyers as compared to 
109 Japanese destroyers. 

On balance I would say that the Japanese Fleet was superior to the 
Pacific Fleet with the increments which the Congressman has just 
given me. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 125 

Mr. Gearhart, So while we were inferior in May of 1941, we re- 
duced our relative position to the Japanese Navy still further, that is 
the effect of it. 

Admiral Inglis. Any transfer of ships from the Pacific Fleet 
resultino; in a reduction would, of course, result in a deterioration of 
our own position. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, where do the orders effecting a transfer from 
the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet emanate ? 

Admiral Inglis. That would be Chief of Naval Operations. Just 
what reasons would bring about those I am not prepared to say. I 
don't know whether they would come from any higher [^99] 
source or not, but the orders would be issued by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, whatever that higher authority would be the 
orders would probably come in the name of the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations ? 

Admiral Inglis. As far as the fleet is concerned that is correct, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know anything about these particular 
orders ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. May I ask counsel to endeavor to secure them? I 
would like to look at them. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the order transferring ships to the Atlantic 
Fleet in May 1941 ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Beginning in May of 1941, 

Mr. Gesell. I take it you want transfers both ways. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. If there are any transfers indicated from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific I would like to see those, too ; that is, the orders 
providing for them.^ 

The Chairman. Is that all the cross examination ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I am through; yes. 

(Tentative order of proof — Preliminary statement covering com- 
mittee procedure, submitted by Mr. Mitchell and referred to at p. 119, 
follows:) 

[300] TENTATIVE ORDER OF PROOF 

(Draft of November 7, 1945) 

Preliminary Statement Covering Committee Procedure, Relations with 
Agencies Concerned, and Introduction of Letters Exchanged — Secretaries 
Foreestal, Patterson, President Truman, Roosevelt Estate, Plus Tbuman 
Directives 

[301] The story of the actual attack and the Japanese plans for attack will 
be presented by an Army and a Navy officer, who will summarize all available 
data. The summary will be prepared under direction of counsel along the lines 
suggested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of 
opinion and questions of individual responsibility. The summary will be subject 
to amendment if proved in error through subsequent witnesses. This procedure 
will save calling scores of witnesses and will give to the committee and the public 
the first organized comprehensive account of the attack. 

A. the attack 

1. Disposition Pacific Fleet 12/7. Show in map form. 

2. Description : 

(a) Transports west of Hawaii on 12/7. 

(b) Fleet base and Oahu ground and harbor installations— J/ap. 



1 See Hearings, Part 13, pp. 5502 and 5504 et seq. for documents supplied by the Navy 
Department in this connection. 

79716 — 46— pt. 1 11 



126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(c) Harbor nets and topedo baffles. 

(d) Depth of harbor and channel. 

(e) Absence barrage balloons. 

3. Brief notes installations neighboring islands. 

4. Time differentials and distances. 

5. Detailed map showing fleet in Pearl Harbor 12/7 — 

(List of vessels — class and type.) 

Estimates of time required 12/7 to get fleet under steam and out of harbor. 

6. Reconnaissance : 

Extent of offshore reconnaissance evening 12/6. 
Extent of offshore reconnaissance morning 12/7. 
[302] Extent of inshore reconnaissance evening 12/6. 
Extent of inshore reconnaissance morning 12/7. 

Missions of all other friendly planes in air morning 12/7, including Halsej 
fliers, B-17's from the mainland, P-40's on submarine exercise, etc. 
Extent reconnaissance from neighboring islands. 

7. Radar: 

Hours operating 12/7, scheduled and actual. 
Description facilities available : 

Location. 

Range, high flight or low flight. 

Inability to distinguish friendly planes. 
Presentation of historical plot. 

Summary testimony re qualifications of operators and handling of infor- 
mation obtained before and during attack. 
Reasons ship radar not useful. 

8. Sound detectors: 

Facilities for underwater — extent operating and manned. 
Facilities for airplane spotting — extent operating and manned. 

9. Submarine contacts : 

Indicate character of any submarine patrol operating 12/7. 
Summarize reported contacts 11/27-12/6, inclusive. 

Summarize contacts morning 12/7 giving detail of messages sent to 
shore and action taken. 

10. Present account various phases of attack, working in general picture 
of defensive action taken. 

(Note Jap objectives, idications advance knowledge.) 

11. Efforts to track the Japs after attack. 

12. ////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////// 

13. Aircraft: 

Disposition planes on ground by fields at time of attack and service 
assignments. 
Number and types available. 

[303] Number and types in operating condition. 
Headlines of aircraft in operating condition. 

Note specific reasons for lack of readiness such as engines dis- 
mounted, guns dismounted, gas tanks empty, ammunition not loaded. 
Readiness of aircraft crews. 

Number and types aircraft participating in combat. 
Time required by type. 

Summarize state preparedness for combat of planes in flight time attack. 
Extent types and equipment up to date. 

14. Antiaircraft : 

Number of ship and shore units available. 
Number of ship and shore units operating condition. 
Availability ammunition and proximity to guns. 
Number ship and shore units manner and in action. 
Time required for various units. 
Defective ammunition. 
Extent gun tj-pes up to date. 

15. Brief summary work done in such departments as antisabotage, first aid, 
civilian control, canteens, etc. Heroism. 

16. The damage to United States ships, installations, and personnel (photo- 
gi-aphs and supporting statistics). 

Note extent damage self-inflicted. 
Indicate extent of sabotage, if any. 

17. The damage to the Japs. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 127 

B. THE JAP PLAN 

1. Chronology: 

Date plan completed. 

Date left port. 

Date Dec. 8 fixed. 

Date instructed carry-out plan. 
[304 1 2. Route taken to and from : 

Fix position various key days before and after attack. 

MAP — noting mileages from possible reconnaissance points, shipping 
lanes, etc. 

3. Details of execution. 

4. Projected losses compared actual losses. 

5. Sources data used in planning. 

Note. — The Jap Plan will be reconstructed from captured plans and 
statements made by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack. 

[305] Tektativ-e Order of Witnesses 

washington* 
Witness Principal subject examination 

Admiral Richardson Re Complete story of the reasons why the fleet 

was based at Pearl Harbor, his trips to Wash- 
ington in July and October, 1940, his discus- 
sions and disagreement with President Roose- 
velt and conversations with other officials, his 
relief, his part in tlie Bloch report of Decem- 
ber 30, 1940, endorsed January 7, which led to 
the Knox-Stimson correspondence, and other 
matters pertaining to his Hawaiian command. 

(At this point introduce Knox letter to Stimson dated Jan. 24, 1941, Stimson 
letter to Knox dated Feb. 7, 1941, plan for employment of long-range bombard- 
ment aviation in the defense of Oahu, Martin memo, of Aug. 20, 1941, and read 
into record excerpts from defense plans. ) 

Witness Principal subject examination 

Mr. Hamilton, formerly Chief, Re Jap negotiations, details of information 
Far Eastern Division, State a\ailable to State Department, exchange of 
Department information with Army-Navy representatives, 

and State Department attitude toward basing 
fleet Pearl Harbor. 
Captain McCollum* Re Information available Army and Navy con- 

Captain Safford* cerning Far Western developments, Jap mili- 

Colonel Bratton* tary preparations, fleet loca [3061 tion, 

etc., reports made to responsible officers. State 
Department and White House, handling of 
"magic" intercepts and distribution of messages 
generally. 
General Miles* Re Function and organization of intelligence 

Admiral Wilkinson* units ; information available to these officers 

and action taken thereon except as to events 
of 12/6 and 12/7 to be considered later ; warn- 
ings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of mes- 
sages, conferences held, agencies and persons 
consulted, action taken on replies received to 
warnings, related conferences at White House, 
Marshall-Stark joint messages on military 
situation. 
General Gerow* Re Function and organization of War Plans 

Admiral Turner* units ; information available to these officers 

and action taken thereon (except as to events 
of 12/6 and 12/7 to be considered later) ; 
warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of 
messages, conferences held, agencies and per- 
sons consulted, action taken on replies re- 
ceived to warnings, related conferences at 
White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages 
on military situation. 

♦Whenever witness will be recalled for further examination on additional subjects, this 
is indicated by asterisk. 



128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Witness 
General Arnold 
Admiral Ingersoll* 



[307] FCC monitoring report 
Commander Safford 
Commander Kramer* 
Admiral Noyes 
Colonel Bratton 
Colonel Sadtler 
Colonel Clausen 
Monitoring witnesses 

Commander Kramer 
Commander Safford 
Captain McCollum 
Admiral Turner 
Admiral Schuirmann 
Admiral Wilkinson 
Admiral Ingersoll 
Colonel Bratton 
Colonel Dusenbury 
General Miles 
General Gerow 
Colonel French 
Admiral Bearsdall 
[3081 Miss Grace Tullv 



Admiral Stark 



General Marshall 



Mr. Thomas E. Dewey 
Mr. Hull 



Mr. Stimson 



[309] Knox papers 



Principal subject examination 
Re Warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of 
messages, conferences held, agencies and i)er- 
sons consulted, action taken on replies re- 
ceived to warnings, related conferences at 
White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages 
on military situation. 
Re Winds message. Interception and decoding 
of original message giving winds code and sec- 
ond message Nov. 19. Steps then taken to 
monitor the Jap weather broadcasts. All 
available proof as to whether the "execute" 
message was ever heard or obtained. Also any 
information developed on hidden word mes- 
sages. Exhibits may include excerpts testi- 
mony of officers at various points. 
Re The events of 12/6 and 12/7 including han- 
dling of final 14-part Jap message and mes- 
sages re code burnings and 1 : 00 o'clock de- 
livery, Marshall warning message, conferences 
among Cabinet officers and others, ti'ansmis- 
sion of messages to White House and State 
Department. 



Re Presidential files. Any documents which 
may be found in the Roosevelt papers bearing 
on the Pearl Harbor situation will be intro- 
duced through Miss Tully. 

Re All events, including information available 
to him, conferences with Cabinet oflScers and 
President Roosevelt, handling of warning 
messages, extent of knowledge of impending 
attack, conferences with War Department, etc. 

Re All events, including information available to 
him, conferences with Cabinet officers and 
President Roosevelt, handling of warning mes- 
sages, extent of knowledge of impending at- 
tack, conferences with Navy Department, etc., 
and Dewey incident of 1944. 

Re Communications with General Marshall and 
any additional information available to him. 

Re All events, with particular reference to con- 
versations and meetings with President Roose- 
velt and other Cabinet officers. General Mar- 
shall and Admiral Stark, the question of bas- 
ing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, information 
available to him and handling of crucial mes- 
sages, participation in warnings, and the 
events leading up to the Nov. 26th note to the 
Japanese Government. 

Re All events, with particular reference to in- 
formation available to him, his part in the 
warning messages, and his conferences with 
President Roosevelt and Cabinet officers. 

We are advised by the Knox estate that the 
only papers which may be available are at 
the Navy Department, and this is being in- 
vestigated. 

(Note. — Throughout the testimony in this branch of the presentation, particu- 
larly that directed to high-ranking officials, a detailed inquiry will be made 



•Whenever witness •will be recalled for further examination on additional subjects, this 
is indicated by asterisk. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



129 



into just what information was available to President Roosevelt and the Depart- 
ment of State as to impending attack, and what part, if any, either took in 
giving or withholding warnings to Pearl Harbor.) 



PEARL HARBOR 

Principal subject examination 
Re Condition of Pearl Harbor defenses prior to 
Short's appointment, earlier alerts, and gen- 
eral background information. 
Re Delay construction fixed radar and additional 

airfields. 
Re All classes of information including ship lo- 
cation reports and intelligence bulletins, mes- 
sages of various classes intercepted before and 
after Dec. 7, activities of Jap consular agents, 
Mori tap, Merle Smith cable to Short, Wilkin- 
son Manila report, etc. 

Re Pearl Harbor air defense, reconnaissance, 
and all points bearing on air aspects of situa- 
tion, including details of Martin-Bellinger 
annex. 

Re Radar installations, efficiency of information 
center, adequacy of equipment and personnel. 

Re All events, including plans made to meet sur- 
prise attack, knowledge of information avail- 
able Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken 
in response to warning messages. 

Re All events, including plans made to meet sur- 
prise attack, knowledge of information avail- 
able Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken 
in response to warning messages. 

Re All events, including plans made to meet sur- 
prise attack, knowledge of information avail- 
able Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken 
in response to warning messages. 

Re All events, including plans made to meet sur- 
prise attack, knowledge of information availa- 
ble Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken 
in response to warning messages. 

[Sll] The Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I have had no occasion to say anything 
up to date. 

The Chairman. You have been very quiet, I will say that. 

Mr. Keefe. May I say, as one member of the committee, I presume 
I am correct in the assumption that the weight to be extended to the 
testimony given by these two witnesses who have testified in behalf 
of the Army and Navy will be governed by the sources of their infor- 
mation, the character of the information, whether it is of their own 
knowledge, hearsay, or what not. 

Does the Chair so understand the situation ? 

The Chairman. The committee will, of course, consider the nature 
of the testimony, the source from which it comes, and the weight to 
be given to it. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes, sir. 

Now, I understand from both the Admiral and the Colonel that you 
have heretofore testified that your evidence, in the main, is purely 
hearsay; you have no definite knowledge from personal observation 
of any of the events which occurred at Pearl Harbor immediately 
before the attack, or immediately after and that the sources of your 



Witness 
General Herron 



(To be determined) 

Captain Layton 
Commander Rochefort 
Admiral Mayfiield 
Mr. Shivers, FBI 
Colonel Fielder 
Colonel Bicknell 
Admiral McMorris 
[310] Admiral Bellinger 
General Martin 
General Davidson 

Commander Taylor 
Colonel Powell 
Colonel Phillips 
Admiral Smith 



Admiral Bloch 



General Short 



Admiral Kimmel 



130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

information are based entirely on material which you have discovered 
as a result [312] of searches made, and analyses made by those 
working for you on your respective staffs ; is that right ? 

Admiral Inglis. Speaking for the Nuvy, that is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that correct also for the Army ? 

Colonel Thielen. That is essentially correct; yes, sir. I have been 
asked a few questions on cross-examination in my professional capac- 
ity, which I answered to my own knowledge. 

Mr. Keeee. Do you qualify as an expert on all matters relating to 
the Army ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I do not. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Do you qualify as an expert on all matters relating to 
the Navy, Admiral ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So that neither of you qualify as experts in the accepted 
sense of the term "expert witnesses." 

Now, I have a few questions that I would like to ask which have 
apparently not been heretofore developed in connection with the 
cross-examination. I direct my attention first to the statement made 
by you, Admiral, to the effect that certain orders were issued declaring 
certain waters — they were issued as the result of the Executive order 
of the President — around the Hawaiian Islands to be defensive 
[SIS] borders, as I understood it. 

Admiral Inglis. That order, if that is your point, sir, was, as far 
as the Navy was concerned, contained in a general order issued by the 
Secretary of the Navy, and it defined two defiensive sea areas which 
were outlined on the chart in the course of the prepared statement. 

Mr. Keefe. Will you refer to your prepared statement and see if I 
am in error, that you referred to it as an Executive order of the 
President designating certain prohibited areas? 

Admiral Inglis. It is not in my prepared statement. I gave that ad 
lib, because general orders of that nature usually derive from Execu- 
tive orders, and I personally assumed, as I gave that statement, that 
it was derived from an Executive order. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that a mere assumption on your part ? 

Admiral Inglis. If that is a question at issue, I will be very happy 
to verify that. I still think it did derive from the Executive order. 

Mr. Keefe. You have not seen the Executive order? 

Admiral Inglis. Not recently ; no, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you ever see it ? 

Admiral Inglis. I cannot say whether I ever did or not. 

[314] Mr. I^JEEFE. Do you know the content of that order ? 

Admiral Inglis. Not now, no sir. I can look it up. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you know the date of the general order, if any was 
issued pursuant to the Executive order ? 

Admiral Inglis. Not at this time ; no, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Have you a copy of that general order in your possession 
now? 

Admiral Inglis. No. "We will get it for you, though. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, may I state, Mr. Counsel, that I would like to 
have, for purposes of identification, the Executive order issued by the 
President, if any, establishing the prohibited waters around the 
Philippine Islands. 

Mr. Gesell. The Philippine, or the Hawaiian Islands ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ^ 131 

Mr. Keefe. I mean the Hawaiian Islands. Pardon me. 

Well, if there is one relating to the Philippine Islands it might pos- 
sibly be included in the same order, I don't know. 

1 would also like to have a copy of the order issued by the Navy, 
I he general order, if such an order was in fact issued, including the 
date of that order. 

Admiral Inglis. The Navy Department will produce that.^ 

Mr. IvEEFE. Now, what is your present recollection, from the source 
of the material which you have, and which you studied, as to the 
purpose and intent of that order ^ What [old] did it gen- 
erally establish ? 

Admiral Inglis. My recollection is that it established a defensive 
sea area. It gave the boundaries of this area, and it required that no 
merchant vessels, either foreign or U. S., be permitted to proceed 
through that area, nor no foreign men-of-war be permitted to proceed 
through that area without the approval of the Secretary of the 
Navy. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you know how extensive the area was ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. That was outlined on the chart during 
yesterday's presentation. It was not very extensive. It did cover the 
approaches to Pearl Harbor and the Kaneohe air station. 

[S16] Mr. Keefe. Was that a secret order ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Was it published to the world ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am morally certain it was ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Iveefe. So foreign ships would have notice of the existence of 
such an order ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did the order provide as to what action the Navy was 
to take in the event any foreign ships entered that prohibited area? 

Admiral Inglis. I do not believe the specific action was prescribed, 
but certainly the Navy was to prevent any movement of that kind 
with all resources at its command. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Your evidence, as I recall, indicates that the Navy 
did so on the morning of December 7 before the Japanese attack. 

Admiral Inglis. That is a fair assumption. 

Mr. Keefe. In the matter of sinking the submarine by the destroyer 
Ward. 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that right ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you have, as the result of the search which you have 
conducted, any knowledge of any other ships or [317] vessels 
of any character having been sunk other than those which you have 
testified to ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. You mean prior to December 7, on or 
prior to December 7? 

Mr. Keefe. On or prior to December 7. 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now I believe you testified that the aircraft carrier 
E7iterprise on December 7 was proceeding eastward. 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Do your records indicate what that group of ships 
was composed of? 

1 Copies of the orders appear in Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1681-1686. 



132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That were escorting t\\&^ Enterprise f 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Will you identify them, please? 

Admiral Inglis. That task force consisted of the aircraft carrier 
Enterprise^ the heavy cruisers Northampton^ Chester^ Salt Lake City; 
the destroyers Batchy Mamry, Graven^ Gridley^ McGall, Dunlap^ 
Benham, Fanning^ and Ellet. The total was one aircraft carrier, three 
heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers. 

Mr. Keefe. That task force had been taking some material out to 
Wake Island? 

Admiral Inglis. It had been taking airplanes to Wake Island ; yes, 
sir. 

[SIS'] Mr. Keefe. Do I understand that the cruisers and de- 
stroyers were acting as convoys for the Enterprise? 

Admiral Inglis. The word that we used for it is "escort," sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Escort? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. The convoy is or are the ships which 
the escort escorts. 

Mr. Keefe. Pardon me. I am not very familiar with Navy prac- 
tice. The convoy is the whole works and the escort are those that 
escort the convoy ; is that right ? 

Admiral Inglis. We usually speak of a convoy as the ships to pro- 
tect. 

Mr. KJEEFE. In this case the convoy was what? The Lexington or 
the Enterprise? 

Admiral Inglis. The flagship was the Enterprise. 

Mr. Keefe. What were the ships that were being protected on 
their way along from Wake Island ? 

Admiral Inglis. In this particular case it was called a task force 
rather than either a convoy or an escort. However, I will try to 
clarify that by saying that the Enterprise 

Mr. Keefe (interposing). Let us get it right there. 

The Chairman. Let him complete the answer. 

Mr. Keefe. On the way out, when we were taking planes out to 
Wake, and other material was that a convoy? 

\319\ Admiral Inglis. We would call it a task force in that case, 
because there were no noncombatant ships in that group of ships. 

Mr. Keefe. So on both occasions then this group of ships that left 
Pearl Harbor and went out to Wake was a task force ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And it was a task force on the way back ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that correct? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes. 

Mr. KJEEFE. All right, we will strike the word "convoy" out of this 
discussion then. 

Now what time did that task force leave Wake on the way back to 
Pearl Harbor? Do your records indicate that? 

Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I cannot give you that offhand. We 
will find it. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you have available the log of the Enterprise? 

Admiral Inglis. We can get it. It may take some time, though. 
These logs are not readily available. We will try to get them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 133 

Mr. Keefe. In connection with your examination of the facts im- 
mediately before and after Pearl Harbor, did you have [320] 
access to the logs of the Enterprise f 

Admiral Inglis. The log itself was not available, but a number of 
extracts from the log were included in the court of inquiry and the 
Roberts Board report, and war diaries, things of that nature. 

Mr. Keefe, What do you mean when you say the log of the Enter- 
prise is not available? Do you mean it cannot be obtained? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I do not mean that. I mean it was not 
readily available in the time we had to conduct this research. 

Mr. Keefe. Now in order that this record may be clear — because 
I am a boy from the country and do not understand all these things — 
will you explain in the record just what the log of a ship is supposed 
to contain? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes. 

The log of a ship in the Navy consists in general of two types of 
information. One is contained in columns which tabulate meteorolog- 
ical data such as temperature, humidity, height of the barometer, such 
data as the speed which the ship is making, the number of miles, nau- 
tical miles that have been steamed during each hour of the day, the 
drills that have been held, the ship's position at 8 o'clock in the morn- 
ing, at noon, and at 8 p. m. 

Then the other classification is under the term "remarks," [321] 
and the remarks in the log contain a journal of events of interest, and 
those are divided into the various watches, that is the midwatch is from 
midnight to 4 a. m., the morning watch from 4 a. m. to 8 a. m., and so 
forth. 

The watch officer, the officer of the deck, signs in person the remarks, 
or the diary pertinent to his particular watch. That signature is also 
taken as an authentication of the corresponding data which appears 
in the columns, such as the meteorological data and the speed and 
mileage that the ship has covered. 

Mr. IvEEFE. Does the log ordinarily contain information as to orders 
received b}^ the ship ? 

Admiral Inglis. The log would probably contain the briefest sort 
of reference to the reason for the ship getting under way. I do not 
think for the purposes of this comimittee that would be particularly 
v^aluable, because it usually is couched something like this : 

"In accordance with signal from division commander got under 
way and stood out of the harbor." 

That would not give the source of the division commander's order. 

Mr. Keefe. Would it contain information, for example, as to when 
a flight of scout bombers or planes left the deck of a ship ? 

[o^^l Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Would it contain memoranda as to any orders relating 
to the conduct of those planes after they left the ship ? 

Admiral Inglis. Will you repeat that question? 

Mr. Keefe. Read the question, please. 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Admiral Inglis. In general; no, sir. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Then if the Enterprise, either on the 6th of December 
1941, as it proceeded from Wake to Pearl Harbor, toward Pearl 
Harbor, or on the early morning of the 7th of December, had escort 
planes in the air patrolling the area ahead of this task force, would 
that information be found in the log of the Enterprise? 



134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. I would expect tlie information as to the time 
and number of planes which were launched would appear in the log; 
also the time and the number of planes which returned to the ship 
would appear in the log, and probably a brief word or two about the 
mission of those planes would appear in the log. 

[■3£3] Mr. I^EFE. Would the log also indicate whether those 
planes were armed or unarmed ? 

Admiral Inglis. Under those circumstances, on December 6 and 7, 1 
would be inclined to think that it would not contain that information. 

Mr. Keefe. I have indicated, I believe, that I would like to have the 
log of the Enterprise available.^ 

Well, now, you testified, as I recall, in your general statement as it 
appears in our record of the testimony, page 72, that in addition to 
regular scheduled reconnaissance flights, the U. S. S. Enterprise 200 
miles west of Pearl Harbor launched scout bombers armed with ma- 
chine guns shortly after 6 a. m. which searched to the eastward ahead of 
the ship, an arc of 110° to a distance of 150 miles. 

Where did you get that information ? 

Admiral Inglts. That information was taken from the action report 
of the Enterprise, and from various other original sources. I would 
hazard a guess that some of that came from the interrogation of the 
pilots on those planes. 

Mr. Keefe. You say the action report of the Enterprise. What is 
that? 

Admiral Inglis. "W^ienever a ship of the Navy is in action involving 
any shooting, the commanding officer is required to submit a report of 
the action, which contains numerous details, [■^^•^1 such as the 
number of rounds of ammunition fired, the damage to his own ship, the 
estimated damage to the enemy, a narrative of the events. 

Mr. Keefe. Was the Enterp7ise in action that morning at 6 a.m.? 

Admiral Inglis. Her planes were in action at that time. 

Mr. ICeefe. In action against whom ? 

Admiral Inglis. Against the Japanese planes that attacked Pearl 
Harbor. Not at 6 o'clock, but in the course of that flight. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, but, my dear sir, let us make this clear. The 
attack on Pearl Harbor occurred at 7 : 55, according to your testimony. 
These ships left the Enterprise, these planes, according to your testi- 
mony, shortly after G a. m., nearly 2 hours before the attack on Pearl 
HarlDor. They certainly were not engaged in any action at that time, 
were they, against the Japs ? 

Admiral Inglis. They were engaged in action against the Japs 
sometime after 7 : 45 and before they landed at Ewa Field at times 
varying from 9 : 15 to 10 : 15, which I believe were the figures. 

Mr. Keefe. When they left the Enterprise, they were equipped and 
ready for action, were they not, at 6 o'clock [3^5] that 
morning ? 

Admiral Inglis. I think that is a fair assumption, because they were 
firing at Japanese planes on their way into Ewa landing field. 

Mr. Keefe. You stated in your general statement that they were 
armed. 

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And after leaving the Enterprise they were supposed to 
proceed on and land at Ewa ; is that right ? 

1 The log of the U. S. S. Enterprise was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit 
No. 101. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 135 

Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. As they were coming east that morning, and finally 
came over the island, they engaged the Japs who were then attacking 
Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Inglis. That is the story as I have it ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you deduce from any of the information you have 
been able to obtain, that the commander of that task force had any 
knowledge that there was likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor that 
morning at 6 o'clock? 

Achniral Inglis. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Where is the action report of the Enterprise? Have you 
seen it? 

Admiral Inglis. It is now in the archives and records of the Navy 
Department. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Have you seen it ? 

[3£6-7] May I ask, Mr. Mitchell, that that action report of the 
Enterp?'ise be produced? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. For use in connection with this examination. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.^ 

Mr. Keefe. Now, may I ask you this question : 

So far as the world knew, and the people of America knew, and so 
far as the records show, this country was at peace with Japan at 6 
o'clock on the morning of the Tth day of December; was it not? 

Admiral Inglis. I cannot speak for the people of the world, but 
speaking for myself, that was my impression, that we were technically 
at peace ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. We were technically at peace? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that the way you want to say it ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is the way I want to say it, because with a 
task force approaching Pearl Harbor for the purpose of making a sur- 
prise attack on the Navy and Army at that location, I would say it 
was highly technical. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Do your records disclose, in the action report 
of the Enterprise^ as to why these planes were launched in making 
reconnaissance on the morning of the Tth at 6 o'clock? 

\328'\ Admiral Inglis. I am advised that the purpose given 
was routine flight training. 

Mr. Keefe. Routine flight training? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir ; I hope you will not try to pin me down 
too closely on that, because I am really not too well informed. 

Mr. Keefe. Very well ; we will try to go into that maybe at the time 
when Admiral Halsey, or someone who was on the job, testifies to it, 
perhaps. 

Then, am I to understand that so far as the information available 
that you have from the record, the log of the Enterprise, the action 
report of the Enterprise^ or whatever record you may have examined, 
or your researchers may have examined, that while we were technically 
at peace at 6 o'clock on the morning of the Tth day of December, the 
Enterprise, returning as part of the task force from Wake Island 
with the ships which you have described and enumerated, did have out 



^ The action report of the U. S. S. Enterprise was subsequently admitted to the record as 
Exhibit No. 103. 



136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in front of that task force a patrol of planes, 18 scout bombers fully 
armed, ready for action ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And that those bombers, as they proceeded east, learned 
of the attack at 7 :50, and proceeded then to Pearl Harbor and engaged 
the enemy ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding, yes, sir. 

[S£8a:] Mr. Keefe. Is that right? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Ml". Keefe. Now, then, at 7:55 when this attack came on Pearl 
Harbor, where do j^ou locate this task force of Admiral Halsey 
specifically? 

Admiral Inglis. Two hundred miles west of Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Keefe. Directly west ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Now, there was another task force, was there not, in which was in- 
cluded the aircraft carrier Lexington^ 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. AVho was in command of that escort ? 

Admiral Inglis. Admiral John Henry Newton. 

Mr. Keefe. Where was that task force on the 6th of December 1941 ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have that as 460 miles from Midway, en route to 
Midway. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, where was it with respect to Pearl Harbor, and 
with respect to Halsey's task force? 

Admiral Inglis. Will you get the other chart. No. 1, giving the 
disposition of the task fleet ? 

I make it as roughly, 350 miles, a little north of west [329] 
of Admiral Halsey's Task Force 8. 

Mr. Keefe. Will you point on the map, just for the purpose of 
observation, about where the Halsey task force was, and where the 
Newton task force was. 

Admiral Inglis. There is Task Force 12, that blue dot, at which 
Commander Biard is pointing. And then he is going to draw his 
wand in the direction immediately south of east to Task Force 8. I 
just made a very hasty estimate here of the distance between the two, 
and it comes out about 350 miles. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Now the task force commanded by Admiral Newton was on the 
way to Wake Island, was — or Midway ? 

Admiral Inglis. Midway. 

Mr. Keefe. Midway ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. To deliver certain Marine planes ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. To Midway ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Will you enumerate the ships that composed the task 
force commanded by Admiral Newton ? 

Admiral Inglis. The ships were the aircraft carrier Lexington^ 
the heavy cruisers Chicago^ Portland and Astoria [330] and 

destroyers Porter, Drayton, Flusser, Lamson, and Mahan. A total of 
one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, nine 
altogether. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 137 

Mr, Keefe. Do you have any information as to whether recon- 
naissance was conducted by Admiral Newton by the use of planes ? 

Admiral Inglis. The evidence on that, Mr. Congressman, is a little 
bit — in fact, it is very vague. In the testimony of Admiral Newton 
I believe he said that planes were out scouting, but he did not say 
what planes they were. They may have been planes from the Lexing- 
ton^ or they may have been planes from the heavy cruisers. 

There is also something to indicate that the Lexington carried a 
heavy deck load of these Marine planes, which cluttered up her flight 
deck, making the launching of planes difficult. 

Mr. Keefe. I want to clear this situation up if I can. 

On page 179 of the testimony which you gave yesterday, under cross 
examination by Senator Ferguson, referring to the Lexington group 
under the command of Admiral Newton, Senator Ferguson asked you 
this question : 

Do you know whether they did any reconnaissance? 
Your answer was : 

I understand, because of the additional Marine Corps planes on board, the 
flight deck was so cluttered \_S31 ] that they were not able to launch any. 
Senator Ferguson. So there was no reconnaissance from that? 
Admiral Inglis. Not from the Lexington. 

Is that your testimony? 

Admiral Inglis. I presume it is, sir; and that was my understand- 
ing yesterday. My attention was invited last night to 

Mr. Keefe (interposing). Well, that 

Mr. Gesell. Wait a minute. Congressman. Let him finish. 

Admiral Inglis. Because of this cross examination of Senator Fer- 
guson's, my staif attempted to look this matter up a little more thor- 
oughly, and the best they could give me this morning was there was 
some doubt as to just what planes there were in the air. So I would 
prefer Admiral Newton to answer that. 

Mr. Keefe. After you so testified, Admiral — which, of course, I 
understand you are testifying just from your recollection of the ma- 
terial and papers and files, so on and so forth — you were not there, 
and necessarily you have no personal recollection of it. 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. As a matter of fact, when you got through your testi- 
mony yesterday, some of your staff called your at- \^332'\ tention 
to the testimony of Admiral Newton himself given before Admiral 
Hewitt, did they not? 

Admiral Inglis. I am not sure to whom the testimony was given, 
but that is correct, sir. 

Mr, Keefe. I now call your attention to the testimony of Admiral 
Newton himself given before Admiral Hewitt in the so-called Hewitt 
investigation which appears on page 318, questions 29, 30, and 31 on 
that page. This question was asked of Admiral Newton by Admiral 
Hewitt : 

Do you recall having any particular concern over the fact that the mission was 
advancing your course over 1,000 miles towards Japan? 

Answer. I consider that I was going into waters that had not been fre- 
quented by our ships for some time, and there might be more danger from sub- 
marines than we had considered in the past. I set a speed of 17 knots in daylight, 
and zigzagging. I also had scouting flights made by planes to cover our 
advance. 

Did you read that testimony of Admiral Newton himself ? 



138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. That was invited to my attention either late last 
night or early this morning, the very selection you just read. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Then, as a matter of fact, whether the planes came 
from the flight deck of the Lexington^ the \333\ carrier, or 
whether they came from some other ship that was part of that task 
force, the record, as given in the testimony of Admiral Newton himself, 
said that he had not only scout planes covering his advance, but that 
also because he was in waters that our ships had not theretofore been 
traveling for some time, zigzagging his ships to avoid possible attack 
by submarines. 

Did you gather that from the testimony ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir ; that is precisely what the testimony says. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, then, what submarines would be liable to 
attack at that time ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am afraid that is a conjectural question which I 
am not prepared to answer. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I would like, for a moment, to address my re- 
marks to the Colonel, and I would like to have placed back on the easel 
that map or plot showing the — 

Colonel Thielen. The radar, sir? 

Mr. Keefe. The radar chart. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a ques- 
tion while the testimony is waiting ? 

Mr. Keefe. A question of whom ? 

Mr. Murphy. The gentleman from Wisconsin. 

Mr. Keefe. You want to ask me a question? 

\33Ii\ Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. 

I wonder if the gentleman is reading from the Hewitt report, or 
the Hart report ? 

Mr. Keefe. When I said Hewitt I meant Hart. Will you correct 
the record ? I am reading from the Hart report. 

Mr. Murphy. That is not the Hewitt report at all. It is page 318 
of the Hart report. 

Mr. Iveefe. Thank you very much for your diligence in correcting 
me. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire as to the date of 
the Hart report? 

Mr. I^EFE. It is dated February 12, 1941, to June 15, 1944. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it the report or the testimony ? 

Mr. Kj:efe. It is testimony in the hearing conducted by Admiral 
Hart. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to correct the record in any way, 
making it show it is testimony rather than report % 

Mr. Keefe. Well, it is all included. The testimony is included in 
the report. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, can I inquire whether or not 
Admiral Hart filed a report ? 

The Chairman. Does the Congressman know whether he {SSd'X 
did or not? 

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest it would be better to call it the Hart 
record. 

Mr. Gesell. I think the confusion comes because the transcript, 
which is the record, is called the report. As I undeirstand it, that is 
the reason for the confusion. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 139 

Mr. Keefe. That is what I have understood it to be. In reading 
references to it in other parts of these very voluminous records, it is 
referred to as the Hart report. 

In this report, of course, is contained the testimony of innumerable 
witnesses, and I quoted from the testimony of Admiral Newton. 

Now, I call your attention particularly to this chart. I will get 
over here so I can see it myself. My eyesight is not good. 

As I understood from your testimony, colonel, this streak that you 
have indicated on the exhibit 

Is this going to be an exhibit? The record will not be very good, 
because the record will not show what I am pointing to unless we 
have it as an exhibit. 

The ChxVirman. It is an exhibit that has been submitted to all of 
us here, which is not in color. 

Mr. Keefe. What is the number of the exhibit? Army exhibit 
No. 10. 

[3S6] Mr. JSIiTCHELL. That is going to be offered. 

Colonel Thielex. That is page 8 of the Army exhibit, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Just so the record will indicate what we are talking 
about. 

[337] Mr. MuKPHY. May I suggest that is the exhibit that has 
been verified by Colonel Murphy. 

Mr. Keefe. And further authenticated by Congressman Murphy. 
That ought to make it unanimous. 

At least here is a map blown up, as you testified, from an Army 
exhibit, showing what I understood you to say was information that 
was obtained from this mobile radar unit located, on the morning of 
the 7th of November, up here at Opana, is that right ? 

Colonel Thielen. The 7th of December, sir. Otherwise your 
statement is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now these dots in the center starting at 
7 : 02 and going down through 7 : 39, 7 : 40, 7 : 43, indicate a flight of 
planes coming in ? 

Colonel Thielex. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Coming in Pearl Harbor? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. IvEEFE. Is that right ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And that is taken from the chart made out there at this 
radar detecting apparatus, is that right ? 

Colonel Thielen. I do not know exactly how that record was made. 
We have it as an authorized record of the plot of the Opana radio 
station, signed by the assistant signal [S3S] officer of the Ha- 
waiian Department. 

Mr. Keefe. "V^Hiat are these dots over here on the purple arrow point- 
ing toward the island ? Wliat do they indicate ? 

Colonel Thielen. Those are plots which were made at the times 
indicated by the Opana station. 

Mr. IvEEFE. W^ell, the times of those are 6 : 45, 6 : 48, 6 : 51, so on and 
so forth. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. There is no implication that those were 
Japanese planes. 



140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. They may have been our own planes, so far as the evi- 
dence shows ? 

Colonel Thielen. They may have been. 

[3S9] Mr. Keefe. There is no evidence to show what those planes 
were then ? 

Colonel Thielen. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Keefe. I notice also, to the left of the large purple arrow point- 
ing toward the island, two streaks, with an arrow pointing in the 
opposite direction, and two times indicated, 10 : 39 and 10 : 27. 

What does that arrow indicate ? 

Colonel Thielen. That is taken from the plot. That was indicated 
on the plot as an arrow. The clear arrow is an attempt to reproduce 
the arrow shown on the basic document, an original of which was 
offered to the committee yesterday afternoon. 

Mr. Keefe. My question related to this arrow to the left. What 
does that indicate? 

Colonel Thielen. It is the blue arrow. I am explaining the blue 
arrow which lies within the purple arrow. That is the arrow formed 
by the mask which was placed over the purple arrow. 

Mr. Keefe. I am talking about the arrow which has to the left of it 
the time 10 : 39 and 10 : 27. What does that arrow indicate ? 

Colonel Thielen. It indicates a plot. That is the way it was given 
on the document from which that exhibit was taken, l^^O^ as 
an arrow rather than as a succession of pips. 

Mr. Keefe. Does that indicate, if the pips were on here, would it 
indicate planes flying away from the island? 

Colonel Thielen. It appears to indicate one or more aircraft flying 
away from the island. 

Mr. Keefe. Why aren't the pips on here the same as on the other 
arrow ? 

Colonel Thielen. I can't answer that. That is the way it was on the 
original. 

Mr. Keefe. At least, so far as your testimony is concerned, then, the 
arrow to which I have referred which is pointed toward the top of the 
exhibit, and to the left of which appears the times 10 : 39 and 10 : 27, 
refers to planes that were leaving the island ? 

Colonel Thielen. Two or more planes. 

Mr. Keefe. Going away? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, then, I would like to know this : In your examina- 
tion of the files relating to this aircraft attack on Pearl Harbor, did 
you find a record of the transmission to any authority in the island of 
the planes as they left? 

Cglonel Thielen. There is no such statement in my testimony nor 
did I encounter any such statement in any other testimony. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you know whether or not the records [34^] 
contain information furnished from this mobile unit which was ulti- 
mately given to the authorities out there at Pearl Harbor which indi- 
cated the flight of planes away from the island ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. All I know about the outgoing flight is 
that it appeared on the historical plot, so-called. 

Mr. Keefe. And you have no knowledge as to when that informa- 
tion appearing on the historical plot may have been given to the 
authorities on the island ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 141 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir ; I have no such information. 

Mr. Keefe. Have you ever checked the records to ascertain whether 
there was in fact any such transmittal of information as to this out- 
going flight ? 

Colonel Thielen. I have not personally done so. I know that this 
whole Opana station question was gone into very thoroughly by the 
researchers working with me. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, from your knowledge and the information gained 
from your gleanings of this material that you went over and that your 
researchers went over, could you say whether or not when information 
was obtained at this mobile station whether that information was 
transmitted to the commanding officer. General Short, or anybody else 
in command out there at that time? 

Colonel Thielen. It divides itself into two parts, sir. I have testi- 
fied concerning that long inward plot which starts [^4^] at 
7 : 02, which was reported to the watch officer at Fort Shaf ter, and I 
have further testified that the watch officer took no action in that con- 
nection. 

Mr. Keefe. Well now, in order that I might be perfectly clear, I 
understood that this particular radar station had shut down some time 
after 7 o'clock. 

Colonel Thielen. I didn't say that, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, was it in continuous operation all during the 
attacks ? 

Colonel Thielen. The plot indicates that it was in operation from 
7 : 02 to 7 : 43. We have the testimony of Lieutenant Tyler that when 
he received notification of the attack at 8 o'clock he recalled all radar 
personnel to their stations. Whether they actually so returned or not 
I do not know. What happened after 8 o'clock I have only the knowl- 
edge indicated by the plot which we have been discussing. 

Mr. Keefe. Then the historical plot which gives you the information 
that certain planes were spotted leaving the island, certainly would 
indicate that that radar station was in operation at the times indicated 
on the exhibit, 10 :39 and 10 :27? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; that would so indicate. 

Mr. Kj:efe. So if this station was in operation at 10 : 39 and 10 : 27 
and picked up flights of planes, one or more, [343] leaving the 

island, going away, would that information normally have been im- 
mediately transmitted to General Short's office, or somebody in com- 
mand on that island? 

Colonel Thielen. It would unquestionably have been transmitted 
as far as the information center in order that the proper action could 
be taken by the Air Forces. Whether or not it would have come to 
General Short's personal attention or not I can't say. 

Mr. Keefe. The plotting also indicates the direction that those 
planes were taking and the distance they were away at the time the 
radar picked them up. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So if they had had the information they would have 
known that these returning planes were flying away from the island 
in this direction, would they not? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And the task forces at sea, both of them were out there 
for the purpose of going into action, weren't they ? 

79716 — 46— pt. 1 12 



142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Thielen. They were out there for that purpose? 

Mr. Keefe. You can't answer that. You are from the Army. 
Pardon me. 

Do you know whether or not in the search of your records and all 
of the material that came to your attention — radar [W] be- 
ing on land under the control and jurisdiction of the Army and the 
Navy not having any land-based radar — do you know whether or not 
there are any records available as to when General Short's office, or 
anybody else in command, was notified of this plot showing these 
planes leaving the island ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I have no such information. I should, 
however, like to point out in this connection that we have no definite 
information that those were hostile planes. 

The Chairman. Are you through, Mr. Keefe? 

Mr. Keefe. Just a moment, please. 

I would like to ask the Admiral, if I may. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you have available — strike that out. 

Colonel, may I have your attention a moment, please. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. There has been offered the duly certified record of the 
plotting of these planes, an instrument which is certified to by Lieu- 
tenant Murphy — Lieutenant Colonel, I guess 

Senator Brewstek. Mr. Chairman, I think that should be offered. 
I understood it was. 

Mr. Keefe. I would like to have it identified and offered in evidence 
now. 

Mr, Murphy. That will be Exhibit 4, Mr. Chairman. 

[34-5] The Chairman. This is the one that was asked for yester- 
day and obtained. It was not put in the record as an exhibit. 

Mr. Keefe. Will you have it identified as an exhibit? 

Mr. Mitchell. We will make it Exhibit 4 and offer it in evidence. 
Exhibit 4 will be this chart showing the plotting by the radar station 
at Opana on the morning of December 7. That is enough, isn't it, 
Colonel? 

Colonel Thielen. That is a sufficient description. 

Mr. Mitchell, Exhibit No. 4, Mr. Congressman. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 4.") 

Mr. Keefe. Now, Colonel, this exhibit 4 is supposed to be a correct 
record. I note that you have, in preparing the big chart which has 
been exhibited to the committee, you have left off two words that 
appear in red ink opposite the numbers giving the time 10 : 39 and 
10:27, the words being "enemy return." 

Did you see those? 

Colonel Thielen. I did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Who put that on there ? 

Colonel Thielen. Presumably Lieutenant Colonel Murphy. May 
I explain the omission from this chart at this time? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Colonel Thielen. In addition to the words "enemy return" appears 
a question mark. I have deliberately omitted from ['346] my 
testimony all questionable material. 

Mr. Keefe. That is why it was left out ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 143 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. I would like to point out that on the exhibit which Ave 
have f)repared to offer the words "enemy return" and the question 
mark appear. Item 7 of the Army exhibit. 

Mr. Keefe. We have offered this and this shows the same thing. 
This is the original. 

That is all of this witness. I want to talk for a moment to the 
admiral. 

Do you have a printed phamphlet known as, I think it is 2CL-41, 
a certain security order ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is in the arcliives of the Navy Department. 
We haven't got it at hand but again we will produce it. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, in preparing your statement for the Navy did you 
examine this security order issued by Admiral Kimmel ? 

Admiral Inglis. My staff did ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Are you f amaliar with what it contains ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir, not personally. 

Mr. Keefe. Beg pardon? 

Admiral Inglis. I am not personally familiar with that document. 

[347'] 1 have just been informed by my helper here that he did 
look at that and decided that it was outside of the scope of the outline 
handed to us. 

Mr, Keefe. Well, it related, did it not, to the manner in which these 
ships were to be berthed and moored in the harbor at Pearl Harbor for 
security purposes ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman, I am not familiar 
with the order. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I am sorry that in making your presentation you 
have omitted this very, very important and highly important matter. 

Mr. Gesell. It is controversial. 

Mr. Keefe. Is there anything controversial about it, Mr. Gesell ? Is 
there anything controversial about the fact that such an order was 
issued ? It is a printed order. 

Mr. Gesell. If that is the order that has to do with the disposition 
of vessels in the harbor, so as to effect the maximum antiaircraft oppo- 
sition, and matters of that sort — we felt that should be taken up with 
the officers who ordered the disposition of the fleet so they could give 
their reason and explain what was done, when it was done, and why 
it was done. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, the order was issued by Admiral Kimmel, wasn't 
it? 

[348] Mr. Gesell. I believe so. 

Mr. Keefe. And, which I understand is in a printed pamphlet, al- 
though I haven't been able to get it yet. As a member of the 
committee I am interested in it. 

Mr. Gesell. We have it ; if you ask for it we will be glad to give 
it to you. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, we are going to ask for a lot of things as we go 
along in this matter, and maybe we will get them. We hope so. 

I am now making the request that I be furnished with this order. 
And are there additional copies available so that the committee may 
have copies ? 



144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. I believe it is a printed order. Therefore there should 
be copies. 

Mr. Keefe. There shouldn't be anything controversial about the 
fact. Here is an order which is printed. What could be contro- 
versial about it ? 

Mr. Gesell. Are you asking me, Mr. Congressman ? 

Mr. Keefe. You said it was controversial. 

Mr. Gesell. The question of why it was ordered and who it was 
ordered by is controversial. 

Mr. Keefe. So that I may understand, wasn't it an order issued 
by Admiral Kimmel? 

Mr. Geseix. I so understand. 

[349] Mr. Keefe. Then there is nothing controversial. 

Mr. Gesell. As to the content of the order, I take it not. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you discuss that matter, Admiral, with our 
counsel ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; not personally. This is the first time I 
ever heard of it. 

The Chairman. The Chair will ask counsel to attempt to secure 
sufficient copies of that printed order to furnish each member with a 
copy. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, a couple of other questions. 

You gave some testimony as to the reconnaissance of planes around 
the Fourteenth Naval District. That includes Wake, doesn't it; 
Midway, Johnston ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, there were 12 PBY's that left Pearl Harbor on 
the 30th of November, were there not ? 

Admiral Inglis. My presentation did not go back before the 6tli 
of December in that connection. 

]\Ir. Kf^fe. So you have no knowledge of that ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

[360] Mr. Keefe. You didn't make any examination of any- 
thing prior to the Cth of December? 

Admiral Inglis. Not in connection with reconnaissance; no, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So you are not in position to testify as to any recon- 
naissance that took place on the 5th or 4th or any other time except 
the 6th and 7th ; is that right? 

Admiral Inglis. That is right. 

Mr. Keefe. That is all. 

The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask a question or two. 

In regard to this map — will you put that radar map back, the one 
that was just there? I guess Colonel Thielen can answer this question. 

This long purple line in the center indicating an arrow, as far as 
the radar is concerned, shows the direction in which planes were flying? 

Colonel Thielen. That is a graphical representation which we made 
to indicate that fact. 

The Chairman. That arrow indicates what was recorded from 2 
minutes after until 7 : 30 ; is that correct ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. The white squares actually indicate 
that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 145 

The Chairmax. Those white squares were put in to indicate 
[351] the time that synchronizes with the particular portion of 
that arrow ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. More accurately, the white squares are 
the basic data. They represent the plots which were made. The pur- 
ple arrow was added to indicate, make it more graphic to the com- 
mittee, the direction of the attack. 

The Chairman. In other words, the purple arrow, the long purple 
arrow, indicates incoming planes? 

Colonel Thielen. For the purpose of that attack ; yes sir. 

The Chairman. Yes. I understand you to say that there is nothing 
on the plot, as you call it, which indicates whether they were friendly 
or hostile planes? 

Colonel Thielen. That is correct. 

The Chairman. How close would they have to get to the point of 
attack before those in charge of the radar station would know whether 
or not they were enemy or fi'iendly planes ? 

Colonel Thielen. As I understand the development of radar at 
that time there would be no indication whatsoever purely by radar. 
It would have to be either by visual recognition, or by an identification 
signal sent out by the plane radio independent of the radar. 

[352] The Chairman. Now, some question has been raised about 
these radar operators remaining at this Opana station after 7 o'clock, 
in view of the fact that their duty required them to stay until only 7 
o'clock. Would you be able to say from the records, whether the 
reason they remained there was because the truck was late, or whether 
they wanted to get some more training. 

Colonel Thielen. Well, it appears to me immaterial why. They 
had the option of resting while the truck arrived, or actually contin- 
uing to conduct training. They took the latter alternative. 

The Chairman. Some importance seems to be attached to the fact 
that the truck was late, and I am wondering whether, if the truck had 
been on time, if they would have been there between 7 : 02 and 7 : 39 
and would have made these records which you have exhibited. 

Colonel Thielen. I don't think anybody could answer that. 

The Chairman. That is speculative. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And while they were waiting for the truck they 
decided to operate a little ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. They showed commendable zeal. 

The Chairman. The small purple arrow pointing the other 
[353] way indicating the direction of the planes being at 10 : 27 — 
is it? 

Colonel Thielen, Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And going down to 10:39 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is 12 minutes. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Which was nearly an hour after the attack had 
ceased, as I understand it from your testimony, the attack having been 
over at 9:45. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. So, if that is a correct representation of the flight 
of enemy planes — which could still be unidentified, I suppose, so far as 
the radar was concerned 



146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Thielen. Even more likely because of the range — the range 
is greater. 

The Chairman. That would have indicated that 45 minutes or an 
hour, 45 minutes approximately, after the attack was over, the de- 
parture of these planes was caught on the instrument at that time? 

Colonel Thielen. An outgoing flight was picked up. 

The Chairman, Now, I don't know whether you testified, Colonel, 
or whether the admiral testified yesterday, stating that on the 6th of 
December there were no searches made by [354] airplanes 
from Pearl Harbor ; is that true ? 

Admiral Inglis. My testimony was that we had no written record of 
any searches. 

The Chairman. No record — no written record of any searches, and 
that is limited to the searches that would have been made from Pearl 
Harbor as a base, is it ? The reason I ask, on your item No. 10, which 
is the reproduction of that map there [indicating] in your black space, 
you say "Air searches flown in Hawaiian area." Then you have in that 
diagonal square, "6th of December, 1941," indicating that in that square 
there was some air flight in progress. Was that the airplanes from 
the Enterprise? 

[355] Admiral Inglis. Those were the airplanes from the En- 
terprise. My statement that there was no written record of any recon- 
naissance flights applied to shore-based planes, but there were aircraft 
in flight from the Enterprise., as shown on the diagonal stripes. 

The Chairman. So that there is no contradiction between your 
statement yesterday that there were no flights from shore bases on the 
6th of December and this indication that from the Enterprise., which 
was 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, that there were these flights 
participated in by the 18 planes that attacked from it? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir; no contradiction. 

The Chairman. All right. Now, at the time that these planes took 
off from the Enterprise in what direction was it going? 

Admiral Inglis. The Enterprise was traveling almost due east. 

The Chairman. Toward Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Inglis. Toward Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairman. Now, in what direction was the Lexington 
traveling ? 

Admiral Inglis. The Lexington was going a little north of west — 
a little north and west. 

The Chairman. Toward 

\S56] Admiral Inglis. Midway. 

The Chairman. Midway? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes. 

The Chairman. And they were about how far apart ? 

Admiral Inglis. At the time of the attack, as we have just brought 
out, they were approximately 350 miles apart and rapidly drawing 
further apart. 

The Chairman. Yes. One of them was going northwest and the 
other coming east ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 147 

The Chairman. Yes, Well, now, do the records from which you 
have taken your statement and upon which your statement is based 
indicate whether these planes that were armed, apparently, when they 
left the deck of the Enterprise had any knowledge of an attack or 
impending attack at Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Inglis. The record is completely negative in that respect 
and I would certainly assume that the pilots had no knowledge of that 
at all. 

The Chairman. Now, let me ask you about these planes that left 
Hamilton Field, is it, San Francisco, Hamilton Field? That, I be- 
lieve, is the colonel's statement ; it is in the colonel's statement. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. At what time did you say they left on the [357'\ 
night of the 6th? 

Colonel Thielen. 9 :30 p. m. the 6th December. 

The Chairman. 9 :30 p. m. ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Unarmed and without radar, as you said? 

Colonel Thielen. Unarmed ; presumably without radar. 

The Chairman. And probably having radio sets? 

Colonel Thielen. Probably, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Probably, but you have no positive evidence on that 
score ? 

Colonel Thielen. No positive evidence. It would be extremely 
unlikely that they did not have. 

The 'Chairman. They were headed for the Philippine Islands but 
were to stop at Hawaii for what purpose — for refueling or do you 
know ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that would unquestionably be one of 
the purposes of the stop. 

The Chairman. Yes. And when they got there they found this 
attack in progress, is that right ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

The Chairman. And being unarmed they had no facilities with 
which to engage very effectively in the battle, did they ? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. They all attempted to land. 

[358^ The Chaikvian. They all attempted to land? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes. 

The Chairman. And some of them were destroyed in that process ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Your testimony, the testimony of both of you 
gentlemen has been referred to here as hearsay evidence. I suppose 
that you knew when you were asked to present this chronological nar- 
rative or physical narrative of what happened out there, not being 
there yourself, understood that you were not to testify from personal 
knowledge but from records that you were able to obtain in these 
various departments and that there is no misunderstanding that what 
you were to say here is, technically speaking from the standpoint of 
a lawyer, hearsay evidence. 

Is that true, Admiral? 

Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that yours also? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that is my understanding. 



148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Of course, as a matter of law we all understand 
what you do not see yourself and testify about is legally referred to as 
hearsay, and there was no misunderstanding about that. Nobody ex- 
pected it to be anything else, so far as I know. 

[3S9] Is that your understanding of it? 

Admiral Inglis. That was my understanding, yes, sir. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I think that is all I want to ask him. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I did neglect to ask one or two ques- 
tions that I had in mind, that I would like to complete if I may do 
so at this time. 

The Chairman. Yes, Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Colonel, I would like to ask you this : How many fixed 
antiaircraft batteries were there on Oahu at the time of this attack? 

Colonel Thielen. That will take a little counting, sir. There 
were a good many of them and in the Army exhibit, section 1, page 
1 — or, rather, beginning on page 2, we have a list of Coast Artillery 
units. In general this could be narrowed down to the gun, I am sure, 
and made very accurate with a little further study, but, in general, 
units other than the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery JRegiment — the six 
batteries at Schofield Barracks and the seven batteries at Camp 
Malakole — all of those other yellow squares situated at Fort Weaver, 
at Fort De Russy and Fort Ruger and at Black Point, which is down 
at the top of Diamond Head, are fixed batteries situated to protect 
the coastal defenses, the seacost defense guns in that sector, 

[360] Mr. Keefe. Now, how many mobile batteries were there 
on the island that day ? 

Colonel Thielen. The only fully mobile unit was the Sixty-fourth — 
let me check that — the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery 
Kegiment which would contain 3 batteries having 3 gun batteries, a 
total of 9 — well, wait a minute; the Third Battalion, with semiauto- 
matic weapons, has 4 batteries. That would give us 10 full mobile 
batteries. 

The seanimobile armaments had three Coast Artillery regiments 
with weapons which could be transported but for which the prime 
movers, as we call them, the trucks to tow them, were not available 
in sufficient quantity to move the entire regiment at one time. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I assume in making up your statement you had 
opportunity to and did read the Army Board's report? 

Colonel Thielen. I read it, sir, not as closely as did my researchers. 
I read it not with the idea of extracting anything but for the purpose 
of acquainting myself with the background. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Who was General Burgin? 

Colonel Thielen. General Burgin commanded the Hawaiian Coast 
Artillery Command, which embraced two major divisions, the seacoast 
regiments and the antiaircraft regiments. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, on the morning of December 7, [361] 1941, 
when the attack took place, how many of these fixed batteries were 
ready for action? 

Colonel Thielen. I believe that that could be figured out. May I 
invite your attention to section 7 of the Army exhibit, from which 
we can probably deduce those facts ? None, of course, were loaded. 

Mr. Keefe. None were loaded? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 149 

Mr, Keefe. Was the ammunition available? 

Colonel Thielen. The ammunition was, in general, in boxes at 
the position. 

Mr. Keefe. It had to be unboxed and taken out of the boxes to the 
guns to be loaded? 

Colonel Thielen. That is for the 3-inch guns, the primary arma- 
ment, that is true. 

Mr. Keefe. That is after the so-called No. 3 alert went into eilect? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; no fixed guns were in position with 
ammunition at the gun positions under alert No. 1. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes, but I mean they were not loaded, you said. 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; they were not loaded. 

Mr. Keefe. In order to put them in position to fire, the ammuni- 
tion would have to be taken out of the boxes in places where it was 
adjacent to the battery; is that right? 

[362] Colonel Tiiielex. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, where was the ammunition for the mobile units ? 

Colonel Thielen. That was located at Aliamanu Crater. 

Mr. Keeefe. And how far away from the mobile batteries? 

Colonel Thielen. That was quite close. That was near Fort Shaf- 
ter, which is the nerve center of the island defense and the inter- 
section of the road net which goes down along the south sector and 
critical area. There was also antiaircraft ammunition at Schofield 
Barracks. 

Mr. Keefe. "Well, the ammunition for the mobile gun batteries 
was in Aliamanu Crater, which is about a mile from Fort Shafter, 
up in an old volcano ; is that right ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes. sir; that is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And all the mobile batteries,* wherever they were lo- 
cated, had to send up to this crater to get their ammunition ; is that 
correct ? 

Colonel Thielen. Well, not all. As I pointed out, some was at 
Schofield Barracks, where some of the mobile batteries were situated. 

May I review my brief, which I believe covered that? Would 
you care^ to hear it, sir, hear the discussion that I gave yesterday 
directly pertaining to this question ? 

Mr. Keefe. Well, if you care to repeat it. I haven't [363] 
asked for it, but I haven't any objection to it if you want to do it. 

Colonel Thielen. It is directly responsive to your question, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Very well. 

Colonel Thielen. Under alert No. 1 only a limited amount of 
ammunition was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. The Coast Artillery Command had previously been author- 
ized to draw, and had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only, 
including antiaircraft. However, at these installations, the shells 
were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition from damage 
and deterioration. The ammunition for the mobile guns and bat- 
teries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Bar- 
racks. 

Mr. Iveefe. Now, in connection with your testimony, did you 
read the testimonv of General Burgin as he gave it to the Army 
Board? 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir : I do not recollect it. 



150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. May I call your attention to the fact that General 
Burgin testified before the Army Board, which is cited and referred 
to in the Board's report, and I quote : 

They were all ready to get into action immediately with the exception that the 
mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the 
sea [364] coast, those batteries imbedded in concrete, had the ammunition 
nearby. I had insisted on that to General Short in person and had gotten his 
permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition moved up into the seacoast to 
the battery positions and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however, 
boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. 

Ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which 
you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter up iu the old 
volcano. The mobile batteries had to .send there to get ammunition. In addi- 
tion to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their 
field positions. They were not in field positions. 

Is that correct ? 

Colonel TuiELEN. Yes, sir, as applied to the mobile batteries. As 
I pointed out, they were located at Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks, 
and Camp Malakole. 

Mr. K^EFE. Did you ascertain the facts with reference to the issu- 
ance of ammunition and why it was that ammunition had not been 
issued to these mobile batteries ? 

Colonel TiiiELEN. I am not prepared to give a why, to give an an- 
swer as to why that was not done, sir. I may say that I have had a 
discussion with the people who were doing the researching on tliis sub- 
ject and they assured me that testimony, [365] including that 
of ordnance officers, places us on very firm ground in the testnnony 
which I gave yesterday and which I just repeated. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I call your attention to the testimony of General 
Burgin on that issue, in which he testified : 

They didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition and, besides, we would 
get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise. It was almost 
a matter of impossibility to get your amunition out because in the minds of a 
person who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, 
comes back in and has to be renovated. Tlie same was especially true here. 
It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazine. We tried 
the ordnance people without result. General Max Murray and myself went 
personnally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for 
the Field Artillery ; I asked for ammunition for antiaircraft. We were put 
off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time 
and that we would have warning before any attack ever sprung up. 

Did you find that, review that testimony before you made your 
statement to the committee here? 

Colonel TiiiELEN". I was generally familiar with that testimony 
and I know that my researchers knew it in detail. 

[366] Mr. Keefe. Well, then, it is safe to say, is it not, that so 
far as the mobile units were concerned after the attack came they had 
to be dispersed to their positions and had to send to this crater in order 
to get their ammunition before they could enter the fight ? 

Colonel Thielen. To the crater and to Schofield Barracks. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. The ammunition was centrally located. 

Mr. Keei'E. How long did it take to get it, to get that done after the 
attack came, normally? 

Colqnel Thielen. That would, of course, depend upon the location 
of the various batteries. May I point out that the bulk of the anti- 
aircraft not in position, the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery, was located 
at Fort Shafter, which was only a mile from Aliamanu Crater. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 151 

Mr. Keete. Well, then, let me ask you this question: In your 
research and in your examination to present this situation you have 
disclosed a good many other pertinent and very technical facts. Do 
the records any place disclose how long it actually did take? 

Colonel Thiei.en-. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And how long did it take? 

Colonel Thielex. We have a schedule of that in the Army exhibit. 

[367] Mr. Gessell. It is right in the exhibit for each particular 
battery. 

Colonel Thielen. For every battery. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you may have seen it, Mr. Gesell. 

Mr. Gessell. It is before you, Congressman. It is the schedule that 
was discussed yesterday. I was calling your attention to it. It gives 
the time intervals. 

Colonel Thielen. That is on page 11 of the Army exhibit. 

The Vice Chairman. We went over that. 

Mr. Keefe. He went over that ? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

The Chairman. Is that all? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

The Chairman. Admiral, I want to ask one or two questions; 
maybe you testified about it yesterday. If you did, I don't want to 
repeat. 

You stated, I think, that there was a net strung across the mouth 
of this channel into Pearl Harbor but that notwithstanding that net 
a Japanese submarine did get in. Is that true? 

Admiral Inglis. That is true ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Does that record show when the net was spread 
and when the submarine got in? 

Admiral Inglis. The record does not show when the sub- [368] 
marine got in and the record is not clear as to when the net was opened. 

You see, those nets have a gate, as we call it, which usually can 
be opened to allow the passage of friendly ships, and I am not prepared 
to give the information as to just when that gate was opened and 
when it was closed. I would say from the construction of the net 
that the submarine must have gone through that net at some time 
when the gate was open because the net seems to be very effective in 
stopping the passage of any ship eixcept when the gate was open. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether it was customary to open 
the gate in the daytime or at night or both? 

Admiral Inglis. I don't know what the custom was at that place 
at that time. 

Tlie Chairman. How far was it from the mouth where the net 
was that this channel that had been chiseled out, how many miles is it 
to, we will say, the Ford Island ? 

Admiral Inglis. Roughly about 2 miles, sir. 

The Chairman. About 2 miles ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes. 

The Chairman. Now, one other question and I think that is all. 

You testified here that the Pacific Fleet — which is independent of 
the Asiatic Fleet, I believe ? 

[369] Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I have no reference to that. The Pacific Fleet, 
based at Pearl Harbor, was about two-thirds the size of the Atlantic 
Fleet. Now, how much of the Pacific Fleet was in Pearl Harbor? 



152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis, You will find that in the statement. 
The Ch AXEMAN. Well, I do not want to repeat. 

Now, yesterday yon said that there were six battleiships in the 
Atlantic Fleet and attention was called to two others that were doing 
what you call 

Admiral Inglis. Shake-down. 
The Chairman. Shake-down. 

Is that a naval term for practicing or try-out? Were they new 
ships that had not yet joined the Atlantic Fleet? 

Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, I did not include in my statement 
any ships that were in the blueprinting stage, that were befjng built 
and had not yet been launched, or that had been launched but were not 
commissioned, or that were commissioned but had not been ordered 
to join the fleet. The ships are in various stages of completion from 
the time the blueprints are drawn until the shake-down cruise is com- 
pleted. 

Now, after a ship goes into commission with her full crew and her 
ammunition allowance and become a working organization, a period 
called a shake-down cruise or shake-down period is allowed the ship 
to work out all the kinks in the machinery and [370] in the 
organization, to teach the crew their ships, and that, depending on the 
type of ship, may take anything from perhaps a month to some times 
as much as 6 months or even, in cases where they run into a great 
deal of difficulty with the machinery, perhaps as much as a year. 

Now, those two battleships, the Woshingfon and North CarolincL, 
were of that status. They had been commissioned, they had their 
crews and their ammunition on board, but they were still under 
shake-down and had not yet joined the fleet. 

The Chairman. In other words, notwithstanding the fact that they 
were in the Atlantic Ocean or in some body of water adjacent to it, 
they were not a part of the Atlantic Fleet? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. That is all. I understand that Senator Brewster 
\Tants to ask you a question or two. 

Senator Brewster. I have said I wanted to ask some questions. 
You said I wanted to ask a question. I would like to ask some ques- 
tions. I haven't asked any questions so far. 

I think 4 o'clock has rung. 

Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman jdelcl to get some information here, 
Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. We are constantly referring to Army exhibits, which I 
now have before me, and reference was made to the place- [371] 
ment of the various iDatteries and the time they got into action. Has 
that exhibit been offered in evidence in this case, or do you intend to 
offer it? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was just waiting for a chance, Mr. Congressman. 
At the close of their testimony I was going to make a formal offer. 
You have copies of it, but I was going to put it into the record by a 
formal offer. 

Mr. Keefe. I want to concern myself with that. I understand, 
then, that you are going to offer this Army exhibit formally ? 

Mr. Mitchell. We will do it now, if I may. I would like to get it 
over with before I forget it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 153 

The Cpiairmax. And also the Navy. 

Mr. Mitchell. I offer as Exhibit 5 the Army folder of documents, 
maps, and so forth, that ^vas produced by Colonel Thielen in connec- 
tion with his part in the narrative statement. 

I also offer as Exhibit 6 the Navy folder, with all papers therein 
contained, which are those produced by Admiral Inglis in connection 
with his statement, and that includes the document that j^ou just have 
in your hand. They are all offered. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of information: 
Of course, the testimony given by these gentlemen went right through 
these exhibits that were presented to each member of the committee. 
That is correct, isn't it? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is true, but I am offering the exhib- [372] 
its complete so that they will be formal parts of the record. 

(The documents referred to were marked ''Exhibits Xos. 5 and 6," 
respectively.) 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I make a request from 
counsel ? 

The CiiAiRMAX. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to request counsel to get the origi- 
nal plotting chart made by Private Elliott at the Opana station on the 
morning of the 7th of December 1941. 

As I understand it, they have been talking about originals here and 
this seems to be a photostatic copy and at the next session I will want 
to ask some questions upon that plotting. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where would that be. Colonel ? Is it in Washing- 
ton? 

Colonel Thielex. No, sir ; I think not. We have never come across 
that, the plotting that was actually made on the plotting board at the 
station. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you talking about the station at Opana or 
the main station? I am talking about the one that Elliott plotted, 
that he actually plotted.^ 

Colonel Thielen. I have never encountered any — this is one point 
that I have gone into in some detail. I have never encountered any 
reference to the plot that was made by the enlisted men when they 
were tracking a plane. We have heard of Colonel Murphy's authen- 
ticated document which presents the plot that was made. 

[373] Mr. Mitchell. Who is he? 

Senator Ferguson. Where was ISlurphy when this plot was being 
made ? Why can't we get the original plot to show the line of flight 
and whether or not planes came in at six something and whether or 
not they went out at 10 : 45 and 10 : 25 ? What I want is the original 
plotting made by Elliott, that he describes in his testimony. 

Colonel Thielen. I am sure the War Department will make every 
effort to get it. 

Senator Brewster. Will the counsel indicate in connection with 
the presentation of the Navy and Army exhibits the number of items 
included which, as I think, were illustrated nmnerically, so that they 
can be identified in that way ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In the Navy folder they are itemized as items 1 to 20. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 



'The plot referred to was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 155. 



154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. And in the Army folder I don't think they are. 
I doubt if it had a list. The mimeographed part of it is a document 
divided into sections, with 13 pages. In addition to that there are six 
charts. 

Senator Brewster. Can the radar records of any one distinct station 
from the other stations for this period from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock at 
all the stations on Hawaii and during the later part of the morning, 
whenever they were in operation, be made available, or copies of it? 

[S74] Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; anything that is in existence 
will be made available. I will give you my personal opinion as an 
artilleryman, though, that ordinary computations made at the time by 
personnel in the operation of such a device would not ordinarily be a 
matter of permanent record. 

Senator Brewster. Do you think, Colonel, and would it be likely 
that records of the morning of December 7 would be destroyed ? 

Colonel Thielex. I believe, and again I am giving you a personal 
opinion based on professional experience, that Colonel Murphy, fore- 
seeing the situation and the possible demands for information of this 
type, deliberately made this historic plot of information that was 
available. 

Senator Brewster. Colonel Murphy was in charge of all the radar 
stations, was he ? 

Colonel Thielen. He was a signal officer in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. The chief signal officer, Colonel Powell, was in charge of the 
aircraft warning system. 

Senator Brewster. Are either of those officers available here now ? 

Colonel Thielen. I believe Colonel Powell is. I understand Colo- 
nel Murphy has since died. 

Senator Brewster. Colonel Powell, is he expected to appear, do you 
know? 

[37S] Mr. Mitchell. He is on the list. 

Mr. Gesell. He is on the list. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Murphy a witness before any of the boards? 

Mr. Gesell. No, not that I know of. 

Colonel Thielen. I believe he died shortly after that time. I can- 
not state definitely. 

Senator Brewster. Would you, Mr. Mitchell, advise Colonel Powell 
that we would be interested in whatever original as well as transcript 
of those records are available of those records ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I will ask Colonel Duncombe to get ahold of him. 
Even if he hasn't these records here he can xeplain to you where he 
saw them and what was done with them. 

Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, may I make one brief correction in 
the statement that I made yesterday ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. It won't take but a moment. 

In my original statement I said that the three patrol planes from 
Kaneohe were to take off at sunrise, 5 : 27 Hawaiian time on the 7th, 
but that they did not take off until about 6 : 40. I later corrected that 
by saying that the plan was that they take off at dawn, 1 hour before 
sunrise. 

I have since found that I was mistaken in both cases and the facts 
are that the order was for them to take off at sun- [376] rise. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 155 

which was at 6 : 26. They actually took off at 6 : 40. In other words, 
they were 14 minutes late instead of 1 hour and 13 minutes late. 

Senator Lucas. Will you produce those records that show that also ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. I have two requests to make: One, that I be fur- 
nished with a copy of the summary of far eastern documents, the G-2 
and Signal CorjDs documents as I understand, and I would like to 
have a copy of the log of the cruiser Boise for the last 5 days of Novem- 
ber 1941 and, say, the first 10 days of December 1941.^ 

The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, if there is nothing further we will 
recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow and the chairman will express the 
hope that we will conclude with the testimony of Admiral Inglis and 
Colonel Thielen before 12 o'clock. 

(Wliereupon, at 4: 10 o'clock p. m., Friday, November 16, 1945, an 
adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock a. m., Saturday, November 
17, 1945.) 



1 Exhibit No. 68. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 157 



[377^ PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK 



SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1945 

CONGBESS OF THE UnITED StATES, . 

Joint Committee on the Investigation of the 

Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the 
caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. 
Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, ancl Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[^75] The Chairman. The committee will be in session. 

When the committee adjourned yesterday the Senator from Maine, 
Mr. Brewster, was on the verge of cross-examining the witnesses. 
Senator Brewster ? 

The Chair just announced that when we adjourned yesterday the 
Senator from Maine was on the verge of cross-examining the witnesses. 
You may now proceed. 

Senator Brewster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I would like to hear what you said. I 
cannot hear you. 

The Chairman. I said that when the committee adjourned yesterday 
the Senator from Maine was on the verge of cross-examining the wit- 
nesses and that he would now proceed. 

Mr. Keefe. Before he proceeds may I inquire from the Chairman ? 
There has been a lot of inquiry directed to me. May I inquire as to 
whether it is contemplated to hold hearings this afternoon ? 

The Chairman. Well, the Chair would hope not, we hope we can 
finish these witnesses by noon, but if we do not finish them we will try 
to finish them by going as late as 1 o'clock if necessary and not adjourn 
at 12 as we have been. Neither house is in session today. 

Go ahead, Senator, 

Senator Brewster. Admiral Inglis, covering one or two points 
which you have not fully developed in connection with [^STff] 
the hypothetical submarine entrance into Pearl Harbor at 4 : 30 on the 
morning of December 7, have you any further naval theory or record 
to that eifect? You intimated that' you did not consider the maps 
which were shown of the so-called battle area were, possibly, authentic. 
I assume that you have made some explorations of that situation. 

Admiral Inglis. I cannot add anything to what I said yesterday. 
I am not sure that I have the map which you have just mentioned 

79716 — 46— pt. 1- 13 



158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in the book of battle reports precisely identified as identical with that 
map that I had in mind. I am not sure that we are talking about the 
same map. 

Senator Brewster. So when you intimated that the entry — I saw 
it with my own eyes — was not on the map, did you find another map ? 

Admiral Inglis. It may have been a different map than the one in 
that book. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. But all I can do is repeat the general statement 
that I made yesterday, that the best picture or estimate that we can 
make from the evidence available to us is that one submarine definitely 
did enter Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Brewster. Well, that is not a matter of anybody's opinion, 
is it? You got the submarine, didn't you, that you captured or sank 
at the time ? 

[380] Admiral Inglis. That is right. 

Senator Brewster. So that there isn't any dispute about that. 

Admiral Inglis. If the Senator will permit me, I was just reviewing 
what I said yesterday, which was that one submarine did definitely 
enter Pearl Harbor. A second one may possibly have entered Pearl 
Harbor but we rather think it did not. 

Senator Brewster. And what became of the map which was cap- 
tured with the submarine at Barbers Point ? 

Admiral Inglis. I think that that, or a photostatic copy of it, is in 
the Navy archives. 

Senator Brewster. And you do not agree with the interpretation of 
that by the Army or FBI, or by the so-called battle report account? 

Admiral Inglis. I am not personally familiar with the opinion of 
the Army or FBI on battle reports. My own translators, after con- 
siderable research and considerable study of the Japanese symbols 
on that map, have decided that the evidence tends to be against the 
conclusion that that submarine entered the harbor. 

Senator Brewster. And what is your theory of how the submarine 
did enter into the harbor that actually did get in there ? 

[381] Admiral Inglis. Well, that is in the realm of speculation, 
Mr. Senator, but if you wish me to speculate I would speculate that the 
submarine probably followed a United States ship through the gate, 
the gate having been opened for the admission of a United States 
naval vessel. 

Senator Brewster. What are the records on the ships coming in that 
morning ? 

Admiral Inglis. We haven't got that. We tried to find it and we 
haven't got that and I suggest that that material could better be ob- 
tained from some of the witnesses who were present at the time. 

Senator Brewster. What was the arrangement between the Army 
and Navy about offshore patrol ; what was the understanding between 
them? 

Admiral Inglis. I don't know what the understanding was. So 
far as I know there was no off-shore patrol conducted by the Army. 
There was an off-shore patrol conducted by the Navy, as I have de- 
scribed in my previous testimony. 

Senator Brewster. And what was the nature of that ? 

Admiral Inglis. The Navy's off-shore patrol? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 159 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. It consisted of the searches by aircraft that were 
shown on the charts. 

Senator Brewster. I am speaking now of the routine, not {382} 
of the ones which you have described, but of the routine throughout 
the weeks or months preceding that. Were there any regulations cov- 
ering that in that period ? 

Admiral Inglis. We did not attempt to cover that prior to the 6th 
of December. Our presentation only took up from the 6th of Decem- 
ber and from then on, because that is all that was in the outline. 

Senator Brewster. And you are not, then, prepared to testify as 
to what the understanding was between the Army and Navy as to the 
patrol around the waters of Hawaii ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Brewster. What was the range of the PBY's ? What was 
the range of the PBY bombers ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am just speaking off the cuff now, but as I 
recall it the figure was 800-mile radius of action. It would be some- 
thing more than twice that much for the range. They would go 
out 800 miles generally on the course followed and then back again, 
making a triangular track. 

Senator Brewster. You had some of those PBY's there at Hawaii, 
did you not? :• j 

Admiral Inglis. I did not hear your question. 

Senator Brewster. You had some of those PBY's there at Hawaii, 
did you not ? 

ySS] Admiral Inglis. Oh, yes. 

Senator Brewster. How many of them, do you recall ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am not certain. Referring to item 12 of the 
Navy exhibit, at Kaneohe there was a total of 36 PBY's. At Ford 
Island a total of 31 — I beg your pardon, 33. 

Senator Brewster. Thirty-three ; that makes a total of 69 PBY's. 

Admiral Inglis. I believe that is substantially correct, yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Those were suitable at that time for this long- 
range patrol ? 

Admiral Inglis. That type of plane was suitable for that type of 
patrol, yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. How long have you been in Intelligence, 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Inglis. How long have I been in Intelligence? 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. Since the 1st of June of this year. 

Senator Brewster. Has your experience before that been any in 
that field or in operations? 

Admiral Inglis. More in operations and communications, general 
service that most of us have, no unusual type of duty, except that I was 
a specialist in communications for a while. 

Senator Brewster. And it would not require any special training to 
know that the Japanese had in previous wars in- [384-] dulged 
in these sneak attacks, would it ? 

Admiral Inglis. I believe that is a matter of history. 

Senator Brewster. So that if there were likely to be trouble between 
the Japanese and the United States, provoked by the United States, 



160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

it was altogether likely that it would be started in that way, wouldn't 
that be right ? 

Admiral Ixglis. I think that would be a safe conclusion to draw, 
yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And that it is rather accepted in military and 
naval strategy to aim at the jugular? 

Admiral Inglis. I did not get the last part. 

Senator Brewster. To aim at the jugular. You try to strike at the 
strongest spot, where you can do the most damage? 

Admiral Inglis. Well, I 

Senator Brewster. Let me put it this way : Hasn't that been what 
the Japs have always done ? In their previous wars didn't they always 
hit the enemy where they would do the enemy the most damage at 
one time in those sneak attacks ? 

Admiral Inglis. Of course, that is a pretty broad, general state- 
ment, Senator. I guess I could agree with you as a general statement. 

Senator Brewster. Yes ; so that if there were to be trouble it would 
be reasonable to anticipate that it might [385] come in Pearl 
Harbor, would that be a fair statement ? 

Admiral Ixglis. I am afraid 3^ou are going out of my field now, 
sir. 

Senator Brewster. Well, you are the Director of Intelligence for 
the Navy, so 3^ou are assumed to have a certain competency in this 
field. You are handling this responsibility now and you must be 
looking to the future. 

Admiral Ixglis. Well, I feel flattered at your compliment, Senator. 

Senator Brewster. Well, I am quite serious. I have a very high 
respect for your accomplishments, I think 3'ou have exhibited them 
already and we are trying to learn, of course, by experience to avoid 
trouble hereafter. 

What I am coming to is this, that if there were any reason to antic- 
ipate trouble at Pearl Harbor, where most of our Pacific fleet was 
concentrated, most of its striking power, it would have been possible 
by the use of the PBY patrol bombers readily to have ascertained 
whether an}' striking force or carrier force were approaching, would 
it not, by a patrol ? 

Admiral Ix'glis. I am not sure whether the number of planes avail- 
able for that type of search at that time was sufficient to allow a con- 
tinual search all day every day. 

Senator Brewster. Well, would it have required anything more 
than an 800-mile patrol from Pearl Harbor over [386] the 
areas which were not covered by your shipping each day to have made 
it impossible for a hostile fleet to have approached ? 

Admiral Ixglis. I think again you are getting a little bit out of my 
field and more into the field of aviation officers, but from my broad 
general experience as a naval officer I would say that probably that 
number of planes was not sufficient to cover all possible avenues of 
approach of a hostile force 24 

Senator Brewster. That is not what I asked you and you are intelli- 
gent enough to answer my question. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I am going to object to the questions 
of the Senator from Maine. 
. The Chairmax. Let the Senator from Maine proceed in order. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 161 

Admiral Inglis. Will the Senator please repeat the question? 

Senator Brewster. You ask the question — read it. 

(The question referred to was read by the reporter as follows:) 

Well, would it have required anything more than an 800-mile patrol from 
I'earl Harbor over the areas which were not covered by your shipping each 
day to have made it impossible for a hostile [387] fleet to have ap- 
proached? 

Admiral Ixglis. I beg your pardon. I did not understand the 
question. 

Senator Brewster. I thought you did not. 

Admiral Ixglis. The answer to that question is "Yes," with this 
qualification, that again speaking now in general terms, the areas 
which would be hjq^othetically covered by your own shipping could 
probably not be counted upon. In other words, to carry out such a 
thorough search as the one you have in mind we would have to cover 
almost the whole 360° arc. 

Senator Brewster. Well, that may be true, Admiral, but isn't it also 
true that, exactly as the Japanese planned, they would not be likely 
to approach through areas where our shipping was frequenting the 
courses ? 

Admiral Ixglis. That is right. 

Senator Brewster. They would be desirous of avoiding us. 

Admiral Ix-^glis. That is correct. 

Senator Brewster. So that if at the time we abandoned our ship- 
ping on the northern route patrols had been carried out on the northern 
area, with the limited range of the battle planes from carriers, it would 
have been, let us say, at least exceedingly difficult for the Jap force to 
have approached? 

[388] Admiral Ixglis. That is correct. 

Senator Brewster. And, of course, that is one of the things which 
I think is of serious concern and in my visits to Pearl Harbj^r before 
and after it occurred there was always great discussion, the Army 
feeling that if it had been permitted to carry out these patrols with 
their long range bombers they could have detected this and the Navy 
holding the Army strictly accountable for the defense of Hawaii ; but, 
as I understand — and I will ask the counsel or you to have this veri- 
fied — it was a matter of agreement and orders that the Army was not to 
participate in a patrol beyond a very limited area, a hundred miles or 
so, I believe, while the Navy was to take care of the longer range 
patrol because of the existing controversy at that period which, I am 
sure, both of you gentlemen are thoroughly familiar, as to the control 
of long-range aircraft and the function and the mission which they 
were to perform. 

Mr. Mitchell. It may help the Senator if I say that at a very 
early stage of the case, in fact, within the next day or two if we take 
the normal course, we will produce all the defense plans that show 
the respective duties of the Army and Navy about that reconnaissance 
and we have a very splendid document here prepared by General 
Martin, I think, in the summer of 1941 that answers every question 
that you [389] have asked about the patrols that could have 
been carried on, how many planes were required to do it and quite a 
complete picture of the thing that you are interested in. 



162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We have that and it is coming in with the defense plans which 
show the respective duties of the Army and Navy and what was 
required in the way of equipment to execute it. 

Senator Brewster. Well, I should be glad to have that. I did not 
assume that this was a matter which was in controversy in any way, 
as to what were the Army and Navy arrangements, so I think it is 
a little regrettable that the Army and Navy did not agree to give 
us what were the actual arrangements, unless it was at the suggestion 
of counsel. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, these gentlemen were only giving the facts 
as to the actual conditions on the day of the attack and the available 
equipment, and the Army and Navy plans for defense prepared 
during the summer of 1941, over the months prior to Pearl Harbor, 
being a series of plans, each of them all arranged, with these things 
in them that you are interested in and you will get a more accurate 
story from those than you would from possibly a witness who was 
called on another matter and has not studied it lately. 

Senator Brewster. Very well, I will be very happy to waive the 
presentation of that until the proper time. 

Admiral, I want to take one other phase, which is all I [SOO] 
care, I think, to examine you about, and that is the matter of the dis- 
tribution of the fleet. 

You have realized, I presume, in your position that that has been 
one of the matters that has been much agitated in connection with 
this matter, as to the allocation of the fleets between the Atlantic and 
the Pacific, have you not. Admiral? There has been considerable 
discussion as to whether or not there was a good disposition. 

Admiral Inglis. There has been considerable discussion, yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And also as to the reasons for it and where the 
orders were developed, so that speaking from that background and 
your position you would gather also that that is one of the questions 
that will very likely be considerably discussed in this case. 

Admiral Inglis. I would expect that. 

Senator Brewster. Now, when the matter came up you spoke of 
the Pacific Fleet as being two-thirds of the Atlantic Fleet in strength. 
Admiral Inglis. That is numerical strength, yes. 

Senator Brewster. That is based on the unit. And you were then 
asked further by Senator Ferguson about the allocation of the units. 
I want to read you your evidence and ask you your comment on it. I 
read quotations from your [S91] evidence on page 172: 

Admiral, you said — 

this is Senator Ferguson speaking — 

Admiral, you said that about two-thirds of our fleet was in the Pacific ; is that 
correct ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I said that the numerical sti-ength of the Pacific 
Fleet was two-thirds that of the Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific Fleet was smaller 
than the Atlantic Fleet. 

And then after some other colloquies, turning to page 173, Senator 
Ferguson again: 

Well, how many capital battleships were in the Atlantic? 
Admiral Inglis. In the Atlantic Fleet were six battleships. In the Pacific 
Fleet were nine battleships. Six in the Atlantic and nine in the Pacific. 

Now, at that point it seems to me, Admiral, you were a little less( 
than careful. Your first statement was absolutely correct. Your ad- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 163 

dition was absolutely incorrect and it occurs to me that hearing of 
this colloquy you must have been rather well aware of what Senator 
Ferguson, at least, was asking. 

I will read the next page, after some further colloquies : 

Senator Febguson. Now, how many battleships were in Atlantic? 
[392] Admiral Inglis. Six. 

On the basis of the subsequent evidence which was finally extracted 
from you that statement was unqualifiedly false ; is that not correct? 

Admiral Inglis. I think the Senator is drawing some conclusions 
with respect to the 

Senator Brewster, I am quoting your testimony before this tribunal 
and that statement, as you have now admitted after we finally elicited 
the information, was unqualifiedly false. 

The Chairman. If the Senator will permit 

Senator Brewster. The chairman can do anything he likes. I am 
making a statement of fact. 

The Chairman. Well, the Chair feels that this inquiry ought to be 
conducted with decorum and respect and for a member of this com- 
mittee to charge a witness with making an unqualifiedly false state- 
ment seem to the Chair, whether it seems to other members of this 
committee proper, to be out of order. 

Senator Brewster. I will continue the quotation : 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I read from battle report. Pearl Harbor to Coral 
Sea, which is supposed to be an official record, page 6 : 
"In the Atlantic there were eight battleships." 

[S9S] Eeading from page 6 : 

Admiral Inglis. I can't recognize that book as being official. I have here a list 
of the specific ships — 

I go on : 

Admiral Inglis. I personally still don't recognize that as being official, except 
what you have told me now, but, if I may, Senator Ferguson, I will read the list 
of ships that were in the Atlantic Fleet, and the list of those in the Pacific Fleet. 

Still it is apparently contemplated that we were wishing to discover 
the truth. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

You then proceeded to read the list of the two fleets. I want to go 
now to another page and quote. This has gone on now for five pages 
trying to extract the simple facts as to the disposition of our fleets, of 
our battleships, which is what Senator Ferguson repeatedly asked you, 
and he finally, and I might say at my suggestion, because I was com- 
pletely bewildered by what you were trying to tell us, on page 176 
Senator Ferguson says : 

How many battleships did we have in December 1941? 
Admiral Inglis. Fifteen, sir. 

There again is a statement which, on your subsequent [394] 
evidence when you finally admitted the existence of the Washington 
and the North Carolina ready for their cruises and shake-downs, is a 
statement that does not correspond with what up in our part of the 
country would be considered as the truth. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 

The Chairman. No ; let the Senator proceed without interruption. 



164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster (reading) : 

Senator Fekguson. Fifteen? 

Admiral Inglis. Fifteen tlaat were attached to tlie fleets. Tliere were two or 
three that had just been completed, or were on their shake-down duty. 

At last we are permitted to lind out what is the answer to this- 
conundrum. 

Senator Ferguson. Where were they? 

You then testified as to the Washington and the North Carolina on 
shake-down in the Atlantic. 

All I have to say is this, Admiral, and I say it in all charity. I have 
served on the Naval Affairs Committee during my period in Congress ; 
I have been interested in the Navy ; we have the Navy up in Maine in 
large measure and everybody else is interested in it and, of course, 
for 4 years we have been dealing very definitely with preparedness and 
defense and I speak not only from observation but the thoughts 
\^395~\ of most of the members of our committee involved in that 
task and of its distinguished chairman. President Truman,^ in regret- 
ting profoundly that there has developed an attitude of mind on the 
part, particularly of the Navy, that does not seem to recognize the 
rights and interests of this Congress to receive full, frank, and fair 
answers to the questions that have come up and I say particularly 
in the process of this hearing for yourself and your fellow officers and 
for the future welfare of the Navy, which is the great problem in this 
country in building up the confidence that it wants to command, by a 
freer and a franker approach to the aims of myself and other members 
of the connnittee it would do much to increase that confidence that 
I think we all want to establish. 

[^396~\ Senator Lucas. Is this going to be a lecture school, Mr. 
Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Whatever it is, it will speak for itself. 

Go ahead. Admiral, if you want to comment on that dissertation 
you are at liberty to do so. 

Admiral Inglis. May I comment in full, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Maine has im- 
pugned my honesty and my motives. I resent that. I gave the facts 
to the best of my knowledge and belief. 

The point he has brought up about the Washington and North Caro- 
lina^ and the other ships which had not joined the fleets was fully 
covered in a statement which I made yesterday afternoon. I said in 
that statement that, of course, you might count battleships or other 
ships which were still in the blueprint stage, you might count battle- 
ships or other ships still in the building ways, you might count battle- 
ships or other ships which had been launched l3ut which had not been 
completed, you might count battleships or other ships which had been 
commissioned but had not joined the fleet, but I was counting the 
ships that had joined the fleet, and I thought I made that quite clear 
in my statement. 

I have done my very best in this presentation to give all the facts 
to the best of my knowledge and ability. I [,?57] don't be- 
lieve the Navy, and certainly not the organization, is attempting to 
withhold any evidence whatsoever. I repeatedly stated I was author- 

1 Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 165 

ized for the Navy to state that we would produce any facts that we 
were asked to produec. 

Senator Brewster. I think the record Avill speak for itself. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions, Senator? 

Senator Brewster. No. 

The Chairman. Does any other member of the committee wish to 
ask Admiral Inglis any questions? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask the colonel some questions. 

Colonel, I show you the exhibit that is in evidence here, this map 
of the radar. 

Colonel Thielen : Will you put the radar plot up. Captain Barnes ? 

Senator Ferguson. Was the chart that is on the board here made 
from the exhibit that you have ? 

Colonel Thielen. It was made from an exhibit which I believe was 
identical. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you looked for the original charting done 
of the Opana station ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir ; a radiogram was dispatched to [398] 
the Hawaiian Department since the last meeting asking for the original 
plots from all radar stations on December 7, 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. I show you a photostat that is exhibit 3-B in 
evidence, and I ask you what that is. 

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 3-B in evidence where ? 

Mr. KJEEFE. Mr. Chairman, 3-B of what? 

Senator Ferguson. The exhibit itself does not show, but I am of 
the opinion it is of the Army exhibits. Does counsel agree with that? 
I shall just identify it from the mark on the paper itself. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, just as a matter of informa- 
tion, I understood the Senator to say it was in evidence. 

Senator Ferguson. I was reading what was on the sheet. That is 
on the sheet. 

The Chairman. That was a part of the Army file which was 
yesterday put in evidence along with the Navy white folder. 

Senator Ferguson. No, no. 

Mr. Mitchell. Let me clear that up. The document which the 
Senator just produced is not in evidence in this hearing. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. I understood him referring to it as having been in 
evidence in some other investigation. 

Senator Ferguson. I merelv read off the identification numbers, 
what is on the blueprint itself. It is only for the [399] pur- 
pose of identification. That expression I used is on the sheet itself. 

The Chairman. If there is a memorandum on the sheet showing 
it is in evidence, it ought to show in what proceeding it is in evidence. 

Senator Ferguson. It does not show that. I would like to make 
that clear for the record. Will the colonel read what is on the corner 
of the sheet so the record will be clear? 

Colonel Thielen. I see the statement "Exhibit 3-B in evidence." 

Senator Ferguson. That is exactly what I read. That is for 
identification purposes. 

Have you examined it? 

Colonel Thielen. For the first time now. 



166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Will you compare it with the board and with 
the exhibit now in evidence ? 

Colonel Thtelen. I have compared it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Are they alike ? 

Colonel Thielen. Exhibit 3-B, so-called, appears to include the 
information on the board. 

Senator Ferguson. That is not what I asked you. Are they alike ? 

The Chairman. Let the witness explain in what particular they 
differ, if they do differ. 

[400] Senator Ferguson. Cannot I have an answer to my ques- 
tion first ? Are they alike ? 

The Chairman. He was in the process of answering your question. 
Senator, when you interrupted. 

Go ahead and give your answer. 

Colonel Thielen. The exhibit 3-B in evidence, so-called, appears 
to include the plots referred to on the board and on the exhibit which 
3^ou handed me previously, sir, and in addition appears to have other 
plots which were made later in the day. 

Senator Ferguson. Now will you tell us how they differ? Will 
you give us all that is on the exhibit that I gave you this morning, 
exhibit 3-B in evidence, the way it is marked ? 

Colonel Thielen. It contains numerous additional plots. 

[401] Senator Ferguson. Will you give them to us ? 

Colonel Thielen. It would be very difficult to do that orally, sir. 
I see pips and plots all over the area. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean to say you cannot give us any of 
them ? Are your eyes not able to read them ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I start up in the upper left-hand 
corner and I see a spot 

Senator Ferguson. What is the time marking? 

Colonel Thielen. 10 : 3 — and the final digit is illegible. Below 
that is 10 : 35. Below that is 10, and then illegible and the digit 3. 
Below that is 10 : 30. Below that is 10 : 2 and an illegible digit. Be- 
low that is 10 : 27 and an illegible digit. About an inch below that 
is a spot with illegible digits. Below that about a half inch is a 
spot 10: 31. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, are not they illegible just simply because 
the photostat is not clear ? 

Colonel Thielen. I believe that is true, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, go ahead. 

Colonel Thielen. That appears to conclude that plot of the 10 : 00 
series. 

Senator Ferguson. Give us the other plots. 

Colonel Thielen. Wliich are you referring to ? 

Senator Ferguson. On the map, that is not on the one [402] 
shown to us. 

Colonel Thielen. About 3 inches due north of Kaena Point, I find 
a single spot, and to the southeast is a dotted line, about an inch, 
and another spot surrounded by numerals, some of them illegible, one 
of which I make out as 7 : 50 or 7 : 56. 

Senator Ferguson. They are to the left of what is on the chart 
here, 7:39? 

Colonel Thielen. It would be in the neighborhood of a point 
on the chart marked 6 : 59. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 167 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Colonel Thielen. Below the broad arrow. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the mark on this chart I gave you? 
6:30? 

Colonel Thielen. I read 7 : 50 here. 

Senator Ferguson. 7 : 50. 

Colonel Thielen. There is no indication, however, that that is the 
same plot as the one on the board. 

Senator Ferguson. Now what else is on that chart that is not on 
the one on the board ? 

Colonel Thielen. There are 

Senator Ferguson (interposing). I am talking about the Opana 
chart, 3-B in evidence, so marked. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, this is marked "Opana" down in [4031 
the lower left-hand corner. Out to the east-northeast — or west-north- 
west of Kaena Point is a series — I should estimate the distance on this 
scale of about 50 miles — is a series of arrows pointing out spots, no one 
of which, as near as I can make out, has a time indicated on it. South 
of that, in the general area off the Hawaiian coast of the island are 
a number of white dots which may be caused by faults in the photostat, 
or may be plots. 

Senator Ferguson, Just there it is very important then to get all 
of the facts that we should have the original instrument and not be 
depending upon a photostat which can be so defective that you cannot 
read it ; is that right ? 

Colonel Thielen. Since the last meeting, sir, the War Department 
has dispatched a radiogram to the Hawaiian Department asking for 
the originals of the plots of all stations on December 7, 1941. 

[4^4J Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us why you produced the 
plot you did and did not give us the one in the Army board records ? 
I understood the evidence was to be evidence not disputed, that you 
were to bring in. How do you account for that ? 

Colonel Thielen. For one thing, sir, this appears to include all plots 
made during the day and not those made during the attack, with which 
I was dealing. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliy did you bring in your 10 : 39 then ? 

Colonel Thielen. Because that occurs on Exhibit 4, which I clearly 
specified was the one from which I had taken the chart. 

Senator Ferguson. Is not Exhibit 4 a plot made up by an individual 
and not the original evidence ? 

Colonel Thielen. Both plots are authenticated by Lieutenant Colo- 
nel Murphy. 

Senator Ferguson. I ask you whether the one I gave you, 3-B, the 
Opana photostat, is not purporting to be from an original ? 

Colonel Thielen. That appears to be, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I show you another photostat, 
exhibit 3-A in evidence — and I take it for granted that means it was 
in evidence at the Army board, and I just use that for identification 
purposes — and ask you if you [4^<5] ever saw that ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I have not only seen that but I have 
had it reproduced as an Army exhibit on page 8. 

Senator Ferguson. That one is reproduced. Did you use that infor- 
mation on the chart that you gave us ? 



168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Thielen. Not on the chart of the Opana station, sir, because 
the chart to which you have last referred is not the chart of the Opana 
station. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you to read the notes down in the 
cornej' and see whether part of it is not of the Opana station. 

Colonel Thieleis^. This says : 

Detector station records at Kaena, Opana, Kaala, Shatter, Kokohead on Decem- 
ber 7, 1941, prior to 7 : 00 a. m. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you think we only wanted, in your verbal 
evidence here, the Opana station? 

Colonel Thielen. As I pointed out. Senator, the chart to which 
you refer was offered in evidence as Army exhibit, page 8. 

Senator Ferguson. I realize that. Why did not you include the 
showings on this map ? 

Colonel Thielen. The only significance I see in this chart is that it 
confirms the plots earlier in the day of the Opana station, indicating 
that that station was tracking [406] correctly. 

Senator Ferguson. Do we understand then that we have received 
here on the board a corrected chart ? 

Colonel Thielen. By no means. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you to look at page 116, that you 
gave me the other clay as the page from which you got the evidence on 
this radar, about Avhat Elliott was doing. Do you find anything on 
that? That is the Roberts evidence. You gave me page 116 as the 
report as I told you I could not find it in the report because the report 
did not haA^e so many pages and then you said it was in the evidence. 

Now I sliow you page 116 of the evidence and ask you if you find 
anything on that? 

Colonel Thielen. I will check my documentation on that, sir. It is 
entirely possible that my documentation is incorrect ; but I read them 
correctly. It is exhibit S of the Roberts report, page 116, affidavit of 
Private McDonald. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you got the affidavit of Private McDon- 
ald? 

Colonel Thielen. It is in the files of the War Department ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How could he give what Elliott was doing when 
he was the telephone operator down at the center? Why would you 
rely upon his affidavit? 

[40/] Colonel Thielen. Let me check that to see just what that 
referred to, sir. I see that that evidence refers to the location of the 
aircraft as picked up by Private Elliott and Private Lockard, which 
was presumably reported to Private McDonald. 

Senator Ferguson. Now might I inquire from counsel whether or 
not they have the affidavit in the Roberts report ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I haven't them in court this minute. 

Senator Ferguson. I am asking you whether you have them. 

Mr. Mitchell. We have the Roberts record, if that is what you 
mean, all the exhibits in the War and Nav}^ that the Roberts commis- 
sion is presumed to have had. 

Senator Ferguson. Will counsel try and locate that affidavit for 
the committee? 

Mr. Mitchell. My chief assistant suggested that j^ou may have the 
Roberts record. We were passing these things out. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 169 

Senator Ferguson. I do not have the affidavit. I did not know 
there were any affidavits until the witness lias been giving affidavits. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will look up our records and see who has that 
information. What is it exactly you want, Senator Ferguson? 

Senator Ferguson. I want the affidavit in the Roberts investigation. 

Mr. Mitchell. All the affidavits ^ 

[408] Senator Ferguson. All the affidavits in the Roberts in- 
vestigation. 

Colonel Thielen. I learn that my citation in my document was 
incorrect originally, page 116. I should have cited volume 2 of the 
Roberts report, pages 66 and 67, General Short's testimony, as to the 
facts mentioned. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now on this' map that you have 
given us the Opana station shows 6 : 45, 6 : 48, 6 : 50, 6 : 51, 6 : 58, 6 : 48, 
6:51,6:52, and 6: 59. 

Now referring to the testimony of Elliott on page 997, transcript 
of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board on Thursday, 
August 17, 1944, and reading back one question : 

General Frank. What I am trying to ascertain is whether on the morning of 
December 7 there was more activity than usual or whether there was less 
activity than usual, or was it average? 

Sergeant Eixiott. Well, sir, during our problem on Sunday there was practi- 
cally no activity at all. 

General Frank. Prior to this time? 

Sergeant Eluott. Prior to 7 o'clock; yes, sir. We had no plots to send in 
to our information center and had no targets. 

Now how do you reconcile that evidence with what you are giving 
the committee ? I show you the original. 

Colonel Thielen. I consider this evidence of the plot [^OO] 
authenticated by a signal officer responsible at this station to be evi- 
dence that is worthy of being presented to the committee, under my 
directive of giving them the facts, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Over and above the sworn testimony of the man 
who did the charting, is that correct? 

Colonel Thielen. There is no evidence that he was on the set at 
that particular time. 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about Elliott. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Are we then going to get from the Army the 
conclusions of some officers later on and not the eyewitnesses to these 
facts? Is that what we are getting here? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is a question for counsel, I think. 

Senator Ferguson. I am asking the witness. 

The Chairman. The witness cannot answer what we are o-oino- to 
get hereafter. As everybody has been advised, Mr. Lockard and Mr. 
Tyler are both on the list of witnesses. They were in charge, makino- 
these records, and certainly their testimony will be produced here. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I correct my statement, but I 
cannot speak for the future. I am talking about what we did get. 

Is that correct, that it was the conclusions of officers rather than the 
testimony of eyewitnesses ? 

[4^0] Colonel Thielen. I see no conclusion in what purports to 
be and is authenticated as the record of the plots of the Opana station. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not see any 

Colonel Thielen. I do not say it is a conclusion to reproduce a plot. 



170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Wliere the witness himself, who made the chart, 
says there were no other targets that morning, in the statement, and 
you bring in the conclusion of an officer that there were ? 

Colonel Thielen. I do not consider it a conclusion, sir. It is a 
plot. 

Senator Ferguson. What is it? 

Colonel Thielen. It is a written record, sir. It is a plot. 

Senator Ferguson. Who made it? 

Colonel Thielen. Lieutenant Colonel Murphy. 

Senator Ferguson. What did he make it from? Did he make it 
from the one I gave you ? 

Colonel Thielen. From the records of the Opana station. I cannot 
say what he saw when he made this record. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for two records of that 
station then ? 

Colonel Thielen. One of them covers the entire day, sir, [4-^-?] 
and one covers the critical period. 

Senator Ferguson. How could the one that followed, that covered 
the entire day, be any different than the one that gave them the exact 
period, and that is up to 7 : 39 ? 

Colonel Thielen. In what way, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. How could they differ? The one that covered 
all day, how could it be different from the one that coveired it up 
to 7 : 39 ? I take it the 7 : 39 chart up to that point, would be complete 
up to that time, would it not ? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that would be the supposition. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it would not have any thing on that was 
not on this chart. Now where do you get this 6 : 50 and 6 : 45, if this 
man who made the chart said he did not have any other targets on 
that day? 

Colonel Thielen. Where do I get it, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Colonel Thielen. I get it from the so-called historic plot. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now will you give us when the first 
bomb was dropped again ? 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman suspend a minute 
until I can look at the report and the exhibit on which he questioned 
the witness ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[4i^] Mr. Murphy. Will you pass them over, please ? 

The Chairman. Will we have to suspend in order to do that ? 

Mr. Murphy. No ; I just made the request. 

Senator Ferguson. I want them back. I have some other ques- 
tions. 

Mr. Murphy. All right, in just a minute. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read my last question ? 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson. What do your records show ? 

Colonel Thielen. The observers at Hickam Field saw aircraft at 
7:55 a. m. and the attack was initiated immediately, presumably the 
first bomb dropped within a matter of seconds after 7 : 55 a. m. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 171 

Senator Ferguson. 7 : 55 a. m. All right. How do you account for 
the planes that came in at 7 : 39 to 7 : 55 ? How do you account for their 
action from 7 : 39 to 7 : 55 ? 

Colonel Thielen. Well, I am not prepared to state positively that 
those planes appearing at 7 : 39 ol! Kahuku Point were the planes that 
appeared at Hickam Field at 7 : 55. 

Senator Ferguson. How far is the point 7 : 39 from Hickam Field ? 

Colonel Thielen. I should estimate that at approximately 60 miles. 

[41S] Senator Ferguson. About 60 miles. Do you know what 
Elliott said about how far he followed these planes in? Fifteen to 
twenty miles, did not he say ? 

Colonel Thielen. I do not recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the radar was doing at that 
time ? 

Colonel Thielen. What the radar was doing, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Colonel Thielen. I do not believe I understand the question, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it ? 

Colonel Thielen. I understood the words sir, but not the intent. I 
do not understand what is wanted. 

Senator Ferguson. Read the question. 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how the radar would function at 
that time ? 

Colonel Thielen. How it would function ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, whether it would take it 15 or 20 miles from 
the radar itself. 

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. I know that the lobe, so-called, sent out 
by the radar, behaves very erratically. I am not technically qualified 
to state how it would behave at that short range. 

[4^4] Senator Ferguson. Have you examined Lockard's or 
Elliott's testimany about these targets before 7 : 02, during their so- 
called, as you call it, regular shift? 

Colonel Thielen. I did not direct their attention specifically to 
that; no, sir. They have unquestionably read that testimony in re- 
searching this particular phase. 

Senator FeKguson. As I understand it, instead of what the testi- 
mony shows you gave us a plot that was made up by Colonel Murphy. 

Colonel Thielen. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the way you leave the record, and that 
is the way it stands, is it not? 

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just one 
observation. 

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. On Exhibit No. 4 which was offered in evidence there 
is a statement "Record of early flights December 7, 1941, obtained 
by Opana detector", and then the signature of Lieutenant Colonel 
Murphy. 

On the exhibit which the gentleman from Michigan questioned 
the witness about there is a notification "Opana detector" and then 
some word that is illegible, "Record of early flights", [4^^] and 
then a notation which would seem to bear the initials of some other 
witness. 



172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[416] So this record, Exhibit 4, is of the early flights, and this 
other notation by someone else appeal's not to be on the record in 
question, and I wish the witness would find out what the last of this 
notation on the lower right-hand corner of exhibit 3-B is, so we might 
see what the difference between the two exhibits is. 

Colonel Thielen. I will endeavor to find that out, sir. I learned 
that my researchers are familiar with that, consulted radar experts 
on it, and determined that it was generally illegible. 

The Chairman. All right. Any further questions ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, may I ask for information from 
Admiral Inglis 'i He has been very accommodating up to now. I 
want to follow up the naval strength in both the Pacific and Atlantic. 

I have in my hands a rough draft of what I would like to see in 
the record in tlie form of a chart. It asks for the strength of the Ger- 
man Navy as of May 1, additions from the then Vichy France, the 
Italian strength, and for the augmentation from Axis, Allies, or from 
other sources. 

Then, in the last column, the total naval strength from all sources 
in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. 

I ask for that same information as of December 7, 1941. 

Then, information to the same effect of Japanese strength [4-?^] 
as of May 1, 1941, and as of December 7, 1941, in the Pacific, and for 
American strength in the Pacific with Allied augmentation both in 
respect to the Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet. 

If you can have that prepared. Admiral, and insert it in the record 
of today's proceedings, I would appreciate it very much. But if that 
is too short a time, I hope you can get it in by Monday. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will hand it to the Navy Department.^ 

Admiral Inglis. We can have it ready for you by Monday, I am 
afraid we cannot by today. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Have you concluded, Mr. Gearhart? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I ask now to put into evidence 
these two exhibits that I handed to the witness for identification, and 
I ask now that they be part of the record. 

Mr. Counsel, will you tell us what numbers they will be ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I will mark them as soon as I have them. 

Senator Ferguson. So they will get the correct numbers. 

Mr, Gesell. One of them is already in evidence. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you want them both ? We already have [4^8] 
one. 

Senator Ferguson. Just the large one. 

Mr. Mitchell. At the request of Senator Ferguson, the document 
he has produced, which for identification has on it the words "Exhibit 
3-B in evidence," apparently from some earlier proceedings, is now 
marked Exhibit 7, and offered in evidence. 

The Chairman. All right. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 7.") 

The Chairman. Any further questions? 

The Vice Chairman. Mr, Chairman, in fairness to myself, as a 
member of the committee, I just simply want to say I do not share the 
views expressed or the remarks made to the admiral who has been 

' Admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 86. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 173 

appearing before us as a witness. I think both of these gentlemen 
have acquitted themselves with great credit and distinction, and are a 
distinct credit to the great services they represent. 

The Chairman. Counsel will proceed now with anything further 
he has. 

Senator Lucas. I would like to make a statement along the same 
line as Mr. Cooper. 

The Chairman. Let me suggest that these two witnesses will be 
here for a while longer and at the conclusion of their testimony, it 
might be appropriate to have a testimonal [4^9] meeting with 
respect to the opinions of the committee with regard to this very 
testimony. 

Senator Lucas. I want to be the first one to testify when the testi- 
monial meeting starts. 
Mr. Murphy. I would like to join in that too. 

The Chairman. The Chairman wants to be in that too. Go ahead. 
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Inglis, one question. You spoke about 
Jap submarines entering Pearl Harbor. Are you referring to the 
midget submarines, so-called ? 
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Not the large seagoing submarines? 
Admiral Inglis. Not the large seagoing submarines; no, sir. 
Mr, Mitchell. As to those midget submarines, what does the record 
show as to how many men were in the crew ? 

Admiral Inglis. I believe they were manned by a crew of two men — 
that is, two persons, I should say. 
Mr. Mitchell. A very small vessel? 
Admiral Inglis. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, I ask you if you have brought here, 
at my request, all of the documents in the Navy from Japanese sources 
relating to the Japanese account of the attack at Pearl Harbor? 

[4^0'] Admiral Inglis. Substantially everything except the 
communication intelligence material which I believe counsel has from 
other sources and not from me. 
The Chairman. A little louder. We could not hear the last remark. 
(The answer was read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not understand, I thought you produced here 
all of the material from Jap sources which have made any disclosure 
as to what they did in respect to this attack. 
Admiral Inglis. I wanted to be quite meticulous. 
Mr. Mitchell. You mean the espionage documents, do you? 
Admiral Inglis. I mean the material you referred to as cryptic 
analytical. 
Mr. Mitchell, Yes. 

Admiral Inglis, I think you have that. You did not get it from me, 
Mr. Mitcpiells That is right. Now, let us look at this material 
and see what it is. I hand you a bundle of loose sheets in the Japanese 
language. What is that ? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, does the record show clearly when 
counsel received these papers? Have you made clear on the record 
when you received these papers, counsel ? 

[^i] Mr. Mitchell, I think T received tliese original docu- 
ments within the last 24 hours, 

79716 — 46— pt. 1 14 



174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

i^enator Ferguson. About when did you get them ? 

Mr, Mitchell. You mean the exact hour ? 

Senator Ferguson. When? There are two sets of them and I 
would just like to know when counsel got them. 

Mr. Mitchell. My assistants says these documents reached me ap< 
proximately 2 p. m. yesterday afternoon. 

Senator Ferguson. Two p. m. yesterday afternoon. 

Has counsel had time to examine each one of them ? 

Mr. Mitchell. We went over them in a rough way. 1 have not 
spent much time on this document in the Japanese language, but we 
thought we would get back to the original source here. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they give you translations? 

Mr. Mitchell. They are in the papers here. 

Senator Ferguson. They are among the papers ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. May I ask him about what these are, Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I do not know. 

Mr. Mitchell. I want you to know. 

What is this document, this bundle of photostats here in the Jap- 
anese language ? Will you state generally what that is ? 

Admiral Inglis. There are photostat copies of two docu- [^v"^^] 
ments in the Japanese language which my translators inform me are 
Japanese top secret operation orders No. 1 and No. 2. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is a staff plan, do you mean, a staff order? 

Admiral Inglis. It is a plan and an order, in effect. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you look over these other documents and just 
generally describe what they are. 

Admiral Inglis. This first one I have is a translation of a captured 
document; the title is "Submarine School Notes Concerning Early 
War Experiences Off Hawaii." 

Senator Ferguson. Could I inquire from counsel when counsel re- 
quested these documents from the Navy? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think these particular documents I asked 
him to bring in here sometime jj-esterday, because I understood the 
c^ommittee wanted all the original material on which any testimony 
was based. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand it has not been requested by coun- 
sel prior to yesterday. 

Mr. Mitchell. We had the operational order in English, the trans- 
lation of it, but I did not have the Japanese rendition, if that is 
what you mean. I had a translation of it for some days, I think. 

Senator Lucas. You should have translated them right, ]Mr. 
Mitchell. 

[4^3] Mr. INIiTCHELL. I could not swear to that. 
Senator Lucas. I know there are going to be a lot of questions 
about that. 

]\Ir. Mitchell. I do not suppose anybody can settle that question. 

Will you go on, Admiral — if I may proceed uninterruptedly. 
The Chairman. Yes, go ahead, gentlemen. 
Admiral Inglis. Are you ready, sir? 

Mr. Mitchell. All right. Go head. 

Admiral Inglis. The next dociuneiU is entitled "Translation of a 
Captured Japanese Document. The professional notebook of an 
ensign in the Japanese Navy," The date is February 25, 1944. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 175 

Perhaps I should go back to the second document and say that the 
date on that is January 12, 1941. 

The next document that I have is dated March 2, 1943. The subject 
is Kuboaki, Takeo. Tliat is obviously the name of a Japanese. 
"Superior class engineer petty officer, interrogation of," That is the 
subject. 

[4-"34] The next document that I have is entitled "Japanese Sub-' 
marine Operations at Pearl Harbor." This is an evaluation prepared 
by intelligence officers. 

Mr, Keefe. Jap intelligence officers ? 

Admiral Inglis. United States intelligence officers. 

The next document is entitle;! 'Tntelligence Report." The subject 
is "Japan Navy submarines." The date on this is April 22, The 
vear is not given. It might be deduced, however, that the year is 
i944. 

The next document is 16 August 194-3. It is marked "Interrogation 
Report No, 148 of Yokota, S." Yokota is the family name and S 
the initial of the given name. 

The next document is entitled "United States Pacific Fleet and 
Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 
1944." 

The next document is dated 30 June 1943. The subject is "ICPOA 
Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 472, Submarine 
School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences off Hawaii. 

'TCPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 

473, Instructions to the Yatsumaki Butai." 

"ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemj'- Documents, Item No. 

474, Places of Military Importance in the Kurile Islands." 

The next document is dated 25 July 1945, Translation [4^S] 
No. 290. Subject, "The Southern Cross by Kuramoti, Iki", Kuramoti 
being the family name and Iki the given name. 

The next document is a translation of combined fleet top seci-et 
operation order No, 1, 

Mr. Mitchell. Is that a translation of the Jap script we have here, 
or is supposed to be? 

Admiral Inglis. This is a translation of the Japanese script. I 
am informed by my translators that there are a few corrections which 
they feel should be made in this document here, and those corrections 
will be produced at the proper time. 

We haven't got the photostatic copies now. 

The next document is entitled, "Enemy Lists of Sorties by Sub- 
carried Planes." There is no date on this. Its precise source is not 
indicated. 

The next document is a memorandum dated October 13, 1945, 
addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the fifth Marine 
Amphibious Corps. The subject is "Prewar Espionage in the 
Hawaiian Island," and it pertains to an interview with Yoshio 
Shiga, lieutenaut commander. Imperial Japanese Navy. In this 
case Yoshio is the given name and Shiga is the family name. That 
memorandum is signed by Robert N. Tate, special agent of the 
Counter-intelligence Corps, attached to the Four Hundred Ninety- 
sixth CIC Detachment of the Fifth Marine Division, and contains 
several endorsements through official channels, sliowing its [4^^] 



176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

receipt in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations yesterday, No- 
vember 16. I believe counsel ought to have the copy, which is not 
included in these papers, of reports submitted by the General Head- 
quarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, from 
headquarters at Tokyo. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. At this point I will read into the record 
a paraphrase of a message dated October 6, 1945, from the Secretary 
of War to General MacArthur, as follows : 

The War Department has been requested to provide the joint congressional 
committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack vpith information concerning 
the attack available in Japanese files and records, to include Japanese agencies 
involved or informed of plans, date the attack was first planned, sources and 
nature of information on which plans and operation based, details of plans as 
they developed, composition of attack force, Japanese losses, routes followed by 
attack force before and after attack, and Japanese Ivnowledge of damage inflicted. 
Request suitable measures be taken to obtain above information. Advise by 
cable information now available, steps open to you to obtain desired material with 
estimate of time required, summary of additional information as available. Air 
mail pertinent documents. 

Now in response to that message the AVar Department has produced 
three documents: One, cables from General MacArthur, [4^'/] 
dated the 14th of October — this is a preliminary report — and a further 
detailed report dated October 26, 1945. 

Then you just spoke of another one. That last one came in last 
night, that was a Navy report, is that right? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. That came from the Marines 
through Navy channels. 

Mr. MiTciTELL. Have you had this report from General MacArthur's 
headquarters in this message before you ? 

Adniiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And examined that ? 

Admiral Inglis. Y^es, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now the War Department handed me last night, or 
early this morning, another message from General Headquarters, 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. That means General 
MacArthur, Tokyo. That is dated November 8, 1945. Have you 
examined that? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, we have also examined that. 

Mr. Mitchell. How would you classify this material, as to the type 
of material it is? First there is an operational order and other 
captured documents from the Japs, is that it ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then you have also a number of documents recording 
interviews of captured Japanese prisoners ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

[4^8] Mr. Mitchell. Then you have the report from General 
MacArthur? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, and those are interviews of Japa- 
nese officers who were not in the status of prisoners of war. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is there anything else in that file that is classified 
in a different way, that you can think of ? 

Admiral Inglis. The only remaining item is the report which 
originated with the Marine detachment and which was forwarded 
through Navy channels, and that is largely the interrogation of Lieu- 
tenant Commander Shiga, Imperial Japanese Navy. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is not he a prisoner of war ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 177 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; he is in more or less the same category as 
the others, an officer v\ho was interviewed after VJ-day. 

Mr. IMiTCHELL. That is the document that came in last night, isn't 
it? 

Admiral Inglis. That is the document that came in last night. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now previous to the receipt of that document, and 
the one of November 8 from General Macx^rthur, have you prepared 
a summary digest of these documents ? 

Admiral Inglis. I had, sir. I would like to add to my [4^9] 
answer to your former question that this last document which has just 
been presented, the one that was received last night 

ilr. Mitchell. By the Navy? 

Admiral Inglis. Through Navy sources, through Navy channels — 
also contains an endorsement, or rather a carbon copy of an endorse- 
ment from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, which 
pertains to some investigations we have made out there, in an effort 
t o corroborate or contradict some of the testimony of this Lieutenant 
Commander Shiga. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, since the receipt of these last tAvo documents 
tliat came through Navy sources and Army sources within the last 
few hours, have v'ou gone through them to see whether your digest 
requires any additions? 

Admiral Inglis. I have, sir; and it does require some substantial 
clianges and additions. , 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you made those ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You had to do that last night and this morning, is 
that correct ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And you have already put in motion mimeographic 
machines so that copies of them may be supplied? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now I would like to ask the Admiral if [4301 
you will please give your digest of these original documents that you 
have there. ' 

Admiral Inglis. I w^ould like to say, first of all, that throughout 
this presentation which is to follow, the dates will be expressed in 
Japanese time. Thus the date of the attack will be given as Decem- 
ber 8, which is Japanese time, rather than December 7, which is 
Hawaiian time. Wherever I deviate from that practice I will 
specifically so state, as I proceed. 

With respect to that difference, we should add 191^ hours to Hon- 
olulu time in order to get Tokyo time; we should add 51^ hours to 
Honolulu time in order to get Washington time, and we should adtl 
14 hours to Washington time in order to get Tokyo time. 

I would also like to make the preliminary comment that some of 
the phraseology used in this presentation may sound a little strange 
to American ears. That is because of peculiar Japanese usage, where 
the Japanese are directly quoted. 

The first item concerns the formulation of the plan for the attack 
on Pearl Harbor. It is reported that a surprise attack 

Mr. Mitchell (interposing). When you say "it is reported" you 
mean it is disclosed in tliese documents? Is that what 5''ou mean? 

[4^1] Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. That expression 



178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"it is reported" is used advisedly, to indicate that it has not been con- 
firmed by other sources, and we cannot guarantee its accuracy. All 
we have is the report. 

Mr. Mitchell. You are not guaranteeing the Japs? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

[4^2] It is reported that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was 
originally conceived and proposed in the first part of January 1941 by 
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief combined fleet, who, 
at that time, ordered Rear Adm. Takijiro Onishi, then chief of staff 
of the Eleventh Air Fleet, to study the operation. In the latter part 
of August 1941, Admiral Yamamoto ordered all fleet commanders and 
other ke}^ staff members to Tokyo for war games preliminar}^ to a 
final formulation of operation plans for a Pacific campaign which in- 
cluded a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. A war plans conference was 
lield continuously at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 
to September 13. On September 13 an outline containing essential 
points of a basic operation order, which was later to be issued as Com- 
bined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, was completed. This 
operation order, which included detailed plans for the surprise attack 
on Pearl Harbor, was promulgated to all fleet and task force command- 
ers on November 5. 1941. Therefore, this date, November 5, 1941, is 
to be regarded as the date on which the plan for the attack on Pearl 
Harbor was completed. 

Operation orde^- No. 1 under heading of "Preparations for the Out- 
break of War" states that — 

When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders 
will be WS] issued establishing the approximate date (Y-Day) for 
commencement of operations and announcing "First Preparations for War." 

That completes that quotation. 

The operation order continues to say that — 

The time for the Outbreak of War (X-Day) will be given in an Imperial General 
Headquarters Order. 

The details of the plan of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as set forth 
in operation order No. 1, were worked out by members of the naval 
general staff operations feection, combined fleet operations staff and 
first air fleet operations staff. 

III. Determination of December 8 as day of attack; under elate of 
November 7, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto issued combined fleet top se- 
cret operation order No. 2 saying "First preparations for war. Y-day 
will be December 8." In accordance with the definition of Y-day as 
given in operation order No. 1, this establishes December 8 onl}^ as the 
approximate date for commencement of operations. An Imperial 
naval order issued from the Imperial general headquarters under date 
of December 2, 1941 states : 

The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on 
8 December. 

This order is in effect the announcement of X-clay as defined in 
operation order No. 1. Thus it becomes apparent that the tentative 
approximate elate for the attack [^■^4] selecteel on November 7 
and defined as Y-day is reafiirmed on December 2 as X-clay. In other 
words, the original tentative date — Y-day — and the final precise 
elate — X-day — are in fact the same date. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is December 7, our time? 

Admiral Inglis. The date of attack is December 7. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 179 

Mr. Mitchell. You explained in the beginning that Japanese times 
were given, but to just point it up, I am asking if that December 8 was 
December 7 Honohilu time. 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct. Unless I make some parentheti- 
cal, all times will be Tokj^o time. 

To repeat, in other words, the original tentative date — Y-day — and 
the final precise date — X-day — are, in fact, the same date. 

In discussions prior to November 7, the Imperial headquarters navy 
section generally recognized December 8 as suitable from an opera- 
tional standpoint and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders 
of the combined fleet. For a dawn attack in the Hawaiian area in 
December, the 10th would have been suitable from the standpoint of 
the dark of the moon. 

Mr. Mitchell. That you are taking from the documents; it is 
Japanese opinion? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct. This is all oriented [4^5] 
to the Japanese point of view. 

However, it was expected that the United States Pacific Fleet, in 
accordance with its custom during maneuvers, would enter the harbor 
on Friday and leave on Monday — Hawaiian dates. 

That is Friday and Monday, Hawaiian dates. 

Therefore, Sunday — Hawaiian date — was decided on. In order to 
assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the 
take-off time of the attacking planes was to be set as near to dawn 
as possible — approximately 1 hour after sunrise. 

Here I come to the deviation from the original script. 

Mr. Mitchell. A deviation resulting from these last documents? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct. 

The following statement is made by a Japanese officer pilot who 
participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor : 

On October 5, 1941, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the carriers, 
aboard the Akayi in Shibushi Bay, by the chief of staff of the carriers. Rear 
Admiral Rynosuke Kosaka. About 100 attended. They were told, very secretly, 
that on "December 1941 (Japan time), a Japanese naval air force would strike 
the American Fleet at Hawaii." Grand Admiral of the Japanese Navy, Isoi-aku 
Yamamoto, also addressed the group, saying that, "Although Japan never wanted 
to fight Uo6'\ the United States, they were forced to because they would 
be defeated regardless, if the United States continued its aid to China and its oil 
embargo. The United States Fleet," he said, "was Japan's strongest enemy, so 
if they could strike it unexpectedly at Hawaii it would be 2 or "S months before it 
could maneuver. By that time occupation of Borneo, the Philippines, Singapore. 
Java, and Sumatra would be complete." 

The next title has to do with the date of leaving port. 

It is reported that on or about November 14 CINC of the combined 
fleet ordered the units of the Pearl Harbor attacking force to assemble 
in Hitokappu Bay. 

Commander Biard, will you point to Hitokappu Bay? That is the 
Island of Etorofu. 

It is further reported that about November 21 the situation seemed 
to be approaching a stage where commencement of hostilities were 
inevitable. The navy section of the Imperial general headquarters 
therefore issued the following order : 

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to 
advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station 
Ihem in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such [JfSl] 
that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet the 
situation promptly. 



180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I would like to say at this time that upon introducing the subject 
of "Date of leaving port," I went back to the original script as pre- 
' pared a few days ago. 

On November 25 the commander in chief, combined fleet, issued the 
following order to the striking force, which had, since November 22, 
been assembled at Hitokappu Bay. 

(a) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining 
close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters 
and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United 
States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first aid raid is planned 
for dawn of X-day — exact date to be given by later order. 

Upon completion of the air raid the task force, keeping close coordination 
and guarding against enemy counter attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters 
and then return to Japan. 

(b) Should it appear certain that Japanese- American negotiations will reach 
an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the 
forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their 
bases.^ 

[^38] (c) The task force shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 
November 26 and advance to 42° N. and 170° E. — standing by position — on the 
afternoon of December 4, Japan time, and speedily complete refueling. 

Commander Biard, will you point to that position? 
The actual time of departure was 9 : 00 a. m., November 26, Japan 
time — 1 : 30 p. m., November 25, Hawaii time. 

V. Date of instructions to execute plan : Combined fleet top secret 
operation order No. 2, issued by Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in- 
chief of the combined fleet, and dated November 7, 1941 is the basic 
order or instruction to execute the detailed plan for the attack on 
Pearl Harbor. 

On December 1 the Cabinet Council approved the commencement of 
hostilities against the United States. On the same day, an Imperial 
naval order issued on instruction by the Imperial general headquarters 
stated : 

Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached 
a position (sic) to declare war on the United States of America. 

On December 2 an Imperial naval order issued under instruction 
from the Imperial general headquarters stated : 

The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced 
on December 8. 

There is no copy of this order available nor is there conclusive evi- 
dence that [4^9] it constitutes the formal X-day order re- 
ferred to in operations order No. 1. Its .effect, however, is clearly 
equivalent to the final determination of a specific time for the outbreak 
of the war, and it may be regarded therefore as a final determination 
of X-day. 

VI. Details of plan: Hitokappu Bay was selected as the point of 
departure from Japan because it was recognized as the most suitable 
place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new developments 
in the situation as well as to keep its location and movements secret. 

In formulating final plans, it was decided that a torpedo attack 
against anchored ships in Pearl Harbor was the most effective method 



^ See p. 205, infra, for correction by Adm. Inglis. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 181 

of putting the main strength of the United States Pacific Fleet in the 
Hawaii area out of action for a long period of time. The following 
two obstacles were considered : 

(a) The fact that Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow. 

(b) The fact that Pearl Harbor was probably equipped with torpedo 
nets. 

In regard to point (a) it was planned to attach stabilizers to the 
torpedoes and launch thean from an extremely low altitude. 

In regard to point (b), since success could not be [44-01 
counted on, a bombing attack was also employed. 

I must deviate again from the text prepared the other day and 
refer to this last source received just yesterday. 

Evidence indicates that as late as 29 November — Japan time — 
the Japanese force expected to find six United States carriers in 
Hawaiian waters; they were aware that the U. S. S. Saratoga was, 
in late November, on the west coast of the United States and also 
that the U. S. S. Enterpiise would be "two or three days out of the 
attack." On 31 November, Japan time, when the striking force was 
well out to sea, it received a report that only one or two carriers were 
in Pearl Harbor. On December 6, Japan time, word was received 
that no carriers were in Pearl Harbor, but that 8 battleships and 15 
cruisers were in the harbor. At a briefing, which took place on or 
about December 5, Japan time, each pilot was furnished a photograph 
of a map of Pearl Harbor on which each pilot made notes on courses, 
anchorage areas, or missions. 

Now I return to the script of 2 or 3 days ago. 

Three courses were considered for the Hawaii operation : The 
northern course which was actuall}'^ used, a central course which 
headed east following the Hawaiian Islands, and a southern route 
passing through the Marshall Islands and approaching from the south. 

[44i] Commander Biard, would you roughly indicate those 
three routes ? 

That would be the northern route (following Commander Biard's 
pointer), that would be the central route, through the Mandated Is- 
lands and the Hawaiian chain and the southern group just out of the 
Mandated Islands, up to Hawaii. 

On the northern route, although it Avas far from the enemy, United 
States, patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little 
chance of meeting- commercial vessels, the influences of weather and 
topography were important. Refueling at sea and navigation were 
difficult. On the central and southern routes the advantages and dis- 
advantages were generally just the opposite to those of the northern 
route. Although it may be assumed tliat the central and southern 
routes would be preferable for the purposes of refueling at sea, the 
chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the 
routes lie near Wake, Midway, Palmyra, Johnston Islands, and so 
forth. Consequently, it was hardl}^ expected that a surprise attack 
could be made. The ability to refuel and the necessity of surprise 
were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed, the execution 
of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling 
problem could be overcome by training. On tlie other hand, a surprise 
attack under all circumstances could not be as- [44-^] sured by 
Japanese strength alone. Therefore, the northern route was selected. 



182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

By routing the striking force to pass between Midway and the 
Aleutians, it was expected to pass outside the patrol zones of United 
States patrol planes. Moreover, screening destroyers were sent ahead 
of the fleet, and in the event any vessels were encountered the main 
body of the force would make a severe change of course and endeavor 
to avoid detection. If the striking force had been detected prior to 
X-2-clay, it was planned to have the force return without executing 
the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-l-clay, the ques- 
tion of whether to make an attack or to return would have been de- 
cided in accordance with the local conditions. If the attack had failed, 
it was planned to send the main force in the Island Sea out to the 
Pacific in order to bring in the task force. 

I would like to remark again, that this is Japanese phraseology^ 
and may api^ear a little strange in its reasoning processes. 

Returning now to the prepared script, item 7 is entitled "Sources 
of data used in planning the Pearl Harbor attack were as follows." 

These sources — I am speaking now from the point of view of the 
Japanese — were : 

[44^] (A) American public broadcasts from Hawaii. 

(B) Reports of Japanese naval attaches in "Washington, D. C. 

(C) Reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters prior to the 
attack. A Japanese pilot states that at no time were visual land sig- 
nals used from Hawaii. 

(D) Information obtained from ships which had called at Hawai- 
ian ports in mid-November. 

Those are the onh' four sources which the Japanese have admitted. 
We know, however, that there is a fifth source : 

(E) Espionage network in Hawaiian Islands, being uncensored 
cable communications with Japan. 

That last is from an American source, not from the Japanese source. 

Mr. Keefe. Under (C), with respect to signals, I didn't quite catch 
that. It doesn't appear here. 

Admiral Inglis. I beg your pardon. I am glad you brought that up. 
That last sentence "a Japanese pilot states" came from this last source 
which we just received last night. That was a change in the script. 

Mr. Keefe. That will be included in the mimeographed corrected 
statement which we will receive later ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is right. 

The Vice Chaikman. And that goes under what? . 

[444] Admiral IxGLis. Under source (C). 

Now, again I must deviate from the original script and quote this 
last document which was just received yesterday. 

A Japanese oflBcer pilot lias reported his belief "that information concerning all 
movements of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor was transmitted to the fleet 
through coded messages broadcast over a Honolulu commercial broadcasting 
station." Source was certain "that there was a Hawaiian Nisei" — a second- 
generation American of Japanese descent — "who was a Japanese naval officer, 
aboard the flagship Akagi, whose specific job was listening to these broadcasts 
and decoding them." Source said "that in his opinion the codes were many and 
varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast the German attache lost one 
dog, it might mean that a carrier left Pearl Harbor. If the German attachi6 
wanted a cook or houseboy, it might m.ean that a battleship or cruiser had entered 
the harbor." 

Source states "that the information was conveyed on radio programs just 
following the news broadcasts, which he stated were at 6: 30 a. m., 12 noon, and 
7 p. m. He was prone to think that time following the 7 p. m., broadcast was 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 183 

used since the Japanese agents would then have had an opportunitj- to convey 
information concerning a whole day's activities. 

[44-5] I would like to say at this time that the endorsement which 
the authorities at Hawaii, the FBI, ONI, and MIS, have placed on this 
Last document indicates that they cannot find any substantiation for 
this plan to use Honohdu commercial broadcasting stations to convey 
information to the Japanese task force. They also pointed out that 
this procedure would not have been necessary since the Japanese 
consul, who was the center of the espionage network, had full access 
to a direct connection via cable uncensored directly from Honolulu 
to Tokyo. 

That completes the deviation from the original script, and I return 
now to item 8, which is "Details of execution." 

[440] VIII. Details of execution: Study of the Japanese plan 
of operation indicates the Japanese high command made the follo\v- 
-ing assumptions with regard to the United States Fleet : 

(a) That the main body of the United States Pacific Fleet would be 
at anchor within Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Sunday, Hawaii 
time. 

(b) That a carrier force could be moved from home waters across 
the Pacific to within striking distance of the main islands of the 
Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by Americar 
defensive reconnaissance. 

(c) That should assumptions (a) or (h) be in error, a reserve grouj) 
of heavy naval units could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support 
to the carrier striking force in a decisive engagement with the American 
Fleet. The other task forces of the Japanese Fleet (southern force, 
northern force, and the south seas force) would be available for this 
purpose. Implied in the plan is the assumption that, in the event of 
such an engagement, the combined strength of the bulk of available 
Japanese major fleet units would be sufficient to defeat the American 
Fleet. 

(d) A powerful carrier air strike directed against the American 
forces based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were efi!ected, achieve 
the strategic result of crippling the American Fleet; that such a 
strike would achieve also the [44'^] destruction of American 
land-based air power and thus permit the Japanese striking force to 
withdraw without damage. 

The omission from the Japanese plans of provision for landings on 
Oahu was decided upon during discussions held on September 6 and 7 
when operation order No. 1 was being put together. It was, decided 
that no landing operation should be included because it would have 
been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than 
a month after the opening of hostilities; it was further recognized 
that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy 
would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could be ac-. 
complished without detection; it was further recognized that insuper- 
able logistic problems rendered landings on the island impractical. 

The complete plan of the Pearl Harbor attack was known in advance 
to members of the Navy General Staff, the commanders in chief and 
Chiefs of Staff, and staff members of the combined fleet headquarters 
and first air fleet headquarters. Part of the plan w-as known in advance 
to the Navy Minister, Navy Vice Minister, and other ranking naval 
officers. 



184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It is also reported — again I use that expression advisedly — it is also 
reported that the Emperor knew in advance onl^'^ the general outline 
of the plan and that none of the Japaneses officials who were in the 
United States, including [44^] Ambassadors Nomura and 
Kurusu, knew anything about the plan in advance. 

Parenthetically again, that last sentence, referring to the knowledge 
or lack of knowledge of the Emperor and Nonnira and Kurusu, is only 
based on a single report purely from recollection of a Japanese officer. 

[44^] The aims of the entire Japanese campaign, including the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, were predicated on the desire for military 
conquest, security', and enhancement of the Empire by occupation of 
areas rich in natural resources. With regard to the Pearl Harbor 
attack, operation order No. 1 says that : 

In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of opera- 
tion, and supply lines to the Orient, will be out. Enemy forces will be inter- 
cepted and annihilated. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will 
to fight. 

Since the American Fleet and air power based in the Hawa^iian 
area were the only obstacles of consequence, a major task force built 
around a carrier striking group was considered essential to conducting 
a successful surprise attack. Accordingly, the following allocation of 
forces for the Pearl Harbor attack was made : 

Refer now, please, to item 17 in the Navy folder, which gives the 
composition of the forces in some detail.. I will summarize by saying 
that it consisted of : 

Striking force: Commanding Officer: CinC 1st Air Fleet, Vice 
Admiral Chuichi Nagnmo. 

[4S0] BatDiv 3 ( 1st Section) (Hiei, Kirishima) , 2 BB. 

CarDiv 1 (Kaga) (Akagi). 

CarDiv 2 (Hiryu, Soryu). 

CarDiv 5 (Shokaku, Zuikaku) , 6 CV. 

CruDiv 8 (Tone, Chikuma) , 2 CA. 

DesRon 1 ( Abukuma, 4 DesDivs) , 1 CL, 16 DD. 

11 train vessels. 

ADVANCE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

Commanding Officer: CinC 6th Fleet, Vice Admiral Mitsumi 
Shimizu. 

Isuzu, Yura, 2 CL. 

Katori, 1 CL-T. 

I-cla*s submarines (including SubRons 1, 2, 3), 20 SS. 

(I-l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 68, 69, 74) 

Midget submarines, 5 M-SS. 

6 train vessels. 

Of the 11 train vessels allotted to the striking force only 3 tankers 
and 1 supply ship actually accompanied the force. In addition, 3 
submarines of the advance expeditionary force accompanied the strik- 
ing force, the other submarines having proceeded from the Inland 
Sea independently of the striking force. 

The striking force departed Hitokappu Bay at 9 a. m., November 26, 
and in accordance with orders from CinC Combined [4^ J] 
Fleet, proceeded to its destination 200 miles due north of Oahu. It 
was fueled en route. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 185 

At this time I would like to pause to advise the committee that the 
reproduction of this chart to which Commander Biard is pointing is' 
included in the Navy folder as item 18. 

On leaving the harbor, the striking force was joined by three sub- 
marines which, with several of the destroyers, took station as scouting 
screen. Held down by the low speed of the train vessels and the )ieed 
for fuel economy, the force cruised eastward at 13 knots. Lookouts 
were posted but no searches or combat air patrols were flown. It had 
been anticipated that North Pacific weather would cause difficulty in 
refueling at sea and those ships whose capacity in relation to consump- 
tion was small were loaded with oil in drums for emergency use. 

Now, off the script, the next paragraph is modified somewhat by this 
document which we just received yesterday through the naval channels. 

The weather, however, proved unifoi-mly calm, and fueling from the 
tankers was carried out as planned. A participating pilot states that 
the weather was foggy part of the time. On or about December 2, all 
ships were darkened and condition two (second degree of readiness, 
gun crews stationed) was set. 

That condition of readiness was set about December 2. 

\4S"2] On December 4, Japan time, the rendezvous point (42° W., 
170° E.) was reached and the combat ships of the force fueled to capac- 
ity from the tankers, which were dropped that night. The task force 
t hen turned southeast, probably at increased speed. The carriers Iliiyn 
and Soryu^ whose fuel capacity was small, had been oiled daily while 
in company with the tankers and now had to be fueled by bucket 
brigade from the oil drums taken on board. The cruise up to this date 
had been uneventful; no sliii^s or planes had been sighted and no false 
alarms had been sounded. When the force was 800 miles due north of 
Hawaii, on December fi, Japan time, it received from the Japanese 
Navy Department a radio message "Climb Mount Niitaka"; this was 
the signal for the attack and the force proceeded south at 24 knots to its 
destination. On the niglit of the 7-8th of December, Japan time, the 
run in was made at top speed, 26 knots. 

Again I would like to say that radio message concerning "Climb 
Mount Niitaka" was derived from this last source which we just 
received yesterday. 

Returning now to the original script : 

The problem of defeating enemy — United States — radio intelligence 
was met by a program of deceptive traffic — false assumption of call 
signs, padding of circuits, and so forth — to simulate the presence of a 
striking force, carriers and carrier air groups {-k^S^ in the 
Inland Sea. In contrast, no effort was made to mask the movements 
or presence of the naval forces moving southward, because jjhysical 
observation of that movement were unavoidable and the radio activity 
of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of normalcy. 

Again ad libbing, just to be sure that there is no misunderstanding;, 
the movement southward that the Japanese are speaking of in this 
connection was a movement of other forces from Japanese Empire 
waters south toward the French-Indochina coast, and not the move- 
ment of the task force, the Japanese task force, from its position 400 
miles north of Hawaii to its position 200 miles north of Hawaii. 

Returning to the script: 



186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Upon arrival at their destination, 200 miles due north of Oahu, the 
carriers of the striking force launched on schedule a total of 361 planes 
in three waves, commencing at 6 a. m. and ending at 7 : 15 a. m,^ 
December 7, Hawaii time. 

I might add here at this point, which is not in either script, the note 
that I have : "It was planned that the force be protected during the 
attack by a combat patrol of 18 fighters to be launched about 0545 — ■ 
5 : 45. That, presumably, is in addition to the 361 planes forming 
the attack group. 

Returning now to the script : 

[4^41 The planes rendezvoused to the soutli and then flew in for 
coordinated attacks. In addition to the attack planes launched at this 
time, it was planned to launch two type Zero reconnaissance seaplanes 
to execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage 
just before the attack. 

I must deviate again from the script which was distributed 2 or 3 
days ago and say that from the source just received yesterday we 
derived this additional information. 

Apparently, one seaplane from a cruiser took off at about 0430 
Hawaii time for observation purposes at 16,404 feet altitude. 
Returning now to the original script : 

Upon completion of the launchings, the force withdrew at high 
speed, 26 or 27 knots, to the northwest. Plane recovery was effected 
between 10 : 30 a. m. and 1 : 30 p. m., December 7, Hawaii time. The 
striking force then proceeded by a circuitous route to Kure, arriving 
December 23, Japan time. En route carrier division two — Hhyu, 
Soryu — Cruiser Division Eight — Tone^ Chikuina — and two destroy- 
ers — Tanikaze, Yurakaze — were detached on December 15, Japan time, 
to serve as reinforcements for the Wake Island operation. Original 
plans called for the retiring task force to strike at Midway if possible, 
but, probably because of the presence of a United States task force 
south of Midway, that strike was not made. 

[^5] Until completion of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 
by the striking force, the advance expeditionary force of submarines 
was under command of the striking force commander. The precise 
movements of the participating submarines are not known, but it is 
believed that most of these units departed from home waters in late 
November and proceeded to the Hawaiian area via Kwajalein; a few 
of these submarines, delayed in leaving Japan, changed course and 
proceeded directly to Hawaii. 

The functions assigned to the submarines of the advance expedi- 
tionary force were carried out as planned in operations order No. 1, 
namely: 

{a) Until X-3 some of the submarines were to reconnoiter impor- 
tant points in the Aleutians, Fiji, and Samoa, and were to observe and 
report on any strong American forces discovered. 

{h) One element was assigned to patrol the route of the striking 
force in advance of the movement of that force to ensure an unde- 
tected approach. 

{c) Until X-5 the remaining submarines were to surround Hawaii 
at extreme range while one element approached and reconnoitered 
without being observed. 



PROCEEDINCS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 187 

(d) On X day the submarines in the area ^ere to — 

observe and attack the American Fleet in tlie Hawaii area; make a surprisf 
attack on the channel leading into Pearl Harbor and attempt to close it; if tlie 
enemy moves out to fight, he will [-^56] be pursued and attacked. 

During the evening of December 7 (the day before the actual at- 
tack), the force of I class submarines took up scouting positions in 
allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of Pearl 
Harbor; these submarines were ordered not to attack until the task 
force strike was verified. 

Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, 5 midget submarines 
were launched from specially fitted fleet submarines as a special at- 
tacking force to conduct an offensive attack against American ships 
within the harbor and to prevent the escape of the American Fleet 
through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air strike. Avail- 
able data indicates that only one of the five midget submarines pene- 
trated into the harbor; it inflicted no damage on American units and 
none of the five rejoined the Japanese force. 

After the actual attack, the I class submarines maintained their 
])artols in the Hawaiian area and at least one of the group (the 1-7) 
launched its aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to 
ascertain the status of the American fleet and installations. The op- 
eration plan provided that, in the eveut of virtual destruction of the 
American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, one submarine division or less would 
be placed between Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic; 
in fact, at least one submarine (the 1-17) was dispatched to the 
[4^7] Oregon coast on or about December 14. One large subma- 
rine (pilot rescue) was stationed east of Kaui. 

That last also comes from this latest source, about the rescue sub- 
marine stationed east of Kaui. Kaui is northwest of Oahu. I might 
also say parenthetically that this is the first information we have 
ever had that the Japanese used the submarine rescue tactics which 
were later so successfully employed by our own forces. 

The next subheading is "Projected Losses Compared with Actual 
Losses." 

During the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo, 
from September 2 to 13, 1941, it was assumed that the Pearl Harbor 
striking force would suffer the loss of one-third of its participating 
units; it was specifically assumed that one Ahagi class carrier, and 
one Soryu class carrier would be lost. No mention is made of prob- 
able plane losses. A very slight expectation was held that some of 
the five midget submarines would be retrieved but all midget sub- 
marine ])ersonnel were prepared for death. The losses actually in- 
curred were 27 aircraft and all of the 5 midget submarines. 

The Japanese assessment of damage inflicted on the American forces 
was made from reports of flight personnel upon their return and from 
studies of photographs taken by flight personnel. No reconnaissance 
planes were used during the [4-58^ attack to assess results, al- 
though one plane was launched from a submarine for this purpose 
well after the attack had been completed; one element of fighter 
planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as pos- 
sible to make observations. The official Japanese estimate of damage 
inflicted and the contrastiug actual damage inflicted is as follows: 



188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In this table I give material both from Japanese sonrces and Ameri- 
can sources. In the left-hand table is the Japanese estimate. In the 
right-hand table is the actual damage as reported from American 
sources. 

The Japanese estimated that they had suidv four battleships, two 
cruisers, and one tanker. 

Actually thej^ sank four battleships, a converted battleship, the 
Utah, and also one mine layer, the Oghihi. 

The Japs estimated that they had heavily damaged four battleships 
and five cruisers. 

Actually they had heavily damaged one battleship, two light 
cruisers, three destroyers, and one repair ship. 

The Japanese estimated that they had lightly damaged one battle- 
ship. Actually they had slightly damaged three battleships. 

I beg your pardon. Three battleships, one light cruiser, and one 
aircraft tender. 

The Japanese estimated that they had destroyed a total [45P] 
of 450 aircraft. Actually they destroyed 92 Navy planes. 

Perhaps the colonel can give the number of Army planes destroyed 
and then we will have it all at this point. 

Colonel Thielen. Yes ; we have some figures on that. 

The Vice Chairman. You have 10.5 here, Admiral. 

Admiral Inglis. You mean Navy planes? 

The Vice Chairmax. One hundred and five Navy. 

\I{60i\ Admiral Inglis. That figure of Navy damage has been 
bandied about among my staff, and we have liad reports all the way 
from something down in the 80's up to 136. The other day we gave as 
our best estimate 105. We have revised that to our best estimate of 102. 

Colonel TiiiELEX. Our figure was 96 Army planes lost, and I should 
explain that is greater than the initial reports primarily because some 
of the planes were cannibalized to put other aircraft in the air. But 
the final figure is 96 Army planes lost as the result of enemy action. 

Admiral Inglis. I think it is fair to state that the Japanese esti- 
mated that they had destroyed 450 planes: that they actually de- 
stroyed, in round numbers, 200 planes, perhaps a little less than 200. 

Finally, it may thus be concluded that the Japanese estimate of 
damage to United States ships was highly conservative, whereas their 
estimate of damage to United States aircraft was grossly exaggerated. 

Mr. Mitchell, Do you want to put up the map there. Admiral, that 
shows the reconnaissance? 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I note the time, and before any 
cross-examination, as far as we are coiicerned, we would wish to have 
an opportunity to look at tlie exhibits, other than the Japanese lan- 
guage ones — we would not be able to \_hGl\ I'ead thenu There 
will perhaps be opportunity during the recess. 

The Chairman, The Chair announced a while ago that we might run 
to 1 o'clock. What is the wish of the committee ? 

The Vice Chairman. Let us hear from counsel. 

Mr. Mitchell, We are willing to stop or go on, as you please. 

The Chairman, What is the desire of the committee with respect 
to an afternoon session ? 

Senator Brewster. I think we better go over to Monday morning. 

Mr. MuEPHT, Mr, Chairman, might I suggest that the witness lias 
not yet concluded his direct testimony. 

Senator Brewster. He has completed the statement. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 189 

Mr. Murphy. I understand counsel is now referring to some charts. 

The Chairman. He had finished his statement. 

Senator George. I suggest we go over to Monday. 

The Chairman. He had finished reading his statement, whereupon 
counsel was going to ask him some questions. 

Admiral Inglis. I have just two more charts. 

Senator Ferguson. Could we have counsel ask his questions and 
then recess? 

The Chairman. We can determine about the recess, but I [46'2'\ 
think in the meantime counsel should be permitted to conclude. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is what I mean. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Admiral Inglis. I would like, before concluding my direct state- 
ment, to invite the attention of the committee to two charts, which 
are also included in the folder which has been presented to you, in 
reduced form. 

The first one is an outline of the island of Oahu and shows the 
track or path of the two attacking units. I think you can see by the 
chart, without any great amount of explanation from me, the track 
which the Japanese pilot reported that the attacking units took. That 
is the first one there. 

The first wave is on the left. It shows how it is split up into 
several parts to attack various objectives. 

Then, the other arrows, on the right, show the second wave. It 
shows how it is split up to attack three different objectives. 

Now, if we could have the other chart showing the searches. 

That chart is item 19 in the folder, and the next is item 20 — I beg 
your pardon. It is the other way around. 

Mr. Murphy. In order to keep the record straight may it be noted 
that the witness is now referring to item 20 in the Xavy folder. 

Admiral Inglis. I have just completed referring to item 20. 

[463] Item 19 is a reproduction of searches that Avere shown in 
the previous testimony but now we have added to it, superimposed on 
it, the track of the Japanese task force, and you will notice there is one 
point where the track of the Japanese force overlaps a searched sector. 
However, the best evidence that we have is that by the time the search 
planes got out to that point the Japanese task force had left the area 
and was on its way northwestward at high speed and no contact was 
made. 

That concludes my statement. 

Mr. Gesell. One or two questions. Admiral, on the statement. 

You stated that the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was com- 
pleted on November 5, Jap time. I gather from that j^ou were talking, 
at that point, about the war plan as opposed to the operational deci- 
sion to put the plan into execution ; is tJiat right. 

Admiral Ingijs. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, by the 5th of November, Jap time, the 
Japs had worked out how they were going to accomplish this attack, 
but you did not mean to indicate that by that time they had reached a 
decision of a final and binding nature to attack; is that correct. 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct. 

[464-] Mr. Gesell. Coming over to the order of November 25, to 
which you referred I think on page 4 of your statement, where you said 
the commander in chief of the combined fleet issued an order to the 

79716 — 46 — pt. 1 15 



190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

striking force, and directing your attention particularly to subpara- 
graph B, which reads as follows : 

Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an 
amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action all the forces 
of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases. 

I want to ask you whether there is any evidence in any of this mate- 
rial that that order, and specifically the portion I just read, was ever 
revoked by any Japanese authorities prior to the attack ? 

Admiral Inglis. That order was not revoked. By inference it 
might be perhaps assumed that the order to climb Mount Niitaka was, 
in effect, a final firm commitment. 

Mr. Gesell. And when was that order received, did you say, by the 
striking force, to climb Mount Niitaka? 

Admiral Ingijs. That was on the 6th of December Japanese time, 
or the 5th of December United States time. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, what time of day ; does your information disclose 
what time of day ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

[465] Mr. Gesell. Will you point to the chart and indicate 
approximately what distance from Pearl Harbor you would estimate 
tliat the Japanese Fleet was at the time that order was received ^ 

Admiral Inglis. That will take a minute to figure out. 

Mr. Gesell. All right. 

The Vice Chairman: While we are waiting, could you spell that 
name, the name of the mountain, for us? 

Admiral Inglis. Niitaka. That is N-i-i-t-a-k-a. 

The best estimate that I can make is the point where that track 
intersects the 160 meridian. 

Will you point to that, 160 west. 

That is, necessarily, just pretty much of a guess, but I would say 
that it was at about this location, where the Japanese striking force is 
alleged to have received the message to climb Mount Niitaka. 

Mr. Gesell. I didn't understand whether that message was pur- 
ported to have come from Tokyo. 

Admiral Inglis. We understood that message came from Tokyo. 

Mr. Gesell. At the point you estimated the message was received 
the striking force was about ready to start its direct run toward Oahu ; 
is that correct ? 

Admiral Inglis. Almost; yes, sir. 

[466] Mr. Gesell. Now, with reference to the sources of data 
used in planning by the Japanese. You stated that source "E," espio- 
nage network in Hawaiian Islands, using uncensored cable communi- 
cations with Japan, was a source which you had added from your 
own knowledge of Jap sources ; is that not correct ? 

Admiral Inglis. Not from my own personal knowledge but from 
the United States records. 

Mr. Gesell. You were referring, were you, to intercepted Japanese 
messages concerning military installations, which were classified as 
the "magic" material or the "ultra" material by the Navy and Army? 

Admiral Inglis. The sources that I have indicated here are the 
FBI and ONI. These are derived from investigation reports of our 
agents in the Hawaiian area, not cryptanalytical material. 

Mr. Gesell. I thought I understood you to use the word "crypt- 
analytical" material vA\en discussing that paragraph? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 191 

Admiral Inglis. Not intentionally. I said using uncensored cable 
connnunications with Japan. That would be to forward the results 
of the Japanese espionage. They would use uncensored cable com- 
munications. 

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, we would like to direct the committee's 
attention to Exhibit 2 at this time, which is already in evidence, con- 
taining the Japanese messages concerning [467] military in- 
stallations and ship movements, and particularly to the section con- 
cerned with Hawaii. The committee will there see a series of messages 
between Tokyo and Honolulu, some of them translated after December 
7, mau}^ of them before, all of them concerned with the disposition of 
the fleet in the harbor, the nature of the reconnaissance, questions as 
to whether or not torpedo nets were down, the area in which the fleet 
conducted its regular maneuvers, and other information of a direct 
military espionage nature. 

I think subsequent testimony will indicate that at least most of these 
messages were sent by cable facilities from Hawaii to Tokyo or vice 
versa. 

The Chairmax. May I ask, do you mean commercial cable facilities? 

Mr. Gesell. Commercial cable facilities ; yes, sir. 

We. would like particularly to call attention to a message which 
appears at page 117 under the heading of "Other Messages of Particu- 
lar Interest," which indicates that on February 15, 1941, general no- 
tification was sent out concerning the nature of the espionage data 
that was wanted from various points by the Japanese authorities. 

Now, you referred, Admiral, to "train vessels." What are "train 
vessels?" 

Admiral Inglis. Train vessels are what we call auxiliary [468] 
types, such as tankers, supply ships, repair ships. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, in discussing the actual activities of the Japanese 
aircraft at the time of the commencement of the attack you stated that 
the planes rendezvoused to the south and then flew in for coordinated 
action. Did yoii mean to indicate by that that the planes came to Oahu 
from points in the south ? 

Admiral Inglis. By no means. Of course, this is Japanese language, 
that I have been quoting, or translations of it, but the intent of that 
statement was that the Japanese planes would rendezvous south of the 
carriers v,'hich were north of Oahu, and then pi'oceed from that ren- 
dezvous on farther south to Oahu itself. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, they would simply gather south of 
where the carriers were, but still north of Oahu, to make their forma- 
tion for the attack? 

Admiral Inglis. Correct. 

Mr. Gesell. As a matter of fact, your item No. 20 sketch indicates 
plainly, does it not, that, at least according to those records, the planes 
did come into Oahu from the north ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. I was somewhat puzzled by the time shown on item 20 
and I wanted to see if you could verify those times with the times that 
we have been discussing heretofore. The [469] times that 
appeared on the radar maps that the committee has been considering 
were, of course, all Hawaiian times, starting with the early pick-ups 
at 6 and 7 o'clock. 



192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, the times that appear on this map, if I read it correctly, say 
3 : 10, 4 : 10, 3 : 20, 4 : 25, and some of the notes indicate other times in 
about that area. 

I wonder if you cohld reconcile that difference for us ? 

Admiral Ixglis. As I understand it, this sketch is a reproduction of 
one drawn bv the Japanese officer who was interrogated and the best 
we can make out of that is that that time given was Tokyo time. 

If you substract 191/2 hours from 3 : 10, that should convert it into 
Hawaiian Honolulu time. 

Senator Ferguson. What would that be, will counsel inquire ? 

Mr. Gesell. I was going to make the computation. Senator. 

Senator Brewster. It is on the map, I understand. 

Admiral Inglis, Another way is to add 4^4 hours in 1 day. That 
would make it at 7 : 40. That would make the figure on the left-hand 
arrow 7 : 40 instead of 3 : 10. 

Mr. Gesell. Where it appears as 3 :10, that was 7 : 40. 

Admiral Inglis. That is the best we could make out of it; yes, sir. 

[470] Mr. Gesell. Now, that somewhat closely coincides, does 
it not, witli the information contained on the historical plot that we 
have been discussing? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, it does. 

Mr. Gesell. That showed that the planes were in fairly close to 
the northern tip of the island by, I believe, 7 : 39? 

Admiral Inglis. Right, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, this tract does not show any Japanese air activ- 
ity earlier than 3 : 10 or 7 : 40, does it ? 

Admiral Inglis. That tract does not, no, sir.. 

Mr. Gesell. Have you given in your statement all the information 
which is available as to the preliminary scouting activities of Jap 
planes prior to diis main flight that actually made the attack? 

Admiral Inglis. I think we have quoted verbatim the statements 
that these two pilots made. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, with respect to the discussion of the submarine 
movements — — 

Admiral Inglis. Mr. Gesell, may I interrupt a minute ? 

Mr. Gesell. Certainly. 

Admiral Inglis. I don't think that I gave you a final definitive 
answer to j^our question. My answer was that to the best of my 
knowledge and belief we have quoted precisely the translations of 
the statements made by the two pilots [4^^} and also, to the 
best of my knowledge and belief, that is the only evidence which we 
have. 

Mr. Gesell. I did not mean to interrupt ; I am sorry. 

Now, with respect to the disposition of the submarine forces which 
you have considered, you reported that at least one body of the sub- 
marines went to Hawaii via Kawajalein, did you not? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. That is in the Marshall group of islands, is it not ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Have you any information as to when those sub- 
marines arrived in the areas of the Marshall Islands? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. In discussing whether or not midget submarines pene- 
trated into the harbor you again indicated that your data pointed 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 193 

to the fact that only one submarine had penetrated into the harbor 
but that involved, did it not, the same qualitative judgments on your 
part as have already been considered by the committee in connection 
with your previous statement concerning submarines in the harbor? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. I have nothing to add re- 
garding submarines than I stated in m}^ previous statement. 

[472] Mr. Gesell. This is merely a repetition of your statement 
on this score ? 

Admiral Inglis. Tliat is right. 

Mr. Gesell. Did the Japanese in any way report how many sub- 
marines got in the harbor ? 

iVdmiral Inglis. We have no such report. 

Mr. Gesell. It is known, is it not, that none of the submarines re- 
turned, none of the Jap submarines returned ? 

Admiral Inglis. Tlie Japanese admit that. 

The Chaerman. That is midgets. 

Mr. Gesell. We are talking about the midget submarines. 

The Chairman, That is right. 

Admiral Inglis. The five midgets did not return, 

Mr. Gesell. Now, you say that they were these midget submarines 
from a mother ship. You mean that the small submarine was inside 
a larger submarine, or just how did it work ? 

Admiral Inglis. Those midget submarines are carried as a deck 
load on the larger submarine, 

Mr. Gesell. Under water or on the surface ? 

Admiral Inglis. Under water or on the surface. 

Mr, Gesell, In other words, the mother submarine can submerge 
taking the midget submarines with it? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. Of course, with some loss of 
military effectiveness because of the unusual [W3] load. 

Mr. Geseix. Yes, I imagine so. 

Now, I wanted to ask one question of you concerning the recon- 
naissance map item which we had, oi^ which the track of the Jap strik- 
ing force was presented. 

You stated that there was one overlap of the radius sliown there, 
I am not clear whether the reconnaissance as shown on that chart is 
the actual distance flown by the reconnaissance airplanes or whether 
it takes into account the visual reconnaissance which would be possible 
from the end of the radius of a flight. 

Do you understand what I mean ? 

Admiral Inglis. I understand, what you mean and I am not clear 
on that either, 

Mr. Gesell. The question, of course, arises, if it is the former rather 
than the latter, whether from the terminal points of the actual flight 
it would have been possible to see the departing or incoming Jap 
forces. I take it the incoming clearly no ; the question only relates to 
the departing Jap forces. 

Admiral Inglis. Of course, that is a highly speculative matter from 
my point of view, as to just what the visibility was, what the altitude 
of the planes was and how far they could see and I am afraid I cannot 
answer that question except [4741 fo say again that no sight 
contact was obtained, 

Mr, Gesell, Could you, when you get to it, also let us know whether 
the chart has charted the flight of the planes or whether it has taken 



194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

into account the additional reconnaissance possible by eyesight from 
the extremity of the reconnaissance? 

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the chart was only intended 
to show the actual flifTht of the planes and not the extension because of 
unj radius of visibility. 

' Air. Gesell. Have you any opinion as to what the maximum area 
of visibility might be ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I cannot answer that. 

Mr. Gesell. That would depend on the height of the planes and the 
atmospheric condition at tlie time, I take it. 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. As well as the eyesight of the pilots ? 

Admiral Inglis. Correct. 

Mr. Mitcpiell. Just one question, Admiral. 

This reconnaissance we have just been talking about on the vertical 
lines was the reconnaissance made after the attack in an effort to locate 
the carriers ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. The horizontal lines west of Pearl Harbor represent 
the only reconnaissance, I understand, that was li^S^ made on 
the 7th, prior to the attack? 

Admiral Inglis. Tliat is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And that reconnaissance, whether you can see 50 
miles beyond the liniits of the plane's flight, was obviously nowhere 
near the Jap fleets or the Jap carriers or the incoming planes? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think that is all. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Mitchell, I wonder if you would inquire from 
the witness what the initials "GMT" mean in connection with time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Greenwich meridian time; over in England some- 
where. 

Mr. Gearhart. Of course. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the starting point of all time. 

Mr. Gesell. Congressman, you will find all times transposed from 
tliat base in one of the schedules in the Navy folder. 

Mr. Gearhart. I see the exhibit here. In one of the items here they 
classify the time as "GMT December 8." What would that mean 
in United States, what would that mean in Hawaii and what would 
that mean in Japan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There is a table that gives all that. We can look 
it up for you. It is in an exhibit in evidence. 

[476'\ Mr. Gesell. Item 4, Mr. Gearhart, of the Navy exhibit. 
It is transposed into our time for the fifth, sixth and seventh, so that 
we can tell from any time we have what time it was at the key points, 
any different kind or type of time we want. 

Mr. Gearhart. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Gesell. I think that will prove helpful as the hearing goes along. 

Mr. Gearhart. Thank jou. 

Mr. Gesell. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have another exhibit of that 
Opana marked "15," in evidence. This may be clearer than the one I 
put in. I wonder whether we should also put this exhibit in? The 
other one was not so clear. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 195 

Mr. Mitchell. Is it a photostat of that other one? 

Senator Ferguson. I cannot tell without comparing the two. 

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose we look at it over the week end and see 
what it is. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, for the record, in view of the fact that 
the witness was asked about the other one I would say that they both 
should go in. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I had in mind, that they both go in. 

The Chairman. I' see no objection to them both going [4'^'7\ 
in, but counsel say they want to see over the week end what it is. 

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire if the witness over the week end 
will compare it, compare the three to show the differences? I think 
this is much clearer and it will be helpful and he will be able to see 
the differences between them. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is what I had in mind. 

Admiral Inglis. This is not mine. 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, this is the Army's ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Senator Brewster asked about these sources 
of material exhibits on the last statement. Would you like to have 
them over the week end ? 

Senator Brewster. I would like over the week end and for the 
convenience of counsel to have them for 2 or 3 hours. I will send them 
back to counsel. 

Mr. ISIitciiell. We will turn them over to you and leave them in 
your office and if any of the other members of the committee want to 
see them they can do so. 

The Chairman. Is the English translation on the exhibit? 

Mr. Mitchell. We will give him one with the English translation 
on. 

The Chairman. I think the Senator from ]\Iaine wanted the 
English translation. I thought if the Senator from Maine [P'S] 
wanted the English translation I would take the one in Japanese 
home with me over the week end. 

Senator Brewster. I might comment that I think probably the ex- 
amination would be as much as the Senator has made of any of thei 
other exhibits. 

The Chairman. The Senator from Maine has no information on 
that subject. 

Senator Brewster. Well, the Chairman had no information from 
me either. 

The Chairman. As is the similar case on many subjects which he ^ 
discusses. 

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire when Senator Brewster will get 
them, so that we may be able to see them in Senator Brewster's office? 

Mr. Gesell. Why doesn't he put them under his arm and take i^^ 
right now ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is a good suggestion. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question of the Senator 
from Maine? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. May I be permitted (o see tlu> ilewitl re}>ort? 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 



196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. There is one question that I am not quite clear on and 
I would like to have the witness give the information. He may have 
given it but I am not quite clear on it, [P'd] and that is the 
question as to the approximate mileage distance from Pearl Harbor of 
this task force, the Japanese task force, at the time the message was 
received. 

Admiral Inglis. I gave it as closely as I could estimate it and you 
will remember, Congressman Keefe, that they were 800 miles north 
of Oahu at the time they turned due south. That was 800 miles 
north of Oahu. 

Now, the point at which — I just guessed and I must insist that it is 
only a guess — at which the}' probably recei^^ed that radio message 
is where that track crosses the one hundred and sixtieth meridian, 
and again just guessing, I would say that was 200 miles further 
back toward Japan or, let vis say, a thousand miles roughly. 

Mr. Keeee. About a thousand miles north of Oahu when this mes- 
sage was received ? 

Admiral Inglis. Well, a thousand miles back along their track. 
Of course, that was not due north because it was a zigzag course. 

Mr. Keeee. All right. 

The Chairman. Well, is there any further clarification desired by 
anybody of the Admiral's testimony before we recess ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have one more initial 
clarified. "GCT", what does that mean 'i 

Admiral Inglis. Greenwich civil time. 

[4-^0] Mr. Gearhart. What is the diif erence ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am a little rusty on my navigation at the moment, 
but as I recall it Greenwich meridian time starts at midnight and 
Greenwich Civil Time starts at noon, or just the other way around. 

Mr. Gearhart. I would like to ask you to help me in deciding what 
kind of time we have got here. 

The Chairman. We don't want any two-timers. 

Mr. Gearhart. But the message was broadcast over the I'adio in 
Japan at 2 o'clock, I think it was GMT December 8, 1941. Do you 
know whether that refers to Japanese time or to time within the 
United States ? _ 

Admiral Inglis. If it is expressed in that way that would be 
London time. 

Mr. Gearhart. London time? 

Admiral Inglis. That would be London time, when it savs "GMT". 
That is what it says, isn't it, "GMT ? " 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. GMT would be that time in London with the base 
point noon rather than midnight. 

INIr. Gearhart. Then if I should look at the chart in the Navy folder 
and find London time, in a moment's calculation I can take the time 
for London and determine what it is in the United States and what 
it was in Japan ? 

[481'\ Admiral Inglis. I think you can, sir. 

The Chairman. If there is nothing further, the committee will re- 
cess until 10 o'clock Monday morning. 

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., November 17, 1945, an adjournment 
was taken until 10 a. m., Monday, November 19, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 197 



im'\ PEAKL HAEBOR ATTACK 



MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

W ashington^ I). C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., 
in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator 
Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson, and Eepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

\_IiS3~\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

General Mitchell and Mr. Gesell, you apparently concluded your 
examination of the witnesses on Saturday. Is there anything further 
vou wish to ask them this morning before the committee examines 
them? 

Mr. Mitchell. Xo, Mr. Chairman, but the committee ought to say 
whether they want Colonel Thielen to take up the radar chart business 
that one of the Senators asked him about, or whether we should go on 
with the Japanese attack. Would 3^ou like to have the radar matter 
come up first ? 

Senator Ferguson. Personally, I would like to go along with the 
Japanese attack, to keep the sequence. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then counsel have no further questions at this time 
about the Japanese attack. 

Mr. Murphy. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I want to go into 
the radar matter, but I will postpone it mitil later. 

The Chairman. We will let the radar matter slide until we get 
through with Admiral Inglis. 

The Chair wishes to make this statement. In the committee a few 
days ago, when we decided the order in which the examination of 
witnesses would take place, the Chair, as a matter of courtesy to all the 
other members, suggested that he postpone any examination on his 
part until all the members of the \_k-^h'\ committee had an 
opportunity to examine the witnesses. The Chairman had no thought 
that there would be any advantage or disadvantage in whether he 
asked any questions at the beginning or waited until the examina- 
tion was over to ask such questions as had not been covered bj^ other 
members of the committee. 

However, in view of the fact that that may be regarded as an effort 
to get the last word — which no member of this committee really has. 



198 CONCRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

because even after formal examination, and after committee members 
have examined the witnesses, if a Senator or a Member of the House 
thinks he has some other question to ask, he can do it freely — but in 
order that there may not be any question about it, the Chair will 
exercise the right to proceed to examine the witnesses before he alter- 
nates among other members of the committee. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that, I should 
like to make clear there is no objection, as far as the ranking minority 
member is concerned, to the Chairman making the final examination. 
The suggestion which I made was that I, as a member of the minority, 
would not like to precede you, that is all. That would be probably 
helpful all around, as the Chairman himself originally conceded. 

The Chairman. I want to say to the Senator from Maine, it is 
entirely immaterial to me, as a member of the committee, [4^5 \ 
and as Chairman, whether I examine the witness first, or wait until all 
other members have examined the witnesses. I personally see no ad- 
vantage or disadvantage in the particular position that any member 
uf the committee occupies in examining the witnesses. I do not know 
that the ranking minority member or the ranking majority member, 
if it is divided up into minority and majority, in the interrogation of 
witnesses, has any particular significance. But for the time being, in 
regard to this witness, the Chair will go ahead and ask only a few 
questions, if that is agreeable to the committee. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, the acoustics are so bad, I can hardly 
hear at this end of the bench what you are saying. 

The Chairmax. The Chairman thought he was talking loud enough 
to be heard. He will elevate his voice and move the microphone in 
more proximity to his mouth. 

TESTIMONY OF REAE ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BEENAED 
THIELEN (Eesumed) 

The Chairman. Admiral, the information which you have given us 
in your statement of Saturday is based entirely upon the captured 
documents since the end of the war with Japan, the documents cap- 
tured by American forces and also conversa- [4S6] tions had 
with captured Japanese? 

Admiral Inglis. Not necessarily since the end of the war. Senator 
Barkley. Some of those documents were captured during the progress 
of the war. Some of the interrogation was made of prisoners of war 
who were captured during the war, and who were interrogated during 
the war. 

The Chairman. So that your statement as outlined here is based 
upon captured documents before and since the surrender of Japan 
and conversations had with prisoners of war captured before the end 
of the war, but who were still in custody of the American forces ? 

Admii'al Inglis. Yes. 

The Chairman. Up to the end of the war ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. And also statements made by Japanese officers, or 
men who were not prisoners of war; is that trne? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir, with one exception; tliere is 
one statement in the prepared statement which was based on i'e{)oris 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 199 

of FBI and ONI investigators, just one sentence. Aside from that, 
all of this material came from Japanese sources. 

The Chairman. For the record, will you explain — of course the 
FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation — [-^7] what is 
the ONI? 

Admiral Ixglis. The FBI stands for the Federal Bureau of Investi- 
gation, and the ONI stands for Oflico of Naval Intelligence. 

The Chairman. I do not think I care to ask any further questions. 

Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, may I make one correction of the 
testimony that I gave on the 16th of November? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. On page 293, line 23, and on page 294, line 19, I 
would like to correct ''■Wasp''' to read '•^Horiiet.''' ^ 

The Chairman. Well, both of them have quite some stingers. 

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. Senator George? 

Senator George. I have no questions at present, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Congressman Cooper? 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly. 

Admiral, you are familiar with this document here, containing 
messages, reports, and information forwarded by General MacArthur ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes. 

[4-38] The Vice Chairmax. As I understood it, anything con- 
tained in this document was included in your statement presented here 
on Saturday. 

Admiral Inglis. The gist of that document, which is dated October 
20, 1945, was considered in preparing the statement, and we feel 
that all of the pertinent and essential material contained in there was 
incorporated into the statement where it was appropriate, and where 
we felt it was properly confirmed or where it was not contradicted 
in some other document. 

[4-89] The Vice Chairman. This material was handed to me and 
other members of the committee by counsel on Saturday and I under- 
stood that you had had the benefit of this material and that your testi- 
mony Saturday embraced the information contained in this. 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. One other question, if I may, please. Admiral. 

In your statement presented to the committee on Saturday, I would 
like to invite your attention to the bottom of page 11, the last sentence, 
continuing to the top of page 12, in which it is stated : 

In addition to the attaclv planes launched at this time it was reported that 
two type zero reconnaissance seaplanes w-ere launched at approximately .5:00 
a.m. 7 December, Hawaiian time, to execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor 
and Lahaina anchorage just before the attack. 

Now, especially this sentence : 

Available evidence indicates that these reconnaissance planes reached their 
destination one hour before the arrival of the attack planes. 

Admiral Inglis. I believe that was in the former draft and was not 
presented Saturday. That was corrected later on — or changed later 
on. 

[4^0] The Vice Chairman. I know you called attention to some 
changes in that paragraph and I didn't know whether that sentence 
was supposed to be changed or not. 

> p. 123, supra. 



200 CONGRESSIONAL, INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. That sentence was struck out and another one sub- 
stituted for it. If the Congressman desires I will read the statement 
that was made Saturda}^ morning. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, we have been provided with a copj' 
this morning of your statement as you gave it with the necessary 
changes and corrections included. 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. So the correction would appear in this draft. 

Admiral Inglis. It should appear, yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then that sentence to which I have invited 
attention, or, rather, two sentences, that did not reflect the situation 
then, is that correct? 

Admiral Inglis. We think that the statement as made in the cor- 
rected draft which was given Saturday more truly reflects the in- 
formation that we had. 

The Vice Chairman. Then the information that \the reconnais- 
sance planes reached their destination an hour before the attack 
planes, is that accurate or not? 

Admiral Inglis. We have no proof of that, sir. 

The Vice Chairiman. No proof of that ? 
[iO^] Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairivian. All right. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral, just one or two questions. 

The draft which was submitted by the Navy and presented to the 
rommittee on Saturday last was prepared, as I understand it, by the 
Navy officials? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That draft, as I understood it, was based upon, 
primarily upon captured documents by the United States Navy? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. United States Navy and in 
some cases Army. 

Senator Lucas. Now, in the main, the investigation in the first in- 
stance was made by the officials of the United States Navj^? 

Admiral Inglis. Some of the interrogations were made by Army 
officers, as well as Navj' officers. 

Senator Lucas, I understand that. I am talking primarily about 
the captured documents. That was a Navy undertaking? 

Admiral Inglis. The study of those which transposed that into 
this prepared statement was made by Naval officers, yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Then you have prepared a draft to submit to the 
committee before you learned of the last information [4^^] 
which came from General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo? 

Admiral Inglis. There were " several drafts prepared, Senator 
Lucas. The last of them, the one that was used was altered, as com- 
pared to the one just before that, by the receipt of a document for- 
warded through naval channels. Not from the Senior Commander 
for the Allied Powers in Tokyo. 

Senator Lucas. That was the first alteration and that was based on 
additional information which was received by the Navy? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. Then a third alteration was made and that was 
based upon information received from the Allied headquarters in 
Tokyo? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 201 

Admiral Ixglis. No, sir. Just the other wny around. 

Senator Lucas. Will you just make it clear for me? 

Admiral Inglis. I will try to make it as clear as I can. The first 
draft was prepared without the benefit of the material which was 
received from the Tokyo headquarters of General jMaCxA.rthur. The 
second draft was prepared with the benefit of that material. And the 
third and final draft was prepared with the benefit of a paper which 
was received throufrh naval channels Itite Friday afternoon. 

Senator Lucas. Thank you. 

Xow, the Army and the Navy both have been working [W^^ 
independently upon this, have they !? 

Admiral Inglis. The Army has had no direct connection with the 
preparation of this script. 

Senator Lucas. But insofar as the examination of witnesses and 
talking with prisoners, and any other thing in connection with the 
investigation, the Army followed the course that they thought was 
correct and the Navy followed the course that they thought was 
correct in working up this case ? 

Admiral Inglis. Throughout the war the interrogation of prison- 
ers was a joint effort of Army oihcers and Navy officers, and also in 
some cases enlisted men, working together in the interrogation of 
Japanese prisoners. Also there was a complete interchange generally 
of documentary information and intelligence as between the Army 
and Navy throughout the war. 

Senator Lucas. Insofar as the information which came which 
caused you to make some changes in the second draft, that was infor- 
mation which was received by the Navy from the Army operating 
under MacArthur in Japan? 

Admiral Inglis. That information was obtained by officers attached 
to General MacArthur's headquarters. 

Senator Lucas. And the Navy had nothing to do with that ? 

Admiral Inglis. I would be morally certain that naval officers 
assisted in the interrogation but they were attached to General 
MacArthur's command. 

[4'94-] Senator Lucas. Let me ask you one further question. 

Is there any material difference between what the Navy originally 
found, upon which the draft was prepared, and wliat General Mac- 
Arthur and his forces found and sent to the Navy, upon which this 
second draft was prepared? If so. please state. 

Admiral Inglis. Speaking in general terms, the material obtained 
from General MacArthur merely confirmed information which we had 
previously received from other sources. There are a very few cases 
where there was a conflict between the two. Wherever there was a 
conflict we tried to resolve, the staff tried to resolve, the conflict in 
favor of the most credible evidence. 

However, I think, speaking in general terms, that the conflict was 
not particularly significant. 

Senator Lucas. Upon all major points, as I understand it, the two 
reports more or less agreed ? 

Admiral Inglis, That is correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I think that is all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark. 

Mr, Clark. No questions at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster. 



202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. I understand, Admiral, that the translations 
which yon presented on Saturday covered all of the Japanese docu- 
ments which you turned over? 

[495] Admiral InCxLIS. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Well, in what examination I was able to make 
over the week end there was some 300 pages of Japanese material that 
was not translated. Can you explain that discrepancy ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the translation is complete. 

Senator Brewster. Well, have you the exhibits there? 

[Pause.] • 

Admiral Inglis. Senator Brewster, I am informed by the translator 
who is sitting at my elbow that this material was received by micro- 
film and that at the end of the microfilm there was some additional 
Japanese documents which had nothing to do with the Pear Harbor 
case but in the mechanical process of turning it out that is included 
with the material which has to do with Pear Harbor. 

Senator Brewster. That would mean there were approxhnately 118 
pages of material bearing on this and 300 pages bearing on other 
matters. 

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that is correct, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Well, that would explain the discrepancy. 

That other material, what did it have to do with ? 

Admiral Inglis. Those were combined fleet orders which were 
issued subsequent to the attacks and had nothing to do with [4^6'] 
the attack itself; concerning Japanese operations after Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Brewster. Now, you, in the summary which you gave, cited 
the Japanese estimate of damage as 450 planes. From what examin- 
ation I was able to make there appeared to be an estimate of 250 planes 
that were damaged, plus 10 ; another estimate of 157. They appar- 
ently were different estimates. Estimates of different pilots. I didn't 
find the figure of 450. Was that a cumulation, or what was the basis 
of it? 

Admiral Inglis. The source of that figure of 450 is a combination 
of sources A, B, and C. There was one statement that 250 planes were 
known to have been destroyed plus an indeterminate number of others 
presumably in the hangars, and therefore not subject to photographic 
reconnaissance and observation. 

Senator Brewster. Two hundred and fifty plus ten. 

Admiral Inglis. Some of the other sources increased the figure and 
said specifically that their estimate was 450. 

Senator Brewstkr. That specific figure appeared somewhere 
didn't it? 

Admiral Inglis. That figure is in the diary of a Japanese ensign 
captured at Tarawa. The committee has that exhibit. 

Senator Brewster. Yes, I have that. What is the citation on that? 

[4-9/] Admiral Incilis. I am sorry, that we haven't got. 

Senator Brewster. What I have is page 15, showing this estimate 
of 157. 

Admiral Inglis. The only copy of any of those documents in 
existence are in the hands of the committee. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, for the record may we have what the 
Senator is reading from, page 15 of what? 

The Chairman. Will the Senator state what that was that he was 
reading from? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 203 

Senator Brewster. It was the document the witness now has. 

Admiral Inglis. I have before me a document entitled "Translation 
of Captured Document, Professional Notebook of an Ensign in the 
Japanese Navy, Captured Tarawa, 24 November, 1943." 

Senator Brewster. Is that the diary to which you are referring? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And that shows, on the page I pointed out, the 
figure of 157? 

Admiral Inglis. On page 4 of that document, at the top of the 
page, fifth line, is the figTire "shot down, 450 planes". 

Senator Brewster. That is right. What was the later record, how 
did he distinguish between tliese two? What is the [4^8'] dis- 
crepancy between them? 

Admiral Inglis. The official figure which the Japanese announced 
shortly after the attack was 450 planes. I am informed that later 
(;n, in a more detailed analysis of the evidence which, apparently, 
was available to the Japanese, that they became more conservative 
and cut this down to 157, but that was never incorporated into a 
subsequent official announcement. As far as the public knew they 
stood by their original announcement of 450._ 

Senator Brewster. What does that purport to be, on page 115, 
where the figure of 157 was used ? 

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that this purports to be just the 
ensign's recollection, apparently, of an order from the Navy Ministry, 
but the text is so obscure that I wouldn't like to state just what the 
significance of that is. 

Senator Brewster. Now, tibout the records of the Hawaii broad- 
casting stations to check up on the report as to espionage, are those 
station records available for that period ? 

Admiral Inglis. I believe that the Army will have those, if any, 
and I would like to inform the Senator that I only had about 5 minutes 
to look at this last document which came in, and I am not too familiar 
with the substance contained in that document; and, of course, with 
respect to any intelligence or counter-intelligence material that the 
Senator may be interested [W^] in? I would like to refer him 
to the then district intelligence officer out in the Fourteenth District, 
naval district. Admiral Mayfield, who is listed as a witness, and also 
Admiral Wilkinson, who was then the Director of Intelligence, and 
who is also listed as a witness. 

I am not prepared to answer questions on that. 

[SOO] Senator Brewster. Well, as I understand, this possible 
tip as to the broadcasting from Hawaii to inform the Japanese fleet 
came on October 13. that they made this extension "Tokyo" at the 
suggestion of the authorities here and tliat an immediate check was 
made then to find out whether transcripts of those Hawaiian broad- 
casts during the period just preceding Pearl Harbor, December 7, 
were available. 

That, I assume, came under your office. 

Admiral Inglis. From a very hasty look at tliat document I would 
have that same impression. 

Senator Brev/ster. Yes; and <hat it then appeared that those rec- 
ords were missiug. Is that also your impression ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is luy impression. 

Senator Brewster. Yes; so that the records for that period appar- 
ently disappeared. The suggestions were made that some of them 



204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

think that might possibly have been turned over to the Army or the 
FBI. 

Admiral Inglis. I believe that is what the paper says, yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Now, can the Army find out? Colonel, have 
you any information about this ? 

Colonel Thtelen. No, sir ; I have no knowledge of that whatsoever. 

Senator Brewster, Well, the matter will be followed up. 

[501] Under which jurisdiction would that matter come? 

Admiral Inglis. Well, 1 would suggest that the Senator address a 
question of that nature to Admiral Mayfield and Admiral Wilkinson. 

Senator Brewster. Well, no, I am speaking to the Director of Naval 
Intelligence now, as this is apparently a current matter. It apparently 
is obvious that there are no past records about this and the question is 
to determine what did become of those records and not under whose 
authority they were destroyed. 

Admiral Inglis. According to our records, those documents were 
turned over to a Major Putnam, an Army major, who was on duty 
in Hawaii at that time. 

Senator Brewster. Well, I know you don't want to do an injustice 
to the Army, but I think there is great doubt on that score. I think 
Major Plitnam expressed some doubt as to Avhether he got them. In 
any event, the station claims it did not turn over any but limited ones, 
Avhich may or may not have had any relation to this particular episode, 
but would it come within your purview now as Director of Naval 
Intelligence to pursue that matter and to find out as fully as possible 
whether or not there may have been any relation? 

Admiral Inglis. The Office of Naval Intelligence has already in- 
quired into that matter and the best information [502] that we 
have is that these documents were turned over to Major Putnam of the 
Army, 

Senator Brewster. In connection with the message of — or the battle 
orders of November 25 and December 2 as appear in your evidence on 
page 437 in our text, it may not be particularly material, although 
it has sufficient significance so that I am sure you would want the 
record correct. 

According to the exhibits which we examined, the battle order which 
3^ou cited on November 25 was actually the one of December 2. The 
phraseology was somewhat different in those two orders. 

Have you those there? That is subhead B on page 437, at the bot- 
tom of the page. You will find that under the transcript that you 
presented to all the members of the committee from General Mac- 
Arthur's headquarters on complying with your orders of October 26th. 

Admiral Inglis. Is the Senator referring to the quotation : 

"Japan now understands her self-preservation and self-defense has reached" — 
".Tapan under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense has reached 
a decision to declare war on the United States of America"? 

Senator Brewster. No; have you the transcript of the evidence? 
Well, yes, it is after that order,^but it is 4-A, [503] and in 
your testimony there cited as "B" at the bottom of page 437. 

Admiral Inglis. I have that, sir. Your question is, what is the 
source of that? 

Senator Brewster. Well, yes. 

Admiral Inglis. The source of that is the material from headquar- 
ters in Tokyo. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 205 

Senator Breavster. Well, my point was that the language which you 
used — I think you have transposed them between the 2oth of November 
and December 2. 

Admiral Ixglis. If the Senator will refer to the so-called Mac- 
Arthur paper on 

Senator Brewster. Yes ; I have it before me. 

Admiral Inglis. Sir? 

Senator Brewster. I have it before me. 

Admiral Inglis. On page 3, at the bottom of the page, subpara- 
graph 4-A. 

Senator Brewster. Tha^ is right. 

Admiral Ikglis. Issued in December. 

iSIr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, is there a copy of that 
to be made available to all the other members of the committee? 

Senator Brewster. Yes, you have that. 

Mr. Murphy. You are reading from the copy ? 

[■'^OJf] Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Ixglis. Then the 

Senatoi- Brewster. I have it before me. 

Admiral Ixglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. That was issued on December 2, is that right ? 

Admiral Ixglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Now. you show that in your testimony on page 
4o7 as issued on the 22d of November. 

Admiral Ixglis. Now, if the Senator will bear with me and refer 
to page 8 of that same document, down near the bottom of the page, 
there is a shorter version of that same paragraph. 

Senator BREW^STER. That is right. 

Admiral Ixglis. Now^, that version on page 8 was issued on the 22d 
of November. 

Senator Brewster. That is right, and that is the one which should 
a):)pear at the bottom of page 437 as the 22d of November order, is 
tliat right? 

Admiral Ixglis. To be chronologically correct, I believe that is the 
case, yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. I don't know that there will ever be any mate- 
rial distinction betAveen them but I think it woidd be well if you would 
see that the record is corrected so that [-^Oo] whatever varia- 

tion there is in language between the order of the 22d of November — 
on the 25th of November, that i^ the date, the 25th of November and 
the December 2 order is clarified in the record in whatever way you 
find most practicable. 

Admiral Ixglis. ]May I ask the reporter uoav to make this correc- 
tion on the record? At the bottom of l)age 437, lines 21 to 25. inclu- 
sive, substitute the following: 

(b) Should the negiUiafioiis with the United States prove successful the task 
foi-ce sluill hold itselt in ivadiness forthwith to retniu aud reassemble.^ 

Senator Breavster. Noav, the other is on page 464, which is the 
order of — Avell, that refers again to the erroneous order. You subse- 
quently put in the message of December 2. It seemed to me it might 
haA-e some importance that on December 2 they did issue the order 
which you haA-e erroneously quoted. Perhaps you can put it in at 

' 1'. IKO, SIIIHJI. 

79716 — 46— pt. 1 16 



206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that same point, at page 437, if you wish to, and substitute for that 
on December 2 that further language was used in the battle order. 

Admiral Inglis. Yes ; will the reporter please add to that previous 
quotation that on the 2d of December the longer version, as shown in 
the original transcript, volume 3, was issued as an Imperial naval 
order. 

Senator Brew^ster. I don't know what the significance is. [■506] 
They call it a Naval General Staff instruction. Does that have any 
significance in your documents. 

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the Japanese procedure in a 
case of that nature is for the Imperial General Headquarters to issue 
instructions to the Navy section. The Navy section then converts 
those instructions into an order. 

Senator Brewster. Now, will you properly complete the text as 
shown in the MacArthur report of that December 2 Navy General 
Staff instruction? 

Admiral Ixglis. The version as contained in the so-called Mac- 
Arthur paper is: 

Naval Genei-al Staff instruction (issued 2 December) Bear in mind that isliould 
it apppar cejtain that the Japanese- American negotiations will reach an amica- 
l)le settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of ihe 
combined fleet are to be ordered to re-assemble and to return to their bases. 

Senator Brewster. Now, the only other comment I have. Admiral, 
and I don't want to seem too meticulous, but it did seem, at least, Ave 
are dealing in connection with the question of visual hand signals. 

You remember that was a matter of discussion, as to whether or 
not that ever occurred and you reported from the Japanese manu- 
scripts reports that the Japanese pilots stated [507] that no 
visual signals Avere received. 

I rjoted in the report of it that he added — it may or may not be 
significant — the words "to his knowledge," and it seemed to me it 
might be illuminating as indicating that he did not presume to say as 
to whether anybody else might have received them but as far as he 
knew none were received. I am sure that was simply 

Admii'al Ixglis. I agree with the Senator and think that the same 
reservation should be applied to nearly all of the verbal testimony 
given by these prisoners of war. 

Senator Brewster. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Is that all? 

Senator Brew^ster. That is all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Inglis, as I understand it in the printed 
testimony at page 422 you outlined in the record the sources of ma- 
terial u])on which you based the summary which you gave to the com- 
mittee, is that correct? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, as I also understand it, the committee 
were furnished with a group of papers, the first one dated November 8. 
1945, and headed "General Headquarters Supreme Commander for 
the Allied Powers", continuing dov/n to a paper which appears to be 
a questionnaiiC, all of these papers [508] apparently having 
beeu forwarded to us from tlie General Headquarters of the Supreme 
Conunander for the Allied Powers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 207 

Are there any of these papers that are not covered by the ori^rinals 
or the i)hotostats of orio;iiials ir;iveu to the gentleman from Maine? 
In order to make myself clear, have you seen these papers which we 
were handed as comin_<r from the Allied headquarters? 

Admii'al Ixcjlis. I am quite sure that is the same document as this, 
although this is mimeograjDhed and mine is not. 

Mr. MuRpiiY. Now, may I inquire of counsel of these papers are to 
be put into the record so that they will be available to whoever reads 
the record ? Are they going to be offered as an exhibit ? 

Mr. MrrciiELL. We will offer them. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, when the Navy Board sat in order to go 
into this question of the Jap invasion they had in that record, as I 
understand it, the testimony of the Japanese ensign, or the reports of 
the Japanese ensign's testimony, as well as the prisoner at Pearl Har- 
bor, did they not ? 

Admiral Ixglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And they had the major part of the material which 
you have supplied to the committee, with the exception of the addi- 
tions which were furnished by General MacArthur during the recent 
several weeks since October, is that right? 

[o09] Admiral Ixglis. This plus the letter that was received 
Friday night through naval channels ; yes, sir. • 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the prisoner who was captured at Pearl 
Harbor, is he still living and available? 

Admiral Ixglis. We have been trying to find the answer to that 
question and so far we have been unable to. 

Mr. ]\IuEPiiY. But there was some testimony in the several reports, 
were there not, concerning his version of the map that was taken from 
the submarine? 

Admiral Ixglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And there are two maps, are there not, two submarine 
maps or charts? 

Admiral Ix'glis. There is only one, sir. 

Mr. Mltrphy. Well, the submarine that was beached at Pearl Har- 
bor, was there a chart taken from that ? 

Admiral Ix'glis. There was no chart taken from the submarine that 
was destroyed in Pearl Harbor. The chart was taken from the sub- 
marine which beached itself near Kaneohe. 

Mr. Mi'rphy. Well, there was one beached — I mean there was one 
map taken from that submarine; you got the chart out of that, didn't 

Admiral Ixglis. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And then there was another beached in the bay area, 
or did that approach Pearl Harbor? 

[SIO] Admiral Ix^glis. That submarine that was beached or de- 
stroyed inside Pearl Harbor had no — I .shouldn't say it had no chai't 
because I don't know, but they did not obtain a chart from that sub- 
marine. 

Mr. ]\Iurphy. My recollection is that there was testimony concern- 
ing two different chart •. Am I correct in that? You say there was 
only one ? 

Admiral Ixglis. The other one, I think thfit w^as a chart that was 
made by aviators. 



208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr, Murphy. No^Y, then, the operational orders and the plans con- 
cerning Avhich you testified and concerning which we have photostatic 
copies here, now where are the originals? 

Admiral Ixglis. The best evidence that we have indicates that after 
that original was photostated it v/as purloined by a souvenir hunter. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, on page 422 you referred to a captured docu- 
ment. The title is, "Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War 
Experiences Off Hawaii." 

Admiral Ixolis. Yes, sir. 

]Mr. Murphy. Where is that docimient, do you know? 

Admiral Inglis. The original of that document,- 1 understand is 
in the files of the Joint Intelligence Section of the Pacific Ocean area 
at Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Murphy. Nov.-. the operational order about which you ['5ii] 
testified on page 422. where is that, the original ? 

Admiral Ixglis. The committee has the original of that docume?it. 

Mr. Murphy. Is that one of the papers that was handed to the 
gentleman from Maine? 

Admiral Inglis. That was handed to counsel, I guess. It was in 
that sheaf of papers. 

Mr. Murphy. To the Senator from Maine? 

Mr. Gesell. That is right. 

Mr. ISIuRPHY. Now, the next document on page 

Mr. Mitchell. Let us straighten that out. 

Senator Fergusox. Just a moment. Mr. Chairman, I think we 
ought to clear that up, as to whether or not that was a photostat or 
the original instrument. 

Admiral Ixglis. I am informed that that particular document was 
the original. 

Senator Fergusox. Would you identify it here? 

Admiral Ixglls. Yes, sir, if you will pass the papers to me. 

I will have to correct the statement that I made. The original 
was not turned over to the committee. A copy of that which was 
turned over to the committee is photostated but the original itself is 
here in Washington but it is in such bad shape physically that it 
cannot be handled. It will [512] disintegrate if handled. 

]Mr. Murphy. And was it in the same shape as it is now when the 
photostat was made? 

Admiral Ix^glis. Approximately, yes. I am informed it was under 
water for 4 months. 

Mr. Murphy. The next document you testified about was on page 
423, "Translation of a Captured Japanese Document. The profes- 
sional notebook of an ensign in the Japanese Navy." The date is 
February 25, 1944. 

Where is that notebook ? 

Admiral Ix^glis. The original of that document is also in the Joint 
Intelligence Section of the Pacific Ocean area at Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Murphy. For the record I want to note that the witness cor- 
rected the date of the second document and said it was January 12, 
1941. 

Is that the date you were correcting at that time? You said "the 
f.econd dociiment."' Now, were you referring to the Japanese ensign's 
notebook or were you referring to some other document? I am 
talking about page 423. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 209 

Admiral Inglis. The document which is referred to on page 42o 
carries the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean area's letterhead 
with their date February 25, 1944. The document was captured at 
Tarawa on November 24, 1943. It it [■^^■^l the same document. 

Mr. Murphy. But what I am trjdng to clear up, that in your testi- 
mony on page 423 — and do you have a copy there before you? 

Admiral Inglis. I have, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You said : 

Perhaps I should go back to the second document and say that the date on 
that is January 12, 1941. 

Yon were speaking about some other document, other than the 
.notebook, were you ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. That is a different document 
that I had inadvertently entered previously without giving the date. 

Mr. Murphy, Now, the next document you talked aborit you said 
was dated March 2, 1943, and the subject is: "Kuboaki, Takeo," and 
you said, "That is obviously the name of a Japanese." ''Superior 
Class Engine or Petty Officer, interrogation of." 

Where is the original of that? 

Mr. Geskll. Is this it. Admiral, here? He is handing you another 
one now. 

Admiral Inglis. No. That document is a photostat of a letter 
from the Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Forces. 
I am not sure where the original would be [-^-?4] but I presume 
that it is in Pearl Harbor with the files of Commander, South Pacific 
Area. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, when my examination is concluded. Admiral, 
I am going to have the Navy liaison oflicer that is Avorking with the 
■committee to see that every one of these originals and every one of 
tliese documents are made availalde for the inspection of the commit- 
tee in Washington get in touch with you. 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. INIuRPHY. Now, you say that you concluded on that. Admiral, 
as to where the original was? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, the next document that you referred to on page 
424, "Japanese Submarine Operations at Pearl Harbor." You said 
that was an evaluation prej^ared by United States intelligence officers. 
Where is the original of that? 

Admiral Inglis, This document is the original of an evaluation. 
It is undated. 

Mr. Murphy. And that is before the committee? 

Admiral Inglis. It is before the connnittee. It is und:ited and un- 
signed but I am informed that it was pre))ared by Captain Pearson. 

Mr. IMuRPHY. Now, the next one you referred to is entitled, "Intelli- 
gence Report on the Subject of Japan Navy \ol5] Sub- 
marines," Where is the original of that ( That was a paper prepared 
by American intelligence, wasn't it ? 

Admiral Incjlis. I have the ])aper here: yes, sir. I am trying to 
examine it. The document in question was prepared, was mimeo- 
graphed from a stencil and this is as close an approach to an oi'iginal 
as we could provide. The stencil itself was destroyed. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. I see. The next document you referred to was dated 
August 16, 1943, marked, "Interrogation Eeport No. 148 of 
Yokota, S." 



210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Where is the original of that document? 

Admiral Ixglis. Presumably the original of that document is in 
the files of Commander, Southwest Pacific Area. 

Mr. Murphy. The next docume-nt you talked about was. "United 
States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence 
Bulletin of December -S, 1944." 

Do you have the original copy of that here? 

Admiral Inglis. The document which the connnittee has is as close 
to an original as could be produced, as that is a periodical. 

Mr. ISIuKPHY. The next document you spoke of was dated June 
oO, 1943. The subject is, "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy 
Documents, Item. No. 472, Submarine. School Notes Concerning Early 
AVar Experiences off Hawaii." 

\ol6] Whei-e is the original of that document? 

Admiral Inglis. The Japanese version of that document is in the 
Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean area. Pearl Harbor. This 
document which the committee has, the translation is a mimeograph 
and, tlierefore, as close an approach as could be made to tliG original 
of the English translation. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. Then you also testified about an 'TCPOA Transla- 
tion of Captured Enemy Documents, Item. No. 473, Instructions to 
the Yatsumaki Butai." 

Where is the original of that? 

Admiral Inglis. 472, 473, and 474 are all included in the same 
document. 

Mr. Murphy. The next document you spoke of is dated July 25, 
1945, translation No. 290. Subject : "The Southern Cross bv Kuramoti, 
Iki." 

Where is the original of that ? 

Admiral Inglis. May I ask, Congressman Murphy, whetlier you 
want any of the Japanese version or the English translation ? 

Mr. ]\Iup.PMY. The original source. 

xVdmiral Inglis. The original source is in Japanese and is here in. 
Washington. The committee has been given a mimeographed copy 
of the English translation, which is as close an approach to the original 
as could be provided. 

[-57/1 Mr. ]MuEPHT. Now, the next document referred to is a 
translation of combined fleet top secret operation, order No. 1. W^here 
is the original of that. I mean the original Japanese version i 

Admiral Inglis. The original in Japanese of that document is here 
in Washington but it is in such an advanced state of deterioration that 
it could not be handled. 

Is the photostat presented as a photostat of it in the condition in 
which it now is? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MuKPHY. The next document referred to is: "Enemy Lists of 
Sorties by Sub-carried planes." 

Where is the original of that ? You stated, "Its precise source is not 
indicated." 

Admiral Inglls. The original is ])robably in the Joint Int (diligence 
Center. Pacific Ocean area at Pearl Harbor, althonuh I am Tiot certain 
of that. 

Mr. MiRpiiY. The next document vou referred to is a memorandum 
dated October 13, 1945, addressed to "the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 211 

of the Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps on the subject, Prewar 
Espionage in the HaAvaiian IsUinds, 

Is the paper you have an original copy of that? 

Admiral Inglis. The paper that has been submitted to the commit- 
tee is the original copy. In fact, it is the only [-5^5] copy in 
Washington. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, there was some testimony concerning the para- 
phrase of a message dated October 6. 1945, from the Secretary of War 
to General MacArthur and, as I understand it, all committee members 
have been furnished a copy of that. 

Mr. Mitchell. They have it. It is a paraphrasing for the protec- 
tion of our codes. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

jMr. Mitchell. The committee understands that. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

And then there was testimony on the bottom of page 426 concerning 
cables from General MacArthur dated the 14th of October and a fur- 
tlier detailed report dated October 2G, 1945, and then the report of the 
night preceding your testimony. 

As I understand it, all of those are originals in here, is that right ? 

JMr. Mitchell. Well, those are copies furnished by the War Depart- 
ment. 

Mr. Murphy. To the committee? 

JNIr. Mitchell. To us and to the connnittee. They were reproduced 
so that everybody would have copies of them. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. The original dispatch from MacArthur may be in 
the files of the War Department. 

\5W] Mr. JNIuKPHY. At any rate, the committee have a copy of it. 

Mr. Gesell. The originals are right here, Congressman, if there is 
any question as to whether they were correctly reproduced. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. And would that hold true, too, as to the 
message from General MacArthur dated November 8, 1945? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. Congressman Murphy, I have just been handed a 
note here that says : 

There were several charts recovered from the submarine that was beached at 
Bellows Field. These are now held and will be produced by Captain Layton. 

Mr. Murphy. I understand there was more than one there, that 
was why I asked about it. 

There were certain corrections, Admiral, made in the record as a 
result of the testimony of the previous questioner, the Senator from 
Maine, and do we have in the exhibit which will be offered a copy of 
each of the papers from which you read, each of the orders? 

Admiral Inglis. The basis of those corrections are contained in the 
headquarters Tokyo report. 

Mr. Murphy, Which is part of the exliibit, as I under- lo'^O'] 
stand it. 

Admiral Inglis. Which is part of the exhibit, 

Mr. Murphy. And, coun.sel, it will be offered? 

Mr. Gesell. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy, Now, then, I have no other questions, Admiral, ex- 
cept to say that I expect and hope that all of the originals will, insofar 



212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

as possible, be made available for the inspection of the entire com- 
mittee. 

Admiral lasroLis. Yes, sir; they will, sir. 

Mr. MuEPHT. No other questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chatpjman. Senator Ferguson ? 

Senator Fer(;uson. Admiral Inglis, when you received this present 
data — now, I am talking about the data prior to the ]\[acArthur 
(hit a — who evaluated it so that you might put it in your statement? 

Admiral Inglis, Commander Hindmarsh and Lieutenant Kurts, 
wlio are now sitting at my right elbow, did most of the work on that. 

Senator Ferguson. Who else worked on it ? 

Admiral Inglis. A LieutenaiU Ebb also worked on these and much 
of the source material was in the form of translations received from 
the Soutliwestern Pacific area headquarters. 

Senator Ferc-f-ion. Was it ev:diiated out in the field at [-^•2-?] 
all? 

Admiral Inglis. It receiA^ed an evaluation in the field and then a 
second evaluatitm here in Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what evaluaticm are we getting in your 
statement, the one that was made in the field or the one that was made 
here ? 

Admiral Inglis. Fimdamentalh^ you are getting the evaluation 
made here. However, there is no conflict of significance between the 
two evaluations. 

Senator Ferguson. When was it evaluated ? 

Admiral Incjlis. The people who have been doing this work have 
been working on it since the middle of June of this year. 

Senator Ferguson. I see by the press tliat Mr. Byrnes. Secretary 
of State, made a statement iLsing some of this informatioiL Do you 
know who evaluated it for jNIr. Byrnes ? 

Let the record show Admiral Inglis is conferring with his aides. 

T]ie Chairman. He might also give the names of his aides and their 
qualifications, that he conferred with. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. The evalution which has been presented to tlie 
committee, that is, the evaluation before it was affected by the last 
tAvo documents, in substance was [-^■--] presented to the Sec- 
retary of the Navy — I mean the Secretary of Stn.te, some time ago. 

Senator Ferguson. I notice also b}^ the press that the Secretary of 
the Xavy used a certain amount of this data. Who evaluated his 
information ? 

Admiral Inglis. He received a copy of the same document that was 
presented to the Secretary of State. 

Senator Ferguson. And when was that document presented to the 
Secretary of State ? 

Admiral Inglis. I haven't got that date at hand, but we can get it. 
Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you be able to get the document itself 
that was given to the Secretary of State as well as to the Secretarv 
of the Navy? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Counsel General Mitchell, will you get 
that then for the committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.^ 



» See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5352. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 213 

Senator Fer'jusox. Now. I will at^k you, Admiral, when these gen- 
tlemen, your aides here, evaluated this information did they use the 
diplomatic messages between Japan and America^ 

Admiral Ixglis. No, sir. I want to make that quite clear, that none 
of the material contained in this presenta- [J;^JJ tion was ob- 
tained from crypt analytical sources. 

Senotor Fekgusox. That was not my question. Did they use in 
order that they may evaluate the evidence that they obtained from 
the Japanese prisoners and evidence that they obtained from maps, 
and so forth, did they also check it with the diplomatic messages^ 

Admiral In({i.is. No, sir. 

Seuator Fergusok'. Do you know as an initelligence officer how you 
could evaluate that and not check it with the diplomatic messages 
from Japan? 

Admiral Ixglis. We evaluated it by checking witli all of the source 
material which we had available. We did not have available to us 
the crypt analytic material which the Senator has just mentioned. 

[-5^4] Senator Ferguson. In other words, you did not have in 
your possession, wlien you evaluated this for the committee. Japanese 
messages concerning military installations, ship movements, and so 
forth, which is the instrument with the yellow cover on it^ 

Admiral Ixglis. No, sir; we did not have them. 

Seuat()r Ferguson. It is Exhibit No. 2 in this case. Have you ever 
had this ? 

Admiral Ixglis. No, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. Then you made this evaluation of the Ja[>anese 
information from prisoners when you had in your files at least, direct 
evidence from the Japanese officials, and did not use this official infor- 
mation to evaluate evidence? 

xVdmiral Ixglis. No. sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I call the Senator's attention to the fact that Ex- 
hibit 2 does not contain any Japanese intercepts; this Exhibit 2 coii- 
taiiis messages passing to and from Tokyo. 

Senator Fergusox. I appreciate that, but they gave au outline of 
the source of their information, and they intimated that certain 
sources were used, aiul certain sources were not used. 

Now, I Avant to refer you to this instrument which is marked 
"Exhibit No. 2," and call your attention to page 22. Have you got a 
copy f)f it ? 

[J.v-'] Arhniral Ixglis. I have not got a copy of it. I have never 
seen a copy. Thosi^ messages were not in the files of Naval Intelligence. 

Senator Fergi'sox, Will you refer to page 22? 

Admiral Ixglis. If I may have a copy ; yes, sir. 

Mr. ^Mitchell. Here is one. 
. Mr. Gesell. "\"\liat page is that? 

Senator Fergusox. Page 22. 

(A document was handed to Admiral Inglis.) 

Senator Fergusox. This is from Honolulu to Tokvo, December 3, 
1941. 

Admiral Ixglis. I have it before me. 

Senator Fergusox. You have it? 

Admiral Ixglis. Yes. 

Senator Fergusox. Now. \y\\] yon make inquiry to se«> whether or 
not that instrument was not translated in the rough and in the posses- 



214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sion of the Navy by 1 : 30 and not [S26] later than 2 o'ch)ck on 
December 6, 1941 ^ Do you know whether that is a fact ■ 

Admiral Inglis. I do liot understand your question, Senator 
Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to know from your aides whether or not 
that instrument was not translated in the rough and in the possession 
of the Navy at 1 : 30 and not later than 2 o'clock on December 6, 1941 ? 

Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer tJiat question, Senator. 

Senator Feegusox. I am trying to ask if your aides know. 

Admiral Inglis. They cannot either. If you will let me complete 



mv answer 



Senator Ferguson. I will let you complete it. 

Admiral Inglis. Sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. I will let you complete it. Go ahead. 

Admiral Inglis. I would like to say all of this crypt analytical 
material comes in the cognizance of Naval Communications, rather 
than Naval Intelligence. There are several witnesses who are listed 
to appear before the committee who can give first-hand knowledge or 
evidence along this line. I cannot. 

Senator Ferguson. You cannot? 

Admiral Inglis. No. 

['527] Senator Ferguson. Look on page 23, to the KGMB want 
ads. Was that considered by the evaluators when you gave your 
statement? 

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the material was obtained by 
us from another source. 

Senator Ferguson. As a matter of fact, it was obtained from the 
Army staff here in Virginia, was it not, at Fort Knox ? 

Admiral Inglis. Our source was a man by the name of Otto Kuhn 
^vho was interrogated on this subject. 

Senator Ferguson. He was later tried, was he not, in Hawaii ? 

Admiral Inglis. I understand that he was ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now you say that the Navy's source of this 
information was Kuhn and not a translation? 

Admiral Inglis. I say that the source available to my staff was 
Kuhn. 

Senator Ferguson. Kulin was not apprehended until after the Tth 
of December, was he ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did your staff use that instrument or that in- 
formation in evaluating the Japanese information ? 

Admiral Inglis. It was considered. That was considered, but it 
was also understood from another source that that [J53S] par- 
ticular scheme or systeiui vvas not actually used, and therefore it was 
not considered. 

Senator Ferguson. Give us that source. 

Mr. Murphy. While they are looking for it, will the gentleman yield 
for one observation ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, the exhibit says it was not trans- 
lated until 12/11/41, and then in parentheses (7) . I do not know what 
that (T) means. 

Senator Ferguson. We will develop later it was translated on the 
6th at noon. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 215 

Admiral InOxLTS. In reply to the Senator's question I would like 
to quote from a carbon copy of an enclosure to nn endorsement which 
is contained in a letter received through naval channels originating 
in the Fourteenth Naval District. 

On page 10, paragi'aph 13, of this carbon copy appears the fol- 
lowing : 

The KG^NIB want ads morning programs from November 24 to December 8, 
1941, were checked by FBI Honolulu with negative results in locating any coded 
phrases regarding the Chinese rug, chicken farm, or beauty-parlor operator. It 
appears unlikely that phrases regarding the German attache, had they appeared 
on this program during the period in question, would have gone unnoticed by 
the agency conducting that investigation. 

[5.29'] Senator Ferguson. Did they examine the original broad- 
casts or scripts ? 

Admiral Inglis. I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do w'e understand then there is quite a bit of 
controversy on these items you have given us? Are we to under- 
stand that you evaluated it without using any of these codes or the 
coded messages? 

xVdrniral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And we also understand that the}^ did not use 
in anj' way diplomatic messages? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether more weight was given 
to the information obtained from the so-called prisoners of war than 
was given to the MacArthur information, that came directly from 
the Navy in Tokyo? 

Admiral Inglis. There was very little conflict between the two. 
Where there was conflict, all I can say is we resolved the conflict and 
gave the material which in our judgment most accuratel^^ presented 
the case. 

Senator Ferguson. Now will you look on page 452 of our tran- 
script — I will withdraw that. 

Are the ads that you cannot substantiate from the same evidence 
as this message "Climb Mount Niitaka"' ? 

Admiral Inglis. Are the ads from tlie same evidence as [SSO] 
the message "Climb Mount Niitaka"? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. What is the Senator's question ? 

Senator Ferguson. Is it from the same source as the rug ads and 
the climb the mountain? 

Admiral Inglis. It is mentioned in the same document but not 
from the same source. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it in the same interview ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, Sir. The want ad, the paragraph about the 
KGMB want ads is derived from the FBI investigation in Honolulu. 
The "Climb Mount Nittaka" material is derived from one [)risoner 
of war and one Japanese who was interrogated after VJ-da_y. 

[o31] Senator Fercjuson. Was not the clue, though, "from the 
same source, tlie information that you were investigating? 

Admiral Inglis. The pilot Shiga, who was interrogated at Sasibo, 
and the report of his interrogation contained in this last document 
which we just received Friday, did mention a want ad code. 

Senator Ferguson. He mentioned the want ad code, did he not? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes. 



216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now, why did you accept, at his suggestion, 
the climbing of the mountain and not the want ad proposition? Do 
you have any reason for that? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. The item about climbing the mountain 
was also mentioned by another Japanese prisoner of war, and had 
some confirmation. The item about the KGMB want ads had been 
investigated by the FBI in Honolulu and could not be corjfirmed. 
In fact, the information seemed to be negative. Therefore, the 
•'climb Mount Niitaka" was included and the KGMB want ads was 
not. 

Senator Ferguson. In the United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific 
Ocean Area Weekly Intelligence, the one you gave to the committee, 
states the information as to climbing Mount Xiitaka wiis in Order 
No. 1, combined fleet secret order No. 1, that is. that was his memory 
of it? 

['5S2'] Admiral Inglis. We have no positive evidence of that. 
Senator. If I may give you as complete a story as possible on that, I 
would like to do it. at this point, sir. on this "climb Mount Niitaka," 

Senator Ferguson. Will you wait until I get through, and then 
give A^our version of it. 

Admiral Inglis. Certainly. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look on page 11 of the analysis there 
of the lieutenant, and see what he says about this Mount Niitaka? 

Admiral Inglis. "\^'liat page? 

Senator Ferguson. Page 11. 

Admiral Inglis. Can you identify the document? 

Mr. Mitchell. Page 11 of what document, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to point it out. There [indicat- 
ing]. 

Admiral Inglis. Paragraph 14, about the Japanese consulate gen- 
eral? 

Senator Ferguson. No ; paragi'aph 15. 

Admiral Inglis. I have that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it? 

Admiral Inglis (reading) : 

Inasmuch as Shiga's information was reportedly given to him by another oflBcer 
aboard the Akagi following the attack, its accuracy is subject to some doubt. 

[S33] Senator Ferguson. And who says that? Is that Lieu- 
tenant Peterson of the United States Navy ? 

Admiral Inglis. K. H. Peterson, lieutenant. United States Navy 
Reserve, signed that report ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. With that doubt in mind, then, and with Mac- 
Arthur's information as to order No. 1, do you still place much 
credence to that information? Order No. 1, as far as the Mac- 
Arthur information is concerned, does not include that at all, does it ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. We still think 

Senator Ffj^guson (interposing). Did you analyze it with that 
in mind ? 

Mr. MuRPHT. Mr. Chairman, let the witness answer the question. 

The Chairman. Let the witness complete his answer. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Admiral Inglis. We still think that the statement made in the pres- 
entation is the best estimate that we can make, sir, because it was 
partially confirmed from another source. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 217 

Senator Ferguson. Where is that source? 

Admiral Inglis. That source was a Japanese prisoner of war, who 
was captured at Saipan in the Marianas campaign. 

In his interrogation — remember, please, this was a year ['5o4^] 
before VJ-day — in his interrogation, he said it had beeii planned to 
use that phrase "climb Mount Xiitaka" to confirm the launching of the 
attack. However, he did not say. and was not able to say, that that 
phrase was ever actually used. He did not know whether or not it 
had ever been received. 

So in the first draft all mention of "climb Mount Niitaka" was 
omitted, because it could not be confirmed. . Then later on when we 
got this other report from Shiga which said he had been out with the 
Japanese striking force, and that the message had been received, we 
then felt there was sufficient confirmation of that to incorporate it 
into the presentation. 

Senator Fergusox. But operational order No. 1, that is, what pur- 
ports to be operational order No. 1, does not contain it? 

Admiral Ixglis. No, sir. There were a number of things from 
operation order No. 1 which had been deleted. Presumably the Japa- 
nese did not give operation order No. 1 in full to any ships except those 
which were in the striking force. I presume that would be for secur- 
ity reasons. There was no need to give it to those who did not need 
to know it. Therefore operation order No. 1, which we had and which 
was captured in the Nachi, which was not in the striking force, had 
some deletion from the operational order, and it is quite possible 
"climb iSIount Niitaka" was one of the deletions since [53o] the 
Xachi was not one of the striking force. 

Senator Ferguson. Why do you say it was possible? Was there 
anything in there about climbing the mountain? 

Admiral Inglis. There was nothing in the operation order No. 1 
which we received that mentioned "climb Mount Niitaka." 

Senator Ferguson. You received it from two sources, one from the 
ship and one from the MacArthur source, is that correct ? 

Admiral Inglis. You are referring to "climb Mount Niitaka"? 

Senator Ferguson. No; I am talking about operation order No. 1. 

Admiral Inglis. Operation order No. 1 that we had was received 
before VJ-day. It was translated from a document captured from 
the Japanese cruiser Nachi. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you also get a copy of it, or information 
concerning it, from MacArthur? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mac Arthur's report does not contain it. His report 
states that the documents in Japan, in Tokyo, had been destroyed. 

Admiral Inglis. The MacArthur report contains some reference 
to operation order No. 1. but does not contain the operation order 
itself. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it give any information or anj' \p-^(^] 
intimation that the information given about climbing the mountain 
was on the same day ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Fi:rguson. Can you account why our Navy has not the 
record at least of receiving the messages sent to this fleet? 

Admiral Inglis. I have no specific information on that. Again, 
that Avould come from Naval Communications rather than from m& 



218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Did you make any check to ascertain whether 
or not we intercepted the radio at the time it was sent, and this infor- 
mation is in line with that radio interce])tion ? 

Admiral Ixglis. I made no such check, because the instructions wei'e 
to exclude from my presentation anything from a cryptanalytical 
source. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Will you state that again? Is your answer that 
you were supposed to exclude from your presentation any decoded 
messages ? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir, on the understanding it would 
be brought before the committee by later witnesses. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator ^deld? 

[5S7] The Chairman. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to make the observation that Captain 
Layton is coming, and that he will be available on the very subject 
about which he is asking the witness. 

Senator Ferguson. I am concerned now with one thing, and that is 
about the instructions to the admiral, not to use in his information 
anything that was decoded. 

Mr. Mitchell. I can answer that. 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would. 

Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. The instructions to the admiral were to prepare a 
statement of the Japanese attack from Japanese sources, and confine 
liimself to that, and that is what I think he has tried to do. These 
things you refer to are not Japanese sources at all. The full informa- 
tion about all these intercepts is going to be covered by other witnesses. 
The admiral was asked not to present anything except what he had 
obtained from the Japanese. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, the decoded messages 
are certainly from Japanese sources. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I did not so treat them in my instructions to 
the admiral. 

[•538] The CnATrniAN. Decoded messages would be messages de- 
coded by the War or Xavy Department. As far as the Navy Departr 
ment is concerned, they would be here in the possession of the Navy 
and not in the possession r)f Japanese prisoners of war; isn't that true ? 

Admiral Inglts. That is true, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now going back, Admiral, have you any reason 
why you did not use the source of information that came from the Japs 
prior to the outbreak of the war, the bombing, that we decoded and 
which came from the prisoners after the attack? 

Admiral Inglis. We used all the information from the prisoners. 
We did not use any of the information from cryptanalytical sources, 
because we did not have access to the latter, and it was not within the 
scope of the instructions which we received. 

Senator Ferguson, And vras it also because of the instructions from 
counsel ? 

Admiral Inglis. It was the instructions which my staff received. I 
suppose they originated with counsel. 

Senator Ferguson. And did the exclusion, that you were not to use 
the information also exclude the so-called diplomatic intorcppts? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 219 

Admiral Ixglis. It did, sir. 

[o39] Senator Ferguson. And also the infoinuiliuu in our Avliite 
papers, our messages? Did it exclude that, that j^on were not to con- 
sider that Avhen you were giving us an evaluation of the evidenc' ? 

Admiral Ixglis. I do not know what the Senator refers to as the 
^'white paper." 

Senator Ferguson. You do not know what the wliite papers are? 

Admiral Inglis. Not by that name, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The papers that have been printed, the informa- 
tion by the State Department that may be known to you as peace or 
war. 

Admiral Inglis. I think the Senator refers to a State Department 
paper which did not contain any reference to deciphered or crypt- 
analytical material. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. 

Admiral Inglis. And that material was used in making up this 
presentation, or at least it was considered. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that from Japanese sources ? 

Admiral Inglis. That was from the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Was the original source the Japanese? Will 
you find out ? In other words, the messages on the diplomatic rela- 
tions, November 20, to our State Department, was that considered in 
evaluating any of this information ? 

[540] Admiral Inglis. I am informed by my staff that that was 
considered by them as background, but no quotations were made 
from it. 

Senator Ferguson. I see one statement in the MacArthur informa- 
tion, and I want to know what credit they gave, and what value they 
gave this question No. 12. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman give the page number? 

Senator Ferguson. They are not paged. It is under November 1. 
1945. 

When was the final confirmation of this plan made? 
Answer. 1 December, IWl. 

Have you got it before you ? 

Admiral Inglis. I have that ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And now will you turn to operational order 
under October 26, 1945. the letter of transmittal, and then read under 
"(a)" the information? Will you read that? Have you got the in- 
strument I am talking about ? 

Admiral Inglis. I will read it, if I can find it. Senator Ferguson. 
I have the first reference which you made, December 1, 1941. You 
say this is the other document? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[■^1] Admiral Inglis. The first reference which the Senator 
made 

Senator Ferguson. Read the imperial order. 

Admiral Inglis. On page 3, paragraph 1 (a), 3 (a) : 

Imperial Naval Order, issued 2 December : 

The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British 
Empire 

Senator Ferguson. No. Read No. 1, the imperial naval ordei", 
No. 1. 



220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Inglis. No. 1 : 

Imperial Naval Order, issued 1 December. Japan under the necessity of 
her self-pi'eservation and self-defense has reached a decision to declare war on 
the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to 
start action will be given later. 

Senator Ferguson. Xow, going over to 12. that I read into tlie 
record, when was the final confirmation of this plan made, the 1st 
of December 1941, is that correct ? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? 

The Chairman. Will the Senator from Michigan yield to the 
Congressman from Pennsylvania '? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. In the broadcast of the 5th of December, which might 
be what the gentleman is looking for, there was a [-543] mes- 
sage : 

In reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important 
at this end, but proceed witli what you are doing, specific orders will be issued 
soon. 

That seems to be pointing to some additional order. That is on 
page 234 of the examination of Captain Layton in the Hewitt report. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you, Admiral, any information as to what 
the Congressman from Pennsylvania, iSIr. Murphy, is speaking about ^ 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have not had that message available. 

Senator Ferguson. Have 5^ou had the privilege of talking with 
Captain La\i:on ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't discussed this with him? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What date do you say that the fleet left the 
ba}'' in Japan ? 

Admiral Inglis. The actual time of departure was 9 a. m., November 
26, Japan time. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar in the diplomatic messages 
that there had been a time limit of the 25th put on the negotiations, 
that they had to be. ended by the 25th? 

[-543] Admiral Inglis. No, sir, I am not familiar witli that. 

Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with that? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. W^ere ,you familiar with the fact that then it 
was extended to the 29th ? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with that? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I may have some vague recollection of 
reading something like that in the newspapers. 

Senator Fergit.son. Would you know of anything that would make 
the date of leaving, which is the 26th, being the 25th here— is it not? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The same date as the order from CNO to divert 
all shipping south and to start convoys — is there any relation between 
those two? 

Admiral Inglis. There is no relationship that I know of; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you tried to analyze those dates, that they 
are on the same date? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir ; that hadn't occurred to me. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 221 

Sentitor Ferguson. Will yon ask your aides and see if they put any 
'significance on those dates? 

Admiral Inglis. I am sorry I can't be helpful, Senator. [S44] 
The staff who prep;u-ed the .Japanese plan are not the staff' who pre- 
pared the American plan and the staff who prepared the Japanese plan 
felt that that Avas not relevant to their plan and wouldn't attempt to 
make any evaluation. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you knoAV whetlier or not — when was the 
time, what was the date of tlie order to "Climb ]Mount Niitaka"? 

Admiral Inglis. Climb Mount Niitaka? 

Senator Ferguson. The 3d of December? 

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; that was later than that. Our informa- 
tion is that that messag-e was received by the Japanese striking force 
on the 5th of December. Hawaiian time. 

Senator Fer(;us()N. 5th of December, Hawaiian time? 

Admiral Ingijs. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be on the Gth, oiu- time? 

Admiral Inglis. On the 6th, Japan time. 

Senator Fercjuson. Japan time? 

Admiral Inglis. Not our time. On the 5th. Hawaiian time. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Inglis. Which would lie tlie 6th, Japanese time. 

Senator FERifUSON. Well, now, have you made a search to ascertain 
whether or not an}" of our monitor systems, any of our radios picked 
that message up? 

Admiral Inglis. No. sir. That again would come under communi- 
cations rather than intelligence. I think that later [^-4-^] wit- 
nesses can give a better answer than I on that. 

Mr. Mitchell. May I interrupt. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe we quite understand what these 
gentlemen have been asked do. In the outline of the case and the 
nature of the proof which was furnished to the committee on the 2d 
of November is found first an analysis of the attack from the Amer- 
ican point of view and second the attack from the Jap point of view 
and it contains this statement : 

The Jap plan will be veconsti-ucted from captured plans and statements made 
by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack. 

Now, these gentlemen haveii't been asked to go into the other fields, 
crypt analytical things, and they are really not prepared to do it, 
because their instructions were to confine themselves to a reconstruction 
of the Jap plan as far as they could from captured plans and statements 
made by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack. 

All this material, about the diplomatic intercepts and exchanges, 
and other crypt analytical material, was all listed on our analysis here 
for presentation by other witnesses. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not going to spend much time on it. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think your questions are pertinent, Senator, but 1 
think other proof will cover it. 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out what weight we [^4^] 
should give, as a committee, to this testimony, and since we have the 
General ]\IacArthur statements, I ask, Mv. Chairman, I note from what 

79716— 46— pt. 1 17 



222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

counsel has said that they were not asked for, therefore I ask that the 
information from General MacArthur be made a part of the record. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. That request was made 15 or 20 minutes ago by the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Senator Ferguson. Has it been made a part of the record ? 

Mr. Murphy. Counsel said he would offer it and make it a part of 
the record. 

Mr. Mitchell. I proposed to do that several days ago. 

The Chairman. I am quite certain it wasn't necessary for either of 
the members of the committee to ask counsel to make that a part of 
the record but now that it is done it will be done. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have at the present time. 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I have just a few questions. 

Admiral, when I had you under examination on Friday last, I asked 
you to supply any evidence that might be available in reference to the 
condition of the ships in Pearl Harbor. 

[S4.7] Admiral Inglis. You asked that, I believe, to be furnished 
through the usual Navy liaison channels, and I would like to recom- 
mend at this time to the Congressman that Captain Kniskern, of the 
Bureau of Ships, I believe, is best informed on that subject. 

Mr. Gearhart. K-i-s-k-e-r-n? 

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was Captain Kniskern at Pearl Harbor at the time 
of the catastrophe and before ? 

Admiral Inglis. I don't think so, but he has made a detailed study 
of all the reports for the Bureau of Ships. 

Mr. Gearhart. I wonder if I could have those reports upon which 
which he has based his conclusions ; is that possible ? ^ 

Aclmiral Inglis. Yes, sir; I presume it is, although I would hazard 
a guess they are very voluminous. 

Mr. Gearhart. "\V1io Avas commander of the Task Force No. 1 on 
that day? 

Admiral Inglis. Admiral Pye. 

Mr. Gearhart. May I inquire of counsel if Admiral Pye will be one 
of the witnesses? 

]SIr. Mitchell. He is on the list. 

Mr. Gearhart. Who was the executive officer of Task Force No. 1? 

Admiral Inglis. We don't have an executive officer of the [^4^] 
task force commander. The chief of staff, I think, was then Captain 
Train, although I am not positive. 

Mr. Gearhart. Is the chief of staff second in command? 

Admiral Inglis. He is the chief of staff. Very often another officer 
in the task force may be senior to the chief of staff and would succeed 
to the command in case of disability of the commander. But Ih.e chief 
of staff is the senior staff' officer and next senior to the admiral on his 
own personal staff in his official family. 

iSIr. Gearhart. Who is the officer in such a fighting contingent who 
would have possession of all orders, written and unwritten, which 
would have to do with the management of the task force? 



1 See Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2677-2678 ; see also Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 223 

Admiral I^^GLIS. I would think that the flag secretary would prob- 
ably come closest to that. 

Mr. Gearhakt. May I ask counsel if he will be a witness^ 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know vrho he was. What task force are you 
referiing to? 

Mr. Geariiart, Task Force No. 1, under th.e command of Vice 
Aihuiral Pye. 

Mr. Mitchell. We haven't listed him. 

Mr. Geariiart. Can you tell me the name of the officer you liave 
just mentioned? 

Admiral Ixglis. No, sir. The Navy will try to find that [-54^] 
out for you. 

Mv. Gi-:ariiart. Have you received any report or. why tJie one bat- 
tleship was in drydock? 

Admiral Ixglis. I haven't got the information as to why she was 
in dock; no, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. The battleship that was in drydock on December 7, 
1941, was the battleship Pennsylvania; is that correcF? 

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Who issued the orders for the lining up of the bat- 
tleships in Pearl Harbor opposite Ford Island in pairs? 

Admiral Ixglis. That was contained in a circular letter issued by 
the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and contained the berth- 
ing plan for the ships in Pearl Harbor, 

Mr. Gearhart. Has that order been supplied for the record yet ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, Your Honor. 

Mr. Gesell. Talking about 2CL41, Security of Fleet at Base in 
Operating Areas? I think that is tlie one you are talking about. 

jMr. Mitchell. That is not in port, is it ? That is in operating areas. 

Admiral Ixglis. In order to save time, I will say this \^ooO'\ 
in response to the Congressman's questions, that if that has not already 
been furnished the committee, it will be furnished.^ 

Mr. Gearhart. What is the date of it? 

Admiral Ixglis. I don't know, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Wh.o issued it ? 

[ool'\ Such an order would come from the commander in chief of 
the Pacific Fleet rather than the commander in chief of the Fourteenth 
Naval District? 

Admiral Ix'Glis. You will remember that the Fourteenth Naval 
District at that time was under the command of the commander in 
chief. I think that in all probability the plan issued by Admiral 
Kimmel would be an outline : the details probably would be carried 
out by the Fourteenth Naval District. But without the document, I 
can't discuss that too accurately. 

Mr. Gearhart. Have you recently read the order to which you 
have just referred? 

Admiral Ixglis. No, sir. 

Mr. Ge-\rhart. Now, I would like to ask you professionally, not so 
much about what transpired there, but what could transpire there. 

What is the descriptive Uiime or term that is applied when the 
ships are under the highest form of inspection? 

Admiral Ixglis. I am sorrv. Congressman. 



1 See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127. 



224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you ever hear of a military inspection, that 
phrase being used ? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; there is a military inspection and a 
material inspection. 

Mr. Ge.\rhart. All right, military inspection, is that the term 
under which you have the most complete inspection of [6-52] 
vessels ? 

Admiral Inglis. They cover two different subjects. The material 
inspection covers a very searching inspection of the material condition 
of the ship. Its state of corrosion, or lack of corrosion, the struc- 
tural strength of the ship and condition of machinery. Military 
inspection is directed more toward inspection of the efficiency or 
effectiveness of the ship as a fighting unit of the fleet and includes 
such factors as the state of discipline among the crew, and the 
effectiveness of the battery, matters of that kind. 

Mr. Gearhart. You can have a military or a material inspection 
of an entire contingent, or it can be directed to special ships within 
the contingent ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Inglis The usual practice is to have a progressive schedule 
of inspections. In general, the division commander would inspect 
the ships of his own division, and it is quite possible that inspection 
of two ships might coincide on the same day, but as a general rule 
they probably would be staggered throughout the year. 

Mr. Gearhart. What are the names of the ships, the battleships, 
which were in Pearl Harbor on the day of the catastrophe, that did 
not belong to Task Force No. 1 ? 

Admiral Inglis. I haven't that information readily available, sir. 

[odS] Mr. Gearhart. You know as a matter of fact that Task 
Force No. 1 had six battleships, did you not ? 

Admiral Inglis. I don't know, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. As regular contingents? 

Admiral Inglis. I don't know ; I haven't got that information. 

]\Ir. Gearhart. Do you happen to know from other sources that 
there were three battleships in the harbor at the time of the attack 
which belonged to Task Force No. 2? 

Admiral Inglis. I am sorry ; I don't know the organization of the 
task forces by ships. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, when Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor and 
the Hawaiian Islands on his missions, or task, leaving behind three 
battleships in the harbor, under whose command would those three 
battleships be during his absence? 

Admiral Inglis. In the case which the Congressman has cited, I 
believe they would be under Commander of Battleships, who was Ad- 
miral Anderson. 

Mr. Gearhart. Where was Admiral Anderson headquartered at 
that time? Where was he stationed? 

Admiral Inglis. His headquarters would be on a battleship. We 
haven't the information here as to which battleship it was. Prob- 
ably the West Virginia. 

Mr. Gearhart. In the harbor? 

[oo4] Admiral Ingias. The West Virginia was in the harbor, 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, when Admiial Halsey left with his Task 
Force No. 2, leaving behind his three battleships in the harbor, where 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 225 

Task Force No. 1 was anchored, would those three battleships become 
attached to Task Force No. 1 sulDJect to the orders of Admiral Pye? 

Admiral Ixglis. Not necessarily, sir ; the organization by task forces 
differs from the administrative organization, and in this case that you 
cite, the battleships would have fallen under the commander, the ad- 
ministrative commander, rather than the task force commander. 

Mr. Gearhart. May I inquire of distinguished counsel, whether 
there will be a witness here who can give testimony on that subject? 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes, these gentlemen have only been prepared 
within narrow Innits to testify here. Of course they can't furnish all 
of the information that the committee ought to have and is anxious 
to have. 

Mr. Gesell. And which we are anxious to present. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, and which we are anxious to present, but we 
can't try the whole case with one witness. We have a lot more down 
the line, witnesses who have personal knowledge of these things. 

[Sdo] Mr. Gearhakt. I am very anxious to know the details. 

Mr. Mitchell. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Gearhart. I am hoping I can get them a little in advance. 

Now, referring to your statement of yesterday, to your description of 
Operational Order No. 1, and Operational Order No. 2 

The Chairman. If the Congressman will permit, the hour of 12 
o'clock has arrived, and unless he can conclude very soon, we might 
recess here. 

Mr. Gearhart. Very well. 

The Chairman. Until 2 o'clock, then. 

(Wliereupon at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 : 00 p. m., of 
the same day.) 

[■5o6^ afternoon session — 2 p. m. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
When the committee recessed, Congressman Gearhart was exam- 
ining the witness. He may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. IKGLIS AND 
COL. BERNARD THIELEN (Resumed) 

Mr, Gearhart. I notice. Admiral, from your report, that in your 
leport given to this committee, I find the following words, which I 
will read : 

Under date of 7 November, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto issued Combined Fleet 
Top Secret Operation Order No. 2, saying "First Preparations for War. Y Day 
will be December 8." In accordance with the definition of Y Day as given in 
Operation Order No. 1, this establishes December 8 only as the approximate 
date for commencement of operations. An Imperial Naval Order issued from 
the Imperial General Headquarters under date of 2 December 1941 states: 
"The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced 
on 8 December." This order is in effect the announcement of X Day as defined 
in Operation Order No. 1. Thus it becomes apparent that the tentative approxi- 
mate date for the attack selected on 7 November and defined as Y Day is 
reaffirmed on 2 December as X Day. In other words, the original tentative 
date (Y Day) and the final precise date (X Day) are in fact the same date. 

[SS7] That is the end of your statement. 

In the light of that testimony, and substantiation of it, I desire to 
read an abstract of certain decoded or cracked Japanese messages, 
which are referred to in the memorandum of the Judge Advocate 
General for the Secretary of War. 



226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Report. 
Board Report dated 25 November, 1944. 

The first one is : 

5 November translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy, 
setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging renewed effort. 

The next one I desire to read is the following: 

16 November translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington. Referring to 
impossibility to change deadline to 25 November and to press negotiations with 
the United States. 

The third one, 19 Xovember, translated 20 November. Tokyo to 
Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the 
United States consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will 
have to be broken off." 

The next one, I call the committee's attention to is the following : 

22. November translated 22 November, Tokyo to Washington. [558] Ex- 
tends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is 
absolute deadline. After that things are automatically going to happen. 

The next one I desire to read from this same summary of the Judge 
Advocate General is the following : 

26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and 
yamamoto. Kurusu stating United States will not yield, that he could make 
no progress. 

Now, I read one more : 

28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. States that 
in spite of Ambassador's superhuman efforts the United States has "presented a 
humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as a basis for negotiations." 
Therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days. After that 
negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to give im- 
pression negotiations are broken off. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlemen yield? 

Mr. Gearhart. And finally, and in conclusion of my readings from 
the summary of the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, I 
read this one : 

29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing 
Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach. 

I thought it would be very interesting, because it [559] abso- 
lutely sustains the position here. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield to a question? 

Mr. Gearhart. I have concluded. 

The Chairman. Was that a question or a statement? 

Mr. Murphy. I am making a request, asking the gentleman from 
California whether he will yield. 

The CHAiRrMAx. The Chair would like to inquire of the gentleman 
from California whether what he read was in the nature of a question 
or a statement on his part. 

Mr. Gearhart. As I read it, it is a statement, but I can convert it 
very quickly into a question by asking the witness : 

Are you familiar with those documents? 

Admiral Ixglis. Officially, no; but they do sound strangely familiar 
to my ears. I may have read them in the newspapers or certain por- 
tions of them. 

[560] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 227 

The Chair3cax. Will the gentleman yield to his colleague? 

Mr. Gearhart. I have concluded. 

The Chairman. You decline to yield ? 

Mr. Gearhart. No, I don't; I said I have concluded. If the gentle- 
man "wants to make a statement he can be recognized in his own right. 

Mr. Murphy. This time is in the hands, as I understand it, of the 
gentleman from California. 

What I wanted to say was that the paper to which he referred, 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board report from which he read, those very 
same messages are already in evidence in this case in Exhibit No. 2. 

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit No. 1, 1 believe. 

Mr. Murphy. Exhibit No. 1. 

Mr. Gearhart. I wanted them at this point. 

Mr. Murphy. I also wanted to make this request before the gentle- 
man concluded his questioning, if he would j'ield. 

There has been a request made for the log and certain other papers 
from the Boise. According to the newspapers it is in connection with 
whether or not the Boise had sighted the enemy force on the way to 
Pearl Harbor. 

In connection with that I want to make the request that the officer 
in charge of the Boise be produced at the time of [_^61^ the log- 
ging and that the general officer of the ship who was the informant of 
the gentleman from California also be produced so that we might have 
the information first-hand.^ 

The Chair3ian. Give the name to counsel. 

Mr. JMuRPHY. I don't know the name, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mitchell. We have already taken steps to get the log of the 
Boise. I don't know who her commander was, but if he is still alive 
he will be produced. 

Mr. Murphy. I understand the log itself will show certain nota- 
tions, but since the gentleman from California has raised the issue 
I think Ave ought to have before us the informant, who was an officer 
of the Boise and the officer in command of the Boise., so that we might 
give the American people a full picture. 

The Chairman. Will the Navy furnish the committee the name 
of the commander of the Boise? 

Admiral Ixglis. The committee has been furnished the names of 
Commander Robertson and Commander Moran. Perhaps the gentle- 
man from California can repeat the name of his informant. I am 
not sure that I know that, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. May I request the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Cliairman, to state the name of the officer who was his informant 
about the Boise incident so that the committee, and the American 
people, might have all the facts ? 

\d62^ Mr. Gearhart. I will have to obtain the name from my 
files in my office. 

Furthermore, I am not a witness on the stand and I am not subject 
to cross-examination by any member of the committee, unless called 
as a witness. 

If you think that I am going to divulge of my informants you have 
seven or eiglit guesses coming. Anybody who gives me information 
can rely on the fact tliat their confidences will be kept. 



1 The log was subsociuuntly fKUiiittcd to tliu rceDril as Exliiljit Nn. (J8. 



228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. The Chair woukl simply observe that if members 
of the committee do not wish to be put in the attitude of witnesses 
they ought not to testify. 

Mr. Gearhakt. I hope the Chairman follows his own admonition. 

The Chairman. I have done so up to now and will try to do so in 
the future, Con<rressman. 

Con^rressman Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions by anj^ member 
of the committee of Admiral Ingiis? 

Senator Ferguson. One question. I think Admiral Ingiis, when 
I was examining him, wanted to make a statement, and I suggested 
that he wait. I would like to have him make that statement now. 1 
don't want him to feel that he was not [S63] allowed to make it. 

The Vice Chairman. I made a note at the time. The Admiral 
indicated that he wanted to make some further statement about the 
"Climb Mt. Niitaka" message. 

Senator Ferguson. I wanted him to have the privilege of making 
any statement for the record that he desired. 

Admiral Inglis. Thank you, Seinitor. I have already cleared up 
that point to my own satisfaction. 

Senator Ferguson. By the questioning? 

Admiral Inglis. Yes; just following that question. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois. 

Senator Lucas. I should like to make one observation in view of the 
colloquy between Congressman Mur{>hy and Congressman Gearhart. 

It does seem to me that if we are going to obtain all the facts, that 
any informant, or any individual who has any knowledge about Pearl 
Harbor, the full connnittee should know about that individual. The 
name of that individual should be given to counsel in order that he, 
that individual, may be requested to come and testify, and if he does 
not want to testify, and we think his evidence is pertinent and material, 
he should be subpenaed. That is the only way you are going to get 
all of the facts which, as one member of the conmiittee, ['50'.l] I 
want. 

These rumors that are being spread by individuals and are occasion- 
ally used, at least as a portion of the truth, we should be able to get to 
the bottom of those rumors. 

The Congressman from California says that anyone wlio wants to 
tell him anything will have his confidence, which means that he is not 
going to give to the committee the name of that individual, and yet we 
are asking, all of us are asking the l^avy and the Army witnesses to 
give us the facts completely. 

That is what we want and certainly if any member of the committee 
has the name of an important witness about Pearl Harbor, who hasn't 
the courage to come before the committee and tell his story, then, it 
seems to me, such information, or statements, should be seriously 
discounted. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions? 

Mr. Gearhart. ISIr. Chairman 

The CHAIR:^rAIN. Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. I want to say for the benefit of the distinguished 
Senator from Illinois that I intend to exercise a wise discretion in tlie 



PROCEEDINGS (3F JOINT COMMITTEE 229 

matter of revealing the names of those who give me information, and 
if any citizen of this country con)es to me and gives me valuable infor- 
mation which will lead me to believe he is a proper witness to be placed 
upon the stand I will call that witness' name to the attention of the 
l')65] committee and I Avill keep the cfmfidence of the man who 
tells me of that Avitness and the testimony that he will give. 

If I am to be deprived of the right, or if any member of the commit- 
tee is to be denied the right of receiving information from people by 
reason of the necessity of revealing their name, that means that you 
have closed the door of investigation in our face. I can't think of 
anj' better way of discouraging people from coming forward than to 
announce in advance that any information they convey will result in 
their oAvn subjection to publicity and perhaps to personal embarrass- 
ment. I will keep their confidence, if it should be kept. 

The Chairmax. Has the Congressman from California concluded? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 

The Chairmax. Just a moment. The Chair wishes to make this 
observation, that the record will show that in order to obtain the full- 
est infoi-mation from those in the Government services, whether they 
are in the military services or in ciA'ilian life, the President issued an 
order lifting any ban against them coming forward and giA'ing to the 
committee, or to its counsel, or to individual members of the commit- 
tee, an}' information they had in their possession, or thought they had, 
[■566li which had not otherwise been disclosed. 

It has been the understanding, at least it has been my understand- 
ing, that when any such person came forward and gave to the com- 
mittee or its counsel information, that that information would be 
divulged and the name of the informer would be brougb.t to the atten- 
tion of the committee, so that it might determine whether to call such 
person as a witness. 

There was no need for lifting of the ban so far as persons not in the 
Government services are concerned. Not only are they free, but I 
think it is their duty to come forward and give to the committee, or 
any member of the committee, or committee counsel, any information 
that they have that will shed light upon this Pearl Harbor situation. 

In view of the fact that it was understood that any person in the 
Government of the United States, in any capacity, who came forAvard 
with information to the members of the committee, the member re- 
ceiving such information Avould make it known to the committee. 
The Chair, of course, has no desire to regulate the attitude of any 
member on that subject. The very object of lifting the ban, so far 
as Government employees was concerned, was so that the committee 
might have all the information. 

[■567] iMr. MuRPHT. Mr. Chaii-man 

The Chairmax. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. MuRPrrY. I might say the only reason I brought up the subject 
is that I understand from reading the paj^ers that the gentleman from 
California was informed by someone of the crew, an officer of the 
Baise, as to something relative to the .Japanese force having been 
sighted. That is a question now that we have to decide and certainly 
that is pertinent evidence; it is important evidence. 



230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

If there is an eye-witness in the workl, we ought to have him, and 
if the gentleman from California knows of that eye-witness, I think 
he ought to put his name on the record. 

Mr. Keei-^e. Mr. Chairman 

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

IMr. Keefe. As one member of this committee, down at the tail end, 
the last one, may I suggest that I am interested in getting on with this 
proceeding. Let's call the witnesses and get the facts. I would like 
to get on with this hearing. 

The Chair^ian. The Chair wishes enthusiastically to confirm and 
commend the gentleman from Wisconsin in that desire. 

Are there any further questions b}' any member of the committee 
of Admiral Inglis? 

(No response.) 

[S68] The Chairman. Is there any further question any mem- 
ber desires to ask Colonel Thielen ? 

(No response.) 

The Chairman. If not, the Chair will — 

Does the admiral wish to make any further statement ? 

Admiral Ingeis. I think I can make one statement that may be help- 
ful to the committee. It concerns the Japanese operation order No. 1. 
I just want to clear up one point that might be confusing. 

The copy of this order which we have does not specifically direct 
the striking force to attack Pearl Harbor. An examination of the 
document shows that an attempt was made by the Japanese to delete 
all reference to the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Apparently this was done before the document was forwarded by 
the Japanese to the heavy cruiser Nachi, because the Nachi was not 
allocated to the Pearl Harbor striking force. 

However, apparently, due to an oversight by the Japanese official 
A\ ho forwarded this to the Nachi, several brief references to the plan 
for the attack on Pearl Harbor were left in the document as recovered 
from the Nachi. 

That is all I have. 

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to thank Admiral Inglis 
\dG9] and Colonel Thielen on behalf of the committee for the 
diligence with which 3^ou have carried out the assignment given you, 
in undertaking to bring to the attention of the committee a vivid pic- 
ture of what happened at Pearl Harbor on December T, 1941, and the 
circumstances surrounding it. 

The Chair fefels that you are entitled to have it said that you have 
both had a very distinguished career in the armed services of the 
United States. 

I understand that you, Admiral, were appointed to Annapolis, the 
Naval Academy, from the State of Michigan, by Congressman Wood- 
ruff, who is still a member of the House of Representatives, and that 
you have had, in service in World War I, and World War II, an out- 
standing record, that you have been cited numerous times, 
decorated for that service. It is a matter about which I know you 
would not speak, but I want to commend your enthusiasm and your 
diligence and commend you for the patriotic service that you have 
rendered the United States in World War No. I and in World ^\'ar II. 

To you, Colonel Thielen, I wish to say that the committee thanks 
you. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 231 

YoiT were appointed, as I understand it, to West Point by com- 
petitive examination from the Armj'^, and that yon have \o70\ 
also had a distinguished career in the Army and have rendered 
outstanding service in this war, have been decorated and cited a num- 
ber of times for heroic service, evidence of which you bear upon your 
bosom, and on behalf of the committee I wish to thank you and com- 
mend 3'OU for the task Avhich you undertook and for what seems to the 
Chair to be a successful accomplishment of that task. 
Admiral Inglis. Thank you very much. 
Colonel TniELEisr. Thank you. 

The Cpiairman, Who is the next witness, Mr. Counsel? 
Mr. Mitchell. We will first offer in evidence us exhibit 8, the 
material from the War Department, which contributed to the sum- 
mai-y of the Japanese attack. This includes the preliminary mes- 
sage from General MacArthur's headquarters, dated October 14, the 
follow-up message of October 15, and then the other documents which 
he sent along by air mail, and which have been referred to by the 
witnesses. 

Now, there are many other documents which have been used as the 
basis of this summary of the story of the Japanese attack, and unless 
some members of the committee have a different view, I would sug- 
gest that instead of being put into the record, and making a big 
printing job, these documents be just held for the use of the committee 
members here. If you want them in the record, I will offer them. 

[-57i] The Chairman. Are they sufncienth^ numerous thrtt each 
member may have a copy i' 

Mr. Mitchell. There is only one copy here. We could have a set 
made of all of them, and if you want them in the record later, we 
can offer them. 

The Chairman. The Chair suggests that for the time being they not 
be printed as a part of the record, but if members of the committee 
desire them individually, they can have them. 

The Vice Chairman. I didn't quite . understand Mr. IMitcheHV 
statement. Are these additional messages, or additional inforr.iation 
received from General MacArthur? 

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 8 I offered, because one of the members of 
the connnittee rec{uested I do so. It includes everything that came 
from MacArthur. 

The Vice Chairman. That is the same one that all of us were given 
a copy of ? 

Mr. jMitchell. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Is there anything in addition to that ? 
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Senator Brewster. I thought you were referring to these Japanese 
exhibits. Were those the documents you were referring to? 

[S73] Mr. M'tchell. Exhibit 8 includes all the documents tiiat 
came from the War Department through General MacArthur's head- 
quarters on which the Japanese story of tlie attack is based. 

I offer that separateh^, because some members of the connnittee 
requested me to do so. 

If that request had not been made, I would have made the request 
as to all of this material, both Ai-my and Navy, that Ave not put it in 
the record at present, unless somebody wants it, but have it copied and 
distributed among the members. 



232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The committee already has copies of the MacArthur material. 

Senator Brewster. I understood that the request was that tlie 
MacArthur material should be in the record. I thought you were now 
referring to the other exhibits which offered all of these translated 
Japanese 'documents, which I think certainly wouldn't be at all 
necessary to put in the record, but simply have available. 

[S7S] The Vice Chairman. That is just what I am thinking. 

The CiiAiRMAX. That is right. As the Chair understands it, the 
MacArthur information has already been made part of the record. 

Senator Brewster. Is that correct ? ' 

The Chairman. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have just offered it as Exhibit 8. Tliat is the 
INIacArthur material and I offer it because some members of the com- 
mittee wanted it in. Now, the Navy material, I have not offei-ed that. 

Senator Brewster. Just a minute. I thought that was going in the 
record. 

The Chairman. It is. 

Senator Brewster. He is offering it as an exhibit and it is a part of 
this record and is going to be in the record, is it not? 

Mr. ISIitchell. Not according to a lawyer's point of view. 

The Chairman. Well, the exhibit may or may not be printed in the 
hearings and it is my understanding that this exhibit is to be printed 
in the printed record. 

Mr. Mitchell. Maybe the Senator, when he speaks of the record, is 
referring to documents being read in the room and transcribed by the 
reporter. Is that what you have in mind ? 

Senator Brewster. When I referred to the record I meant [57^] 
to the typed record Avhich we are receiving as opposed to any exhibits 
which are. of course, part of the record, but are not incorporated in 
the printed records. 

Mr. Mitchell. This exhibit will not be written out at lai-ge in the 
reporters' transcript, but when the record is made u]), the whole record, 
the exhibit will appear as a part of the record of the committee. 

The Chairman. You are speaking now about exhibit 8 i 

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 8. 

The Chairman. Yes. Now, the other exhibit that you referred to, 
which you suggested not be printed as a part of the hearing, what is 
that? 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, unless some member of the committee thinks 
it necessary 

The Chairman. What was that exhibit ? 

Mr. Mitchell. This was the material, the captured documents, 
statements from captured Japanese war prisoners, that the Navy 
received. 

The Chairman. Is it agreeable then that that be held for the in- 
formation of the committee subject to later action if it is desired to 
have them made a part of the hearing? 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think they should be made part of 
the record for only this reason. The people of America want to know 
all the facts and this hearing is being held for the people of America 
as well as for the conunittee l-^'^'^l and. certainly, these docu- 
ments are such that in order for the ordinary citizen to judge the 
record thev ought to be ^Diead on the record for them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 233 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, if the Congressman feels that, way I would 
have all the material, both Army and Navy, on which the story of the 
Jap attack has been based, introduced in evidence and I am doing that 
in Exhibit 8. 

Now, Senator, do you want this MacArthur material transcribed at 
length in the daily transcript, is that what you want? 

Senator Brewster. That was my understand hig. You say "at 
length." It is not, of course, at all at length compared with what we 
have, but this, it seems to me, to be a most excellent sununary, com- 
parable, certainly, to the summary which we received. 

The Chairman. Is it the wish of the committee that these exhibits 
referred to, the MacArthur information, and also the Japanese exhibits 
upon which the statement has been based, as has been already detailed 
by Admiral Inglis, be printed now as a part of the daily record of the 
hearing? 

Senator Breavster. As far as I am concerned, I sense, counsel's 
distinction between the MacArthur report and the captured Japanese 
documents. I think that liepresentative Murphy's suggestion is that 
it might be well to have those printed as exhibits as well, but I think 
t h'cit we may want to ['576] put them in the transcripts as well. 

Mr. Mitchell. Let me see if I can settle it this way : 

I offer in evidence as Exhibit 8 all of the material, Army and Navy, 
on which the story of the Jap attack has been forjnulated here, with 
the understanding that that part of Exhibit 8 which came from 
MacArthur's headquarters will be copied into t]ie daily transcript 
by the reporter and the Navy material will not, but will be printeij 
later on as a part of the exhibits. That is what j-ou want, is it i 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. That is agreeable. 

The Chairman. Is that satisfactory ? 

Senator Brewster. Now, then, that includes the captured Japanese 
personnel material in the later part of the record, is Ihat correct? 

Mr. Mitchell. The Japanese captured material will not be written 
in tlie daily typewritten transcript. 

Senator Brewster. No. 

Mr. Mitchell. But it will be attached to the record as an exhibit. 

The Chairman. That is understood then. 

(The documents referred to above were marked "Exhibit No. 8," 
and in part follow herewith.) 

[577] confidential 

Paiuphbase of Message Dated 14 October From I^IagArthtjr's Headquaktek.s 

TO War Depart jfENT 

Japanese say ruauy records were burned. However, complete report, with 
chart of task force, now being written and to be sent by air. I'reliniinary 
information received from the Jai)anese Navy is as follows: On 5 November 
1!)41, plan for attack on Pearl Harbor was adopted, and on 1 December 1941 
Cabinet Council decided on commencement of hostilities. Order that hostile 
action should open on 8 December was issued by Imperial General Headquarters 
(m 2 December. Navy section of Injperial General Headquarters and Combined 
Fleet Headquarters were involved in discussions and decisions to make attack. 

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet on 2') November ordered task force to 
leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North — 170° East by 
afternoon .3 December for complete refueling. Attaci? force was organized as 
follows: 1st Air Squadron (Kaga and Alagi (Akagi), 2nd Air Squadron (Hiryu 



234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and Soryu), 5th Air Squadron (Zuikaku and Shokaku), 3rd Squadron (Hiel and 
Kongo), Sth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma), 4 destroyer divisions making one 
squadron, S ti'ansports and 2 suhnir.rines. 

Japanese lost 27 aircraft; estimate damage to U. S. Navy at 2 battleships 
(Oklahoma and West Virginia) sunk, [578] 4 battleships and 4 heavy 
cruisers damaged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned 
or shot down. 

Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from 
Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance sub- 
marines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of vrar and, (d) things heai-d ' 
from ships AAhich called at Hawaii mid-Novemlser. 

[579] confidential 

Paraphrase of INIessages Dated 15 October 1945 From jNIacArtkur's 
Headquarters to War Department 

1. We are continuing local investigation. 

2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence 
Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of partial 
coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on way to 

Tokyo from 3ilanila. Documents on which collation is based have already been 
sent to Washington. 

[580] General Headquarters, 

Supreme Commander For Thei Allied Powers, 

S November, J9-'i5. 
AG 350.05 (8 Nov 45) GB 

Subject : Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. 
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. 
(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2) 

1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945) GB, and 
AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with 
your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, 
requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect 
to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an addirinnal partial report, 
is forwarded herewith. 

2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question 
48 of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army 
and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our connnunication 
of 26 October referred to above. 

FOU THE SUPltEXfE COMMANDEU : 

/S/ H. W. Allen, 
H. W. Allen, 
Colonel, A. G. D., 
Asst. Adjutant General. 

1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire. 
[581] Doc. No. 1668 

Allied Translator and Inteepreiteb Section United States Army Forces, 

Pacific 

Note: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 

pearl harbor questionnaire 
26 October 1945 

The answers to questions 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19. 20 and 48 of Colonel MUNSON'S 
questionnaire of 17 October, the PEARL HARBOR Attack, are contained 
herein. 

Note: Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshlhira (28 
December 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August 1943), who were 
staff oflicers in the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and 
because of the pertinent records have been burned, these answers are based 
upon the recollections of Commander TACHIBANA, Itaru, who was on duty 
in the Intelligence Department at that time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 235 

14. Sources of intelligence? 

Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES FLEET in the HAAVAII 
area, the coudition of military installations, the days upon which the fleet 
moved out of and into port, the location and coudition of moorages, waters in 
which maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc. ; were used as basic intelligence 
material. This material was collated by th^ Intelligence Department of the 
Naval General Staff [582] and used as the basis for the operation plan. 

Tlie primary sources were : 

1. Naval attache to the Japauese Embassy in Washington. 

■2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES. 

'S. American radio broadcasts (public). 

4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at HONOLULU. 

5. General information. 

lucll 

15. Cliaiacteristics of intelUgencc? 

Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of 
years. 

16. How and from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel 
oi the air units obtained? 

A. The location of the anchorages .shown on the maps was determined on 
the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in "14", beginning 
in the early pai-t of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages 
in PEARL HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet 
Headquarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly. 

B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled 
trum the sources listed in "14". 

C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force 
and the air units were determined [oSS] from information provided by 
tlie previously named source. Factors taken into consideration in the choice 
v>-ere American air patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were judged to 
be those upon which there was slight chance of encountering a patrol, merchant 
ships, etc. 

17. in what way did the Attack Force check on information while it was 
underway? 

As information was gathered from the sources mentioned in "14" it was for- 
warded to the Attack Force. 

18. V,'hat role teas played by agents in HAWAII? 
None. 

19.-20. Photographing of ships in the harbor and opportunities for same. 

Applicable facts not available. 

48. What pertinent informatioyi icas received frO'in merchant ships prior to 
flic attack? 

Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on. moorages in PEARL 
HARBOR, .ship and air unit maneuvers, the names of vessels encountered in 
the HAWAII area, etc. This information was used in the statistical collation 
oi information mentioned in "14". 



[58.'f] General Headquarters 

SuPiiEME Commander for the Allied Pov/eks 

AG S.jO.Or. (1 Nov 45) GB 1 Novcnihrr V.}',',. 

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. 
To : Chief of Staff, War Detiartment, Washington, D. C. 

(Attention : A. C. of S., G-2) 

1. Reference our communication AG 350.0."; (2G October 1945), GB, same 
subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 
7 October 1945 and WX 7.5.j61, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information 
to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor 
on 7 December 1941, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith. 

2. 'I'his reiiort was compiled by the Liaison Conunittee (Tokyo) for the Im- 
jierial Japanese Army and Navy in re-sponse to our Qeustionnaire furnished 
the Liai.son Committee on 17 October, a copy of wliicli was forwarded as Incl. 
No. 4 to our communication of 20 October (referred to above) and includes 



236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

detailed information in answer to questions 1-13 inclusive, 21-28 inclusive, and 
30-47 inclusive, thereof. 

3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have 
been largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by inter- 
rogation of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Estab- [5So j 
lishments of the time. Sources of "such items of information are stated in the 
text. 

4. The Japanese report that answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and ques- 
tion 48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which opera- 
tional plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in 
progress. Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the 
time of surrender; however, efforts to reconstruct it, at least partially, from 
memory and from fragmentary soui'ces, are being continued. This additional 
information will be forwarded as soon as received and translated. 

Fob the Supbeme Commander : 

/s/ H. W. Atxen. 

Colonel, A. G. D.. 
Asst. Adjutant General. 
1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire. 

[586] Doc. 1032 

Allied Tuansi-ator and Inteepeeter Section 
United States Abmy Forces, Pacific 

Note: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical 
Investigation Section, G-3, 17 October-20 October 1945. 

REPLY TO A questionnaire CONCIERNING PEARL H ABHOR ATTACK 

[587] Doc. #1032 DRM/FMO/HDP 

[Pp. 1] I. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16. 17, IS, 19. 20 and 48 (that is. the informa- 
tion therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be forwarded 
later. 

II. The reply to Paragraphs 20 (concerning orders) will be delayed because 
all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the surrender. A de- 
tailed report based on the recollections of the peoijle concerned and on frag- 
mentary sources, without the aid of documents which should be available, is in 
iireparation. 

[Pp. 2] (Note: The following Paragraphs 1, 2. 3, and 4 are based on the 

recollections of Chief of Oi)erations Section Naval General StiifE, Gapt TOMIOKA, 
Sadatoshi ; member of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Conidr. MIYO, 
Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and 
Comdr WATANABE, Yasuji.) 

1. Who eonceivcd and proposed the PEARL HARBOR surprise atlach? 
Adm YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then CinC, Combined Fleet. 

2. When ira.s' this done? 

The first part of January 1941. (CinC YAMMOTO ordei-ed Rear Adm ONISHI, 
Takijiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to study the operation.) 

3. Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipalion of a uiir against 
the UNITED STATES) included in JAPAN'S [5SS] prcicar plans? 

No. 

4. If this is so. icriie the facts shoicn in the pretoar plans. 
(No statement.) 

[Pp. 3] (Note: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are basea <;n the recol- 
lections of Adm NAGANO, Osami. then Chief of the Naval General Staff.) 

5. When was it decided to attack PEARL HARBOR? 

3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, 
when CinC. Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO came to TOKYO. 

6. Who made the foregoing decision? 
Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO. 

7. // the decision vas made in conference, give time of said conference and 
names of all persons present. 

It was not made in conference. 

4. (Note: The following Paragraphs 8, 0, 10, 11 and 12 are based upon the 
recollections of Chief of the Operations Section Naval Geiieral Staff, Capt 
TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, Comdr IMIYO, Tatsukichi, a luemlH'r of the Operation Sec- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 237 

tional Naval General Staff; and Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, a member of the 
Combined Fleet Staff.) 

8. What important factors were considered in reaching this decision? 

The factors considered were: (1) rendering impotent [o6'9] the 
UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of 
action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPI^■E Islands), 
and (2) the defense of our mandated islands. 

9. Who were the persons who icorked out the details of the actual plan? 
Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet Operations 

Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff". 

10. When was the above undertaking started? 
In the first part of September 1941. 

11. Who made the final confirmation of this plan when it was completed? 
CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO. 

[Pp. 5] 12. When teas the final confirmation of this plan made? 

1 Dec 41. 
13. Who were the people and organizations loho Jcnetc of this plan? 

(Note: This answer is based on the recollections of the Chief of the Naval 
General Staff, Adm NAGANO, Osami ; Chief of the Operations Section Naval 
General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi ; and Comdr MIYO, Takkichi, a mem- 
ber of the Operations Section Naval General Staff.) 

Those connected with the Navy are as follows : 

(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance : 
[590] Chief of the Naval General Staff 
Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff 

Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff 
Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff 

The Commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff members 
of the Combined Fleet Hq and 1 Air Fleet Hq 

(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance : 

Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff 
Navy Minister 
• Navy Vice-Minister 

Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry 

Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval Affairs, and some of their 

personnel 
Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their chiefs of 
staff and some of the staff members. 

(3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance : 

The Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking the main 
strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet with a task force 
after the last ultimatum to the UNITED STATES Government [591 ] 
had been delivered.) 

(Note: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are unknown. 
However, it is certain that none of the Japanese ofiicials who were in the UNITED 
STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador NOMURA, Ambassador 
KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached to the embassy in the UNITED 
STATES and the Imperial Consul in HONULULU, knew anything about this 
plan in advance.) 

[Pp. 7] (Note: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the 
recollections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt 
TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi ; Comdr MIYO, Takkichi, a meml)er of the Operations Sec- 
tion Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt KUROSHIMA, 
Kameto, and Comdr WATANABE, Yasuji ; and the commanding officer of the 
AKAGI Air Unit, Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.) 

21. Write a detailed report on hoio this plan could have been improved. 

a. 27ie obstacles ichich were considered and hoio they were overcome. 

(1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was considered. 
To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruising range were deck- 
loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was stowed in open spaces inside 
the ship. In the eventuality that there were no opportunity to refuel at sea, 
all the ships except the [592] destroyers had a cruising radius extending 
to approximately E. Long. 160°. In the event the destroyers were unable to 
refuel there was a plan to have them separate and return. In actual fact, how- 
ever, the sea was comparatively calm and the scheduled refueling was possible. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 1 18 



238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was, the 
most effective method or putting the main strength of the UNITED STATES 
PACIFIC Fleet in the HAWAII area out of action for a considerably long period 
of time. Hence, the following two obstacles were considered : 

(a) The fact that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and shallow. 

(b) The fact that PEARL HARBOR was probably equipped with torpedo nets. 

(c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torjpe- 
does and launch them from an extremely low altitude. 

(d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing 
attack was also employed. 

b. Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom? There were none. 

c. How were the units and commanding officers who were to participate se- 
lected {surface forces and air forces) f 

[Pp. 9] Air forces: The basic unit was organized by attaching the flight 
personnel of Car Div 4 (RYUJO and RYUHO) to Car [593] Div 1 
(AKAGI, KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time 
the most highly trained units in the combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because it had 
just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight personnel from 
every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated training, it was planned to 
bring them to peak efficiency. 

Surface forces : As far as possible, vessels with a long cruising range were 
selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers. 

d. What iccre the reasons for the actual course selected? 

Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The northern 
course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following 
along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route passing through the 
MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the south. On the northern route, 
although it was far from the enemy patrol screen of land-based airplanes and 
there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather 
and topography were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. 
On the central and southern routes the advantages and disad- [Pp. 10] 
vantages are generally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route. 
Although it may be assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes 
of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great 
because the routes near WAKE, MIDWAY, PALMYRA, JOHNSTON [5941 
Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a surprise attack 
could be made. 

The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation. 
If either of them failed the execution of the operation would have been impossible. 
However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other 
hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be assured by our own 
strength. Therefore, the northern route was selected. 

e. M^hat preparations were made for the prevention of discovery en route? 

(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the ALEU- 
TIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol planes. 

(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and in the 
event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet would make a 
severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection. 

[Pp. 11] (3) Complete radio silence was carried out. 

f. In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have been 
taken f , 

The day of the attack was designated as X-day. 

If discovered prior to X-2 Day, we would have returned without executing the 
air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1 Day, the question of whether 
to make an [595] attack or to return would have been decided in accord- 
ance with the local conditions. 

g. What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention of the 
UN f TED STATES elseivherc? 

The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Area and the land-based air units in 
the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures 
were taken to indicate that the Task Force was still in training in the KYUSHU 
Area. 

h. // the attack had failed, what countermeasures tcould have been taken? 

In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main Force in 
the INLAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean. 




OT««r»d to deploy «t 
SlT* bODtl&e unit 
Attack nir. or4»r«- 
ttdl BoBblii« Onlt 



79716 O— 46— pt. 1 (Pmep. 239) No. 3 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



239 



[Pp. 12] 22. Btate reasons for and particulars of the selection of tlie date 
of 7 December. 

(1) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged 8 De- 
cember (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational standpoint and made 
the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the Combined Fleet. 

(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth would 
have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon. However, since 
it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet, in accordance with 
its habits during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday [596] and 
leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so as to hit between these days. 

[Pp. 13] 23. How was the time for the attack selected and for what reasons? 

In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the 
take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as possible. The attack 
time was set at 0330 hours (JAPAN time). (Sunrise that day was at 0230 
hours.) 

1598] [Pp. 15] (2) Air Strength: (a) Reconnaissance Unit. 



Type 


Type of airpianes 


Number 

of 
airplanes 


Ships on which based 


Duty 


Airplanes for reron- 
naissance just be- 


Type Zero Reconnais- 
sance Seaplanes. 


2 


/TONE (1).- 


fReconnaissance of 
PEARL HARBOR 




\CHIKUMA (1) 


choraee Just before 
I the attack. 




Type 95 Reconnais- 
sance Seaplanes. 


4 


fHIEI (1) 


1 


Search-patrol planes.. 


KIRISHIMAd) 

TONE (1).. . . 


1 Patrolling waters 
1 around OAHU. 




CHIKUMA (1) 





[601] [Pp. 18] 25. During this operation were any of the fleet units or 
air forces diverted to attack secondary targets? 

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr. 
FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, wlio was in command of the AKAGI Air Unit at tliat time.) 

(1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEBONO, USHIO) left TOKYO 
Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 8 December, 
bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part of the INLAND Sea. 
The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served as a supply ship. 

(2) On 16 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two aircraft car- 
riers (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHIKUMA), and two 
destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted to WAKE Island. They 
were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support the WAKE Invasion Operation. 

[Pp. 19] 26. (Note: These answers are based on the recollections and in- 
quiries of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI Air Unit at 
that time.) 

a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air attack, 
giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target 
(1) FjU-st Attack. 

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes). 
Target : Battleships. 
[602] Reasoning : 

(1) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effectively 
Gripped by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an altitude of 3,000 
meters or more. 

(2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was esti- 
mated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had, an 80% ratio 
of hits could be expected against stationary battleships if formations of Ave 
airplanes were employed from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more. Therefore, 
it was concluded that about four battleships could be effectively crippled 
with 10 formations of bombers. 



240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(S) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use as many 
of them as possible, however, both bombing attacks and torpedo attacks 
were used for the following reasons : 

(a) If torpedo nets were layed, the attack would otherwise be 
unsuccessful. 

(&) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in 
PEARL HARBOR requires special techniqua 

(c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs [60S] abreast 
each other. Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective 
method against the inside ships. 

b. Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes). 
Target : Battleships and aircraft carriers. 

Reasoning : 

Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most skillful at 
shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an attempt made to put 
as many battleships and carriers temporarily out of action due to underwater 
damage as the conditions previously related in "(c)" would permit. (Be- 
cause the carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the 
airplanes concentrated on the battleships.) 

c. Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers). 
Target : Air bases. 

15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes) — Hangars and grounded airplanes at FORD 
Island. 

16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes) — Hangars and grounded airplanes at 
WHEELER. 

Reasoning: 

(1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the UNITED 
STATES PACIFIC Fleet [60 i] temporarily out of action, the attack 
was directed at the battleships and carriers. However, fighter plane bases 
were attacked first because it was necessary to prevent a counterattack by 
American fighter planes against our main attack units — the horizontal bomb- 
ing and torpedo bombing units. 

(2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED STATES 
Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the UNITED STATES 
PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD Island. 

d. Fighter striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters). 
Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes. 

2 Fighter Striking Unit— FORD Island and HICKHAM. 

4 Fighter Striking Unit— WHEELER and BARBERS POINT. 
6 Fighter Striking Unit— KANEOHB. 

Reasoning: 

(1) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to main- 
tain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any enemy fighter 
planes which got into the air. 

[605] (2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to 

split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the varrious 
airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack. 
(2) Second Attack. 

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes). 
Target : Air bases. 

6 Attack Unit — Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM. 

5 Attack Unit— Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANEOHE, FORD 
Island and BARBERS POINT. 

Reasoning : 

By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of action, a 
counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented. 

(b) Dive Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers). 
Target: Aircraft carriers and cruisers. 

Reasoning : 

[606] (1) Although the 250-kg. bombs which the airplanes were able 
to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleships, it was estimated that 
they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers and carriers 
of that time. 

(2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American carriers 
operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets of this dive bombing 
unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of 
the attack, most of the blows were directed against battleships.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 241 

(c) Fighter Striking Unit (3G Type Zero Fighters). 
Targets : Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes. 

2 Fighter Striking Unit— FORD Island and HICKHAM. 

4 Fighter Striking Unit— WHEELER and KANEOHE. 
Reasoning : 

Same as stated previously. 

b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units followed 
from the aircraft carriers to the targets. 

[607] Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the 
carriers at OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense clouds hung 
at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above them.) 
The positions of the carrier groups were as follows : 

(1) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The 
carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANA) 
Island. 

( 2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours. The 
carriers were 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI 
Island, 
[pp 26] The movements of the airplanes after they came in sight of OAHU is 
shown in the appended sketch. 

c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target. 
First Attack Unit : 

Dive Bombing Unit— WHEELER Field— 0325 hours. 

Torpedo Attack Unit — Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage — 0327 hours. 
Horizontal Bombing Unit — Same as above — 0235 hours. 
Fighter Striking Unit — Began ground strafing — 0330 hours. 
[60S] Second Attack Unit. 

All three units — Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and Fighter 

Striking Unit — attacked their targets about 0430 hours. However, details 

are not available because the Commanding Officer of the Second Attack Unit, 

Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in January 1945. 

(Note: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated. Both 

First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an hour). 

[pp 27] d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their flight back to the 
carriers? Why were these courses chosen? 

A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical miles bear- 
ing 340° from KAENA* Point. From there all units proceeded directly back to 
the carriers. 

Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to withdrawing on 
courses designed to deceive possible opposition. 

[pp 29] 27. How were midget submarines used? 

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, 
Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.) 

a. Reasons for use : 

To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-operation in 
the assault by the air forces. 

[609] b. How many were used? 

Five. 

c. Were they expected to return? 

While the probability that they would be able to return was very small, it was 
not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine personnel, however, 
were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. (They were pre- 
cursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.) 

d. Did any return? 

None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were exhausted. 

e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this weapon, 
[pp 30] The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance 

to PEARL HARBOR witnessed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631 hours 
8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio report on the 
success of the attack was received from one of the midget submarines at 1811 
hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December, HAWAII time). 

It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there were 
no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the daylight attack on 
8 December; but it was verified that the night attack [610] on the same 
day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great damage was caused to 
one or more large war vessels. 



242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[pp 31] 28. Was this a well-elaborated plan or one developed, lor the emer- 
gency t 

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, 
Chief of Operations Section, Naval General Staff, and of Comdr FUCHIDA, 
Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.) 

a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have been dis- 
carded or modified? 

(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded. 

b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been 
modified? 

(Replies by FUCHIDA:) 

(1) Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or had 
there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would have coun- 
terattacked. 

(2) Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area of 
about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the American 
fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw. 

[pp 32] (Note: The following replies. Paragraphs 30-38, are based on the 
recollections of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, 1611^ Commanding OfBcer of 
AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.) 

SO. When did the Task Force begin to form? 

The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might be on or 
about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or tn small formations and to 
rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November. 

31. Where was the rendezvoust 
TANKAPPU-WAN. 

32. When did the Task Force get underway on its tnisslonf 

It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 26 November. 

S3. Was there any provision to receive icord of a settlement while this Task 
Force was underway f What steps would have ieen taken if a compromise had 
been reached? 

Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TANKAPPU- 
WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN. 

SJf. Did everything proceed according to plant 

Yes. 
[pp 33] 35. If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen 
and ivhyf 

(No statement.) 

S6. Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway? 

No. 

37. Was any shipping, other tJian Japanese, seen while underway? 
[612] None. 

38. If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures would have been 
taken f 

(No statement.) 

[613] [pp. 34] 39. Why was the air assault not continued, and why was 
it not followed up by surface units or by a landing? 

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, 
Commanding OiRcer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.) 

(1) The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the 
UNTED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might 
make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished by 
air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the American 
task forces were unknown, and since the chances of scouting them were 
small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the 50-odd 
remaining HAWAII-based large airplanes, the advantages of a quick with- 
drawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was undertaken. 

(2) No landing operation was planned because it would have been impos- 
sible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after 
the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the problems 
of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it 
unlikely that the initial attack could have been accomplished without 
detection. 

[pp 35] (Note: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the 
recollections and inquiries of Comdr. FUCHIDA, [61Jt] Mitsuo, Command- 
ing Officer of AKAGI Unit at tliat time.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 243 

40. What damage did the Japanese receive? 
In the First Attack: 

Fighter planes 3 

Dive bombers .^ — ^ — ,-^ r- 1 

Torpedo bombers , , . 5 

Total -r ^ — 9 

In the Second Attack: 

Fighter planes 6 

Dive bombers 14 

Total . . _20 

Grand total 29 

41. What was the estimated damage to American forces? 

(1) Naval vessels: 

Sunk: 4 battleships 

1 cruiser 

2 tankers 

[pp 36] Heavily damaged : 4 battleships 
Lightly damaged: 1 battleship 

(2) Airplanes 

Shot down : Approximately 10 Airplanes. 

Burned or destroyed on the ground: Approximately 250 airplanes. 
Total: Approximately 260 airplanes. 
[615] It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a con- 
siderable number were destroyed in the hangars. 

42. How was the damage inflicted on the Americans determined? 

(1) From reports of flight personnel upon their return. 

(2) From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel. 

(Note: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results immediately 
after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered, after com- 
pleting its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the results.) 

[Pp 37] 43. Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed 
in additional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the 
main attack? 

(Note: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Comdr 
FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit, and 
of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet.) 

Apart from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of PEARL 
HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in follow-up 
attacks or in reconnaissance. 

[616] [Pp38] (Note: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based 
on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time 
of the attack.) 

45. Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack 
on PEARL HARBOR : 

Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the day 
before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They were 
ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified. 

46a. If there were, where were these submarines based? 

Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at KWAJA- 
LEIN, to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed in leaving 
JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII. 

b. What were their operation orders? 

The orders given to the submarines were as follows : Part were to proceed 
with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII; the ma- 
jority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in Hawaiian waters 
by the evening of [pp 39] 7 December, while the midget submarines 
were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy fleet as well as 
strike into PEARL HARBOR. 

At the same time, they were given strict [617] orders not to attack until 
the Task Force strike had been verified. 

c. Were reports made during and after the attack? 



244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

When the Task Force and the midget submarine strikes were completed, the 
midget submarines reported as follows: 

(1) Report of the attack as observed by a midget submarine on the night 
of December 8. 

(2) A midget submarine radioed the same night "Surprise attack 
succeds". 

(3) A report on the departure of midget submarmies and that it was 
impossible to recover their personnel though all recovery measures had been 
tried. 

d. What damage was sustained by the submarines? 

One submarine was detected and depth-charged by patrol vessels near the 
entrance [pp. 40] to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the 
antisubmarine net, it extricated itself, after some damage, and returned safely. 
Apart from this case there was one other submarine lost off PEARL HARBOR; 
the time and place of its sinking are unknown. 

47. How long did the submarines remain in Hawaiian waters? 

The submarines continued operations in the vicinity of HAWAII from 
8 December, the day of the [618] attack, until early January of the fol- 
lowing year. During this time, most of the submarines proceeded to the west 
coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy shipping, and part of the submarines 
returned to JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the Hawaiian area for the 
maximum length of time. 

[619] General Headquaetees 

SUPBEME Commanded of the Allied Powers 

AG 350.05 (26 Oct 45) GB. 26 October 1945. 

Subject: Additional data with reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. 
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. 
(Attn: A. C. of S., C-2) 

1. Compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 Octoljer 1945, and WX 
75561. 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the 
Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the 
attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1. 2, 3, and 5. are foi-warded in amplifica- 
tion of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October 1945. 

2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) 
for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which 
has been furnislied the Liaison Committe in order to guide their effoi'ts into 
the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage pos- 
sible is attached hereto as Inclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted 
as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated. 

Foe the supeeme commandee: 

/s/ H. W. Allen. 

Colonel. A. G. D. 
Ass't Adiutant Oenerul. 
[620] 5 incls : 

Incl 1 — Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45. 
Incl 2 — Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45. 
Incl 3 — Report, Liaison Committee, 11 Oct 45. 
Incl 4 — Questionnaire to Liaison Committee. 
Incl 5 — Map, routes of Jap Fleet. 

[621] Liaison Committee (Tokto) fob Tsm Impeeial Japanese Aemt and 

Navy 

8 October 19^5. 
N. D. No. 108 
To : Colonel F. P. Munson, USA. 

Gr-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 
We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii which 
has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to Com- 
mander Yamaguchi, I. J. N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial 
Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945. 

K. Nakamuba, 
Rear Admiral, I. J. N., 
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy. 
(Incl. #1) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 245 

1622] General Survey of the Attack on Hawaii Prepared in Accordance with 
Oral Instructions by Col. Muuson to Commander Yamagiichi of the Liaison 
Committee for the Imperial Army and Navy. 

I. Operation Orders 

A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters 

(1) Imperial Naval Order 

(a) (Issued 1 December) 

Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and 
self-defense, has reached a decision to declare war on the 
United States of America, British Empire and the Nether- 
lands. Time to start an action will be given later. 

(2) The Instruction by the Chief of the Naval General staff under 
the Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order. 
(Later abridged: Naval General Staff Instruction). 

(a) (Issued 1 December) 

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shaU, 
at the start of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet 
in the Hawaiian Area to reduce it to impotency, using the 
First Air Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force. 

(3) Imperial Naval Order 

(a) (Issued 2 December) 

[623] The hostile actions against the United States of 
America, the British Empire and the Netherlands shall be 
commenced on December 8. 

(4) Naval General Staff Instruction 

(a) (Issued 2 December) 

Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Jap- 
anese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settle- 
ment prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the 
forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble 
and return to their bases. 

B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet 
and other Headquarters. 

The subject matters are being investigated through memners connected with 
the said forces of that period. 

II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources. 

(1) Reports of Naval Attache in Washington D. C. (Announce- 
ments by American Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.) 

(2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid- 
November. 

(3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters 
immediately preceding the outbreak of war. 

[62Ii] (4) Radio Broadcasts from Hawaii. 

III. Organization of Attacking Force 
First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga) 
Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Iliryu) 
Fifth Air Squadron (Shokaku and Zuikaku 
Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei) 
Eighth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma) 

First Destroyer Squadron (Abukuma, 6th Destroyer Division, 17th De- 
stroyer Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer Division.) 
Supply Force (8 Transports) 
Submarine Force (2 Submarines) 

IV. Movement of Attacking Force (See attached Map) 
v. Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy. 

Sunk — 2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma), 1 Destroyer, 1 Trans- 
port. 
Seriously Damaged — 4 Battleships, 4 Heavy Cruisers. 

Aircraft shot down or burned — over 350 
VI. Losses of Japanese Navy 

Failed to Return — 27 aircrafts. 
N. B. As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those 
who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be 
made. 



246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[625] Liaison Committee (Tokyo) fob the Imperial Japanese Abmt and 

Navy 

10 October 1945. 
N. D. No. 123. 

To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of the Supi'eme Commander 

for the Allied Puvvers. 
Re: N. D. No. 1U8, 8 October 1945. 
Subject: Additions to the Auswers already given to the questions regarding the 

Attack on Hawaii, 

1. Additional operational orders: 

(a) Units of the attaekiug forces assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Etorofu-jima), 
by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Couibined Fleet. 

N. ii. — About 14 November the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet is- 
sued tiie above order because he recognised Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable 
place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new development in the situa- 
tion, as'well as to keep its location and movements secret. 

(b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by order of the Imperial General 
Headquarters. 

N. B. — Around 21 November the situation had seemed to be appronching to a 
stage where conmiencement [626] of hostilities would be inevitable. The 
Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the follow- 
ing order (Imperial Niival Order) to the I'onminncler-in-Cliief of the Combined 
Fleet: 'The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary 
forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall 
station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such 
that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such 
situation promptly." 

But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurusu to the United 
States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American 
negotiations to an amicable settlement, an in.struction had already been issued 
by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces 
were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United 
States proving successful. 

2. Inforuuition rega riling the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the force, of 
which tlie luicleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one outside of 
the Japanese Navy. 

Even within the Navy, the only ones who knew of the above fact were in 
addition to the attiicking force itself, tiie leading ofBoers of the Navy Section of 
the ImperiQl General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and [627] 
a certain restricted number of officers intimately concerned with the fleet 
opera ti()n. 

3. "Radio broadcasts from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source 
of information were the broadcasts made to the general public. 

K. Nakamura, 
Rear Admiral, I. J. N., 
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy. 

[628] Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and 

Navy 

11 October 1945. 
N. D. No. 130. 

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 General Headquarters of the Supreme 
Coumiander for the Allied Powers. 

In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby our 
report as follows: 

1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay. 

The following oider was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined 
Fleet on 7 November : 

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hito- 
kappu I5ay by '-'2 November for re-fueling". 

2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces. 

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined 
Fleet on 25 November: 

(a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining 
close guard against submarines and [629] aircraft, shall advance into 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 247 

Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main 
force of the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii a|ul deal it a mortal blow. Tlie tirst air-raid is 
planned for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given l\v Inter order). 

"Upon completion of the air-raid, the Tasli Force, l^eepiiig close co-onlination 
and guarding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy 
waters and then return to Japan". . , ., 

(b) "Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the 
Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble". 

3 Order directing the attacking force to proceed on its mission: 

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined 
Fleet on 25 November : . , „, ,-,.x , 

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu 
Bay on the morning of 2G November and advance to 42° N 170° E (standing-by 
position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete refuelling". 

4 Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon, 

(a) Bv way of preparation for the opening of hostilities, the plan of naval 
operations against the [630] United States. Great Britain and Netherlands 
(including the plan for the attack on I'earl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November. 

(b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon Ijy Cabinet Council on 1 
December. 

(c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that 
hostile action was to be opened on 8 December. 

5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were con- 
cerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor: 

The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Headquarters 
of the Combined Fleet. 

N B.— Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were 
connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be made 
as a result of further investigation. 

K. Nakamt-ba 
Jicnr Admiral. JJN, 
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy. 



16X11 Qttestionnaibe 

^"^^ n October 1,5. 

To be answered completely. Answers to he substantiated by copies of all 
plans, orders, maps, photos, reports, and other otticial documents available. 
In case a question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and 
official position. ^ , „ u « 

1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? 
(Give names or agencies, e. g. Admiral , General Stuff, Naval 

General Staff, War Ministry, etc.) 

2. When? .^, ^ ^ „^- 
(Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e. g. August 1!)40, 

Spring of 1941. year 1022— any time such a proposal firxt was considered either 
for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion.) 

3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese 
plans for possible use in event of war with U. S. ? 

4. If so. describe it as given in these pre-war plans. 

(State obiectives, forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you expected 
to accomplish, etc.) 

5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor. 

(Give dates as accurately as posdsible, e. g. 1 September [<>52] 1941, 
Spring of 1041.) ^ ^ ,,. , 

6. Who made this decision? (e. g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Minis- 
try, or some combination of persons or agencies.) 

7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate 
date) of that conference and the names of all known persons attending. 

8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision? 

(e. g. Desire to cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against 
P. I.?: b'^stroy U. S. main Pacific base?; Gain time for P. I. campaign? Protect 
mandated islands? or what? (incl #4) 

9. Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed? 

(e. g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) Note: 
When I say Plan. I differentiate between plana or staff studies and the actual 
orders issued to put the plan in effect. 



248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

10. When did this work begin? 

11. When the plan was completed who finally approved it? 

12. When was the plan finally approved? 

13. What persons and agencies knew about this plan? 

(e. g. the Emperor, the War Ministry, the Central Staff, [633] the Naval 

Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at Honolulu, Military Attaches to 

The Ambassador at Washington, Kurusu, etc.) Note: Names of individ- 
uals and agencies are both desired — for example, the Cabinet as a whole might 
not have been informed but the War Minister would. Also, state persons who 
had partial knowledge, e. g. the Emperor might have known you planned to 
attack but not without declaring war, etc. 

14. What sources furnished information on what the plan was based? Give 
names, rank and positions. 

(e. g. Military attaches, Consuls, Japanese Civilian resident of Honolulu, 
Broadcasts, New articles). 

15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above- 
listed sources? 

16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps 
carried by your aviator^ obtained? 

(e. g. Accurately plotted and named ship berths, barracks, azimuths on 
which to approach, etc.). 

17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route? 

18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play? 

[634] 19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units 
In the harbor? 

20. If so. when (particularly the date of the last taken). 

21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed. 

Discuss : 

a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome. 

b. Partial decisions made and by whom. 

c. How were the commanders and particular units to (Both fleet 
units and air units) selected? 

d. Why was the route you selected chosen? 

e. What provision was made against discovery en route? 

f. What action was to be taken if discovered? 

g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were em- 
ployed ? 

h. What action was to be taken if the attack failed? 

22. How was the date of Dpceniber 7 selected and for what reasons? 

23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons? 

24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units). 

25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time 
during the operation, e. g. to attack secondary targets? 

26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack. 
Include: 

[635] Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why? 
Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why? 
Time each group was to strike its target. 
Route fs) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes) selected? 

27. Discuss use of midget-submarines. 

(Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any 
back, any other details, conclusions as to usefulness of this weapon). 

[636] 28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give de- 
tails: (e. g. If the U. S. had made some concessions was it to be abandoned or 
changed? If the U. S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have 
been made?) 

29. Furnish a copy of each of the following: 

a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation. 

b. Any Staff Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto. 

c. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect. 
Note : If any document is not available give all details of it you can from 

memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked.) 

30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force? 

31. Where did it assemble? 

32. When did it move out on its mission? 

33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while 
the Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken. 



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PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 249 

34. Did everything go as planned? 

35. If not, wiiat changes or mishaps occurred and why? 

36. Was the tasli force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route? 
1637] 37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route? 

38. If so, what was done about them? 

39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a 
landing? 

40. List your losses. 

41. List estimated U. S. Losses. 

42. From what sources did you determine U. S. losses? 

43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance against 
Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately following the 
attack. 

( e. g. night after attack, following day, etc. ) 

44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case. 

(e. g, "All copies of order burned on surrender", "ads. who is 

only person who knew this was killed on (date)."). 

45. Did you have any submarines operating in the Hawaiian area prior to the 
attack on Pearl Harbor? 

46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation in- 
structions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were 
there any casualties among these submarines? 

47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in Hawaiian area? 

48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from 
Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor? 

[639] Mr. Mitchell. Now, Mr. Chairman, in connection with 
the story of the Jap attack I have been awaiting an opportunity to 
take a few minutes to read into the record certain of these so-called 
diplomatic intercepts that were picked up and decoded. 

The Congressman from California has already referred to some, 
I think, which are pertinent but he only gave extracts from the Judge 
Advocate General's report. 

Mr. Geaehart. It was the Judge Advocate General's summary, 
not mine. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. And I think there are many obscure state- 
ments in these diplomatic decoded messages which you cannot under- 
stand except by paralleling them with the movements of the Japanese 
attacking force, and with the permission of the committee — I have 
just a few pages — I would like to put into the record at this point* 
these portions so as to connect them up with the story. 

The first one is on page 96 of our exhibit 1, which contains all of 
these messages. It is from Tokyo to Washington. That means their 
ambassador at Washington. It is their number 727. It is dated 
November 4, 1941 [reading] : 

Proposal "B" : 

This proposal is based upon proposal "A". If there appears to be a remark- 
able difference between the Japanese and American views, since the situation 
does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to put for- [GJfO] ward some 
substitute plan. Therefoi-e, our second formula is advanced with the idea of 
making a last effort to prevent something happening. The substance is as 
follows : 

Then I will omit certain portions which are not pertinent right at 
this moment and it follows [reading] : 

The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually return— 

this is part of his proposal to the United States — 

mutually return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets 
and the Government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan with the 
petroleum she needs. 



250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Turning over on page 98, if the committee wants to follow me on 
this, of Exhibit 1, we have another message, No. 731, Tokyo to Wash- 
ington, November 4, li)41 [reading] : 

In tiiese negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and 
has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this pro- 
posal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Brit- 
ain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also as interested parties, to put into 
effect the terms of the understanding in question. If we should proceed without 
any definite assurances on this point and reached an accord with Washington 
alone, it might very well be that it would never work. 

[G41] Consequently, 1 want jou please to impress upon the American ofla- 
cials the importance of this essential measure and have them agree to make 
Great Britain and the Netherlands both simultaneously sign those tenns in 
which they are concerned. Please wire me the results. 

Then follows another message from Tokyo to Washington on the 
same page, dated November 5, 1941 [reading] : 

If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we 
would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratihcation of 
the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear th:it too much time would be 
consumed obtaining this. From the viewpoint of speed and certainty, we would 
like to avoid having to follow this course. From the gist of the U. S. proposals, 
we fee! tiiat the U. S. Government is also desirous of not having to await Senate 
ratitication. 

We have been led to believe that it is the U. S. Government's intention to use 
this instrument as a basis for some future treaty, and tliat it would be classified 
as one type of an "Executive Agreement" as the President is authorized to do. 
We have been proceeding in the past on this assumption. Will you please 
ascertain the U. S. attitude on this point? 

In any event, it is of utmost importance that an agreement be entered into 
along the lines given in the loV/iJ message referred to in the heading at the 
earliest possible moment. Under present conditions, speed is an absolute essen- 
tial factor. 

Then on page 99, a message from Tokj'o to Washington dated No- 
vember 5, 1941. The hrst two paragraphs I will not read at present. 
The third [reading] : 

If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A 
and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to 
submit our absolutely tiual proposal. Proposal B. Please, therefore, ascertain 
the U. S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be 
sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States. 

As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's tinal step. 
Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely 
no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish 
to stress this point over and over. 

We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that 
this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them 
that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal. 

[043] On page 100, from Tokyo to Washington, a message of 
November 5, 1941. That is numbered 736. [Reading] : 

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange- 
ments for the signing of tliis agreement be comi)]eted by the 25th of this month- 
I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoid- 
able one. Please understand this thorougiily and tackle the problem of saving 
the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with 
great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. 

On page 116 of Exhibit 1, Tokyo to Washington, November 11, 1941 
[reading] : 

Judging from the progress of the 



PROCEEDINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 251 

The Chairman. When you say "from Tolcyo to Washington," do you 
mean from the Japanese Government to their Ambassador in Wash- 
ington ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. [Eeading] : 

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications 
that the United Stiites is still not fully a\\ are uf the exceedingly criticalness of the 
situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth iu my message #736. — 

that is on the 25th — 

Is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and 
therefore it is essential [<>Ji'i] that n settlement be reached by about that 
time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th according to the schedule. 
The government must have a clear pictui-e of things to come, in presenting its case 
at the session. You can see. therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, 
and that time is indeed becoming short. 

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the 
above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secre- 
tary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your 
power to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. 
At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy 
approval to our final proposal. 

Page 122 of Exhibit 1. I only have two or three of these. This is 
from Washington, from Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, under date 
of November 12, 1941. [Reading] : 

Departmental secret. 

Continuing he said. ".Japan does not like to exercise force — not by any means. 
If we could get petroleum and other raw materials from the United States and 
the Netherlands Indies, we would not have to use force, would we? Then, when 
we come to the question of non-discrimination in commerce, 1 don't think that 
[6^5] the United States will have any objection to our proposal." 

Page 137 of Exhibit 1. This is from Tokyo to Washington, Novem- 
ber 16, 1941. [Reading]: 

For your Honor's own information. 

I have read your #1000 and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude 
for the efforts you have put forth, hut the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender 
thread of a few days, so please fiirht harder than you ever did before. 

What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I 
have given it already the fullest consiuerntion. but I have only to refer you to the 
fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you please try to realize what 
that means. 

That is the one fixing the 25th as the dead line. 

In your opinion, we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain 
patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out 
of the question. I set the dead line for the solution of these negotiations in my 
#736 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see bow 
short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and 
delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of 
our proposals, 1646] and do your best to bring about an immediate 
solution. 

Page 165 of Exhibit 1 

Mr. Kektt3. Mr. Chairiiiitu, may T inquire? I understand counsel 
is now reading for the purpose of the record, certainly, these code 
cablegrams, the.se decoded cablegrams that are printed at length in an 
exhibit already in evidence. 

Mr. Mitchell. They are already in evidence, but my point about 
them was that you cannot understand the hidden suggestions in here, 
particularly the ones I am about to read, unless you parallel it with 
the story of the Japanese movements and planning for the Japanese 



252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

attack. That is the reason I am putting them in now, sir, in order to 
make the comparison for the committee, so they can form their own 
judgment about it. 

Mr. Keefe. I see. 

Mr. IMiTCHELL. Page 165, from Tokyo to Washington, dated Novem- 
ber 22, 1941. [Reading] : 

To both you Ambassadors. 

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You 
should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed 
policy and do your very best. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess 
why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within 
the next thi'ee or four days you can finish your conversations witli the Americans; 
if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out [647] for 
you — twenty ninth) ; if the pertinent notes can be exchanges; if we can get an 
understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands ; and in short if every- 
thing can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we 
mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are 
automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful considera- 
tion and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for 
the information of you two Ambassadors alone. 

Now, there is just one more. It is a message from Tokyo to Wash- 
ington, dated November 24, for both Ambassadors. 

The time limit set in my message of 812 — 

that is the one I have just read — 

is Tokyo time 29th. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, will you call Admiral Richardson? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel one question? 

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois. 

Senator Lucas. You have read to us decoded messages, continu- 
ously referring to Japanese No. 736. Now, I presume that that 736, 
of course, is in that exhibit? 

Mr. Mitchell. I read that. It is a message from Tokyo to Wash- 
ington dated November 5, stating that because of various circum- 
stances it is absolutely essential and necessary that all arrangements 
for the signing of this agreement be coniDleted [64S] by the 
25th. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. Well, now, I was going to follow that up with 
whether or not the agreement that they discuss in these messages is 
now a part of the record ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the terms that they proposed to our Govern- 
ment. 

Senator Lucas. That is what I mean. 

Mr. Mitchell. There never was any yielding to them. 

Senator Lucas. Of course, I was wrong in using the word "agree- 
ment." I meant to inquire whether or not the terms proposed by the 
Japanese Government, upon which they based these messages, are a 
part of the record and even so I think it would be apropos at this 
time to include them at the end of the messages that counsel read. 

_Mr. Mitchell. Well, I will say this. The terms that they trans- 
mitted to their ambassadors to "^be submitted to our Government, 
about doing away with the freezing and furnishing them oil and 
things of that kind are in other intercepted messages in this very 
same exhibit 1, but there will be evidence introduced, after Admiral 
Richardson, from the State Department, giving the full story of the 
negotiations and just what proposals they made. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 253 

Senator Lucas. All right. My only thoug^ht was that if it would 
come in at this particular point it would clarify the record. 

[649] The Chairman. We can hold that up until later. 

Senator Lucas. Very well, then, I withdrew the request. 

Mr. Mitchell. I was just referring to some vague happenings and 
things that would happen and the reason for the deadline. 

The Chairtnian. All right, General, call the next witness. 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Richardson. 

The Chairman. Admiral, will you be sworn ? 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JAMES OTTO EICHAEDSON UNITED 
STATES NAVY (EETIRED) 

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.) 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, please state your full name. 

Admiral Richardson. Admiral James Otto Richardson. 

Mr, Mitchell. Admiral Richardson, how long did you serve in the 
United States Navy? 

Admiral Richardson. I entered the Naval Academy in September 
1898 ; graduated in 1902._ 

Mr. Mitchell. Wliat is your present rank ? 

Admiral Richardson. Admiral, United States Navy, retired. 

Mr. Mitchell. You were giving us- 



Admiral Richardson. Oh, would you like for me to give you 



Mr. Mitchell. No. During your Navy service have you spent 
[650'] some of your duty time in Asiatic areas and Pacific areas? 
Would you give us a brief review of your Asiatic experience? 

Admiral Richardson. If it meets the wishes of the counsel to the 
committee, I will give a brief summary of my service record using 
my own judgment to select those items which might be of interest 
to the matter under investigation. 

In 1902, in accordance with my request, I was ordered to the 
Asiatic station where I remained until 1905. During that time I 
served 1 year in the southern Philippines. The remainder of the 
time I was on the China coast and in Japan. 

It so happened that I arrived in Yokohama in time to see the 
Russian Minister depart immediately preceding the beginning of the 
Russo-Japanese War. I was in Yokohama when that war was 
initiated by the surprise attack of the Japanese on the Russian Fleet 
at Port Arthur and the Russian ship at Chemulpo. 

I remained in Japan for approximately 3 months. I returned to 
Japan again in time to be in Tokyo when the Japanese Government 
received the first news on the battle of Tsuschima which in effect 
closed the Russo-Japanese War. 

I went to the China station again in 1922, where I remained until 
1924. During that time I served on the China coast and the last 
year I was in command of the south China patrol. I was in Amoy 
when the first news of the earthquake [SSI] on the 1st of Sep- 
tember 1923 occurred. 

From 1924 until 1931 I performed various duties in Washington, 
at the Naval Academy, and on the Atlantic coast. In 1931 I placed 
the U. S. S. Augusta in commission and she served as flagship for 
the scouting force then in the Atlantic and proceeded to the Pacific 
when practically all of our combatant ships were concentrated in the 
Pacific. 

79716— 46— pt. 1 19 



254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 

I was detached in 1933 and was a student at the Naval War College 
for 1 year. 

From 1934 to 1935 I was budget officer of the Navy Department. 
From 1935 to 1936 I served for a short period in command of Cruiser 
Division 6 and then chief of staff to the commander in chief, United 
States Fleet. 

From 1936 to 1937 I commanded the destroyers of the scouting 
force. From 1937 to 1938 I was the Assistant Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, during which period the China incident started and during 
which period the attack on the Panay occurred. 

From 1938 to 1939 I was the Chief of what was then called the 
Bureau of Navigation, now known as the Bureau of Naval Personnel. 

From 1939, the summer, until 1940 I was commander of the battle 
force. From 1940 to 1941 I was commander in chief of the United 
States Fleet. At that time the United States [_652] Fleet com- 
prised all combatant ships in commission that were not assigned to the 
Asiatic Fleet or not operating directly under the Chief of Naval Op- 
erations. 

I reported for duty as commander of battle force on June 24, 1939. 
On January 6, 1940, I relieved Admiral Claude C. Bloch as com- 
mander in chief of United States Fleet. On the 5th of January 1941 
I received a secret dispatch in a code held only by the Chief of Naval 
Operations and myself informing me that I would be detached on 
the 1st of February. 

On February 1, 1941, 1 was relieved by Admiral Husband E. Kim- 
mel. At that time the fleet was reorganized, and Admiral Kimmel 
became commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and another officer 
became commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. 

I departed from Honolulu on February 14, 1941, and on March 25, 
1941, 1 reported for duty as a member of the General Board. 

Mr. Mitchell. At that time when you were commander of the 
United States Fleet was there a separate command known as the 
commander of the Pacific Fleet? 

Admiral Richardson. There was not. 

Mr. Mitchell. Who was Chief of Naval Operations while you were 
chief in command of the United States Fleet? 

Admiral Richardson. Admiral Harold R. Stark, who was my 
[_65S'] immediate superior. 

Mr. Mitchell. When you were at that time commander of the 
United States Fleet at what Pacific city or was it on the Pacific side 
or the Atlantic side that you went to? 

Admiral Richardson. Wlien I assumed command of the United 
States Fleet there was a portion of the fleet serving in the Atlantic. 
There was a detachment of the United States Fleet serving in the 
Hawaiian area, known as the Hawaiian detachment, which was com- 
posed of heavy cruisers and destroyers, and, if my memory serves me 
correctly, one aircraft carrier. The Hawaiian detachment was under 
the command of Vice Adm. Adolphus Andrews, who was also com- 
mander of the scouting force. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, were you located on the Pacific coast? 

Admiral Richardson. All the fleet in the Pacific assigned to the 
United States Fleet, that did not form a part of the Hawaiian detach- 
ment, was based at San Diego and San Pedro, Long Beach. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 255 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is where you made your headquarters 
then? 

Admiral Richardson. I actually assumed command of the fleet in 
the harbor of San Pedro, Long Beach, and I remained there until 
approximately the 1st of April, when the fleet departed for their 
annual fleet exercises. 

[064] Mr. Mitchell. What was your flagship at that time? 

Admiral Richakdson. The U. S. S. Pennsylvania. 

Mr. Mitchell. You say the Pacific Fleet that you were in command 
of out there that was not included in tliese other detachments, that 
was based on the Pacific coast, was ordered out to maneuvers in the 
spring of 1940 ? 

Admiral Richardson. It had been the custom for many years to 
have annual fleet exercises, including fleet problems and other exer- 
cises under simulated war conditions, where all available ships and 
aircraft were employed in training. 

Mr. Mitchell. What were the base ports of the Pacific Fleet at that 
time other than the Hawaiian detachment and the Asiatic vessels you 
spoke of ? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, each ship had a home port. 

Mr. Mitchell. Generally speaking, I mean what were the principal 
points? 

Admiral Richardson. They were based practically all the time at 
San Pedro and Long Beach but the ships periodically proceeded to 
Bremerton and to San Francisco for overhaul, and normal operations 
in training and gunnery exercises were otf the coast of southern 
California. 

Mr. Mitchell. Wlien the fleet vessels under your command made 
that movement in the spring of 1940, to what area did they proceed ? 

[055] Admiral Richardson. Tiiey proceeded to sea divided into 
two task forces representing opposing fleets and conducted a war game 
and various exercises and tiien united with the Hawaiian detachment 
and proceeded to the Hawaiian area, arriving there on the — I actually 
arrived at Lahaina Roads at 1500 on April 10. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you had been ordered to move out into 
Hawaiian waters after these exercises, or had you 

Admiral Richardson. Each year the fleet exercises were held in a 
different part of the world, a different part of the ocean, to familiarize 
the officers with the weather conditions and the terrain and everything 
else that it was necessary to know and before I became commander in 
chief the plans for this exercise had already been drawn up and 
approved and I carried out exercises which were planned by my 
predecessor. j 

When I arrived in Pearl Harbor according to the published plan 
the fleet, with the exception of the Hawaiian detachment, was to 
depart from the Hawaiian area on the 9th of May — no, the 9th of 
April. Wait a minute, let me see. No, the 9th of May. 

Mr. Mitchell. This is 1940? 

Admiral Richardson. 1940. 

Mr. Gearhart. What was the date? 

[650] Admiral Richardson. The 9th of May 1940. 

Mr. Mitchell. And you say, do you 

Admiral Richardson. From the Hawaiian area the return would 
normally have been to the Pacific coast. 



256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. The point is that when you went to Hawaiian waters 
at that time you expected that that would be a temporary arrangement 
and that you would shortly return to the Pacific coast? 

Admiral Richardson. That was an arrangement the schedule for 
which had been prepared and approved and was known to all the 
officers and men in the fleet. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you understood it was temporary ? 

Admiral Richardson. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Now, we have a file of correspondence that 
includes some letters between you and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval 
Operations, running from January 1940 to January 1941. You have 
examined that file and have a copy of it ? 

Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. You have supplied me with a copy 
of that file. 

Mr. Mitchell. At this point I would like to offer in evidence as 
Exhibit 9 the file of correspondence that I have just referred to, of 
which each member of the committee has a copy. 

(The documents referred to were marked ''Exhibit No. 9.") 

[067] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, just so that I will be able 
to follow the questioner, is there any way of telling how many parts 
there are in particular in Exhibit 9 ? I have seen several groups of 
papers. 

Mr. Gesell. I think. Congressman, that there are really basically 
two parts ; the letters called Stark to Admiral Richardson are mimeo- 
graphed and the letters of Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark are 
the ones you have there in your hand ; they are photostatic copies. 

Senator Brewster: Does this purport to be a complete record of 
their correspondence in that period? 

Mr. Gesell. No, it does not. 

Senator Brewster. How were the eliminations made ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there are a great many personal letters. I 
think these letters were chosen because they relate to the reasons for 
the fleet going out there and the objections that Admiral Richardson 
later developed as to their staying there. That was, really, what I 
think they are mostly pertinent to. 

Senator Brewster. Has your staff been over the complete file to 
select those which they consider pertinent ? 

Mr. Mitchell. These letters were furnished us both by Admiral 
Stark and his counsel and by Admiral Richardson. I won't say that 
I have seen every letter that passed between them [658] dur- 
ing that period. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, has counsel or have any of the 
counsel staff seen all of the letters ? 

Mr. Gesell. We have seen all the letters that we have been able to 
read. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean that you have been able 
to read? 

Mr. Gesell. Just exactly that, Senator, the ones we have been able 
to find. This correspondence is personal correspondence and we asked 
counsel for Admiral Stark to submit to us all of the letters that he 
had exchanged with Admiral Richardson and counsel submitted us 
a file which they stated was the complete file of correspondence which 
they had. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 257 

We have also had searches made in the Navy Department for any 
correspondence between these two officers. 

Admiral Stark and his counsel have reviewed the selection of the 
letters made here and we have also shown the file to Admiral Richard- 
son and he has double checked the selections, so that we have taken 
such precautions as we can to assure that the correspondence is repre- 
sentative of the topics that the documents were selected for and have 
done everything we can to make sure that we have obtained any letters 
that we can find. 

[659] Senator Ferguson. Are you through ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson-. Mr. Chairman, on page 14-0 there seems to be 
no beginning to that letter. Can that be explained ? 

Mr. Gesell. That is a last sheet which came in there by error and 
connects to another letter which is not offered in evidence. 

Senator FERGUSOisr. You have the other letter? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have, for submission to the committee, 
the other letters? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. How many letters will that be? 

Mr. Gesell. A small number. I have not counted them. You are 
welcome to see them. Many of them are personal letters that do 
not seem to us to be germane. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I make one suggestion? 

As these exhibits go into this record it seems to me, in order for 
anyone to clearly understand the letters and the answers thereto, the 
letters should go in, and then they should be followed by the answers. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have mine arranged that way. 

Senator Lucas. The exhibits that were given to us were not ar- 
ranged that way. 

[660] Mr. Mitchell. I know it, so I tore mine down and put 
them in chronological order. 

The letters I have here are letters that seem to me to be pertinent to 
the inquiry that I was going to make of Admiral Richardson here. If 
there are any more of those letters that you want to see I will get 
them for you. 

Admiral Richardson. May I make a statement, Mr. Chairman, in 
regard to this correspondence? 

The Chairman. Yes, go ahead, Admiral. 

Admiral Richardson. Wlien I relieved Admiral Bloch as com- 
mander in chief of the United States Fleet I found that quite a little 
official business had been conducted in personal correspondence, so 
that when I relieved Admiral Bloch it was necessary for me to write 
to Admiral Stark for information which I needed. I did not want 
that to occur when I was relieved, so before I was relieved I gave my 
file of personal letters to my relief. 

The Chairman. To whom? 

Admiral Richardson. To the officer who relieved me. 

The Chairman. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Admiral Kimmel. 

Admiral Richardson. Admiral Kimmel, with the request that he and 
his prospective chief of staff look over the file of letters and indicate 
those that they felt would be useful [661] in the conduct of the 



258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

affairs of the fleet, and I would retain them and deliver them to Ad- 
miral Kimmel. The majority of the other letters were destroyed by me 
because I was unwilling to take away and have in my custody letters 
that referred to fleet business, §o that I could not supply counsel with 
my file of letters. I have been able to secure some copies from the 
Department and from various sources, so that my supply of letters, 
which will be essential to refresh my memory on many of these points, 
would not have been made available to me except through the counsel. 

The Vice Chairman. Just a minute, Mr. Chairman. 

I understood you to say. Admiral, those letters that were not being 
desirable by your relief you destroyed. 

Admiral Richardson. I did. A few found their way into my 
papers when my efl'ects were packed up, so I did have a few, but by 
no means a complete file. 

The Chairman. All right, go ahead. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, Admiral, I have here a letter dated 
March 15, 1940. 

Admiral Richardson. March what? 

Mr. Mitchell. March 15, 1940, addressed to "Dear J. O." and signed 
"Betty". Who is "J. O."? 

Admiral Richardson. I am J. O. 

Mr. Mitchell. Who is "Betty"? 

[06£] Admiral Richardson. Admiral H. R. Stark. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is that the way you usually addressed each other 
in this personal correspondence? 

Admiral Richardson. It was. 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice in the letter of March 15, 1940 on page 2 
there is a paragraph that reads as follows : 

I still think that the decision to send the detachment to Hawaii under present 
world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence 
there may have on the Orange foreign policy. 

Wliat did the word "orange" stand for in naval parlance? Was it 
Japan? 
Admiral Richardson. Japan. 
Mr. Mitchell (reading) : 

The State Department is strong for the present set-up and considers It bene- 
ficial ; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc. 

That is a letter from Admiral Stark to you ? 

Admiral Richardson. Yes, and that was in reply to my letter to 
him asking about why the Hawaiian detachment was there, and I 
would like to invite your attention to the second paragraph in that 
letter of March 15, 1940. 

Mr. Mitchell. When you went there you expected to come back 
soon and then you found you were not ordered back; that is right, 
isn't it? 

Admiral Richardson. That is true. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then you wanted to know why you were kept out 
there ? 

[Od-S] Admiral Richardson. That is true. 

Mr. Mitchell. And this correspondence started, and you asked 
Admiral Stark why you were there, and this reference I just made is 
to that discussion, is it? 

Admiral Richardson. No; I think not. It is March 15, is it not? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 259 

Admiral Eichardson. I was not out there. This 15th of March 
letter relates to the presence in the Hawaiian area of the Hawaiian 
detachment 

Mr. Mitchell. I see. 

Admiral Richardson. Which had proceeded to the Hawaiian area 
in the fall preceding. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. Then we pass on to the letter of May 
7, 1940, by Admiral Stark to you, and I find that contains this state- 
ment: 

When the fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two 
weeks, but I cannot tell) the President has asked that the fleet schedule be so 
arranged that on extremely short notice the fleet be able to return concentrated to 
Hawaiian waters. This will present somewhat of a [GGJ/] problem in lug- 
ging around more oil with you perhaps than usual and keeping more provisions on 
board, because if action is wauled it will be wanted quickly. As far as I can see, 
your proposed schedule meets this requirement, and unless you hear to the con- 
trary, you may assume it is O. K. 

That is on May 7, 1940, and up to that time you expected to come 
back in the course of 2 weeks ? 

Admiral Richardson. No — oh, yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Admiral Richardson. I thought it was possible. 

[665] Mr. Mitchell. We have here a letter of May 22 that is 
written by you to Admiral Stark, May 22, 1940, in which you write 
him: 

As you no doubt 'well appreciate, I now must plan the Fleet schedule, and 
employment for the next few months. To do this intelligently, however, it is 
necessary to know more than I know now about why we are here and how long we 
will probably stay. I realize that the answer to the second question is largely 
depeudent upon the first, and probably also upon further developments, but none- 
theless I should have something to go on. 

For Instance, carrying out even a curtailed gunnery schedule will require whole- 
sale movements of targets, tugs, utility planes, etc., from the Coast. The following 
are pertinent questions : 

(a) Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other nations by our pres- 
ence, and if so, what effect would the carrying out of normal training (insofar as 
we can under the limitations on anchorages, airfields, facilities and services) have 
on this purpose? Tiie effect of the emergency docking program and the consequent 
absence of task forces during the training period must also be considered. 

(b) Are we here as a stepping-off phice for belligerent activity? If so, we 
should devote all of our [JJGG] time and energies to preparing for war. 
This could more effectively and expeditiously be accomplished by an immediate 
return to the West Coast, with "freezing" of personnel, fliling up complements, 
docking, and all the rest of it. We could return here upon completidn. 

As it is now, to try and do both (a) and (b) from here and at the same time is 
a diversiflcation of effort and purpose that can only result in the accomplishment 
of neither. 

If we are here to develop this area as a peacetime operating base, consideration 
should be given to the certain decrease in the efliciency of the Fleet and the lower- 
ing of morale that may ensue, due to inadequate anchorages, airfields, facilities, 
services, recreation conditions, for so large a fleet. If only peacetime training 
is involved, should the Bureau of Navigation and I not be advised so we may 
remove restrictions on oflicer details? 

Now, with that statement before you, will you state to the committee 
just what your situation had been up to that time, and how you hap- 
pened to write that letter? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, a fleet composed of a large number of 
ships and men and planes must secure careful planning, in order that 
time not be wasted and that something be accomplished. When the 
fleet went to the Hawaiian area as a part of the fleet exercises, we had 



260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a definite schedule of gunnery exercises, steaming competitions, full 
power [067] drives, inspections, and everything else that is 
required to keep a fleet busy, and keep them under training. 

When the fleet went to the Hawaiian area we did not take with us 
tugs, targets, target rafts, target planes, towing planes, repair ships ; 
so that if the fleet was to remain m the Hawaiian area, in order that 
it could be usefully employed, it was essential that I know that we 
remain there long enough to bring out all of the gear that was neces- 
sary for training the ship, for fear that I would start all this material 
to Hawaii and then, after it once started and got halfway there I would 
return, and then have to wait for several weeks for it to get back to 
the normal bases on the west coast, so I could continue training. 

So that, from my point of view, my efl'ectiveness in the fleet and 
continued training in the fleet demanded an early decision, so that plans 
could be made. 

Mr. Mitchell. When did you first learn, and how, that the decision 
had been made here in Washington to base your fleet at Pearl Harbor 
instead of on the Pacific coast ? 

Admiral Richardson. The first notice that I received was a dispatch 
from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief. United 
States Fleet, May 4, which reads 

Mr. Mitchell. What is the date of it ? 

Admiral Richardson. May 4. 

[668] Mr. Gearhart. 1940 ? 

Admiral Richardson. May 4, 1940. 

It looks probable but not final that Fleet will remain Hawaiian waters for 
short time after May 9. Will expect to apprise you further Monday or Tuesday 
next. 

The 4th of May was Saturday. On the 7th of May I received from 
the Chief of Naval Operations, addressed to CINCUS— CINCUS 
was the abbreviation for commander in chief United States Fleet — 

CINCUS make immediate press release instructions as follows : 

"I request permission to remain in Hawaiian waters to accomplish some 

things I wanted to do while here. The Department has approved this request." 
Delay Fleet departure Hawaiian area is for about two weeks prior to the end 

of which time you will be further advised regarding future movements. Carry 

out regular scheduled overhauls of individual units, movements of base force 

units at your discretion. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you issue the press release ? 

Admiral Richardson. I did. 

Mr. Mitchell. You had not requested or asked to be left out there, 
had you ? 

Admiral Richardson. I had not. 

Mr. KJEETE. I am having difficulty, Mr. Mitchell. I have [669] 
the answer but I did not get your full question. 

Mr. Mitchell. I probably did not have my nose in the microphone 
again. My question was whether he had given the press release, and he 
said he did, and I asked him if he had asked to be kept out there at 
Hawaii, and he said "No." 

Mr. Kepte. Thank you. 

Mr. Mitchell. I refer now to a letter of May 27, 1940, which was 
written by Admiral Stark to you in response to the letter of May 22 
that I just read from, and in which you wanted to know about what 
you were supposed to do, and he said, among other things : 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 261 

Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by 
paragraph. 

First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, 
and to tell you that here in the Department we are up against the same thing. 

Why are you in the Hawaiian area? 

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought 
your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters 
I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is 
that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take 
independent action. 

[670J We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that 
so far as they are concerned, she, Japan has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies. 

Then later in the letter : 

Along the same line as the first question presented, you would naturally ask — 
suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? 
My answer to that is, I don't know, and I think there is nobody on God's green 
earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, 
both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the 
thought contained in your i-ecent letter. 

I would point out one thing, and that is even if the decision here were for 
the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the 
Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would 
completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just 
remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do, and so long as 
they don't know, they may hesitate or be deterred. These facts I have kept 
very secret here. 

The above, I think will answer the question "why you are there." It does 
not answer, the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured 
that the minute I get [671] this information I will rush it to you. Nobody 
can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question and also — like you — 
I have been unable to get the answer. 

I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I 
may say that so far as the Department is concerned, you are at liberty to play 
with the gunnery schedule in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices 
for the time being and substituting others which you may consider important, 
and which you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically, if you want 
to cut short range battle practice and proceed with long range practices, or 
division practices or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc., 
which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain 
status — go ahead. Just keep us informed. 

Later on, he says : 

You ask whether you are there as a stepping-off place for belligerent activity! 

Answer: Obviously it might become so under certain conditions, but a definite 
answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing. 

I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast 
for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did 
return, it might nullify [672] the reasons for your being in Hawaii. This 
very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have 
authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, 
etc., and this should help in any case. 

He says later : 

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating 
base, but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are 
up against. 

As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due 
to inadequate anchorages, airfields, service, recreation conditions, for so large a 
fleet: 

I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval 
Academy in the West Indies. 

Now, that brings to our minds the question of your attitude about 
the basing of the fleet, and I call your attention to a letter you wrote 
to Admiral Stark — before we get to that, I have a letter here of June 
22j Stark to Richardson. 



262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keete. Is that contained in this file ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not so sure. It is a loose sheet. 

Mr. Gesell. It was sent to you subsequently, Congressman Keefe. 
There were additional letters discovered after the [673] first 
mimeographing, and they were sent to the members of the committee, 
and they did not come in the same attachment as the others. 

The Chairman. Tliey were put in a folder marked "Additional 
Letters Between Stark and Kichardson." 

Mr. Keete. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sorry we did not have them all together at the 
start. 

This letter is from Stark to Kichardson, June 22 ; 

Your trip to Washington was held in abeyance because of uncertainty as to 
the movement of the Fleet in the immediate future. Tentatively, decision has 
been made for the Fleet to remain for the present where it is. 

Is that about the first- 



Admiral Richardson. What letter is that? 

Mr. ISIiTCHELL. June 22, 1940. Maybe the Admiral hasn't got a 
copy of it. 

Mr. Gesell. I will get him one. 

[674] Admiral Eichardson. I have my letter. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. There is one from you dated June 22, but 
this is one from Admiral Stark to you dated June 22, which was sup- 
plied to us later from the original file. 

I am sorry, I thought you had seen it. 

Admiral Richardson. All right ; I have that letter.^ 

Mr. Mitchell. Had you received any information more definite 
than that as to the permanency of your station at Pearl Harbor prior 
to that letter ? It says : 

Tentatively decision has been made for the fleet to remain for the present 
where it is. This decision may be changed at any time. 

Admiral Richardson. No, I had received no prior information. _ 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you had developed by that time very definite 
ideas in your own mind in opposition to the advisability of basing the 
fleet at Pearl Harbor, had you not? Will you please state in your 
own way just what the situation was and what your objections were 
grounded upon ? 

Admiral Richardson. My objections for remaining there were, 
primarily, that you only had one port, secure port, and very crowded, 
no recreation facilities for the men, a long distancefrom Pearl Harbor 
to the city of Honolulu, inadequate transportation, inadequate airfields. 

[675] A carrier cannot conduct all training for her planes from 
the carrier deck. In order to launch her planes she must be underway 
at substantial speed, using up large amounts of fuel. So that wherever 
carriers are training their squadrons there must be flying fields avail- 
able, so that while the ship herself is undergoing overhaul, or repair, 
or upkeep, the planes may conduct training, flying from the flying 
fields. 

There were inadequate and restricted areas for anchorages of the 
fleet ; to take them in and out of Pearl Harbor wasted time. 

Another reason, which was a substantial one: Americans are per- 
fectly willing to go anywhere, stay anywhere, do anything when 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 263 

there is a job to be done and they can see the reason for their being 
there, but to keep the fleet, during what the men considered normal 
peacetimes, away from the coast and away from their families, away 
from recreation, rendered it difficult to maintain a high state of 
morale that is essential to successful training. 

For those reasons, and because I believe that the fleet could be 
better prepared for war on a normal basis on the west coast, I wanted 
to return to the west coast. 

Mr. MncHELL. There is also a letter from you — or rather a memo- 
randum from the Secretary, it is called, dated September 12, 1940, 
Will you please turn to that? 

[676] Admiral Eichardson. I have it. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. You have it. 

Admiral Eichardson. September 12, 1940. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Was that prepared while you were out in 
the Hawaiian area? 

Admiral Eichardson. It was. At that time I had shifted my 
flag and was then flying it from the U. S. S. Enterprise, an aircraft 
carrier. 

The Secretary of the Navy visited the Hawaiian area from Septem- 
ber 6 until September 15. During that time I had him off Lahaina 
for dinner aboard the Enterprise with all the flag officers present. 
He was aboard the Enterprise for awhile. Then he was shifted to 
other types of ships, battleships, destroyers, cruisers. 

I did that in order that he might see the operations conducted by 
various types of ships and in order that he might meet other flag 
officers in the fleet. I was particularly careful to see that he had an 
opportunity to talk with Admiral Kimmel, Vice Admiral Andrews, 
Admiral Snyder, and a destroyer captain named Binf ord. 

I knew that he would hear the news of many officers and I was 
anxious that he remember the things that I had said to him ; and in 
order that he might not confuse what I had said to him with the 
things that had been said to him by others, I [667] prepared a 
memorandum setting forth a brief outline of the points that I had 
covered in very extensive conversations and I filed a copy of that mem- 
orandum with the Chief of Naval Operations, because I endeavored at 
all times to let the Chief of Naval Operations know what I was doing, 
or what it was my intention to do. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you please turn to that memorandum of the 
12th of September 1940. At the bottom of page 2, under "4 (A)" 
is the title "Eetention of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area." 

Was that statement intended to sum up your views about the reten- 
ion of the fleet in the Hawaiian area ? 

Admiral Eichardson. It was. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you mind reading that, Admiral? 

Admiral Eichardson (reading). 

Retention of the fleet in tlie Hawaiian Area. 

(a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached 
to l)asing the fleet in this area, some of which are : 

(1) Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies. 

(2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security. 

(3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due [67S] to 
difficulties of entry, berthing and departure of large ships. 



264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface. 

(5) Inadequate facilities for ileet services, training, recreation and housing, 

(6) Prolonged absence from mainland of officers and men in time of peace 
adversely afEects morale. 

(7) In case of war, necessary for fleet to return to mobilization ports on 
West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measure resulting 
in confusion and a net loss of time. 

Shall I continue ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I think those are pertinent. 

Admiral Richardson (reading) : 

If the disposition of the fleet were determined solely by naval considerations 
the major portion of the fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases be- 
cause such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war. 

If factors other than purely naval ones are to influence the decision as to 
where the fleet should be based at this time, the naval factors should be fully 
presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision 
on the readiness of the fleet. In other words, is it more important [679] to 
lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the fleet in the 
Hawaiian area, than to facilitate its preparation lor active service in any area 
by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases? 

In case our relations with another Pacific nation deteriorate, what is the State 
Department's conception of our next move? Does it believe that the fleet is 
now mobilized and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii 
or safely conduct necessary training from the insecure anchorage at Lahaina 
which is 2,000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific 
Coast bases? 

Mr. Mitchell. Shortly after that you made a visit to Washington, 
did you not, Admiral ? 

Admiral Richardson. I did. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember when you reached here and when 
you left, approximately ? You were here on October 8, were you not ? 

Admiral Richardson. Yes. At 07 : 07, on October 7. I talked with 
Stark, Nimitz, EJiox. That was my second visit to Washington. I 
came at that time because the Secretary said he wanted to talk to me. 
I arrived. I found that they were considering increasing the strength 
of the Asiatic Fleet, which was under the command of Admiral Hart. 
And while here I lunched with the President. Had a long talk with 
him. I saw Dr. Stanley [6S0] Hornbeck of the Department of 
State, who was at that time, if my memory serves me correctly, the 
advisor of the State Department on far eastern affairs. 

Mr. Mitchell. In your interviews with the Secretary of the Navy 
and Admiral Stark, did you take up this question with them of your 
objections, the objections that you just stated, as to the basing of the 
fleet in the Hawaiian area ? 

Admiral Richardson. I think not, because I had given a memoran- 
dum to the Secretary and fully stated my views to him. I had sent 
a copy of it to Admiral Stark, w^ho was thoroughly familiar with my 
views. And I had sent a copy of part of it to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck 
of the State Department who knew what I thought. So, if I remember 
correctly, I did not talk about that with Admiral Stark. I talked 
primarily about detaching ships from the main fleet to strengthen the 
Asiatic Fleet. 

And the first day I arrived I was suddenly confronted with the fact 
that 5,000 sailors had landed on the west coast to be turned over to me 
and I had to find some means of getting them out to Hawaii. So I 
had to take a carrier — I think it was the Saratoga — and use her to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 265 

transport the men that I was unable to accommodate in ships that had 
come to the coast with me. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the White House records show that on October 
8, 1940, you had lunch with the President and with Governor Leahy at 
1 p. m. Do you remember that ? 

[681] Admiral Richardson. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. Governor Leahy or Admiral Leahy? 

Admiral Richardson. Admiral William E. Leahy. 

Mr. Mitchell. He was then Governor of Puerto Rico. 

Admiral Richardson. Yes. We did not go to the White House 
office in company. I was invited by the President through the Chief 
of Naval Operations to lunch at 1 o'clock. When I arrived there I 
found Admiral Leahy there. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you state in your own way. Admiral, just what 
occurred at that meeting and what was said about any of these matters 
we have been referring to ? 

Admiral Richardson. The President talked to Admiral Leahy about 
Puerto Rican affairs, and as I was not interested, I remember little 
of what was said; but I have a vague recollection that one subject 
under discussion was the question of housing. 

The President asked Admiral Leahy his opinion about strengthen- 
ing the Asiatic Fleet and my recollection is that Admiral Leahy said 
that whatever you sent out will be lost, therefore I would send the 
least valuable combatant ships we have, the 7,500 ton cruisers, but I 
recommended, I personally recommended that none be sent. A deci- 
sion to send none was reached. 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Leahy had been Chief of Naval Operations 
previously? 

[68£] Admiral Richardson. He had been Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions. He was Chief of Naval Operations when I was the assistant. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then proceed, Admiral, with your statement of 
what occurred there. 

Admiral Richardson. The following statement, because of its im- 
portance, I have written out. I wrote it out several weeks ago when 
it appeared certain, in my mind, that I would, unfortunately, be called 
before this committee. And with the permission of the Chairman I 
would like to read this statement 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Richardson. Which I prepared in the quiet of my home, 
where I could think and refresh my memory to a maximum extent 
possible. 

The Chairman. You may proceed, Admiral, to do that. 

Admiral Richardson. I took up the question of returning to the 
Pacific coast all of the fleet except the Hawaiian detachment. 

The President stated that the fleet was retained in the Hawaiian 
area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of 
•Japan. 

I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might 
influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military 
government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared 
for war, and had no train of [OSS'] auxiliary ships without 
which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore, the pres- 
ence of the fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on 
Japanese action. 



266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 

I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that 
we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned 
to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and 
fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then 
stripped for war operations. 

The President said in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that 
the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area, has had, and is now 
having, a restraining influence on the actions of Japan." 

I said, "Mr. President, I still do not believe it, and I know that our 
fleet is disadvantageously disposed for preparing for or initiating war 
operations." 

The President then said, "I can be convinced of the desirability of 
returning the battleships to the west coast if I can be given a good 
statement which will convince the American people and the Japanese 
Government that in bringing the battlesliips to the west coast we are 
not stepping backward." 

This is embarrassing. 

Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war. He 
replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, 
or the Dutch East Indies we would not [684] enter the war, 
that if they even attacked the Pliilippines he doubted whether we 
would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mis- 
takes and that as the war continued and the area of operations ex- 
panded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter 
the war. 

Mr. Mitchell. Does that complete your statement of the conver- 
sation ? 

Admiral Richardson. Tliat is about all of it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you want to adjourn? 

The Chaikman. Four o'clock having arrived, the Chair thinks we 
might recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, 
November 20, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 267 



[685] PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK 



TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318) , Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. 
Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[686] The Chairman. The committee will be in order. 

Mr. Mitchell, you were examining the witness when we adjourned. 
You may proceed. 

Before you proceed, Mr. Mitchell — this is not necessarily on the 
record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

The Chairi^ian. All right, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. JSIitghell. Very well. 

TESTIMONY OF ADM. JAMES OTTO EICHAEDSON (Resumed) 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Richardson, in the correspondence which 
you have there appears to be a memorandum from the Chief of Naval 
Operations dated October 9, 1940, made by you. That was the day 
following this visit with the President ? 

Admiral Richardson. It was. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if counsel will permit me 
to interpose. 

Last week I requested from Admiral Inglis a chart which he said 
he would have ready for me yesterday showing the disposition of the 
ships in the Pacific from May 1941 to December 7, 1941. I would like 
to have that at this moment, if I could. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am informed that they have been working 
[687] on it ; they ought to have it any time ; they haven't sent it yet. 

Mr. Gearhart. I am most anxious to have it before I am permitted 
to examine the witness now on the stand. I want to ask him questions 
concerning those figures. So if a chart can be supplied me, I will ap- 
preciate it very, very much. 

The Chairman. I am satisfied that Admiral Inglis and the Navy 
Department will make the chart available as soon as possible, and as 
soon as it is available it will be presented here.^ 

» Exhibit No. 86. 



268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Go ahead, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. You made that memorandum of October 9, 1940, 
following your visit the day before with the President? 

Admiral Richardson. I did. In order that the Chiei of Naval Op- 
erations might be informed as to the decisions of the President and 
as to his views as expressed to me. 

Mr. Mitchell. The first item on that memorandum is : "Go ahead 
with assembly of train." 

What does that mean? 

Admiral Richardson. There had been some discussion as to as- 
sembling auxiliary vessels, transports, repair ships, supply ships. I 
had urged that it be done as one evidence of our intention to be pre- 
pared. The President stated that [688] we would go ahead 
with the assembly of a train. 

Mr. Mitchell. Item 2 is : ''Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to 
fill four old light cruisers?" 

Is that a question the President asked, or one you wanted to know 
about ? 

Admiral Richardson. The President asked me. I knew we did not 
have it. So I wanted the Chief of Naval Operations informed that 
he might find it necessary or advisable to have a supply of fuel oil in 
Samoa. 

Mr. Mitchell. Item 3 : 

Give me a chart showing British and French bases or possible bases for sur- 
face ships, submarines, or airplanes in islands in the Pacific east of the interna- 
tional date line. 

Was that another request from the President? 

Admiral Richardson. No. That was a request by me, as I remem- 
ber it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then, in paragraph 4, you stated : 

The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley 

That is Admiral Ghormley, is it? 

Admiral Richardson. It is Admiral R. L. Ghormley. 

Mr. Mitchell (reading) : 

was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical 

materials, and the [69S] British Admirality felt that they should have 
offices prepared for staff conferences. 

Were you reporting a thing that the President had said to you ? 
Admiral Richardson. I was. 
Mr. Mitchell. No. 5 : 

The British believe the Germans will iitteinpt to oceiipy Dalcar from Spain 
overland through Africa. 

Under that, in brackets, "F. D. R." 

What does that mean? 

Admiral Richardson. "F. D. R." belongs to the next paragraph. 
The first is a bit of information. The next, the sixth paragraph is 
intended to read: 

I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, can be convinced of the desirability, 

because that is what the President stated to me. 
[670] Mr. Mitchell (reading) : 

I can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West 
Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American peo- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 269 

pie, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West 
Coast we are not stepping backward. 

That was informing the Chief of Naval Operations what the Presi- 
dent had said ? 

Admiral Richardson. That is true. I was at that time, just before 
going to Washington, on board a flagship on the west coast with ap- 
proximately one-third of the battleships. We had returned to the 
west coast for replenishment and for recreation and for overhaul and, 
if my memory serves me correctly, I was at that time flying my flag 
on the New Mexico. 

Mr. Mitchell. Item 7, the last on the memo, is this [reading] : 

The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light 
Cruisers to visit Mindinao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed 
toward sending a stronger force. 

That was just passing on to the Chief of Naval Operations an item 
of information ? 

\_691'\ Admiral Eichaedson. It was. 

Mr. Mitchell. Going back now. Admiral, to July 1940, prior to this 
visit in October 1940, j^ou made a visit to Washington in July 1940, 
did you ? 

Admiral Richardson. At my suggestion, before I left the west coast 
for the Hawaiian area, I was ordered to proceed by air to AVashington 
for a conference with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Presi- 
dent. 

I actually started and France capitulated and mj^ trip was delayed. 
I later came by air, arriving in Washington on July 8 and departing 
from Washington for Honolulu on July 11. 

Mr. Mitchell. The appointment book at the White House states 
that on July 8 you had a luncheon engagement with the President at 
1 p. m. ; on July 11 another appointment with the President at 12 noon. 
What is your memory about that ? 

Achniral Richardson. As to the appointment on July 8, 1 had lunch 
with the President and talked with him for 2 or 3 hours and my mission 
at that time was primarily to find the thought back of our retention in 
Hawaii, to explore and endeavor to ascertain, if possible, the duration 
of our stay and, from my point of view, stress the necessity of in- 
creasing the number of men in the Navy because we were at that time 
building a very large Navy ; we had on board ship \692'\ ap- 
proximately 85 percent of the number of men required to man the 
ships. 

In normal times, in normal peacetimes, you can build a destroyer 
quicker than you can train the men to man them. Therefore, I was 
very strongly of the opinion that all the ships in active commission 
in the fleet should have on board them all the men that they could carry 
in order that the ships themselves might be prepared and that nucleus 
crews should be trained for the new ships, because they would be 
required whether we had peace or had war. I was also desirous of 
securing the retention of officers in the fleet without the normal change 
of duty. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were those the subjects that you discussed with the 
President? 

Admiral Richardson. They were. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you want to state in your own way, as near as you 
can recollect, what the general tenor of the conversation was? 

79716— 46— pt. 1 20 



270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Eichardson. Well, the President was rather loath to in- 
crease the number of men because he felt, as expressed to me, that men 
of mechanical trades in civil life could be quickly inducted and made 
adequate sailormen if their services were suddenly required. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. What about the second appointment at [693] 
12 noon on July 11 with the President? Do you remember about that 
and what was said ? 

Admiral Richardson. I believe that that— well, I know that that 
meeting lasted only a few minutes and I went by to tell the President 
good-bye and no subjects of any moment were discussed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any appointment with Mr. Hull or 
Mr. Welles, or both of them, during July 1940 ? Their record shows 
an appointment on July 9. 

Admiral Richardson. During that visit I saw Secretary Hull and 
Under Secretary Welles and talked to both of them at the same time, 
or, rather, I talked to Secretary Hull in the presence of Under Secre- 
tary Welles for an hour or so, 

I saw Senator Byrnes on the 10th of July. I had lunch with Gen- 
eral Marshall on the 10th of July. I saw Dr. Stanley Hornbeck on the 
11th of July and outside of naval personnel I think those were the only 
officials that I saw. I wanted to see the then Congressman Sci-ugham, 
who was chairman of the subcommittee of the Appropriations Com- 
mittee of the House that handled naval appropriations, but he was not 
in town. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember the subject of your discussion with 
Mr. Hull on that meeting of the 9th of July, what the general tenor of 
it was ? 

[694] Admiral Richardson. I saw Mr. Hull to fully explore and 
learn all that I could as to why the fleet was retained in Hawaii, how 
long they would probably stay there and what the future intentions 
were, because I had been directed to retain the fleet in Hawaii and 
anounced that it was retained there at my request and naturally, since 
I had made no such request, 1 wanted to know what was back of the 
whole thing. 

I also felt so strongly the need for men that I wanted to impress 
on both the Secretary' of State and the Under Secretary of State that 
I felt that they should assist insofar as possibly they could in seeing 
that the fleet was fully manned. 

Mr. Mitchell. In this correspondence file is a letter from you to Ad- 
miral Stark dated June 22, 1940, dated at Lahina Roads, is it? 

Admiral Richardson. Lahaina Roads. 

Mr. MncHELL. Will you please look at that ? 

Admiral Richardson. I cannot find that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I will hand it to you, my cop3^ 

Admiral Richardson. I have it. My letter ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Your letter. 

Admiral Richardson. Yes ; I have it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Your letter refers to the fact that General Herron, 
then commanding the Hawaiian department, had [69S] re- 
ceived an alert from the War Department. Do you remember that 
incident ? 

Admiral Richardson. Vividly. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was any alert ordered from W^ashington for the 
Navy at the same time ? Just go on in your own way and tell us about 
it. Admiral. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 271 

Admiral Kichardsox. Lieutenant General Herron, commanding the 
Hawaiian department, received from the War Department a dispatch 
on July 17, 1940, which read : 

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific 
trade to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting 
undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Main- 
tain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct 
with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge. 

At that time I was at sea. Lt. Gen. Charles D. Herron visited 
Admiral Claude C. Bloch on June 17, informed him of the receipt of 
these orders and requested the Navy establish a distance reconnais- 
sance. This is hearsay and gained from official correspondence. 

Admiral Bloch, in company with General Herron, either had Vice 
Admiral Andrews come in or visited him and requested him to estab- 
lish the long range reconnaissance be- [696] cause the patrol 
planes were under Vice Admiral Andrews. Vice Admiral Andrews 
was the senior officer afloat in Pearl Harbor. 

I was informed of what had been done by both Admiral Andrews 
and I believe Admiral Bloch, so I sent to the commandant of the 
Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, the following message: 

Would like to know whether request of Commanding General Hawaiian De- 
partment for additional air patrol is a part of Army exercises or is it based upon 
information from the "War Department? 

I received at 0945 local time on June 19, 1940 the following reply : 

Request of Commanding General was based upon a directive from the War 
Department. He has no information as to whether or not it is an exercise. 

I had received no information from the Navy Department. There- 
fore, despite what anybody else believed, I knew that it could not be 
other than a drill. 

The Vice Chairman. Other than a what? 

Admiral Richaedson. Other than an exercise, because I firmly 
believed that no important information would be available to General 
Marshall that was not available to Admiral Stark and if the informa- 
tion was of such a character as to [697] necessitate alerting the 
Army, the Navy would be equally alerted; but in order to be cer- 
tain I 

Mr. Mitchell. Are you looking for your letter of the 22d ? 

Admiral Kichardsox. No. On June 21 I had a plane come out 
from Pearl Harbor, pick me up at 0745, take me into Pearl Harbor, 
where I had a conference with Admiral Bloch ^nd General Herron. 
I read the order. I asked General Herron whether it was a real alert 
or a drill. He said he did not know. I assured him that it could not 
be anything but an exercise. 

I sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations requesting in- 
formation. No reply was ever received. 

In compliance with General Herron's request to establish a patrol 
Vice Admiral Andrews modified the patrol that was then in effect. 
I had established a plane patrol centered on Lahaina, wliich covered 
the arc from 220 to 335 degrees to a distance of 180 miles. Admiral 
Andrews changed this patrol to cover the arc from south, through 
west to north to a distance of 300 miles. He also established a dawn 
and dusk patrol, reported his action to me in a letter dated June 18 



272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and requested that I confirm this action. I sent to Vice Admiral An- 
drews the following dispatch : 

Affirm patrol. 

Do you want me to go on ? 

[69S] Mr. Mitchell. That report from Admiral Andrews is the 
document in the .correspondence file dated June 18, 1940, "Memor- 
andum from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet." You 
have it before you, have you ? 

Admiral Kichardson. I forwarded that with a letter from Admiral 
Bloch to me, with the dispatch exchange between me and the com- 
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in my letter to the Chief 
of Naval Operations in order that he might be fully informed as to 
the whole incident. 

Mr. Mitchell. The report of Admiral Andrews states that the 
sector you spoke of from south through west to north to a distance of 
300 miles would be searched. 

Admiral Richardson. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. With what types of planes was that reconnaissance 
conducted ? 

Admiral Richardson. "Well, the pati'ol planes, a type then known 
as VP, which is a seaplane, unarmed, used later in this war, primarily 
as a rescue plane. 

Mr. Mitchell. How long did you keep that plane reconnaissance 
operation on that scale? 

Admiral Richardson, In order that the committee may be fully 
informed with respect to long-range reconnaissance which prevailed 
for a number of months, it will be necessary for me to cover some 
correspondence and make a comprehensive [699] statement. 

Shall I proceed? 

Mr. Mitchell. If you are ready to. 

Admiral Richardson. In connection with the annual fleet exercises, 
it had always been the custom to simulate war conditions, and there- 
fore, when the fleet arrived in the Hawaiian area, about April 10, and 
all of the heavy ships anchored off Lahaina Roads, I established, as a 
part of the exercises, a dawn and dusk inner patrol of planes, which 
extended to a distance of about 80 miles. I established an antisubma- 
rine patrol of destroyers at all the entrances to Lahaina Roads, and I 
established a long range reconnaissance of approximateh' 180 miles. 

This reconnaissance was established solely as an exercise. It was 
not adequate either as to the density of the planes or as to the distance 
searched to j^rovide warning of any impending attack from a prospec- 
tive enemy. Because of the frequent warnings which I had received 
from the Chief of Naval Operations in personal letters, because of my 
orders to remain in the Hawaiian area with the fleet for reasons 
unknown to me, I continued this patrol and gradually the purpose for 
which it was maintained was somewhat modified. 

It was continued for three purposes: First, for training; next, be- 
cause of my knowledge of the Japanese, and the Panay incident. 
Although I "felt there was absolute- \700'] ly no danger at that 
time of an attack by the Japanese fleet, I feared that there was, at any 
time, a possibility that some fanatical, ill-advised officer in command 
of a submarine or a ship might attack. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 273 

Also I felt — and this may have been Avrong, but I felt that Admiral 
Stark might not have all the information that there was available, or 
he might not f uUj miderstand the implications of all tlie information 
that he had, and that partly as a personal defensive device, he was 
warning me to be on the alert against a possible attack, and being an 
ofiicer of long experience, I wanted the same protection, and therefore 
I flew this patrol so it could not be said of me after the thing happened 
that I was warned and did nothing about it. 

It was in effect from that point of view a token reconnaissance. 

That Avas continued until, in November ^8, 1940, in a letter to 
Admiral Stark, I said, in part — that is my letter of the 28th of 
November — 

Tour last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in 
the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the 
Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received. 

With regard to the first of these matters, i will take this [701] up with 
Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. 

The third paragraph states : 

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me 
greater concern 

Mr. Mitchell (interposing). You might read that fully, that sec- 
ond paragraph. 

Admiral Kighardson. That relates to another item, but I will do 
that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Admiral Richardson (reading) : 

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my 
arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great 
deal of concern, and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets 
within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too re- 
stricted and ships at present are not moored within torpedo range of tiie entrance. 

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me 
greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for 
employment of a great number of fleet units for security alone, which will con- 
sume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training 
and indoctrination. I feel that the fleet must opei'ate on either of two assump- 
tions, i. e., (a) that [702] we are at peace and no security measures are 
required ; or (b) that wartime measures of security must be carried out. 

Heretofore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis 
for training, and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to 
bring on a war by an attack on the fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical 
nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on fleet units. 

Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters, and in view 
of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come 
to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose tenta- 
tive draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. 
It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new 
personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes and some degree of extra dis- 
comfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted. 

Now, Admiral Stark replied to that letter in a letter dated Decem- 
ber 23, the third paragraph of which says — have you got it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, I have, but I was wondering if you would 
not get the thread of this a little better if you went back to Admiral 
Stark's letter to you of November 22, [703] the reply to which 
you just read? You refer to that in the reply. That is November 
22, 1940. 



274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Richardson. Mr. Counsel, there are two points, there are 
two lines of thought. There are two chains of action, and I am 
pursuing one. 

Mr. Mitchell. All right. Go ahead. You may go back to that, 
if necessary. 

Admiral Richardson. Go back ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Admiral Richardson. What I am now discussing is long range 
reconnaissance. In Admiral Stark's letter of December 23, he stated, 
in paragraph 3 : 

First, in regard to security, I endeavored to outline to Murphy — 

Murphy was at that time Commander Vincent R. Murphy, my war 
plans officer, whom I had left in "Washington to discuss matters with 
the War Plans Division of Naval Operations. [Reading :] 

[704] I endeavored to outline to Murphy my idea as to the extent security 
measui'es should be prosecuted, namely, that while the extent of security meas- 
ures required his increasing, it has not yet reached the demands of full wartime 
security. As I discussed with Murphy, there will be an advantage in making 
occasional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft but it is not yet necessary to 
make these continuous. I agree with you that the wear and tear on equipment, 
and the detrimental effects on training, of full security measures should be 
given due weight. 

Upon receipt of that letter of December 30, IDttO, in a letter addressed 
to the fleet, the number of the letter being "U. S. Fleet Confidential 
Letter No. 8CL 1-40; Subject: Security of fleet units operating in 
the Hawaiian area", which is the finished product, the tentative draft 
of which I sent to Admiral stark 

The Vice Chairman. AMiat is the date of that, please ? 

Admiral Richardson. December 30, 1940. I doubt whether the 
committe has a copy of this letter, because I myself received it just 
yesterday, and I secured this letter because the counsel indicated to 
me his intention to interrogate me with respect to long range recon- 
naissance. Undoubtedly the counsel will supply the members of the 
committe with a copy of this letter, if he has not already done so. 

[705^ Mr. Gesfxl. It has not been supplied as yet. 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, you are not referring to the report of 
December 30, 1940, from the commandant ? 

Admiral Richardson. No. 

Mr. Mitchell. They are different documents ? 

Admiral Richardson. Mr. Counsel, there are two chains of circum- 
stances and letters originating at about the same time. I am pursuing 
one of them. 

Mr. Mitchell. This letter you refer to is from you to Admiral 
Stark, is it ? 

Admiral Richardson. 'N^Hien Admiral Stark informed me that he 
felt it was no longer necessary to do other than sweep operating areas 
and do what his letter of December 23, said to do, then I had no 
concern over doing other than what I thought was necessary. I dis- 
continued then long rang reconnaissance of any kind except the sweep- 
ing of operating areas. 

I present this letter primarily to show that I discontinued patrol 
plane reconnaissance. I also issued this directive : 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 275 

Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchor- 
ages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului 
may be considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the en- 
trance and ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire 
from outside the harbor. 

Now if counsel so desires, I will pursue the other [706^ chain 
of circumstances. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was the precise date that Admiral Kimmel 
assumed command there? 

Admiral Richardson. After issuing this directive, 8CL-40 of 
December 30, 1940, I felt that this letter was not sufficiently compre- 
hensive to provide for the security of the fleet, so I immediately 
started the preparation of a revision of that document. I was en- 
gaged — at least my staff was — in revising that when I received in- 
formation of my prospective detachment. So I amplified that very 
much. But inasmuch as I was to be relieved in the near future, 
I asked that my staff confer with the prospective staff of the pros- 
pective commander in chiefs to ascertain their views. So the docu- 
ment that was later issued under the title of "Pacific Fleet Con- 
fidential Letter No. 2CL-41, date of February 15, 1941" was signed 
by Admiral H. E. Kimmel, who was the commander in chief of the 
Pacific Fleet having relieved me on February 1, 1941. 

Had I remained in command of the U. S. Fleet this order would 
have borne my signature and it would have been substantially the 
same order. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, let us go back for a moment to Admiral 
Stark's letter to you of November 22, 1940, which I have before me. 
He says : 

While you were here early in October we sent a dispatch [707] to Com- 
fourteen to ascertain from Admiral Bloch whether or not the protection being 
afforded to the vital element of the naval establishment in Hawaii was satisfac- 
tory, this in order that, if required, we could make representations to the War 
Department to direct more thorough protection on the part of its Hawaiian De- 
partment. 

Admiral Bloch's answers to this dispatch and to a second dispatch on the 
same subject were not very definite, and did not provide bases for further action 
by the Department. 

Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl 
Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both 
with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with 
the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable 
object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based 
in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and 
imposes on the Commander in Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in 
which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and 
of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem compre- 
hensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy 
Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional 
equipment and additional protective measures. 

[708] For instance, is it desirable to place torpedo nets within the harbor 
itself? I will appreciate your comment and those of Comfourteen on this 
question. 

Anti-aircraft protection can be provided first by units of the Fleet, actually 
in Pearl Harbor with guns ready at all times ; by stationing about the Navy 
Yard of Army A. A. defense measures including mobile batteries, and possibly 
by utilization of Marine Defense Battalion Anti-Aircraft Units now available 
in the Pearl Harbor area, or that could be made available. Also by keeping 
carrier fighters squadrons alerted and ready to go. 



276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

And SO on. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, you responded to that letter on the 28th of 
November and you said : 

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Blnch on my 
aiTival back in Hawaii. 

Now you did take it up with Admiral Bloch ? 

Admiral RicHARDSoisr. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Just tell us what you did about that. 

Admiral Richardson. The letter of Admiral Stark to me dated 
November 22, 1940, is one of a series of letters and incidents about 
which at least three witnesses in addition to me will testify, and in 
order that that matter may be initially understood I think it advis- 
able to cover the whole series. 

When I was in Washington the 7th, or the 11th of October [709] 
I discussed with Admiral Stark the position of the fleet when in Pearl 
Harbor, the inadequate provision that had been made both by the 
Army and Navy to protect the fleet, and before I returned to Pearl 
Harbor Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Bloch, commandant of the 
Fourteenth Naval District, a dispatch requesting certain information, 
as indicated in his first paragraph of the letter of November 22. 

I remained on the A^etv Mexico on the west coast and did not arrive 
in Pearl Harbor until the 6th of December. Admiral Bloch was the 
commandant of the district, and he was exceedingly busy w^ith work 
under construction. I felt that it was essential that I personally know 
what we had, and what the Army had, therefore I arranged with Lt. 
Gen. Charles D. Herron to inspect everything that the Army had to 
defend the Army and Navy installations in Hawaii from all forms 
of overseas attack. 

I asked General Herron to have the officers who were subordinate 
to him, who Avere directly responsible for any part of the defense, 
prepared to show me what they had, to give me a list of what they had, 
give me a list of what the plans called for them to have, and the best 
estimate they could make of when they would receive what they re- 
quired. 

The flagship was going to sea on individual exercises which did 
not require my presence. Therefore, on December 19, [710] in 
company witli General Herron, I reviewed the Army equipment and 
received the data requested. I delivered this data to Admiral Bloch 
and told him that inasmuch as he represented the fleet in relation? with 
the Army in Hawaii, because I might be away at any time, that I 
wanted him to use this data and prepare a letter to the Navy Depart- 
ment setting forth his views and forward the letter through me, which 
Admiral Bloch did in a letter dated December 30, 1940. The subject : 
"Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Abil- 
ity of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks." 

[_711~\ That letter was forwarded by me to the Chief of Naval 
Operations with the first endorsement dated January 4, 1941. I have 
been informed, and I believe that rear admiral, now Admiral Rich- 
mond Kelly Turner, then on duty in the War Plans Division of Naval 
Operations, prepared, for the signature of the Secretary of the Navy, a 
letter dated January 24, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of War. 

Reference to this letter appears on page 5, section 7 of the report of 
the Roberts Commission. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 277 

Mr. Mitchell. This letter, Admiral, of December oO, 1940, signed by 
Admiral Bloch and addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, is in 
evidence here. Have you it before you ? 

Admiral Kichardson. I have. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you mind reading paragraphs 1 and 2 of that 
leiter, or shall I read it for you ? 

Admiral Richardson. I will read it : 

In view of the inquiries contained in references («) — wlaich is Stark's dispatch 
of October 1940 — (&) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set 
forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile 
attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand. 

Aircraft Raids : 

[712] Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be 
brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two vpays of repelling attack. 

First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Sec- 
ond, by driving off attacking bombers with antiaircraft guns and fighters. The 
Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant recon- 
naissance with which to locate any enemy carriers, and the only planes belonging 
to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army 
bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area G9 B-18 bombers. All of these are 
classified as being obsolete. The model is 6 years old and the planes tliemselves 
are 5 years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are 
satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing planes are expected some- 
time in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance, 
requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared 
by the fleet. 

To drive o£E bombing planes after they have been launched, will require both 
fighting planes and antiaircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area, 36 
pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are 6 years 
old, and some of them are 4 years old. [71S] In numbers and models there 
is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in 
production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This 
does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not 
appear adequate. 

The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor Base by anti- 
aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty- 
four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more to be delivered 
in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50-calibre out of the 
projected 120 37-millimeter and 308 .50-calibre machine guns. The Army plans 
to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a 
few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to in- 
crease the number of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblence 
of antiaircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the eflicacy of 
a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The 
Army has made no plans for the antiaircraft defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe ; 
furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti- 
aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in 
order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge 
of the density of antiaircraft barrages [714] abroad, I am of the opinion 
that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient 
defense of the Hwaiian area. 

This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 calibre machine gims. 
[715] In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning 
service which will consist of 8 radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed 
and 55 are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this 
warning net should be adequate. 

May I also read the last paragraph ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Any part of it that you think is material. Admiral. 

Admiral Richardson. This is paragraph 11 : 

It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War 
Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agree- 
ment between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the 
officials of the 14th Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do 
something in regard to Army matters. 



278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then on January 7, 1941, you placed an endorse- 
ment on that communication of Bloch's ? 

Admiral Kichakdson. I think that is January 4, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is it? 

Admiral Richardson. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes. It is blotted up. January 4. 

Admiral Richardson. That is Saturday, and I wanted this away 
as quickly as I could and I know I would not hold it. 

Mr. Mitchell. That expresses directly your individual [716] 
views about the situation, did it ? 

Admiral Richardson. It did. I think that Admiral Bloch and I 
were in complete agreement, because we fully discussed the matter. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you care to read the portions of that that 
you think are especially useful ? The first paragraph probably covers 
the ground really, and the second — I will read it if you like. 

Admiral Richardson. I think, if I may be permitted to suggest it, 
that the first and third paragraphs ought to be read, because the third 
paragraph contains the matter that has been mentioned several times. 
Paragraph 1: 

Forwarded. The Coaimander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant 
14th Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. 
As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the 
Commandant 14th Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Com- 
mander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant 14th Naval District in the opin- 
ion that the Army Pursuit Squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries are inadequate 
to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established 
the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile 
three-inch gunds for this area is not 1717] considered adequate. With 
the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater 
number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter 
liigh altitude bombing attaclis on Pearl Harbor. 

[718] Mr. Mitchell. I will read "2" for you, to relieve your 
voice, Admiral. 
Admiral Richardson. All right. 
JVIr. Mitchell (reading) : 

2. As neither the increased antiaircraft batteries, nor the augmented pursuit 
squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of the Fleet units 
within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet 
which may be in Pearl Harbor in the event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans 
for cooperation with the local defense forces are being made. At present, the 
continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is 
not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions 
does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting en- 
tirely the training i*equired by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely 
curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required. 

Admiral Richardson. Paragraph 3: 

There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles 
or nets within the Harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo 
plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the Harbor, particu- 
larly the movement of large ships and the landing and takeoff of patrol squad- 
rons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the [7i9] only operating base avail- 
able to the Fleet in this ai-ea, any pressure defense measures that will further 
restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. 

Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present condi- 
tions the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently 
near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered it is 
necessary to lay such nets. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 279 

That paragraph was, in part, based on information from the Navy 
Department; insofar as was known torpeclos launched from aircraft 
would not operate in water of the depth of Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Mitchell. You spoke. Admiral, of the fact that following that 
report of Admiral Bloch of December 30, forwarded with the endorse- 
ment you have just read, there resulted the letter from the Secretary 
of the Navy, Mr. Knox, to the Secretary of War, which you stated 
was prepared for him by Admiral Turner. 

Admiral Eichaedson. Admiral Turner so informed me. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have that letter here and it hasn't been offered in 
evidence yet. Probably I had better read it if the committee is ready. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Will you identify that ? 

[7W] Mr. Mitchell. These are letters which we will mark Ex- 
hibit 10. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 10.") 

Mr. Mitchell. It follows right along logically after this Bloch 
report. It is a letter from Secretary Knox, dated January 24, 1941, 
addressed to the Secretary of War. 

Mr. Keefe. What is the date of it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. January 24, 1941. 

[721] My Deab Mb. Secbetaky : The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while 
in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under 
renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several 
weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity 
of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of success- 
ful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates 
with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a 
surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. 

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or 
naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidlj^ as can be done, that will increase 
the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character 
mentioned above. 

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con- 
sidered to be : 

(1) Air bombing attack. 

(2) Air torpedo plane attack. 

(3) Sabotage. 

(4) Submarine attack. 
[722] (5) Mining. 

(6) Bombardment by gun fire. 

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been 
provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally 
to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution 
of which I consider to be of primary importance. 

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, 
simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. 
The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, 
and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of 
carriers and their supporting vessels. 

The counter measures to be considered are : 

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before 
air attack can be launched ; 

(2) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their 
objectives ; 

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire. 

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke; 

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages. 

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite 
possibility, might not be carried out in case [723] of an air attack initiated 
without warning prior to a declaration of war. 



280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required 
for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit 
aircraft are at present in Oahn, and that, while the organization and equipping 
of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equip- 
ment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and 
sound locators which are only effective up to four miles. 

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the 
standards of the 'war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-air- 
craft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 
mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries 
are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea 
coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun 
bombardment, one of the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. 
If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft 
guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack. 

By late summer the defenses wil be considerably strengthened by additions in 
guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, 
twenty-four 90-mm., [7241 and one hundred twenty 37-mm. guns will be on 
hand ; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149 ; the new 
radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of 
the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this 
augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of 
course, affect the critical period immediately before us. 

The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest 
value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated 
some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might 
prove most advantageous. 

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals : 

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit air- 
craft and antiaircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in 
Hawaii. 

(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, 
the employment of smoke, and other special services for improving the defenses 
of Pearl Harbor. 

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval 
and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, 
against surprise aircraft raids. 

(4) That the Arniy and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of 
joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids 
against Pearl Harbor. 

[725] (5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces 
in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly 
so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist. 

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures 
to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of 
the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Depart- 
ment. 

Then attached to that is the reply of Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Secre- 
tary of War, dated February 7, 1941 : 
[726] War Department, 

Washington, Fel. 7, 1941. 
Subject : Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 
To: The Secretary of the Navy. 

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise 
attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express com- 
plete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our 
making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian 
Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues 
to hold a higli priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the 
importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. 

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit 
planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these 
are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to 
have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to 
Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 281 

will bring the Armv pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-3G type and 
seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-F 
pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanl^s [727] and modern armor 
will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to 

3 Tliere are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, 
twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA 
machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one 
hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .uO AA 
machine guns. , ^ ^, * 

4 With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor 
has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements 
for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. 
Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment 
cannot be made at an earlier date. 

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give 
immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages 
and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage 
balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be 
made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on 
hand and eighty-four being manufactured— forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, 
and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration 
funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke 
for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified [728] 
opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employ- 
ment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the 
Commanding General will look into this matter again. 

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding 
a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawiian 
Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities 
in making those measures effective. 

Signed by Henry L. Stimson, Seci-etary of War. 

[7£9] Attached to that is a letter of transmittal from the Chief of 
Naval Operations to the commander in chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

"Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," and copy of 
Secretary Knox's letter, and one of Secretary Stimson's letters ; trans- 
mitted under date of February 11, 1941. 

And another, addressed to the the commanding general, Hawiian 
Department, signed by General Dick,- Adjutant General, dated Feb- 
ruary 7, 1941, inviting attention to the correspondence I have just 
read between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War. 

And attached then is a document dated February 13, 1941, signed 
by Carl Grosse, Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters, Hawiian 
Department, acknowledging receipt of the Adjutant General's letter 
of February 7, together with the two enclosures noted. 

They are all part of the same exhibit (No. 10) . 

[730] Now, Admiral Kichardson, had you left Hawaii before 
February 11 and 13 when this Knox-Stimson matter was up? 

Admiral Richaedson. I was relieved of command of the fleet on 
the 1st of February 1941. Thereafter I knew nothing about fleet 
matters, although I did not actually leave the islands until the 14th 
of February. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, this correspondence between the Navy 
and the War Department that I have just read, that reached there 
February 11 and 13, would not have come to your hands? 

Admiral Richardson. This is the first time it has come to my 
notice. 

Mr, Mitchell. Now, going back to your visits with Secretary Hull 
and Secretary Knox, which was your first trip here in 1940, along in 



282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

July, you said you went to Mr. Hull and others to find out what the 
situation was, why you were being kept at Pearl Harbor. I neglected 
to ask you what Mr. Hull said, if he gave the reason for it. 

Admiral Richardson. Mr. Hull in a very complete and comprehen- 
sive manner presented to me his views of the relationships, relations 
between the United States and Japan. He felt that we should take a 
very strong position with respect to Japan and that the retention 
of the fleet in Hawaii was a reflection of that strong attitude. 

[7S1] I did not receive this impression from Secretary Hull, and 
I cannot state with certainty how I received it, but I left here with the 
distinct impression that there was an opinion in Washington that 
Japan could be bluffed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, when you were here during that trip you 
visited with Admiral Stark, I suppose ? 

Admiral Eichardson. I did. I stayed with Admiral Stark at the 
Admiral's house. 

Mr. Mitchell. In your contact with him did you gather any differ- 
ent impression about his attitude toward basing the fleet at Pearl 
Harbor instead of on our west coast than he expressed in these letters? 

Admiral Richaedson. It is my belief that had Admiral Stark been 
uninfluenced by other considerations he would have wholeheartedly 
agreed with me. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, just what did he say about it in your meetings 
with him, if you remember. 

Admiral Richardson. Well, his letters, I think, in many places 
show that he hoped that the fleet would return to the west coast, and 
after the fleet had been in Hawaii for some time he authorized me to 
return approximately one-third of the fleet to the coast at a time 
for recreation and replenislunent and the securing of additional men, 
and when he informed me that I might do that he said that he in- 
formed me with great [732] pleasure. And I believe that I 
came with either the first or the second one of those task forces that 
visited the coast. 

Mr. JMiTCHELL. During 1940^ when you were in command of the 
fleet, did you have fleet war games out in the Hawaiian area ? 

Admiral Richardson. We had, wliile I was in command of the fleet, 
only one big fleet exercise which involved two fleet propers. They 
took place between the first of April and the 9th of May. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did any of those exercises involve a simulated air 
attack by an enemy carrier force ? 

Admiral Richardson. Those exercises did not. The exercises were 
planned by my predecessor. They did not include a carrier attack 
on Pearl Harbor. And joint exercises with the Army were discussed 
by Admiral Stark with me in letters, and it was too late to modify 
the plans, and in those exercises the only exercises in which the Army 
participated was, I believe, on the 8th or 9th of April. I sent some 
heavy cruisers in to simulate an attempted raid in order to exercise 
the forces stationed in Hawaii, the Navy patrol planes, in locating the 
force and the Army bombers in bombing it, and the submarine stations 
normally in Pearl Harbor in attacking the force, which was simulating 
an attack, so that there was not a large scale joint exercise between 
[73S] the Army and the Navy in which a carrier raid on installa- 
tions in Hawaii occurred, although in previous years, when I was in a 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 283 

position other than commander in chief, I had been present in the fleet 
when such attacks were made. 

[734-] Mr. Mitchell, I think we are ready for the committee to 
inquire of the witness. 

The Chaikman, Admiral, who was your immediate predecessor as 
commander of the United States Fleet ? 

Admiral Richardson. I relieved Admiral Claude C. Bloch. 

The Chairman. Wliat is the technical relationship between the 
commander in chief of the fleet, such as that which you were com- 
mander of, and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District? 

Admiral Richardson. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval 
District is a subordinate of the commander in chief. He is also under 
the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to other than fleet matters. 

The Chairman, ^Vlien the fleet is at sea does the commandant of the 
Fourteenth Naval District have complete authority within that district 
or is he still subject to orders of the commander in chief of the fleet? 

Admiral Richardson, He is always subject to the orders of the 
commander in chief. Because the commander in chief may not be 
present in Pearl Harbor he is the representative of the commander 
in chief in dealings with the commanding general. 

The Chairsian. Yes. Now, up to the time when you were detached, 
the force of which you were commander in chief was [735] 
known as the United States Fleet, is that true ? 

Admiral Richardson, That is correct, because at that time the 
commander in chief of the United States Fleet had command of all 
the ships in the Atlantic that were in commission and not operating 
directly under the Chief of Naval Operations as a ship would be were 
she undergoing shake-down preparatorj' to joining the fleet. 

The Chairman, So that during the time when you were com- 
mander in chief of the United States Fleet that meant that you were 
the commander in chief of the entire fleet ? 

Admiral Richardson, That is true. 

The Chairman. No matter where it was located ? 

Admiral Richardson. That is true. 

The Chairman. Now, there was a reorganization that was some- 
what coincident with your detachment ? 

Admiral Richardson. Absolutely coincident. 

The Chairman, And they divided the fleet into the Pacific Fleet and 
the Asiatic Fleet? 

Admiral Richardson. No. 

The Chairman. No? 

Admiral Richardson. There had always been a small force known 
as the Asiatic Fleet that was not under the command of the commander 
in chief of the United States Fleet but passed under his command in 
case the United States Fleet moved [736] to the western 
Pacific. 

The Chahiman. Well, on the 1st of February, then, 1941 approxi- 
mately, the Pacific Fleet as such came into existence ? 

Admiral Richardson, It did. The title and the position of com- 
mander in chief United States Fleet disappeared and in lieu thereof 
there was established the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, 
which commanded all the ships in the Pacific Ocean that were not 
part of the Asiatic Fleet and were not operating directly under the 



284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Chief of Naval Operations, There was a commander in chief Atlan- 
tic Fleet, who commanded all the combatant ships in commission in 
the Atlantic Fleet except those that were operating directly under 
the Chief of Naval Operations. 

The Chairman. When did you become commander in chief of the 
United States Fleet? 

Admiral Eichardson. On January 6, 1940. 

The Chairman. So that you were in command of the fleet approxi- 
mately 13 months ? 

Admiral Richardson. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Was Admiral Kimmel associated with the fleet 
under j^our command in the Pacific? 

Admiral Richardson. He was. He was in the fleet under the com- 
mand of, or the immediate senior under Admiral Stark before I be- 
came commander in chief and before Admiral Stark [737] be- 
came Chief of Naval Operations. In fact, he relieved Admiral Stark 
as commander of the cruisers and from that position he relieved me. 

The Chairman. What relationship did he occupy in authority with 
respect to you as commander in chief of the fleet? Was he senior 
officer under you or how far down the line did he go ? 

Admiral Richardson. Admiral Kimmel ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Richardson. Well, he was very far down. He was a 
rear admiral and under me came first the commander of the battle 
force, who was an admiral. Then commander of the scouting force 
and commander of battleships, who were both vice admirals. Then 
Admiral Kimmel commanded the cruisers and as such he was on the 
same level as the commander of the battleships, the commander of 
the destroyers and the commander of the aircraft. 

The Chairman. And he was commander of all the cruisers then in 
the force? 

Admiral Richardson. Yes, what we call a type commander. 

The Chairman. Yes. Now, in this correspondence between Ad- 
miral Stark and you, you continuously emphasized your belief that 
the fleet should be based on the Pacific coast rather than in the Hawai- 
ian Islands or Oahu? 

[738] Admiral Richardson. I did that. 

The Chairman. And there were, as I gather from the correspond- 
ence, manj' reasons for that opinion on your part, one among them 
being that you had larger areas for training of the aircraft force and 
the other activities of training the men and also that you believed that 
the morale of the men would be improved by being closer to their 
homes ? 

Admiral Richardson. That is true. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Richardson. I presented solely the naval point of view. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Richardson. There are other considerations that at times 
determined the disposition of the fleet or the units thereof. 

The Chairman. Yes. And in your correspondence with the Chief 
of Naval Operations and in your conversations with him in Washing- 
ton and with the Secretary of State and with the President you were 
impressed with their belief that in addition to naval reasons that there 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 285 

was probably a diplomatic or other, maj^be psychological, reason for 
keeping the fleet in that area as a deterrent against activities on the 
part of Japan? 

Admiral Riciiardsox. Absolutely. 

[739] The Chairman. Now, when you were in Washington you 
3mphasized the fact that you needed more men and that the Navy was 
beign vastly expanded and that men were not coming in as fast as ships 
were being built ? 

Admiral Richardson. That is correct. 

The Chairman. That you needed more men ? 

Admiral Richardson. I did it in and out. of port, everywhere. 

The Chairman. Yes. Then you referred to 5,000 men that were 
allotted to you on one of your trips here, or while you were here on 
one of your trips and that you sent them out to the Hawaiian area on 
a carrier, did you say ? 

Admiral Ricpiardson. Those that I was unable to accommodate in 
the ships that came with me to the west coast I sent out to Pearl Harbor 
in a carrier. 

The Chairman. Yes. Following 3"our detachment from the fleet 
you became a member of the General Board of the Navy here in 
Washington ? 

Admiral Richardson. That is true. 

The Chairman. I think that is all I want to ask at this time. Sen- 
ator George? 

Senator George. I don't care to ask aii}^ questions at the present 
time. 

Tlie Chairman. Congressman Cooper? 

[740'] The Vice Chairman. I don't think I have any questions 
now, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the admiral 
two or three questions. 

In your memorandum of September 12, 19i0, to the Secretary of 
the Navy you submitted a number of pertinent points to be considered, 
among which were the operations of the fleet and in that part of the 
memorandum you discussed the problems involved if the fleet was 
to be retained in Hawaiian waters. 

As I understand it, those points of disadvantage that you stressed 
in that memorandum were purely problems from a naval standpoint 
and nothing else? 

Admiral Richardson. Oil, absolutely. 

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, you set forth seven points, seven 
disadvantages to basing the fleet in that area. Those points have 
been gone over by counsel and yourself and I was anxious to determine 
from you as to whether or not at that time you considered the question 
of the possibility of a hostile air attack from some aggressor nation, 
in connection with not basing the fleet in the Hawaiian waters? 

Admiral Richardson. I had not considered that it was likely that 
the fleet would be attacked by a carrier raid T^^-?] and I so 
stated repeatedly in security orders issued to the fleet. 

The Chairman. Will the admiral desist for a moment? The Chair 
announced at the beginning of these hearings that the photographers 
would not be permitted in this areaway. It interferes with the wit- 

79716— 46— pt. 1 21 



286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

nesses, with the counsel, and with the committee, and I hope that my 
friend will observe that rule hereafter. You may proceed, Senator. 

Senator Lucas. This memorandum was in June 1940, and if I un- 
derstand you correctly. Admiral, the possibility of a hostile air attack 
on the fleet was not considered in making up the recommendations 
which the authorities here in Washington should study ? 

Admiral Richardson. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. And the question of a submarine attack was not con- 
sidered either in connection with those plans ? 

Admiral Richardson. I have difficulty in hearing the Senator. 

Senator Lucas. I say the question of a submarine attack by a hostile 
force was not considered in 1940 either ? 

Admiral Richardson. No. I think my view is clearly presented in 
a document before the committee which says : 

The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may rea- 
sonably be based on two assump- [7^2] tions : 

(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present exist- 
ing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and mis- 
guided nationals of such powers may attempt ; 

(1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor, 

(2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pear Harbor by sinking an obstruc- 
tion in the Channel, 

(3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor. 

So that, actually, before I left the fleet we were sweeping the channel 
against magnetic mines. 

Senator Lucas. How long was it after you gave your seven points 
of disadvantage to keeping the fleet in Hawaii that the order of 
Admiral Andrews was issued to start the patrol which you discussed? 

Admiral Richardson. Admiral Andrews' order did not start a 
patrol . 

Senator Lucas. What was that order ? 

Admiral Richardson. It modified the patrol that I had in existence. 

Senator Lucas. I see, all right. And when did that patrol go into 
existence that you had. Admiral ? 

[7^] Admiral Richardson. It started the day that the fleet ar- 
rived in the Hawaiian area on the 10th of April. 

Senator Lucas. 1940? 

Admiral Richardson. 1940, purely as a part of the fleet exercise for 
training purposes. 

Senator Lucas. For training purposes only ? 

Admiral Richardson. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. And how long did that continue ? 

Admiral Richardson. It continued until, I think, the 30th of 
December 1940. 

Senator Lucas. Well, how did the admiral's order augment that? 
I had just forgotten your statement a moment ago. 

Admiral Richardson. Initially the long-range patrol, so-called, but 
it was not a long-range patrol, it was to 180 miles centered on Lahaina 
between the arc of 220 and 235, as I remember, but I can verify that — 
220 to 335 to 180 miles. 

Now, when the Army received an alert Admiral Andrews shifted 
the center from Lahaina to Pearl Harbor and increased the distance 
to 300 miles and changed the arc from 180 through west to north. 
Later on I modified that patrol. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 287 

Senator Lucas. Yes. Now, before you leave the patrol, how long 
did that continue ? 

Admiral Kichabdson. The patrol established by Admiral Andrews ? 

[744] Senator Lucas. That is right. 

Admiral Richardson. I am not certain, but I think it continued as 
long as the Army maintained their alert which was, as I remember, 
almost a month. 

Senator Lucas. Now, how many planes were being used on that 
patrol ? 

Admiral Richardson. I haven't the faintest idea. 

Senator Lucas. That is an Army question ? 

Admiral Richardson. I haven't any idea. 

Senator Lucas. Did the Navy use any planes ? 

Admiral Richardson. Oh, the Army used no planes. 

Senator Lucas. But you don't know how many planes the Navy 
used on that patrol ? 

Admiral Richardson. No. 

Senator Lucas. Well, who would know that ? 

Admiral Richardson. I doubt if anybody would know 

Senator Lucas. Well, weren't you 

Admiral Richardson — Because you cannot remember, at least, the 
commander in chief cannot remember, details of activities after 5 
years. 

Senator Lucas. Well, did you make any record of the daily patrols 
that were made by these planes from the ships ? 

Admiral Richardson. No. You established it in an order and for- 
got it, assuming that it would be carried out. 

[745] Senator Lucas. You do not recall? You wouldn't want 
to make a guess as to how many planes daily went out on this patrol 
to cover this arc that was established by the admiral ? 

Admiral Richardson. No ; I would not hazarf'. a guess and the only 
possible source of information of any reliability would be in the files 
of the commander in chief and the files 

Senator Lucas. Of the Fourteenth Naval District ? 

Admiral Richardson (continuing). Become very voluminous and 
are normally retained active only about 2 or 3 years. 

Senator Lucas. Do I understand that at that particular time the 
planes that were on the sea on the Enterprise, that were making daily 
flights in training, that there was no record of the number of planes 
that went out and when they came back ? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, every ship keeps in her log a record of 
everything that it does. 

Senator Lucas. Well, that is what I thought. 

Admiral Richardson. AncJ in the patrol squadrons there would 
undoubtedly be maintained a record of when the planes left and when 
they returned. 

Senator Lucas. Now, who would have the record of the patrol, of 
the men who were making the determination of the number of planes 
that were going out on this patrol in line [74(j] with the order 
that was augmented by Admiral Andrews ? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, Admiral Andrews' order to the officer 
in command of the patrol wing would tell him how many planes to 



288 CONGRESSIOI^AL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

use, when to start out, how far they would go, when they would 
return. 

Senator Lucas. Well, was that Admiral Andrews' responsibility 
then? 

Admiral Kichaedson. What? 

Senator Lucas. Would that be Admiral Andrews' responsibility 
for issuing the order and for the keeping of the record of the planes? 

Admiral Richardson. No ; he- would not keep a record. In con- 
sultation with the commander of the patrol wing, which I think was 
Patrol Wing 2, he would issue the order in general terms. The com- 
mander of Patrol Wing 2 would implement it and record his com- 
pliance. . 

Senator Lucas. All right. Later on, Admiral, you modified this 
order ? 

Admiral Richardson. I did. 

Senator Lucas. Just how did you do it, now ? 

Admiral Richardson. Because of the number of planes that were 
available and because of the need for training men, I modified the 
patrol to cover periodically an arc between 170°, which is 10° to the 
east of south and [74-7] 350°, and I covered daily an iarc, a 
sector of that arc and in order that it might not be evident to Japanese 
residents of Oahu that I was searching the same sector every day, I 
rotated that sector. 

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, one further question and then 
I will be through. 

With respect to the letter that you wrote to Admiral Stark after 
General Herron, as I understood you to say, had been notified that 
an alert was on in the Hawaiian Islands, you did not receive any in- 
formation at that time from anyone in Washington, D. C, about 
that? 

Admiral Richardson. Not at that time. 

Senator Lucas. You later said that you wrote to Admiral Stark 
about the type of alert that was on and that you. had never received 
any answer from him. 

Admiral Richardson. Oh, I telegTaphed him, I mean I sent him 
a radio and asked him what it was all about. 

Senator Lucas. And you never received any reply to that ? 

Admiral Richardson. Never. 

Senator Lucas. Did you ever talk to Admiral Stark after that as 
to why he did not reply to that important message of yours? 

Admiral Richardson. I talked to both Admiral Stark and [748] 
General Marshall. 

Senator Lucas. What did Admiral Stark say as to the reason he 
did not reply after this type of alert went out to the islands ? 

Admiral Richardson. He said it was an exercise, an Army exercise. 

Senator Lucas. That is what Admiral Stark said ? 

Admiral Richardson. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. And he did not think it was sufficiently important, 
even though he had received a message from you, he did not think it 
was important enough to make reply to you? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, he knew that I had enough confidence 
in him to know that if it were the real thing he would have told me. 

Senator Lucas. But vou did send him a wire ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 289 

Admiral Richardson, I did. 

Senator Lucas. And asked him about it ? 

Admiral Richardson. I did. 

Senator Lucas. You wanted to find out for yourself ? 

Admiral Richardson. I wanted an answer, too. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. One other question, if I may. Over 
in one of these letters in reading this correspondence I note this, 
Admiral. In your letter of May 13, [749] 1940, addressed to 
Admiral Stark — at that time you were then still discussing the reasons 
pro and con as to why the fleet should or should not be based in 
Hawaiian waters — in this letter you state this : 

It seems that under present world conditions the paramount thing for us is 
the security of the Western Hemisphere. This, in my opinion, transcends every- 
thing, anything, certainly, in the Far East, our own or other interests. South 
America is the greatest prize yet remaining to be grabbed. 

Who did you expect to grab South America in that letter? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, Senator, I haven't a copy of that 
letter. 

Senator Lucas. It would be interesting to loiow because 

Admiral Richardson. May what? 

Senator Lucas. This is May 13, 1940. 

The Chairman, If the Admiral is in a position to answer that ques- 
tion he may do so. We have gone past our adjourning hour. 

Admiral Richardson. Oh, I have that. 

Senator Lucas, I am sure you and I agree on the same thing, prob- 
ably, as to who we thought might grab South America, but it was 
just interesting to get your further reactions. 

Admiral Richardson. Well, I didn't want anybody to grab [750'] 
South America. 

The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

(Wliereupon, at 12 : 05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p, m. of the 
same day.) 

[751] AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 : 00 P. M. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

When we recessed Senator Lucas was examining Admiral Richard- 
son. You may resume. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Richardson, in one of your statements 
made before the committee this morning you stated that you were 
certain that the Navy could have been alerted as well as the Army 
had it been any other thing than a drill. 

Admiral Richardon. Correct, 

Senator Lucas. Later on you told the committee, and told me on 
examination, that you wired, you radioed, I think you said, Admiral 
Stark, asking him directly in this radiogram what the alert meant, 
and you received no reply. 

Admiral Richardson. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas Later on you had a talk with Admiral Stark here 
in Washington and in that conversation with the Admiral he advised 
you that it was merely a drill ? 

Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You also said that while you were here you had a 
conversation with General Marshall on that same question. 

Admiral Richardson. That is correct. 



290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. Will you, give to the committee what General 
Marshall said about the alert? 

[7S£] Admiral Richardson. I told General Marshall that the 
commanding general of the Hawaiian Department had received an 
alert, that I was certain that it was a drill, but a situation had been 
created where there was some uncertainty and some uneasiness, and 
that I would like to know what was the purpose of the alert dispatch 
sent by him. 

He said : 

Oh, that was simply an exercise and I thought if I did not state that it was an 
exercise the exercise would be carried out more completely. 

Senator Lucas. That is about the end of the conversation, I take it! 

Admiral Richardson. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, you stated previously 

The Chairman. The Chair will state that Congressman Clark would 
be the next in order but he is not here at the moment. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, you stated in your examination that you 
and Admiral Stark were close personal friends ? 

Admiral Richardson. Had been. Admiral Stark entered the Naval 
Academy 1 year after I did., 

Mr. Murphy. When in Washington you stayed at his home? 

Admiral Richardson. I did. He served with me when we [753] 
were both ensigns. 

Mr. Murphy. What was the attitude of Admiral Stark in regard to 
the location of the fleet at Hawaii ? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, from all that he said to me, and from 
all that he wrote to me, I gathered that he was fully in sympathy 
with me. Of course, he was more closely in touch with diplomatic 
considerations than I was. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you receive a message from Admiral Stark dated 
March 15, 1940? 

Admiral Richardson. A letter ? 

Mr. Murphy. I understand that on March 15, 1940, Admiral Stark 
sent you a message in which he declared, despite your many doubts, 
that the policy of keeping the fleet units in Hawaiian waters was sound, 
and that the State Department was very strong for it. Did you re- 
ceive such a communication ? 

Admiral Richardson. That communication did not refer to the 
retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian waters, for the reason that the 
fleet had not arrived in the Hawaiian waters at that date. That re- 
ferred to( the Hawaiian detachment which was sent to the Hawaiian 
area the fall preceding, I think, September or October 1939. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you know of any written memorandum, by letter 
or otherwise, where at any time Admiral Stark stated his position as 
to whether or not the fleet should be assigned [7-54] to Hawaii ? 

Admiral Richardson. He stated repeatedly that he hoped we would 
return and that our delay in Hawaiian waters would not be unduly 
prolonged. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you state — give me a reference to any communi- 
cation that you know where Admiral Stark made his position clear in 
writing? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 291 

Senator Brewster. May I be permitted to speak? 

Mr. Murphy. Do you want to help me ? 

Admiral Richardson. On the 7th of May in a letter to mei he says : 

Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this 
reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian waters for a 
couple of weeks. 

When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two 
weeks, but I cannot tell) * * * 

He said : 

Of course, you know* the thought behind the above * * * 

Mr. Murphy. Are you following the letter ? 
Admiral Richardson. No, I am skipping. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, you stopped at "but I cannot tell" in the second 
line in the second paragraph, did you? 
Admiral Richardson. That is right. 
Mr. Murphy. Then you go from there to where ? 
[755] Admiral Richardson. The fourth paragraph? 

Of course, you know the thoughts behind the above and that is that the Italian 
situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded as critical; 
then ????? nobody can answer the riddle just now. 

Mr. Murphy. Where is Admiral Stark's position in that? 

Admiral Richardson. That is all I know. 

[756] Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Admiral Richardson. It is manifest that he trusted that the fleet 
would not remain there long. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, where is his position, I mean as to whether 
it should or not ? Can you refer to anything in writing at any time, 
anywhere, where Admiral Stark states his position to you that he is 
in agreement with you, or that he disagTees with the proposition of 
having the fleet there ? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, whatever he said I firmly believe that 
he wholeheartedly agreed with me. 

Mr. Murphy. But can you give us a reference to anything in writ- 
ing anywhere ? If so, state it. 

Senator Brewster. I refer you, Admiral, to the letter of May 22 
to you, the first paragraph of which is [reading] : 

Replying to your letter of May 13th — 

in which I think Admiral Stark made his position very clear. 

Admiral Richardson. Unfortunately, I have not a copy of that 
letter. 

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest to the Chairman that inadvertently 
the Chair has overlooked that this would be the turn of Senator 
Brewster, the Senator from Maine, to examine the witness. 

The Chairman. . Well, the Chairman exercised his right [757] 
at the beginning and I examined following the examination of counsel 
and did examine the Admiral but not upon this point. 

Mr. Murphy. I beg your pardon, you misunderstood me. I meant 
that after Mr. Clark it would then have been the turn of Senator 
Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. I have placed no objection to your examining 
the Admiral. 

Mr. Murphy. And then I would follow. 



292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. That is quite all right, Congressman Murphy, 
and I hope you will accept my suggestion which is simply in the in- 
terest of saving time. 

The Chairman. The Chair is subject to correction. In the absence 
of Mr. Clark the next in order by the alternation would have been the 
Senator from Maine, Mr. Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. I am quite willing to let Mr. Murphy proceed. 

The Chairman. I apologize to the Senator from Maine for that 
omission. 

Senator Brewster. I know that my rights are being saved, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr, Murphy. Now, do you have the letter of May 22 suggested by 
the gentleman, the Senator from Maine ? 

Admiral Richardson. I doubt if I can find anywhere a specific 
statement saying : 

I am opposed to retaining the [758] fleet in the Hawaiian area. 

Mr. Murphy. Can you find a specific statement saying that he 
agrees with you categorically ? 

Admiral Richardson. This is what he says on the 22d of May. 
[Reading:] 

When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy — 

that means the dispatch to return — 

it looked as if Italy were coming in almost immediately and that a serious 
situation might develop in the East Indies, and that there was a possibility of 
our being involved. However, the recent "blitzkrieg" events in Europe have 
certainly altered the picture for the time being. Personally I think it has 
made more remote (for the moment at least) th'e question of a westward move- 
ment of the fleet. I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad 
to know I had already so expressed myself. 

Mr. Murphy. That is the only written memorandum to which you 
can refer? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, I 

Mr. Murphy. I mean is that the only one ? 

Admiral Richardson. Congressman Murphy, since the receipt of 
this correspondence I have been almost constantly in attendance here. 
If I had time to search through all of the papers carefully I have no 
doubt that I would find suflB- [7S9] cient evidence of his con- 
currence with me as to convince anyone. 

Mr. Murphy. If you find it will you produce it, please? 

Admiral Richardson. I will, or I shall. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you had a meeting with the President 
about which you prepared a memorandum in October of 1940. Did 
you prepare any memoranda after the previous meetings? 

Admiral Richardson. I did not. 

Mr. Murphy. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster ? 

Senator Brewster. Pursuing further the question which the Con- 
gressman has been asking, I think it should be clear what was the 
representation in your letter to which Admiral Stark expressed his 
view on. It was, as I understand it, your letter of May 13, in which 
you used the following language [reading] : 

I feel that any move west means hostilities. I feel that at this time it would 
be a grave mi.'^take to become involved in the West where our interests, although 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 293 

important, are not vital, and thereby reduce our ability to maintain the security 

of the Western Hemisphere which is vital. -,tt„„<. 

If the Fleet is to go west it can only start, properly prepared, from the West 

Coast where it can be [760] docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a 

''^ReSVsS'r'irtS^Luhough I am entirely without information I realize your 
position and I want you to know that If the situation becomes such that higher 
authority decides we should go West, all of us are ready to give all we have. 

That is the end of the quotation from your letter, to which I under- 
stand Admiral Stark in his letter of May 22 replied. [Reading : J 

I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already 
so expressed myself. 

Would that lead you to believe, or would that leave you in any 
doubt. Admiral Richardson, as to the position of Admiral btark m 

this matter? . -, , , , ^ i • -i.- ^ 

Admiral Richardson. I was never m any doubt about his position. 

Senator Brewster. And what was the situation, Admiral, of the 
fleet? With the fleet which you had at Pearl Harbor— was it what 
would be considered in naval parlance as a fleet? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, it was a combatant fleet but it did not 
have in company with it the auxiliaries that would be essential to 
active operations. , .^.. m'^n 

Senator Brewster. So that if there were hostihties [762] 
that should develop, what would have been the mission of the fleet 
under anv plans that were in existence ? 

Admiral Richardson. Under the existing plans it would have been 
necessary for the fleet to return to the west coast to mobilize, assemble a 
train, fill the ships with the regulation number of personnel, provi- 
sions, supplies, stores, fuel, strip the ships of needless articles which 
necessarily appear on a ship during a long period of peace and prepare 
them for offensive operation. _ . ^ 

Senator BitEWSTER. State whether or not the fleet on December 7 
was in such a condition as would have required its return similarly ? 

Admiral Ricpiardson. It had been more comletely prepared for war 
action because before I returned to Pearl Harbor with a portion of 
the fleet, arriving thereon the 6th of December, we had placed m 
storage a lot of inflammable material that we carried m time of peace. 
The ships had been degaussed. 

The Chairman. Had been what ? 

Admiral Richardson. Degaussed. 

The Chairman. I don't get that word. 

Admiral Richardson. Well, it is a French word which means rmi- 
ning a coil of wire around them which energized will probably prevent 
the magnetic field of the ship from exploding a magnetic mine. 

I'/e^] Senator Brewstek. Under the plans existing prior to 
December 7, so far as your own knowledge goes, what was it con- 
templated should be the mission of the Navy during the earlier period 
of any hostilities with a Western Pacific power ? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, the plans then in existence were called 
the "Orange" plan or the "0-1" plan and it was, in my opinion, a 
fairly sound plan theoretically, but the time element bore no relation 
to reality and some time in October I wrote a comprehensive letter to 
the Chief of Naval Operations presenting my conception of the then 
existing "Orange" plan, which is in the hands of the committee. 



294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK " 

Senator Brewster. That was in 1940 ? 

Admiral Richardson. 1940. 

Senator Breavster. And did that contemplate some manner of of- 
fensive action by the fleet ? 

• Admiral Richardson. It did, early action to reconnoiter and attack 
some of the mandated islands and a progressive step-by-step movement 
westward with the taking, eventually, of Truk in a time stated that 
absolutely could not be realized. 

Senator Brewster. I want to quote to you, because I think we all are 
going to be vitally concerned with this matter of naval defense. You 
were Assistant Chief of Naval [76S] Operations during 1937 
and 1938 under Admiral Leahy ? 

Admiral Richardson. One year. 

Senator Brewster. I am quoting from Admiral Leahy's statement 
before the Naval Affairs Committee on the function of the Navy, as 
I think it will contribute to this matter, and I want to know whether 
you would agree with this concept. I quote Admiral Leahy on the 
first page of his testimony at the 1938 hearings. [Reading:] 

In defending our territory in war, we cannot assume an attitude of passive de- 
fense and simply beat off an attack at one place and later at another. In such 
a case we would see our coasts blockaded, our outlying possessions seized, our 
commerce, both coastwise and foreign, driven off the seas, and we would undergo 
the costly experience of finding the war lasting just as long as the enemy willed 
it; that is, until he had attained every objective and everything he wanted. 
The only way that war, once begun, can be brought to a successful conclusion 
is by making the enemy want to stop fighting — ^by injuring him before he reaches 
our shores so badly that he will be anxious to make peace. Prompt and effective 
injury to an enemy, at a distance from our shores, is the only correct strategy 
to be employed. 

[764] We have outlying possessions in Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, 
Samoa. Panama, Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The Philip- 
pine Islands are still United States territory and will remain so until complete 
independence is attained. All of these outlying island possessions are more 
or less vulnerable, and their defense depends upon two factors. One is a 
local defense by mobile forces and fortifications. The other, and the dominant 
factor, is sea power. A superior Navy can prevent powerful attacks being 
made on all those island possessions that lie closer to our home territory than 
they do to those of an enemy or enemies. A sufficient Navy can keep open 
the lines of supply to the defenders of such possessions, and, if they are secure 
in their own local defenses against minor attacks, the Navy can use them as 
bases from which to operate against the enemy or enemies. Defense of those 
possessions — Guam, the Philippines and Alaska — which lie nearer to the home 
territory of another power or powers than they do to the continental United 
States, is dependent solely upon sea power and the ability of sea jwwer to 
support forces in those areas. 

[765] I presume you would be in full agreement with that? 

Admiral Richardson. Complete accord. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. Now, I have here an exhibit which has 
been furnished us, which is extracts from the joint Army and Navy 
Avar plan, Rainbow No. 1. That is a part of the extracts ftom joint 
Army and Navj^ war plan. Orange 1938. 

I assume that was in the process of development year by j^ear, but 
this does not contain any of the tasks that were assigned under 
section 6 and others. In section 6, the presentation apparently con- 
fines itself to the defense plans of the Hawaiian area without includ- 
ing therein anything regarding the tasks which I assume were the 
function of the Navy to carry out, the task forces, or tasks. 

Admiral Richardson. That is true. What is the date of that? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 295 

Senator Brewster. This one is dated 1938, the Orange plan. I 
think that was Orange No. 1. This was approved, it says, by the 
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy August 14, 1939, 
verbally by the President October 14, 1939, by the Joint Board April 
10, 1940. That is April 10, 1940, brought down current. That was 
finally Rainbow No. 1. 

You have that before you, do you? 

Admiral Richardson. I have it. 

Senator Brewster. Now, whether or not 

[766] Admiral Richardson. But, Senator Brewster, these are 
copies of extracts from plans that were modified from time to time. 
They are not complete ; some of them were made after I left the fleet ; 
some of them were in process of being made, so any questions that I 
answer with respect to this is certainly to be most confusing because 
here is one that is dated March 28, 1941. I know nothing about it. 

Senator Brewster. I think my question won't involve, perhaps, any 
confusion. The point which I wish to inquire about is whether or not 
the appointment of the tasks as they are called, which I assume were 
the functions of the Navy, the affirmative tasks, would be essential 
to an appraisal of the responsibility of the commanders in that area? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, I think it would be but it would not 
be anything other than confusing to consider any other plans than 
the plans that were in existence on the 7th of December 1941, about 
which I know nothing. 

Senator Brewster. Well, I don't intend to enter into that field. 
My point is in attempting to appraise the responsibility of those who 
were in authority at Pearl Harbor, as to whether or not their respon- 
sibility in taking aggressive action with the fleet under their charge 
must not necessarily be known in order to determine as to the wisdom 
of their course at any given time ? 

[767] Admiral Richardson. Well, of course, no plans ever made 
by the Army or the Navy of the United States visualized their being 
put in effect without either a declaration of war or an attack upon us, 
so if you take the joint Army and Navy Basic Plan Orange 1938, that 
was the basic plan on which the Navy drew its war plan and on which 
the Army drew its war plan. 

Senator Brewster. Well, reading these excerpts, these extracts I 
have given you, which are apparently exclusively of a defensive char- 
acter, one might draw the impression that the Navy had no function 
than to be there at Pearl Harbor and assist in its defense. That, of 
course, would not be a warranted conclusion, would it. Admiral? 
The Navy had another job to do under all plans, did it not? 

Admiral Richardson. Oh, absolutely, and the Navy's job was to be 
aggressive. 

Senator Brewster. That is right. 

Admiral Richardson. Now, the pages of this refer specifically to 
the joint responsibilities of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area 
and it does not refer, as I can find here, to anything about what the 
fleet is going to do. 

Senator Brewster. Well, over on page — I should say it is No. 2. 
For instance, on that first page we have section 1. We then have 
section 2 on the first page. There is no [768] section 3 ap- 
parently. It becomes section 4, then section 5, section 6. Then we 



296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

come to extracts of Joint Arni}^ and Navy Basic War Plans, Rainbow 
No. 1, section 6. [Reading :] 

Tasks * * * Joint Tasks * * * 

Now, I take it those refer to omissions as to the naval tasks which 
they were supposed to undertake. 

Admiral Richardson. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. It is a part of the function of both the Navy 
and the Army to keep in constant preparation for possible war plans 
under any eventualities, is it not ? 

Admiral Richardson. If you will turn to pa<i;e o, under paragraph 
35, "Naval tasks"; 

(F) Prepai'e to capture and establish control over the Caioline and Marshall 
Island areas. 

Now, all war plans that I am familiar with for the Navy contained 
a task along those lines. 

[769] Senator Brewster. What you were reading answers my 
question, I guess. It is a function of the Army and Navy to keep in 
constant operation Avar plans in the event of any eventualities ? 

Admiral Richardson. That is true. 

Senator Brewster. When this came up, orders were immediately 
issued, were they not, to execute war plan 46 against Japan? 

Admiral Rich.virdson. I have no idea. 

Senator Brewster. On that date ? 

Admiral Richardson. I have no idea. 

Senator Brewster. I heard you mention when the order came 
through. That was what impressed me. I do not know what it meant. 
I assumed it was the plan which had been prepared. 

Acbniral Richardson. In every war plan there is a provision for 
putting it into effect, and it is defined and known how the plan will 
be put into effect, and when that order is received it goes into effect 
and everybody knows it is in effect, but during the latter part of 1940 
and the early part of 1941, due to changing world conditions, the 
Navy war plans were in a constant state of flux, in an effort to have a 
plan that was in accordance with the existing situation. 

As a matter of fact, there is in this correspondence a [770] 
letter from me with respect to the plan that was being developed, in 
which it is stated that the plan and that letter was prepared with the 
knowledge and approval of my successor. We worked on it jointly 
during the week or 10 days before I was relieved. 

The numbers of the plans are so numerous and the provision of every 
plan is so different, the assumptions are so different, that it would be 
impossible for me to recall now the assumptions in Rainbow 1, 2, 3, 4, 
or 5. 

Senator Brewster. But you would be — had you finished? 

Admiral Richardson. No. In fact, there was a plan which was 
known, I think, as "plan dog" for a while. "Dog" being the Navy 
name of the "D". 

The Chairman. "Dog"? 

Admiral Richardson. Dog, d-o-g. 

The Chairman. Common cur. 

Senator Brewster. But all of these plans contemplated aggressive 
action by the Navy as contrary to merely defensive action in fixed 
positions ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 297 

Admiral Richardson. The Navy had always believed that the only 
way you could defend the country was by aggressive action. 

Senator Brewster. The basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor then 
would, of necessity, mean a return to the west [7711 coast, in 
time of war, and did inevitably affect the time element very seriously, 
the time involved in the return ? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, there is a difference of opinion on that 
point. I thought it did. 

Senator Brewster. What would be the approximate time for the 
return to the west coast and making the preparations under the condi- 
tion when you were there? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, it is about a little over 2,000 miles, and 
the fleet would only make about 15 knots, and that is 360 knots a day, 
or about a week to get back. 

Senator Brewster. In the matter of the patrol reconnaissance, the 
difficulty, so far as the air reconnaisance was concerned, was with the 
shortage of planes, was it not ? 

Admiral Rchardson. That is right. 

Senator Brewster. Are you familiar with the naval expansion bill 
of 1838, which provided for 3,000 naval aircraft? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, I am familiar with it to a very limited 
extent. 

Senator Brewster. Was that during your period as Assistant Chief 
of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Richardson. Yes, but the Assistant Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions in those days concerned himself primarily with administrative 
matters. Relations with the committees [773] of Congress, 

with the other executive departments, and with the President were 
handled by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Snator Brewster. It was becoming evident, more evident each 
year, was it not, as to the part which airplanes would play in naval 
as well as land war? 

Admiral Richardson. Np doubt about that. 

Senator Brewster. That was a constantly expanding activity? 

Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. You spoke about getting the impression while 
you were in Washington, but not from Cordell Hull, that Japan could 
be bluffed. Do you recall where you gained that impression ? Could 
I recall to you, did you confer with Stanley Hornbeck while you were 
here ? 

Admiral Richardson. I did. 

Senator Brewster. Wliether or not you gained any impression of 
that through your conferences with him ? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, whether T was correct or not, I was 
distinctly of the impression that Dr. Hornbeck was exercising a 
greater influence over the disposition of the fleet than I was. 

Senator Brewster. Could you develop that at all ? 

Admiral Richardson. The only way in which I can develop that is 
this : 

I saw Dr. Hornbeck on July 11. I talked to him from [773] 
10 : 30 to noon. 

According to my notebook I said he is the strong man on the Far 
East and the cause of our staying in Hawaii where he will hold us 
as long as he can. And that was an impression that I wrote in my 
notebook when it happened. 



298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[774-] On October 9 I saw Hornbeck, who was unwilling to ac- 
cept the responsibility for retaining the fleet in Hawaii. Now I may 
have been entirely wrong, but that was the impression I gained. 

Senator Brewster. Did j^ou express to him, Admiral, in your con- 
versations, the same opinion that you had expressed to the President 
as to the psychology of the Japanese military authorities on the situa- 
tion? 

Admiral Eichardson. Well, inasmuch as Dr. Hornbeck was the 
advisor of the State Department on far eastern affairs and had written 
many books on the subject, some of which I had read, I doubt whether 
I told him that he was completely wrong, but I expressed my view 
fully. 

Senator Brew^ster. He was at that time the one in charge of what 
they called the far eastern desk in the State Department? 

Admiral Richardson. No. I had known Dr. Hornbeck for some 
time. 

Senator Brewster. His first name is Stanley ? 

Admiral Richardson. Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, and I think he had 
been relieved as head of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and had 
been superseded by Mr. Max Hamilton, if I remember correctly, whom 
I had also known for many years. Dr. Hornbeck was the advisor 
of the State Department on far [77S] eastern affairs. 

Senator Brewster. In connection. Admiral, with your service in 
Hawaii, was there a local influence in leaving Hawaii? 

Admiral Richardson. If there was it was unknown to me. 

Senator Brewster. You did not have any situation of that kind 
locally ? 

Admiral Richardson. None at all. 

Senator Brewster. That is all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark, when your name was reached 
you were temporarily absent. Do you have any questions of the 
Admiral ? 

Mr. Clark. I have no questions. 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Am I next in order, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. I think in order to balance between the two sides, 
inasmuch as the Chairman has assumed to do the first interrogating 
on the Senate side, that you would come next. 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, pursuing the questions that have been 
asked just a moment ago by the Senator from Maine, I think you 
testified that the fleet, as you commanded it in 1940, was under- 
manned, undertrained, understaffed, under provisioned and underam- 
munitioned. 

Admiral Richardson. Well, no American force was ever [776] 
underprovisioned. We eat better than anybody in the world. 

Mr. Gearhart. But did you have a sufficient supply of edibles to 
keep you going for a long time, for instance, through a war engage- 
ment, a war responsibility? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, normally we carried dry provisions 
for about 60 days, if I remember correctly. Insofar as I remember, 
there was no question of provisions. The ships did not carry the full 
wartime allowance of ammunition because of the needless expendi- 
ture of fuel in pushing that much weight through the water. There 
was a deficiency in certain types of ammunition. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 299 

For example, we had little, if any bombardment ammunition whdch 
would be necessary in effecting a landing. 

As to enough men, never within my knowledge, except in war, has 
the Navy had on board enough men to fight the ship. We have been 
lucky if we could secure sufficient appropriations to maintain 85 per- 
cent of complement. Men of experience were being removed from 
the ships in order to train new men. 

Mr, Gearhart, Now to place it on a percentage basis, what would 
be the percentage of fighting efficiency of the Navy as you commanded 
it? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, that would be a highly theoretical 
question. No answer would be of any value. 

Mr. Gearhart. You consider you were 85 percent manned? 

[777] Admiral Richardson. Well, we had 85 percent enough 
men to man the battery and steam at full power for more than a xery 
short time, and as an instrument of war their value was prospective. 
They coulcl be fully realized in a short space of time by the addition of 
men, because men in war learn far more rapidly than they do in time of 
peace. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, then, the Navy under your command was not 
in a condition of readiness to commence the war with Japan? 

Admiral Richardson. Absolutely not. 

Mr. Gearhart. And if it were the policy of the United States to 
commence a war with Japan the ships would have to return first to 
the west coast, spending a week in travel and a week in coming back — 
and how many weeks being put in shape for striking ? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, in my letter, one of my letters, I stated 
that in the event active war operations were undertaken it would either 
be necessary to return to the coast for mobilization or preparation or 
accept the handicaps of preparing m Pearl Harbor. I could not 
hazard a guess as to how soon they would be ready from Pearl Har- 
bor, returning to the coast and being ready to start again, because 
I do not know how quickly you could have assembled the ships, the 
tankers, and done the training. Actually it was a year or so, was it 
not? 

[778] Mr, Gearhart. You say a year or so? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, before we really got going well in this 
war it was not a matter of weeks. 

Mr, Gearhart. Then in order to prepare the fleet to strike, say, 
Japan originally, it would have to travel from Hawaii to the United 
States, spending a week, then uncertain weeks in the United States 
being equipped for war, and then travel back a week, and that would 
mean really b}^ leaving it in Hawaii it was 4,500 miles further away 
from the enemy than it would be if it had been in the United States ? 

Admiral Richardson, Yes, but I think when a'ou consider the 
many, many other things that had to be done before active war opera- 
tions could be undertaken, the question of whether it was in Hawaii 
or whether it was on the west coast would have little effect on the 
over-all time, because you had to assemble, train, you might have to 
build some, you might have to haA'e drydocks, you might have to have 
repair facilities, you had to have a terriffic amount of stores and all 
kinds of equipment for building roads and airfields, and everything 
else, none of which was ready. 



300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Admiral Richardson. So that the question of whether it was in 
Hawaii or whether it was on the west coast, when actual war started 
it was a niat,ter of no moment, in my opinion, because [779] 
other things controlled the time of getting ready. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, considering the other situation, the one which 
actually happened, by having our fleet in Hawaiian waters we had 
our fleet 2,500 miles closer to the enemy for their sneak attack? 

Admiral Richardson. Do you want an opinion on that? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, unless it is a question of geograjphy, unless 
it is a matter of going over water, or something else. 

Admiral Richardson. In my opinion, Congressman Gearhart, a 
Japanese fleet that could cross most of the Pacific ocean and deliver 
an undiscovered attack on Pearl Harbor would quite likely have 
been able to deliver the same attack on Puget Sound. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, that is amazing. 

Admiral Richardson. But the whole question is the amount of oil 
they have got in the ships. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now you have outlined the deficiencies in our 
Navy's strength at that time. Were those deficiencies known to the 
Japanese? Have you any way of knowing whether they were or 
not? 

Admiral Richardson. Well, I never had any doubt that the Japa- 
nese knew everything they wanted to know about our fleet, and the 
Secretary of the Navy told me himself that they knew more about it 
than I did. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, then in the light of what you have [780] 
just said, do you think that the President was correct when he said he 
thought the presence of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters had a I'estrain- 
ing effect on the Japanese ? 

Admiral Richardson. I did not think so when I was talking to 
him, and I have not changed my mind. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now while you were in command of the ship — or 
of the fleet in 1940, and during the months of 1941 when you were 
in charge of the fleet, were any of your battleships, aircraft carriers, 
cruisers, destroyers or service vessels transferred to the Atlantic? 

Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, my memory is not active, 
and certainly with changes made during my incumbency as to the 
ships in the Atlantic and ships in the Pacific, because new ships were 
being built, and joining the fleet, and some ships were being trans- 
ferred from that part of the United States Fleet in the Pacific to 
that part of it in the Atlantic,, so I have here something that has just 
been prepared for me, expecting that this question might be asked 
me, from the records of the Navy Department the transfers that were 
made. 

Before I can answer that I would need about 5 minutes to look 
over the data which has been compiled at my request. 

Mr. Gearhart. Will you take a minute or two and see if there 
were any considerable or important transfers made one [781] 
way or the other ? 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, it might be well to have it 
incorporated in the record. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 301 

Mr. Geseix. We were hoping to get the final answer on that, 
Senator. 

The Chairmax. The committee will be in order. 

Admiral Richaedsox. Mr. Chairman, in lieu of presenting at this 
time a hurriedly prepared presentation of this kind