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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

JOINT  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION 
OF  THE  PEAEL  HAKBOE  ATTACK 

C0NGEES8  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH  CONGKESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Con.  Res.  27 

A    CONCURRENT    RESOLUTION    AUTHORIZING    AN 

INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  ATTACK  ON  PEARL 

HARBOR     ON     DECEMBER     7,     1941,     AND 

EVENTS  AND  CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING  THERETO 


PART  1 

NOVEMBER   15,  16,  17,  19,  20,  and  21,  1945 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack 


PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

o.n^.^^JOINT  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION 
OF  THE  PEAEL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
CONGEESS  or  THE  UNITED  STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH  CONGEESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Con.  Res.  27 

79th  Congress 

A  CONCURRENT   RESOLUTION  AUTHORIZING  AN 

INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  ATTACK  ON  PEARL 

HARBOR   ON   DECEMBER   7,    1941,    AND 

EVENTS  AND  CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING  THERETO 


PART  1 

NOVEilLJER  13,  IG,  17,  19,  20,  and  21,  1945 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack 


UNITED  STAl'KS 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING   OFFICE 
767115  WASHINGTON  :   1946 


*2>7(.7 


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JOINT  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  PEARL 
HARBOR  ATTACK 

ALBEN  W.  BARKLEY,  Senator  from  Kentucky,  Chairman 
JERE  COOI'ER,  Representative  from  Tennessee,  Vice  Chairman 
WALTER  F.  GEORGE,  Senator  from  Georgia    JOHN    W.    MURPHY,    Representative   from 
SCOTT  W.  LUCAS,  Senator  from  Illinois  Pennsylvania 

OWEN  BRE^VSTER,  Senator  from  Maine  BERTRAND    W.    GEARHART,    Representa- 

HOMER  FERGUSON,    Senator  from  Michi-         tive  from  California 
gan 

,    BAYARD    CL. 
Nortla  Carolina 


gan  FRANK    B.    KEEFE,    Representative    from 

J.    BAY'ARD    CLARK,    Representative   from         Wisconsin 


COUNSEL 
(Through  January  14,  1946) 
Wii.LiAJi  D.  Mitchell,  General  Counsel 
Gerhard  A.  Gesell,  Chief  Assistant  Counsel 
JULE  M.  Ha.nxaford,  Assistant  Counsel 
John  E.  Masten,  Assistant  Counsel 

(After  January  14,  1946) 
Seth  W.  Richardson,  General  Counsel 
Samuel  H.  Kaufman.  Associate  General  Counsel 
John  E.  Masten,  Assistant  Counsel 
Edward  P.  Morgan,  Assistant  Coimsel 
LOGAN  J.  Lane,  Assistant  Counsel 


HEARINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


Part 
Ko. 


10 
11 


Pages  Transcript  ^  Hearings 

pages 

1-  399      1-  1058  Nov.  15,  16,  17,  19,  20,  and  21,  1945. 

401-  982  1059-  2586  Nov.  23,  24,  26  to  30,  Dec.  3  and  4.  1945. 

983-1583  2587-  4194  Dec.  5.  6,  7,  8,  10,  11,  12,  and  13.  1945. 

1585-2083  4195-  5460  Dec.  14,  15,  17,  18,  19,  20,  and  21,  1945. 

2065-2492  5461-  6646  Dec.  31,  1945,  and  Jan.  2,  3,  4,  and  5,  1946. 

2493-2920  6647-  7888  Jan.  15,  16,  17,  18,  19,  and  21,  1946. 

2921-3378  7889-  9107  Jan.  22,  23,  24,  25,  26,  28  and  29,  1946., 

3379-3927  9108-10517  Jan.  30,  31,  Feb.  1,  2,  4,  5,  and  6,  1946. 

3929-4599  10518-12277  Feb.  7,  8,  9,  11,  12,  13,  and  14,  1946. 

4601-5151  12278-13708  Feb.  15,  16,  18,  19,  and  20,  1946. 

5153-5560  13709-14765  Apr.  9  and  11,  and  May  23  and  31,  1946. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


Part 

No.  Exhibits  Nos. 

12  1  through  6. 

13  7  and  8. 

14  9  through  43. 

15  44  through  87. 

16  88  through  110. 

17  111  through  128. 

18  129  through  156. 

19  157  through  172. 

20  173  through  179. 

21  ISO  through  183,  and  Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22  through  25  Roberts  Commission  Proceedings. 

26  Hart  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

27  through  31  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board  Proceedings. 
32  through  33  Navy  Court  of  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

34  Clarke  Investigation  Proceedings. 

35  Clausen  Investigation  Proceedings. 

36  through  38  Hewitt  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

39  Pieports  of  Roberts  Commission,  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board, 
Navy  Court  of  Inquiry  and  Hewitt  Inquiry,  with  endorse- 
ments. 


IV 


CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


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Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov.  15,  1945, 

to  May  31, 

1946 

Pages 

5269-5291 

381-4-3826 
3450-3519 

"""5089-5122 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May  14  to 

July  11,  1945) 

1 1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1     lo     1     1     1     1     1     1     1 

« 1      1      1      1      1  lO 1 

^ 1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1  1     1    1    1    1    1    1    1 

(^  1  1  'i  'i  'i  'i  'i  I  1  1  1  1  1  1  'i  'iF:;  1  1  1  1  !  1  I 

II 1      1      1      lr}^      1      1      1      i      1      1      1 

!  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  :  !  1  :     1  i  1  ;  1  !  ! 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov.  23,  1944, 

to  Sept.  12, 

1945) 

Pages 

--- 

194 
59-63 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept.  14  to 

16,  1944;  July 

13  to  Aug. 

4,  1945) 

1      1      1      1      1      1      1      1      1      1      1      1(N 

Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit  No. 

146 

(Navy  Court 

of  Inquiry, 

July  24  to 

Oct.  19,  1944) 

Pages 

""660-688" 

Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit  No. 

145 
(Army  Pearl 
Harbor  Hoard, 

July  20  to 
Oct.  20,  1914) 

Pages 

3105-3120" 

2479-2491 

4022-4027" 
148-186 

2567-2580' 

3972-3988 

2492-2515 

1575-1643" 

3720-3749" 
1186-1220 

1413-1442" 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

144 

(Hart  Inquiry, 

Feb.  12  to 
June  15,  1944) 

1      1      1      1  CO      1 itH 

1      i      1      iCT>      1      1      1 CO 

willlCOl r-llllllll 

^  1    1    1    1  1     1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1  1     1    1    1    1    1    1    1 

e      1      1      1      1  --1      1      1      1 lO      1      1      1      1      1      1      1 

►iiiiiiO II.-1IIIIIII 

1        1        1        iCO        1        1        1 1        IrH        1        1        1        1        I        1        1 

Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit  No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Doc.  18,  1941, 

to  Jan.  23, 1942) 

Pages 
203-209 

1127-1138 
1033-1038 

1719-1721' 

1219-1224' 

"886-951' 
1382-1399 

"377-389' 
1224-1229 

"314-320' 

Allen,  Brooke  E.,  Maj 

Allen,  Riley  H 

Anderson,  Edward  B.,  Maj 

Anderson,  Ray 

Anderson,  Walter  S.,  Rear  Adni 

Anstev,  Alice 

Arnold,  H.  H.,  Gen 

Asher,  N.  F.,  Ens 

Ball,  N.  F.,  Ens 

Ballard,  Emma  Jane 

Barber,  Bruce  G 

Bartlctt,  George  Francis 

Bates,  Paul  M.,  Lt.  Comdr 

Beardall,  John  R.,  Rear  Adm 

Beardall,  John  R.,  Jr.,  Ens 

Beatty,  Frank  E.,  Rear  Adm • 

Bellinger,  P.  N.  L.,  Vice  Adm 

Benny,  Chris  J 

Benson,  Henry  P 

Berquist,  Kenneth  P.,  Col 

Berry,  Frank  M.,  S  1/c 

Betts,  Thomas  J.,  Brig.  Gen 

Bieknell,  George  W.,  Col 

Bissell,  John  T.,  Col 

INDEX  OF  WITNESSES 


l>  00 

lO  CO 

I    I 

lO  o 


ci 


(M  CO 

O5C0 
(NCC 

OlCO 

coco 

(N  CO 


^   Tt*   00 

I    (N  CO 


— (  o 

f  COCD 

(N  o 

«::i>CJ 

(MO 

o  oco 

<N     1 

<Nco   1 

1    00 

1      1    00 

CDO 

00  l>^ 

-H    00 

OCDQC 

IM 

lO  O 

IN 

(N  CO 

o  --^  ■^  »o  cc  CO 

CO  (M  tT  CC  CO  o 
CO^  (N  ;C  — ' 
(>5  -^     I    CO  CO  ■* 

I     I  CO   I     I     I 

lO  lO  ■*  00  CO  LO 
^  ^  -H  iCCO  o 
OO  (M«0  O 
(N-*        COCOTf 


■»*<  CC  lO 

cc  CI  lo 

^  CC  "* 


d 


s 
d 


o 


H 


T1 

« 

rl 

^ 

ci 

o 

o 

^- 

o 

o 

c 
o 

CO  •"! 


C        ^ 


5  'i 


13 

g 

o 


o 


t^O 


o 


o  o 


«     pq     «; 


^J 


c3   o 


P5« 


x:  — hJ 


,03   5"2 


4=  j: 


■  o 


O  .-    O 

mcQfc 


•^^ 


i  ^  c 
o  o  r 


O'  H       -  ; , 

>  ^  u2    2  hr.'    a 

C  o'  c  S  c" 
o 


r-"      .«= 


^,  c:  fc<  (-.  t-  *j 

(5  «  ffi  ffi  «  «  m  m-ffi 


■.Si—    .2 
3    r       .  c 

■^     -"^  03—' 

3    C    O    (B 

o  o  ?  tc 

>i    fc-    H  — 

Cj   oj   o3   C^ 

oooo 


OO 


o 
^O 

on       ^ 


O 


« 


S  J^"?  0000 
00000000 


VI 


CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov.  15,  194.5, 

to  Mav  31, 

1940 

Pages 
5080-5089 

3826-3838 

Joint 

Committee 

E.vhibit  No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

Mav  14  to 

July  11,  1945) 

Pages 

163-181 

'"418-423' 
"451-464' 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov.  23,  1944, 

to  Sept.  12, 

1945) 

Pages 

'8'7-'b" 
205 

"B223-224" 
B6.5-66 
B229-231 
49-51 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept.  14  to 

16,  1944;  July 

13  to  Aug. 

4,  1945) 

^1    iiiiii    i  i  i    i  i  i  i  i  i  i  i  i  i  i  i  i  i 
1    llllll    III    1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 

Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit  No. 

14f) 

(Navy  Court 

of  Inquiry, 

July  24  to 

Oct.  19,  1944) 

Pages 
495-510 

Joint 

Committee 
Exhibit  No. 

145 
(Army  Pearl 
Harbor  Board, 

July  20  to 
Oct.  20,  1944) 

Pages 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3190-3201' 
1928-1965 

3642-3643 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

144 

(Hart  Inquiry, 

Feb.  12  to 
Juno  15,  1941) 

Pages 

""179-184" 
""105-114" 

96-105 

74-85 

""368-378" 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec.  18,  1941, 

to  Jan.  23, 1942) 

Pages 
478-483, 
301-310 

1171-1178" 

1178-1180" 
1659-1663, 
170-198 

"'812-843,' 
1538-1571 
504-509 

2-32' 

365-368 

1747-1753' 

Craige,  Nelvin  L.,  Lt.  Col 

Creighton,  John  M.,  Capt.  (USN) 

Crosley,  Paul  C,  Comdr 

Curley,  J.  J.  (Ch/CM) 

Curts,  M.  E.,  Capt.,  USN 

Daubin,  F.  A.,  Capt.,  USN 

Davidson,  Howard  C,  Maj.  Gen 

Davis,  Arthur  C,  Rear  Adm 

Dawson,  Harry  L 

Deane,  John  R.,  Maj.  Gen 

DeLany,  Walter  S.,  Rear  Adm 

Dickens,  June  D.,  Sgt 

Dillingham,  Walter  F 

Dillon,  James  P 

Dillon,  John  H.,  Maj 

Dingeman,  Ray  E.,  Col 

Donegan,  William  Col 

Doud,  Harold ,■  Col 

Dunlop,  Robert  H.,  Col 

Dunning,  Mary  J 

Dusenbury,  Carlisle  Clyde,  Col 

Dyer,  Thomas  H.,  Capt.,  USN 

Earle,  Frederick  M.,  W/0 

Earle,  John  Bayliss,  Capt.,  USN 

INDEX   OF  WITNESSES 


VII 


o:r; 


'^■^ 


<N  CO 


« 


o  o 

!X  O 

o 


oc  00 

00  '^ 

I  -* 

(N     I 

CO  lO 

00  00 


(M  COiO 

ic  CO  CO 

C^  -H  (M 


^H  lO   TJH 

lO  <N  GO 
(M  ---  (N 


t^CO 

Tfi  CO 

^CO 

I    ■* 

T-H<N 


CD  ^ 
COc^(N 


o  i-o  CO 

COCO  (N 

I      I      I 
00OJ> 

00 -^OJ 

(NCO  ^ 


■-■  O 

coo 
coco 

coo 
coco 


^  CO(M 

O  -^  CO 

CO  CO  o 

I    I  ^ 

00  1-  o 
iNCOt^ 

o 


lO  o 
CRCO 

oo 

C55  05 


t.OC^ 

-*  O 

I  ^ 
00  I 
c^  00 


o 


^  J 

CO  s 


oo^ 


'rP  oO 


c  o 


c  o 

go 


>    CS    Oj    QJ  .rt 


0  0°= 

ca-<  t, 
c  o  c 


rbi:    .-S 


feh-) 


50 


^'^     o 


;0 


O 


'^0M 


K   O  o   C 

o  "  "■ 


ii  -u  3  ^  ^  't^  0' 


fci  ~  3 

fe  f^  |JH  fe  fe  Ph  fe 


>^    -So 


w 


w 


,:h  ^  t-c  b< 


:;  03  03  (L> 
foOOO 


CO 


o  :r 

o  o 
o  g 

00 


.0 


•3  §■ 

03   (U 

00 


a 

I'd 

l<1 


.f=< 


I-"   o 


-s^ 


4^^    S 


OK 


VIII        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov.  15,  1945, 

to  May  31, 

1946 

Pages 
4797-4828 

463-457, 

551-560, 

605-615, 

5367-5415 1 

4221-4366 
26-34,  36-38, 
40-49,  55-73, 
75-79,  82-92, 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May  14  to 

July  11,  1945) 

Pages 

428-432 
414-417 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov.  23,  1944, 

to  Sept.  12, 

1945) 

iiiiiiieoi— iiNiiiii-Hi                 iiii 

iiiiiiii-HiOXiiiiiOi                       IIII 

»llllllllNl.-l--tlllll'-Hl                                    IIII 

0, 1  1    '  1        1    1    1    1    1  1     1              IIII 

e     1      1      1      1      1      1      1  CO      1  0            1      1      1      1      1  0      1                       IIII 
tin     1      1      1      .      1      1      1^      lO            0      1                       IIII 

lINlT-H                .-HI                                 IIII 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept.  14  to 

16,  1941:  July 

13  to  Aug. 

4,  1945) 

1      1      1      1      1      1      I      1      1      1      I      1      1      1      1      1      1      1                       1      1      !      1 

Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit  No. 

146 

(Navy  Court 

of  Inquiry, 

July  24  to 

;oct.  19, 1944) 

Pages 
1070-1076 

461-469 

"763-772' 

816-851 

Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit  No. 

145 
(Army  Pearl 
Harbor  Board, 

July  20  to 
Oct.  20,  1944) 

iO.-ii-*iiO(Miiii^t^iii                       lOOii 

1   C2  t>.         1   t^         1         1   TTl   -^         1         1         1         1  ^    r-l         1         1         1                                    It-,         1         1 

»iOC»iiMii(N05iiii(MC5iil                       il-ii 

^     .  (M  CO      1     1        1      1     1    CO      1      1      1      1  C-5  r-H      1      1      1                         II        11 

„e     1    1      1       1  r-^      1      1  f,    1       1      1      1      1    1      1       III                      1  m      1     1 

tiiiOt^i^J^iiO'^iiiiO-^iii                      1^*11 

iCOLi.cOiiCOCOiiiiO^iii                      ii>ii 

1  0  0      1            1      1        Ci      1      1      1      1  C^5  Cl      1      1      1                       1            11 

1  CO  CO      1            1      1        01      1      1      1      1  C^  -H      1      1      1                        1            11 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

144 

(Hart  Inquiry, 

Feb.  12  to 
June  15,  1944) 

1      1      1      1      1      1      1      1 11                       1      lO      1 

1111 1       1       1       1       1       1                           1       ICO       1 

»    1     1     1     1     1     1 1     1  ^     1 

C:,      1       1       1        1        1       1       1        1       1        1       1       1       1       1       1        1       1       1                              111          1 

^  ;  ;  ;  ;  1  ;  ;  :  !  ;  :  ;  :  :  1  1  ;  1         !  ;^  ; 

III IIII 1       1  TT*       1 

Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit  No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec.  18,  1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 

Pagei 

1571-1574" 

1664-1676 
"469-473~ 

1 

Hamilton,  Maxwell  M.,  State  Dept 

Hannum,  Warren  T.,  Brig.  Gen 

Harrington,  Cyril  J 

Hart,  Tliomas  Charles,  Senator 

Hayes,  PhiHp,  MaJ.  Gen 

Heard,  William  A.,  Capt.,  USN 

Henderson,  H.  H.,  Lt.,  USA 

Herron,  Charles  D.,  Maj.  Gen 

Hill,  William  H.,  Senator 

Holmes,  J.  Wilfred.,  Capt.,  USN 

Holtwick,  J.  S.,  Jr.,  Comdr 

Hoppough,  Clay,  Lt.  Col 

HornVjeck,  Stanley  K 

Home,  Walter  Wilton 

Howard,  Jack  W.,  Col 

HubbeU,  Monroe  H.,  Lt.  Comdr 

Huckins,  Thomas  A.,  Capt.,  USN 

Hull,  CordelL- 

Humphrey,  Ricliard  W.  RM  3/c 

Hunt,  John  A.,  Col 

Ingersoll,  Royal  E.,  Adm 

Inglis,  R.  B.,  Rear  Adm 

INDEX   OF   WITNESSES 


IX 


ci  ^  <M  CO  ■*  TjH  lo  L':  ic  t^  ;x; 


?2S 


^lO 


rH^ 


i 


t^  O  lO 

o  c^  00 

C<)  C^  TjH 


ci- 


1  rf  CO 
O  O  '^ 


"^CO 


coco 
ot  ro 
CO  t^ 

77 


•+  o  ^-„-oo  r-  t^  CO 
iC  i.-::  n  f2  '^  ^'^  l^  '^ 

77 J. J,777  I 

C  O  h2  ,T  ^  .-o  ^  CO 
lO  rr     ^  ^"  t  L-  I>. 


d 


o 


,a  ^  "^  SQ 

525  Ex; -is 

C/g  (S  C3  cj 


O  kT        ^  P^  ^jh 

s  >:  >:  5  s  3 
^=^  1  s  e  3 


o 


i-J  p*^   Kn 


+^fei^tZ!  ' 


bo   I  "S  ,-^    r  r 

^  '  S  o  ■—  til 


73  o 


o 


-tJ   _   ^   ^ 
e3  <a  y  .-  .5  .3 


>^    r 

^   ^   ^ 

:f§a 

is  o  S 

K>  k>  ►^  v,>  ^v*  K/^  ^>  K.^  *sx< 


W 


bC  iC  bt.  bC  b£i_2  : 

c  ^  a  c  z  ^ 


CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov.  15,  1945, 

to  May  31, 

194G 

0     1      1      1      1     1      lO  00      1      1 Ill      i_-    -0      1     1 

CO    1    1    1    1    1    loco    1    1    1    1    1 '^Z^o    1    1 

•o    1    1    1    1    1    loco    1    1    1    1    1 2^0'^    '    ' 

lOlllll'Tt<|          llllllllll.^^lOII 

IJ:    1    1    1    1    1    Ick^    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1     1  1    1  Jj    1    ! 

I'O      1      1      .      1      1      '(NCO      1      1      1      .      1      1      1      .      1      1      i2?^S      1      1 

^10    <    1    '    <    <    ^yj         III. ^S-Hii 

lOiiiiii-*            iiiiiiiiiii«^iOii 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Intjuiry, 

Mav  14  to 

July  11,  1945) 

Pages 

541-553 

182-292 

"'140^142' 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov.  23,  1944, 

to  Sept.  12, 

1945) 

Pages 

103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept.  14  to 

IG,  1944;  July 

13  to  Aug. 

4,  1945) 

^    '        '    1    '    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    '    '    '    '            '    ' 

Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit  No 

14G 

(Navy  Court 

of  Inquiry, 

July  24  to 

Oct.  19,  1944) 

1      1      1      1    -1      1      1  00      1      1      1      1      iCO      1      1      1      1  0      lie                  II 

lllllll^ tl||IITt<lOO                         II 

M 0 coiiiit^ioo             II 

a  1    1    1    1    1    1    '  1 ^    '    '    '    '  1     '  1           '    ' 

0 '^ 00      1      1      1      1  TtH      1  (N                  II 

ftiiliiliiO (NiiiiCOiiC                  II 

iiiiii.OiiiiiCOiiiit^.CO                  11 

Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit  No. 

145 
(Army  Pearl 
Harfcor  Board, 

July  20  to 
Oct.  20,  1944) 

Pages 

2665-2695' 
3028-3067 

1161-1185' 

2787-2802' 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374' 

2-54' 

T.  S.  2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 

Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit  No. 

144 

(ITart  Inquiry, 

Feb.  12  to 
Juno  15,  1944) 

Pages 

214-225 
363-367 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec.  18,  1941, 

to  Jan.  2:3, 1942) 

Pages 

1146-1156' 

1156-1171' 

4-32' 
1068-1095 

1272-1285' 

"500-504' 

1793-1805' 

"320-352," 
1648- 
1659 

Krick,  Harold  D.,  Capt.,  USN 

Kroner,  Hayes  A.,  Brig.  Gen 

Landretli,  J.  L.,  Ens 

Lane,  Louis  R.,  Ch.  W/0 

Larkin,  C.  A.,  Lt.  Col 

Laswell,  Alva  B.,  Col.  USMC 

Lawton,  William  S.,  Col 

Layton,  Edwin  T.,  Capt.,  USN 

Leahy,  William  D.,  Adm 

Leary,  Herbert  F.,  Vice  Adm 

Lewis,  Fulton,  Jr 

Litell,  S.  H 

Locey,  Frank  H 

Lockard,  Joseph  L.,  Lt.,  USA 

Lorence,  Walter  E.,  Col 

Lumsden,  George,  Ma] 

Lyman,  W.  T.,  Lt.,  USN 

Lynch,  Paul  J 

Lynn,  George  W.,  Lt.  Comdr 

MacArthur,  Douglas,  Gen 

Marshall,  George  C,  Gen 

Marston,  Morrill  W.,  Col 

Martin,  F.  L.,  Maj.  Gen 

IXDEX   OF   WITNESSES 


XI 


cnzz 

I    -hT 

fo|2 


GC   r-H 

CI  o 


O 


TTi  cC  IM 
(N        00 


CO  ic  (N  c;  in 
C:  Cl  CO  ^  go 

cc  Oi  at  oc  jx 

C^COCO(M^ 

1      1      !      1     I 

c;  cc  ec  «  ^ 

«2  ■—  O  COc35 

GO  cr-  GO  00 

01  CC<N  <N 


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T-  i^  O  I-  «-■  ti  fe- 

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XII 


CONGRESSIOXAL  INVESTIGATION  TEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov.  15,  1945, 

to  May  31, 

194G 

Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May  14  to 

July  11,  1915) 

00                  1                                   III            1      1      1      1 

II CO                    1                                         III              1       1       1       1 

2      1      1      1            III            1      ICO                  1                                   1 1 

^ 1           1                     111       1    1    1    1 

e l>                 1                                 

^11 (X)                  1                                   III            1      1      1      1 

1 1      iCO                  1                                   

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov.  23,  1944, 

to  Sei)t.  12, 

1945) 

oil            111            1^                  1                               (Mil            it^ii 

TtHii         III         iioo              1                         (^3ll         it>ii 

Z    \       • ^                 <                               (Mil            'III 

g,iO      11            111            III                   1                                         II            1  (O      1      1 

c^-*  ;  1     1  1  1     1  ig       !               i  i     i"^  i  i 

Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit  No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept.  14  to 

IG,  1944;  July 

13  to  Aug. 

4,  1915) 

^  i  i  i       ;  i      i  i       i             i        i  i 

Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit  No. 

14G 

(Navy  Court 

of  Inquiry, 

July  24  to 

Oct.  19,  1944) 

1    lio         III         III             r-„-„-~=^'''^'c<i     1     lo         1     loo  00 

1    Id         III         III          ^^JPoocoio    1    iTt<         1    lOC 

1  ;  IT     III     III      7^1^2::;:  i  it     I  m - 

g'ilr^         111         111          ^^l|l^''^         '    '^^ 

C^iit-.            Ill            III                    jTgl'-HO'-iii— 1            lll>^ 

\  [^     111     III         c^^§2!2  1  1^     ;  I'^g 

Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit  No. 

145 
(Army  Tearl 
Harbor  Board, 

July  20  to 
Oct.  20,  1944) 

Pages 

1107-1160," 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

1968-1988" 
1035-1070 

778-789 

.Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit  No. 

144 

(Hart  Inquiry, 

Feb.  12  to 
June  15,  1944) 

Pages 
147-169 

Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit  No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec.  IS,  1941. 

to  Jan.  23, 1942) 

1    1  fj-i>.  Tt<    1    1      o    1  ,_-,_-oo    1                         1    1  ci-rr    1    1    1    1 
ii£rccc5ii     101,212^1                       iiooooiiii 

1  1  ,'^^:2  1  1    2  1^^^   !                  !  I^°f  1   1  1  1 

^  1  \^i^  ;  I  i  igg    !             1  i^ig  1  1  1  1 

1  l^^g  :  ;    ;5  ;SS      ;                 1  Ig^  1  1  1  1 

s 

Pettigrew,  Moses  W.,  Col 

Phelan,  John,  Ens 

Phillips,  Walter  C,  Col 

Pickett,  Harry  K.,  Col 

Pierson,  Millard,  Col 

Pine,  Willard  B 

Poindexter,  Joseph  B.,  Gov 

Powell,  Boiling  R.,  Jr.,  Maj 

Powell,  C.  A.,  Col 

Powers,  R.  D.,  Jr.,  Lt.  Comdr 

Prather,  Louise 

Pratt,  John  S.,  Col 

Pye,  William  S.,  Vice  Adm 

Rafter,  Case  B 

Raley,  Edward  W.,  Col 

Ramsey,  Logan  C,  Capt.,  USN 

Redman,  Joseph  R.,  Rear  Adm 

INDEX   OF   WITNESSES 


xni 


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CO(M 


i 


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XIV 


COXGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


'^  CO 


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INDEX   OF  WITNESSES 


XV 


I         I         I         I      -M^   r^rt   -I 

TjH  as-*  c»   I    I     -I    I 

C0-*Ol>C5C0OOi0 

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t^  T-H  --H  lO  ^  ^  r-H  rt 

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<N  CO  lO  1> 


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CO  CO  00 

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a>  oj  o  0) 


XVI        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


§a|2 


C   ~  ."t;  O     fe  ~   -H        - 

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LIST  OF   DOCUMENTS  XVII 


LIST  OF  DOCUMENTS  APPEAEING  IN  THE  JOINT 
COMMITTEE'S  HEARINGS  NOT  INTRODUCED  AS 
EXHIBITS 


PART  1 


Senate  Concurrent  Resolution  27,  establishing  the  Joint  Committee  on  the     Page 
Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack 3 

Corresi)oudence  between  joint  committee  and  State,  War,  Navy  Depart- 
ments, and  between  committee  and  President  Truman  and  estate  of 
former  President  Roosevelt,  concerning  liaison  ofHcers  and  records  to 
assist   committee 5 

Presidential  directive  of  August  28,  1945,  concerning  disclosure  of  crypt- 

analytic  technique  or  procedures 8 


Presidential  order  of  October  23,  1945,  lifting  ban  of  August  28,  1945,  di- 
rective for  benefit  of  committee S 

Presidential  order  of  November  7,  1945,  concerning  information  given  by 

service  personnel 9 

Presidential  memorandum  of  November  9,  1945,  enlarging  on  order  of  No- 
vember 7,  1945 9 

Excerpts  from  the  Congressional  Record  of  September  6,  1945,  including 
the  discussion  and  adoption  by  the  Senate  of  Senate  Concurrent  Resolu- 
tion 27  establishing  the  joint  committee 10 

I'aragraph  from  "I  Fly  for  Vengeance,"  by  Commander  Clarence  Earl  Dick- 
inson, appearing  in  Saturday  Evening  Post  of  October  10,  1942 114 

Tentative  order  of  proof  submitted  by  committee  counsel 125 

Paraphrase  of  message  of  October  6,  1945,  from  Secretary  of  War  to  Gen- 
eral MacArthur 176 

Statement  by  Japanese  officer  who  participated  in  Pearl  Harbor  attack 179 

Order  issued  by  Navy  Section  of  Japanese  Imperial  General  Headquarters 

concerning  attack 179 

Statement  of  Japanese  officer  on  information  concerning  ship  movements 
reaching  Japanese  task  force  from  Honolulu  commercial  broadcast- 
ing stations 182 

Japanese  Naval  General  Staff  Instruction  of  December  2,  as  contained  in 

MacArthur  report 205 

Letter  received  by  Navy  regarding  FBI  check  of  Honolulu  programs 215 

Prepared  statement  by  Admiral  Richardson  on  meeting  with  Admiral  Leahy 

and  President  on  October  S,  1940 265 

Memorandum  of  October  9,  1940,  by  Admiral  Richardson  on  his  conference 
with  the  President 268 

Messages  between  Admiral  Richardson  and  Admiral  Bloch  concerning  War 

Department  1940  alert 271 

Statement  of  Admiral  Richardson's  view  on  security  of  fleet  in  Hawaiian 
area '. 286 

Admiral  Leahy's  statement  on  function  of  Navy  before  Naval  Affairs 
Committee 294 

Admiral  Richardson's  statement  concerning  patrol  line  from  Hawaii  to 

Asiatic  coast _.       3()5 

79716— 46— pt.  1 2 


XVIII  LIST   OF  DOCUMENTS 

Admiral  Richardson's  dispatch  of  June  22,  1940,  to  Chief  of  Naval  Oper-     Page 
ations  concerning  War  Department  alert 312 

Answer  of  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  Richardson's  dispatch  of  June 

22,  1940 312 

Letter  of  January  25,  1941,  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  Chief  of  Naval 

Operations,  regarding  air-defense  conditions  at  Pearl  Harbor 368 

Excerpts  from  war  and  defense  plans 372 

PART  2 

Article  of  August  13,  1941,  sent  to  New  York  Times  by  Otto  D.  Tolischus, 

on  American  and  British  stand  in  far  eastern  crisis 487 

Prime  Minister  Churchill's  statement  in  House  of  Commons  on  January 

27,  1942,  relating  to  United  States  entry  into  the  war 489 

Memorandum  of  November  30,  1941,  on  conference  between  Secretai-y  of 
State  and  Lord  Halifax,  on  United  States  position  if  Britain  should  resist 
Japanese  move  on  Kra  Isthmus 491 

Winant  telegram  of  December  2,  1941,  to  Secretary  of  State,  concerning 

Japanese  moves  toward  Kra  Isthmus 493 

Winant  cable  of  December  6,  1941,  to  Secretary  of  State,  concerning  Japa- 
nese convoy  movement 493 

Welles-Halifax  discussion  of  November  28,  1941,  concerning  Japanese 
situation 495 

Memorandum  of  December  2,  1941,  by  Under  Secretary  Welles  to  British 

Ambassador,  transmitting  documents  handed  to  Japanese  Ambassador--      508 

New  York  Times  article  of  August  25,  1941,  giving  text  of  Prime  Minister 

Churchill's  address  on  meeting  with  President 524 

Letter  of  November  12,  1945,  from  Mr.  Grew  to  committee  counsel,  regard- 
ing assistance  to  committee 623 

Letters  exchanged  between  Mr.  'Grew  and  the  President,  December  14, 

1940,  and  January  21.  1941 630 

Telegram  of  December  5,  1941,  from  Ambassador  Grew  to  Secretary  Hull, 

regarding  opinion  in  Japan  of  the  "ten  point"  note  of  November  26,  1941-       686 

Quotations  from  New  York  Times  of  December  5,  1941,  on  possibility  of 

closing  Japanese  consulates  in  United  States 688 

Conversation  of  February  14,  1941,  between  Mr.  Dooman  and  Mr.  Ohashi —       726 

Dispatch  No.  796,  dated  November  28,  1941,  from  State  Department  to  the 
American  Embassy,  Tokyo,  concerning  the  proposed  modus  vivendi 
studied  by  the  Department 742 

Campaign  address  of  October  30,  1940,  at  Boston  by  President  Roosevelt—      750 

Dispatch  of  December  4,  1941,  from  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  naval 
attaches  at  Tokyo,  Bangkok,  Peiping,  and  Shanghai,  concerning  destruc- 
tion of  codes 765 

Memorandum  of  September  6,  1941,  from  General  Fielder  for  G-2,  regard- 
ing Summaries  of  Information 846 

Excerpt  from  m^norandum  from  Maj.  Gen.  H.  A.  Drum,  commanding  gen- 
eral, Hawaiian  Department,  to  The  Adjutant  General,  War  Department, 
dated  September  21,  1935,  concerning  defense  mission,  Hawaiian  De- 
partment         868 

Excerpts  from  Colonel  Montague's  memorandum  of  November  2,  1945, 

on  function  of  Joint  Army-Navy  Intelligence  Committee 911 


PART  3 


Stimson-Kuox  letter  of  June  2,  1941,  to  the  President  transmitting  Joint 
Army  and  Navy  Basic  War  Plan— Rainbow  No.  5,  and  ABC-1,  recom- 
mending approval 994 


LIST  OF  DOCUMENTS  XIX 

Memorandum  of  June  9,  1941,  from  Colonel  Scobey  to  Chief  of  Staff,     Page 
explaining  the  President's  position  as  to  approval  of  ABC-1  and  Joint 
Army  and  Navy  Rainbow  No.  5 995 

Stimson-Knox  memorandum  of  August  20,  1941,  to  the  President,  transmit- 
ting ABC-22  and  recommending  approval 997 

Memorandum  of  August  29,  1941,  from  Colonel  Scobey  to  Chief  of  StafE, 

stating  President's  approval  of  ABC-22 997 

Letter  of  November  28,  1945,  from  Admiral  Eichardson  to  committee 
counsel,  covering  dispatches  between  himself  and  Admiral  Stark  on 
Army  alert  in  1940 1055 

Corrected  memorandum  of  July  17,  1941,  for  the  commanding  general, 
United  States  Air  Forces  from  Col.  Orlando  Ward,  concerning  Chief  of 
Staff's  request  for  study  of  air  situation  in  Hawaii 1105 

Excerpt  from  letter  of  December  20,  1941,  from  General  Marshall  to  Gen- 
eral Emmons  regarding  unity  of  command  in  Hawaii 1122 

Letter  of  September  25, 1944,  from  General  Marshall  to  Governor  Dewey__     1128 

Letter  of  September  27,  1944,  from  General  Marshall  to  Governor  Dewey__     1129 

Excerpt  from  telegram  of  August  30,  1941,  from  General  MacArthur  to 
General  Marshall  expressing  appreciation  for  War  Department  support 
of  his  command 1161 

Excerpt  from  United  States  Code,  1940  edition,  page  491,  paragraph  33,  re- 
garding duties  of  Chief  of  Staff 1201 

Minutes  of  Joint  Board  meeting  of  November  3,  1941 1253 

Admiral  Hart's  proposal  that  the  United  States  photograph  islands  of  Far 

East  and  Western  Pacific 1291 

Memorandum  of  December  11,  1945,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  answering  questions  on  November  5  and  27,  1941,  memoranda  by 
General  Marshall  and  Admiral  Stark,  and  on  November  27, 1941,  Marshall 
warning . 1307 

Admiralty  dispatch  of  December  7,  1941,  to  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

concerning  Far  East  conferences 1341 

Dispatch  of  December  7,  1941,  from  commander  in  chief,  China,  to  com- 
mander in  chief,  Asiatic  Fleet,  concerning  Japanese  convoy  movement —     1341 

Dispatch  of  December  7, 1941,  from  special  naval  observer,  London,  to  Naval 

Operations,  concerning  landing  at  Khotabahru 1342 

Extract  from  congressional  directive  to  Secretary  of  War  and  Navy  to  con- 
duct Pearl  Harbor  investigations 1359 

Memorandum  of  December  1,  1941,  from  Stanley  K.  Hornbeck  to  Secretary 

Stimson,  enclosing  memoranda  on  far  eastern  situation 1394 

Memorandum  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee  counsel,  transmitting 
dispatch  (probably  of  June  19,  1940)  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral 
Richardson,  concerhing  movement  of  Pacific  Fleet 1409 

Top  secret  report  of  the  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board,  and  top  secret  memo- 
randa of  the  Judge  Advocate  General 1443 

Cable  of  December  16,  1941,  signed  "Marshall,"  concerning  relief  of  Gen- 
eral  Short 1529 

Questions  for  General  Marshall  submitted  by  counsel  for  General  Short- __     1536 

Letter  of  July  3, 1941,  from  Chief  of  Staff  and  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to 
special  naval  observer,  London,  commenting  on  report  of  Singapore 
Conference ^^ 1542 

General  Short's  endorsement  of  August  20, 1941,  Martin  Air  Study 1545 

Headline  of  Washington  News  for  December  3,  1941 1569 

Quotation  from  article  stated  to  have  appeared  in  newspapers  on  Novem- 
ber 29,  1941,  concerning  statement  by  Prime  Minister  Tojo 1570 


XX  LIST  OF  DOCUMENTS 

Letter  of  November  25,  1941,  from  First  Secretary,  Japanese  Embassy,     I'age 
Washington,  to  Mr.  Herbert  S.  Mills 1570 

Advertisement  in  Honolulu  Advertiser  for  August  24,  1941,  concerning  war 

risk  insurance 1572 


PART  4 


Article  in  Honolulu  Advertiser  of  August  13,  1944  (1941?)  on  vpar  bom- 
bardment insurance 1573 

Quotation  from  page  213  of  Hawaii — Restless  Rampart  by  Joseph  Barber, 

Jr.,  concerning  statement  l)y  General  Herron  on  fortification  of  Oahu 1606 

Excerpt  from  Field  Manual  100-15,  W.  D.,  Field  Service  Regulations,  June 

29,  1942,  on  method  of  transmitting  orders  to  theater  commanders 1645 

Excerpts  from  Stafe  Officers'  Field  Manual 1645 

Field  Manual  100-5,  May  22,  1941,  Field  Service  Regulations,  VV.  D.,  Opera- 
tions, concerning  forms  of  orders  for  tactical  situations 1649 

Chart  on  Arrivals  of  vessels  in  Port  [Pearl  Harbor]  just  prior  to  Decem- 
ber 7,  1941 1676 

Memorandum  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee  counsel,  dated 
December  13,  1945,  reporting  on  recall  of  United  States  merchant  ships 
to  west  coast  after  attack  and  on  dispatch  of  December  7,  1941 1680 

Executive  orders  establishing  defensive  sea  areas  around  Pearl  Harbor 

and  other  areas 1681 

Memorandum  of  December  13, 1945,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  listing  naval  planes  in  Pacific  Fleet  on  January  6,  1940,  and 
February  1,  1941,  and  sectors  and  distances  from  Oahu  covered 1687 

Memorandum  of  November  25,  1941,  to  Secretary  Hull  from  Dutch  Ambas- 
sador Loudon,  concerning  Japanese  proposals 1692 

Department  of  State  memorandum  of  conversation  with  Dr.  Loudon  con- 
cerning modus  Vivendi 1693 

Memorandum  of  December  10,  1945,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  enclosing  intercepts  between  No.  836  and  No.  841  of  Exhibit 
No.  1 1716 

Memorandum  of  December  12,  1940,  by  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  on  Fort- 
nightly Summary  of  Current  National  Situation,  to  be  prepared  and 
distributed   regularly 1731 

Memorandum  of  March  11,  1941,  from  Admiral  Kirk  for  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations  on  Admiral  Kimmel's  request  for  advice  on  diplomatic 
activities 1739 

Excerpts  from  United  States  News  of  September  1, 1945,  page  34,  concerning 

movements  from  Japan  to  Tankan  Bay 1803 

Letter  of  November  17,  1945,  from  committee  counsel  to  Senator  Ferguson 
concerning  request  for  information  on  Japanese  knowledge  of  reading 
of  their  codes  by  the  United  States 1817 

March  11,  1941,  memorandum  of  Admiral  Kirk  to  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions      1885 

Letter  of  August  19,  1941,  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Kimmel,  regard- 
ing information  on  Pacific  situation 1838 

Intercepts  of  Japanese  messages  relating  to  suspicion  of  American  code- 
reading  activities 1860 

Statement  of  Admiral  Wilkinson  on  responsibility  for  development  of 
enemy  intentions ;  memorandum  of  December  19,  1945,  from  Admiral 
Kirk,  same  subject;  two  cables  (to  and  from  Admiral  James),  same 
subject 1925 

Memorandum  of  December  12,  1940,  from  Admiral  Stark  to  commander  in 
chief,  Asiatic  Fleet,  on  Instructions  Concerning  Preparation  of  United 
States  Asiatic  Fleet  for  War  under  War  Plan  Rainbow  31,  and  relating 
to  American-Dutch-British  conversations 1929 


LIST  OF  DOCUMENTS  XXI 

Note  of  April  13, 1941,  from  British  military  mission  giving  instructions  to     Page 
representative  at  Singapore  confex-ence 19S3 

Report  of  December  7,  1941  (Philippine  time),  from  commander  in  Chief, 
Asiatic  Fleet,  to  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  concerning  discussions  at 
conference  with  Admiral  Phillips,  and  reply  by  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
on  December  7,  1941 1933 

Report  from  Admiral  Kimmel  on  December  S,  1941,  concerning  damage  to 

ships  in  Pearl  Harbor  attack 2023 


PART  5 


Memorandum  of  December  19,  1945,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  on  Japanese  messages  relating  to  suspicions  that  their  code  mes- 
sages were  being  read 2069 

Copy  of  December  1, 1941,  United  Press  dispatch  and  of  report  of  December 
2,  1941,  from  United  States  military  observer  in  Singapore,  relating  to 
status  of  Singapore  alerts 2071 

Memorandum  of  December  27,  1945,  from  Colonel  Root  to  Lieutenant 

Colonel  Duncombe,  on  Philippine  plane  situation 2073 

Cable  of  December  17.  1941,  to  General  Short  from  General  Bryden  con- 
cerning oi'ders  for  relief  of  General  Short;  cable  of  January  6,  1942, 
to  commanding  general,  Hawaiian  Department,  from  Adams,  on  relief 
of  Generals  Short  and  Martin : 2076 

Memorandum  of  December  21,  1945,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 

counsel  on  Japanese  intercepts  containing  code  word  "Haruna" 2077 

War  Department  memorandum  of  December  31,  1945,  giving  information 
on  Japanese  ships  moving  southward  and  on  cable  of  December  6,  1941, 
from  Winant  to  State  Department  concerning  Japanese  ship  movements.    2078 

Information  from  documentary  evidence  on  messages  at  pages  14-29  of 

Exhibit  No.  2 2082 

Memorandum  of  October  31,  1941,  by  Dr.  Hornbeck,  read  to  joint  board 

meeting  of  November  3,  1941,  on  far-eastern  situation 2085 

Telephone  calls  from  outside  through  White  House  switchboard  on  Novem- 
ber 25,  26,  27,  and  28,  1941,  as  shown  by  operator's  notes 2093 

Memorandum  of  December  31,  1940,  from  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to 
Director  of  Naval  Districts  Division,  signed  "R.  E.  Ingersoll,"  regard- 
ing defense  of  Pearl  Harbor  by  the  Army 2138 

Memorandum  of  January  9,  1941,  from  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  Chief 
of  Staff,  signed  "R.  E.  Ingersoll,"  concerning  installation  of  aircraft 
detection  equipment 2138 

Dispatch  of  November  26,  1941,  from  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  Admiral 
Kimmel,  concerning  removal  of  planes  from  Hawaii  to  Wake  and  Mid- 
way     2155 

Dispatch  of  November  27,  1941,  from  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  Admiral 
Kimmel,  concerning  Army  making  available  to  Navy  infantry  units  for 
defense  battalion 2156 

Message  of  November  28,  1941,  from  Admiral  Kimmel  to  Admiral  Stark, 

on  sending  planes  to  Wake  and  Midway,  and  Army  troop  reinforcement-    2157 

Dispatch  of  October  17,  1941,  from  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  CinCPac, 

on  reinforcement  of  Philippines,  and  precautions  at  Wake  and  Midway.    2160 

Memorandum  from  CinCUS  Fleet  to  Commander  Aircraft,  Battle  Force 
and  Commander  Patrol  Wing  2,  concerning  basing  of  aircraft  at  naval 
air  station  at  Wake  and  Midway 2160 

Memorandum  of  November  28,  1941,  from  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to 

CinCPac,  concerning  defenses  and  reinforcements 2161 

Dispatch  of  November  28,  1941,  from  Admiral  Kimmel  to  his  subordinates; 

orders  to  local  aircraft  units,  Wake,  Midway,  and  Pearl  Harbor 2161 


XXII  LIST  OF  DOCUMENTS 

Dispatch  of  December  4,  1941,  from  CinCPac  to  ComTaskFor  3,  Com-     Pfge 
fourteen,  and  ComPatWing  2,  concerning  local  unit  orders  Wake,  Mid- 
way, and  Pearl  Harbor 2162 

Memorandum  of  December  2, 1941,  from  Admiral  Kimmel  to  Admiral  Stark, 

on  defense  of  outlying  bases 2167 

Memorandum  of  November  6,  1945,  giving  names  of  major  vessels  in  Pacific 

Ocean  on  December  7,  1941 2210 

Memorandum  of  May  1, 1941,  from  commandant.  Fourteenth  Naval  District, 

to  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  on  plans  for  air  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor-     2239 

Memorandum  of  June  20,  1941,  from  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  com- 
mander In  chief,  Atlantic,  Pacific,  and  Asiatic  fleets  and  commandants 
of  all  naval  districts,  on  joint  security  measures  for  protection  of  the 
fleet  and  Peai'l  Harbor  base 2240 

Table  submitted  by  Admiral  Stark  on  dispositions  of  Atlantic,  Asiatic,  and 

Pacific  fleets  on  December  7,  1941 2249 

Letter  of  December  19,  1945,  signed  by  Dean  Acheson,  Acting  Secretary  of 

State  concerning  memoranda  prepared  by  Lawrence  Salisbury 2250 

Dispatch  of  November  26,  1941,  from  commandant.  Fourteenth  Naval  Dis- 
trict, to  OPNAV,  concerning  information  there  on  Japanese  Fleet  lo- 
cations      2256 

Dispatch  of  November  26,  1941,  from  Comfourteen,  on  location  of  Jap- 
anese Fleet 2256 

Dispatch  of  December  1,  1941,  from  special  naval  observer  in  London  to 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  on  French  and  German  ships  believed  to  be 
sailing  from  East  to  Europe,  and  United  States  Navy  interception 2311 

Dispatch  of  December  2|  1941,  from  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  special 

naval  observer  in  London,  denying  our  right  to  intercept  vessels 2311 

Excerpt  from  speech  by  President  Roosevelt  on  October  27, 1941,  relating  to 
our  pledge  to  help  destroy  Hitlerism 2313 

Excerpt  from  Washington  Post,  November  27,  1941,  page  4,  on  activities  of 

Secretary  Hull  and  conference  with  Kurusu  and  Nomura 2323 

Report  by  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  President  on  Pearl  Harbor  attack 2338 

Memorandum  of  March  17, 1942,  for  Admiral  Draemel,  giving  views  of  Cap- 
tain Zacharias 2354 

Dispatch  of  November  7,  1941,  from  Admiral  Hart,  concerning  ABD-2 2369 

Admiral  Stark's  reply  of  November  11,  1941 2369 

Letter  of  July  22,  1941,  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Mr.  Sumner  Welles,  con- 
cerning embargoes  and  July  19,  1941,  study  by  Admiral  Turner  on  em- 
bargo problems 2382 

Letter  of  commendation  from  Secretary  Knox  to  Admiral  Stark,  dated 

March  21,  1942 2402 

Citation  from  President  to  Admiral  Stark,  dated  April  9,  1942 2403 

Dispatch  from  commander  in  chief,  Asiatic  Fleet,  to  OPNAV  December  2, 

1941,  giving  Admiral  Hart's  views  on  Japanese  situation 2417 

Dispatch  from  Secretary  of  Navy  to  commander  in  chief,  Pacific  Fleet, 

dated  December  16,  1941,  concerning  relief  of  Admiral  Kimmel 2430 

Table  on  time  of  transmission  to  Honolulu  by  Radio  of  Navy  dispatches 2439 

Memorandum  from  Superintendent  of  Naval  Observatory  concerning  dawn 

at  Honolulu  on  December  7,  1941 2439 

Message  of  August  11,  1945,  from  General  Eisenhower  to  Admiral  Stark, 

expressing  appreciation  for  latter's  efforts  in  European  theater 2442 

Army  citation  of  July  15, 1944,  to  Admiral  Stark  for  Distinguished  Service 
Medal 2442 

Excerpt  from  Joint  Action  of  Army  and  Navy,  1935,  Chapter  V,  Coastal 
Frontier  Defense 2455 


LIST   OF  DOCUMENTS  XXIIl 

Excerpt  from  an  article  "I  Fly  for  Vengeance,"  Saturday  Evening  Post,     ^»se 
October  10,  1942,  by  Lt.  Clarence  E.  Dickinson 2471 

Memorandum  of  January  2,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  concerning  all-out  alert  at  airfields  in  Hawaii  from  December 
1  to  6,  1941 - 2490 

Memorandum  of  December  27,  1945,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 

counsel,  on  all-out  alert  in  Hawaii  from  December  1  to  6,  1941 2491 


PART  6 


Memorandum  of  December  21.  1945,  from  committee  counsel  to  Miss  Grace 
Tully,  concerning  photostatic  copy  of  original  signed  Roberts  report  and 
drafts  of  report  in  President  Roosevelt's  files 2493 

Memorandum  from  Miss  Grace  Tully  to  committee  counsel,  concerning 
Roberts  report —^ 2494 

Memorandum  of  January  2,  1946,  from  committee  counsel  to  Mr.  Justice 
Roberts,  concerning  submission  of  Roberts  report 2494 

Letter  of  January  4,  1946,  from  Mr.  Justice  Roberts  to  committee  counsel, 

concerning  delivery  of  Roberts  report  to  President  Roosevelt 2494 

Excerpt  from  Admiral  Kimmel's  letter  of  January  12,  1941,  to  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations,  concerning  assignment  as  commander  in  chief, 
Pacific  Fleet 2498 

Excerpt  from  report  by  Admiral  King  on  Our  Navy  at  War  dated  March  27, 

1944,  regarding  strength  of  Pacific  Fleet  prior  to  Pearl  Harbor 2504 

Excerpt  from  joint  action  of  Army  and  Navy,  1935,  concerning  security 

of  fieet  base 2505 

Excerpt  from  Admiral  Bloch's  memorandum  of  October  17,  1941,  request- 
ing planes,  equipment,  and  forces 2506 

Endorsement  by  Admiral  Kimmel  to  Bloch  memorandum  of  October  17, 

1941 2506 

Excerpt  from  memorandum  of  November  25,  1941,  from  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations  to  commandant.  Fourteenth  Naval  District,  on  inability  of 
Navy  Department  to  assign  planes  to  district 2507 

Memorandum  of  September  23,  1941,  from  Admiral  Kimmel  to  Admiral 
Bloch  on  security  of  aircraft,  Hawaiian  area,  from  air  attacks  at  fields 
or  stations 2577 

Order  issued  by  Admiral  Kimmel  on  November  28,  1941,  after  receipt 

of  war  warning 2662 

Memorandum  on  January  14,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 

counsel,  on  establishment  of  Pearl  Harbor 2665 

Letter  from  Admiral  Stark  enclosing  dispatch  of  August  28,  1941,  con- 
cerning Southeast  Pacific 2666 

Letter  of  January  14,  1946,  from  Admiral  Stark  enclosing  dispatch  of 
October  9,  1941,  advising  CinCPac  of  issuance  of  shooting  orders 
in  Atlantic 2668 

Dispatches  of  December  2  and  3,  1941,  from  OPNAV  to  CinCAf,  relating 

to  patrol  in  Western  Pacific 2670 

Table  comparing  actual  damage  to  fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  damage 

as  stated  in  report  by  Secretary  of  Navy,  released  December  15,  1941 2674 

Table  showing  times  when  various  points  in  Pacific  were  attacked 2675 

Memorandum  of  December  11,  194.5,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 

counsel,  on  water-tight  integrity  of  vessels 2676 

C  B.  Munson  report  of  January  11,  1946,  concerning  Japanese  on  west 

coast 2680 

Dispatch  of  November  28,  1941,  from  CinCPac  to  Admiral  Halsey 2702 


XXIV  LIST  OF  DOCUMENTS 

Editorial  in  Chicago  Tribune  of  October  27,  1941,  entitled  "Mr.  Knox  Spies     ^'ago 
a  War" 2751 

Report  of  House  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs  concerning  establishment  of 

a  naval  base  at  Pari  Harbor,  dated  1908 2768 

Headline  from  Honolulu  Advertiser,  November  30,  1941 2806 

Table  showing  times  of  attack  at  various  locations  in  Pacific 2819 

Photostat  of  front  page  of  Christian  Science  Monitor  for  September  28, 

1944 2820 

Memorandum  of  January  18,  1946,  from  Dean  Acheson  to  Mr.  Gearhart, 
concerning  copy  of  Tripartite  Pact  enclosing  Department  of .  State 
translation 2853 

Quotation  from  Black's  Law  Dictionary  on  interpretation  of  ejusdem 
generis  rule 2858 

Quotation  from  volume  14,  Words  and  Phrases  (permanent  edition)  p.  135, 

on  ejusdem  generis 2858 

Excerpt  from  The  Situation  in  the  Far  East,  a  general  summary  on  Novem- 
ber 26,  1941,  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  concerning  strengthening  defense 
of  Dutch  Guinea 2862 

Quotation  from  New  York  Times  of  December  6,  1942,  on  time  of  attack 
on  Pearl  Harbor 2892 

Letter  of  November  18,  1941,  from  Mr.  Hamilton  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 

concerning  exchange  of  certain  territories  in  Pacific  for  Japenese  ships.    2912 

Telegram  of  February  7,  1941,  from  Ambassador  Grew  to  the  Secretary  of 

State,  taking  stock  of  political  and  military  situation  in  the  Far  East 2917 


PART  7 


Cable  of  November  29,  1941,  from  Adjutant  General,  War  Department,  to 
commanding  general,  Hawaii,  on  reinforcement  of  outlying  islands 2938 

Memorandum  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee  counsel,  concerning 
message  of  December  5,  1941,  from  G-2  War  Department,  to  G-2 
Panama 2991 

Report  of  December  20,  1941,  by  Fifty-third  CA  Brigade  (AA)  on  action 

during  Pearl  Harbor  attack S002 

Telegram  of  January  22,  1946.  from  Maj.  George  Leask,  former  assistant 
signal  ofticer,  San  Francisco  Port  of  Embarkation  to  General  Short, 
concerning  radar  towers  shipped  from  Oakland  to  Hawaii 3033 

Memorandum  of  January  24,  1946,  from  Army -liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  with  enclosures  relating  to  General  Marshall's  message  of  De- 
cember 7,  1941,  to  General  Short 3091 

Radiogram  of  December  7,  1941,  from  General  Short  to  Adjutant  General, 

War  Department,  Washington,  reporting  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor 3096 

Memorandum  of  January  24,  1946,  from  Colonel  Lawton,  concerning  the 

budget  estimate  for  1941-42  for  radar  operation 3114 

Letter  of  January  25,  1942,  from  General  Short  to  General  Marshall,  en- 
closing application  for  retirement 3134 

Memorandum  of  January  26,  1943,  from  General  Marshall  to  Secretary  of 

War,  concerning  retirement  of  General  Short 3139 

Memorandum  of  January  28,  1942,  from  General  Marshall  to  Adjutant 

General,  concerning  General  Short's  retirement  application 3139 

Handwritten  note  by  General  Marshall  to  G-1,  on  opinion  of  Judge  Advocate 

General,  concerning  General  Short's  retirement 3140 

Memorandum  of  February  13,  1942,  from  Secretary  of  War  to  Chief  of 

Staff  concerning  General  Short's  retirement 3140 


LIST  OF  DOCUMENTS  XXV 

Memorandum,  undated,  from  Secretary  of  War  to  President,  concerning     Pag* 
retirement  of  General  Short  and  Admiral  Kimmel  and  handwritten  note 
on  Secretary  of  War's  proposed  wording 3140 

Memorandum  of  February  14,  1942,  from  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  to  Attor- 
ney General,  concerning  General  Short's  and  Admiral  Kimmel's  retire- 
ment applications 3140 

Memorandum,  undated,  from  General  Marshall  to  Secretary  of  War,  for 

decision  concerning  General  Short  and  Admiral  Kimmel 3141 

Memorandum  of  February  14,  1942,  from  Attorney  General  to  Secretary 
of  War,  concerning  retirement  applications  of  General  Short  and  Admiral 
Kimmel 3141 

Order  of  February  17,  1942,  directing  retirement  of  General  Short 3142 

Undated  memorandum  from  Secretary  of  War  to  Judge  Advocate  General, 

requesting  further  opinion  on  General  Short's  retirement 3144 

Undated  memorandum  to  Secretary  of  War,  signed  "G.  0.  M.,"  referring  to 

Judge  Advocate  General's  recommendations  concerning  General  Short 3144 

Memorandum  of  January  27,  1942,  from  Judge  Advocate  General  for  Chief 

of  Staff,  on  course  of  action  with  respect  to  General  Short 3145 

Memorandum  of  January  31,  1942,  from  Judge  Advocate  General  to  Secre- 
tary of  War  on  course  of  action  with  respect  to  General  Short 3146 

Memorandum  of  September  IS,  1943,  from  Secretary  of  War  to  General 

Short,  concerning  waiver  of  statute  of  limitations 3151 

Waiver  of  statute  of  limitations  signed  by  General  Short,  dated  September 
20,  1943 3151 

Memorandum  of  July  4,  1944,  from  Acting  Secretary  of  War  to  the  Presi- 
dent, asking  his  approval  or  disapproval  of  a  request  from  General  Short 
for  a  copy  of  Roberts  Commission  proceedings 3153 

lietter  of  October  20,  1944,  from  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Short,  con- 
cerning General  Short's  request  for  information  from  records 3154 

Message  of  December  9,  1941,  from  War  Department  to  commanding  gen- 
eral, Hawaii,  requesting  report  on  time  of  receipt  of  War  Department 
message  No.  529 3163 

Memorandum  on  time  of  receipt  of  No.  529  and  reply  to  December  9, 

1941,  message 3164 

Memorandum  for  AC/S,  G-2,  concerning  supplementary  Pearl  Harbor  in- 
vestigation by  Major  Clausen 3198 

Memorandum  for  Major  Clausen  from  General  Cramer,  on  unexplored 

leads  in  Pearl  Harbor  investigation 3198 

Letter  of  December  16,  1941,  to  the  President  from  the  Secretary  of  War, 

on  commission  for  Pearl  Harbor  investigation 3260 

Letter  of  January  27,  1942,  to  Mr.  Justice  Roberts  from  Secretary  of  War, 

concerning  report  on  Pearl  Harbor 3261 

Letter  of  January  31,  1942,  from  Mr.  Justice  Roberts  to  Secretary  of  War, 

acknowledging  January  27  letter 3261 

Report  of  January  23, 1942,  from  the  Roberts  Commission  to  the  President-    3285 

Memorandum   of  March  17,   1942,  for  Admiral   Draemel   from   Captain 

Zacharias,  on  Hawaiian  situation 3307 

Memorandum  of  January  26,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  on  comparison  of  Army  and  Navy  intercepts  December  2,  3,  4, 
1941 3324 


PART  8 


Memorandum  of  January  7,  1946,  from  committee  counsel,  to  Senator 
Ferguson,  enclosing  Army  and  Navy  liaison  officers'  memoranda  on  Japa- 
nese intercepts  in  Exhibit  No.  1 3423 


XXVI  LIST   OF  DOCUMENTS 

Memorandum  of  January  22,  1946,  from  committee  counsel,  for  Senator     Page 
Ferguson,  enclosing  memorandum  from  Army  liaison  oflScer,  concerning 
part  2  of  message  No.  985 3423 

Letter  of  December  22,  1943,  from  Captain  SafEord  to  Captain  Kramer,  on 

winds  message 3698 

Memorandum  of  December  28,  1943,  from  Captain  Kramer  to  Captain 

SafEord,  replying  to  December  22  letter 3699 

Personal  letter  of  January  22,  1944,  from  Captain   SafEord  to  Captain 

Kramer,  using  code,  concerning  Pearl  Harbor  and  winds  message 3700 

Memorandum  of  January  26,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  otflcer,  to  committee 

counsel,  on  comparison  of  Army  and  Navy  intercepts  December  2-4, 1941_     3779 

Memorandum  of  February  1,  l&i6,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 

counsel,  on  Alusna  Batavia  dispatch  03.1030  December  1941 3779 

Memorandum  of  December  6,  1941,  for  Colonel  Holbrook  from  Lieutenant 
Perry,  reporting  burning  of  codes  and  ciphers  at  Japanese  Embassy 
in  Washington 3780 

Memorandum  of  December  13, 1945,  from  Army  liaison  officer,  to  committee 
counsel,  enclosing  certificates  of  search  for  communications  between  the 
President  and  the  Prime  Minister  during  period  November  24-December 
7,1941 3840 

Memorandum  of  December  13,  1945,  from  Lieutenant  Commander  Baecher 
to  Captain  SailCord,  enclosing  "Presidential  Directives  for  Witnesses  be- 
fore the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor 
Attack" —    3883 

Excerpt  from  memorandum  of  Admiral  R.  S.  Edwards  on  Presidential  Se- 
curity Directive  Regarding  Cryptanalytic  Discussions 3884 


PART  9 


Letter  of  January  15,  1946,  from  Captain  Welker  to  Captain  SafEord,  an- 
swering inquiry  about  winds  message 4009 

Memorandum  of  January  14,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  on  duty  officers  in  offices  of  Chief  of  Staff  and  General  Gerow 
on  night  of  December  6,  1941 4010 

Memorandum  of  January  31,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  replying  to  request  by  Senator  Ferguson  on  working  hours  in 
Admiral  Turner's  office  December  6-7,  1941 ;  circular  letter  from  Secre- 
tary of  Navy,  dated  November  10,  1941,  prescribing  duty  hours 4010 

Memorandum  of  February  11,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer,  on  message 

No.  900,  dated  December  6,  1941 4188 

Message  of  December  5,  1941,  from  Berlin  to  Tokyo,  requesting  that  Ger- 
many and  Italy  be  advised  of  contents  of  Konoye  message 4199 

Berlin  to  Tokyo  message  of  December  3,  1941,  reporting  status  of  German- 
Russian  hostilities 4199 

Berlin  to  Tokyo  message  of  December  3,  1941,  reporting  on  interview  with 

Ribbentrop 4200 

Washington  to  Tokyo  message  of  December  5,  1941,  from  Kurusu,  request- 
ing retention  of  Terasaki  until  end  of  negotiations 4202 

Memorandum  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee  counsel,  giving  infor- 
mation on  handling  of  Alusna  Batavia  dispatch  031030  December  1941 —     4214 

Memoi-andum  of  January  29,  1946,  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee  coun- 
sel, on  transmission  and  receipt  of  OPNAV  dispatch  061743  December 
1941 4288 

Secret  memorandum  of  June  10,  1941,  from  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to 

Secretary  of  the  Navy,  discussing  strategic  situation  in  Pacific  Ocean__     4299 

Excerpt  from  statement  of  December  1.  1944,  by  Secretary  of  AVar  that  his 

investigation  would  be  continued 4306 


LIST   OF  DOCUMENTS  XXVII 

Page 
Summary  of  interrogation  of  Captain  Takahaslii,  dated  October  20,  1945—  4439 
SafEord  citation  for  Legion  of  Merit,  dated  February  11, 1946 4461 

Message  from  Merle  Smith  to  War  Department  and  Hawaii  dated  Decem- 
ber 6,  1941,  on  Dutch  activation  of  plan  A-2  because  of  Japanese  naval 

movements  out  of  Palau 4566 

Letter  of  July  14,  1943,  from  President  Roosevelt  requesting  military 
attache  dispatches  after  January  1,  1937,  indicating  possibility  of  war 4588 


PART  10 


Message  of  March  25,  1941,  from  OPNAV  to  commandant  of  the  Sixteenth 

Naval  District,  on  exchange  of  Army  and  Navy  intercepts 4721 

Message  of  March  25,  1941,  from  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  the  Chief  of 
Staff,  commanding  general  of  the  Philippine  Department,  and  comman- 
dant of  the  Sixteenth  Naval  District,  authorizing  exchange  of  informa- 
tion     4721 

Excerpt  from  instructions  to  staff  of  commander  in  chief.  Pacific  Fleet, 

July  14,  1941 4829 

Letter  of  April  22,  1941,  from  Captain  McCollum  to  Captain  Layton,  on 

dissemination  of  diplomatic  traffic 4845 

Memorandum  of  February  12,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer,  on  planes 

and  guns  sent  to  foreign  countries  from  February  1  to  December  7, 1941_    4873 

Memorandum  of  February  14,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer,  enclosing 
memorandum  on  transfers  of  antiaircraft  weapons  before  December  7, 
1941 4874 

Letter  of  January  16,  1946,  from  Mr.  Robert  Shivers,  concerning  Japanese 
language  broadcasts 4912 

Telegram  of  November  29,  1941,  from  Panama  Canal  Zone,  reporting  de- 
fensive measures  taken 4976 

Confidential  letter  of  November  10,  1941  from  CinCPac,  on  emergency 

basing  of  aircraft  at  Wake  and  Midway 5014 

Citations  of  John  F.  Sonnett  by  Secretary  of  Navy  and  Admiral  Hewitt, 

dated  July  17,  1945 5023 

Memorandum  of  May  18,  1945  from  Admiral  Hewitt  to  Secretary  of  the 

Navy,  on  further  investigation  of  Pearl  Harbor  attack 5025 

Testimony  of  Lieutenant  Lockhart  at  special  Signal  Corps  investigation, 
concerning  detection  of  Japanese  planes  approaching  Pearl  Harbor  on 
the  morning  of  December  7,  1941 5076 

Message  of  December  6,  1941,  from  American  Naval  Observer  Singapore 
to  Admiral  Hart,  concerning  reported  pledge  of  American  armed  support 
of  British  in  case  of  Japanese  attack 5082 

Letter  of  February  5,  1946,  from  Honolulu  Star-Bulletin  and  sworn  state- 
ment of  Porter  Dickinson  dated  February  1,  1946,  concerning  Jumbo 
silk  advertisement 5115 

List  of  newspaper  headlines  in  Hawaiian  and  Honolulu  daily  papers 5123 

Pacific  Fleet  confidential  letter  No.  2CL^1  of  February  15,  1941,  on  Se- 
curity of  fleet  at  base  and  in  operating  areas 5128 

Navy  Department  table  giving  relative  strength  of  Japanese  and  United 

States  Fleets  and  Air  Forces  in  1932 5133 

Memorandmn  of  January  26,  1946,  on  B-17  flights  to  Hawaii  after  De- 
cember 7,  1941 5134 

Memorandum  of  February  15,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  concerning  microfilms  received  from  General  MacArthur's  head- 
quarters  ^,— --- .-_„ ^ „, ^-__„ ^ 5136 


XXVIII  LIST  OF  DOCUMENTS 

Memorandum  of  February  20,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee     Page 
counsel,  inclosing  February  1,  1946,  report  from  General  MacArthur's 
headquarters  on  pre-Pearl  Harbor  transmission  of  coded  messages  from 
Hawaii 5138 

Memorandum  of  February  6,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  concerning  planes  sent  through  Hawaii  to  Philippines  from 
July  to  December  7,  1941 5142 

Memorandum  of  January  24,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  on  search  for  dispatches  sent  from  Navy  Department  to  naval 
commanders  in  field  on  December  6  or  7,  1941 5146 

Memorandum  of  January  25,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  on  governmental  authority  of  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
during  1941  over  Johnston,  Canton,  and  Christmas  Islands 5147 

State  Department  reply  to  Senator  Ferguson's  inquiry  whether  memoran- 
dum of  Mr.  Max  Hamilton  on  proposal  to  transfer  Borneo  to  Japanese 
reached  the  President 5147 

Message  of  December  5,  1941,  from  Washington  to  American  Legation  in 
Budapest,  requesting  transmission  of  note  verbale  to  Hungarian  Govern- 
ment      5148 

Memorandum  of  May  18,  1945,  from  Admiral  Hewitt  to  Lieutenant  Com- 
mander Baecher,  concerning  preliminary  investigation  at  Pearl  Harbor 
and  July  6,  1945,  modification  of  precept 5149 


PART  11 


Undated  letter  from  State  Department  to  committee  counsel,  replying  to 
counsel's  request  of  February  23, 1946,  re  proposed  message  from  British 
and  Dominion  Governments  to  Japan,  warning  her  against  invasion 
of  Thailand 5165 

Memorandum  dated  December  7, 1941,  from  British  Embassy,  for  President, 
for  comment  to  Prime  Minister  on  attached  proposed  message  from 
British  and  Dominion  Governments  to  Japan  warning  her  against  in- 
vasion of  Thailand .' 5165 

Paraphrase  of  telegram  (undated)  from  Australian  Minister  for  External 
Affairs  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Dominion  Affairs  of  the  United  King- 
dom, which  refers  to  proposed  message  to  Japan  warning  her  against 
invasion  of  Thailand  and  mentions  decision  of  President  of  United  States 
to  send  message  to  Jap  Emperor,  and  subsequent  intentions  if  it  was  not 
answered,  including  a  warning  from  President  to  Japan 5166 

Message  from  OPNAV  to  CinCAF,  December  7, 1941,  071722  re  request  of  Jap 
Government  for  safe  conduct  of  S.  S.  Madison  on  trip  to  Chingwangtao 
to  arrive  December  10,  1941 5202 

Message  from  CinP&c  to  OPNAV  dated  December  1,  1941,  010300,  sug- 
gesting ship  might  be  sent  to  Chingwangtao  to  evacuate  marines  and 
civilians 5203 

Message  from  Secretary  Navy  to  CinCAF  dated  December  1,  1941,  012359, 
granting  authority  to  charter  President  Madison  for  trip  from  Manila  to 
Chingwangtao  for  evacuation  of  citizens 5203 

Message  from  CinCAF  to  Commander,  United  States  Marine  Corps  forces. 
North  China,  dated  December  2,  1941,  021634,  re  instructions  to  withdraw 
marines  via  President  Harrison  due  to  arrive  Chingwangtao  December 
10 5204 

Message  from  CinCAF  to  OPNAV,  December  3,  1941,  021820,  reporting 
evacuation  of  Fourth  Marines,  President  Harrison  departing  Manila 
December  4  for  Chingwantao 5204 

Message  from  OPNAV  to  CinCAF  dated  December  8,  1941,  072230.  can- 
celing OPNAV  071722  asking  CinCAF  to  give  appropriate  instructions  to 
the  President  Harrison 5206 


LIST  OF  DOCUMENTS  XXIX 

Memorandum  from  Admiral  O.  S.  Colclongh  to  committee  counsel,  dated     Page 
December  10,  1945,  re  two  dispatches  in  "White  House  File"  of  messages 
maintained  at  Navy  Department  for  messages  sent  by  President  over 
Navy  facilities 5213 

Dispatch  261854  dated  November  26,  1941,  from  OPNAV  to  CinCAF  trans- 
mitting message  from  the  President  to  the  Philippine  High  Commis- 
sioner      5214 

Dispatch  280228  dated  November  28,  1941,  from  CinCAF  to  OPNAV  trans- 
mitting message  from  Philippine  High  Commissioner  to  the  Presi- 
dent  -    5214 

Memorandum  dated  December  4, 1941,  from  R.  E.  Schuirmann,  Navy  Depart- 
ment, for  Secretary  of  State,  summing  up  the  situation  with  reference 
to  the  Japanese  advance  as  it  affected  the  Netherlands  East  Indies, 
including  CNO  recommendation  on  Davao-Waigeo  line 5215 

Message  from  Foote  at  Batavia  to  Secretary  of  State,  dated  September  22, 
1941,  commenting  on  press  conference  held  by  Rt.  Hon.  Duff  Cooper  in 
which  he  stated  he  considered  the  ABCD  bloc  a  reality 5257 

Message  dated  November  2,  1941,  from  Ambassador  Winant.  London,  to 
Secretaiy  of  State,  transmitting  message  from  Prime  Minister  Churchill 
to  President  on  transfer  of  large  British  ship  to  Indian  Ocean 5292 

Memorandum  dated  November  30,  1&45,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  for  com- 
mittee counsel,  re  time  of  receipt  of  message  from  U.  S.  S.  Ward,  by 
Admiral  Bloch  and  Admiral  Kimmel,  and  attached  brief  of  testimony 
appearing  in  prior  proceedings  on  that  point 5293 

Memorandum  dated  April  2,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  for  committee 
counsel,  re  testimony  as  to  why  B-17's  arrived  at  Oahu  from  the  west 
coast  on  December  7,  1941,  without  ammunition,  citing  testimony  appear- 
ing this  and  prior  proceedings  on  the  proposition 5294 

Memoi'andum  dated  January  25,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  for  com- 
mittee counsel,  re  draft  and  notes  made  in  connection  with  Admiral 
Inglis'  statement  of  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor 5294 

Memorandum  dated  February  19,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  for  com- 
mittee counsel,  re  conditions  of  radio  silence  in  effect  in  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  Fleets  on  December  7,  1941 5294 

Memorandum  dated  April  2,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  for  committee 
counsel,  re  conditions  of  radio  silence  in  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Fleets  and 
date  conditions  made  effective 5295 

Memorandum  dated  January  22,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  for  com- 
mittee counsel,  re  description  of  notations  appearing  on  radio  message 
No.  489,  dated  January  29,  1941,  from  The  Adjutant  General  to  the  com- 
manding general,  Hawaii 5296 

Memorandum  dated  February  27,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  for  com- 
mittee counsel,  re  number  of  priority  dispatches  sent  to  Hawaii  by  War 
Department  on  December  7,  1941,  and  re  priority  messages  decoded  in 
Hawaii  before  the  December  7,  1941,  warning  from  General  Marshall 5297 

Message  dated  December  7,  1941,  from  General  Marshall  to  commanding 
general,  Hawaiian  Department,  Fort  Shafter,  T.  H.,  No.  529  Seventh, 
text  omitted,  on  original  Signal  Corps  record 5297 

Message  appearing  on  page  14077,  as  received  at  Hawaiian  Department, 

or  original  sheet  after  decoding 5297 

Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  Tariff  Book  No.  73  for  1941  (cover  only)___    5298 

Western    Union    regulations    for    handling    United    States    Government 

messages 5298 

RCA   Communications,    Inc.,   Telegraph   Tariff,   Effective   April   1,   1940 

(cover  only) 5300 

RCA  regulations  for  handling  Government  telegrams 5301 

Message  dated  December  7,  1941,  from  Colton,  acting,  for  Fort  Shafter, 

T.  H.  No.  530 5301 


XXX  LIST  OF  DOCUMENTS 

Memorandum  dated  February  21,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  for  com-     Paee 
mittee   counsel,    re   operation   of   radar   stations   at   New   York   City, 
San  Francisco,  and  Seattle  on  December  7,  1941 5302 

Message  dated  January  31,  1946,  from  commanding  general,  Eastern  De- 
fense Command,  to  War  Department,  re  operation  of  radar  at  Atlantic 
Highlands,  N.  J.,  Mount  Cadillac,  Maine,  and  Fort  Hancock  on  Decem- 
ber 7,  1941 5302 

Memorandum  dated  February  8,  1946,  from  commanding  officer,  head- 
quarters Signal  Corps  Engineering  Laboratories,  Bradley  Beach,  N.  J., 
for  chief.  Engineering  and  Technical  Service,  War  Department,  in 
operation  of  radar  on  east  coast  on  December  7,  1941 5302 

Memorandum  dated  February  18,  1946,  from  adjutant  general,  headquar- 
ters, First  Air  Force,  Mitchell  Field,  N.  Y.,  to  War  Department  special 
staff,  re  photostatic  copy  of  logs  of  radar  sets  in  operation  on  December 
6  and  7,  1941,  in  New  York  area 5303 

Message  dated  February  4,  1946,  from  commanding  general,  Fourth  Air 
Force,  San  Francisco,  Calif.,  to  War  Department,  re  operation  of  radar 
stations  on  west  coast  on  Deceml)er  7,  1941 5303 

Copy  of  letter  dated  November  25,  1941,  from  Admiral  Nimitz,  then  Chief 
of  Bureau  of  Navigation,  Navy  Department,  to  Admiral  Kimmel,  on 
general  subject  of  radar  for  fleet 5304 

Memorandum  dated  Februai-y  6,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  for  com- 
mittee counsel,  re  false  weather  messages  intercepted  on  December  4  and 
5,  1941,  by  the  FCC 5304 

Letter  undated,  from  Chester  T.  Lane,  Deputy  Commissioner,  Office  of 
Foreign  Liquidation  Commissioner,  Department  of  State,  to  committee 
counsel,  giving  history  of  lend-lease  procedure  prior  to  December  7, 
1941 5305 

Memorandum  dated  February  25,  1946,  from  Rear  Adm.  Leigh  Noyes  for 
committee  counsel,  re  typographical  errors  noted  in  record  of  his  testi- 
mony and  his  suggestion  re  possible  message  he  discussed  with  Colonel 
Sadtler  on  December  5,  1941 5306 

Memorandum  dated  February  25,  1946,  from  Admiral  Noyes  for  Navy 

liaison  officer,  re  typographical  errors  reported  in  his  testimony 5307 

Letter  dated  February  27,  1946,  from  John  F.  Sonnett  to  committee  coun- 
sel, re  typographical  errors  reported  in  his  testimony 5308 

Letter,  undated,  from  Cordell  Hull  to  committee  counsel,  re  typographical 
errors  reported  in  his  testimony  and  clarification  of  two  answers  to 
questions  in  his  testimony 5308 

Memorandum  dated  March  11,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  transmitting  requested  corrections  in  testimony  of  Capt.  A.  D. 
Kramer,  United  States  Navy 5309 

Memorandum  dated  March  3,  1946,  from  Capt.  A.  D.  Kramer,  United 
States  Navy,  to  committee  counsel,  forwarding  requested  corrections 
in  his  testimony ^ 5309 

Memorandum  dated  April  1,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  forwarding  requested  corrections  in  testimony  of  Capt.  A.  H. 
McCollum,  United  States  Navy 5313 

Letter  dated  March  18,  1946,  from  Capt.  A.  H.  McCollum,  United  States 
Navy,  to  committee  chairman,  forwarding  suggested  corrections  in 
his  testimony 5313 

Memorandum  dated  April  4,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  for  committee 
counsel,  re  source  material  used  in  preparation  of  a  timetable  of  Japa- 
nese attacks  at  outbreak  of  war  in  Pacific 5315 

Memorandum  dated  February  21,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officed  for  com- 
mittee counsel,  re  authority  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Clausen  to  administer 
oaths  during  the  investigation  which  he  conducted  regarding  the  Pearl 
Harbor  attack  at  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  citing  Article 
of  War  114 5316 


LIST   OF  DOCUMENTS  XXXI 

Memorandum  dated  February  1,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  for  com-     Page 
mittee  counsel,  re  additional  information  relating  to  the  initial  Japanese 
attack  against  the  Philippines 5316 

History  of  the  Fifth  Air  Force  (and  its  predecessors),  part  1,  December 

1941  to  August  1942— December  1941  installment 5318 

History  of  Thirtieth  Bombardment  Squadron  (H)  and  Nineteenth  Bom- 
bardment Group  (H),  December  7,  1941,  to  December  31,  1942,  includ- 
ing reports  by  Maj.  W.  P.  Fisher 5330 

History,  Twenty-fourth  Pursuit  Group  in  the  Philippines  from  November 

1,  1940,  through  December  S,  1941 5333 

Record  of  interview  with  Major  Heald,  communications  officer.  Fifth  Air 
Force  Service  Command,  re  activity  of  Fifth  Air  Base  Group  in  Philip- 
pines from  November  15  to  December  8,  1941 5335 

Memorandum  dated  January  15,  1946,  from  Lt.  Col.  Joseph  B.  Mitchell, 
General  Staff  Corps,  for  Army  liaison  officer,  re  organization  of  the  Far 
East  Air  Force,  with  enclosures 5336 

Letter  dated  February  11,  1946,  from  G.  E.  Sterling,  Assistant  Chief  Engi- 
neer, Federal  Communications  Commission,  to  committee  counsel,  trans- 
mitting statements  of  FCC  employess  re  monitoring  for  "winds"  mes- 
sage at  Hawaii 5340 

Memorandum  dated  February  7,  1946,  from  Lee  R.  Dawson  to  Chief,  Radio 

Intelligence  Division,  FCC  re  "winds  messages" 5340 

Memorandum  dated  February  4,  1946,  from  Lee  R.  Dawson  to  Chief,  Radio 

Intelligence  Division,  FCC  x"e  "winds  messages" 5340 

Memorandum  dated  February  5,  1946,  from  Earl  A.  Nielsen  to  Chief,  Radio 

Intelligence  Division,  FCC  i*e  "winds  message" 5340 

Letter  dated  February  5,  1946,  from  John  H.  Homsy  to  George  E.  Sterling, 

FCC,  re  "winds  messages" 5341 

Memorandum  dated  February  7, 1946,  from  Tom  B.  Wagner  to  Chief,  Radio 
Intelligence  Division,  FCC,  re  "winds  messages" 5341 

Message  dated  February  6,  1946,  from  monitoring  officer,  Theodore  H. 
Tate,  Koloa  Kauai,  T.  H.,  to  Chief,  Radio  Intelligence  Division,  FCC 
re  monitoring  for  "winds  messages" 5341 

Memorandum  dated  February  5,  1946,  from  Waldemar  M.  Klima  to  Chief, 
Radio  Intelligence  Division,  FCC,  re  "winds  message" 5342 

Letter  dated  February  14,  1946,  from  G.  E.  Sterling,  FCC,  to  committee 
counsel,  re  "winds  message"  and  transmitting  an  affidavit  by  A.  Prose 
Walker,  an  FCC  employee 5342 

Affidavit  dated  February  13,  1&46,  from  A.  Prose  Walker  to  Mr.  George  E. 

Sterling,  FCC,  re  "winds  message" 5343 

Letter  dated  February  18,  1946,  from  G.  E.  Sterling,  FCC,  to  committee 
counsel,  transmitting  information  received  from  Hawaii  re  "winds 
message" 5343 

Letter  dated  February  11,  1946,  from  supervisor,  Hawaiian  monitoring 

area,  to  Chief,  Radio  Intelligence  Division,  FCC,  re  "winds  message" 5343 

Memorandum  dated  January  9,  1946,  from  State  Department  liaison  officer 
to  committee  counsel,  re  telegram  from  Ambassador  Grew  to  Secretary 
of  State,  dated  August  16,  1941 5344 

Memorandum  dated  January  9,  1946,  from  State  Department  liaison  officer 
to  committee  counsel,  re  telegram  from  Ambassador  Grew  to  Secretary 
of  State,  dated  August  16,  1941  (five  sections) 5344 

Memorandum  dated  December  11,  1945,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  com- 
mittee counsel,  re  watertight  integrity  of  major  vessels  in  Pearl  Harbor 
December  7,  1941,  transmitting  table  of  inspection 5347 

Memorandum  dated  December  11,  1945,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  com- 
mittee counsel,  re  condition  of  watertight  integrity  of  major  vessels  in 
Pearl  Harbor  December  7,  1941,  transmitting  statement  compiled  from 
ships  logs  of  various  ship  insijections  on  December  5  and  6,  1941 5347 


XXXII  LIST  OF  DOCUMENTS 

Memorandum  dated  January  29,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  com-     Page 
mittee  counsel,  re  further  check  of  logs  of  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor  on 
December  7,  1941,  concerning  watertight  integrity 5350 

Memorandum  dated  April  8,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  re  official  notification  to  Navy  Department  of  air  raid  on  Pearl 
Harbor  and  orders  sent  by  Navy  Department  to  fleets,  re  execution  of 
war  plans  against  Japan 5351 

Memorandum  dated  February  28,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  for  com- 
mittee counsel,  re  microfilm  received  from  General  MacArthur's  head- 
quarters in  Tokyo,  containing  material  from  Japanese  files  on  United 
States-Japanese  negotiations  prior  to  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack 5352 

Memorandum  dated  April  5,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  re  document  presented  to  Secretary  of  State  Byrnes,  contain- 
ing information  of  Japanese  plans  leading  up  to  the  attack  on  Pearl 
Harbor,  based  on  subsequently  obtained  information 5352 

Reconstruction  of  Japanese  plans  leading  up  to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor 
(based  on  information  obtained  subsequent  to  December  7,  1941),  which 
is  the  document  presented  to  Secretary  of  State  Byrnes  and  referred 
to  at  transcript  page 5852 

Memorandum  dated  February  8,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  for  com- 
mittee counsel,  re  report  of  Japanese  air  reconnaissance  over  Philip- 
pines or  other  United  States  possessions  prior  to  December  7,  1941,  en- 
closing message  dated  November  23, 1941  (220228)  from  Alusna  Singapore 
to  OPNAV  re  Gilbert  Islands,  message  dated  November  24,  1941  (240610) 
from  Governor,  Guam,  to  OPNAV,  re  Guam,  and  memorandum  on  inter- 
rogation of  Captain  Takahashi  on  October  20,  1945,  re  Philippines ;  and 
mentions  interview  with  Rear  Admiral  Toshio  Matsunaga,  re  Guam  and 
dispatch  from  marines  on  Wake  Island,  re  report  of  Pan-American  clipper 
sighting  Jap  planes  east  of  Guam 5359 

Memorandum  dated  March  7,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  for  committee 
counsel,  re  testimony  of  Vice  Adm.  T.  S.  Wilkinson,  and  letter  from 
Admiral  Ingersoll  to  Admiral  Wilkinson,  re  scope  of  activity  of  Office 
of  Naval  Intelligence  prior  to  Pearl  Harbor  attack 5361 

Letter  dated  May  20,  1946,  from  Senator  Homer  Ferguson  to  committee 
counsel  concerning  War  Department  documents  relating  to  the  develop- 
ment of  long-range  heavy  bombers  as  proposed  by  General  Andrews  and 
Colonel  Knerr 5464 

Letter  dated  February  4,  1941,  from  commander  in  chief.  Pacific  Fleet,  H. 
E.  Kimmel  to  his  task  force  commanders  concerning  aircraft  in  Hawaiian 
area,  maximum  readiness  of 5471 

Memorandum  dated  December  5,  1941,  of  conversation  between  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  and  the  British  Ambassador  concerning  cooperation  with 
Dutch  East  Indies  against  Japan 5472 

Dispatch  No.  1906  dated  December  8,  1941,  from  Ambassador  Grew,  Tokyo, 
to  State  Department  advising  of  the  delivery  to  the  Japanese  Foreign 
Minister  of  the  President's  message  of  December  6,  1941,  to  the  Japanese 
Emperor 5473 

Dispatch  No.  286  dated  December  6, 1941,  from  State  Department  to  Ameri- 
can Embassy,  Chungking,  advising  of  the  delivery  of  the  President's 
message  that  date  to  the  Japanese  Emperor,  with  instructions  to  repeat 
the  message  to  Chiang  Kai-Shek  for  his  information 5473 

Dispatch  No.  823  dated  December  7, 1941,  from  State  Department  to  Ameri- 
can Embassy,  Tokyo,  relating  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  and  delivery  by 
the  Japanese  Ambassador  of  the  14-part  note 5473 

Memorandum  dated  May  3,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  concerning  orders  purporting  to  delay  the  return  to  Pearl  Harbor 
in  December  1941  of  Task  Force  8  under  Admiral  Halsey,  as  mentioned 
in  testimony  of  Captain  Zacharias,  p.  8734 5474 

Memorandum  dated  January  31,  1946,  from  committee  counsel  to  Navy 
liaison  officer  requesting  information  set  forth  above 5474 


LIST   OF   DOCUMENTS  XXXIII 

Memorandum  dated  May  23,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee     Page 
counsel   concerning  memorandum   dated   November   12,   1941,   prepared 
by  Capt.  A.  D.  Kramer,  United  States  Navy,  regarding  dissemination 
of  Magic  material  to  the  White  House,  enclosing  a  copy  of  such  paper  ob- 
tained from  Capt.  L.  S.  SafEord,  United  States  Navy 5475 

Memorandum  dated  May  23,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  in  respect  of  statements  made  by  Lt.  Clarence  E.  Dicliinson  in 
the  October  10,  1942,  issue  of  the  Saturday  Evening  Post,  concerning 
orders  under  which  he  flew  a  plane  from  the  U.  S.  S.  Enterprise  from 
November  28  to  December  7,  1941 5476 

Memorandum  dated  May  22,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  concerning  the  winds  code  as  referred  to  in  the  so-called  history 
written  in  1942  of  the  activity  of  the  Navy  Department  Communications 
Unit,  about  which  Admiral  Hart  testified  was  involved  in  his  conversation 
with  Captain  Safford,  and  messages  quoted  therein 5477 

Memorandum  dated  May  16,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  and  attached  copy  of  study  made  by  Captain  Kramer  of  the 
times  of  delivery  to  the  White  House  of  certain  translations  of  Japanese 
intercepts 5480 

Memorandum  dated  April  26,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel,  enclosing  two  Navy  communications  with  Rear  Adm.  Cato  D. 
Glover,  United  States  Navy,  concerning  notation  in  OPNAV  watch  officers 
log  on  December  6,  1941  of  contact  with  Admiral  H.  R.  Stark,  and  second 
memorandum  to  counsel  dated  May  7,  1946,  concerning  compilation  of 
location  of  naval  forces  requested  by  Secretary  of  War 5482 

Memorandum  dated  May  8,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  concerning  report  that  reconnaissance  was  not  being  carried 
out  at  Hawaii  due  to  wear  on  planes  and  crews 5484 

Memorandum  dated  May  10,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  concerning  search  of  Navy  files  for  message  from  Capt.  John 
Creighton,  Singapore,  to  Admiral  T.  C.  Hart  on  December  4,  5,  or  6, 
1941,  concerning  sighting  of  Japanese  convoy 5484 

Memorandum  dated  May  2,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  concerning  air  patrols  operating  from  Oahu  prior  to  December 
7,  1941,  enclosing  Pacific  Fleet  confidential  letter  No.  2CL— 41  dated 
February  15,  1941,  and  Pacific  Fleet  confidential  memorandum  No. 
lCM-41  dated  February  25,  1941 5485 

Memorandum  dated  May  9,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  concerning  report  in  exhibit  No.  160  of  information  from  a 
Captain  Smith,  mentioned  by  the  President 5491 

Memorandum  dated  May  1,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  concerning  intercept  and  translation  of  message  No.  1405  from 
Berlin  to  Tokyo,  and  memo  dated  April  15,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison 
officer  on  the  same  subject 5492 

Memorandum  dated  May  3,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  concerning  monthly  reports  of  Navy  intercept  stations  at  Winter 
Harbor,  Maine,  and  Cheltenham,  Md 5493 

Memorandum  dated  April  26,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  to  committee 
counsel  concerning  exchange  of  corresix»ndence  between  President  Tru- 
man and  Rear  Adm.  H.  E.  Kimmel,  retired,  enclosing  copies  of  the  cor- 
respondence      5493 

Memorandum  dated  April  26,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  concerning 
any  report  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General  of  the  Navy  on  the  report 

of  the  Roberts  Commission 5495 

Draft  of  proposed  charge  against  Rear  Adm.  Husband  E.  Kimmel,  United 

States  Navy,  retired,  for  a  general  court  martial 5495 

Memorandum  dated  April  23,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  concerning 
cards  prepared  in  Navy  Department  relating  to  execute  message  for  the 
winds  code 5497 

79716— 46— pt.  1 3 


XXXIV  LIST   OF   DOCUMENTS 

Memoraudum  dated  April  18,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  correcting     Page 
memorandum  dated  January  25,  1946,  concerning  the  destruction  of 
drafts  and  work  materials  used  in  preparation  of  statement  made  by 
Admiral  Inglis  before  the  committee 5498 

Memorandum  dated  December  13,  1945,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  com- 
mittee counsel  concerning  production  and  distribution  of  B-17  bombers 
as  of  September  1,  1941 5498 

Memorandum  dated  April  16,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  concerning 
transmission  of  dispatch  061743  of  December  1941  from  OPNAV  to 
CINCPAC  for  action  and  to  CINCAF  for  information.  (This  dispatch 
authorized  destruction  of  secret  and  confidential  documents  in  outlying 
islands) 5498 

Memorandum  dated  April  17,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  concerning 
phrase  "CINCPAO  and  CINCAF  provide  necessary  escort"  appearing  in 
dispatch  252203  of  November  1941  (exhibit  No.  3) 5499 

Memorandum  dated  April  17,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  concerning 
time  table  of  Japanese  attacks — source  of  material,  relating  to  time  of 
attacks  at  Clark  Field  and  Nichols  Field  in  the  Philippines 5499 

Memorandum  dated  April  15,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  enclosing  four 

intercepted  Japanese  messages  relating  to  Japanese  news  broadcasts —     5500 

Memorandum  dated  May  1,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  concerning 
memorandum  mentioned  in  letter  dated  April  4,  1941,  from  Admiral 
Stark  to  Admiral  Kimmel 5502 

Memorandum  dated  May  1, 1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  concerning  copies 
of  orders  transferring  ships  from  the  Pacific  to  the  Atlantic  and  vice 
versa  from  May  to  December  1941  enclosing  letter  dated  April  7,  1941, 
from  OPNAV  to  CINCPAC 5502 

Memorandum  dated  April  30,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  concerning 
identity  of  ship  on  chart  dated  December  5, 1941  (exhibit  No.  109)  located 
to  north  of  Oahu 5504 

Memorandum  dated  April  29,  1946,  from  Navy  liaison  officer  concerning 
transfers  of  ships  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  betvpeen  May  1,  1940, 
and  December  7,  1941 5505 

Memorandum  dated  April  23,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  concerning 
duty  officer  log^  kept  for  offices  of  Secretary  of  War  and  Chief  of  Staff 
between  November  1  and  December  7,  1941 5506 

Memorandum  dated  May  21,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  concerning 
Japanese  estimate  of  United  States  air  strength  in  Hawaiian  area  prior 
to  the  attack  on  December  7,  1&41 5507 

Memoranda  dated  from  April  9  to  May  23,  1946,  concerning  information 
obtained  by  the  Australian  Minister  as  to  proposed  action  of  the  Presi- 
dent in  the  event  the  Japanese  did  not  reply  to  his  message  of  December 

6,  1941,  to  the  Emperor 5508 

Letter  dated  November  2,  1941,  from  committee  chairman  to  President 
Truman's  secretary,  suggesting  Presidential  memorandum  to  executive 
offices  regarding  scope  of  committee  inquiry,  and  reply  dated  November 

7,  1945 5510 

Suggested  corrections  in  his  testimony  by  Capt.  Ellis  M.  Zacharias 5511 

Suggested  corrections  in  his  testimony  by  Admiral  H.  R.  Stark 5512 

Suggested  corrections  in  his  testimony  by  Rear  Adm.  John  R.  Beardall 5513 

Suggested  corrections  in  his  testimony  by  Henry  C.  Clausen 5513 

Interrogations   and   answers   by   Brig.    Gen.   Francis   G.    Brink,   United 

States  Army 5514 

Interrogations  and  answers  by  Vice  Adm.  William  A.  Glassford,  United 

States  Navy 5516 

Memorandum  for  committee  counsel's  tiles  concerning  exhibits  Nos.  1 
and  2 5522 


LIST  OF   DOCUMENTS  XXXV 

Letter  dated  November  15,  1945,  from  Senator  Ferguson  to  committee     Page 
counsel  concerning  intercepted  Japanese  messages  from  January  l  to 
July  1.  1941 5523 

Letter  dated  December  17, 1945,  from  Tyler  Kent  to  committee  chairman—     5524 

Correspondence  relating  to  State  Department  papers  concerning  the  Tyler 

Kent   affair 5524 

Correspondence  relating  to  all  messages  between  this  Government  and  the 

Bi-itish  Government  for  November  25,  26,  and  27,  1941 5530 

State  Department  memorandum  of  conversation  dated  November  27,  1941, 
concerning  British  parallel  action  desired  re  our  export  policy  to  French 
Indo-China 5532 

Dispatch  No.  5727  dated  November  27,  1941,  from  Ambassador  Winant, 
London,  to  State  Department  concerning  British  economic  study  of 
Japanese  industrial  potential 5533 

Copy  of  letter  dated  November  25,  1941,  from  Dean  Acheson  to  Mr.  R.  J. 

Stopford,  financial  counselor,  British  Embassy 5534 

Memorandum  dated  May  22,  1946,  from  Army  liaison  officer  to  committee 

counsel  concerning  former  Secretary  Stimson's  diary 5535 

Letter  dated  May  26,  1946,  from  Admiral  H.  R.  Stark  to  committee  chair- 
man concerning  information  which  was  furnished  by  Capt.  H.  D.  Krick, 
USN,  regarding  the  activities  of  Admiral  Stark  on  December  6,  1941 —     5543 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


W  PEAEL  HAEBOR  ATTACK 


THURSDAY,  NOVEMBER   15,   1945 

Congress  of  the  United  States, 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation 

OF  THE  Pearl  Harbor  Attack, 

Washington,  D.  G. 

The  joint  committee  met,  pursuant  to  notice,  at  10  a.  m.,  in  the 
caucus  room  (room  318),  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Alben  W. 
Barkley  (chairman)  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Barkley  (chairman),  George,  Lucas,  Brewster, 
and  Ferguson  and  Representatives  Cooper  (vice  chairman),  Clark, 
Murphy,  Gearhart,  and  Keefe. 

Also  present:  William  D.  Mitchell,  general  counsel;  Gerhard  A. 
Gesell,  Jule  M,  Hiinnaford,  and  John  E.  Masten,  of  counsel,  for  the 
joint  committee. 

[2]         The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

AH  those  in  the  auditorium  will  please  be  seated. 

Before  we  start,  the  Chair  desires  to  admonish  the  audience  that 
we  are  glad  to  have  them  here,  but  in  view  of  the  difficult  acoustics  in 
this  room,  it  will  make  it  necessary  for  the  committee  to  use  these 
microphones.  We  must  ask  the  audience  to  refrain  from  any  sort  of 
conversation  or  any  sort  of  demonstration  during  these  hearings,  any 
applause  or  otherwise. 

Also  I  think  it  is  advisable  to  say  to  our  friends,  the  photographers, 
we  are  glad  to  cooperate  with  you  in  getting  all  the  pictures  you  may 
wish  to  take  so  long  as  it  does  not  interfere  with  these  hearings. 

During  the  testimony,  while  the  witnesses  are  on  the  stand,  the 
photographers  will  not  be  permitted  to  occupy  this  space  here  iij 
front  of  the  committee. 

Take  whatever  pictures  you  want  to  take  and  then  leave  this  con- 
gested area  here. 

The  last  time  I  sat  on  a  committee  in  this  room,  I  could  not  see 
the  witness  half  the  time,  because  of  the  photographers  standing 
between  me  and  the  witness,  trying  to  take  him  with  his  hands  up, 
or  something  like  that. 

We  must  insist  that  during  these  hearings,  while  the  witness  is  on 
the  stand  and  testifying,  that  the  photogi*aphers  will  not  occupy  this 
space  between  the  committee  and  the         [3]         witness  and  counsel. 

I  want  to  make  the  announcement  in  advance  so  that  there  will 
not  be  any  misunderstanding.     It  applies  to  everybody  alike. 

I  believe  the  members  of  the  committee  are  all  here. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  as  counsel  for  the  committee,  we  are  ready  to  proceed. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman 


'  Italic  figures  in  brackets  throughout  refer  to  page  numbers  of  the  official  transcript 
of  testimony. 


2  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Brewster.  Mr.  Chairman,  before  you  proceed,  I  would  like 
to  make  one  comment  for  myself  and  others.  I  want  to  record  my 
regret  and  protest,  at  the  start  of  the  hearings  at  this  time,  and  as 
has  previously  been  said,  and  I  would  like  to  have  that  entered  in 
the  record,  and  that  is  this : 

It  has  only  been  within  the  past  week  that  the  members  of  the 
Executive  Department  have  had  the  permission,  under  notification  of 
the  President's  order  to  submit  the  exhibits  so  they  will  be  in  the  best 
order,  and  I  have  been  given  a  stack  of  papers,  over  a  thousand  pages, 
which  it  is  essential  to  go  over  in  order  to  conduct  any  intelligent 
cross-examination. 

I  hope  my  fears  will  be  disappointed,  my  fears  that  this  will 
result  in  confusion  and  delay,  but  I  do  think  it  ought  to  be  made  a 
matter  of  record  at  this  time  that  we  regret  this  somewhat  premature 
beginning  of  this  inquiry. 

[4]  The  Chairman.  The  Chair  desires  to  be  reasonable  in  re- 
gard to  that.  The  committee  at  one  time,  some  2  or  3  weeks  ago,  I  for- 
get the  date,  unanimously  decided  to  begin  hearings  today;  that  is, 
those  who  voted. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  would  like  the  record  to  show  that 

The  Chairman.  Those  who  voted  in  the  committee,  voted  without 
dissent  to  begin  the  hearing  today.  Two  members  were  absent  and  two 
were  present  and  not  voting. 

At  a  meeting  later,  a  week  ago,  or  a  week  or  10  days  ago,  a  motion 
was  made  to  postpone  the  hearings  from  today  until  the  23d  day  of 
November,  which  is  the  day  following  Thanksgiving,  and  that  motion 
was  voted  down. 

The  situation  that  confronts  us,  that  confronts  all  the  members  of 
the  committee,  is  that  documents  have  been  given  to  us  as  quickly  and 
as  practicably  as  counsel  obtained  them.  Inasmuch  as  these  hearings 
will  probably  last  several  weeks,  it  occurred  to  the  Chair  that  we  will 
have,  as  we  go  along,  ample  opportunity  to  familiarize  ourselves  with 
the  testimony  brought  before  us  today,  without  attempting  to  read  any 
documents  before  we  begin. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  make  a  statement 
on  the  record. 

Tlie  Chairman.  Yes,  go  ahead. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  had  made  a  request  [5] 
previously  that  the  committee  be  furnished  these  exhibit  copies  at  least 
10  days  prior  to  the  hearing.  If  I  had  had  some  assistance,  I  would 
have  been  able  to  have  carried  down  the  exhibits  that  had  been  given  to 
me  on  Wednesday  and  on  Tuesday.  Over  a  thousand  of  them  have 
been  placed  in  our  hands.  Many  of  them  it  is  impossible  to  read  be- 
cause of  the  job  of  photostating  them.  Therefore,  it  is  just  a  physical 
impossibility  to  go  over  the  papers  prior  to  this  hearing. 

Wliile  I  will  do  my  very  best,  I  do  want  the  record  to  show  that  we 
have  not  had  these  exhibits  in  this  form  properly  indexed. 

Here  is  the  first  one.  It  is  over  200  pages,  and  no  index  to  it.  It 
has  been  just  a  physical  impossibility  to  go  over  them  intelligently, 
although  I  want  to  say  on  the  record,  I  will  do  my  best  to  go  over 
them  as  the  hearing  goes  along,  and  it  may  be  essential  that  we  recall 
witnesses  in  order  that  we  may  properly  examine  and  obtain  all  of 
the  facts. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  6 

The  Chairman.  Of  course,  if  I  may  say  so,  there  would  be  no  objec- 
tion to  recalling  any  witness  by  the  committee.  The  exhibits  were 
given  to  all  members  at  a  given  time.  They  have  been  given  to  mem- 
bers as  soon  as  it  was  possible,  and  as  fast  as  it  was  possible  to  obtain 
them.  There  are  large  quantities  of  them.  We  are  all  laboring  under 
the  same  handicap,  that  we  have  not  been  able  to  read  them  all  since 
[6]         we  got  them. 

As  I  said  a  moment  ago,  I  think  as  the  hearings  go  on,  we  can  famil- 
iarize ourselves  with  them  sufficiently  to  permit  us  to  know  each  day 
what  would  be  expected  in  the  way  of  testimony,  and  prepare  for  that 
day. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  record  ought  to  also  show  that  I  have  made 
many  requests  for  other  things.  We  do  not  have  all  the  files  here  at 
the  present  time. 

The  Chairman.  In  order  that  the  record  may  be  correct,  as  the  re- 
quests have  been  made,  the  records  have  been  sought,  and  have  been 
either  delivered,  or  are  in  the  process  of  preparation.  It  is  manifestly 
impossible  to  provide  all  the  exhibits  at  one  time.  As  soon  as  they 
were  ready,  they  were  delivered  to  the  committee,  as  soon  as  they 
could  be  obtained. 

Senator  Ferguson.  May  I  understand  that  it  is  a  fact  as  to  the 
exhibits  that  have  been  requested,  that  the  staff  has  them  but  they 
are  not  at  the  present  time  ready  for  delivery?  That  is  my  under- 
standing. 

[7]  The  Chairman.  The  committee  has  no  way  to  know  what 
personal  requests  have  been  made  either  in  writing  or  orally  by  mem- 
bers of  the  committee  to  the  counsel,  by  individual  members.  Counsel 
explained  to  the  committee  that  as  fast  as  these  exhibits  could  be  ob- 
tained and  could  be  copied  for  each  member  and  for  others,  that  they 
would  be  supplied. 

Now,  Mr.  Mitchell,  will  you  proceed  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  to  open  the  record,  there  are  some 
informal  matters.     I  have  some  documents 

Senator  Brewster.  Before  he  proceeds  I  renew  my  motion. 

The  Chairman.  Let's  have  order,  please,  in  the  committee  room. 

Mr.  Mitchell. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  to  open  the  record  formally,  there 
are  a  few  documents  that  should  be  entered. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  First  is  the  concurrent  resolution  of  the  Senate  un- 
der which  the  committee  was  organized. 

(S.  Con.  Res.  27  follows:) 

[S.  Con.  Res.  27,  79th  Cong.,  1st  sess.] 
[S]  CONCURRENT  RESOLUTION 

Resolved  by  the  Senate  (the  House  of  Representatives  concurring) ,  That  there 
is  hereby  established  a  joint  committee  on  the  investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor 
attack,  to  be  composed  of  five  Members  of  the  Senate  (not  more  than  three  of 
whom  shall  be  members  of  the  majority  party),  to  be  appointed  by  the  President 
pro  tempore,  and  five  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  (not  more  than 
three  of  whom  shall  be  members  of  the  majority  party),  to  be  appointed  by  the 
Speaker  of  the  House.  Vacancies  in  the  membership  of  the  committee  shall 
not  affect  the  power  of  the  remaining  members  to  execute  the  functions  of  the 
committee,  and  shall  bo  filled  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  the  original 


4  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

selection.  The  committee  sliall  select  a  chairman  and  a  vice  chairman  from 
among  its  members. 

Sec.  2.  The  committee  shall  make  a  full  and  complete  investigation  of  the 
facts  relating  to  the  events  and  circumstances  leading  up  to  or  following  the 
attack  made  by  Japanese  armed  forces  upon  Pearl  Harbor  in  the  Territory  of 
Hawaii  on  December  7,  1941,  and  shall  report  to  the  Senate  and  the  House  of 
Representatives  not  later  than  January  3,  1946,  the  results  of  its  investigation, 
together  with  such  recommendations  as  it  may  deem  advisable. 

[9]  Sec.  3.  The  testimony  of  any  person  in  the  armed  services,  and  the  fact 
that  such  person  testified  before  the  joint  committee  herein  provided  for,  shall 
not  be  used  against  him  in  any  court  proceeding,  or  held  against  him  in  examining 
his  military  status  for  credits  in  the  service  to  wliich  he  belongs. 

Sec.  4.  (a)  The  committee,  or  any  duly  authorized  subcommittee  thereof,  is 
authorized  to  sit  and  act  at  such  places  and  times  during  the  sessions,  recesses, 
and  adjourned  periods  of  the  Seventy-ninth  Congress  (prior  to  January  3,  1946), 
to  require  by  subpena  or  otherwise  the  attendance  of  such  witnesses  and  the 
production  of  such  books,  papers,  and  documents,  to  administer  such  oaths, 
to  take  such  testimony,  to  procure  such  printing  and  binding,  and  to  make  such 
expenditures  as  it  deems  advisable.  The  cost  of  stenographic  services  to  report 
such  hearings  shall  not  be  in  excess  of  25  cents  per  hundred  words. 

(b)  The  committee  is  empowered  to  appoint  and  fix  the  compensation  of  such 
experts,  consultants,  and  clerical  and  stenographic  assistants  as  it  deems  neces- 
sary, but  the  compensation  so  fixed  shall  not  exceed  the  compensation  pre- 
scribed under  the  Classification  Act  of  1923,  as  amended,  for  comparable  duties. 

(c)  The  expenses  of  the  committee,  which  shall  not  exceed  $25,000,  shall  be 
paid  one-half  from  the  contingent  fund  of  the  Senate  and  one-half  from  the 
contingent  fund  of  [10]  the  House  of  Representatives,  upon  vouchers 
signed  by  the  chairman. 

Passed  the  Senate  September  6,  1945. 
Attest : 

Leslie  L.  BiFi-LE,  Secretary. 

Passed  the  House  of  Representatives  September  11,  1945. 
Attest : 

Souxp  Trimble,  Clerk. 


Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  there  is  the  record  of  the  members  of  the 
committee. 

(The  list  of  the  committee  members  is  as  follows :) 

MEMBEES  OF  THE  COMMITTEE 

Alben   W.    Barkley,    Kentucky  (chair- Jere  Cooper,  Tennessee  (vice  chairman). 

man).  J.  Bayard  Clark,  North  Carolina. 

Walter  F.  George,  Georgia.  John  W.  Murphy,  Pennsylvania. 

Scott  W.  Lucas,  Illinois.  Bertrand  W.  Gearhart,  California. 

Owen  Brewster,  Maine.  Frank  B.  Keefe,  Wisconsin. 

Homer  Ferguson,  Michigan. 

[11]         Mr.  Mitchell.  Next  is  a  list  of  all  counsel,  including  coun- 
sel for  a  number  of  witnesses  who  will  be  called. 

(The  list  of  counsel  for  the  committee  is  as  follows :) 

Counsel  for  the  committee : 

Chief  counsel,  William  D.  Mitchell. 
Chief  assistant  counsel,  Gerhard  A.  Gesell. 
Assistant  counsel,  Jule  M.  Hannaford. 
Assistant  counsel,  John  E.  Masten. 

Executive  secretary  for  the  committee : 

Mrs.  Flo  E.  Bratten ;  office,  357  Senate  Office  Building ;  telephone  extensions 
1159  and  1189. 

Counsel  for  General  Short : 

Capt.  Patrick  H.  Ford.  2601  Munitions  Building,  Wnr  Dopartment,  exten- 
sion 7-8109. 

Counsel  for  Admiral  Kimmel : 

Charles    Rugg,    Building   N.    Room    l-N-90.    Navy    Department,    extension 
3292;  Lt.  Edward  B.  Hanify,  Navy  Department,  extension  6-3036. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  5 

[12]        Counsel  for  Admiral  Stark: 

Hugh  H.  Obear,  Southern  Building,  "Washington,  D.  C,  telephone  National 

2155. 
Lt.  Conulr.  David  Richmond,  Navy  Department,  extension  2326. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  there  is  the  correspondence,  with  which  you  are 
familiar,  between  the  chairman  of  the  committee  and  the  Secretary  of 
State,  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  the  White 
House,  asking  for  the  appointment  of  the  liaison  officers  and  the 
responses  from  those  Departments  and  the  President, 

There  is  also  a  letter  here  from  the  estate  of  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt 
respecting  the  late  President's  files  in  the  Archives  Building. 

(The  correspondence  referred  to  follows :) 

OCTOBEE  5,  1945. 
The  Honorable  .James  F.  Byrnes, 

The  Secretary  of  State,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Deae  Me.  Seceetaey:  On  behalf  of  the  joint  congressional  committee  to  investi- 
gate the  disaster  at  Pearl  Harbor,  I  am  writing  to  suggest  that  you  designate 
someone  in  the  State  Department  to  whom  counsel  for  the  committee  may  apply 
at  any  time  to  aid  us  in  obtaining  information  from  the  Department's  records 
and  to  arrange  for  the  attendance  before  the  committee  of  [13]  witnesses 
from  the  State  Department.  We  believe  such  an  arrangement  should  expedite 
the  work  of  the  committee. 

Now  that  the  war  is  ended,  we  hope  tliat  reasons  of  national  security  should 
not  require  that  any  information  material  to  the  investigation  be  withheld  from 
the  committee  or  their  counsel,  and  that  the  committee  will  be  free  to  use  any 
pertinent  evidence.  The  committee  proposes  to  hold  public  hearings  and  all 
evidence  material  to  our  inquiry  will  thus  be  made  public. 
Respectfully, 

Alben  W.  Baekley, 
Chairman,  Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack. 


The  Seceetaey  of  State, 
Washington,  October  IS,  JOJfS. 
The  Honoi-able  Alben  W.  Barkley, 

United  States  Senate,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Deae  Alben  :  Replying  to  your  letter,  I  have  asked  Under  Secretary  Acheson  to 
make  available  any  information  the  State  Department  may  have  which  is  desired 
by  the  committee  with  reference  to  the  investigation  referred  to  by  you. 
[Ilf]         Sincerely  yours, 

James  F.  Byenes, 


OCTOBEE  5, 1945. 
The  Honorable  Robeet  P.  Patteeson, 

The  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  G. 
Deae  Mr.  Seceetaey  :  On  behalf  of  the  joint  congressional  committee  to  inves- 
tigate the  disaster  at  Pearl  Harbor,  I  am  writing  to  suggest  that  you  designate 
someone  in  the  "War  Department  to  whom  counsel  for  the  committee  may  apply 
at  any  time  to  aid  us  in  obtaining  information  from  the  Department's  records  and 
to  arrange  for  the  attendance  before  the  committee  of  witnesses  from  the  armed 
forces.  We  believe  such  an  arrangement  should  expedite  the  work  of  the 
committtee. 

Now  that  the  war  is  ended,  we  hope  that  reasons  of  national  security  should  not 
require  that  any  information  material  to  the  investigation  be  withheld  from  the 
committee  or  their  counsel  and  that  the  committee  will  be  free  to  use  any  i)erti- 
nent  evidence.  The  committee  proposes  to  hold  public  hearings,  and  all  evidence 
material  to  our  inquiry  will  thus  be  made  public. 
Respectfully, 

Alben  W.  Baekley, 
Chairman,  Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack. 


6  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[15]  WAB  DEaPAETMENT, 

Washington,  October  10,  J9^f5. 
Hon.  Alben  W.  Bakkley, 

Chairman,  Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the 
Pearl  Harlor  Attack,  United  States  Senate. 
Deak  Senator  Baeicley  :  In  accordance  with  the  suggestion  in  your  letter  of 
October  5,  Lt.  Col.  Harmon  Buncombe  has  been  designated  as  the  representative 
of  the  War  Department  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  joint  congressional  com- 
mittee to  investigate  the  disaster  at  Pearl  Harbor.  He  will  have  full  access  to 
all  pertinent  files  and  records  of  the  War  Department  and  will  arrange  for  the 
attendance  before  the  committee  of  witnesses  from  the  Army. 

The  War  Department  is  prepared  to  furnish  the  committee  and  their  counsel  all 
information  in  its  possession  material  to  the  investigation  and  to  have  the  com- 
mittee make  free  use  of  any  pertinent  evidence.    Also,  the  War  Department  will 
be  glad  to  assist  the  committee  in  its  desire  to  hold  public  hearings. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Robert  P.  Patterson,  Secretary  of  War. 


OCTOBEE  5,  1945. 
[16]         The  Honorable  James  Forrestal, 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  B.  C. 
Dear  Mr.  Secretary  :  On  behalf  of  the  joint  congressional  committee  to  in- 
vestigate the  disaster  at  Pearl  Harbor,  I  am  writing  to  suggest  that  you  desig- 
nate someone  in  the  Navy  Department  to  whom  counsel  for  the  committee  may 
apply  at  any  time  to  aid  us  in  obtaining  information  from  the  Department's 
records  and  to  arrange  for  the  attendance  before  the  committee  of  witnesses 
from  the  armed  forces.  We  believe  such  an  arrangement  should  expedite  the 
work  of  the  committee. 

Now  that  the  war  is  ended,  we  hope  that  reasons  of  national  security  should 
not  require  that  any  information  material  to  the  investigation  be  withheld  from 
the  committee  or  their  counsel,  and  that  the  committee  will  be  free  to  use  any 
pertinent  evidence.  The  committee  proposes  to  hold  public  hearings  and  all  evi- 
dence material  to  our  inquiry  will  thus  be  made  public. 
Respectfully, 

Alben  W.  Barkley, 
Chairman,  Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack. 


\_17]  The  Seceetaey  oe  the  Navy, 

Washington,  October  11,  1945. 
The  Honorable  Alben  W.  Barkley, 

Chairman,  Joint  Committee  on  Investigation  of  the 
Pearl  Harbor  Attack,  United  States  Senate. 
Deae  Senator  Barkley  :  Reference  is  made  to  your  letter  dated  October  5, 
1945,  suggesting  the  designation  of  a  Navy  Department  representative  with 
whom  counsel  for  the  committee  may  deal  in  matters  concerning  information 
and  witnesses  desired  by  the  committee. 

In  accordance  with  your  request,  Rear  Adm.  O.  S.  Colclough,  USN,  the  Assistant 
.Judge  Advocate  General  of  the  Navy,  is  designated  to  receive  and  act  upon 
counsel's  request  for  information  from  the  Navy  Department's  records  and  for 
the  attendance  of  naval  witnesses. 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  suggestion,  your  referenced  letter  expresses  the 
hope  that,  by  virtue  of  the  war's  end,  reasons  of  national  security  do  not  require 
the  withholding  from  the  committee,  or  its  counsel,  any  information  material 
to  the  investigation,  and  that  the  committee,  whose  hearings  will  be  public,  will 
be  free  to  use  any  pertinent  evidence.  Please  be  assured  that  the  Navy  De- 
partment stands  ready  to  render  full  assistance  to  the  committee  and  its  counsel, 
[18]  making  available  from  its  records  nil  information  material  to  the 
investigation. 

Sincerely  yours, 

James  Forrestal. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  7 

[19]  October  5,  1945. 

The  Honorable  Hahby  S.  Tkuman, 

The  White  House,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Deab  Mk.  Peesident  :  On  behalf  of  the  Joint  Congressional  Committee  on  the 
Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack,  I  respectfully  suggest  for  your  con- 
sideration that  someone  in  the  Executive  Offices  be  named  by  you,  to  whom  the 
committee  and  its  counsel  may  go  to  obtain  information  from  the  files  in  the 
Executive  Office  bearing  on  the  matter  under  investigation,  and  that  the  com- 
mittee may  be  free  to  disclose  at  its  public  hearings  information  so  obtained. 
Respectfully, 

Alben  W.  Bakkley. 
Chairman,  Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor 
Attack. 


[20]  The  White  House, 

Washington,  October  13,  194^/. 
Hon.  Alben  W.  Bakkley 

United  States  Senate,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Dear  Senator  Barkley:  Replying  to  your  letter  of  the  5th,  regarding  the 
appointment  of  someone  in  the  Executive  Offices  to  consult  with  the  committee 
and  its  counsel,  I  am  appointing  Judge  Latta,  who  has  been  in  charge  of  all  the 
files  in  the  White  House  for  the  past  28  years. 
Any  information  that  you  want  will  be  cheerfully  supplied  by  him. 
For  your  information  all  the  files  of  the  previous  administration  have  been 
moved  to  the  Archives  Building  and  Hyde  Park.    If  there  is  any  difficulty  about 
your  having  access  to  them  I'll  be  glad  to  issue  the  necessary  order  so  that  you 
may  have  complete  access. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Harry  S.  Truman. 


[21]  Estate  of  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt. 

J20  Broadway,  New  York  5,  October  31, 1945. 
Dr.  Solon  J.  Buck. 

Archivist  of  the  United  States, 

National  Archives  Building,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Dear  Sir:  On  behalf  of  the  executors  of  the  estate  of  the  late  Franklin  D. 
Roosevelt,  it  is  hereby  requested  that  you  permit  Miss  Grace  G.  TuUy  to  withdraw 
from  the  files  of  the  late  Mr.  Roosevelt,  now  at  the  National  Archives  for  storage 
and  safekeeping,  and  make  available  to  the  Senate-House  Joint  Committee 
Investigating  the  Pearl  Harbor  Disaster  such  papers  relating  to  the  subject  of 
the  investigation  as  it  may  request. 

This  is  to  certify  that  such  papers  are  being  withdrawn  and  made  available  to 
said  committee  at  the  instigation  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  and  with 
the  approval  of  the  executors  of  the  estate. 
Tours  very  truly, 

Earle  R.  Koons. 

[^2]  Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  there  is  a  list  of  liaison  officers  who 
have  been  designated  by  the  various  departments,  with  their  addresses 
and  telephone  numbers,  which  may  be  of  service  to  the  members  of 
the  committee. 

(The  list  of  liaison  officers  follows :) 

[2S]  List  of  Liaison  Officers,  Appointed  by  Agencies 

War  Department : 

Lt.  Col.  Harmon  Duncombe ;  telephone,  extension  2335 ;  room  4D761,  Pentagon. 
Capt.  R.  M.  Diggs ;  telephone,  extension  2335 ;  room  4D757,  Pentagon. 
Capt.  C.  Roger  Nelson ;  telephone,  extension  73157 ;  room  2G686,  Pentagon. 
Lt.  Bennett  Boskey ;  telephone,  extension  71470 ;  room  4D757,  Pentagon. 


8  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Navy  Department: 

Rear  Adm.  Oswald  S.  Colcough,  Assistant  Judge  Advocate  General;    tele- 
phone, extension  3365  ;  room  2307. 
Lt  Comdr.  John  Ford  Baecher,  United  States  Naval  Reserve;  telephone, 
extension  2451 ;  room  1083A. 

[2^]        State  Department: 

Under  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Acheson ;  telephone,  extension  2101 ;  room 

2031/2. 
Edward  Miller ;  telephone,  extension  2210 ;  room  280. 
Joseph  Ballantine;  telephone,  exten.sion  2210;  room  288. 

White  House : 

Judge  Maurice  C.  Latta. 

Miss  Grace  Tully   (Roosevelt  papers). 

FBI : 

D.  M.  Ladd,  Assistant  Director ;  telephone,  Executive  7100,  extension  2121 ; 
room  1742,  Justice. 

[25]  Mr,  Mitchell,  Tlien  there  follows  the  directive  of  August 
28,  1945,  by  the  President  forbidding  the  disclosure  of  technique  or 
procedures  or  any  specific  results  of  any  cryptanalytic  unit,  the 
agencies  that  break  codes. 

(The  directive  of  August  28, 1945,  follows :) 

[2C]  [Copy] 

August  28  1945. 
Memorandum  for — 

The  Secretary  of  State. 

Tlie  Secretary  of  War. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 

The  Attorney  General. 

The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 

The  Director  of  the  Budget. 

The  Director  of  the  Office  of  War  Information. 
Appropriate  departments  of  the  Government  and  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  are 
hereby  directed  to  take  such  steps  as  are  necessary  to  prevent  release  to  the 
public,  except  with  the  specific  approval  of  the  President  in  each  case,  of: 
Information  regarding  the  past  or  present  status,  technique,  or  procedures,  degree 
of  success  attained,  or  any  specific  results  of  any  cryptanalytic  unit  acting  under 
the  authority  of  tlie  United  States  Government  or  any  Department  thereof, 

Habby  S.  Teuman. 

[^7]  Mr.  Mitchell,  There  is  the  order  of  October  23,  1945,  by 
the  President  lifting  the  ban  of  that  directive  for  the  benefit  of  this 
commit  tee, 

(The  memorandum  follows:) 

[28]         Memorandum  for — 
The  Secretary  of  State. 
The  Secretary  of  War. 
The  Secretary  of  Navy, 
The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 
In  order  to  assist  the  Joint  Congressional  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of 
tlie  Pearl  Harbor  Attack  in  its  desire  to  hold  public  hearings  and  make  public 
pertinent  evidence  relating  to  the  circumstances  of  that  attack,  a  specific  excep- 
tion to  my  memorandum  dated  August  28, 1945,  relating  to  the  release  of  informa- 
tion concerning  cryptanalytic  activities,  is  hereby  made  as  follows : 

The  State,  War,  and  Navy  Departments  will  make  available  to  the  Joint 
Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack,  for  such  use  as  the 
committee  may  determine,  any  information  in  their  possession  material  to  the 
investigation,  and  will  respectively  authorize  any  employee  or  member  of  the 
armed  services  whose  testimony  is  desired  by  the  committee  to  testify  publicly 
before  the  committee  concerning  any  matter  pertinent  to  the  investigation. 

(Signed)     Harry  S.  Truman 
HARRY   S.   Teuman. 
Approved  October  23.  1945. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  9 

[29]  Mr.  Mitchell.  There  is  another  order,  of  November  7, 
1945,  by  the  President  respecting  leave  for  men  in  the  services  to  talk 
freely  with  the  committee  and  vohmteer  information. 

(The  memorandum  of  November  7,  1945,  follows:) 

[30]  The  White  House, 

Washington,  November  7,  IOj^S. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  Executives  of  all  Executive  Departments,  Agencies, 

Commissions,  and  Bureaus,  including  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 

Section  3  of  the  concurrent  resolution  creating  the  Joint  Congressional  Com- 
mittee on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack  reads  as  follows : 

"Sec.  3.  The  testimony  of  any  person  in  the  armed  services,  and  the  fact  that 
such  person  testified  before  the  joint  committee  herein  provided  for,  shall  not 
be  used  against  him  in  any  court  proceeding  or  held  against  him  in  examining 
his  military  status  for  credits  in  the  service  to  vphich  he  belongs." 

In  order  to  assist  the  joint  committee  to  make  a  full  and  complete  investiga- 
tion of  the  facts  relating  to  the  events  leading  up  to  or  following  the  attack,  you 
are  requested  to  authorize  every  person  in  your  respective  departments  or 
agencies,  if  they  are  interrogated  by  the  committee  or  its  counsel,  to  give  any 
information  of  which  they  may  have  knowledge  bearing  on  the  subject  of  the 
committee's  investigation. 

You  are  further  requested  to  authorize  them  whether  or  [Sll  not  they 
are  interrogated  by  the  committee  or  its  counsel  to  come  forward  voluntarily 
and  disclose  to  the  committee  or  to  its  counsel  any  information  they  may  have 
on  the  subject  of  the  inquiry  which  they  may  have  any  reason  to  think  may  not 
already  have  been  disclosed  to  the  committee. 

This  directive  is  applicable  to  all  persons  in  your  departments  or  agencies 
whether  they  are  in  the  armed  services  or  not  and  whether  or  not  they  are  called 
to  testify  before  the  joint  committee. 

Haeky  S.  Truman. 

[32]  Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  there  is  a  memorandum  by  the  Presi- 
dent under  date  of  November  9,  1945,  enlarging  on  the  last-mentioned 
memorandum. 

(The  memorandum  of  November  9,  1945,  follows:) 

[SS]        Memorandum  for  the  chief  executives  of  all   executive  departments, 
agencies,  Commissions,  and  Bureaus,  including  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 

With  further  reference  to  my  letter  of  November  7.  1945,  addressed  to  the 
above  executives,  you  are  requested  further  to  authorize  every  person  in  your 
respective  departments  or  agencies,  whether  or  not  they  are  interrogated  by  the 
committee  or  its  counsel,  to  come  forward  and  disclose  orally  to  any  of  the 
members  of  the  Joint  Congressional  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the 
Pearl  Harbor  Attack  any  information  they  may  have  on  the  subject  of  the  in- 
quiry which  they  may  have  any  reason  to  think  has  not  already  been  disclosed 
to  the  committee. 

This  does  not  include  any  files  or  written  material. 

[Handwritten:]     O.  K. 

H.  S.  T. 

[34.]  Mr.  Mitchell.  Those  formal  documents  I  hand  to  the  re- 
porter to  open  the  record  in  that  way. 

Senator  Brewster.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  it  would  also  be  proper 
and  helpful  if  the  record  of  the  original  presentation  of  the  resolu- 
tion by  the  chairman,  and  the  discussions  on  the  floor  at  that  time — 
not  subsequent — at  that  time,  be  inserted  in  the  record  so  that  there 
may  be  a  full  interpretation  of  what  was  the  purport  of  the  hearings. 

The  Chairman.  There  being  no  objection  in  connection  with  the 
introduction  of  the  joint  resolution,  the  statement  made  by  the  author 
of  the  resolution,  and  the  discussion  that  took  place  at  that  time,  will 
be  inserted  in  the  record. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  ask  that  the  full 
discussion  that  took  olace  at  that  time  be  inserted  in  the  record. 


10  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Brewster.  That  is  what  I  intended. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  what  I  understood  the  Senator  from  Maine 
requested. 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 

I  would  like  also  to  have  the  request  of  the  committee  to  the  Presi- 
dent, the  final  draft  of  the  order,  inserted,  in  connection  with  the  order 
which  was  made.     I  think  you  are  familiar  with  that,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Without  objection,  that  will  be  inserted  in  con- 
nection with  these  papers.^ 

[-5^(2]  (Excerpts  from  the  Congressional  Record  of  September  G, 
1945,  including  the  discussion  and  adoption  of  S.  Con,  Res.  27,  ordered 
to  be  printed  at  this  point,  follow :) 

Mr.  Baekley.  Mr.  President,  inasmuch  as  I  shall  be  compelled  to  leave  the 
Chamber  shortly  on  an  important  matter  and  may  not  be  present  during  the  en- 
tire call  of  the  morning  hour's  business,  I  ask  unanimous  consent  that  I  may  be 
permitted  at  this  time  to  make  a  brief  statement  and,  following  that,  to  introduce 
a  concurrent  I'esolution. 

The  President  pro  tempore.  Is  there  objection?  The  Chair  hears  none,  and 
the  Senator  from  Kentucky  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Barkley.  Mr.  President,  the  Japanese  attack  upon  Pearl  Harbor  occurred 
on  December  7,  1941. 

On  December  IS,  President  Roosevelt  appointed  by  Executive  order  a  board 
or  commission  to  ascertain  and  report  the  facts  relating  to  the  attack  made  by 
Japanese  armed  forces  upon  the  Territory  of  Hawaii  on  December  7,  1941. 

This  commission  was  composed  of  Justice  Owen  J.  Roberts,  as  chairman,  Ad- 
miral William  H.  Standley,  Admiral  J.  M.  Reeves,  Gen.  Frank  H.  McCoy,  and 
Gen.  Joseph  T.  McNarney. 

The  commisison  made  its  report  to  the  President  on  January  29, 1942,  and  this  re- 
port was  immediately  made  public. 

In  June  1944,  by  joint  resolution  approved  June  13,  Congress  in  effect  di- 
rected the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  designate  ap- 
propriate boards  or  courts  of  inquiry  "to  ascertain  and  report  the  facts  relating 
to  the  attack  made  by  Japanese  armed  forces  upon  the  Territory  of  Hawaii  on 
December  7.  1941,  and  to  make  such  recommendations  as  it  may  deem  proper." 

The  board  appointed  on  behalf  of  the  War  Department  was  composed  of  Lt. 
Gen.  George  Grunert,  as  president,  Maj.  Gen.  Henry  D.  Russell,  and  Maj.  Gen. 
Walter  H.  Frank. 

This  board  made  its  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War  on  October  20,  1944,  and 
the  report  was  released  to  the  public  on  Wednesday,  August  29,  1945.  The  re- 
port consists  of  more  than  300  pages  of  typewritten  matter  detailing  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack,  indulges  in  criticisms  of  certain  military 
and  other  officials,  and  makes  no  recommendations  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

The  board  appointed  on  behalf  of  the  Navy  consisted  of  Admiral  Orin  G.  Mur- 
fin,  as  president.  Admiral  Edward  C.  Kalbfus,  and  Vice  Admiral  Adolphus 
Andrews. 

This  board  finished  its  inquiry  on  October  19,  1944,  then  adjourned  to  await 
the  action  of  the  convening  authority. 

The  report  of  the  Navy  board  went  into  some  detail  concerning  the  circum- 
stances of  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack,  and  recommended  that  no  further  proceed- 
ings be  had  in  the  matter. 

This  report  was  also  made  public  by  the  President  on  August  29,  1945. 

Since  these  reports  were  made  public,  I  have  spent  a  large  portion  of  my  time 
studying  them,  and  also,  in  connection  with  them,  I  have  reread  the  report  of  the 
Roberts  commission. 

The  official  report  of  the  board  appointed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  I  have  here, 
and,  as  I  have  said,  it  consists  of  304  pages  of  typewritten  matter  on  what  we 
call  legal  size  paper,  not  letter  size.  The  report  of  the  board  appointed  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  contains  various  divisions,  all  of  which  add  up  to  something 
like  100  pages  of  typewritten  matter. 

Reading  these  reports  and  studying  them,  insofar  as  I  could  in  the  limited  time 
Bt  my  disposal,  requii'ed  my  attention  not  only  during  the  daytime  since  the 


^  See  the  suggested  memorandum  approved  by  the  President  in  Hearings,  Part  11,  p.  5510. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  11 

reports  were  made  public  on  last  Wednesday,  but  required  practically  all  of  two 
nights,  in  order  that  I  might  read  not  only  the  reports,  but  the  statement  or 
summary  made  by  the  Secretary  of  War  based  upon  the  report  of  the  Army 
board  and  the  statement  made  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  based  upon  the 
report  of  the  naval  board  of  inquiry,  as  well  as  other  documents  pertaining  thereto. 
I  have  not  been  away  from  the  city  of  Washington  during  the  entire  adjournment 
since  the  1st  day  of  August,  when  the  Senate  adjourned. 

Mr.  President,  I  shall  not  at  this  time  attempt  to  discuss  these  various  reports 
in  detail,  but  after  studying  them  to  the  extent  possible  in  the  time  at  my 
disposal,  I  am  convinced  that  a  further  searching  inquiry  should  be  made  under 
the  authority  and  by  the  direction  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States. 

In  forming  this  opinion,  Mr.  President,  I  cast  no  reflections  upon  the  ability, 
the  patriotism,  the  good  faith,  or  the  sincerity  of  the  boards  which  have  thus  far 
investigated  and  reported  upon  the  Pearl  Harbor  disaster,  nor  on  any  member 
of  these  various  boards.  They  are  all  outstanding  American  citizens  and  officials, 
who  have  rendered  signal  service  to  their  country  over  a  long  period  of  time  in 
various  capacities.  That  includes  the  members  of  the  Roberts  commission, 
the  War  Department  board,  and  the  Navy  Department  board,  as  well  as  all  those 
officials  who  have  commented  upon  these  reports  or  are  in  any  way  involved 
in  them. 

But  the.se  reports,  Mr.  President,  are  confusing  and  conflicting  when  compared 
with  one  another,  and  to  some  extent  contain  contradictions  and  inconsistencies 
within  themselves. 

Under  these  cii-cumstances  it  is  not  strange  that  wide.spread  confusion  and 
suspicion  prevail  amoing  the  American  people  and  among  the  Members  of 
Congress. 

In  these  several  reports  men  in  the  armed  services  and  in  civilian  positions 
of  executive  responsibility  and  authority  are  subjected  to  criticism,  and  the 
defenses  are  themselves  inconsistent  and  contradictory.  It  would  be  easy  now, 
if  time  allowed  and  if  it  were  necessary,  to  point  out  these  inconsistoncies  between 
the  report  made  by  the  naval  board  and  the  report  made  by  the  Army  board,  and 
both  of  them  as  compared  to  the  Roberts  report.  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  go 
into  that  at  this  time. 

It  is  my  belief,  therefore,  Mr.  President,  arrived  at  immediately  upon  the 
conclusion  of  my  study  of  these  reports,  that  under  all  the  circumstances  Congress 
itself  should  make  its  own  thorough,  impartial,  and  fearless  inquiry  into  the 
facts  and  circumstances  and  conditions  prevailing  prior  to  and  at  the  time  of  the 
Pearl  Hai'bor  attack,  no  matter  how  far  back  it  may  be  necessary  to  go  in  order 
to  appraise  the  situation  which  existed  prior  to  and  at  the  time  of  the  attack. 

This  inquiry.  Mr.  President,  should  be  of  such  dignity  and  authenticity  as  to 
convince  the  Congress  and  the  country  and  the  world  that  no  effort  has  been 
made  to  shield  any  person  who  may  have  been  directly  or  indirectly  responsible 
for  this  disaster,  or  to  condemn  unfairly  or  unjustly  any  person  who  was  in 
authority,  military,  naval,  or  civilian,  at  the  time  or  prior  thereto. 

Ever  since  the  day  of  Pearl  Harbor  there  have  been  discussions  of  courts 
martial  in  the  Army  and  in  the  Navy.  We  have  here  extended  from  time  to 
time  the  statute  of  limitations  pertaining  to  courts  martial.  The  report  of 
neither  the  naval  nor  the  military  board  of  inquiry  recommends  any  further 
proceedings  in  these  matters.  It  is  my  xmderstanding  that  the  law  is  that  in  the 
Army  no  man  has  a  legal  right  to  demand  that  he  be  court-martialed.  Charges 
must  be  filed  against  an  Army  officer  or  an  enlisted  man  setting  out  the  offense 
which  he  is  alleged  to  have  committed.  He  has  no  right,  as  I  understand  the  law, 
to  go  into  the  War  Department  and  demand  that  he  be  court-martialed  upon 
any  accusation  or  any  charge  of  misconduct  on  his  part. 

[34&]  I  understand  that  in  the  Navy  any  officer  or  man  who  is  charged  with 
an  offense  that  would  constitute  a  violation  of  the  Articles  of  War  or  Navy  Regu- 
lations has  the  right  to  demand  or  request — I  am  not  certain  that  he  has  the 
right  to  demand,  but  has  the  right  to  request,  and  it  may  be  to  demand — that  he 
be  given  a  court  martial. 

So  that  as  it  applies  to  any  Army  officer  who  may  have  been  responsible  prior  to 
or  at  the  time  of  this  attack,  as  I  understand,  he  has  no  right  to  demand  that 
he  be  given  a  trial  in  order  that  he  may  be  vindicated  or  that  the  facts  may  be 
brought  out.  Whether  in  the  Navy  formal  request  has  been  made  by  any  naval 
officer  for  a  court  martial  I  am  not  in  position  to  say,  though  the  newspapers 
have  cai'ried  stories  that  such  a  request  has  been  made. 

But  if  it  were  possible  or  appropriate,  Mr.  President,  to  subject  high-ranking 
military  or  naval  officers  to  courts  martial,  tbe  trials  might  be  conducted   iu 


12  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

secret,  and  would  relate  themselves  principally,  if  not  entirely,  to  the  guilt  or 
innocence  of  the  person  against  whx)m  the  specific  charges  were  leveled.  I  do 
not  here  feel  called  upon  or  competent  to  determine  whether  court  martial 
should  be  inaugurated  in  any  case  involving  any  officer  of  the  Army  or  Navy 
or  any  person  in  the  armed  forces. 

But  I  am  convinced  that  the  Congress  and  the  country  desire  an  open,  public 
investigation  which  will  produce  the  facts,  and  all  the  facts,  so  far  as  it  is 
humanly  possible  to  produce  them. 

Such  an  investigation  should  be  conducted  as  a  public  duty  and  a  public 
service. 

It  should  be  conducted  without  partisanship  or  favoritism  toward  any  respon- 
sible official,  military,  naval,  or  civilian,  high  or  low,  living  or  dead. 

It  should  be  conducted  in  an  atmosphere  of  judicial  responsibility,  and  it 
ought  to  be  so  complete  and  so  fair  that  u,o  person  could  doubt  the  good  faith  of 
the  report  and  the  findings  made  in  it,  or  those  who  make  it. 

It  ought  not  to  be  conducted  or  undertaken  for  the  purpose  or  with  the  sole 
view  of  vindicating  or  aspersing  any  man  now  in  office,  or  who  has  been  in  office 
during  the  period  involved. 

It  ought  not  to  be  undertaken  or  conducted  for  the  purpose  of  enhancing  or 
retarding  the  welfare  of  any  political  party,  or  any  person  now  in  office,  or  any 
person  who  desires  or  aspires  to  hold  public  office. 

It  should  not  be  conducted  for  the  purpose  of  attempting  to  bedaub  the  escut- 
cheon of  any  innocent  man,  high  or  low,  living  or  dead,  with  the  infamy  of 
Imputed  wrong. 

It  should  not  be  conducted  with  the  purpose  of  gratifying  the  misanthropic 
hatreds  of  any  person  toward  any  present  or  past  public  servant,  high  or  low, 
living  or  dead. 

It  should  not  be  conducted  for  the  purpose  of  casting  aspersions  upon  the 
names  and  records  of  men  who  have  rendered  outstanding  service  to  their  coun- 
try and  to  the  world ;  nor  should  it  be  conducted  for  the  purpose  of  whitewashing 
any  person  who  may  have  been  guilty  of  wrongdoing  in  connection  with  the 
whole  affair. 

Such  an  investigation  should  look  solely  to  the  ascertainment  of  the  cold,  un- 
varnished, indisputable  facts  so  far  as  they  are  obtainable,  not  only  for  the 
purpose  of  fixing  responsibility,  whether  that  responsibility  be  upon  an  individual 
or  a  group  of  individuals,  or  upon  a  system  under  which  they  operated  or  co- 
operated, or  failed  to  do  either.  It  should  be  conducted  with  a  view  of  ascertain- 
ing whether,  in  view  of  what  happened  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  prior  thereto,  or  even 
subsequent  thereto,  it  might  be  useful  to  us  in  legislating  in  regard  to  the  oper- 
ations of  our  military  and  naval  forces  and  the  executive  departments  having 
control  of  them,  or  which  are  supposed  to  work  with  them. 

In  my  opinion  this  investigation  should  be  a  joint  effort  of  the  two  Houses  of 
Congress.  If  the  two  Houses  should  undertake  separately  to  investigate,  going 
their  separate  ways,  the  result  might  be  divergent  reports  made  by  the  two 
Houses,  which  would  .contribute  to  further  confusion  in  the  minds  of  the  public, 
as  well  as  in  the  minds  of  Members  of  Congress.  Whatever  the  findings  may 
be,  they  will  carry  more  weight  and  bear  greater  authority  if  both  Houses  of 
Congress  jointly  and  concurrently  conduct  the  investigation. 

For  these  reasons,  Mr.  President,  acting  in  my  capacity  as  a  Member  of  the 
Senate  and  in  my  capacity  as  majority  leader  of  this  body,  I  am  submitting  a 
concurrent  resolution  directing  such  an  investigation  by  a  joint  committee  of  the 
two  Houses,  consisting  of  five  Members  from  each  House,  no  more  than  three  of 
whom  shall  be  members  of  the  majority  party,  to  be  appointed  by  the  respective 
Presiding  Officers  of  the  two  Houses,  with  all  the  authority  they  will  need ;  and, 
in  order  that  there  may  be  no  unnecessary  delay  in  making  the  investigation  and 
the  report  to  Congress,  directing  that  such  report  be  made  not  later  than  Janu- 
ary 3,  1946. 

It  is  now  nearly  4  years  since  disaster  occurred  at  Pearl  Harbor.  During 
the  war,  for  certain  military  reasons,  it  was  deemed  inexpedient  to  do  what  I  am 
now  proposing.  I  believe  that  that  decision  on  the  part  of  the  Congress  and  the 
Government  as  a  whole  was  a  wise  decision.  But  the  war  is  now  over,  and  there 
is  no  military  reason  of  which  I  am  cognizant  which  would  make  it  advisable 
any  longer  to  delay  a  complete  revelation  of  all  the  facts  and  circumstances 
leading  up  to  this  disaster,  and  the  events  which  occurred  while  it  was  in  progress. 
Mr.  Pi-esident,  I  am  submitting  this  resolution  with  the  full  knowledge  and 
approval  of  the  President  of  United  States.  After  I  had  studied  the  reports 
and  made  up  my  own  mind  as  to  what  ray  duty  was,  I  called  upon  the  President 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  13 

and  discussed  the  matter  with  him,  because  obviously  I  would  uot  waut  to  take 
such  a  step  without  discussing  it  with  him  or  at  least  letting  him  know  what  I  had 
in  mind  and  what  I  thought  about  it.  He  not  only  approved  but  urged  that  I  be  not 
dissuaded  for  any  reason  from  my  purpose  to  submit  the  resolution  calling  for  this 
investigation. 

Also,  since  the  preparation  of  the  resolution,  I  have  discussed  the  matter  with 
the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  I  have  his  assurance  that  if 
and  when  the  Senate  acts  upon  the  concurrent  resolution,  it  will  receive  prompt 
consideration  by  the  House. 

Mr.  President,  I  express  the  earnest  hope,  which  the  President  shares,  that 
the  two  Houses  may  promptly  agree  to  the  resolution ;  that  the  investigation 
may  proceed  forthwith,  without  further  delay ;  and  that  the  Congress  and  the 
country  may  expect  a  full  and  impartial  report,  without  regard  to  the  conse- 
quences, within  the  time  limit  designated  in  the  I'esolution.  I  send  the  resolution 
to  the  desk  and  ask  that  it  be  read  and  appropriately  referred. 

[S^c]         Mr.  Fekguson.  Mr.  President,  will  the  Senator  yield? 

Mr.  Bakkxet.  I  yield. 

Mr.  Febguson.  I  think  it  would  be  appropriate  to  ask  that  the  concurrent  reso- 
lution be  immediately  considered  and  agreed  to. 

Mr.  Baekley.  That  is  what  I  had  in  mind.  I  should  like  to  ask  that  that  be 
done.  Under  the  rule,  a  resolution  providing  for  an  investigation  and  calling 
for  the  expenditure  of  funds  is  supposed  to  be  referred  to  a  standing  committee, 
reported  back,  and  then  referred  to  the  Committee  to  Audit  and  Control  the 
Contingent  Expenses  of  the  Senate.  Personally  I  should  like  to  obviate  those 
necessities,  and  I  suppose  it  could  be  done  by  unanimous  consent.  I  make  the 
parliamentary  inquiry  now  as  to  whether,  notwithstanding  the  rule,  the  Senate 
could,  by  unanimous  consent,  proceed  to  consider  and  agree  to  the  concurrent 
resolution. 

The  PBEsmENT  pro  tempore.     It  will  be  done  by  unanimous  consent. 

Mr.  Ferguson.  Mr.  President,  will  the  Senator  further  yield? 

Mr.  Baekley.  I  yield. 

Mr.  Febguson.  I  ask  unanimous  consent  for  the  present  consideration  of  the 
concurrent  resolution. 

Mr.  Bakkley.  I  think  it  would  be  appropriate  to  read  the  resolution  first,  for 
the  information  of  the  Senate.  If  I  could  obtain  unanimous  consent  for  its 
present  consideration,  I  should  be  extremely  happy. 

The  Pbesident  pro  tempore.  The  concurrent  resolution  will  be  read  for  the 
information  of  the  Senate. 

The  concurrent  resolution  ( S.  Con.  Res.  27)  was  read  as  follows  : 

"Resolved  by  the  Senate  {the  House  of  Representatives  concurring) ,  That  there 
is  hereby  established  a  joint  committee  on  the  investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor 
attack  to  be  composed  of  five  Members  of  the  Senate  (not  more  than  three  of 
whom  shall  be  members  of  the  majority  party),  to  be  appointed  by  the  President 
pro  tempore,  and  five  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  (not  more  than 
three  of  whom  shall  be  members  of  the  majority  party),  to  be  appointed  by  the 
Speaker  of  the  House.  Vacancies  in  the  membership  of  the  committee  shall 
not  affect  the  power  of  the  remaining  members  to  execute  the  functions  of  the 
committee,  and  shall  be  filled  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  the  original 
selection.  The  committee  shall  select  a  chairman  and  a  vice  chairman  from 
among  its  members. 

Sec.  2.  The  committee  shall  make  a  full  and  complete  investigation  of  the 
facts  relating  to  the  attack  made  by  Japanese  armed  forces  upon  Pearl  Harbor 
in  the  Territory  of  Hawaii  on  December  7,  1941,  and  shall  report  to  the  Senate 
and  the  House  of  Representatives  not  later  than  .January  3,  1946,  the  results  of 
its  investigation,  together  with  such  recommendations  as  it  may  deem  advisable. 

"Sec.  3.  The  testimony  of  any  person  in  the  armed  services,  and  the  fact  that 
such  person  testified  before  the  joint  committee  herein  provided  for,  shall  not 
be  used  against  him  in  any  court  proceeding,  or  held  against  him  in  examining 
his  military  status  for  credits  in  the  service  to  which  he  belongs. 

"Sec.  4.  (a)  The  committee,  or  any  duly  authorized  subcommittee  thereof,  is 
authorized  to  sit  and  act  at  such  places  and  times  during  the  sessions,  recesses, 
and  adjourned  periods  of  the  Seventy-ninth  Congress  (prior  to  January  3,  1946), 
to  require  by  subpena  or  otherwise  the  attendance  of  such  witnesses  and  the 
production  of  such  books,  papers,  and  documents,  to  administer  such  oaths,  to 
take  such  testimony,  to  procure  such  printing  and  binding,  and  to  make  such 
expenditures  as  it  deems  advisable.  The  cost  of  stenographic  services  to  report 
such  hearings  shall  not  be  in  excess  of  25  cents  per  hundred  words. 

70716— 46— pt.  1 4 


14  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

"(b)  The  committee  is  empowered  to  appoint  and  fix  the  compensation  of 
such  experts,  consultants,  and  clerical  and  stenographic  assistants  as  it  deems 
necessary,  but  the  compensation  so  fixed  sliall  not  exceed  the  compensation 
prescribed  under  the  Classification  Act  of  1923,  as  amended,  for  comparable 
duties. 

"(c)  The  expenses  of  the  committee,  which  shall  not  exceed  $25,0(X),  shall  be 
paid  one-half  from  the  contingent  fund  of  the  Senate  and  one-half  from  the 
contingent  fund  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  upon  vouchers  signed  by  the 
chairman." 

Mr.  Barkley.  Mr.  President,  in  view  of  the  Chair's  ruling  that  the  concurrent 
resolution  may  now  be  considered  by  unanimous  consent,  without  reference  to 
a  committee,  I  ask  unanimous  consent  for  the  present  consideration  of  the  con- 
current resolution  and  for  its  immediate  adoption. 

The  PitEsiDENT  pro  tempore.  Is  there  objection  to  the  request  of  the  Senator 
from  Kentucky? 

Mr.  White,  Mr.  Ferguson,  and  Mr.  Lucas  addressed  the  Chair. 
The  President  pro  tempore.  Does  the  Senator  from  Kentucky  yield;  and  if 
so.  to  whom? 

Mr.  Baukley.  I  yield  to  the  Senator  from  Maine.  I  have  promised  to  yield 
to  the  Senator  from  Michigan,  and  later  I  shall  yield  to  the  Senator  from 
Illinois. 

Mr.  WHrrE.  Mr.  President,  in  all  ordinary  circumstances  I  should  be  moved 
to  object  to  such  a  request  as  has  been  made,  for  I  think  that  by  and  large  we 
progress  most  wisely  if  we  observe  the  rules  of  the  Senate  as  to  procedure  in 
this  body.  But  I  believe  there  is  so  nearly  unanimous  sentiment  of  approval 
in  this  Chamber  in  respect  to  a  resolution  similar,  if  not  identical,  to  that  offered 
by  the  Senator  from  Kentucky  that  I  have  no  purpose  to  object. 

I  do  wish  to  say,  Mr.  President,  that  I  know  of  at  least  one  resolution  of 
similar  purport  prepared  by  a  Senator  uimmi  this  side  of  the  aisle  whose  pur- 
pose it  was  to  introduce  it  at  some  proper  time,  but  I  take  it  that  the  two 
resolutions  are  not  dissimilar  in  their  object.  Their  purpose  is  the  same;  and 
so  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  am  not  going  to  object  to  the  request  made  by  the 
Senator  from  Kentucky.  I  think  the  Senate  overwhelmingly  approves  the 
purpose  of  his  resolution  and  of  his  request. 
Mr.  Bakkley.  I  thank  the  Senator. 

Mr.  Ferguson.  Mr.  President 

Mr.  Barkley.  I  yield  now  to  the  Senator  from  Michigan. 

Mr.  Ferguson.  Mr.  President,  I  had  prepared  to  offer  a  concurrent  resolu- 
tion nearly  identical  in  terms  to  the  concurrent  resolution  which  is  now  befdre 
the  Senate.  I  merely  had  in  mind  that  probably  seven  Members  from  each 
House  would  be  better  becau.se  of  the  question  of  attendance,  but  I  should  like 
in  the  time  of  the  Senator  from  Kentucky  to  say  a  few  things  now  in  relation 
to  why  I  believe  a  resolution  such  as  the  one  which  has  just  been  read  should 
[S^d]        immediately  be  adopted. 

Mr.  Barkley.  Mr.  President,  if  the  Senator  will  permit  me  to  do  so,  I  shovdd 
like  to  make  a  remark  in  regard  to  his  attitude  and  situation.  I  appreciate  his 
attitude  and  his  cooperation.  I  did  not  know  that  he  contemplated  the  in- 
troduction of  a  resolution  until  I  saw  mention  of  it  in  the  newspapers  last 
night.  But  in  the  meantime  I  had  already  prepared  mine  and,  as  I  have  said, 
I  had  conferred  with  the  President  and  with  others  about  it.  So  it  was  not 
prepared  and  offered  in  any  way  for  the  purpose  of  interfering  with  the  in- 
troduction of  any  other  resolution.  But  I  felt  probably  it  should  be  offered  and 
considered  and,  if  possible,  adopted  immediately.  So  that  the  country  will  un- 
derstand that  the  Senate,  and.  I  am  sure,  the  House  of  Representatives,  feel 
that  they  owe  a  public  duty  to  go  into  this  whole  matter;  and  I  wish  the 
Senator  from  Michigan  and  all  other  Senators  to  know  that  I  deeply  appreciate 
the  cooperation  which  seems  evident  in  regard  to  the  matter. 

Mr.  Ferguson.  Mr.  President,  I  appreciate  and  I  understand  the  situation. 
It  is  not  a  question  as  to  who  introduces  or  offers  the  resolution,  but  it  is  a 
matter  of  having  the  job  done.  I  should  like  to  make  a  few  remarks  at  this 
time  regarding  why  I  believe  such  a  resolution  should  be  adopted. 

At  the  very  outset  I  want  to  make  clear  precisely  what  I  think  should  be 
investigated.  The  question  is  why  our  Army  and  Navy  were  not  able  either 
to  avoid  or  to  cope  with  the  initial  attack  launched  by  the  Japanese  at  Pearl 
Harbor.  Everybod.v — those  who  opposed  the  war  and  those  who  favored  it 
— was  shocked  at  the  swift  liquidation  of  our  Pacific  naval  strength ;    I  ahi 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  15 

sure  that  everybody,  men  of  every  point  of  view — will  agree  that  we  ought  to 
have  the  whole  truth  about  this  unfortunate  event.  The  only  question  is  as  to 
how  this  inquiry  should  be  made. 

I  am  sure  that  no  one  will  question  that  some  inquiry  is  necessary.  The 
President  of  the  United  States  dispatched  Secretary  Knox  to  Hawaii  immedi- 
ately after  the  battle  to  investigate,  because  he  felt  the  people  ought  to  know 
the  truth.  In  5  days  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  was  back  with  his  report. 
He  said: 

■'The  United  States  services  were  not  on  the  alert  against  the  surprise  air 
attack  on  Hawaii.  This  fact  calls  for  a  formal  investigation  which  will  be 
initiated  immediately  by  the  President.  Further  action  Is,  of  course,  dependent 
on  the  facts  and  recommendations  made  by  this  investigating  board.  We  are 
all  entitled  to  know  it  if  (a)  there  was  any  error  of  judgment  which  con- 
tributed to  the  surprise,  (b)  if  there  was  any  dereliction  of  duty  prior  to  the 
attack." 

Only  a  few  days  later,  the  President  named  a  commission  of  five,  headed 
by  Justice  Owen  J.  Roberts,  to  go  to  Hawaii  and  make  a  fuller  investigation. 
However,  the  Executive  order  for  the  Roberts  inquiry  read  as  follows  : 

"The  purposes  of  the  required  inquiry  and  report  are  to  provide  bases  for 
sound  decisions  whether  any  dereliction  of  duty  or  errors  of  judgment  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  Army  or  Navy  personnel" — 

We  in  the  Senate  must  note  that  it  referred  just  to  Army  or  Navy  personnel — 
"contributed  to  such  successes  as  were  achieved  by  the  enemy  on  the  occasion 
mentioned;  and,  if  so,  what  these  derelictions  or  errors  were,  and  who  were 
responsible  therefor." 

That  meant  that  the  commission  could  go  only  into  the  question  of  dereliction  of 
duty  or  error  of  judgment  of  the  Army  and  Navy  personnel. 

The  report  of  that  commission  became  a  subject  of  endless  discussion  and 
questioning. 

The  last  report  of  the  War  Department  said  that  their  Board  had  made  a 
careful  review  of  the  record  and  exhibits  of  the  Roberts  commission.  It  further 
said  that  the  Board  had  been  materially  helped  and  enlightened  by  the  report  and 
record  of  the  Roberts  commission,  and  that  "we  append  to  this  report  a  section 
indicating  the  additional  information  and  documents  which  have  been  made 
available  as  a  result  of  our  extended  investigation,  and  which  probably  did  not 
come  to  the  attention  of  the  Roberts  commission ;  or  at  least  were  not  mentioned 
in  either  the  testimony,  documents,  or  report  of  the  Roberts  commission." 

In  June  1944  Congress  by  resolution  directed  the  Army  and  Navy  to  proceed 
forthwith  with  an  investigation  into  the  facts  surrounding  the  catastrophe  of 
December  7,  1941.  Under  that  aiithority  the  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board  and  the 
Navy  Court  of  Inquiry  filed  their  reports  in  October  1944.  That  was  9  months 
ago.  But  the  nature  of  their  findings  was  not  made  known  until  last  week.  This 
delay  in  turn  created  the  impression  in  many  minds  that  something  wajs  being 
suppressed.  I  do  not  wish  to  make  any  criticism  of  this  myself.  It  can  be  argued 
that  it  would  have  been  unwise  to  publish  these  findings  while  we  were  still 
engaged  in  active  warfare  and  when  unity  of  purpose  and  spirit  against  the 
enemy  was  essential.  Some  persons  even  claimed  military  security  was  involved. 
Nevertheless,  men — being  what  they  are — had  their  curiosity  and  their  suspi- 
cions whetted  about  the  contents  of  these  reports  by  the  very  act  of  withholding 
them. 

I  am  sure  the  officers  charged  with  the  investigations  have  performed  their 
duties  with  a  full  sense  of  their  responsibilities.  Now  that  they  have  made 
known  their  conclusions  the  whole  situation  remains  more  clouded  than  ever. 

Returning  to  the  Army  report,  it  says  fiu'ther : 

"We  have  not  had  the  opportunity,  nor  the  organization,  to  comb  personally 
and  exhaustively  the  ofiicial  files,  but  we  have  called  for  the  pertinent  letters, 
documents,  and  memoranda.  We  believe  that  practically  all  of  them  have  been 
secured." 

We  note  that  they  do  not  say  that  all  have  been  secured,  but  that  "practically" 
all  have  been  secured,  "although  we  have  found  a  few  files  from  which  important 
and  vital  papers  are  missing.  In  many  instances  we  have  found  these  docu- 
ments elsewhere,  or  we  were  able  to  prove  them  through  copies  in  other  hands." 

This  quite  clearly  shows  that  the  Army  board  felt  the  investigation  was  not 
complete.     Neither  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  nor  the  Secretary  of  War  was 


16  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

satisfied  with  the  report  from  the  respective  boards.  When  the  Navy  report  was 
delivered  to  him  last  October,  Secretary  Forrestal  said : 

"The  Secretary  is  not  satisfied  that  the  investigation  has  gone  to  the  point  of 
exhaustion  of  all  possible  evidence.  Accordingly,  he  has  decided  that  his  own 
investigation  should  be  further  continued  until  the  testimony  of  every  witness  in 
possession  of  material  facts  can  be  obtained  and  all  possible  evidence  exhausted." 
[SJfe]  Last  October,  when  the  Army  report  was  delivered  to  him,  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  said : 

"In  accordance  with  the  opinion  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General,  I  have  de- 
cided that  my  o^\^l  investigation  should  be  further  continued  until  all  the  facts 
are  made  as  clear  as  possible,  and  until  the  testimony  of  every  witness  in  jws- 
session  of  material  fact  can  be  obtained,  and  I  have  given  the  necessary  direc- 
tion to  accomplish  this  result. 

Thex-eafter  the  Army  detailed  Lieutenant  Colonel  Clausen  of  the  United 
States  Army  to  continue  an  ex  parte  investigation  into  the  Pearl  Harbor  catas- 
trophe, and  the  Navy  Department  detailed  Vice  Adm.  Henry  K.  Hewitt  to  continue 
the  Navy  Department  investigation  as  an  ex  parte  investigation  into  the  catas- 
trophe. 

While  Admiral  Kimmel  was  entitled  to  counsel  and  to  take  part  in  the  pro- 
ceedings before  the  Navy  Board  of  Inquiry,  General  Short  was  entitled  to 
counsel  but  had  no  right  to  take  part  in  any  of  the  proceedings.  These  con- 
tinued investigations  made  by  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  Navy  have  not  been 
given  to  the  public.  There  is  no  evidence  that  the  continued  investigations 
dispose  of  the  conflict  between  the  two  reports  and  fix  the  responsibility  on  the 
basis  of  persuasive  evidence.  That  being  true.  Congress  must  try  to  find  out 
the  facts  for  the  public  and  for  itself.  The  two  boards  are  quite  far  from  being 
in  agreement,  and  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  have 
each  issued  critical  opinions  of  the  findings  of  their  own  boards. 

The  last  published  findings  have  added  to  the  list  of  the  accused  names  which 
are  still  more  eminent  than  those  of  Admiral  Kimmel  and  General  Short.  As 
matters  now  stand  Admiral  Stark,  who  was  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  at  the 
time  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack,  and  General  Marshall,  who  led  our  armies 
through  the  great  struggle  just  crowned  with  victory,  and  former  Secretary  of 
State  Cordell  Hull,  have  been  held  to  share  in  the  guilt  of  the  defeat.  The 
President  of  the  United  States  has  agreed  with  some  of  the  findings  and  has 
disagreed  with  others. 

Certainly  no  responsible  statesman  will  quarrel  with  the  curiosity  of  the 
people  about  this  now  badly  confused  episode.  The  curiosity  of  the  people 
about  their  public  affairs  is  the  scfle  bulwark  of  a  republican  government.  There 
are  too  few  nations  left  in  which  there  is  a  public  opinion.  This  court  of  public 
opinion  is  a  valuable  institution  in  the  United  States,  and  must  be  able  to 
function. 

It  is  a  citizen's  duty  to  be  curious.  But  it  is  also  his  right  to  have  the  whole 
truth  about  even  small  matters,  and,  of  course,  for  a  greater  reason  to  have 
the  whole  truth  about  a  subject  which  has  cost  so  much  in  the  blood  of  our 
sons,  and  the  treasure  of  our  people. 

But  there  is  still  another  force  to  be  recognized  here.  I  refer  to  the  Ameri- 
can's sense  of  fair  play.  It  is  a  powerful  feature  of  our  national  character. 
First,  we  had  two  distinguished  officers  who  were  accused  of  neglect  of  duty, 
and  removed  from  their  commands.  Everyone  expected  they  would  be  tried. 
But  they  have  never  been  tried.  And  because  they  are  officers  of  the  armed  serv- 
ices they  are  not  at  liberty  to  talk  up  with  the  same  freedom  possessed  by  an 
accused  private  citizen.  They  have  not  had  a  trial  and  they  have  not  even 
had  the  opportunity  of  defending  their  honor  in  the  public  press.  I  do  not 
want  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  conditions  which  may  have  made  this 
possible. 

The  only  point  I  want  to  make  is  that  our  Government  cannot  behave  in  this 
way  without  creating  in  the  minds  of  the  masses  of  our  people  a  feeling  of 
sympathy  for  these  men.  Our  Government  cannot  afford  to  do  this  sort  of 
thing.  To  do  so  violates  a  fundamental  principle  of  conduct  which  our  boys  and 
girls  learn  in  the  very  first  years  of  their  schooling,  namely,  the  great  prin- 
ciple of  American  fair  play.  It  violates  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  right 
of  the  accused  to  a  fair  trial  with  the  opportunity  of  presenting  his  side  in 
public. 

Every  consideration — the  demands  of  public  policy,  the  obligation  of  justice  to 
the  men  who  fell  in  the  battle,  the  duty  of  fair  play  to  those  who  have  been 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  17 

accused— cries  out  for  some  foi-m  of  inquiry  which  will  bring  to  light  the 
whole  truth. 

Here  we  have  Cordell  Hull,  a  distinguished  former  Member  of  this  body, 
publicly  and  officially  charged  with  a  dereliction  of  duty,  partly  responsible  for 
the  loss  of  thousands  of  lives.  We  cannot  subject  him  to  a  court  martial,  but 
we  must  not  permit  that  stain  to  remain  on  his  name  without  invoking  all  the 
powers  of  the  Government  to  uncover  all  the  facts.  He  is  entitled  to  have  those 
facts  produced.  He  is  entitled  to  more  than  mere  conclusions  based  on  part  of 
the  facts.  All  the  facts  cannot  be  produced  by  an  Army  court  martial  of  Gen- 
eral Short,  or  a  naval  court  martial  of  Admiral  Kimmel.  The  Pearl  Harbor 
tragedy  was  a  single  great  episode  in  which  many  services,  such  as  the  Army, 
the  Navy,  and  the  State  Department  participated.  The  controversy  relating  to 
the  subject  cannot  be  settled  by  a  group  of  trials  and  inquiries  in  which  each 
service  will  be  the  judge  of  its  own  actions.  There  is  in  the  Government  no 
agency  capable  of  examining  the  whole  chapter  and  compelling  the  production 
of  all  the  facts,  except  the  Congress  of  the  United  Stntes. 

What  is  true  of  Mr.  Hull  is  true  of  General  Marshall.  He  has  presided  over 
our  military  forces  in  the  greatest  war  of  our  history,  and  has,  in  the  public  mind, 
managed  that  great  task  with  courage  and  ability,  and  certainly  with  success. 
On  the  very  day  of  final  victory  he  is  confronted  with  the  judgment  of  an 
Army  board  that  the  catastrophe  at  Pearl  Harbor,  which  began  the  war,  was 
due  in  part  to  his  failure  to  perform  his  duty.  We  cannot  leave  that  slur  upon 
the  name  of  General  Marshall  without  giving  him  the  full  benefit  of  a  complete 
and  unprejudiced  publication  of  every  fact.  Here  again  we  cannot  do  it  in  a 
court  martial.  General  Marshall  ought  not  to  have  to  submit  to  a  court  martial, 
For  if  he  escapes  the  judgment  of  any  Army  court  martial  he  may  run  into  n 
verdict  of  guilty  against  him  in  the  eyes  of  the  public  by  a  Navy  court  martial  of 
Admiral  Kimmel,  where  he  would  have  no  right  to  defend  himself. 

All  these  men.  Secretary  Hull,  General  Marshall,  Admiral  Stark,  Admiral  Kim- 
mel, and  General  Short,  have  an  inescapable  claim  upon  the  conscience  of 
the  American  people  for  a  full  and  honest  inquiry  into  the  whole  incident,  and 
tliat  such  inquiry  be  conducted  by  a  Congress  which  will  proceed  in  the  opeii. 
with  full  opportunity  for  every  side  to  participate  in  the  proceedings. 

I  do  not  see  how  Congress  can  ignore  the  things  that  are  being  said  through- 
out the  country  about  all  this  subject.  Newspapers  and  magazines  have  offered 
their  versions  of  this  distressful  event,  and  millions  of  people  have  read  The 
accounts.  Whether  they  are  true  or  false  is  not  the  question  here.  Some  of  f  hen^ 
are  certainly  not  true,  because  the  numerous  versions  themselves  contradict 
each  other  quite  as  freely  as  do  the  official  versions.  But  this  subject  is  one 
which  must  be  set  straight,  and  I  can  think  of  no  way  to  do  so  except  by  a  con- 
gressional investigation,  and  because  it  is  so  important,  nothing  less  than  a  com- 
mittee which  represents  both  Houses  of  Congress  should  make  the  inquiry. 

The  reason  why  this  inquiry  is  needed  is  as  I  have  pointed  out.  The  Roberts 
inquiry  was  limited  by  the  Executive  order.  The  Army  report  covers  304  pages, 
but  when  we  reach  page  241  it  jumps  suddenly  to  page  294.  A  whole  chapter 
of  52  pages  of  the  Army  board's  findings  has  been  omitted  by  order  of  Secretary 
Stimson.  The  Navy  report  contains  a  clause  which  indicates  that  the  Navy 
board  of  inquiry  was  directed  to  leave  out  certain  testimony.  In  fact,  the  Navy 
board  said : 

[34n  "The  details  of  this  information  are  not  discussed  or  analyzed  in 
these  findings,  the  court  having  been  informed  that  their  disclosure  would  militate 
against  the  successful  prosecution  of  the  war." 

This  tells  us  plainly  that  the  Army  board  of  review  and  Navy  court  of  inquiry 
left  these  details  out  not  on  their  own  motion  but  under  orders  from  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  and  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  Let  us  concede  that  there  may  have  been 
a  reason  for  omitting  this  testimony  during  the  war ;  there  is  certainly  no  reason 
for  hiding  it  now.  It  is  unthinkable  that  the  Congress  and  the  public  shall  not 
have  access  to  this  testimony  in  order  to  appraise  justly  the  correctness  of  the 
findings  of  the  Army  board  and  Navy  court  of  inquiry. 

There  are  points  of  serious  difference  between  the  Army  and  Navy  board  re- 
ports. For  example,  one  of  them  fixes  the  date  when  General  Marshall  and  Ad- 
miral Stark  petitioned  the  President  that  no  ultimatum  be  issued  to  Japan  as  of 
November  5,  the  other  as  of  November  27 — a  very  vital  dilTerence. 

A  congressional  investigation  is  the  only  means  of  producing  all  the  facts. 
All  we  have  now  are  the  conclusions  of  the  Roberts  commission  and  the  conclu- 


18  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

sions  of  the  Army  and  Navy  commissions,  but  the  public  has  been  denied  all  the 
facts  and  testimony  on  which  these  are  based. 

There  is  a  feature  of  these  reports  which  is  certain  to  impair  public  confi- 
dence in  them  regardless  of  their  internal  soundness.  In  this  whole  episode 
not  only  the  conduct  of  the  leading  commanders  but  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  the  Secretary  of  State  is  involved.  The  press  has  al- 
ready caught  the  significance  of  who  was  responsible  for  appointing  the  Army 
board  and  the  Navy  court  of  inquiry.  It  has  been  noted  that  neither  report 
makes  any  criticism  of  the  Secretary  of  War  or  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  bur 
that  the  Army  report  goes  out  of  its  way  to  castigate  the  Secretary  of  State,  who 
had  no  hand  in  appointing  his  judges.  These  are  reasons  why  neither  the  Army, 
the  Navy,  nor  the  State  Department,  or  any  tribunals  within  them,  should  make 
the  final  investigations.  It  is  also  a  reason  why  courts  martial  cannot  properly 
determine  all  the  facts  of  this  case.  Actually  this  is  no  longer  a  case  where  Kim- 
mel  and  Short,  Marshall  and  Stark,  Stimsou  and  Knox  and  Hull,  along  with 
various  subordinate  commanders  of  both  services,  are  on  trial.  Stated  more  cor- 
rectly, the  case  brings  in  the  responsibilities  of  so  many  that  what  we  have  on 
trial  is  the  Army,  the  Navy,  and  the  State  Department,  and  only  Congress  has 
the  authority  to  find  all  the  facts. 

The  Army  report  puts  blame  on  General  Marshall  and  Secretary  Hull.  The 
Secretary  of  War  criticizes  the  findings  of  his  own  board  and  disagrees  with  the 
verdict  against  General  Marshall.  The  President  of  the  United  States  approved 
the  verdict  in  part  and  criticized  it  in  part.  He  dissented  from  the  criticism  of 
Secretary  Hull  and  General  Mai-shall.  As  disclosed  by  the  Army  report,  Mr. 
Stimson  furnished  most  of  the  testimony  against  Secretary  Hull.  Secretai'y 
Stimson  declares  that  Hull  gave  the  Japanese  an  ultimatum  on  November  26, 
while  Secretary  Hull  stoutly  denies  this. 

Whatever  point  there  may  be  in  these  differences,  which  are  merely  samples 
which  come  to  mind,  the  fact  remains  that  a  great  deal  of  information  which  has 
been  withheld  because  the  war  was  raging  at  top  height  9  months  ago  must  now 
be  made  public. 

If  we,  the  Congress,  do  not  do  this,  history  will  do  it,  and  will  also  appraise  our 
neglect. 

Mr.  Lucas  and  Mr.  White  addressed  the  Chair. 

The  President  pro  tempore.  Does  the  Senator  from  Kentucky  yield,  and  if  so, 
to  whom? 

Mr.  BAKKI.EY.  I  yield  to  the  Senator  from  Illinois. 

Sir.  Lucas.  Mr.  President,  I  should  like  to  make  an  inquiry  with  respect  to  the 
concurrent  resolution.     In  section  2  I  find  the  following : 

"The  committee  shall  make  a  full  and  complete  investigation  of  the  facts  relat- 
ing to  the  attack  made  by  Japanese  armed  forces  upon  Pearl  Harbor  in  the  Terri- 
tory of  Hawaii  on  December  7,  1941." 

I  should  like  to  ask  the  able  majority  leader  whether  or  not  he  considers  that 
under  this  resolution  the  committee  would  have  the  power  to  investigate,  let  us 
say,  what  took  place  at  Wake  Island  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  December  1941, 
or  what  took  place  in  the  Philippines  on  December  7,  1941,  or  the  following  day. 
In  other  words,  are  we  going  into  the  investigation  of  what  transpired  in  the 
Pacific  on  December  7,  1941,  or  does  the  concurrent  resolution  confine  the  investi- 
gation solely  to  what  happened  at  Pearl  Harbor?  Would  the  committee  be  able 
to  make  further  investigation  as  to  what  happened  in  the  Pacific  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Baekley.  In  answer  to  the  question  .propounded  by  the  Senator,  in  my 
opinion  the  language  of  the  concurrent  resolution  is  broad  enough  to  permit  the 
committee  to  investigate  anything  which  happened  prior  to  the  attack  at  Pearl 
Harbor,  or  led  up  to  it,  the  circumstances  which  produced  it,  as  well  as  the  conse- 
quences of  the  attack.  I  realize  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  include  in  a  single 
resolution  reference  to  all  the  islands  in  the  Pacific  which  were  attacked  either 
concurrently  with  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  or  shortly  thereafter.  The  attack 
on  Pearl  Harbor  was  the  attack  which  precipitated  the  war,  which  brought  us  into 
the  war,  and  all  the  controversy  has  revolved  around  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 
But  I  use  the  language  "relating  to  the  attack"  so  as  to  make  it  possible  for  the 
committee  to  investigate  anything  which  took  place  prior  to  it,  or  any  of  the  con- 
sequences which  may  have  fiowed  from  the  attack.  The  Philippine  attack,  the 
Guam  attack,  and  the  Wake  Island  attack  were  all  within  a  radius  of  a  few  liours, 
and  they  were  related  to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor.  So  I  think  the  language  is 
sufiiciently  broad  to  cover  those  attacks. 

Mr.  White.  What  the  Senator  from  Kentucky  has  just  said  about  the  language 
"relating  to  the  attack  made  by  Japanese  armed  forces  upon  Pearl  Harbor"  in 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  19 

part  answers  the  question  I  had  in  mind.  The  language  '"relating  to  the  attack 
made  by  Japanese  armed  forces  upon  Pearl  Harbor  on  December  7,  1941"'  is  in 
itself  rather  restricting.  But  the  Senator  has  said  it  is  his  intention,  and  lie 
thinks  it  is  within  the  authority  of  the  resolution,  to  have  an  investigation  of  all 
the  facts  and  all  the  circumstances  and  all  the  events  preceding  the  day  of  the 
attack  upon  Pearl  Harbor  which  had  any  relation  to  that  tragic  day's  events,  and 
also  anything  which  may  have  happened  subsequent  thereto  which  throws  any 
light  upon  the  occurrences  preceding  December  7  and  happening  on  that  day. 

Mr.  Barkley.  The  Senator  from  Maine  is  absolutely  correct.  Anything  which 
relates  itself  to  the  attack,  whether  it  occurred  prior  to  the  attack  or  whether  it 
grew  out  of  tlie  attack,  all  has  to  do  with  the  attack,  because  without  that  attack 
presumably  we  would  not  at  that  time  have  been  involved  in  the  war,  we  would 
not  have  declared  war  on  the  following  day.  The  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  was  the 
key  attack  of  the  Japanese  armed  forces  in  that  area,,  and  these  other  attacks  were 
incidental  to  it.  So  I  think  they  all  relate  to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  whether 
they  happened  prior  to  it  or  after  that  attack. 

Mr.  White.  And  the  resolution  gives  practically  plenary  powers  of  investiga- 
tion with  respect  to  all  matters  which  occurred  before  the  time  of  Pearl  Harbor 
or  thereafter,  which  relate  in  any  way  to  the  occurrence  of  the  attack? 

Mr.  Barkley.  Yes.  Whether  those  things  happened  in  Washington,  or  whether 
they  happened  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  or  whether  they  happened  in  Japan, 
or  whether  they  happened  anywhere  else  in  the  world — if  they  relate  themselves, 
prior  to  or  subsequently,  to  the  attack,  the  committee  can  go  into  them.  I  think 
the  language  is  broad  enough  to  permit  that, 

Mr.  Taft.  Mr.  President,  will  the  Senator  yield? 
[34ff]         Mr.  Barkley.  I  yield. 

Mr.  Taft.  I  have  some  doubt  whether  the  resolution  should  not  be  amended 
to  be  somewhat  broader,  to  include  the  Philippines ;  to  include,  so  to  speak,  the 
Japanese  attack  on  the  United  States.  I  assume  that  the  Senator's  remarks, 
however,  will  be  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  House  of  Representatives  when 
it  considers  the  resolution,  and  if  the  language  is  too  narrow  that  his  remarks 
may  have  the  effect  of  broadening  it. 

Mr.  Barkley.  Of  course,  the  Senator  realizes  that  I  have  no  pride  of  language. 
I  consulted  with  our  experts  in  the  framing  of  the  resolution,  and  it  was  thought 
that  its  terms  were  broad  enough  to  cover  anything  that  had  any  connection 
with  Pearl  Harbor.  Inasmuch  as  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  constituted  the 
key  event  or  episode  around  which  all  this  investigation  revolves,  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  committee  would  have  plenary  authority  to  go  into  any  matter  anywhere 
in  the  world  that  had  anything  to  do  with  it.  But  if  anyone  can  offer  better 
language  I  certainly  would  not  stand  in  opposition  to  it.  I  think,  however, 
the  language  is  broad  enough.  If  we  name  Wake  Island,  the  Philippines,  and 
some  other  place,  we  run  a  risk,  by  naming  more  than  the  Pearl  Harbor  incident, 
of  by  inference  excluding  other  things  that  the  committee  would  undoubtedly 
want  to  go  into. 

Mr.  Taft.  Mr.  President,  will  the  Senator  yield  further? 

Mr.  Barkley.  Yes. 

Mr.  Taft.  Does  the  Senator  consider  that  the  language  is  broad  enough  to  go 
back  to  the  beginning  of  the  war,  that  is,  I  mean  to  the  general  policy,  the  appli- 
cation of  the  Neutrality  Act.  the  shipment  of  scrap,  and  so  forth? 

Mr.  Barkley.  Yes.  I  think  it  is  broad  enough  to  go  back  to  the  Japanese 
invasion  of  Manchuria  or  to  any  other  period  in  past  history  that  can  in  any 
way  be  connected  with  or  related  to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

Mr.  Taft.  l\Ir.  President,  since  the  Senator  is  the  author  of  the  concurrent 
resolution,  and  since  that  is  his  interpretation  of  it.  I  am  willing  to  accept  that 
interpretation. 

I\Ir.  Ferguson.  Mr.  President,  will  the  Senator  yield? 

Mr.  Barkley.  I  yield. 

Mr.  Ferguson.  "The  language  I  had  prepared  was  that  "the  committee  shall 
make  a  full  and  complete  investigation  of  the  facts  surrounding  the  attack  and 
the  events  and  circumstances  leading  to  the  attack  made  by  the  Japanese  armed 
forces  on  the  Territory  of  Hawaii  December  7.  1941."  But  I  am  glad  to  have 
the  explanation  of  the  able  majority  leader  that  his  language  is  intended  to  cover 
this  entire  field.  I  think  that  the  battles  of  the  Philippines  and  of  Guam  and 
elsewhere  were  merely  battles  in  our  war. 

Mr.  Barkley.  We  were  practically  at  war  when  those  things  happened. 

IMr.  Ferguson.  Yes;  that  is  right.  The  .spark  was  ignited,  or  the  button  was 
pushed,  as  was  said  in  the  report,  by  the  attack  at  Pearl  Harbor. 


20  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Baekley.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  FEaiGusoN.  That  was  the  initial  attack. 

Mr.  Baeklet.  Yes. 

Mr.  Brewster.  Mr.  President,  will  the  Senator  yield? 

Mr.  Babkley.  I  yield. 

Mr.  Brewstehj.  I  wish  to  associate  myself  completely  with  what  the  Senator 
from  Kentucky  has  stated  today,  and  I  think  he  has  rendered  a  very  great  public 
service  to  his  country.  I  do  not  mean  to  intimate  any  doubt  as  to  the  concurrent 
resolution  .containing  language  properly  calculated  to  implement  what  the  Senator 
has  said. 

I  recognize,  however,  the  very  great  importance  of  what  we  are  doing,  and 
that,  under  well-settled  rules  of  parliamentary  construction,  the  language  of 
the  concurrent  resolution,  if  unambiguous,  must  control,  irrespective  of  the 
very  illuminating  discussions  here,  and  of  anything  which  the  Senator  himself 
may  have  said. 

I  do  feel  that,  having  delayed  4  years  the  consideration  of  this  matter  by  the 
Congress,  certainly  the  public  interest  will  not  be  seriously  prejudiced  if  we 
should  delay  24  hours,  and  send  the  concurrent  resolution  to  an  appropriate 
standing  committee  which  may  consider  this  whole  question  as  to  whether  or 
not  the  language  is  calculated  to  carry  out  what  is  obviously  the  unanimous 
desire  of  the  Senate. 

I  hesitate  to  be  the  only  Member  who  apparently  is  concerned,  but  I  frankly 
do  feel  that  this  matter  should  go  to  the  appropriate  standing  committee. 

Mr.  Barkley.  Mr.  President,  let  me  say  to  the  Senator  that  I  hope  nothing 
will  happen  today  in  the  Senate  which  will  create  the  impression  that  we  are 
quibbling  over  the  adoption  of  the  concurrent  resolution.  If  any  broadening  or 
any  change  might  have  to  be  made  to  the  language,  since  the  measure  must  go 
to  the  House,  I  myself  will  take  the  responsibility  of  conferring  with  the  Members 
of  the  House  who  will  be  interested  in  the  matter,  with  the  view  of  broadening 
the  language  as  may  seem  necessary ;  and  I  hope  the  Senator,  under  those  cir- 
cumstances, will  not  object  to  the  present  consideration  of  the  concurrent 
resolution. 

Mr.  Brewster.  Mr.  President,  I  frankly  do  not  possess  the  agility  of  mind 
which  is  possessed  by  the  95  other  Members  of  the  Senate  to  render  an  opinion 
from  the  very  hasty  consideration  given  this  matter  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate 
today,  as  to  whether  or  not  this  concurrent  resolution  implements  the  mar- 
velously  adequate  speech  of  the  Senator  from  Kentucky.  I  do  think  that  not 
only  his  interest  but  that  of  the  country  and  of  the  Senate  will  be  served  by  at 
least  pausing  to  consider  whether  or  not  this  concurrent  resolution  is  well  cal- 
culated to  carry  out  what  is  obviously  our  unanimous  purpose.  I  think  the 
suggestion  that  the  24  hours  delay,  which  is  all  that  would  be  required  to  send 
the  matter  to  an  appropriate  standing  committee,  cannot  have  great  weight. 

Mr.  Barkley.  Of  course  I  do  not  know  how  long  it  would  take  a  standing  com- 
mittee to  meet  and  deliberate  about  the  matter. 

Mr.  Brewster.  To  which  committee  does  the  Senator  from  Kentucky  consider 
the  matter  should  go? 

Mr.  Barkley.  It  would  go,  according  to  the  advice  I  have  received  from  the 
parliamentarian,  to  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs.  It  might  go  to  either  the 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs  or  to  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  but  inas- 
rrtuch  as  Pearl  Harbor  was  a  naval  base,  and  the  greater  proportion  of  the 
damage  was  done  to  the  Navy,  it  has  seemed  appropriate  that  it  go  to  the 
Committee  on  Naval  Affairs. 

Mr.  Brewster.  Well,  I  feel  that  certainly  that  committee  could  meet  quickly. 

Mr.  BARKLEY.  There  is  another  matter  Involved.  If  the  concurrent  resolution 
is  sent  to  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs  under  the  rule  and  comes  back  to 
the  Senate  it  must  then  go  to  the  Committee  to  Audit  and  Control  the  Contingent 
Expenses  of  the  Senate,  which  would  involve  further  delay.  I  think  no  sub- 
stantial loss,  either  in  the  matter  of  broadening  the  resolution,  or  anything 
connected  with  it,  would  be  incurred  by  allowing  it  to  be  adopted  now  without 
having  to  go  through  the  routine  of  two  committees  before  we  can  secure  action. 

Mr.  Brewster.  What  I  anticipate  will  ahnost  inevitably  occur,  if  the  proposed 
action  is  taken,  is  that  when  it  goes  to  the  House  the  scope  of  the  resolution  will 
there  be  broadened,  and  I  will  much  prefer  that  the  Senate  should  now  undertake 
to  place  in  the  concurrent  resolution  language  which  will  carry  out  what  is 
obviously  now  the  unanimous  desire  of  the  Senate,  rather  than  to  rely  on  the 
House  to  amend  language  which  may  be  deemed  as  not  entirely  clear,  particularly 
as  the  Members  of  the  House  will  not  have  the  benefit  of  the  very  splendid 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  21 

explanation  made  by  the  Senator  from  Kentucky  as  to  what  he  intends  by  the 
[34h]         resolution. 

Mr.  Baekley.  I  entertain  no  jealousy  on  my  part  toward  the  House  in  the 
matter  of  amending  anything  the  Senate  may  adopt.  We  frequently  exercise 
that  right  in  the  Senate.  If  the  House  should  see  lit  to  broaden  the  language, 
unless  it,  by  broadening  the  language,  thinned  it  out  and  watered  it  down,  I 
certainly  would  have  no  objection.  But  I  think  it  important  that  we  get  to 
work  on  this  job  at  once  without  creating  the  impression  that  we  are  seeking 
to  cause  delay,  through  any  technicalities,  or  through  any  effort  of  evasion, 
or  in  any  other  way. 

Mr.  Brewster.  I  certainly  share  the  desire  of  the  Senator  from  Kentucky 
for  expedition,  but  as  I  said  before,  having  waited  4  years,  I  am  certain  that 
we  can  safely  wait  4  days  more,  and  I  think  the  country  will  be  much  more  im- 
pressed with  the  deliberateness  of  our  consideration  if  that  course  is  taken. 

Mr.  Baekley.  I  do  not  think  the  country  will  have  any  doubt  about  our 
deliberateness.  We  have  been  talking  about  this  matter  ever  since  it  occurred. 
We  have  debated  it  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  time  and  time  again  in  connection 
with  the  extension  of  the  statute  of  limitations.  I  do  not  think  that  any  impres- 
sion of  hasty  action  on  our  part,  can  be  gotten  from  the  adoption  of  the  concurrent 
resolution  now.  I  think  it  would  be  a  wholesome  example  to  the  country  and  to 
every  one  concerned  if  we  could  handle  it  in  the  way  now  proposed. 

Mr.  Beewstek.  There  is  one  thing  about  the  language  which  gives  me  concern, 
and  which  I  should  certainly  like  to  consider.  The  language  is,  "the  facts 
relating  to  the  attack  by  O'apanese  armed  forces  upon  Pearl  Harbor  in  the  Terri- 
tory of  Hawaii."  As  I  understand,  a  very  intimate  part  of  that  attack  involved 
two  silk-hatted  gentlemen  who  spent  the  time  during  the  attack  with  Secretary 
Hull.  Whether  they  were  a  part  of  the  armed  forces  may  perhaps  be  a  matter 
of  debate.  I  believe  that  what  occurred  in  connection  with  all  those  events  is 
very  intimately  concerned  with  the  attack,  and  I  should  not  want  any  language 
to  be  calculated  to  limit  our  inquiry. 

Mr.  Baejkxey.  The  Senator  is  too  good  a  parliamentarian  and  too  good  a 
draftsman  to  assume  that  the  language  ought  to  be  amended  so  as  to  mention 
specifically  the  silk-hatted  gentlemen  to  whom  he  has  reference. 

Mr.  Brewstee.  But  I  do  not  like  to  exclude  them  by  saying  "Japanese  armed 
forces." 

Mr.  Baeklet.  They  are  not  excluded. 

Mr.  Beewsteb.  They  are  certainly  not  included  in  that  language. 

Mr.  Baekley.  The  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  occurred  while  they  were  here  carry- 
ing on  negotiations  with  the  Secretary  of  State.  The  Secretary  of  State  received 
notice  of  the  attack  while  they  were  in  his  office.  Certainly  that  circumstance  is 
related  to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

Mr.  Brewster.  I  think  it  might  well  be  a  debatable  question  as  to  whether  they 
are  included  within  the  term  "Japanese  armed  forces." 

Mr.  Baekley.  These  things  are  all  related  to  that  attack.  Whether  they  were 
members  of  the  armed  forces  or  not  is  not  very  important,  because  they  certainly 
did  not  themselves  make  the  attack  in  person  when  they  were  conferring  with  the 
Secretary  of  State  in  Washington. 

Mr.  Brewstee.  I  should  say  that  they  were  a  most  essential  element. 

Mr.  Vande2^berg.  Mr.  President,  will  the  Senator  yield? 

Mr.  Baekley.  I  yield. 

Mr.  Vandenberg.  The  language  contained  in  the  resolution  submitted  by  the 
able  junior  Senator  from  Michigan  [Mr.  Ferguson]  was  given  very  careful 
consideration,  and  from  our  point  of  view  it  has  had  the  sort  of  study  which 
the  Senator  from  Maine  has  indicated.  I  am  sure  the  language  fully  meets  the 
purpose  of  the  Senator  from  Kentucky.  Would  there  be  any  objection  to  chang- 
ing the  first  sentence  in  section  2,  which  now  reads,  "The  committee  shall  make  a 
full  and  complete  investigation  of  the  facts  relating  to  the  attack  made  by 
Japanese  armed  forces  upon  Pearl  Harbor  in  the  Territory  of  Hawaii"  so  as  to 
read  "The  committee  shall  make  a  full  and  complete  investigation  of  the  facts 
surrounding  the  attack  and  the  events  and  circumstances  leading  up  to  the  at- 
tack made  by  Japanese  armed  forces  upon  Pearl  Harbor  in  the  Territory  of 
Hawaii? 

Mr.  Barkley.  I  see  no  substantial  difference  between  the  words  "relating  to" 
and  the  word  "surrounding."  However,  I  have  no  objection  to  the  remainder 
of  that  language.  I  believe  that  the  words  "relating  to"  are  more  appropriate 
than  the  word  "surrounding,"  but  I  certainly  would  have  no  objection  to  including 
the  phrase  "leading  up  to,"  which  could  be  inserted  after  the  words  "relating  to." 

Mr.  FE3KOU80N.  Mr.  President,  will  the  Senator  yield? 


22  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Babklby.  I  yield. 

Mr.  FEBGtjsoN.  I  was  somewhat  concerned  as  to  whether  to  use  the  words 
"relating  to"  or  the  word  "surrounding."  I  think  they  mean  the  same  thing  in 
relation  to  this  event.  If  the  able  senior  Senator  from  Michigan  would  use  the 
words  "relating  to,"  and  then  add  the  words  "the  events  and  circumstances," 
I  think  that  would  cover  the  objection  of  the  Senator  from  Maine. 

Mr.  Barkley.  I  had  in  mind  also  the  question  as  to  whether  additional  lan- 
guage, which  would  specifically  apply  to  previous  events  leading  up  to  the  attack, 
should  be  included;  but  I  did  not  include  it  for  the  reason,  as  I  have  explained, 
that  I  thought  the  words  "relating  to"  covered  it  fully,  and  included  events  both 
prior  to  and  subsequent  to  the  attack.  However,  I  have  no  objection  to  inserting, 
after  the  words  "relating  to"  the  language  suggested  by  the  Senator  from 
Michigan. 

Mr.  VANDENBH31G.  Mr.  President,  will  the  Senator  further  yield? 

Mr.  Bakkley.  I  yield. 

Mr.  Vandbnbehg.  The  language  would  then  i-ead : 

"The  committee  shall  make  a  full  and  complete  investigation  of  the  facts 
relating  to  the  events  and  circumstances  leading  up  to  the  attack  made  by  Japa- 
nese armed  forces  on  Pearl  Harbor  in  the  Territory  of  Hawaii." 

Mr.  Barkley.  I  have  no  objection  to  that  language. 

Mr.  Lucas.  Mr.  President,  will  the  Senator  yield? 

Mr.  Barkley.  I  yield. 

Mr.  Lucas.  May  I  ask  whether  or  not  that  language  would  prevent  us  from 
investigating  anything  subsequent  to  the  attack?  We  talk  about  everything 
leading  up  to  the  attack. 

Mr.  Vandenbbrg.  And  subsequent. 

Mr.  Lucas.  The  word  "subsequent"  is  not  in  there. 

Mr.  Barkley.  "We  can  say  "leading  up  to  or  following  the  attack." 

Mr.  Vandenbero.  I  believe  that  would  cover  it. 

Mr.  Barkley.  I  have  no  desire  to  cut  off  the  investigation  at  any  particular 
date  if  it  has  any  relationship  to  this  attack,  or  the  consequences  of  it. 

The  President  pro  tempore.  The  Senator  has  the  right  to  modify  his  con- 
current resolution. 

Mr.  Barkley.  Mr.  President,  I  will  modify  the  concurrent  resolution  by  in- 
serting after  the  words  "relating  to,"  the  words  "the  events  and  circumstances 
leading  up  to  or  following." 

Mr.  Walsh.  Mr.  President,  will  the  Senator  yield? 

Mr.  Barkley.  I  yield. 

Mr.  Walsh.  Before  the  vote  is  taken  on  the  resolution,  which  I  hope  will 
be  unanimous,  I  wnsh  to  take  occasion  to  compliment  the  distinguished  majority 
leader  upon  the  magnificent  and  generous  manner  in  which  he  has  responded 
to  the  overwhelming  popular  sentiment  of  the  country.  He  has  not  only  done 
that,  but  he  has  relieved  us  all  of  many  hours  of  anxiety,  lifted  this  question 
above  partisanship,  and  made  an  appeal  for  what  the  country  wants— a  high- 
minded,  clean,  judicial  investigation  of  all  the  facts  connected  with  the  Pearl 
Harbor  disaster.  I  wish  to  say  to  him  that  he  has  exercised  statesmanlike 
judgment  on  manv  occasions  in  the  past,  but  never  of  a  loftier  character  than 
todav.  He  has  never  rendered  a  better  public  service.  He  has  not  only  rendered 
a  service  by  responding  to  the  public  demand,  but  he  has  removed  all  doubts  or 
questions  as  to  the  sincerity  of  our  present  Government  and  of  the  Navy  De- 
partment in  their  willingness  to  have  the  whole  story  told  truthfully  aiid  can- 
didly. As  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  before  which  this  prob- 
lem "has  been  pending  bv  reason  of  petitions  filed  with  us,  I  wish  to  compliment 
the  Senator  from  Kentucky  and  thank  him  for  the  service  which  he  has  rendered 

the  country.  ,,  ,       ^  ^^     c,       ^ 

Mr   Barkley.  Mr.  President,  I  deeply  appreciate  the  remarks  of  the  Senatoi. 

The  President  pro  tempore.  Is  there  objection  to  the  request  of  the  Senator 
from  Kentucky  that  the  concurrent  resolution,  as  modified,  be  immediately 
considered,  without  reference  to  a  cominittee?    The  Chair  hears  none. 

[SUl        The  question  is  on  agreeing  to  the  concurrent  resolution,  as  modified. 

The  concurrent  resolution   (S.  Con.  Res.  27).  as  modified,  was  agreed  to,  as 

follows :  .  .     ^    ml    i.  j.1^ 

"Resolved  hij  the  Senate  (the  House  of  RepresentatWes  concurnhg),  That  there 
is  hereby  established  a  joint  committee  on  the  investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor 
attack,  to  be  composed  of  five  Members  of  the  Senate  (not  more  than  three  ot 
whom  shall  be  members  of  the  majority  party),  to  be  appovnted  by  the  President 
pro  tempore,  and  five  Members  of  the  House  of  Rep rt>senlrt lives   (not  more  than 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  23 

three  of  whom  shall  be  members  of  the  majority  party),  to  be  appointed  by  the 
Speaker  of  the  House.  Vacancies  in  the  membership  of  the  conimittee  shall  not 
affect  the  power  of  the  remaining  members  to  execute  the  functions  of  the  com- 
mittee, and  shall  be  filled  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  the  original  selec- 
tion. The  committee  shall  select  a  chairman  and  a  vice  chairman  from  among 
its  members. 

"Sec.  2.  The  committee  shall  make  a  full  and  complete  investigation  of  the 
facts  relating  to  the  events  and  circumstances  leading  up  to  or  following  the 
attack  made  by  Japanese  armed  forces  upon  Pearl  Harbor  in  the  Territory  of 
Hawaii  on  December  7,  1941,  and  shall  report  to  the  Senate  and  the  House  of 
Representatives  not  later  than  January  3,  1946,  the  results  of  its  investigation, 
together  with  such  recommendations  as  it  may  deem  advisable. 

•'Sec.  3.  The  testimony  of  any  person  in  the  armed  services,  and  the  fact  that 
such  person  testified  before  the  joint  committee  herein  provided  for,  shall  not 
be  used  against  him  in  any  court  proceeding,  or  held  against  him  in  examining 
his  military  status  for  credits  in  the  service  to  which  he  belongs. 

"Sec.  4.  (a)  The  committee,  or  any  duly  authorized  subcommittee  thereof, 
is  authorized  to  sit  and  act  at  such  places  and  times  during  the  sessions,  recesses, 
and  adjourned  periods  of  the  Seventy-ninth  Congress  (prior  to  January  3,  1946), 
to  require  by  subpena  or  otherwise  the  attendance  of  such  witnesses  and  the 
production  of  such  books,  papers,  and  documents,  to  administer  such  oaths,  to 
take  such  testimony,  to  procure  such  printing  and  binding,  and  to  make  such 
expenditures  as  it  deems  advisable.  The  cost  of  stenographic  services  to  report 
such  hearings  shall  not  be  in  excess  of  25  cents  per  hundred  words. 

"(b)  The  committee  is  empowered  to  appoint  and  fix  the  compensation  of 
such  experts,  consultants,  and  clerical  and  stenographic  assistants  as  it  deems 
necessary,  but  the  compensation  so  fixed  shall  not  exceed  the  compensation 
prescribed  under  the  Classification  Act  of  1923,  as  a  mended,  for  comparable 
duties. 

"(c)  The  exj)enses  of  the  committee,  which  shall  not  exceed  $25,000,  shall  be 
paid  one-half  from  the  contingent  funds  of  the  Senate  and  one-half  from  the 
contingent  fund  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  upon  vouchers  signed  by  the 
chairman." 

Mr.  Babkley.  Mr.  President,  I  did  not  intend,  at  the  outset,  to  take  so  much 
time  at  this  hour,  but  I  hope  it  has  been  well  spent. 

[SS]         (Discussion  off  the  record.) 

The  Chairman.  Counsel  may  go  ahead. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  if  counsel  spoke  into  the 
microphone  we  could  better  hear,  rather  than  if  he  stood  up. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  never  tried  a  case  with  my  nose  in  a  micro- 
phone, but  I  will  do  my  best. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  sure  you  will  do  all  right,  Mr.  Mitchell. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  would  like  me  to  keep  my  seat  ? 

Senator  Brewster.  I  think  so. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  There  are  two  master  exhibits  which  have  been  dis- 
tributed to  the  committee.  They  will  be  referred  to  by  innumerable 
witnesses  on  the  stand,  and  I  think  this  the  appropriate  time  to  pre- 
sent them. 

One  is  a  document,  printed  in  the  Government  Printing  Office,  en- 
titled "Intercepted  Diplomatic  Messages  Sent  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment Between  July  1  and  December  8,  1941."  These  were  messages,  in 
code,  intercepted  by  our  services,  decoded  and  translated.  They  were 
exchanged  between  the  Japanese  Government  and  its  Embassy  at 
Washington,  and  include  the  responses  from  Washington  to  Tokyo. 
There  are  a  few  of  them  that  are  diplomatic  messages  from  Japan  to 
their  Ambassadors  in  other  nations. 

They  are  arranged  chronologically  in  the  order  in  which  [36] 
they  were  sent.  We  will  not  refer  to  them  this  morning,  I  think,  but 
will  shortly.     The  document,  of  course,  will  be  supported  later  au- 


24  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

thentically  by  detail  witnesses,  but  for  the  present  we  present  it  to  the 
reporter  as  Exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  Are  those  to  be  printed  at  this  point  in  the  record  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  No,  they  are  ah-eady  printed  by  the  Government 
Printing  Office,  and  they  are  available  in  this  form  to  the  committee. 
We  will  mark  it  "Exhibit  1,"  but  the  reporter  will  not  have  to  tran- 
scribe it. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  1") 

The  Vice  Chairman.  That  is  one  of  the  documents  that  was  supplied 
to  the  committee  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  not  long  ago ;  I  think  yesterday. 

Senator  Brewster.  Are  copies  of  that  now  available  to  the  press? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  This  is  being  received  in  evidence  as  exhibit  1  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  It  is  filed  with  the  committee  as  exhibit  1, 
and  will  be  referred  to  specifically,  as  I  understand  it,  by  witnesses 
later. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  it  is  wide  open  once  it  is  offered. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  what  I  wanted  to  be  sure  of.  It  is  a  part 
of  the  record. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 

[^7]  Senator  Brewster.  That  was  the  one  that  was  received  by 
us  yesterdaj^  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  sir. 

The  next  exhibit,  I  have  marked  "Exhibit  2."  This  is  another  volume 
of  Japanese  messages  from  their  Government  and  their  people  around 
the  world  relating  to  military  installations,  ship  movements,  and  so 
forth.  The  first  exhibit  we  will  call  the  diplomatic  messages,  because 
they  related  to  diplomatic  negotiations,  but  this  one  is  concerned  with 
the  military  installations,  reports  from  their  espionage  people  in  dif- 
ferent places,  and  matters  of  that  kind.  That  volume  also  includes 
documents  in  code,  intercepted,  decoded,  and  translated  by  our  crypt- 
analytic  units,  and  they  are  arranged  in  chronological  order. 

I  present  that  as  Exhibit  2  so  that  it  may  be  available  to  every  witnss. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  2.") 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  make  an  inquiry  as  to 
whether  counsel  claims  that  is  all  the  information :  are  these  two  ex- 
hibits now  complete  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  There  may  be  additional  information.  I  do  not 
claim.  Senator,  that  anything  we  have  is  final  or  complete.  We  will  see 
after  we  get  going  whether  you  are  satisfied  with  what  is  produced. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  wanted  to  have  the  record  show  as  to  whether 
or  not  it  is  purported  that  these  are  complete. 

[<?<§]  Mr.  Mitchell.  No,  sir.  These  are  selected  messages  that 
seem  pertinent  to  the  case,  and  it  is  always  open,  if  there  is  any  inquiry 
by  anybody  on  the  committee  that  we  are  asked  to  pursue,  why,  we 
will  pursue  it  further. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  inquire  whether  or  not  copies 
of  Exhibit  2  have  been  supplied  the  individual  members  of  this  com- 
mittee ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Were  they  included  in  the  packet  given  us  yesterday  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell,  They  are  earlier  than  that. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  25 

Senator  Brewster.  That  was  delivered  to  us  on  November  13,  I 
think. 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  think  it  was  early  this  week. 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes ;  Tuesday  of  this  week,  I  think. 

The  Chairman.  All  right.     You  may  go  ahead,  Mr.  Mitchell. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  in  the  previous  investigations  that 
have  been  held,  scores  of  witnesses  and  thousands  of  pages  of  testi- 
mony were  taken  on  piecing  together  the  story  of  the  situation  at 
Pearl  Harbor  on  December  7,  1941,  and  to  describe  the  incidents  of 
the  attack. 

If  this  committee  were  to  pursue  that  same  course,  it  might  take 
2  or  3  weeks  for  that  kind  of  testimony. 

We  have,  in  an  effort  to  save  time  of  the  committee,  [-39]  had 
prepared  by  the  Army  and  the  Navy  jointly,  under  our  direction,  a 
narrative  and  detailed  statement,  based  upon  reports  and  material 
available  in  those  departments,  of  the  conditions  prevailing  at  Pear] 
Harbor  on  that  day,  and  the  events  that  took  place.  We  have  tried  to 
eliminate,  and  I  think  we  have,  every  question  that  is  in  controversy, 
every  matter  of  fact  that  hasn't  clearly  been  established,  and  any  ques- 
tion of  responsibility. 

I  think  the  officers  who  are  presenting  that  for  us  have  followed 
that  schedule. 

This  isn't  intended  to  foreclose  the  fact  on  anything.  It  is  a  picture 
of  the  conditions  that  existed  on  the  7th  and  things  that  happened, 
and  if  there  is  any  question  that  arises  later  as  to  whether  it  is  ac- 
curate or  not,  of  course,  it  will  be  open  to  the  taking  of  eyewitness 
testimony.  And  there  are  also  many  questions,  doubtless,  that  aren't 
covered  by  the  statement,  because  they  are  not  yet  fully  established, 
or  in  controversy,  that  will  have  to  be  filled  in  by  eyewitnesses. 

The  officers  who  have  done  this  work  for  us  are  Kear  Adm.  T.  B. 
Inglis,  of  the  Navy,  and  Col.  Bernard  Thielen,  of  the  Army,  and  we 
would  like  to  have  them  sworn. 

The  Chairman.  Which  one  do  you  want  first  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  narrative  statement  is  a  consolidated  one.  It 
is  not  a  Navy  or  an  Army  statement.  It  is  all  [4^]  woven  to- 
gether, and  these  gentlemen  ought  to  be  sworn  together,  and  they  will 
pick  up  portions  of  it  and  pass  the  ball  as  they  go  along. 

The  Chairman.  Will  the  two  witnesses  referred  to  arise,  and  be 
sworn  ? 

(The  witnesses  were  sworn  by  the  Chairman.) 

The  Chairman.  Be  seated. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  will  ask  that  the  men  taking  pic- 
tures complete  their  work  before  we  get  started. 

The  Chairman.  The  photographers  may  get  their  pictures  and 
then  clear  this  space  in  here. 

The  committee,  in  executive  session,  decided  that  the  order  of  pro- 
cedure, so  far  as  the  examination  of  witnesses  is  concerned,  shall  be 
that  counsel  should  be  first  permitted  to  examine  the  witnesses  without 
interruption ;  that  upon  the  conclusion  of  his  examination,  members 
of  the  committee  will  alternate  from  the  Chair  right  and  left  between 
the  members  from  the  Senate  and  the  House,  and  they  will  ask  such 
questions  as  they  have,  and  following  that,  counsel  for  any  witness 
who  has  counsel  will  be  permitted  to  examine  the  witness  himself. 

So,  gentlemen,  we  will  now  proceed. 


26  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[41]       TESTIMONY  OF  REAR  ADM.  T.  B.  INGLIS,  UNITED  STATES 
NAVY,  AND  COL.  BERNARD  THIELEN,  UNITED  STATES  ARMY 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral  Inglis,  what  is  your  status  in  the  Navy  now  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  attached  to  the  Office  of  Naval  Operations  as 
Chief  of  Naval  Intelligence. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  How  long  have  you  been  in  that  post  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  had  that  particular  post  for  about  1  week, 
Mr.  Mitchell. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  were  you  doing  before  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Before  that  I  was  Deputy  Director  of  Naval  In- 
telligence. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Have  you  had  in  your  naval  work  the  task  at  times 
to  prepare  material  and  documents  and  I'eview  the  facts  and  do  work 
of  that  kind  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  had  something  over  31  years  of  naval  ex- 
perience, and  during  this  time  I  have  served  on  several  admirals' 
staffs.  More  recentl}^,  my  duties  in  the  Navy  Department  do  require 
that  I  prepare  evaluations  and  studies  somewhat  comparable  to  this 
we  are  discussing  this  morning. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  duty  were  you  engaged  in  on  December  7, 
1941? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  was  commanding  officer  of  the  [4^] 
U.  S.  S.  Algerab,  which  was  a  ship  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  at  that  time. 
Oil  that  particular  date,  my  ship  and  I  were  in  port  in  New  York. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Had  you  been  stationed  at  the  Pearl  Harbor  base 
previously  to  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  never  had  shore  duty  at  Pearl  Harbor.  I 
have  visited  Pearl  Harbor  on  numerous  occasions  on  board  ships. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  So  you  are  familiar  with  the  locality  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  generally  familiar  with  the  locality ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  prepared  here,  in  connection  with  Colonel 
Thielen,  a  narrative  statement  from  the  official  records  and  other 
data  available  to  you? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have,  sir,  with  the  assistance  of  officers  under  my 
control. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  were  instructed,  or  asked  by  counsel  to  elimi- 
nate matters  that  were  in  dispute  or  questions  of  responsibility,  or 
questions  where  your  reports  and  records  showed  a  point  of  fact  had 
not  been  clearly  established? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  and  we  have  done  our  best  to  carry 
out  that  directive. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Colonel  Thielen,  what  is  your  status  in  the  Army 
today  ? 

[4^]  Colonel  Thielen.  I  am  a  member  of  the  War  Department 
General  Staff,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Have  you  been  stationed  at  Pearl  Harbor? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.  I  was  stationed  there  from  1934  through 
1936. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  were  you  on  duty  on  December  7,  1941  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  was  instructor  at  the  United  States  Military 
Academy. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  27 

144]  Mr.  Mitchell.  Have  you  had  occasion  in  your  work  to  do 
the  sort  of  thing  that  I  asked  Admiral  Inglis  about,  preparing  docu- 
ments and  related  material? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.    That  is  my  normal  duty. 
Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  you  gentlemen  proceed  as  you  have  prepared 
your  work  and  give  us  this  narrative  statement  of  the  conditions  at 
Pearl  Harbor  on  December  7,  and  what  occurred  there. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  propose  to  start  this  presentation  with  a  brief 

description 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  do  we  have  copies  of  this  state- 
ment ? 

Mr.  Gesell.  No,  Senator;  there  are  no  mimeographed  copies  of  the 
statement.  There  are  before  each  member  of  the  committee  two  basic 
folders  which  I  show  you  now,  the  Navy  folder  of  exhibits  and  charts, 
and  the  Army  folder,  which  is  the  red  envelope,  large  red  envelope. 
I  suggest  that  those  are  the  two  basic  documents  that  each  member  of 
the  committee  will  wish  to  have  before  him  to  follow  this  presentation. 
Senator  Brewster.  Mr.  Chairman,  it  was  my  understanding  that  if 
there  were  any  prepared  statements  we  would  have  them  24  hours 
in  advance.    Was  that  not  the  understanding? 

The  Chairman.  Well,  it  wasn't  the  Chair's  understanding  that  that 
rule  applied  at  this  preliminary  testimony  here. 

[4'5]  The  witnesses  who  were  to  testify  after  this  groundwork 
was  laid  as  to  what  happened  on  that  day  would  present  to  the  com- 
mittee copies  of  their  written  statements  in  advance. 

Senator  Brewster.  It  is  equally  essential  here.  I  think.  Do  you 
have  prepared  statements  we  can  have  now? 

Mr.  Gesell.  We  haven't  considered  these  were  prepared  statements, 
Senator.  The  charts  and  schedules  which  contain  the  basic  informa- 
tion are  all  before  the  members  of  the  committee.  There  is  going  to 
be  a  good  deal  of  ad  libbing  on  the  charts.  It  is  not  quite  in  the 
nature  of  a  prepared  statement.  For  that  reason  it  is  not  before  the 
committee. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Has  counsel  had  a  copy  of  this  prepared  state- 
ment, and  if  so,  when  did  he  get  it? 

Mr.  Gesell.  We  have  no  copy,  Senator,  and  we  have  never  had  a 
copy  of  any  prepared  statements  from  either  of  these  witnesses. 

Senator  Brew\ster.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  it  be  understood  that  after 
today  the  rule  will  apply? 

The  Chairman,  It  will  apply  to  witnesses.  Whether  it  will  apply 
after  today  I  don't  know.  I  can't  tell  how  soon  these  witnesses  will  be 
through. 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  didn't  miderstand  that  this  type  of  prepared 
statement  came  within  the  rule,  but  we  will  have  it  mimeographed  and 
furnish  it  to  the  members  of  the  committee  as  [46]  rapidly  as 
possible,  and  if  you  Avant  the  witnesses  recalled  we  will  be  happy  to 
recall  them. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  might  also  state  that  arrangements  have 
been  made  with  the  reporters  taking  this  testimony  to  provide  each 
member  a  copy  of  the  day's  testimony  on  the  following  morning,  and 
I  think  they  will  be  able  to  furnish  it  to  the  members  on  tlie  evening 
the  testimony  has  been  brought  forward. 


28  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Brewster.  Fine. 

'TT'he  Chairman.  We  will  have  it  as  soon  as  possible. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  may  ])roceed,  Admiral. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  propose  to  start  this  presentation  with  a  brief 
description  of  the  geography  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  their  re- 
lation to  the  whole  Pacific  Ocean  area. 

Commander  Biard  has  a  chart  which  has  the  title  up  in  the  upper 
right-hand  corner  "Disposition  of  United  States  Pacific  Fleet  on 
December  7, 1941." 

I  will  ask  the  committee  to  refer  to  that  chart  and  also  to  item  No.  1, 
which  is  a  reproduction  of  that  chart,  and  which  is  contained  in  the 
white  folder  which  has  been  given  to  each  member  of  the  committee. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Pearl  Harbor  is  on  the  southern  or  lee  side  of 
the  island  of  Oahu,  which  is  one  of  the  eight  principal  islands  of  the 
Hawaiian  chain.  These  eight  Hawaiian  Islands  lie  in  a  strategically 
and  commercially  important  [47]  position  in  the  North  Pacific 
Ocean  approximately  2,000  nautical  miles  west  to  southwest  of  San 
Francisco. 

Commander  Biard  is  pointing  out  these  distances  and  directions  as 
we  proceed. 

Oahu  is  the  most  important  of  the  islands  because  of  the  excellent 
enclosed  fleet  anchorage  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  the  commercial  port 
of  Honolulu.  It  is  3,430  nautical  miles  southeast  of  Tokyo,  4,685 
nautical  miles  northwest  of  Panama,  1,990  nautical  miles  south  of 
Dutch  Harbor  in  the  Aleutian  Islands  and  4,767  nautical  miles  east 
of  Manila. 

[48]  A  table  of  distance  from  Pearl  Harbor  and  other  impor- 
tant points  in  the  Pacific  is  item  2  of  the  Navy  folder.  In  this  con- 
nection, it  must  be  remembered  that  a  nautical  mile  is  approximately 
11/^  land  miles. 

The  islands  have  a  mild  subtropical  climate  with  moderate  seasonal 
changes  of  temperature.  They  lie  in  the  path  of  the  steady  north- 
easterly trade  winds ;  therefore,  the  northern  portions  of  Oahu  and  the 
immediate  adjacent  waters  are  characterized  by  fresh  winds  from  a 
northerly  direction.  The  force  of  the  trades  is  broken  by  the  configura- 
tion of  the  lands  so  that  to  the  south  of  Oahu  the  seas  are  relatively 
smooth. 

Commander  Biard,  will  you  point  to  the  other  chart,  please,  showing 
the  island  of  Oahu?  That  is  the  lee  of  the  island,  where  the  winds 
and  seas  are  more  moderate  than  on  the  windward  side. 

Much  of  the  moisture  of  the  trade  winds  is  deposited  on  the  high 
peaks  to  the  north  forming  mist  and  clouds.  Because  of  this,  the 
visibility  to  the  south  of  the  islands  is  better  than  to  the  north.  Fur- 
ther, the  northern  fringe  of  the  trade  belt  lies  roughly  about  300 
to  the  north  of  Oahu — will  you  point  that  out  ?  Three  hundred  miles 
to  the  north  of  Oahu  there  is  a  belt  characterized  by  low  ceilings,  poor 
visibility,  squalls,  and  rain. 

[49]  The  Hawaiian  chain  of  islands  and  adjacent  waters  are 
shown  in  item  3  of  the  Navy  folder.  It  may  be  seen  from  this  chart 
that  the  sea  area  around  the  Hawaiian  Islands  was  on  December  7, 
1941,  divided  into  certain  restricted  fleet  training  areas  where  units 
and  aircraft  of  the  fleet  might  carry  out  exercises  and  target  practices. 
This  same  chart  also  shows  two  defensive  sea  areas  off  Pearl  Harbor 
and  Kaneohe.    These  defensive  sea  areas  were  designated  by  the  Presi- 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  29 

dent  of  the  United  States  and  entry  of  all  merchant  ships,  both  United 
States  and  foreign,  and  of  all  foreign  men-of-war  was  prohibited 
unless  specific  permission  for  sucli  entry  had  been  granted  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy. 

The  next  item  is  a  rather  puzzling  question  of  time,  difference  of 
time,  in  different  parts  of  the  world. 

Time  varies  throughout  the  world.  For  instance,  when  going  from 
Washington,  D.  C,  to  Chicago  it  is  necessary  for  a  traveler  to  adjust 
his  watch  upon  arrival  in  Chicago,  because  Chicago  time  is  1  hour 
behind  that  in  Washington.  Comparable  changes  of  time  occur  when- 
ever the  traveler  moves  about  the  world. 

Wlien'the  Japanese  attacked  Pearl  Harbor  at  7 :  55  on  the  morning  of 
December  7,  1941,  it  was  1 :  25  in  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  in 
Washington,  D.  C,  and  was  3 :  25  a.  m.,  December  8,  in  Tokyo. 

[SO]  Item  4  of  the  Xavy  folder  is  a  table  showing  comparative 
times  and  dates  for  Greenwich,  England,  Washington,  D.  C,  San 
Francisco,  Hawaii,  Tokyo,  and  Manila  on  December  6,  7,  and  8,  1941. 

The  time  of  sunrise  on  the  morning  of  December  7,  1941,  the  begin- 
ning of  morning  twilight  was  5 :  06  a.  m.,  Hawaiian  time,  and  sunrise 
was  6 :  26  a.  m.,  Hawaiian  time.  That  is  an  hour  and  twenty  minutes 
before  sunrise. 

Proceeding  next  to  the  composition  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
Fleets,  on  the  7th  of  December  1941  the  Pacific  Fleet  was  numerically 
two-thirds  the  size  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  but  the  Pacific  Fleet  contained 
more  modern  and  more  heavily  armed  vessels. 

Next,  the  commanders  of  major  units  of  the  United  States  Pacific 
Fleet: 

The  commander  in  chief  of  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet,  who 
was  also  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  United  States  Fleet,  was 
Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel. 

The  force  commanders  were  commander,  battle  force,  Vice  Adm. 
W.  S.  Pye;  commander,  scouting  force,  Vice  Adm.  Wilson  Brown; 
commander,  base  force,  Rear  Adm.  W.  L.  Calhoun. 

The  type  comanders,  and  by  "type"  I  mean  the  type  or  classification 
of  the  ships  which  they  comanded  : 

[51]         Commander  aircraft,  battle  force.  Vice  Adm.  W.  F.  Halsey. 

Commander  battleships,  battle  force.  Rear  Adm.  W.  S.  Anderson. 

Commander  cruisers,  battle  force.  Rear  Adm.  H.  F.  Leary. 

Commander  mine  craft,  battle  force,  Rear  Adm.  W.  R.  Furlong. 

Commander  cruisers,  scouting  force.  Rear  Adm.  J.  H.  Newton. 

Commander  destroyers,  battle  force.  Rear.  Adm.  M.  J.  Draemel. 

Commander  submarines,  scouting  force,  Rear  Adm.  Thomas  Withers. 

Commander  aircraft,  scouting  force.  Rear  Adm.  J.  S.  McCain. 

Commander  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District,  Rear  Adm.  C.  C. 
Bloch. 

And  in  explanation  of  the  relationship  between  tlie  Fourteenth 
Naval  District  and  the  commander  in  chief,  the  Fourteenth  Naval 
District  was  a  subordinate  command  of  the  commander  in  chief  Pacific 
Fleet  and  in  this  respect  differed  from  the  then  uswal  practice  in  the 
continental  United  States. 

The  Fourteenth  Naval  District  included  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 
[52]         Midway,  Wake,  Johnston,  Palmyra,  and  Canton  Islands. 

79716 — 46 — pt.  1 5 


30  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Commander  Biard,  will  you  just  draw  an  imaginary  line  about  the 
Fourteenth  Naval  District  ?     Just  circle  it  with  your  wand,  will  you  ? 

The  disposition  of  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet  outside  of  the 
continental  United  States  at  8  a.  m.,  December  7  was  roughly  as 
follows : 

The  main  body  of  the  fleet  in  Pearl  Harbor  comprised  8  battleships, 
2  heavy  cruisers,  6  light  cruisers,  30  destroyers,  and  49  other  vessels 
such  as  submarines,  mine  craft,  tenders,  transports,  and  miscellaneous 
small  craft. 

Those  are  the  ships  that  were  in  Pearl  Harbor.  We  will  go  into 
greater  detail  on  that  a  little  fui-ther  along  in  the  discussion. 

You  may  also  refer  to  the  chart  in  item  No.  1,  Navy  folder,  for  the 
location  in  detail  and  the  naming  of  these  ships. 

In  addition  to  that,  item  5  of  the  Navy  folder  contains  a  complete 
list  of  every  ship  in  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

Task  Force  8  under  Admiral  Halsey  consisted  of  one  aircraft  carrier 
{Entet'pnse) ,  three  heavy  cruisers,  and  nine  destroyers.  It  was  about 
200  miles  west  of  Oahu,  en  route  to  Pearl  Harbor  after  having  ferried 
Marine  Corps  fighter  planes  to  AVake  Island. 

[63^  That  task  force  was  coming  back  from  Wake  Island  to 
Pearl  Harbor. 

Task  Force  12  under  Admiral  Newton  consisted  of  one  aircraft 
carrier  {Lexington) ,  three  heavy  cruisers,  and  five  destroyers.  It  was 
about  460  miles  southeast  of  Midway,  en  route  to  Midway  from  Pearl 
Harbor  with  a  squadron  of  Marine  Corps  scout  bombers. 

Task  Force  3  under  Admiral  Wilson  Brown  consisted  of  one  heavy 
cruisers  and  five  destroyer  minesweepers.  It  had  just  arrived  off 
Johnston  Island  to  conduct  tests  of  a  new  type  landing  craft. 

One  heavy  cruiser,  with  four  destroyer  minesweepers,  was  in  the 
fleet  operating  area  about  25  miles  south  of  Oahu  conducting  exercises. 

The  heavy  cruiser  Pensacola  with  an  eight-ship  convoy  west-bound 
was  in  the  Samoan  area.     More  will  be  said  about  convoys  later. 

The  heavy  cruiser  Louisville  with  a  two-ship  convoy  east-bound  was 
near  the  Solomons. 

Two  submarines  and  a  cargo  ship  were  in  the  Midway  area  and  a 
similar  group  in  the  Wake  area. 

Two  tankers  were  about  half  way  between  Hawaii  and  the  west  coast 
of  the  United  States. 

Some  smaller  units  of  the  fleet  were  in  positions  as  [■5^]  fol- 
lows: One  destroyer  {Ward),  concerning,  which  more  will  be  said 
later,  was  patrolling  off  the  entrance  of  Pearl  Harbor ;  one  destroyer 
in  company  with  a  submarine  was  about  60  miles  southwest ;  three  sub- 
marines were  200  miles  east  of  Oahu ;  the  seaplane  tender  Wright  was 
300  miles  west,  and  four  auxiliaries  were  in  Honolulu  and  Lahina 
Roads. 

The  remaining  units  of  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet  are  shown  on 
the  chart  as  item  1  of  the  Nav\^  folder. 

A  detailed  list  giving  the  names  and  locations  of  United  States  naval 
ships  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  is  item  5  of  the  Navy  folder. 

Turning  next  to  the  location  of  cargo  ships  and  troop  carriers : 

About  25  cargo  and  troop  carriers  which  were  United  States  owned 
or  chartered  were  west  of  Hawaii  at  the  time  of  the  attack  on  Pearl 
Harbor.  As  shown  on  the  chart  (item  1,  Navy  folder) ,  eight  of  these, 
in-cluding  one  Navy  and  thi-ee  Army  troop  transports  and  four  ships 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE       '  31 

carrying  general  cargo  bound  for  the  Philippines,  were  in  the  Samoan 
area,  escorted  by  the  heavy  cruiser  Pensacola.  Two  Army  troop  trans- 
ports were  in  the  Solomons  area  bound  for  Pearl  Harbor,  escorted  by 
the  heavy  cruier  Louisville.  Four  independently  routed  ships  without 
escorts  carrying  general  cargo  were  between  700  and  1,200  miles  south- 
west of  Hawaii  westward  bound,  while  [<5<5]  another,  east- 
bound,  was  in  the  same  area.  One  vessel  was  at  Canton  Island,  four 
in  Australia,  one  in  New  Guinea,  one  in  Java,  and  three  in  the  Manila 
area.     All  troop  carriers  were  being  escorted. 

All  of  the  west-bound  ships  had  left  Honolulu  from  2  to  9  days  prior 
to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  routed  and  dispatched  from  there  by 
the  port  director.  Fourteenth  Naval  District. 

A  detailed  list  of  these  ships  and  their  locations  is  item  6  of  the  Navy 
folder. 

There  was  no  United  States  or  Allied  shipping  of  consequence  along 
the  North  Pacific  trade  routes  west  of  the  180th  meridian  on  December 
7,1941. 

Those  thin  black  lines  represent  the  great  circle  course  to  the  Orient 
from  Los  Angeles,  San  Francisco,  and  Puget  Sound. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  mean  the  regular  ship  lanes  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  regular,  normal  shipping  lanes  used  in  time  of 
peace. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Those  great  circle  courses  are  the  shortest  distances 
between  those  points.  That  is  because  of  the  Mercator  projection  on 
the  chart.  A  straight  line  is  not  the  shortest  distance  between  two 
points  on  such  a  chart. 

[J^]  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  on  November  25,  1941, 
directed  that  all  trans-Pacific  shipping  be  routed  through  the  Torres 
Strait  between  Australia  and  New  Guinea. 

Senator  Ferguson.  May  I  have  that  date  again,  please  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  name  ?     Torres. 

Senator  Ferguson.  No,  the  date. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Oh,  the  date?    November  25,  1941. 

Therefore,  the  usual  shipping  lanes,  as  shown  on  the  maps  of  tlie 
North  Pacific,  were  not  being  followed,  but  rather  all  ships  were  being 
routed  as  indicated — from  Honolulu  via  Suva  in  the  Fijis  and  thence 
to  Australia,  or  via  the  Torres  Strait  to  the  Philippines.  Ships 
destined  for  Guam  were  routed  via  the  Philippines,  thus  avoiding 
as  much  as  possible  the  sea  area  controlled  by  the  Japanese  mandated 
islands  in  the  Pacific. 

Trans-Pacific  shipping  lanes,  both  the  usual  lanes  and  those  being 
followed  just  prior  to  and  on  December  7,  1941,  are  shown  in  item  1 
in  thin  black  lines. 

Passing  next  to  a  description  of  the  Navy  installations  ashore  in 
the  Hawaiian  Islands;  except  for  Pearl  Harbor  itself  these  are  all 
classified  as  minor  United  States  naval  installations  and  were 
naturally  integrated  in  the  over-all  defense  of  the  islands,  of  which 
Pearl  Harbor  was  the  focal  point. 

[57]  I  will  ask  the  committee  now  to  refer  to  item  3-A  of  the 
folder  and  Commander  Biard  is  going  to  point  to  the  Army  chart,  on 
which  we  have  a  Navy  overlay. 


32  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

On  the  island  of  Molokai  there  was  the  Homestead  Field  Naval  Air 
Base,  which  consisted  of  a  runway,  a  warming-up  platform  and  sup- 
porting installations. 

On  the  island  of  Maui  there  was  the  Puunene  Naval  Air  Base,  which 
consisted  of  runways,  a  warming-up  platform,  and  a  CAA  Terri- 
torial landing  field. 

Also  on  Maui  was  the  INIaalaea  naval  emergency  landing  field,  which 
consisted  of  two  runways  and  other  supporting  installations. 

On  the  island  of  Hawaii,  the  largest  island  in  the  group,  there  was 
tlie  naval  radio  station  at  Hilo. 

On  the  most  important  island  of  the  group,  Oahu,  although  not  the 
largest,  there  was  a  naval  air  station  at  Ewa,  which  consisted  of  a 
mooring  mast,  a  landing  mat,  and  supporting  installations. 

At  tlie  naval  air  station,  Kaneohe,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  island, 
was  a  landing  mat  and  warming-up  platform  and  supporting  installa- 
tions and  also  a  seaplane  base. 

At  Kaliuku  Point,  up  at  the  north  end  of  the  island,  there  was  an 
emergency  landing  field. 

At  Lualualei,  a  naval  radio  station,  transmitting  station. 

[S8]  At  Wahiawa,  in  the  interior,  a  naval  radio  receiving 
station. 

At  Heeia,  a  naval  radio  transmitting  station,  and  at  Wailupe  a 
naval  radio  receiving  station. 

I  would  like  to  make  it  quite  clear  at  this  point  that  these  radio 
stations  were  radio  stations  for  transmitting  and  receiving  messages 
and  were  not  radar  stations. 

Pearl  Harbor,  on  December  7,  1941,  was  a  major  fleet  base  capable 
of  berthing  the  entire  Pacific  Fleet.  If  the  committee  will  now  turn 
to  item  7  in  the  Navy  folder  you  will  find  a  chart  of  the  approaches 
to  Pearl  Harbor. 

,    That  is  a  reproduction  of  the  smallish  chart  that  has  just  been 
mounted  on  the  easel. 

You  will  see  that  the  only  entrance  is  from  the  south  via  an  entrance 
cliannel  blasted  through  the  fringing  coral  reef  which  had  formerly 
blocked  the  entrance  to  the  harbor.  This  channel  extending  to  the 
harbor  entrance  proper  was  375  yards  wide  and  3,500  yards  long, 
Avith  a  minimum  depth  of  45  feet.  The  entrance  proper  to  Pearl 
Harbor  is  between  Keahi  Point  and  Holokahiki  Point.  From  here 
the  channel  leads  to  the  various  lochs  and  passages  which  form 
the  harbor. 

I  think  I  should  explain  at  this  time  that  the  word  "1-o-c-h"  is  used 
occasionally  throughout  this  presentation  and  indicates  an  arm  of  the 
harbor,  or  perhaps  tlie  Scotch  [59]  would  call  it  a  "wake," 
although  it  is  not  fresh  water.  It  is  not  a  "lock"  as  used  in  connection 
with  canals. 

The  ramifications  of  the  harbor  are  shown  on  the  chart,  item  8  of 
the  Navy  folder,  and  also  on  the  chart  which  has  just  been  mounted 
on  the  left-hand  easel. 

You  will  see  on  that  chart  that  the  water  surface  is  illustrated  by  a 
blue  color  and  the  land  surface  by  a  white  color.  The  positions  of 
certain  ships  are  marked  in  red,  but  I  will  ask  you  to  disregard  that 
for  the  moment.    We  will  come  back  to  those  later  on. 

There  were  varying  depths  in  the  harbor,  as  shown  by  soundings 
on  the  chart.    Those  tiny  black  figures  show  the  soundings. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  33 

The  major  channels  or  the  main  channels  and  water  m  the  vicinity 
of  the  major  ships'  berths  had  a  depth  of  40  feet.  From  the  sea  buoys 
to  the  large  drydocks  a  portion  of  the  channel  had  a  minimum  depth 
of  45  feet  to  provide  for  the  entrance  and  docking  of  damaged  vessels. 

The  entrance  to  the  harbor  was  closed  by  two  protective  nets.  Here 
the  channel  through  the  coral  reefs  was  about  400  yards  wide  and  the 
depth  was  from  41  to  50  feet.  The  nets  themselves  consisted  of  a 
combined  antitorpedo  net  and  antiboat  boom  to  seaward  and  an  inner 
antitorpedo  net  without  the  boat  boom. 

[60]  You  see,  there  are  two  nets  there.  The  barrier  one  has  anti- 
boat  booms,  which  are  usually  cross-armed  with  spikes  to  prevent 
surface  craft  from  sliding  up  over  the  boom.  Of  course,  the  nets 
down  below  the  booms  are  to  stop  torpedoes  and  also  submarines  pro- 
ceeding under  water. 

The  standard  net  is  30  feet  deep  and  when  suspended  covers  a  depth 
of  35  feet.  Because  the  channel  was  of  a  greater  depth,  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations  instructed  the  Commandant,  Fourteenth  Naval  Dis- 
trict, to  suspend  the  inner  net  15  feet,  making  a  total  coverage  of  45 
feet. 

The  Pearl  Harbor  fleet  base  included  every  type  of  naval  activity. 
Many  of  the  installations  operable  at  that  time  were  new,  having  been 
built  subsequent  to  August  1939.  Major  installations  in  operation 
were,  at  the  Navy  Yard,  Pearl  Harbor:  One  battleship  dock,  built 
1928;  one  battleship  dock,  under  construction;  one  floating  dry  dock, 
18,000  tons;  one  large  repair  basin,  supporting  industrial  establish- 
ments for  repairs  to  anything  afloat;  one  fuel  depot  with  two  tank 
farms  above  ground — as  you  all  know,  a  tank  farm  is  a  collection  of 
fuel-oil  storage  tanks;  one  submarine  base — all  services  for  war  condi- 
tions; [61]  one  section  base — inshore  patrol  and  harbor  en- 
trance control  post. 

And  then,  of  course,  there  was  the  administrative  office  of  the  Four- 
teenth Naval  District  which  was  inside  the  navy  yard. 

At  the  naval  air  station — Ford  Island,  which  is  the  large  island  at 
the  center  of  the  harbor — there  was  a  large  flying  field,  warming-up 
platform,  seaplane  parking  areas,  and  supporting  installations. 

Next  we  come  to  the  ships  present  at  Pearl  Harbor  on  December 
7,  1941.     You  can  refer  again  to  item  8  in  the  white  folder. 

Eight  battleships  of  between  29,000  and  33,000  tons  each  were  among 
the  ships  of  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor  on 
December  7, 1941. 

Units  of  the  fleet  were  located  as  follows : 

The  battleships  Nevada — Commander  Biard  is  pointing  those  out 
now;  those  battleships  are  shown  in  red  and  they  are  as  precisely  as 
we  can  make  them  to  scale. 

The  Nevada,  Anzona,  West  Virginia^  Tennessee,  Ohlahovia,  Mary- 
land, and  California  were  moored  on  the  southeast  side  of  Ford 
Island ;  the  Pennsylvania  in  drydock  No.  1  at  the  navy  yard. 

Two  heavy  cruisers.  New  Orleans  and  &an  Francisco,  of  the  10,000- 
ton  type,  were  at  docks  in  the  navy  yard  repair  basin. 

[62]  Four  light  cruisers  of  the  10,000-ton  type  were  berthed  as 
follows :  St.  Louis,  Honolulu,  Helena  at  navy  yard  clocks,  and  Phoenix 
moored  northeast  of  Ford  Island. 

Two  light  cruisers  of  the  7,000-ton  type,  Raleigh  and  Detroit,  were 
moored  on  the  northwest  side  of  Ford  Island. 


34  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Twenty -nine  destroyers  (all  but  three  of  which  had  been  completed 
since  1933)  were  moc/ed  to  the  north  and  west  of  Ford  Island. 

There  were  five  submarines,  four  of  which  were  tied  up  at  the 
submarine  base,  and  the  fifth  at  Ten-ten  dock  in  the  navy  yard. 

That  dock  is  called  Ten-ten  dock  because  it  is  1,010  feet  long. 

One  gunboat  was  tied  lip  at  a  navy  yard  dock.  Nine  minelayers 
(eight  of  which  were  converted  flush-deck  destroyers)  w^ere  located 
at  navy  yard  docks  and  in  middle  loch. 

Eleven  minesweepers  (five  of  which  were  converted  flush-deck  de- 
stroyers) moored  in  middle  loch  and  at  navy  yard  docks. 

Twenty-three  fleet  auxiliaries,  such  as  repair  ships,  oilers,  tenders, 
store  ships,  and  tugs  were  located  at  various  berths  throughout  the 
harbor. 

There  were  ni^  aircraft  carriers  in  port. 

All  battleships  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  except  the  Colorado^  [_63^ 
which  was  in  the  Navy  3(^ard,  Puget  Sound,  were  present,  in  Pearl 
Harbor. 

Item  9  of  the  white  fodder  gives  a  list  of  the  vessels  present  at  the 
time  of  the  attack. 

In  accordance  with  e;^isting  fleet  orders,  the  vessels  of  the  Pacific 
Fleet  except  those  uhde/going  navy  ^^ard  overhaul  maintained  condi- 
tion of  readiness  3  while  in  the  harbor.  This  condition  at  that  time 
varied  according  to  the  armaments  of  the  various  types  of  ships  but,  in 
general,  required  that  about  one-fourth  of  the  antiaircraft  batteries 
and  necesssary  control  stations  be  manned  and  that  ready  ammunition 
be  at  the  guns.  Vessels  likewise  were  limited  in  the  degree  to  which 
they  could  disable  their  propulsive  machinery.  In  general,  most  ves- 
sels were  on  12  hours'  notice. 

By  "12  hours'  notice"  I  mean  that  the  ships  w'ere  required  to  be  able 
to  get  under  way  12  hours  after  receiving  the  order  to  get  under  way, 

I  will  ask  Colonel  Thielen  to  pick  up  from  this  point. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Very  well, 

[6Ji]  The  Army's  report,  of  course,  roughly  parallels  that  which 
Admiral  Inglis  has  just  completed  for  the  Navy.  That  is,  it  takes 
up  the  Army  organization  in  that  area  and  the  disposition  of  Army 
units,  with  their  strength  indicated. 

The  Hawaiian  Islands  were  organized  for  joint  defense  as  the  Ha- 
waiian Coastal  Frontier.  The  Army  command  was  designated  as 
the  Hawaiian  Department.  On  February  7,  1941,  Maj.  Gen.  Walter 
C.  Short  relieved  Maj,  Gen,  Charles  D,  Herron  as  commanding  general 
of  the  Hawaiian  Department, 

The  principal  elements  of  the  Department  were  two  infantry  divi- 
sions and  supporting  ground  troops  composing  the  beach  and  land 
defense  forces ;  the  Coast  Artillery  command,  consisting  of  the  seacoast 
and  antiaircraft  defense  forces ;  and  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force. 

On  December  6, 1941,  General  Short  had  approximately  43,000  troops 
under  his  command,  disposed  as  shown  in  detail  on  pages  1  to  5  of  the 
Army  exhibit  which  the  committee  has  and  which  lists  the  unit  loca- 
tions by  district,  with  an  indication  of  the  strength  of  each  unit  and 
the  station  at  which  located. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  Army  exhibits  are  in  the  brown  folder. 

Mr.  Gesell.  It  is  the  mimeographed  folder  in  a  brown  folder,  I 
think, 

Mr,  Mitchell,  Go  ahead. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  35 

[6S]  Colonel  Thielen.  On  the  small  chart  there  is  the  indication 
of  the  major  units  as  distributed  in  the  various  islands  of  the  group.  A 
reproduction  of  that  chart,  is  in  the  hands  of  each  member  of  the 
committee. 

In  the  Kauai  district  we  had  the  Third  Battalion,  Two  Hundred  and 
ninety-ninth  Infantry — less  Companies  K  and  L — and  attached  troops ; 
Company  C,  Two  Hundred  and  Ninety-ninth  Infantry ;  First  Platoon, 
Signal  Company  Aircraft  Warning ;  Air  Corps  Detachment. 

In  the  Maui  district  we  had  the  First  Battalion,  Two  Hundred  and 
Ninety-ninth  Infantry,  less  Company  C,  and  attached  troops;  Com- 
pany K,  Two  Hundrecl  and  Ninety-ninth  Infantr}^,  Molokai ;  Fourth 
Platoon  Signal  Comj^any,  Aircraft  Warning  Air  Corps  Detachment. 

In  the  Hawaii  district  we  had  the  Second  Battalion,  Two  hundred 
and  Ninety-ninth  Infantry  and  attached  troops:  Camp  Detachment, 
Kilauea  Military  Camp;  Fifth  Platoon  Signal  Company,  Aircraft 
Warning  Air  Corps  Detachment. 

On  the  principal  island  of  Oahu  we  had  the  following  lesser  units: 
The  Twenty-fourth  Infantry  Division — less  Two  Hundred  and  Ninety- 
ninth  Infantry  Regiment:  Twenty-fifth  Infantry  Division;  Hawaiian 
Coast  Artillery  Commancl ;  [66]  Hawaiian  Air  Force ;  Thirty- 
Fourth  Engineers;  Eight  Hundred  and  Fourth  Engineer  Battalion, 
Aviation ;  Eleventh  Tank  Company ;  Company  A,  First  Separate 
Chemical  Battalion,  and  Hawaiian  Pack  Train. 

The  Twenty-fourth  Infantry  Division  was  responsible  for  the 
ground  defense  of  the  northern  half  of  Oahu,  and  the  Twenty-fifth 
Division  for  that  of  the  southern  sector.  Most  of  the  components  of 
these  divisions  were  located  at  Schofield  Barracks. 

The  Hawaiian  Coast  Artillery  Command,  under  Maj.  Gen.  Henry 
T.  Burgin,  consisted  of  the  following  harbor  defense  units :  Fifteenth 
Coast  Artillery  Regiment,  harbor  defense ;  Sixteenth  Coast  Artillery 
Regiment,  harbor  defense ;  Forty-first  Coast  Artillery  Regiment,  rail- 
way; Fifty-fifth  Coast  Artillery  Regiment,  155  millimeter,  tractor- 
drawn;  and  of  these  antiaircraft  units:  Sixty-fourth  Coast  Artillery 
Regiment,  semimobile;  Ninety-seventh  Coast  Artillery  Regiment, 
semimobile;  Ninety-eighth  Coast  Artillery  Regiment,  semimobile; 
Two  Hundred  and  Fifty-first  Coast  Artillery  Regiment,  mobile. 

The  principal  weapons  of  the  Hawaiian  Coast  Artillery  Command 
were  as  shown  on  page  6  of  Army  exhibit. 

[67]  Other  large-caliber  guns  available  for  defense  but  manned 
by  field  artillery  were  two  240-millimeter  howitzers  and  thirty-two 
155-millimeter  howitzers.  The  seacoast  guns  were  installed  prin- 
cipally in  permanent  fortifications.  The  fixed  antiaircraft  guns  were 
emplaced  generally  to  defend  the  seacoast  artillery,  and  the  mobile 
antiaircraft  units  were  normally  stationed  at  Fort  Shaffer,  Schofield 
Barracks,  and  Camp  Malakole. 

Liaison  between  the  Coast  Artillery  command  and  the  Navy  was 
maintained  prior  to  December  7  by  one  Army  officer  and  one  enlisted 
man  stationed  at  the  harbor  patrol  station  at  Pearl  Harbor.  The 
harbor  patrol  station  was  controlled  and  operated  by  the  Navy.  The 
plirpose  of  this  liaison  was  to  coordinate  identification  of  waterborne 
craft  and  other  possible  targets. 

The  principal  units  of  Maj.  Gen.  Frederick  L.  Martin's  Hawaiian 
Air  Force  were  the  Fifth  and  Eleventli  Bombardment  Groups,  the 
Fifteenth  and  Eighteenth  Pursuit  Groups,  the  Eighty-sixth  Obser- 


36  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

vation  Squadron,  and  the  Air  Corps  Services.  The  Air  Force  was 
generally  disposed  on  four  fields,  Hickam,  Wheeler,  Haleiwa,  and 
Bellows. 

Prior  to  the  attack  on  December  7,  alert  No.  1  of  the  local  defense 
plan  set  up  by  the  Hawaiian  Department  was  [68]  in  effect. 
This  alert,  one  of  three  provided  in  the  plan,  was  therein  defined  as  a 
"defense  against  acts  of  sabotage  and  uprisings  within  the  islands, 
with  no  threat  from  without."  Military  installations  and  equipment, 
planes,  hangars,  ammunition,  communication  centers,  highway  bridges, 
and  the  like  were  protected  by  standing  guards  and  patrols. 

I  will  now  explain  the  dispositions  as  indicated  on  the  chart,  on  the 
large  map  of  Oahu,  mider  alert  No.  1. 

The  two  divisions,  as  I  have  already  indicated,  had  alL  their  princi- 
pal elements  located  in  Schofield  Barracks.  There  were,  however,  a 
number  of  patrols  and  standing  guards  primarily  on  the  road  around 
Kakanoe  Island  from  Honolulu,  around  to  the  east,  up  past  Kaena 
Point,  and  back  down  the  central  valley.  These  patrols  were  located 
at  intersections,  highway  bridges,  and  other  critical  points. 

The  yellow  squares  indicate  antiaircraft  weapons,  and,  as  I  re- 
marked, it  will  be  noted  that  in  general  they  are  situated  down  on  the 
south  coast,  protecting  the  seacoast  installations,  except  for  concen- 
trations of  these  weapons  at  Schofield  Barracks,  the  regiment  at  Fort 
Shafter,  as  previously  mentioned,  and  several  mobile  batteries  out  at 
Camp  Malakole. 

Most  of  the  white  squares  are  either  seacoast  weapons  of  various 
types,  those  that  have  the  general  appearance  of  [dd]  cannon, 
and  the  aircraft  installations  at  the  field  which  I  have  mentioned. 

That  concludes  the  Army's  indication  of  organization  and  strength 
and  I  believe  the  Navy  will  now  resume. 

[70]       Admiral  Inglis.  The  next  topic  is  "Offshore  reconnaissance." 

There  is  no  written  record  available  of  any  searches  having  been 
made  on  December  6,  either  from  the  Hawaiian  area  or  from  Midway. 
However,  Midway  had  orders  to  have  one  squadron  of  aircraft  search 
daily  a  circular  area  with  a  radius  of  100  miles.  Patrol  squadrons 
from  Midway  were  also  ordered  to  perform  searches  wherever  sea 
forces  were  operating — that  is,  surface  forces.  In  general,  the  oper- 
ating areas  for  fleet  units  were  south  of  a  line  drawn  from  Midway  to 
Oahu. 

I  would  like  now  to  invite  the  attention  of  the  committee  to  item 
10  of  the  Navy  folder,  which  is  a  reproduction  of  the  large  chart  that 
is  on  display  on  the  right-hand  easel.  That  chart  shows  in  green  and 
wdiite  diagonal  lines  the  air  searches  conducted  on  the  6th  of  December 
and  in  black  and  white  horizontal  lines  the  searches  conducted  just 
prior  to  the  Japanese  attack  on  the  7th  of  December  and  then  in  red 
and  white  vertical  lines  the  searches  after  the  attack  on  the  7th  of 
December. 

Of  course,  in  reproducing  that  chart  for  your  folders  the  colors  do 
not  show,  but  the  identity  is  preserved  by  the  direction  of  the  stripes — 
horizontal,  vertical,  and  diagonal. 

[71]  Patrol  squadrons  from  Midway  were  also  ordered  to  per- 
form searches  wherever  sea  forces  were  operating.  In  general,  the 
operating  areas  for  fleet  units  were  south  of  a  line  drawn  from  Mid- 
wav  to  Oahu. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  37 

Although  there  is  no  record  of  regular  reconnaissance  flights  being 
made  on  this  date,  the  U.  S.  S.  Enterprise^  375  miles  west  of  Pearl 
Harbor  and  traveling  due  east,  did  at  1  in  the  afternoon  launch  15 
torpedo  bombers  which  searched,  ahead  of  the  ship,  an  arc  of  110° 
to  a  distance  of  150  miles.  At  the  time  of  the  above  search,  the  Enter- 
prise had  six  other  planes  in  the  air  as  an  antisubmarine  patrol  ahead 
of  the  ship. 

On  the  morning  of  December  7  there  were  three  patrol  planes  of  the 
PBY-5  type  from  Kaneohe  Air  Station  engaged  in  a  routine  search 
of  the  fleet  operating  areas  approximately  120  miles  south  of  Oahu. 
That  is  shown  in  the  black  and  white  horizontal  stripes. 

According  to  the  operations  plan  then  current,  each  plane  was  to 
be  fueled  with  1,000  gallons  of  gasoline  which  would  give  it  a  patrolling 
range  of  800  miles.  The  planes  were  to  take  off  at  dawn,  5 :  27 
Hawaiian  time  on  the  7th,  carrying  two  depth  charges  and  with  all 
machine  guns  fully  armed.  However,  these  planes  did  not  take  off 
until  about  6 :  40.  Later,  when  the  attack  took  place,  these  planes 
were  [7£]  diverted  to  the  northwest  to  search  for  the  Japanese 
forces. 

Four  patrol  planes  were  also  in  the  air  when  the  attack  came,  en- 
gaged in  intertype  tactical  exercises  with  United  States  submarines 
near  Lahaina  Roads.  They  also  were  diverted  after  the  attack  to 
search  for  Japanese  forces.  All  their  machine  guns  were  fully  armed 
but  they  carried  no  depth  charges.  Thus  there  were  a  total  of  seven 
Navy  patrol  planes  employed  in  the  search. 

In  addition  to  regular  scheduled  reconnaissance  flights,  the  U.  S.  S. 
Enterprise^  200  miles  west  of  Pearl  Harbor,  launched  18  scout  bombers 
armed  with  machine  guns,  shortly  after  6  a.  m.,  which  searched  to  the 
eastward  ahead  of  the  ship  an  arc  of  110°  to  a  distance  of  150  miles. 
The  mission  of  these  planes  was  to  search  an  area  around  and  ahead 
of  the  Enterprise  and  then  to  land  at  Ewa  where  thej^  were  to  be  based 
while  the  ship  was  in  port.  They  arrived  there  during  the  attack  on 
Pearl  Harbor  and  engaged  Japanese  aircraft.  Three  of  these  planes 
landed  at  9 :  40  and  10  at  10 :  15.     The  other  five  never  arrived. 

There  is  no  written  report  available  of  any  inshore  reconnaissance 
"and  by  "inshore"  I  mean  a  distance  up  to  only  30  miles — flown  by 
the  Navy  off  Oahu  the  afternoon  and  evening  of  December  6  or  the 
morning  of  December  7,  1941. 

From  neighboring  islands  on  the  morning  of  December  7  [7.5] 
there  was  a  reconnaissance  of  five  patrol  planes  armed  with  machine 
guns  and  a  full  allowance  of  ammunition,  which  took  off  from  the 
naval  air  station,  Midway,  at  7 :  50  Hawaiian  time.  Their  mission 
was  to  patrol  the  area  to  the  south  and  southeast  of  Midway  to  a 
distance  of  450  miles.  Although  this  reconnaissance  was  scheduled 
before,  it  actually  occurred  after  the  attack  and  is  shown  on  the  chart 
in  vertical  stripes. 

Two  additional  planes  of  the  same  type  took  off  at  the  same  time 
to  rendezvous  with  the  U.  S.  S.  Lexington  at  a  point  400  miles  from 
Midway  in  a  southeasterly  direction.  These  planes  were  to  escort  the 
18  marine  scout  bombing  planes  being  brought  in  by  the  Lexington  as 
reinforcements  for  Midway.  This  marine  flight  was  canceled  after 
news  was  received  of  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

Five  additional  planes,  armed  with  two  500-pound  bombs  each,  were 
on  the  alert  at  Midway  ready  to  take  off  on  10-minutes'  notice. 


38  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

I  will  ask  Colonel  Thielen  to  take  up  from  here  again. 

[74]  Colonel  Thielen.  As  for  Army  reconnaissance,  there  is  no 
evidence  that  any  inshore  patrol  was  maintained  by  the  Army  Air 
Forces  on  December  7  or  on  the  days  preceding  the  attack.  Neither 
is  there  evidence  that  Army  bombers  were  patrolling  offshore  on 
December  7  prior  to  the  attack. 

Closely  related  to  this  subject,  however,  is  the  flight  of  B-17's  being 
ferried  from  the  mainland,  which  arrived  in  Oahu  about  the  time  of 
the  attack. 

Beginning  at  9 :  30  p.  m.,  December  6, 1941,  six  B-17's  of  the  Eighty- 
eighth  Keconnaissance  Squadron  and  six  B-17's  of  the  Thirty-eighth 
Reconnaissance  Squadron  took  off  from  Hamilton  Field,  Calif.,  at  2- 
minute  intervals.  These  airplanes  were  to  travel  to  the  Philippines 
via  Oahu.     They  were  not  armed. 

The  aircraft  did  not  maintain  formation  or  visual  contact  with 
each  other,  and  made  landfall  at  Oahu  at  various  places.  The  course 
from  the  mainland  followed  the  arc  of  a  great  circle  which  would  bring 
the  planes  into  Oahu  from  the  northeast.  However,  one  plane  ap- 
proached Oahu  from  about  100  miles  north-northwest  of  the  island 
and  another  from  Kauai,  about  75  miles  west-northwest  of  Oahu. 

All  planes  landed  on  Oahu  between  8 :  30  and  9  a.  m..  December  7. 
One  landed  at  Wheeler  Field,  one  at  Bellows  Field,  one  on  a  golf 
course,  two  at  Haleiwa  and  the  remainder  at  Hickaaii  Field.  Three 
planes  were  badly  damaged  and  one  was  [75]  destroyed  dur- 
ing landing. 

As  to  the  air  warning  service  which  was  in  effect  at  this  time,  this 
air  warning  service  included  the  vadar  detecting  stations  and  related 
equipment  and  was  under  the  control  of  the  Hawaiian  Department 
signal  officer.  The  warning  net  did  not  include  any  system  of  ground 
observers. 

By  December  7,  the  Hawaiian  Department  had  received  all  compo- 
nents for  three  fixed  detector  stations  ( SCR  271) .  At  the  time  of  the 
attack,  construction  work  had  not  been  completed  on  the  fixed  instal- 
lations at  Mount  Kaala  (Oahu),  Kokee  (Kaua|i)  and  Haleakala 
(Maui),  for  the  use  of  this  equipment.  Six  mobile,  long-range  radar 
sets  (SCR  270)  had  been  deceived,  five  of  which  were  in  operation 
early  on  December  7  at  the  following  points  on  Oahu — Fort  Shafter, 
Koko  Head,  Kaaawa,  Opana  and  Kawailoa.  This  mobile  set  (SCR 
270)  has  a  normal  range  up  to  150  miles,  depending  upon  the  height  of 
the  station  and  height  of  aircraft.  Detection  of  planes  at  a  distance  of 
150  miJes  and  flying  at  20,000  feet  may  be  expected  from  sea-level 
positions.  The  set  consists  essentially  of  four  large,  heavy  truck  units. 
It  takes  at  least  4  hours  to  place  the  set  in  operation.  Its  full  operat- 
ing complement  requires  four  crews  of  six  trained  men  to  each  crew. 
The  equipment  is  accurate  to  within  2  miles  in  range  and  3°  in  azimuth, 
that  is,  in  direction. 

[7'^]  As  a  matter  of  interest,  the  range  and  other  characteristics 
of  the  fixed  sets  were  substantial]}-  the  same  as  those  of  the  mobile 
sets. 

In  use  radar  indicates  the  presence  of  an  airplane  by  a  luminous  pip 
on  a  dark  screen.  A  large  number  of  airplanes  at  a  great  distance  fly- 
ing in  formation  would  appear  as  an  abnormally  wide  pip.  At  the 
radar  station  one  of  the  crew  observes  the  indication  of  the  airplanes 
on  the  screen  and  periodically  calls  off  the  distance.     Another  reads 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  39 

direction  from  an  azimuth  scale.  From  these  data  are  plotted  posi- 
tions on  a  chart.  There  was  no  way  on  December  7,  1941,  of  distin- 
guishing between  the  images  formed  by  enemy  planes  and  by  friendly 
planes. 

When  he  placed  alert  No.  1  in  effect,  General  Short  also  directed 
that  the  Aircraft  Warning  Service  operate  all  mobile  aircraft-warning 
stations  from  2  hours  before  dawn  to  1  hour  after  dawn — speciJ&cally, 
from  4  to  7  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Thus,  the  operating  schedule  of 
the  mobile  radar  detector  stations  was  daily  from  4  a.  m.  to  7  a.  m., 
routine  training  from  7  a.  m.  to  11  a.  m.  except  Sundays,  and  daily 
except  Saturday  and  Sunday  from  12  to  4  p.  m.  for  training  and  main- 
tenance work. 

May  I  call  your  attention  to  the  chart  which  represents  a  consolida- 
tion of  the  recorded  plots  at  the  Opana  station  [77]  before  and 
after  the  attack ;  also,  in  the  Army  exhibit,  page  7,  is  a  reproduction 
of  a  photostatic  copy  of  the  record  of  early  flights  on  December  7, 
1941,  obtained  by  the  Opana  detector  station.  This  chart  on  the  easel 
is  taken  from  the  photostatic  chart. 

On  page  8  of  the  exhibit  is  a  reproduction  of  a  photostatic  copy  of 
mobile  detector-station  records  obtained  prior  to  7  a.  m.  on  December  7, 
1941.  The  dots  indicate  the  location  of  aircraft.  Going  back  to  the 
chart  on  the  easel,  the  blue  arrow  represents  the  direction  of  approach 
of  the  B-l7's  previously  mentioned  as  being  ferried  from  the  main- 
land. 

I  perhaps  should  mention  that  those  planes  were  not  recorded  by 
the  radar  station.  Their  direction  is  put  on  the  chart  merely  as  a 
matter  of  orientation. 

At  7  a.  m.,  December  7, 1941,  all  radar  detector  stations  closed  down 
except  the  Opana  station  at  Kahuku  Point,  which  remained  in  opei'a- 
tion  in  order  to  continue  the  training  of  a  new  man,  Pvt.  George  E. 
Elliott,  who  had  volunteered  to  remain  on  the  job  for  this  purpose. 

[78]  At  7 :  02  a.  m.  this  station,  manned  by  Private  Elliott  and 
Pvt.  Joseph  L.  Lockard,  picked  up  an  indication  of  airplanes  at  132 
miles,  bearing  3°  east  of  north,  indicated  by  that  pip  at  the  top  of  the 
chart  marked  with  the  time  7 :  02. 

The  soldiers  kept  tracking  the  target.  At  7 :  20  a.  m.  Private  Loc- 
kard called  to  inform  Lieutenant  Tyler,  the  watch  officer  at  the  infor- 
mation center.  Fort  Shaffer,  of  his  observations,  but  that  officer  decided 
to  take  no  action. 

Shortly  after  8  a.  m.  Lieutenant  Tyler  received  a  telephone  message 
that  Wheeler  Field  was  under  attack.  Lieutenant  Tyler  thereupon 
directed  that  all  radar  crews  be  recalled  to  their  stations. 

Sound  detectors:  In  the  Coast  Artillery  Antiaircraft  Regiment 
there  were  generally  two  battalions  of  guns,  each  of  which  included 
three  gun  batteries  and  a  battery  of  ten  60-inch  searchlights. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Just  a  minute,  Colonel.  Will  you  put  the  map  back 
there  ?    I  would  like  to  ask  him  a  question. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  have  anything  to  say  about  those  purple  ink 
marks  on  your  exhibit,  ''6 :  45"  and  ''6 :  48"  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  can't  hear  your  question,  Mr.  Mitchell. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  am  sorry.  I  have  to  put  my  nose  in  [79] 
the  instrument. 


40  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Have  you  anything  to  say  about  those  indications  of  interception 
at  earlier  hours  to  the  left  of  that,  as  you  pointed  out  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  As  I  mentioned,  that  chart  was  taken  from  the 
historical  plot,  so-called,  of  which  the  committee  has  a  photostatic 
copy.  I  reproduced  the  information  in  those  pips  on  the  chart  for  the 
sake  of  accuracy,  but  I  am  not  in  a  position  to  interpret  them. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is,  the  Army  hasn't  any  information,  from  its 
records,  to  interpret  what  the  radar  station  showed,  what  the  record  of 
the  radar  station  showed,  to  the  left,  I  mean  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Any  interpretation  would  be  speculation,  I  think, 
on  my  part,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  just  wondered,  as  it  is  shown  there,  whether  some- 
thing ought  to  be  said  about  it. 

Colonel  Thielen.  They  are  taken,  as  I  said,  for  the  sake  of  com- 
pleteness from  the  historical  plot.  They  do  appear  on  the  plot.  They 
were  plotted  on  the  Opana  station.  As  I  indicated,  with  the  state  of 
radar  at  that  time,  it  could  not  be  definitely  stated  whether  any  image 
was  that  of  a  friendly  or  hostile  aircraft. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman 

[80]  Senator  Lucas.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  going  to  raise  the 
point  of  order.     If  we  are  going  to  have  a  rule  it  ought  to  be  followed. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Since  the  point  of  order  is  raised 

The  Chairman.  I  think  we  have  a  point  of  order  that  we  agreed  to 
follow,  otherwise  we  will  be  breaking  down  the  rules  before  we  start. 

Go  ahead. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Go  ahead,  Colonel. 
Colonel  Thielen.  As  for  the  sound  detectors 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  assumed,  Mr.  Chairman,  when  the  counsel 
asked  questions  and  no  one  else  asked  questions,  that  it  would  naturally 
come  around  to  ask  him  a  question. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair's  interpretation  of  the  rule  is  that  the 
committee  members  are  not  to  ask  questions  until  the  counsel  has 
finished  with  the  witness. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  means  completely  finished  with  the  witness 
and  he  turns  him  over  to  the  committee  ? 

The  Chairivian.  Yes. 

Senator  Brewster.  It  might  be  quite  in  order  for  the  committee 
members  to  suggest  questions,  so  if  they  have  any  suggestions  to  make 
they  make  written  suggestions.  I  think  it  might  clarify  the  record 
as  to  procedure. 

The  Chairman.  Certainly. 

[81]  Mr.  Mitchell.  Colonel,  may  I  ask  you  also  if  there  is  any- 
thing you  have  to  say  about  the  purple  arrow  going  from  10 :  39  to 
10 :  27  on  that  map  ?     Wliat  does  that  mean  ?     Why  is  that  on  there  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Because  those  two  points  were  plotted  by  the 
Opana  station  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  After  the  attack  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  correct.  We  could  see  definitely  that 
they  were  going  away,  those  at  10 :  27  having  been  plotted  earlier 
than  that  at  10 :  39. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  all.     You  may  go  ahead. 

Colonel  Thielen.  As  for  the  sound  detectors,  in  the  Coast  Artillery 
Anti-Aircraf t  Kegiment  there  were  generally  two  battalions  of  guns, 
each  of  which  included  3  gun  batteries  and  a  battery  of  10  GO-inch 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  41 

searchlights.  One  sound  detector  generally  worked  with  each  search- 
light. The  primary  purpose  of  the  sound  detector  was  to  pick  up  an 
airplane  by  its  sound  and  then  to  point  the  searchlight ;  consequently 
detectors  were  employed  only  at  night. 

The  sound  detector  in  use  at  the  time  had  an  optimum  range  of 
about  10,000  yards. 

I  believe  the  Navy  will  now  discuss  their  radar. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Before  discussing  Navy  radar  I  would  like  to 
reconcile  one  point  that  might  seem  inconsistent  to  [83]  the 
members  of  the  committee. 

You  will  recall,  in  describing  the  search  of  the  patrol  planes,  I 
said  that  the  planes  were  to  take  off  at  sunrise,  5 :  27  Hawaiian  time. 
That  word  "sunrise"  was  taken  out  of  the  report,  but  I  think  it  was  a 
typogi-aphical  error  because  sunrise  was  actually  an  hour  later, 
at  6 :  26. 

It  is  my  understanding  that  the  j)lan  did  call  for  the  planes  to 
take  off  at  5 :  27,  an  hour  before  sunrise,  which  is  usually  considered 
as  dawn  in  those  latitudes. 

With  that  explanation,  I  would  like  to  pass  on  now  to  the  Navy's 
radar  equipment.  The  only  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor  equipped  with  ship 
search  radar  at  that  time,  on  December  7,  1941,  were  the  battleships 
Pennsylvania,  California,  West  Virginia,  and  the  seaplane  tender 
Curtiss.  The  radar  equipment  on  these  ships  was  not  manned  since 
the  height  of  the  land  around  the  harbor  would  have  made  it  ineffec- 
tive. The  equipment  on  the  Curtiss  was  put  into  operation  at  the 
beginning  of  the  first  attack  and  that  on  the  Pennsylvania  began  to 
operate  15  minutes  later,  both  with  negative  results. 

Facilities  for  aircraft  spotting:  On  board  the  naval  vesselsat  Pearl 
Harbor,  aircraft  spotting  was  a  function  of  the  crews  manning  their 
stations  at  condition  of  readiness  then  existing.  Every  ship's  organi- 
zation bill  provided  for  certain  members  of  the  watch  [83]  at 
the  gun  and  control  stations  to  act  as  aircraft  lookouts.  There  were 
no  naval  air  lookout  stations  ashore.  However,  crews  of  the  signal 
tower  at  Pearl  Harbor  had  certain  air  lookout  duties  as  part  of  their 
general  signal  duties. 

Character  of  antisubmarine  patrol  operations,  December  7,  1941 : 
On  the  morning  of  December  7,  1941,  the  United  States  destroyer 
Ward  was  assigned  and  was  carrying  out  an  inner  antisubmarine 
patrol  off  the  Pearl  Harbor  entrance.  Commander  Biard  is  pointing 
to  that  locality.  This  patrol  searched  the  navigable  waters  between 
bearings  100°  to  250°  (true)  from  entrance  buoy  No.  1  to  a  distance 
of  2  miles. 

The  mission  of  this  patrol  was  to  detect  and  prevent  unidentified 
submarines  and  unauthorized  vessels  from  entering  the  approaches 
to  the  Pearl  Harbor  entrance  channel. 

Although  not  part  of  the  antisubmarine  patrol,  the  United  States 
minesweepers  Condor  and  Crosshill  were  conducting  minesweeping 
operations  in  the  channel  and  approaches  thereto. 

The  fleet  units  at  sea  were  screened  by  both  a  surface  and  air  anti- 
submarine patrol. 

Account  of  Japanese  attack  on  ships  and  installations  at  Pearl  Har- 
bor, December  7,  1941 :  Possibly  the  first  Japanese  contact  off  Oahu 
was  made  at  3 :  50  a.  m.  Pearl  Harbor  time — 9 :  20  a.  m.  Washington 
time —        [SJ^]        when  the  United  States  coastal  minesweeper  Con- 


42  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

dor  sighted  the  periscope  of  a  submerged  submarine.  At  that  time  the 
Condor  was  conducting  minesweeping  operations  approximately  1% 
miles  southwest  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  entrance  buoys.  At  3 :  57  a.  m. 
the  Condor,  by  visual  signal,  informed  the  destroyer  Ward,  then 
patroling  off  the  Pearl  Harbor  entrance,  of  this  contact. 

The  Ward  thereupon  immediately  instituted  a  search  and  at  about 
6 :  40  a.  m.  sighted  the  periscope  of  an  unidentified  submarine  appar- 
ently trailing  the  United  States  target  repair  ship  Antwres,  then  en 
route  to  Honolulu  Harbor. 

Commander  Biard,  will  you  show  the  relationship  between  Hono- 
lulu Harbor  and  Pearl  Harbor  entrance  ? 

That  is  Pearl  Harbor  [indicating]  and  that  is  Honolulu  Harbor, 
about  10  miles  apart. 

{85^  Upon  sighting  the  submarine,  the  Ward  ordered  all  hands 
to  battle  stations,  increased  her  speed  from  5  to  25  knots,  and  started 
the  attack.  The  Ward  opened  fire  with  her  guns  at  6  :  45  a.  m.  and  a 
depth  charge  attack  was  commenced.  The  second  gun  salvo  scored  a 
direct  hit  upon  the  conning  tower  of  the  Japanese  submarine.  As  a 
result  of  these  attacks,  the  submarine  is  believed  to  have  gone  down  in 
1,200  feet  of  water.     A  large  amount  of  oil  came  to  the  surface. 

At  6 :  54  a.  m.,  the  Wai'd  sent  the  following  dispatch  by  voice  trans- 
mission to  the  commandant.  Fourteenth  Naval  District : 

We  have  attacked,  fired  upon,  and  dropped  charges  upon  submariue  operating 
in  defensive  sea  area. 

At  7 :  15  a.  m. — 12 :  45  p.  m.  Washington  time — this  message  was 
reported  delivered  to  the  district  officer,  Lt.  Comdr.  Harold  Ka- 
minski.  In  turn,  at  7 :  16  a.  m.,  Lieutenant  Commander  Kaminski  no- 
tified the  duty  officer  of  the  commander-in-chief,  United  States  Fleet. 
This  was  the  first  information  received  at  the  Pearl  Harbor  head- 
quarters of  the  commander-in-chief.  United  States  Fleet,  that  un- 
identified forces  might  be  in  the  Hawaiian  area.  Twenty-five  minutes 
after  this  telephone  report,  a  second  was  received  at  the  headquarters, 
commander-in-chief,  United  States  Fleet,  from  the  operations  officer 
of  patrol  wing  two  relaying  a  report  received  at  [5^]  7 :  32 
a.  m.  to  the  effect  that  a  patrol  plane  had  sunk  an  unidentified  subma- 
rine south  of  Pearl  Harbor  channel  entrance  buoy.  This  was  the  same 
submarine  reported  by  the  Ward.  This  report  was  followed  by  an- 
other telephone  report  from  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  duty  officer 
in  which  it  was  stated  that  the  Ward  was  towing  a  sampan  into  Hono- 
lulu. This  last  report  was  undoubtedly  erroneous  since  there  is  no 
mention  in  the  Wardh  administrative  log  of  her  towing  a  sampan. 

Upon  receipt  of  the  Ward''s  report  by  the  commandant.  Fourteenth 
Naval  District,  the  commandant  ordered  the  ready-du<:y  destroyer 
U.  S.  S.  Monaghan  to  proceed  to  sea,  to  close  the  net  gate,  to  attempt  to 
verify  the  contact  report  giving  full  details,  and  to  notify  the  com- 
mander in  chief's  staff  duty  officer.  A  dispatch  was  sent  to  the  Ward 
at  7 :  37  a.  m.,  asking  verification  of  the  report  and  details  of  the  attack 
on  the  enemy  submarine. 

After  the  Ward'^s  message  and  prior  to  the  Japanese  raid,  no  other 
reports  indicating  or  verifying  the  enemy's  presence  were  received  at 
the  headquarters,  commandant,  Fourteenth  Naval  District. 

At  about  7:55  a.  m.  Pearl  Harbor  time — 1 :  25  p.  m,  Washington 
time— the  navy  yard  signal  tower  telephoned  the  comniander  in  chief, 
Pacific  Fleet,  as  follows : 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  43 

[87]         Enemy  air  raid — not  drill. 

Almost  simultaneously,  Japanese  torpedo  planes  attacked  the  battle- 
ships. From  then  on  until  9 :  45  a.  m.,  Pearl  Harbor  time — 3 :  15  p.  m. 
Washington  time — there  was  almost  continuous  enemy  air  activity  of 
some  kind  over  the  harbor.  However,  there  seemed  to  be  separate 
periods  of  greatly  intensified  activity.  On  this  basis,  the  narrative  of 
the  attack  may  be  divided  into  five  phases. 

The  five  phases  of  the  attack  are : 

Phase  I :  Combined  torpedo  plane  and  dive  bomber  attacks  lasting 
from  7 :  55  a.  m.  to  8 :  25  a.  m. 

Phase  II :  Lull  in  attacks  lasting  from  8  :  25  a.  m.  to  8 :  40  a.  m. 

Phase  III :  Horizontal  bomber  attacks  extending  from  8 :  40  a.  m. 
to  9 :  15  a.  m. 

Phase  IV:  Dive  bomber  attacks  between  9:  15  and  9:45  a.  m. 

Phase  V :  Waning  of  attacks  and  completion  of  raid  after  9  :  45  a.  m. 

The  primary  objectives  of  the  Japanese  during  the  raid  were  the 
heavy  combatant  ships  and  aircraft.  Damage  to  the  light  forces  and 
the  industrial  plant  was  incidental  to  the  destruction  or  disablement 
of  the  heavy  ships  and  aircraft  based  ashore. 

[88]        Phase  I — 7:55-8:25  a.  m. — Combined  torpedo  and  dive- 
homber  attacks 

The  beginning  of  the  attack  coincided  with  the  hoisting  of  the 
preparatory  signal  for  8  o'clock  colors.  At  this  time — namely  7 :  55 
a.  m. — Japanese  dive  bombers  appeared  over  Ford  Island,  and  within 
the  next  few  seconds  enemy  torpedo  planes  and  dive  bombers  swung 
in  from  Various  sectors  to  concentrate  their  attack  on  the  heavy  ships 
moored  in  Pearl  Harbor.  It  is  estimated  that  nine  planes  engaged 
in  the  attack  on  the  naval  air  station  on  Ford  Island,  concentrated 
on  the  planes  parked  in  the  vicinity  of  hangar  No.  6. 

At  the  time  of  the  attack,  our  planes — patrol  flying  boats,  flbat 
planes,  and  scout  bombers,  carrier  type — were  lined  up  on  the  field. 
These  planes  caught  fire  and  exploded.  Machine-gun  emplacements 
were  set  up  hastily  and  manned,  although  the  return  fire  from  shore 
on  Ford  Island  was  pitifully  weak.  Then  as  suddenly  as  they  had 
appeared,  the  Japanese  plaiies  vanished.  No  further  attack  on  this 
air  station  was  made  during  the  day.  Except  for  a  direct  hit  oil 
hangar  No.  6  resulting  from  a  bomb  which  was  apparently  aimed  at 
the  battleship  California  and  which  fell  short,  the  damage  to  the 
station  itself  was  comparativel}'^  slight.  However,  33  of  our  best 
planes  out  of  a  total  of  70  planes  of  all  types  were  destroyed  or 
damaged. 

\89]  As  soon  as  the  attack  began,  commander.  Patrol  Wing  2 
broadcasted  from  Ford  Island  the  warning :  "Air  raid.  Pearl  Harbor — ■ 
This  is  not  a  drill."  This  warning  was  followed  a  few  minutes 
later  by  a  similar  message  from  the  commander  in  chief,  United 
States  Fleet. 

At  approximately  the  same  time  that  the  Japanese  dive  bombers 
appeared  over  Ford  Island,  other  low-flying  planes  struck  at  the 
Kaneohe  Naval  Air  Station  on  the  other  side  of  the  island.  The 
attack  was  well  executed,  with  the  planes  coming  down  in  shallow 
dives  and  inflicting  severe  casualties  on  the  seaplanes  moored  in  the 
water.  Machine  guns  and  rifles  wei-e  brought  out,  and  men  dispersed 
to  fire  at  will  at  the  low-flying  planes.     After  a  period  of  10  to  15 


44  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

minutes,  the  attacking  planes  drew  off  to  the  north  at  a  low  altitude 
and  disappeared  from  sight.  Several  other  contingents  of  bombers 
passed  over,  but  none  dropped  bombs  on  Kaneohe  Bay. 

About  25  minutes  after  the  first  attack,  another  squadron  of  planes 
similar  to  one  of  our  light  bomber  types,  appeared  over  Kaneohe  and 
commenced  bombing  and  strafing.  Number  3  hangar  received  a 
direct  hit  during  this  attack  and  four  planes  in  the  hangar  were 
destroyed.  The  majority  of  the  casualties  suffered  at  Kaneohe 
resulted  from  this  attack:.  Most  of  the  injured  personnel  were  in 
the  squadrons  attempting  either  to  launch  their  planes  or  to  save 
those  [90]  planes  not  as  yet  damaged.  When  the  enemy 
withdrew,  some  10  to  15  minutes  later,  salvage  operations  were  com- 
menced, but  it  was  too  late  to  save  No.  1  hangar,  which  burned  until 
only  its  steel  structural  work  was  left.  Only  9  out  of  the  35  planes 
at  Kaneohe  escaped  destruction  in  this  attack.  Six  of  these  were 
damaged  and  three  were  in  the  air  on  patrol  south  of  Oahu  as  pre- 
viously described. 

Meanwhile,  the  Marine  air  base  at  Ewa  was  undergoing  similar 
attack.  Apparently  the  attack  on  Ewa  preceded  that  at  Pearl  Harbor 
by  about  2  minutes.  It  was  delivcTed  by  two  squadrons  of  18  to  24 
single-seater  fighter  planes  using  machine-gun  strafing  tactics,  which 
came  in  from  the  northwest  at  an  altitude  of  approximately  1,000 
feet.  These  enemy  planes  would  descend  to  within  20  to  25  feet 
of  the  ground,  attacking  single  planes  with  short  bursts  of  gunfire. 
Then  they  would  f)ull  over  the  tree  tops,  reverse  their  course,  and 
attack  from  the  opposite  direction.  Within  less  than  15  minutes,  all 
the  Marine  tactical  aircraft  had  been  shot  up  or  set  on  fire.  Then  the 
guns  of  the  enemy  fighters  were  turned  upon  our  utility  aircraft, 
upon  planes  that  had  been  disassembled  for  repair,  and  upon  the 
Marines  themselves. 

Effective  defense  measures  were  impossible  until  after  the  first  raid 
had  subsided.  Pilots,  aching  to  strike  at  the  enemy  in  the  air,  viewed 
the  wreckage  which  until  a  [91]  few  minutes  before  had  been 
a  strong  air  group  of  Marine  fighters  and  bombers.  All  together  33 
out  of  the  49  planes  at  Ewa  had  gone  up  in  smoke.  Some  marines, 
unable  to  find  anythmg  more  effective,  had  tried  to  oppose  fighter 
planes  with  pistols,  since  the  remaining  16  planes  were  too  badly 
damaged  to  fly. 

Although  in  phase  I  of  the  attack  on  the  ships  at  Pearl  Harbor 
Japanese  dive  bombers  were  effective,  the  torpedo  planes  did  the  most 
damage.  They  adhered  strictly  to  a  carefully  laid  plan  and  directed 
their  attacks  from  those  sectors  which  afforded  the  best  avenues  of 
approach  for  torpedo  attack  against  selected  heavy  ship  objectives. 
Thus  they  indicated  accurate  knowledge  of  harbor  and  channel  depths 
and  the  berths  ordinarily  occupied  by  the  major  combatant  units  of 
our  fleet.  At  least  in  the'great  majority  of  cases,  the  depth  of  water  in 
Pearl  Harbor  did  not  prevent  the  successful  execution  of  this  form  of 
attack.  Shallow  dives  of  the  torpedoes  upon  launching  were  assured 
by  the  use  of  specially  constructed  wooden  fins,  remnants  of  which 
were  discovered  on  enemy  torpedoes  salvaged  after  the  attack. 

Four  separate  torpedo-plane  attacks  were  made  during  phase  I. 
The  major  attack  was  made  by  12  planes  which  swung  in  generally 
from  the  southeast  over  the  tank  farm  and  the  vicinity  of  Merry 
Point.     After  splitting,  they  launched  their  torpedoes  at  very  low  al- 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  45 

titudes  (within  50  [92]  to  100  feet  of  the  water),  and  from 
very  short  distances,  aiming  for  the  battleships  berthed  on  the  south- 
east side  of  Ford  Island.  All  the  outboard  battleships,  namely,  the 
Nevada,  Arizo7ia,  West  Virginia,  Oklahoma,  and  California,  were  ef- 
fectively hit  by  one  or  more  torpedoes.  Strafing  was  simultaneously 
conducted  from  the  rear  cockpits.  A  recovered  unexploded  torpedo 
carried  an  explosive  charge  of  1,000  pounds. 

During  the  second  of  these  attacks,  the  Oklahoma  was  struck  by 
three  torpedoes  on  the  port  side  and  heeled  rapidly  to  port,  impeding 
the  efforts  of  her  defenders  to  beat  off  the  attackers. 

The  third  attack  was  made  by  one  torpedo  plane  which  appeared 
from  the  west  and  was  directed  against  the  light  cruiser  Helena  and 
the  minelayer  Oglala,  both  of  which  were  temporarily  occupying  the 
berth  previously  assigned  to  the  battleship  Pennsylvania,  flagship  of 
the  Pacific  Fleet.  One  torpedo  passed  under  the  Oglala  and  exploded 
against  the  side  of  the  Helena.  The  blast  stove  in  the  side  plates  of 
the  Oglala.  Submersible  pumps  for  the  Oglala  were  obtained  from 
the  Helena,  but  could  not  be  used  since  no  power  was  available  because 
of  damage  to  the  ship's  engineering  plant. 

The  fourth  wave  of  five  planes  came  in  from  the  northwest  and 
attacked  the  seaplane  tender  Tangier,  the  target  \PS]  ship 
Utah,  and  the  light  cruisers  Raleigh  and  Detroit.  The  Raleigh  was 
struck  by  one  torpedo,  and  the  Utah  received  two  hits  in  succession, 
capsizing  at  8 :  13  a.  m.  At  first  it  was  feared  that  the  Raleigh  would 
capsize.  Orders  were,  therefore,  given  for  all  men  not  at  the  guns 
to  jettison  all  topside  weights  and  put  both  airplanes  in  the  water. 
Extra  manila  and  wire  lines  were  also  run  to  the  quays  to  help  keep 
the  ship  from  capsizing. 

The  Utah,  an  old  battleship  converted  into  a  target  ship,  had  re- 
cently returned  from  serving  as  a  target  for  practice  aerial  bombard- 
ment. As  soon  as  she  received  her  torpedo  hits,  she  began  listing 
rapidly  to  port.  After  she  had  listed  to  about  40°,  the  order  was 
given  to  abandon  ship.  This  order  was  executed  with  some  difficulty 
as  the  attacking  planes  strafed  the  crew  as  they  went  over  the  side. 
Remnants  of  the  crew  had  reached  Ford  Island  safely.  Later  knock- 
ing was  heard  within  the  hull  of  the  Utah.  With  cutting  tools  ob- 
tained from  the  Raleigh,  a  volunteer  crew  succeeded  in  cutting 
through  the  hull  and  rescuing  a  fireman  second  class  who  had  been 
entrapped  in  the  void  scape  underneath  the  dynamo  room. 

An  interesting  sidelight  on  Japanese  intentions  and  advance  knowl- 
edge is  suggested  by  the  fact  that  berths  F-10  and  F-11  in  which  the 
Utah  and  Raleigh  were  placed  were  [P^]  designated  carrier 
berths  and  that  a  carrier  was  frequently  moored  in  nearby  F-9. 

The  Detroit  and  Tangier  escaped  torpedo  damage,  one  torpedo 
passing  just  astern  of  the  Detroit  and  burying  itself  in  the  mud.  An- 
other torpedo  passed  between  the  Tangier  and  the  Utah. 

It  is  estimated  that  the  total  number  of  torpedo  planes  engaged  in 
these  four  attacks  was  21. 

In  the  eight  dive-bomber  attacks  occurring  during  phase  I,  three 
types  of  bombs  were  employed — light,  medium,  and  incendiary. 

During  the  second  of  these  attacks,  a  bomb  hit  exploded  the  forward 
14-inch  powder  magazine  on  the  battleship  Arizona  and  caused  a  rav- 
aging oil  fire,  which  sent  up  a  great  cloud  of  smoke,  thereby  inter- 

79716 — 46 — pt.  1 ^6 


46  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

fering  with  antiaircraft  fire.  The  battleship  Tennessee  in  the  adja- 
cent berth  was  endangered  seriously  by  the  oil  fire. 

The  West  Virginia  was  hit  during  the  third  of  these  attacks  by  two 
heavy  bombs  as  well  as  by  torpedoes.  Like  the  California^  she  had  to 
be  abandoned  after  a  large  fire  broke  out  amidships.  Her  executive 
officer,  the  senior  survivor,  dove  overboard  and  swam  to  the  Ten- 
nessee^ where  he  organized  a  party  of  West  Virginia  survivors  to 
help  extinguish  the  fire  in  the  rubbish,  trash,  and  oil  which  [P-5] 
covered  the  water  between  the  Tennessee  and  Ford  Island. 

The  total  number  of  dive  bombers  engaged  in  this  phase  is  esti- 
mated at  30.  While  a  few  fighters  were  reported  among  the  attackers 
in  the  various  phases,  they  were  no  doubt  confused  with  light  bombers 
and  accordingly  are  not  treated  as  a  distinct  type. 

Although  the  major  attack  by  high-altitude  horizontal  bombers 
did  not  occur  until  phase  III,  15  planes  of  this  type  operating  in  four 
groups  were  active  during  phase  I. 

Most  of  the  torpedo  damage  to  the  fleet  had  occurred  by  8 :  25 
a.  m.  All  the  outboard  battleships  had  been  hit  by  one  or  more 
torpedoes ;  all  the  battleships  had  been  hit  by  one  or  more  bombs  with 
the  exception  of  the  Oklahoma^  which  took  four  torpedoes  before  it 
capsized,  and  the  Pennsylvania^  which  received  a  bomb  hit  later.  By 
the  end  of  the  first  phase,  the  West  Virginia  was  in  a  sinking  con- 
dition ;  the  California  was  down  by  the  stern ;  the  Arizona  was  a  flam- 
ing ruin;  the  other  battleships  were  all  damaged  to  a  greater  or 
lesser  degree. 

Although  the  initial  attack  of  the  Japanese  came  as  a  surprise,  de- 
fensive action  on  the  part  of  the  fleet  was  prompt.  All  ships  immedi- 
ately went  to  general  quarters.  Battleship  ready  machine  guns  like- 
wise opened  fire  at  once,  and  within  an  estimated,  average  time  of 
less  than  5  minutes  \_96']  practically  all  battleships  and  anti- 
aircraft batteries  were  firing. 

The  cruisers  were  firing  all  antiaircraft  batteries  within  an  average 
time  of  about  4  minutes.  The  destroyers,  although  opening  up  with 
"machine  guns  almost  immediately,  averaged  7  minutes  in  bringing  all 
antiaircraft  guns  into  action. 

During  this  phase  of  the  battle  there  was  no  movement  of  ships 
within  the  harbor  proper.  The  destroyer  Helni^  which  had  gotten 
under  way  just  prior  to  the  attack,  was  outside  the  harbor  entrance 
when  at  8: 17  a  submarine  conning  tower  was  sighted  to  the  right  of 
the  entrance  channel  and  northward  of  buoy  No.  1.  The  submarine 
immediately  submerged.  The  Helm  opened  fire  at  8 :  19  a.  m.  when  the 
submarine  again  surfaced  temporarily.    No  hits  were  observed. 

[57]  Phase  II — S:^5-8:Jfi  a.  m. — Lull  in  attacks 
This  phase  is  described  as  a  lull  only  by  way  of  comparison.  Air 
activity  continued  during  this  phase  although  somewhat  abated,  with 
sporadic  attacks  by  dive  and  horizontal  bombers.  During  this  phase 
an  estimated  total  of  15  dive  bombers  participated  in  5  attacks  upon 
the  ships  in  the  navy  yard,  the  battleships  Maryland^  Oklahoma^ 
Nevada^  and  Pennsylvania^  and  various  light  cruisers  and  destroyers. 
Although  three  attacks  by  horizontal  bombers  occurred  during  the 
lull,  these  appear  to  have  overlapped  into  phnse  III  and  are  con- 
sidered under  that  heading. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  47 

At  8 :  32  a.  m.  the  battleship  Oklahoma  took  a  heavy  list  to  star- 
board and  capsized. 

During  phase  II,  there  was  still  relatively  little  ship  movement 
within  the  harbor.  The  ready-duty  destroyer  Monaghan  had  re- 
ceived orders  at  7:  51  a.  m.  (Pearl  Harbor  time)  to  "proceed  immedi- 
ately and  contact  Ward  in  defensive  sea  area."  At  about  8 :  37,  ob- 
serving an  enemy  submarine  just  west  of  Ford  Island  under  fire  from 
both  the  Curtiss  and  Ta/ngie7\  the  Monaghan  proceeded  at  high  speed 
and  at  about  8 :  43  rammed  the  submarine.  As  the  enemy  vessel  had 
submerged,  the  shock  was  slight.  The  Monaghan  thereupon  reversed 
engines  and  dropped  two  depth  charges. 

The  Curtiss  had  previously  scored  two  direct  hits  on  [P5]  the 
conning  tower.  This  submarine  was  later  salvaged  for  inspection  and 
disposal.  The  Monaghan  then  proceeded  down  the  channel  and  con- 
tinued her  sortie.  At  the  same  time  that  the  Monagham  got  under- 
way, the  destroyer  Henley  slipped  her  chain  from  buoy  X-11  and 
sortied,  following  the  Monaghan  down  the  channel. 

Phase  III — 8:  If.0-9: 15  a.  m. — Horizontal  honiber  attacks 

The  so-called  lull  in  the  air  raid  was  terminated  by  the  appearance 
over  the  fleet  of  eight  groups  of  high-altitude  horizontal  bombers 
which  crossed  and  recrossed  their  targets  from  various  directions, 
inflicting  serious  damage.  Some  of  the  bombs  dropped  were  con- 
verted 15-  or  16-inch  shells  of  somewhat  less  explosive  quality,  marked 
by  very  little  flame.  According  to  some  observers,  many  bombs 
dropped  by  high-altitude  horizontal  bombers  either  failed  to  explode 
or  landed  outside  the  harbor  area. 

During  the  second  attack  (at  9:06  a.  m.)  the  Pennsylvania  was 
hit  by  a  heavy  bomb  which  passed  through  the  main  deck  amidships 
and  detonated,  causing  a  fire,  which  was  extinguished  with  some 
difficulty. 

The  third  group  of  planes  followed  very  closely  the  line  of  battle- 
ship moorings.  It  was  probably  one  of  these  planes  that  hit  the 
California  with  what  is  believed  to  have  been  a  15-inch  projectile 
equipped  with  tail  vanes  which  [PP]  penetrated  to  the  second 
deck  and  exploded.  As  a  result  of  the  explosion,  the  armored  hatch 
to  the  machine  shop  was  badly  sprung  and  could  not  be  closed,  result- 
ing in  the  spreading  of  a  serious  fire. 

Altogether,  30  horizontal  bombers,  including  9  planes  which  had 
participated  in  earlier  attacks,  are  estimated  to  have  engaged  in  phase 
III.  Once  more  it  was  the  heavy  combatant  ships,  the  battleships 
and  cruisers,  which  bore  the  brunt  of  these  attacks. 

Although  phase  III  was  largely  devoted  to  horizontal  bombing, 
approximately  18  dive  bombers  organized  in  5  groups  also  participated. 

It  was  probably  the  second  of  these  groups  which  did  considerable 
damage  to  the  Nevada^  then  proceeding  down  the  South  Channel,  and 
also  to  the  Shaw,  Cassin,  and  Downes,  all  three  of  which  were  set  afire. 

During  the  fifth  attack,  a  Japanese  dive  bomber  succeeded  in  drop- 
ping 1  bomb  on  the  seaplane  tender  Curtiss  which  detonated  on  the 
main-deck  level,  killing  20  men,  wounding  58,  and  leaving  1  other 
unaccounted  for. 

During  this  same  phase,  the  Curtiss  took  under  fire  one  of  these 
bombers,  which  was  pulling  out  of  a  dive  over  the  naval  air  station. 
Hit  squarely  by  the  Curtiss''  accurate  gunfire,  the  plane  crashed  on  the 


48  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

ship,  spattering  burning  [100]  gasoline  and  starting  fires  so 
menacing  that  one  of  the  guns  had  to  be  temporarily  abandoned. 

Considerable  ship  movement  took  place  during  phase  III.  At  8 :  40 
a.  m.  the  Nevada  cleared  berth  F-8  without  assistance  and  proceeded 
down  the  South  Channel.  As  soon  as  the  Japanese  became  aware 
that  a  battleship  was  trying  to  reach  open  water,  they  sent  dive  bomber 
after  dive  bomber  down  after  her  and  registered  several  hits.  In 
spite  of  the  damage  she  had  sustained  in  the  vicinity  of  floating  dry- 
dock  No.  2,  and  although  her  bridge  and  forestructure  were  ablaze, 
the  ship  continued  to  fight  effectively.  At  9 :  10,  however,  while  she 
was  attempting  to  make  a  turn  in  the  channel,  the  Nevada  ran  aground 
in  the  vicinity  of  buoy  No.  19. 

Meanwhile  the  repair  ship  Vestal,  also  without  assistance,  had  got- 
ten underway  at  about  8:  40,  had  cleared  the  burning  Arizona,  and  at 
abfiat  9 :  10  anchored  well  clear  northeast  of  Ford  Island. 

Soon  after  the  Nevada  and  Vestal  had  cleared  their  berths,  tugs 
began  to  move  the  Oglala  to  a  position  astern  of  the  Helena  at  "Ten- 
ten"  Dock.  The  Oglala  was  finally  secured  in  her  berth  at  about  9 :  00, 
but  shortly  thereafter  she  capsized. 

At  8 :  42,  the  oiler  Neosho  cleared  berth  F-4  unaided  and  stood 
toward  Merry  Point  in  order  to  reduce  fire  hazard  to  her  cargo  and 
to  clear  the  way  for  a  possible  sortie  by  the  battleship  Mari/land. 

[101'\  Next,  phase  IV,  from  9 :  15  to  9 :  45,  dive-bomber  at- 
tacks  

The  CliAiRMAisr.  Under  the  program  of  the  committee,  12  o'clock 
having  arrived,  I  think  we  should  now  recess  until  2  p.  m.,  and  com- 
plete your  testimony  then. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  may  have  30  seconds  longer,  I 
could  finish  this  particular  part. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment.    You  might  as  well  come  back  at  2. 

(Whereupon,  at  12  m.,  the  committee  recessed,  to  reconvene  at  2 
p.  m.,  of  the  same  day.) 

[102'\  AFTERNOON  SESSION — 2  P.  M. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
Admiral,  you  may  proceed. 

TESTIMONY  OF  REAE  ADM.  T.  B.  INGIIS  AND  COL.  BERNARD 
THIELEN  (Resumed) 

Admiral  Inglis.  In  this  morning's  portion  of  the  presentation  I 
finished  phases  I,  II,  and  III.  I  propose  now  to  take  up  the  story  with 
phase  IV,  which  lasted  from  9 :  15  to  9 :  45  and  was  characterized  by 
dive-bomber  attacks. 

Phase  IV — 9: 15-9: 1^5  a.  m. — Dive  hoiiiber  attacks 

During  phase  IV  an  estimated  27  dive  bombers  conducted  9  strafing 
attacks  directed  against  ships  throughout  the  entire  harbor  area.  In 
all  probability  the  planes  were  the  same  ones  that  had  conducted  pre- 
vious attacks.  These  attacks  overlapped  by  about  10  minutes  the 
horizontal  bomber  attacks  previously  described  in  phase  III. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  49 

Phase  V — 9:4S — Waning  of  attacks  and  convpletion  of  raid 

By  9 :  45  all  enemy  planes  had  retired.  Evading  our  aerial  searches, 
both  shore-based  and  from  carriers  at  sea,  the  Japanese  striking  force 
retired  to  its  home  waters  without  being  contacted  by  any  of  our  units. 
For  summary  of  Japanese  planes  participating  in  attack  see  item  11 
in  the  white  folder. 

The  foregoing  has  been  a  discussion  of  the  attack  phase  only.  The 
details  of  our  aircraft  and  antiaircraft  action  will  be  given  later. 

{103'\  Summary  of  percentage  of  personnel  mustered  on,  sta- 
tion :  Fleet  orders  at  the  time  of  Pearl  Harbor  directed  that  one-fourth 
of  the  officers  and  one-half  of  the  enlisted  personnel  be  on  board  at  all 
times. 

Excerpts  from  a  summarized  report  of  personnel  actually  on  board 
at  the  commencement  of  the  attack  on  December  7, 1941,  are  as  follows : 

On  hoard 

Commanding  officers   of  battleships 5  out  of  8 

Commanding  officers  of  cruisers 6  out  of  7 

Commanding  officers  of  destroyers percent 63 

Damage-control  officers  of  battleships 6  out  of  8 

Average  percentage  of  officers : 

Battleships    (approximate) percent 60-70 

Cruisers,  battle  force  (approximate) do 65 

Destroyers,  battle  force  (approximate) do 50 

Average  percentage  of  men : 

Battleships do 95 

Cruisers,  battle  force do 98 

Destroyers,  battle  force do 85 

There  were  ample  personnel  present  and  ready  to  man  all  naval 
shore  installations. 

I  will  ask  Colonel  Thielen  to  take  up  from  here. 

[lOJi-']  Colonel  Thielen.  In  presenting  the  Army's  story  of  the 
attack,  I  propose  to  describe  what  happened  at  each  of  the  three 
major  airfields,  Hickam  Field,  Wlieeler,  and  Bellows,  and  after  that 
to  describe  the  action  taken  by  our  ground  forces,  and  our  coast  ar- 
tillery command  in  response  to  the  attack. 

Our  planes  on  Hickam  Field  at  the  time  of  the  attack  were  lined  up 
on  the  warming-up  aprons  three  or  four  abreast,  with  approximately 
10  feet  between  wing  tips,  and  approximately  135  feet  from  the  tail 
of  one  plane  to  the  nose  of  another. 

If  you  will  note  the  plan  of  the  Hickam  Feld  as  displayed  on  the 
easel,  you  may  be  able  to  distinguish  the  aircraft  on  the  warming-up 
apron.  They  are  actually  drawn  to  scale.  They  may  not  be  legible. 
However,  each  member  of  the  committee  has  a  photograph  of  the  plan 
of  each  of  these  airfields. 

Hickam  Field  observers  report  that  the  first  indication  of  an  attack 
was  at  7 :  55  a.  m.  when  nine  enemy  single-engine,  low-wing  mono- 
planes, carrying  torpedoes,  were  observed  southeast  of  Hickam  Field 
hangar  line,  flying  at  an  altitude  of  about  50  feet  toward  Pearl  Harbor. 
They  were  in  two  echelons,  five  ])]anes  in  the  first  and  four  in  the 
second.     These  airplanes  did  not  attack  Hickam  Field.. 

\_105']  At  almost  the  same  time,  however,  nine  dive  bombers  at- 
tacked the  Hawaiian  Air  Depot  buildings  and  Hickam  Field  hangar 
line  from  the  south,  and  three  additional  planes  attacked  the  same  ob- 
jectives from  the  northwest.  Several  minutes  later  nine  additional 
dive  bombers  bombed  Hickam  Field  hanger  line  from  the  southeast. 
Immediately  thereafter,  seven  additional  dive  bombers  attacked  the 


50  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Hickam  Field  hangar  line  from  the  east.  All  planes  dived  at  approxi- 
mately 45  to  50  degrees  from  altitudes  of  3,000  to  5,000  feet.  Bombs 
were  released  at  about  1,000  feet  with  the  planes  pulling  out  of  dives 
from  800  to  approximately  300  feet.  Machine  gun  fire  was  employed 
before  and  after  bomb  release.    This  attack  lasted  about  10  minutes. 

The  second  attack  on  Hickam  Field  occurred  at  about  8 :  25  a.  m., 
when  between  six  and  nine  planes  approached  from  the  south  and  at- 
tacked No.  1  aqua  system,  which  is  a  hydrostatic  pass  for  the  fuel  pump- 
ing system,  and  also  the  technical  buildings  immediately  behind  the 
hangar  lines,  and  the  consolidated  barracks.  These  planes  when  first 
observed  were  flying  level  and  released  their  bombs  from  level  flight  at 
an  altitude  of  about  150  feet.  During  and  immediately  after  this 
bombing  attack  our  planes  on  the  parking  apron  were  attacked  with 
gun  fire.  About  1  minute  later  (8 :  26)  a  formation  of  five  or  six  planes 
bombed  the  baseball  diamond  1^06]  from  a  high  altitude,  pos- 
sibly believing  the  gasoline  storage  system  to  be  in  that  area.  The 
second  attack  lasted  between  10  and  15  minutes. 

The  third  attack  at  Hickam  occurred  about  9  a.  m.,  when  six  to  nine 
planes  (presumably  those  that  had  previously  bombed  from  level  flight 
at  150  feet  at  8 :  25)  attacked  with  machine  gun  fire  the  technical  build- 
ings behind  the  hangar  lines  and  certain  planes  which  by  then  were 
dispersed. 

These  attacks  came  from  four  directions  almost  simultaneously.  At 
the  same  time  a  formation  of  from  seven  to  nine  planes,  flying  in  V 
formation  at  an  altitude  estimated  at  6,000  feet  approached  from  the 
south,  releasing  bombs  which  struck  the  consolidated  barracks,  the 
parade  ground,  and  post  exchange.  The  third  attack  lasted  about  8 
minutes.  All  enemy  planes  observed  at  low  altitudes  were  single  en- 
gine, low-wing  monoplanes.  The  tj^pe  of  high  altitude  bombers  was 
not  definitely  established.  Largest  bombs  used  were  believed  not  to 
exceed  600  pounds.  Gun  ammunition  was  identified  as  7.7  and  20  milli- 
meter ammunition. 

At  Wheeler  Field,  our  planes  were  parked  in  the  space  between  the 
aprons  in  front  of  the  hangars,  generally  in  a  series  of  parallel  lines 
approximately  wing  tip  to  wing  tip,  the  lines  varying  from  15  to  20 
feet  apart. 

[107]  About  25  Japanese  planes  approached  at  8 :  02  a.  m.,  gener- 
ally from  the  southeast,  at  about  5,000  feet  altitude.  They  passed  well 
to  the  east  of  the  field,  circled  counter-clockwise,  losing  altitude  and 
approached  for  attack  from  the  north  at  about  3,000  feet,  generally  per- 
pendicular to  the  hangar  line.  The  formation  of  the  entire  ^roup  was 
roughly  a  V — with  five  sections  of  four  planes  each  forming  the  V 
formation — that  is  indicated  on  the  chart  and  on  the  photographic 
leproductions  thereof — with  a  fourth  plane  extending  the  right  leg 
of  the  V. 

A  single  odd  plane  flew  slightly  to  the  rear  of  the  formation.  They 
dived  at  an  angle  of  about  45°  and  struck  the  hangar  line  and  vicinity 
over  a  length  of  about  900  yards,  starting  from  the  engineering  hangar 
which  is  at  the  extreme  southwest  of  the  hangar  line.  Out  of  approx- 
imately 35  bombs  dropped,  4  were  about  600  pounds,  3  were  about  250 
pounds,  8  were  about  100  pounds,  and  the  remainder  were  smaller, 
some  of  them  appearing  to  be  oil  or  other  type  incendiary  bombs. 
Machine  gun  fire  was  employed  during  the  dive  bombing  attack. 
Practically  all  bombs  struck  the  hangar  line  and  points  in  the  rear 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  51 

and  were  released  at  altitudes  of  200  and  250  feet.  After  releasing 
bombs,  the  planes  continued  to  dive  for  a  short  distance  and  pulled 
out  at  about  the  same  angle  as  at  the         [^08]         start  of  the  dive. 

After  the  first  dive  bombing  the  formation  broke,  apparently  in  all 
directions,  with  individual  planes  continuing  gun  fire  without  regard 
to  the  possibility  of  collision.  This  phase  of  the  attack  was  carried  on 
from  altitudes  of  approximately  200  feet  and  the  only  semblance  of 
order  appeared  to  be  that  planes  circled  counterclockwise.  Principal 
targets  for  this  gim  fire  were  our  planes  on  the  hangar  line  and  build- 
ings, and  personnel  in  the  immediate  vicinity.  All  planes  in  the  first 
attacking  formation  appeared  similar  and  were  single-engine,  low- 
wing  monoplanes.  While  not  positively  established,  it  is  presumed 
from  evidence  of  20  millimeters  fire  that  this  attack  included  fighters  in 
support  of  dive  bombers.  The  entire  attack  lasted  approximately  15 
minutes. 

Another  attack  struck  Wheeler  Field  a  few  minutes  after  9  a.  m. 
This  attack  consisted  of  seven  enemy  planes  which  approached  from 
the  south,  flying  roughly  in  line  at  an  altitude  of  about  500  feet.  They 
fired  machine  guns  at  planes  being  taxied  onto  the  airdrome,  but  it  is 
believed  that  no  plane  fired  more  than  25  to  50  rounds.  All  seven 
planes  were  single-engine,  low-wing  monoplanes,  two-seaters.  They 
withdrew  to  the  north.  The  whole  second  attack  lasted  less  than  5 
minutes  and  could  very  reasonably  have  been  [^09]  made  by  a 
group  of  planes  expending  the  remainder  of  their  ammunition. 

During  the  first  raid  at  Wheeler  Field,  personnel  were  employed  in 
rescuing  the  wounded,  fighting  the  numerous  fires  and  in  removing 
airplanes  from  danger.  As  soon  as  undamaged  aircraft  had  been 
rolled  away  to  a  safe  place,  the  crews  began  arming  them. 

On  Bellows  Field  at  the  time  of  the  attack  the  P— iO's  were  parked 
in  line  at  10  to  15  feet  intervals.  The  reconnaissance  planes  were  also 
parked  in  a  line  at  slightly  greater  intervals. 

I  might  point  out  that  those  aircraft  on  the  white  squares  represent 
the  original  formation  as  it  was  at  the  time  of  the  first  attack.  We  have 
also  represented  aircraft  in  blue  squares  dispersed  over  the  field. 
Those  are  the  same  aircraft  represented  as  being  initially  in  line. 
After  the  first  attack  they  were  all  over  the  field. 

A  single  Japanese  fighter  plane  initiated  the  attack  at  approxi- 
mately 8:30  a.  m.  It  came  directly  from  the  east  and  employed 
machine-gun  fire  on  the  tent  area  apparently  expending  all  its  ammu- 
nition in  this  one  attack. 

At  about  9  a.  m.,  the  nine  fighters  attacked  Bellows  Field  from  the 
north  in  three  groups  of  three  planes  each  in  V  formation.  This 
attack  lasted  about  15  mhmtes  and  [ii^]  consisted  of  gim  fire 
only.  It  was  initiated  with  a  diving  attack  of  all  nine  planes,  after 
which  the  three  formations  of  three  each  peeled  olf  and  attacked  from 
various  directions.  The  antiaircraft  defense  during  this  attack  on 
Bellows  Field  consisted  of  small-arms  fire  by  elements  of  the  Two 
Hundred  and  Ninety-eighth  Infantry. 

After  the  single  plane,  tent-area  attack,  one  of  the  B-17's  which 
had  arrived  from  the  mainland  and  which  had  been  unable  to  land 
at  Hickam  Field,  attempted  to  land  at  Bellows  Field  but  rolled  off 
the  runway.  And  that  can  be  seen  on  the  chart  in  the  orange  circle, 
the  approximate  position  where  it  left  the  runway.  This  plane  was 
repeatedly  machine-gunned  by  the  nine  attacking  planes. 


52  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  attack  at  Bellows  Field  appeared  to  be  well  planned,  rehearsed, 
and  well  executed.  One  plane  was  reported  shot  down  by  the  Infantry 
troops  defending  the  area  but  no  part  of  it  was  recovered  from  the 
sea  for  identification. 

At  Haleiwa — you  might  point  that  out,  Captain,  on  the  big  map — 
the  planes  of  the  Forty-seventh  Pursuit  Squadron  were  parked  in  the 
open  in  close  formations.     However,  Haleiwa  Field  was  not  attacked. 

In  all  these  attacks  on  Oahu  airfields,  strafing  planes  came  down  to 
a  very  low  altitude.  Thej^  used  .50  caliber,  7.7  millimeter  and  20 
millimeter  ammunition.  Rigid  flight  discipline  was  [-?-?-?] 
demonstrated  by  the  enemy  and  accurate  bombing  was  evidenced. 
Such  attacks  could  not  have  been  performed  without  numerous  and 
detailed  rehearsals.  Every  movement  was  well  executed.  The  evi- 
dence indicates  that  the  attacks  on  the  airfields  were  made  by  a  maxi- 
mum of  105  airplanes ;  the  number  may  have  been  less  since  some  of 
the  planes  may  have  taken  part  in  more  than  one  attack. 

After  9 :  45  a.  m.,  December  7,  there  were  no  further  attacks  on 
Oahu  installations.  Despite  numerous  false  reports,  no  landings 
were  attempted. 

A  few  bombs  were  dropped  in  Honolulu,  but  probably  this  was  the 
result  of  individual  planes  clearing  their  bomb  racks  before  departing. 
There  was  some  strafing  and  a  few  bombs  were  dropped  on  Schofield 
Barracks  and  Fort  Shafter,  Several  bursts  of  machine-gini  fire  were 
delivered  at  targets  other  than  military  objectives. 

When  the  first  bombs  were  dropped  and  machine-gun  fire  com- 
menced, practically  all  observers  were  so  surprised  that  for  a  few 
minutes  the  real  situation  was  not  grasped.  Perhaps  2  or  4  minutes 
elapsed  before  General  Short  was  informed  by  his  chief  of  staff  that 
an  attack  was  in  progress.  General  Short  immediately  directed  that 
all  troops  be  turned  out  under  alert  No.  3. 

This  alert  required  all  units  to  occupy  battle  positions  shown  on  this 
map —  [-?-?^]  which  I  will  explain  in  a  moment — in  the  short- 
est possible  time  and  to  defend  Oahu.  All  troops  accordingly  moved 
to  their  prescribed  positions.  The  advance  command  post  of  the 
Hawaiian  Department  was  operating  in  Aliamanu  Crater  by  8 :  45 
a.  m.  with  limited  personnel,  and  the  advance  command  posts  of  the 
Twenty-fifth  Division  and  of  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force  by  11  a.  m. 
Rear  echelons  remained  at  their  normal  locations — which,  for  the 
department,  was  Fort  Shafter;  for  the  division,  Schofield  Barracks. 

At  Schofield  Barracks,  Brig.  Gen.  Durward  S.  Wilson,  commanding 
the  Twenty-fourth  Division,  first  heard  the  sounds  of  an  attack  at 
about  8 :  05  a.  m.  Within  a  few  minutes  his  chief  of  staff  had  issued 
instructions  to  the  units  to  get  their  machine  guns  into  the  antiaircraft 
positions,  to  increase  the  standing  guard  and  to  send  patrols  through- 
out the  division  sector — which  was  the  northern  half  of  the  island — 
to  observe  the  beaches.  Before  he  had  left  his  quarters,  General  Wil- 
son heard  some  of  our  machine  guns  in  operation.  About  8 :  50  a.  m. 
the  division  received  word  from  department  headquarters  that  alert 
No.  3  would  go  into  effect  at  once.  Approximately  90  percent  of  the 
Twenty-fourth  Division  troops  were  present  for  duty  on  the  morning 
of  December  7,  according  to  a  report  made  shortly  after  by  the  Ha- 
waiian Department.  The  division  was  in  position  in  [-?-?'5]  the 
north  sector  by  5  p.  m.  with  ammunition  except  for  the  240's,  240- 
millimeter  howitzers. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  53 

The  disposition  of  the  division,  Twenty-fourth  Division,  as  shown 
on  the  map,  can  be  picked  up  by  the  crossed  rifles  for  Infantry  posi- 
tions, by  the  cannon  for  Field  Artillery  battalions,  and  the  main  line 
of  resistance  on  the  east  coast  can  be  seen  following  the  ridge  line  of 
the  Koolau  Range  on  the  east  and  the  Waianae  Kange  on  the  west. 

Maj.  Gen.  Maxwell  Murray,  commanding  the  Twenty-fifth  Infantry 
Division,  stated  that  the  attack  began  about  7 :  53  a.  m.  Some  machine 
guns  were  in  firing  positions  on  the  roofs  within  10  minutes.  Alert 
No.  3  was  placed  in  etf  ect  at  about  9  o'clock.  Some  ammunition — other 
than  high  explosive — had  been  moved  into  the  barracks  which  meant 
that  most  of  the  men  had  as  much  as  30  rounds.  About  85  percent 
of  the  Twenty -fifth  Division  troops  were  reported  present  for  duty  at 
the  time  of  the  attack.  By  4  p.  m.,  on  the  Ttli  all  units  of  the  Twenty- 
fifth  Infantry  Division  were  in  war  positions  in  the  south  sector  with 
ammunition,  except  for  the  240-millimeter  howitzers.  Map  shows 
sectors  and  subsectors  of  responsibility  in  the  south  sector. 

The  yellow  squares,  the  antiaircraft,  which  I  will  discuss  in  a  mo- 
ment, of  course,  were  not  under  division  control.  Again,  the  crossed 
rifles  indicate  the  Infantry  [^^4-]  and  the  w-heel  cannon  the 
Field  Artillery,  indicating  the  disposition  under  alert  No.  3. 

Under  alert  No.  1,  the  harbor  defense  troops  of  the  Coast  Artillery 
Command  were  at  their  gun  positions  while  the  antiaircraft  units 
remained  at  their  home  stations  and  guarded  against  sabotage.  On 
December  7,  some  of  the  AA  units  got  into  position  in  15  or  20  minutes, 
but  others  had  to  go  to  the  other  side  of  the  island  and  were  not  in 
position  until  afternoon.  A  detailed  account  of  the  movement  of  anti- 
aircraft units  is  given  on  pages  11  and  12  of  the  Army  exhibit.  An 
estimated  87  percent  of  the  Coast  Artillery  personnel  were  present  for 
duty  at  8  a.  m.,  December  7.  No  Coast  Artillery  Command  oihcers 
were  reported  absent  at  the  time  of  the  attack  except  one  who  was 
killed  trying  to  get  back  to  his  place  of  duty. 

Maps  captured  from  planes  shot  down  in  the  attack  indicated  that 
the  enemy  had  complete  and  up-to-date  information  concerning  the 
exact  dispositions  of  military  forces,  depots,  and  engineering 
establishments. 

ir*ercent  mustered :  A  summary  of  a  report  compiled  by  the  adjutant 
general  of  the  Hawaiian  Department  indicates  that  at  least  85  percent 
of  the  officers  and  men  were  present  with  their  units  at  8  a.  m.,  Decem- 
ber 7. 

[US]  Now,  going  back  to  the  subject  of  aircraft,  and  the  results 
of  the  attack,  also  the  condition  of  aircraft  before  the  attack,  at  the 
time  of  the  attack  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force,  in  common  with  other 
units  of  the  Hawaiian  Department,  was  operating  under  alert  No.  1. 
General  jSIartin,  commanding  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force,  had  informed 
his  subordinates  that  it  was  a  real  and  not  a  practice  alert.  He  had 
further  instructed  that  aircraft  would  not  be  dispersed  and  that  all 
units  would  continue  training  under  condition  "Easy  5." 

"Easy"  being  phonetic  for  "E." 

"Eas3^  5'' — E-5  under  the  standing  operating  procedure — meant  that 
all  aircraft  would  continue  to  conduct  routme  training  operations, 
with  none  in  readiness  for  combat  operations,  and  with  4  hours'  time 
allowed  for  the  first  plane  of  each  unit  to  be  in  the  air,  armed,  and 
prepared  for  combat. 


54  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Page  10  of  the  Army  exhibit  shows  when  and  in  what  numbers  planes 
took  off  from  Oahu  Army  airfields  after  the  attack,  and  page  9  of  the 
same  exhibit  shows  the  status  of  all  combat  planes  before  and  after  the 
attack  as  reported  by  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force.  In  this  connection 
attention  is  invited  to  the  fact  that  final  reports  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment show  that  total  plane  losses  was  somewhat  greater  than  initially 
reported.  In  explanation  of  the  disparity  it  [li(>]  should  be 
stated  that  to  meet  the  emergency  created  by  the  attack  certain  dam- 
aged planes  which  normally  might  have  been  repaired  were  stripped 
for  parts  and  destroyed. 

The  attention  of  the  committee  is  invited  to  the  chart  which  has  just 
been  placed  on  the  easel  and  which  is  a  blowup  of  the  exhibit  previously 
referred  to,  the  status  of  combat  planes  before  and  after  the  attack. 
The  color  code  is  applied  to  the  number  of  planes  in  each  column.  The 
blue  indicating  planes  in  commission,  the  buff'  out  of  commission,  and 
finally  the  total  on  hand,  and  at  the  head  of  each  column  where  the 
numerical  designation  of  the  plane  is  given,  if  that  designation  is  on 
the  green  background,  that  plane  was  considered  obsolete  by  the  Air 
Force. 

The  yellow  code,  which  occurs  only  in  the  columns  "After  Attack," 
indicates  those  aircraft  which  were  destroyed. 

At  Hickam  Field,  prior  to  the  attack,  6  heavy  bombers — B-17 — 20 
nonmodern  medium  bombers — B-18 — and  5  modern  light  bombers — 
A.-20 — were  in  commission  but  were  not  ready  for  immediate  use  be- 
cause they  were  not  loaded  with  bombs  and  ammunition.  The  follow- 
ing planes  were  on  hand  but  out  of  commission  for  reasons  indicated : 

Six  B-l7's — engine  repair,  fuel  tank  repair,  60-hour  inspection,  200- 
hour  inspection,  and  carburetor  repair ; 

Twelve  B-lS's,  overhaul,  damaged  landing  gear,  damaged  [^^7] 
elevator,  and  first  echelon  maintenance ; 

Seven  A-20's — damaged  wing  flaps,  repair  and  first  echelon  mainte- 
nance. 

First  echelon  maintenance  is  maintenance  of  a  nature  which  can  be 
performed  by  the  crew  of  the  plane ;  50-hour  inspection  is  an  inspection 
and  overhaul  of  each  plane  which  is  required  to  be  made  after  each  50 
hours  of  flight ;  and  200-hour  inspection  is  a  more  thorough  overhaul 
made  after  200  hours  of  flight. 

After  the  attack,  8  B-17"s  were  on  hand  of  which  4  were  usable ;  20 
B-18's  were  on  hand  of  which  10  were  usable ;  10  A-20's  were  on  hand 
with  5  usable.  Eighteen  of  our  combat  planes  were  lost  on  Hickam 
Field.  It  was  11 :  27  a.  m. — as  shown  in  another  exhibit — when  the 
first  four  A-20's  took  off  from  the  field  for  combat. 

At  Wheeler  Field  and  Haleiwa  prior  to  the  attack,  the  following 
planes  were  in  commission  but  not  ready  for  immediate  use  since  they 
were  unarmed ;  82  pursuit,  52  P-40's,  20  P-36's,  10  P-26's ;  2  medium 
bombers,  1  B-12A,  1  B-18 ;  2  light  bombers,  A-12 ;  5  reconnaissance 
1  0-47,  1  OA-8,  3  OA-y's;  and  o  advanced  trainers,  AT-6;  which  are 
not  shown  on  the  chart,  the  chart  including  only  combat  aircraft. 

On  hand  but  out  of  commission  for  maintenance  work  were  [i^S] 
these  additional  planes :  2  B-12's,  35  P-40's,  19  P-36's,  4  P-26's  and 
1  AT-6 — not  shown  on  the  chart. 

After  the  attack,  the  number  of  usable  planes  by  type  were  as  follows : 
27  out  of  a  total  of  57  P-40's,  16  out  of  35  P-36's,  4  out  of  8  r-26's,  1 
B-18,  1  out  of  3  B-12's,  1  of  2   AT-6's,  1  0-47,  1  OA-8  and  1  OA-9. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  55 

Forty-two  combat  planes  were  lost  in  the  attack  in  this  airdrome.  At 
8 :  30  a.  m.  the  first  aircraft,  four  P-40's  and  two  P-36's  took  off  for 
combat. 

Planes  assigned  to  the  Forty-seventh  Pursuit  Squadron,  which  was 
in  training  at  Haleiwa  Airfield — and  they  have  been  included  in  this 
Wheeler  chart— consisted  of  17  pursuit,  13  P-40's,  2  P-36's,  2  P-26's, 
and  1  medium  bomber,  B-12.  That  is  the  table  of  organization 
strength  of  the  unit. 

The  exact  number  of  planes  at  Haleiwa  on  the  morning  of  Decem- 
ber 7  is  not  known.  The  field  was  alerted  at  8 :  15  a.  m.  Between  8 :  15 
and  10  a.  m.  two  flights  were  made,  each  consisting  of  four  P-40's 
and  one  P-36.  Four  enemy  planes  were  downed  by  the  first  flight 
while  the  second  flight  downed  three.  One  pilot  was  lost  over  Sclio- 
field  Barracks. 

At  Bellows  Field  12  pursuit  planes,  P-40;  and  6  reconnaissance 
planes,  4  0-47's,  2  0-49's;  were  in  commission  prior  to  the  attack. 
However,  none  of  these  were  ready  L^-?^]  for  immediate  use 
because  their  weapons  were  not  loaded  with  ammunition.  An  addi- 
tional two  reconnaissance  planes,  0^7,  were  located  at  Bellows  Field 
but  were  out  of  commission  for  engine  change.  It  was  9 :  50  a.  m. 
before  the  first  0-47  took  off.  Three  of  our  combat  aircraft  were 
destroyed  on  this  field. 

After  the  attack  on  December  7,  about  11 :40  a.  m.,  four  A-20's  and 
two  B-l7's  took  off.  Also  at  3 :20  p.  m.,  three  B-l7's  were  dispatched, 
as  a  result  of  a  request  of  the  Navy,  to  search  for  an  enemy  carrier. 
The  search  was  unsuccessful  and  they  returned  at  6 :25  p.  m. 

As  for  the  antiaircraft  their  activities  subsequent  to  the  attack, 
shown  as  previously  mentioned  on  pages  11  and  12  of  the  Army 
exhibit,  show  the  time  required  for  the  various  units  of  the  Fifty-third 
Coast  Artillery  Brigade,  Antiaircraft  to  take  battle  positions  after 
the  attack  of  December  7  and  the  extent  to  which  they  engaged  the 
enemy. 

Under  alert  No.  1  only  a  limited  amount  of  ammunition  was  in  the 
hands  of  troops  of  the  Hawaiian  Department.  The  Coast  Artillery 
command  had  previously  been  authorized  to  draw,  and  had  drawn, 
ammunition  for  its  fixed  positions  only,  including  antiaircraft.  How- 
ever, at  these  installations,  the  shells  were  kept  in  boxes  in  order  to 
keep  the  ammunition  from  damage  and  deterioration.  The  ammuni- 
tion for  the  [120]  mobile  guns  and  batteries  was  in  storage 
chiefly  at  Aliamanu  Crater  and  Schofield  Barracks.  The  Infantry 
and  Artillery  units  of  the  twenty-fourth  and  twenty-fifth  Divisions 
had  only  a  small  amount  of  machine-gun  and  rifle  ammunition.  All 
divisional  artillery  ammunition,  grenades,  and  mortar  shells  were  in 
the  ordnance  storage  depots,  principally  at  Schofield  Barracks. 

The  3-inch  antiaircraft  gun  issued  to  units  in  Hawaii  at  that  time 
had  a  maximum  effective  range  of  about  10,000  yards.  It  had  a  mini- 
mum effective  range  of  about  2,000  yards. 

The  37  millimeter  antiaircraft  gun  had  a  maximum  horizontal  range 
of  9,300  yards,  and  a  maximum  vertical  range  of  approximately  6,300 
yards. 

This  concludes  the  Army's  story  of  the  attack. 

[121]  Admiral  Inglis.  Turning  now  to  the  Navy's  aircraft  and 
state  of  readiness  of  aircraft  and  antiaircraft  guns,  the  committee  will 
find  in  item  12  of  the  white  folder  the  locations,  squadrons,  numbers 


56 


CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


of  planes  in  commission,  types,  numbers  available,  numbers  in  oper- 
ating condition,  readiness  in  operating;  condition,  readiness  of  crews, 
numbers  participating  in  combat  and  service  assigned  to  land  based 
naval  and  Marine  planes  in  the  Hawaiian  area. 

Item  13  of  the  white  folder  contains  this  information  summarized  on 
a  chart  showing  location  of  the  fields  and  stations. 

The  planes  in  flight  at  the  time  of  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  were 
armed  for  combat  as  follows : 

The  7  patrol  flying  boats  in  the  air,  3  from  Kaneohe  and  4  from  Ford 
Island,  all  carried  machine  guns  and  were  fully  supplied  with  ammuni- 
tion. In  addition  to  machine  guns  and  ammunition,  the  three  planes 
from  Kaneohe  searching  the  fleet  operating  areas  south  of  Oahu  were 
armed  with  two  depth  charges  each  for  use  against  submarines.  These 
planes  were  working  with  the  destroyer  Ward.  One  of  these  aircraft 
dropped  one  depth  chnrge  in  an  attack  on  a  submarine  in  the  defensive 
sea  area  off  Pearl  Harbor  at  6 :  45  Hawaiian  time.  Utility  Squadron  3, 
stationed  at  Maui  Airport,  which  was  the  new  naval  air  station  at 
Puunene.  seems  to  have  had  some  {122']  planes  in  the  air  prior 
to  7 :  50,  Hawaiian  time,  on  the  day  of  the  attack.  These  planes  are 
not  combat  planes  and  do  not  normally  carry  armament.  Available 
reports  do  not  indicate  the  state  of  armanipnt  of  the  scout  bombers 
from  the  Enterprise  that  arrived  over  Pearl  Harbor  during  the  attack. 
As  they  engaged  the  enemy,  it  appears  that  machine  guns  were 
equipped  and  ammunition  provided. 

Next,  antiaircraft:  There  were  no  naval  antiaircraft  shore  batteries 
in  or  around  Pearl  Harbor  at  the  time  of  the  Japanese  attack.  All 
naval  antiaircraft  batteries  were  ship-based,  and  were  composed  of  the 
following  types  and  number  of  guns : 


Gun  types 


Number 

Maximum  range 

Maximum 

eflective 

range  yards 

Ceiling-feet 

Yards 

136 
96 
121 
427 

37, 200 
26, 300 
21, 700 

15,900 
13,500 
11,000 

12,000 
7,000 
5,000 

6-lnch,  38  caliber  antiaircraft 

5-inch,  26  caliber  antiaircraft - 

3-inch,  50  caliber  antiaircraft 

Antiaircraft  machine  guns  from  J.l  inch  to  .30  caliber 


«  Effective  ranges  of  500  to  2,500  yards. 

Effective  range  is  that  range  at  which  fire  should  be  opened  with 
reasonable  chance  that  fire  would  produce  damage  on  the  target. 

{l^S]  ^  Antiaircraft  guns  by  ship  classes  and  types  of  guns  is 
shown  in  item  14  of  Navy  folder. 

Official  reports  indicate  that  all  naval  antiaircraft  batteries  were 
in  operating  condition.  The  number  of  temporary  gun  stoppages 
during  action  was  so  low  as  to  be  negligible  and  when  such  momentary 
stoppages  occurred,  except  as  guns  were  knocked  out  in  battle  casual- 
ties, they  were  quickly  remedied. 

All  ships  had  the  full  service  allowance  of  ammunition  on  board 
except  in  a  few  cases  where  removal  was  necessary  because  of  repairs 
in  progress. 

All  ships  had  ready  ammunition  at  the  guns  in  accordance  with 
existing  directives.  Battleships  and  cruisers  had  15  rounds  per  gun 
for  two  guns  of  the  5-inch  antiaircraft  batterv  and  300  rounds  per 
gun  for  half  of  the  50-caliber  machine  guns.    The  destroyers  present 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  57 

all  had  50-caliber  ammunition  available  and  some  o-iiich  ammunition. 
Although  the  initial  attack  -^as  launched  as  a  surprise,  ready  machine 
guns  opened  fire  at  once  and  all  batteries  except  those  on  ships  under- 
gomg  overhaul  took  up  the  fire  within  approximately  7  minutes  after 
the  attack  was  initiated. 

The  considerable  amount  of  ammunition  available  is  shown  by  a 
tabulation  of  all  romids  expended. 

There  were  1,665  rounds  of  5-inch  38-caliber  antiaircraft  [i^-^] 
ammunition  fired. 

There  were  1,523  rounds  of  5-inch  25-caliber  antiaircraft  ammuni- 
tion fired. 

There  were  1,741  rounds  of  3-inch  50-caliber  antiaircraft  ammuni- 
tion fired. 

There  were  275,807  rounds  of  machine-gun  ammunition  fired. 

At  the  time  of  the  attack,  rouglily  one- fourth  of  all  shipboard  anti- 
aircraft gmis  were  manned,  and  within  7  to  10  minutes,  all  anti- 
aircraft batteries  were  manned  and  firing. 

Keady  antiaircraft  machine  guns  opened  fire  immediately  and 
within  an  average  estimated  time  of  under  5  minutes  practically  all 
battleship  antiaircraft  batteries  were  firing;  cruisers  were  firing  all 
antiaircraft  batteries  within  an  average  time  of  4  minutes;  and 
destroyers,  though  opening  up  with  machine  guns  almost  immediately, 
averaged  7  minutes  in  bringing  all  antiaircraft  guns  into  action. 
Minor  combatant  types  had  all  joined  in  the  fire  within  10  minutes 
after  the  beginning  of  the  attack. 

Turning  next  to  the  question  of  sabotage,  there  is  no  record  of 
any  sabotage  during  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

Next  the  subject  of  first  aid :  The  dead  and  wounded  were  handled 
by  a  number  of  naval  medical  activities ;  battle  dressing  stations  and 
sick  bays  of  [i^5]  the  warships;  hospital  ship /So/ace/ United 
States  Naval  Hospital;  dispensaries  of  the  two  naval  air  stations; 
Marine  Corps  air  station  at  Ewa;  defense  battalions  of  the  Fleet 
Marine  Force ;  navy  yard  dispensary ;  section  base  dispensary ;  ammu- 
nition depot  dispensary,  and  at  a  ''field  hospital"  which  was  set  up  in 
the  officers'  club  of  the  navy  yard  shortly  after  the  attack. 

Three  hundred  thirty  dead  and  1,113  wounded  were  brought  to 
naval  hospital  stations  during  the  period  December  7-10.  Many 
others  died  who  were  trapped  in  capsized  or  sunken  sliips. 

Colonel  Thielen  will  take  up  from  here. 

[1£6^  Colonel  Thielex.  As  to  the  miscellaneous  subjects  of 
hostile  agents,  sabotage,  and  civilian  protection  I  have  a  few  remarks. 

Prior  to  the  attack,  all  known  Japanese,  Italian,  and  German  agents 
had  been  listed  by  Army  G-2,  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  and 
Naval  Intelligence.  Within  a  few  hours  after  the  attack  the  Japanese 
agents  were  being  apprehended  and  assembled  in  the  Immigration 
Station,  Honolulu.  All  agents  were  subsequently  assembled  in  the 
Quarantine  Station  on  Sand  Island,  the  total  being  370  Japanese,  98 
Germans,  and  14  Italians. 

There  are  no  proven  instances  of  sabotage  before,  during,  or  after 
the  attack,  although  the  jamming  of  radio  frequencies  which  occurred 
immediately  after  the  attack  and  which  made  communication  difficult 
may  have  been  due,  in  part,  to  sabotage. 

By  noon  the  roads  were  becoming  jammed  with  traffic  going  in  every 
direction.     Under  the  direction  of  Mr.  Addison  Kirk  and  his  civilian 


58  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

relief  committee,  the  Honolulu  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  which  operates  a 
large  number  of  busses,  immediately  moved  into  Hickam  Field  and 
Fort  Kamehameha,  and  started  evacuating  civilians  from  these  areas. 
All  during  Sunday  afternoon  and  the  following  day  the  evacuation  of 
civilians  continued,  most  of  them  being  quartered  in  schools  and  homes 
[1^7]  throughout  the  city.  At  Fort  Shafter,  where  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Interceptor  Command  was  being  constructed  in  a  spur 
of  the  Koolau  Mountains,  the  women  and  children  of  Fort  Shafter 
and  a  few  from  Schofield  barracks  were  accommodated.  Slit  trenches 
were  being  dug  at  all  the  posts  and  in  parks,  school  grounds,  and  all 
open  places  accessible  to  civil  communities. 

Admiral  Inglis  will  take  on  from  here. 

[12S]  Admiral  Inglis.  With  respect  to  damage  to  Navy  ships, 
a  general  description  of  the  damage  to  naval  vessels  has  been  given 
in  the  narrative.  In  item  15  of  the  Navy  folder  the  members  of  the 
committee  will  find  a  complete  detailed  description  of  this  damage, 
with  the  first  sheet  being  a  summary. 

Item  16,  Navy  folder,  describes  the  loss  of  87  nonairborne  naval  air- 
craft, and  the  loss  of  five  airborne  planes  from  the  carrier  Enterprise, 
for  a  total  of  92  planes,  and  itemizes  also  the  damage  to  installations 
at  Ford  Island  Naval  Air  Station,  Kaneohe  Naval  Air  Station,  and 
the  Marine  Air  Base  at  Ewa. 

Now,  turning  to  the  damage  to  Japanese,  it  was  estimated  that  the 
Japanese  lost  a  total  of  28  planes,  most  of  which  were  dive  bombers 
and  torpedo  planes,  due  to  Navy  action. 

Three  Japanese  submarines  of  45  tons  each  and  carrying  two  tor- 
pedoes were  accounted  for;  two  were  destroyed  by  Navy  action  and 
one  was  grounded  off  Bellows  Field  and  recovered. 

From  reports  available  to  the  commander  in  chief,  it  is  estimated 
that  the  Japanese  lost,  due  solely  to  Navy  action,  a  minimum  of  68 
killed.  An  estimate  of  wounded  cannot  be  made.  One  officer,  an 
ensign,  was  taken  prisoner  when  he  abandoned  the  small  submarine 
which  grounded  off  Bellows  Field. 

[129]  The  above  report  on  the  Japanese  damages  or  losses  does 
not  include  operational  losses,  only  losses  in  combat. 

With  respect  to  efforts  to  track  the  Japs  after  the  attack,  air 
searches  to  track  the  Japanese  striking  force  were  ordered  and  carried 
out  without  result. 

Colonel  Thielen  will  take  over  now. 

[ISO]  Colonel  Thielen.  As  to  the  Army  casualties  and  the  dam- 
age suffered  by  Army  installations,  on  page  13  of  the  Army  exhibit 
there  is  a  list  of  Army  casualties  in  the  Hawaiian  Department  on 
December  7,  1941.    They  were : 

Killed  in  action 194 

Wounded  in  action 360 

Missing  in  action 22 

Died,  nonbattle 2 

Declared  dead  (Public  Law,  490) 1 

Died  of  wounds 21 

Total 600 

In  addition  to  the  extensive  damage  to  installations  on  airfields 
shown  by  the  various  photographs  submitted  herewith,  final  reports 
show  that  96  Army  planes  were  lost  as  a  result  of  enemy  action  on 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  59 

December  7.  This  figure  includes  aircraft  destroyed  in  depots  and  also 
those  damaged  planes  which  were  stripped  for  parts. 

As  to  the  damage  done  to  Japanese,  General  Short  reported  that  11 
enemy  aircraft  were  shot  down  by  Army  pursuit  planes  and  antiair- 
craft fire. 

[ISl]  Admiral  Inglis.  The  Navy  and  Marine  Corps  suffered  a 
total  of  2,835  casualties,  of  which  2,086  officers  and  men  were  killed 
or  fatally  woimded.  Seven  hundred  and  fifty-nine  wounded  survived. 
None  were  missing. 

Next  with  respect  to  the  conduct  and  behavior  under  fire  of  the 
personnel. 

In  the  accounts  of  some  90  ships  under  attack,  commanding  officers 
have  recorded  hundreds  of  acts  of  heroism  in  keeping  with  the  highest 
traditions  of  the  naval  service.  No  instance  is  recorded  in  which  the 
behavior  of  crews  or  individuals  left  anything  to  be  desired. 

References  to  individual  valor  are  replete  with  such  acts  as — 

(1)  Medical  officers  and  hospital  corpsmen  rendering  aid  and  treat- 
ment while  they  themselves  needed  help. 

(2)  Officers  and  men  recovering  dead  and  wounded  through  flame 
and  from  flooded  compartments. 

(3)  Fighting  fires  while  in  actual  physical  contact  with  the  flames. 

(4)  Handling  and  passing  ammunition  under  heavy  fire  and 
strafing. 

(5)  Repairing  ordnance  and  other  equipment  under  fire. 

(6)  Remaining  at  guns  and  battle  stations  though  wounded  or 
while  ships  were  sinking. 

[1S£]  (7)  Reporting  for  further  duty  to  other  ships  after  being 
blown  off  their  own  sinking  vessels. 

For  deeds  of  extreme  heroism  on  December  7,  15  Medals  of  Honor 
have  been  awarded  and  60  Navy  Crosses. 

Colonel  Thielen  will  now  take  over. 

[133]  Colonel  Thielen.  On  the  Army  side,  too,  acts  of  heroism 
were  numerous.  Five  Distinguished  Service  Crosses  and  65  Silver 
Stars  were  awarded  to  Army  personnel  for  heroism  displayed  during 
the  December  7  attack. 

That  concludes  the  Army's  narrative  of  the  attack. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  also  concludes  the  Navy's  formal  presentation. 

[ISi]  Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral,  the  Navy  had  the  Fourteenth 
Naval  District  and  the  Pacific  Fleet.  This  story  you  have  developed 
covered  both  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir.  As  I  pointed  out,  the  Fourteenth  Naval 
District  in  this  particular  instance  was  under  the  command  of  the 
commander-in-chief  and  the  presentation  that  I  have  given  covers  the 
activities  of  both  the  forces  afloat  and  the  forces  ashore  in  the  Four- 
teenth Naval  District. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  as  I  understand  it,  the  Navy  commands  had  for 
antiaircraft  defense  only  the  antiaircraft  guns  based  on  the  ships? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  You  said  something  about  marines  on  shore  setting 
up  machine  guns.    I  was  not  so  clear  about  that. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  marines  that  I  mentioned  ashore  as  firing  back 
at  the  Japanese  planes  during  the  attack  were  the  personnel  of  the 
Marine  air  squadrons  at  Ewa  and  those  machine  guns,  I  think  in  most 
cases,  were  stripped  from  the — perhaps  not  stripped,  but  taken  from 


60  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

the  armory  and  comprised  the  guns  which  normally  would  be  used 
by  the  aircraft  themselves. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  then,  the  only  other  defense  the  naval  com- 
mand had  when  under  attack  was  in  the  airplane  defense  ? 

[JSS]  Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  to  the  best  of  my  knowl- 
edge. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  those  planes,  as  I  understood  you,  were  carrier 
planes  that  came  in  and  became  land  based  at  Ford  Island  as  their 
carriers  came  into  port,  except  for  some  that  were  on  the  cruisers,  two 
or  three  per  cruiser  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  planes  that  I  mentioned  from  the  carriers  were 
en  route — no,  I  take  that  back.  They  were  sent  out  by  the  Enterprise 
on  search  and  then  when  the  attack  developed  they  were  diverted  in  an 
attempt  to  repel  the  Japanese  attack. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  sum  up  and  state  how  many  naval  planes 
of  the  fighter  type  capable  of  fighting  enemy  planes  got  into  the  air 
before  the  attack  was  over? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Before  the  attack  was  opened 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Over. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Oh,  before  the  attack  was  over  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  after  it  commenced  and  before  it  ended.  I  am 
not  interested  in  those  which  got  into  the  air  after  it  was  over. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  a  table  here  which  I  think  will  give  you  the 
information  that  you  asked  for. 

At  the  naval  station,  Ford  Island,  there  was  a  total  of  70  planes 
before  the  attack  started.  Of  these  19  were  destroyed,  [ISSl  14 
were  damaged  and  37  were  left  undamaged.  Of  those  37  planes,  31 
were  utility  planes,  not  designed  for  combat,  4  were  the  patrol  planes 
already  in  flight  and  2  were  in  the  shop  under  repairs,  so  that  there 
were  no  planes  at  Ford  Island  available  to  engage  in  combat  except  the 
four  which  were  already  in  flight.  That  is  from  the  Ford  Island 
Station. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  you  say  none  of  them  got  into  the  air  at  all? 

Admiral  Inglis.  None  except  four  which  were  already  in  the  air. 
They  were  in  the  air  before  the  fight  started. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  They  were  in  the  air  before  the  fight  started? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes. 

At  Kaneohe  37  planes  were  attached  to  the  air  station.  28  of  those 
were  destroyed,  6  were  damaged,  3  were  undamaged  and  those  3  which 
were  undamaged  were  in  the  air  before  the  attack. 

At  Ewa  49  Marine  planes  were  based  at  that  naval  air  station  and 
of  those  49,  33  were  destroyed  and  16  damaged,  leaving  none  in  oper- 
ating condition. 

At  Maui  there  were  a  total  of  eight  planes  but  all  of  those  planes 
were  utility  planes  and  not  designed  for  combat  operations.  None  of 
those,  of  course,  were  damaged. 

At  Johnston  Island  there  were  two  PBY's  undamaged.  I  have 
[137]  no  information  on  the  employment  of  those,  but  Jolinston 
Island  is  a  long  way  from  Hawaii. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  A  PB Y  is  an  observation  plane  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  PBY  is  a  long  range  airplane. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Not  a  fighter? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  a  fighter;  no,  sir;  but  equipped  with  fairly 
respectable  armament. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  61 

At  Midway  there  were  12  PBY's.  None  of  these  12  was  damaged, 
of  course,  because  Midway  was  not  attacked,  but  these  jdanes  were 
on  the  search,  as  has  already  been  described. 

Now,  in  addition  to  that  the  Northampton^  a  heavy  cruiser, 
launched  two  or  her  observation  planes  which  are  not  very  effi- 
cient as  fighters  but,  nevertheless,  they  did  succeed  in  shooting  down 
one  Japanese  plane  off  the  Island  of  Niihau. 

That  is  about  the  extent  of  my  information  in  answer  to  your 
question,  sir. 

\^138^  Mr.  Mitchell.  Colonel  Thielen,  as  I  understand  it,  the 
Army  exhibit,  in  accordance  with  the  statement  on  page  10,  covers  that 
information  from  the  Army  standpoint,  does  it?    Is  that  complete? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir ;  that  is  complete  to  the  best  of  my  knowl- 
edge and  belief. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  According  to  that,  on  Hickam  Field  the  first  plane 
that  got  into  the  air  was  at  11 :  27  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  attack  was  over  by  that  time? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir ;  the  attack  was  well  over. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  At  Wheeler  Field  you  got  some  P-40's  up  at  8 :  34  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  a  figliter  group  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.  I  believe  that  is  a  significant  point. 
The  airplanes  at  Hickam  Field  were  bombers  and  those  at  Wheeler 
Field  were  pursuit  ships,  as  they  called  them  in  those  days,  fighters 
as  we  call  them  now,  which  did  get  up  all  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  got  some  up  at  8 :  20,  some  at  8 :  55,  an  hour 
after  the  attack  started,  some  at  9 :  15  and  some  at  9 :  30.  Those 
were  all  the  planes  at  "VVlieeler  Field  that  had  gotten  into  the  air? 

\^139']  Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir,  since  9 :  35  is  taken  as  the 
definite  termination  of  the  attack. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  are  those  at  7 :  47  at  Bellows  Field  and  that  one 
that  you  say  got  up  at  9 :  15  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Those  are  observation  airplanes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Have  you  a  summary  of  your  figures  to  show  how 
many  planes  of  fighting  type  the  Army  forces  had  in  commission  and 
how  many  of  them  got  into  the  air  before  the  attack  was  over  ?  Could 
you  secure  that  for  us?  Could  3^011  sum  that  \\\^  for  us  without  too 
much  trouble  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  think  the  exhibit  on  the  preceding  page,  taken  in 
connection  with  that  which  you  cited,  sir,  on  page  10  do  tell  a  complete 
story.  The  exhibit  on  page  9  is  that  which  I  have  displa}' ed  on  a  chart. 
I  will  be  glad  to  recall  the  chart. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  No.  Ithought  maybe  you  had  a  total.  Well,  that  is 
satisfactory;  the  committee  can  see  it. 

Will  the  committee  inquire? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  George? 

Senator  George.  I  have  no  questions. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Cooper? 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  inquire  briefly. 
I^IJ^O']  Admiral,  as  I  understood  you,  on  December  7,  1911,  the 
Pacific  Fleet  was  about  three-fourths  the  size  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet, 
but  I  understood  you  to  say  the  Pacific  Fleet  was  more  modern  and 
stronger  or  had  larger  vessels  ?     Is  that  correct  ? 

79716 — 46— pt.  1 7 


62  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  A^rTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  Mr.  Congressman,  except  that  the 
figure  was  two-thirds. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Two-thirds  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Rather  than  three-fourths. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  And  I  also  understood  you  to  say  that  there 
were  no  searches  made  on  December  6, 1941,  by  aircraft. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  not  correct.  We  have  no  written  record  of 
any  searches  except  the  search  from  the  Enterprise  which  is  shown  on 
the  chart. 

Tiie  Vice  Chairman.  Were  there  any  searches  made  the  day  before 
that  anywhere  near  this  approximate  time  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  not  prepared  to  answer  that  specifically.  I 
might  hazard  an  opinion  that  there  were. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Then  one  other  question,  if  I  may,  while  along 
the  line  of  General  Mitchell's  inquiry. 

According  to  item  11  of  the  Navy  exhibit  presented  here,  it  is  shown 
that  the  Japanese  aircraft  participating  in  this  attack  totaled  105. 
Is  that  correct?  Item  11  of  your  white  exhibit  here,  the  second  page  of 
that,  it  shows  there,  total  {,1-^1^  number  of  planes  making  at- 
tack, including  those  which  repeated,  and  out  at  the  right  hand  column, 
"Total  156.".  Then  under  that,  "Total  number  of  planes,  exclusive 
of  those  which  repeated,"  it  totals  105. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  those  figures  now,  sir.  I  must  say  that  that 
number — that  is  the  number  of  planes  which  repeated  their  attacks 
and,  therefore,  are  counted  as  more  than  once  in  the  first  figure, 
is  necessarily  an  estimate  but  our  best  estimate,  according  to  the 
records  that  wo  have  available,  is  105  as  the  total  number  of  planes 
which  actually  attacked. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  As  far  as  the  Navy  and  Army  can  ascer- 
tain  

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  these  are  only  Navy  figures. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Well,  I  understood  the  colonel  to  give  the 
same  figure  in  his  statement.  You  agreed  on  that.  So  far  as  the 
x^rmy  and  Navy  knew  at  that  time  there  were  105  Japanese  planes 
that  participated  in  the  attack? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Now,  then,  are  you  prepared  to  tell  us  what 
the  United  States  air  strength  in  Hawaii  was  at  that  time  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  can  tell  you  what  the  Navy  air  strength  was. 
That  is  contained  in  one  of  the  exhibits. 

[i^]  In  item  12  in  the  Navy  folder  you  will  find  a  table  giving, 
among  other  things,  the  number  of  planes  attached  to  the  various 
squadrons  and  stationed  at  the  various  naval  air  stations. 

The  Vice  Chair3Ian.  I  have  examined  that,  Admiral,  in  an  effort  to 
get  the  information  I  am  now  requesting.  At  least,  it  is  not  put  up 
in  the  same  form  as  the  Jap  planes  and  I  was  wondering  what  the 
total  was. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  would  have  to  qualify  any  answer  that  I  might 
make  to  your  question  by  pointing  out  that  a  large  number  of  those 
planes  given  in  item  12  are  utility  types  and  not  suitable  for  combat. 

For  instance,  all  of  those  marked  "VJ"  are  utility  type  planes 
and  that  takes  out  a  large  proportion  of  the  total  as  being  suitable 
for  combat  operations.  Those  planes  are  used  for  towing  target 
sleeves  for  antiaircraft  fire  and  for  transport  and  things  of  that 
nature,  duties  other  than  combat. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  63 

The  Vice  CHAiRiiAiSr.  Well,  in  an  effort  to  not  detain  you  unduly 
as  I  am  sure  other  members  of  the  committee  want  to  inquire,  could 
you  gentlemen  give  me  a  figure  that  would  compare  with  the  105 
Jap  planes  which  made  the  attack? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir;  if  you  will  bear  with  me  just  a  moment 
while  I  add  them  up.    I  come  out  with  the  answer  52. 

Mr.  Gesell.  That  is  Navy  planes? 

[14^]        Admiral  Inglis.  Those  are  Navy  planes. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Navy  planes  52  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  52  Navy  planes  comparable  in  design  to  the  Japa- 
nese planes  which  made  the  attack.  That  excludes  the  utility  planes 
and  the  PBY's. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  In  other  words,  this  52  would  be  the  number 
of  combat  Navy  planes  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  All  right. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  think  I  should  add,  to  make  the  story  complete, 
that  that  does  not  include  the  planes  from  the  carriers,  that  is,  the 
Enterprise  and  Lexington.  These  are  only  the  planes  based  on 
Hawaii. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  W^I^j  ^ow  many  carrier  planes  were  in  a 
position  that  they  could  have  been  used  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Enterprise  was  200  miles  away  from  Pearl 
Harbor  at  the  time  and  any  planes  that  she  might  have  had  available 
to  participate  in  the  attack  would  have  been  nearly  at  the  extreme 
limit  of  their  radius  of  action.  However,  there  were  18  Enterprise 
planes  which  did  get  into  the  general  area  of  the  attack. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Eighteen? 

Admiral  Inglis.  So  if  you  cared  to  3'ou  could  add  the  18  to  the  52, 
making  a  total  of  70. 

\_llfjf]  The  Vice  Chairman.  Now,  at  what  stage  of  the  attack 
did  these  18  get  into  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Those  planes  took  off  from  the  Enterprise  shortly 
after  6  a.  m.  The  attack  was  launched  at  7:55  a.  m.  and  3  of  the 
planes  landed  at  9 :  40  and  10  at  10 :  15.  I  would  gather  from  that 
that  the  Enterprise  planes  reached  the  scene  of  the  attack  at  an  esti- 
mated time  of  perhaps  9  o'clock. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Would  that  be  during  the  time  the  attack 
was  in  progress? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Were  there  any  other  carrier  planes  that  were 
available  there,  such  as  you  have  described  about  the  Enterprise? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir ;  no  other  carrier  planes. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  And  no  others  that  did  participate? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  only  other  planes  that  we  have  not  already 
covered  were  the  two  planes  from  the  Northampton  and,  again,  those 
planes  are  not  of  combat  type.  Thej^  were  observation  planes  but  they 
did  shoot  down  one  Japanese  plane  in  spite  of  their  comparative 
weakness. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  ask  the 
colonel  for  the  same  type  of  information  so  far  as  the  Army  is 
concerned. 

\_lh5^  Colonel  Thielen.  First,  sir,  I  would  like  to  correct  what 
I  believe  is  your  impression  that  only  105  planes  were  involved  in 
attacks  on  both  Army  and  Navy  installations.     Is  that  correct? 


64  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  Vice  Chairman.  That  is  the  way  I  understood  it. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  want  to  say  that  is  not  the  Army  view.  We 
consider  that  105  airplanes  is  our  estimate  of  the  number  that  were 
involved  in  the  attacks  only  on  Army  installations  and  I  believe  it  is 
a  mere  coincidence  that  the  Navy  has  the  same  figure. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Well,  the  figure  is  the  same  in  both  state- 
ments. Does  that  mean,  then,  that  there  were  just  exactly  105  planes 
that  attacked  the  Army  and  just  exactly  105  planes  that  attacked  the 
Navy? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  how  many  attacked 
the  Navy,  but  our  estimate  is  105  aircraft  attacking  Army  installa- 
tions only. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  will  give  you  later  the  Japanese  story  showing 
how  many  planes  they  sent.  This  is  only  confusion  and  guesswork, 
these  figures  that  are  given  here. 

Colonel  Thh:len.  It  is  purely  an  estimate.  It  is  obtained  by  add- 
ing up  the  total  number  of  aircraft  reported  by  observers  at  the  three 
Army  fields  attacked.  It  is  entirely  possible  that  there  is  considerable 
duplication,  as  no  one  [^4^]  was  in  a  position  to  observe  more 
than  one  airfield  at  a  time. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Well,  I  had  this  figure.  I  had  just  assumed 
from  what  I  heard  you  both  say  that  there  were  105  Japanese  planes 
engaged  in  the  attack  and  I  had  assumed  that  that  was  the  total  num- 
ber of  Japanese  planes. 

Colonel  Thielen.  As  I  say,  the  Army  considers  that  105  aircraft 
attacked  Army  installations. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  What  do  you  have  to  say  about  that,  Ad- 
miral ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  the  same  thing,  Mr.  Cooper.  The  figure 
of  105  is  just  an  estimate. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  I  understood  that. 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  is  just  impossible  to  arrive  at  a  precise  figure 
because,  as  you  know,  there  was  a  great  deal  of  confusion  at  that  time 
and  this  is  just  the  best  that  we  can  make  of  the  reports  that  we  have 
and  the  estimate  is  105  planes  engaged  in  the  attacks  against  naval 
ships  and  naval  shore  installations. 

You  remember  that  in  answer  to  your  question  I  tried  to  bring  out 
that  these  were  Navy  figures.  These  presentations  that  the  colonel 
and  I  have  been  making  were  made  up  separately.  There  is  no,  if  I 
may  use  the  term,  collusion  between  us  except  insofar  as  we  have 
arranged  for  certain  portions  L-?-^^]  of  the  presentation  to  go 
to  the  Army  side  and  then  certain  portions  to  go  to  the  Navy  side,  but 
we  have  not  tried  to  reconcile  our  figures. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  It  had  not  occurred  to  me.  Admiral,  that 
there  was  any  collusion  but  I  was  rather  in  the  position  of  hoping  to 
congratulate  you  gentlemen  if  the  Army's  estimate  of  the  number  of 
Jap  planes  and  the  Navy's  estimate  of  the  number  of  Jap  planes  hap- 
pened to  be  the  same.  I  thought  you  were  doing  remarkably  good 
estimating  if  you  were  both  estimating  the  same. 

Admiral  Inglis,  I  am  afraid  in  all  modesty  I  will  have  to  admit 
that  that  is  a  pure  coincidence. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  What  I  was  trying  to  find  out  was  how  many 
Jap  planes  were  attacking  us. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  65 

Admiral  Inglis.  As  Mr.  Mitchell  has  said,  Mr.  Cooper,  a  later  pres- 
entation will  give  the  Japanese  side  of  the  story  and  I  think  we  will 
get  much  more  accurate  figures  from  that. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  All  right.  I  was  hoping  to  ascertain,  so  far 
as  you  could  tell  us,  the  number  of  Jap  planes  that  were  attacking  us. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  And  the  strength  of  the  United  States  air- 
craft in  Hawaii  at  that  time,  combat  planes  that  might  have  been 
used  in  meeting  or  repelling  that  attack. 

114^1        Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  That  is  what  I  was  hoping  to  get. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir.  I  think  you  have  the  whole  figure.  It  is 
70  in  the  case  of  the  Navy. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Seventy  in  the  case  of  the  Navy? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir,  and  our  best  estimate  of  the  Japanese 
planes  that  were  making  the  attack,  that  is,  from  the  American  point 
of  view,  without  the  Japanese  intelligence  before  us,  was  105  against 
naval  targets. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Now,  let  me  see  if  I  can  get  some  help  from 
you,  Colonel. 

Colonel  Thlelen.  I  would  like  to  point  out  first  that  no  aircraft 
were  armed  and  equipped  for  combat  against  these  Japanese,  but  of 
the  pursuit  aircraft  in  commission  on  Oahu  at  the  time  of  the  attack 
we  had  94  pursuit  aircraft  before  the  attack  and  53  after  the  attack. 

The  Vice  Chairman.    Ninety-four  before  the  attack? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  And  your  total  number  was  what.  Admiral? 

Admiral  Inglis.  My  total  was  52  shore-based  planes,  plus  the  18 
from  the  Enterprise,  making  70. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  That  is  164  for  the  Army  and  Navy. 

A  question  to  both  of  you  gentlemen.  Are  you  prepared  to 
[i4^]  give  us  some  estimate  of  the  number  of  Japanese  planes  that 
attacked  both  Army  and  Navy  installations  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Tlie  only  way  I  could  answer  that  would  be  to  add 
Colonel  Thielen's  figures  to  mine  and  that  would  be  210,  but  there 
again,  Mr.  Cooper,  we  must  qualify  that  by  saying  that  some  of  these 
reports  have  been  duplicated.  Perhaps  the  same  plane  attacked  both  a 
Navy  ship  and  an  Army  air  station. 

[150]  The  Vice  Chairman.  I  can  well  understand  that.  I 
would  expect  that  to  be  the  best  guess. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  would  say  the  best  estimate  we  can  come  out  with 
would  be  210. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  George  would  like  to  ask  a  question. 

Senator  George.  Admiral,  I  believe  you  stated  this  morning  that 
United  States  shipping  along  the  northern  route  had  been  discon- 
tinued as  of  November  25, 1941 ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  George.  Did  you  assign  any  reason  for  that  order  for  dis- 
continuing the  shipping  on  that  route? 

Admiral  Inglis.  This  presentation  that  we  have  made' has  omitted 
all  reference  to  any  reasons  for  action  taken. 

Senator  George.  I  merely  wanted  to  get  clear  in  my  mind  what  you 
said.     You  did  not  assign  any  reasons? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  did  not;  no,  sir. 


66  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Senator  Lucas, 

Senator  Ltjcas.  Admiral,  in  the  earlier  part  of  your  testimony 
you  gave  to  the  committee  some  facts  with  respect  to  the  reconnais- 
sance planes  which  took  off  on  the  morning  of  December  7.  I  am  not 
sure  that  I  thoroughly  understood  just  why  the  delay  existed  there, 
or  whether  the  evidence,  or  the  records  of  the  Navy  disclose  the  reason 
for  that  hour's  delay  of  these  planes  taking  off  for  reconnaissance  work. 

[ISl]  Admiral  Inglis.  That,  as  I  recall  it,  was  the  case  of  the 
planes  taking  off  from  Midway 

Senator  Lucas.  No ;  not  from  Midway. 

Admiral  Inglis.  You  remember,  Senator  Lucas,  I  corrected  that 
word  "sunrise"  to  make  it  read  "dawn."  The  plan  was  to  have  these 
planes  take  off  at  dawn,  which  is  usually  considered  as  1  hour  before 
sunrise.  That  was  the  standing  order,  that  they  were  to  take  off  at 
dawn,  which  was  5 :  27. 

However,  these  planes  did  not  actually  take  off  until  about  6 :  40, 
which  is  even  more  than  hour  late.  Those  were  the  three  patrol 
planes  from  Kaneohe  air  station. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  is  right.  Are  there  any  records  which  dis- 
close the  reason  for  the  delay  in  taking  off? 

Admiral  Inglis.  There  again,  Senator,  in  our  presentation  we  have 
purposely  avoided 

Senator  Lucas  (Interposing) .  I  am  not  asking  for  your  conclusion, 
I  am  asking  you  whether  or  not  you  have  discovered  any  records  in 
the  Navy  Department  giving  or  disclosing  any  reasons  why  these  three 
reconnaissance  planes  were  over  an  hour  late  in  taking  off  on  the  dawn 
patrol. 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  I  do  not  know  the  reason. 

Senator  Lucas.  One  other  question  with  respect  to  those  recon- 
naissance planes:  Do  the  records  disclose  the  distances  that  these 
reconnaissance  planes  covered  on  their  usual  dawn  [ISB]  pa- 
trol flight? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Those  patrol  planes  were  described  in  the  exhibit 
which  is  number — do  you  remember  the  zebra  stripes? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Item  10. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Item  10.  Item  10  in  the  Navy  folder,  you  will 
find  the  horizontal  stripes  due  south  of  Oahu.  As  I  recall  it  that 
distance  was  120  miles. 

Senator  Lucas.  120  miles? 

Admiral  Inglis.  120  miles. 

Senator  Lucas.  Now  one  other  question.  Do  the  records  disclose 
as  to  how  long  that  patrol  had  been  in  existence  previous  to  Decem- 
ber 7?  ^ 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  cannot  answer  that  question,  sir.  I  do  not  know 
whether  they  do  or  not. 

Senator  Lucas.  Will  counsel  please  take  these  questions  that  I  am 
asking  and  supply,  if  he  can,  the  answer  for  the  record?  ^ 

You  also  discussed  the  sighting  of  the  submarine  at  3 :  50  in  the 
morning  on  the  morning  of  December  7.  You  also  stated  that  the  com- 
mander of  that  ship  notified  the  comlmander  of  the  destroyer  Ward 
that  at  3 :  57  he  had  sighted  the  periscope  of  the  submarine. 

It  is  my  understanding  of  your  testimony  that  the  Ward  [ISS] 
opened  fire  at  6 :  45  on  that  submarine,  after  sighting  it  at  6 :  40,  and 


'  See  Hearings,  Part  4,  p.  1887  et  seq. ;  see  also  Part  11,  p.  5484  et  seq. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  67 

then  the  commander  of  the  Ward  reported  to  the  commanding  officer 
at  6  :  54  that  the  submarine  had  been  sunk. 

Now  who  was  the  commanding  officer  at  that  time  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  name  of  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Ward  ^ 

Senator  Lucas.  Yes;  the  name  of  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
Ward — or,  I  mean  the  name  of  the  commanding  officer  to  whom  the 
commander  of  the  Ward  reported. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Ward  sent  the  dispatch  to  the  office  of  the  com- 
mandant, Fourteenth  Naval  District. 

Senator  Lucas.  Who  was  in  charge  of  it  at  that  time  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  dispatch  was  delivered  to  the  district  duty 
officer,  who  was  Lt.  Comdr.  Harold  Kaminski. 

Senator  Lucas.  It  was  delivered  to  Lieutenant  Commander  Kamin- 
ski, but  who  was  in  charge  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  at  that 
time  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  commandant  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  Dis- 
trict was  Admiral  Bloch. 

Senator  Lucas.  Do  the  records  show  where  Admiral  Bloch  was  at 
the  time  this  message  was  delivered? 

Admiral  Inglis.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge  and  belief,  he  was 
in  his  quarters. 

Senator  Lucas.  Do  the  records  show  whether  or  not  he  [i5^] 
was  notified  by  Lieutenant  Commander  Kaminski  with  respect  to  the 
sinking  of  this  submarine  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  afraid  I  cannot  answer  that  question. 

Senator  Lucas.  Do  the  records  show  whom  Kaminski — or  whatever 
his  name  is — notified  about  the  sinking? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Kaminski  was  notified  and  he  in  turn  passed  the 
message  to  the  headquarters  of  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  United 
States  Fleet. 

Senator  Lucas.  Who  received  that  message  at  the  headquarters  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  haven't  got  that  information.     I  can  get  it  for 

you- 

Senator  Lucas.  I  wish  you  would  get  it.  Admiral  Kimmel,  of 
course,  was  the  gentleman  in  charge  of  the  fleet  at  that  time. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Admiral  Kimmel  was  commander  in  chief  of  the 
United  States  Fleet  and  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

Senator  Lucas.  Does  the  record  show  whether  or  not  Admiral  Kim- 
mel received  the  message  at  any  time  before  the  attack  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  cannot  answer  that  question  either,  sir. 

Senator  Lucas.  According  to  your  testimony  the  attack  took  place 
at  7:  55. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

\_166^  Senator  Lucas.  The  submarine  was  sunk  by  the  Ward  at 
6 :  54.  I  should  like  to  know  whether  or  not,  during  that  hour's  time, 
Admiral  Bloch  or  Admiral  Kimmel  received  any  direct  notice  of  the 
sinking  of  that  submarine. 

Now  of  course  we  will  ask  the  officer  who  made  the  report  on  the 
sinking  of  the  submarine  to  have  it  with  him  in  the  morning,  to  see 
what  importance  was  attached  to  the  sinking  of  this  submarine,  as  far 
as  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  is  concerned. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Senator,  I  would  not  expect  that  any  of  those 
authorities  or  officials  would  have  received  the  report  that  the  sub- 


68  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

marine  had  been  sunk,  because  the  report  of  the  Ward  was  "We  have 
attacked" 

Senator  Lucas.  Whatever  the  report  was — I  do  not  care  for  the 
report  itself,  but  whatever  the  report  was  that  went  in. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  will  get  that  information  for  you. 

Senator  Lucas.  I  want  to  know  why  it  happened,  and  if  they  made 
a  report  on  it,  and  whatever  the  report  is,  and  to  whom  it  went,  and 
especially  would  I  like  to  know  at  what  time — if  there  is  any  time — 
that  Admiral  Bloch  and  Admiral  Kimmel  received  that  report. 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  will  get  that  information  and  insert  it  in  the 
record,  if  it  is  available.^ 

Senator  Lucas.  One  other  question  and  then  I  will  be  [^^6] 
through. 

When  you  say  that  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  was  under  the 
commander  in  chief,  you  mean  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  Pacific 
Fleet? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir;  Admiral  Kimmel. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Clark. 

Senator  Lucas.  May  I  ask  one  more  question,  Mr.  Chairman,  before 
you  go  to  Congressman  Clark  ? 

Do  the  records  disclose  as  to  whether  or  not  those  on  patrol  duty 
around  Pearl  Harbor  looking  for  submarines  discovered  at  any  time 
previous  to  the  morning  of  December  7  anything  that  would  direct 
their  attention  that  submarines  were  in  that  area  previous  to  the  morn  - 
ing  of  December  7  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  the  records  on  that  subject  are  completely 
negative. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  is,  up  to  that  time,  up  to  the  morning  of 
December  7,  as  far  as  the  record  is  concerned,  there  is  no  record  that 
shows  that  there  was  any  danger  from  the  standpoint  of  looking  for 
submarines,  or  a  submarine  attack,  even  though  they  were  on  guard 
and  the  boys  were  looking  for  submarines  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge. 

[JS7]         Senator  Lucas,  That  is  all.  Admiral  Inglis. 

The  Chairman,  Congressman  Clark. 

Mr.  Clark.  Admiral,  you  showed  a  diagram  this  morning  on  the 
extent  of  the  plane  patrol.  The  impression  I  gained  was  the  extent 
of  the  patrol  immediately  after  the  attack  is  shown  in  red. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Clark.  Would  you  mind  having  that  map  put  back  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Commander  Biard,  will  you  put  up  the  chart  show- 
ing the  patrols, 

Mr,  Clark.  Now  what  I  was  trying  to  get  clear  in  ni}^  own  mind,  if 
the  red  diagram  there  shows  the  extent  of  the  patrols  by  the  planes 
around  Pearl  Harbor  subsequent  to  the  attack — is  that  right? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr,  Clark.  Is  that  a  larger  or  a  smaller  area  of  patrol  than  had 
been  the  case  immediately  prior  to  the  attack  ? 

(The  roll  call  buzzer  sounded.) 

The  Chairman.  I  might  say  to  the  committee  that  that  is  a  roll- 
call  vote  in  the  Senate  on  the  substitute  offered  by  Senator  Byrd  to 
the  amendment  offered  by  Senator  Donnell  to  the  reorganization  bill, 

'  See  Hearings,  Part  11,  p.  5293. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  69 

The  committee  has  been  excused  from  attendance  during  the  hearing 
here. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Without  waiving  my  right  to  examine  the 
[i'5<§]  witness,  might  I  be  excused  just  long  enough  to  vote  on  that  ? 
I  think  it  is  an  important  matter. 

The  Chaikman.  Yes,  if  the  Senator  wishes  to,  and  if  any  other  Sena- 
tors wish  to  vote  I  think  they  may  also  be  excused. 

Senator  Lucas.  I  am  willing  to  give  you  one  vote  here. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  wish  of  the  committee  ? 

Senator  Brewster.  I  am  willing  to  stay  here  and  allow  Senator 
Ferguson  to  go. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  a  very  important  vote.  That  is  the  only 
reason  why  I  ask  to  be  excused. 

The  Chairman.  The  Senator  may  be  excused.  The  Chair  will 
ask  the  Vice  Chairman  to  take  the  Chair  while  he  goes  and  votes. 

The  Vice  Chaieman.  The  committee  will  please  be  in  order. 

You  may  proceed,  Mr.  Clark. 

Mr.  Clark.  You  have  my  question. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  believe  your  question  was :  Did  the  patrol  which 
was  ordered  immediately  after  the  attack  cover  a  greater  area  than 
that  which  had  normally  been  covered  before  the  attack  ? 

Mr.  Clark.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  the  answer  to  that 
question  is  "yes." 

Mr.  Ci-ARK.  Now  you  gave  us  a  very  graphic  picture  of  Pearl  Harbor, 
and  the  military  establishment  there,  including  [i^9]  every- 
thing on  the  airport  and  so  forth.  I  am  interested  to  know,  and  I  as- 
sume you  would  be  the  proper  witness  to  ask,  how  that  establishment 
on  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  the  military  establishment,  compares  with 
any  other  base  or  military  establishment  we  may  have  had  in  the  Pacific 
area  at  that  time,  including  the  Philippine  Islands,  as  to  size  and 
strength  and  equipment,  and  munitions  of  war. 

Admiral  Inglis.  You  wish  me  to  compare  Hawaii  with  any  other 
United  States  base  or  establishment,  military  installation  ? 

Mr.  Clark.  In  the  Pacific  area. 

Admiral  Inglis.  In  the  Pacific  area  ? 

Mr.  Clark.  Yes,  sir. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Of  course  that  perhaps  is  a  matter  of  opinion,  but 
my  opinion  is  that  it  was  by  far  the  strongest  United  States  base  in  the 
Pacific  area. 

Mr.  Clark.  That  is  all  I  have,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Senator  Brewster. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  will  waive  questions  at  this  time. 

The  Vice  Chaikman.  Mr.  Murphy,  of  Pennsylvania. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Admiral,  in  answer  to  Mr.  Clark's  question  as  to 
whether  or  not  the  patrol  afterward,  after  the  attack,  was  larger  than 
before,  your  answer  was,  in  your  opinion,  "yes." 

Isn't  it  true  that  the  black  lines  indicate  the  patrol  before  and  the  red, 
which  includes  the  area  of  the  black,  was  [^^0]  afterward,  and 
therefore  the  necessity  much  larger  than  it  was  before  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Murphy.  All  right.  Now  then,  it  is  my  understanding  that  you 
and  Colonel  Thielen  are  prepared  only  to  discuss  the  details  of  the 
attack  and  not  to  go  into  the  whys  and  wherefores. 


70  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir,  speaking  for  myself. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  concur  in  that. 

Mr.  MuRPHT.  I  would  like  to  know  from  someone  in  the  Navy,  and  I 
assume  you  are  not  the  one,  I  would  like  to  record  to  show  that  I  want  to 
know  whether  or  not  there  was  any  inspection  order  within  a  week  prior 
to  Pearl  Harbor,  the  ejBfect  of  which  would  be  to  put  the  ships  out  of 
commission. 

One  member  of  the  committee  has  intimated  that  such  an  inspection 
was  ordered.  I  would  like  to  meet  it  squarely  just  as  soon  as  we 
possibly  can. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  cannot  answer  that  question,  but  perhaps  I  can 
throw  a  little  light  on  your  inquiry,  and  that  is  this,  that  a  careful  study 
of  the  damage  sustained  by  the  ships  at  Pearl  Harbor  on  that  day  was 
made  by  some  competent  officers  in  the  Bureau  of  Ships,  and  as  a  result 
of  that  study  they  concluded  that  the  California  was  the  only  ship 
where  the  opening  of  the  compartments  had  any  effect  or  was  in  any 
way  a  contributing  factor  to  the  damage  suffered  by  the  ship. 

[i^i]  Mr.  MuEPHY.  Now  then,  so  far  as  the  other  ships  are 
concerned,  they  were  not  under  a  condition  of  inspection  that  would 
call  for  open  compartments  and  other  conditions  that  would  disable 
them  in  case  of  combat ;  is  that  right  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  I  did  not  intend  to  give  that  impression  in 
my  answer.  I  do  not  know  the  answer  to  that  specific  question.  All  I 
can  say  is  any  openings  did  not  contribute  to  the  spread  of  the  damage 
or  the  flooding  of  the  ships,  except  on  the  California. 

Mr.  Murphy.  May  I  indicate  to  counsel  on  the  record,  and  to  the 
Navy,  that  I  hope  some  witness  will  be  called  who  will  be  able  to  give 
any  details  of  what  inspection,  if  any,  was  ordered  within  a  week  of 
December  7 ;  what  effect,  if  any,  that  had  on  the  ships  on  the  morning 
of  December  7, 1941. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  would  say,  Mr.  Congressman,  that  we  are  hard  at 
work  on  that  now. 

Mr.  Murphy.  All  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  haven't  the  story  here  today  because  we  haven't 
gotten  to  the  bottom  of  it. 

Mr.  Murphy.  All  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  are  cutting  out  of  this  statement  anything  that 
has  not  been  definitely  established. 

Mr.  Murphy.  All  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  very  point  is  under  inquiry  now.  [i^^] 
We  have  some  information  about  it,  but  it  is  not  complete.^ 

Mr.  Murphy.  My  next  question.  Admiral,  is  that  in  your  exhibit  you 
have  given  a  list  of  the  ships  that  were  sunk,  damaged,  and  capsized. 
That  was  Exhibit  No.  17. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  item  15. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Item  15.  That  contains  a  list  of  battleships,  light 
cruisers,  destroyerSj  repair  ships,  mine  layers,  seaplane  tenders,  and 
miscellaneous  auxiliaries. 

The  Navy  did  make  a  public  statement,  did  they  not,  through  Secre- 
tary Knox,  within  a  few  days  subsequent  to  December  7, 1941,  as  to  the 
damage  to  ships  at  Pearl  Harbor,  including  those  sunk  and  those 
damaged  ? 

1  See  Hearings,  Part  11,  p.  5347,  for  all  couimunications  on  the  subject  of  water-tiglit 
iutegrity  of  vessels  at  Pearl  Harbor. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  71 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  believe  that  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  would  like  to  have  some  witness  from  the  Navy 
testify  on  the  record  as  to  how  the  list  given  today  compares  with  the 
public  notice  given  immediately  after  Pearl  Harbor. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  will  have  to  get  that  for  you,  sir,  and  insert  it  in 
the  record.^ 

Mr.  Murphy.  The  next  thing  I  would  like  to  ask,  Admiral,  and 
I  would  like  to  ask  of  you,  Colonel  Thielen,  and  that  is  what  recon- 
naissance was  ordered  by  Admiral  Kimmel  or  by  General  Short  sub- 
sequent to  the  messages  received  by  them  on  November  27  down  to 
and  including  December  7,  1941,  and  I  [163]  assume  that 
neither  of  you  are  prepared  to  answer  those  questions  at  the  present 
time. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  cannot  answer. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  cannot  give  a  definitive  answer,  I  can  only 
point  out  the  condition  of  alert  that  was  placed  in  effect  at  that  time, 
which  did  not  envisage  the  possibility  of  attack  from  without. 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  would  like  to  have  a  specific  answer.  In  addition 
to  the  fact  that  alert  No.  1  as  to  sabotage  was  ordered,  I  would  like 
to  have  a  specific  answer  as  to  what  reconnaissance,  if  any,  was  ordered 
by  the  Navy  and  Army  immediately  subsequent  to  November  27  and 
prior  to  the  morning  of  December  7,  1941. 

Mr.  IVIiTCHELL.  We  have  other  witnesses  that  are  going  to  be 
brought  on  that  will  cover  that,  Mr.  Congressman. 

Mr.  Murphy.  All  right.  Now  then,  the  two  figures  of  105,  they, 
of  course,  would  make  210,  but  neither  of  you,  as  I  take  it,  would 
attempt  to  say  that  the  planes  that  were  used  in  the  Army  attack 
were  not  also  used  in  the  Navy  attack? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Speaking  for  myself,  I  see  no  way  of  unscrambling 
those  figures. 

[164]  The  Vice  Chairman.  Senator  Ferguson  would  be  next 
but  he  has  been  temporarily  excused.    Mr.  Geartiart,  of  California. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Admiral  Inglis 

The  Vice  Chahuvian.  Here  is  Senator  Ferguson.  He  is  your  turn, 
Senator  Ferguson.    Will  you  defer,  Mr.  Gearhart? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  defer. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Senator  Ferguson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral,  can  I  inquire  as  to  when  you  first 
knew  that  you  were  to  be  the  witness  to  give  these  facts  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  At  3  o'clock  last  Friday  afternoon,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  up  to  that  time,  what  did  you  have  to  do 
with  assembling  the  facts  ?  Up  until  3  o'clock  Friday,  what  did  you 
have  to  do  in  relation  to  assembling  the  facts  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  As  Acting  Chief  of  Naval  Intelligence,  my  officers 
had  been  engaged  for  perhaps  a  week  before  that  in  getting  up  this 
presentation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  From  whom  did  you  get  your  instructions  as 
to  what  was  desired  by  the  committee? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  instructions  were  relayed  to  us  through  the 
Judge  Advocate  General's  office. 

[i^<5]         Senator  Ferguson.  Are  they  in  writing? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Are  they  what,  sir  ? 

1  See  Hearings,  Part  6,  p.  2674  for  a  table  submitted  by  the  Navy  Department  showing 
a  "Comparison  of  actual  damage  suffered  by  the  fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  that  stated  in 
the  report  that  was  released  by  Secretary  Knox  on  15  December  1941." 


72  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  Are  they  in  writing? 

Admiral  Inglis.  1  believe  not,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  were  the  instructions  you  were  given 
by  the  Judge  Advocate  General's  office  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  instructions  were  to  be  prepared  to  make  a 
presentation  before  the  committee  of  the  factual  evidence  concerning 
the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  on  December  7. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  instructed  to  give  no  conclusions, 
or  no  orders  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Those  instructions  evolved  in  the  course  of  time, 
I  don't  believe  that  they  were  specifically  stated  in  that  form  when 
the  instructions  were  first  passed  along  to  us. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  you  first  get  the  instructions  not  to 
draw  any  conclusions  or  not  to  give  any  orders;  that  is,  to  cite  any 
orders? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  were  given  an  outline  of  the  subjects  which 
were  to  be  covered. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  give  us  the  outline?  Was  it  in 
writing  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir.     Do  you  wish  me  to  read  it  off,  sir? 

[166]         Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  is  two  pages. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  the  same  outline  we  gave  the  committee. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Could  I  see  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

(A  copy  was  handed  to  Senator  P  erguson.) 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Senator  may  keep  that  copy  if  he  wishes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  have  others? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  selected  you,  Admiral,  to  be  the  spokes- 
man? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Vice  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  Admiral 
Edwards,  gave  me  the  directive. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Can  I  inquire  from  the  colonel  as  to  when  he 
first  learned  that  he  was  to  be  a  witness  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  didn't  receive  positive  information  until  just 
before  the  past  week  end,  Friday  or  Saturday.  I  had  been  told  be- 
fore that  time  that  I  might  be  called  upon  to  actually  present  the 
story. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  when  did  you  first  know  that  you  were 
to  present  the  story  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  As  I  say,  I  was  informed  positively  [^^7] 
on  Friday  or  Saturday  last. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  drew  up  your  presentation  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  belong  to  a  section  of  the  Operations  Division, 
War  Department  General  Staff,  which  is  continuously  engaged  in 
research  of  this  type,  in  examination  of  after-action  reports,  and 
other  such  first  sources,  to  prepare  digests  similar  to  this.  We  work 
together.  We  have  a  procedure  whereby  a  number  of  researchers, 
both  officers  and  enlisted  personnel,  are  given  their  task,  and  the 
material  is  assembled  and  edited. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  was  your  report  assembled  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  first  draft,  a  week  or  6  days  ago. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  73 

Senator  Ferguson.  A  week  or  6  days  ago.  When  did  you  fii-st 
furnish  counsel  of  the  committee  with  a  copy  of  your  draft? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No  such  copy  has  been  furnished  to  this  time,  to 
the  best  of  my  knowledge. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Up  until  the  present  time.  Admiral,  when  did 
you  first  furnish  the  committee  or  any  counsel  with  a  copy  of  your 
draft? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  beg  pardon  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wlien  did  you  first  furnish  the  committee  or 
counsel  with  a  copy  of  your  draft  ? 

[168]  Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  believe  I  have  given  the  counsel 
a  copy  of  the  draft.  I  have  given  the  committee,  I  mean  the  counsel, 
copies  of  the  exhibits,  but  as  far  as  I  know,  not  of  the  draft  of  this 
script. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Of  what  you  read  to  the  committee  ? 
Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  believe  so ;  no,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  noticed  one  conclusion  that  you  drew,  and  that 
was  in  relation  to  the  radar,  that  the  man  was  practicing  after  7 
o'clock. 

Admiral  Inglis.  No  ;  that  was  the  Army. 
Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Colonel,  will  you  give  us  what  information  you 
have  on  that  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Would  the  Senator  care  to  have  me  repeat  the 
story  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  No  ;  I  don't  want  the  story  repeated.  I  would 
like  to  have  what  information  was  given  to  you  that  he  was  actually 
practicing.     Who  told  you  that? 

Colonel  Thielen.  You  mean  my  sources  on  that,  sir?  This  copy  is 
documented.  The  fact  that  these  two  enlisted  men  picked  up  an  in- 
dication of  hostile  aircraft  by  radar  at  7 :  02  a.  m.  on  the  morning  of 
December  7  comes  from  the  Roberts  report,  page  116,  affidavit  of 
Private  McDonald. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  I  understand  that  you  examined         [-?^5] 
the  Roberts  report  in  order  that  you  might  give  us  this  summary  ? 
Colonel  Thielen,  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliat  other  reports  did  you  examine? 
Colonel  Thielen.  I  have  a  rather  long  list  here.  Senator.  I  did  not 
examine  that  all  personally.  It  so  happens  I  did  examine  the  Roberts 
report  personally.  I  examined  the  Grunert  report  personally,  and 
various  other  sources.  There  is  a  list  of  some  74  documents  which 
were  examined  by  the  various  members  of  the  section  of  which  I  am 
a  part. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Well,  now,  when  you  examined  these  various 
reports,  were  they  in  conflict  with  the  reports  on  the  items  which  you 
have  given  us  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  None  came  to  my  attention,  sir.  I  was  not  look- 
ing for  any  conflicts.  I  was  deliberately  omitting  any  conflicts  or 
controversial  subjects  from  my  report. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Will  you  tell  us  if  these  witnesses  testified  in 
any  other  hearing  besides  the  Roberts,  as  to  whether  or  not  this  man 
was  actually  practicing? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  don't  believe  I  am  the  best  witness  on  that,  sir. 
I  don't  know.    I  am  not  an  authority  on  all  of  the  various  reports. 


74  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  AITACK 

[170]  Senator  Ferguson.  Why  would  you  give  us  the  conclusion 
out  of  the  Eoberts  report  when  you  know  that  that  was  a  cursory 
report  ? 

Colonel  Thxelen.  Because  there  is,  apparently,  no  conflict,  as  far 
as  our  researchers  were  able  to  determine. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  say  there  is  no  conflict  at  all  on  that  ques- 
tion? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Apparently  not,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  do  I  understand  your  statement  is 
hearsay  on  that? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Everything  that  I  have  said  today  is  hearsay,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Everything  that  you  have  said  here  today  is 
hearsay  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  correct,  and  none  of  this  material — I  was 
not  present  at  Pearl  Harbor,  nor  was  I  in  the  War  Department  on 
December  7. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  much  comes  out  of  the  Roberts  report  on 
Elliott's  training? 

Colonel  Thielen.  On  his  training? 

Senator  Ferguson.  On  Elliott  bemg  in  training  at  that  particular 
moment. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  believe  merely  the  statement. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  whom  did  he  telephone  ? 

[171]  Colonel  Thielen.  I  won't  say  to  whom  Elliott  telephoned. 
I  will  say,  as  I  said  in  the  script,  that  the  telephone  report  was  made 
by  the  Opana  radar  station  to  Lt.  Kermit  Tyler,  the  watch  officer  at  the 
information  center,  Fort  Shafter. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  his  title  at  that  time  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  He  was  known  as  the  watch  officer. 

Senator  Ferguson.  At  what  particular  station? 

Colonel  Thielen.  At  the  information  center  for  the  various  radar 
stations. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  how  many  people  were  present 
at  that  community  ceffiter  on  that  morning  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Does  the  Roberts  report  show,  oi-  any  other 
report  that  you  examined? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  have  no  recollection  of  that  being  given. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  the  Navy  had  a  watch 
there  at  that  time  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  know. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  either  Tyler  or 
Elliott,  or  the  other  man  with  Elliott  knew  that  B-l7's  were  coming 
in  that  morning? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  don't  know  what  the  extent  [17^] 
of  their  knowledge  was. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  give  us  the  exact  plan  of  what  was 
shown  on  the  radar  design  plan! 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  was  a  copy,  as  faithful  as  we  could  make  it. 
It  was  not  a  mechanical  reproduction.  It  was  done  by  an  artist. 
It  was  as  good  a  copy  as  we  could  make  of  the  so-called  historical 
plot. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  the  original? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  have  an  original. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  75 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  produce  it  for  the  committee  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

(The  document  was  handed  to  Senator  Ferguson.) 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  who  made  this  original  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  is  authenticated  by  an  ofiicer  named  Murphy. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Back  to  the  Admiral,  now.  I  have  to  keep 
skipping  back  and  forth. 

Admiral,  you  said  that  about  two-thirds  of  our  fleet  was  in  the 
Pacific;  is  that  correct? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir.  I  said  that  the  numerical  strength  of  the 
Pacific  Fleet  was  two-thirds  that  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet.  The  Pacific 
Fleet  was  smaller  than  the  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  beg  your  pardon.  One  third  was  [J7S'\ 
in  the  Pacific  and  two-thirds  in  the  Atlantic? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir.     We  still  haven't  got  our  fractions  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  ^Yhat  is  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  still  haven't  got  our  fractions  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  how  many  capital  battleships  were  in  the 
Atlantic? 

Admiral  Inglis.  In  the  Atlantic  Fleet  were  6  battleships.  In  the 
Pacific  Fleet  were  9  battleships.  Six  in  the  Atlantic  and  9  in  the 
Pacific. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  eight  out  of  the  nine  were  destroyed,  or 
damaged  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  many  were  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Well,  I  have  to  distinguish  between  damaged  and 
destroyed. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  many  were  hit.     Put  it  that  way. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Well,  the  Colorado,  of  course,  was  the  ninth  one, 
and  she  was  not  present  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  all  the  others  hit  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  All  the  others  were  hit  to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  there  was  only  one  battleship  [i?"^] 
in  the  Pacific  that  was  not  hit? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  how  many  battleships  were  in  the  Atlanitc  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Six. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  I  read  from  Battle  Report,  Pearl  Harbor 
to  Coral  Sea,  which  is  supposed  to  be  an  official  record,  page  6 : 

In  the  Atlantic  there  were  eight  battleships. 

Reading  from  pasre  6. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  can't  recognize  that  book  as  being  official.     I  have 

here  a  list  of  the  specific  ships 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  read  you  the  first  part  of  this  book : 

Notes  on  the  background  and  writing  of  this  book.  When  the  authors  of  this 
book  were  directed  b.v  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Frank  Knox  to  begin  a  prepara- 
tion, a  few  months  before  his  death,  the  instructions  were  brief  and  to  the 
point — 

indicating  that  he  had  something  to  do  with  the  preparation  of  this 
Battle  Report,  and  the  Navy  officers  that  wrote  this  book. 
It  says : 

Prepared  from  official  sources  by  Commander  Walter  Karig,  and  Lt.  Welbourn 
Kelley. 


76  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  personally  still  don't  recognize  that  as  being  offi- 
cial, except  what  you  have  told  me  now,  [i?'<^]  but,  if  I  may, 
Senator  Ferguson,  I  will  read  the  list  of  ships  that  were  in  the  At- 
lantic Fleet,  and  the  list  of  those  in  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

Senator  Fekguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  In  the  Atlantic  were  the  New  York^  the  Idaho^ 
Mississippi^  New  Mexico^  Arkansas,  and  Texas. 

In  the  Pacific,  the  Pennsylvania^  California,  West  Virginia,  Arizona, 
Nevada,  Oklahoma,  Tennessee,  Colorado,  and  Maryland. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  familiar  with  the  Secretary  of  the 
Nav}'  Knox's  memorandum  or  report  that  he  drew  up  or  had  drawn 
up  at  the  time  of — after  the  incident? 

Admiral  Inglis.  You  mean  immediately  after  the  attack? 

Senator  Ferguson.  No.  Did  you  use  anything  from  that  report  in 
making  up  your  report  here  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  gave  a  report  at  that  time;  did  he  not? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  read  such  a  report  in  the  newspapers.  You  mean 
about  a  month  after  Pearl  Harbor? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  Didn't  you  try  to  get  that  as  a  part  of 
your  source  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Well,  I  am  not  too  familiar  with  the  sources  that 
were  used  by  my  researchers,  but  I  don't  [77^]  believe  that  was 
used. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  the  report  the  President 
used  sometime  after  was  used  in  making  up  this  report? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  not  familiar  with  the  President's  report. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  are  we  going  to  check  the  accuracy  of  this 
report  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  All  I  can  is  that  my  presentation  was  made  from 
the  official  reports,  not  those  that  were  prepared  for  the  President, 
but  from  the  original  reports  of  the  Roberts  inquiry,  and  the  Murfin 
board  inquiry,  and  documents  of  that  nature.  Wherever  possible,  they 
were  documents  that  contained  sworn  testimony. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  many  battleships  did  we  have  in  December 
1941? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Fifteen,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Fifteen  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Fifteen  that  were  attached  to  the  Fleets.  There 
were  two  or  three  that  had  just  been  completed,  or  were  on  their 
shake- down  duty. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  were  they  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  is  my  recollection  that  the  Washington  and  New 
Mexico  were  on  shake-down  duty  in  the  Atlantic.  [i77]  One 
of  those  ships,  I  am  sure,  from  personal  observation  was  in  the  navy 
yard  at  New  York — Brooklyn. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Two  of  those  then  were  in  \X\q,  Atlantic  even 
though  on  shake-down  duty  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  probably  accounts  for  the  discrepancy  be- 
tween the  six  and  eight. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  would  indicate  that  this  hook  was  a  little 
more  accurate  than  your  figures. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  would  indicate  my  figures  contain  the  num- 
ber of  ships  attached  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet  and  the  number  attached  to 
the  Pacific  Fleet. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  77 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  how  long  after  the  attack  came 
at  Pearl  Harbor,  it  came  at  the  Philippines?  Will  you  name  the 
attacks  that  were  had  by  the  Japs  on  the  date  of  the  Tth,  or  if 
it  was  across  the  international  date  line,  on  the  8th,  and  give  us 
the  hours  of  those  attacks? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  confined  my  studies  to  the  attack  on  Pearl 
Harbor  and  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  I  can  get  that  information  for 
you. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  get  us  that?  Get  us  the  hours  of 
the  attacks. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir.^ 

Senator  P  erguson.  Now,  have  you  any  knowledge  of  what  recon- 
naissance there  was  on  or  about  December  1,  from  Pearl  [1781 
to  Johnston  to  Midway  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  1  have  nothing  earlier  than  December  6 
readily  at  hand. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  that  on  or  about  the  3d  that 
there  was  some  reconnaissance  from  Wake  to  Midway  to  Pearl,  ar- 
riving on  the  5th? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  I  have  no  information  readilj^  at  hand 
earlier  than  the  6th  of  December. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  laiow  each  flight  was  with  at  least 
1  squadron  and  12  PB Y's  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir.  I  have  no  information  readily  at  hand 
earlier  than  the  6th  of  December. 

Senator  Ferguson.  On  the  5th  or  6th,  did  the  Lexington  proceed 
to  Pearl  from  Midway? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Lexington  was  en  route  to  Midway  from 
Pearl. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.     Who  was  in  charge  of  the  Lexington% 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Lexington  was  in  a  task  group  commanded 
by  Admiral  Newton. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  did  Halsey  have  charge  of — Admiral 
Halsey? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Just  a  minute,  sir.  I  want  to  be  sure  I  have  got 
those  correct. 

[17 ff]        Senator  Ferguson.  Did  he  have  the  Enterprise? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Lexington  group  was  under  Admiral  Newton. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  was  going  from  Pearl  to  what?     Midway? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  was  going  from  Pearl  to  Midway  with  a  squad- 
ron of  Marine  Corps  scout  bombers. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  they  did  any  recon- 
naissance ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  understand  because  of  the  additional  Marine 
Corps  planes  on  board,  tlie  flight  deck  was  so  cluttered  that  they 
weren't  able  to  launch  any. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So  there  was  no  reconnaissance  from  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  from  the  Lexington. 

Senator  F'erguson.  Was  there  from  the  Enterprisel 

>  A  table  showing  "Time  of  Jap  attacks  in  the  Pacific  7  and  8  December  1941,  supplied 
br  the  Navy  Department,  appears  in  Hearings,  Part  6,  p.  2675. 

79716— 46— pt.  1 8 


78  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  reconnaissance  was  there  from  the  En- 
terprise? 

Admiral  Inglis.  As  given  in  the  presentation,  the  Enterprise 
launched  a  squadron  of  18  planes  to  scout  through  a  sector  of  110° 
immediately  forward  of  the  ship's  course  to  a  distance  of  150  miles. 

[180']  Senator  Ferguson.  How  far  south  would  that  be  of  the 
line  where  the  Jap  planes  were  supposed  to  have  been  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Japs  what,  sir  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Planes ;  the  carriers  of  the  Japs. 

Admiral  Inglis.  You  mean  the  carriers  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  How  far  would  this  reconnaissance  be 
south  of  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  will  come  out  in  the  Japanese  presentation, 
but  I  would  say  about  200  miles,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  About  200  miles. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  read  the  article  in  the  Saturday 
Evening  Post  by  Lieutenant  Richardson  about  his  orders? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  From  the  Enterprise  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  anything  about  those  orders  ? 

Admiral  Inglisv  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  caused  the  delay  in  having 
the  planes  leave  the  ground  on  the  various  occasions  that  you  have 
mentioned,  that  they  were  an  hour  or  two  late,  they  were  also  late  at 
Midway  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not  know  the  reason. 

[ISl]         Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  look  it  up  or  try  to  find  out? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  didn't  personally.  Perhaps  some  of  my  research- 
ers may  have. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  anj^  transports  left  our 
west  coast  on  the  6th  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  In  answer  to  that  question — whether  they  left  the 
west  coast  of  the  United  States  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir ;  I  don't. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  one  had  left  and  came 
back  because  of  the  assault  on  F'earl  Harbor  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  no  positive  knowledge  of  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  find  out  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir.^ 

Senator  Ferguson.  Senator  George  asked  you  about  why  the  trajflic 
was  diverted  from  the  north  route.  Have  you  that  data  or  did  you  ever 
see  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  ha^^n't  got  it ;  no,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  From  whom  did  you  get  your  information  that  it 
was  diverted  on  the  25th  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  got  the  source  right  here,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  give  us  the  source? 


1  See  Hearings,  Part  4,  p.  1680,  for  a  report,  dated  Dec.  13,  1945,  from  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment showing  the  recall  of  merchant  ships  to  the  West  Coast,  by  names  of  ships,  rintos 
thev  sailed,  and  dates  they  retnrned. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  79 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir.  That  was  a  dispatch  from  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations  dated  November  25,  1941. 

[IS^]         Senator  Ferguson.  I  didn't  hear  you. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  source  is  a  dispatch  originated  by  the  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations  on  the  25th  of  November  1941,  carrying  the 
reference  number  252203. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  was  Admiral  Stark? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Admiral  Stark  was  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions at  that  time ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  came  out  in  Washington ;  is  that  true  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  true. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  a  copy  of  that  was  ever 
sent  to  the  admiral  in  charge  of  the  Fourteenth  District? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  practically  certain  that  it  was  addressed  to 
him  among  others,  but  I  am  not  positive  of  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  the  order  with  you  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  get  me  the  order  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  will,  sir.^ 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  did  you  use  that  in  your  report  and  not 
bring  us  the  order? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  material  from  which  this  presentation  was 
made  is  tremendously  bulky.     I  haven't  got  it  all  here. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  determined  to  put  that  in  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Who  determined  what? 

[183]  Senator  Ferguson.  Who  determined  to  put  that  item  in 
the  report  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  was  presented  to  me  by  the  researchers  and 
I  made  the  decision  to  include  it  in  the  presentation.  I  felt  that  it 
was  quite  pertinent. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  who  gave  the  order  for  the  B-17's 
to  leave  Hamilton  Field,  San  Francisco  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not  know.     That  is  an  Army  activity. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Going  back  to  the  colonel,  do  you  know  who 
gave  the  orders  for  the  B-l7's  to  leave  Hamilton  Field,  Colonel  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  look  into  that  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  when  the  orders  were  given? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  time  they  left? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  time? 

Colonel  Thielen.  At  9 :  30  p.  m.,  6th  December,  San  Francisco  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  what  field  were  they  destined  for  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  They  were  destined  for  the  Philippines  [i^4] 
by  way  of  Oahu. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliat  was  their  destination  at  the  Hawaiian 
Islands? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  could  only  guess  that  it  would  be  Hickam  Field, 
the  biggest  field,  a  bomber  field,  and  therefore  suitable  for  BlT's. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  they  equipped  with  radio? 

'  The  dispatch,  subsequently  admitted  to  the  record  as  "Exhibit  No.  3,"  was  read  into 
the  record  ;  see  p.  82,  infra. 


80  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Colonel  TiiiELEN".  I  can't  answer  that  definitely.  Presumably  they 
were. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  any  information  that  they  had  been 
in  touch  with  any  radio  station  on  the  islands  prior  to  the  flight  of 
Japs  coming  in? 

Colonel  TiiiELEN.  I  have  only  the  negative  information  that  they 
flew  without  contact  with  Hawaii. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  they  flying  blind  or  without  contact  ? 

Colonel  TiTiELEN.  Apparently  they  were,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  why? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir;  I  do  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  why  they  were  iniarmed  at  that 
time  ? 

Colonel  Ttiielen.  They  were  being  ferried  to  the  Philippines. 
They  were  not  on  a  combat  mission. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  I  understand  from  that  that  [^86]  all 
planes  not  on  combat  missions  are  unarmed  ?  Have  you  any  personal 
knowledge  of  that,  Colonel? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  a  rather  broad  generalization,  sir.  A 
state  of  war  did  not  exist  at  the  time  of  their  departure.  They  were 
on  a  ferrying  mission.  In  time  of  peace  it  would  be  normal  for  them 
to  be  unarmed. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  ask  you  why  it  was  that  on  the  Enterprise 
that,  as  the  lieutenant  says,  they  had  war  orders  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  have  no  knowledge. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  was  just  200  miles  west  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands.  Can  you  tell  why  the  B-l7's  didn't  have  any  orders  and 
those  from  the  Enterprise  did  have  orders  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  cannot. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  look  that  up  and  try  to  find  out  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  believe  that  is  outside  my  scope,  but  I  will  be 
glad  to  do  it.^ 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  mean  that  you  are  limited  in  what 
information  you  will  be  able  to  get  for  the  committee  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  have  not  been  designated  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment to  coordinate  all  witnesses  who  are  to  appear  before  the  com- 
mittee. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  not  asking  you  that.  I  am  asking  you  to 
get  that  particular  order,  if  you  can,  why  one  didn't  [iS6'\  have 
and  one  did  have. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Very  well,  I  will  make  an  effort  to  get  that  order. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  might  say  we  have  witnesses  on  the  list  for  all 
these  things. 

The  Chairman.  We  have  reached  the  hour  of  4  o'clock. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  have  considerable  more,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  I  think,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  we  cannot  finish 
with  these  witnesses  this  afternoon,  we  might  as  well  recess  until 
10  o'clock  tomorrow  morning. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Senator,  I  have  something  for  each  member  of  the 
committee  before  we  break  up. 

(Documents  were  handed  to  the  committee.) 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

(Wliereupon,  at  4  p.  m.,  the  committees  recessed  until  10  a.  m.,  Fri- 
day, November  16,  1945.) 

1  See  Hearings,  Part  11,  p.  5293-5294.  ,"^31 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  81 


[187-]  PEAEL  HARBOE  ATTACK 


FRIDAY,   NOVEMBER   16,    1945 

Congress  of  the  United  States, 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of 

THE  Pearl  Harbor  Attack, 

Washington^  D.  G. 

The  joint  committee  met,  pursuant  to  adjournment,  at  10  a.  m., 
in  the  caucus  room  (room  318) ,  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Alben 
W.  Barkley  (chairman)  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Barkley  (chairman),  George,  Lucas,  Brewster, 
and  Ferguson;  and  Eepresentatives  Cooper  (vice  chairman),  Clark, 
Murphy,  Gearhart,  and  Keefe. 

Also  present:  William  D.  Mitchell,  general  counsel;  Gerhard  A. 
Gesell,  Jule  M.  Hannaford,  and  John  E.  Masteai,  of  counsel,  for  the 
joint  committee. 

[188]         The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

The  Chair  understands  that  counsel  wishes  to  make  a  brief  observa- 
tion before  we  proceed  with  the  further  examination. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  there  is  a  little  confusion  in  regard, 
I  think,  to  these  requests  of  witnesses  to  produce  information  and 
documents. 

Now,  Admiral  Inglis  and  Colonel  Thielen  had  a  special  job  to  do, 
simply  to  prepare  a  narrative  statement  compiled  from  records  of  the 
Departments.  We  have  a  liaison  staff,  as  the  committee  knows,  whose 
job  it  is  to  respond  to  every  request  from  the  committee  or  counsel 
for  documents,  and,  of  course,  it  is  a  little  confusing  to  a  witness 
who  isn't  on  that  liaison  staff  to  be  asked  to  produce  something. 

Counsel  is  delighted  to  have  the  members  of  the  committee  state 
in  the  open  hearings  here  anything  they  want  produced,  but  we 
would  like  to  have  it  understood  that  when  a  request  of  that  kind 
is  made  for  information  to  the  Navy,  for  instance,  that  the  people 
that  have  been  set  apart  by  the  Secretarj^  of  the  Navy  to  respond  to 
those  requests  are  the  ones  supposed  to  dig  it  up. 

For  instance.  Admiral  Inglis  has  the  custody  of  these  records  and 
all  he  could  do  would  be  to  pass  it  on  to  the  secretary  of  the  staff. 

So  we  would  like  to  have  it  understood  that  when  a  member  of 
the  committee  makes  a  request  while  the  witness  is  testify-  [189] 
ing,  a  request  to  have  matters  produced,  why,  we  will  have  to  channel 
it  througli  the  liaison  staff,  because  the  witness  isn't  in  that  category. 
If  he  is,  all  right.    If  h©  has  personal  custody  of  that  document. 

I  am  not  suggesting  that  the  committee  not  make  requests  but  I 
want  them  to  understand  that  to  avoid  confusion  it  will  have  to  be 
handled  that  way. 


82  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  any  requests  made  of  these  wit- 
nesses will  be ■ 

Mr.  Mitchell.  It  is  a  request  to  the  Navy  Department. 

The  Chairman.  The  documents  will  be  furnished  but  it  will  be 
furnished  by  the  staff  that  is  charged  with  looking  up  the  documents? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  sir.  The  witness  will  have  to  turn  the  request 
over  to  the  proper  people  in  the  respective  Departments. 

The  Chairman.  The  main  object  is  to  get  the  documents. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  There  is  no  difficulty  about  that.  Simply  the  witness 
is  sometimes  embarrassed  a  little  bit  in  being  asked  to  produce  things 
personally. 

Among  the  things  asked  for  yesterday  which  we  have  already  been 
able  to  obtain,  one  of  the  members  of  the  committee  requested  a  copy 
of  the  order  which  routed  shipping  to  the  south.  We  have  already 
obtained  that  and  I  will  read  it  into  the  record  to  have  it  out  of  the 
way,  if  it  is  agreeable. 

[^90]  This  is  a  dispatch  dated  November  25, 1941,  from  the  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations.  The  commander  to  whom  it  was  directed  for 
action  is  the  commander  of  the  Twelfth  Naval  District.  I  understand 
that  is  San  Francisco.  Copies  were  sent  to  four  commanders.  The 
commander  in  chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet,  the  commander  in  chief  of 
the  Asiatic  Fleet,  the  commander  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District — 
that  is  at  Honolulu — and  the  commander  of  the  Sixteenth  Naval  Dis- 
trict.    I  understand  that  is  at  Manila. 

And  the  dispatch  reads  in  this  way : 

Route  all  trans-Pacific  shipping  through  Torres  Straits.  The  commander  in 
chief,  Pacific  Fleet ;  commander  in  chief  Asiatic  Fleet,  providing  necessary  escort. 
Refer  your  dispatch  230258. 

It  is  marked  "Top  Secret"  in  purple.  Certified  to  be  a  true  copy  by 
Ralph  W.  Lundberg,  lieutenant  commander. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  What  is  the  date  of  that? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  November  25,  1941. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  at  that  time  was 
Admiral  Stark? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  And  who  was  the  commander  in  the  Twelfth  Naval 
District  at  San  Francisco,  does  the  record  show  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  It  doesn't. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  think  it  was  Admiral  Greenslade. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  have  the  exhibit? 
IJ91]         I  requested  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes.    Do  you  want  it  offered  in  evidence? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  offer  it  in  evidence  after  I  have  identified 
it  with  the  witness. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  all,  Mr.  Mitchell  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Senator  Ferguson. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  83 

TESTIMONY   OF  REAE   ADM.   T.   B.   INGLIS   AND   COL.   BERNARD 
THIELEN  (Resumed) 

Senior  Ferguson.  Admiral,  this  exhibit  which  has  just  been  read — 

Route  all  trans-Pacific  shipping  througli  Torres  Straits,  Cincpac  and  Cincaf 
provide  necessary  escort,  refer  your  dispatch  230258 — • 

when  did  you  first  see  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  dispatch  you  have  in  your  hands? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

[192]  Admiral  Inglis.  I  first  saw  that  piece  of  paper  this  morn- 
ing at  about  9  :  30. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  did  you  see  to  give  us  the  information 
yesterday  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  information  that  I  gave  you  yesterday  was 
from  a  brief  or  script  which  was  prepared  by  my  research  staff  with 
the  notation  that  that  dispatch  that  you  have  in  your  hand  was  the 
source. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  had  your  staff  go  over  the  files? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  any  counsel  sit  with  you  to  prepare  your 
script  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  no  personal  counsel.  Is  that  what  you 
mean? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  not  figuring  that  you  personally  are  inter- 
ested here.    You  are  acting  as  an  admiral  of  the  Navy. 

Admiral  Ingus.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  As  an  admiral,  did  you  have  any  counsel  with 
you? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Judge  Advocate  General's  office  had  repre- 
sentatives at  various  times  when  we  were  going  over  this  script. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  the  committee  have  a  counsel  [193] 
member  present? 

Admiral  Inglis.  On  one  or  two  occasions  the  script  was  discussed 
with  the  committee  counsel. 

Senator  Ferguson.  With  whom  did  you  discuss  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  With  Mr.  Mitchell  and  Mr.  Gesell. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  they  see  this  exhibit  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  until  this  morning. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Not  until  this  morning.  Do  you  know  why  it 
was  not  delivered  to  the  committee  before? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  do  not,  sir.    It  wasn't  asked  for. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  do  I  understand  they  only  get  what  they 
ask  for? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  afraid  I  can't  answer  that.  I  was  only  given 
a  specific  job,  Senator  Ferguson.    I  don't  know. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  see  these  instructions  ? 

Story  of  the  actual  attack  and  Japanese  plans  will  be  presented  by  an  Army 
and  a  Navy  officer  who  will  summarize  all  available  data.  The  summary  will 
be  prepared  under  the  direction  of  counsel  along  the  lines  suggested  by  the  fol- 
lowing outline.  Care  will  be  taken  to  avoid  all  matters  of  opinion  and  question 
of  individual  responsibility. 


84  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  did  not  see  that  paper. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  yon  ever  see  that  ? 

[194]  Admiral  Inglis.  I  did  not  see  that  paper.  I  did  have  an 
outline,  and  I  was  told  pretty  much  the  gist  of  the  material  you  have 
just  read,  but  it  was  given  to  me  verbally. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  preparing  the  conclusions  that  you  prepared, 
did  you  furnish  to  the  committee  the  data  upon  which  it  was  founded  ? 
For  instance,  you  gave  the  substance  of  this  message.  You  said  it 
was  routed,  but  you  didn't  give  the  committee  the  exhibit.  Do  you 
know  why  they  were  not  furnished  with  the  exhibits  so  that  the  com- 
mittee might  draw  the  conclusion  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  didn't  feel  that  that  was  part  of  my  function. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  your  function  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  My  function  was  to  prepare  a  presentation  for  this 
committee,  giving  the  facts  that  were  not  controversial,  and  were  sub- 
stantiated rather  conclusively,  in  my  opinion,  by  the  documents  we 
had  available  in  the  Navy  Department. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well  now,  were  you  to  furnish  the  documents, 
or  just  the  narrative  form? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  personally  was  furnished  with  a  narrative  pre- 
pared by  my  researchers.  In  certain  cases  I  asked  them  to  produce 
the  source  of  the  data  for  my  own  inspection.  Also  we  produced  the 
folder  which  has  been  [10S~\  called  the  Navy  folder,  in  the 
white  cover,  and  which  does  contain  certain  factual  material,  but  that 
again  has  been  digested  from  the  basic  documents. 

[196]  Senator  Ferguson.  You  furnished  me  yesterday  a  blue 
sheet  with  information  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  the  outline. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  And  that  differs  somewhat  from  the  one 
that  was  handed  to  the  committee  by  the  counsel  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  outline  was  subject  to  modification  from  time 
to  time  as  we  worked  up  this  presentation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  who  modified  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  would  say  it  was  probably  a  joint  effort.  The 
Judge  Advocate  General  and  I  might  have  had  a  little  something  to 
do  with  it.  We  collaborated  with  the  Army  in  arranging  the  sequence 
of  presenting  the  various  items. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  many  times  did  you  confer  with  Mr. 
Mitchell? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  would  say  three ;  three  times. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  how  many  with  Mr.  Gesell  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  About  the  same  number  of  times. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  they  change  anj- thing  that  you  had  in  your 
exhibit  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  They  did  not  change  anything.  They  suggested 
a  few  changes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  did  they  suggest? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Well,  wherever  there  was  anything  that  was  con- 
troversial or  that  might  have  been  interpreted 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  85 

[197]  Senator  Ferguson.  Tell  us  some  of  the  things  that  they 
took  out. 

Admiral  Inglis.  They  did  not  take  out  anything.  Senator  Ferguson, 
I  want  to  make  that  quite  clear.     They  only  suggested  that 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right,  what  did  tiiey  suggest  that  you  take 
out? 

Admiral  Inglis.  There  was  one  paragraph,  for  example,  that  I 
remember  that  I  had  in  suggesting  that  the  country  as  a  whole  was  not 
unified  just  before  Pearl  Harbor. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  who  told  you  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  was  my  own  opinion  and,  therefore,  I  agreed 
that  it  was  not  proper  to  put  in  the  presentation.  There  were  some 
other  items. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Had  you  talked  over  with  anyone  the  fact  that 
you  wanted  to  put  that  in  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  talked  it  over  with  my  staff ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  who  was  your  staff  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Captain  Davis,  Captain  Phelan  and  Commander 
Hindmarsh  and  a  number  of  others. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  did  that  happen  to  come  into  this  question 
of  what  actually  happened  at  Pearl  Harbor?  Were  you  tryin^g  to  fix 
responsibility  ? 

[J98]         Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  then,  why  would  you  suggest  even  putting 
in  that  the  people  were  not  prepared  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  thought  that  it  might  give  a  little  background 
that  would  be  good  for  the 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  used  the  word  "united,"  that  the  people  were 
not  united  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  people  of  this  country  were  not  united. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  understand  the  President  said  something  to 
that  effect  about  the  time  that  the  reports  were  issued.  You  did  not  get 
the  suggestion  from  that,  did  you? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir.  I  got  it  from  my  own  understanding  of  the 
psychology  of  this  country  at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Of  the  American  people? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  with  whom  did  you  discuss  that  item  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  discussed  it  Mith  Captain  Davis,  with  Captain 
Phelan.     I  am  quite  sure,  with  both  jMr.  Mitchell  and  Mr.  Gesell. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  did  they  say  about  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  After  considerable  discussion  it  was  agreed,  and  I 
concurred  in  the  decision,  that  it  should  be         [^99]         omitted. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  the  discussion  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  discussion  was  whether  or  not  that  was  ap- 
propriate to  put  in  a  factual  presentation  of  this  kind. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  did  it  have  to  do  with  the  attack  on 
Pearl  Harbor? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Well,  we  all  agreed 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  think  the  people  were  to  blame? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Are  you  asking  for  my  opinion  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  you  put  it  in  the  memo  and  they  per- 
suaded you  to  take  it  out.  T  am  asking  you  whether  that  is  your 
opinion  ? 


86  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  My  opinion  is  that  they  did  contribute  to  some 
extent  to  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  you  explain  how  that  contributed 
to  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Because  the  armed  forces  were  not  as  strong  as 
they  might  have  been  had  the  country  been  unified  and  had  the 
appropriations  been  larger  for  the  Army  and  Navy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right;  now,  do  you  know  anything  about 
the  appropriations'^ 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  only  know  that  the  Navy  kept  asking  for  more 
than  they  could  get. 

[200]  Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  this,  that  when  the 
Navy  asked  for  an  item  that  on  many  occasions  the  Budget  Director 
and  the  Executive  branch  of  the  Government  cut  it  down  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  Congress  often  put  them  up  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  did  not  know  about  the  latter.  I  did  know 
about  the  former. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  that  the  people,  the  Congress 
for  the  people,  did  put  those  up  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Now  that  you  mention  it  I  believe  very  likely 
that  there  were  certain  specific  instances  where  the  Congress  did 
increase  appropriations. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  how  could  you  blame  the  people 
for  not  getting  armament? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  not  blaming  them.  Senator.  I  am  just 
saying  that  that  was  my  opinion,  that  that  was  the  frame  of  mind 
that  this  country  was  in  at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  will  you  furnish  to  the  committee 
your  original  drafts  where  you  had  that  in  and  I  would  like  to  see 
all  the  other  things  that  were  taken  out,  and  will  you  now  give 
us  the  other  things  that  were  taken  out  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  will  furnish  that  if  I  can.  I  am  afraid  that 
was  destroyed.    Now,  the  other  things  that  were  taken  out 

[201]  Senator  Ferguson.  Why  would  you  destroy  anything 
like  that  afterward  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  did  not  see  any  reason  to  keep  it  if  it  was  not 
to  be  presented. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  any  notes  or  any  memorandum  in  rela- 
tion to  the  preparing  of  your  memo  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  not  sure,  sir.  I  will  have  to  look  through 
my  papers ;  I  am  not  sure. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  will  you  furnish  to  the  committee,  so  that 
the  committee  may  have  them,  all  your  notes  and  all  your  memoranda? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  will  furnish  anything  I  have.^ 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right ;  now,  what  else  was  taken  out  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  other  things  that  were  taken  out  were  historical 
items  dating  back  to  1931. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  were  they? 

Admiral  Inglis.  An  outline  of  the  Japanese  aggression  in  Man- 
churia, the  Marco  Polo  Bridge  incident,  of  the  aggression  of  Italy 
toward  Ethiopia,  of  Germany  towards  Austria,  the  Saar,  and  showing 
the  rise  of  nazism  and  fascism. 

1  See  Hearings,  Part  11,  p.  5294. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  87 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  just  take  this  outline  and  tell  me  how 
many  of  the  items,  including  the  blame  on  the  American  people,  are 
included  in  the  request? 

[203]  Admiral  Inglis.  They  are  not  in  the  outline  and,  there- 
fore, they  were  taken  out. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  how  did  you  come  to  put  them  in  at  all  ? 
The  Navy  was  not  going  to  make  a  defense,  were  they  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  why  they  were  taken  out.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Because  the  Navy  was  attempting  to  make  a 
defense,  is  that  right  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  was  my  own  personal,  idea  and  I  soon  saw 
that  it  was  not  sound  and,  therefore,  they  were  taken  out. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  did  you  discuss  it  with  the  Judge 
Advocate? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  believe  I  did,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  he  consented  to  put  it  in  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  no,  sir;  I  was  advised  by  everyone  that  I 
talked  to  that  it  should  come  out. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  did  you  show  it  to  Mr.  Mitchell? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  not  sure  whether  it  was  Mr.  Mitchell  or  Mr. 
Gesell  that  I  talked  to  about  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  did  you  show  them  your  memo? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  have  a  memo  prepared  of  that? 

[£03]         Admiral  Inglis.  I  had  a  rough  draft  of  this  material. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  will  you  try  and  look  to  see  whether 
you  have  your  rough  draft  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir;  I  have  already  agreed  to  get  anything 
that  I  have  available. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  talk  with  Admiral  King 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson,  (continuing)  about  preparing  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Forrestal  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir ;  that  was  my  own  idea,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  did  you  discuss  it  with  anyone  ? 

Admiral  Ingus.  I  discussed  it  with  the  people  whom  I  have  already 
enumerated. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  did  you  get  that  data? 

Admiral  Inglis.  From  my  own  recollection  of  the  history  of  the 
world  from  1931  on. 

Senator  Ferguson.  "What  did  you  think  that  had  to  do  with  the 
actual  physical  facts  at  Pearl  Harbor  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  was  only  background  material  that  I  thought 
might  be  of  some  value. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  on  this  exhibit,  we  will  call  it  exhibit 
1 — Mr.  Chairman,  I  now  offer  it  in  evidence. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Exhibit  3. 

[204]         Senator  Ferguson.  What? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Exhibit  3. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  offer  Exhibit  3. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  3".) 


88  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATl^ACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  first  that  you  saw  of  this  particular  exhibit 
was  this  morning  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  got  your  testimony  before  you  ?  Have 
you  got  your  page  where  were  referring  to  the  shipping  route  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  read  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  quote  from  the  testimony  of  yesterday. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis  (reading)  : 

The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  on  November  25,  1941  directed  that  all  trans- 
pacific shipping  be  routed  through  the  Torres  Strait  between  Australia  and  New 
Guinea. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  that  is  all  you  said  about  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  all  I  said  about  it  except  under  cross-exam- 
ination. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  and  I  asked  you  some  questions  [20S] 
on  cross  examination.     I  asked  you  to  get  the  original. 

Now  I  will  ask  you  why  you  did  not  put  in  the  part  that  was  to 
provide  for  escorts  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  think  that  was  perhaps  omitted  by  my  staff  be- 
cause it  might  have  been  somewhat  controversial. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  think  that  this  part  of  the  message  is  con- 
troversial, "Provide  necessary  escort"? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  might  lead  to  controversy  because  of  the  word 
"necessary."  That  would  be  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  disposi- 
tion of  ships  for  escorts  as  opposed  to  the  need  for  keeping  them  con- 
centrated for  combat. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  did  any  member  of  this  staff,  of  this  com- 
mittee staff,  check  your  memorandum  that  you  were  going  to  write 
here  prior  to  its  writing  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir,  not  the  draft.  There  was  some  discussion 
about  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  There  was  some  discussion.  Did  any  member 
read  it  prior  to  the  time  that  you  gave  it  here? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  they  ever  see  the  exhibits  upon  which  it  was 
founded  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Do  you  mean  by  "exhibits"  these  things  in  the 
folder  or  that 

Senator  Ferguson.  No  ;  I  mean  such  as  Exhibit  3. 

[206]         Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  know  what  they  saw,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  any  idea  whether  they  ever  saw  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  think  that  a  great  many  records  were  available 
to  the  counsel. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  do  you  mean  "available"  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Were  turned  over  to  them. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  was  this  not  turned  over? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Perhaps  it  was. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  ask  counsel  now,  when  did  counsel  get 
this  Exhibit  3? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  first  saw  it  about  10  minutes  ago. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Well,  I  think,  to  make  the  record  clear 

Senator  Ferguson. -That  is  what  we  would  like  to  have. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  89 

Mr.  Gesell.   (continuing) There  is  in  the  file  of  counsel  a  very 

substantial  number  of  dispatches. 

Senator  Ferguson.  No,  no,  let  us  keep  the  record  clear. 

Mr.  Geseljl.  I  beg  your  pardon.  Senator.  I  am  answering  your 
question,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  you  get  Exhibit  3  ? 

Mr.  Gesell.  That  particular  dispatch  is  very  likely  among  the 
group  of  dispatches  which  we  have  had  in  our  office  for  a  considerable 
period  of  time.  If  you  are  talking  about  the  piece  of  paper  in  your 
hand,  we  saw  that  this  morning. 

[£07]  Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  did  he  make  the  statement  of 
yesterday  based  on  very  likely  whether  this  was  in  your  file  or  not  ? 

The  Chairman.  Is  there  any  dispute  about  the  authenticity  of  this 
Exhibit  No.  3? 

Admiral  Inglis.  None  whatsoever. 

The  Chairman,  Is  there  any  dispute  on  the  part  of  any  member 
of  the  committee? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Am  I  to  take  that  that  I  am  not  supposed  to 
examine  the  witness  about  that?    . 

The  Chairman.  Not  at  all ;  I  just  want  to  know  whether  there  is 
any  dispute  about  the  authenticity  of  this  document  that  you  are  talk- 
ing about. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  question  is  why  it  has  not  been  produced 
to  the  committee,  that  we  are  on  right  now. 

Will  you  give  me  all  the  information  in  the  Navy  in  relation  to  the 
part  of  this  message  that  says,  "Provide  necessary  escort?" 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  authorized  to  say  that  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment— or  to  say  for  the  Navy  Department  that  any  information  re- 
quested by  the  committee  which  is  available  to  the  Navy  will  be 
produced. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  but  do  you  take  that  request  as  not 
from  one  of  the  committee? 

[W8]  Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir ;  from  the  committee  as  a  request 
which  will  be  complied  with  to  the  best  of  our  ability.^ 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  any  information,  personal  informa- 
tion, on  this  "Provide  necessary  escort?" 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  not,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  at  any  time  that  there  was  any 
message  including  this  "Provide  necessary  escort?" 

Admiral  Inglis,  The  only  information  that  I  had  was  what  I  gave 
the  committee  yesterday,  until  I  saw  that  message  which  you  have  in 
your  hand. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  gave  us  a  list  yesterday  of  the  location  of 
all  ships  in  the  Pacific,  did  you  not? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson,  I  will  ask  you  where  the  Boise  was  between 
the  23d  of  November  1941,  and  the  6th  of  December  1941  ? 

Admiral  Inglis,  The  Boise'^. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  My  recollection  is  that  the  Boise  was  in  the  Asiatic 
Fleet, 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  where  the  American  Leader  ship 
was? 

*  See  memorandum  from  the  Navy  Department  in  Hearings,  Part  11,  p.  5499. 


90  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir ;  never  heard  of  that  ship. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  the  American  Leader 
[209]         left  Honolulu  on  November  23, 1941  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  do  not,  sir.  I  rather  gather  from  the  name  of 
the  ship  that  she  is  a  merchant  ship. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes;  that  is  right. 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir.    My  information 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  your  information  on  the  Boisel 

Admiral  Inglis.  On  the  Boise'i 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  haven't  anything  in  writing  here,  but  my  recol- 
lection is  that  she  was  attached  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet  out  in  the  Philip- 
pines at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  I  will  ask  you  whether  or  not  she 
was  not  convoying  many  other  ships,  or,  at  least,  convoying  the  Ameri- 
can Leader? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  know  that,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  don't  know  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir.  I  don't  know  anything  about  the  Ameri- 
can Leader. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  so  that  the  record  may  show,  what  we 
would  like  to  get  the  information  on,  as  to  who  was  the  captain  of  the 
American  Leader.,  whether  or  not  she  left  Honolulu  on  November  the 
20th  and  arrived  in  Manila  on  December  the  6th,  whether  she  was  in 
a  convoy  or  not,  in  convoy  during  any  of  that  time.  Do  you  have  any 
information  on  that  ? 

[^i6>]         Admiral  Inglis.  If  we  have  any  we  will  produce  it,  sir.^ 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  have  you  'I 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  not,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  whether  or  not  one  of  the  convoying  ships, 
at  least  one  was  the  Boise;  whether  or  not  the  ships  were  blacked  out 
at  night.    Do  you  know  whether  that  was  true  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  give  us  the  definition  of  what  was 
meant  by  "a  convoy"  in  this  message  of  November  the  25th  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  In  its  common  term  a  convoy  is  a  collection  of 
ships  steaming  together  as  a  group  under  escort. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  any  ships  leave  the  Pacific  coast  after  the 
25th  in  convoy? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  believe  my  presentatidn  described  two  convoys. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  were  they? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  heavy  cruiser  Pensacola  with  an  eight-ship 
convoy  was  west-bound,  located  in  the  Samoan  area. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  she  start  on  convoy  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  All  of  those  ships  left  between  2  and  7  days  prior 
to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  as  I  recall  it,  but  I  cannot  give  you  the 
precise  date.  I  will  get  it  [2ii]  for  you,  though ;  at  least,  the 
Navy  Department  will  get  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  I  would  like  to  have  on  that  American 
Leader  and  also  on  the  Boise  a  record  of  orders  for  blackouts  and 
when  they  were  given  and  how  they  were  distributed. 


*  See  Hearings,  Part  10,  p.  5127,  for  a  statement  re  the  American  Leader  based  on  infor- 
mation received  from  the  Navy  Department. 

See  also  "Exhibit  No.  68,"  the  log  of  D.  S.  S.  Boise. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  91 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Navy  Department,  I  am  sure,  will  make  all 
that  information  which  they  have  available  also. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  when  the  first  order  of  convoying  was  in 
the  Pacific. 

By  the  way,  had  you  any  evidence  when  you  were  getting  this  up, 
or  any  evidence  that  there  were  German  submarines  in  the  Pacific  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  know  of  no  evidence. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Or  battleships  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  know  of  no  evidence ;  no,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  know  of  no  such  evidence.  As  one  of  the 
Intelligence  officers  do  vou  know  of  any  reason  for  convoys  in  the 
Pacific  on  the  25th  of  November  1941  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Of  course,  I  was  not  an  Intelligence  officer  at  that 
time  and  all  I  can  do  is  express  an  opinion  that  the 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  will  you  furnish  to  counsel  for  the  com- 
mittee all  the  information  that  you  have  as  to  the  [^-?^]  con- 
voying, whether  there  were  German  subs  or  German  battleships  or 
other  instruments,  or  anything  that  would  be  of  danger  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir.  The  Navy  Department  will  make  that 
information  available. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  prej^are  your  statement  from  original 
data? 

Admiral  Inglis.  My  staff  did ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  see  all  the  data  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  you  did  not  check  it  with  your  statement  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Only  in  certain  cases. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  j'ou  state  some  of  the  cases  that  you  did 
check  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  checked  some  of  the  distances  from  Oahu  to 
other  strategical  and  geographical  points  on  the  chart.  I  asked  the 
staff  to  verify  several  points  that  came  up. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  are  some  of  those  points? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  relationship  between  the  Fourteenth  Naval 
District  and  the  commander  in  chief  was  one  of  them.  There  was 
some  argument  about  the  spelling  of  some  of  these  Hawaiian  words 
and  their  pronunciation;  the  depths  of  water  in  Pearl  Harbor  and 
in  the  channels  approaching,  I  think. 

[^13]  Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  say  anything  in  that  report 
about  torpedo  nets  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir;  that  is  another  thing  I  questioned  my 
staff  very  closely  on,  because  I  wanted  to  be  sure  I  had  the  basis  for  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  tell  us  what  you  were  talking  about 
when  you  referred  to  torpedo  nets  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  A  torpedo  net. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  get  me  the  part  in  your  testimony  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir,  if  I  may  quote  from  my  yesterda^^'s  state- 
ment. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis  (reading)  : 

The  entrance  to  the  harbor  was  closed  by  two  protective  nets ;  into  the  channel 
through  the  coral  reefs  it  was  about  400  yards  and  the  depth  was  from  41  to  60 
feet,  and  the  nets  themselves  consisted  of  a  combined  antitorpedo  and  antiboat  net. 


92  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Fergctson.  Just  a  minute  now.  You  were  then  referring 
only  to  torpedo  nets  at  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  two  torpedo  nets ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  At  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  At  the  entrance  to  the  harbor. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  far  would  they  be  from  ships? 

[^J4]         Admiral  Inglis.  We  can  get  that  from  the  chart,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well-  - 

Admiral  Inglis.  About  2  miles. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  talking  about  the  torpedo  nets  in  relation 
to  the  ships. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Oh,  no,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  refer  to  them  in  your  report  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir ;  the  torpedo  nets  I  referred  to  were  across 
the  channel  entrance,  as  shown  on  the  chart. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  see  a  message  that  was  intecepted  at 
Fort  Hunt  in  Virginia  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  A  message  about  what,  sir  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  was  translated  on  the  6th. 

Admiral  Inglis.  A  message  from  whom  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  A  message  from  Japan — Honolulu. 

Admiral  Inglis,  No,  sir ;  I  have  not  had- — 

Senator  Ferguson.  From  Honolulu  to  Japan,  rather,  or  Tokyo. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Japanese  message  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  not  had  access  to  any  of  those  messages. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  refer  in  your  statement  to  barrage 
balloons  above  Pearl  Harbor  ? 

[215]         Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  there  any  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  do  not  know,  sir.  That  would  be  an  Army  ques- 
tion. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  would  not  know  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  would  not  know  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  there  any  torpedo  nets  close  to  the  ships, 
the  battleships  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge.  There  were  no 
nets,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  try  to  check  on  that,  as  to  whether  or  not 
there  were  any  nets  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  As  long  as  nobody  said  there  were,  I  did  not  see  any 
reason  to  check  it.  It  was  my  personal  understanding  that  there  were 
no  nets  about  the  battleships  at  that  time. 

[216]  Senator  Ferguson.  Going  to  the  colonel.  Colonel,  in  your 
testimony  yesterday,  on  page  168  you  referred  to  page  116,  arid  you 
say  [reading] : 

You  mean  my  sources  ou  that,  sir?  This  copy  is  documented.  The  fact  that 
these  two  enlisted  men  picked  up  an  indication  of  hostile  aircraft  by  radar  at  7  :  02 
a.  m.  on  the  morning  of  December  7  comes  from  the  Roberts'  report,  page  116, 
affidavit  of  Private  McDonald. 

I  have  the  Roberts'  report  before  me  liere,  and  the  last  page  in  my 
copy  of  the  report  is  No.  21. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  think  I  can  clarify  that,  sir. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  93 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  give  me  the  item  of  the  report  that  you 
were  referring  from? 

The  Chairman,  Let  the  witness  clarify  his  answer  to  that  question, 
Senator  Ferguson.     He  is  entitled  to  do  that. 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  reference  which  I  gave  was  to  the  testimony, 
not  to  the  report  itself.  I  was  not  referring  to  the  conclusions,  the 
findings,  or  any  element  of  the  Roberts'  report  other  than  the  transcript 
of  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  were  you  talking  about  the  page  in.  the 
transcript  of  the  testimony  in  the  Roberts'  report  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir ;  I  believe  that  is  the  reference. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  there  an  individual  in  thei-e,  a  [^17] 
man  by  the  name  of  McDonald? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  have  that  transcript  of  testimony  before 
me  so  I  cannot  answer  the  question. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  got  something  before  you  there  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir;  I  have  some  extracts  which  I  had  made 
last  night  of  testimony  given  before  the  Roberts  commission  relative  to 
the  radar  question. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  give  us  that  testimony? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  this  is  what  you  founded  your  statement  on  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right. 

Colonel  Thielen.  General  Short's  testimony  before  the  Roberts 
commission,  page  65  of  the  transcript. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  had  read  that  before  you  made  up  your 
report  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  jMy  researchers  had  read  it.  I  had  also  read  the 
Roberts  report,  but  not  closely,  with  the  view  to  incorporating  it  into 
the  statement  which  was  prepared,  merely  by  way  of  acquiring  some 
background  for  this  assignment. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  instructed  to  avoid  any  controversial 
matters  or  matters  of  opinion? 

[^i<§]  Colonel  Thielen.  I  was  instructed  to  avoid  them  in  the 
statement ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Pardon? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir;  I  was  instructed  to  avoid  them  in  the 
statement  which  I  was  to  present  to  the  committee. 

Senator  Ferguson.  \Vlien  did  you  first  show  the  counsel  for  the 
committee,  or  any  member  of  the  committee,  your  report  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  never  showed  the  counsel  or  any  member  of  the 
committee  my  report. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  confer  with  anyone  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Whom  did  you  confer  with? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  conferred  with  counsel  for  the  committee. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  was  the  counsel? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Mr.  Mitchell  and  Mr.  Gesell. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  did  they  make  any  suggestions  as  to  what 
should  go  in  or  come  out? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Their  only  suggestions,  as  far  as  the  Army  pres- 
entation was  concerned,  had  to  do  with  bringing  the  presentation 

79716—46 — pt.  1 9 


94  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

within  the  scope  of  the  directive;  in  other  words,  of  eliminating 
controversial  material.  Also  some  mechanical  suggestions,  such  as 
eliminating  tedious  lists  of  equipment  that  could  be  transferred  from 
the  oral  presentation         [219]         to  the  exhibit. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  tell  us  some  of  the  controversial  mat- 
ters that  they  suggested  that  you  take  out  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  recall  none,  sir.  I  believe  they  were  very 
minor.  I  do  not  remember  any  body  of  testimony.  It  may  have  been 
a  word  which  could  be  improved  here  and  there. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  you  last  confer  with  them  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  On  last  Monday,  sir.  That  was  the  only  con- 
ference I  had. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  Monday  of  this  week  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  past  Monday. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  have  your  statement  finished  at  that 
time? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  had  a  statement  finished ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  give  it  to  them  to  read  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  did  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  did  you  confer  on  it  if  they  did  not 
read  it? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  was  discussed  with  them.  I  told  them  orally 
what  I  was  going  to  say.    I  quoted  pages  from  my  script. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  got  your  original  script? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir;  I  do  not  have  it.  It  has  been  revised 
since  then,  largely  in  a  mechanical  way,  to  [220]  improve  co- 
ordination with  the  Navy,  as  far  as  the  presentation  is  concerned, 
and  to  eliminate  tedious  details  which  were  later  incorporated  in  the 
Army  exhibits. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  show  it  to  them  after  you  revised  it? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  I  did  not ;  nor  did  I  discuss  it  with  them  after 
revision. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  going  back  to  that  item  that  you  w^ant  to 
read  from  General  Short,  will  j^ou  read  it  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.  General  Short's  testimony  before  the 
Roberts  Commission,  page  65  of  the  transcript,  and  I  quote : 

This  Opana  station  is  along  the  ridge  here,  somewhere  along  in  here  [indicating]. 
It  is  not  marked  on  the  map ;  up  to  the  north.  That  station,  just  on  its  own — 
they  work  normally  for  training  from  7  to  11  every  day  and  apparently  they  just 
thought  they  would  not  knock  off  just  because  it  was  Sunday,  and  the  staff  went 
ahead  and  worked. 

And  I  close  the  quotes  there. 

I  have  also  the  testimony  of  Colonel  Powell,  who  was  the  Hawaiian 
Department  signal  officer,  before  the  Roberts  Commission,  page  358  of 
the  transcript,  and  I  quote : 

It  is  almost  fantastic  the  way  these  things  operate,  and  the  men  are  all  anxious 
to  learn  about  them.  This  [221]  particular  one  wanted  to  work  longer 
to  get  more  training,  because  we  were  to  put  control  sets  on  the  other  islands, 
and  he  wanted,  I  suppose,  to  become  one  of  the  operators  on  the  other  islands. 
That  he  did  not  say,  but  that  is  what  they  were  working  for,  to  be  able  to  operate 
those  sets  on  the  other  islands. 

That  closes  the  quotation  of  Colonel  Powell. 

I  have  also  an  extract  from  the  testimony  of  Sergeant  Elliott  before 
the  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  95 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  he  did  not  testify  before  the  Roberts  Com- 
mission— Elliott  did  not,  did  he  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  cannot  answer  that  question  offhand. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right,  go  ahead. 

Colonel  Thielen.  This  is  page  1001  of  the  transcript  and  I  quote: 

Well,  that,  sir,  is :  After  our  problem  was  over  at  seven  o'clock,  I  was  to  get 
further  instruction  in  the  operation  of  the  oscilloscope,  and  at  that  time  I  was  at 
the  controls.  However,  Lockard  was  instructing  me  as  to  the  different  echoes 
that  I  would  see,  and  it  was  at  that  time  that  the  flight  was  noticed  by  Private 
Lockard. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  at  what  time  they  started  work  that 
morning  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  know  what  the  schedule  called  for.  [^^S] 
It  called  for  work  from  4  a.  m.  to  7  a.  m. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Three  hours  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  would  be  correct ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  find  in  the  Army  report  that  it  was  4 
hours  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  believe  I  thoroughly  understand  that  ques- 
tion, sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  Icok  at  page  1029,  where  it  says : 

Lieutenant  Lockard.  Well,  sir,  each  group  had  four  hours  on,  and — let's  see — we 
were  divided  into  three  groups,  four  hours  on  and  eight  hours  off;  but  we  had 
four  hours  on  the  'scope,  then  four  hours  guards,  then  we  had  four  hours  off. 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  was  the  weekday  schedule,  I  believe.  Sena- 
tor. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  there  a  different  schedule  on  Sunday? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.  I  can  review  the  schedule  as  I  gave 
it  in  my  testimony  yesterday.  On  weekdays  other  than  Saturday 
and  Sunday  the  schedule  was  specifically  from  4  a.  m.  to  7  a.  m. 
actually  tracking  aircraft. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  time  does  the  record  show  that  they 
actually  shut  down  the  radar  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  On  7  December? 

[^^S]         Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  doubt  that  the  Opana  station  was  shut  down, 
sir.  They  continued  operation  at  7  a.  m.,  as  indicated  on  the  historic 
plot,  so-called.  That  plot  indicates  echoes  well  into  the  morning, 
and  we  have  the  testimony  of  Lieutenant  Tyler  that  he  recalled, 
or  states,  that  after  he  was  notified  at,  I  believe,  about  8  a.  m.,  that 
Wheeler  Field  was  under  attack. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  examined  all  of  the  Army  and  Roberts 
report  before  you  brought  in  your  conclusion  about  the  practice, 
and  so  forth  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  did  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  do  you  say  that  anything  that  was  brought 
in  here  is  beyond  dispute,  that  it  is  not  disputed  in  any  way? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  a  relative  term,  I  believe.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well 

Colonel  Thielen.  Any  statement  could  be  disputed.  We  have 
tried  to  confine  it  to  statements  concerning  which  there  has  been  no 
controversy. 


96  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  let  me  review  page  1105  from,  the 
Army  report  in  relation  to  Colonel  Tyler ;  let  me  read  General  Grun- 
ert's  remark.     [Reading:] 

[224]  General  Geuneet.  And  there  was  nothing  for  you  to  do,  there,  between 
7  and  8,  but  twiddle  your  thumbs? 

Colonel  Tyler.  No,  sir ;  there  was  nothing  to  do. 

General  GRtiNEKT.  Then  it  appears  that  the  organization  seemed  to  be  faulty, 
and  if  instruction  faulty,  and  there  seemed  to  be  a  lack  of  organization  and 
common  sense  and  reason  on  this.  You  went  up  there  to  do  duty  as  a  pursuit 
oflBcer  in  the  information  center.  There  was  nobody  to  do  the  work  with, 
because  the  controller  was  not  there,  and  the  Navy  liaison  man  wasn't  there, 
and  probably  some  others  were  missing,  so  you  couldn't  do  your  duty,  as  a 
pursuit  officer,  because  there  was  nobody  to  do  duty  with ;  and  then,  at  the 
end  of  the  tour,  at  7  o'clock,  everybody  disappeared  except  the  telephone 
operator  and  you ;  and  the  telephone  operator  remained  there  for  apparently 
no  reason.    You  had  no  particular  duty,  did  you? 

Colonel  Tylee.  No,  sir ;  we  hadn't. 

General  Geuneet.  It  seems  all  cockeyed  to  me — and  that,  on  the  record, 
too. 

Did  you  read  that  part  of  General  Grunert's  statement  there  in  the 
testimony  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  did  not  personally  read  that,  sir.  I  believe  I 
can  clarify  a  possible  faulty  impression  in  that  the  testimony  which 
you  just  read  refers  to  the  information  [^£5]  center,  which  was 
located  at  Fort  Shafter  and  not  to  the  radar  unit  at  Opana,  out  at 
Kahuku  Point. 

Will  you  point  that  out,  please,  Captain  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  say  that  the  reason  these  boys  were 
at  the  radar  station  after  7  that  morning  was  that  the  truck  did  not 
come  to  pick  them  up?     That  is  the  reason  they  were  there? 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  evidence  I  have  indicates  that  Private  Elliott 
volunteered  for  additional  training.  I  know  nothing  about  the  delay 
of  the  truck  in  picking  them  up. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  the  reason  that  they  were  not 
picked  up  was  that  the  truck  did  not  pick  them  up  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  did  not  know  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  read  all  this  testimony  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  did  not  read  it  all.  Perhaps  I  should 
explain  my  position  is  very  similar  to  that  of  Admiral  Inglis.  I  did 
not  perform  any  appreciable  quantity  of  research  on  this  testimony. 
It  was  done  by  other  staff  officers. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  the  gentleman  yield? 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  permit  Mr.  Murphy  to  interpose? 

Senator  Ferguson.  For  what  purpose  ? 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  was  wondering  whether  or  not  the  witness  had 
finished  the  question  that  you  asked  15  minutes  ago.  He  read  three 
paragraphs.  In  my  impression,  that  question  is  still  [££6]  not 
answered. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  go  back  to  that. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  have  some  further  testimony. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right.  You  read  what  you  claim  you 
founded  your  statement  on. 

Colonel  Thielen.  After  reading  the  testimony  of  Sergeant  Elliott 
that  he  wanted  to  get  some  instruction  on  the  use  of  the  oscilloscope 
on  which  Lockard  was  instructing  him,  and  that  the  flight  was  noticed 
by  Private  Lockard,  I  go  on  to  further  testimony  by  the  same  witness. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  97 

In  response  to  a  question  by  General  Frank,  "\Vlio  wanted  to  shut 
it  down?"  Sergeant  Elliott  replied: 

Private  Lockard  wanted  to  shut  the  unit  down,  and  since  I  was  to  get  the 
instruction  on  it  I  wanted  to  continue  operation.  Finally,  after  insisting  on  that, 
we  did  continue  the  flight  and  completing  the  flight  on  this  chart  which  you  have 
just  shown  me  before,  sir,  and  we  followed  the  flight  all  the  way  in  until  it  was 
approximately  15  or  25  miles  from  the  island  of  Oahu,  and  the  flight  was  lost. 

That  concludes  the  testimony  which  I  wish  to  quote. 

Captain,  put  the  radar  plot  up,  please. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  got  the  testimony  there?  Look  on 
page  1004. 

Colonel  TiiiELEN,  No,  sir ;  I  do  not  have  that. 
•  r^^]         Senator  Ferguson.  What? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not  have  the  testimony,  I  have  only 
the  pertinent  extracts. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  says  this  [reading] : 

The  oscilloscope,  from  the  beam  tliat  is  sent  out,  has  a  back  echo,  and  at  that 
particular  spot  the  oscilloscope  is  blank,  and  it  is  impossible  to  pick  up  any 
flight  whatsoever  at  that  particular  point,  and  that  was  as  far  as  we  could 
follow  the  flight,  and  at  approximately  7 :  39  is  when  we  started  to  shut  down 
the  unit,  and  at  7 :  45  our  truck  came  from  our  camp  (incidentally,  which  was  9 
miles  away  from  the  unit)  to  pick  us  up  to  take  us  to  breakfast,  and  upon 
arriving  at  the  camp,  why,  we  had  found  out  what  had  happened  at  Pearl 
Harbor. 

Does  not  that  indicate  the  reason  that  they  were  there  with  the 
machine,  that  they  were  waiting  on  their  truck? 

Colonel  Thielen,  No,  sir.  May  I  point  out  the  time  that  that  flight 
was  picked  up,  at  7 :  02,  as  indicated  on  the  chart,  and  it  was  tracked 
continuously  to,  I  believe,  the  testimony  that  you  quoted  said  7 :  45. 

Senator  Ferguson,  7 :  45  is  when  the  truck  picked  them  up. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Wlien  it  actually  picked  them  up? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.    He  says  [reading]  : 

At  7 :  45  our  truck  came  from  our  camp  to  pick  us  up. 

Colonel  Thielen.  What  opinion  did  I  give  you  on  that,  [228} 
Senator  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  answer  to  this  question,  "What  time  did  the 
center  close  up  where  Tyler  was?" 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  know  that,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Taking  Sergeant  Elliott's  other  statement  [read- 
ing] : 

No,  sir ;  there  was  no  time.  I  am  sure  there  wasn't.  Another  point,  sir,  that 
I  might  bring  out,  our  clock  at  the  unit  I  said  showed  7 :  02  at  the  time  that  we 
sent  in  the  first  plot.  However,  when  I  was  ordered,  over  the  plotting  set  while 
we  were  operating  the  problem,  to  shut  down,  the  time  by  the  clock  there  was 
6 :  54,  and  I  can't  remember  as  to  whether  we  had  made  any  time  check  what- 
soever that  morning. 

Do  you  know  whether  or  not  the  main  board  closed  down  at  6  :  54? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  believe  that  is  highly  controversial,  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  say  that  is  highly  controversial.  Is  that 
the  reason  it  is  not  in  your  i-eport  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir ;  that  would  account  for  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  these  controversial 
matters  are  going  to  be  presented  to  the  committee  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  could  answer  that.  We  have  all  the  evidence  on 
this  radar  report,  the  witness  is  prepared  to        [£29]        testify  about 


98  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

it.  It  is  one  of  those  things  that  we  are  going  into  fully.  This  witness 
was  instructed  to  keep  out  of  fields  where  that  situation  existed. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Colonel,  do  you  know  anything  about  the  op- 
erations of  the  radar  after  the  attack  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Only  the  statement  which  I  gave  in  my  script 
yesterday,  that  Lieutenant  Tyler,  after  receiving  word  from  Wheeler 
Field  of  the  attack,  recalled  all  crews  to  their  stations.  What  the 
results  of  that  call  were  I  do  not  know. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  there  is  a  vacuum  here  then,  as 
far  as  we  are  concerned  with  any  information  as  to  the  operations 
of  the  radar  after  the  attack.  I  am  talking  about  the  movable  sets. 
The  permanent  sets  were  not  completed.  The  movable  sets  we  are 
talking  about ;  are  we  not  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  there  any  information  you  obtained  or  you 
can  give  us  in  relation  to  the  operation  of  these  sets  after  the  attack? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Only  those  Opana  plots  which  show  on  the 
radar  chart  which  is  on  the  easel. 

Senator  Ferguson.  From  what  set  did  those  come  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Those  are  Opana  plots. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  who  was  operating  that  set  at 
10:27? 

[^SO]         Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  any  records  to  show  whose  infor- 
mation this  is?  I  cannot  see  because  of  the  light.  Between  9  and 
1027,  651,  652,  and  648. 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  entire  record  is  authenticated  by  Lieuten- 
ant Colonel  Murphy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  From  what  machine? 

Colonel  Thielen.  From  the  Opana  station. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  why  these  machines  were  not 
used  to  get  the  enemy  going  out  ?  When  you  knew  they  would  come 
in  on  the  machine,  why  were  not  the  machines  used  to  get  the  enemy 
going  out? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  know  that  they  were  not,  nor  if  not, 
why  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  do  you  know  of  any  information  or  any 
place  that  the  committee  can  get  information  on  that? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  am  sure  that  the  committee  can,  through  coun- 
sel, obtain  the  best  available  witnesses  on  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  general — was  it  General 
Powell? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Colonel  Powell. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  He  is  on  the  list  of  witnesses. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  he  stated  in  relation  to  that? 

[^■31]  The  Chairman.  Colonel  Powell,  I  will  say,  is  on  the  list 
of  witnesses  to  appear  here  in  person.  Wliatever  he  stated,  or  what- 
ever he  has  to  state,  will  be  brought  before  the  committee  by  him  in 
person. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  was  just  trying  to  get  at  what  might  be  in  their 
files  in  relation  to  this. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  am  not  a  very  good  authority  on  what  is  in  the 
War  Department  files,  sir.  Another  procedure  has  been  set  up  for 
obtaining  any  information  which  the  War  Department  has. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  99 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  the  B-l7's  had  radar  in 
them  ? 

Colonel  Thxelen.  I  do  not  know.  My  opinion  would  be  that  they 
did  not.     I  do  not  believe  that  radar 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  they  had  radio  ? 

Senator  Lucas.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  submit,  the  witness  ought  to  have 
an  opportunity  to  answer. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  answer  that  question  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir,  I  have  not  completed  my  answer. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  you  may  complete  your  answer. 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  presumption  would  be  that  they  were  not 
equipped  with  radar,  considering  the  status  of  development  of  radar 
at  that  time. 

[23£]  Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  they  had  radio 
upon  them  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir,  I  do  not  know  definitely.  Presumably 
they  would  have. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  look  into  that? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir;  I  did  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  any  station  on 
Hawaii  operated  all  night  with  Hawaiian  music  that  night,  the  6th  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir,  I  do  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  it  was  played  for 
the  purpose  of  these  B-17's  tuning  on  it  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir,  I  do  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  at  the  same  time  the  Jap 
planes  tuned  on  it  too? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir,  I  have  no  information  on  that  whatso- 
ever. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  read  all  of  Tyler's  testimony  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  have  any  information  in  relation  to 
whether  or  not  these  radars  would  pick  up  whether  it  was  enemy 
planes  or  friendly  planes? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That,  as  I  testified  yesterday,  is  not  practicable, 
for  that  type  of  radar,  at  least.  They  could  [2-33~\  not  distin- 
guish between  hostile  aircraft  and  friendly  aircraft. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  has  charge  of  the  submarines?  That 
would  be  the  admiral,  would  it  not  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral,  did  you  state  yesterday  anything 
about  what  submarines  had  been  in  the  Harbor? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  submarines  that  were  in  the  Harbor,  the 
United  States  submarines  that  were  in  the  Harbor  were  listed  in  the 
script. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  many  Japs  got  into  the  Harbor? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  best  evidence  we  have  indicates  that  only 
one  got  in.  There  was  some  evidence  that  might  lead  to  the  supposi- 
tion that  a  second  submarine  got  in,  but  on  further  research  my  people 
told  me  they  did  not  think  there  was  more  than  one. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  I  understand  that  the  one  sub  came  in  at 
4 :  30  in  the  morning  and  went  out  at  5  :  30  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  do  not  know  about  that,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  any  information  on  that? 


100       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  Nothing  conclusive;  no,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  3^ou  find  any  maps,  or  have  you  any  maps 
in  your  possession  showing  the  log  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  was  told  there  was  no  log,  and  I  was  told  that 
there  was  a  chart  wdiich  was  recovered  f  rorn — I  [2341  believe  it 
was  the  submarine  that  went  aground  at  Bellows  Field,  showing  the 
track  around  Ford  Island,  but  that  we  thought  was  only  a  prospective 
course  and  not  one  which  was  actuall}^  taken  by  the  submarine. 

There  is  a  little  confusion  that  comes  in  in  translating  the  Japanese 
characters.  Some  of  their  tenses  are  hard  to  distinguish  between 
the  present  tense  and  future  tense. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  that  is  a  disputed  item,  is  it,  as  to  whether 
or  not  a  sub  came  in  and  went  around  Pearl  Harbor,  around  Ford 
Island,  and  came  out  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  evidence  on  that  is  certainly  not  conclusive. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  would  be  one  of  the  reasons  why  it  would 
not  be  put  in  your  statement  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir.  I  would  like  to  add,  Senator,  to  that 
that  our  best  evaluation  of  the  information  is  that  only  one  submarine 
entered  Pearl  Harbor. 

Senator  Ferguson.  We  have  in  this  battle  report,  at  one  point  on 
this  chart,  to  bolster  the  evidence  of  his  better  vision  he  wrote  in 
Japanese,  "I  saw  it  with  my  own  eyes."    Did  you  read  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  did  not ;  no.    No,  I  did  not  read  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  about  it?  Do  you  know  whether  that  is 
in  your  evidence,  in  your  Navy  Department  ^ 

[235]         Admiral  Inglis.  I  presume 

Senator  Ferguson  (interposing).  That  is  on  the  log,  isn't  it,  that 
you  recovered? 

Admiral  Inglis.  If  you  are  talking  about  the  submarine  that  went 
ashore  at  Bellows  Field,  I  do  not  believe  that  that  is  in  the  log. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  is  there  any  evidence  at  all  in  the  Navy 
Department  on  that  item  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  only  evidence  that  I  know  about  is  what  one 
of  my  officers  told  me,  which  is  to  the  effect  that  they  recovered  a  chart 
in  that  submarine  showing,  as  I  said,  a  track  around  Ford  Island  and 
out  again.  They  think,  from  the  translation  of  the  Japanese  charac- 
ters on  that  chart  now  that  is  what  it  was. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Will  the  gentleman  yield  at  that  point? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  the  witness  might  finish  his  answer. 

Mr.  ICeefe.  I  thought  he  did. 

The  Chairman.  He  did  not. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  translation  of  the  Japanese  characters  were 
somewhat  confusing.  A  great  deal  of  time  was  spent  on  that  chart 
trying  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  submarine  actually  entered 
the  harbor  or  only  planned  to  enter  the  [236]  harbor,  and  the 
conclusion  which  the  experts  came  out  with  was  that  the  submarine 
did  not  probably  enter  the  harbor. 

[237]  Senator  Ferguson.  Do  I  understand  that  we  are  taking 
the  opinion  of  the  expert  here  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Perhaps  I  should  not  have  used  the  word  "ex- 
perts."   I  will  correct  that  to  "translators." 


PROCEEDINGS   OE   JOINT   COMMITTEE  101 

The  Chairman.  If  I  may  say  there,  that  would  be  another  matter 
that  would  be  left  out,  because  it  is  speculative  and  controversial. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Exactly,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  the  gentleman  yield  further  on  that? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Keefe. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Might  I  say,  Senator,  while  you  are  questioning  with 
respect  to  this  item,  my  understanding  is  that  these  two  officers  from 
this  grounded  submarine  were  captured  by  the  Army. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Now,  will  the  gentleman  yields 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  that  the  information  obtained  from  those  officers 
was  obtained  by  the  Army  and  not  by  the  Navy.  I  Avish  you  would 
inquire  into  that  question  from  the  Army,  because  there  seems  to  be 
a  sharp  line  of  cleavage  between  the  two  services. 

Colonel  Tiiielen.  No,  sir ;  I  have  no  information  on  that. 

The  Chairman.  I  might  suggest  to  the  committee 

[£38]  Senator  Ferguson.  Might  I  inquire — you  captured  those 
men,  did  you  not,  with  these  charts^  The  officer  you  captured  on  the 
sub,  and  the  opei-ator  you  took,  with  the  charts,  did  you  not^ 

Mr.  Murphy,  Will  the  gentlemtm  yield? 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  minute.  Let  the  witness  answer  this  ques- 
tion. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  know,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Haven't  you  any  information  that  he  was  cap- 
tured and  the  sub  was  captured  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  personally  have  no  such  information. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  Admiral  Inglis 

Mr.  Murphy.  My  request  for  the  gentleman  to  yield  is  that  we  have 
been  given  an  outline  as  to  what  the  testimony  is  going  to  be  that  will 
be  gone  into  subsequently,  and  it  is  on  that  very  subject. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  want  to  find  out  what  information  these  gen- 
tlemen have. 

Mr.  Murphy.  You  are  anticipating  the  statement  of  the  witness. 

The  Chairman.  Go  ahead.     Let  us  make  progress. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Going  to  the  admiral,  did  Admiral  Halsey's 
ships  have  radar  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  carrier  did,  yes,  sir. 

[239]         Senator  Ferguson.  The  carriers  had  radar  ■? 

Admiral  Inglis.  His  carrier  had  radar ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  On  the  memo  that  went  to  you.  Admiral,  on 
page  2  [reading]  : 

Summarize  percentage  personnel  mustered  various  departments — -summary  tes- 
timony showing  no  drunkenness. 

Was  that  on  yours  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir ;  that  was  scratched  off. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  A\as  it  scratched  off?  Did  you  go  into 
that  question  at  all? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  was  discussed  just  very  briefly,  and  the  opinion 
seemed  to  be  that  there  was  not  any  drunkenness  that  had  anything 
to  do  with  the  case. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Whose  opinion  was  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Of  the  researchers. 


102       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  As  I  understand  it  then,  we  are  getting  the 
opinions  of  your  researchers,  that  do  not  come  up  here.     Is  that  right? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Senator,  I  would  like  to  make  again  the  same 
statement  that  I  made  several  times,  that  this  presentation  which 
Colonel  Thielen  and  I  have  given  is  an  attempt  to  give  the  committee 
just  the  high  lights  of  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  we  only  covering 
those  matters  which  are  not  controversial,  and  which  are  fairly  well 
1^4^]         substantiated  by  the  evidence  available  to  us. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well  now,  you  say  "fairly  well."  Is  anything 
controversial  if  it  is  only  fairly  well  shown  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  May  I  delete  the  word  "fairly"  then? 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  want  to  take  the  word  "fairly"  and  leave 
only  the  word  "well"  in ;  is  that  right? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir,  or  conclusively. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  well  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Conclusively. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  in  whose  opinion  is  it  conclusive  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Well,  it  is  a  combination  of  the  opinions  of  the 
people  that  are  working  on  the  statement. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Well,  now,  can  you  give  us  from  your  evidence 
why  it  took  from  9  a.  m. — or  until  9  a.  m.  to  put  No.  3  alert  into  effect  ? 
.    Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  an  Army  question,  I  believe. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Colonel,  did  you  ever  put  the  No.  3  alert  in  for 
the  Navy  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  did  not  have  No.  1,  2,  and  3,  alerts.  That  is  an 
Army  term. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  do  j^ou  have  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  have  condition  1,  2,  and  3. 

Condition  1  is  general  quarters  with  all  battle  stations  [2^i] 
manned.  It  is  just  the  opposite  with  the  Army.  They  have  1,  2,  and 
3  in  the  opposite  order. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  at  6  o'clock  in  the  morning,  at  Pearl 
Harbor,  on  the  7th,  what  alert  was  in  effect,  as  far  as  the  Navy  was 
concerned  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  is  my  recollection  that  condition  3  was  in  effect. 
That,  as  I  have  described,  calls  for,  roughly,  one-half  of  the  antiair- 
craft battery  to  be  manned — or  one-fourth. 

Senator  Ferguson.  At  6  o'clock  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  the  condition  on  the  6th? 

Admiral  Inglis.  On  the  6th  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Well,  I  would  assume  that  the  same  condition  pre- 
vailed. It  is  my  understanding  that  condition  No.  3  was  the  routine 
condition  that  applied  at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  was  the  routine  condition  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  my  understanding;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  that  alert  change? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Of  course  there  are  routine  drills  at  scheduled 
times  during  every  day,  when  they  go  to  condition  1.  But  for  the 
purpose  of  this  inquiry,  I  think,  to  answer  your  question,  I  should  say 
that  that  condition  changed  at         [242]     the  time  of  the  attack. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  how  long  it  took  to  put  another 
alert  in  at  that  time  ? 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  103 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  probably  would — of  course,  it  would  vary  with 
different  ships,  but  I  would  say  on  the  average,  about  3  minutes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  look  into  the  question  of  inspection 
Sunday  morning,  whether  or  not  there  was  inspection  of  the  ships? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Inspection  of  what  nature,  sir  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Any  inspection.  Were  any  of  the  bulkheads 
open,  or  any  of  the  doors  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  You  mean  inspection  of  watertight  integrity? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  question  was  raised  by  one  of  the  other  mem- 
bers yesterday.  It  is  being  looked  into  now,  and  I  am  sure  complete 
information  on  that  subject  will  be  made  available. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Up  to  date  have  you  looked  into  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  not  personally,  but  some  of  my  people  have 
worked  on  it  last  night. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  cannot  give  us  an  answer  on  that? 

[243]         Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  but  that  information 

Senator  Ferguson  (interposinng).  As  I  understand 

The  Chairman.  Wait  a  minute.  The  witness  was  about  to  say 
something  else.    Let  him  finish. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  cannot  give  you  anything  at  this  time,  but  that 
information  will  be  available.^ 

Senator  Ferguson.  As  I  understand  it  now,  the  alert  changed  then 
from  No.  3  to  No.  —  what  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  One. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  about  how  many  minutes? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  estimate  3  minutes. 

[^44-]  Senator  Ferguson.  Now  I  will  ask  the  colonel  why  it  took 
until  9  o'clock  to  change  their  alert,  when  the  Navy  said  they  changed 
theirs  in  3  minutes. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  cannot  answer  why,  but  I  would  like  to  review 
this  much  of  my  testimony  yesterday.     [Beading :] 
When  the  first  bombs  were  dropped  and  machine  gun  fire  commenced 

Senator  Ferguson.  By  the  way,  will  you  give  us  the  time  of  the  first 
report  of  a  bomb  dropped  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  first  report  of  a  bomb  dropped  was  at  7 :  55 
a.  m. 

The  Chairjian.  Go  ahead  now. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Go  ahead. 

Colonel  Thielen  (reading)  : 

When  the  first  bombs  were  dropped  and  machine  gun  fire  commenced,  prac- 
tically all  observers  were  so  surprised  that  for  a  few  minutes  the  real  situation 
was  not  grasped.  Perhaps  3  or  4  minutes  elapsed  before  General  Short  was  in- 
formed by  his  chief  of  staff  that  an  attack  was  in  progress.  General  Short 
immediately  directed  that  all  troops  be  turned  out  under  alert  No.  3. 

Later,  in  speaking  of  the  two  divisions,  I  say : 

At  Schofield  Barracks,  Brig.  Gen.  Durward  S.  Wilson,  commanding  the  Twenty- 
fourth  Division,  first  heard  the  sounds  of  an  attack  at  about  8 :  05  a.  m.  Within 
a  few  minutes  his  [245]  chief  of  staff  had  issued  instructions  to  the  units 
to  get  their  machine  guns  into  the  antiaircraft  positions,  to  increase  the  standing 
guard,  and  to  send  patrols  throughout  the  division  sector — which  was  the  northern 
half  of  the  island — to  observe  the  beaches.  Before  he  had  left  his  quarters,  Gen- 
eral Wilson  heard  some  of  our  machine  guns  in  operation.  About  8 :  50  a.  m.  the 
division  received  word  from  department  headquarters  that  alert  No.  3  would 
go  into  effect  at  once. 

^  See  footnote  1,  p.  70,  supra. 


104       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  time  was  that? 

Colonel  Thielex.  What  is  that,  sir? 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  time  was  that  again  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  At  8 :  50  the  division  received  word. 

Senator  Ferguson.  My  question  was  about  9  o'clock. 

Colonel  Thielen.  In  the  case  of  the  other  division,  it  was  the  figure 
given,  as  9  o'clock. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  all  the  information  there  is  in  the  Pearl 
Harbor  file,  is  in  the  Army  file  here  in  Washington  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir.  There  is  unquestionably  additional  tes- 
timony on  that  subject.  Of  course  the  actual  extent  of  the  alert  is  a 
question  of  debate.  The  reason  I  referred  to  my  testimony  is  to  point 
out  that  action  was  taken  immediately  on  hearing  the  sounds  of  fire. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  prepared  any  other  reports,  Colonel, 
on  the  Pearl  Harbor  matter  ? 

['24j6]         Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  This  is  the  only  one  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  This  is — I  would  like  to  point  out  that  I  did  not 
personally  prepare  this  report.     I  am  presenting  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  I  understand  you  were  just  sent  here  to 
read  it? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  not  exactly  true.  I  had  a  hand  in  the 
preparation  of  the  report,  but  I  did  not  do  the  research  into  the  first 
sources.  ■ 

Senator  Ferguson.  Are  you  through? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  would  you  say  prepared  it? 

Colonel  Thielen.  A  number  of  officers  in  my  group  in  the  War 
Department  General  Staff. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  give  their  names;  all  the  people  wlio 
worked  on  it  that  you  know  of  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  can  give  the  name  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Car- 
roll, Lieutenant  Colonel  Root,  as  the  two  principal  researchers  under 
whose  direction  various  enlisted  personnel  looked  up  specific  points. 

[^^7]  Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral,  have  you  prepared  any  other 
reports  on  the  Pearl  Harbor  incident  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir;  I  have  a  report  which,  I  understand,  is 
scheduled  for  presentation  as  soon  as  this  cross-examination  is  finished, 
on  the  Japanese  attack.  That  is,  the  attack  as  viewed  by  the  Japanese, 
which  is  digested. 

Senator  1<'erguson.  Any  others  beyond  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  the  only  other  report  that  you  prepared  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  right,  sir,  on  this  subject. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  time  did  you.  Admiral,  first  confer  with 
Colonel  Thielen? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Colonel  Thielen?  Oh,  I  think  it  was  Monday 
morning,  this  week. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  when  you  had  a  rehearsal  liere  in  this 
room? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  might  be  described  as  a  rehearsal. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  would  jou  describe  it  as  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  was  a  discussion. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  105 

Senator  Ferguson.  A  discussion? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir;  and  we  came  to  an  agreement  as  to  the 
sequence  in  which  various  items  would  be  presented. 

[^48]  Senator  Ferguson.  Were  all  these  maps  prepared  espe- 
cially for  this  committee  hearing? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Speaking  for  the  Navy  maps,  I  believe  that  is 
correct,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And,  Colonel,  were  your  maps  prepared  espe- 
cially for  this  hearing? 

Colonel  TiiiELEN.  These  maps  were  prepared  under  my  personal 
direction  for  this  presentation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  was  stated  yesterday,  Colonel,  that  the  radio 
was  jammed.  It  was  said  there  was  no  evidence  of  sabotage,  but 
the  radio  was  jammed.     Wliat  do  you  mean  by  that? 

Colonel  Thielen.  In  general,  the  jamming  of  a  radio  means  set- 
ting up  signals  over  a  frequency  band  which  will  interfere  with  the 
transmission  of  signals  from  other  stations.  This  can  be  done  in  sev- 
eral ways  mechanically.  It  can  be  done  by  the  old-fashioned  spark 
set.     There  are  any  number  of  ways  of  obstructing  radio  channels. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  do  you  know  how  this  was  done? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir;  I  don't  have  that  information.  Per- 
Iiaps  the  Hawaiian  Department  Signal  Corps  officer  does. 

Senator  Ferguson.  At  least  you  don't  know  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  don't  know ;  no,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Could  it  be  done  from  the  Japanese  [^W] 
carriers  out  at  sea  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  a  technical  question  which  I  prefer 
not  to  answer  because  I  don't  know  definitely. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you,  Admiral,  any  orders  not  to  sink 
any  subs,  to  Admiral  Kimmel  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  nothing  on  that ;  no,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  there  were  any 
orders  issued? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  know,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know,  Colonel,  whether  or  not  there 
was  any  limitation  on  the  distance  that  Army  planes  could  fly  to 
sea? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir;  I  don't  know  whether  there  was  or 
not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  there  was  a  10- 
mile  limit? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not  know  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  any  planes  were 
diverted  and  shipped  elsewhere  than  to  Hawaii  a  few  weeks  or 
months  before? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  don't  know  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  haven't  any  information  on  that? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir. 

[250]  Senator  Ferguson.  We  spoke  yesterday  about  Kaminski, 
Kaminski  was  a  naval  or  Army  man  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  was  Lieutenant  Commander  Kaminski,  who 
was  the  duty  officer  in  the  office  of  the  commandant,  Fourteenth  Naval 
District. 


106       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  understood  that  you  were  to  give  us  the  mes- 
sage he  gave.    Was  it  in  writing  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  was  to  find  out,  as  I  understand,  when  this 
message  was  delivered  personally  to  Admiral  Bloch  and  Admiral 
Kimmel. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  find  that  out? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  not  yet. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  mentioned  Admiral  Bloch.  You  stated 
yesterday  that  he  would  make  reports  to  Admiral  Kimmel.  Is  that 
true? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  I  don't  recall  making  that  statement. 
The  normal  channel  for  such  a  report  would  be  from  the  comman- 
dant. Fourteenth  Naval  District,  duty  officer,  who  was  Lieutenant 
Commander  Kaminski,  to  the  fleet  duty  officer. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  he  ever  made  any  report, 
directly  to  Washington,  Admiral  Bloch? 

Admiral  Inglis.  To  Washington? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

[2S1]  Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  have  that,  but  I  am  quite  sure 
Washington  was  informed  of  the  attack  shortly  after  the  period. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral,  you  spoke  yesterday  about  the  aid  to 
the  injured  at  the  time. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  all  of  the  physi- 
cians turned  out  on  the  island  to  help  the  Navy  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  only  information  I  have  on  that  is  just  the 
impression  that  I  gained  from  reading  reports  in  the  press  and  other 
sources  shortly  after  the  attack  happened,  and  my  impression  is  that 
the  performance  of  the  Medical  Department  was  beyond  reproach. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  did  you  get  any  evidence  at  all  that  the 
supplies  were  locked  up  in  such  a  way  that  they  couldn't  be  obtained 
and  it  was  necessary  to  go  to  the  private  physicians  to  get  help? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir ;  I  hadn't  heard  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  have  no  information  on  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  the  private  physi- 
cians did  render  service  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  know ;  no,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  haven't  any  evidence  on  that,  one  [^5^] 
way  or  another  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  no  evidence ;  no,  sir. 

Senator  Fesguson.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Gearhart,  I  believe,  is  the  next 
member  of  the  committee. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Colonel  Thielen,  I  have  listened  to  some  of  your  tes- 
timony with  increasing  amazement  and  for  that  reason  I  would  like  to 
ask  you  a  few  questions. 

First,  concerning^  the  portable  radar  set  at  Opana.  During  the 
course  of  your  testimony,  you  have  referred  to  it  is  a  "practicing 
event." 

May  I  ask  you  if,  in  your  conferences  with  your  staff,  in  the  prepa- 
ration of  your  statement,  that  you  decided  to  refer  to  it  as  a  "prac- 
ticing event"  for  the  purpose  of  belittling  the  report  that  came  from 
those  men  that  were  there  operating  the  machine  on  December  7, 1941  ? 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  107 

Colonel  Thielen.  First,  I  don't  place  your  reference,  but  I  can 
assure  you  that  I  had  no  intention  of  belittling  the  men. 

A  "practicing  event"  was  that? 

Mr.  Gearhakt.  You  spoke  of  some  men  practicing  there. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  don't  recall  using  that  term.  May  I  check  my 
script  for  a  moment? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  You  have  heard  the  term  used  by  others  [2S3] 
in  this  room,  haven't  you,  since  you  have  been  testifying? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  recall  no  instance  of  that. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  You  didn't  hear  the  admiral,  your  associate  there, 
and  colleague,  use  the  word  "practicing"  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  think  the  admiral  would  have  no  reason  to  refer 
to  our  use  of  radar. 

Mr.  Gearh^vrt.  Haven't  you  testified  here  these  boys  continued,  these 
young  men  continued,  the  use  of  that  machine  in  operation  after  7 
o'clock  because  they  wanted  to  practice  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  did  not  use  that  term,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  What  term  did  you  use  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  May  I  quote  my  testimony  on  that  point? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  am  not  only  confining  myself  to  your  written 
testimony,  but  the  other  testimony  you  have  given  orally.  You  say 
you  haven't  used  the  word  "practicing." 

Colonel  Thielen.  May  I  take  it  from  the  transcript  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Suppose  you  read  what  you  said  from  your  paper 
while  somebody  is  looking  it  up  in  the  transcript,  if  that  is  agreeable. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.     [Reading:] 

At  seven  a.  m.,  7  December,  1941,  all  radar  detector  [254]  stations  closed 
down  except  the  Opana  station  at  Kahuku  Point  which  remained  in  operation  in 
oi'der  to  continue  the  training  of  a  new  man.  Private  George  E.  Elliott,  who  had 
volunteered  to  remain  on  the  job  for  this  purpose. 

At  7 :  02  a.  m.  this  station,  manned  by  Private  Elliott  and  Private  Joseph  L. 
Lockard,  picked  up  an  indication  of  airplanes  at  132  miles,  bearing  3  degrees 
east  of  north. 

The  soldiers  kept  tracking  the  target. 

I  believe  that  is  all  that  is  applicable. 

Mr.  Ge^\rhart.  I  will  read  you  from  the  testimony  of  Lt.  Joseph 
Lockard,  given  on  the  30th  day  of  October  1944,  at  the  Pentagon 
Building.     [Reading:] 

Question.  In  order  to  operate  the  machine  you  had  to  mount  the  truck? 

Answer  (by  Lieutenant  Lockard).    We  had  to  unlock  the  vans  and  open  them. 

Question.  There  was  nothing  in  this  van  except  the  machine  itself? 

Answer.  That  is  right. 

Question.  Was  Elliott  doing  the  actual  computation  or  were  you? 

Answer.  I  was  doing  the  computation.  Elliott  was  doing  the  plotting  and 
keeping  the  log. 

Question.  What  do  you  mean  by  "operating  the         [2551         equipment"? 

Answer.  Operations  consist  of  controlling  the  movement  of  the  antenna  and 
reading  the  information  from  the  oscilloscope  both  on  the  screen  and  on  the 
mileage  scale. 

Question.  As  you  were  operating  this  thing  you  didn't  see  anything  at  all  until 
about  two  minutes  after  seven.  When  seven  o'clock  came,  what  did  you  say  to 
Elliott? 

Answer.  We  mentioned  the  fact  that  the  truck  hadn't  arrived,  and  there 
was  no  particular  point  in  closing  up  and  sitting  out  on  the  grass  when  we 
could  be  comfortable  inside. 

Question.  At  about  two  minutes  after  seven,  you  were  the  first  to  notice 
anything  on  the  scope? 

Answer.  Yes. 


108       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Does  that  indicate  to  you  that  they  continued  after  7  because  Mr. 
Elliott,  who  had  already  had  instructions,  day  after  day  and  week 
after  week,  under  Lieutenant  Lockarcl,  because  he  wanted  a  little 
more  training  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  have  already  quoted  testimony  which  does 
indicate  the  situation  as  I  testified  yesterday,  and,  by  the  way,  I 
find  that  my  oral  presentation  agrees  with  that  which  I  gave  you. 

Mr.  Geakhart.  Yes;  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  truck  was  late 
to  take  them  to  breakfast,  and  didn't  come  until  [£56]  7 :  45 — 
you  know  that  to  be  a  fact? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not. 

Mr.  Gearhaet.  Then  you  testified  a  moment  ago  in  respect  to  the 
hours  in  which  the  radar  at  Opana  was  in  use.  Will  you  give  that 
again,  please? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.     [Eeading :] 

When  he  placed  Alert  No.  1  in  effect,  General  Short  also  directed  that  the 
aircraft  warning  service  operate  all  mobile  aircraft  warning  stations  from 
two  hours  before  dawn  to  one  hour  after  dawn,  specifically  from  4  to  7  o'clock 
in  the  morning.  Thus,  the  operating  schedule  of  the  mobile  radar  detector 
stations  was  daily  from  4  a.  m.  to  7  a.  m. ;  routine  training  from  7  a.  m.  to 
11  a.  m.,  except  Sunday,  and  daily,  except  Saturday  and  Sunday  from  12  o'clock 
to  4  o'clock  p.  m.  for  training  and  maintenance  woi'k. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Where  do  you  get  that  information  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  have  that  documented,  sir.    I  can  look  it  up 

I  take  that  from  General  Short's  testimony  before  tlie  Roberts 
commission,  vokmie  2,  page  43. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  W^ell,  do  you  think  Lieutenant  Lockard  ought  to 
know  when  he  was  working  and  what  his  hours  of  dut}'  were,  since 
he  was  on  the  job? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Presumably  he  would;  yes,  sir;  although 
[257]  at  that  time  he  was  a  private,  and  would  naturally  be  under 
the  orders  of  someone  else. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  He  was  a  rather  capable  private,  to  be  a  lieuten- 
ant today;  doesn't  that  demonstrate  that  he  was  a  capable  private? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir;  but  his  capabilities,  I  don't  believe, 
are  the  issue.    It  was  his  actual  position  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Let's  read  more  of  his  testimony  given  when  he 
was  a  second  lieutenant  in  the  Signal  Corps,  and  after  he  had  been 
commissioned.     [Reading :] 

Answer.  There  were  approximately  six  men  per  unit.  We  had  six  in  ours. 
We  operated  from  7  to  5  o'clock. 

Question.  Nobody  operated  at  nighttime,  so  far  as  you  know? 

Answer.  If  there  was  an  alert,  or  if  maneuvers  were  going  on,  or  some- 
thing of  that  kind,  there  were  not  night  operations. 

Question.  From  7  to  5,  except  for  lunch  period,  you  were  on  daily? 

Answer.  Yes ;  during  the  week. 

Question.  Sunday  was  a  day  off,  normally? 

Answer.  We  had  to  operate  Simdays  from  4  in  the  morning  until  7  in  the 
morning.     We  took  turns.     That  happened         [258]        to  be  my  Sunday, 

From  that  it  would  appear  that  they  worked  Sundays  and  pre- 
sumably holidays,  from  4  in  the  morning  until  breakfast  time,  7 
o'clock;  that  on  weekdays  they  woi-ked  from  breakfast  time,  7  o'clock, 
until  5  in  the  afternoon. 

How  do  you  account  for  such  a  discrepan("y  in  the  testimony  that 
you  have  quoted  in  opposition? 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  109 

Colonel  Thielen.  Admitting  the  discrepancy  between  my  closing 
time  of  4  p.  m.  and  that  testified  as  5  p.  m.,  I  believe  the  discrepancy  is 
in  the  term  "work."  I  broke  that  down  to  actual  operation  of  the 
detector  in  picking  up  aircraft  from  4  a.  m.  to  7  a.  m.,  and  training, 
which  might  not  actually  involve  tracking  aircraft,  from  7  to — I  don't 
remember  the  exact  time — from  7  to  11,  and  training  and  maintenance 
from  12  to  4,  which  agrees,  I  believe,  substantially  with 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  think,  you.  Colonel,  picked  the  wrong  word  from 
the  wrong  place,  when  you  stress  the  word  "work."  It  was  I  that  used 
the  word  "work."  It  doesn't  appear  in  the  testimony  I  read.  He 
called  it  operating  the  machine. 

Have  you  another  explanation? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Operating  the  machine  would  not  necessarily 
be  "on  the  alert  for  the  detection  of  aircraft." 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  want  to  ask  you,  Colonel,  as  a  military  [259] 
man,  whether  or  not  you  think  there  is  anything  significant  in  the  fact 
that,  according  to  your  orders,  this  machine  should  have  been  turned 
off  at  7  o'clock,  and  the  further  fact  that  the  range  of  these  machines 
was  about  13G  miles  and  no  farther,  that  the  Japanese  planes  should 
fly  into  that  oscilloscope  2  minutes  after  it  ought  to  have  been  off 
the  air? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  draw  no  conclusion  from  that,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Does  it  suggest  to  you,  as  a  military  man,  that  the 
Japanese  had  knowledge  of  the  orders  that  we  had  under  which  these 
machines  were  operated  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Not  necessarily,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Would  you  give  consideration  to  that  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  is  a  very  definite  possibility;  yes,  sir. 

Mr,  Gearhart.  Don't  you  think  it  strangely  significant  that  the 
Japanese  planes  flew  into  the  range  of  that  machine  just  2  minutes 
after  it  was  supposed  to  be  off  the  air  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  might  have  been. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Who  made  the  order? 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  order,  sir? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  The  order  fixing  the  time  for  these  radars  to  be 
on  the  air. 

Colonel  Thielen.  General  Short  was  responsible  for  that  [260] 
order. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Have  you  a  copy  of  that  order  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir.    I  have  a  reference  to  it  in  my  testimony. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  will  remind  counsel  that  I  asked  him  wrecks  ago  for 
copies  of  that  order,  together  with  a  statement  of  the  history  source, 
and  the  name  of  the  person  who  signed  it,  and  I  have  not  received  it.^ 

Now,  radar  is  operated  in  the  daytime  as  well  as  nighttime? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  In  daytime  they  will  record  the  approach  of  planes 
that  are  far  beyond  the  range  of  human  vision,  will  they  not? 

Colonel  Thielen.  With  exception  taken  to  the  term  "record,"  yes, 
sir ;  they  indicate. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Using  that  distinction,  it  will  indicate  on  the  oscillo- 
graph ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 


^  Reports  from  the  War  Department  on  orders  governing  the  operation  of  radar  in  Hawaii 
prior  to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  were  subsequently  introduced  as  Exhibit  No.  137. 

79716 — 46— pt.  1 10 


110       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Gearhart.  On  the  oscilloscope,  that  the  airplanes  are  approach- 
ing from  a  very  great  distance? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  And  the  range  of  those  portables,  the  only  radars 
they  had  on  the  islands,  six  of  them,  was  136  to  [£6l]  138 
miles  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  My  figure  is  150. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Now,  there  have  been  many  different  maneuvers 
down  through  the  years  in  the  islands  over  there  in  which  an  air  attack 
upon  the  islands  was  under  contemplation,  maneuvers  in  which  cups 
were  bestowed  upon  attacking  forces,  simulated  attacking  forces,  for 
taking  the  islands,  for  instance,  in  these  maneuvers.  One  was  held  a 
few  months  before,  and  at  that  time  it  was  found  by  the  judges  that  the 
proper  time  to  make  an  air  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  is  to  ride  in  on  the 
rays  of  the  sun ;  is  that  not  correct  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  know,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Do  you  know  that,  as  an  Army  officer,  that  that  is  the 
generally  accepted  thesis  among  military  and  naval  people? 

Colonel  Thielen.  You  refer  to  coming  in  on  the  sun  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes. 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  is  a  commonly  used  tactic ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  In  other  words,  the  Japanese  didn't  have  to  have  any 
imagination  in  planning  this  attack;  all  they  had  to  do  was  to  read  the 
newspapers  and  listen  to  speeches,  and  know  that  that  was  the  accepted 
idea  among  American  officers  as  to  when  the  islands  should  be  attacked 
with  the  [262]  greatest  possibility  of  success,  was  to  ride  in 
on  the  rays  of  the  sun,  as  the  Japanese  did  later;  is  that  correct? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  don't  know,  sir.  I  say  it  is  a  recognized  tactic. 
That  is  as  far  as  I  can  go  as  an  Army  officer. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Don't  you  think  it  was  strangely  significant  that 
the  order  keeping  these  radars  on  the  air  should  provide  that  they 
should  be  off  the  air  at  a  time  that  an  attack  of  that  kind  could  be 
made  with  the  greatest  chances  of  success,  according  to  the  accepted 
views  of  the  Army  and  Navy  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Do  I  see  significance  in  that  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes. 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Does  it  suggest  that  possibly  somebody  was  exerting 
a  tremendous  influence  over  the  writing  of  orders  somewhere  along 
the  line,  in  headquarters  at  Honolulu  or  America  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  it  suggests  nothing  of  the  kind  to  me. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Wlien  we  had  six  radar  machines  over  there,  why 
were  they  all  on  at  once,  and  all  off  at  once?  Wliy  wasn't  it  provided 
that  they  should  spell  each  other  off  over  the  24-hour  period  of  the 
day? 

[263]         Mr.  MnRPHT.  Will  the  gentleman  yield? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  No,  sir ;  I  don't  think  I  will. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  am  no  expert  on  radar,  which  is  a  highly  tech- 
nical subject.  I  can  suggest  an  answer  to  your  last  question — and  he 
might  drop  the  chart  showing  the  radio  stations.  Let  me  say,  each 
radar  in  general  covers  a  certain  sector.  No  one  radar  detector  on  the 
island  could  determine  an  approach  from  any  direction. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Do  you  think  that  answer  justifies  the  taking  off  of 
the  air  radar  during  the  dangerous  hours  of  the  24-hour  period  ? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  111 

Colonel  Thielen.  By  no  means,  but  it  accounts  for  the  simultaneous 
operation  of  several  radar  stations. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  If  you  were  in  charge,  don't  you  think  you  could 
think  of  a  way  of  getting  six  machines  in  operation  over  a  period  of 
24  hours  a  day  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  would  want  complete  coverage.  It  would  not 
be  a  solution  to  alternate  the  operation  of  radar  around  the  island. 
You  would  have  to  have  coverage  of  each  sector  while  that  particular 
station  was  operating. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Considering  the  terrain  of  Oahu,  there  are  high 
points  on  the  mountains,  on  the  top  of  which  these  machines  could  be 
placed,  and  they  could  cover  larger  theaters  than  assigned  to  these 
fixed  machines  when  you  scattered  them  [264]  along  the  coast ; 
isn't  that  correct? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  believe  that  is  correct  in  general.  There  are 
technicalities  in  the  field  of  radar  that  I  wouldn't  want  to 
testify  on. 

[£6S]  Mr.  Gearhart.  Now.,  were  there  any  orders  from  Wash- 
ington to  General  Short  or  to  any  other  person  directing  that  no  fire 
be  had  on  any  Japanese  vessels  or  any  Japanese  installations 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  know,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart  (continuing).  Until  the  Japanese  fired  first? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  know,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  You  know  that  such  an  order  was  issued  to  General 
MacArthur,  do  you  not  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  You  know  that  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  is  that  war  shall  be  declared  by  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir ;  I  am  familiar  with  the  Constitution. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  You  know  that  is  a  fact.  Was  any  order  issued 
from  Washington  that  you  know  anything  about,  either  to  General 
MacArthur  or  to  General  Short,  reminding  them  that  they  should 
not  take  any  offensive  action  because  of  this  constitutional  provision? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  was  in  no  position  to  have  any  such  knowledge 
and  I  do  not  have  any. 

[£60]        Mr.  Gearhart.  Is  that  the  reason 

Mr.  Murphy.  Will  the  gentleman  yield  ? 

Mr.  Geiarhart.  Is  that  the  reason  why  they  have  you  people  come 
up  here  to  read  hearsay  testimony  to  us,  so  that  whenever  we  ask  you 
a  question  in  connection  with  that  testimony  you  can  always  reply, 
"I  am  only  here  to  give  you  the  information  I  was  sent  up  here  to 
give  you"  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  in  my  case,  at  least,  that  is  definitely  not 
true.  I  can  explain  the  reason  I  was  sent  up  here,  I  think,  satisfac- 
torily. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  there  are  admirals  and  generals  available  to 
subpena  by  this  committee  who  went  through  this  attack.  Why  are 
they  not  here  to  read  these  statements  instead  of  yourself  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Because  the  directive  setting  up  this  particular 
testimony  was  merely,  I  might  say,  to  orient  the  committee  by  giving 
a  narrative  of  the  facts  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack. 


112       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Gearhart.  And  there  are  others  that  could  ^ive  the  narrative 
from  reference  to  documents,  as  you  have,  and  also  to  give  testimony 
in  respect  to  actual  personal  experiences  and  they  are  not  here. 

The  Chairman.  If  that  kind  of  thing  is  going  to  go  on  here  the 
Chairman  desires  to  say  for  the  record  that  this  [267]  method 
of  procedure  was  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the  committee  as  the  pro- 
cedure to  be  followed.  It  was  understood  that  this  narrative  recital 
was  to  be  made  by  a  representative  of  the  Navy  and  a  representative 
of  the  Army.  The  men  who  were  on  the  ground  and  know  what 
happened  will  be  called,  but  they  cannot  all  be  called  en  masse. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  With  all  due  respect  to  the  chairman  of  this  com- 
mittee, I  want  to  say  at  this  particular  time  that  I  never  agreed  and 
neither  did  any  other  member  of  the  committee  agree  that  they  would 
consent  to  calling  the  witness  in  question  just  to  get  hearsay 
statements. 

The  Chairman.  Counsel  for  the  committee  for  an  hour  and  a  half 
explained  this  procedure  to  the  committee  and  no  member  of  the  com- 
mittee, all  members  being  present,  raised  any  objection. 

Mr.  Gearheart.  Yes,  but  we  expected  to  get  witnesses  who  knew 
something  about  what  they  were  talking,  not  hearsay. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman  the  Chairman  has  stated  some- 
thing on  the  record  that  is  not  as  I  understood  it  at  all.  There  was  no 
consent  given,  there  was  no  consent  passed  about  the  manner  of  pro- 
ducing this.  We  were  told  that  this  was  a  tentative  outline  and  I  want 
the  record  to  emphatically  show  that  I  never  consented  to  trying  this 
matter  in  this  way. 

[268]  The  Chairman.  Well,  I  don't  care  to  get  into  a  contro- 
versy here,  but  I  don't  want  the  record  to  be  misrepresented.  There 
was  no  objection  expressed  on  the  part  of  any  committeeman  to  having 
a  representative  of  the  Navy  and  a  representative  of  the  Army  come 
up  and  from  documents  and  reports  and  evidence  within  the  two  de- 
partments give  us  a  narrative  recital  of  what  happened  physically 
at  Pearl  Harbor.  They  did  state  that  evidence  would  be  produced 
during  the  hearings  by  eye-witnesses  and  that  will  be  done. 

Senator  Brewster.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  speak 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  yield  to  the  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  The  Senator  from  Maine  is  recognized. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  don't  want  to  add  to  any  confusion  on  this 
score,  but  I  certainly  do  not  want  to  be  recorded  as  one  who  ever 
assented  to  this  method  of  procedure.  I  had  very  grave  doubts  re- 
garding the  method  when  it  was  proposed,  I  expressed  considerable 
concern ;  I  urged  very  strenuously,  as  the  record  shows,  that  this  mat- 
ter be  deferred  until  we  could  acquire  a  more  proper  understanding 
of  it  from  the  various  exhibits  and  records  and  twice  renewed  my 
motion  for  postponement. 

I  think  that  the  developments  to  date  have  amply  demonstrated  the 
inexpediency  of  this  method  of  procedure,  with  two  men  here  to  occupy 
2  days,  who  had  no  information  what-  [269]  ever,  who  had  no 
connection  whatever  with  Pearl  Harbor  and  who  evidently  have  very 
little  familiarity  with  the  records  and  I  think  it  is  most  unfortunate 
that  the  first  2  days  have  been  so  largely  wasted  by  this  work. 

Mr.  Gearheart.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  proceed  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  Congressman  (jearhart,  proceed,  but  as  a  mat- 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  113 

ter  of  information,  wliether  this  is  wise  or  unwise,  it  is  the  method 
that  we  agreed  to  and  I  hope  that  it  can  be  speedily  accomplished. 

Senator  FERGUSOisr.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  again  want  to  make  this 
record  clear  that  I  did  not  agree  to  this  method  of  procedure.  My 
motion  was  to  adjourn  it  so  that  we  could  get  the  original  records 
here  and  so  that  we  might  go  over  the  matter  before  we  brought  wit- 
nesses in. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  neither  the  Senator  nor  any  other  committee- 
man objected  to  these  representatives  being  brought  here  for  a  narra- 
tive recital,  as  explained  by  counsel.  The  Senator  did  move  to  post- 
pone it.  The  Senator  from  Michigan  moved  to  postpone  it  on  another 
ground  entirely;  but  go  ahead,  Mr.  Gearhart. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  want  to  proceed.  It  is  only  a  few  minutes  before 
noon. 

The  Chahiman.  Let  us  go  ahead  with  the  witness  and  let  [2701 
the  committeeman  continue  without  any  further  interruption. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Addressing  my  next  question  to  Admiral  Inglis, 
I  will  ask  you.  Admiral,  whether  or  not  there  were  any  orders  issued 
either  from  Washington  or  in  the  islands,  directing  the  commander 
in  chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  and  the  commander  of  the  Fourteenth 
Naval  District  not  to  fire  upon  Japanese  ships  or  installations  until 
we  were  fired  on  first? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  no  knowledge  of  such  an  order. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  You  know  of  orders  that  were  issued  by  Admiral 
Kimmel  which  were  to  the  opposite  effect,  do  you  not  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  no  personal  knowledge  of  such  orders;  no, 
sir.     I  would  have  to  look  that  up. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  I  will  refer  you  to  the  report  of  the  NavaJ 
Court  of  Inquiry  wherein  they  refer  to  certain  orders  issued  by  Ad- 
miral Kimmel  in  violation  of  Washington  instructions,  the  admiral  as- 
suming the  responsibility  on  the  theory  that  he  would  act  first  and  ex- 
plain later.     Do  you  remember  that  part  of  the  report  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  have  you  read  the  report? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  I  have  not. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Then  you  are  not  giving  us  [271'\  informa« 
tion  that  is  based  upon  the  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  information  which  I  have  given  you  has  been 
based  on  the  research  work  of  the  people  who  work  for  me  and  I  as- 
sume that  they  have  read  some  of  those  things.  I  might  also  say 
that,  in  my  opinion,  from  what  I  know  at  this  moment,  that  that  is 
controversial  and  also  has  something  to  do  with  fixing  the  respon- 
sibility.    We  have  omitted  those  subjects  from  this  presentation. 

Mr,  Gearhart.  Do  you  know  a  man  in  the  Navy  by  the  name  of 
Commander  Clarence  Earl  Dickson,  or  Clarence  Earl  Dickinson,  Jr.  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  A  flying  naval  officer,  serial  No.  74369? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  do  not  know  him,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  in  addition  to  being  a  competent  flying  officer 
he  is  also  a  very  capable  author.  He  wrote  a  story  for  the  Saturday 
Evening  Post  which  appeared  in  that  publication  on  the  10th  of 
October  issue  of  1942,  which  he  entitled  "I  Fly  for  Vengeance."  I 
want  to  read  you  just  one  paragraph.     Maybe  this  will  refresh  your 


114       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

memory  on  some  orders  that  were  issued  at  that  time.  It  is  the  second 
paragraph  of  the  story.     [Reading :] 

It  was  not  that  we  pilots  did  not  sense  the  ten-  [212]  sion  that  lit  up 
the  Pacific.  You  could  feel  it  everywhere  all  the  time.  The  mission  from  which 
we  were  returning — 

I  will  interpolate,  on  December  7 — 

had  the  flavor  of  impeding  action.  We  had  been  delivering  a  batch  of  12 
Grumman  Wildcats  of  Marine  Fighting  Squadron  21  to  Wake  Island  where 
they  were  badly  needed.  On  this  cruise  we  had  sailed  from  Pearl  Harbor  on 
November  28  under  absolute  war  orders.  Vice  Adm.  William  F.  Halsey,  Jr., 
the  commander  of  the  aircraft  battle  force,  had  given  instructions  that  the 
secrecy  of  our  mission  was  to  be  protected  at  all  costs.  We  were  to  shoot  down 
anything  we  saw  in  the  sky  and  pound  anything  we  saw  in  the  sea.  In  that 
way  there  could  be  no  leak  to  the  Japanese. 

And  I  might  point  out  to  you  that  at  the  time  that  was  written 
Clarence  E.  Dickinson  was  a  lieutenant  and  that  the  last  time  I  recall 
he  had  been  promoted  twice  and  is  now  a  commander,  so  evidently 
there  wasn't  any  objection  in  the  Navy  Department  to  that  which 
he  said. 

Now,  do  you  anything  about  that  of  which  Lieutenant  and  now 
Commander  Dickinson  wrote? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir.  We  did  not  attempt  to  read  magazine 
articles  and  things  of  that  character  in  making  up  this  presentation. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Will  you  get  me,  Mr.  Counsel,  [273]  the  or- 
ders under  which  Lieutenant  Dickinson  flew  on  that  trip  and  if  those 
orders  were  in  part  verbal  will  you  please  ascertain  for  me  what  the 
verbal  part  of  the  orders  were?^ 

Senator  Lucas.  I  would  suggest  you  get  the  witness  also,  Mr. 
Counsel. 

Mr.  Gesell.  The  witness  is  on  our  list.  Admiral  Halsey  is  on  the 
list  to  testify.  He  was  in  command  of  those  flyers.  He  seemed  to 
us  to  be  the  logical  person  to  give  the  facts  that  the  Congressman  is 
interested  in. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes.  I  merely  advert  to  this  because  of  all  of  this 
being  a  surprise.  Why  should  anybody  be  surprised  when  we  are 
making  war  orders? 

The  Chairman.  Does  any  member  of  the  committee  think  that  this 
is  argumentative  matter  that  should  appeal  to  the  committee  and  not  to 
the  witness? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  That  is  to  the  entire  country,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  I  have  no  doubt  of  that. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  And  that  will,  accordingly,  include  our  distin- 
guished Chairman  as  well. 

The  Chairman.  No  doubt  and  I  accept  my  part  of  the  responsi- 
bility. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  It  is  a  very  heavy  burden  for  you  to  bear,  I  admit 
that. 

[^74]  Now,  Admiral  Inglis,  do  you  know  where  the  United 
States  cruiser  Boise  was  about  that  week  of  December  1  to  December 
7?         _ 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  understand  the  Boise  was  in  the  Philippines. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  In  the  Philippines? 


^  See  Hearings,  Part  11,  p.  5476  for  a  letter  from  the  Navy  Department. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  115 

Admiral  Ikglis.  She  was  attached  to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  but  actually 
present  in  the  Philippines  if  my  information  is  correct.  I  just  ob- 
tained this  information  just  this  moment. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  "\Anio  \\'as  commander  of  that  ship  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  What  is  that  ? 

Mr,  Gearhart.  Who  was  commander  of  that  ship  at  that  time? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Captain  Robinson.    I  am  not  sure  of  his  initials. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Do  you  know  w^ho  is  commander  at  the  present  time  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Do  you  know  a  Commander  or  Captain  Moran? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  ]\Iike  Moran? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  He  at  one  time  was  in  command  [275^  of 
that  ship  and  at  one  time  preceding  that  was  executive  officer  of  that 
ship ;  is  that  not  correct  ? 

Admiral  Inglis  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Gearhart,  Can  you  tell  me  whether  or  not  the  Japanese  fleet, 
the  attacking  force  that  was  proceeding  to  rendezvous  200  miles 
north  of  Oahu — if  that  ship  did  not  sight  the  Japanese  fleet? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  know  of  no  sighting  of  the  Japanese  fleet  at 
all.  My  information  is  that  the  Japanese  fleet  which  attacked  Pearl 
Harbor  was  not  sighted. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Will  you  make  an  investigation  and  determine 
whether  or  not  there  is  a  report  on  file  indicating  that  the  officers 
and  crew,  somebody  in  an  official  position  on  the  cruiser  Boise,  sighted 
the  Japanese  attacking  fleet  during  the  first  week  of  December? 

Admiral  Inglis.  If  there  is  any  evidence,  either  written  or  from 
witnesses,  I  am  authorized  to  state  that  the  Navy  Department  will 
make  that  available  to  you  and  the  committee,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  It  will  not  be  forgotten  now  that  I  have  raised  the 
question,  I  trust. 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  will  not  be  forgetten.^ 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Now,  there  is  another  thing  that  I  would  like  to 
ask  you  about. 

[£76]  Were  any  orders  issued  from  Hawaii  or  from  Washington 
or  from  any  other  place  placing  restrictions  upon  the  use  of  ship  ra- 
dios, radios  of  the  type,  for  instance,  on  the  cruiser  Boise?  I  am  now 
referring  to  the  fatal  week  in  December. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  answering  that  question  now  from  my  own 
personal  memory,  Mr.  Gearhart,  and  I  have  a  recollection  that  I 
am  not  too  sure  of,  because  this  was  nearly  5  years  ago,  that  there 
was  a  general  order  in  effect  about  that  time  which  applied  to  both 
the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  Fleets,  instructing  them  to  maintain 
radio  silence.  I  cannot  be  positive  that  that  applied  to  the  Pacific 
Fleet,  but  my  recollection  is  that  it  applied  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet 
and  in  all  probability  it  applied  also  to  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  When  was  that  order  enjoining  silence  upon  ships 
at  sea  made  ? 

Achniral  Inglis.  I  haven't  got  that  information  available.  The 
Navy  will  try  to  get  it  for  you,  sir.- 

1  The  log  of  U.  S.  S.  Boise  was  subsequently  admitted  to  the  record  as  "Exhibit  No.  68." 

2  See  Hearings,  Part  11,  p.  5294. 


116       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Geaehart.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  made  just  shortly  be- 
fore, around  the  latter  part  of  November  or  the  early  part  of  De- 
cember, 1941,  wasn't  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  is  my  recollection  that  the  order  was  issued 
long  before  that,  sir,  but  my  recollection  may  be  faulty. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  By  the  way,  was  that  phrase,  [S??]  "task 
force"  used  in  1941  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  believe  it  was,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  was  told  that  it  came  into  use  and  was  borrowed 
from  the  Japanese  nomenclature  on  or  well  along  in  1942. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  not  my  understanding. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Don't  you  think  it  is  strangely  significant  that  there 
should  be  an  order  directing  all  of  our  ships  to  sail  south  of  Hawaii, 
that  there  should  be  a  radio  beam  directed  to  be  held  on  all  night  for 
the  benefit  of  B-17's  which  the  Japanese  availed  themselves  of? 
Don't  you  think  it  is  rather  significant  that  there  were  naval  orders 
enjoining  silence  upon  all  of  our  ships  at  sea,  which  would  forbid 
them  from  reporting  anything  that  they  might  obtain  by  way  of  in- 
formation on  the  liigh  seas  ?  Don't  you  think  it  is  strangely  significant 
that  the  radar  should  be  turned  off  the  air  during  the  danger  hours 
of  the  day? 

What  effort  has  been  made  by  the  Intelligence  Service  to  break  down 
and  ascertain  how  all  these  strangely  significant  things  could  occur, 
all  of  which,  every  one  of  them,  operating  to  the  benefit  of  our  enemy 
and  to  the  vulnerability  of  our  own  crews  and  ships  ? 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  object  to  that  on  the  ground  that 
the  witness  has  been  asked  five  different  [B78]  questions  and 
I  think  they  should  be  propounded  one  at  a  time. 

The  Chairman.  Let  him  answer  all  the  five. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  think  the  five  together  is  what  makes  it  signifi- 
cant. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  of  significance  will  not  be  gone  into 
at  the  moment,  but  answer,  if  you  can,  Admiral,  all  five  together  or 
ad  seriatim. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Congressman  Gearhart,  that  covers  a  lot  of 
territory.  Two  of  these  questions,  if  I  recall  them,  refer  to  Army 
matters,  the  B-l7's  and  the  radar  going  off  the  air  at  T  o'clock. 

Now,  you  ask  me  my  opinion  of  the  significance  of  those  five  things  ? 
I  am  not  sure  that  I  understand  what  the  point  is  that  you  are  making, 
but  I  will  do  the  best  I  can  to  give  you  my  opinion  of  the  significance. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  you  say  you  don't  understand  why  I  have 
raised  this  question,  or  what  I  mean  by  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  understand  what 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  understand  that  the  Intelligence  Service  is  an 
agency  of  the  Army  and  an  agency  of  the  Navy,  created  for  the  pur- 
pose of  taking  these  strange  circumstances  and  finding  out  what  they 
mean.  Therefore  I  asked  you  have  you  made  any  investigation  to 
determine  why  this  long  list  of  events,  all  of  which  tied  the  hands  of 
America  and  '  [279]  all  of  which  benefited  the  Japanese,  why 
they  should  all  occur  at  one  time,  in  one  picture?  Has  that  been  a 
study  of  the  Intelligence  Bureau  of  which  you  are  a  part  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  would  like  to  leave  out,  if  I  may,  from  the  record 
any  discussion  of  the  functions  or  success  of  the  Intelligence  Service 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  117 

at  present.  Insofar  as  it  affected  Pearl  Harbor  I  think  I  can  answer 
the  gentleman's  question. 

My  opinion  is  that  the  significance  of  those  three  things  is  accounted 
for  by  the  tense  relationship  which  existed  in  world  politics  at  that 
time  and  it  was  only  natural,  for  instance,  that  under  the  circum- 
stances information  concerning  the  movements  of  our  fleet  should  be 
denied  to  any  country  with  which  our  relations  were  strained.  That 
is  the  only  significance  that  I  can  read  into  the  five  items  that  the 
gentleman  has  just  given  me. 

Mr.  Geaehart.  In  your  testimony  yesterday  you  said  that  there 
was  a  condition  existing  on  the  battleship  Calif  ornki  which  prevented 
it  from  performing  its  best  service  under  the  crisis.  You  said  you 
had  a  report  from  the  Chief  of  Naval  Yards  and  Docks. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  report  came  from  some  officers  in  the  Bureau 
of  Ships  who  had  made  a  study  of  that  and  the  gist  of  the  report  that 
I  gave  yesterday  was  that  the  California  was  the  only  ship  where  any 
openings  or  lack  of  closures,  let  \280^  us  say,  of  watertight 
doors  and  hatches  contributed  in  any  way  to  the  damage  which 
resulted. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  The  words  which  caught  my  attention  was  that — 

in  any  way  contributed  to  the  inability  of  that  ship  to  fight. 

Now,  were  there  other  ships  that  had  their  doors  opened,  other  ships 
that  had  themselves  in  such  a  condition  that  they  could  not  fight  in  the 
most  efficient  manner  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  openings,  of  course,  would  not  stop  the  ship 
from  fighting  but  might  possibly  lessen  the  ability  of  the  ship  to  stay 
afloat. 

Now,  as  I  said  earlier  this  morning,  we  are  getting  that  material 
together  for  you  in  response  to  that  question  and  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment will  make  available  to  you  and  to  the  committee  everything 
that  they  have  on  the  subject. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Very  well,  but  why  put  it  off  when  you  have  right 
in  your  hands  a  report  from  which  you  can  give  us  that. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  haven't  got  it  right  in  my  hands. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  3^011  read  this  report  of  the  Yards  and  Docks, 
the  Bureau  of  Ships  or  Yards  and  Docks,  whichever  it  was? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  read  no  report.  This  is  the  Bureau  of  Ships, 
Mr.  Congressman,  that  is  responsible  for  that  sub-  \^81\  ject, 
not  the  Bureau  of  Yards  and  Docks ;  the  Bureau  of  Ships. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  The  Bureau  of  Ships  ^ 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  haven't  got  a  report,  in  response  to  your  question. 
I  was  told  by  my  staff  that  they  have  received  verbally  this  informa- 
tion that  I  have  given  you  about  the  California  being  the  only  ship 
where  the  openings  contributed  in  any  way  to  the  damage  which  was 
suffered  by  any  of  the  ships  there. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Did  your  staff  tell  you  what  the  conditions  were 
on  the  California? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  in  detail,  no,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Generally  what  did  they  tell  you  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  They  told  me  that  because  of  some  difficulty  in 
closing  the  watertight  doors  and  hatches  after  general  quarters  were 
sounded,  which  changes  the  conditions  of  readiness  from  three  to  one, 
because  of  that  difficulty  that  the  flooding  and  perhaps  resulting  fire 
spread  more  rapidly  than  otherwise  might  have  been  the  case. 


118       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Why  were  the  doors  and  hatches  of  the  California 
opened  on  that  day  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  cannot  answer  that  question  at  present,  but  we 
will  get  that  information. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Congressman,  this  is  one  of  these  [^5^] 
things  we  are  going  into  and  it  lias  got  to  the  point  where  we  feel  we 
have  to  call  witnesses  who  were  actually  on  those  ships  to  be  sure  to 
know  what  the  conditions  were  and  we  are  going  to  do  so  and  I  hope 
we  will  get  it  all  here. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Counsel  will  recall  that  I  have  asked  for  all  written 
orders  which  might  have  produced  that  condition  or  a  similar  con- 
dition on  our  ships,  verbal  orders,  ship  orders  or  district  orders  or 
commander  in  chief  orders  or  Washington  orders. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  My  impression  is  that  things  of  that  kind  are  indi- 
vidual ship  matters.  As  the  matter  stands  we  may  have  to  call  oflficers 
or  men  who  were  on  the  vessels  themselves,  but  we  are  going  ahead  to 
try  to  get  the  facts. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  It  is  now  past  12,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  all,  Mr.  Gearhart  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  No.  I  say  it  is  now  past  12.  We  have  reached  our 
adjournment  hours. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  then,  we  will  stand  in  recess  until  2  o'clock 
this  afternoon. 

( Whereux^on,  at  12 :  05  p.  m.,  a  recess  was  taken  until  2  p.  m.  of  the 
same  day.) 

\283'\  ATTERNOON  SESSION 2  :  00  P.  M. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

Before  proceeding  further  with  the  witness,  in  view  of  the  discussion 
that  took  place  this  morning  among  members  of  the  committee,  the 
Chair  feels  that  in  the  interest  of  accuracy  there  ought  to  be  placed 
in  the  record  at  this  point  a  memorandum  prepared  and  submitted  to 
the  committee  by  Mr.  Mitchell,  the  general  counsel,  which  is  described 
as  a  "Tentative  order  of  proof."    Then  a 

Preliminary  statement,  covering  committee  procedure,  relations  witli  agencies 
concerned,  and  introduction  of  letters  exchanged  with  Secretaries  Forrestal, 
Patterson,  President  Truman,  Roosevelt  estate,  plus  Truman  directives — 

which  was  done  previously,  when  we  started. 

Then  on  the  following  page  of  this  memorandum  it  is  stated  [read- 
ing] : 

Tlie  story  of  the  actual  attack  and  the  Japanese  plans  for  attack  will  be  pre- 
sented by  an  Army  and  a  Navy  officer,  who  will  summarize  all  available  data. 
The  summary  will  be  prepared  under  direction  of  counsel  along  the  lines  sug- 
gested by  the  following  outline.  Care  will  be  taken  to  avoid  all  matters  of 
opinion  and  questions  of  individual  responsibility.  The  summary  will  be  subject 
to  amendment  if  proved  in  error  through  subsequent  witnesses.  This  procedure 
will  save  calling  scores  of  witnesses  and  will  give  to  the  committee  and  the 
i28Sa'^         public  the  first  organized  comprehensive  account  of  the  attack. 

And  following  that  there  is  subdivision  "A,"  under  the  heading 
of  "The  Attack,"  and  under  that  subdivision  "A"  there  are  17  points, 
outlined  by  the  counsel,  and  discussed  in  the  committee.  That  memo- 
randum is  dated  November  7,  and  which  is  a  revision  of  a  previous 
memorandum  dated  November  1  and  distributed  to  all  members  of 
the  committee  on  the  1st  of  November. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  119 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  think  it  was  the  2d.  I  think  the  meeting  took 
place  on  the  2d.     The  memorandum  is  dated  the  1st. 

The  Chairman".  The  memorandum  is  dated  the  1st,  yes  and  the 
meeting  took  place  on  the  2d,  and  the  following  meeting  probably 
on  the  8th,  because  the  following  memorandum  was  dated  the  7th, 
which  was  the  day  before. 

Under  subdivision  "A"  there  are  17  different  points  which  were 
discussed  with  the  committee  in  a  session  that  lasted  from  10 :  30  in 
the  morning  to  about  1 :  30  in  the  afternoon. 

Then  there  is  a  subdivision  "B,"  which  is  "The  Jap  Plan."  That  is, 
the  plan  of  the  Japanese  as  discovered  from  the  records  since  obtained 
from  Japanese  sources,  captured  Japanese  ships,  and  so  on,  and  which 
is  to  come  later  under  Admiral  Inglis'  testimony. 

These  17  points  were  thoroughly  discussed  by  the  committee  and  the 
list  of  witnesses  was  gone  over  and  what  they  would  testify  to,  or  a 
general  outline  of  their  testimony  was  &S4]  discussed,  and 
there  were  three  or  four  or  five  witnesses  added  to  the  list,  including 
Sumner  Welles,  Mr.  Joseph  Grew,  former  Ambassador  to  Japan,  Mr. 
Tyler,  whose  name  has  been  mentioned  here,  and  Mr.  Lockard,  whose 
name  has  been  mentioned  here,  and  also  Captain  Zacharias,  whose 
name  was  suggested  by  Congressman  Keefe  of  Wisconsin. 

The  only  other  changes  made  to  this  tentative  suggestion  of  pro- 
cedure was  that  under  Item  No.  12,  which  was  headed  as  follows, 
"Summarize  Percentage  Personnel  Mustered  Various  Departments," 
and  then  in  parentheses  "perhaps  here  summary  testimony  showing 
no  drunkemiess" — the  committee  decided  to  strike  out  No.  12  and  not 
go  into  that  in  this  preliminary  statement  because  that  would  be  a 
matter  that  would  have  to  be  testified  to,  probably,  by  witnesses  who 
were  on  the  ground  and  in  addition  it  was  thought  in  any  preliminary 
statement  it  would  not  be  wise  to  go  into  that  phase  of  the  question. 

Outside  of  those  changes,  this  memorandum  was  discussed  at  length 
and  no  objection  was  raised  to  it,  and  every  name,  every  additional 
name  suggested  by  the  members  of  the  committee  was  added  to  the 
list  of  witnesses,  and  has  been  published. 

I  ask  that  this  document,  with  these  additions  and  corrections,  be 
printed  at  this  point. 

(The  document  appears  in  full  at  pp.  125-129,  inclusive.) 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  no  objection  to  it  being  print- 
ed in  the  record,  but  I  don't  want  my  cross-  [285]  examination 
interrupted  with  it.  I  ask  unanimous  consent  that  it  go  in  the  record 
immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  my  remarks. 

The  Chairman.  Yes ;  that  is  entirely  satisfactory. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  have  only  two  or  three  questions  to  ask  anyway, 
and  I  don't  want  my  remarks  interrupted. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  entirely  satisfactory. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  want  to  say  in  explanation,  if  that  is  offered  to 
establish  any  point,  that  there  is  no  objection  to  that  order  of  proof, 
that  the  only  objection  I  have  raised  has  been  against  the  people  who 
have  been  brought  here  to  establish  the  things  that  are  set  forth  in  that 
document. 

I  objected  to  it  on  the  ground  that  they  are  hearsay  witnesses  and 
I  have  never  been  in  a  court  room  where  they  allowed  hearsay  evidence 
when  there  were  live  witnesses  to  furnish  direct  evidence, 


120       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  Chairman.  It  was  understood  during  this  whole  discussion 
that  this  presentation,  this  preliminary  presentation,  was  not  to  be 
made  by  eyewitnesses,  that  it  was  to  be  made  by  a  representative  of 
the  Army  and  a  representative  of  the  Navy,  and  that  that  relation  and 
that  delineation  and  narrative  recital  of  what  happened,  the  physical 
situation  surrounding  it,  was  to  be  given  by  a  representative  of  the 
Army  and  of  the  Navy  from  the  records  in  the  War  and  Navy  Depart- 
ments, and  [286]  not  by  eyewitnesses,  which  would  require,  as 
everybody  understood,  as  the  committee  understood,  and  as  counsel 
explained,  probably  2  or  3  weeks,  to  get  eyewitnesses  to  everything 
that  transpired  out  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

I  think  it  is  due  the  committee,  and  the  public,  to  say  that  there  was 
no  objection  to  this  procedure,  and  that  every  suggestion  of  additional 
witnesses  or  modification  of  procedure  was  agreed  to  at  the  time. 

Senator  Breavster.  Again,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  want  to  amend  your 
statement. 

In  the  first  place,  as  to  the  extent  of  the  discussion,  it  is  my  very 
clear  recollection  that  most  of  our  discussion  was  centered,  in  all  of 
our  recent  meetings,  on  much  more  controversial  matters,  which  have 
been  fully  aired  on  the  floor,  and  need  not  be  discussed  here. 

This  matter  was  brought  up,  this  memorandum  you  speak  of  was 
submitted,  and  I  recall  very  distinctly — which,  apparently,  the  chair- 
man does  not  recall — that  I  urged  the  point  of  view  of  Representative 
Keefe,  of  Wisconsin,  who,  out  of  a  considerable  experience  as  a  trial 
lawyer,  preferred  to  approach  this  in  chronological  order,  starting 
back  and  bringing  the  events  in  in  chronological  order,  in  order  that 
we  might  make  a  proper  record  for  posterity. 

It  was  the  recommendation  of  counsel,  and  it  was,  we  [287] 
gathered,  the  opinion  of  the  majority,  that  this  was  the  way  to  proceed. 
This  discussion  of  which  you  speak  followed  three  or  four  votes  in 
which  there  had  been  a  sharp  difference  between  the  majority  and  the 
minority  and  there  was  no  reason  to  think  that  any  further  agitation 
would  have  resulted  differently. 

I  am  not  prepared — I  was  not  prepared,  at  any  rate — to  hold  too 
strong  an  opinion  as  to  which  course  was  better  and  I  so  stated,  but  I 
do  feel  that  events  have  demonstrated  that  it  has  not  been  as  fortunate 
as,  perhaps,  was  anticipated.  I  think  that  is  a  fair  statement  of  the 
attitude. 

[288]  Tlie  Chairman.  I  might  add  to  that  that  it  was  discussed 
in  the  committee  and  presented  by  the  counsel  as  probably  the  most 
logical  way  to  proceed  so  as  to  describe  the  actual  attack,  what  took 
place  on  the  day  of  the  attack  and  the  conditions  which  surrounded  it 
and  then  bring  it  out  in  that  method.  It  was  the  general  understand- 
ing that  that  would  be  the  course  pursued. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  The  Senator  from  Michigan. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  want  the  record  to  be  clear.  Mr.  Chairman, 
it  IS  true  that  item  No.  12  was  discussed  and  the  question  of  drunken- 
ness was  taken  out.  The  discussion  was  not  as  full  as  indicated  by  the 
chairman.  I  distinctly  remember  protesting  doing  it  in  this  manner 
because  I  asked  the  committee  to  have  counsel  give  us  the  exhibits  at 
least  10  days  in  advance  so  that  the  members  of  the  committee  would 
be  fully  acquainted  with  all  of  the  facts. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  121 

It  was  stated  then  that  we  would  get  the  exhibits  either  that  Friday 
or  Saturday  or  possibly  Monday.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  received 
mine  on  the  Tuesday  and  Wednesday,  the  day  before  the  hearing. 

Now,  it  appears  that  we  have  not  received  all  of  the  exhibits.  I  want 
this  record  to  show  that  there  was  no  vote  taken  on  this  method  of 
handling  the  matter ;  there  was  no  consent,  as  far  as  I  know,  of  any 
member  concerned.  We  were  [289~\  given  this  outline,  it  is 
true.  There  was  no  vote  taken  as  to  whether  that  was  to  be  the  method 
or  not  and  I  protested,  as  I  did  on  the  floor,  that  this  method  of  trial 
would  be  a  trial  such  as  the  Army  and  Navy  and  the  various  services 
wanted  it  to  be. 

The  Chairmax.  Unfortunately,  there  was  no  stenographic  record 
taken  in  any  of  the  executive  sessions  of  what  discussion  took  place. 
Any  Senator  or  any  Congressman  or  any  member  of  the  committee 
could  have  moved  that  this  method  not  be  adopted  as  the  procedure, 
and  that  we  should  adopt  any  other  method  of  procedure.  No  motion 
being  made,  no  vote  was  taken.  The  whole  thing  was  discussed,  each 
item  was  read  by  the  counsel,  Mr.  Mitchell,  item  by  item  and  discussed, 
each  witness  that  was  to  be  called  and  what  he  was  expected  to  testify 
to  in  the  various  divisions  of  the  tentative  procedures  of  proof  and  the 
fact  that  no  vote  was  taken  on  whether  this  should  be  the  procedure 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  nobody  made  any  motion  about  it,  and  it  was 
generally  accepted  as  the  procedure  which  would  be  followed. 

Senator  Brewstee.  Well,  I  don't  think  it  is  proper,  Mr.  Chairman, 
to  carry  this  discussion  to  any  great  extent,  but  I  am  quite  sure  that 
you  are  correct  in  stating  that  each  item  was  read.  That  is  not  my 
recollection  as  to  what  was  done.  We  had  it  for  2  or  3  days  to  examine 
it. 

[290]  The  Chairman.  You  had  it  for  a  week  before  that  meet- 
ing, every  member  of  the  committee  had  it  for  a  week  before  the  meet- 
ing and  that  memorandum  was  dated  the  1st  of  November.  Every 
committeeman  was  given  a  copy  of  that  and  had  it  a  week  before  we 
had  the  following  meeting. 

There  was  this  new  revision  which  had  come  about  by  the  considera- 
tion of  the  November  1  memorandum  and  that  was  discussed,  as  I  said 
a  little  while  ago,  in  a  meeting  which  lasted  for  about  3  hours.  I 
don't  say  that  that  was  the  exclusive  thing  that  was  discussed.  There 
were  motions  made  to  postpone  the  hearing  that  were  voted  upon  also, 
but  this  memorandum  was  read  and  explained  by  the  counsel  to  those 
present  and  that  means  all  the  members  of  the  committee. 

Put  this  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Murphy.  At  a  previous  meeting  when  the  plan  was  before 
the  committee  certain  members  asked  that  it  be  put  over  to 
the  following  meeting  because  they  did  not  have  enough  opportunity 
to  study  it ;  that  was  the  meeting  previously  to  the  November  8  meet- 
ing. And  after  the  meeting  on  November  8  I  dictated  to  my  secretary 
a  memorandum  of  what  actually  took  place  there,  and  I  have  that 
memorandum  that  was  made  that  afternoon,  and  it  is  in  accord  with 
what  the  chairman  outlined  except  as  to  the  3  hours  of  discussion.  I 
have  a  record  here  of  what  each  member  brought  up  at  that  time. 

[291]  Senator  Brewster.  I  trust  that  the  Secretary's  records 
will  be  presented  to  the  committee  and  that  they  will  be  more  accurate 
than  the  only  other  one  that  was  presented  to  the  Chairman  and  that 
we  had  to  ask  to  have  corrected  because  it  was  inaccurate. 


122       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  Chairman.  That  is  not  correct.  The  Senator  had  demanded  a 
roll  call,  which  was  not  taken  in  the  committee  by  a  vote ;  it  was  taken 
by  a  show  of  hands,  and  I  asked  the  Senator  from  Maine  that  if  there 
was  any  way  by  which  the  Government  Printing  Office  could  indicate 
a  vote  by  showing  of  hands  that  I  would  accept  it.  The  vote  was  later 
taken  as  if  it  was  by  a  show  of  hands,  and  it  was  put  in  the  record  that 
way.    That  is  why  that  mistake  was  made. 

Senator  Lucas.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  say  a  few  words. 

The  Chairman.  The  Senator  from  Illinois. 

Senator  Lucas.  I  haven't  said  very  much  in  this  hearing,  and  I  am 
not  going  to  say  much  now.  It  seems  to  me  this  is  much  to  do  about 
nothing  anyway. 

There  is  just  one  thing  that  I  want  to  direct  to  the  attention  of  the 
committee  and  that  is  this :  This  case  is  being  prepared  by  General 
Mitchell  anyway,  but  the  committee  employed  him  and  unanimously 
accepted  him  as  general  counsel.  I  doubt  if  there  is  any  individual 
here  that  would  probably  try  the  case  the  same  way  that  he  is  trying 
it.  However,  we  [£9£]  selected  him  to  do  it,  and  I  am  thor- 
oughly satisfied  with  the  way  he  is  handling  this  case. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  go  ahead,  Mr.  Gearhart  and  finish  your  inter- 
rogation. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Let  me  conclude  this  discussion  by  pointing  out 
that  the  principle  for  which  I  contend,  the  ^dolation  of  which  I  will 
constantly  protest,  is  the  calling  of  hearsay  witnesses  to  prove  facts 
when  there  are  eyewitnesses  available  to  the  same  point.  I  am  not 
questioning  what  is  in  that  paper  at  all;  I  never  have,  and  this  is 
not  in  the  nature  of  impeachment  to  offer  it  in  the  record.  For  that 
reason  I  will  welcome  it  at  the  conclusion  of  my  cross-examination. 

The  Chairman.  I  will  be  glad  to  have  it  put  in  at  the  end  of  the 
Congressman's  examination.    Go  ahead. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  There  is  just  one  thing,  Admiral  Inglis,  that  I 
want  to  conclude  my  cross-examination  by  asking  you  about,  and 
that  has  to  do  with  the  order  of  ISIay  194:1  transferring  three  battle- 
ships, one  aircraft  carrier,  four  cruisers,  and  nine  destroyers  to  the 
Atlantic.  Then  there  was  much  discussion  about  two-thirds  and  one- 
third  which  left  me  with  confusion  confounded. 

Before  any  of  the  ships  were  transferred  to  the  Atlantic  you  would 
say  that  that  was  a  hundred  percent  of  our  fleet.  What  you  mean  is 
when  they  transferred  these  ships  that  numer-  [£93\  ically,  at 
least,  the  Pacific  Fleet  was  reduced  one-third,  is  that  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  will  try  to  make  that  just  as  clear  as  I  can, 
Mr.  Gearhart.  I  cannot  give  you  the  precise  dates  when  various 
specific  ships  were  transf eirred  from  one  fleet  to  another. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  By  that  you  mean  that  the  ships  were,  at  different 
times,  under  different  orders  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  presume  so. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Did  that  all  occur  during  the  month  of  May  1941, 
or  was  it  over  a  larger  period  than  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  would  be  my  impression  and  understanding  that 
it  was  over  a  considerable  period  of  time.  There  was  some  shifting 
of  ships  around  from  one  fleet  to  another  for — well,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  that  has  been  going  on  forever,  but  as  of  the  7th  of  December 
1941  the  numerical  strength  of  the  ships  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  was 
roughly  two-thirds  that  of  the  numerical  strength  of  the  ships  of  the 
Atlantic  Fleet. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  123 

Now,  the  question  has  been  raised  about  several  ships  which  were 
not  a  part  of  either  the  Athmtic  or  the  Pacific  Fleet.  Those  ai^ 
the  battleships  North  Carolina  and  Washington  and  the  aircraft 
carrier  Wasp^  in  particular.  Those  ships  had  recently  been  completed 
and  commissionecl,  they  were  still  on  their  shake-down  periods. 

[^P^]  I  have  a  personal  recollection  of  one,  the  North  Carolina^ 
which  was  in  the  Brooklyn  Navy  Yard  undergoing  some  repairs,  hav- 
ing some  very  serious  defects  remedied.  Those  defects  show  up  on  a 
shake-down  cruise  and  must  be  corrected  before  the  ships  are  ready  in 
all  respects  to  join  the  fleet. 

Those  ships  I  did  not  count  in  my  numerical  summary  and  they 
have  no  effect  on  these  proportions  which  I  have  given  you  of  two- 
thirds  numerical  strength. 

I  think  I  should  also  say  again  that  that  is  numerical  strength  and 
not  necessarily  battle  efficiency  or  battle  fighting  efficiency  or  power, 
because  it  so  happens  that  the  numbers  in  the  Atlantic  Fleet  were 
increased  to  a  good  extent  by  the  preponderance  of  destroyers  in  the 
Atlantic  Fleet.  On  the  other  hand,  there  were  more  battleships  in 
the  Pacific  Fleet,  but  I  have  counted  each  ship  by  one  regardless  of 
whether  it  was  a  battleship  or  a  submarine  or  a  destroyer. 

In  other  words,  of  the  aircraft  carriers  there  were  three  assigned  to 
each  fleet  and  that  again  does  not  count  the  Wasp  which  had  not  yet 
joined  either  fleet  and  was  still  in  the  shake-down  period. 

Does  that  answer  your  question,  sir? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  It  clears  it  up  considerably. 

Now,  what  was  left  in  the  Pacific  Fleet  when  the  ships  that  I  have 
just  enumerated  were  transferred  to  the  Atlantic? 

[295']  Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  the  list  of  ships  that  were  in  the 
Pacific  Fleet  on  December  7,  1941.     Is  that  what  you  wish,  sir? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes.  Are  you  going  to  draw  a  distinction  between 
the  Asiatic  Fleet  and  the  Pacific  Fleet  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  the  figures  for  the  Asiatic  Fleet  also  if  you 
wish  those. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  give  those  separately  so  that  the  record  will  be 
clear  on  it. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  can  give  those  by  ships,  that  is,  so  many  battle- 
ships, or  I  can  give  them  by  names  of  specific  ships.  Wliich  way  would 
you  prefer  it? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  By  ships. 

Admiral  Inglis.  All  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Have  you  the  record  in  the  other  way,  that  is,  by 
name  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  it  any  way  you  want  it ;  yes,  sir.  It  is  much 
longer  by  names  of  ships.     It  runs  into  seven  pages  of  tabulated  data. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  let  us  have  it  by  type  then. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Taking  first  the  battleships :  There  were  six  as- 
signed to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  nine  assigned  to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  and  none 
assigned  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet. 

In  the  case  of  the  aircraft  carriers,  there  were  four  [296]  as- 
signed to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  three  to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  and  none  to  the 
Asiatic  Fleet. 

Well,  I  might  add  parenthetically  that  I  have  not  counted  the  Long 
Island  in  my  ad  lib  testimony.     The  Long  Island  was  a  very  inferior 

^Subsequently  corrected  to  Hornet.     See  p.  199,  infra. 


124       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

type  of  carrier.  She  was  assigned  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet  and  makes  the 
fourth  one. 

Heavy  cruisers :  5  assigned  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  12  to  the  Pacific 
Fleet,  and  1  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet. 

Light  cruisers :  12  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  10  to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  and 
1  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet. 

Destroyers :  97  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  54  to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  and  13  to 
the  Asiatic  Fleet. 

Submarines :  58  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  23  to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  29  to 
the  Asiatic  Fleet. 

Minelayers :  None  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  nine  to  the  Pacific  Fleet, 
and  none  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet. 

Mine  sweepers :  37  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  26  to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  and 
6  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet. 

Patrol  vessels :  5  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  13  to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  14  to 
the  Asiatic  Fleet. 

Now,  the  numerical  totals  of  all  of  those  are  Atlantic  Fleet  224, 
Pacific  Fleet  159,  Asiatic  Fleet  64. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Now,  prior  to  May  1941,  which  was  prior  to  the 
transfer  of  any  of  the  ships  that  I  have  listed  [2971  from  the 
Pacific  to  the  Atlantic,  was  the  American  Navy  in  the  Pacific  nu- 
merically stronger  than  the  Japanese  Navy? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Prior  to  May  1941  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  That  is  a  date  that  I  take  from  the  Navy  court  of 
inquiry  report  as  the  date  when  the  transfer  of  these  ships  occurred. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  haven't  those  figures  readily  available.  Again 
will  be  very  happy  to  get  them  for  you. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  did  you  have  the  list  of  ships  that  were  trans- 
ferred ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  thought  by  one  order  and  you  tell  me  by  several 
orders,  to  the  Atlantic. 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  I  haven't  got  that  readily  available. 
What  I  have  here  is  a  list  of  the  ships  and  the  assignment  of  those 
ships  to  their  respective  fleetvS  as  of  December  7. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  I  will  ask  the  question  in  this  way:  You  are 
an  expert  in  naval  affairs.  If  you  would  add  to  the  Pacific  Fleet 
on  December  7,  1941,  three  battleships,  one  aircraft  carrier,  four 
cruisers,  and  nine  destroyers,  would  you  say  that  the  American  Fleet 
in  the  Pacific  would  be  numerically  superior  to  the  Japanese? 

Admiral  Inglis.  If  you  will  give  me  those  figures  again  [^98] 
I  will  answer  that  definitely. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Three  battleships,  one  aircraft  carrier,  four  cruisers, 
and  nine  destroyers. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  would  give  our  battleship  strength  in  the 
Pacific  Fleet  as  12  opposed  to  10  Japanese  battleships ;  aircraft  car- 
riers 4  opposed  to  8  Japanese  aircraft  carriers;  16  heavy  cruisers 
as  compared  to  18  Japanese  heavy  cruisers ;  10  light  cruisers  as  com- 
pared to  17  Japanese  light  cruisers ;  and  63  destroyers  as  compared  to 
109  Japanese  destroyers. 

On  balance  I  would  say  that  the  Japanese  Fleet  was  superior  to  the 
Pacific  Fleet  with  the  increments  which  the  Congressman  has  just 
given  me. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  125 

Mr.  Gearhart,  So  while  we  were  inferior  in  May  of  1941,  we  re- 
duced our  relative  position  to  the  Japanese  Navy  still  further,  that  is 
the  effect  of  it. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Any  transfer  of  ships  from  the  Pacific  Fleet 
resultino;  in  a  reduction  would,  of  course,  result  in  a  deterioration  of 
our  own  position. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Now,  where  do  the  orders  effecting  a  transfer  from 
the  Pacific  Fleet  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet  emanate  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  would  be  Chief  of  Naval  Operations.  Just 
what  reasons  would  bring  about  those  I  am  not  prepared  to  say.  I 
don't  know  whether  they  would  come  from  any  higher  [^99] 
source  or  not,  but  the  orders  would  be  issued  by  the  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  whatever  that  higher  authority  would  be  the 
orders  would  probably  come  in  the  name  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Oper- 
ations ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  As  far  as  the  fleet  is  concerned  that  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Do  you  know  anything  about  these  particular 
orders  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  May  I  ask  counsel  to  endeavor  to  secure  them?  I 
would  like  to  look  at  them. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  the  order  transferring  ships  to  the  Atlantic 
Fleet  in  May  1941  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Beginning  in  May  of  1941, 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  take  it  you  want  transfers  both  ways. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes.  If  there  are  any  transfers  indicated  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  I  would  like  to  see  those,  too ;  that  is,  the  orders 
providing  for  them.^ 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  all  the  cross  examination  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  am  through;  yes. 

(Tentative  order  of  proof — Preliminary  statement  covering  com- 
mittee procedure,  submitted  by  Mr.  Mitchell  and  referred  to  at  p.  119, 
follows:) 

[300]  TENTATIVE  ORDER  OF  PROOF 

(Draft  of  November  7,  1945) 

Preliminary  Statement  Covering  Committee  Procedure,  Relations  with 
Agencies  Concerned,  and  Introduction  of  Letters  Exchanged — Secretaries 
Foreestal,  Patterson,  President  Truman,  Roosevelt  Estate,  Plus  Tbuman 
Directives 

[301]  The  story  of  the  actual  attack  and  the  Japanese  plans  for  attack  will 
be  presented  by  an  Army  and  a  Navy  officer,  who  will  summarize  all  available 
data.  The  summary  will  be  prepared  under  direction  of  counsel  along  the  lines 
suggested  by  the  following  outline.  Care  will  be  taken  to  avoid  all  matters  of 
opinion  and  questions  of  individual  responsibility.  The  summary  will  be  subject 
to  amendment  if  proved  in  error  through  subsequent  witnesses.  This  procedure 
will  save  calling  scores  of  witnesses  and  will  give  to  the  committee  and  the  public 
the  first  organized  comprehensive  account  of  the  attack. 

A.  the  attack 

1.  Disposition  Pacific  Fleet  12/7.     Show  in  map  form. 

2.  Description : 

(a)  Transports  west  of  Hawaii  on  12/7. 

(b)  Fleet  base  and  Oahu  ground  and  harbor  installations— J/ap. 


1  See  Hearings,  Part  13,  pp.  5502  and  5504  et  seq.  for  documents  supplied  by  the  Navy 
Department  in  this  connection. 

79716 — 46— pt.  1 11 


126        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(c)  Harbor  nets  and  topedo  baffles. 

(d)  Depth  of  harbor  and  channel. 

(e)  Absence  barrage  balloons. 

3.  Brief  notes  installations  neighboring  islands. 

4.  Time  differentials  and  distances. 

5.  Detailed  map  showing  fleet  in  Pearl  Harbor  12/7 — 

(List  of  vessels — class  and  type.) 

Estimates  of  time  required  12/7  to  get  fleet  under  steam  and  out  of  harbor. 

6.  Reconnaissance : 

Extent  of  offshore  reconnaissance  evening  12/6. 
Extent  of  offshore  reconnaissance  morning  12/7. 
[302]        Extent  of  inshore  reconnaissance  evening  12/6. 
Extent  of  inshore  reconnaissance  morning  12/7. 

Missions  of  all  other  friendly  planes  in  air  morning  12/7,  including  Halsej 
fliers,  B-17's  from  the  mainland,  P-40's  on  submarine  exercise,  etc. 
Extent  reconnaissance  from  neighboring  islands. 

7.  Radar: 

Hours  operating  12/7,  scheduled  and  actual. 
Description  facilities  available : 

Location. 

Range,  high  flight  or  low  flight. 

Inability  to  distinguish  friendly  planes. 
Presentation  of  historical  plot. 

Summary  testimony  re  qualifications  of  operators  and  handling  of  infor- 
mation obtained  before  and  during  attack. 
Reasons  ship  radar  not  useful. 

8.  Sound  detectors: 

Facilities  for  underwater — extent  operating  and  manned. 
Facilities  for  airplane  spotting — extent  operating  and  manned. 

9.  Submarine  contacts : 

Indicate  character  of  any  submarine  patrol  operating  12/7. 
Summarize  reported  contacts  11/27-12/6,  inclusive. 

Summarize  contacts   morning   12/7   giving    detail   of   messages   sent   to 
shore  and  action  taken. 

10.  Present  account  various  phases   of  attack,   working  in  general  picture 
of  defensive  action  taken. 

(Note  Jap  objectives,  idications  advance  knowledge.) 

11.  Efforts  to  track  the  Japs  after  attack. 

12.  ////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////// 

13.  Aircraft: 

Disposition  planes  on  ground  by  fields  at  time  of  attack  and  service 
assignments. 
Number  and  types  available. 

[303]         Number  and  types  in  operating  condition. 
Headlines  of  aircraft  in  operating  condition. 

Note  specific   reasons   for   lack   of   readiness   such   as   engines   dis- 
mounted, guns  dismounted,  gas  tanks  empty,  ammunition  not  loaded. 
Readiness  of  aircraft  crews. 

Number  and  types  aircraft  participating  in  combat. 
Time  required  by  type. 

Summarize  state  preparedness  for  combat  of  planes  in  flight  time  attack. 
Extent  types  and  equipment  up  to  date. 

14.  Antiaircraft : 

Number  of  ship  and  shore  units  available. 
Number  of  ship  and  shore  units  operating  condition. 
Availability  ammunition  and  proximity  to  guns. 
Number  ship  and  shore  units  manner  and  in  action. 
Time  required  for  various  units. 
Defective  ammunition. 
Extent  gun  tj-pes  up  to  date. 

15.  Brief  summary  work  done  in  such  departments  as  antisabotage,  first  aid, 
civilian  control,  canteens,  etc.     Heroism. 

16.  The  damage  to  United  States  ships,  installations,  and  personnel   (photo- 
gi-aphs  and  supporting  statistics). 

Note  extent  damage  self-inflicted. 
Indicate  extent  of  sabotage,  if  any. 

17.  The  damage  to  the  Japs. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  127 

B.    THE   JAP  PLAN 

1.  Chronology: 

Date  plan  completed. 

Date  left  port. 

Date  Dec.  8  fixed. 

Date  instructed  carry-out  plan. 
[304 1         2.  Route  taken  to  and  from  : 

Fix  position  various  key  days  before  and  after  attack. 

MAP — noting   mileages   from   possible   reconnaissance    points,    shipping 
lanes,  etc. 

3.  Details  of  execution. 

4.  Projected  losses  compared  actual  losses. 

5.  Sources  data  used  in  planning. 

Note. — The  Jap   Plan  will  be   reconstructed  from   captured  plans   and 
statements  made  by  Jap  prisoners  obtained  after  the  attack. 

[305]  Tektativ-e  Order  of  Witnesses 

washington* 
Witness  Principal  subject  examination 

Admiral  Richardson  Re  Complete  story  of  the  reasons  why  the  fleet 

was  based  at  Pearl  Harbor,  his  trips  to  Wash- 
ington in  July  and  October,  1940,  his  discus- 
sions and  disagreement  with  President  Roose- 
velt and  conversations  with  other  officials,  his 
relief,  his  part  in  tlie  Bloch  report  of  Decem- 
ber 30,  1940,  endorsed  January  7,  which  led  to 
the  Knox-Stimson  correspondence,  and  other 
matters  pertaining  to  his  Hawaiian  command. 

(At  this  point  introduce  Knox  letter  to  Stimson  dated  Jan.  24,  1941,  Stimson 
letter  to  Knox  dated  Feb.  7,  1941,  plan  for  employment  of  long-range  bombard- 
ment aviation  in  the  defense  of  Oahu,  Martin  memo,  of  Aug.  20,  1941,  and  read 
into  record  excerpts  from  defense  plans. ) 

Witness  Principal  subject  examination 

Mr.  Hamilton,  formerly  Chief,  Re  Jap  negotiations,  details  of  information 
Far  Eastern  Division,  State  a\ailable  to  State  Department,  exchange  of 
Department  information  with  Army-Navy  representatives, 

and  State  Department  attitude  toward  basing 
fleet  Pearl  Harbor. 
Captain  McCollum*  Re  Information  available  Army  and  Navy  con- 

Captain  Safford*  cerning  Far  Western  developments,  Jap  mili- 

Colonel  Bratton*  tary  preparations,  fleet  loca         [3061         tion, 

etc.,  reports  made  to  responsible  officers.  State 
Department   and   White   House,   handling  of 
"magic"  intercepts  and  distribution  of  messages 
generally. 
General  Miles*  Re   Function    and    organization    of   intelligence 

Admiral  Wilkinson*  units ;  information  available  to  these  officers 

and  action  taken  thereon  except  as  to  events 
of  12/6  and  12/7  to  be  considered  later ;  warn- 
ings sent  to  Pearl  Harbor,  drafting  of  mes- 
sages, conferences  held,  agencies  and  persons 
consulted,  action  taken  on  replies  received  to 
warnings,  related  conferences  at  White  House, 
Marshall-Stark  joint  messages  on  military 
situation. 
General  Gerow*  Re   Function    and   organization   of   War   Plans 

Admiral  Turner*  units ;  information  available  to  these  officers 

and  action  taken  thereon  (except  as  to  events 
of  12/6  and  12/7  to  be  considered  later)  ; 
warnings  sent  to  Pearl  Harbor,  drafting  of 
messages,  conferences  held,  agencies  and  per- 
sons consulted,  action  taken  on  replies  re- 
ceived to  warnings,  related  conferences  at 
White  House,  Marshall-Stark  joint  messages 
on  military  situation. 

♦Whenever  witness  will  be  recalled  for  further  examination  on  additional  subjects,  this 
is  indicated  by  asterisk. 


128        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Witness 
General  Arnold 
Admiral  Ingersoll* 


[307]     FCC  monitoring  report 
Commander  Safford 
Commander  Kramer* 
Admiral  Noyes 
Colonel  Bratton 
Colonel  Sadtler 
Colonel  Clausen 
Monitoring  witnesses 

Commander  Kramer 
Commander  Safford 
Captain  McCollum 
Admiral  Turner 
Admiral  Schuirmann 
Admiral  Wilkinson 
Admiral  Ingersoll 
Colonel  Bratton 
Colonel  Dusenbury 
General  Miles 
General  Gerow 
Colonel  French 
Admiral  Bearsdall 
[3081     Miss  Grace  Tullv 


Admiral  Stark 


General  Marshall 


Mr.  Thomas  E.  Dewey 
Mr.  Hull 


Mr.  Stimson 


[309]     Knox  papers 


Principal  subject  examination 
Re  Warnings  sent  to  Pearl  Harbor,  drafting  of 
messages,  conferences  held,  agencies  and  i)er- 
sons  consulted,  action  taken  on  replies  re- 
ceived to  warnings,  related  conferences  at 
White  House,  Marshall-Stark  joint  messages 
on  military  situation. 
Re  Winds  message.  Interception  and  decoding 
of  original  message  giving  winds  code  and  sec- 
ond message  Nov.  19.  Steps  then  taken  to 
monitor  the  Jap  weather  broadcasts.  All 
available  proof  as  to  whether  the  "execute" 
message  was  ever  heard  or  obtained.  Also  any 
information  developed  on  hidden  word  mes- 
sages. Exhibits  may  include  excerpts  testi- 
mony of  officers  at  various  points. 
Re  The  events  of  12/6  and  12/7  including  han- 
dling of  final  14-part  Jap  message  and  mes- 
sages re  code  burnings  and  1 :  00  o'clock  de- 
livery, Marshall  warning  message,  conferences 
among  Cabinet  officers  and  others,  ti'ansmis- 
sion  of  messages  to  White  House  and  State 
Department. 


Re  Presidential  files.  Any  documents  which 
may  be  found  in  the  Roosevelt  papers  bearing 
on  the  Pearl  Harbor  situation  will  be  intro- 
duced through  Miss  Tully. 

Re  All  events,  including  information  available 
to  him,  conferences  with  Cabinet  oflScers  and 
President  Roosevelt,  handling  of  warning 
messages,  extent  of  knowledge  of  impending 
attack,  conferences  with  War  Department,  etc. 

Re  All  events,  including  information  available  to 
him,  conferences  with  Cabinet  officers  and 
President  Roosevelt,  handling  of  warning  mes- 
sages, extent  of  knowledge  of  impending  at- 
tack, conferences  with  Navy  Department,  etc., 
and  Dewey  incident  of  1944. 

Re  Communications  with  General  Marshall  and 
any  additional  information  available  to  him. 

Re  All  events,  with  particular  reference  to  con- 
versations and  meetings  with  President  Roose- 
velt and  other  Cabinet  officers.  General  Mar- 
shall and  Admiral  Stark,  the  question  of  bas- 
ing the  fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor,  information 
available  to  him  and  handling  of  crucial  mes- 
sages, participation  in  warnings,  and  the 
events  leading  up  to  the  Nov.  26th  note  to  the 
Japanese  Government. 

Re  All  events,  with  particular  reference  to  in- 
formation available  to  him,  his  part  in  the 
warning  messages,  and  his  conferences  with 
President  Roosevelt  and  Cabinet  officers. 

We  are  advised  by  the  Knox  estate  that  the 
only  papers  which  may  be  available  are  at 
the  Navy  Department,  and  this  is  being  in- 
vestigated. 

(Note. — Throughout  the  testimony  in  this  branch  of  the  presentation,  particu- 
larly that  directed  to  high-ranking  officials,  a  detailed  inquiry  will  be  made 


•Whenever  witness  •will  be  recalled  for  further  examination  on  additional  subjects,  this 
is  indicated  by  asterisk. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


129 


into  just  what  information  was  available  to  President  Roosevelt  and  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  as  to  impending  attack,  and  what  part,  if  any,  either  took  in 
giving  or  withholding  warnings  to  Pearl  Harbor.) 


PEARL    HARBOR 

Principal  subject  examination 
Re  Condition  of  Pearl  Harbor  defenses  prior  to 
Short's  appointment,  earlier  alerts,  and  gen- 
eral background  information. 
Re  Delay  construction  fixed  radar  and  additional 

airfields. 
Re  All  classes  of  information  including  ship  lo- 
cation reports  and  intelligence  bulletins,  mes- 
sages of  various  classes  intercepted  before  and 
after  Dec.  7,  activities  of  Jap  consular  agents, 
Mori  tap,  Merle  Smith  cable  to  Short,  Wilkin- 
son Manila  report,  etc. 

Re  Pearl  Harbor  air  defense,  reconnaissance, 
and  all  points  bearing  on  air  aspects  of  situa- 
tion, including  details  of  Martin-Bellinger 
annex. 

Re  Radar  installations,  efficiency  of  information 
center,  adequacy  of  equipment  and  personnel. 

Re  All  events,  including  plans  made  to  meet  sur- 
prise attack,  knowledge  of  information  avail- 
able Washington  and  Hawaii,  and  steps  taken 
in  response  to  warning  messages. 

Re  All  events,  including  plans  made  to  meet  sur- 
prise attack,  knowledge  of  information  avail- 
able Washington  and  Hawaii,  and  steps  taken 
in  response  to  warning  messages. 

Re  All  events,  including  plans  made  to  meet  sur- 
prise attack,  knowledge  of  information  avail- 
able Washington  and  Hawaii,  and  steps  taken 
in  response  to  warning  messages. 

Re  All  events,  including  plans  made  to  meet  sur- 
prise attack,  knowledge  of  information  availa- 
ble Washington  and  Hawaii,  and  steps  taken 
in  response  to  warning  messages. 

[Sll]         The  Chairman.  Mr.  Keefe. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  had  no  occasion  to  say  anything 
up  to  date. 

The  Chairman.  You  have  been  very  quiet,  I  will  say  that. 

Mr.  Keefe.  May  I  say,  as  one  member  of  the  committee,  I  presume 
I  am  correct  in  the  assumption  that  the  weight  to  be  extended  to  the 
testimony  given  by  these  two  witnesses  who  have  testified  in  behalf 
of  the  Army  and  Navy  will  be  governed  by  the  sources  of  their  infor- 
mation, the  character  of  the  information,  whether  it  is  of  their  own 
knowledge,  hearsay,  or  what  not. 

Does  the  Chair  so  understand  the  situation  ? 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will,  of  course,  consider  the  nature 
of  the  testimony,  the  source  from  which  it  comes,  and  the  weight  to 
be  given  to  it. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Yes,  sir. 

Now,  I  understand  from  both  the  Admiral  and  the  Colonel  that  you 
have  heretofore  testified  that  your  evidence,  in  the  main,  is  purely 
hearsay;  you  have  no  definite  knowledge  from  personal  observation 
of  any  of  the  events  which  occurred  at  Pearl  Harbor  immediately 
before  the  attack,  or  immediately  after  and  that  the  sources  of  your 


Witness 
General  Herron 


(To  be  determined) 

Captain  Layton 
Commander  Rochefort 
Admiral  Mayfiield 
Mr.  Shivers,  FBI 
Colonel  Fielder 
Colonel  Bicknell 
Admiral  McMorris 
[310]     Admiral  Bellinger 
General  Martin 
General  Davidson 

Commander  Taylor 
Colonel  Powell 
Colonel  Phillips 
Admiral  Smith 


Admiral  Bloch 


General  Short 


Admiral  Kimmel 


130       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

information  are  based  entirely  on  material  which  you  have  discovered 
as  a  result  [312]  of  searches  made,  and  analyses  made  by  those 
working  for  you  on  your  respective  staffs ;  is  that  right  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Speaking  for  the  Nuvy,  that  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Is  that  correct  also  for  the  Army  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  essentially  correct;  yes,  sir.  I  have  been 
asked  a  few  questions  on  cross-examination  in  my  professional  capac- 
ity, which  I  answered  to  my  own  knowledge. 

Mr.  Keeee.  Do  you  qualify  as  an  expert  on  all  matters  relating  to 
the  Army  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not. 

Mr.  KJEEFE.  Do  you  qualify  as  an  expert  on  all  matters  relating  to 
the  Navy,  Admiral  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  So  that  neither  of  you  qualify  as  experts  in  the  accepted 
sense  of  the  term  "expert  witnesses." 

Now,  I  have  a  few  questions  that  I  would  like  to  ask  which  have 
apparently  not  been  heretofore  developed  in  connection  with  the 
cross-examination.  I  direct  my  attention  first  to  the  statement  made 
by  you,  Admiral,  to  the  effect  that  certain  orders  were  issued  declaring 
certain  waters — they  were  issued  as  the  result  of  the  Executive  order 
of  the  President — around  the  Hawaiian  Islands  to  be  defensive 
[SIS]         borders,  as  I  understood  it. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  order,  if  that  is  your  point,  sir,  was,  as  far 
as  the  Navy  was  concerned,  contained  in  a  general  order  issued  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  it  defined  two  defiensive  sea  areas  which 
were  outlined  on  the  chart  in  the  course  of  the  prepared  statement. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Will  you  refer  to  your  prepared  statement  and  see  if  I 
am  in  error,  that  you  referred  to  it  as  an  Executive  order  of  the 
President  designating  certain  prohibited  areas? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  is  not  in  my  prepared  statement.  I  gave  that  ad 
lib,  because  general  orders  of  that  nature  usually  derive  from  Execu- 
tive orders,  and  I  personally  assumed,  as  I  gave  that  statement,  that 
it  was  derived  from  an  Executive  order. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Is  that  a  mere  assumption  on  your  part  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  If  that  is  a  question  at  issue,  I  will  be  very  happy 
to  verify  that.     I  still  think  it  did  derive  from  the  Executive  order. 

Mr.  Keefe.  You  have  not  seen  the  Executive  order? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  recently ;  no,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Did  you  ever  see  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  cannot  say  whether  I  ever  did  or  not. 

[314]         Mr.  I^JEEFE.  Do  you  know  the  content  of  that  order  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  now,  no  sir.     I  can  look  it  up. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  you  know  the  date  of  the  general  order,  if  any  was 
issued  pursuant  to  the  Executive  order  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  at  this  time ;  no,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Have  you  a  copy  of  that  general  order  in  your  possession 
now? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No.    "We  will  get  it  for  you,  though. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  may  I  state,  Mr.  Counsel,  that  I  would  like  to 
have,  for  purposes  of  identification,  the  Executive  order  issued  by  the 
President,  if  any,  establishing  the  prohibited  waters  around  the 
Philippine  Islands. 

Mr.  Gesell.  The  Philippine,  or  the  Hawaiian  Islands  ? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE       ^  131 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  mean  the  Hawaiian  Islands.    Pardon  me. 

Well,  if  there  is  one  relating  to  the  Philippine  Islands  it  might  pos- 
sibly be  included  in  the  same  order,  I  don't  know. 

1  would  also  like  to  have  a  copy  of  the  order  issued  by  the  Navy, 
I  he  general  order,  if  such  an  order  was  in  fact  issued,  including  the 
date  of  that  order. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Navy  Department  will  produce  that.^ 

Mr.  IvEEFE.  Now,  what  is  your  present  recollection,  from  the  source 
of  the  material  which  you  have,  and  which  you  studied,  as  to  the 
purpose  and  intent  of  that  order  ^  What  [old]  did  it  gen- 
erally establish  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  My  recollection  is  that  it  established  a  defensive 
sea  area.  It  gave  the  boundaries  of  this  area,  and  it  required  that  no 
merchant  vessels,  either  foreign  or  U.  S.,  be  permitted  to  proceed 
through  that  area,  nor  no  foreign  men-of-war  be  permitted  to  proceed 
through  that  area  without  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  you  know  how  extensive  the  area  was  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir.  That  was  outlined  on  the  chart  during 
yesterday's  presentation.  It  was  not  very  extensive.  It  did  cover  the 
approaches  to  Pearl  Harbor  and  the  Kaneohe  air  station. 

[S16]         Mr.  Keefe.  Was  that  a  secret  order  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Was  it  published  to  the  world  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  morally  certain  it  was ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Iveefe.  So  foreign  ships  would  have  notice  of  the  existence  of 
such  an  order  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Did  the  order  provide  as  to  what  action  the  Navy  was 
to  take  in  the  event  any  foreign  ships  entered  that  prohibited  area? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  do  not  believe  the  specific  action  was  prescribed, 
but  certainly  the  Navy  was  to  prevent  any  movement  of  that  kind 
with  all  resources  at  its  command. 

Mr.  KJEEFE.  Your  evidence,  as  I  recall,  indicates  that  the  Navy 
did  so  on  the  morning  of  December  7  before  the  Japanese  attack. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  a  fair  assumption. 

Mr.  Keefe.  In  the  matter  of  sinking  the  submarine  by  the  destroyer 
Ward. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Is  that  right  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  you  have,  as  the  result  of  the  search  which  you  have 
conducted,  any  knowledge  of  any  other  ships  or  [317]  vessels 
of  any  character  having  been  sunk  other  than  those  which  you  have 
testified  to  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir.  You  mean  prior  to  December  7,  on  or 
prior  to  December  7? 

Mr.  Keefe.  On  or  prior  to  December  7. 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now  I  believe  you  testified  that  the  aircraft  carrier 
E7iterprise  on  December  7  was  proceeding  eastward. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  your  records  indicate  what  that  group  of  ships 
was  composed  of? 

1  Copies  of  the  orders  appear  in  Hearings,  Part  4,  pp.  1681-1686. 


132       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  were  escorting  t\\&^  Enterprise  f 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Will  you  identify  them,  please? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  task  force  consisted  of  the  aircraft  carrier 
Enterprise^  the  heavy  cruisers  Northampton^  Chester^  Salt  Lake  City; 
the  destroyers  Batchy  Mamry,  Graven^  Gridley^  McGall,  Dunlap^ 
Benham,  Fanning^  and  Ellet.  The  total  was  one  aircraft  carrier,  three 
heavy  cruisers,  and  nine  destroyers. 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  task  force  had  been  taking  some  material  out  to 
Wake  Island? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  had  been  taking  airplanes  to  Wake  Island ;  yes, 
sir. 

[SIS']  Mr.  Keefe.  Do  I  understand  that  the  cruisers  and  de- 
stroyers were  acting  as  convoys  for  the  Enterprise? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  word  that  we  used  for  it  is  "escort,"  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Escort? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir.  The  convoy  is  or  are  the  ships  which 
the  escort  escorts. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Pardon  me.  I  am  not  very  familiar  with  Navy  prac- 
tice. The  convoy  is  the  whole  works  and  the  escort  are  those  that 
escort  the  convoy ;  is  that  right  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  usually  speak  of  a  convoy  as  the  ships  to  pro- 
tect. 

Mr.  KJEEFE.  In  this  case  the  convoy  was  what?  The  Lexington  or 
the  Enterprise? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  flagship  was  the  Enterprise. 

Mr.  Keefe.  What  were  the  ships  that  were  being  protected  on 
their  way  along  from  Wake  Island  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  In  this  particular  case  it  was  called  a  task  force 
rather  than  either  a  convoy  or  an  escort.  However,  I  will  try  to 
clarify  that  by  saying  that  the  Enterprise 

Mr.  Keefe  (interposing).    Let  us  get  it  right  there. 

The  Chairman.  Let  him  complete  the  answer. 

Mr.  Keefe.  On  the  way  out,  when  we  were  taking  planes  out  to 
Wake,  and  other  material  was  that  a  convoy? 

\319\  Admiral  Inglis.  We  would  call  it  a  task  force  in  that  case, 
because  there  were  no  noncombatant  ships  in  that  group  of  ships. 

Mr.  Keefe.  So  on  both  occasions  then  this  group  of  ships  that  left 
Pearl  Harbor  and  went  out  to  Wake  was  a  task  force  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  it  was  a  task  force  on  the  way  back  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Is  that  correct? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes. 

Mr.  KJEEFE.  All  right,  we  will  strike  the  word  "convoy"  out  of  this 
discussion  then. 

Now  what  time  did  that  task  force  leave  Wake  on  the  way  back  to 
Pearl  Harbor?    Do  your  records  indicate  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  afraid  I  cannot  give  you  that  offhand.  We 
will  find  it. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  you  have  available  the  log  of  the  Enterprise? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  can  get  it.  It  may  take  some  time,  though. 
These  logs  are  not  readily  available.    We  will  try  to  get  them. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  133 

Mr.  Keefe.  In  connection  with  your  examination  of  the  facts  im- 
mediately before  and  after  Pearl  Harbor,  did  you  have  [320] 
access  to  the  logs  of  the  Enterprise  f 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  log  itself  was  not  available,  but  a  number  of 
extracts  from  the  log  were  included  in  the  court  of  inquiry  and  the 
Roberts  Board  report,  and  war  diaries,  things  of  that  nature. 

Mr.  Keefe,  What  do  you  mean  when  you  say  the  log  of  the  Enter- 
prise is  not  available?     Do  you  mean  it  cannot  be  obtained? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  I  do  not  mean  that.  I  mean  it  was  not 
readily  available  in  the  time  we  had  to  conduct  this  research. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now  in  order  that  this  record  may  be  clear — because 
I  am  a  boy  from  the  country  and  do  not  understand  all  these  things — 
will  you  explain  in  the  record  just  what  the  log  of  a  ship  is  supposed 
to  contain? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes. 

The  log  of  a  ship  in  the  Navy  consists  in  general  of  two  types  of 
information.  One  is  contained  in  columns  which  tabulate  meteorolog- 
ical data  such  as  temperature,  humidity,  height  of  the  barometer,  such 
data  as  the  speed  which  the  ship  is  making,  the  number  of  miles,  nau- 
tical miles  that  have  been  steamed  during  each  hour  of  the  day,  the 
drills  that  have  been  held,  the  ship's  position  at  8  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing, at  noon,  and  at  8  p.  m. 

Then  the  other  classification  is  under  the  term  "remarks,"  [321] 
and  the  remarks  in  the  log  contain  a  journal  of  events  of  interest,  and 
those  are  divided  into  the  various  watches,  that  is  the  midwatch  is  from 
midnight  to  4  a.  m.,  the  morning  watch  from  4  a.  m.  to  8  a.  m.,  and  so 
forth. 

The  watch  officer,  the  officer  of  the  deck,  signs  in  person  the  remarks, 
or  the  diary  pertinent  to  his  particular  watch.  That  signature  is  also 
taken  as  an  authentication  of  the  corresponding  data  which  appears 
in  the  columns,  such  as  the  meteorological  data  and  the  speed  and 
mileage  that  the  ship  has  covered. 

Mr.  IvEEFE.  Does  the  log  ordinarily  contain  information  as  to  orders 
received  b}^  the  ship  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  log  would  probably  contain  the  briefest  sort 
of  reference  to  the  reason  for  the  ship  getting  under  way.  I  do  not 
think  for  the  purposes  of  this  comimittee  that  would  be  particularly 
v^aluable,  because  it  usually  is  couched  something  like  this : 

"In  accordance  with  signal  from  division  commander  got  under 
way  and  stood  out  of  the  harbor." 

That  would  not  give  the  source  of  the  division  commander's  order. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Would  it  contain  information,  for  example,  as  to  when 
a  flight  of  scout  bombers  or  planes  left  the  deck  of  a  ship  ? 

[o^^l         Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Would  it  contain  memoranda  as  to  any  orders  relating 
to  the  conduct  of  those  planes  after  they  left  the  ship  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Will  you  repeat  that  question? 

Mr.  Keefe.  Read  the  question,  please. 

(The  question  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

Admiral  Inglis.  In  general;  no,  sir. 

Mr.  KJEEFE.  Then  if  the  Enterprise,  either  on  the  6th  of  December 
1941,  as  it  proceeded  from  Wake  to  Pearl  Harbor,  toward  Pearl 
Harbor,  or  on  the  early  morning  of  the  7th  of  December,  had  escort 
planes  in  the  air  patrolling  the  area  ahead  of  this  task  force,  would 
that  information  be  found  in  the  log  of  the  Enterprise? 


134       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  would  expect  tlie  information  as  to  the  time 
and  number  of  planes  which  were  launched  would  appear  in  the  log; 
also  the  time  and  the  number  of  planes  which  returned  to  the  ship 
would  appear  in  the  log,  and  probably  a  brief  word  or  two  about  the 
mission  of  those  planes  would  appear  in  the  log. 

[■3£3]  Mr.  I^EFE.  Would  the  log  also  indicate  whether  those 
planes  were  armed  or  unarmed  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Under  those  circumstances,  on  December  6  and  7, 1 
would  be  inclined  to  think  that  it  would  not  contain  that  information. 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  have  indicated,  I  believe,  that  I  would  like  to  have  the 
log  of  the  Enterprise  available.^ 

Well,  now,  you  testified,  as  I  recall,  in  your  general  statement  as  it 
appears  in  our  record  of  the  testimony,  page  72,  that  in  addition  to 
regular  scheduled  reconnaissance  flights,  the  U.  S.  S.  Enterprise  200 
miles  west  of  Pearl  Harbor  launched  scout  bombers  armed  with  ma- 
chine guns  shortly  after  6  a.  m.  which  searched  to  the  eastward  ahead  of 
the  ship,  an  arc  of  110°  to  a  distance  of  150  miles. 

Where  did  you  get  that  information  ? 

Admiral  Inglts.  That  information  was  taken  from  the  action  report 
of  the  Enterprise,  and  from  various  other  original  sources.  I  would 
hazard  a  guess  that  some  of  that  came  from  the  interrogation  of  the 
pilots  on  those  planes. 

Mr.  Keefe.  You  say  the  action  report  of  the  Enterprise.  What  is 
that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  "W^ienever  a  ship  of  the  Navy  is  in  action  involving 
any  shooting,  the  commanding  officer  is  required  to  submit  a  report  of 
the  action,  which  contains  numerous  details,  [■^^•^1  such  as  the 
number  of  rounds  of  ammunition  fired,  the  damage  to  his  own  ship,  the 
estimated  damage  to  the  enemy,  a  narrative  of  the  events. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Was  the  Enterp7ise  in  action  that  morning  at  6  a.m.? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Her  planes  were  in  action  at  that  time. 

Mr.  ICeefe.  In  action  against  whom  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Against  the  Japanese  planes  that  attacked  Pearl 
Harbor.     Not  at  6  o'clock,  but  in  the  course  of  that  flight. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  but,  my  dear  sir,  let  us  make  this  clear.  The 
attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  occurred  at  7 :  55,  according  to  your  testimony. 
These  ships  left  the  Enterprise,  these  planes,  according  to  your  testi- 
mony, shortly  after  G  a.  m.,  nearly  2  hours  before  the  attack  on  Pearl 
HarlDor.  They  certainly  were  not  engaged  in  any  action  at  that  time, 
were  they,  against  the  Japs  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  They  were  engaged  in  action  against  the  Japs 
sometime  after  7 :  45  and  before  they  landed  at  Ewa  Field  at  times 
varying  from  9  :  15  to  10 :  15,  which  I  believe  were  the  figures. 

Mr.  Keefe.  When  they  left  the  Enterprise,  they  were  equipped  and 
ready  for  action,  were  they  not,  at  6  o'clock  [3^5]  that 
morning  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  think  that  is  a  fair  assumption,  because  they  were 
firing  at  Japanese  planes  on  their  way  into  Ewa  landing  field. 

Mr.  Keefe.  You  stated  in  your  general  statement  that  they  were 
armed. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  after  leaving  the  Enterprise  they  were  supposed  to 
proceed  on  and  land  at  Ewa ;  is  that  right  ? 

1  The  log  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Enterprise  was  subsequently  admitted  to  the  record  as  Exhibit 
No.  101. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  135 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  my  understanding ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  As  they  were  coming  east  that  morning,  and  finally 
came  over  the  island,  they  engaged  the  Japs  who  were  then  attacking 
Pearl  Harbor? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  the  story  as  I  have  it ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  you  deduce  from  any  of  the  information  you  have 
been  able  to  obtain,  that  the  commander  of  that  task  force  had  any 
knowledge  that  there  was  likely  to  be  an  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  that 
morning  at  6  o'clock? 

Achniral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Where  is  the  action  report  of  the  Enterprise?  Have  you 
seen  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  is  now  in  the  archives  and  records  of  the  Navy 
Department. 

Mr.  KJEEFE.  Have  you  seen  it  ? 

[3£6-7]  May  I  ask,  Mr.  Mitchell,  that  that  action  report  of  the 
Enterp?'ise  be  produced? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  For  use  in  connection  with  this  examination. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  sir.^ 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  may  I  ask  you  this  question : 

So  far  as  the  world  knew,  and  the  people  of  America  knew,  and  so 
far  as  the  records  show,  this  country  was  at  peace  with  Japan  at  6 
o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  Tth  day  of  December;  was  it  not? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  cannot  speak  for  the  people  of  the  world,  but 
speaking  for  myself,  that  was  my  impression,  that  we  were  technically 
at  peace ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  We  were  technically  at  peace? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Is  that  the  way  you  want  to  say  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  the  way  I  want  to  say  it,  because  with  a 
task  force  approaching  Pearl  Harbor  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  sur- 
prise attack  on  the  Navy  and  Army  at  that  location,  I  would  say  it 
was  highly  technical. 

Mr.  Keefe.  All  right.  Do  your  records  disclose,  in  the  action  report 
of  the  Enterprise^  as  to  why  these  planes  were  launched  in  making 
reconnaissance  on  the  morning  of  the  Tth  at  6  o'clock? 

\328'\  Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  advised  that  the  purpose  given 
was  routine  flight  training. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Routine  flight  training? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir ;  I  hope  you  will  not  try  to  pin  me  down 
too  closely  on  that,  because  I  am  really  not  too  well  informed. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Very  well ;  we  will  try  to  go  into  that  maybe  at  the  time 
when  Admiral  Halsey,  or  someone  who  was  on  the  job,  testifies  to  it, 
perhaps. 

Then,  am  I  to  understand  that  so  far  as  the  information  available 
that  you  have  from  the  record,  the  log  of  the  Enterprise,  the  action 
report  of  the  Enterprise^  or  whatever  record  you  may  have  examined, 
or  your  researchers  may  have  examined,  that  while  we  were  technically 
at  peace  at  6  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  Tth  day  of  December,  the 
Enterprise,  returning  as  part  of  the  task  force  from  Wake  Island 
with  the  ships  which  you  have  described  and  enumerated,  did  have  out 


^  The  action  report  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Enterprise  was  subsequently  admitted  to  the  record  as 
Exhibit  No.  103. 


136       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

in  front  of  that  task  force  a  patrol  of  planes,  18  scout  bombers  fully 
armed,  ready  for  action  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  my  understanding,  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  that  those  bombers,  as  they  proceeded  east,  learned 
of  the  attack  at  7 :50,  and  proceeded  then  to  Pearl  Harbor  and  engaged 
the  enemy  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  my  understanding,  yes,  sir. 

[S£8a:]         Mr.  Keefe.  Is  that  right? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Ml".  Keefe.  Now,  then,  at  7:55  when  this  attack  came  on  Pearl 
Harbor,  where  do  j^ou  locate  this  task  force  of  Admiral  Halsey 
specifically? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Two  hundred  miles  west  of  Pearl  Harbor. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Directly  west  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  All  right. 

Now,  there  was  another  task  force,  was  there  not,  in  which  was  in- 
cluded the  aircraft  carrier  Lexington^ 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  AVho  was  in  command  of  that  escort  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Admiral  John  Henry  Newton. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Where  was  that  task  force  on  the  6th  of  December  1941  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  that  as  460  miles  from  Midway,  en  route  to 
Midway. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  where  was  it  with  respect  to  Pearl  Harbor,  and 
with  respect  to  Halsey's  task  force? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Will  you  get  the  other  chart.  No.  1,  giving  the 
disposition  of  the  task  fleet  ? 

I  make  it  as  roughly,  350  miles,  a  little  north  of  west  [329] 
of  Admiral  Halsey's  Task  Force  8. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Will  you  point  on  the  map,  just  for  the  purpose  of 
observation,  about  where  the  Halsey  task  force  was,  and  where  the 
Newton  task  force  was. 

Admiral  Inglis.  There  is  Task  Force  12,  that  blue  dot,  at  which 
Commander  Biard  is  pointing.  And  then  he  is  going  to  draw  his 
wand  in  the  direction  immediately  south  of  east  to  Task  Force  8.  I 
just  made  a  very  hasty  estimate  here  of  the  distance  between  the  two, 
and  it  comes  out  about  350  miles. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Yes. 

Now  the  task  force  commanded  by  Admiral  Newton  was  on  the 
way  to  Wake  Island,  was — or  Midway  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Midway. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Midway  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  To  deliver  certain  Marine  planes  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  To  Midway  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Will  you  enumerate  the  ships  that  composed  the  task 
force  commanded  by  Admiral  Newton  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  ships  were  the  aircraft  carrier  Lexington^ 
the  heavy  cruisers  Chicago^  Portland  and  Astoria         [330]  and 

destroyers  Porter,  Drayton,  Flusser,  Lamson,  and  Mahan.  A  total  of 
one  aircraft  carrier,  three  heavy  cruisers,  and  five  destroyers,  nine 
altogether. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  137 

Mr,  Keefe.  Do  you  have  any  information  as  to  whether  recon- 
naissance was  conducted  by  Admiral  Newton  by  the  use  of  planes  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  evidence  on  that,  Mr.  Congressman,  is  a  little 
bit — in  fact,  it  is  very  vague.  In  the  testimony  of  Admiral  Newton 
I  believe  he  said  that  planes  were  out  scouting,  but  he  did  not  say 
what  planes  they  were.  They  may  have  been  planes  from  the  Lexing- 
ton^ or  they  may  have  been  planes  from  the  heavy  cruisers. 

There  is  also  something  to  indicate  that  the  Lexington  carried  a 
heavy  deck  load  of  these  Marine  planes,  which  cluttered  up  her  flight 
deck,  making  the  launching  of  planes  difficult. 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  want  to  clear  this  situation  up  if  I  can. 

On  page  179  of  the  testimony  which  you  gave  yesterday,  under  cross 
examination  by  Senator  Ferguson,  referring  to  the  Lexington  group 
under  the  command  of  Admiral  Newton,  Senator  Ferguson  asked  you 
this  question : 

Do  you  know  whether  they  did  any  reconnaissance? 
Your  answer  was : 

I  understand,  because  of  the  additional  Marine  Corps  planes  on  board,  the 
flight  deck  was  so  cluttered         \_S31  ]         that  they  were  not  able  to  launch  any. 
Senator  Ferguson.  So  there  was  no  reconnaissance  from  that? 
Admiral  Inglis.  Not  from  the  Lexington. 

Is  that  your  testimony? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  presume  it  is,  sir;  and  that  was  my  understand- 
ing yesterday.    My  attention  was  invited  last  night  to 

Mr.  Keefe  (interposing).  Well,  that 

Mr.  Gesell.  Wait  a  minute.  Congressman.    Let  him  finish. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Because  of  this  cross  examination  of  Senator  Fer- 
guson's, my  staif  attempted  to  look  this  matter  up  a  little  more  thor- 
oughly, and  the  best  they  could  give  me  this  morning  was  there  was 
some  doubt  as  to  just  what  planes  there  were  in  the  air.  So  I  would 
prefer  Admiral  Newton  to  answer  that. 

Mr.  Keefe.  After  you  so  testified,  Admiral — which,  of  course,  I 
understand  you  are  testifying  just  from  your  recollection  of  the  ma- 
terial and  papers  and  files,  so  on  and  so  forth — you  were  not  there, 
and  necessarily  you  have  no  personal  recollection  of  it. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  when  you  got  through  your  testi- 
mony yesterday,  some  of  your  staff  called  your  at-  \^332'\  tention 
to  the  testimony  of  Admiral  Newton  himself  given  before  Admiral 
Hewitt,  did  they  not? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  not  sure  to  whom  the  testimony  was  given, 
but  that  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr,  Keefe.  I  now  call  your  attention  to  the  testimony  of  Admiral 
Newton  himself  given  before  Admiral  Hewitt  in  the  so-called  Hewitt 
investigation  which  appears  on  page  318,  questions  29,  30,  and  31  on 
that  page.  This  question  was  asked  of  Admiral  Newton  by  Admiral 
Hewitt : 

Do  you  recall  having  any  particular  concern  over  the  fact  that  the  mission  was 
advancing  your  course  over  1,000  miles  towards  Japan? 

Answer.  I  consider  that  I  was  going  into  waters  that  had  not  been  fre- 
quented by  our  ships  for  some  time,  and  there  might  be  more  danger  from  sub- 
marines than  we  had  considered  in  the  past.  I  set  a  speed  of  17  knots  in  daylight, 
and  zigzagging.  I  also  had  scouting  flights  made  by  planes  to  cover  our 
advance. 

Did  you  read  that  testimony  of  Admiral  Newton  himself  ? 


138       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  was  invited  to  my  attention  either  late  last 
night  or  early  this  morning,  the  very  selection  you  just  read. 

Mr.  KJEEFE.  Then,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  whether  the  planes  came 
from  the  flight  deck  of  the  Lexington^  the  \333\  carrier,  or 
whether  they  came  from  some  other  ship  that  was  part  of  that  task 
force,  the  record,  as  given  in  the  testimony  of  Admiral  Newton  himself, 
said  that  he  had  not  only  scout  planes  covering  his  advance,  but  that 
also  because  he  was  in  waters  that  our  ships  had  not  theretofore  been 
traveling  for  some  time,  zigzagging  his  ships  to  avoid  possible  attack 
by  submarines. 

Did  you  gather  that  from  the  testimony  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir ;  that  is  precisely  what  the  testimony  says. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  now,  then,  what  submarines  would  be  liable  to 
attack  at  that  time  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  afraid  that  is  a  conjectural  question  which  I 
am  not  prepared  to  answer. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  I  would  like,  for  a  moment,  to  address  my  re- 
marks to  the  Colonel,  and  I  would  like  to  have  placed  back  on  the  easel 
that  map  or  plot  showing  the — 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  radar,  sir? 

Mr.  Keefe.  The  radar  chart. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  the  gentleman  yield  for  a  ques- 
tion while  the  testimony  is  waiting  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  A  question  of  whom  ? 

Mr.  Murphy.  The  gentleman  from  Wisconsin. 

Mr.  Keefe.  You  want  to  ask  me  a  question? 

\33Ii\         Mr.  Murphy.  Yes,  sir. 

I  wonder  if  the  gentleman  is  reading  from  the  Hewitt  report,  or 
the  Hart  report  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  When  I  said  Hewitt  I  meant  Hart.  Will  you  correct 
the  record  ?     I  am  reading  from  the  Hart  report. 

Mr.  Murphy.  That  is  not  the  Hewitt  report  at  all.  It  is  page  318 
of  the  Hart  report. 

Mr.  Iveefe.  Thank  you  very  much  for  your  diligence  in  correcting 
me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  could  I  inquire  as  to  the  date  of 
the  Hart  report? 

Mr.  I^EFE.  It  is  dated  February  12,  1941,  to  June  15,  1944. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  it  the  report  or  the  testimony  ? 

Mr.  Kj:efe.  It  is  testimony  in  the  hearing  conducted  by  Admiral 
Hart. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  want  to  correct  the  record  in  any  way, 
making  it  show  it  is  testimony  rather  than  report  % 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  it  is  all  included.  The  testimony  is  included  in 
the  report. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  can  I  inquire  whether  or  not 
Admiral  Hart  filed  a  report  ? 

The  Chairman.  Does  the  Congressman  know  whether  he  {SSd'X 
did  or  not? 

Mr.  Murphy.  May  I  suggest  it  would  be  better  to  call  it  the  Hart 
record. 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  think  the  confusion  comes  because  the  transcript, 
which  is  the  record,  is  called  the  report.  As  I  undeirstand  it,  that  is 
the  reason  for  the  confusion. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  139 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  is  what  I  have  understood  it  to  be.  In  reading 
references  to  it  in  other  parts  of  these  very  voluminous  records,  it  is 
referred  to  as  the  Hart  report. 

In  this  report,  of  course,  is  contained  the  testimony  of  innumerable 
witnesses,  and  I  quoted  from  the  testimony  of  Admiral  Newton. 

Now,  I  call  your  attention  particularly  to  this  chart.  I  will  get 
over  here  so  I  can  see  it  myself.    My  eyesight  is  not  good. 

As  I  understood  from  your  testimony,  colonel,  this  streak  that  you 
have  indicated  on  the  exhibit 

Is  this  going  to  be  an  exhibit?  The  record  will  not  be  very  good, 
because  the  record  will  not  show  what  I  am  pointing  to  unless  we 
have  it  as  an  exhibit. 

The  ChxVirman.  It  is  an  exhibit  that  has  been  submitted  to  all  of 
us  here,  which  is  not  in  color. 

Mr.  Keefe.  What  is  the  number  of  the  exhibit?  Army  exhibit 
No.  10. 

[3S6]         Mr.  JSIiTCHELL.  That  is  going  to  be  offered. 

Colonel  Thielex.  That  is  page  8  of  the  Army  exhibit,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Just  so  the  record  will  indicate  what  we  are  talking 
about. 

[337]  Mr.  MuKPHY.  May  I  suggest  that  is  the  exhibit  that  has 
been  verified  by  Colonel  Murphy. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  further  authenticated  by  Congressman  Murphy. 
That  ought  to  make  it  unanimous. 

At  least  here  is  a  map  blown  up,  as  you  testified,  from  an  Army 
exhibit,  showing  what  I  understood  you  to  say  was  information  that 
was  obtained  from  this  mobile  radar  unit  located,  on  the  morning  of 
the  7th  of  November,  up  here  at  Opana,  is  that  right  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  7th  of  December,  sir.  Otherwise  your 
statement  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  All  right.  Now  these  dots  in  the  center  starting  at 
7 :  02  and  going  down  through  7 :  39,  7 :  40,  7 :  43,  indicate  a  flight  of 
planes  coming  in  ? 

Colonel  Thielex.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Coming  in  Pearl  Harbor? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  IvEEFE.  Is  that  right  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir ;  that  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  that  is  taken  from  the  chart  made  out  there  at  this 
radar  detecting  apparatus,  is  that  right  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  know  exactly  how  that  record  was  made. 
We  have  it  as  an  authorized  record  of  the  plot  of  the  Opana  radio 
station,  signed  by  the  assistant  signal  [S3S]  officer  of  the  Ha- 
waiian Department. 

Mr.  Keefe.  "V^Hiat  are  these  dots  over  here  on  the  purple  arrow  point- 
ing toward  the  island  ?     Wliat  do  they  indicate  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Those  are  plots  which  were  made  at  the  times 
indicated  by  the  Opana  station. 

Mr.  IvEEFE.  W^ell,  the  times  of  those  are  6 :  45,  6 :  48,  6 :  51,  so  on  and 
so  forth. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.  There  is  no  implication  that  those  were 
Japanese  planes. 


140       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Keefe.  They  may  have  been  our  own  planes,  so  far  as  the  evi- 
dence shows  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  They  may  have  been. 

[3S9]  Mr.  Keefe.  There  is  no  evidence  to  show  what  those  planes 
were  then  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  notice  also,  to  the  left  of  the  large  purple  arrow  point- 
ing toward  the  island,  two  streaks,  with  an  arrow  pointing  in  the 
opposite  direction,  and  two  times  indicated,  10 :  39  and  10 :  27. 

What  does  that  arrow  indicate  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  taken  from  the  plot.  That  was  indicated 
on  the  plot  as  an  arrow.  The  clear  arrow  is  an  attempt  to  reproduce 
the  arrow  shown  on  the  basic  document,  an  original  of  which  was 
offered  to  the  committee  yesterday  afternoon. 

Mr.  Keefe.  My  question  related  to  this  arrow  to  the  left.  What 
does  that  indicate? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  is  the  blue  arrow.  I  am  explaining  the  blue 
arrow  which  lies  within  the  purple  arrow.  That  is  the  arrow  formed 
by  the  mask  which  was  placed  over  the  purple  arrow. 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  am  talking  about  the  arrow  which  has  to  the  left  of  it 
the  time  10 :  39  and  10  :  27.     What  does  that  arrow  indicate  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  indicates  a  plot.  That  is  the  way  it  was  given 
on  the  document  from  which  that  exhibit  was  taken,  l^^O^  as 
an  arrow  rather  than  as  a  succession  of  pips. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Does  that  indicate,  if  the  pips  were  on  here,  would  it 
indicate  planes  flying  away  from  the  island? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  appears  to  indicate  one  or  more  aircraft  flying 
away  from  the  island. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Why  aren't  the  pips  on  here  the  same  as  on  the  other 
arrow  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  can't  answer  that.  That  is  the  way  it  was  on  the 
original. 

Mr.  Keefe.  At  least,  so  far  as  your  testimony  is  concerned,  then,  the 
arrow  to  which  I  have  referred  which  is  pointed  toward  the  top  of  the 
exhibit,  and  to  the  left  of  which  appears  the  times  10 :  39  and  10 :  27, 
refers  to  planes  that  were  leaving  the  island  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Two  or  more  planes. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Going  away? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  then,  I  would  like  to  know  this :  In  your  examina- 
tion of  the  files  relating  to  this  aircraft  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  did 
you  find  a  record  of  the  transmission  to  any  authority  in  the  island  of 
the  planes  as  they  left? 

Cglonel  Thielen.  There  is  no  such  statement  in  my  testimony  nor 
did  I  encounter  any  such  statement  in  any  other  testimony. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  the  records  [34^] 
contain  information  furnished  from  this  mobile  unit  which  was  ulti- 
mately given  to  the  authorities  out  there  at  Pearl  Harbor  which  indi- 
cated the  flight  of  planes  away  from  the  island  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir.  All  I  know  about  the  outgoing  flight  is 
that  it  appeared  on  the  historical  plot,  so-called. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  you  have  no  knowledge  as  to  when  that  informa- 
tion appearing  on  the  historical  plot  may  have  been  given  to  the 
authorities  on  the  island  ? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  141 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir ;  I  have  no  such  information. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Have  you  ever  checked  the  records  to  ascertain  whether 
there  was  in  fact  any  such  transmittal  of  information  as  to  this  out- 
going flight  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  have  not  personally  done  so.  I  know  that  this 
whole  Opana  station  question  was  gone  into  very  thoroughly  by  the 
researchers  working  with  me. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  from  your  knowledge  and  the  information  gained 
from  your  gleanings  of  this  material  that  you  went  over  and  that  your 
researchers  went  over,  could  you  say  whether  or  not  when  information 
was  obtained  at  this  mobile  station  whether  that  information  was 
transmitted  to  the  commanding  officer.  General  Short,  or  anybody  else 
in  command  out  there  at  that  time? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  divides  itself  into  two  parts,  sir.  I  have  testi- 
fied concerning  that  long  inward  plot  which  starts  [^4^]  at 
7 :  02,  which  was  reported  to  the  watch  officer  at  Fort  Shaf ter,  and  I 
have  further  testified  that  the  watch  officer  took  no  action  in  that  con- 
nection. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well  now,  in  order  that  I  might  be  perfectly  clear,  I 
understood  that  this  particular  radar  station  had  shut  down  some  time 
after  7  o'clock. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  didn't  say  that,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  was  it  in  continuous  operation  all  during  the 
attacks  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  plot  indicates  that  it  was  in  operation  from 
7 :  02  to  7 :  43.  We  have  the  testimony  of  Lieutenant  Tyler  that  when 
he  received  notification  of  the  attack  at  8  o'clock  he  recalled  all  radar 
personnel  to  their  stations.  Whether  they  actually  so  returned  or  not 
I  do  not  know.  What  happened  after  8  o'clock  I  have  only  the  knowl- 
edge indicated  by  the  plot  which  we  have  been  discussing. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Then  the  historical  plot  which  gives  you  the  information 
that  certain  planes  were  spotted  leaving  the  island,  certainly  would 
indicate  that  that  radar  station  was  in  operation  at  the  times  indicated 
on  the  exhibit,  10 :39  and  10 :27? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir ;  that  would  so  indicate. 

Mr.  Kj:efe.  So  if  this  station  was  in  operation  at  10 :  39  and  10 :  27 
and  picked  up  flights  of  planes,  one  or  more,         [343]  leaving  the 

island,  going  away,  would  that  information  normally  have  been  im- 
mediately transmitted  to  General  Short's  office,  or  somebody  in  com- 
mand on  that  island? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  would  unquestionably  have  been  transmitted 
as  far  as  the  information  center  in  order  that  the  proper  action  could 
be  taken  by  the  Air  Forces.  Whether  or  not  it  would  have  come  to 
General  Short's  personal  attention  or  not  I  can't  say. 

Mr.  Keefe.  The  plotting  also  indicates  the  direction  that  those 
planes  were  taking  and  the  distance  they  were  away  at  the  time  the 
radar  picked  them  up. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  So  if  they  had  had  the  information  they  would  have 
known  that  these  returning  planes  were  flying  away  from  the  island 
in  this  direction,  would  they  not? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  the  task  forces  at  sea,  both  of  them  were  out  there 
for  the  purpose  of  going  into  action,  weren't  they  ? 

79716 — 46— pt.  1 12 


142       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Colonel  Thielen.  They  were  out  there  for  that  purpose? 

Mr.  Keefe.  You  can't  answer  that.  You  are  from  the  Army. 
Pardon  me. 

Do  you  know  whether  or  not  in  the  search  of  your  records  and  all 
of  the  material  that  came  to  your  attention — radar  [W]  be- 
ing on  land  under  the  control  and  jurisdiction  of  the  Army  and  the 
Navy  not  having  any  land-based  radar — do  you  know  whether  or  not 
there  are  any  records  available  as  to  when  General  Short's  office,  or 
anybody  else  in  command,  was  notified  of  this  plot  showing  these 
planes  leaving  the  island  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir,  I  have  no  such  information.  I  should, 
however,  like  to  point  out  in  this  connection  that  we  have  no  definite 
information  that  those  were  hostile  planes. 

The  Chairman.  Are  you  through,  Mr.  Keefe? 

Mr.  Keefe.  Just  a  moment,  please. 

I  would  like  to  ask  the  Admiral,  if  I  may. 

The  Chairman.  Go  ahead. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  you  have  available — strike  that  out. 

Colonel,  may  I  have  your  attention  a  moment,  please. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  There  has  been  offered  the  duly  certified  record  of  the 
plotting  of  these  planes,  an  instrument  which  is  certified  to  by  Lieu- 
tenant Murphy — Lieutenant  Colonel,  I  guess 

Senator  Brewstek.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  that  should  be  offered. 
I  understood  it  was. 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  would  like  to  have  it  identified  and  offered  in  evidence 
now. 

Mr,  Murphy.  That  will  be  Exhibit  4,  Mr.  Chairman. 

[34-5]  The  Chairman.  This  is  the  one  that  was  asked  for  yester- 
day and  obtained.     It  was  not  put  in  the  record  as  an  exhibit. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Will  you  have  it  identified  as  an  exhibit? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  will  make  it  Exhibit  4  and  offer  it  in  evidence. 
Exhibit  4  will  be  this  chart  showing  the  plotting  by  the  radar  station 
at  Opana  on  the  morning  of  December  7.    That  is  enough,  isn't  it, 
Colonel? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  a  sufficient  description. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  Exhibit  No.  4,  Mr.  Congressman. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  4.") 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  Colonel,  this  exhibit  4  is  supposed  to  be  a  correct 
record.  I  note  that  you  have,  in  preparing  the  big  chart  which  has 
been  exhibited  to  the  committee,  you  have  left  off  two  words  that 
appear  in  red  ink  opposite  the  numbers  giving  the  time  10 :  39  and 
10:27,  the  words  being  "enemy  return." 

Did  you  see  those? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  did,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Who  put  that  on  there  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Presumably  Lieutenant  Colonel  Murphy.  May 
I  explain  the  omission  from  this  chart  at  this  time? 

Mr.  Keefe.  Yes. 

Colonel  Thielen.  In  addition  to  the  words  "enemy  return"  appears 
a  question  mark.  I  have  deliberately  omitted  from  ['346]  my 
testimony  all  questionable  material. 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  is  why  it  was  left  out  ? 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  143 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  would  like  to  point  out  that  on  the  exhibit  which  Ave 
have  f)repared  to  offer  the  words  "enemy  return"  and  the  question 
mark  appear.    Item  7  of  the  Army  exhibit. 

Mr.  Keefe.  We  have  offered  this  and  this  shows  the  same  thing. 
This  is  the  original. 

That  is  all  of  this  witness.  I  want  to  talk  for  a  moment  to  the 
admiral. 

Do  you  have  a  printed  phamphlet  known  as,  I  think  it  is  2CL-41, 
a  certain  security  order  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  in  the  arcliives  of  the  Navy  Department. 
We  haven't  got  it  at  hand  but  again  we  will  produce  it. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  in  preparing  your  statement  for  the  Navy  did  you 
examine  this  security  order  issued  by  Admiral  Kimmel  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  My  staff  did ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Are  you  f amaliar  with  what  it  contains  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir,  not  personally. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Beg  pardon? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  not  personally  familiar  with  that  document. 

[347']  1  have  just  been  informed  by  my  helper  here  that  he  did 
look  at  that  and  decided  that  it  was  outside  of  the  scope  of  the  outline 
handed  to  us. 

Mr,  Keefe.  Well,  it  related,  did  it  not,  to  the  manner  in  which  these 
ships  were  to  be  berthed  and  moored  in  the  harbor  at  Pearl  Harbor  for 
security  purposes  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  sorry,  Mr.  Congressman,  I  am  not  familiar 
with  the  order. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  I  am  sorry  that  in  making  your  presentation  you 
have  omitted  this  very,  very  important  and  highly  important  matter. 

Mr.  Gesell.  It  is  controversial. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Is  there  anything  controversial  about  it,  Mr.  Gesell  ?  Is 
there  anything  controversial  about  the  fact  that  such  an  order  was 
issued  ?    It  is  a  printed  order. 

Mr.  Gesell.  If  that  is  the  order  that  has  to  do  with  the  disposition 
of  vessels  in  the  harbor,  so  as  to  effect  the  maximum  antiaircraft  oppo- 
sition, and  matters  of  that  sort — we  felt  that  should  be  taken  up  with 
the  officers  who  ordered  the  disposition  of  the  fleet  so  they  could  give 
their  reason  and  explain  what  was  done,  when  it  was  done,  and  why 
it  was  done. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  the  order  was  issued  by  Admiral  Kimmel,  wasn't 
it? 

[348]        Mr.  Gesell.  I  believe  so. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And,  which  I  understand  is  in  a  printed  pamphlet,  al- 
though I  haven't  been  able  to  get  it  yet.  As  a  member  of  the 
committee  I  am  interested  in  it. 

Mr.  Gesell.  We  have  it ;  if  you  ask  for  it  we  will  be  glad  to  give 
it  to  you. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  we  are  going  to  ask  for  a  lot  of  things  as  we  go 
along  in  this  matter,  and  maybe  we  will  get  them.    We  hope  so. 

I  am  now  making  the  request  that  I  be  furnished  with  this  order. 
And  are  there  additional  copies  available  so  that  the  committee  may 
have  copies  ? 


144       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  believe  it  is  a  printed  order.  Therefore  there  should 
be  copies. 

Mr.  Keefe.  There  shouldn't  be  anything  controversial  about  the 
fact.  Here  is  an  order  which  is  printed.  What  could  be  contro- 
versial about  it  ? 

Mr.  Gesell.  Are  you  asking  me,  Mr.  Congressman  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  You  said  it  was  controversial. 

Mr.  Gesell.  The  question  of  why  it  was  ordered  and  who  it  was 
ordered  by  is  controversial. 

Mr.  Keefe.  So  that  I  may  understand,  wasn't  it  an  order  issued 
by  Admiral  Kimmel? 

Mr.  Geseix.  I  so  understand. 

[349]         Mr.  Keefe.  Then  there  is  nothing  controversial. 

Mr.  Gesell.  As  to  the  content  of  the  order,  I  take  it  not. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Did  you  discuss  that  matter,  Admiral,  with  our 
counsel  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  not  personally.  This  is  the  first  time  I 
ever  heard  of  it. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  will  ask  counsel  to  attempt  to  secure 
sufficient  copies  of  that  printed  order  to  furnish  each  member  with  a 
copy. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  Admiral,  a  couple  of  other  questions. 

You  gave  some  testimony  as  to  the  reconnaissance  of  planes  around 
the  Fourteenth  Naval  District.  That  includes  Wake,  doesn't  it; 
Midway,  Johnston  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  Pearl  Harbor? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  there  were  12  PBY's  that  left  Pearl  Harbor  on 
the  30th  of  November,  were  there  not  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  My  presentation  did  not  go  back  before  the  6tli 
of  December  in  that  connection. 

]\Ir.  Kf^fe.  So  you  have  no  knowledge  of  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

[360]  Mr.  Keefe.  You  didn't  make  any  examination  of  any- 
thing prior  to  the  Cth  of  December? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  in  connection  with  reconnaissance;  no,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  So  you  are  not  in  position  to  testify  as  to  any  recon- 
naissance that  took  place  on  the  5th  or  4th  or  any  other  time  except 
the  6th  and  7th ;  is  that  right? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  would  like  to  ask  a  question  or  two. 

In  regard  to  this  map — will  you  put  that  radar  map  back,  the  one 
that  was  just  there?    I  guess  Colonel  Thielen  can  answer  this  question. 

This  long  purple  line  in  the  center  indicating  an  arrow,  as  far  as 
the  radar  is  concerned,  shows  the  direction  in  which  planes  were  flying? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  a  graphical  representation  which  we  made 
to  indicate  that  fact. 

The  Chairman.  That  arrow  indicates  what  was  recorded  from  2 
minutes  after  until  7 :  30 ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.  The  white  squares  actually  indicate 
that. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  145 

The  Chairmax.  Those  white  squares  were  put  in  to  indicate 
[351]  the  time  that  synchronizes  with  the  particular  portion  of 
that  arrow  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir.  More  accurately,  the  white  squares  are 
the  basic  data.  They  represent  the  plots  which  were  made.  The  pur- 
ple arrow  was  added  to  indicate,  make  it  more  graphic  to  the  com- 
mittee, the  direction  of  the  attack. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  the  purple  arrow,  the  long  purple 
arrow,  indicates  incoming  planes? 

Colonel  Thielen.  For  the  purpose  of  that  attack ;  yes  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  I  understand  you  to  say  that  there  is  nothing 
on  the  plot,  as  you  call  it,  which  indicates  whether  they  were  friendly 
or  hostile  planes? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  correct. 

The  Chairman.  How  close  would  they  have  to  get  to  the  point  of 
attack  before  those  in  charge  of  the  radar  station  would  know  whether 
or  not  they  were  enemy  or  fi'iendly  planes  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  As  I  understand  the  development  of  radar  at 
that  time  there  would  be  no  indication  whatsoever  purely  by  radar. 
It  would  have  to  be  either  by  visual  recognition,  or  by  an  identification 
signal  sent  out  by  the  plane  radio  independent  of  the  radar. 

[352]  The  Chairman.  Now,  some  question  has  been  raised  about 
these  radar  operators  remaining  at  this  Opana  station  after  7  o'clock, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  their  duty  required  them  to  stay  until  only  7 
o'clock.  Would  you  be  able  to  say  from  the  records,  whether  the 
reason  they  remained  there  was  because  the  truck  was  late,  or  whether 
they  wanted  to  get  some  more  training. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Well,  it  appears  to  me  immaterial  why.  They 
had  the  option  of  resting  while  the  truck  arrived,  or  actually  contin- 
uing to  conduct  training.    They  took  the  latter  alternative. 

The  Chairman.  Some  importance  seems  to  be  attached  to  the  fact 
that  the  truck  was  late,  and  I  am  wondering  whether,  if  the  truck  had 
been  on  time,  if  they  would  have  been  there  between  7 :  02  and  7 :  39 
and  would  have  made  these  records  which  you  have  exhibited. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  don't  think  anybody  could  answer  that. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  speculative. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  And  while  they  were  waiting  for  the  truck  they 
decided  to  operate  a  little  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.    They  showed  commendable  zeal. 

The  Chairman.  The  small  purple  arrow  pointing  the  other 
[353]  way  indicating  the  direction  of  the  planes  being  at  10 :  27 — 
is  it? 

Colonel  Thielen,  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  And  going  down  to  10:39 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  12  minutes. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Which  was  nearly  an  hour  after  the  attack  had 
ceased,  as  I  understand  it  from  your  testimony,  the  attack  having  been 
over  at  9:45. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  So,  if  that  is  a  correct  representation  of  the  flight 
of  enemy  planes — which  could  still  be  unidentified,  I  suppose,  so  far  as 
the  radar  was  concerned 


146       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Colonel  Thielen.  Even  more  likely  because  of  the  range — the  range 
is  greater. 

The  Chairman.  That  would  have  indicated  that  45  minutes  or  an 
hour,  45  minutes  approximately,  after  the  attack  was  over,  the  de- 
parture of  these  planes  was  caught  on  the  instrument  at  that  time? 

Colonel  Thielen.  An  outgoing  flight  was  picked  up. 

The  Chairman,  Now,  I  don't  know  whether  you  testified,  Colonel, 
or  whether  the  admiral  testified  yesterday,  stating  that  on  the  6th  of 
December  there  were  no  searches  made  by  [354]  airplanes 
from  Pearl  Harbor ;  is  that  true  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  My  testimony  was  that  we  had  no  written  record  of 
any  searches. 

The  Chairman.  No  record — no  written  record  of  any  searches,  and 
that  is  limited  to  the  searches  that  would  have  been  made  from  Pearl 
Harbor  as  a  base,  is  it  ?  The  reason  I  ask,  on  your  item  No.  10,  which 
is  the  reproduction  of  that  map  there  [indicating]  in  your  black  space, 
you  say  "Air  searches  flown  in  Hawaiian  area."  Then  you  have  in  that 
diagonal  square,  "6th  of  December,  1941,"  indicating  that  in  that  square 
there  was  some  air  flight  in  progress.  Was  that  the  airplanes  from 
the  Enterprise? 

[355]  Admiral  Inglis.  Those  were  the  airplanes  from  the  En- 
terprise. My  statement  that  there  was  no  written  record  of  any  recon- 
naissance flights  applied  to  shore-based  planes,  but  there  were  aircraft 
in  flight  from  the  Enterprise.,  as  shown  on  the  diagonal  stripes. 

The  Chairman.  So  that  there  is  no  contradiction  between  your 
statement  yesterday  that  there  were  no  flights  from  shore  bases  on  the 
6th  of  December  and  this  indication  that  from  the  Enterprise.,  which 
was  200  miles  west  of  Pearl  Harbor,  that  there  were  these  flights 
participated  in  by  the  18  planes  that  attacked  from  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir;  no  contradiction. 

The  Chairman.  All  right.  Now,  at  the  time  that  these  planes  took 
off  from  the  Enterprise  in  what  direction  was  it  going? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Enterprise  was  traveling  almost  due  east. 

The  Chairman.  Toward  Pearl  Harbor  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Toward  Pearl  Harbor. 

The  Chairman.  Now,  in  what  direction  was  the  Lexington 
traveling  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Lexington  was  going  a  little  north  of  west — 
a  little  north  and  west. 

The  Chairman.  Toward 

\S56]        Admiral  Inglis.  Midway. 

The  Chairman.  Midway? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  And  they  were  about  how  far  apart  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  At  the  time  of  the  attack,  as  we  have  just  brought 
out,  they  were  approximately  350  miles  apart  and  rapidly  drawing 
further  apart. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  One  of  them  was  going  northwest  and  the 
other  coming  east  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  147 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  Well,  now,  do  the  records  from  which  you 
have  taken  your  statement  and  upon  which  your  statement  is  based 
indicate  whether  these  planes  that  were  armed,  apparently,  when  they 
left  the  deck  of  the  Enterprise  had  any  knowledge  of  an  attack  or 
impending  attack  at  Pearl  Harbor  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  record  is  completely  negative  in  that  respect 
and  I  would  certainly  assume  that  the  pilots  had  no  knowledge  of  that 
at  all. 

The  Chairman.  Now,  let  me  ask  you  about  these  planes  that  left 
Hamilton  Field,  is  it,  San  Francisco,  Hamilton  Field?  That,  I  be- 
lieve, is  the  colonel's  statement ;  it  is  in  the  colonel's  statement. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  At  what  time  did  you  say  they  left  on  the  [357'\ 
night  of  the  6th? 

Colonel  Thielen.  9 :30  p.  m.  the  6th  December. 

The  Chairman.  9 :30  p.  m.  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Unarmed  and  without  radar,  as  you  said? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Unarmed ;  presumably  without  radar. 

The  Chairman.  And  probably  having  radio  sets? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Probably,  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Probably,  but  you  have  no  positive  evidence  on  that 
score  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No  positive  evidence.  It  would  be  extremely 
unlikely  that  they  did  not  have. 

The  'Chairman.  They  were  headed  for  the  Philippine  Islands  but 
were  to  stop  at  Hawaii  for  what  purpose — for  refueling  or  do  you 
know  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir,  that  would  unquestionably  be  one  of 
the  purposes  of  the  stop. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  And  when  they  got  there  they  found  this 
attack  in  progress,  is  that  right  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir,  that  is  correct. 

The  Chairman.  And  being  unarmed  they  had  no  facilities  with 
which  to  engage  very  effectively  in  the  battle,  did  they  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir.    They  all  attempted  to  land. 

[358^         The  Chaikvian.  They  all  attempted  to  land? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  And  some  of  them  were  destroyed  in  that  process  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Your  testimony,  the  testimony  of  both  of  you 
gentlemen  has  been  referred  to  here  as  hearsay  evidence.  I  suppose 
that  you  knew  when  you  were  asked  to  present  this  chronological  nar- 
rative or  physical  narrative  of  what  happened  out  there,  not  being 
there  yourself,  understood  that  you  were  not  to  testify  from  personal 
knowledge  but  from  records  that  you  were  able  to  obtain  in  these 
various  departments  and  that  there  is  no  misunderstanding  that  what 
you  were  to  say  here  is,  technically  speaking  from  the  standpoint  of 
a  lawyer,  hearsay  evidence. 

Is  that  true,  Admiral? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  my  understanding,  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  yours  also? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir,  that  is  my  understanding. 


148       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  Chairman.  Of  course,  as  a  matter  of  law  we  all  understand 
what  you  do  not  see  yourself  and  testify  about  is  legally  referred  to  as 
hearsay,  and  there  was  no  misunderstanding  about  that.  Nobody  ex- 
pected it  to  be  anything  else,  so  far  as  I  know. 

[3S9]         Is  that  your  understanding  of  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  was  my  understanding,  yes,  sir. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  that  is  all  I  want  to  ask  him. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  did  neglect  to  ask  one  or  two  ques- 
tions that  I  had  in  mind,  that  I  would  like  to  complete  if  I  may  do 
so  at  this  time. 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  Mr.  Keefe. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Colonel,  I  would  like  to  ask  you  this :  How  many  fixed 
antiaircraft  batteries  were  there  on  Oahu  at  the  time  of  this  attack? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  will  take  a  little  counting,  sir.  There 
were  a  good  many  of  them  and  in  the  Army  exhibit,  section  1,  page 
1 — or,  rather,  beginning  on  page  2,  we  have  a  list  of  Coast  Artillery 
units.  In  general  this  could  be  narrowed  down  to  the  gun,  I  am  sure, 
and  made  very  accurate  with  a  little  further  study,  but,  in  general, 
units  other  than  the  Sixty-fourth  Coast  Artillery  JRegiment — the  six 
batteries  at  Schofield  Barracks  and  the  seven  batteries  at  Camp 
Malakole — all  of  those  other  yellow  squares  situated  at  Fort  Weaver, 
at  Fort  De  Russy  and  Fort  Ruger  and  at  Black  Point,  which  is  down 
at  the  top  of  Diamond  Head,  are  fixed  batteries  situated  to  protect 
the  coastal  defenses,  the  seacost  defense  guns  in  that  sector, 

[360]  Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  how  many  mobile  batteries  were  there 
on  the  island  that  day  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  only  fully  mobile  unit  was  the  Sixty-fourth — 
let  me  check  that — the  Two  Hundred  and  Fifty-first  Coast  Artillery 
Kegiment  which  would  contain  3  batteries  having  3  gun  batteries,  a 
total  of  9 — well,  wait  a  minute;  the  Third  Battalion,  with  semiauto- 
matic weapons,  has  4  batteries.  That  would  give  us  10  full  mobile 
batteries. 

The  seanimobile  armaments  had  three  Coast  Artillery  regiments 
with  weapons  which  could  be  transported  but  for  which  the  prime 
movers,  as  we  call  them,  the  trucks  to  tow  them,  were  not  available 
in  sufficient  quantity  to  move  the  entire  regiment  at  one  time. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  I  assume  in  making  up  your  statement  you  had 
opportunity  to  and  did  read  the  Army  Board's  report? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  read  it,  sir,  not  as  closely  as  did  my  researchers. 
I  read  it  not  with  the  idea  of  extracting  anything  but  for  the  purpose 
of  acquainting  myself  with  the  background. 

Mr.  KJEEFE.  Who  was  General  Burgin? 

Colonel  Thielen.  General  Burgin  commanded  the  Hawaiian  Coast 
Artillery  Command,  which  embraced  two  major  divisions,  the  seacoast 
regiments  and  the  antiaircraft  regiments. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  on  the  morning  of  December  7,  [361]  1941, 
when  the  attack  took  place,  how  many  of  these  fixed  batteries  were 
ready  for  action? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  believe  that  that  could  be  figured  out.  May  I 
invite  your  attention  to  section  7  of  the  Army  exhibit,  from  which 
we  can  probably  deduce  those  facts  ?    None,  of  course,  were  loaded. 

Mr.  Keefe.  None  were  loaded? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  149 

Mr,  Keefe.  Was  the  ammunition  available? 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  ammunition  was,  in  general,  in  boxes  at 
the  position. 

Mr.  Keefe.  It  had  to  be  unboxed  and  taken  out  of  the  boxes  to  the 
guns  to  be  loaded? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  for  the  3-inch  guns,  the  primary  arma- 
ment, that  is  true. 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  is  after  the  so-called  No.  3  alert  went  into  eilect? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir;  no  fixed  guns  were  in  position  with 
ammunition  at  the  gun  positions  under  alert  No.  1. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Yes,  but  I  mean  they  were  not  loaded,  you  said. 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir;  they  were  not  loaded. 

Mr.  Keefe.  In  order  to  put  them  in  position  to  fire,  the  ammuni- 
tion would  have  to  be  taken  out  of  the  boxes  in  places  where  it  was 
adjacent  to  the  battery;  is  that  right? 

[362]         Colonel  Tiiielex.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  where  was  the  ammunition  for  the  mobile  units  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  was  located  at  Aliamanu  Crater. 

Mr.  Keeefe.  And  how  far  away  from  the  mobile  batteries? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  was  quite  close.  That  was  near  Fort  Shaf- 
ter,  which  is  the  nerve  center  of  the  island  defense  and  the  inter- 
section of  the  road  net  which  goes  down  along  the  south  sector  and 
critical  area.  There  was  also  antiaircraft  ammunition  at  Schofield 
Barracks. 

Mr.  Keefe.  "Well,  the  ammunition  for  the  mobile  gun  batteries 
was  in  Aliamanu  Crater,  which  is  about  a  mile  from  Fort  Shafter, 
up  in  an  old  volcano ;  is  that  right  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes.  sir;  that  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  all  the  mobile  batteries,*  wherever  they  were  lo- 
cated, had  to  send  up  to  this  crater  to  get  their  ammunition ;  is  that 
correct  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Well,  not  all.  As  I  pointed  out,  some  was  at 
Schofield  Barracks,  where  some  of  the  mobile  batteries  were  situated. 

May  I  review  my  brief,  which  I  believe  covered  that?  Would 
you  care^  to  hear  it,  sir,  hear  the  discussion  that  I  gave  yesterday 
directly  pertaining  to  this  question  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  if  you  care  to  repeat  it.  I  haven't  [363] 
asked  for  it,  but  I  haven't  any  objection  to  it  if  you  want  to  do  it. 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  is  directly  responsive  to  your  question,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Very  well. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Under  alert  No.  1  only  a  limited  amount  of 
ammunition  was  in  the  hands  of  troops  of  the  Hawaiian  Depart- 
ment. The  Coast  Artillery  Command  had  previously  been  author- 
ized to  draw,  and  had  drawn,  ammunition  for  its  fixed  positions  only, 
including  antiaircraft.  However,  at  these  installations,  the  shells 
were  kept  in  boxes  in  order  to  keep  the  ammunition  from  damage 
and  deterioration.  The  ammunition  for  the  mobile  guns  and  bat- 
teries was  in  storage  chiefly  at  Aliamanu  Crater  and  Schofield  Bar- 
racks. 

Mr.  Iveefe.  Now,  in  connection  with  your  testimony,  did  you 
read  the  testimonv  of  General  Burgin  as  he  gave  it  to  the  Army 
Board? 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir :  I  do  not  recollect  it. 


150        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Keefe.  May  I  call  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  General 
Burgin  testified  before  the  Army  Board,  which  is  cited  and  referred 
to  in  the  Board's  report,  and  I  quote : 

They  were  all  ready  to  get  into  action  immediately  with  the  exception  that  the 
mobile  batteries  did  not  have  the  ammunition.  The  fixed  batteries  along  the 
sea  [364]  coast,  those  batteries  imbedded  in  concrete,  had  the  ammunition 
nearby.  I  had  insisted  on  that  to  General  Short  in  person  and  had  gotten  his 
permission  to  take  this  antiaircraft  ammunition  moved  up  into  the  seacoast  to 
the  battery  positions  and  have  it  nearby  the  antiaircraft  guns.  It  was,  however, 
boxed  up  in  wooden  boxes  and  had  to  be  taken  out. 

Ammunition  for  the  mobile  guns  and  batteries  was  in  Aliamanu  Crater,  which 
you  may  know  or  may  not,  is  about  a  mile  from  Fort  Shafter  up  iu  the  old 
volcano.  The  mobile  batteries  had  to  .send  there  to  get  ammunition.  In  addi- 
tion to  that,  the  mobile  batteries  had  to  move  out  from  the  various  posts  to  their 
field  positions.     They  were  not  in  field  positions. 

Is  that  correct  ? 

Colonel  TuiELEN.  Yes,  sir,  as  applied  to  the  mobile  batteries.  As 
I  pointed  out,  they  were  located  at  Fort  Shafter,  Schofield  Barracks, 
and  Camp  Malakole. 

Mr.  K^EFE.  Did  you  ascertain  the  facts  with  reference  to  the  issu- 
ance of  ammunition  and  why  it  was  that  ammunition  had  not  been 
issued  to  these  mobile  batteries  ? 

Colonel  TiiiELEN.  I  am  not  prepared  to  give  a  why,  to  give  an  an- 
swer as  to  why  that  was  not  done,  sir.  I  may  say  that  I  have  had  a 
discussion  with  the  people  who  were  doing  the  researching  on  tliis  sub- 
ject and  they  assured  me  that  testimony,  [365]  including  that 
of  ordnance  officers,  places  us  on  very  firm  ground  in  the  testnnony 
which  I  gave  yesterday  and  which  I  just  repeated. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  I  call  your  attention  to  the  testimony  of  General 
Burgin  on  that  issue,  in  which  he  testified : 

They  didn't  want  to  issue  any  of  the  clean  ammunition  and,  besides,  we  would 
get  our  ammunition  in  plenty  of  time  should  any  occasion  arise.  It  was  almost 
a  matter  of  impossibility  to  get  your  amunition  out  because  in  the  minds  of  a 
person  who  has  preservation  of  ammunition  at  heart  it  goes  out,  gets  damaged, 
comes  back  in  and  has  to  be  renovated.  Tlie  same  was  especially  true  here. 
It  was  extremely  difficult  to  get  your  ammunition  out  of  the  magazine.  We  tried 
the  ordnance  people  without  result.  General  Max  Murray  and  myself  went 
personnally  to  General  Short.  General  Murray  pled  for  his  ammunition  for 
the  Field  Artillery ;  I  asked  for  ammunition  for  antiaircraft.  We  were  put 
off,  the  idea  behind  it  being  that  we  would  get  our  ammunition  in  plenty  of  time 
and  that  we  would  have  warning  before  any  attack  ever  sprung  up. 

Did  you  find  that,  review  that  testimony  before  you  made  your 
statement  to  the  committee  here? 

Colonel  TiiiELEN".  I  was  generally  familiar  with  that  testimony 
and  I  know  that  my  researchers  knew  it  in  detail. 

[366]  Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  then,  it  is  safe  to  say,  is  it  not,  that  so 
far  as  the  mobile  units  were  concerned  after  the  attack  came  they  had 
to  be  dispersed  to  their  positions  and  had  to  send  to  this  crater  in  order 
to  get  their  ammunition  before  they  could  enter  the  fight  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  To  the  crater  and  to  Schofield  Barracks. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Yes. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.     The  ammunition  was  centrally  located. 

Mr.  Keei'E.  How  long  did  it  take  to  get  it,  to  get  that  done  after  the 
attack  came,  normally? 

Colqnel  Thielen.  That  would,  of  course,  depend  upon  the  location 
of  the  various  batteries.  May  I  point  out  that  the  bulk  of  the  anti- 
aircraft not  in  position,  the  Sixty-fourth  Coast  Artillery,  was  located 
at  Fort  Shafter,  which  was  only  a  mile  from  Aliamanu  Crater. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  151 

Mr.  Keete.  Well,  then,  let  me  ask  you  this  question:  In  your 
research  and  in  your  examination  to  present  this  situation  you  have 
disclosed  a  good  many  other  pertinent  and  very  technical  facts.  Do 
the  records  any  place  disclose  how  long  it  actually  did  take? 

Colonel  Thiei.en-.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  how  long  did  it  take? 

Colonel  Thielex.  We  have  a  schedule  of  that  in  the  Army  exhibit. 

[367]  Mr.  Gessell.  It  is  right  in  the  exhibit  for  each  particular 
battery. 

Colonel  Thielen.  For  every  battery. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  you  may  have  seen  it,  Mr.  Gesell. 

Mr.  Gessell.  It  is  before  you,  Congressman.  It  is  the  schedule  that 
was  discussed  yesterday.  I  was  calling  your  attention  to  it.  It  gives 
the  time  intervals. 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  on  page  11  of  the  Army  exhibit. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  We  went  over  that. 

Mr.  Keefe.  He  went  over  that  ? 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  all? 

Mr.  Keefe.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Admiral,  I  want  to  ask  one  or  two  questions; 
maybe  you  testified  about  it  yesterday.  If  you  did,  I  don't  want  to 
repeat. 

You  stated,  I  think,  that  there  was  a  net  strung  across  the  mouth 
of  this  channel  into  Pearl  Harbor  but  that  notwithstanding  that  net 
a  Japanese  submarine  did  get  in.     Is  that  true? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  true ;  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Does  that  record  show  when  the  net  was  spread 
and  when  the  submarine  got  in? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  record  does  not  show  when  the  sub-  [368] 
marine  got  in  and  the  record  is  not  clear  as  to  when  the  net  was  opened. 

You  see,  those  nets  have  a  gate,  as  we  call  it,  which  usually  can 
be  opened  to  allow  the  passage  of  friendly  ships,  and  I  am  not  prepared 
to  give  the  information  as  to  just  when  that  gate  was  opened  and 
when  it  was  closed.  I  would  say  from  the  construction  of  the  net 
that  the  submarine  must  have  gone  through  that  net  at  some  time 
when  the  gate  was  open  because  the  net  seems  to  be  very  effective  in 
stopping  the  passage  of  any  ship  eixcept  when  the  gate  was  open. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  whether  it  was  customary  to  open 
the  gate  in  the  daytime  or  at  night  or  both? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  know  what  the  custom  was  at  that  place 
at  that  time. 

Tlie  Chairman.  How  far  was  it  from  the  mouth  where  the  net 
was  that  this  channel  that  had  been  chiseled  out,  how  many  miles  is  it 
to,  we  will  say,  the  Ford  Island  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Roughly  about  2  miles,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  About  2  miles  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Now,  one  other  question  and  I  think  that  is  all. 

You  testified  here  that  the  Pacific  Fleet — which  is  independent  of 
the  Asiatic  Fleet,  I  believe  ? 

[369]        Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  I  have  no  reference  to  that.  The  Pacific  Fleet, 
based  at  Pearl  Harbor,  was  about  two-thirds  the  size  of  the  Atlantic 
Fleet.    Now,  how  much  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  was  in  Pearl  Harbor? 


152        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis,  You  will  find  that  in  the  statement. 
The  Ch AXEMAN.  Well,  I  do  not  want  to  repeat. 

Now,  yesterday  yon  said  that  there  were  six  battleiships  in  the 
Atlantic  Fleet  and  attention  was  called  to  two  others  that  were  doing 
what  you  call 

Admiral  Inglis.  Shake-down. 
The  Chairman.  Shake-down. 

Is  that  a  naval  term  for  practicing  or  try-out?  Were  they  new 
ships  that  had  not  yet  joined  the  Atlantic  Fleet? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  did  not  include  in  my  statement 
any  ships  that  were  in  the  blueprinting  stage,  that  were  befjng  built 
and  had  not  yet  been  launched,  or  that  had  been  launched  but  were  not 
commissioned,  or  that  were  commissioned  but  had  not  been  ordered 
to  join  the  fleet.  The  ships  are  in  various  stages  of  completion  from 
the  time  the  blueprints  are  drawn  until  the  shake-down  cruise  is  com- 
pleted. 

Now,  after  a  ship  goes  into  commission  with  her  full  crew  and  her 
ammunition  allowance  and  become  a  working  organization,  a  period 
called  a  shake-down  cruise  or  shake-down  period  is  allowed  the  ship 
to  work  out  all  the  kinks  in  the  machinery  and  [370]  in  the 
organization,  to  teach  the  crew  their  ships,  and  that,  depending  on  the 
type  of  ship,  may  take  anything  from  perhaps  a  month  to  some  times 
as  much  as  6  months  or  even,  in  cases  where  they  run  into  a  great 
deal  of  difficulty  with  the  machinery,  perhaps  as  much  as  a  year. 

Now,  those  two  battleships,  the  Woshingfon  and  North  CarolincL, 
were  of  that  status.  They  had  been  commissioned,  they  had  their 
crews  and  their  ammunition  on  board,  but  they  were  still  under 
shake-down  and  had  not  yet  joined  the  fleet. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  they 
were  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  or  in  some  body  of  water  adjacent  to  it, 
they  were  not  a  part  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  all.  I  understand  that  Senator  Brewster 
\Tants  to  ask  you  a  question  or  two. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  have  said  I  wanted  to  ask  some  questions. 
You  said  I  wanted  to  ask  a  question.  I  would  like  to  ask  some  ques- 
tions.    I  haven't  asked  any  questions  so  far. 

I  think  4  o'clock  has  rung. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Will  the  gentleman  jdelcl  to  get  some  information  here, 
Mr.  Chairman? 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 

Mr.  Keefe.  We  are  constantly  referring  to  Army  exhibits,  which  I 
now  have  before  me,  and  reference  was  made  to  the  place-  [371] 
ment  of  the  various  iDatteries  and  the  time  they  got  into  action.  Has 
that  exhibit  been  offered  in  evidence  in  this  case,  or  do  you  intend  to 
offer  it? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  was  just  waiting  for  a  chance,  Mr.  Congressman. 
At  the  close  of  their  testimony  I  was  going  to  make  a  formal  offer. 
You  have  copies  of  it,  but  I  was  going  to  put  it  into  the  record  by  a 
formal  offer. 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  want  to  concern  myself  with  that.  I  understand, 
then,  that  you  are  going  to  offer  this  Army  exhibit  formally  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  will  do  it  now,  if  I  may.  I  would  like  to  get  it 
over  with  before  I  forget  it. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  153 

The  Cpiairmax.  And  also  the  Navy. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  offer  as  Exhibit  5  the  Army  folder  of  documents, 
maps,  and  so  forth,  that  ^vas  produced  by  Colonel  Thielen  in  connec- 
tion with  his  part  in  the  narrative  statement. 

I  also  offer  as  Exhibit  6  the  Navy  folder,  with  all  papers  therein 
contained,  which  are  those  produced  by  Admiral  Inglis  in  connection 
with  his  statement,  and  that  includes  the  document  that  j^ou  just  have 
in  your  hand.     They  are  all  offered. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Mr.  Chairman,  as  a  matter  of  information: 
Of  course,  the  testimony  given  by  these  gentlemen  went  right  through 
these  exhibits  that  were  presented  to  each  member  of  the  committee. 
That  is  correct,  isn't  it? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  true,  but  I  am  offering  the  exhib-  [372] 
its  complete  so  that  they  will  be  formal  parts  of  the  record. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  ''Exhibits  Xos.  5  and  6," 
respectively.) 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  could  I  make  a  request  from 
counsel  ? 

The  CiiAiRMAX.  Senator  Ferguson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  would  like  to  request  counsel  to  get  the  origi- 
nal plotting  chart  made  by  Private  Elliott  at  the  Opana  station  on  the 
morning  of  the  7th  of  December  1941. 

As  I  understand  it,  they  have  been  talking  about  originals  here  and 
this  seems  to  be  a  photostatic  copy  and  at  the  next  session  I  will  want 
to  ask  some  questions  upon  that  plotting. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  would  that  be.  Colonel  ?  Is  it  in  Washing- 
ton? 

Colonel  Thielex.  No,  sir ;  I  think  not.  We  have  never  come  across 
that,  the  plotting  that  was  actually  made  on  the  plotting  board  at  the 
station. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Are  you  talking  about  the  station  at  Opana  or 
the  main  station?  I  am  talking  about  the  one  that  Elliott  plotted, 
that  he  actually  plotted.^ 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  have  never  encountered  any — this  is  one  point 
that  I  have  gone  into  in  some  detail.  I  have  never  encountered  any 
reference  to  the  plot  that  was  made  by  the  enlisted  men  when  they 
were  tracking  a  plane.  We  have  heard  of  Colonel  Murphy's  authen- 
ticated document  which  presents  the  plot  that  was  made. 

[373]         Mr.  Mitchell.  Who  is  he? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  was  ISlurphy  when  this  plot  was  being 
made  ?  Why  can't  we  get  the  original  plot  to  show  the  line  of  flight 
and  whether  or  not  planes  came  in  at  six  something  and  whether  or 
not  they  went  out  at  10  :  45  and  10 :  25  ?  What  I  want  is  the  original 
plotting  made  by  Elliott,  that  he  describes  in  his  testimony. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  am  sure  the  War  Department  will  make  every 
effort  to  get  it. 

Senator  Brewster.  Will  the  counsel  indicate  in  connection  with 
the  presentation  of  the  Navy  and  Army  exhibits  the  number  of  items 
included  which,  as  I  think,  were  illustrated  nmnerically,  so  that  they 
can  be  identified  in  that  way  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  the  Navy  folder  they  are  itemized  as  items  1  to  20. 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 


'The  plot  referred  to  was  subsequently  admitted  to  the  record  as  Exhibit  No.  155. 


154       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  in  the  Army  folder  I  don't  think  they  are. 
I  doubt  if  it  had  a  list.  The  mimeographed  part  of  it  is  a  document 
divided  into  sections,  with  13  pages.  In  addition  to  that  there  are  six 
charts. 

Senator  Brewster.  Can  the  radar  records  of  any  one  distinct  station 
from  the  other  stations  for  this  period  from  4  o'clock  to  7  o'clock  at 
all  the  stations  on  Hawaii  and  during  the  later  part  of  the  morning, 
whenever  they  were  in  operation,  be  made  available,  or  copies  of  it? 

[S74]  Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir;  anything  that  is  in  existence 
will  be  made  available.  I  will  give  you  my  personal  opinion  as  an 
artilleryman,  though,  that  ordinary  computations  made  at  the  time  by 
personnel  in  the  operation  of  such  a  device  would  not  ordinarily  be  a 
matter  of  permanent  record. 

Senator  Brewster.  Do  you  think,  Colonel,  and  would  it  be  likely 
that  records  of  the  morning  of  December  7  would  be  destroyed  ? 

Colonel  Thielex.  I  believe,  and  again  I  am  giving  you  a  personal 
opinion  based  on  professional  experience,  that  Colonel  Murphy,  fore- 
seeing the  situation  and  the  possible  demands  for  information  of  this 
type,  deliberately  made  this  historic  plot  of  information  that  was 
available. 

Senator  Brewster.  Colonel  Murphy  was  in  charge  of  all  the  radar 
stations,  was  he  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  He  was  a  signal  officer  in  the  Hawaiian  Depart- 
ment. The  chief  signal  officer,  Colonel  Powell,  was  in  charge  of  the 
aircraft  warning  system. 

Senator  Brewster.  Are  either  of  those  officers  available  here  now  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  believe  Colonel  Powell  is.  I  understand  Colo- 
nel Murphy  has  since  died. 

Senator  Brewster.  Colonel  Powell,  is  he  expected  to  appear,  do  you 
know? 

[37S]        Mr.  Mitchell.  He  is  on  the  list. 

Mr.  Gesell.  He  is  on  the  list. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  Murphy  a  witness  before  any  of  the  boards? 

Mr.  Gesell.  No,  not  that  I  know  of. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  believe  he  died  shortly  after  that  time.  I  can- 
not state  definitely. 

Senator  Brewster.  Would  you,  Mr.  Mitchell,  advise  Colonel  Powell 
that  we  would  be  interested  in  whatever  original  as  well  as  transcript 
of  those  records  are  available  of  those  records  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  will  ask  Colonel  Duncombe  to  get  ahold  of  him. 
Even  if  he  hasn't  these  records  here  he  can  xeplain  to  you  where  he 
saw  them  and  what  was  done  with  them. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  make  one  brief  correction  in 
the  statement  that  I  made  yesterday  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  won't  take  but  a  moment. 

In  my  original  statement  I  said  that  the  three  patrol  planes  from 
Kaneohe  were  to  take  off  at  sunrise,  5 :  27  Hawaiian  time  on  the  7th, 
but  that  they  did  not  take  off  until  about  6 :  40.  I  later  corrected  that 
by  saying  that  the  plan  was  that  they  take  off  at  dawn,  1  hour  before 
sunrise. 

I  have  since  found  that  I  was  mistaken  in  both  cases  and  the  facts 
are  that  the  order  was  for  them  to  take  off  at  sun-         [376]        rise. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  155 

which  was  at  6  :  26.  They  actually  took  off  at  6 :  40.  In  other  words, 
they  were  14  minutes  late  instead  of  1  hour  and  13  minutes  late. 

Senator  Lucas.  Will  you  produce  those  records  that  show  that  also  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Gearhart. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  have  two  requests  to  make:  One,  that  I  be  fur- 
nished with  a  copy  of  the  summary  of  far  eastern  documents,  the  G-2 
and  Signal  CorjDs  documents  as  I  understand,  and  I  would  like  to 
have  a  copy  of  the  log  of  the  cruiser  Boise  for  the  last  5  days  of  Novem- 
ber 1941  and,  say,  the  first  10  days  of  December  1941.^ 

The  Chairman.  Well,  gentlemen,  if  there  is  nothing  further  we  will 
recess  until  10  o'clock  tomorrow  and  the  chairman  will  express  the 
hope  that  we  will  conclude  with  the  testimony  of  Admiral  Inglis  and 
Colonel  Thielen  before  12  o'clock. 

(Wliereupon,  at  4: 10  o'clock  p.  m.,  Friday,  November  16,  1945,  an 
adjournment  was  taken  until  10  o'clock  a.  m.,  Saturday,  November 
17,  1945.) 


1  Exhibit  No.  68. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  157 


[377^  PEAEL  HARBOE  ATTACK 


SATURDAY,   NOVEMBER   17,    1945 

CONGBESS  OF  THE  UnITED  StATES,    . 

Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the 

Pearl  Harbor  Attack, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

The  joint  committee  met,  pursuant  to  adjournment,  at  10  a.  m.,  in  the 
caucus  room  (room  318),  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Alben  W. 
Barkley  (chairman)  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Barkley  (chairman),  George,  Lucas,  Brewster, 
and  Ferguson  and  Representatives  Cooper  (vice  chairman),  Clark, 
Murphy,  Gearhart,  ancl  Keefe. 

Also  present:  William  D.  Mitchell,  general  counsel;  Gerhard  A. 
Gesell,  Jule  M.  Hannaford,  and  John  E.  Masten,  of  counsel,  for  the 
joint  committee. 

[^75]         The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  be  in  session. 

When  the  committee  adjourned  yesterday  the  Senator  from  Maine, 
Mr.  Brewster,  was  on  the  verge  of  cross-examining  the  witnesses. 
Senator  Brewster  ? 

The  Chair  just  announced  that  when  we  adjourned  yesterday  the 
Senator  from  Maine  was  on  the  verge  of  cross-examining  the  witnesses. 
You  may  now  proceed. 

Senator  Brewster.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  hear  what  you  said.  I 
cannot  hear  you. 

The  Chairman.  I  said  that  when  the  committee  adjourned  yesterday 
the  Senator  from  Maine  was  on  the  verge  of  cross-examining  the  wit- 
nesses and  that  he  would  now  proceed. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Before  he  proceeds  may  I  inquire  from  the  Chairman  ? 
There  has  been  a  lot  of  inquiry  directed  to  me.  May  I  inquire  as  to 
whether  it  is  contemplated  to  hold  hearings  this  afternoon  ? 

The  Chairman.  Well,  the  Chair  would  hope  not,  we  hope  we  can 
finish  these  witnesses  by  noon,  but  if  we  do  not  finish  them  we  will  try 
to  finish  them  by  going  as  late  as  1  o'clock  if  necessary  and  not  adjourn 
at  12  as  we  have  been.     Neither  house  is  in  session  today. 

Go  ahead,  Senator, 

Senator  Brewster.  Admiral  Inglis,  covering  one  or  two  points 
which  you  have  not  fully  developed  in  connection  with  [^STff] 
the  hypothetical  submarine  entrance  into  Pearl  Harbor  at  4 :  30  on  the 
morning  of  December  7,  have  you  any  further  naval  theory  or  record 
to  that  eifect?  You  intimated  that' you  did  not  consider  the  maps 
which  were  shown  of  the  so-called  battle  area  were,  possibly,  authentic. 
I  assume  that  you  have  made  some  explorations  of  that  situation. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  cannot  add  anything  to  what  I  said  yesterday. 
I  am  not  sure  that  I  have  the  map  which  you  have  just  mentioned 

79716 — 46— pt.  1- 13 


158       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

in  the  book  of  battle  reports  precisely  identified  as  identical  with  that 
map  that  I  had  in  mind.  I  am  not  sure  that  we  are  talking  about  the 
same  map. 

Senator  Brewster.  So  when  you  intimated  that  the  entry — I  saw 
it  with  my  own  eyes — was  not  on  the  map,  did  you  find  another  map  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  may  have  been  a  different  map  than  the  one  in 
that  book. 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  But  all  I  can  do  is  repeat  the  general  statement 
that  I  made  yesterday,  that  the  best  picture  or  estimate  that  we  can 
make  from  the  evidence  available  to  us  is  that  one  submarine  definitely 
did  enter  Pearl  Harbor. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  that  is  not  a  matter  of  anybody's  opinion, 
is  it?  You  got  the  submarine,  didn't  you,  that  you  captured  or  sank 
at  the  time  ? 

[380]         Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Brewster.  So  that  there  isn't  any  dispute  about  that. 

Admiral  Inglis.  If  the  Senator  will  permit  me,  I  was  just  reviewing 
what  I  said  yesterday,  which  was  that  one  submarine  did  definitely 
enter  Pearl  Harbor.  A  second  one  may  possibly  have  entered  Pearl 
Harbor  but  we  rather  think  it  did  not. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  what  became  of  the  map  which  was  cap- 
tured with  the  submarine  at  Barbers  Point  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  think  that  that,  or  a  photostatic  copy  of  it,  is  in 
the  Navy  archives. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  you  do  not  agree  with  the  interpretation  of 
that  by  the  Army  or  FBI,  or  by  the  so-called  battle  report  account? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  not  personally  familiar  with  the  opinion  of 
the  Army  or  FBI  on  battle  reports.  My  own  translators,  after  con- 
siderable research  and  considerable  study  of  the  Japanese  symbols 
on  that  map,  have  decided  that  the  evidence  tends  to  be  against  the 
conclusion  that  that  submarine  entered  the  harbor. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  what  is  your  theory  of  how  the  submarine 
did  enter  into  the  harbor  that  actually  did  get  in  there  ? 

[381]  Admiral  Inglis.  Well,  that  is  in  the  realm  of  speculation, 
Mr.  Senator,  but  if  you  wish  me  to  speculate  I  would  speculate  that  the 
submarine  probably  followed  a  United  States  ship  through  the  gate, 
the  gate  having  been  opened  for  the  admission  of  a  United  States 
naval  vessel. 

Senator  Brewster.  What  are  the  records  on  the  ships  coming  in  that 
morning  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  haven't  got  that.  We  tried  to  find  it  and  we 
haven't  got  that  and  I  suggest  that  that  material  could  better  be  ob- 
tained from  some  of  the  witnesses  who  were  present  at  the  time. 

Senator  Brewster.  What  was  the  arrangement  between  the  Army 
and  Navy  about  offshore  patrol ;  what  was  the  understanding  between 
them? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  know  what  the  understanding  was.  So 
far  as  I  know  there  was  no  off-shore  patrol  conducted  by  the  Army. 
There  was  an  off-shore  patrol  conducted  by  the  Navy,  as  I  have  de- 
scribed in  my  previous  testimony. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  what  was  the  nature  of  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Navy's  off-shore  patrol? 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  159 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  consisted  of  the  searches  by  aircraft  that  were 
shown  on  the  charts. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  am  speaking  now  of  the  routine,  not  {382} 
of  the  ones  which  you  have  described,  but  of  the  routine  throughout 
the  weeks  or  months  preceding  that.  Were  there  any  regulations  cov- 
ering that  in  that  period  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  did  not  attempt  to  cover  that  prior  to  the  6th 
of  December.  Our  presentation  only  took  up  from  the  6th  of  Decem- 
ber and  from  then  on,  because  that  is  all  that  was  in  the  outline. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  you  are  not,  then,  prepared  to  testify  as 
to  what  the  understanding  was  between  the  Army  and  Navy  as  to  the 
patrol  around  the  waters  of  Hawaii  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  What  was  the  range  of  the  PBY's  ?  What  was 
the  range  of  the  PBY  bombers  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  just  speaking  off  the  cuff  now,  but  as  I 
recall  it  the  figure  was  800-mile  radius  of  action.  It  would  be  some- 
thing more  than  twice  that  much  for  the  range.  They  would  go 
out  800  miles  generally  on  the  course  followed  and  then  back  again, 
making  a  triangular  track. 

Senator  Brewster.  You  had  some  of  those  PBY's  there  at  Hawaii, 
did  you  not?  :•  j 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  did  not  hear  your  question. 

Senator  Brewster.  You  had  some  of  those  PBY's  there  at  Hawaii, 
did  you  not  ? 

ySS]         Admiral  Inglis.  Oh,  yes. 

Senator  Brewster.  How  many  of  them,  do  you  recall  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  not  certain.  Referring  to  item  12  of  the 
Navy  exhibit,  at  Kaneohe  there  was  a  total  of  36  PBY's.  At  Ford 
Island  a  total  of  31 — I  beg  your  pardon,  33. 

Senator  Brewster.  Thirty-three ;  that  makes  a  total  of  69  PBY's. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  believe  that  is  substantially  correct,  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  Those  were  suitable  at  that  time  for  this  long- 
range  patrol  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  type  of  plane  was  suitable  for  that  type  of 
patrol,  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  How  long  have  you  been  in  Intelligence, 
Admiral  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  How  long  have  I  been  in  Intelligence? 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Since  the  1st  of  June  of  this  year. 

Senator  Brewster.  Has  your  experience  before  that  been  any  in 
that  field  or  in  operations? 

Admiral  Inglis.  More  in  operations  and  communications,  general 
service  that  most  of  us  have,  no  unusual  type  of  duty,  except  that  I  was 
a  specialist  in  communications  for  a  while. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  it  would  not  require  any  special  training  to 
know  that  the  Japanese  had  in  previous  wars  in-  [384-]  dulged 
in  these  sneak  attacks,  would  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  believe  that  is  a  matter  of  history. 

Senator  Brewster.  So  that  if  there  were  likely  to  be  trouble  between 
the  Japanese  and  the  United  States,  provoked  by  the  United  States, 


160       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

it  was  altogether  likely  that  it  would  be  started  in  that  way,  wouldn't 
that  be  right  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  I  think  that  would  be  a  safe  conclusion  to  draw, 
yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  that  it  is  rather  accepted  in  military  and 
naval  strategy  to  aim  at  the  jugular? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  did  not  get  the  last  part. 

Senator  Brewster.  To  aim  at  the  jugular.  You  try  to  strike  at  the 
strongest  spot,  where  you  can  do  the  most  damage? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Well,  I 

Senator  Brewster.  Let  me  put  it  this  way :  Hasn't  that  been  what 
the  Japs  have  always  done  ?  In  their  previous  wars  didn't  they  always 
hit  the  enemy  where  they  would  do  the  enemy  the  most  damage  at 
one  time  in  those  sneak  attacks  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Of  course,  that  is  a  pretty  broad,  general  state- 
ment, Senator.     I  guess  I  could  agree  with  you  as  a  general  statement. 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes ;  so  that  if  there  were  to  be  trouble  it  would 
be  reasonable  to  anticipate  that  it  might  [385]  come  in  Pearl 
Harbor,  would  that  be  a  fair  statement  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  I  am  afraid  3^ou  are  going  out  of  my  field  now, 
sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  you  are  the  Director  of  Intelligence  for 
the  Navy,  so  3^ou  are  assumed  to  have  a  certain  competency  in  this 
field.  You  are  handling  this  responsibility  now  and  you  must  be 
looking  to  the  future. 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Well,  I  feel  flattered  at  your  compliment,  Senator. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  I  am  quite  serious.  I  have  a  very  high 
respect  for  your  accomplishments,  I  think  3'ou  have  exhibited  them 
already  and  we  are  trying  to  learn,  of  course,  by  experience  to  avoid 
trouble  hereafter. 

What  I  am  coming  to  is  this,  that  if  there  were  any  reason  to  antic- 
ipate trouble  at  Pearl  Harbor,  where  most  of  our  Pacific  fleet  was 
concentrated,  most  of  its  striking  power,  it  would  have  been  possible 
by  the  use  of  the  PBY  patrol  bombers  readily  to  have  ascertained 
whether  an}'  striking  force  or  carrier  force  were  approaching,  would 
it  not,  by  a  patrol  ? 

Admiral  Ix'glis.  I  am  not  sure  whether  the  number  of  planes  avail- 
able for  that  type  of  search  at  that  time  was  sufficient  to  allow  a  con- 
tinual search  all  day  every  day. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  would  it  have  required  anything  more 
than  an  800-mile  patrol  from  Pearl  Harbor  over  [386]  the 
areas  which  were  not  covered  by  your  shipping  each  day  to  have  made 
it  impossible  for  a  hostile  fleet  to  have  approached  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  I  think  again  you  are  getting  a  little  bit  out  of  my 
field  and  more  into  the  field  of  aviation  officers,  but  from  my  broad 
general  experience  as  a  naval  officer  I  would  say  that  probably  that 
number  of  planes  was  not  sufficient  to  cover  all  possible  avenues  of 
approach  of  a  hostile  force  24 

Senator  Brewster.  That  is  not  what  I  asked  you  and  you  are  intelli- 
gent enough  to  answer  my  question. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  going  to  object  to  the  questions 
of  the  Senator  from  Maine. 
.    The  Chairmax.  Let  the  Senator  from  Maine  proceed  in  order. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  161 

Admiral  Inglis.  Will  the  Senator  please  repeat  the  question? 

Senator  Brewster.  You  ask  the  question — read  it. 

(The  question  referred  to  was  read  by  the  reporter  as  follows:) 

Well,  would  it  have  required  anything  more  than  an  800-mile  patrol  from 
I'earl  Harbor  over  the  areas  which  were  not  covered  by  your  shipping  each 
day  to  have  made  it  impossible  for  a  hostile  [387]  fleet  to  have  ap- 
proached? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  I  beg  your  pardon.  I  did  not  understand  the 
question. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  thought  you  did  not. 

Admiral  Ixglis.  The  answer  to  that  question  is  "Yes,"  with  this 
qualification,  that  again  speaking  now  in  general  terms,  the  areas 
which  would  be  hjq^othetically  covered  by  your  own  shipping  could 
probably  not  be  counted  upon.  In  other  words,  to  carry  out  such  a 
thorough  search  as  the  one  you  have  in  mind  we  would  have  to  cover 
almost  the  whole  360°  arc. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  that  may  be  true,  Admiral,  but  isn't  it  also 
true  that,  exactly  as  the  Japanese  planned,  they  would  not  be  likely 
to  approach  through  areas  where  our  shipping  was  frequenting  the 
courses  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Brewster.  They  would  be  desirous  of  avoiding  us. 

Admiral  Ix-^glis.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Brewster.  So  that  if  at  the  time  we  abandoned  our  ship- 
ping on  the  northern  route  patrols  had  been  carried  out  on  the  northern 
area,  with  the  limited  range  of  the  battle  planes  from  carriers,  it  would 
have  been,  let  us  say,  at  least  exceedingly  difficult  for  the  Jap  force  to 
have  approached? 

[388]         Admiral  Ixglis.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Brewster.  And,  of  course,  that  is  one  of  the  things  which 
I  think  is  of  serious  concern  and  in  my  visits  to  Pearl  Harbj^r  before 
and  after  it  occurred  there  was  always  great  discussion,  the  Army 
feeling  that  if  it  had  been  permitted  to  carry  out  these  patrols  with 
their  long  range  bombers  they  could  have  detected  this  and  the  Navy 
holding  the  Army  strictly  accountable  for  the  defense  of  Hawaii ;  but, 
as  I  understand — and  I  will  ask  the  counsel  or  you  to  have  this  veri- 
fied— it  was  a  matter  of  agreement  and  orders  that  the  Army  was  not  to 
participate  in  a  patrol  beyond  a  very  limited  area,  a  hundred  miles  or 
so,  I  believe,  while  the  Navy  was  to  take  care  of  the  longer  range 
patrol  because  of  the  existing  controversy  at  that  period  which,  I  am 
sure,  both  of  you  gentlemen  are  thoroughly  familiar,  as  to  the  control 
of  long-range  aircraft  and  the  function  and  the  mission  which  they 
were  to  perform. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  It  may  help  the  Senator  if  I  say  that  at  a  very 
early  stage  of  the  case,  in  fact,  within  the  next  day  or  two  if  we  take 
the  normal  course,  we  will  produce  all  the  defense  plans  that  show 
the  respective  duties  of  the  Army  and  Navy  about  that  reconnaissance 
and  we  have  a  very  splendid  document  here  prepared  by  General 
Martin,  I  think,  in  the  summer  of  1941  that  answers  every  question 
that  you  [389]  have  asked  about  the  patrols  that  could  have 
been  carried  on,  how  many  planes  were  required  to  do  it  and  quite  a 
complete  picture  of  the  thing  that  you  are  interested  in. 


162       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

We  have  that  and  it  is  coming  in  with  the  defense  plans  which 
show  the  respective  duties  of  the  Army  and  Navy  and  what  was 
required  in  the  way  of  equipment  to  execute  it. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  I  should  be  glad  to  have  that.  I  did  not 
assume  that  this  was  a  matter  which  was  in  controversy  in  any  way, 
as  to  what  were  the  Army  and  Navy  arrangements,  so  I  think  it  is 
a  little  regrettable  that  the  Army  and  Navy  did  not  agree  to  give 
us  what  were  the  actual  arrangements,  unless  it  was  at  the  suggestion 
of  counsel. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  these  gentlemen  were  only  giving  the  facts 
as  to  the  actual  conditions  on  the  day  of  the  attack  and  the  available 
equipment,  and  the  Army  and  Navy  plans  for  defense  prepared 
during  the  summer  of  1941,  over  the  months  prior  to  Pearl  Harbor, 
being  a  series  of  plans,  each  of  them  all  arranged,  with  these  things 
in  them  that  you  are  interested  in  and  you  will  get  a  more  accurate 
story  from  those  than  you  would  from  possibly  a  witness  who  was 
called  on  another  matter  and  has  not  studied  it  lately. 

Senator  Brewster.  Very  well,  I  will  be  very  happy  to  waive  the 
presentation  of  that  until  the  proper  time. 

Admiral,  I  want  to  take  one  other  phase,  which  is  all  I  [SOO] 
care,  I  think,  to  examine  you  about,  and  that  is  the  matter  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  fleet. 

You  have  realized,  I  presume,  in  your  position  that  that  has  been 
one  of  the  matters  that  has  been  much  agitated  in  connection  with 
this  matter,  as  to  the  allocation  of  the  fleets  between  the  Atlantic  and 
the  Pacific,  have  you  not.  Admiral?  There  has  been  considerable 
discussion  as  to  whether  or  not  there  was  a  good  disposition. 

Admiral  Inglis.  There  has  been  considerable  discussion,  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  also  as  to  the  reasons  for  it  and  where  the 
orders  were  developed,  so  that  speaking  from  that  background  and 
your  position  you  would  gather  also  that  that  is  one  of  the  questions 
that  will  very  likely  be  considerably  discussed  in  this  case. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  would  expect  that. 

Senator  Brewster.  Now,  when  the  matter  came  up  you  spoke  of 
the  Pacific  Fleet  as  being  two-thirds  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  in  strength. 
Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  numerical  strength,  yes. 

Senator  Brewster.  That  is  based  on  the  unit.  And  you  were  then 
asked  further  by  Senator  Ferguson  about  the  allocation  of  the  units. 
I  want  to  read  you  your  evidence  and  ask  you  your  comment  on  it.  I 
read  quotations  from  your         [S91]         evidence  on  page  172: 

Admiral,  you  said — 

this  is  Senator  Ferguson  speaking — 

Admiral,  you  said  that  about  two-thirds  of  our  fleet  was  in  the  Pacific ;  is  that 
correct  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir.  I  said  that  the  numerical  sti-ength  of  the  Pacific 
Fleet  was  two-thirds  that  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet.  The  Pacific  Fleet  was  smaller 
than  the  Atlantic  Fleet. 

And  then  after  some  other  colloquies,  turning  to  page  173,  Senator 
Ferguson  again: 

Well,  how  many  capital  battleships  were  in  the  Atlantic? 
Admiral  Inglis.  In  the  Atlantic  Fleet  were  six  battleships.     In  the  Pacific 
Fleet  were  nine  battleships.     Six  in  the  Atlantic  and  nine  in  the  Pacific. 

Now,  at  that  point  it  seems  to  me,  Admiral,  you  were  a  little  less( 
than  careful.    Your  first  statement  was  absolutely  correct.    Your  ad- 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  163 

dition  was  absolutely  incorrect  and  it  occurs  to  me  that  hearing  of 
this  colloquy  you  must  have  been  rather  well  aware  of  what  Senator 
Ferguson,  at  least,  was  asking. 

I  will  read  the  next  page,  after  some  further  colloquies : 

Senator  Febguson.  Now,  how  many  battleships  were  in  Atlantic? 
[392]         Admiral  Inglis.  Six. 

On  the  basis  of  the  subsequent  evidence  which  was  finally  extracted 
from  you  that  statement  was  unqualifiedly  false ;  is  that  not  correct? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  think  the  Senator  is  drawing  some  conclusions 
with  respect  to  the 

Senator  Brewster,  I  am  quoting  your  testimony  before  this  tribunal 
and  that  statement,  as  you  have  now  admitted  after  we  finally  elicited 
the  information,  was  unqualifiedly  false. 

The  Chairman.  If  the  Senator  will  permit 

Senator  Brewster.  The  chairman  can  do  anything  he  likes.  I  am 
making  a  statement  of  fact. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  the  Chair  feels  that  this  inquiry  ought  to  be 
conducted  with  decorum  and  respect  and  for  a  member  of  this  com- 
mittee to  charge  a  witness  with  making  an  unqualifiedly  false  state- 
ment seem  to  the  Chair,  whether  it  seems  to  other  members  of  this 
committee  proper,  to  be  out  of  order. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  will  continue  the  quotation : 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  I  read  from  battle  report.  Pearl  Harbor  to  Coral 
Sea,  which  is  supposed  to  be  an  official  record,  page  6 : 
"In  the  Atlantic  there  were  eight  battleships." 

[S9S]         Eeading  from  page  6 : 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  can't  recognize  that  book  as  being  official.  I  have  here  a  list 
of  the  specific  ships — 

I  go  on : 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  personally  still  don't  recognize  that  as  being  official,  except 
what  you  have  told  me  now,  but,  if  I  may,  Senator  Ferguson,  I  will  read  the  list 
of  ships  that  were  in  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  and  the  list  of  those  in  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

Still  it  is  apparently  contemplated  that  we  were  wishing  to  discover 
the  truth. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

You  then  proceeded  to  read  the  list  of  the  two  fleets.  I  want  to  go 
now  to  another  page  and  quote.  This  has  gone  on  now  for  five  pages 
trying  to  extract  the  simple  facts  as  to  the  disposition  of  our  fleets,  of 
our  battleships,  which  is  what  Senator  Ferguson  repeatedly  asked  you, 
and  he  finally,  and  I  might  say  at  my  suggestion,  because  I  was  com- 
pletely bewildered  by  what  you  were  trying  to  tell  us,  on  page  176 
Senator  Ferguson  says : 

How  many  battleships  did  we  have  in  December  1941? 
Admiral  Inglis.  Fifteen,  sir. 

There  again  is  a  statement  which,  on  your  subsequent  [394] 
evidence  when  you  finally  admitted  the  existence  of  the  Washington 
and  the  North  Carolina  ready  for  their  cruises  and  shake-downs,  is  a 
statement  that  does  not  correspond  with  what  up  in  our  part  of  the 
country  would  be  considered  as  the  truth. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  the  gentleman  yield? 

The  Chairman.  No  ;  let  the  Senator  proceed  without  interruption. 


164        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Brewster  (reading)  : 

Senator  Fekguson.  Fifteen? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Fifteen  tlaat  were  attached  to  tlie  fleets.  Tliere  were  two  or 
three  that  had  just  been  completed,  or  were  on  their  shake-down  duty. 

At  last  we  are  permitted  to  lind  out  what  is  the  answer  to  this- 
conundrum. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  were  they? 

You  then  testified  as  to  the  Washington  and  the  North  Carolina  on 
shake-down  in  the  Atlantic. 

All  I  have  to  say  is  this,  Admiral,  and  I  say  it  in  all  charity.  I  have 
served  on  the  Naval  Affairs  Committee  during  my  period  in  Congress ; 
I  have  been  interested  in  the  Navy ;  we  have  the  Navy  up  in  Maine  in 
large  measure  and  everybody  else  is  interested  in  it  and,  of  course, 
for  4  years  we  have  been  dealing  very  definitely  with  preparedness  and 
defense  and  I  speak  not  only  from  observation  but  the  thoughts 
\^395~\  of  most  of  the  members  of  our  committee  involved  in  that 
task  and  of  its  distinguished  chairman.  President  Truman,^  in  regret- 
ting profoundly  that  there  has  developed  an  attitude  of  mind  on  the 
part,  particularly  of  the  Navy,  that  does  not  seem  to  recognize  the 
rights  and  interests  of  this  Congress  to  receive  full,  frank,  and  fair 
answers  to  the  questions  that  have  come  up  and  I  say  particularly 
in  the  process  of  this  hearing  for  yourself  and  your  fellow  officers  and 
for  the  future  welfare  of  the  Navy,  which  is  the  great  problem  in  this 
country  in  building  up  the  confidence  that  it  wants  to  command,  by  a 
freer  and  a  franker  approach  to  the  aims  of  myself  and  other  members 
of  the  connnittee  it  would  do  much  to  increase  that  confidence  that 
I  think  we  all  want  to  establish. 

[^396~\  Senator  Lucas.  Is  this  going  to  be  a  lecture  school,  Mr. 
Chairman  ? 

The  Chairman.  Whatever  it  is,  it  will  speak  for  itself. 

Go  ahead.  Admiral,  if  you  want  to  comment  on  that  dissertation 
you  are  at  liberty  to  do  so. 

Admiral  Inglis.  May  I  comment  in  full,  sir? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  Senator  from  Maine  has  im- 
pugned my  honesty  and  my  motives.  I  resent  that.  I  gave  the  facts 
to  the  best  of  my  knowledge  and  belief. 

The  point  he  has  brought  up  about  the  Washington  and  North  Caro- 
lina^ and  the  other  ships  which  had  not  joined  the  fleets  was  fully 
covered  in  a  statement  which  I  made  yesterday  afternoon.  I  said  in 
that  statement  that,  of  course,  you  might  count  battleships  or  other 
ships  which  were  still  in  the  blueprint  stage,  you  might  count  battle- 
ships or  other  ships  still  in  the  building  ways,  you  might  count  battle- 
ships or  other  ships  which  had  been  launched  l3ut  which  had  not  been 
completed,  you  might  count  battleships  or  other  ships  which  had  been 
commissioned  but  had  not  joined  the  fleet,  but  I  was  counting  the 
ships  that  had  joined  the  fleet,  and  I  thought  I  made  that  quite  clear 
in  my  statement. 

I  have  done  my  very  best  in  this  presentation  to  give  all  the  facts 
to  the  best  of  my  knowledge  and  ability.  I  [,?57]  don't  be- 
lieve the  Navy,  and  certainly  not  the  organization,  is  attempting  to 
withhold  any  evidence  whatsoever.     I  repeatedly  stated  I  was  author- 

1  Special  Senate  Committee  Investigating  the  National  Defense  Program 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  165 

ized  for  the  Navy  to  state  that  we  would  produce  any  facts  that  we 
were  asked  to  produec. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  think  the  record  Avill  speak  for  itself. 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  any  further  questions,  Senator? 

Senator  Brewster.  No. 

The  Chairman.  Does  any  other  member  of  the  committee  wish  to 
ask  Admiral  Inglis  any  questions? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  The  Senator  from  Michigan. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  want  to  ask  the  colonel  some  questions. 

Colonel,  I  show  you  the  exhibit  that  is  in  evidence  here,  this  map 
of  the  radar. 

Colonel  Thielen  :  Will  you  put  the  radar  plot  up.  Captain  Barnes  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  the  chart  that  is  on  the  board  here  made 
from  the  exhibit  that  you  have  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  was  made  from  an  exhibit  which  I  believe  was 
identical. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  looked  for  the  original  charting  done 
of  the  Opana  station  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir ;  a  radiogram  was  dispatched  to  [398] 
the  Hawaiian  Department  since  the  last  meeting  asking  for  the  original 
plots  from  all  radar  stations  on  December  7,  1941. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  show  you  a  photostat  that  is  exhibit  3-B  in 
evidence,  and  I  ask  you  what  that  is. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Exhibit  3-B  in  evidence  where  ? 

Mr.  KJEEFE.  Mr.  Chairman,  3-B  of  what? 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  exhibit  itself  does  not  show,  but  I  am  of 
the  opinion  it  is  of  the  Army  exhibits.  Does  counsel  agree  with  that? 
I  shall  just  identify  it  from  the  mark  on  the  paper  itself. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Mr.  Chairman,  just  as  a  matter  of  informa- 
tion, I  understood  the  Senator  to  say  it  was  in  evidence. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  was  reading  what  was  on  the  sheet.  That  is 
on  the  sheet. 

The  Chairman.  That  was  a  part  of  the  Army  file  which  was 
yesterday  put  in  evidence  along  with  the  Navy  white  folder. 

Senator  Ferguson.  No,  no. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Let  me  clear  that  up.  The  document  which  the 
Senator  just  produced  is  not  in  evidence  in  this  hearing. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  understood  him  referring  to  it  as  having  been  in 
evidence  in  some  other  investigation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  merelv  read  off  the  identification  numbers, 
what  is  on  the  blueprint  itself.  It  is  only  for  the  [399]  pur- 
pose of  identification.     That  expression  I  used  is  on  the  sheet  itself. 

The  Chairman.  If  there  is  a  memorandum  on  the  sheet  showing 
it  is  in  evidence,  it  ought  to  show  in  what  proceeding  it  is  in  evidence. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  does  not  show  that.  I  would  like  to  make 
that  clear  for  the  record.  Will  the  colonel  read  what  is  on  the  corner 
of  the  sheet  so  the  record  will  be  clear? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  see  the  statement  "Exhibit  3-B  in  evidence." 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  exactly  what  I  read.  That  is  for 
identification  purposes. 

Have  you  examined  it? 

Colonel  Thielen.  For  the  first  time  now. 


166        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  compare  it  with  the  board  and  with 
the  exhibit  now  in  evidence  ? 

Colonel  Thtelen.  I  have  compared  it,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Are  they  alike  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Exhibit  3-B,  so-called,  appears  to  include  the 
information  on  the  board. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  not  what  I  asked  you.     Are  they  alike  ? 

The  Chairman.  Let  the  witness  explain  in  what  particular  they 
differ,  if  they  do  differ. 

[400]  Senator  Ferguson.  Cannot  I  have  an  answer  to  my  ques- 
tion first  ?     Are  they  alike  ? 

The  Chairman.  He  was  in  the  process  of  answering  your  question. 
Senator,  when  you  interrupted. 

Go  ahead  and  give  your  answer. 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  exhibit  3-B  in  evidence,  so-called,  appears 
to  include  the  plots  referred  to  on  the  board  and  on  the  exhibit  which 
3^ou  handed  me  previously,  sir,  and  in  addition  appears  to  have  other 
plots  which  were  made  later  in  the  day. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  will  you  tell  us  how  they  differ?  Will 
you  give  us  all  that  is  on  the  exhibit  that  I  gave  you  this  morning, 
exhibit  3-B  in  evidence,  the  way  it  is  marked  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  contains  numerous  additional  plots. 

[401]         Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  give  them  to  us  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  would  be  very  difficult  to  do  that  orally,  sir. 
I  see  pips  and  plots  all  over  the  area. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  mean  to  say  you  cannot  give  us  any  of 
them  ?     Are  your  eyes  not  able  to  read  them  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.  I  start  up  in  the  upper  left-hand 
corner  and  I  see  a  spot 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  the  time  marking? 

Colonel  Thielen.  10 : 3 — and  the  final  digit  is  illegible.  Below 
that  is  10 :  35.  Below  that  is  10,  and  then  illegible  and  the  digit  3. 
Below  that  is  10 :  30.  Below  that  is  10 :  2  and  an  illegible  digit.  Be- 
low that  is  10 :  27  and  an  illegible  digit.  About  an  inch  below  that 
is  a  spot  with  illegible  digits.  Below  that  about  a  half  inch  is  a 
spot  10:  31. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  are  not  they  illegible  just  simply  because 
the  photostat  is  not  clear  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  believe  that  is  true,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right,  go  ahead. 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  appears  to  conclude  that  plot  of  the  10 :  00 
series. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Give  us  the  other  plots. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Wliich  are  you  referring  to  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  On  the  map,  that  is  not  on  the  one  [402] 
shown  to  us. 

Colonel  Thielen.  About  3  inches  due  north  of  Kaena  Point,  I  find 
a  single  spot,  and  to  the  southeast  is  a  dotted  line,  about  an  inch, 
and  another  spot  surrounded  by  numerals,  some  of  them  illegible,  one 
of  which  I  make  out  as  7 :  50  or  7 :  56. 

Senator  Ferguson.  They  are  to  the  left  of  what  is  on  the  chart 
here,  7:39? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  would  be  in  the  neighborhood  of  a  point 
on  the  chart  marked  6 :  59. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  167 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Below  the  broad  arrow. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  the  mark  on  this  chart  I  gave  you? 
6:30? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  read  7 :  50  here. 

Senator  Ferguson.  7 :  50. 

Colonel  Thielen.  There  is  no  indication,  however,  that  that  is  the 
same  plot  as  the  one  on  the  board. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  what  else  is  on  that  chart  that  is  not  on 
the  one  on  the  board  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  There  are 

Senator  Ferguson  (interposing).  I  am  talking  about  the  Opana 
chart,  3-B  in  evidence,  so  marked. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  this  is  marked  "Opana"  down  in  [4031 
the  lower  left-hand  corner.  Out  to  the  east-northeast — or  west-north- 
west of  Kaena  Point  is  a  series — I  should  estimate  the  distance  on  this 
scale  of  about  50  miles — is  a  series  of  arrows  pointing  out  spots,  no  one 
of  which,  as  near  as  I  can  make  out,  has  a  time  indicated  on  it.  South 
of  that,  in  the  general  area  off  the  Hawaiian  coast  of  the  island  are 
a  number  of  white  dots  which  may  be  caused  by  faults  in  the  photostat, 
or  may  be  plots. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Just  there  it  is  very  important  then  to  get  all 
of  the  facts  that  we  should  have  the  original  instrument  and  not  be 
depending  upon  a  photostat  which  can  be  so  defective  that  you  cannot 
read  it ;  is  that  right  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Since  the  last  meeting,  sir,  the  War  Department 
has  dispatched  a  radiogram  to  the  Hawaiian  Department  asking  for 
the  originals  of  the  plots  of  all  stations  on  December  7,  1941. 

[4^4J  Senator  Ferguson.  Can  you  tell  us  why  you  produced  the 
plot  you  did  and  did  not  give  us  the  one  in  the  Army  board  records  ? 
I  understood  the  evidence  was  to  be  evidence  not  disputed,  that  you 
were  to  bring  in.     How  do  you  account  for  that  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  For  one  thing,  sir,  this  appears  to  include  all  plots 
made  during  the  day  and  not  those  made  during  the  attack,  with  which 
I  was  dealing. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliy  did  you  bring  in  your  10 :  39  then  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Because  that  occurs  on  Exhibit  4,  which  I  clearly 
specified  was  the  one  from  which  I  had  taken  the  chart. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  not  Exhibit  4  a  plot  made  up  by  an  individual 
and  not  the  original  evidence  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Both  plots  are  authenticated  by  Lieutenant  Colo- 
nel Murphy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  ask  you  whether  the  one  I  gave  you,  3-B,  the 
Opana  photostat,  is  not  purporting  to  be  from  an  original  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  appears  to  be,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right.  Now  I  show  you  another  photostat, 
exhibit  3-A  in  evidence — and  I  take  it  for  granted  that  means  it  was 
in  evidence  at  the  Army  board,  and  I  just  use  that  for  identification 
purposes — and  ask  you  if  you         [4^<5]         ever  saw  that  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir.  I  have  not  only  seen  that  but  I  have 
had  it  reproduced  as  an  Army  exhibit  on  page  8. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  one  is  reproduced.  Did  you  use  that  infor- 
mation on  the  chart  that  you  gave  us  ? 


168        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Colonel  Thielen.  Not  on  the  chart  of  the  Opana  station,  sir,  because 
the  chart  to  which  you  have  last  referred  is  not  the  chart  of  the  Opana 
station. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  ask  you  to  read  the  notes  down  in  the 
cornej'  and  see  whether  part  of  it  is  not  of  the  Opana  station. 

Colonel  Thieleis^.  This  says : 

Detector  station  records  at  Kaena,  Opana,  Kaala,  Shatter,  Kokohead  on  Decem- 
ber 7, 1941,  prior  to  7 :  00  a.  m. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  think  we  only  wanted,  in  your  verbal 
evidence  here,  the  Opana  station? 

Colonel  Thielen.  As  I  pointed  out.  Senator,  the  chart  to  which 
you  refer  was  offered  in  evidence  as  Army  exhibit,  page  8. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  realize  that.  Why  did  not  you  include  the 
showings  on  this  map  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  only  significance  I  see  in  this  chart  is  that  it 
confirms  the  plots  earlier  in  the  day  of  the  Opana  station,  indicating 
that  that  station  was  tracking         [406]         correctly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  we  understand  then  that  we  have  received 
here  on  the  board  a  corrected  chart  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  By  no  means. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  I  will  ask  you  to  look  at  page  116,  that  you 
gave  me  the  other  clay  as  the  page  from  which  you  got  the  evidence  on 
this  radar,  about  Avhat  Elliott  was  doing.  Do  you  find  anything  on 
that?  That  is  the  Roberts  evidence.  You  gave  me  page  116  as  the 
report  as  I  told  you  I  could  not  find  it  in  the  report  because  the  report 
did  not  haA^e  so  many  pages  and  then  you  said  it  was  in  the  evidence. 

Now  I  sliow  you  page  116  of  the  evidence  and  ask  you  if  you  find 
anything  on  that? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  will  check  my  documentation  on  that,  sir.  It  is 
entirely  possible  that  my  documentation  is  incorrect ;  but  I  read  them 
correctly.  It  is  exhibit  S  of  the  Roberts  report,  page  116,  affidavit  of 
Private  McDonald. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  got  the  affidavit  of  Private  McDon- 
ald? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  is  in  the  files  of  the  War  Department ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  could  he  give  what  Elliott  was  doing  when 
he  was  the  telephone  operator  down  at  the  center?  Why  would  you 
rely  upon  his  affidavit? 

[40/]  Colonel  Thielen.  Let  me  check  that  to  see  just  what  that 
referred  to,  sir.  I  see  that  that  evidence  refers  to  the  location  of  the 
aircraft  as  picked  up  by  Private  Elliott  and  Private  Lockard,  which 
was  presumably  reported  to  Private  McDonald. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  might  I  inquire  from  counsel  whether  or 
not  they  have  the  affidavit  in  the  Roberts  report  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  I  haven't  them  in  court  this  minute. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  asking  you  whether  you  have  them. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  have  the  Roberts  record,  if  that  is  what  you 
mean,  all  the  exhibits  in  the  War  and  Nav}^  that  the  Roberts  commis- 
sion is  presumed  to  have  had. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  counsel  try  and  locate  that  affidavit  for 
the  committee? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  My  chief  assistant  suggested  that  j^ou  may  have  the 
Roberts  record.     We  were  passing  these  things  out. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  169 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  do  not  have  the  affidavit.  I  did  not  know 
there  were  any  affidavits  until  the  witness  lias  been  giving  affidavits. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  will  look  up  our  records  and  see  who  has  that 
information.     What  is  it  exactly  you  want,  Senator  Ferguson? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  want  the  affidavit  in  the  Roberts  investigation. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  All  the  affidavits  ^ 

[408]  Senator  Ferguson.  All  the  affidavits  in  the  Roberts  in- 
vestigation. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  learn  that  my  citation  in  my  document  was 
incorrect  originally,  page  116.  I  should  have  cited  volume  2  of  the 
Roberts  report,  pages  66  and  67,  General  Short's  testimony,  as  to  the 
facts  mentioned. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right.  Now  on  this'  map  that  you  have 
given  us  the  Opana  station  shows  6  :  45,  6  :  48,  6 :  50,  6 :  51,  6 :  58,  6 :  48, 
6:51,6:52,  and  6:  59. 

Now  referring  to  the  testimony  of  Elliott  on  page  997,  transcript 
of  proceedings  before  the  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board  on  Thursday, 
August  17,  1944,  and  reading  back  one  question : 

General  Frank.  What  I  am  trying  to  ascertain  is  whether  on  the  morning  of 
December  7  there  was  more  activity  than  usual  or  whether  there  was  less 
activity  than  usual,  or  was  it  average? 

Sergeant  Eixiott.  Well,  sir,  during  our  problem  on  Sunday  there  was  practi- 
cally no  activity  at  all. 

General  Frank.  Prior  to  this  time? 

Sergeant  Eluott.  Prior  to  7  o'clock;  yes,  sir.  We  had  no  plots  to  send  in 
to  our  information  center  and  had  no  targets. 

Now  how  do  you  reconcile  that  evidence  with  what  you  are  giving 
the  committee  ?     I  show  you  the  original. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  consider  this  evidence  of  the  plot  [^OO] 
authenticated  by  a  signal  officer  responsible  at  this  station  to  be  evi- 
dence that  is  worthy  of  being  presented  to  the  committee,  under  my 
directive  of  giving  them  the  facts,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Over  and  above  the  sworn  testimony  of  the  man 
who  did  the  charting,  is  that  correct? 

Colonel  Thielen.  There  is  no  evidence  that  he  was  on  the  set  at 
that  particular  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  talking  about  Elliott. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Are  we  then  going  to  get  from  the  Army  the 
conclusions  of  some  officers  later  on  and  not  the  eyewitnesses  to  these 
facts?     Is  that  what  we  are  getting  here? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  a  question  for  counsel,  I  think. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  asking  the  witness. 

The  Chairman.  The  witness  cannot  answer  what  we  are  o-oino-  to 
get  hereafter.  As  everybody  has  been  advised,  Mr.  Lockard  and  Mr. 
Tyler  are  both  on  the  list  of  witnesses.  They  were  in  charge,  makino- 
these  records,  and  certainly  their  testimony  will  be  produced  here. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  correct  my  statement,  but  I 
cannot  speak  for  the  future.     I  am  talking  about  what  we  did  get. 

Is  that  correct,  that  it  was  the  conclusions  of  officers  rather  than  the 
testimony  of  eyewitnesses  ? 

[4^0]  Colonel  Thielen.  I  see  no  conclusion  in  what  purports  to 
be  and  is  authenticated  as  the  record  of  the  plots  of  the  Opana  station. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  do  not  see  any 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  say  it  is  a  conclusion  to  reproduce  a  plot. 


170       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliere  the  witness  himself,  who  made  the  chart, 
says  there  were  no  other  targets  that  morning,  in  the  statement,  and 
you  bring  in  the  conclusion  of  an  officer  that  there  were  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  consider  it  a  conclusion,  sir.  It  is  a 
plot. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  it? 

Colonel  Thielen.  It  is  a  written  record,  sir.    It  is  a  plot. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  made  it? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Murphy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  did  he  make  it  from?  Did  he  make  it 
from  the  one  I  gave  you  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  From  the  records  of  the  Opana  station.  I  cannot 
say  what  he  saw  when  he  made  this  record. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  do  you  account  for  two  records  of  that 
station  then  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  One  of  them  covers  the  entire  day,  sir,  [4-^-?] 
and  one  covers  the  critical  period. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  could  the  one  that  followed,  that  covered 
the  entire  day,  be  any  different  than  the  one  that  gave  them  the  exact 
period,  and  that  is  up  to  7 :  39  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  In  what  way,  sir? 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  could  they  differ?  The  one  that  covered 
all  day,  how  could  it  be  different  from  the  one  that  coveired  it  up 
to  7 :  39  ?  I  take  it  the  7 :  39  chart  up  to  that  point,  would  be  complete 
up  to  that  time,  would  it  not  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir,  that  would  be  the  supposition. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  it  would  not  have  any  thing  on  that  was 
not  on  this  chart.  Now  where  do  you  get  this  6 :  50  and  6 :  45,  if  this 
man  who  made  the  chart  said  he  did  not  have  any  other  targets  on 
that  day? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Where  do  I  get  it,  sir  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  get  it  from  the  so-called  historic  plot. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right.  Now  will  you  give  us  when  the  first 
bomb  was  dropped  again  ? 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  the  gentleman  suspend  a  minute 
until  I  can  look  at  the  report  and  the  exhibit  on  which  he  questioned 
the  witness  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

[4i^]         Mr.  Murphy.  Will  you  pass  them  over,  please  ? 

The  Chairman.  Will  we  have  to  suspend  in  order  to  do  that  ? 

Mr.  Murphy.  No  ;  I  just  made  the  request. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  want  them  back.  I  have  some  other  ques- 
tions. 

Mr.  Murphy.  All  right,  in  just  a  minute. 

The  Chairman.  Go  ahead.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  read  my  last  question  ? 

(The  question  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  do  your  records  show  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  The  observers  at  Hickam  Field  saw  aircraft  at 
7:55  a.  m.  and  the  attack  was  initiated  immediately,  presumably  the 
first  bomb  dropped  within  a  matter  of  seconds  after  7 :  55  a.  m. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  171 

Senator  Ferguson.  7 :  55  a.  m.  All  right.  How  do  you  account  for 
the  planes  that  came  in  at  7 :  39  to  7 :  55  ?  How  do  you  account  for  their 
action  from  7 :  39  to  7 :  55  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Well,  I  am  not  prepared  to  state  positively  that 
those  planes  appearing  at  7 :  39  ol!  Kahuku  Point  were  the  planes  that 
appeared  at  Hickam  Field  at  7 :  55. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  far  is  the  point  7 :  39  from  Hickam  Field  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  should  estimate  that  at  approximately  60  miles. 

[41S]  Senator  Ferguson.  About  60  miles.  Do  you  know  what 
Elliott  said  about  how  far  he  followed  these  planes  in?  Fifteen  to 
twenty  miles,  did  not  he  say  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  recall. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  the  radar  was  doing  at  that 
time  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  What  the  radar  was  doing,  sir  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  do  not  believe  I  understand  the  question,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  read  it  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  understood  the  words  sir,  but  not  the  intent.  I 
do  not  understand  what  is  wanted. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Read  the  question. 

(The  question  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  how  the  radar  would  function  at 
that  time  ? 

Colonel  Thielen.  How  it  would  function  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  whether  it  would  take  it  15  or  20  miles  from 
the  radar  itself. 

Colonel  Thielen.  No,  sir.  I  know  that  the  lobe,  so-called,  sent  out 
by  the  radar,  behaves  very  erratically.  I  am  not  technically  qualified 
to  state  how  it  would  behave  at  that  short  range. 

[4^4]  Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  examined  Lockard's  or 
Elliott's  testimany  about  these  targets  before  7 :  02,  during  their  so- 
called,  as  you  call  it,  regular  shift? 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  did  not  direct  their  attention  specifically  to 
that;  no,  sir.  They  have  unquestionably  read  that  testimony  in  re- 
searching this  particular  phase. 

Senator  FeKguson.  As  I  understand  it,  instead  of  what  the  testi- 
mony shows  you  gave  us  a  plot  that  was  made  up  by  Colonel  Murphy. 

Colonel  Thielen.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  the  way  you  leave  the  record,  and  that 
is  the  way  it  stands,  is  it  not? 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  all. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  make  just  one 
observation. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Murphy. 

Mr.  Murphy.  On  Exhibit  No.  4  which  was  offered  in  evidence  there 
is  a  statement  "Record  of  early  flights  December  7,  1941,  obtained 
by  Opana  detector",  and  then  the  signature  of  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Murphy. 

On  the  exhibit  which  the  gentleman  from  Michigan  questioned 
the  witness  about  there  is  a  notification  "Opana  detector"  and  then 
some  word  that  is  illegible,  "Record  of  early  flights",  [4^^]  and 
then  a  notation  which  would  seem  to  bear  the  initials  of  some  other 
witness. 


172       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[416]  So  this  record,  Exhibit  4,  is  of  the  early  flights,  and  this 
other  notation  by  someone  else  appeal's  not  to  be  on  the  record  in 
question,  and  I  wish  the  witness  would  find  out  what  the  last  of  this 
notation  on  the  lower  right-hand  corner  of  exhibit  3-B  is,  so  we  might 
see  what  the  difference  between  the  two  exhibits  is. 

Colonel  Thielen.  I  will  endeavor  to  find  that  out,  sir.  I  learned 
that  my  researchers  are  familiar  with  that,  consulted  radar  experts 
on  it,  and  determined  that  it  was  generally  illegible. 

The  Chairman.  All  right.    Any  further  questions  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  for  information  from 
Admiral  Inglis  'i  He  has  been  very  accommodating  up  to  now.  I 
want  to  follow  up  the  naval  strength  in  both  the  Pacific  and  Atlantic. 

I  have  in  my  hands  a  rough  draft  of  what  I  would  like  to  see  in 
the  record  in  tlie  form  of  a  chart.  It  asks  for  the  strength  of  the  Ger- 
man Navy  as  of  May  1,  additions  from  the  then  Vichy  France,  the 
Italian  strength,  and  for  the  augmentation  from  Axis,  Allies,  or  from 
other  sources. 

Then,  in  the  last  column,  the  total  naval  strength  from  all  sources 
in  the  Atlantic  and  Mediterranean. 

I  ask  for  that  same  information  as  of  December  7,  1941. 

Then,  information  to  the  same  effect  of  Japanese  strength  [4-?^] 
as  of  May  1,  1941,  and  as  of  December  7,  1941,  in  the  Pacific,  and  for 
American  strength  in  the  Pacific  with  Allied  augmentation  both  in 
respect  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet  and  Pacific  Fleet. 

If  you  can  have  that  prepared.  Admiral,  and  insert  it  in  the  record 
of  today's  proceedings,  I  would  appreciate  it  very  much.  But  if  that 
is  too  short  a  time,  I  hope  you  can  get  it  in  by  Monday. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  will  hand  it  to  the  Navy  Department.^ 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  can  have  it  ready  for  you  by  Monday,  I  am 
afraid  we  cannot  by  today. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  concluded,  Mr.  Gearhart? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  ask  now  to  put  into  evidence 
these  two  exhibits  that  I  handed  to  the  witness  for  identification,  and 
I  ask  now  that  they  be  part  of  the  record. 

Mr.  Counsel,  will  you  tell  us  what  numbers  they  will  be  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  will  mark  them  as  soon  as  I  have  them. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So  they  will  get  the  correct  numbers. 

Mr,  Gesell.  One  of  them  is  already  in  evidence. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  want  them  both  ?  We  already  have  [4^8] 
one. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Just  the  large  one. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  At  the  request  of  Senator  Ferguson,  the  document 
he  has  produced,  which  for  identification  has  on  it  the  words  "Exhibit 
3-B  in  evidence,"  apparently  from  some  earlier  proceedings,  is  now 
marked  Exhibit  7,  and  offered  in  evidence. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  7.") 

The  Chairman.  Any  further  questions? 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Mr,  Chairman,  in  fairness  to  myself,  as  a 
member  of  the  committee,  I  just  simply  want  to  say  I  do  not  share  the 
views  expressed  or  the  remarks  made  to  the  admiral  who  has  been 

'  Admitted  to  the  record  as  Exhibit  No.  86. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  173 

appearing  before  us  as  a  witness.  I  think  both  of  these  gentlemen 
have  acquitted  themselves  with  great  credit  and  distinction,  and  are  a 
distinct  credit  to  the  great  services  they  represent. 

The  Chairman.  Counsel  will  proceed  now  with  anything  further 
he  has. 

Senator  Lucas.  I  would  like  to  make  a  statement  along  the  same 
line  as  Mr.  Cooper. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  suggest  that  these  two  witnesses  will  be 
here  for  a  while  longer  and  at  the  conclusion  of  their  testimony,  it 
might  be  appropriate  to  have  a  testimonal  [4^9]  meeting  with 
respect  to  the  opinions  of  the  committee  with  regard  to  this  very 
testimony. 

Senator  Lucas.  I  want  to  be  the  first  one  to  testify  when  the  testi- 
monial meeting  starts. 
Mr.  Murphy.  I  would  like  to  join  in  that  too. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chairman  wants  to  be  in  that  too.    Go  ahead. 
Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral  Inglis,  one  question.     You  spoke  about 
Jap  submarines  entering  Pearl  Harbor.     Are  you  referring  to  the 
midget  submarines,  so-called  ? 
Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Not  the  large  seagoing  submarines? 
Admiral  Inglis.  Not  the  large  seagoing  submarines;  no,  sir. 
Mr,  Mitchell.  As  to  those  midget  submarines,  what  does  the  record 
show  as  to  how  many  men  were  in  the  crew  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  believe  they  were  manned  by  a  crew  of  two  men — 
that  is,  two  persons,  I  should  say. 
Mr.  Mitchell.  A  very  small  vessel? 
Admiral  Inglis.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  Admiral,  I  ask  you  if  you  have  brought  here, 
at  my  request,  all  of  the  documents  in  the  Navy  from  Japanese  sources 
relating  to  the  Japanese  account  of  the  attack  at  Pearl  Harbor? 

[4^0']         Admiral  Inglis.  Substantially    everything    except    the 
communication  intelligence  material  which  I  believe  counsel  has  from 
other  sources  and  not  from  me. 
The  Chairman.  A  little  louder.     We  could  not  hear  the  last  remark. 
(The  answer  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  do  not  understand,  I  thought  you  produced  here 
all  of  the  material  from  Jap  sources  which  have  made  any  disclosure 
as  to  what  they  did  in  respect  to  this  attack. 
Admiral  Inglis.  I  wanted  to  be  quite  meticulous. 
Mr.  Mitchell.  You  mean  the  espionage  documents,  do  you? 
Admiral  Inglis.  I  mean  the  material  you  referred  to  as  cryptic 
analytical. 
Mr.  Mitchell,  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis,  I  think  you  have  that.    You  did  not  get  it  from  me, 
Mr.  Mitcpiells  That  is  right.     Now,  let  us  look  at  this  material 
and  see  what  it  is.     I  hand  you  a  bundle  of  loose  sheets  in  the  Japanese 
language.     What  is  that  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  does  the  record  show  clearly  when 
counsel  received  these  papers?  Have  you  made  clear  on  the  record 
when  you  received  these  papers,  counsel  ? 

[^i]  Mr.  Mitchell,  I  think  T  received  tliese  original  docu- 
ments within  the  last  24  hours, 

79716 — 46— pt.  1 14 


174        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

i^enator  Ferguson.  About  when  did  you  get  them  ? 

Mr,  Mitchell.  You  mean  the  exact  hour  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  When?  There  are  two  sets  of  them  and  I 
would  just  like  to  know  when  counsel  got  them. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  My  assistants  says  these  documents  reached  me  ap< 
proximately  2  p.  m.  yesterday  afternoon. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Two  p.  m.  yesterday  afternoon. 

Has  counsel  had  time  to  examine  each  one  of  them  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  went  over  them  in  a  rough  way.  1  have  not 
spent  much  time  on  this  document  in  the  Japanese  language,  but  we 
thought  we  would  get  back  to  the  original  source  here. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  they  give  you  translations? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  They  are  in  the  papers  here. 

Senator  Ferguson.  They  are  among  the  papers  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes.     May  I  ask  him  about  what  these  are,  Senator  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.    I  do  not  know. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  want  you  to  know. 

What  is  this  document,  this  bundle  of  photostats  here  in  the  Jap- 
anese language  ?    Will  you  state  generally  what  that  is  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  There  are  photostat  copies  of  two  docu-  [^v"^^] 
ments  in  the  Japanese  language  which  my  translators  inform  me  are 
Japanese  top  secret  operation  orders  No.  1  and  No.  2. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  a  staff  plan,  do  you  mean,  a  staff  order? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  is  a  plan  and  an  order,  in  effect. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  look  over  these  other  documents  and  just 
generally  describe  what  they  are. 

Admiral  Inglis.  This  first  one  I  have  is  a  translation  of  a  captured 
document;  the  title  is  "Submarine  School  Notes  Concerning  Early 
War  Experiences  Off  Hawaii." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Could  I  inquire  from  counsel  when  counsel  re- 
quested these  documents  from  the  Navy? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  I  think  these  particular  documents  I  asked 
him  to  bring  in  here  sometime  jj-esterday,  because  I  understood  the 
c^ommittee  wanted  all  the  original  material  on  which  any  testimony 
was  based. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  understand  it  has  not  been  requested  by  coun- 
sel prior  to  yesterday. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  had  the  operational  order  in  English,  the  trans- 
lation of  it,  but  I  did  not  have  the  Japanese  rendition,  if  that  is 
what  you  mean.    I  had  a  translation  of  it  for  some  days,  I  think. 

Senator  Lucas.  You  should  have  translated  them  right,  ]Mr. 
Mitchell. 

[4^3]         Mr.  INIiTCHELL.  I  could  not  swear  to  that. 
Senator  Lucas.  I  know  there  are  going  to  be  a  lot  of  questions 
about  that. 

]\Ir.  Mitchell.  I  do  not  suppose  anybody  can  settle  that  question. 

Will  you  go  on,  Admiral — if  I  may  proceed  uninterruptedly. 
The  Chairman.  Yes,  go  ahead,  gentlemen. 
Admiral  Inglis.  Are  you  ready,  sir? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  All  right.    Go  head. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  next  dociuneiU  is  entitled  "Translation  of  a 
Captured  Japanese  Document.  The  professional  notebook  of  an 
ensign  in  the  Japanese  Navy,"     The  date  is  February  25,  1944. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  175 

Perhaps  I  should  go  back  to  the  second  document  and  say  that  the 
date  on  that  is  January  12,  1941. 

The  next  document  that  I  have  is  dated  March  2,  1943.  The  subject 
is  Kuboaki,  Takeo.  Tliat  is  obviously  the  name  of  a  Japanese. 
"Superior  class  engineer  petty  officer,  interrogation  of,"  That  is  the 
subject. 

[4-"34]  The  next  document  that  I  have  is  entitled  "Japanese  Sub-' 
marine  Operations  at  Pearl  Harbor."  This  is  an  evaluation  prepared 
by  intelligence  officers. 

Mr,  Keefe.  Jap  intelligence  officers  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  United  States  intelligence  officers. 

The  next  document  is  entitle;!  'Tntelligence  Report."  The  subject 
is  "Japan  Navy  submarines."  The  date  on  this  is  April  22,  The 
vear  is  not  given.  It  might  be  deduced,  however,  that  the  year  is 
i944. 

The  next  document  is  16  August  194-3.  It  is  marked  "Interrogation 
Report  No,  148  of  Yokota,  S."  Yokota  is  the  family  name  and  S 
the  initial  of  the  given  name. 

The  next  document  is  entitled  "United  States  Pacific  Fleet  and 
Pacific  Ocean  Areas,  Weekly  Intelligence  Bulletin  of  8  December 
1944." 

The  next  document  is  dated  30  June  1943.  The  subject  is  "ICPOA 
Translation  of  Captured  Enemy  Documents,  Item  No.  472,  Submarine 
School  Notes  Concerning  Early  War  Experiences  off  Hawaii. 

'TCPOA  Translation  of  Captured  Enemy  Documents,  Item  No. 

473,  Instructions  to  the  Yatsumaki  Butai." 

"ICPOA  Translation  of  Captured  Enemj'-  Documents,  Item  No. 

474,  Places  of  Military  Importance  in  the  Kurile  Islands." 

The  next  document  is  dated  25  July  1945,  Translation  [4^S] 
No.  290.  Subject,  "The  Southern  Cross  by  Kuramoti,  Iki",  Kuramoti 
being  the  family  name  and  Iki  the  given  name. 

The  next  document  is  a  translation  of  combined  fleet  top  seci-et 
operation  order  No,  1, 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Is  that  a  translation  of  the  Jap  script  we  have  here, 
or  is  supposed  to  be? 

Admiral  Inglis.  This  is  a  translation  of  the  Japanese  script.  I 
am  informed  by  my  translators  that  there  are  a  few  corrections  which 
they  feel  should  be  made  in  this  document  here,  and  those  corrections 
will  be  produced  at  the  proper  time. 

We  haven't  got  the  photostatic  copies  now. 

The  next  document  is  entitled,  "Enemy  Lists  of  Sorties  by  Sub- 
carried  Planes."  There  is  no  date  on  this.  Its  precise  source  is  not 
indicated. 

The  next  document  is  a  memorandum  dated  October  13,  1945, 
addressed  to  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2  of  the  fifth  Marine 
Amphibious  Corps.  The  subject  is  "Prewar  Espionage  in  the 
Hawaiian  Island,"  and  it  pertains  to  an  interview  with  Yoshio 
Shiga,  lieutenaut  commander.  Imperial  Japanese  Navy.  In  this 
case  Yoshio  is  the  given  name  and  Shiga  is  the  family  name.  That 
memorandum  is  signed  by  Robert  N.  Tate,  special  agent  of  the 
Counter-intelligence  Corps,  attached  to  the  Four  Hundred  Ninety- 
sixth  CIC  Detachment  of  the  Fifth  Marine  Division,  and  contains 
several  endorsements  through  official  channels,  sliowing  its         [4^^] 


176       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

receipt  in  the  office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  yesterday,  No- 
vember 16.  I  believe  counsel  ought  to  have  the  copy,  which  is  not 
included  in  these  papers,  of  reports  submitted  by  the  General  Head- 
quarters of  the  Supreme  Commander  for  the  Allied  Powers,  from 
headquarters  at  Tokyo. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes.  At  this  point  I  will  read  into  the  record 
a  paraphrase  of  a  message  dated  October  6,  1945,  from  the  Secretary 
of  War  to  General  MacArthur,  as  follows : 

The  War  Department  has  been  requested  to  provide  the  joint  congressional 
committee  investigating  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack  vpith  information  concerning 
the  attack  available  in  Japanese  files  and  records,  to  include  Japanese  agencies 
involved  or  informed  of  plans,  date  the  attack  was  first  planned,  sources  and 
nature  of  information  on  which  plans  and  operation  based,  details  of  plans  as 
they  developed,  composition  of  attack  force,  Japanese  losses,  routes  followed  by 
attack  force  before  and  after  attack,  and  Japanese  Ivnowledge  of  damage  inflicted. 
Request  suitable  measures  be  taken  to  obtain  above  information.  Advise  by 
cable  information  now  available,  steps  open  to  you  to  obtain  desired  material  with 
estimate  of  time  required,  summary  of  additional  information  as  available.  Air 
mail  pertinent  documents. 

Now  in  response  to  that  message  the  AVar  Department  has  produced 
three  documents:  One,  cables  from  General  MacArthur,  [4^'/] 
dated  the  14th  of  October — this  is  a  preliminary  report — and  a  further 
detailed  report  dated  October  26,  1945. 

Then  you  just  spoke  of  another  one.  That  last  one  came  in  last 
night,  that  was  a  Navy  report,  is  that  right? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir.  That  came  from  the  Marines 
through  Navy  channels. 

Mr.  MiTciTELL.  Have  you  had  this  report  from  General  MacArthur's 
headquarters  in  this  message  before  you  ? 

Adniiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  examined  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Y^es,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now  the  War  Department  handed  me  last  night,  or 
early  this  morning,  another  message  from  General  Headquarters, 
Supreme  Commander  for  the  Allied  Powers.  That  means  General 
MacArthur,  Tokyo.  That  is  dated  November  8,  1945.  Have  you 
examined  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir,  we  have  also  examined  that. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  How  would  you  classify  this  material,  as  to  the  type 
of  material  it  is?  First  there  is  an  operational  order  and  other 
captured  documents  from  the  Japs,  is  that  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  you  have  also  a  number  of  documents  recording 
interviews  of  captured  Japanese  prisoners  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

[4^8]  Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  you  have  the  report  from  General 
MacArthur? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  and  those  are  interviews  of  Japa- 
nese officers  who  were  not  in  the  status  of  prisoners  of  war. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Is  there  anything  else  in  that  file  that  is  classified 
in  a  different  way,  that  you  can  think  of  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  only  remaining  item  is  the  report  which 
originated  with  the  Marine  detachment  and  which  was  forwarded 
through  Navy  channels,  and  that  is  largely  the  interrogation  of  Lieu- 
tenant Commander  Shiga,  Imperial  Japanese  Navy. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Is  not  he  a  prisoner  of  war  ? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  177 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  he  is  in  more  or  less  the  same  category  as 
the  others,  an  officer  v\ho  was  interviewed  after  VJ-day. 

Mr.  IMiTCHELL.  That  is  the  document  that  came  in  last  night,  isn't 
it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  the  document  that  came  in  last  night. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now  previous  to  the  receipt  of  that  document,  and 
the  one  of  November  8  from  General  Macx^rthur,  have  you  prepared 
a  summary  digest  of  these  documents  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  had,  sir.  I  would  like  to  add  to  my  [4^9] 
answer  to  your  former  question  that  this  last  document  which  has  just 
been  presented,  the  one  that  was  received  last  night 

ilr.  Mitchell.  By  the  Navy? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Through  Navy  sources,  through  Navy  channels — 
also  contains  an  endorsement,  or  rather  a  carbon  copy  of  an  endorse- 
ment from  the  Commandant  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District,  which 
pertains  to  some  investigations  we  have  made  out  there,  in  an  effort 
t  o  corroborate  or  contradict  some  of  the  testimony  of  this  Lieutenant 
Commander  Shiga. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  since  the  receipt  of  these  last  tAvo  documents 
tliat  came  through  Navy  sources  and  Army  sources  within  the  last 
few  hours,  have  v'ou  gone  through  them  to  see  whether  your  digest 
requires  any  additions? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have,  sir;  and  it  does  require  some  substantial 
clianges  and  additions.  , 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Have  you  made  those  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  had  to  do  that  last  night  and  this  morning,  is 
that  correct  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  you  have  already  put  in  motion  mimeographic 
machines  so  that  copies  of  them  may  be  supplied? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now  I  would  like  to  ask  the  Admiral  if  [4301 
you  will  please  give  your  digest  of  these  original  documents  that  you 
have  there.  ' 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  w^ould  like  to  say,  first  of  all,  that  throughout 
this  presentation  which  is  to  follow,  the  dates  will  be  expressed  in 
Japanese  time.  Thus  the  date  of  the  attack  will  be  given  as  Decem- 
ber 8,  which  is  Japanese  time,  rather  than  December  7,  which  is 
Hawaiian  time.  Wherever  I  deviate  from  that  practice  I  will 
specifically  so  state,  as  I  proceed. 

With  respect  to  that  difference,  we  should  add  191^  hours  to  Hon- 
olulu time  in  order  to  get  Tokyo  time;  we  should  add  51^  hours  to 
Honolulu  time  in  order  to  get  Washington  time,  and  we  should  adtl 
14  hours  to  Washington  time  in  order  to  get  Tokyo  time. 

I  would  also  like  to  make  the  preliminary  comment  that  some  of 
the  phraseology  used  in  this  presentation  may  sound  a  little  strange 
to  American  ears.  That  is  because  of  peculiar  Japanese  usage,  where 
the  Japanese  are  directly  quoted. 

The  first  item  concerns  the  formulation  of  the  plan  for  the  attack 
on  Pearl  Harbor.     It  is  reported  that  a  surprise  attack 

Mr.  Mitchell  (interposing).  When  you  say  "it  is  reported"  you 
mean  it  is  disclosed  in  tliese  documents?     Is  that  what  5''ou  mean? 

[4^1]        Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir.     That  expression 


178       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

"it  is  reported"  is  used  advisedly,  to  indicate  that  it  has  not  been  con- 
firmed by  other  sources,  and  we  cannot  guarantee  its  accuracy.  All 
we  have  is  the  report. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  are  not  guaranteeing  the  Japs? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

[4^2]  It  is  reported  that  a  surprise  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  was 
originally  conceived  and  proposed  in  the  first  part  of  January  1941  by 
Admiral  Isoroku  Yamamoto,  commander  in  chief  combined  fleet,  who, 
at  that  time,  ordered  Rear  Adm.  Takijiro  Onishi,  then  chief  of  staff 
of  the  Eleventh  Air  Fleet,  to  study  the  operation.  In  the  latter  part 
of  August  1941,  Admiral  Yamamoto  ordered  all  fleet  commanders  and 
other  ke}^  staff  members  to  Tokyo  for  war  games  preliminar}^  to  a 
final  formulation  of  operation  plans  for  a  Pacific  campaign  which  in- 
cluded a  surprise  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor.  A  war  plans  conference  was 
lield  continuously  at  the  Naval  War  College,  Tokyo,  from  September  2 
to  September  13.  On  September  13  an  outline  containing  essential 
points  of  a  basic  operation  order,  which  was  later  to  be  issued  as  Com- 
bined Fleet  Top  Secret  Operation  Order  No.  1,  was  completed.  This 
operation  order,  which  included  detailed  plans  for  the  surprise  attack 
on  Pearl  Harbor,  was  promulgated  to  all  fleet  and  task  force  command- 
ers on  November  5.  1941.  Therefore,  this  date,  November  5,  1941,  is 
to  be  regarded  as  the  date  on  which  the  plan  for  the  attack  on  Pearl 
Harbor  was  completed. 

Operation  orde^-  No.  1  under  heading  of  "Preparations  for  the  Out- 
break of  War"  states  that — 

When  the  decision  is  made  to  complete  over-all  preparations  for  operations,  orders 
will  be  WS]  issued  establishing  the  approximate  date  (Y-Day)  for 
commencement  of  operations  and  announcing  "First  Preparations  for  War." 

That  completes  that  quotation. 

The  operation  order  continues  to  say  that — 

The  time  for  the  Outbreak  of  War  (X-Day)  will  be  given  in  an  Imperial  General 
Headquarters  Order. 

The  details  of  the  plan  of  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  as  set  forth 
in  operation  order  No.  1,  were  worked  out  by  members  of  the  naval 
general  staff  operations  feection,  combined  fleet  operations  staff  and 
first  air  fleet  operations  staff. 

III.  Determination  of  December  8  as  day  of  attack;  under  elate  of 
November  7,  1941,  Admiral  Yamamoto  issued  combined  fleet  top  se- 
cret operation  order  No.  2  saying  "First  preparations  for  war.  Y-day 
will  be  December  8."  In  accordance  with  the  definition  of  Y-day  as 
given  in  operation  order  No.  1,  this  establishes  December  8  onl}^  as  the 
approximate  date  for  commencement  of  operations.  An  Imperial 
naval  order  issued  from  the  Imperial  general  headquarters  under  date 
of  December  2,  1941  states : 

The  hostile  actions  against  the  United  States  of  America  shall  be  commenced  on 
8  December. 

This  order  is  in  effect  the  announcement  of  X-clay  as  defined  in 
operation  order  No.  1.  Thus  it  becomes  apparent  that  the  tentative 
approximate  elate  for  the  attack  [^■^4]  selecteel  on  November  7 
and  defined  as  Y-day  is  reafiirmed  on  December  2  as  X-clay.  In  other 
words,  the  original  tentative  date — Y-day — and  the  final  precise 
elate — X-day — are  in  fact  the  same  date. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  December  7,  our  time? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  date  of  attack  is  December  7. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  179 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  explained  in  the  beginning  that  Japanese  times 
were  given,  but  to  just  point  it  up,  I  am  asking  if  that  December  8  was 
December  7  Honohilu  time. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct.  Unless  I  make  some  parentheti- 
cal, all  times  will  be  Tokj^o  time. 

To  repeat,  in  other  words,  the  original  tentative  date — Y-day — and 
the  final  precise  date — X-day — are,  in  fact,  the  same  date. 

In  discussions  prior  to  November  7,  the  Imperial  headquarters  navy 
section  generally  recognized  December  8  as  suitable  from  an  opera- 
tional standpoint  and  made  the  decision  in  cooperation  with  the  leaders 
of  the  combined  fleet.  For  a  dawn  attack  in  the  Hawaiian  area  in 
December,  the  10th  would  have  been  suitable  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  dark  of  the  moon. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  you  are  taking  from  the  documents;  it  is 
Japanese  opinion? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct.  This  is  all  oriented  [4^5] 
to  the  Japanese  point  of  view. 

However,  it  was  expected  that  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet,  in 
accordance  with  its  custom  during  maneuvers,  would  enter  the  harbor 
on  Friday  and  leave  on  Monday — Hawaiian  dates. 

That  is  Friday  and  Monday,  Hawaiian  dates. 

Therefore,  Sunday — Hawaiian  date — was  decided  on.  In  order  to 
assure  the  success  of  the  attack  and  still  avoid  a  night  attack,  the 
take-off  time  of  the  attacking  planes  was  to  be  set  as  near  to  dawn 
as  possible — approximately  1  hour  after  sunrise. 

Here  I  come  to  the  deviation  from  the  original  script. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  A  deviation  resulting  from  these  last  documents? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct. 

The  following  statement  is  made  by  a  Japanese  officer  pilot  who 
participated  in  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor : 

On  October  5,  1941,  a  meeting  was  called  of  all  officer  pilots  of  the  carriers, 
aboard  the  Akayi  in  Shibushi  Bay,  by  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  carriers.  Rear 
Admiral  Rynosuke  Kosaka.  About  100  attended.  They  were  told,  very  secretly, 
that  on  "December  1941  (Japan  time),  a  Japanese  naval  air  force  would  strike 
the  American  Fleet  at  Hawaii."  Grand  Admiral  of  the  Japanese  Navy,  Isoi-aku 
Yamamoto,  also  addressed  the  group,  saying  that,  "Although  Japan  never  wanted 
to  fight  Uo6'\  the  United  States,  they  were  forced  to  because  they  would 
be  defeated  regardless,  if  the  United  States  continued  its  aid  to  China  and  its  oil 
embargo.  The  United  States  Fleet,"  he  said,  "was  Japan's  strongest  enemy,  so 
if  they  could  strike  it  unexpectedly  at  Hawaii  it  would  be  2  or  "S  months  before  it 
could  maneuver.  By  that  time  occupation  of  Borneo,  the  Philippines,  Singapore. 
Java,  and  Sumatra  would  be  complete." 

The  next  title  has  to  do  with  the  date  of  leaving  port. 

It  is  reported  that  on  or  about  November  14  CINC  of  the  combined 
fleet  ordered  the  units  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  attacking  force  to  assemble 
in  Hitokappu  Bay. 

Commander  Biard,  will  you  point  to  Hitokappu  Bay?  That  is  the 
Island  of  Etorofu. 

It  is  further  reported  that  about  November  21  the  situation  seemed 
to  be  approaching  a  stage  where  commencement  of  hostilities  were 
inevitable.  The  navy  section  of  the  Imperial  general  headquarters 
therefore  issued  the  following  order : 

The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Combined  Fleet  shall  order  necessary  forces  to 
advance  to  the  area  in  which  they  are  to  wait  in  readiness  and  shall  station 
Ihem  in  such  positions  that,  in  the  event  of  the  situation  becoming  such  [JfSl] 
that  commencement  of  hostilities  be  inevitable,  they  will  be  able  to  meet  the 
situation  promptly. 


180        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

I  would  like  to  say  at  this  time  that  upon  introducing  the  subject 
of  "Date  of  leaving  port,"  I  went  back  to  the  original  script  as  pre- 
'  pared  a  few  days  ago. 

On  November  25  the  commander  in  chief,  combined  fleet,  issued  the 
following  order  to  the  striking  force,  which  had,  since  November  22, 
been  assembled  at  Hitokappu  Bay. 

(a)  The  task  force,  keeping  its  movements  strictly  secret  and  maintaining 
close  guard  against  submarines  and  aircraft,  shall  advance  into  Hawaiian  waters 
and  upon  the  very  opening  of  hostilities,  shall  attack  the  main  force  of  the  United 
States  Fleet  in  Hawaii  and  deal  it  a  mortal  blow.  The  first  aid  raid  is  planned 
for  dawn  of  X-day — exact  date  to  be  given  by  later  order. 

Upon  completion  of  the  air  raid  the  task  force,  keeping  close  coordination 
and  guarding  against  enemy  counter  attack,  shall  speedily  leave  the  enemy  waters 
and  then  return  to  Japan. 

(b)  Should  it  appear  certain  that  Japanese- American  negotiations  will  reach 
an  amicable  settlement  prior  to  the  commencement  of  hostile  action,  all  the 
forces  of  the  combined  fleet  are  to  be  ordered  to  reassemble  and  return  to  their 
bases.^ 

[^38]  (c)  The  task  force  shall  leave  Hitokappu  Bay  on  the  morning  of 
November  26  and  advance  to  42°  N.  and  170°  E. — standing  by  position — on  the 
afternoon  of  December  4,  Japan  time,  and  speedily  complete  refueling. 

Commander  Biard,  will  you  point  to  that  position? 
The  actual  time  of  departure  was  9 :  00  a.  m.,  November  26,  Japan 
time — 1 :  30  p.  m.,  November  25,  Hawaii  time. 

V.  Date  of  instructions  to  execute  plan :  Combined  fleet  top  secret 
operation  order  No.  2,  issued  by  Admiral  Yamamoto,  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  combined  fleet,  and  dated  November  7,  1941  is  the  basic 
order  or  instruction  to  execute  the  detailed  plan  for  the  attack  on 
Pearl  Harbor. 

On  December  1  the  Cabinet  Council  approved  the  commencement  of 
hostilities  against  the  United  States.  On  the  same  day,  an  Imperial 
naval  order  issued  on  instruction  by  the  Imperial  general  headquarters 
stated : 

Japan,  under  the  necessity  of  her  self-preservation  and  self-defense,  has  reached 
a  position  (sic)  to  declare  war  on  the  United  States  of  America. 

On  December  2  an  Imperial  naval  order  issued  under  instruction 
from  the  Imperial  general  headquarters  stated : 

The  hostile  actions  against  the  United  States  of  America  shall  be  commenced 
on  December  8. 

There  is  no  copy  of  this  order  available  nor  is  there  conclusive  evi- 
dence that  [4^9]  it  constitutes  the  formal  X-day  order  re- 
ferred to  in  operations  order  No.  1.  Its  .effect,  however,  is  clearly 
equivalent  to  the  final  determination  of  a  specific  time  for  the  outbreak 
of  the  war,  and  it  may  be  regarded  therefore  as  a  final  determination 
of  X-day. 

VI.  Details  of  plan:  Hitokappu  Bay  was  selected  as  the  point  of 
departure  from  Japan  because  it  was  recognized  as  the  most  suitable 
place  for  enabling  the  attacking  force  to  meet  any  new  developments 
in  the  situation  as  well  as  to  keep  its  location  and  movements  secret. 

In  formulating  final  plans,  it  was  decided  that  a  torpedo  attack 
against  anchored  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor  was  the  most  effective  method 


^  See  p.  205,  infra,  for  correction  by  Adm.  Inglis. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  181 

of  putting  the  main  strength  of  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet  in  the 
Hawaii  area  out  of  action  for  a  long  period  of  time.  The  following 
two  obstacles  were  considered : 

(a)  The  fact  that  Pearl  Harbor  is  narrow  and  shallow. 

(b)  The  fact  that  Pearl  Harbor  was  probably  equipped  with  torpedo 
nets. 

In  regard  to  point  (a)  it  was  planned  to  attach  stabilizers  to  the 
torpedoes  and  launch  thean  from  an  extremely  low  altitude. 

In  regard  to  point  (b),  since  success  could  not  be  [44-01 
counted  on,  a  bombing  attack  was  also  employed. 

I  must  deviate  again  from  the  text  prepared  the  other  day  and 
refer  to  this  last  source  received  just  yesterday. 

Evidence  indicates  that  as  late  as  29  November — Japan  time — 
the  Japanese  force  expected  to  find  six  United  States  carriers  in 
Hawaiian  waters;  they  were  aware  that  the  U.  S.  S.  Saratoga  was, 
in  late  November,  on  the  west  coast  of  the  United  States  and  also 
that  the  U.  S.  S.  Enterpiise  would  be  "two  or  three  days  out  of  the 
attack."  On  31  November,  Japan  time,  when  the  striking  force  was 
well  out  to  sea,  it  received  a  report  that  only  one  or  two  carriers  were 
in  Pearl  Harbor.  On  December  6,  Japan  time,  word  was  received 
that  no  carriers  were  in  Pearl  Harbor,  but  that  8  battleships  and  15 
cruisers  were  in  the  harbor.  At  a  briefing,  which  took  place  on  or 
about  December  5,  Japan  time,  each  pilot  was  furnished  a  photograph 
of  a  map  of  Pearl  Harbor  on  which  each  pilot  made  notes  on  courses, 
anchorage  areas,  or  missions. 

Now  I  return  to  the  script  of  2  or  3  days  ago. 

Three  courses  were  considered  for  the  Hawaii  operation :  The 
northern  course  which  was  actuall}'^  used,  a  central  course  which 
headed  east  following  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  a  southern  route 
passing  through  the  Marshall  Islands  and  approaching  from  the  south. 

[44i]  Commander  Biard,  would  you  roughly  indicate  those 
three  routes  ? 

That  would  be  the  northern  route  (following  Commander  Biard's 
pointer),  that  would  be  the  central  route,  through  the  Mandated  Is- 
lands and  the  Hawaiian  chain  and  the  southern  group  just  out  of  the 
Mandated  Islands,  up  to  Hawaii. 

On  the  northern  route,  although  it  Avas  far  from  the  enemy,  United 
States,  patrol  screen  of  land-based  airplanes  and  there  was  little 
chance  of  meeting-  commercial  vessels,  the  influences  of  weather  and 
topography  were  important.  Refueling  at  sea  and  navigation  were 
difficult.  On  the  central  and  southern  routes  the  advantages  and  dis- 
advantages were  generally  just  the  opposite  to  those  of  the  northern 
route.  Although  it  may  be  assumed  tliat  the  central  and  southern 
routes  would  be  preferable  for  the  purposes  of  refueling  at  sea,  the 
chances  of  being  discovered  by  patrol  planes  were  great  because  the 
routes  lie  near  Wake,  Midway,  Palmyra,  Johnston  Islands,  and  so 
forth.  Consequently,  it  was  hardl}^  expected  that  a  surprise  attack 
could  be  made.  The  ability  to  refuel  and  the  necessity  of  surprise 
were  the  keys  to  this  operation.  If  either  of  them  failed,  the  execution 
of  the  operation  would  have  been  impossible.  However,  the  refueling 
problem  could  be  overcome  by  training.  On  tlie  other  hand,  a  surprise 
attack  under  all  circumstances  could  not  be  as-  [44-^]  sured  by 
Japanese  strength  alone.     Therefore,  the  northern  route  was  selected. 


182        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

By  routing  the  striking  force  to  pass  between  Midway  and  the 
Aleutians,  it  was  expected  to  pass  outside  the  patrol  zones  of  United 
States  patrol  planes.  Moreover,  screening  destroyers  were  sent  ahead 
of  the  fleet,  and  in  the  event  any  vessels  were  encountered  the  main 
body  of  the  force  would  make  a  severe  change  of  course  and  endeavor 
to  avoid  detection.  If  the  striking  force  had  been  detected  prior  to 
X-2-clay,  it  was  planned  to  have  the  force  return  without  executing 
the  air  attack.  In  the  event  of  being  discovered  on  X-l-clay,  the  ques- 
tion of  whether  to  make  an  attack  or  to  return  would  have  been  de- 
cided in  accordance  with  the  local  conditions.  If  the  attack  had  failed, 
it  was  planned  to  send  the  main  force  in  the  Island  Sea  out  to  the 
Pacific  in  order  to  bring  in  the  task  force. 

I  would  like  to  remark  again,  that  this  is  Japanese  phraseology^ 
and  may  api^ear  a  little  strange  in  its  reasoning  processes. 

Returning  now  to  the  prepared  script,  item  7  is  entitled  "Sources 
of  data  used  in  planning  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack  were  as  follows." 

These  sources — I  am  speaking  now  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
Japanese — were : 

[44^]         (A)   American  public  broadcasts  from  Hawaii. 

(B)  Reports  of  Japanese  naval  attaches  in  "Washington,  D.  C. 

(C)  Reconnaissance  submarines  in  Hawaiian  waters  prior  to  the 
attack.  A  Japanese  pilot  states  that  at  no  time  were  visual  land  sig- 
nals used  from  Hawaii. 

(D)  Information  obtained  from  ships  which  had  called  at  Hawai- 
ian ports  in  mid-November. 

Those  are  the  onh'  four  sources  which  the  Japanese  have  admitted. 
We  know,  however,  that  there  is  a  fifth  source : 

(E)  Espionage  network  in  Hawaiian  Islands,  being  uncensored 
cable  communications  with  Japan. 

That  last  is  from  an  American  source,  not  from  the  Japanese  source. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Under  (C),  with  respect  to  signals,  I  didn't  quite  catch 
that.    It  doesn't  appear  here. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  beg  your  pardon.  I  am  glad  you  brought  that  up. 
That  last  sentence  "a  Japanese  pilot  states"  came  from  this  last  source 
which  we  just  received  last  night.    That  was  a  change  in  the  script. 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  will  be  included  in  the  mimeographed  corrected 
statement  which  we  will  receive  later  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  right. 

The  Vice  Chaikman.  And  that  goes  under  what?    . 

[444]         Admiral  IxGLis.  Under  source  (C). 

Now,  again  I  must  deviate  from  the  original  script  and  quote  this 
last  document  which  was  just  received  yesterday. 

A  Japanese  oflBcer  pilot  lias  reported  his  belief  "that  information  concerning  all 
movements  of  ships  into  and  out  of  Pearl  Harbor  was  transmitted  to  the  fleet 
through  coded  messages  broadcast  over  a  Honolulu  commercial  broadcasting 
station."  Source  was  certain  "that  there  was  a  Hawaiian  Nisei" — a  second- 
generation  American  of  Japanese  descent — "who  was  a  Japanese  naval  officer, 
aboard  the  flagship  Akagi,  whose  specific  job  was  listening  to  these  broadcasts 
and  decoding  them."  Source  said  "that  in  his  opinion  the  codes  were  many  and 
varied  but  that  if,  for  example,  it  was  broadcast  the  German  attache  lost  one 
dog,  it  might  mean  that  a  carrier  left  Pearl  Harbor.  If  the  German  attachi6 
wanted  a  cook  or  houseboy,  it  might  m.ean  that  a  battleship  or  cruiser  had  entered 
the  harbor." 

Source  states  "that  the  information  was  conveyed  on  radio  programs  just 
following  the  news  broadcasts,  which  he  stated  were  at  6:  30  a.  m.,  12  noon,  and 
7  p.  m.     He  was  prone  to  think  that  time  following  the  7  p.  m.,  broadcast  was 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  183 

used  since  the  Japanese  agents  would  then  have  had  an  opportunitj-  to  convey 
information  concerning  a  whole  day's  activities. 

[44-5]  I  would  like  to  say  at  this  time  that  the  endorsement  which 
the  authorities  at  Hawaii,  the  FBI,  ONI,  and  MIS,  have  placed  on  this 
Last  document  indicates  that  they  cannot  find  any  substantiation  for 
this  plan  to  use  Honohdu  commercial  broadcasting  stations  to  convey 
information  to  the  Japanese  task  force.  They  also  pointed  out  that 
this  procedure  would  not  have  been  necessary  since  the  Japanese 
consul,  who  was  the  center  of  the  espionage  network,  had  full  access 
to  a  direct  connection  via  cable  uncensored  directly  from  Honolulu 
to  Tokyo. 

That  completes  the  deviation  from  the  original  script,  and  I  return 
now  to  item  8,  which  is  "Details  of  execution." 

[440]  VIII.  Details  of  execution:  Study  of  the  Japanese  plan 
of  operation  indicates  the  Japanese  high  command  made  the  follo\v- 
-ing  assumptions  with  regard  to  the  United  States  Fleet : 

(a)  That  the  main  body  of  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet  would  be 
at  anchor  within  Pearl  Harbor  on  December  7,  1941,  Sunday,  Hawaii 
time. 

(b)  That  a  carrier  force  could  be  moved  from  home  waters  across 
the  Pacific  to  within  striking  distance  of  the  main  islands  of  the 
Hawaiian  group  without  undue  risk  of  detection  by  Americar 
defensive  reconnaissance. 

(c)  That  should  assumptions  (a)  or  (h)  be  in  error,  a  reserve  grouj) 
of  heavy  naval  units  could  sortie  from  the  Inland  Sea  to  give  support 
to  the  carrier  striking  force  in  a  decisive  engagement  with  the  American 
Fleet.  The  other  task  forces  of  the  Japanese  Fleet  (southern  force, 
northern  force,  and  the  south  seas  force)  would  be  available  for  this 
purpose.  Implied  in  the  plan  is  the  assumption  that,  in  the  event  of 
such  an  engagement,  the  combined  strength  of  the  bulk  of  available 
Japanese  major  fleet  units  would  be  sufficient  to  defeat  the  American 
Fleet. 

(d)  A  powerful  carrier  air  strike  directed  against  the  American 
forces  based  in  Hawaii  could,  if  tactical  surprise  were  efi!ected,  achieve 
the  strategic  result  of  crippling  the  American  Fleet;  that  such  a 
strike  would  achieve  also  the  [44'^]  destruction  of  American 
land-based  air  power  and  thus  permit  the  Japanese  striking  force  to 
withdraw  without  damage. 

The  omission  from  the  Japanese  plans  of  provision  for  landings  on 
Oahu  was  decided  upon  during  discussions  held  on  September  6  and  7 
when  operation  order  No.  1  was  being  put  together.  It  was, decided 
that  no  landing  operation  should  be  included  because  it  would  have 
been  impossible  to  make  preparations  for  such  a  landing  in  less  than 
a  month  after  the  opening  of  hostilities;  it  was  further  recognized 
that  the  problems  of  speed  and  of  supplies  for  an  accompanying  convoy 
would  have  made  it  unlikely  that  the  initial  attack  could  be  ac-. 
complished  without  detection;  it  was  further  recognized  that  insuper- 
able logistic  problems  rendered  landings  on  the  island  impractical. 

The  complete  plan  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack  was  known  in  advance 
to  members  of  the  Navy  General  Staff,  the  commanders  in  chief  and 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  and  staff  members  of  the  combined  fleet  headquarters 
and  first  air  fleet  headquarters.  Part  of  the  plan  w-as  known  in  advance 
to  the  Navy  Minister,  Navy  Vice  Minister,  and  other  ranking  naval 
officers. 


184       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

It  is  also  reported — again  I  use  that  expression  advisedly — it  is  also 
reported  that  the  Emperor  knew  in  advance  onl^'^  the  general  outline 
of  the  plan  and  that  none  of  the  Japaneses  officials  who  were  in  the 
United  States,  including  [44^]  Ambassadors  Nomura  and 
Kurusu,  knew  anything  about  the  plan  in  advance. 

Parenthetically  again,  that  last  sentence,  referring  to  the  knowledge 
or  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  Emperor  and  Nonnira  and  Kurusu,  is  only 
based  on  a  single  report  purely  from  recollection  of  a  Japanese  officer. 

[44^]  The  aims  of  the  entire  Japanese  campaign,  including  the 
attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  were  predicated  on  the  desire  for  military 
conquest,  security',  and  enhancement  of  the  Empire  by  occupation  of 
areas  rich  in  natural  resources.  With  regard  to  the  Pearl  Harbor 
attack,  operation  order  No.  1  says  that : 

In  the  east  the  American  Fleet  will  be  destroyed  and  American  lines  of  opera- 
tion, and  supply  lines  to  the  Orient,  will  be  out.  Enemy  forces  will  be  inter- 
cepted and  annihilated.  Victories  will  be  exploited  to  break  the  enemy's  will 
to  fight. 

Since  the  American  Fleet  and  air  power  based  in  the  Hawa^iian 
area  were  the  only  obstacles  of  consequence,  a  major  task  force  built 
around  a  carrier  striking  group  was  considered  essential  to  conducting 
a  successful  surprise  attack.  Accordingly,  the  following  allocation  of 
forces  for  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack  was  made : 

Refer  now,  please,  to  item  17  in  the  Navy  folder,  which  gives  the 
composition  of  the  forces  in  some  detail..  I  will  summarize  by  saying 
that  it  consisted  of : 

Striking  force:  Commanding  Officer:  CinC  1st  Air  Fleet,  Vice 
Admiral  Chuichi  Nagnmo. 

[4S0]         BatDiv  3  ( 1st  Section)  (Hiei,  Kirishima) ,  2  BB. 

CarDiv  1  (Kaga)   (Akagi). 

CarDiv  2  (Hiryu,  Soryu). 

CarDiv  5  (Shokaku,  Zuikaku) ,  6  CV. 

CruDiv  8  (Tone,  Chikuma) ,  2  CA. 

DesRon  1  ( Abukuma,  4  DesDivs) ,  1  CL,  16  DD. 

11  train  vessels. 

ADVANCE  EXPEDITIONARY  FORCE 

Commanding  Officer:  CinC  6th  Fleet,  Vice  Admiral  Mitsumi 
Shimizu. 

Isuzu,  Yura,  2  CL. 

Katori,  1  CL-T. 

I-cla*s  submarines  (including  SubRons  1,  2,  3),  20  SS. 

(I-l,  2,  3, 4,  5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18,  20, 22-24,  68,  69,  74) 

Midget  submarines,  5  M-SS. 

6  train  vessels. 

Of  the  11  train  vessels  allotted  to  the  striking  force  only  3  tankers 
and  1  supply  ship  actually  accompanied  the  force.  In  addition,  3 
submarines  of  the  advance  expeditionary  force  accompanied  the  strik- 
ing force,  the  other  submarines  having  proceeded  from  the  Inland 
Sea  independently  of  the  striking  force. 

The  striking  force  departed  Hitokappu  Bay  at  9  a.  m.,  November  26, 
and  in  accordance  with  orders  from  CinC  Combined  [4^ J] 
Fleet,  proceeded  to  its  destination  200  miles  due  north  of  Oahu.  It 
was  fueled  en  route. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  185 

At  this  time  I  would  like  to  pause  to  advise  the  committee  that  the 
reproduction  of  this  chart  to  which  Commander  Biard  is  pointing  is' 
included  in  the  Navy  folder  as  item  18. 

On  leaving  the  harbor,  the  striking  force  was  joined  by  three  sub- 
marines which,  with  several  of  the  destroyers,  took  station  as  scouting 
screen.  Held  down  by  the  low  speed  of  the  train  vessels  and  the  )ieed 
for  fuel  economy,  the  force  cruised  eastward  at  13  knots.  Lookouts 
were  posted  but  no  searches  or  combat  air  patrols  were  flown.  It  had 
been  anticipated  that  North  Pacific  weather  would  cause  difficulty  in 
refueling  at  sea  and  those  ships  whose  capacity  in  relation  to  consump- 
tion was  small  were  loaded  with  oil  in  drums  for  emergency  use. 

Now,  off  the  script,  the  next  paragraph  is  modified  somewhat  by  this 
document  which  we  just  received  yesterday  through  the  naval  channels. 

The  weather,  however,  proved  unifoi-mly  calm,  and  fueling  from  the 
tankers  was  carried  out  as  planned.  A  participating  pilot  states  that 
the  weather  was  foggy  part  of  the  time.  On  or  about  December  2,  all 
ships  were  darkened  and  condition  two  (second  degree  of  readiness, 
gun  crews  stationed)  was  set. 

That  condition  of  readiness  was  set  about  December  2. 

\4S"2]  On  December  4,  Japan  time,  the  rendezvous  point  (42°  W., 
170°  E.)  was  reached  and  the  combat  ships  of  the  force  fueled  to  capac- 
ity from  the  tankers,  which  were  dropped  that  night.  The  task  force 
t hen  turned  southeast,  probably  at  increased  speed.  The  carriers  Iliiyn 
and  Soryu^  whose  fuel  capacity  was  small,  had  been  oiled  daily  while 
in  company  with  the  tankers  and  now  had  to  be  fueled  by  bucket 
brigade  from  the  oil  drums  taken  on  board.  The  cruise  up  to  this  date 
had  been  uneventful;  no  sliii^s  or  planes  had  been  sighted  and  no  false 
alarms  had  been  sounded.  When  the  force  was  800  miles  due  north  of 
Hawaii,  on  December  fi,  Japan  time,  it  received  from  the  Japanese 
Navy  Department  a  radio  message  "Climb  Mount  Niitaka";  this  was 
the  signal  for  the  attack  and  the  force  proceeded  south  at  24  knots  to  its 
destination.  On  the  niglit  of  the  7-8th  of  December,  Japan  time,  the 
run  in  was  made  at  top  speed,  26  knots. 

Again  I  would  like  to  say  that  radio  message  concerning  "Climb 
Mount  Niitaka"  was  derived  from  this  last  source  which  we  just 
received  yesterday. 

Returning  now  to  the  original  script : 

The  problem  of  defeating  enemy — United  States — radio  intelligence 
was  met  by  a  program  of  deceptive  traffic — false  assumption  of  call 
signs,  padding  of  circuits,  and  so  forth — to  simulate  the  presence  of  a 
striking  force,  carriers  and  carrier  air  groups  {-k^S^  in  the 
Inland  Sea.  In  contrast,  no  effort  was  made  to  mask  the  movements 
or  presence  of  the  naval  forces  moving  southward,  because  jjhysical 
observation  of  that  movement  were  unavoidable  and  the  radio  activity 
of  these  forces  would  provide  a  desirable  semblance  of  normalcy. 

Again  ad  libbing,  just  to  be  sure  that  there  is  no  misunderstanding;, 
the  movement  southward  that  the  Japanese  are  speaking  of  in  this 
connection  was  a  movement  of  other  forces  from  Japanese  Empire 
waters  south  toward  the  French-Indochina  coast,  and  not  the  move- 
ment of  the  task  force,  the  Japanese  task  force,  from  its  position  400 
miles  north  of  Hawaii  to  its  position  200  miles  north  of  Hawaii. 

Returning  to  the  script: 


186        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Upon  arrival  at  their  destination,  200  miles  due  north  of  Oahu,  the 
carriers  of  the  striking  force  launched  on  schedule  a  total  of  361  planes 
in  three  waves,  commencing  at  6  a.  m.  and  ending  at  7 :  15  a.  m,^ 
December  7,  Hawaii  time. 

I  might  add  here  at  this  point,  which  is  not  in  either  script,  the  note 
that  I  have :  "It  was  planned  that  the  force  be  protected  during  the 
attack  by  a  combat  patrol  of  18  fighters  to  be  launched  about  0545 — ■ 
5 :  45.  That,  presumably,  is  in  addition  to  the  361  planes  forming 
the  attack  group. 

Returning  now  to  the  script : 

[4^41  The  planes  rendezvoused  to  the  soutli  and  then  flew  in  for 
coordinated  attacks.  In  addition  to  the  attack  planes  launched  at  this 
time,  it  was  planned  to  launch  two  type  Zero  reconnaissance  seaplanes 
to  execute  reconnaissance  of  Pearl  Harbor  and  Lahaina  Anchorage 
just  before  the  attack. 

I  must  deviate  again  from  the  script  which  was  distributed  2  or  3 
days  ago  and  say  that  from  the  source  just  received  yesterday  we 
derived  this  additional  information. 

Apparently,  one  seaplane  from  a  cruiser  took  off  at  about  0430 
Hawaii  time  for  observation  purposes  at  16,404  feet  altitude. 
Returning  now  to  the  original  script : 

Upon  completion  of  the  launchings,  the  force  withdrew  at  high 
speed,  26  or  27  knots,  to  the  northwest.  Plane  recovery  was  effected 
between  10 :  30  a.  m.  and  1 :  30  p.  m.,  December  7,  Hawaii  time.  The 
striking  force  then  proceeded  by  a  circuitous  route  to  Kure,  arriving 
December  23,  Japan  time.  En  route  carrier  division  two — Hhyu, 
Soryu — Cruiser  Division  Eight — Tone^  Chikuina — and  two  destroy- 
ers— Tanikaze,  Yurakaze — were  detached  on  December  15,  Japan  time, 
to  serve  as  reinforcements  for  the  Wake  Island  operation.  Original 
plans  called  for  the  retiring  task  force  to  strike  at  Midway  if  possible, 
but,  probably  because  of  the  presence  of  a  United  States  task  force 
south  of  Midway,  that  strike  was  not  made. 

[^5]  Until  completion  of  the  surprise  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor 
by  the  striking  force,  the  advance  expeditionary  force  of  submarines 
was  under  command  of  the  striking  force  commander.  The  precise 
movements  of  the  participating  submarines  are  not  known,  but  it  is 
believed  that  most  of  these  units  departed  from  home  waters  in  late 
November  and  proceeded  to  the  Hawaiian  area  via  Kwajalein;  a  few 
of  these  submarines,  delayed  in  leaving  Japan,  changed  course  and 
proceeded  directly  to  Hawaii. 

The  functions  assigned  to  the  submarines  of  the  advance  expedi- 
tionary force  were  carried  out  as  planned  in  operations  order  No.  1, 
namely: 

{a)  Until  X-3  some  of  the  submarines  were  to  reconnoiter  impor- 
tant points  in  the  Aleutians,  Fiji,  and  Samoa,  and  were  to  observe  and 
report  on  any  strong  American  forces  discovered. 

{h)  One  element  was  assigned  to  patrol  the  route  of  the  striking 
force  in  advance  of  the  movement  of  that  force  to  ensure  an  unde- 
tected approach. 

{c)  Until  X-5  the  remaining  submarines  were  to  surround  Hawaii 
at  extreme  range  while  one  element  approached  and  reconnoitered 
without  being  observed. 


PROCEEDINCS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  187 

(d)  On  X  day  the  submarines  in  the  area  ^ere  to — 

observe  and  attack  the  American  Fleet  in  tlie  Hawaii  area;  make  a  surprisf 
attack  on  the  channel  leading  into  Pearl  Harbor  and  attempt  to  close  it;  if  tlie 
enemy  moves  out  to  fight,  he  will         [-^56]         be  pursued  and  attacked. 

During  the  evening  of  December  7  (the  day  before  the  actual  at- 
tack), the  force  of  I  class  submarines  took  up  scouting  positions  in 
allotted  patrol  sectors  covering  the  waters  in  the  vicinity  of  Pearl 
Harbor;  these  submarines  were  ordered  not  to  attack  until  the  task 
force  strike  was  verified. 

Between  50  and  100  miles  off  Pearl  Harbor,  5  midget  submarines 
were  launched  from  specially  fitted  fleet  submarines  as  a  special  at- 
tacking force  to  conduct  an  offensive  attack  against  American  ships 
within  the  harbor  and  to  prevent  the  escape  of  the  American  Fleet 
through  the  harbor  entrance  during  the  scheduled  air  strike.  Avail- 
able data  indicates  that  only  one  of  the  five  midget  submarines  pene- 
trated into  the  harbor;  it  inflicted  no  damage  on  American  units  and 
none  of  the  five  rejoined  the  Japanese  force. 

After  the  actual  attack,  the  I  class  submarines  maintained  their 
])artols  in  the  Hawaiian  area  and  at  least  one  of  the  group  (the  1-7) 
launched  its  aircraft  to  conduct  a  reconnaissance  of  Pearl  Harbor  to 
ascertain  the  status  of  the  American  fleet  and  installations.  The  op- 
eration plan  provided  that,  in  the  eveut  of  virtual  destruction  of  the 
American  Fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor,  one  submarine  division  or  less  would 
be  placed  between  Hawaii  and  North  America  to  destroy  sea  traffic; 
in  fact,  at  least  one  submarine  (the  1-17)  was  dispatched  to  the 
[4^7]  Oregon  coast  on  or  about  December  14.  One  large  subma- 
rine (pilot  rescue)  was  stationed  east  of  Kaui. 

That  last  also  comes  from  this  latest  source,  about  the  rescue  sub- 
marine stationed  east  of  Kaui.  Kaui  is  northwest  of  Oahu.  I  might 
also  say  parenthetically  that  this  is  the  first  information  we  have 
ever  had  that  the  Japanese  used  the  submarine  rescue  tactics  which 
were  later  so  successfully  employed  by  our  own  forces. 

The  next  subheading  is  "Projected  Losses  Compared  with  Actual 
Losses." 

During  the  war  games  carried  on  at  the  Naval  War  College,  Tokyo, 
from  September  2  to  13,  1941,  it  was  assumed  that  the  Pearl  Harbor 
striking  force  would  suffer  the  loss  of  one-third  of  its  participating 
units;  it  was  specifically  assumed  that  one  Ahagi  class  carrier,  and 
one  Soryu  class  carrier  would  be  lost.  No  mention  is  made  of  prob- 
able plane  losses.  A  very  slight  expectation  was  held  that  some  of 
the  five  midget  submarines  would  be  retrieved  but  all  midget  sub- 
marine ])ersonnel  were  prepared  for  death.  The  losses  actually  in- 
curred were  27  aircraft  and  all  of  the  5  midget  submarines. 

The  Japanese  assessment  of  damage  inflicted  on  the  American  forces 
was  made  from  reports  of  flight  personnel  upon  their  return  and  from 
studies  of  photographs  taken  by  flight  personnel.  No  reconnaissance 
planes  were  used  during  the  [4-58^  attack  to  assess  results,  al- 
though one  plane  was  launched  from  a  submarine  for  this  purpose 
well  after  the  attack  had  been  completed;  one  element  of  fighter 
planes  was  ordered,  after  completing  its  mission,  to  fly  as  low  as  pos- 
sible to  make  observations.  The  official  Japanese  estimate  of  damage 
inflicted  and  the  contrastiug  actual  damage  inflicted  is  as  follows: 


188        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

In  this  table  I  give  material  both  from  Japanese  sonrces  and  Ameri- 
can sources.  In  the  left-hand  table  is  the  Japanese  estimate.  In  the 
right-hand  table  is  the  actual  damage  as  reported  from  American 
sources. 

The  Japanese  estimated  that  they  had  suidv  four  battleships,  two 
cruisers,  and  one  tanker. 

Actually  thej^  sank  four  battleships,  a  converted  battleship,  the 
Utah,  and  also  one  mine  layer,  the  Oghihi. 

The  Japs  estimated  that  they  had  heavily  damaged  four  battleships 
and  five  cruisers. 

Actually  they  had  heavily  damaged  one  battleship,  two  light 
cruisers,  three  destroyers,  and  one  repair  ship. 

The  Japanese  estimated  that  they  had  lightly  damaged  one  battle- 
ship.    Actually  they  had  slightly  damaged  three  battleships. 

I  beg  your  pardon.  Three  battleships,  one  light  cruiser,  and  one 
aircraft  tender. 

The  Japanese  estimated  that  they  had  destroyed  a  total  [45P] 
of  450  aircraft.     Actually  they  destroyed  92  Navy  planes. 

Perhaps  the  colonel  can  give  the  number  of  Army  planes  destroyed 
and  then  we  will  have  it  all  at  this  point. 

Colonel  Thielen.  Yes ;  we  have  some  figures  on  that. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  You  have  10.5  here,  Admiral. 

Admiral  Inglis.  You  mean  Navy  planes? 

The  Vice  Chairmax.  One  hundred  and  five  Navy. 

\I{60i\  Admiral  Inglis.  That  figure  of  Navy  damage  has  been 
bandied  about  among  my  staff,  and  we  have  liad  reports  all  the  way 
from  something  down  in  the  80's  up  to  136.  The  other  day  we  gave  as 
our  best  estimate  105.    We  have  revised  that  to  our  best  estimate  of  102. 

Colonel  TiiiELEX.  Our  figure  was  96  Army  planes  lost,  and  I  should 
explain  that  is  greater  than  the  initial  reports  primarily  because  some 
of  the  planes  were  cannibalized  to  put  other  aircraft  in  the  air.  But 
the  final  figure  is  96  Army  planes  lost  as  the  result  of  enemy  action. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  think  it  is  fair  to  state  that  the  Japanese  esti- 
mated that  they  had  destroyed  450  planes:  that  they  actually  de- 
stroyed, in  round  numbers,  200  planes,  perhaps  a  little  less  than  200. 

Finally,  it  may  thus  be  concluded  that  the  Japanese  estimate  of 
damage  to  United  States  ships  was  highly  conservative,  whereas  their 
estimate  of  damage  to  United  States  aircraft  was  grossly  exaggerated. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  Do  you  want  to  put  up  the  map  there.  Admiral,  that 
shows  the  reconnaissance? 

Senator  Brewster.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  note  the  time,  and  before  any 
cross-examination,  as  far  as  we  are  coiicerned,  we  would  wish  to  have 
an  opportunity  to  look  at  tlie  exhibits,  other  than  the  Japanese  lan- 
guage ones — we  would  not  be  able  to  \_hGl\  I'ead  thenu  There 
will  perhaps  be  opportunity  during  the  recess. 

The  Chairman,  The  Chair  announced  a  while  ago  that  we  might  run 
to  1  o'clock.    What  is  the  wish  of  the  committee  ? 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Let  us  hear  from  counsel. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  We  are  willing  to  stop  or  go  on,  as  you  please. 

The  Chairman,  What  is  the  desire  of  the  committee  with  respect 
to  an  afternoon  session  ? 

Senator  Brewster.  I  think  we  better  go  over  to  Monday  morning. 

Mr.  MuEPHT,  Mr,  Chairman,  might  I  suggest  that  the  witness  lias 
not  yet  concluded  his  direct  testimony. 

Senator  Brewster.  He  has  completed  the  statement. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  189 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  understand  counsel  is  now  referring  to  some  charts. 

The  Chairman.  He  had  finished  his  statement. 

Senator  George.  I  suggest  we  go  over  to  Monday. 

The  Chairman.  He  had  finished  reading  his  statement,  whereupon 
counsel  was  going  to  ask  him  some  questions. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  just  two  more  charts. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Could  we  have  counsel  ask  his  questions  and 
then  recess? 

The  Chairman.  We  can  determine  about  the  recess,  but  I  [46'2'\ 
think  in  the  meantime  counsel  should  be  permitted  to  conclude. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes;  that  is  what  I  mean. 

The  Chairman.  Go  ahead. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  would  like,  before  concluding  my  direct  state- 
ment, to  invite  the  attention  of  the  committee  to  two  charts,  which 
are  also  included  in  the  folder  which  has  been  presented  to  you,  in 
reduced  form. 

The  first  one  is  an  outline  of  the  island  of  Oahu  and  shows  the 
track  or  path  of  the  two  attacking  units.  I  think  you  can  see  by  the 
chart,  without  any  great  amount  of  explanation  from  me,  the  track 
which  the  Japanese  pilot  reported  that  the  attacking  units  took.  That 
is  the  first  one  there. 

The  first  wave  is  on  the  left.  It  shows  how  it  is  split  up  into 
several  parts  to  attack  various  objectives. 

Then,  the  other  arrows,  on  the  right,  show  the  second  wave.  It 
shows  how  it  is  split  up  to  attack  three  different  objectives. 

Now,  if  we  could  have  the  other  chart  showing  the  searches. 

That  chart  is  item  19  in  the  folder,  and  the  next  is  item  20 — I  beg 
your  pardon.     It  is  the  other  way  around. 

Mr.  Murphy.  In  order  to  keep  the  record  straight  may  it  be  noted 
that  the  witness  is  now  referring  to  item  20  in  the  Xavy  folder. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  just  completed  referring  to  item  20. 

[463]  Item  19  is  a  reproduction  of  searches  that  Avere  shown  in 
the  previous  testimony  but  now  we  have  added  to  it,  superimposed  on 
it,  the  track  of  the  Japanese  task  force,  and  you  will  notice  there  is  one 
point  where  the  track  of  the  Japanese  force  overlaps  a  searched  sector. 
However,  the  best  evidence  that  we  have  is  that  by  the  time  the  search 
planes  got  out  to  that  point  the  Japanese  task  force  had  left  the  area 
and  was  on  its  way  northwestward  at  high  speed  and  no  contact  was 
made. 

That  concludes  my  statement. 

Mr.  Gesell.  One  or  two  questions.  Admiral,  on  the  statement. 

You  stated  that  the  plan  for  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  was  com- 
pleted on  November  5,  Jap  time.  I  gather  from  that  j^ou  were  talking, 
at  that  point,  about  the  war  plan  as  opposed  to  the  operational  deci- 
sion to  put  the  plan  into  execution ;  is  tJiat  right. 

Admiral  Ingijs.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Gesell.  In  other  words,  by  the  5th  of  November,  Jap  time,  the 
Japs  had  worked  out  how  they  were  going  to  accomplish  this  attack, 
but  you  did  not  mean  to  indicate  that  by  that  time  they  had  reached  a 
decision  of  a  final  and  binding  nature  to  attack;  is  that  correct. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct. 

[464-]  Mr.  Gesell.  Coming  over  to  the  order  of  November  25,  to 
which  you  referred  I  think  on  page  4  of  your  statement,  where  you  said 
the  commander  in  chief  of  the  combined  fleet  issued  an  order  to  the 

79716 — 46 — pt.  1 15 


190       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

striking  force,  and  directing  your  attention  particularly  to  subpara- 
graph B,  which  reads  as  follows : 

Should  it  appear  certain  that  Japanese-American  negotiations  will  reach  an 
amicable  settlement  prior  to  the  commencement  of  hostile  action  all  the  forces 
of  the  combined  fleet  are  to  be  ordered  to  reassemble  and  return  to  their  bases. 

I  want  to  ask  you  whether  there  is  any  evidence  in  any  of  this  mate- 
rial that  that  order,  and  specifically  the  portion  I  just  read,  was  ever 
revoked  by  any  Japanese  authorities  prior  to  the  attack  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  order  was  not  revoked.  By  inference  it 
might  be  perhaps  assumed  that  the  order  to  climb  Mount  Niitaka  was, 
in  effect,  a  final  firm  commitment. 

Mr.  Gesell.  And  when  was  that  order  received,  did  you  say,  by  the 
striking  force,  to  climb  Mount  Niitaka? 

Admiral  Ingijs.  That  was  on  the  6th  of  December  Japanese  time, 
or  the  5th  of  December  United  States  time. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Now,  what  time  of  day ;  does  your  information  disclose 
what  time  of  day  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

[465]  Mr.  Gesell.  Will  you  point  to  the  chart  and  indicate 
approximately  what  distance  from  Pearl  Harbor  you  would  estimate 
tliat  the  Japanese  Fleet  was  at  the  time  that  order  was  received  ^ 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  will  take  a  minute  to  figure  out. 

Mr.  Gesell.  All  right. 

The  Vice  Chairman:  While  we  are  waiting,  could  you  spell  that 
name,  the  name  of  the  mountain,  for  us? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Niitaka.    That  is  N-i-i-t-a-k-a. 

The  best  estimate  that  I  can  make  is  the  point  where  that  track 
intersects  the  160  meridian. 

Will  you  point  to  that,  160  west. 

That  is,  necessarily,  just  pretty  much  of  a  guess,  but  I  would  say 
that  it  was  at  about  this  location,  where  the  Japanese  striking  force  is 
alleged  to  have  received  the  message  to  climb  Mount  Niitaka. 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  didn't  understand  whether  that  message  was  pur- 
ported to  have  come  from  Tokyo. 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  understood  that  message  came  from  Tokyo. 

Mr.  Gesell.  At  the  point  you  estimated  the  message  was  received 
the  striking  force  was  about  ready  to  start  its  direct  run  toward  Oahu ; 
is  that  correct  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Almost;  yes,  sir. 

[466]  Mr.  Gesell.  Now,  with  reference  to  the  sources  of  data 
used  in  planning  by  the  Japanese.  You  stated  that  source  "E,"  espio- 
nage network  in  Hawaiian  Islands,  using  uncensored  cable  communi- 
cations with  Japan,  was  a  source  which  you  had  added  from  your 
own  knowledge  of  Jap  sources ;  is  that  not  correct  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  from  my  own  personal  knowledge  but  from 
the  United  States  records. 

Mr.  Gesell.  You  were  referring,  were  you,  to  intercepted  Japanese 
messages  concerning  military  installations,  which  were  classified  as 
the  "magic"  material  or  the  "ultra"  material  by  the  Navy  and  Army? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  sources  that  I  have  indicated  here  are  the 
FBI  and  ONI.  These  are  derived  from  investigation  reports  of  our 
agents  in  the  Hawaiian  area,  not  cryptanalytical  material. 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  thought  I  understood  you  to  use  the  word  "crypt- 
analytical" material  vA\en  discussing  that  paragraph? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  191 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  intentionally.  I  said  using  uncensored  cable 
connnunications  with  Japan.  That  would  be  to  forward  the  results 
of  the  Japanese  espionage.  They  would  use  uncensored  cable  com- 
munications. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  would  like  to  direct  the  committee's 
attention  to  Exhibit  2  at  this  time,  which  is  already  in  evidence,  con- 
taining the  Japanese  messages  concerning  [467]  military  in- 
stallations and  ship  movements,  and  particularly  to  the  section  con- 
cerned with  Hawaii.  The  committee  will  there  see  a  series  of  messages 
between  Tokyo  and  Honolulu,  some  of  them  translated  after  December 
7,  mau}^  of  them  before,  all  of  them  concerned  with  the  disposition  of 
the  fleet  in  the  harbor,  the  nature  of  the  reconnaissance,  questions  as 
to  whether  or  not  torpedo  nets  were  down,  the  area  in  which  the  fleet 
conducted  its  regular  maneuvers,  and  other  information  of  a  direct 
military  espionage  nature. 

I  think  subsequent  testimony  will  indicate  that  at  least  most  of  these 
messages  were  sent  by  cable  facilities  from  Hawaii  to  Tokyo  or  vice 
versa. 

The  Chairmax.  May  I  ask,  do  you  mean  commercial  cable  facilities? 

Mr.  Gesell.  Commercial  cable  facilities ;  yes,  sir. 

We. would  like  particularly  to  call  attention  to  a  message  which 
appears  at  page  117  under  the  heading  of  "Other  Messages  of  Particu- 
lar Interest,"  which  indicates  that  on  February  15,  1941,  general  no- 
tification was  sent  out  concerning  the  nature  of  the  espionage  data 
that  was  wanted  from  various  points  by  the  Japanese  authorities. 

Now,  you  referred,  Admiral,  to  "train  vessels."  What  are  "train 
vessels?" 

Admiral  Inglis.  Train  vessels  are  what  we  call  auxiliary  [468] 
types,  such  as  tankers,  supply  ships,  repair  ships. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Now,  in  discussing  the  actual  activities  of  the  Japanese 
aircraft  at  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  attack  you  stated  that 
the  planes  rendezvoused  to  the  south  and  then  flew  in  for  coordinated 
action.  Did  yoii  mean  to  indicate  by  that  that  the  planes  came  to  Oahu 
from  points  in  the  south  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  By  no  means.  Of  course,  this  is  Japanese  language, 
that  I  have  been  quoting,  or  translations  of  it,  but  the  intent  of  that 
statement  was  that  the  Japanese  planes  would  rendezvous  south  of  the 
carriers  v,'hich  were  north  of  Oahu,  and  then  pi'oceed  from  that  ren- 
dezvous on  farther  south  to  Oahu  itself. 

Mr.  Gesell.  In  other  words,  they  would  simply  gather  south  of 
where  the  carriers  were,  but  still  north  of  Oahu,  to  make  their  forma- 
tion for  the  attack? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Correct. 

Mr.  Gesell.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  your  item  No.  20  sketch  indicates 
plainly,  does  it  not,  that,  at  least  according  to  those  records,  the  planes 
did  come  into  Oahu  from  the  north  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  was  somewhat  puzzled  by  the  time  shown  on  item  20 
and  I  wanted  to  see  if  you  could  verify  those  times  with  the  times  that 
we  have  been  discussing  heretofore.  The  [469]  times  that 
appeared  on  the  radar  maps  that  the  committee  has  been  considering 
were,  of  course,  all  Hawaiian  times,  starting  with  the  early  pick-ups 
at  6  and  7  o'clock. 


192       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Now,  the  times  that  appear  on  this  map,  if  I  read  it  correctly,  say 
3 :  10,  4 :  10,  3 :  20,  4 :  25,  and  some  of  the  notes  indicate  other  times  in 
about  that  area. 

I  wonder  if  you  cohld  reconcile  that  difference  for  us  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  As  I  understand  it,  this  sketch  is  a  reproduction  of 
one  drawn  bv  the  Japanese  officer  who  was  interrogated  and  the  best 
we  can  make  out  of  that  is  that  that  time  given  was  Tokyo  time. 

If  you  substract  191/2  hours  from  3 :  10,  that  should  convert  it  into 
Hawaiian  Honolulu  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  would  that  be,  will  counsel  inquire  ? 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  was  going  to  make  the  computation.  Senator. 

Senator  Brewster.  It  is  on  the  map,  I  understand. 

Admiral  Inglis,  Another  way  is  to  add  4^4  hours  in  1  day.  That 
would  make  it  at  7 :  40.  That  would  make  the  figure  on  the  left-hand 
arrow  7  :  40  instead  of  3  :  10. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Where  it  appears  as  3 :10,  that  was  7 :  40. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  the  best  we  could  make  out  of  it;  yes,  sir. 

[470]  Mr.  Gesell.  Now,  that  somewhat  closely  coincides,  does 
it  not,  witli  the  information  contained  on  the  historical  plot  that  we 
have  been  discussing? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  it  does. 

Mr.  Gesell.  That  showed  that  the  planes  were  in  fairly  close  to 
the  northern  tip  of  the  island  by,  I  believe,  7 :  39? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Right,  sir. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Now,  this  tract  does  not  show  any  Japanese  air  activ- 
ity earlier  than  3  :  10  or  7 :  40,  does  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  tract  does  not,  no,  sir.. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Have  you  given  in  your  statement  all  the  information 
which  is  available  as  to  the  preliminary  scouting  activities  of  Jap 
planes  prior  to  diis  main  flight  that  actually  made  the  attack? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  think  we  have  quoted  verbatim  the  statements 
that  these  two  pilots  made. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Now,  with  respect  to  the  discussion  of  the  submarine 
movements — — 

Admiral  Inglis.  Mr.  Gesell,  may  I  interrupt  a  minute  ? 

Mr.  Gesell.  Certainly. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  think  that  I  gave  you  a  final  definitive 
answer  to  j^our  question.  My  answer  was  that  to  the  best  of  my 
knowledge  and  belief  we  have  quoted  precisely  the  translations  of 
the  statements  made  by  the  two  pilots  [4^^}  and  also,  to  the 
best  of  my  knowledge  and  belief,  that  is  the  only  evidence  which  we 
have. 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  did  not  mean  to  interrupt ;  I  am  sorry. 

Now,  with  respect  to  the  disposition  of  the  submarine  forces  which 
you  have  considered,  you  reported  that  at  least  one  body  of  the  sub- 
marines went  to  Hawaii  via  Kawajalein,  did  you  not? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gesell.  That  is  in  the  Marshall  group  of  islands,  is  it  not  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Have  you  any  information  as  to  when  those  sub- 
marines arrived  in  the  areas  of  the  Marshall  Islands? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Gesell.  In  discussing  whether  or  not  midget  submarines  pene- 
trated into  the  harbor  you  again  indicated  that  your  data  pointed 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  193 

to  the  fact  that  only  one  submarine  had  penetrated  into  the  harbor 
but  that  involved,  did  it  not,  the  same  qualitative  judgments  on  your 
part  as  have  already  been  considered  by  the  committee  in  connection 
with  your  previous  statement  concerning  submarines  in  the  harbor? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir.  I  have  nothing  to  add  re- 
garding submarines  than  I  stated  in  m}^  previous  statement. 

[472]  Mr.  Gesell.  This  is  merely  a  repetition  of  your  statement 
on  this  score  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Tliat  is  right. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Did  the  Japanese  in  any  way  report  how  many  sub- 
marines got  in  the  harbor  ? 

iVdmiral  Inglis.  We  have  no  such  report. 

Mr.  Gesell.  It  is  known,  is  it  not,  that  none  of  the  submarines  re- 
turned, none  of  the  Jap  submarines  returned  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Tlie  Japanese  admit  that. 

The  Chaerman.  That  is  midgets. 

Mr.  Gesell.  We  are  talking  about  the  midget  submarines. 

The  Chairman,  That  is  right. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  five  midgets  did  not  return, 

Mr.  Gesell.  Now,  you  say  that  they  were  these  midget  submarines 
from  a  mother  ship.  You  mean  that  the  small  submarine  was  inside 
a  larger  submarine,  or  just  how  did  it  work  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Those  midget  submarines  are  carried  as  a  deck 
load  on  the  larger  submarine, 

Mr.  Gesell.  Under  water  or  on  the  surface  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Under  water  or  on  the  surface. 

Mr,  Gesell,  In  other  words,  the  mother  submarine  can  submerge 
taking  the  midget  submarines  with  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir.  Of  course,  with  some  loss  of 
military  effectiveness  because  of  the  unusual         [W3]         load. 

Mr.  Geseix.  Yes,  I  imagine  so. 

Now,  I  wanted  to  ask  one  question  of  you  concerning  the  recon- 
naissance map  item  which  we  had,  oi^  which  the  track  of  the  Jap  strik- 
ing force  was  presented. 

You  stated  that  there  was  one  overlap  of  the  radius  sliown  there, 
I  am  not  clear  whether  the  reconnaissance  as  shown  on  that  chart  is 
the  actual  distance  flown  by  the  reconnaissance  airplanes  or  whether 
it  takes  into  account  the  visual  reconnaissance  which  would  be  possible 
from  the  end  of  the  radius  of  a  flight. 

Do  you  understand  what  I  mean  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  understand,  what  you  mean  and  I  am  not  clear 
on  that  either, 

Mr.  Gesell.  The  question,  of  course,  arises,  if  it  is  the  former  rather 
than  the  latter,  whether  from  the  terminal  points  of  the  actual  flight 
it  would  have  been  possible  to  see  the  departing  or  incoming  Jap 
forces.  I  take  it  the  incoming  clearly  no ;  the  question  only  relates  to 
the  departing  Jap  forces. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Of  course,  that  is  a  highly  speculative  matter  from 
my  point  of  view,  as  to  just  what  the  visibility  was,  what  the  altitude 
of  the  planes  was  and  how  far  they  could  see  and  I  am  afraid  I  cannot 
answer  that  question  except  [4741  fo  say  again  that  no  sight 
contact  was  obtained, 

Mr,  Gesell,  Could  you,  when  you  get  to  it,  also  let  us  know  whether 
the  chart  has  charted  the  flight  of  the  planes  or  whether  it  has  taken 


194        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

into  account  the  additional  reconnaissance  possible  by  eyesight  from 
the  extremity  of  the  reconnaissance? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  informed  that  the  chart  was  only  intended 
to  show  the  actual  flifTht  of  the  planes  and  not  the  extension  because  of 
unj  radius  of  visibility. 

'  Air.  Gesell.  Have  you  any  opinion  as  to  what  the  maximum  area 
of  visibility  might  be  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  afraid  I  cannot  answer  that. 

Mr.  Gesell.  That  would  depend  on  the  height  of  the  planes  and  the 
atmospheric  condition  at  tlie  time,  I  take  it. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Gesell.  As  well  as  the  eyesight  of  the  pilots  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Correct. 

Mr.  Mitcpiell.  Just  one  question,  Admiral. 

This  reconnaissance  we  have  just  been  talking  about  on  the  vertical 
lines  was  the  reconnaissance  made  after  the  attack  in  an  effort  to  locate 
the  carriers  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  horizontal  lines  west  of  Pearl  Harbor  represent 
the  only  reconnaissance,  I  understand,  that  was  li^S^  made  on 
the  7th,  prior  to  the  attack? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Tliat  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  that  reconnaissance,  whether  you  can  see  50 
miles  beyond  the  liniits  of  the  plane's  flight,  was  obviously  nowhere 
near  the  Jap  fleets  or  the  Jap  carriers  or  the  incoming  planes? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  think  that  is  all. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Mitchell,  I  wonder  if  you  would  inquire  from 
the  witness  what  the  initials  "GMT"  mean  in  connection  with  time  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Greenwich  meridian  time;  over  in  England  some- 
where. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Of  course. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  the  starting  point  of  all  time. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Congressman,  you  will  find  all  times  transposed  from 
tliat  base  in  one  of  the  schedules  in  the  Navy  folder. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  see  the  exhibit  here.  In  one  of  the  items  here  they 
classify  the  time  as  "GMT  December  8."  What  would  that  mean 
in  United  States,  what  would  that  mean  in  Hawaii  and  what  would 
that  mean  in  Japan  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  There  is  a  table  that  gives  all  that.  We  can  look 
it  up  for  you.     It  is  in  an  exhibit  in  evidence. 

[476'\  Mr.  Gesell.  Item  4,  Mr.  Gearhart,  of  the  Navy  exhibit. 
It  is  transposed  into  our  time  for  the  fifth,  sixth  and  seventh,  so  that 
we  can  tell  from  any  time  we  have  what  time  it  was  at  the  key  points, 
any  different  kind  or  type  of  time  we  want. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  think  that  will  prove  helpful  as  the  hearing  goes  along. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Thank  jou. 

Mr.  Gesell.  All  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  another  exhibit  of  that 
Opana  marked  "15,"  in  evidence.  This  may  be  clearer  than  the  one  I 
put  in.  I  wonder  whether  we  should  also  put  this  exhibit  in?  The 
other  one  was  not  so  clear. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  195 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Is  it  a  photostat  of  that  other  one? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  cannot  tell  without  comparing  the  two. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Suppose  we  look  at  it  over  the  week  end  and  see 
what  it  is. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  for  the  record,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  witness  was  asked  about  the  other  one  I  would  say  that  they  both 
should  go  in. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  what  I  had  in  mind,  that  they  both  go  in. 

The  Chairman.  I' see  no  objection  to  them  both  going  [4'^'7\ 
in,  but  counsel  say  they  want  to  see  over  the  week  end  what  it  is. 

Senator  Ferguson.  May  I  inquire  if  the  witness  over  the  week  end 
will  compare  it,  compare  the  three  to  show  the  differences?  I  think 
this  is  much  clearer  and  it  will  be  helpful  and  he  will  be  able  to  see 
the  differences  between  them. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  what  I  had  in  mind. 

Admiral  Inglis.  This  is  not  mine. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Oh,  this  is  the  Army's  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  Senator  Brewster  asked  about  these  sources 
of  material  exhibits  on  the  last  statement.  Would  you  like  to  have 
them  over  the  week  end  ? 

Senator  Brewster.  I  would  like  over  the  week  end  and  for  the 
convenience  of  counsel  to  have  them  for  2  or  3  hours.  I  will  send  them 
back  to  counsel. 

Mr.  ISIitciiell.  We  will  turn  them  over  to  you  and  leave  them  in 
your  office  and  if  any  of  the  other  members  of  the  committee  want  to 
see  them  they  can  do  so. 

The  Chairman.  Is  the  English  translation  on  the  exhibit? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  will  give  him  one  with  the  English  translation 
on. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  the  Senator  from  ]\Iaine  wanted  the 
English  translation.  I  thought  if  the  Senator  from  Maine  [P'S] 
wanted  the  English  translation  I  would  take  the  one  in  Japanese 
home  with  me  over  the  week  end. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  might  comment  that  I  think  probably  the  ex- 
amination would  be  as  much  as  the  Senator  has  made  of  any  of  thei 
other  exhibits. 

The  Chairman.  The  Senator  from  Maine  has  no  information  on 
that  subject. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  the  Chairman  had  no  information  from 
me  either. 

The  Chairman.  As  is  the  similar  case  on  many  subjects  which  he  ^ 
discusses. 

Senator  Ferguson.  May  I  inquire  when  Senator  Brewster  will  get 
them,  so  that  we  may  be  able  to  see  them  in  Senator  Brewster's  office? 

Mr.  Gesell.  Why  doesn't  he  put  them  under  his  arm  and  take  i^^ 
right  now  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  a  good  suggestion. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  a  question  of  the  Senator 
from  Maine? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Murphy.  May  I  be  permitted  (o  see  tlu>  ilewitl  re}>ort? 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 


196       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Keefe.  There  is  one  question  that  I  am  not  quite  clear  on  and 
I  would  like  to  have  the  witness  give  the  information.  He  may  have 
given  it  but  I  am  not  quite  clear  on  it,  [P'd]  and  that  is  the 
question  as  to  the  approximate  mileage  distance  from  Pearl  Harbor  of 
this  task  force,  the  Japanese  task  force,  at  the  time  the  message  was 
received. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  gave  it  as  closely  as  I  could  estimate  it  and  you 
will  remember,  Congressman  Keefe,  that  they  were  800  miles  north 
of  Oahu  at  the  time  they  turned  due  south.  That  was  800  miles 
north  of  Oahu. 

Now,  the  point  at  which — I  just  guessed  and  I  must  insist  that  it  is 
only  a  guess — at  which  the}'  probably  recei^^ed  that  radio  message 
is  where  that  track  crosses  the  one  hundred  and  sixtieth  meridian, 
and  again  just  guessing,  I  would  say  that  was  200  miles  further 
back  toward  Japan  or,  let  vis  say,  a  thousand  miles  roughly. 

Mr.  Keeee.  About  a  thousand  miles  north  of  Oahu  when  this  mes- 
sage was  received  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Well,  a  thousand  miles  back  along  their  track. 
Of  course,  that  was  not  due  north  because  it  was  a  zigzag  course. 

Mr.  Keeee.  All  right. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  is  there  any  further  clarification  desired  by 
anybody  of  the  Admiral's  testimony  before  we  recess  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  have  one  more  initial 
clarified.    "GCT",  what  does  that  mean  'i 

Admiral  Inglis.  Greenwich  civil  time. 

[4-^0]         Mr.  Gearhart.  What  is  the  diif erence  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  a  little  rusty  on  my  navigation  at  the  moment, 
but  as  I  recall  it  Greenwich  meridian  time  starts  at  midnight  and 
Greenwich  Civil  Time  starts  at  noon,  or  just  the  other  way  around. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  would  like  to  ask  you  to  help  me  in  deciding  what 
kind  of  time  we  have  got  here. 

The  Chairman.  We  don't  want  any  two-timers. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  But  the  message  was  broadcast  over  the  I'adio  in 
Japan  at  2  o'clock,  I  think  it  was  GMT  December  8,  1941.  Do  you 
know  whether  that  refers  to  Japanese  time  or  to  time  within  the 
United  States  ?  _ 

Admiral  Inglis.  If  it  is  expressed  in  that  way  that  would  be 
London  time. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  London  time? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  would  be  London  time,  when  it  savs  "GMT". 
That  is  what  it  says,  isn't  it,  "GMT  ? " 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  GMT  would  be  that  time  in  London  with  the  base 
point  noon  rather  than  midnight. 

INIr.  Gearhart.  Then  if  I  should  look  at  the  chart  in  the  Navy  folder 
and  find  London  time,  in  a  moment's  calculation  I  can  take  the  time 
for  London  and  determine  what  it  is  in  the  United  States  and  what 
it  was  in  Japan  ? 

[481'\         Admiral  Inglis.  I  think  you  can,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  If  there  is  nothing  further,  the  committee  will  re- 
cess until  10  o'clock  Monday  morning. 

(Whereupon,  at  12:45  p.  m.,  November  17,  1945,  an  adjournment 
was  taken  until  10  a.  m.,  Monday,  November  19,  1945.) 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  197 


im'\  PEAKL  HAEBOR  ATTACK 


MONDAY,   NOVEMBER   19,    1945 

Congress  of  the  United  States, 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation 

OF  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack, 

W ashington^  I).  C. 

The  joint  committee  met,  pursuant  to  adjournment,  at  10  a.  m., 
in  the  caucus  room  (room  318),  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator 
Alben  W.  Barkley  (chairman)  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Barkley  (chairman),  George,  Lucas,  Brewster, 
and  Ferguson,  and  Eepresentatives  Cooper  (vice  chairman),  Clark, 
Murphy,  Gearhart,  and  Keefe. 

Also  present:  William  D.  Mitchell,  general  counsel;  Gerhard  A. 
Gesell,  Jule  M.  Hannaford,  and  John  E.  Masten,  of  counsel,  for  the 
joint  committee. 

\_IiS3~\         The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

General  Mitchell  and  Mr.  Gesell,  you  apparently  concluded  your 
examination  of  the  witnesses  on  Saturday.  Is  there  anything  further 
vou  wish  to  ask  them  this  morning  before  the  committee  examines 
them? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Xo,  Mr.  Chairman,  but  the  committee  ought  to  say 
whether  they  want  Colonel  Thielen  to  take  up  the  radar  chart  business 
that  one  of  the  Senators  asked  him  about,  or  whether  we  should  go  on 
with  the  Japanese  attack.  Would  3^ou  like  to  have  the  radar  matter 
come  up  first  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Personally,  I  would  like  to  go  along  with  the 
Japanese  attack,  to  keep  the  sequence. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  counsel  have  no  further  questions  at  this  time 
about  the  Japanese  attack. 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  want  to  say,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  I  want  to  go  into 
the  radar  matter,  but  I  will  postpone  it  mitil  later. 

The  Chairman.  We  will  let  the  radar  matter  slide  until  we  get 
through  with  Admiral  Inglis. 

The  Chair  wishes  to  make  this  statement.  In  the  committee  a  few 
days  ago,  when  we  decided  the  order  in  which  the  examination  of 
witnesses  would  take  place,  the  Chair,  as  a  matter  of  courtesy  to  all  the 
other  members,  suggested  that  he  postpone  any  examination  on  his 
part  until  all  the  members  of  the  \_k-^h'\  committee  had  an 
opportunity  to  examine  the  witnesses.  The  Chairman  had  no  thought 
that  there  would  be  any  advantage  or  disadvantage  in  whether  he 
asked  any  questions  at  the  beginning  or  waited  until  the  examina- 
tion was  over  to  ask  such  questions  as  had  not  been  covered  bj^  other 
members  of  the  committee. 

However,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  that  may  be  regarded  as  an  effort 
to  get  the  last  word — which  no  member  of  this  committee  really  has. 


198       CONCRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

because  even  after  formal  examination,  and  after  committee  members 
have  examined  the  witnesses,  if  a  Senator  or  a  Member  of  the  House 
thinks  he  has  some  other  question  to  ask,  he  can  do  it  freely — but  in 
order  that  there  may  not  be  any  question  about  it,  the  Chair  will 
exercise  the  right  to  proceed  to  examine  the  witnesses  before  he  alter- 
nates among  other  members  of  the  committee. 

Senator  Brewster.  Mr.  Chairman,  in  connection  with  that,  I  should 
like  to  make  clear  there  is  no  objection,  as  far  as  the  ranking  minority 
member  is  concerned,  to  the  Chairman  making  the  final  examination. 
The  suggestion  which  I  made  was  that  I,  as  a  member  of  the  minority, 
would  not  like  to  precede  you,  that  is  all.  That  would  be  probably 
helpful  all  around,  as  the  Chairman  himself  originally  conceded. 

The  Chairman.  I  want  to  say  to  the  Senator  from  Maine,  it  is 
entirely  immaterial  to  me,  as  a  member  of  the  committee,  [4^5  \ 
and  as  Chairman,  whether  I  examine  the  witness  first,  or  wait  until  all 
other  members  have  examined  the  witnesses.  I  personally  see  no  ad- 
vantage or  disadvantage  in  the  particular  position  that  any  member 
uf  the  committee  occupies  in  examining  the  witnesses.  I  do  not  know 
that  the  ranking  minority  member  or  the  ranking  majority  member, 
if  it  is  divided  up  into  minority  and  majority,  in  the  interrogation  of 
witnesses,  has  any  particular  significance.  But  for  the  time  being,  in 
regard  to  this  witness,  the  Chair  will  go  ahead  and  ask  only  a  few 
questions,  if  that  is  agreeable  to  the  committee. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  acoustics  are  so  bad,  I  can  hardly 
hear  at  this  end  of  the  bench  what  you  are  saying. 

The  Chairmax.  The  Chairman  thought  he  was  talking  loud  enough 
to  be  heard.  He  will  elevate  his  voice  and  move  the  microphone  in 
more  proximity  to  his  mouth. 

TESTIMONY  OF  REAE  ADM.  T.  B.  INGLIS  AND  COL.  BEENAED 
THIELEN  (Eesumed) 

The  Chairman.  Admiral,  the  information  which  you  have  given  us 
in  your  statement  of  Saturday  is  based  entirely  upon  the  captured 
documents  since  the  end  of  the  war  with  Japan,  the  documents  cap- 
tured by  American  forces  and  also  conversa-  [4S6]  tions  had 
with  captured  Japanese? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  necessarily  since  the  end  of  the  war.  Senator 
Barkley.  Some  of  those  documents  were  captured  during  the  progress 
of  the  war.  Some  of  the  interrogation  was  made  of  prisoners  of  war 
who  were  captured  during  the  war,  and  who  were  interrogated  during 
the  war. 

The  Chairman.  So  that  your  statement  as  outlined  here  is  based 
upon  captured  documents  before  and  since  the  surrender  of  Japan 
and  conversations  had  with  prisoners  of  war  captured  before  the  end 
of  the  war,  but  who  were  still  in  custody  of  the  American  forces  ? 

Admii'al  Inglis.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Up  to  the  end  of  the  war  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  And  also  statements  made  by  Japanese  officers,  or 
men  who  were  not  prisoners  of  war;  is  that  trne? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir,  with  one  exception;  tliere  is 
one  statement  in  the  prepared  statement  which  was  based  on  i'e{)oris 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  199 

of  FBI  and  ONI  investigators,  just  one  sentence.  Aside  from  that, 
all  of  this  material  came  from  Japanese  sources. 

The  Chairman.  For  the  record,  will  you  explain — of  course  the 
FBI  is  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation —  [-^7]  what  is 
the  ONI? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  The  FBI  stands  for  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investi- 
gation, and  the  ONI  stands  for  Oflico  of  Naval  Intelligence. 

The  Chairman.  I  do  not  think  I  care  to  ask  any  further  questions. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  make  one  correction  of  the 
testimony  that  I  gave  on  the  16th  of  November? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  On  page  293,  line  23,  and  on  page  294,  line  19,  I 
would  like  to  correct  ''■Wasp'''  to  read  '•^Horiiet.'''  ^ 

The  Chairman.  Well,  both  of  them  have  quite  some  stingers. 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  right,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  George? 

Senator  George.  I  have  no  questions  at  present,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Cooper? 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  inquire  briefly. 

Admiral,  you  are  familiar  with  this  document  here,  containing 
messages,  reports,  and  information  forwarded  by  General  MacArthur  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes. 

[4-38]  The  Vice  Chairmax.  As  I  understood  it,  anything  con- 
tained in  this  document  was  included  in  your  statement  presented  here 
on  Saturday. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  gist  of  that  document,  which  is  dated  October 
20,  1945,  was  considered  in  preparing  the  statement,  and  we  feel 
that  all  of  the  pertinent  and  essential  material  contained  in  there  was 
incorporated  into  the  statement  where  it  was  appropriate,  and  where 
we  felt  it  was  properly  confirmed  or  where  it  was  not  contradicted 
in  some  other  document. 

[4-89]  The  Vice  Chairman.  This  material  was  handed  to  me  and 
other  members  of  the  committee  by  counsel  on  Saturday  and  I  under- 
stood that  you  had  had  the  benefit  of  this  material  and  that  your  testi- 
mony Saturday  embraced  the  information  contained  in  this. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  One  other  question,  if  I  may,  please.  Admiral. 

In  your  statement  presented  to  the  committee  on  Saturday,  I  would 
like  to  invite  your  attention  to  the  bottom  of  page  11,  the  last  sentence, 
continuing  to  the  top  of  page  12,  in  which  it  is  stated : 

In  addition  to  the  attaclv  planes  launched  at  this  time  it  was  reported  that 
two  type  zero  reconnaissance  seaplanes  w-ere  launched  at  approximately  .5:00 
a.m.  7  December,  Hawaiian  time,  to  execute  reconnaissance  of  Pearl  Harbor 
and  Lahaina  anchorage  just  before  the  attack. 

Now,  especially  this  sentence : 

Available  evidence  indicates  that  these  reconnaissance  planes  reached  their 
destination  one  hour  before  the  arrival  of  the  attack  planes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  believe  that  was  in  the  former  draft  and  was  not 
presented  Saturday.  That  was  corrected  later  on — or  changed  later 
on. 

[4^0]  The  Vice  Chairman.  I  know  you  called  attention  to  some 
changes  in  that  paragraph  and  I  didn't  know  whether  that  sentence 
was  supposed  to  be  changed  or  not. 

>  p.  123,  supra. 


200       CONGRESSIONAL,  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  sentence  was  struck  out  and  another  one  sub- 
stituted for  it.  If  the  Congressman  desires  I  will  read  the  statement 
that  was  made  Saturda}^  morning. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Well,  we  have  been  provided  with  a  copj' 
this  morning  of  your  statement  as  you  gave  it  with  the  necessary 
changes  and  corrections  included. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  So  the  correction  would  appear  in  this  draft. 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  should  appear,  yes,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Then  that  sentence  to  which  I  have  invited 
attention,  or,  rather,  two  sentences,  that  did  not  reflect  the  situation 
then,  is  that  correct? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  think  that  the  statement  as  made  in  the  cor- 
rected draft  which  was  given  Saturday  more  truly  reflects  the  in- 
formation that  we  had. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Then  the  information  that  \the  reconnais- 
sance planes  reached  their  destination  an  hour  before  the  attack 
planes,  is  that  accurate  or  not? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  have  no  proof  of  that,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairiman.  No  proof  of  that  ? 
[iO^]         Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairivian.  All  right.    Thank  you. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Lucas. 

Senator  Lucas.  Admiral,  just  one  or  two  questions. 

The  draft  which  was  submitted  by  the  Navy  and  presented  to  the 
rommittee  on  Saturday  last  was  prepared,  as  I  understand  it,  by  the 
Navy  officials? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  draft,  as  I  understood  it,  was  based  upon, 
primarily  upon  captured  documents  by  the  United  States  Navy? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir.  United  States  Navy  and  in 
some  cases  Army. 

Senator  Lucas.  Now,  in  the  main,  the  investigation  in  the  first  in- 
stance was  made  by  the  officials  of  the  United  States  Navj^? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Some  of  the  interrogations  were  made  by  Army 
officers,  as  well  as  Navj'  officers. 

Senator  Lucas,  I  understand  that.  I  am  talking  primarily  about 
the  captured  documents.    That  was  a  Navy  undertaking? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  study  of  those  which  transposed  that  into 
this  prepared  statement  was  made  by  Naval  officers,  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Lucas.  Then  you  have  prepared  a  draft  to  submit  to  the 
committee  before  you  learned  of  the  last  information  [4^^] 
which  came  from  General  MacArthur's  headquarters  in  Tokyo? 

Admiral  Inglis.  There  were "  several  drafts  prepared,  Senator 
Lucas.  The  last  of  them,  the  one  that  was  used  was  altered,  as  com- 
pared to  the  one  just  before  that,  by  the  receipt  of  a  document  for- 
warded through  naval  channels.  Not  from  the  Senior  Commander 
for  the  Allied  Powers  in  Tokyo. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  was  the  first  alteration  and  that  was  based  on 
additional  information  which  was  received  by  the  Navy? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Lucas.  Then  a  third  alteration  was  made  and  that  was 
based  upon  information  received  from  the  Allied  headquarters  in 
Tokyo? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOIXT   COMMITTEE  201 

Admiral  Ixglis.  No,  sir.    Just  the  other  wny  around. 

Senator  Lucas.  Will  you  just  make  it  clear  for  me? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  will  try  to  make  it  as  clear  as  I  can.  The  first 
draft  was  prepared  without  the  benefit  of  the  material  which  was 
received  from  the  Tokyo  headquarters  of  General  jMaCxA.rthur.  The 
second  draft  was  prepared  with  the  benefit  of  that  material.  And  the 
third  and  final  draft  was  prepared  with  the  benefit  of  a  paper  which 
was  received  throufrh  naval  channels  Itite  Friday  afternoon. 

Senator  Lucas.  Thank  you. 

Xow,  the  Army  and  the  Navy  both  have  been  working  [W^^ 
independently  upon  this,  have  they !? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Army  has  had  no  direct  connection  with  the 
preparation  of  this  script. 

Senator  Lucas.  But  insofar  as  the  examination  of  witnesses  and 
talking  with  prisoners,  and  any  other  thing  in  connection  with  the 
investigation,  the  Army  followed  the  course  that  they  thought  was 
correct  and  the  Navy  followed  the  course  that  they  thought  was 
correct  in  working  up  this  case  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Throughout  the  war  the  interrogation  of  prison- 
ers was  a  joint  effort  of  Army  oihcers  and  Navy  officers,  and  also  in 
some  cases  enlisted  men,  working  together  in  the  interrogation  of 
Japanese  prisoners.  Also  there  was  a  complete  interchange  generally 
of  documentary  information  and  intelligence  as  between  the  Army 
and  Navy  throughout  the  war. 

Senator  Lucas.  Insofar  as  the  information  which  came  which 
caused  you  to  make  some  changes  in  the  second  draft,  that  was  infor- 
mation which  was  received  by  the  Navy  from  the  Army  operating 
under  MacArthur  in  Japan? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  information  was  obtained  by  officers  attached 
to  General  MacArthur's  headquarters. 

Senator  Lucas.  And  the  Navy  had  nothing  to  do  with  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  would  be  morally  certain  that  naval  officers 
assisted  in  the  interrogation  but  they  were  attached  to  General 
MacArthur's  command. 

[4'94-]         Senator  Lucas.  Let  me  ask  you  one  further  question. 

Is  there  any  material  difference  between  what  the  Navy  originally 
found,  upon  which  the  draft  was  prepared,  and  wliat  General  Mac- 
Arthur  and  his  forces  found  and  sent  to  the  Navy,  upon  which  this 
second  draft  was  prepared?    If  so.  please  state. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Speaking  in  general  terms,  the  material  obtained 
from  General  MacArthur  merely  confirmed  information  which  we  had 
previously  received  from  other  sources.  There  are  a  very  few  cases 
where  there  was  a  conflict  between  the  two.  Wherever  there  was  a 
conflict  we  tried  to  resolve,  the  staff  tried  to  resolve,  the  conflict  in 
favor  of  the  most  credible  evidence. 

However,  I  think,  speaking  in  general  terms,  that  the  conflict  was 
not  particularly  significant. 

Senator  Lucas.  Upon  all  major  points,  as  I  understand  it,  the  two 
reports  more  or  less  agreed  ? 

Admiral  Inglis,  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  Lucas.  I  think  that  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Clark. 

Mr,  Clark.  No  questions  at  this  time,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Brewster. 


202       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Brewster.  I  understand,  Admiral,  that  the  translations 
which  yon  presented  on  Saturday  covered  all  of  the  Japanese  docu- 
ments which  you  turned  over? 

[495]         Admiral  InCxLIS.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  in  what  examination  I  was  able  to  make 
over  the  week  end  there  was  some  300  pages  of  Japanese  material  that 
was  not  translated.    Can  you  explain  that  discrepancy  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  informed  that  the  translation  is  complete. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  have  you  the  exhibits  there? 

[Pause.]  • 

Admiral  Inglis.  Senator  Brewster,  I  am  informed  by  the  translator 
who  is  sitting  at  my  elbow  that  this  material  was  received  by  micro- 
film and  that  at  the  end  of  the  microfilm  there  was  some  additional 
Japanese  documents  which  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  Pear  Harbor 
case  but  in  the  mechanical  process  of  turning  it  out  that  is  included 
with  the  material  which  has  to  do  with  Pear  Harbor. 

Senator  Brewster.  That  would  mean  there  were  approxhnately  118 
pages  of  material  bearing  on  this  and  300  pages  bearing  on  other 
matters. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  informed  that  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  that  would  explain  the  discrepancy. 

That  other  material,  what  did  it  have  to  do  with  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Those  were  combined  fleet  orders  which  were 
issued  subsequent  to  the  attacks  and  had  nothing  to  do  with  [4^6'] 
the  attack  itself;  concerning  Japanese  operations  after  Pearl  Harbor. 

Senator  Brewster.  Now,  you,  in  the  summary  which  you  gave,  cited 
the  Japanese  estimate  of  damage  as  450  planes.  From  what  examin- 
ation I  was  able  to  make  there  appeared  to  be  an  estimate  of  250  planes 
that  were  damaged,  plus  10 ;  another  estimate  of  157.  They  appar- 
ently were  different  estimates.  Estimates  of  different  pilots.  I  didn't 
find  the  figure  of  450.  Was  that  a  cumulation,  or  what  was  the  basis 
of  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  source  of  that  figure  of  450  is  a  combination 
of  sources  A,  B,  and  C.  There  was  one  statement  that  250  planes  were 
known  to  have  been  destroyed  plus  an  indeterminate  number  of  others 
presumably  in  the  hangars,  and  therefore  not  subject  to  photographic 
reconnaissance  and  observation. 

Senator  Brewster.  Two  hundred  and  fifty  plus  ten. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Some  of  the  other  sources  increased  the  figure  and 
said  specifically  that  their  estimate  was  450. 

Senator  Brewstkr.  That  specific  figure  appeared  somewhere 
didn't  it? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  figure  is  in  the  diary  of  a  Japanese  ensign 
captured  at  Tarawa.     The  committee  has  that  exhibit. 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes,  I  have  that.     What  is  the  citation  on  that? 

[4-9/]         Admiral  Incilis.  I  am  sorry,  that  we  haven't  got. 

Senator  Brewster.  What  I  have  is  page  15,  showing  this  estimate 
of  157. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  only  copy  of  any  of  those  documents  in 
existence  are  in  the  hands  of  the  committee. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  for  the  record  may  we  have  what  the 
Senator  is  reading  from,  page  15  of  what? 

The  Chairman.  Will  the  Senator  state  what  that  was  that  he  was 
reading  from? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  203 

Senator  Brewster.  It  was  the  document  the  witness  now  has. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  before  me  a  document  entitled  "Translation 
of  Captured  Document,  Professional  Notebook  of  an  Ensign  in  the 
Japanese  Navy,  Captured  Tarawa,  24  November,  1943." 

Senator  Brewster.  Is  that  the  diary  to  which  you  are  referring? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  that  shows,  on  the  page  I  pointed  out,  the 
figure  of  157? 

Admiral  Inglis.  On  page  4  of  that  document,  at  the  top  of  the 
page,  fifth  line,  is  the  figTire  "shot  down,  450  planes". 

Senator  Brewster.  That  is  right.  What  was  the  later  record,  how 
did  he  distinguish  between  tliese  two?  What  is  the  [4^8']  dis- 
crepancy between  them? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  official  figure  which  the  Japanese  announced 
shortly  after  the  attack  was  450  planes.  I  am  informed  that  later 
(;n,  in  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  evidence  which,  apparently, 
was  available  to  the  Japanese,  that  they  became  more  conservative 
and  cut  this  down  to  157,  but  that  was  never  incorporated  into  a 
subsequent  official  announcement.  As  far  as  the  public  knew  they 
stood  by  their  original  announcement  of  450._ 

Senator  Brewster.  What  does  that  purport  to  be,  on  page  115, 
where  the  figure  of  157  was  used  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  informed  that  this  purports  to  be  just  the 
ensign's  recollection,  apparently,  of  an  order  from  the  Navy  Ministry, 
but  the  text  is  so  obscure  that  I  wouldn't  like  to  state  just  what  the 
significance  of  that  is. 

Senator  Brewster.  Now,  tibout  the  records  of  the  Hawaii  broad- 
casting stations  to  check  up  on  the  report  as  to  espionage,  are  those 
station  records  available  for  that  period  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  believe  that  the  Army  will  have  those,  if  any, 
and  I  would  like  to  inform  the  Senator  that  I  only  had  about  5  minutes 
to  look  at  this  last  document  which  came  in,  and  I  am  not  too  familiar 
with  the  substance  contained  in  that  document;  and,  of  course,  with 
respect  to  any  intelligence  or  counter-intelligence  material  that  the 
Senator  may  be  interested  [W^]  in?  I  would  like  to  refer  him 
to  the  then  district  intelligence  officer  out  in  the  Fourteenth  District, 
naval  district.  Admiral  Mayfield,  who  is  listed  as  a  witness,  and  also 
Admiral  Wilkinson,  who  was  then  the  Director  of  Intelligence,  and 
who  is  also  listed  as  a  witness. 

I  am  not  prepared  to  answer  questions  on  that. 

[SOO]  Senator  Brewster.  Well,  as  I  understand,  this  possible 
tip  as  to  the  broadcasting  from  Hawaii  to  inform  the  Japanese  fleet 
came  on  October  13.  that  they  made  this  extension  "Tokyo"  at  the 
suggestion  of  the  authorities  here  and  tliat  an  immediate  check  was 
made  then  to  find  out  whether  transcripts  of  those  Hawaiian  broad- 
casts during  the  period  just  preceding  Pearl  Harbor,  December  7, 
were  available. 

That,  I  assume,  came  under  your  office. 

Admiral  Inglis.  From  a  very  hasty  look  at  tliat  document  I  would 
have  that  same  impression. 

Senator  Brev/ster.  Yes;  and  <hat  it  then  appeared  that  those  rec- 
ords were  missiug.     Is  that  also  your  impression  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  luy  impression. 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes;  so  that  the  records  for  that  period  appar- 
ently disappeared.     The  suggestions  were  made  that  some  of  them 


204       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

think  that  might  possibly  have  been  turned  over  to  the  Army  or  the 
FBI. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  believe  that  is  what  the  paper  says,  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  Now,  can  the  Army  find  out?  Colonel,  have 
you  any  information  about  this  ? 

Colonel  Thtelen.  No,  sir ;  I  have  no  knowledge  of  that  whatsoever. 

Senator  Brewster,  Well,  the  matter  will  be  followed  up. 

[501]         Under  which  jurisdiction  would  that  matter  come? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Well,  1  would  suggest  that  the  Senator  address  a 
question  of  that  nature  to  Admiral  Mayfield  and  Admiral  Wilkinson. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  no,  I  am  speaking  to  the  Director  of  Naval 
Intelligence  now,  as  this  is  apparently  a  current  matter.  It  apparently 
is  obvious  that  there  are  no  past  records  about  this  and  the  question  is 
to  determine  what  did  become  of  those  records  and  not  under  whose 
authority  they  were  destroyed. 

Admiral  Inglis.  According  to  our  records,  those  documents  were 
turned  over  to  a  Major  Putnam,  an  Army  major,  who  was  on  duty 
in  Hawaii  at  that  time. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  I  know  you  don't  want  to  do  an  injustice 
to  the  Army,  but  I  think  there  is  great  doubt  on  that  score.  I  think 
Major  Plitnam  expressed  some  doubt  as  to  Avhether  he  got  them.  In 
any  event,  the  station  claims  it  did  not  turn  over  any  but  limited  ones, 
Avhich  may  or  may  not  have  had  any  relation  to  this  particular  episode, 
but  would  it  come  within  your  purview  now  as  Director  of  Naval 
Intelligence  to  pursue  that  matter  and  to  find  out  as  fully  as  possible 
whether  or  not  there  may  have  been  any  relation? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence  has  already  in- 
quired into  that  matter  and  the  best  information  [502]  that  we 
have  is  that  these  documents  were  turned  over  to  Major  Putnam  of  the 
Army, 

Senator  Brewster.  In  connection  with  the  message  of — or  the  battle 
orders  of  November  25  and  December  2  as  appear  in  your  evidence  on 
page  437  in  our  text,  it  may  not  be  particularly  material,  although 
it  has  sufficient  significance  so  that  I  am  sure  you  would  want  the 
record  correct. 

According  to  the  exhibits  which  we  examined,  the  battle  order  which 
3^ou  cited  on  November  25  was  actually  the  one  of  December  2.  The 
phraseology  was  somewhat  different  in  those  two  orders. 

Have  you  those  there?  That  is  subhead  B  on  page  437,  at  the  bot- 
tom of  the  page.  You  will  find  that  under  the  transcript  that  you 
presented  to  all  the  members  of  the  committee  from  General  Mac- 
Arthur's  headquarters  on  complying  with  your  orders  of  October  26th. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Is  the  Senator  referring  to  the  quotation : 

"Japan  now  understands  her  self-preservation  and  self-defense  has  reached" — 
".Tapan  under  the  necessity  of  her  self-preservation  and  self-defense  has  reached 
a  decision  to  declare  war  on  the  United  States  of  America"? 

Senator  Brewster.  No;  have  you  the  transcript  of  the  evidence? 
Well,  yes,  it  is  after  that  order,^but  it  is  4-A,  [503]  and  in 
your  testimony  there  cited  as  "B"  at  the  bottom  of  page  437. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  that,  sir.  Your  question  is,  what  is  the 
source  of  that? 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  source  of  that  is  the  material  from  headquar- 
ters in  Tokyo. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  205 

Senator  Breavster.  Well,  my  point  was  that  the  language  which  you 
used — I  think  you  have  transposed  them  between  the  2oth  of  November 
and  December  2. 

Admiral  Ixglis.  If  the  Senator  will  refer  to  the  so-called  Mac- 
Arthur  paper  on 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes ;  I  have  it  before  me. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Sir? 

Senator  Brewster.  I  have  it  before  me. 

Admiral  Inglis.  On  page  3,  at  the  bottom  of  the  page,  subpara- 
graph 4-A. 

Senator  Brewster.  Tha^  is  right. 

Admiral  Ikglis.  Issued  in  December. 

iSIr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  inquire,  is  there  a  copy  of  that 
to  be  made  available  to  all  the  other  members  of  the  committee? 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes,  you  have  that. 

Mr.  Murphy.  You  are  reading  from  the  copy  ? 

[■'^OJf]         Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Then  the 

Senatoi-  Brewster.  I  have  it  before  me. 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  That  was  issued  on  December  2,  is  that  right  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  Now.  you  show  that  in  your  testimony  on  page 
4o7  as  issued  on  the  22d  of  November. 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Now,  if  the  Senator  will  bear  with  me  and  refer 
to  page  8  of  that  same  document,  down  near  the  bottom  of  the  page, 
there  is  a  shorter  version  of  that  same  paragraph. 

Senator  BREW^STER.  That  is  right. 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Now^,  that  version  on  page  8  was  issued  on  the  22d 
of  November. 

Senator  Brewster.  That  is  right,  and  that  is  the  one  which  should 
a):)pear  at  the  bottom  of  page  437  as  the  22d  of  November  order,  is 
tliat  right? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  To  be  chronologically  correct,  I  believe  that  is  the 
case,  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  don't  know  that  there  will  ever  be  any  mate- 
rial distinction  betAveen  them  but  I  think  it  woidd  be  well  if  you  would 
see  that  the  record  is  corrected  so  that  [-^Oo]         whatever  varia- 

tion there  is  in  language  between  the  order  of  the  22d  of  November — 
on  the  25th  of  November,  that  i^  the  date,  the  25th  of  November  and 
the  December  2  order  is  clarified  in  the  record  in  whatever  way  you 
find  most  practicable. 

Admiral  Ixglis.  ]May  I  ask  the  reporter  uoav  to  make  this  correc- 
tion on  the  record?  At  the  bottom  of  l)age  437,  lines  21  to  25.  inclu- 
sive, substitute  the  following: 

(b)  Should  the  negiUiafioiis  with  the  United  States  prove  successful  the  task 
foi-ce  sluill  hold  itselt  in  ivadiness  forthwith  to  retniu  aud  reassemble.^ 

Senator  Breavster.  Noav,  the  other  is  on  page  464,  which  is  the 
order  of — Avell,  that  refers  again  to  the  erroneous  order.  You  subse- 
quently put  in  the  message  of  December  2.  It  seemed  to  me  it  might 
haA-e  some  importance  that  on  December  2  they  did  issue  the  order 
which  you  haA-e  erroneously  quoted.     Perhaps  you  can  put  it  in  at 

'    1'.    IKO,  SIIIHJI. 

79716 — 46— pt.  1 16 


206        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

that  same  point,  at  page  437,  if  you  wish  to,  and  substitute  for  that 
on  December  2  that  further  language  was  used  in  the  battle  order. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes ;  will  the  reporter  please  add  to  that  previous 
quotation  that  on  the  2d  of  December  the  longer  version,  as  shown  in 
the  original  transcript,  volume  3,  was  issued  as  an  Imperial  naval 
order. 

Senator  Brew^ster.  I  don't  know  what  the  significance  is.  [■506] 
They  call  it  a  Naval  General  Staff  instruction.  Does  that  have  any 
significance  in  your  documents. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  informed  that  the  Japanese  procedure  in  a 
case  of  that  nature  is  for  the  Imperial  General  Headquarters  to  issue 
instructions  to  the  Navy  section.  The  Navy  section  then  converts 
those  instructions  into  an  order. 

Senator  Brewster.  Now,  will  you  properly  complete  the  text  as 
shown  in  the  MacArthur  report  of  that  December  2  Navy  General 
Staff  instruction? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  The  version  as  contained  in  the  so-called  Mac- 
Arthur  paper  is: 

Naval  Genei-al  Staff  instruction  (issued  2  December)  Bear  in  mind  that  isliould 
it  apppar  cejtain  that  the  Japanese- American  negotiations  will  reach  an  amica- 
l)le  settlement  prior  to  the  commencement  of  hostile  action,  all  the  forces  of  ihe 
combined  fleet  are  to  be  ordered  to  re-assemble  and  to  return  to  their  bases. 

Senator  Brewster.  Now,  the  only  other  comment  I  have.  Admiral, 
and  I  don't  want  to  seem  too  meticulous,  but  it  did  seem,  at  least,  Ave 
are  dealing  in  connection  with  the  question  of  visual  hand  signals. 

You  remember  that  was  a  matter  of  discussion,  as  to  whether  or 
not  that  ever  occurred  and  you  reported  from  the  Japanese  manu- 
scripts reports  that  the  Japanese  pilots  stated  [507]  that  no 
visual  signals  Avere  received. 

I  rjoted  in  the  report  of  it  that  he  added — it  may  or  may  not  be 
significant — the  words  "to  his  knowledge,"  and  it  seemed  to  me  it 
might  be  illuminating  as  indicating  that  he  did  not  presume  to  say  as 
to  whether  anybody  else  might  have  received  them  but  as  far  as  he 
knew  none  were  received.     I  am  sure  that  was  simply 

Admii'al  Ixglis.  I  agree  with  the  Senator  and  think  that  the  same 
reservation  should  be  applied  to  nearly  all  of  the  verbal  testimony 
given  by  these  prisoners  of  war. 

Senator  Brewster.  Thank  you. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  all? 

Senator  Brew^ster.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Murphy. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Admiral  Inglis,  as  I  understand  it  in  the  printed 
testimony  at  page  422  you  outlined  in  the  record  the  sources  of  ma- 
terial u])on  which  you  based  the  summary  which  you  gave  to  the  com- 
mittee, is  that  correct? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Now,  then,  as  I  also  understand  it,  the  committee 
were  furnished  with  a  group  of  papers,  the  first  one  dated  November  8. 
1945,  and  headed  "General  Headquarters  Supreme  Commander  for 
the  Allied  Powers",  continuing  dov/n  to  a  paper  which  appears  to  be 
a  questionnaiiC,  all  of  these  papers  [508]  apparently  having 
beeu  forwarded  to  us  from  tlie  General  Headquarters  of  the  Supreme 
Conunander  for  the  Allied  Powers. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  207 

Are  there  any  of  these  papers  that  are  not  covered  by  the  ori^rinals 
or  the  i)hotostats  of  orio;iiials  ir;iveu  to  the  gentleman  from  Maine? 
In  order  to  make  myself  clear,  have  you  seen  these  papers  which  we 
were  handed  as  comin_<r  from  the  Allied  headquarters? 

Admii'al  Ixcjlis.  I  am  quite  sure  that  is  the  same  document  as  this, 
although  this  is  mimeograjDhed  and  mine  is  not. 

Mr.  MuRpiiY.  Now,  may  I  inquire  of  counsel  of  these  papers  are  to 
be  put  into  the  record  so  that  they  will  be  available  to  whoever  reads 
the  record  ?    Are  they  going  to  be  offered  as  an  exhibit  ? 

Mr.  MrrciiELL.  We  will  offer  them. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Admiral,  when  the  Navy  Board  sat  in  order  to  go 
into  this  question  of  the  Jap  invasion  they  had  in  that  record,  as  I 
understand  it,  the  testimony  of  the  Japanese  ensign,  or  the  reports  of 
the  Japanese  ensign's  testimony,  as  well  as  the  prisoner  at  Pearl  Har- 
bor, did  they  not  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Murphy.  And  they  had  the  major  part  of  the  material  which 
you  have  supplied  to  the  committee,  with  the  exception  of  the  addi- 
tions which  were  furnished  by  General  MacArthur  during  the  recent 
several  weeks  since  October,  is  that  right? 

[o09]  Admiral  Ixglis.  This  plus  the  letter  that  was  received 
Friday  night  through  naval  channels ;  yes,  sir.   • 

Mr.  Murphy.  Now,  then,  the  prisoner  who  was  captured  at  Pearl 
Harbor,  is  he  still  living  and  available? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  We  have  been  trying  to  find  the  answer  to  that 
question  and  so  far  we  have  been  unable  to. 

Mr.  ]\IuEPiiY.  But  there  was  some  testimony  in  the  several  reports, 
were  there  not,  concerning  his  version  of  the  map  that  was  taken  from 
the  submarine? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Murphy.  And  there  are  two  maps,  are  there  not,  two  submarine 
maps  or  charts? 

Admiral  Ix'glis.  There  is  only  one,  sir. 

Mr.  Mltrphy.  Well,  the  submarine  that  was  beached  at  Pearl  Har- 
bor, was  there  a  chart  taken  from  that  ? 

Admiral  Ix'glis.  There  was  no  chart  taken  from  the  submarine  that 
was  destroyed  in  Pearl  Harbor.  The  chart  was  taken  from  the  sub- 
marine which  beached  itself  near  Kaneohe. 

Mr.  Mi'rphy.  Well,  there  was  one  beached — I  mean  there  was  one 
map  taken  from  that  submarine;  you  got  the  chart  out  of  that,  didn't 

Admiral  Ixglis.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Murphy.  And  then  there  was  another  beached  in  the  bay  area, 
or  did  that  approach  Pearl  Harbor? 

[SIO]  Admiral  Ix^glis.  That  submarine  that  was  beached  or  de- 
stroyed inside  Pearl  Harbor  had  no — I  .shouldn't  say  it  had  no  chai't 
because  I  don't  know,  but  they  did  not  obtain  a  chart  from  that  sub- 
marine. 

Mr.  ]\Iurphy.  My  recollection  is  that  there  was  testimony  concern- 
ing two  different  chart  •.  Am  I  correct  in  that?  You  say  there  was 
only  one  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  The  other  one,  I  think  thfit  w^as  a  chart  that  was 
made  by  aviators. 


208       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr,  Murphy.  No^Y,  then,  the  operational  orders  and  the  plans  con- 
cerning Avhich  you  testified  and  concerning  which  we  have  photostatic 
copies  here,  now  where  are  the  originals? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  The  best  evidence  that  we  have  indicates  that  after 
that  original  was  photostated  it  v/as  purloined  by  a  souvenir  hunter. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Well,  on  page  422  you  referred  to  a  captured  docu- 
ment. The  title  is,  "Submarine  School  Notes  Concerning  Early  War 
Experiences  Off  Hawaii." 

Admiral  Ixolis.  Yes,  sir. 

]Mr.  Murphy.  Where  is  that  docimient,  do  you  know? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  original  of  that  document,- 1  understand  is 
in  the  files  of  the  Joint  Intelligence  Section  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  area 
at  Pearl  Harbor. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Nov.-.  the  operational  order  about  which  you  ['5ii] 
testified  on  page  422.  where  is  that,  the  original  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  The  committee  has  the  original  of  that  docume?it. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Is  that  one  of  the  papers  that  was  handed  to  the 
gentleman  from  Maine? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  was  handed  to  counsel,  I  guess.  It  was  in 
that  sheaf  of  papers. 

Mr.  Murphy.  To  the  Senator  from  Maine? 

Mr.  Gesell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  ISIuRPHY.  Now,  the  next  document  on  page 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Let  us  straighten  that  out. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Just  a  moment.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  we 
ought  to  clear  that  up,  as  to  whether  or  not  that  was  a  photostat  or 
the  original  instrument. 

Admiral  Ixglis.  I  am  informed  that  that  particular  document  was 
the  original. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Would  you  identify  it  here? 

Admiral  Ixglls.  Yes,  sir,  if  you  will  pass  the  papers  to  me. 

I  will  have  to  correct  the  statement  that  I  made.  The  original 
was  not  turned  over  to  the  committee.  A  copy  of  that  which  was 
turned  over  to  the  committee  is  photostated  but  the  original  itself  is 
here  in  Washington  but  it  is  in  such  bad  shape  physically  that  it 
cannot  be  handled.     It  will         [512]         disintegrate  if  handled. 

]Mr.  Murphy.  And  was  it  in  the  same  shape  as  it  is  now  when  the 
photostat  was  made? 

Admiral  Ix^glis.  Approximately,  yes.  I  am  informed  it  was  under 
water  for  4  months. 

Mr.  Murphy.  The  next  document  you  testified  about  was  on  page 
423,  "Translation  of  a  Captured  Japanese  Document.  The  profes- 
sional notebook  of  an  ensign  in  the  Japanese  Navy."  The  date  is 
February  25,  1944. 

Where  is  that  notebook  ? 

Admiral  Ix^glis.  The  original  of  that  document  is  also  in  the  Joint 
Intelligence  Section  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  area  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

Mr.  Murphy.  For  the  record  I  want  to  note  that  the  witness  cor- 
rected the  date  of  the  second  document  and  said  it  was  January  12, 
1941. 

Is  that  the  date  you  were  correcting  at  that  time?  You  said  "the 
f.econd  dociiment."'  Now,  were  you  referring  to  the  Japanese  ensign's 
notebook  or  were  you  referring  to  some  other  document?  I  am 
talking  about  page  423. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  209 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  document  which  is  referred  to  on  page  42o 
carries  the  Joint  Intelligence  Center,  Pacific  Ocean  area's  letterhead 
with  their  date  February  25,  1944.  The  document  was  captured  at 
Tarawa  on  November  24,  1943.    It  it         [■^^■^l         the  same  document. 

Mr.  Murphy.  But  what  I  am  trjdng  to  clear  up,  that  in  your  testi- 
mony on  page  423 — and  do  you  have  a  copy  there  before  you? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have,  sir. 

Mr.  Murphy.    You  said : 

Perhaps  I  should  go  back  to  the  second  document  and  say  that  the  date  on 
that  is  January  12,  1941. 

Yon  were  speaking  about  some  other  document,  other  than  the 
.notebook,  were  you ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir.  That  is  a  different  document 
that  I  had  inadvertently  entered  previously  without  giving  the  date. 

Mr.  Murphy,  Now,  the  next  document  you  talked  aborit  you  said 
was  dated  March  2,  1943,  and  the  subject  is:  "Kuboaki,  Takeo,"  and 
you  said,  "That  is  obviously  the  name  of  a  Japanese."  ''Superior 
Class  Engine  or  Petty  Officer,  interrogation  of." 

Where  is  the  original  of  that? 

Mr.  Geskll.  Is  this  it.  Admiral,  here?  He  is  handing  you  another 
one  now. 

Admiral  Inglis.  No.  That  document  is  a  photostat  of  a  letter 
from  the  Commander,  South  Pacific  Area  and  South  Pacific  Forces. 
I  am  not  sure  where  the  original  would  be  [-^-?4]  but  I  presume 
that  it  is  in  Pearl  Harbor  with  the  files  of  Commander,  South  Pacific 
Area. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Well,  when  my  examination  is  concluded.  Admiral, 
I  am  going  to  have  the  Navy  liaison  oflicer  that  is  Avorking  with  the 
■committee  to  see  that  every  one  of  these  originals  and  every  one  of 
tliese  documents  are  made  availalde  for  the  inspection  of  the  commit- 
tee in  Washington  get  in  touch  with  you. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  INIuRPHY.  Now,  you  say  that  you  concluded  on  that.  Admiral, 
as  to  where  the  original  was? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Now,  the  next  document  that  you  referred  to  on  page 
424,  "Japanese  Submarine  Operations  at  Pearl  Harbor."  You  said 
that  was  an  evaluation  prej^ared  by  United  States  intelligence  officers. 
Where  is  the  original  of  that? 

Admiral  Inglis,  This  document  is  the  original  of  an  evaluation. 
It  is  undated. 

Mr.  Murphy.  And  that  is  before  the  committee? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  is  before  the  connnittee.  It  is  und:ited  and  un- 
signed but  I  am  informed  that  it  was  pre))ared  by  Captain  Pearson. 

Mr.  IMuRPHY.  Now,  the  next  one  you  referred  to  is  entitled,  "Intelli- 
gence Report  on  the  Subject  of  Japan  Navy  \ol5]  Sub- 
marines," Where  is  the  original  of  that  (  That  was  a  paper  prepared 
by  American  intelligence,  wasn't  it  ? 

Admiral  Incjlis.  I  have  the  ])aper  here:  yes,  sir.  I  am  trying  to 
examine  it.  The  document  in  question  was  prepared,  was  mimeo- 
graphed from  a  stencil  and  this  is  as  close  an  approach  to  an  oi'iginal 
as  we  could  provide.     The  stencil  itself  was  destroyed. 

Mr.  MuRPiiY.  I  see.  The  next  document  you  referred  to  was  dated 
August  16,  1943,  marked,  "Interrogation  Eeport  No.  148  of 
Yokota,  S." 


210        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Where  is  the  original  of  that  document? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Presumably  the  original  of  that  document  is  in 
the  files  of  Commander,  Southwest  Pacific  Area. 

Mr.  Murphy.  The  next  docume-nt  you  talked  about  was.  "United 
States  Pacific  Fleet  and  Pacific  Ocean  Areas,  Weekly  Intelligence 
Bulletin  of  December  -S,  1944." 

Do  you  have  the  original  copy  of  that  here? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  document  which  the  connnittee  has  is  as  close 
to  an  original  as  could  be  produced,  as  that  is  a  periodical. 

Mr.  ISIuKPHY.  The  next  document  you  spoke  of  was  dated  June 
oO,  1943.  The  subject  is,  "ICPOA  Translation  of  Captured  Enemy 
Documents,  Item.  No.  472,  Submarine.  School  Notes  Concerning  Early 
AVar  Experiences  off  Hawaii." 

\ol6]         Whei-e  is  the  original  of  that  document? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  Japanese  version  of  that  document  is  in  the 
Joint  Intelligence  Center,  Pacific  Ocean  area.  Pearl  Harbor.  This 
document  which  the  committee  has,  the  translation  is  a  mimeograph 
and,  tlierefore,  as  close  an  approach  as  could  be  made  to  tliG  original 
of  the  English  translation. 

Mr.  MuRPiiY.  Then  you  also  testified  about  an  'TCPOA  Transla- 
tion of  Captured  Enemy  Documents,  Item.  No.  473,  Instructions  to 
the  Yatsumaki  Butai." 

Where  is  the  original  of  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  472,  473,  and  474  are  all  included  in  the  same 
document. 

Mr.  Murphy.  The  next  document  you  spoke  of  is  dated  July  25, 
1945,  translation  No.  290.  Subject :  "The  Southern  Cross  bv  Kuramoti, 
Iki." 

Where  is  the  original  of  that  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  May  I  ask,  Congressman  Murphy,  whetlier  you 
want  any  of  the  Japanese  version  or  the  English  translation  ? 

Mr.  ]\Iup.PMY.  The  original  source. 

xVdmiral  Inglis.  The  original  source  is  in  Japanese  and  is  here  in. 
Washington.  The  committee  has  been  given  a  mimeographed  copy 
of  the  English  translation,  which  is  as  close  an  approach  to  the  original 
as  could  be  provided. 

[-57/1  Mr.  ]MuEPHT.  Now,  the  next  document  referred  to  is  a 
translation  of  combined  fleet  top  secret  operation,  order  No.  1.  W^here 
is  the  original  of  that.  I  mean  the  original  Japanese  version  i 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  original  in  Japanese  of  that  document  is  here 
in  Washington  but  it  is  in  such  an  advanced  state  of  deterioration  that 
it  could  not  be  handled. 

Is  the  photostat  presented  as  a  photostat  of  it  in  the  condition  in 
which  it  now  is? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  MuKPHY.  The  next  document  referred  to  is:  "Enemy  Lists  of 
Sorties  by  Sub-carried  planes." 

Where  is  the  original  of  that  ?  You  stated,  "Its  precise  source  is  not 
indicated." 

Admiral  Inglls.  The  original  is  ])robably  in  the  Joint  Int (diligence 
Center.  Pacific  Ocean  area  at  Pearl  Harbor,  althonuh  I  am  Tiot  certain 
of  that. 

Mr.  MiRpiiY.  The  next  document  vou  referred  to  is  a  memorandum 
dated  October  13,  1945,  addressed  to  "the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  211 

of  the  Fifth  Marine  Amphibious  Corps  on  the  subject,  Prewar 
Espionage  in  the  HaAvaiian  IsUinds, 

Is  the  paper  you  have  an  original  copy  of  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  paper  that  has  been  submitted  to  the  commit- 
tee is  the  original  copy.  In  fact,  it  is  the  only  [-5^5]  copy  in 
Washington. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Now,  there  was  some  testimony  concerning  the  para- 
phrase of  a  message  dated  October  6.  1945,  from  the  Secretary  of  War 
to  General  MacArthur  and,  as  I  understand  it,  all  committee  members 
have  been  furnished  a  copy  of  that. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  They  have  it.  It  is  a  paraphrasing  for  the  protec- 
tion of  our  codes. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Yes. 

jMr.  Mitchell.  The  committee  understands  that. 

Mr.  Murphy.  All  right. 

And  then  there  was  testimony  on  the  bottom  of  page  426  concerning 
cables  from  General  MacArthur  dated  the  14th  of  October  and  a  fur- 
tlier  detailed  report  dated  October  2G,  1945,  and  then  the  report  of  the 
night  preceding  your  testimony. 

As  I  understand  it,  all  of  those  are  originals  in  here,  is  that  right  ? 

JMr.  Mitchell.  Well,  those  are  copies  furnished  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment. 

Mr.  Murphy.  To  the  committee? 

JNIr.  Mitchell.  To  us  and  to  the  connnittee.  They  were  reproduced 
so  that  everybody  would  have  copies  of  them. 

Mr.  Murphy.  All  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  original  dispatch  from  MacArthur  may  be  in 
the  files  of  the  War  Department. 

\5W]         Mr.  JNIuKPHY.  At  any  rate,  the  committee  have  a  copy  of  it. 

Mr.  Gesell.  The  originals  are  right  here,  Congressman,  if  there  is 
any  question  as  to  whether  they  were  correctly  reproduced. 

Mr.  Murphy.  All  right.  And  would  that  hold  true,  too,  as  to  the 
message  from  General  MacArthur  dated  November  8,  1945? 

Mr.  Gesell.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Congressman  Murphy,  I  have  just  been  handed  a 
note  here  that  says : 

There  were  several  charts  recovered  from  the  submarine  that  was  beached  at 
Bellows  Field.     These  are  now  held  and  will  be  produced  by  Captain  Layton. 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  understand  there  was  more  than  one  there,  that 
was  why  I  asked  about  it. 

There  were  certain  corrections,  Admiral,  made  in  the  record  as  a 
result  of  the  testimony  of  the  previous  questioner,  the  Senator  from 
Maine,  and  do  we  have  in  the  exhibit  which  will  be  offered  a  copy  of 
each  of  the  papers  from  which  you  read,  each  of  the  orders? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  basis  of  those  corrections  are  contained  in  the 
headquarters  Tokyo  report. 

Mr.  Murphy,  Which  is  part  of  the  exliibit,  as  I  under-  lo'^O'] 
stand  it. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Which  is  part  of  the  exhibit, 

Mr.  Murphy.  And,  coun.sel,  it  will  be  offered? 

Mr.  Gesell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Murphy,  Now,  then,  I  have  no  other  questions,  Admiral,  ex- 
cept to  say  that  I  expect  and  hope  that  all  of  the  originals  will,  insofar 


212        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

as  possible,  be  made  available  for  the  inspection  of  the  entire  com- 
mittee. 

Admiral  lasroLis.  Yes,  sir;  they  will,  sir. 

Mr.  MuEPHT.  No  other  questions,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chatpjman.  Senator  Ferguson  ? 

Senator  Fer(;uson.  Admiral  Inglis,  when  you  received  this  present 
data — now,  I  am  talking  about  the  data  prior  to  the  ]\[acArthur 
(hit a — who  evaluated  it  so  that  you  might  put  it  in  your  statement? 

Admiral  Inglis,  Commander  Hindmarsh  and  Lieutenant  Kurts, 
wlio  are  now  sitting  at  my  right  elbow,  did  most  of  the  work  on  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  else  worked  on  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  A  LieutenaiU  Ebb  also  worked  on  these  and  much 
of  the  source  material  was  in  the  form  of  translations  received  from 
the  Soutliwestern  Pacific  area  headquarters. 

Senator  Ferc-f-ion.  Was  it  ev:diiated  out  in  the  field  at  [-^•2-?] 
all? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  receiA^ed  an  evaluation  in  the  field  and  then  a 
second  evaluatitm  here  in  Washington. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  what  evaluaticm  are  we  getting  in  your 
statement,  the  one  that  was  made  in  the  field  or  the  one  that  was  made 
here  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Fimdamentalh^  you  are  getting  the  evaluation 
made  here.  However,  there  is  no  conflict  of  significance  between  the 
two  evaluations. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  was  it  evaluated  ? 

Admiral  Incjlis.  The  people  who  have  been  doing  this  work  have 
been  working  on  it  since  the  middle  of  June  of  this  year. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  see  by  the  press  tliat  Mr.  Byrnes.  Secretary 
of  State,  made  a  statement  iLsing  some  of  this  informatioiL  Do  you 
know  who  evaluated  it  for  jNIr.  Byrnes  ? 

Let  the  record  show  Admiral  Inglis  is  conferring  with  his  aides. 

T]ie  Chairman.  He  might  also  give  the  names  of  his  aides  and  their 
qualifications,  that  he  conferred  with. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  evalution  which  has  been  presented  to  tlie 
committee,  that  is,  the  evaluation  before  it  was  affected  by  the  last 
tAvo  documents,  in  substance  was  [-^■--]  presented  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy — I  mean  the  Secretary  of  Stn.te,  some  time  ago. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  notice  also  b}^  the  press  that  the  Secretary  of 
the  Xavy  used  a  certain  amount  of  this  data.  Who  evaluated  his 
information  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  He  received  a  copy  of  the  same  document  that  was 
presented  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  when  was  that  document  presented  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  haven't  got  that  date  at  hand,  but  we  can  get  it. 
Senator  Ferguson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  be  able  to  get  the  document  itself 
that  was  given  to  the  Secretary  of  State  as  well  as  to  the  Secretarv 
of  the  Navy? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Counsel  General  Mitchell,  will  you  get 
that  then  for  the  committee  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes.^ 


»  See  Hearings,  Part  11,  p.  5352. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  213 

Senator  Fer'jusox.  Now.  I  will  at^k  you,  Admiral,  when  these  gen- 
tlemen, your  aides  here,  evaluated  this  information  did  they  use  the 
diplomatic  messages  between  Japan  and  America^ 

Admiral  Ixglis.  No,  sir.  I  want  to  make  that  quite  clear,  that  none 
of  the  material  contained  in  this  presenta-  [J;^JJ  tion  was  ob- 
tained from  crypt  analytical  sources. 

Senotor  Fekgusox.  That  was  not  my  question.  Did  they  use  in 
order  that  they  may  evaluate  the  evidence  that  they  obtained  from 
the  Japanese  prisoners  and  evidence  that  they  obtained  from  maps, 
and  so  forth,  did  they  also  check  it  with  the  diplomatic  messages^ 

Admiral  In({i.is.  No,  sir. 

Seuator  Fergusok'.  Do  you  know  as  an  initelligence  officer  how  you 
could  evaluate  that  and  not  check  it  with  the  diplomatic  messages 
from  Japan? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  We  evaluated  it  by  checking  witli  all  of  the  source 
material  which  we  had  available.  We  did  not  have  available  to  us 
the  crypt  analytic  material  which  the  Senator  has  just  mentioned. 

[-5^4]  Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  you  did  not  have  in 
your  possession,  wlien  you  evaluated  this  for  the  committee.  Japanese 
messages  concerning  military  installations,  ship  movements,  and  so 
forth,  which  is  the  instrument  with  the  yellow  cover  on  it^ 

Admiral  Ixglis.  No,  sir;  we  did  not  have  them. 

Seuat()r  Ferguson.  It  is  Exhibit  No.  2  in  this  case.  Have  you  ever 
had  this  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Then  you  made  this  evaluation  of  the  Ja[>anese 
information  from  prisoners  when  you  had  in  your  files  at  least,  direct 
evidence  from  the  Japanese  officials,  and  did  not  use  this  official  infor- 
mation to  evaluate  evidence? 

xVdmiral  Ixglis.  No.  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  call  the  Senator's  attention  to  the  fact  that  Ex- 
hibit 2  does  not  contain  any  Japanese  intercepts;  this  Exhibit  2  coii- 
taiiis  messages  passing  to  and  from  Tokyo. 

Senator  Fergusox.  I  appreciate  that,  but  they  gave  au  outline  of 
the  source  of  their  information,  and  they  intimated  that  certain 
sources  were  used,  aiul  certain  sources  were  not  used. 

Now,  I  Avant  to  refer  you  to  this  instrument  which  is  marked 
"Exhibit  No.  2,"  and  call  your  attention  to  page  22.  Have  you  got  a 
copy  f)f  it  ? 

[J.v-']  Arhniral  Ixglis.  I  have  not  got  a  copy  of  it.  I  have  never 
seen  a  copy.     Thosi^  messages  were  not  in  the  files  of  Naval  Intelligence. 

Senator  Fergi'sox,  Will  you  refer  to  page  22? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  If  I  may  have  a  copy ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  ^Mitchell.  Here  is  one. 
.    Mr.  Gesell.  "\"\liat  page  is  that? 

Senator  Fergusox.  Page  22. 

(A  document  was  handed  to  Admiral  Inglis.) 

Senator  Fergusox.  This  is  from  Honolulu  to  Tokvo,  December  3, 
1941. 

Admiral  Ixglis.  I  have  it  before  me. 

Senator  Fergusox.  You  have  it? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Yes. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Now.  \y\\]  yon  make  inquiry  to  se«>  whether  or 
not  that  instrument  was  not  translated  in  the  rough  and  in  the  posses- 


214        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

sion  of  the  Navy  by  1 :  30  and  not  [S26]  later  than  2  o'ch)ck  on 
December  6,  1941  ^     Do  you  know  whether  that  is  a  fact  ■ 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  do  liot  understand  your  question,  Senator 
Ferguson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  want  to  know  from  your  aides  whether  or  not 
that  instrument  was  not  translated  in  the  rough  and  in  the  possession 
of  the  Navy  at  1 :  30  and  not  later  than  2  o'clock  on  December  6,  1941  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  cannot  answer  tJiat  question,  Senator. 

Senator  Feegusox.  I  am  trying  to  ask  if  your  aides  know. 

Admiral  Inglis.  They  cannot  either.    If  you  will  let  me  complete 


mv  answer 


Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  let  you  complete  it. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Sir  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  let  you  complete  it.    Go  ahead. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  would  like  to  say  all  of  this  crypt  analytical 
material  comes  in  the  cognizance  of  Naval  Communications,  rather 
than  Naval  Intelligence.  There  are  several  witnesses  who  are  listed 
to  appear  before  the  committee  who  can  give  first-hand  knowledge  or 
evidence  along  this  line.    I  cannot. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  cannot? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No. 

['527]  Senator  Ferguson.  Look  on  page  23,  to  the  KGMB  want 
ads.  Was  that  considered  by  the  evaluators  when  you  gave  your 
statement? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  informed  that  the  material  was  obtained  by 
us  from  another  source. 

Senator  Ferguson.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  obtained  from  the 
Army  staff  here  in  Virginia,  was  it  not,  at  Fort  Knox  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Our  source  was  a  man  by  the  name  of  Otto  Kuhn 
^vho  was  interrogated  on  this  subject. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  was  later  tried,  was  he  not,  in  Hawaii  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  understand  that  he  was ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  you  say  that  the  Navy's  source  of  this 
information  was  Kuhn  and  not  a  translation? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  say  that  the  source  available  to  my  staff  was 
Kuhn. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Kulin  was  not  apprehended  until  after  the  Tth 
of  December,  was  he  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  your  staff  use  that  instrument  or  that  in- 
formation in  evaluating  the  Japanese  information  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  was  considered.  That  was  considered,  but  it 
was  also  understood  from  another  source  that  that  [J53S]  par- 
ticular scheme  or  systeiui  vvas  not  actually  used,  and  therefore  it  was 
not  considered. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Give  us  that  source. 

Mr.  Murphy.  While  they  are  looking  for  it,  will  the  gentleman  yield 
for  one  observation  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Murphy.  As  I  understand  it,  the  exhibit  says  it  was  not  trans- 
lated until  12/11/41,  and  then  in  parentheses  (7) .  I  do  not  know  what 
that  (T)  means. 

Senator  Ferguson.  We  will  develop  later  it  was  translated  on  the 
6th  at  noon. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  215 

Admiral  InOxLTS.  In  reply  to  the  Senator's  question  I  would  like 
to  quote  from  a  carbon  copy  of  an  enclosure  to  nn  endorsement  which 
is  contained  in  a  letter  received  through  naval  channels  originating 
in  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District. 

On  page  10,  paragi'aph  13,  of  this  carbon  copy  appears  the  fol- 
lowing : 

The  KG^NIB  want  ads  morning  programs  from  November  24  to  December  8, 
1941,  were  checked  by  FBI  Honolulu  with  negative  results  in  locating  any  coded 
phrases  regarding  the  Chinese  rug,  chicken  farm,  or  beauty-parlor  operator.  It 
appears  unlikely  that  phrases  regarding  the  German  attache,  had  they  appeared 
on  this  program  during  the  period  in  question,  would  have  gone  unnoticed  by 
the  agency  conducting  that  investigation. 

[5.29']  Senator  Ferguson.  Did  they  examine  the  original  broad- 
casts or  scripts  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  do  not  know,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  w'e  understand  then  there  is  quite  a  bit  of 
controversy  on  these  items  you  have  given  us?  Are  we  to  under- 
stand that  you  evaluated  it  without  using  any  of  these  codes  or  the 
coded  messages? 

xVdrniral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  we  also  understand  that  the}^  did  not  use 
in  anj'  way  diplomatic  messages? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  more  weight  was  given 
to  the  information  obtained  from  the  so-called  prisoners  of  war  than 
was  given  to  the  MacArthur  information,  that  came  directly  from 
the  Navy  in  Tokyo? 

Admiral  Inglis.  There  was  very  little  conflict  between  the  two. 
Where  there  was  conflict,  all  I  can  say  is  we  resolved  the  conflict  and 
gave  the  material  which  in  our  judgment  most  accuratel^^  presented 
the  case. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  will  you  look  on  page  452  of  our  tran- 
script— I  will  withdraw  that. 

Are  the  ads  that  you  cannot  substantiate  from  the  same  evidence 
as  this  message  "Climb  Mount  Niitaka"'  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Are  the  ads  from  tlie  same  evidence  as  [SSO] 
the  message  "Climb  Mount  Niitaka"? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  What  is  the  Senator's  question  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  it  from  the  same  source  as  the  rug  ads  and 
the  climb  the  mountain? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  is  mentioned  in  the  same  document  but  not 
from  the  same  source. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Isn't  it  in  the  same  interview  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  Sir.  The  want  ad,  the  paragraph  about  the 
KGMB  want  ads  is  derived  from  the  FBI  investigation  in  Honolulu. 
The  "Climb  Mount  Nittaka"  material  is  derived  from  one  [)risoner 
of  war  and  one  Japanese  who  was  interrogated  after  VJ-da_y. 

[o31]  Senator  Fercjuson.  Was  not  the  clue,  though,  "from  the 
same  source,  tlie  information  that  you  were  investigating? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  pilot  Shiga,  who  was  interrogated  at  Sasibo, 
and  the  report  of  his  interrogation  contained  in  this  last  document 
which  we  just  received  Friday,  did  mention  a  want  ad  code. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  mentioned  the  want  ad  code,  did  he  not? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes. 


216       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  why  did  you  accept,  at  his  suggestion, 
the  climbing  of  the  mountain  and  not  the  want  ad  proposition?  Do 
you  have  any  reason  for  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir.  The  item  about  climbing  the  mountain 
was  also  mentioned  by  another  Japanese  prisoner  of  war,  and  had 
some  confirmation.  The  item  about  the  KGMB  want  ads  had  been 
investigated  by  the  FBI  in  Honolulu  and  could  not  be  corjfirmed. 
In  fact,  the  information  seemed  to  be  negative.  Therefore,  the 
•'climb  Mount  Niitaka"  was  included  and  the  KGMB  want  ads  was 
not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet  and  Pacific 
Ocean  Area  Weekly  Intelligence,  the  one  you  gave  to  the  committee, 
states  the  information  as  to  climbing  Mount  Xiitaka  wiis  in  Order 
No.  1,  combined  fleet  secret  order  No.  1,  that  is.  that  was  his  memory 
of  it? 

['5S2']  Admiral  Inglis.  We  have  no  positive  evidence  of  that. 
Senator.  If  I  may  give  you  as  complete  a  story  as  possible  on  that,  I 
would  like  to  do  it.  at  this  point,  sir.  on  this  "climb  Mount  Niitaka," 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  wait  until  I  get  through,  and  then 
give  A^our  version  of  it. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Certainly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  look  on  page  11  of  the  analysis  there 
of  the  lieutenant,  and  see  what  he  says  about  this  Mount  Niitaka? 

Admiral  Inglis.  "\^'liat  page? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Page  11. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Can  you  identify  the  document? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Page  11  of  what  document,  Senator? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  trying  to  point  it  out.  There  [indicat- 
ing]. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Paragraph  14,  about  the  Japanese  consulate  gen- 
eral? 

Senator  Ferguson.  No ;  paragi'aph  15. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  that,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  read  it? 

Admiral  Inglis  (reading)  : 

Inasmuch  as  Shiga's  information  was  reportedly  given  to  him  by  another  oflBcer 
aboard  the  Akagi  following  the  attack,  its  accuracy  is  subject  to  some  doubt. 

[S33]  Senator  Ferguson.  And  who  says  that?  Is  that  Lieu- 
tenant Peterson  of  the  United  States  Navy  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  K.  H.  Peterson,  lieutenant.  United  States  Navy 
Reserve,  signed  that  report ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  With  that  doubt  in  mind,  then,  and  with  Mac- 
Arthur's  information  as  to  order  No.  1,  do  you  still  place  much 
credence  to  that  information?  Order  No.  1,  as  far  as  the  Mac- 
Arthur  information  is  concerned,  does  not  include  that  at  all,  does  it  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir.     We  still  think 

Senator  Ffj^guson  (interposing).  Did  you  analyze  it  with  that 
in  mind  ? 

Mr.  MuRPHT.  Mr.  Chairman,  let  the  witness  answer  the  question. 

The  Chairman.  Let  the  witness  complete  his  answer. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right. 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  still  think  that  the  statement  made  in  the  pres- 
entation is  the  best  estimate  that  we  can  make,  sir,  because  it  was 
partially  confirmed  from  another  source. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  217 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  is  that  source? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  source  was  a  Japanese  prisoner  of  war,  who 
was  captured  at  Saipan  in  the  Marianas  campaign. 

In  his  interrogation — remember,  please,  this  was  a  year  ['5o4^] 
before  VJ-day — in  his  interrogation,  he  said  it  had  beeii  planned  to 
use  that  phrase  "climb  Mount  Xiitaka"  to  confirm  the  launching  of  the 
attack.  However,  he  did  not  say.  and  was  not  able  to  say,  that  that 
phrase  was  ever  actually  used.  He  did  not  know  whether  or  not  it 
had  ever  been  received. 

So  in  the  first  draft  all  mention  of  "climb  Mount  Niitaka"  was 
omitted,  because  it  could  not  be  confirmed.  .  Then  later  on  when  we 
got  this  other  report  from  Shiga  which  said  he  had  been  out  with  the 
Japanese  striking  force,  and  that  the  message  had  been  received,  we 
then  felt  there  was  sufficient  confirmation  of  that  to  incorporate  it 
into  the  presentation. 

Senator  Fergusox.  But  operational  order  No.  1,  that  is,  what  pur- 
ports to  be  operational  order  No.  1,  does  not  contain  it? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  No,  sir.  There  were  a  number  of  things  from 
operation  order  No.  1  which  had  been  deleted.  Presumably  the  Japa- 
nese did  not  give  operation  order  No.  1  in  full  to  any  ships  except  those 
which  were  in  the  striking  force.  I  presume  that  would  be  for  secur- 
ity reasons.  There  was  no  need  to  give  it  to  those  who  did  not  need 
to  know  it.  Therefore  operation  order  No.  1,  which  we  had  and  which 
was  captured  in  the  Nachi,  which  was  not  in  the  striking  force,  had 
some  deletion  from  the  operational  order,  and  it  is  quite  possible 
"climb  iSIount  Niitaka"  was  one  of  the  deletions  since  [53o]  the 
Xachi  was  not  one  of  the  striking  force. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  do  you  say  it  was  possible?  Was  there 
anything  in  there  about  climbing  the  mountain? 

Admiral  Inglis.  There  was  nothing  in  the  operation  order  No.  1 
which  we  received  that  mentioned  "climb  Mount  Niitaka." 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  received  it  from  two  sources,  one  from  the 
ship  and  one  from  the  MacArthur  source,  is  that  correct  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  You  are  referring  to  "climb  Mount  Niitaka"? 

Senator  Ferguson.  No;  I  am  talking  about  operation  order  No.  1. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Operation  order  No.  1  that  we  had  was  received 
before  VJ-day.  It  was  translated  from  a  document  captured  from 
the  Japanese  cruiser  Nachi. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  also  get  a  copy  of  it,  or  information 
concerning  it,  from  MacArthur? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mac  Arthur's  report  does  not  contain  it.  His  report 
states  that  the  documents  in  Japan,  in  Tokyo,  had  been  destroyed. 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  MacArthur  report  contains  some  reference 
to  operation  order  No.  1.  but  does  not  contain  the  operation  order 
itself. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  it  give  any  information  or  anj'  \p-^(^] 
intimation  that  the  information  given  about  climbing  the  mountain 
was  on  the  same  day  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Fi:rguson.  Can  you  account  why  our  Navy  has  not  the 
record  at  least  of  receiving  the  messages  sent  to  this  fleet? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  no  specific  information  on  that.  Again, 
that  Avould  come  from  Naval  Communications  rather  than  from  m& 


218        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  make  any  check  to  ascertain  whether 
or  not  we  intercepted  the  radio  at  the  time  it  was  sent,  and  this  infor- 
mation is  in  line  with  that  radio  interce])tion  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  I  made  no  such  check,  because  the  instructions  wei'e 
to  exclude  from  my  presentation  anything  from  a  cryptanalytical 
source. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Will  the  gentleman  yield? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  state  that  again?  Is  your  answer  that 
you  were  supposed  to  exclude  from  your  presentation  any  decoded 
messages  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir,  on  the  understanding  it  would 
be  brought  before  the  committee  by  later  witnesses. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  the  Senator  ^deld? 

[5S7]         The  Chairman.  Will  the  Senator  yield  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  would  like  to  make  the  observation  that  Captain 
Layton  is  coming,  and  that  he  will  be  available  on  the  very  subject 
about  which  he  is  asking  the  witness. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  concerned  now  with  one  thing,  and  that  is 
about  the  instructions  to  the  admiral,  not  to  use  in  his  information 
anything  that  was  decoded. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  can  answer  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  wish  you  would. 

Mr.  ]\IiTCHELL.  The  instructions  to  the  admiral  were  to  prepare  a 
statement  of  the  Japanese  attack  from  Japanese  sources,  and  confine 
liimself  to  that,  and  that  is  what  I  think  he  has  tried  to  do.  These 
things  you  refer  to  are  not  Japanese  sources  at  all.  The  full  informa- 
tion about  all  these  intercepts  is  going  to  be  covered  by  other  witnesses. 
The  admiral  was  asked  not  to  present  anything  except  what  he  had 
obtained  from  the  Japanese. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  as  I  understand  it,  the  decoded  messages 
are  certainly  from  Japanese  sources. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  I  did  not  so  treat  them  in  my  instructions  to 
the  admiral. 

[•538]  The  CnATrniAN.  Decoded  messages  would  be  messages  de- 
coded by  the  War  or  Xavy  Department.  As  far  as  the  Navy  Departr 
ment  is  concerned,  they  would  be  here  in  the  possession  of  the  Navy 
and  not  in  the  possession  r)f  Japanese  prisoners  of  war;  isn't  that  true  ? 

Admiral  Inglts.  That  is  true,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  going  back,  Admiral,  have  you  any  reason 
why  you  did  not  use  the  source  of  information  that  came  from  the  Japs 
prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  bombing,  that  we  decoded  and 
which  came  from  the  prisoners  after  the  attack? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  used  all  the  information  from  the  prisoners. 
We  did  not  use  any  of  the  information  from  cryptanalytical  sources, 
because  we  did  not  have  access  to  the  latter,  and  it  was  not  within  the 
scope  of  the  instructions  which  we  received. 

Senator  Ferguson,  And  vras  it  also  because  of  the  instructions  from 
counsel  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  It  was  the  instructions  which  my  staff  received.  I 
suppose  they  originated  with  counsel. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  did  the  exclusion,  that  you  were  not  to  use 
the  information  also  exclude  the  so-called  diplomatic  intorcppts? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  219 

Admiral  Ixglis.  It  did,  sir. 

[o39]  Senator  Ferguson.  And  also  the  infoinuiliuu  in  our  Avliite 
papers,  our  messages?  Did  it  exclude  that,  that  j^on  were  not  to  con- 
sider that  Avhen  you  were  giving  us  an  evaluation  of  the  evidenc'  ? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  I  do  not  know  what  the  Senator  refers  to  as  the 
^'white  paper." 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  do  not  know  what  the  wliite  papers  are? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  by  that  name,  no,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  papers  that  have  been  printed,  the  informa- 
tion by  the  State  Department  that  may  be  known  to  you  as  peace  or 
war. 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  think  the  Senator  refers  to  a  State  Department 
paper  which  did  not  contain  any  reference  to  deciphered  or  crypt- 
analytical  material. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  correct. 

Admiral  Inglis.  And  that  material  was  used  in  making  up  this 
presentation,  or  at  least  it  was  considered. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  that  from  Japanese  sources  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  was  from  the  State  Department. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  the  original  source  the  Japanese?  Will 
you  find  out  ?  In  other  words,  the  messages  on  the  diplomatic  rela- 
tions, November  20,  to  our  State  Department,  was  that  considered  in 
evaluating  any  of  this  information  ? 

[540]  Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  informed  by  my  staff  that  that  was 
considered  by  them  as  background,  but  no  quotations  were  made 
from  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  see  one  statement  in  the  MacArthur  informa- 
tion, and  I  want  to  know  what  credit  they  gave,  and  what  value  they 
gave  this  question  No.  12. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Will  the  gentleman  give  the  page  number? 

Senator  Ferguson.  They  are  not  paged.  It  is  under  November  1. 
1945. 

When  was  the  final  confirmation  of  this  plan  made? 
Answer.     1  December,  IWl. 

Have  you  got  it  before  you  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  have  that ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  now  will  you  turn  to  operational  order 
under  October  26,  1945.  the  letter  of  transmittal,  and  then  read  under 
"(a)"  the  information?  Will  you  read  that?  Have  you  got  the  in- 
strument I  am  talking  about  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  will  read  it,  if  I  can  find  it.  Senator  Ferguson. 
I  have  the  first  reference  which  you  made,  December  1,  1941.  You 
say  this  is  the  other  document? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

[■^1]  Admiral  Inglis.  The  first  reference  which  the  Senator 
made 

Senator  Ferguson.  Read  the  imperial  order. 

Admiral  Inglis.  On  page  3,  paragraph  1  (a),  3  (a)  : 

Imperial  Naval  Order,  issued  2  December : 

The  hostile  actions  against  the  United  States  of  America,  the  British 
Empire 

Senator  Ferguson.  No.  Read  No.  1,  the  imperial  naval  ordei", 
No.  1. 


220       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Inglis.  No.  1 : 

Imperial  Naval  Order,  issued  1  December.  Japan  under  the  necessity  of 
her  self-pi'eservation  and  self-defense  has  reached  a  decision  to  declare  war  on 
the  United  States  of  America,  British  Empire  and  the  Netherlands.  Time  to 
start  action  will  be  given  later. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Xow,  going  over  to  12.  that  I  read  into  tlie 
record,  when  was  the  final  confirmation  of  this  plan  made,  the  1st 
of  December  1941,  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Murphy.  Will  the  gentleman  yield? 

The  Chairman.  Will  the  Senator  from  Michigan  yield  to  the 
Congressman  from  Pennsylvania '? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Murphy.  In  the  broadcast  of  the  5th  of  December,  which  might 
be  what  the  gentleman  is  looking  for,  there  was  a  [-543]  mes- 
sage: 

In  reference  to  the  Far  Eastern  Crisis,  what  you  said  is  considered  important 
at  this  end,  but  proceed  witli  what  you  are  doing,  specific  orders  will  be  issued 
soon. 

That  seems  to  be  pointing  to  some  additional  order.  That  is  on 
page  234  of  the  examination  of  Captain  Layton  in  the  Hewitt  report. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you,  Admiral,  any  information  as  to  what 
the  Congressman  from  Pennsylvania,  iSIr.  Murphy,  is  speaking  about  ^ 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  I  have  not  had  that  message  available. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  5^ou  had  the  privilege  of  talking  with 
Captain  La\i:on  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  haven't  discussed  this  with  him? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  date  do  you  say  that  the  fleet  left  the 
ba}''  in  Japan  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  The  actual  time  of  departure  was  9  a.  m.,  November 
26,  Japan  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  familiar  in  the  diplomatic  messages 
that  there  had  been  a  time  limit  of  the  25th  put  on  the  negotiations, 
that  they  had  to  be. ended  by  the  25th? 

[-543]         Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir,  I  am  not  familiar  witli  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  are  not  familiar  with  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  W^ere  ,you  familiar  with  the  fact  that  then  it 
was  extended  to  the  29th  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  are  not  familiar  with  that? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir.  I  may  have  some  vague  recollection  of 
reading  something  like  that  in  the  newspapers. 

Senator  Fergit.son.  Would  you  know  of  anything  that  would  make 
the  date  of  leaving,  which  is  the  26th,  being  the  25th  here— is  it  not? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  same  date  as  the  order  from  CNO  to  divert 
all  shipping  south  and  to  start  convoys — is  there  any  relation  between 
those  two? 

Admiral  Inglis.  There  is  no  relationship  that  I  know  of;  no,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  tried  to  analyze  those  dates,  that  they 
are  on  the  same  date? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir ;  that  hadn't  occurred  to  me. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  221 

Sentitor  Ferguson.  Will  yon  ask  your  aides  and  see  if  they  put  any 
'significance  on  those  dates? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  sorry  I  can't  be  helpful,  Senator.  [S44] 
The  staff  who  prep;u-ed  the  .Japanese  plan  are  not  the  staff'  who  pre- 
pared the  American  plan  and  the  staff  who  prepared  the  Japanese  plan 
felt  that  that  Avas  not  relevant  to  their  plan  and  wouldn't  attempt  to 
make  any  evaluation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  knoAV  whetlier  or  not — when  was  the 
time,  what  was  the  date  of  tlie  order  to  "Climb  ]Mount  Niitaka"? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Climb  Mount  Niitaka? 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  3d  of  December? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No,  sir;  that  was  later  than  that.  Our  informa- 
tion is  that  that  messag-e  was  received  by  the  Japanese  striking  force 
on  the  5th  of  December.  Hawaiian  time. 

Senator  Fer(;us()N.  5th  of  December,  Hawaiian  time? 

Admiral  Ingijs.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  would  be  on  the  Gth,  oiu-  time? 

Admiral  Inglis.  On  the  6th,  Japan  time. 

Senator  Fercjuson.  Japan  time? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Not  our  time.    On  the  5th.  Hawaiian  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Which  would  lie  tlie  6th,  Japanese  time. 

Senator  FERifUSON.  Well,  now,  have  you  made  a  search  to  ascertain 
whether  or  not  an}"  of  our  monitor  systems,  any  of  our  radios  picked 
that  message  up? 

Admiral  Inglis.  No.  sir.  That  again  would  come  under  communi- 
cations rather  than  intelligence.  I  think  that  later  [^-4-^]  wit- 
nesses can  give  a  better  answer  than  I  on  that. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  May  I  interrupt.  Senator? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  don't  believe  we  quite  understand  what  these 
gentlemen  have  been  asked  do.  In  the  outline  of  the  case  and  the 
nature  of  the  proof  which  was  furnished  to  the  committee  on  the  2d 
of  November  is  found  first  an  analysis  of  the  attack  from  the  Amer- 
ican point  of  view  and  second  the  attack  from  the  Jap  point  of  view 
and  it  contains  this  statement : 

The  Jap  plan  will  be  veconsti-ucted  from  captured  plans  and  statements  made 
by  Jap  prisoners  obtained  after  the  attack. 

Now,  these  gentlemen  haveii't  been  asked  to  go  into  the  other  fields, 
crypt  analytical  things,  and  they  are  really  not  prepared  to  do  it, 
because  their  instructions  were  to  confine  themselves  to  a  reconstruction 
of  the  Jap  plan  as  far  as  they  could  from  captured  plans  and  statements 
made  by  Jap  prisoners  obtained  after  the  attack. 

All  this  material,  about  the  diplomatic  intercepts  and  exchanges, 
and  other  crypt  analytical  material,  was  all  listed  on  our  analysis  here 
for  presentation  by  other  witnesses. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  not  going  to  spend  much  time  on  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  think  your  questions  are  pertinent,  Senator,  but  1 
think  other  proof  will  cover  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  trying  to  find  out  what  weight  we  [^4^] 
should  give,  as  a  committee,  to  this  testimony,  and  since  we  have  the 
General  ]\IacArthur  statements,  I  ask,  Mv.  Chairman,  I  note  from  what 

79716— 46— pt.  1 17 


222        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

counsel  has  said  that  they  were  not  asked  for,  therefore  I  ask  that  the 
information  from  General  MacArthur  be  made  a  part  of  the  record. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Will  the  gentleman  yield  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Murphy.  That  request  was  made  15  or  20  minutes  ago  by  the 
gentleman  from  Pennsylvania. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Has  it  been  made  a  part  of  the  record  ? 

Mr.  Murphy.  Counsel  said  he  would  offer  it  and  make  it  a  part  of 
the  record. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  proposed  to  do  that  several  days  ago. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  quite  certain  it  wasn't  necessary  for  either  of 
the  members  of  the  committee  to  ask  counsel  to  make  that  a  part  of 
the  record  but  now  that  it  is  done  it  will  be  done. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  all  I  have  at  the  present  time. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Gearhart. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  just  a  few  questions. 

Admiral,  when  I  had  you  under  examination  on  Friday  last,  I  asked 
you  to  supply  any  evidence  that  might  be  available  in  reference  to  the 
condition  of  the  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor. 

[S4.7]  Admiral  Inglis.  You  asked  that,  I  believe,  to  be  furnished 
through  the  usual  Navy  liaison  channels,  and  I  would  like  to  recom- 
mend at  this  time  to  the  Congressman  that  Captain  Kniskern,  of  the 
Bureau  of  Ships,  I  believe,  is  best  informed  on  that  subject. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  K-i-s-k-e-r-n? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Was  Captain  Kniskern  at  Pearl  Harbor  at  the  time 
of  the  catastrophe  and  before  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  think  so,  but  he  has  made  a  detailed  study 
of  all  the  reports  for  the  Bureau  of  Ships. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  wonder  if  I  could  have  those  reports  upon  which 
which  he  has  based  his  conclusions ;  is  that  possible  ?  ^ 

Aclmiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir;  I  presume  it  is,  although  I  would  hazard 
a  guess  they  are  very  voluminous. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  "\V1io  Avas  commander  of  the  Task  Force  No.  1  on 
that  day? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Admiral  Pye. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  May  I  inquire  of  counsel  if  Admiral  Pye  will  be  one 
of  the  witnesses? 

]SIr.  Mitchell.  He  is  on  the  list. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Who  was  the  executive  officer  of  Task  Force  No.  1? 

Admiral  Inglis.  We  don't  have  an  executive  officer  of  the  [^4^] 
task  force  commander.  The  chief  of  staff,  I  think,  was  then  Captain 
Train,  although  I  am  not  positive. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Is  the  chief  of  staff  second  in  command? 

Admiral  Inglis.  He  is  the  chief  of  staff.  Very  often  another  officer 
in  the  task  force  may  be  senior  to  the  chief  of  staff  and  would  succeed 
to  the  command  in  case  of  disability  of  the  commander.  But  Ih.e  chief 
of  staff  is  the  senior  staff'  officer  and  next  senior  to  the  admiral  on  his 
own  personal  staff  in  his  official  family. 

iSIr.  Gearhart.  Who  is  the  officer  in  such  a  fighting  contingent  who 
would  have  possession  of  all  orders,  written  and  unwritten,  which 
would  have  to  do  with  the  management  of  the  task  force? 


1  See  Hearings,  Part  6,  pp.  2677-2678  ;  see  also  Hearings,  Part  10,  p.  5127. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  223 

Admiral  I^^GLIS.  I  would  think  that  the  flag  secretary  would  prob- 
ably come  closest  to  that. 

Mr.  Gearhakt.  May  I  ask  counsel  if  he  will  be  a  witness^ 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  don't  know  vrho  he  was.  What  task  force  are  you 
referiing  to? 

Mr.  Geariiart,  Task  Force  No.  1,  under  th.e  command  of  Vice 
Aihuiral  Pye. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  haven't  listed  him. 

Mr.  Geariiart.  Can  you  tell  me  the  name  of  the  officer  you  liave 
just  mentioned? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  No,  sir.  The  Navy  will  try  to  find  that  [-54^] 
out  for  you. 

Mv.  Gi-:ariiart.  Have  you  received  any  report  or.  why  tJie  one  bat- 
tleship was  in  drydock? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  I  haven't  got  the  information  as  to  why  she  was 
in  dock;  no,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  The  battleship  that  was  in  drydock  on  December  7, 
1941,  was  the  battleship  Pennsylvania;  is  that  correcF? 

Admiral  Inglis.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Who  issued  the  orders  for  the  lining  up  of  the  bat- 
tleships in  Pearl  Harbor  opposite  Ford  Island  in  pairs? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  That  was  contained  in  a  circular  letter  issued  by 
the  commander  in  chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  and  contained  the  berth- 
ing plan  for  the  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor, 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Has  that  order  been  supplied  for  the  record  yet  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  No,  Your  Honor. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Talking  about  2CL41,  Security  of  Fleet  at  Base  in 
Operating  Areas?    I  think  that  is  tlie  one  you  are  talking  about. 

jMr.  Mitchell.  That  is  not  in  port,  is  it  ?    That  is  in  operating  areas. 

Admiral  Ixglis.  In  order  to  save  time,  I  will  say  this  \^ooO'\ 
in  response  to  the  Congressman's  questions,  that  if  that  has  not  already 
been  furnished  the  committee,  it  will  be  furnished.^ 

Mr.  Gearhart.  What  is  the  date  of  it? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  I  don't  know,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Wh.o  issued  it  ? 

[ool'\  Such  an  order  would  come  from  the  commander  in  chief  of 
the  Pacific  Fleet  rather  than  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  Fourteenth 
Naval  District? 

Admiral  Ix'Glis.  You  will  remember  that  the  Fourteenth  Naval 
District  at  that  time  was  under  the  command  of  the  commander  in 
chief.  I  think  that  in  all  probability  the  plan  issued  by  Admiral 
Kimmel  would  be  an  outline :  the  details  probably  would  be  carried 
out  by  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District.  But  without  the  document,  I 
can't  discuss  that  too  accurately. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Have  you  recently  read  the  order  to  which  you 
have  just  referred? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Ge-\rhart.  Now,  I  would  like  to  ask  you  professionally,  not  so 
much  about  what  transpired  there,  but  what  could  transpire  there. 

What  is  the  descriptive  Uiime  or  term  that  is  applied  when  the 
ships  are  under  the  highest  form  of  inspection? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  I  am  sorrv.  Congressman. 


1  See  Hearings,  Part  10,  p.  5127. 


224       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Did  you  ever  hear  of  a  military  inspection,  that 
phrase  being  used  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes,  sir;  there  is  a  military  inspection  and  a 
material  inspection. 

Mr.  Ge.\rhart.  All  right,  military  inspection,  is  that  the  term 
under  which  you  have  the  most  complete  inspection  of  [6-52] 
vessels  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  They  cover  two  different  subjects.  The  material 
inspection  covers  a  very  searching  inspection  of  the  material  condition 
of  the  ship.  Its  state  of  corrosion,  or  lack  of  corrosion,  the  struc- 
tural strength  of  the  ship  and  condition  of  machinery.  Military 
inspection  is  directed  more  toward  inspection  of  the  efficiency  or 
effectiveness  of  the  ship  as  a  fighting  unit  of  the  fleet  and  includes 
such  factors  as  the  state  of  discipline  among  the  crew,  and  the 
effectiveness  of  the  battery,  matters  of  that  kind. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  You  can  have  a  military  or  a  material  inspection 
of  an  entire  contingent,  or  it  can  be  directed  to  special  ships  within 
the  contingent ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Admiral  Inglis  The  usual  practice  is  to  have  a  progressive  schedule 
of  inspections.  In  general,  the  division  commander  would  inspect 
the  ships  of  his  own  division,  and  it  is  quite  possible  that  inspection 
of  two  ships  might  coincide  on  the  same  day,  but  as  a  general  rule 
they  probably  would  be  staggered  throughout  the  year. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  What  are  the  names  of  the  ships,  the  battleships, 
which  were  in  Pearl  Harbor  on  the  day  of  the  catastrophe,  that  did 
not  belong  to  Task  Force  No.  1  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  haven't  that  information  readily  available,  sir. 

[odS]  Mr.  Gearhart.  You  know  as  a  matter  of  fact  that  Task 
Force  No.  1  had  six  battleships,  did  you  not  ? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  know,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  As  regular  contingents? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  don't  know ;  I  haven't  got  that  information. 

]\Ir.  Gearhart.  Do  you  happen  to  know  from  other  sources  that 
there  were  three  battleships  in  the  harbor  at  the  time  of  the  attack 
which  belonged  to  Task  Force  No.  2? 

Admiral  Inglis.  I  am  sorry ;  I  don't  know  the  organization  of  the 
task  forces  by  ships. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  when  Admiral  Halsey  left  Pearl  Harbor  and 
the  Hawaiian  Islands  on  his  missions,  or  task,  leaving  behind  three 
battleships  in  the  harbor,  under  whose  command  would  those  three 
battleships  be  during  his  absence? 

Admiral  Inglis.  In  the  case  which  the  Congressman  has  cited,  I 
believe  they  would  be  under  Commander  of  Battleships,  who  was  Ad- 
miral Anderson. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Where  was  Admiral  Anderson  headquartered  at 
that  time?     Where  was  he  stationed? 

Admiral  Inglis.  His  headquarters  would  be  on  a  battleship.  We 
haven't  the  information  here  as  to  which  battleship  it  was.  Prob- 
ably the  West  Virginia. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  In  the  harbor? 

[oo4]  Admiral  Ingias.  The  West  Virginia  was  in  the  harbor, 
yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  when  Admiial  Halsey  left  with  his  Task 
Force  No.  2,  leaving  behind  his  three  battleships  in  the  harbor,  where 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  225 

Task  Force  No.  1  was  anchored,  would  those  three  battleships  become 
attached  to  Task  Force  No.  1  sulDJect  to  the  orders  of  Admiral  Pye? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Not  necessarily,  sir ;  the  organization  by  task  forces 
differs  from  the  administrative  organization,  and  in  this  case  that  you 
cite,  the  battleships  would  have  fallen  under  the  commander,  the  ad- 
ministrative commander,  rather  than  the  task  force  commander. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  May  I  inquire  of  distinguished  counsel,  whether 
there  will  be  a  witness  here  who  can  give  testimony  on  that  subject? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Oh,  yes,  these  gentlemen  have  only  been  prepared 
within  narrow  Innits  to  testify  here.  Of  course  they  can't  furnish  all 
of  the  information  that  the  committee  ought  to  have  and  is  anxious 
to  have. 

Mr.  Gesell.  And  which  we  are  anxious  to  present. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  and  which  we  are  anxious  to  present,  but  we 
can't  try  the  whole  case  with  one  witness.  We  have  a  lot  more  down 
the  line,  witnesses  who  have  personal  knowledge  of  these  things. 

[Sdo]        Mr.  Gearhakt.  I  am  very  anxious  to  know  the  details. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  appreciate  that. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  am  hoping  I  can  get  them  a  little  in  advance. 

Now,  referring  to  your  statement  of  yesterday,  to  your  description  of 
Operational  Order  No.  1,  and  Operational  Order  No.  2 

The  Chairman.  If  the  Congressman  will  permit,  the  hour  of  12 
o'clock  has  arrived,  and  unless  he  can  conclude  very  soon,  we  might 
recess  here. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Very  well. 

The  Chairman.  Until  2  o'clock,  then. 

(Wliereupon  at  12  noon,  the  committee  recessed  until  2 :  00  p.  m.,  of 
the  same  day.) 

[■5o6^  afternoon  session — 2  p.  m. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
When  the  committee  recessed,  Congressman  Gearhart  was  exam- 
ining the  witness.     He  may  proceed. 

TESTIMONY  OF  REAR  ADM.  T.  B.  IKGLIS  AND 
COL.  BERNARD  THIELEN  (Resumed) 

Mr,  Gearhart.  I  notice.  Admiral,  from  your  report,  that  in  your 
leport  given  to  this  committee,  I  find  the  following  words,  which  I 
will  read : 

Under  date  of  7  November,  1941,  Admiral  Yamamoto  issued  Combined  Fleet 
Top  Secret  Operation  Order  No.  2,  saying  "First  Preparations  for  War.  Y  Day 
will  be  December  8."  In  accordance  with  the  definition  of  Y  Day  as  given  in 
Operation  Order  No.  1,  this  establishes  December  8  only  as  the  approximate 
date  for  commencement  of  operations.  An  Imperial  Naval  Order  issued  from 
the  Imperial  General  Headquarters  under  date  of  2  December  1941  states: 
"The  hostile  actions  against  the  United  States  of  America  shall  be  commenced 
on  8  December."  This  order  is  in  effect  the  announcement  of  X  Day  as  defined 
in  Operation  Order  No.  1.  Thus  it  becomes  apparent  that  the  tentative  approxi- 
mate date  for  the  attack  selected  on  7  November  and  defined  as  Y  Day  is 
reaffirmed  on  2  December  as  X  Day.  In  other  words,  the  original  tentative 
date  (Y  Day)  and  the  final  precise  date  (X  Day)  are  in  fact  the  same  date. 

[SS7]        That  is  the  end  of  your  statement. 

In  the  light  of  that  testimony,  and  substantiation  of  it,  I  desire  to 
read  an  abstract  of  certain  decoded  or  cracked  Japanese  messages, 
which  are  referred  to  in  the  memorandum  of  the  Judge  Advocate 
General  for  the  Secretary  of  War. 


226        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Subject:  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Report. 
Board  Report  dated  25  November,  1944. 

The  first  one  is : 

5  November  translated  5  November.     Tokyo  to  Washington,  of  utmost  secrecy, 
setting  25  November  as  deadline  for  signing  agreement  and  urging  renewed  effort. 

The  next  one  I  desire  to  read  is  the  following: 

16  November  translated  17  November.  Tokyo  to  Washington.  Referring  to 
impossibility  to  change  deadline  to  25  November  and  to  press  negotiations  with 
the  United  States. 

The  third  one,  19  Xovember,  translated  20  November.  Tokyo  to 
Washington.  Advises  to  present  "the  proposal"  and  that  "if  the 
United  States  consent  to  this  cannot  be  secured,  the  negotiations  will 
have  to  be  broken  off." 

The  next  one,  I  call  the  committee's  attention  to  is  the  following : 

22.  November  translated  22  November,  Tokyo  to  Washington.  [558]  Ex- 
tends time  for  signing  agreement  from  25  November  to  29  November.  Latter  is 
absolute  deadline.    After  that  things  are  automatically  going  to  happen. 

The  next  one  I  desire  to  read  from  this  same  summary  of  the  Judge 
Advocate  General  is  the  following : 

26  November,  translated  26  November.  Conversation  between  Kurusu  and 
yamamoto.  Kurusu  stating  United  States  will  not  yield,  that  he  could  make 
no  progress. 

Now,  I  read  one  more : 

28  November,  translated  28  November.  Tokyo  to  Washington.  States  that 
in  spite  of  Ambassador's  superhuman  efforts  the  United  States  has  "presented  a 
humiliating  proposal  and  Japan  cannot  use  it  as  a  basis  for  negotiations." 
Therefore  answer  will  be  sent  Ambassadors  in  two  or  three  days.  After  that 
negotiations  will  be  de  facto  ruptured.  Ambassadors  are  told  not  to  give  im- 
pression negotiations  are  broken  off. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  the  gentlemen  yield? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  And  finally,  and  in  conclusion  of  my  readings  from 
the  summary  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  I 
read  this  one : 

29  November,  translated  30  November.  Tokyo  to  Washington.  Instructing 
Ambassadors  to  make  one  more  attempt  and  giving  line  of  approach. 

I  thought  it  would  be  very  interesting,  because  it  [559]  abso- 
lutely sustains  the  position  here. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Will  the  gentleman  yield  to  a  question? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  have  concluded. 

The  Chairman.  Was  that  a  question  or  a  statement? 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  am  making  a  request,  asking  the  gentleman  from 
California  whether  he  will  yield. 

The  CHAiRrMAx.  The  Chair  would  like  to  inquire  of  the  gentleman 
from  California  whether  what  he  read  was  in  the  nature  of  a  question 
or  a  statement  on  his  part. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  As  I  read  it,  it  is  a  statement,  but  I  can  convert  it 
very  quickly  into  a  question  by  asking  the  witness : 

Are  you  familiar  with  those  documents? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  Officially,  no;  but  they  do  sound  strangely  familiar 
to  my  ears.  I  may  have  read  them  in  the  newspapers  or  certain  por- 
tions of  them. 

[560]         Mr.  Murphy.  Will  the  gentleman  yield  ? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  227 

The  Chair3cax.  Will  the  gentleman  yield  to  his  colleague? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  have  concluded. 

The  Chairman.  You  decline  to  yield  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  No,  I  don't;  I  said  I  have  concluded.  If  the  gentle- 
man "wants  to  make  a  statement  he  can  be  recognized  in  his  own  right. 

Mr.  Murphy.  This  time  is  in  the  hands,  as  I  understand  it,  of  the 
gentleman  from  California. 

What  I  wanted  to  say  was  that  the  paper  to  which  he  referred, 
the  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board  report  from  which  he  read,  those  very 
same  messages  are  already  in  evidence  in  this  case  in  Exhibit  No.  2. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Exhibit  No.  1, 1  believe. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Exhibit  No.  1. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  wanted  them  at  this  point. 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  also  wanted  to  make  this  request  before  the  gentle- 
man concluded  his  questioning,  if  he  would  j'ield. 

There  has  been  a  request  made  for  the  log  and  certain  other  papers 
from  the  Boise.  According  to  the  newspapers  it  is  in  connection  with 
whether  or  not  the  Boise  had  sighted  the  enemy  force  on  the  way  to 
Pearl  Harbor. 

In  connection  with  that  I  want  to  make  the  request  that  the  officer 
in  charge  of  the  Boise  be  produced  at  the  time  of  [_^61^  the  log- 
ging and  that  the  general  officer  of  the  ship  who  was  the  informant  of 
the  gentleman  from  California  also  be  produced  so  that  we  might  have 
the  information  first-hand.^ 

The  Chair3ian.  Give  the  name  to  counsel. 

Mr.  JMuRPHY.  I  don't  know  the  name,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  have  already  taken  steps  to  get  the  log  of  the 
Boise.  I  don't  know  who  her  commander  was,  but  if  he  is  still  alive 
he  will  be  produced. 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  understand  the  log  itself  will  show  certain  nota- 
tions, but  since  the  gentleman  from  California  has  raised  the  issue 
I  think  Ave  ought  to  have  before  us  the  informant,  who  was  an  officer 
of  the  Boise  and  the  officer  in  command  of  the  Boise.,  so  that  we  might 
give  the  American  people  a  full  picture. 

The  Chairman.  Will  the  Navy  furnish  the  committee  the  name 
of  the  commander  of  the  Boise? 

Admiral  Ixglis.  The  committee  has  been  furnished  the  names  of 
Commander  Robertson  and  Commander  Moran.  Perhaps  the  gentle- 
man from  California  can  repeat  the  name  of  his  informant.  I  am 
not  sure  that  I  know  that,  sir. 

Mr.  Murphy.  May  I  request  the  gentleman  from  California,  Mr. 
Cliairman,  to  state  the  name  of  the  officer  who  was  his  informant 
about  the  Boise  incident  so  that  the  committee,  and  the  American 
people,  might  have  all  the  facts  ? 

\d62^  Mr.  Gearhart.  I  will  have  to  obtain  the  name  from  my 
files  in  my  office. 

Furthermore,  I  am  not  a  witness  on  the  stand  and  I  am  not  subject 
to  cross-examination  by  any  member  of  the  committee,  unless  called 
as  a  witness. 

If  you  think  that  I  am  going  to  divulge  of  my  informants  you  have 
seven  or  eiglit  guesses  coming.  Anybody  who  gives  me  information 
can  rely  on  the  fact  tliat  their  confidences  will  be  kept. 


1  The  log  was  subsociuuntly  fKUiiittcd  to  tliu  rceDril  as  Exliiljit  Nn.  (J8. 


228       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  woukl  simply  observe  that  if  members 
of  the  committee  do  not  wish  to  be  put  in  the  attitude  of  witnesses 
they  ought  not  to  testify. 

Mr.  Gearhakt.  I  hope  the  Chairman  follows  his  own  admonition. 

The  Chairman.  I  have  done  so  up  to  now  and  will  try  to  do  so  in 
the  future,  Con<rressman. 

Con^rressman  Keefe. 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  have  no  questions,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  any  further  questions  by  anj^  member 
of  the  committee  of  Admiral  Ingiis? 

Senator  Ferguson.  One  question.  I  think  Admiral  Ingiis,  when 
I  was  examining  him,  wanted  to  make  a  statement,  and  I  suggested 
that  he  wait.  I  would  like  to  have  him  make  that  statement  now.  1 
don't  want  him  to  feel  that  he  was  not         [S63]         allowed  to  make  it. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  I  made  a  note  at  the  time.  The  Admiral 
indicated  that  he  wanted  to  make  some  further  statement  about  the 
"Climb  Mt.  Niitaka"  message. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  wanted  him  to  have  the  privilege  of  making 
any  statement  for  the  record  that  he  desired. 

Admiral  Inglis.  Thank  you,  Seinitor.  I  have  already  cleared  up 
that  point  to  my  own  satisfaction. 

Senator  Ferguson.  By  the  questioning? 

Admiral  Inglis.  Yes;  just  following  that  question. 

Senator  Lucas.  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

The  Chairman.  The  Senator  from  Illinois. 

Senator  Lucas.  I  should  like  to  make  one  observation  in  view  of  the 
colloquy  between  Congressman  Mur{>hy  and  Congressman  Gearhart. 

It  does  seem  to  me  that  if  we  are  going  to  obtain  all  the  facts,  that 
any  informant,  or  any  individual  who  has  any  knowledge  about  Pearl 
Harbor,  the  full  connnittee  should  know  about  that  individual.  The 
name  of  that  individual  should  be  given  to  counsel  in  order  that  he, 
that  individual,  may  be  requested  to  come  and  testify,  and  if  he  does 
not  want  to  testify,  and  we  think  his  evidence  is  pertinent  and  material, 
he  should  be  subpenaed.  That  is  the  only  way  you  are  going  to  get 
all  of  the  facts  which,  as  one  member  of  the  conmiittee,  ['50'.l]  I 
want. 

These  rumors  that  are  being  spread  by  individuals  and  are  occasion- 
ally used,  at  least  as  a  portion  of  the  truth,  we  should  be  able  to  get  to 
the  bottom  of  those  rumors. 

The  Congressman  from  California  says  that  anyone  wlio  wants  to 
tell  him  anything  will  have  his  confidence,  which  means  that  he  is  not 
going  to  give  to  the  committee  the  name  of  that  individual,  and  yet  we 
are  asking,  all  of  us  are  asking  the  l^avy  and  the  Army  witnesses  to 
give  us  the  facts  completely. 

That  is  what  we  want  and  certainly  if  any  member  of  the  committee 
has  the  name  of  an  important  witness  about  Pearl  Harbor,  who  hasn't 
the  courage  to  come  before  the  committee  and  tell  his  story,  then,  it 
seems  to  me,  such  information,  or  statements,  should  be  seriously 
discounted. 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  any  further  questions? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  ISIr.  Chairman 

The  CHAIR:^rAIN.  Mr.  Gearhart. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  want  to  say  for  the  benefit  of  the  distinguished 
Senator  from  Illinois  that  I  intend  to  exercise  a  wise  discretion  in  tlie 


PROCEEDINGS   (3F  JOINT   COMMITTEE  229 

matter  of  revealing  the  names  of  those  who  give  me  information,  and 
if  any  citizen  of  this  country  con)es  to  me  and  gives  me  valuable  infor- 
mation which  will  lead  me  to  believe  he  is  a  proper  witness  to  be  placed 
upon  the  stand  I  will  call  that  witness'  name  to  the  attention  of  the 
l')65]  committee  and  I  Avill  keep  the  cfmfidence  of  the  man  who 
tells  me  of  that  Avitness  and  the  testimony  that  he  will  give. 

If  I  am  to  be  deprived  of  the  right,  or  if  any  member  of  the  commit- 
tee is  to  be  denied  the  right  of  receiving  information  from  people  by 
reason  of  the  necessity  of  revealing  their  name,  that  means  that  you 
have  closed  the  door  of  investigation  in  our  face.  I  can't  think  of 
anj'  better  way  of  discouraging  people  from  coming  forward  than  to 
announce  in  advance  that  any  information  they  convey  will  result  in 
their  oAvn  subjection  to  publicity  and  perhaps  to  personal  embarrass- 
ment.    I  will  keep  their  confidence,  if  it  should  be  kept. 

The  Chairmax.  Has  the  Congressman  from  California  concluded? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman 

The  Chairmax.  Just  a  moment.  The  Chair  wishes  to  make  this 
observation,  that  the  record  will  show  that  in  order  to  obtain  the  full- 
est infoi-mation  from  those  in  the  Government  services,  whether  they 
are  in  the  military  services  or  in  ciA'ilian  life,  the  President  issued  an 
order  lifting  any  ban  against  them  coming  forward  and  giA'ing  to  the 
committee,  or  to  its  counsel,  or  to  individual  members  of  the  commit- 
tee, an}'  information  they  had  in  their  possession,  or  thought  they  had, 
[■566li         which  had  not  otherwise  been  disclosed. 

It  has  been  the  understanding,  at  least  it  has  been  my  understand- 
ing, that  when  any  such  person  came  forward  and  gave  to  the  com- 
mittee or  its  counsel  information,  that  that  information  would  be 
divulged  and  the  name  of  the  informer  would  be  brougb.t  to  the  atten- 
tion of  the  committee,  so  that  it  might  determine  whether  to  call  such 
person  as  a  witness. 

There  was  no  need  for  lifting  of  the  ban  so  far  as  persons  not  in  the 
Government  services  are  concerned.  Not  only  are  they  free,  but  I 
think  it  is  their  duty  to  come  forward  and  give  to  the  committee,  or 
any  member  of  the  committee,  or  committee  counsel,  any  information 
that  they  have  that  will  shed  light  upon  this  Pearl  Harbor  situation. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  it  was  understood  that  any  person  in  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  in  any  capacity,  who  came  forAvard 
with  information  to  the  members  of  the  committee,  the  member  re- 
ceiving such  information  Avould  make  it  known  to  the  committee. 
The  Chair,  of  course,  has  no  desire  to  regulate  the  attitude  of  any 
member  on  that  subject.  The  very  object  of  lifting  the  ban,  so  far 
as  Government  employees  was  concerned,  was  so  that  the  committee 
might  have  all  the  information. 

[■567]         iMr.  MuRPHT.  Mr.  Chaii-man 

The  Chairmax.  Mr.  Murphy. 

Mr.  MuRPrrY.  I  might  say  the  only  reason  I  brought  up  the  subject 
is  that  I  understand  from  reading  the  paj^ers  that  the  gentleman  from 
California  was  informed  by  someone  of  the  crew,  an  officer  of  the 
Baise,  as  to  something  relative  to  the  .Japanese  force  having  been 
sighted.  That  is  a  question  now  that  we  have  to  decide  and  certainly 
that  is  pertinent  evidence;  it  is  important  evidence. 


230       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

If  there  is  an  eye-witness  in  the  workl,  we  ought  to  have  him,  and 
if  the  gentleman  from  California  knows  of  that  eye-witness,  I  think 
he  ought  to  put  his  name  on  the  record. 

Mr.  Keei-^e.  Mr.  Chairman 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Keefe. 

IMr.  Keefe.  As  one  member  of  this  committee,  down  at  the  tail  end, 
the  last  one,  may  I  suggest  that  I  am  interested  in  getting  on  with  this 
proceeding.  Let's  call  the  witnesses  and  get  the  facts.  I  would  like 
to  get  on  with  this  hearing. 

The  Chair^ian.  The  Chair  wishes  enthusiastically  to  confirm  and 
commend  the  gentleman  from  Wisconsin  in  that  desire. 

Are  there  any  further  questions  b}'  any  member  of  the  committee 
of  Admiral  Inglis? 

(No  response.) 

[S68]  The  Chairman.  Is  there  any  further  question  any  mem- 
ber desires  to  ask  Colonel  Thielen  ? 

(No  response.) 

The  Chairman.  If  not,  the  Chair  will — 

Does  the  admiral  wish  to  make  any  further  statement  ? 

Admiral  Ingeis.  I  think  I  can  make  one  statement  that  may  be  help- 
ful to  the  committee.  It  concerns  the  Japanese  operation  order  No.  1. 
I  just  want  to  clear  up  one  point  that  might  be  confusing. 

The  copy  of  this  order  which  we  have  does  not  specifically  direct 
the  striking  force  to  attack  Pearl  Harbor.  An  examination  of  the 
document  shows  that  an  attempt  was  made  by  the  Japanese  to  delete 
all  reference  to  the  plan  for  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

Apparently  this  was  done  before  the  document  was  forwarded  by 
the  Japanese  to  the  heavy  cruiser  Nachi,  because  the  Nachi  was  not 
allocated  to  the  Pearl  Harbor  striking  force. 

However,  apparently,  due  to  an  oversight  by  the  Japanese  official 
A\  ho  forwarded  this  to  the  Nachi,  several  brief  references  to  the  plan 
for  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  were  left  in  the  document  as  recovered 
from  the  Nachi. 

That  is  all  I  have. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  wishes  to  thank  Admiral  Inglis 
\dG9]  and  Colonel  Thielen  on  behalf  of  the  committee  for  the 
diligence  with  which  3^ou  have  carried  out  the  assignment  given  you, 
in  undertaking  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  committee  a  vivid  pic- 
ture of  what  happened  at  Pearl  Harbor  on  December  T,  1941,  and  the 
circumstances  surrounding  it. 

The  Chair  fefels  that  you  are  entitled  to  have  it  said  that  you  have 
both  had  a  very  distinguished  career  in  the  armed  services  of  the 
United  States. 

I  understand  that  you,  Admiral,  were  appointed  to  Annapolis,  the 
Naval  Academy,  from  the  State  of  Michigan,  by  Congressman  Wood- 
ruff, who  is  still  a  member  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  that 
you  have  had,  in  service  in  World  War  I,  and  World  War  II,  an  out- 
standing record,  that  you  have  been  cited  numerous  times, 
decorated  for  that  service.  It  is  a  matter  about  which  I  know  you 
would  not  speak,  but  I  want  to  commend  your  enthusiasm  and  your 
diligence  and  commend  you  for  the  patriotic  service  that  you  have 
rendered  the  United  States  in  World  War  No.  I  and  in  World  ^\'ar  II. 

To  you,  Colonel  Thielen,  I  wish  to  say  that  the  committee  thanks 
you. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  231 

YoiT  were  appointed,  as  I  understand  it,  to  West  Point  by  com- 
petitive examination  from  the  Armj'^,  and  that  yon  have  \o70\ 
also  had  a  distinguished  career  in  the  Army  and  have  rendered 
outstanding  service  in  this  war,  have  been  decorated  and  cited  a  num- 
ber of  times  for  heroic  service,  evidence  of  which  you  bear  upon  your 
bosom,  and  on  behalf  of  the  committee  I  wish  to  thank  you  and  com- 
mend 3'OU  for  the  task  Avhich  you  undertook  and  for  what  seems  to  the 
Chair  to  be  a  successful  accomplishment  of  that  task. 
Admiral  Inglis.  Thank  you  very  much. 
Colonel  TniELEisr.  Thank  you. 

The  Cpiairman,  Who  is  the  next  witness,  Mr.  Counsel? 
Mr.  Mitchell.  We  will  first  offer  in  evidence  us  exhibit  8,  the 
material  from  the  War  Department,  which  contributed  to  the  sum- 
mai-y  of  the  Japanese  attack.  This  includes  the  preliminary  mes- 
sage from  General  MacArthur's  headquarters,  dated  October  14,  the 
follow-up  message  of  October  15,  and  then  the  other  documents  which 
he  sent  along  by  air  mail,  and  which  have  been  referred  to  by  the 
witnesses. 

Now,  there  are  many  other  documents  which  have  been  used  as  the 
basis  of  this  summary  of  the  story  of  the  Japanese  attack,  and  unless 
some  members  of  the  committee  have  a  different  view,  I  would  sug- 
gest that  instead  of  being  put  into  the  record,  and  making  a  big 
printing  job,  these  documents  be  just  held  for  the  use  of  the  committee 
members  here.    If  you  want  them  in  the  record,  I  will  offer  them. 

[-57i]  The  Chairman.  Are  they  sufncienth^  numerous  thrtt  each 
member  may  have  a  copy  i' 

Mr.  Mitchell.  There  is  only  one  copy  here.  We  could  have  a  set 
made  of  all  of  them,  and  if  you  want  them  in  the  record  later,  we 
can  offer  them. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  suggests  that  for  the  time  being  they  not 
be  printed  as  a  part  of  the  record,  but  if  members  of  the  committee 
desire  them  individually,  they  can  have  them. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  I  didn't  quite .  understand  Mr.  IMitcheHV 
statement.  Are  these  additional  messages,  or  additional  inforr.iation 
received  from  General  MacArthur? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Exhibit  8  I  offered,  because  one  of  the  members  of 
the  connnittee  rec{uested  I  do  so.  It  includes  everything  that  came 
from  MacArthur. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  That  is  the  same  one  that  all  of  us  were  given 
a  copy  of  ? 

Mr.  jMitchell.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Is  there  anything  in  addition  to  that  ? 
Mr.  Mitchell.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  thought  you  were  referring  to  these  Japanese 
exhibits.    Were  those  the  documents  you  were  referring  to? 

[S73]  Mr.  M'tchell.  Exhibit  8  includes  all  the  documents  tiiat 
came  from  the  War  Department  through  General  MacArthur's  head- 
quarters on  which  the  Japanese  story  of  tlie  attack  is  based. 

I  offer  that  separateh^,  because  some  members  of  the  connnittee 
requested  me  to  do  so. 

If  that  request  had  not  been  made,  I  would  have  made  the  request 
as  to  all  of  this  material,  both  Ai-my  and  Navy,  that  Ave  not  put  it  in 
the  record  at  present,  unless  somebody  wants  it,  but  have  it  copied  and 
distributed  among  the  members. 


232       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  committee  already  has  copies  of  the  MacArthur  material. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  understood  that  the  request  was  that  tlie 
MacArthur  material  should  be  in  the  record.  I  thought  you  were  now 
referring  to  the  other  exhibits  which  offered  all  of  these  translated 
Japanese  'documents,  which  I  think  certainly  wouldn't  be  at  all 
necessary  to  put  in  the  record,  but  simply  have  available. 

[S7S]         The  Vice  Chairman.  That  is  just  what  I  am  thinking. 

The  CiiAiRMAX.  That  is  right.  As  the  Chair  understands  it,  the 
MacArthur  information  has  already  been  made  part  of  the  record. 

Senator  Brewster.  Is  that  correct  ?     ' 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  just  offered  it  as  Exhibit  8.  Tliat  is  the 
INIacArthur  material  and  I  offer  it  because  some  members  of  the  com- 
mittee wanted  it  in.    Now,  the  Navy  material,  I  have  not  offei-ed  that. 

Senator  Brewster.  Just  a  minute.  I  thought  that  was  going  in  the 
record. 

The  Chairman.  It  is. 

Senator  Brewster.  He  is  offering  it  as  an  exhibit  and  it  is  a  part  of 
this  record  and  is  going  to  be  in  the  record,  is  it  not? 

Mr.  ISIitchell.  Not  according  to  a  lawyer's  point  of  view. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  the  exhibit  may  or  may  not  be  printed  in  the 
hearings  and  it  is  my  understanding  that  this  exhibit  is  to  be  printed 
in  the  printed  record. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Maybe  the  Senator,  when  he  speaks  of  the  record,  is 
referring  to  documents  being  read  in  the  room  and  transcribed  by  the 
reporter.     Is  that  what  you  have  in  mind  ? 

Senator  Brewster.  When  I  referred  to  the  record  I  meant  [57^] 
to  the  typed  record  Avhich  we  are  receiving  as  opposed  to  any  exhibits 
which  are.  of  course,  part  of  the  record,  but  are  not  incorporated  in 
the  printed  records. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  exhibit  will  not  be  written  out  at  lai-ge  in  the 
reporters'  transcript,  but  when  the  record  is  made  u]),  the  whole  record, 
the  exhibit  will  appear  as  a  part  of  the  record  of  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  speaking  now  about  exhibit  8  i 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Exhibit  8. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  Now,  the  other  exhibit  that  you  referred  to, 
which  you  suggested  not  be  printed  as  a  part  of  the  hearing,  what  is 
that? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  unless  some  member  of  the  committee  thinks 
it  necessary 

The  Chairman.  What  was  that  exhibit  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  was  the  material,  the  captured  documents, 
statements  from  captured  Japanese  war  prisoners,  that  the  Navy 
received. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  agreeable  then  that  that  be  held  for  the  in- 
formation of  the  committee  subject  to  later  action  if  it  is  desired  to 
have  them  made  a  part  of  the  hearing? 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  they  should  be  made  part  of 
the  record  for  only  this  reason.  The  people  of  America  want  to  know 
all  the  facts  and  this  hearing  is  being  held  for  the  people  of  America 
as  well  as  for  the  conunittee  l-^'^'^l  and.  certainly,  these  docu- 
ments are  such  that  in  order  for  the  ordinary  citizen  to  judge  the 
record  thev  ought  to  be  ^Diead  on  the  record  for  them. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  233 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  if  the  Congressman  feels  that,  way  I  would 
have  all  the  material,  both  Army  and  Navy,  on  which  the  story  of  the 
Jap  attack  has  been  based,  introduced  in  evidence  and  I  am  doing  that 
in  Exhibit  8. 

Now,  Senator,  do  you  want  this  MacArthur  material  transcribed  at 
length  in  the  daily  transcript,  is  that  what  you  want? 

Senator  Brewster.  That  was  my  understand  hig.  You  say  "at 
length."  It  is  not,  of  course,  at  all  at  length  compared  with  what  we 
have,  but  this,  it  seems  to  me,  to  be  a  most  excellent  sununary,  com- 
parable, certainly,  to  the  summary  which  we  received. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  the  wish  of  the  committee  that  these  exhibits 
referred  to,  the  MacArthur  information,  and  also  the  Japanese  exhibits 
upon  which  the  statement  has  been  based,  as  has  been  already  detailed 
by  Admiral  Inglis,  be  printed  now  as  a  part  of  the  daily  record  of  the 
hearing? 

Senator  Breavster.  As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  sense,  counsel's 
distinction  between  the  MacArthur  report  and  the  captured  Japanese 
documents.  I  think  that  liepresentative  Murphy's  suggestion  is  that 
it  might  be  well  to  have  those  printed  as  exhibits  as  well,  but  I  think 
t  h'cit  we  may  want  to         ['576]         put  them  in  the  transcripts  as  well. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Let  me  see  if  I  can  settle  it  this  way : 

I  offer  in  evidence  as  Exhibit  8  all  of  the  material,  Army  and  Navy, 
on  which  the  story  of  the  Jap  attack  has  been  forjnulated  here,  with 
the  understanding  that  that  part  of  Exhibit  8  which  came  from 
MacArthur's  headquarters  will  be  copied  into  t]ie  daily  transcript 
by  the  reporter  and  the  Navy  material  will  not,  but  will  be  printeij 
later  on  as  a  part  of  the  exhibits.     That  is  what  j-ou  want,  is  it  i 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 

Mr.  Murphy.  That  is  agreeable. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  satisfactory  ? 

Senator  Brewster.  Now,  then,  that  includes  the  captured  Japanese 
personnel  material  in  the  later  part  of  the  record,  is  Ihat  correct? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  Japanese  captured  material  will  not  be  written 
in  tlie  daily  typewritten  transcript. 

Senator  Brewster.  No. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  But  it  will  be  attached  to  the  record  as  an  exhibit. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  understood  then. 

(The  documents  referred  to  above  were  marked  "Exhibit  No.  8," 
and  in  part  follow  herewith.) 

[577]  confidential 

Paiuphbase  of  Message  Dated  14  October  From  I^IagArthtjr's  Headquaktek.s 

TO  War  Depart jfENT 

Japanese  say  ruauy  records  were  burned.  However,  complete  report,  with 
chart  of  task  force,  now  being  written  and  to  be  sent  by  air.  I'reliniinary 
information  received  from  the  Jai)anese  Navy  is  as  follows:  On  5  November 
1!)41,  plan  for  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  was  adopted,  and  on  1  December  1941 
Cabinet  Council  decided  on  commencement  of  hostilities.  Order  that  hostile 
action  should  open  on  8  December  was  issued  by  Imperial  General  Headquarters 
(m  2  December.  Navy  section  of  Injperial  General  Headquarters  and  Combined 
Fleet  Headquarters  were  involved  in  discussions  and  decisions  to  make  attack. 

Commander  in  Chief  Combined  Fleet  on  2')  November  ordered  task  force  to 
leave  Hitokappu  Bay  next  morning  and  proceed  to  42°  North — 170°  East  by 
afternoon  .3  December  for  complete  refueling.  Attaci?  force  was  organized  as 
follows:  1st  Air  Squadron   (Kaga  and  Alagi  (Akagi),  2nd  Air  Squadron  (Hiryu 


234        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

and  Soryu),  5th  Air  Squadron  (Zuikaku  and  Shokaku),  3rd  Squadron  (Hiel  and 
Kongo),  Sth  Squadron  (Tone  and  Chikuma),  4  destroyer  divisions  making  one 
squadron,  S  ti'ansports  and  2  suhnir.rines. 

Japanese  lost  27  aircraft;  estimate  damage  to  U.  S.  Navy  at  2  battleships 
(Oklahoma  and  West  Virginia)  sunk,  [578]  4  battleships  and  4  heavy 
cruisers  damaged,  one  transport  and  one  destroyer  sunk,  and  350  planes  burned 
or  shot  down. 

Intelligence  from  Hawaii  was  obtained  through  (a)  American  broadcasts  from 
Hawaii,  (b)  reports  from  Naval  Attache  in  Washington,  (c)  reconnaissance  sub- 
marines in  Hawaiian  waters  just  before  outbreak  of  vrar  and,  (d)  things  heai-d  ' 
from  ships  AAhich  called  at  Hawaii  mid-Novemlser. 

[579]  confidential 

Paraphrase  of  INIessages  Dated  15  October  1945  From  jNIacArtkur's 
Headquarters  to  War  Department 

1.  We  are  continuing  local  investigation. 

2.  As  early  as  possible  information  available  to  Allied  Technical  Intelligence 
Service  on  Pearl  Harbor  attack  will  be  forwarded.  Material  consisting  of  partial 
coverage  from  captured  documents   is   already   collated,   but   still   on   way   to 

Tokyo  from  3ilanila.  Documents  on  which  collation  is  based  have  already  been 
sent  to  Washington. 

[580]  General  Headquarters, 

Supreme  Commander  For  Thei  Allied  Powers, 

S  November,  J9-'i5. 
AG  350.05  (8  Nov  45)  GB 

Subject :  Additional  Data  With  Reference  to  Japanese  Attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 
To :  Chief  of  Staff,  War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 
(Attention:  A.  C.  of  S.,  G-2) 

1.  Reference  our  communications  AG  350.05  (1  November  1945)  GB,  and 
AG  350.05  (26  October  1945)  GB,  same  subject,  and  in  further  compliance  with 
your  radios  WX  73711,  War  Sec.  7  October  1945  and  WX  75561,  14  October  1945, 
requesting  certain  information  to  be  obtained  from  the  Japanese  with  respect 
to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  on  7  December  1941,  an  addirinnal  partial  report, 
is  forwarded  herewith. 

2.  This  report  contains  answers  to  questions  14-20  inclusive  and  to  question 
48  of  our  questionnaire  to  the  Liaison  Committee  (Tokyo)  for  the  Japanese  Army 
and  Navy,  a  copy  of  which  was  forwarded  as  Incl.  No.  4  to  our  connnunication 
of  26  October  referred  to  above. 

FOU  THE  SUPltEXfE  COMMANDEU  : 

/S/     H.  W.  Allen, 
H.  W.  Allen, 
Colonel,  A.  G.  D., 
Asst.  Adjutant  General. 

1  Incl :  Partial  Report  in  Answer  to  Questionnaire. 
[581]         Doc.  No.  1668 

Allied  Translator  and  Inteepreiteb  Section  United  States  Army  Forces, 

Pacific 

Note:  Translation  of  document  requested  by  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 

pearl  harbor  questionnaire 
26  October  1945 

The  answers  to  questions  14,  15,  16,  17,  18,  19.  20  and  48  of  Colonel  MUNSON'S 
questionnaire  of  17  October,  the  PEARL  HARBOR  Attack,  are  contained 
herein. 

Note:  Because  of  the  deaths  of  Commander  KANAMOTO,  Yoshlhira  (28 
December  1942),  and  Commander  NAKAJIMA,  Minato  (6  August  1943),  who  were 
staff  oflicers  in  the  Intelligence  Department  of  the  Naval  General  Staff,  and 
because  of  the  pertinent  records  have  been  burned,  these  answers  are  based 
upon  the  recollections  of  Commander  TACHIBANA,  Itaru,  who  was  on  duty 
in  the  Intelligence  Department  at  that  time. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  235 

14.  Sources  of  intelligence? 

Such  matters  as  the  strength  of  the  UNITED  STATES  FLEET  in  the  HAAVAII 
area,  the  coudition  of  military  installations,  the  days  upon  which  the  fleet 
moved  out  of  and  into  port,  the  location  and  coudition  of  moorages,  waters  in 
which  maneuvers  were  held,  air  patrols,  etc. ;  were  used  as  basic  intelligence 
material.  This  material  was  collated  by  th^  Intelligence  Department  of  the 
Naval  General  Staff         [582]         and  used  as  the  basis  for  the  operation  plan. 

Tlie  primary  sources  were  : 

1.  Naval  attache  to  the  Japauese  Embassy  in  Washington. 

■2.  Public  newspapers  in  the  UNITED  STATES. 

'S.  American  radio  broadcasts  (public). 

4.  Crews  and  passengers  on  ships  which  put  in  at  HONOLULU. 

5.  General  information. 

lucll 

15.  Cliaiacteristics  of  intelUgencc? 

Emphasis  was  placed  on  material  collected  statistically  over  a  number  of 
years. 

16.  How  and  from  whom  were  the  details  on  the  maps  carried  by  personnel 
oi  the  air  units  obtained? 

A.  The  location  of  the  anchorages  .shown  on  the  maps  was  determined  on 
the  basis  of  information  gathered  from  the  sources  mentioned  in  "14",  beginning 
in  the  early  pai-t  of  1941.  Information  on  the  condition  of  the  fleet  moorages 
in  PEARL  HARBOR  in  the  early  part  of  November  was  forwarded  to  Fleet 
Headquarters.     Fleet  Headquarters  then  corrected  its  information  accordingly. 

B.  Information  on  barracks  and  other  military  installations  was  compiled 
trum  the  sources  listed  in  "14". 

C.  The  general  outlines  of  the  approach  to  OAHU  for  both  the  Attack  Force 
and  the  air  units  were  determined  [oSS]  from  information  provided  by 
tlie  previously  named  source.  Factors  taken  into  consideration  in  the  choice 
v>-ere  American  air  patrols,  sea  patrols,  etc.  The  routes  selected  were  judged  to 
be  those  upon  which  there  was  slight  chance  of  encountering  a  patrol,  merchant 
ships,  etc. 

17.  in  what  way  did  the  Attack  Force  check  on  information  while  it  was 
underway? 

As  information  was  gathered  from  the  sources  mentioned  in  "14"  it  was  for- 
warded to  the  Attack  Force. 

18.  V,'hat  role  teas  played  by  agents  in  HAWAII? 
None. 

19.-20.  Photographing  of  ships  in  the  harbor  and  opportunities  for  same. 

Applicable  facts  not  available. 

48.  What  pertinent  informatioyi  icas  received  frO'in  merchant  ships  prior  to 
flic  attack? 

Merchant  ships  provided  fragmentary  information  on.  moorages  in  PEARL 
HARBOR,  .ship  and  air  unit  maneuvers,  the  names  of  vessels  encountered  in 
the  HAWAII  area,  etc.  This  information  was  used  in  the  statistical  collation 
oi  information  mentioned  in  "14". 


[58.'f]  General  Headquarters 

SuPiiEME  Commander  for  the  Allied  Pov/eks 

AG  S.jO.Or.  (1  Nov  45)  GB  1  Novcnihrr  V.}',',. 

Subject:  Additional  Data  With  Reference  to  Japanese  Attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 
To  :  Chief  of  Staff,  War  Detiartment,  Washington,  D.  C. 

(Attention :  A.  C.  of  S.,  G-2) 

1.  Reference  our  communication  AG  350.0.";  (2G  October  1945),  GB,  same 
subject,  and  in  further  compliance  with  your  radios  WX  73711,  War  Sec, 
7  October  1945  and  WX  7.5.j61,  14  October  1945,  requesting  certain  information 
to  be  obtained  from  the  Japanese  with  respect  to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor 
on  7  December  1941,  a  partial  detailed  report  is  forwarded  herewith. 

2.  'I'his  reiiort  was  compiled  by  the  Liaison  Conunittee  (Tokyo)  for  the  Im- 
jierial  Japanese  Army  and  Navy  in  re-sponse  to  our  Qeustionnaire  furnished 
the  Liai.son  Committee  on  17  October,  a  copy  of  wliicli  was  forwarded  as  Incl. 
No.  4  to  our  communication  of  20  October   (referred  to  above)   and  includes 


236       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

detailed  information  in  answer  to  questions  1-13  inclusive,  21-28  inclusive,  and 
30-47  inclusive,  thereof. 

3.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Japanese  records  of  this  operation  have 
been  largely  destroyed,  the  bulk  of  this  information  has  been  obtained  by  inter- 
rogation of  important  figures  in  the  Japanese  Military  and  Naval  Estab-  [5So  j 
lishments  of  the  time.  Sources  of  "such  items  of  information  are  stated  in  the 
text. 

4.  The  Japanese  report  that  answers  to  questions  14-20  inclusive  and  ques- 
tion 48  (which  concern  their  sources  of  military  intelligence  on  which  opera- 
tional plans  were  based)  will  require  further  investigation,  which  is  now  in 
progress.  Documentary  evidence  required  by  Question  29  was  destroyed  at  the 
time  of  surrender;  however,  efforts  to  reconstruct  it,  at  least  partially,  from 
memory  and  from  fragmentary  soui'ces,  are  being  continued.  This  additional 
information  will  be  forwarded  as  soon  as  received  and  translated. 

Fob  the  Supbeme  Commander  : 

/s/     H.  W.  Atxen. 

Colonel,  A.  G.  D.. 
Asst.  Adjutant  General. 
1  Incl :  Partial  Report  in  Answer  to  Questionnaire. 

[586]         Doc.  1032 

Allied  Tuansi-ator  and  Inteepeeter   Section 
United  States  Abmy  Forces,  Pacific 

Note:  Translation  of  a  document  requested  by  Colonel  MUNSON,  Historical 
Investigation  Section,  G-3,  17  October-20  October  1945. 

REPLY    TO    A    questionnaire    CONCIERNING    PEARL    H ABHOR    ATTACK 

[587]         Doc.  #1032  DRM/FMO/HDP 

[Pp.  1]  I.  Paragraphs  14,  15,  16.  17,  IS,  19.  20  and  48  (that  is.  the  informa- 
tion therein)  are  under  special  investigation  and  the  answers  will  be  forwarded 
later. 

II.  The  reply  to  Paragraphs  20  (concerning  orders)  will  be  delayed  because 
all  the  copies  of  the  orders  were  burned  at  the  time  of  the  surrender.  A  de- 
tailed report  based  on  the  recollections  of  the  peoijle  concerned  and  on  frag- 
mentary sources,  without  the  aid  of  documents  which  should  be  available,  is  in 
iireparation. 

[Pp.  2]  (Note:  The  following  Paragraphs  1,  2.  3,  and  4  are  based  on  the 

recollections  of  Chief  of  Oi)erations  Section  Naval  General  StiifE,  Gapt  TOMIOKA, 
Sadatoshi ;  member  of  Operations  Section  Naval  General  Staff,  Conidr.  MIYO, 
Tatsukichi;  Combined  Fleet  Staff  members  Capt  KUROSHIMA,  Kameto,  and 
Comdr  WATANABE,  Yasuji.) 

1.  Who  eonceivcd  and  proposed  the  PEARL  HARBOR  surprise  atlach? 
Adm  YAMAMOTO,  Isoroku,  then  CinC,  Combined  Fleet. 

2.  When  ira.s'  this  done? 

The  first  part  of  January  1941.  (CinC  YAMMOTO  ordei-ed  Rear  Adm  ONISHI, 
Takijiro,  at  that  time  Chief  of  Staff  of  11  Air  Fleet,  to  study  the  operation.) 

3.  Was  the  said  action  (or  similar  actions  in  anticipalion  of  a  uiir  against 
the  UNITED  STATES)  included  in  JAPAN'S         [5SS]         prcicar  plans? 

No. 

4.  If  this  is  so.  icriie  the  facts  shoicn  in  the  pretoar  plans. 
(No  statement.) 

[Pp.  3]  (Note:  The  following  Paragraphs  5,  6  and  7  are  basea  <;n  the  recol- 
lections of  Adm  NAGANO,  Osami.  then  Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff.) 

5.  When  was  it  decided  to  attack  PEARL  HARBOR? 

3  Nov.  41.  This  date  was  set  by  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff,  NAGANO, 
when  CinC.  Combined  Fleet  YAMAMOTO  came  to  TOKYO. 

6.  Who  made  the  foregoing  decision? 
Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff  NAGANO. 

7.  //  the  decision  vas  made  in  conference,  give  time  of  said  conference  and 
names  of  all  persons  present. 

It  was  not  made  in  conference. 

4.  (Note:  The  following  Paragraphs  8,  0,  10,  11  and  12  are  based  upon  the 
recollections  of  Chief  of  the  Operations  Section  Naval  Geiieral  Staff,  Capt 
TOMIOKA,  Sadatoshi,  Comdr  IMIYO,  Tatsukichi,  a  luemlH'r  of  the  Operation  Sec- 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  237 

tional  Naval  General  Staff;  and  Capt  KUROSHIMA,  Kameto,  a  member  of  the 
Combined  Fleet  Staff.) 

8.  What  important  factors  were  considered  in  reaching  this  decision? 

The  factors  considered  were:  (1)  rendering  impotent  [o6'9]  the 
UNITED  STATES  PACIFIC  Fleet  in  order  to  gain  time  and  maintain  freedom  of 
action  in  the  SOUTH  SEAS  Operation  (including  the  PHILIPPI^■E  Islands), 
and  (2)  the  defense  of  our  mandated  islands. 

9.  Who  were  the  persons  who  icorked  out  the  details  of  the  actual  plan? 
Members  of  Naval  General  Staff  Operations  Section,  Combined  Fleet  Operations 

Staff  and  1  Air  Fleet  Operations  Staff". 

10.  When  was  the  above  undertaking  started? 
In  the  first  part  of  September  1941. 

11.  Who  made  the  final  confirmation  of  this  plan  when  it  was  completed? 
CinC  Combined  Fleet  YAMAMOTO. 

[Pp.  5]        12.  When  teas  the  final  confirmation  of  this  plan  made? 

1  Dec  41. 
13.  Who  were  the  people  and  organizations  loho  Jcnetc  of  this  plan? 

(Note:  This  answer  is  based  on  the  recollections  of  the  Chief  of  the  Naval 
General  Staff,  Adm  NAGANO,  Osami ;  Chief  of  the  Operations  Section  Naval 
General  Staff,  Capt  TOMIOKA,  Sadatoshi ;  and  Comdr  MIYO,  Takkichi,  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Operations  Section  Naval  General  Staff.) 

Those  connected  with  the  Navy  are  as  follows : 

(1)  Those  who  knew  the  complete  plan  in  advance : 
[590]        Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff 
Vice-Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff 

Chief  of  the  Operations  Section  Naval  General  Staff 
Members  of  Operations  Section  Naval  General  Staff 

The  Commanders  in  chief,  the  chiefs  of  staff  and  most  of  the  staff  members 
of  the  Combined  Fleet  Hq  and  1  Air  Fleet  Hq 

(2)  Those  who  knew  a  part  of  the  plan  in  advance : 

Chiefs  of  Sections  1, 2, 3  and  4  of  the  Naval  General  Staff 
Navy  Minister 
•    Navy  Vice-Minister 

Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Naval  Affairs,  Navy  Ministry 

Chiefs  of  Sections  1  and  2,  Bureau  of  Naval  Affairs,  and  some  of  their 

personnel 
Commander  in  chief  of  each  fleet  of  the  Combined  Fleet,  their  chiefs  of 
staff  and  some  of  the  staff  members. 

(3)  Those  who  knew  the  general  outline  of  the  plan  in  advance : 

The  Emperor.  (The  Emperor  knew  of  the  objective  of  attacking  the  main 
strength  of  the  UNITED  STATES  PACIFIC  Fleet  with  a  task  force 
after  the  last  ultimatum  to  the  UNITED  STATES  Government  [591  ] 
had  been  delivered.) 

(Note:  Any  persons  other  than  those  connected  with  the  Navy  are  unknown. 
However,  it  is  certain  that  none  of  the  Japanese  ofiicials  who  were  in  the  UNITED 
STATES  or  its  possessions,  including  Ambassador  NOMURA,  Ambassador 
KURUSU,  the  Navy  and  Army  officers  attached  to  the  embassy  in  the  UNITED 
STATES  and  the  Imperial  Consul  in  HONULULU,  knew  anything  about  this 
plan  in  advance.) 

[Pp.  7]  (Note:  The  replies  in  Paragraphs  21,  22  and  23  are  based  on  the 
recollections  of  the  Chief  of  the  Operations  Section  Naval  General  Staff,  Capt 
TOMIOKA,  Sadatoshi ;  Comdr  MIYO,  Takkichi,  a  meml)er  of  the  Operations  Sec- 
tion Naval  General  Staff;  Combined  Fleet  Staff  members  Capt  KUROSHIMA, 
Kameto,  and  Comdr  WATANABE,  Yasuji ;  and  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
AKAGI  Air  Unit,  Comdr  FUCHIDA,  Mitsuo.) 

21.  Write  a  detailed  report  on  hoio  this  plan  could  have  been  improved. 

a.  27ie  obstacles  ichich  were  considered  and  hoio  they  were  overcome. 

(1)  The  impossibility  of  refueling  at  sea  due  to  rough  weather  was  considered. 
To  overcome  this  difficulty,  the  ships  with  a  limited  cruising  range  were  deck- 
loaded  with  drums  of  heavy  oil,  and  heavy  oil  was  stowed  in  open  spaces  inside 
the  ship.  In  the  eventuality  that  there  were  no  opportunity  to  refuel  at  sea, 
all  the  ships  except  the  [592]  destroyers  had  a  cruising  radius  extending 
to  approximately  E.  Long.  160°.  In  the  event  the  destroyers  were  unable  to 
refuel  there  was  a  plan  to  have  them  separate  and  return.  In  actual  fact,  how- 
ever, the  sea  was  comparatively  calm  and  the  scheduled  refueling  was  possible. 

79716 — 46 — pt.  1 18 


238       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(2)  It  was  decided  that  a  torpedo  attack  against  anchored  ships  was,  the 
most  effective  method  or  putting  the  main  strength  of  the  UNITED  STATES 
PACIFIC  Fleet  in  the  HAWAII  area  out  of  action  for  a  considerably  long  period 
of  time.     Hence,  the  following  two  obstacles  were  considered : 

(a)  The  fact  that  PEARL  HARBOR  is  narrow  and  shallow. 

(b)  The  fact  that  PEARL  HARBOR  was  probably  equipped  with  torpedo  nets. 

(c)  In  regard  to  point  (a),  it  was  planned  to  attach  stabilizers  to  the  torjpe- 
does  and  launch  them  from  an  extremely  low  altitude. 

(d)  In  regard  to  point  (b),  since  success  could  not  be  counted  on,  a  bombing 
attack  was  also  employed. 

b.  Were  local  decisions  made  and,  if  so,  by  whom?    There  were  none. 

c.  How  were  the  units  and  commanding  officers  who  were  to  participate  se- 
lected {surface  forces  and  air  forces)  f 

[Pp.  9]  Air  forces:  The  basic  unit  was  organized  by  attaching  the  flight 
personnel  of  Car  Div  4  (RYUJO  and  RYUHO)  to  Car  [593]  Div  1 
(AKAGI,  KAGA)  and  Car  Div  2  (SORYU  and  HIRYU),  which  were  at  that  time 
the  most  highly  trained  units  in  the  combined  Fleet.  Car  Div  5,  because  it  had 
just  been  organized,  was  supplemented  by  highly  trained  flight  personnel  from 
every  unit  in  JAPAN,  and,  by  further  concentrated  training,  it  was  planned  to 
bring  them  to  peak  efficiency. 

Surface  forces :  As  far  as  possible,  vessels  with  a  long  cruising  range  were 
selected.     Persons  of  ability  were  selected  for  commanding  officers. 

d.  What  iccre  the  reasons  for  the  actual  course  selected? 

Three  courses  were  considered  for  the  HAWAII  Operation.  The  northern 
course  which  was  actually  used,  a  central  course  which  headed  east  following 
along  the  HAWAII  Archipelago,  and  a  southern  route  passing  through  the 
MARSHALL  Islands  and  approaching  from  the  south.  On  the  northern  route, 
although  it  was  far  from  the  enemy  patrol  screen  of  land-based  airplanes  and 
there  was  little  chance  of  meeting  commercial  vessels,  the  influences  of  weather 
and  topography  were  strong.  Refueling  at  sea  and  navigation  were  difficult. 
On  the  central  and  southern  routes  the  advantages  and  disad-  [Pp.  10] 
vantages  are  generally  just  the  opposite  to  those  of  the  above-mentioned  route. 
Although  it  may  be  assumed  that  these  routes  would  be  preferable  for  purposes 
of  refueling  at  sea,  the  chances  of  being  discovered  by  patrol  planes  were  great 
because  the  routes  near  WAKE,  MIDWAY,  PALMYRA,  JOHNSTON  [5941 
Islands,  etc.  Consequently,  it  could  hardly  be  expected  that  a  surprise  attack 
could  be  made. 

The  ability  to  refuel  and  a  surprise  attack  were  the  keys  to  this  operation. 
If  either  of  them  failed  the  execution  of  the  operation  would  have  been  impossible. 
However,  the  refueling  problem  could  be  overcome  by  training.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  surprise  attack  under  all  circumstances  could  not  be  assured  by  our  own 
strength.     Therefore,  the  northern  route  was  selected. 

e.  M^hat  preparations  were  made  for  the  prevention  of  discovery  en  route? 

(1)  By  electing  the  route  so  as  to  pass  between  MIDWAY  and  the  ALEU- 
TIANS, we  would  pass  outside  the  patrol  zones  of  the  patrol  planes. 

(2)  Screening  destroyers  were  sent  ahead  in  the  path  of  the  fleet  and  in  the 
event  any  vessels  were  encountered,  the  main  body  of  the  fleet  would  make  a 
severe  change  of  course  and  endeavor  to  avoid  detection. 

[Pp.  11]         (3)   Complete  radio  silence  was  carried  out. 

f.  In  the  event  of  being  discovered  what  countermeasures  would  have  been 
taken f  , 

The  day  of  the  attack  was  designated  as  X-day. 

If  discovered  prior  to  X-2  Day,  we  would  have  returned  without  executing  the 
air  attack.  In  the  event  of  being  discovered  on  X-1  Day,  the  question  of  whether 
to  make  an  [595]  attack  or  to  return  would  have  been  decided  in  accord- 
ance with  the  local  conditions. 

g.  What  means  of  deception  were  taken  so  as  to  direct  the  attention  of  the 
UN f TED  STATES  elseivherc? 

The  Main  Force  in  the  INLAND  SEA  Area  and  the  land-based  air  units  in 
the  KYUSHU  Area  carried  on  deceptive  communications,  and  deceptive  measures 
were  taken  to  indicate  that  the  Task  Force  was  still  in  training  in  the  KYUSHU 
Area. 

h.  //  the  attack  had  failed,  what  countermeasures  tcould  have  been  taken? 

In  order  to  bring  in  the  Task  Force  it  was  planned  to  send  the  Main  Force  in 
the  INLAND  SEA  out  to  the  PACIFIC  Ocean. 


OT««r»d  to  deploy  «t  0 
SlT*  bODtl&e  unit 
Attack  nir.  or4»r«- 
ttdl  BoBblii«  Onlt 


79716  O— 46— pt.  1   (Pmep.  239)   No.  3 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


239 


[Pp.  12]  22.  Btate  reasons  for  and  particulars  of  the  selection  of  tlie  date 
of  7  December. 

(1)  The  Imperial  Headquarters  Navy  Section  generally  acknowledged  8  De- 
cember (JAPAN  time)  to  be  suitable  from  an  operational  standpoint  and  made 
the  decision  in  cooperation  with  the  leaders  of  the  Combined  Fleet. 

(2)  For  a  dawn  attack  in  the  HAWAII  Area  in  December,  the  tenth  would 
have  been  suitable  from  the  standpoint  of  the  dark  of  the  moon.  However,  since 
it  was  expected  that  the  UNITED  STATES  PACIFIC  Fleet,  in  accordance  with 
its  habits  during  maneuvers,  would  enter  the  harbor  on  Friday  [596]  and 
leave  on  Monday,  the  eighth  was  decided  on  so  as  to  hit  between  these  days. 

[Pp.  13]        23.  How  was  the  time  for  the  attack  selected  and  for  what  reasons? 

In  order  to  assure  the  success  of  the  attack  and  still  avoid  a  night  attack,  the 
take-off  time  of  the  airplanes  was  set  as  near  to  dawn  as  possible.  The  attack 
time  was  set  at  0330  hours  (JAPAN  time).  (Sunrise  that  day  was  at  0230 
hours.) 

1598]        [Pp.  15]  (2)  Air  Strength:  (a)  Reconnaissance  Unit. 


Type 

Type  of  airpianes 

Number 

of 
airplanes 

Ships  on  which  based 

Duty 

Airplanes  for  reron- 
naissance  just   be- 

Type  Zero  Reconnais- 
sance Seaplanes. 

2 

/TONE  (1).- 

fReconnaissance   of 
PEARL  HARBOR 

\CHIKUMA  (1) 

choraee   Just    before 
I    the  attack. 

Type   95    Reconnais- 
sance Seaplanes. 

4 

fHIEI  (1) 

1 

Search-patrol  planes.. 

KIRISHIMAd) 

TONE  (1)..           .  . 

1  Patrolling  waters 
1    around  OAHU. 

CHIKUMA  (1) 

[601]  [Pp.  18]  25.  During  this  operation  were  any  of  the  fleet  units  or 
air  forces  diverted  to  attack  secondary  targets? 

(Note:  These  answers  are  based  on  the  recollections  and  inquiries  of  Comdr. 
FUCHIDA,  Mitsuo,  wlio  was  in  command  of  the  AKAGI  Air  Unit  at  tliat  time.) 

(1)  The  MIDWAY  Neutralization  Unit  (AKEBONO,  USHIO)  left  TOKYO 
Bay  about  1  December,  arrived  at  MIDWAY  during  the  night  of  8  December, 
bombarded  the  air  base,  and  returned  to  the  western  part  of  the  INLAND  Sea. 
The  SHIRIYA  moved  with  this  unit  and  served  as  a  supply  ship. 

(2)  On  16  December,  while  proceeding  back  from  HAWAII,  two  aircraft  car- 
riers (ZUIKAKU,  SHOKAKU),  two  cruisers  (TONE,  CHIKUMA),  and  two 
destroyers  (TANIKAZE,  URAKAZE)  were  diverted  to  WAKE  Island.  They 
were  sent  by  Combined  Fleet  orders  to  support  the  WAKE  Invasion  Operation. 

[Pp.  19]  26.  (Note:  These  answers  are  based  on  the  recollections  and  in- 
quiries of  Comdr.  FUCHIDA,  Mitsuo,  who  was  in  command  of  AKAGI  Air  Unit  at 
that  time.) 

a.  Explain  the  plans  of  action  and  the  reasoning  therein,  for  the  air  attack, 
giving  the  number  and  type  of  airplanes  used  against  each  target 
(1)  FjU-st  Attack. 

(a)  Horizontal  Bombing  Unit  (50  Type  97  Carrier  Attack  Planes). 
Target :  Battleships. 
[602]        Reasoning : 

(1)  It  was  presumed  that  the  American  battleships  could  be  effectively 
Gripped  by  800-kg  armor  piercing  bombs,  dropped  from  an  altitude  of  3,000 
meters  or  more. 

(2)  Horizontal  bombing  is  relatively  inaccurate,  however,  it  was  esti- 
mated that,  with  the  degree  of  training  the  bombing  unit  had,  an  80%  ratio 
of  hits  could  be  expected  against  stationary  battleships  if  formations  of  Ave 
airplanes  were  employed  from  an  altitude  of  3,000  meters  or  more.  Therefore, 
it  was  concluded  that  about  four  battleships  could  be  effectively  crippled 
with  10  formations  of  bombers. 


240       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(S)  Because  of  the  accuracy  of  torpedo  attacks,  we  desired  to  use  as  many 
of  them  as  possible,  however,  both  bombing  attacks  and  torpedo  attacks 
were  used  for  the  following  reasons : 

(a)  If  torpedo  nets  were  layed,  the  attack  would  otherwise  be 
unsuccessful. 

(&)  Launching  torpedoes  into  shallow  water  such  as  that  in 
PEARL  HARBOR  requires  special  techniqua 

(c)  Ordinarily,  ships  were  moored  in  pairs  [60S]  abreast 
each  other.  Consequently,  bombing  attacks  were  the  only  effective 
method  against  the  inside  ships. 

b.  Torpedo  Bombing  Unit  (40  Type  97  Carrier  Attack  Planes). 
Target :  Battleships  and  aircraft  carriers. 

Reasoning : 

Torpedo  bombing  is  very  accurate.  Therefore,  the  pilots  most  skillful  at 
shallow  water  torpedo  bombing  were  selected  and  an  attempt  made  to  put 
as  many  battleships  and  carriers  temporarily  out  of  action  due  to  underwater 
damage  as  the  conditions  previously  related  in  "(c)"  would  permit.  (Be- 
cause the  carriers  were  not  at  their  anchorages  on  the  day  of  the  attack,  the 
airplanes  concentrated  on  the  battleships.) 

c.  Dive  Bombing  Unit  (54  Type  99  Carrier  Bombers). 
Target :  Air  bases. 

15  Attack  Unit  (27  airplanes) — Hangars  and  grounded  airplanes  at  FORD 
Island. 

16  Attack    Unit    (27    airplanes) — Hangars    and    grounded    airplanes    at 
WHEELER. 

Reasoning: 

(1)  Since  the  primary  objective  of  this  attack  was  to  put  the  UNITED 
STATES  PACIFIC  Fleet  [60 i]  temporarily  out  of  action,  the  attack 
was  directed  at  the  battleships  and  carriers.  However,  fighter  plane  bases 
were  attacked  first  because  it  was  necessary  to  prevent  a  counterattack  by 
American  fighter  planes  against  our  main  attack  units — the  horizontal  bomb- 
ing and  torpedo  bombing  units. 

(2)  It  had  been  concluded  that  WHEELER  Field  was  a  UNITED  STATES 
Army  fighter  plane  base  and  that  carrier  planes  from  the  UNITED  STATES 
PACIFIC  Fleet  were  usually  kept  at  FORD  Island. 

d.  Fighter  striking  Unit  (45  Type  Zero  Carrier  Fighters). 
Targets:  Airborne  airplanes,  grounded  airplanes. 

2  Fighter  Striking  Unit— FORD  Island  and  HICKHAM. 

4  Fighter  Striking  Unit— WHEELER  and  BARBERS  POINT. 
6  Fighter  Striking  Unit— KANEOHB. 

Reasoning: 

(1)  At  the  beginning  of  the  attack  the  fighter  striking  unit  was  to  main- 
tain a  single  formation  and  patrol  over  OAHU,  attacking  any  enemy  fighter 
planes  which  got  into  the  air. 

[605]  (2)     If  no  fighter  opposition  were  met  in  the  air,  the  unit  was  to 

split  up  as  indicated  above  and  attack  grounded   airplanes  on  the  varrious 
airfields  on  OAHU,  thereby  preventing  a  counterattack. 
(2)   Second  Attack. 

(a)  Horizontal  Bombing  Unit  (54  Type  97  Carrier  Attack  Planes). 
Target :  Air  bases. 

6  Attack  Unit — Hangars  and  grounded  airplanes  at  HICKHAM. 

5  Attack  Unit— Hangars  and   grounded   airplanes  at  KANEOHE,   FORD 
Island  and  BARBERS  POINT. 

Reasoning : 

By  putting  the  American  airplanes  on  OAHU  temporarily  out  of  action,  a 
counterattack  against  the  Task  Force  could  be  prevented. 

(b)  Dive  Bombing  Unit  (81  Type  99  Carrier  Bombers). 
Target:  Aircraft  carriers  and  cruisers. 

Reasoning : 

[606]  (1)  Although  the  250-kg.  bombs  which  the  airplanes  were  able 
to  carry  could  not  pierce  the  armor  of  the  battleships,  it  was  estimated  that 
they  would  be  effective  against  the  UNITED  STATES  cruisers  and  carriers 
of  that  time. 

(2)  It  was  estimated  that  there  were  then  four  or  five  American  carriers 
operating  in  the  HAWAII  Area.  They  were  the  targets  of  this  dive  bombing 
unit.  (Since  the  aircraft  carriers  were  not  at  their  anchorages  on  the  day  of 
the  attack,  most  of  the  blows  were  directed  against  battleships.) 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  241 

(c)  Fighter  Striking  Unit  (3G  Type  Zero  Fighters). 
Targets :  Airborne  airplanes,  grounded  airplanes. 

2  Fighter  Striking  Unit— FORD  Island  and  HICKHAM. 

4  Fighter  Striking  Unit— WHEELER  and  KANEOHE. 
Reasoning : 

Same  as  stated  previously. 

b.  Explain  the  courses,  and  the  reasoning  therein,  which  the  air  units  followed 
from  the  aircraft  carriers  to  the  targets. 

[607]        Both  the  First  and  Second  Attack  Units  proceeded  directly  from  the 
carriers  at  OAHU.    They  flew  at  an  altitude  of  3,000  meters.    (Dense  clouds  hung 
at  about  2,000  meters  that  day,  so  the  airplanes  flew  above  them.) 
The  positions  of  the  carrier  groups  were  as  follows : 

(1)  The  airplanes  in  the  First  Attack  Unit  took  off  at  0130  hours.  The 
carriers  were  230  nautical  miles  bearing  0°  from  the  western  tip  of  LANA) 
Island. 

(  2)  The  airplanes  in  the  Second  Attack  Unit  took  off  at  0245  hours.     The 
carriers  were  200  nautical  miles  bearing  0°  from  the  western  tip  of  LANAI 
Island, 
[pp  26]         The  movements  of  the  airplanes  after  they  came  in  sight  of  OAHU  is 
shown  in  the  appended  sketch. 

c.  Give  the  times  at  which  each  unit  attacked  its  target. 
First  Attack  Unit : 

Dive  Bombing  Unit— WHEELER  Field— 0325  hours. 

Torpedo  Attack  Unit — Battleships  at  FORD  Island  Anchorage — 0327  hours. 
Horizontal  Bombing  Unit — Same  as  above — 0235  hours. 
Fighter  Striking  Unit — Began  ground  strafing — 0330  hours. 
[60S]         Second  Attack  Unit. 

All  three  units — Dive  Bombing  Unit,  Horizontal  Bombing  Unit  and  Fighter 

Striking  Unit — attacked  their  targets  about  0430  hours.     However,  details 

are  not  available  because  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the  Second  Attack  Unit, 

Lt.  Comdr  SHIMAZAKI,  was  killed  in  combat  in  January  1945. 

(Note:  The  times  at  which  the  attacks  started  have  been  indicated.    Both 

First  Attack  and  the  Second  Attack  continued  for  30  minutes  to  an  hour). 

[pp  27]  d.  What  courses  did  the  airplanes  follow  on  their  flight  back  to  the 
carriers?    Why  were  these  courses  chosen? 

A  rendezvous  was  made  with  the  Fighter  Striking  Unit  20  nautical  miles  bear- 
ing 340°  from  KAENA*  Point.  From  there  all  units  proceeded  directly  back  to 
the  carriers. 

Because  of  the  flying  time  involved,  no  thought  was  given  to  withdrawing  on 
courses  designed  to  deceive  possible  opposition. 

[pp  29]         27.  How  were  midget  submarines  used? 

(Note:  This  reply  is  based  on  the  recollections  of  Rear  Adm  MITO,  Hisashi, 
Chief  of  Staff,  6  Fleet,  at  that  time.) 

a.  Reasons  for  use : 

To  cause  the  greatest  possible  damage  to  the  enemy  through  co-operation  in 
the  assault  by  the  air  forces. 

[609]        b.  How  many  were  used? 

Five. 

c.  Were  they  expected  to  return? 

While  the  probability  that  they  would  be  able  to  return  was  very  small,  it  was 
not  thought  to  be  wholly  impossible.  All  midget  submarine  personnel,  however, 
were  prepared  for  death  and  none  expected  to  return  alive.  (They  were  pre- 
cursors of  the  KAMIKAZE  Attack  Units.) 

d.  Did  any  return? 

None  were  recovered,  though  all  possible  recovering  measures  were  exhausted. 

e.  Give  a  detailed  report  and  criticism  on  the  effectiveness  of  this  weapon, 
[pp  30]         The  submarines  which  were  on  patrol  duty  outside  the  entrance 

to  PEARL  HARBOR  witnessed  a  great  explosion  within  the  harbor  at  1631  hours 
8  December  (2101  hours,  7  December,  HAWAII  time).  A  radio  report  on  the 
success  of  the  attack  was  received  from  one  of  the  midget  submarines  at  1811 
hours  the  same  day  (0041  hours,  8  December,  HAWAII  time). 

It  was  impossible  to  determine  the  total  damage  inflicted  since  there  were 
no  further  detailed  reports.  This  report  did  not  confirm  the  daylight  attack  on 
8  December;  but  it  was  verified  that  the  night  attack  [610]  on  the  same 
day  had  been  carried  out,  and  it  was  inferred  that  great  damage  was  caused  to 
one  or  more  large  war  vessels. 


242       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[pp  31]  28.  Was  this  a  well-elaborated  plan  or  one  developed,  lor  the  emer- 
gency t 

(Note:  This  reply  is  based  on  the  recollections  of  capt.  TOMIOKA,  Sadatoshi, 
Chief  of  Operations  Section,  Naval  General  Staff,  and  of  Comdr  FUCHIDA, 
Mitsuo,  Commanding  Officer  of  AKAGI  Air  Unit  at  that  time.) 

a.  Had  the  UNITED  STATES  made  concessions  would  the  plan  have  been  dis- 
carded or  modified? 

(TOMIOKA)  It  would  have  been  discarded. 

b.  If  the  American  fleet  had  been  at  sea,  how  would  the  plan  have  been 
modified? 

(Replies  by  FUCHIDA:) 

(1)  Had  the  American  fleet  sought  to  intercept  our  Task  Force  or  had 
there  been  a  significant  threat  to  the  attack  as  planned,  we  would  have  coun- 
terattacked. 

(2)  Had  the  American  fleet  left  port  we  would  have  scouted  an  area  of 
about  300  miles  around  OAHU  and  were  prepared  to  attack.  If  the  American 
fleet  could  not  be  located,  we  were  to  withdraw. 

[pp  32]  (Note:  The  following  replies.  Paragraphs  30-38,  are  based  on  the 
recollections  of  Comdr.  FUCHIDA,  Mitsuo,  1611^  Commanding  OfBcer  of 
AKAGI  Air  Unit  at  the  time  of  the  attack.) 

SO.  When  did  the  Task  Force  begin  to  form? 

The  various  forces  were  to  leave  the  several  areas  where  they  might  be  on  or 
about  15  November,  to  proceed  as  single  vessels  or  tn  small  formations  and  to 
rendezvous  in  TANKAPPU-WAN  by  22  November. 

31.  Where  was  the  rendezvoust 
TANKAPPU-WAN. 

32.  When  did  the  Task  Force  get  underway  on  its  tnisslonf 

It  sailed  from  TANKAPPU-WAN  at  0600  hours  26  November. 

S3.  Was  there  any  provision  to  receive  icord  of  a  settlement  while  this  Task 
Force  was  underway  f  What  steps  would  have  ieen  taken  if  a  compromise  had 
been  reached? 

Depending  on  orders,  the  Task  Force  would  have  returned  to  TANKAPPU- 
WAN,  HOKKAIDO,  or  to  MUTSU-KAIWAN. 

SJf.  Did  everything  proceed  according  to  plant 

Yes. 
[pp  33]        35.  If  it  had  not  done  so,  what  changes  or  mishaps  might  have  arisen 
and  ivhyf 

(No  statement.) 

S6.  Was  the  Task  Force  sighted  or  attacked  while  underway? 

No. 

37.  Was  any  shipping,  other  tJian  Japanese,  seen  while  underway? 
[612]        None. 

38.  If  any  such  shipping  had  been  encountered,  what  measures  would  have  been 
taken f 

(No  statement.) 

[613]  [pp.  34]  39.  Why  was  the  air  assault  not  continued,  and  why  was 
it  not  followed  up  by  surface  units  or  by  a  landing? 

(Note:  This  reply  is  based  on  the  recollections  of  Comdr  FUCHIDA,  Mitsuo, 
Commanding  OiRcer  of  AKAGI  Air  Unit  at  the  time  of  the  attack.) 

(1)  The  object  of  this  attack  was  to  destroy  the  capital  strength  of  the 
UNTED  STATES  PACIFIC  Fleet  and  to  delay  any  attack  which  it  might 
make  across  the  PACIFIC.  Hence  this  objective  could  be  accomplished  by 
air  attack  alone.  Furthermore,  since  the  whereabouts  of  the  American 
task  forces  were  unknown,  and  since  the  chances  of  scouting  them  were 
small,  in  face  of  a  possible  counterattack  in  co-operation  with  the  50-odd 
remaining  HAWAII-based  large  airplanes,  the  advantages  of  a  quick  with- 
drawal were  apparent.     Consequently,  no  naval  assault  was  undertaken. 

(2)  No  landing  operation  was  planned  because  it  would  have  been  impos- 
sible to  make  preparations  for  such  a  landing  in  less  than  a  month  after 
the  opening  of  hostilities,  and  because  it  was  recognized  that  the  problems 
of  speed  and  of  supplies  for  an  accompanying  convoy  would  have  made  it 
unlikely  that  the  initial  attack  could  have  been  accomplished  without 
detection. 

[pp  35]  (Note:  The  following  paragraphs,  40,  41  and  42  are  based  on  the 
recollections  and  inquiries  of  Comdr.  FUCHIDA,  [61Jt]  Mitsuo,  Command- 
ing Officer  of  AKAGI  Unit  at  tliat  time.) 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  243 

40.  What  damage  did  the  Japanese  receive? 
In  the  First  Attack: 

Fighter   planes 3 

Dive   bombers .^ — ^ — ,-^ r-    1 

Torpedo  bombers , , . 5 

Total -r ^ —  9 

In  the  Second  Attack: 

Fighter   planes 6 

Dive  bombers 14 

Total . . _20 

Grand  total 29 

41.  What  was  the  estimated  damage  to  American  forces? 

(1)  Naval  vessels: 

Sunk:  4  battleships 

1  cruiser 

2  tankers 

[pp  36]         Heavily  damaged :  4  battleships 
Lightly  damaged:  1  battleship 

(2)  Airplanes 

Shot  down  :  Approximately  10  Airplanes. 

Burned  or  destroyed  on  the  ground:  Approximately  250  airplanes. 
Total:  Approximately  260  airplanes. 
[615]         It  is  impossible  to  determine  how  many  others,  presumably  a  con- 
siderable number  were  destroyed  in  the  hangars. 

42.  How  was  the  damage  inflicted  on  the  Americans  determined? 

(1)  From  reports  of  flight  personnel  upon  their  return. 

(2)  From  studies  of  photographs  taken  by  flight  personnel. 

(Note:  No  reconnaissance  planes  were  used  to  assess  the  results  immediately 
after  the  attack,  but  one  element  of  fighter  planes  was  ordered,  after  com- 
pleting its  mission,  to  fly  as  low  as  possible  to  observe  the  results.) 

[Pp  37]  43.  Were  any  of  the  air,  submarine  or  surface  units  employed 
in  additional  attacks  on  HAWAII  or  in  reconnaissance  immediately  after  the 
main  attack? 

(Note:  The  following  paragraph  is  based  on  the  recollections  of  Comdr 
FUCHIDA,  Mitsuo,  at  that  time  Commanding  Officer  of  AKAGI  Air  Unit,  and 
of  Rear  Adm  MITO,  Hisashi,  Chief  of  Staff,  6  Fleet.) 

Apart  from  reconnaissance  by  submarines  stationed  at  the  mouth  of  PEARL 
HARBOR  on  the  eve  of  the  day  of  the  attack,  none  engaged  in  follow-up 
attacks  or  in  reconnaissance. 

[616]  [Pp38]  (Note:  The  replies  in  paragraphs  45,  46  and  47  are  based 
on  the  recollections  of  Rear  Adm  MITO,  Hisashi,  Chief  of  Staff,  6  Fleet,  at  the  time 
of  the  attack.) 

45.  Were  any  submarines  operating  in  Hawaiian  waters  prior  to  the  attack 
on  PEARL  HARBOR : 

Submarines  were  stationed  on  lookout  duty  in  Hawaiian  waters,  the  day 
before  the  Task  Force  strike,  on  the  evening  of  7  December.  They  were 
ordered  not  to  attack  until  the  Task  Force  strike  was  verified. 

46a.  If  there  were,  where  were  these  submarines  based? 

Most  of  the  submarines  departed  from  JAPAN  for  a  rendezvous  at  KWAJA- 
LEIN,  to  proceed  thence  to  HAWAII.  A  few,  which  were  delayed  in  leaving 
JAPAN,  changed  course  and  proceeded  directly  to  HAWAII. 

b.  What  were  their  operation  orders? 

The  orders  given  to  the  submarines  were  as  follows :  Part  were  to  proceed 
with  the  Task  Force,  screening  it  as  it  proceeded  toward  HAWAII;  the  ma- 
jority of  the  submarines  were  to  take  up  lookout  stations  in  Hawaiian  waters 
by  the  evening  of  [pp  39]  7  December,  while  the  midget  submarines 
were  to  scout  and  reconnoiter  a  possible  attack  by  the  enemy  fleet  as  well  as 
strike  into  PEARL  HARBOR. 

At  the  same  time,  they  were  given  strict  [617]  orders  not  to  attack  until 
the  Task  Force  strike  had  been  verified. 

c.  Were  reports  made  during  and  after  the  attack? 


244       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

When  the  Task  Force  and  the  midget  submarine  strikes  were  completed,  the 
midget  submarines  reported  as  follows: 

(1)  Report  of  the  attack  as  observed  by  a  midget  submarine  on  the  night 
of  December  8. 

(2)  A  midget  submarine  radioed  the  same  night  "Surprise  attack 
succeds". 

(3)  A  report  on  the  departure  of  midget  submarmies  and  that  it  was 
impossible  to  recover  their  personnel  though  all  recovery  measures  had  been 
tried. 

d.  What  damage  was  sustained  by  the  submarines? 

One  submarine  was  detected  and  depth-charged  by  patrol  vessels  near  the 
entrance  [pp.  40]  to  PEARL  HARBOR.  Though  it  ran  afoul  of  the 
antisubmarine  net,  it  extricated  itself,  after  some  damage,  and  returned  safely. 
Apart  from  this  case  there  was  one  other  submarine  lost  off  PEARL  HARBOR; 
the  time  and  place  of  its  sinking  are  unknown. 

47.  How  long  did  the  submarines  remain  in  Hawaiian  waters? 

The  submarines  continued  operations  in  the  vicinity  of  HAWAII  from 
8  December,  the  day  of  the  [618]  attack,  until  early  January  of  the  fol- 
lowing year.  During  this  time,  most  of  the  submarines  proceeded  to  the  west 
coast  of  the  UNITED  STATES  to  destroy  shipping,  and  part  of  the  submarines 
returned  to  JAPAN.  Only  a  small  number  remained  in  the  Hawaiian  area  for  the 
maximum  length  of  time. 

[619]  General  Headquaetees 

SUPBEME  Commanded  of  the  Allied  Powers 

AG  350.05  (26  Oct  45)  GB.  26  October  1945. 

Subject:  Additional  data  with  reference  to  Japanese  Attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 
To :  Chief  of  Staff,  War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 
(Attn:  A.  C.  of  S.,  C-2) 

1.  Compliance  with  your  radios  WX  73711,  War  Sec,  7  Octoljer  1945,  and  WX 
75561.  14  October  1945,  requesting  certain  information  to  be  obtained  from  the 
Japanese  with  respect  to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  on  7  December  1941,  the 
attached  documents,  Inclosures  Nos.  1.  2,  3,  and  5.  are  foi-warded  in  amplifica- 
tion of  preliminary  report  contained  in  our  radio  CAX  53287,  13  October  1945. 

2.  Investigation  is  being  continued  through  the  Liaison  Committee  (Tokyo) 
for  the  Imperial  Japanese  Army  and  Navy.  A  copy  of  a  questionnaire  which 
has  been  furnislied  the  Liaison  Committe  in  order  to  guide  their  effoi'ts  into 
the  most  productive  channels  and  to  insure  the  most  complete  coverage  pos- 
sible is  attached  hereto  as  Inclosure  No.  4.  A  further  report  will  be  submitted 
as  soon   as  answers  to  the  questionnaires  are  received  and  translated. 

Foe  the  supeeme  commandee: 

/s/     H.  W.  Allen. 

Colonel.  A.  G.  D. 
Ass't  Adiutant  Oenerul. 
[620]        5  incls : 

Incl  1 — Report,  Liaison  Committee,  8  Oct  45. 
Incl  2 — Report,  Liaison  Committee,  10  Oct  45. 
Incl  3 — Report,  Liaison  Committee,  11  Oct  45. 
Incl  4 — Questionnaire  to  Liaison  Committee. 
Incl  5 — Map,  routes  of  Jap  Fleet. 

[621]        Liaison  Committee  (Tokto)  fob  Tsm  Impeeial  Japanese  Aemt  and 

Navy 

8  October  19^5. 
N.  D.  No.  108 
To :  Colonel  F.  P.  Munson,  USA. 

Gr-2,  GHQ  of  the  Supreme  Commander  for  the  Allied  Powers. 
We  forward  herewith  a  general  survey  concerning  the  attack  on  Hawaii  which 
has  been  hastily  prepared  in  accordance  with  your  oral  instruction  to  Com- 
mander Yamaguchi,  I.  J.  N.  of  the  Liaison  Committee  (Tokyo)  for  the  Imperial 
Japanese  Army  and  Navy,  1,000  hours  8  October  1945. 

K.  Nakamuba, 
Rear  Admiral,  I.  J.  N., 
Representing  the  I.  J.  Minister  of  the  Navy. 
(Incl.  #1) 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  245 

1622]  General  Survey  of  the  Attack  on  Hawaii  Prepared  in  Accordance  with 
Oral  Instructions  by  Col.  Muuson  to  Commander  Yamagiichi  of  the  Liaison 
Committee  for  the  Imperial  Army  and  Navy. 

I.  Operation  Orders 

A)  Orders  of  the  Imperial  General  Headquarters 

(1)  Imperial  Naval  Order 

(a)    (Issued  1  December) 

Japan,  under  the  necessity  of  her  self-preservation  and 
self-defense,  has  reached  a  decision  to  declare  war  on  the 
United  States  of  America,  British  Empire  and  the  Nether- 
lands.    Time  to  start  an  action  will  be  given  later. 

(2)  The  Instruction  by  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  General  staff  under 
the  Authority  delegated  to  him  by  the  Imperial  Naval  Order. 
(Later  abridged:  Naval  General  Staff  Instruction). 

(a)    (Issued  1  December) 

The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Combined  Fleet  shaU, 
at  the  start  of  war,  direct  his  attack  on  the  enemy  fleet 
in  the  Hawaiian  Area  to  reduce  it  to  impotency,  using  the 
First  Air  Fleet  as  the  nucleus  of  the  attack  force. 

(3)  Imperial  Naval  Order 

(a)    (Issued  2  December) 

[623]  The  hostile  actions  against  the  United  States  of 
America,  the  British  Empire  and  the  Netherlands  shall  be 
commenced  on  December  8. 

(4)  Naval  General  Staff  Instruction 

(a)    (Issued  2  December) 

Bear  in  mind  that,  should  it  appear  certain  that  the  Jap- 
anese-American negotiations  will  reach  an  amicable  settle- 
ment prior  to  the  commencement  of  hostile  action,  all  the 
forces  of  the  Combined  Fleet  are  to  be  ordered  to  reassemble 
and  return  to  their  bases. 

B)  Orders  of  the  Headquarters  of  the  Headquarters  of  the  Combined  Fleet 
and  other  Headquarters. 

The  subject  matters  are  being  investigated  through  memners  connected  with 
the  said  forces  of  that  period. 

II.  Means  used  to  gain  intelligence  from  Hawaii  and  other  sources. 

(1)  Reports  of  Naval  Attache  in  Washington  D.  C.      (Announce- 
ments by  American  Authorities  and  Press  reports  were  the  sole  source.) 

(2)  Hearings   of   ships   which  called   at   Hawaiian  ports   in   mid- 
November. 

(3)  Through  submarines  on  reconnaissance  duty  in  Hawaiian  waters 
immediately  preceding  the  outbreak  of  war. 

[62Ii]         (4)  Radio  Broadcasts  from  Hawaii. 

III.  Organization  of  Attacking  Force 
First  Air  Squadron  (Akagi  and  Kaga) 
Second  Air  Squadron  (Soryu  and  Iliryu) 
Fifth  Air  Squadron  (Shokaku  and  Zuikaku 
Third  Squadron  (Kongo  and  Hiei) 
Eighth  Squadron  (Tone  and  Chikuma) 

First  Destroyer  Squadron   (Abukuma,  6th  Destroyer  Division,  17th  De- 
stroyer Division,  21st  Destroyer  Division  and  27th  Destroyer  Division.) 
Supply  Force  (8  Transports) 
Submarine  Force  (2  Submarines) 

IV.  Movement  of  Attacking  Force  (See  attached  Map) 
v.  Estimated  Damage  inflicted  on  American  Navy. 

Sunk — 2  Battleships  (West  Virginia  and  Oklahoma),  1  Destroyer,  1  Trans- 
port. 
Seriously  Damaged — 4  Battleships,  4  Heavy  Cruisers. 

Aircraft  shot  down  or  burned — over  350 
VI.  Losses  of  Japanese  Navy 

Failed  to  Return — 27  aircrafts. 
N.  B.  As  this  report  hastily  prepared  based  on  the  combined  memory  of  those 
who  were  connected  with  the  event,  certain  corrections  will  be  expected  to  be 
made. 


246       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[625]        Liaison  Committee   (Tokyo)  fob  the  Imperial  Japanese  Abmt  and 

Navy 

10  October  1945. 
N.  D.  No.  123. 

To:  Asst.  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  General  Headquarters  of  the  Supi'eme  Commander 

for  the  Allied  Puvvers. 
Re:  N.  D.  No.  1U8,  8  October  1945. 
Subject:  Additions  to  the  Auswers  already  given  to  the  questions  regarding  the 

Attack  on  Hawaii, 

1.  Additional  operational  orders: 

(a)  Units  of  the  attaekiug  forces  assembled  in  Hitokappu  Bay  (Etorofu-jima), 
by  order  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Couibined  Fleet. 

N.  ii. — About  14  November  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Combined  Fleet  is- 
sued tiie  above  order  because  he  recognised  Hitokappu  Bay  as  the  most  suitable 
place  for  enabling  the  attacking  force  to  meet  any  new  development  in  the  situa- 
tion, as'well  as  to  keep  its  location  and  movements  secret. 

(b)  The  attacking  forces  left  Hitokappu  Bay  by  order  of  the  Imperial  General 
Headquarters. 

N.  B. — Around  21  November  the  situation  had  seemed  to  be  appronching  to  a 
stage  where  conmiencement  [626]  of  hostilities  would  be  inevitable.  The 
Navy  Section  of  the  Imperial  General  Headquarters,  therefore,  issued  the  follow- 
ing order  (Imperial  Niival  Order)  to  the  I'onminncler-in-Cliief  of  the  Combined 
Fleet:  'The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Combined  Fleet  shall  order  necessary 
forces  to  advance  to  the  area  in  which  they  are  to  wait  in  readiness  and  shall 
station  them  in  such  positions  that,  in  the  event  of  the  situation  becoming  such 
that  commencement  of  hostilities  be  inevitable,  they  will  be  able  to  meet  such 
situation  promptly." 

But  as  the  Japanese  Government  had  sent  Ambassador  Kurusu  to  the  United 
States  by  that  time  and  was  doing  its  utmost  to  bring  the  Japanese-American 
negotiations  to  an  amicable  settlement,  an  in.struction  had  already  been  issued 
by  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff  to  the  effect  that  the  attacking  forces 
were  to  return  and  re-assemble  in  the  event  of  the  negotiations  with  the  United 
States  proving  successful. 

2.  Inforuuition  rega riling  the  departure  from  Hitokappu  Bay  of  the  force,  of 
which  tlie  luicleus  was  the  First  Air  Squadron,  was  given  to  no  one  outside  of 
the  Japanese  Navy. 

Even  within  the  Navy,  the  only  ones  who  knew  of  the  above  fact  were  in 
addition  to  the  attiicking  force  itself,  tiie  leading  ofBoers  of  the  Navy  Section  of 
the  ImperiQl  General  Staff  and  of  the  Combined  Fleet  Headquarters  and  [627] 
a  certain  restricted  number  of  officers  intimately  concerned  with  the  fleet 
opera  ti()n. 

3.  "Radio  broadcasts  from  Hawaii"  which  we  have  mentioned  as  one  source 
of  information  were  the  broadcasts  made  to  the  general  public. 

K.  Nakamura, 
Rear  Admiral,  I.  J.  N., 
Representing  the  I.  J.  Minister  of  the  Navy. 

[628]        Liaison  Committee  (Tokyo)  for  the  Imperial  Japanese  Army  and 

Navy 

11  October  1945. 
N.  D.  No.  130. 

To:  The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2  General  Headquarters  of  the  Supreme 
Coumiander  for  the  Allied  Powers. 

In  compliance  with  your  letter  delivered  on  11  October,  we  forward  hereby  our 
report  as  follows: 

1.  Order  to  the  attacking  force  to  assemble  at  Hitokappu  Bay. 

The  following  oider  was  issued  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Combined 
Fleet  on  7  November : 

"The  Task  Force,  keeping  its  movement  strictly  secret,  shall  assemble  in  Hito- 
kappu I5ay  by  '-'2  November  for  re-fueling". 

2.  Order  giving  the  details  of  the  mission  of  the  attacking  forces. 

The  following  order  was  issued  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Combined 
Fleet  on  25  November: 

(a)  "The  Task  Force,  keeping  its  movement  strictly  secret  and  maintaining 
close  guard  against  submarines  and        [629]        aircraft,  shall  advance  into 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  247 

Hawaiian  waters,  and  upon  the  very  opening  of  hostilities  shall  attack  the  main 
force  of  the  U.  S.  Fleet  in  Hawaii  a|ul  deal  it  a  mortal  blow.  Tlie  tirst  air-raid  is 
planned  for  the  dawn  of  X  day  (exact  date  to  be  given  l\v  Inter  order). 

"Upon  completion  of  the  air-raid,  the  Tasli  Force,  l^eepiiig  close  co-onlination 
and  guarding  against  the  enemy's  counter-attack,  shall  speedily  leave  the  enemy 
waters  and  then  return  to  Japan".  .  ,    ., 

(b)  "Should  the  negotiations  with  the  United  States  prove  successful,  the 
Task  Force  shall  hold  itself  in  readiness  forthwith  to  return  and  re-assemble". 

3  Order  directing  the  attacking  force  to  proceed  on  its  mission: 

The  following  order  was  issued  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Combined 
Fleet  on  25  November :  .     ,    „,  ,-,.x  , 

"The  Task  Force,  keeping  its  movement  strictly  secret,  shall  leave  Hitokappu 
Bay  on  the  morning  of  2G  November  and  advance  to  42°  N  170°  E  (standing-by 
position)  on  the  afternoon  of  3  December  and  speedily  complete  refuelling". 

4  Exact  time  when  the  attack  on  Hawaii  was  decided  upon, 

(a)  Bv  way  of  preparation  for  the  opening  of  hostilities,  the  plan  of  naval 
operations  against  the  [630]  United  States.  Great  Britain  and  Netherlands 
(including  the  plan  for  the  attack  on  I'earl  Harbor)  was  adopted  on  5  November. 

(b)  Commencement  of  hostilities  was  decided  upon  Ijy  Cabinet  Council  on  1 
December. 

(c)  On  2  December  the  Imperial  General  Headquarters  issued  an  order  that 
hostile  action  was  to  be  opened  on  8  December. 

5.  The  following  agencies  of  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  were  con- 
cerned in  the  discussions  and  decisions  to  execute  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor: 

The  Navy  Section  of  the  Imperial  General  Headquarters  and  the  Headquarters 
of  the  Combined  Fleet. 

N  B.— Since  this  report  is  based  on  the  combined  memory  of  those  who  were 
connected  with  the  matter,  it  is  possible  that  some  revisions  may  have  to  be  made 
as  a  result  of  further  investigation. 

K.  Nakamt-ba 
Jicnr  Admiral.  JJN, 
Representing  the  I.  J.  Minister  of  the  Navy. 


16X11  Qttestionnaibe 

^"^^  n  October  1,5. 

To  be  answered  completely.  Answers  to  he  substantiated  by  copies  of  all 
plans,  orders,  maps,  photos,  reports,  and  other  otticial  documents  available. 
In  case  a  question  is  answered  from  memory,  so  state,  giving  name,  rank,  and 
official  position.  ^      ,  „     u     « 

1.  Who  first  thought  of  or  proposed  a  surprise  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor? 
(Give  names  or  agencies,  e.  g.  Admiral ,  General  Stuff,  Naval 

General  Staff,  War  Ministry,  etc.) 

2.  When?  .^,  ^  ^  „^- 
(Give  date  or  approximate  date  as  accurately  as  possible,  e.  g.  August  1!)40, 

Spring  of  1941.  year  1022— any  time  such  a  proposal  firxt  was  considered  either 
for  actual  use  or  in  strategic  planning,  study,  or  discussion.) 

3.  Was  this  maneuver  or  any  similar  maneuver  included  in  pre-war  Japanese 
plans  for  possible  use  in  event  of  war  with  U.  S. ? 

4.  If  so.  describe  it  as  given  in  these  pre-war  plans. 

(State  obiectives,  forces  to  be  employed,  routes  of  approach,  what  you  expected 
to  accomplish,  etc.) 

5.  When  was  the  decision  made  to  actually  attack  Pearl  Harbor. 

(Give  dates  as  accurately  as  posdsible,  e.  g.  1  September  [<>52]  1941, 
Spring  of  1041.)  ^   ^      ,,.   , 

6.  Who  made  this  decision?  (e.  g.  War  Ministry,  Chief  of  Staff,  War  Minis- 
try, or  some  combination  of  persons  or  agencies.) 

7.  If  this  decision  was  made  in  a  conference  give  date  (or  approximate 
date)  of  that  conference  and  the  names  of  all  known  persons  attending. 

8.  What    factors   were   considered    in    arriving    at    this    decision? 

(e.  g.  Desire  to  cripple  Pacific  Fleet  so  as  to  gain  freedom  of  action  against 
P.  I.?:  b'^stroy  U.  S.  main  Pacific  base?;  Gain  time  for  P.  I.  campaign?  Protect 
mandated  islands?  or  what?  (incl  #4) 

9.  Who  worked  up  the  details  of  the  plan  as  it  was  actually  executed? 

(e.  g.  Planning  Section,  General  Staff?  Naval  Staff?  Individuals?)  Note: 
When  I  say  Plan.  I  differentiate  between  plana  or  staff  studies  and  the  actual 
orders  issued  to  put  the  plan  in  effect. 


248       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

10.  When  did  this  work  begin? 

11.  When  the  plan  was  completed  who  finally  approved  it? 

12.  When  was  the  plan  finally  approved? 

13.  What  persons  and  agencies  knew  about  this  plan? 

(e.  g.  the  Emperor,  the  War  Ministry,  the  Central  Staff,         [633]        the  Naval 

Staff,  the  Cabinet,  The  consul  at  Honolulu,  Military  Attaches  to 

The  Ambassador  at  Washington,  Kurusu,  etc.)  Note:  Names  of  individ- 
uals and  agencies  are  both  desired — for  example,  the  Cabinet  as  a  whole  might 
not  have  been  informed  but  the  War  Minister  would.  Also,  state  persons  who 
had  partial  knowledge,  e.  g.  the  Emperor  might  have  known  you  planned  to 
attack  but  not  without  declaring  war,  etc. 

14.  What  sources  furnished  information  on  what  the  plan  was  based?  Give 
names,  rank  and  positions. 

(e.  g.  Military  attaches,  Consuls,  Japanese  Civilian  resident  of  Honolulu, 
Broadcasts,  New  articles). 

15.  What  features  of  information  were  obtained  from  each  of  the  above- 
listed  sources? 

16.  How  and  by  whom  was  the  detailed  information  plotted  on  the  maps 
carried  by  your  aviator^  obtained? 

(e.  g.  Accurately  plotted  and  named  ship  berths,  barracks,  azimuths  on 
which  to  approach,  etc.). 

17.  How  was  this  information  checked  while  the  Task  Force  was  en  route? 

18.  What  part  did  local  agents  in  Hawaii  play? 

[634]  19.  Were  any  photographs  taken  by  the  above  persons  of  fleet  units 
In  the  harbor? 

20.  If  so.  when  (particularly  the  date  of  the  last  taken). 

21.  Give  complete  details  of  how  the  plan  was  developed. 

Discuss : 

a.  Obstacles  considered  and  how  they  were  overcome. 

b.  Partial  decisions  made  and  by  whom. 

c.  How  were  the  commanders  and  particular  units  to    (Both  fleet 
units  and  air  units)  selected? 

d.  Why  was  the  route  you  selected  chosen? 

e.  What  provision  was  made  against  discovery  en  route? 

f.  What  action  was  to  be  taken  if  discovered? 

g.  What  deceptive  measures  to  draw  U.  S.  attention  elsewhere  were  em- 
ployed ? 

h.  What  action  was  to  be  taken  if  the  attack  failed? 

22.  How  was  the  date  of  Dpceniber  7  selected  and  for  what  reasons? 

23.  How  was  the  time  of  attack  selected?     For  what  reasons? 

24.  Give  detailed  composition  of  Task  Force  (Naval  Vessels  and  Air  Units). 

25.  Were  any  of  these  Fleet  Units  or  Air  Units  to  be  detached  at  any  time 
during  the  operation,  e.  g.  to  attack  secondary  targets? 

26.  Give  scheme  of  maneuver  for  air  attack. 
Include: 

[635]        Number  and  type  of  planes  assigned  to  attack  each  target.   Why? 
Routes  of  groups  of  planes  from  carrier  to  target.    Why? 
Time  each  group  was  to  strike  its  target. 
Route fs)  of  escape  after  attack?  Why  was  this  route  (these  routes)  selected? 

27.  Discuss  use  of  midget-submarines. 

(Why  used,  number  used,  whether  you  expected  any  back,  did  you  get  any 
back,  any  other  details,  conclusions  as  to  usefulness  of  this  weapon). 

[636]  28.  Was  the  plan  in  any  way  tentative  or  contingent.  If  so,  give  de- 
tails: (e.  g.  If  the  U.  S.  had  made  some  concessions  was  it  to  be  abandoned  or 
changed?  If  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  had  put  to  sea  what  changes  would  have 
been  made?) 

29.  Furnish  a  copy  of  each  of  the  following: 

a.  The  Plan  for  the  Pearl  Harbor  Operation. 

b.  Any  Staff  Studies  or  other  subsidiary  documents  thereto. 

c.  The  Order  (with  all  amendments  thereto)  that  put  the  plan  in  effect. 
Note :  If  any  document  is  not  available  give  all  details  of  it  you  can  from 

memory  if  necessary.     (Items  furnished  from  memory  will  be  so  marked.) 

30.  When  did  you  begin  assembling  the  Task  Force? 

31.  Where  did  it  assemble? 

32.  When  did  it  move  out  on  its  mission? 

33.  Had  an  amicable  settlement  appeared  likely  or  been  agreed  upon  while 
the  Task  Force  was  en  route  what  action  was  then  to  be  taken. 


^". 


J      A  r'  P  1    »        8 


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or  434  oll^aa  t«  tb«  inoh 
a',  tha  Sciuator 

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yOR  IHt  iUFBIAL  JAPABSK  AIKr  AMD  NAVT  " 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  249 

34.  Did  everything  go  as  planned? 

35.  If  not,  wiiat  changes  or  mishaps  occurred  and  why? 

36.  Was  the  tasli  force  ever  discovered  and/or  attacked  while  en  route? 
1637]        37.  Were  any  non-Japanese  vessels  sighted  en  route? 

38.  If  so,  what  was  done  about  them? 

39.  Why  did  you  not  follow  up  the  air  attack  with  a  surface  attack?  With  a 
landing? 

40.  List  your  losses. 

41.  List  estimated  U.  S.  Losses. 

42.  From  what  sources  did  you  determine  U.  S.  losses? 

43.  Did  you  launch  any  additional  raids  or  make  any  reconnaissance  against 
Hawaii  by  either  air,  submarine,  or  surface  vessels  immediately  following  the 
attack. 

( e.  g.  night  after  attack,  following  day,  etc. ) 

44.  If  any  questions  remain  unanswered,  state  exact  reason  in  each  case. 

(e.  g,  "All  copies  of  order  burned  on  surrender",  "ads. who  is 

only  person  who  knew  this  was  killed  on  (date)."). 

45.  Did  you  have  any  submarines  operating  in  the  Hawaiian  area  prior  to  the 
attack  on  Pearl  Harbor? 

46.  If  so,  where  were  these  submarines  based,  what  were  their  operation  in- 
structions, what  reports  did  they  render  during  and  after  the  attack,  and  were 
there  any  casualties  among  these  submarines? 

47.  If  submarines  were  used,  how  long  did  they  remain  in  Hawaiian  area? 

48.  What  information  pertaining  to  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack  was  received  from 
Japanese  merchant  vessels  before  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor? 

[639]  Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  in  connection  with 
the  story  of  the  Jap  attack  I  have  been  awaiting  an  opportunity  to 
take  a  few  minutes  to  read  into  the  record  certain  of  these  so-called 
diplomatic  intercepts  that  were  picked  up  and  decoded. 

The  Congressman  from  California  has  already  referred  to  some, 
I  think,  which  are  pertinent  but  he  only  gave  extracts  from  the  Judge 
Advocate  General's  report. 

Mr.  Geaehart.  It  was  the  Judge  Advocate  General's  summary, 
not  mine. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes.  And  I  think  there  are  many  obscure  state- 
ments in  these  diplomatic  decoded  messages  which  you  cannot  under- 
stand except  by  paralleling  them  with  the  movements  of  the  Japanese 
attacking  force,  and  with  the  permission  of  the  committee — I  have 
just  a  few  pages — I  would  like  to  put  into  the  record  at  this  point* 
these  portions  so  as  to  connect  them  up  with  the  story. 

The  first  one  is  on  page  96  of  our  exhibit  1,  which  contains  all  of 
these  messages.  It  is  from  Tokyo  to  Washington.  That  means  their 
ambassador  at  Washington.  It  is  their  number  727.  It  is  dated 
November  4,  1941  [reading]  : 

Proposal  "B" : 

This  proposal  is  based  upon  proposal  "A".  If  there  appears  to  be  a  remark- 
able difference  between  the  Japanese  and  American  views,  since  the  situation 
does  not  permit  of  delays,  it  will  be  necessary  to  put  for-  [GJfO]  ward  some 
substitute  plan.  Therefoi-e,  our  second  formula  is  advanced  with  the  idea  of 
making  a  last  effort  to  prevent  something  happening.  The  substance  is  as 
follows : 

Then  I  will  omit  certain  portions  which  are  not  pertinent  right  at 
this  moment  and  it  follows  [reading] : 

The  Governments  of  Japan  and  the  United  States  will  mutually  return— 

this  is  part  of  his  proposal  to  the  United  States — 

mutually  return  to  the  situation  prior  to  the  freezing  of  their  respective  assets 
and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  will  agree  to  furnish  Japan  with  the 
petroleum  she  needs. 


250       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Turning  over  on  page  98,  if  the  committee  wants  to  follow  me  on 
this,  of  Exhibit  1,  we  have  another  message,  No.  731,  Tokyo  to  Wash- 
ington, November  4,  li)41  [reading] : 

In  tiiese  negotiations,  Great  Britain  also  is  an  actively  interested  party  and 
has  vast  interests  in  the  Far  East.  Therefore,  in  order  to  carry  out  this  pro- 
posal (both  Proposal  A  and  Proposal  B),  it  would  certainly  behoove  Great  Brit- 
ain and,  for  that  matter,  the  Netherlands  also  as  interested  parties,  to  put  into 
effect  the  terms  of  the  understanding  in  question.  If  we  should  proceed  without 
any  definite  assurances  on  this  point  and  reached  an  accord  with  Washington 
alone,  it  might  very  well  be  that  it  would  never  work. 

[G41]  Consequently,  1  want  jou  please  to  impress  upon  the  American  ofla- 
cials  the  importance  of  this  essential  measure  and  have  them  agree  to  make 
Great  Britain  and  the  Netherlands  both  simultaneously  sign  those  tenns  in 
which  they  are  concerned.    Please  wire  me  the  results. 

Then  follows  another  message  from  Tokyo  to  Washington  on  the 
same  page,  dated  November  5,  1941  [reading] : 

If  and  when  an  agreement  is  reached  on  the  basis  of  our  latest  proposal  we 
would  prefer  that  it  not  be  written  up  in  the  form  of  a  treaty.  Ratihcation  of 
the  Senate  is  required  for  a  treaty,  and  we  fear  th:it  too  much  time  would  be 
consumed  obtaining  this.  From  the  viewpoint  of  speed  and  certainty,  we  would 
like  to  avoid  having  to  follow  this  course.  From  the  gist  of  the  U.  S.  proposals, 
we  fee!  tiiat  the  U.  S.  Government  is  also  desirous  of  not  having  to  await  Senate 
ratitication. 

We  have  been  led  to  believe  that  it  is  the  U.  S.  Government's  intention  to  use 
this  instrument  as  a  basis  for  some  future  treaty,  and  tliat  it  would  be  classified 
as  one  type  of  an  "Executive  Agreement"  as  the  President  is  authorized  to  do. 
We  have  been  proceeding  in  the  past  on  this  assumption.  Will  you  please 
ascertain  the  U.  S.  attitude  on  this  point? 

In  any  event,  it  is  of  utmost  importance  that  an  agreement  be  entered  into 
along  the  lines  given  in  the  loV/iJ  message  referred  to  in  the  heading  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment.  Under  present  conditions,  speed  is  an  absolute  essen- 
tial factor. 

Then  on  page  99,  a  message  from  Tokj'o  to  Washington  dated  No- 
vember 5,  1941.  The  hrst  two  paragraphs  I  will  not  read  at  present. 
The  third  [reading]  : 

If  the  United  States  expresses  too  many  points  of  disapproval  to  Proposal  A 
and  if  it  becomes  apparent  that  an  agreement  cannot  be  reached,  we  intend  to 
submit  our  absolutely  tiual  proposal.  Proposal  B.  Please,  therefore,  ascertain 
the  U.  S.  attitude  to  Proposal  A  as  soon  as  possible,  and  advise  this  office.  Be 
sure  to  advise  this  office  before  Proposal  B  is  submitted  to  the  United  States. 

As  stated  in  my  previous  message,  this  is  the  Imperial  Government's  tinal  step. 
Time  is  becoming  exceedingly  short  and  the  situation  very  critical.  Absolutely 
no  delays  can  be  permitted.  Please  bear  this  in  mind  and  do  your  best.  I  wish 
to  stress  this  point  over  and  over. 

We  wish  to  avoid  giving  them  the  impression  that  there  is  a  time  limit  or  that 
this  proposal  is  to  be  taken  as  an  ultimatum.  In  a  friendly  manner,  show  them 
that  we  are  very  anxious  to  have  them  accept  our  proposal. 

[043]  On  page  100,  from  Tokyo  to  Washington,  a  message  of 
November  5,  1941.     That  is  numbered  736.     [Reading] : 

Because  of  various  circumstances,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  all  arrange- 
ments for  the  signing  of  tliis  agreement  be  comi)]eted  by  the  25th  of  this  month- 
I  realize  that  this  is  a  difficult  order,  but  under  the  circumstances  it  is  an  unavoid- 
able one.  Please  understand  this  thorougiily  and  tackle  the  problem  of  saving 
the  Japanese-U.  S.  relations  from  falling  into  a  chaotic  condition.  Do  so  with 
great  determination  and  with  unstinted  effort,  I  beg  of  you. 

On  page  116  of  Exhibit  1,  Tokyo  to  Washington,  November  11, 1941 
[reading] : 

Judging  from  the  progress  of  the 


PROCEEDINGS  OP  JOINT  COMMITTEE  251 

The  Chairman.  When  you  say  "from  Tolcyo  to  Washington,"  do  you 
mean  from  the  Japanese  Government  to  their  Ambassador  in  Wash- 
ington ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes.     [Eeading]  : 

Judging  from  the  progress  of  the  conversations,  there  seem  to  be  indications 
that  the  United  Stiites  is  still  not  fully  a\\  are  uf  the  exceedingly  criticalness  of  the 
situation  here.     The  fact  remains  that  the  date  set  forth  iu  my  message  #736. — 

that  is  on  the  25th — 

Is  absolutely  immovable  under  present  conditions.  It  is  a  definite  dead-line  and 
therefore  it  is  essential  [<>Ji'i]  that  n  settlement  be  reached  by  about  that 
time.  The  session  of  Parliament  opens  on  the  15th  according  to  the  schedule. 
The  government  must  have  a  clear  pictui-e  of  things  to  come,  in  presenting  its  case 
at  the  session.  You  can  see.  therefore,  that  the  situation  is  nearing  a  climax, 
and  that  time  is  indeed  becoming  short. 

I  appreciate  the  fact  that  you  are  making  strenuous  efforts,  but  in  view  of  the 
above  mentioned  situation,  will  you  redouble  them.  When  talking  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  and  others,  drive  the  points  home  to  them.  Do  everything  in  your 
power  to  get  a  clear  picture  of  the  U.  S.  attitude  in  the  minimum  amount  of  time. 
At  the  same  time  do  everything  in  your  power  to  have  them  give  their  speedy 
approval  to  our  final  proposal. 

Page  122  of  Exhibit  1.  I  only  have  two  or  three  of  these.  This  is 
from  Washington,  from  Ambassador  Nomura  to  Tokyo,  under  date 
of  November  12,  1941.    [Reading] : 

Departmental  secret. 

Continuing  he  said.  ".Japan  does  not  like  to  exercise  force — not  by  any  means. 
If  we  could  get  petroleum  and  other  raw  materials  from  the  United  States  and 
the  Netherlands  Indies,  we  would  not  have  to  use  force,  would  we?  Then,  when 
we  come  to  the  question  of  non-discrimination  in  commerce,  1  don't  think  that 
[6^5]         the  United  States  will  have  any  objection  to  our  proposal." 

Page  137  of  Exhibit  1.  This  is  from  Tokyo  to  Washington,  Novem- 
ber 16,  1941.    [Reading]: 

For  your  Honor's  own  information. 

I  have  read  your  #1000  and  you  may  be  sure  that  you  have  all  my  gratitude 
for  the  efforts  you  have  put  forth,  hut  the  fate  of  our  Empire  hangs  by  the  slender 
thread  of  a  few  days,  so  please  fiirht  harder  than  you  ever  did  before. 

What  you  say  in  the  last  paragraph  of  your  message  is,  of  course,  so  and  I 
have  given  it  already  the  fullest  consiuerntion.  but  I  have  only  to  refer  you  to  the 
fundamental  policy  laid  down  in  my  #725.  Will  you  please  try  to  realize  what 
that  means. 

That  is  the  one  fixing  the  25th  as  the  dead  line. 

In  your  opinion,  we  ought  to  wait  and  see  what  turn  the  war  takes  and  remain 
patient.  However,  I  am  awfully  sorry  to  say  that  the  situation  renders  this  out 
of  the  question.  I  set  the  dead  line  for  the  solution  of  these  negotiations  in  my 
#736  and  there  will  be  no  change.  Please  try  to  understand  that.  You  see  bow 
short  the  time  is;  therefore,  do  not  allow  the  United  States  to  sidetrack  us  and 
delay  the  negotiations  any  further.  Press  them  for  a  solution  on  the  basis  of 
our  proposals,  1646]  and  do  your  best  to  bring  about  an  immediate 
solution. 

Page  165  of  Exhibit  1 

Mr.  Kektt3.  Mr.  Chairiiiitu,  may  T  inquire?  I  understand  counsel 
is  now  reading  for  the  purpose  of  the  record,  certainly,  these  code 
cablegrams,  the.se  decoded  cablegrams  that  are  printed  at  length  in  an 
exhibit  already  in  evidence. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  They  are  already  in  evidence,  but  my  point  about 
them  was  that  you  cannot  understand  the  hidden  suggestions  in  here, 
particularly  the  ones  I  am  about  to  read,  unless  you  parallel  it  with 
the  story  of  the  Japanese  movements  and  planning  for  the  Japanese 


252       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

attack.  That  is  the  reason  I  am  putting  them  in  now,  sir,  in  order  to 
make  the  comparison  for  the  committee,  so  they  can  form  their  own 
judgment  about  it. 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  see. 

Mr.  IMiTCHELL.  Page  165,  from  Tokyo  to  Washington,  dated  Novem- 
ber 22,  1941.    [Reading]  : 

To  both  you  Ambassadors. 

It  is  awfully  hard  for  us  to  consider  changing  the  date  we  set  in  my  #736.  You 
should  know  this,  however,  I  know  you  are  working  hard.  Stick  to  our  fixed 
policy  and  do  your  very  best.  There  are  reasons  beyond  your  ability  to  guess 
why  we  wanted  to  settle  Japanese-American  relations  by  the  25th,  but  if  within 
the  next  thi'ee  or  four  days  you  can  finish  your  conversations  witli  the  Americans; 
if  the  signing  can  be  completed  by  the  29th,  (let  me  write  it  out  [647]  for 
you — twenty  ninth)  ;  if  the  pertinent  notes  can  be  exchanges;  if  we  can  get  an 
understanding  with  Great  Britain  and  the  Netherlands ;  and  in  short  if  every- 
thing can  be  finished,  we  have  decided  to  wait  until  that  date.  This  time  we 
mean  it,  that  the  dead  line  absolutely  cannot  be  changed.  After  that  things  are 
automatically  going  to  happen.  Please  take  this  into  your  careful  considera- 
tion and  work  harder  than  you  ever  have  before.  This,  for  the  present,  is  for 
the  information  of  you  two  Ambassadors  alone. 

Now,  there  is  just  one  more.  It  is  a  message  from  Tokyo  to  Wash- 
ington, dated  November  24,  for  both  Ambassadors. 

The  time  limit  set  in  my  message  of  812 — 

that  is  the  one  I  have  just  read — 

is  Tokyo  time  29th. 

Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  will  you  call  Admiral  Richardson? 

Senator  Lucas.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  counsel  one  question? 

The  Chairman.  The  Senator  from  Illinois. 

Senator  Lucas.  You  have  read  to  us  decoded  messages,  continu- 
ously referring  to  Japanese  No.  736.  Now,  I  presume  that  that  736, 
of  course,  is  in  that  exhibit? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  read  that.  It  is  a  message  from  Tokyo  to  Wash- 
ington dated  November  5,  stating  that  because  of  various  circum- 
stances it  is  absolutely  essential  and  necessary  that  all  arrangements 
for  the  signing  of  this  agreement  be  coniDleted  [64S]  by  the 
25th. 

Senator  Lucas.  Yes.  Well,  now,  I  was  going  to  follow  that  up  with 
whether  or  not  the  agreement  that  they  discuss  in  these  messages  is 
now  a  part  of  the  record  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  the  terms  that  they  proposed  to  our  Govern- 
ment. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  is  what  I  mean. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  There  never  was  any  yielding  to  them. 

Senator  Lucas.  Of  course,  I  was  wrong  in  using  the  word  "agree- 
ment." I  meant  to  inquire  whether  or  not  the  terms  proposed  by  the 
Japanese  Government,  upon  which  they  based  these  messages,  are  a 
part  of  the  record  and  even  so  I  think  it  would  be  apropos  at  this 
time  to  include  them  at  the  end  of  the  messages  that  counsel  read. 

_Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  I  will  say  this.  The  terms  that  they  trans- 
mitted to  their  ambassadors  to  "^be  submitted  to  our  Government, 
about  doing  away  with  the  freezing  and  furnishing  them  oil  and 
things  of  that  kind  are  in  other  intercepted  messages  in  this  very 
same  exhibit  1,  but  there  will  be  evidence  introduced,  after  Admiral 
Richardson,  from  the  State  Department,  giving  the  full  story  of  the 
negotiations  and  just  what  proposals  they  made. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  253 

Senator  Lucas.  All  right.  My  only  thoug^ht  was  that  if  it  would 
come  in  at  this  particular  point  it  would  clarify  the  record. 

[649]         The  Chairman.  We  can  hold  that  up  until  later. 

Senator  Lucas.  Very  well,  then,  I  withdrew  the  request. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  was  just  referring  to  some  vague  happenings  and 
things  that  would  happen  and  the  reason  for  the  deadline. 

The  Chairtnian.  All  right,  General,  call  the  next  witness. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral  Richardson. 

The  Chairman.  Admiral,  will  you  be  sworn  ? 

TESTIMONY  OF  ADMIRAL  JAMES  OTTO  EICHAEDSON  UNITED 
STATES  NAVY  (EETIRED) 

(The  witness  was  sworn  by  the  chairman.) 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral,  please  state  your  full  name. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Admiral  James  Otto  Richardson. 

Mr,  Mitchell.  Admiral  Richardson,  how  long  did  you  serve  in  the 
United  States  Navy? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  entered  the  Naval  Academy  in  September 
1898 ;  graduated  in  1902._ 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Wliat  is  your  present  rank  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Admiral,  United  States  Navy,  retired. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  were  giving  us- 


Admiral  Richardson.  Oh,  would  you  like  for  me  to  give  you 


Mr.  Mitchell.  No.  During  your  Navy  service  have  you  spent 
[650']  some  of  your  duty  time  in  Asiatic  areas  and  Pacific  areas? 
Would  you  give  us  a  brief  review  of  your  Asiatic  experience? 

Admiral  Richardson.  If  it  meets  the  wishes  of  the  counsel  to  the 
committee,  I  will  give  a  brief  summary  of  my  service  record  using 
my  own  judgment  to  select  those  items  which  might  be  of  interest 
to  the  matter  under  investigation. 

In  1902,  in  accordance  with  my  request,  I  was  ordered  to  the 
Asiatic  station  where  I  remained  until  1905.  During  that  time  I 
served  1  year  in  the  southern  Philippines.  The  remainder  of  the 
time  I  was  on  the  China  coast  and  in  Japan. 

It  so  happened  that  I  arrived  in  Yokohama  in  time  to  see  the 
Russian  Minister  depart  immediately  preceding  the  beginning  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  War.  I  was  in  Yokohama  when  that  war  was 
initiated  by  the  surprise  attack  of  the  Japanese  on  the  Russian  Fleet 
at  Port  Arthur  and  the  Russian  ship  at  Chemulpo. 

I  remained  in  Japan  for  approximately  3  months.  I  returned  to 
Japan  again  in  time  to  be  in  Tokyo  when  the  Japanese  Government 
received  the  first  news  on  the  battle  of  Tsuschima  which  in  effect 
closed  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 

I  went  to  the  China  station  again  in  1922,  where  I  remained  until 
1924.  During  that  time  I  served  on  the  China  coast  and  the  last 
year  I  was  in  command  of  the  south  China  patrol.  I  was  in  Amoy 
when  the  first  news  of  the  earthquake  [SSI]  on  the  1st  of  Sep- 
tember 1923  occurred. 

From  1924  until  1931  I  performed  various  duties  in  Washington, 
at  the  Naval  Academy,  and  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  In  1931  I  placed 
the  U.  S.  S.  Augusta  in  commission  and  she  served  as  flagship  for 
the  scouting  force  then  in  the  Atlantic  and  proceeded  to  the  Pacific 
when  practically  all  of  our  combatant  ships  were  concentrated  in  the 
Pacific. 

79716— 46— pt.  1 19 


254       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEAEL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

I  was  detached  in  1933  and  was  a  student  at  the  Naval  War  College 
for  1  year. 

From  1934  to  1935  I  was  budget  officer  of  the  Navy  Department. 
From  1935  to  1936  I  served  for  a  short  period  in  command  of  Cruiser 
Division  6  and  then  chief  of  staff  to  the  commander  in  chief,  United 
States  Fleet. 

From  1936  to  1937  I  commanded  the  destroyers  of  the  scouting 
force.  From  1937  to  1938  I  was  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions, during  which  period  the  China  incident  started  and  during 
which  period  the  attack  on  the  Panay  occurred. 

From  1938  to  1939  I  was  the  Chief  of  what  was  then  called  the 
Bureau  of  Navigation,  now  known  as  the  Bureau  of  Naval  Personnel. 

From  1939,  the  summer,  until  1940  I  was  commander  of  the  battle 
force.  From  1940  to  1941  I  was  commander  in  chief  of  the  United 
States  Fleet.  At  that  time  the  United  States  [_652]  Fleet  com- 
prised all  combatant  ships  in  commission  that  were  not  assigned  to  the 
Asiatic  Fleet  or  not  operating  directly  under  the  Chief  of  Naval  Op- 
erations. 

I  reported  for  duty  as  commander  of  battle  force  on  June  24,  1939. 
On  January  6,  1940,  I  relieved  Admiral  Claude  C.  Bloch  as  com- 
mander in  chief  of  United  States  Fleet.  On  the  5th  of  January  1941 
I  received  a  secret  dispatch  in  a  code  held  only  by  the  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations  and  myself  informing  me  that  I  would  be  detached  on 
the  1st  of  February. 

On  February  1,  1941, 1  was  relieved  by  Admiral  Husband  E.  Kim- 
mel.  At  that  time  the  fleet  was  reorganized,  and  Admiral  Kimmel 
became  commander  in  chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  and  another  officer 
became  commander  in  chief  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet. 

I  departed  from  Honolulu  on  February  14,  1941,  and  on  March  25, 
1941, 1  reported  for  duty  as  a  member  of  the  General  Board. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  At  that  time  when  you  were  commander  of  the 
United  States  Fleet  was  there  a  separate  command  known  as  the 
commander  of  the  Pacific  Fleet? 

Admiral  Richardson.  There  was  not. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Who  was  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  while  you  were 
chief  in  command  of  the  United  States  Fleet? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Admiral  Harold  R.  Stark,  who  was  my 
[_65S']         immediate  superior. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  you  were  at  that  time  commander  of  the 
United  States  Fleet  at  what  Pacific  city  or  was  it  on  the  Pacific  side 
or  the  Atlantic  side  that  you  went  to? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Wlien  I  assumed  command  of  the  United 
States  Fleet  there  was  a  portion  of  the  fleet  serving  in  the  Atlantic. 
There  was  a  detachment  of  the  United  States  Fleet  serving  in  the 
Hawaiian  area,  known  as  the  Hawaiian  detachment,  which  was  com- 
posed of  heavy  cruisers  and  destroyers,  and,  if  my  memory  serves  me 
correctly,  one  aircraft  carrier.  The  Hawaiian  detachment  was  under 
the  command  of  Vice  Adm.  Adolphus  Andrews,  who  was  also  com- 
mander of  the  scouting  force. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  were  you  located  on  the  Pacific  coast? 

Admiral  Richardson.  All  the  fleet  in  the  Pacific  assigned  to  the 
United  States  Fleet,  that  did  not  form  a  part  of  the  Hawaiian  detach- 
ment, was  based  at  San  Diego  and  San  Pedro,  Long  Beach. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  255 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  that  is  where  you  made  your  headquarters 
then? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  actually  assumed  command  of  the  fleet  in 
the  harbor  of  San  Pedro,  Long  Beach,  and  I  remained  there  until 
approximately  the  1st  of  April,  when  the  fleet  departed  for  their 
annual  fleet  exercises. 

[064]        Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  your  flagship  at  that  time? 

Admiral  Richakdson.  The  U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  say  the  Pacific  Fleet  that  you  were  in  command 
of  out  there  that  was  not  included  in  tliese  other  detachments,  that 
was  based  on  the  Pacific  coast,  was  ordered  out  to  maneuvers  in  the 
spring  of  1940  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  had  been  the  custom  for  many  years  to 
have  annual  fleet  exercises,  including  fleet  problems  and  other  exer- 
cises under  simulated  war  conditions,  where  all  available  ships  and 
aircraft  were  employed  in  training. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  were  the  base  ports  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  at  that 
time  other  than  the  Hawaiian  detachment  and  the  Asiatic  vessels  you 
spoke  of  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  each  ship  had  a  home  port. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Generally  speaking,  I  mean  what  were  the  principal 
points? 

Admiral  Richardson.  They  were  based  practically  all  the  time  at 
San  Pedro  and  Long  Beach  but  the  ships  periodically  proceeded  to 
Bremerton  and  to  San  Francisco  for  overhaul,  and  normal  operations 
in  training  and  gunnery  exercises  were  otf  the  coast  of  southern 
California. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Wlien  the  fleet  vessels  under  your  command  made 
that  movement  in  the  spring  of  1940,  to  what  area  did  they  proceed  ? 

[055]  Admiral  Richardson.  Tiiey  proceeded  to  sea  divided  into 
two  task  forces  representing  opposing  fleets  and  conducted  a  war  game 
and  various  exercises  and  tiien  united  with  the  Hawaiian  detachment 
and  proceeded  to  the  Hawaiian  area,  arriving  there  on  the — I  actually 
arrived  at  Lahaina  Roads  at  1500  on  April  10. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  you  had  been  ordered  to  move  out  into 
Hawaiian  waters  after  these  exercises,  or  had  you 

Admiral  Richardson.  Each  year  the  fleet  exercises  were  held  in  a 
different  part  of  the  world,  a  different  part  of  the  ocean,  to  familiarize 
the  officers  with  the  weather  conditions  and  the  terrain  and  everything 
else  that  it  was  necessary  to  know  and  before  I  became  commander  in 
chief  the  plans  for  this  exercise  had  already  been  drawn  up  and 
approved  and  I  carried  out  exercises  which  were  planned  by  my 
predecessor.  j 

When  I  arrived  in  Pearl  Harbor  according  to  the  published  plan 
the  fleet,  with  the  exception  of  the  Hawaiian  detachment,  was  to 
depart  from  the  Hawaiian  area  on  the  9th  of  May — no,  the  9th  of 
April.    Wait  a  minute,  let  me  see.    No,  the  9th  of  May. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  is  1940? 

Admiral  Richardson.  1940. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  What  was  the  date? 

[650]         Admiral  Richardson.  The  9th  of  May  1940. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  you  say,  do  you 

Admiral  Richardson.  From  the  Hawaiian  area  the  return  would 
normally  have  been  to  the  Pacific  coast. 


256       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  point  is  that  when  you  went  to  Hawaiian  waters 
at  that  time  you  expected  that  that  would  be  a  temporary  arrangement 
and  that  you  would  shortly  return  to  the  Pacific  coast? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  was  an  arrangement  the  schedule  for 
which  had  been  prepared  and  approved  and  was  known  to  all  the 
officers  and  men  in  the  fleet. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  you  understood  it  was  temporary  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Oh,  yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes.  Now,  we  have  a  file  of  correspondence  that 
includes  some  letters  between  you  and  Admiral  Stark,  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations,  running  from  January  1940  to  January  1941.  You  have 
examined  that  file  and  have  a  copy  of  it  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  sir.  You  have  supplied  me  with  a  copy 
of  that  file. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  At  this  point  I  would  like  to  offer  in  evidence  as 
Exhibit  9  the  file  of  correspondence  that  I  have  just  referred  to,  of 
which  each  member  of  the  committee  has  a  copy. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  ''Exhibit  No.  9.") 

[067]  Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  just  so  that  I  will  be  able 
to  follow  the  questioner,  is  there  any  way  of  telling  how  many  parts 
there  are  in  particular  in  Exhibit  9  ?  I  have  seen  several  groups  of 
papers. 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  think.  Congressman,  that  there  are  really  basically 
two  parts ;  the  letters  called  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson  are  mimeo- 
graphed and  the  letters  of  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark  are 
the  ones  you  have  there  in  your  hand ;  they  are  photostatic  copies. 

Senator  Brewster:  Does  this  purport  to  be  a  complete  record  of 
their  correspondence  in  that  period? 

Mr.  Gesell.  No,  it  does  not. 

Senator  Brewster.  How  were  the  eliminations  made  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  there  are  a  great  many  personal  letters.  I 
think  these  letters  were  chosen  because  they  relate  to  the  reasons  for 
the  fleet  going  out  there  and  the  objections  that  Admiral  Richardson 
later  developed  as  to  their  staying  there.  That  was,  really,  what  I 
think  they  are  mostly  pertinent  to. 

Senator  Brewster.  Has  your  staff  been  over  the  complete  file  to 
select  those  which  they  consider  pertinent  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  These  letters  were  furnished  us  both  by  Admiral 
Stark  and  his  counsel  and  by  Admiral  Richardson.  I  won't  say  that 
I  have  seen  every  letter  that  passed  between  them  [658]  dur- 
ing that  period. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  has  counsel  or  have  any  of  the 
counsel  staff  seen  all  of  the  letters  ? 

Mr.  Gesell.  We  have  seen  all  the  letters  that  we  have  been  able  to 
read. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  do  you  mean  that  you  have  been  able 
to  read? 

Mr.  Gesell.  Just  exactly  that,  Senator,  the  ones  we  have  been  able 
to  find.  This  correspondence  is  personal  correspondence  and  we  asked 
counsel  for  Admiral  Stark  to  submit  to  us  all  of  the  letters  that  he 
had  exchanged  with  Admiral  Richardson  and  counsel  submitted  us 
a  file  which  they  stated  was  the  complete  file  of  correspondence  which 
they  had. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  257 

We  have  also  had  searches  made  in  the  Navy  Department  for  any 
correspondence  between  these  two  officers. 

Admiral  Stark  and  his  counsel  have  reviewed  the  selection  of  the 
letters  made  here  and  we  have  also  shown  the  file  to  Admiral  Richard- 
son and  he  has  double  checked  the  selections,  so  that  we  have  taken 
such  precautions  as  we  can  to  assure  that  the  correspondence  is  repre- 
sentative of  the  topics  that  the  documents  were  selected  for  and  have 
done  everything  we  can  to  make  sure  that  we  have  obtained  any  letters 
that  we  can  find. 

[659]         Senator  Ferguson.  Are  you  through  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson-.  Mr.  Chairman,  on  page  14-0  there  seems  to  be 
no  beginning  to  that  letter.     Can  that  be  explained  ? 

Mr.  Gesell.  That  is  a  last  sheet  which  came  in  there  by  error  and 
connects  to  another  letter  which  is  not  offered  in  evidence. 

Senator  FERGUSOisr.  You  have  the  other  letter? 

Mr.  Gesell.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  have,  for  submission  to  the  committee, 
the  other  letters? 

Mr.  Gesell.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  many  letters  will  that  be? 

Mr.  Gesell.  A  small  number.  I  have  not  counted  them.  You  are 
welcome  to  see  them.  Many  of  them  are  personal  letters  that  do 
not  seem  to  us  to  be  germane. 

Senator  Lucas.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  make  one  suggestion? 

As  these  exhibits  go  into  this  record  it  seems  to  me,  in  order  for 
anyone  to  clearly  understand  the  letters  and  the  answers  thereto,  the 
letters  should  go  in,  and  then  they  should  be  followed  by  the  answers. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  mine  arranged  that  way. 

Senator  Lucas.  The  exhibits  that  were  given  to  us  were  not  ar- 
ranged that  way. 

[660]  Mr.  Mitchell.  I  know  it,  so  I  tore  mine  down  and  put 
them  in  chronological  order. 

The  letters  I  have  here  are  letters  that  seem  to  me  to  be  pertinent  to 
the  inquiry  that  I  was  going  to  make  of  Admiral  Richardson  here.  If 
there  are  any  more  of  those  letters  that  you  want  to  see  I  will  get 
them  for  you. 

Admiral  Richardson.  May  I  make  a  statement,  Mr.  Chairman,  in 
regard  to  this  correspondence? 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  go  ahead,  Admiral. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Wlien  I  relieved  Admiral  Bloch  as  com- 
mander in  chief  of  the  United  States  Fleet  I  found  that  quite  a  little 
official  business  had  been  conducted  in  personal  correspondence,  so 
that  when  I  relieved  Admiral  Bloch  it  was  necessary  for  me  to  write 
to  Admiral  Stark  for  information  which  I  needed.  I  did  not  want 
that  to  occur  when  I  was  relieved,  so  before  I  was  relieved  I  gave  my 
file  of  personal  letters  to  my  relief. 

The  Chairman.  To  whom? 

Admiral  Richardson.  To  the  officer  who  relieved  me. 

The  Chairman.  Oh,  yes. 

Mr.  Gesell.  Admiral  Kimmel. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Admiral  Kimmel,  with  the  request  that  he  and 
his  prospective  chief  of  staff  look  over  the  file  of  letters  and  indicate 
those  that  they  felt  would  be  useful        [661]        in  the  conduct  of  the 


258       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

affairs  of  the  fleet,  and  I  would  retain  them  and  deliver  them  to  Ad- 
miral Kimmel.  The  majority  of  the  other  letters  were  destroyed  by  me 
because  I  was  unwilling  to  take  away  and  have  in  my  custody  letters 
that  referred  to  fleet  business,  §o  that  I  could  not  supply  counsel  with 
my  file  of  letters.  I  have  been  able  to  secure  some  copies  from  the 
Department  and  from  various  sources,  so  that  my  supply  of  letters, 
which  will  be  essential  to  refresh  my  memory  on  many  of  these  points, 
would  not  have  been  made  available  to  me  except  through  the  counsel. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Just  a  minute,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  understood  you  to  say.  Admiral,  those  letters  that  were  not  being 
desirable  by  your  relief  you  destroyed. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did.  A  few  found  their  way  into  my 
papers  when  my  efl'ects  were  packed  up,  so  I  did  have  a  few,  but  by 
no  means  a  complete  file. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  go  ahead. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  now,  Admiral,  I  have  here  a  letter  dated 
March  15, 1940. 

Admiral  Richardson.  March  what? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  March  15, 1940,  addressed  to  "Dear  J.  O."  and  signed 
"Betty".     Who  is  "J.  O."? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  am  J.  O. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Who  is  "Betty"? 

[06£]         Admiral  Richardson.  Admiral  H.  R.  Stark. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Is  that  the  way  you  usually  addressed  each  other 
in  this  personal  correspondence? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  was. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  notice  in  the  letter  of  March  15,  1940  on  page  2 
there  is  a  paragraph  that  reads  as  follows : 

I  still  think  that  the  decision  to  send  the  detachment  to  Hawaii  under  present 
world  conditions  is  sound.  No  one  can  measure  how  much  effect  its  presence 
there  may  have  on  the  Orange  foreign  policy. 

Wliat  did  the  word  "orange"  stand  for  in  naval  parlance?    Was  it 
Japan? 
Admiral  Richardson.  Japan. 
Mr.  Mitchell  (reading)  : 

The  State  Department  is  strong  for  the  present  set-up  and  considers  It  bene- 
ficial ;  they  were  in  on  all  discussions,  press  releases,  etc. 

That  is  a  letter  from  Admiral  Stark  to  you  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  and  that  was  in  reply  to  my  letter  to 
him  asking  about  why  the  Hawaiian  detachment  was  there,  and  I 
would  like  to  invite  your  attention  to  the  second  paragraph  in  that 
letter  of  March  15, 1940. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  you  went  there  you  expected  to  come  back 
soon  and  then  you  found  you  were  not  ordered  back;  that  is  right, 
isn't  it? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  you  wanted  to  know  why  you  were  kept  out 
there  ? 

[Od-S]        Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  this  correspondence  started,  and  you  asked 
Admiral  Stark  why  you  were  there,  and  this  reference  I  just  made  is 
to  that  discussion,  is  it? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No;  I  think  not.    It  is  March  15,  is  it  not? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  259 

Admiral  Eichardson.  I  was  not  out  there.  This  15th  of  March 
letter  relates  to  the  presence  in  the  Hawaiian  area  of  the  Hawaiian 
detachment 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  see. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Which  had  proceeded  to  the  Hawaiian  area 
in  the  fall  preceding. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  right.  Then  we  pass  on  to  the  letter  of  May 
7,  1940,  by  Admiral  Stark  to  you,  and  I  find  that  contains  this  state- 
ment: 

When  the  fleet  returns  to  the  Coast  (and  I  trust  the  delay  will  not  be  over  two 
weeks,  but  I  cannot  tell)  the  President  has  asked  that  the  fleet  schedule  be  so 
arranged  that  on  extremely  short  notice  the  fleet  be  able  to  return  concentrated  to 
Hawaiian  waters.  This  will  present  somewhat  of  a  [GGJ/]  problem  in  lug- 
ging around  more  oil  with  you  perhaps  than  usual  and  keeping  more  provisions  on 
board,  because  if  action  is  wauled  it  will  be  wanted  quickly.  As  far  as  I  can  see, 
your  proposed  schedule  meets  this  requirement,  and  unless  you  hear  to  the  con- 
trary, you  may  assume  it  is  O.  K. 

That  is  on  May  7,  1940,  and  up  to  that  time  you  expected  to  come 
back  in  the  course  of  2  weeks  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No — oh,  yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  thought  it  was  possible. 

[665]  Mr.  Mitchell.  We  have  here  a  letter  of  May  22  that  is 
written  by  you  to  Admiral  Stark,  May  22,  1940,  in  which  you  write 
him: 

As  you  no  doubt  'well  appreciate,  I  now  must  plan  the  Fleet  schedule,  and 
employment  for  the  next  few  months.  To  do  this  intelligently,  however,  it  is 
necessary  to  know  more  than  I  know  now  about  why  we  are  here  and  how  long  we 
will  probably  stay.  I  realize  that  the  answer  to  the  second  question  is  largely 
depeudent  upon  the  first,  and  probably  also  upon  further  developments,  but  none- 
theless I  should  have  something  to  go  on. 

For  Instance,  carrying  out  even  a  curtailed  gunnery  schedule  will  require  whole- 
sale movements  of  targets,  tugs,  utility  planes,  etc.,  from  the  Coast.  The  following 
are  pertinent  questions : 

(a)  Are  we  here  primarily  to  influence  the  actions  of  other  nations  by  our  pres- 
ence, and  if  so,  what  effect  would  the  carrying  out  of  normal  training  (insofar  as 
we  can  under  the  limitations  on  anchorages,  airfields,  facilities  and  services)  have 
on  this  purpose?  Tiie  effect  of  the  emergency  docking  program  and  the  consequent 
absence  of  task  forces  during  the  training  period  must  also  be  considered. 

(b)  Are  we  here  as  a  stepping-off  phice  for  belligerent  activity?  If  so,  we 
should  devote  all  of  our  [JJGG]  time  and  energies  to  preparing  for  war. 
This  could  more  effectively  and  expeditiously  be  accomplished  by  an  immediate 
return  to  the  West  Coast,  with  "freezing"  of  personnel,  fliling  up  complements, 
docking,  and  all  the  rest  of  it.    We  could  return  here  upon  completidn. 

As  it  is  now,  to  try  and  do  both  (a)  and  (b)  from  here  and  at  the  same  time  is 
a  diversiflcation  of  effort  and  purpose  that  can  only  result  in  the  accomplishment 
of  neither. 

If  we  are  here  to  develop  this  area  as  a  peacetime  operating  base,  consideration 
should  be  given  to  the  certain  decrease  in  the  efliciency  of  the  Fleet  and  the  lower- 
ing of  morale  that  may  ensue,  due  to  inadequate  anchorages,  airfields,  facilities, 
services,  recreation  conditions,  for  so  large  a  fleet.  If  only  peacetime  training 
is  involved,  should  the  Bureau  of  Navigation  and  I  not  be  advised  so  we  may 
remove  restrictions  on  oflicer  details? 

Now,  with  that  statement  before  you,  will  you  state  to  the  committee 
just  what  your  situation  had  been  up  to  that  time,  and  how  you  hap- 
pened to  write  that  letter? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  a  fleet  composed  of  a  large  number  of 
ships  and  men  and  planes  must  secure  careful  planning,  in  order  that 
time  not  be  wasted  and  that  something  be  accomplished.  When  the 
fleet  went  to  the  Hawaiian  area  as  a  part  of  the  fleet  exercises,  we  had 


260       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

a  definite  schedule  of  gunnery  exercises,  steaming  competitions,  full 
power  [067]  drives,  inspections,  and  everything  else  that  is 
required  to  keep  a  fleet  busy,  and  keep  them  under  training. 

When  the  fleet  went  to  the  Hawaiian  area  we  did  not  take  with  us 
tugs,  targets,  target  rafts,  target  planes,  towing  planes,  repair  ships ; 
so  that  if  the  fleet  was  to  remain  m  the  Hawaiian  area,  in  order  that 
it  could  be  usefully  employed,  it  was  essential  that  I  know  that  we 
remain  there  long  enough  to  bring  out  all  of  the  gear  that  was  neces- 
sary for  training  the  ship,  for  fear  that  I  would  start  all  this  material 
to  Hawaii  and  then,  after  it  once  started  and  got  halfway  there  I  would 
return,  and  then  have  to  wait  for  several  weeks  for  it  to  get  back  to 
the  normal  bases  on  the  west  coast,  so  I  could  continue  training. 

So  that,  from  my  point  of  view,  my  efl'ectiveness  in  the  fleet  and 
continued  training  in  the  fleet  demanded  an  early  decision,  so  that  plans 
could  be  made. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  did  you  first  learn,  and  how,  that  the  decision 
had  been  made  here  in  Washington  to  base  your  fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor 
instead  of  on  the  Pacific  coast  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  first  notice  that  I  received  was  a  dispatch 
from  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  the  commander  in  chief.  United 
States  Fleet,  May  4,  which  reads 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  is  the  date  of  it  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  May  4. 

[668]         Mr.  Gearhart.  1940  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  May  4, 1940. 

It  looks  probable  but  not  final  that  Fleet  will  remain  Hawaiian  waters  for 
short  time  after  May  9.  Will  expect  to  apprise  you  further  Monday  or  Tuesday 
next. 

The  4th  of  May  was  Saturday.  On  the  7th  of  May  I  received  from 
the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  addressed  to  CINCUS— CINCUS 
was  the  abbreviation  for  commander  in  chief  United  States  Fleet — 

CINCUS  make  immediate  press  release  instructions  as  follows : 

"I   request  permission  to  remain   in   Hawaiian  waters   to   accomplish   some 

things  I  wanted  to  do  while  here.     The  Department  has  approved  this  request." 
Delay  Fleet  departure  Hawaiian  area  is  for  about  two  weeks  prior  to  the  end 

of  which  time  you  will  be  further  advised  regarding  future  movements.     Carry 

out  regular  scheduled  overhauls  of  individual  units,  movements  of  base  force 

units  at  your  discretion. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  issue  the  press  release  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  had  not  requested  or  asked  to  be  left  out  there, 
had  you  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  had  not. 

Mr.  KJEETE.  I  am  having  difficulty,  Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  [669] 
the  answer  but  I  did  not  get  your  full  question. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  probably  did  not  have  my  nose  in  the  microphone 
again.  My  question  was  whether  he  had  given  the  press  release,  and  he 
said  he  did,  and  I  asked  him  if  he  had  asked  to  be  kept  out  there  at 
Hawaii,  and  he  said  "No." 

Mr.  Kepte.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  refer  now  to  a  letter  of  May  27,  1940,  which  was 
written  by  Admiral  Stark  to  you  in  response  to  the  letter  of  May  22 
that  I  just  read  from,  and  in  which  you  wanted  to  know  about  what 
you  were  supposed  to  do,  and  he  said,  among  other  things : 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  261 

Yours  of  the  22nd  just  received.  I  shall  endeavor  to  answer  it  paragraph  by 
paragraph. 

First,  however,  I  would  like  to  say  that  I  know  exactly  what  you  are  up  against, 
and  to  tell  you  that  here  in  the  Department  we  are  up  against  the  same  thing. 

Why  are  you  in  the  Hawaiian  area? 

Answer:  You  are  there  because  of  the  deterrent  effect  which  it  is  thought 
your  presence  may  have  on  the  Japs  going  into  the  East  Indies.  In  previous  letters 
I  have  hooked  this  up  with  the  Italians  going  into  the  war.  The  connection  is 
that  with  Italy  in,  it  is  thought  the  Japs  might  feel  just  that  much  freer  to  take 
independent  action. 

[670J  We  believe  both  the  Germans  and  the  Italians  have  told  the  Japs  that 
so  far  as  they  are  concerned,  she,  Japan  has  a  free  hand  in  the  Dutch  East  Indies. 

Then  later  in  the  letter : 

Along  the  same  line  as  the  first  question  presented,  you  would  naturally  ask — 
suppose  the  Japs  do  go  into  the  East  Indies?  What  are  we  going  to  do  about  it? 
My  answer  to  that  is,  I  don't  know,  and  I  think  there  is  nobody  on  God's  green 
earth  who  can  tell  you.  I  do  know  my  own  arguments  with  regard  to  this, 
both  in  the  White  House  and  in  the  State  Department,  are  in  line  with  the 
thought  contained  in  your  i-ecent  letter. 

I  would  point  out  one  thing,  and  that  is  even  if  the  decision  here  were  for 
the  U.  S.  to  take  no  decisive  action  if  the  Japs  should  decide  to  go  into  the 
Dutch  East  Indies,  we  must  not  breathe  it  to  a  soul,  as  by  so  doing  we  would 
completely  nullify  the  reason  for  your  presence  in  the  Hawaiian  area.  Just 
remember  that  the  Japs  don't  know  what  we  are  going  to  do,  and  so  long  as 
they  don't  know,  they  may  hesitate  or  be  deterred.  These  facts  I  have  kept 
very  secret  here. 

The  above,  I  think  will  answer  the  question  "why  you  are  there."  It  does 
not  answer,  the  question  as  to  how  long  you  will  probably  stay.  Rest  assured 
that  the  minute  I  get  [671]  this  information  I  will  rush  it  to  you.  Nobody 
can  answer  it  just  now.  Like  you,  I  have  asked  the  question  and  also — like  you — 
I  have  been  unable  to  get  the  answer. 

I  realize  what  you  are  up  against  in  even  a  curtailed  gunnery  schedule.  I 
may  say  that  so  far  as  the  Department  is  concerned,  you  are  at  liberty  to  play 
with  the  gunnery  schedule  in  any  way  you  see  fit,  eliminating  some  practices 
for  the  time  being  and  substituting  others  which  you  may  consider  important, 
and  which  you  have  the  means  at  hand  to  accomplish.  Specifically,  if  you  want 
to  cut  short  range  battle  practice  and  proceed  with  long  range  practices,  or 
division  practices  or  experimental  or  anything  else,  including  anti-air,  etc.,  etc., 
which  you  think  will  be  to  the  advantage  of  the  Fleet  in  its  present  uncertain 
status — go  ahead.    Just  keep  us  informed. 

Later  on,  he  says : 

You  ask  whether  you  are  there  as  a  stepping-off  place  for  belligerent  activity! 

Answer:  Obviously  it  might  become  so  under  certain  conditions,  but  a  definite 
answer  cannot  be  given  as  you  have  already  gathered  from  the  foregoing. 

I  realize  what  you  say  about  the  advantages  of  returning  to  the  West  Coast 
for  the  purpose  of  preparation  at  this  time  is  out  of  the  question.  If  you  did 
return,  it  might  nullify  [672]  the  reasons  for  your  being  in  Hawaii.  This 
very  question  has  been  brought  up  here.  As  a  compromise,  however,  you  have 
authority  for  returning  ships  to  the  Coast  for  docking,  taking  ammunition,  stores, 
etc.,  and  this  should  help  in  any  case. 

He  says  later : 

You  were  not  detained  in  Hawaii  to  develop  the  area  as  a  peacetime  operating 
base,  but  this  will  naturally  flow  to  a  considerable  extent  from  what  you  are 
up  against. 

As  to  the  decrease  in  the  efficiency  of  the  Fleet  and  the  lowering  of  morale  due 
to  inadequate  anchorages,  airfields,  service,  recreation  conditions,  for  so  large  a 
fleet: 

I  wish  I  could  help  you.  I  spent  some  of  my  first  years  out  of  the  Naval 
Academy  in  the  West  Indies. 

Now,  that  brings  to  our  minds  the  question  of  your  attitude  about 
the  basing  of  the  fleet,  and  I  call  your  attention  to  a  letter  you  wrote 
to  Admiral  Stark — before  we  get  to  that,  I  have  a  letter  here  of  June 
22j  Stark  to  Richardson. 


262       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Keete.  Is  that  contained  in  this  file  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  am  not  so  sure.     It  is  a  loose  sheet. 

Mr.  Gesell.  It  was  sent  to  you  subsequently,  Congressman  Keefe. 
There  were  additional  letters  discovered  after  the  [673]  first 
mimeographing,  and  they  were  sent  to  the  members  of  the  committee, 
and  they  did  not  come  in  the  same  attachment  as  the  others. 

The  Chairman.  Tliey  were  put  in  a  folder  marked  "Additional 
Letters  Between  Stark  and  Kichardson." 

Mr.  Keete.  All  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  am  sorry  we  did  not  have  them  all  together  at  the 
start. 

This  letter  is  from  Stark  to  Kichardson,  June  22 ; 

Your  trip  to  Washington  was  held  in  abeyance  because  of  uncertainty  as  to 
the  movement  of  the  Fleet  in  the  immediate  future.  Tentatively,  decision  has 
been  made  for  the  Fleet  to  remain  for  the  present  where  it  is. 

Is  that  about  the  first- 


Admiral  Richardson.  What  letter  is  that? 

Mr.  ISIiTCHELL.  June  22,  1940.  Maybe  the  Admiral  hasn't  got  a 
copy  of  it. 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  will  get  him  one. 

[674]         Admiral  Eichardson.  I  have  my  letter. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  sir.  There  is  one  from  you  dated  June  22,  but 
this  is  one  from  Admiral  Stark  to  you  dated  June  22,  which  was  sup- 
plied to  us  later  from  the  original  file. 

I  am  sorry,  I  thought  you  had  seen  it. 

Admiral  Richardson.  All  right ;  I  have  that  letter.^ 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Had  you  received  any  information  more  definite 
than  that  as  to  the  permanency  of  your  station  at  Pearl  Harbor  prior 
to  that  letter  ?    It  says : 

Tentatively  decision  has  been  made  for  the  fleet  to  remain  for  the  present 
where  it  is.    This  decision  may  be  changed  at  any  time. 

Admiral  Richardson.  No,  I  had  received  no  prior  information.  _ 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  you  had  developed  by  that  time  very  definite 
ideas  in  your  own  mind  in  opposition  to  the  advisability  of  basing  the 
fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor,  had  you  not?  Will  you  please  state  in  your 
own  way  just  what  the  situation  was  and  what  your  objections  were 
grounded  upon  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  My  objections  for  remaining  there  were, 
primarily,  that  you  only  had  one  port,  secure  port,  and  very  crowded, 
no  recreation  facilities  for  the  men,  a  long  distancefrom  Pearl  Harbor 
to  the  city  of  Honolulu,  inadequate  transportation,  inadequate  airfields. 

[675]  A  carrier  cannot  conduct  all  training  for  her  planes  from 
the  carrier  deck.  In  order  to  launch  her  planes  she  must  be  underway 
at  substantial  speed,  using  up  large  amounts  of  fuel.  So  that  wherever 
carriers  are  training  their  squadrons  there  must  be  flying  fields  avail- 
able, so  that  while  the  ship  herself  is  undergoing  overhaul,  or  repair, 
or  upkeep,  the  planes  may  conduct  training,  flying  from  the  flying 
fields. 

There  were  inadequate  and  restricted  areas  for  anchorages  of  the 
fleet ;  to  take  them  in  and  out  of  Pearl  Harbor  wasted  time. 

Another  reason,  which  was  a  substantial  one:  Americans  are  per- 
fectly willing  to  go  anywhere,  stay  anywhere,  do  anything  when 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  263 

there  is  a  job  to  be  done  and  they  can  see  the  reason  for  their  being 
there,  but  to  keep  the  fleet,  during  what  the  men  considered  normal 
peacetimes,  away  from  the  coast  and  away  from  their  families,  away 
from  recreation,  rendered  it  difficult  to  maintain  a  high  state  of 
morale  that  is  essential  to  successful  training. 

For  those  reasons,  and  because  I  believe  that  the  fleet  could  be 
better  prepared  for  war  on  a  normal  basis  on  the  west  coast,  I  wanted 
to  return  to  the  west  coast. 

Mr.  MncHELL.  There  is  also  a  letter  from  you — or  rather  a  memo- 
randum from  the  Secretary,  it  is  called,  dated  September  12,  1940, 
Will  you  please  turn  to  that? 

[676]        Admiral  Eichardson.  I  have  it. 

Mr.  MrrcHELL.  You  have  it. 

Admiral  Eichardson.  September  12,  1940. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes.  Was  that  prepared  while  you  were  out  in 
the  Hawaiian  area? 

Admiral  Eichardson.  It  was.  At  that  time  I  had  shifted  my 
flag  and  was  then  flying  it  from  the  U.  S.  S.  Enterprise,  an  aircraft 
carrier. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  visited  the  Hawaiian  area  from  Septem- 
ber 6  until  September  15.  During  that  time  I  had  him  off  Lahaina 
for  dinner  aboard  the  Enterprise  with  all  the  flag  officers  present. 
He  was  aboard  the  Enterprise  for  awhile.  Then  he  was  shifted  to 
other  types  of  ships,  battleships,  destroyers,  cruisers. 

I  did  that  in  order  that  he  might  see  the  operations  conducted  by 
various  types  of  ships  and  in  order  that  he  might  meet  other  flag 
officers  in  the  fleet.  I  was  particularly  careful  to  see  that  he  had  an 
opportunity  to  talk  with  Admiral  Kimmel,  Vice  Admiral  Andrews, 
Admiral  Snyder,  and  a  destroyer  captain  named  Binf ord. 

I  knew  that  he  would  hear  the  news  of  many  officers  and  I  was 
anxious  that  he  remember  the  things  that  I  had  said  to  him ;  and  in 
order  that  he  might  not  confuse  what  I  had  said  to  him  with  the 
things  that  had  been  said  to  him  by  others,  I  [667]  prepared  a 
memorandum  setting  forth  a  brief  outline  of  the  points  that  I  had 
covered  in  very  extensive  conversations  and  I  filed  a  copy  of  that  mem- 
orandum with  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  because  I  endeavored  at 
all  times  to  let  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  know  what  I  was  doing, 
or  what  it  was  my  intention  to  do. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  please  turn  to  that  memorandum  of  the 
12th  of  September  1940.  At  the  bottom  of  page  2,  under  "4  (A)" 
is  the  title  "Eetention  of  the  Fleet  in  the  Hawaiian  Area." 

Was  that  statement  intended  to  sum  up  your  views  about  the  reten- 
ion  of  the  fleet  in  the  Hawaiian  area  ? 

Admiral  Eichardson.  It  was. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Would  you  mind  reading  that,  Admiral? 

Admiral  Eichardson  (reading). 

Retention  of  the  fleet  in  tlie  Hawaiian  Area. 

(a)  From  a  purely  Naval  point  of  view  there  are  many  disadvantages  attached 
to  l)asing  the  fleet  in  this  area,  some  of  which  are : 

(1)  Difficulty,  delay  and  cost  of  transporting  men,  munitions,  and  supplies. 

(2)  Inadequacy  of  Lahaina  as  operating  anchorage  due  to  lack  of  security. 

(3)  Inadequacy  of  Pearl  Harbor  as  operating  anchorage  due  [67S]  to 
difficulties  of  entry,  berthing  and  departure  of  large  ships. 


264        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(4)  Congested  and  restricted  operating  areas,  in  the  air  and  on  the  surface. 

(5)  Inadequate  facilities  for  ileet  services,  training,  recreation  and  housing, 

(6)  Prolonged  absence  from  mainland  of  officers  and  men  in  time  of  peace 
adversely  afEects  morale. 

(7)  In  case  of  war,  necessary  for  fleet  to  return  to  mobilization  ports  on 
West  Coast  or  accept  partial  and  unorganized  mobilization  measure  resulting 
in  confusion  and  a  net  loss  of  time. 

Shall  I  continue  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  I  think  those  are  pertinent. 

Admiral  Richardson  (reading)  : 

If  the  disposition  of  the  fleet  were  determined  solely  by  naval  considerations 
the  major  portion  of  the  fleet  should  return  to  its  normal  Pacific  Coast  bases  be- 
cause such  basing  would  facilitate  its  training  and  its  preparation  for  war. 

If  factors  other  than  purely  naval  ones  are  to  influence  the  decision  as  to 
where  the  fleet  should  be  based  at  this  time,  the  naval  factors  should  be  fully 
presented  and  carefully  considered,  as  well  as  the  probable  effect  of  the  decision 
on  the  readiness  of  the  fleet.  In  other  words,  is  it  more  important  [679]  to 
lend  strength  to  diplomatic  representations  in  the  Pacific  by  basing  the  fleet  in  the 
Hawaiian  area,  than  to  facilitate  its  preparation  lor  active  service  in  any  area 
by  basing  the  major  part  of  it  on  normal  Pacific  Coast  bases? 

In  case  our  relations  with  another  Pacific  nation  deteriorate,  what  is  the  State 
Department's  conception  of  our  next  move?  Does  it  believe  that  the  fleet  is 
now  mobilized  and  that  it  could  embark  on  a  campaign  directly  from  Hawaii 
or  safely  conduct  necessary  training  from  the  insecure  anchorage  at  Lahaina 
which  is  2,000  miles  nearer  enemy  submarine  bases  than  our  normal  Pacific 
Coast  bases? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Shortly  after  that  you  made  a  visit  to  Washington, 
did  you  not,  Admiral  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  remember  when  you  reached  here  and  when 
you  left,  approximately  ?     You  were  here  on  October  8,  were  you  not  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes.  At  07 :  07,  on  October  7.  I  talked  with 
Stark,  Nimitz,  EJiox.  That  was  my  second  visit  to  Washington.  I 
came  at  that  time  because  the  Secretary  said  he  wanted  to  talk  to  me. 
I  arrived.  I  found  that  they  were  considering  increasing  the  strength 
of  the  Asiatic  Fleet,  which  was  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Hart. 
And  while  here  I  lunched  with  the  President.  Had  a  long  talk  with 
him.  I  saw  Dr.  Stanley  [6S0]  Hornbeck  of  the  Department  of 
State,  who  was  at  that  time,  if  my  memory  serves  me  correctly,  the 
advisor  of  the  State  Department  on  far  eastern  affairs. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  your  interviews  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
and  Admiral  Stark,  did  you  take  up  this  question  with  them  of  your 
objections,  the  objections  that  you  just  stated,  as  to  the  basing  of  the 
fleet  in  the  Hawaiian  area  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  think  not,  because  I  had  given  a  memoran- 
dum to  the  Secretary  and  fully  stated  my  views  to  him.  I  had  sent 
a  copy  of  it  to  Admiral  Stark,  w^ho  was  thoroughly  familiar  with  my 
views.  And  I  had  sent  a  copy  of  part  of  it  to  Dr.  Stanley  Hornbeck 
of  the  State  Department  who  knew  what  I  thought.  So,  if  I  remember 
correctly,  I  did  not  talk  about  that  with  Admiral  Stark.  I  talked 
primarily  about  detaching  ships  from  the  main  fleet  to  strengthen  the 
Asiatic  Fleet. 

And  the  first  day  I  arrived  I  was  suddenly  confronted  with  the  fact 
that  5,000  sailors  had  landed  on  the  west  coast  to  be  turned  over  to  me 
and  I  had  to  find  some  means  of  getting  them  out  to  Hawaii.  So  I 
had  to  take  a  carrier — I  think  it  was  the  Saratoga — and  use  her  to 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  265 

transport  the  men  that  I  was  unable  to  accommodate  in  ships  that  had 
come  to  the  coast  with  me. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  the  White  House  records  show  that  on  October 
8, 1940,  you  had  lunch  with  the  President  and  with  Governor  Leahy  at 
1  p.  m.    Do  you  remember  that  ? 

[681]        Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Governor  Leahy  or  Admiral  Leahy? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Admiral  William  E.  Leahy. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  He  was  then  Governor  of  Puerto  Rico. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes.  We  did  not  go  to  the  White  House 
office  in  company.  I  was  invited  by  the  President  through  the  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations  to  lunch  at  1  o'clock.  When  I  arrived  there  I 
found  Admiral  Leahy  there. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  state  in  your  own  way.  Admiral,  just  what 
occurred  at  that  meeting  and  what  was  said  about  any  of  these  matters 
we  have  been  referring  to  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  President  talked  to  Admiral  Leahy  about 
Puerto  Rican  affairs,  and  as  I  was  not  interested,  I  remember  little 
of  what  was  said;  but  I  have  a  vague  recollection  that  one  subject 
under  discussion  was  the  question  of  housing. 

The  President  asked  Admiral  Leahy  his  opinion  about  strengthen- 
ing the  Asiatic  Fleet  and  my  recollection  is  that  Admiral  Leahy  said 
that  whatever  you  sent  out  will  be  lost,  therefore  I  would  send  the 
least  valuable  combatant  ships  we  have,  the  7,500  ton  cruisers,  but  I 
recommended,  I  personally  recommended  that  none  be  sent.  A  deci- 
sion to  send  none  was  reached. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral  Leahy  had  been  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
previously? 

[68£]  Admiral  Richardson.  He  had  been  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions.   He  was  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  when  I  was  the  assistant. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  proceed,  Admiral,  with  your  statement  of 
what  occurred  there. 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  following  statement,  because  of  its  im- 
portance, I  have  written  out.  I  wrote  it  out  several  weeks  ago  when 
it  appeared  certain,  in  my  mind,  that  I  would,  unfortunately,  be  called 
before  this  committee.  And  with  the  permission  of  the  Chairman  I 
would  like  to  read  this  statement 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Which  I  prepared  in  the  quiet  of  my  home, 
where  I  could  think  and  refresh  my  memory  to  a  maximum  extent 
possible. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  proceed,  Admiral,  to  do  that. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  took  up  the  question  of  returning  to  the 
Pacific  coast  all  of  the  fleet  except  the  Hawaiian  detachment. 

The  President  stated  that  the  fleet  was  retained  in  the  Hawaiian 
area  in  order  to  exercise  a  restraining  influence  on  the  actions  of 
•Japan. 

I  stated  that  in  my  opinion  the  presence  of  the  fleet  in  Hawaii  might 
influence  a  civilian  political  government,  but  that  Japan  had  a  military 
government  which  knew  that  the  fleet  was  undermanned,  unprepared 
for  war,  and  had  no  train  of  [OSS']  auxiliary  ships  without 
which  it  could  not  undertake  active  operations.  Therefore,  the  pres- 
ence of  the  fleet  in  Hawaii  could  not  exercise  a  restraining  influence  on 
Japanese  action. 


266       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEAKL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

I  further  stated  we  were  more  likely  to  make  the  Japanese  feel  that 
we  meant  business  if  a  train  were  assembled  and  the  fleet  returned 
to  the  Pacific  coast,  the  complements  filled,  the  ships  docked,  and 
fully  supplied  with  ammunition,  provisions,  stores,  and  fuel,  and  then 
stripped  for  war  operations. 

The  President  said  in  effect,  "Despite  what  you  believe,  I  know  that 
the  presence  of  the  fleet  in  the  Hawaiian  area,  has  had,  and  is  now 
having,  a  restraining  influence  on  the  actions  of  Japan." 

I  said,  "Mr.  President,  I  still  do  not  believe  it,  and  I  know  that  our 
fleet  is  disadvantageously  disposed  for  preparing  for  or  initiating  war 
operations." 

The  President  then  said,  "I  can  be  convinced  of  the  desirability  of 
returning  the  battleships  to  the  west  coast  if  I  can  be  given  a  good 
statement  which  will  convince  the  American  people  and  the  Japanese 
Government  that  in  bringing  the  battlesliips  to  the  west  coast  we  are 
not  stepping  backward." 

This  is  embarrassing. 

Later  I  asked  the  President  if  we  were  going  to  enter  the  war.  He 
replied  that  if  the  Japanese  attacked  Thailand,  or  the  Kra  Peninsula, 
or  the  Dutch  East  Indies  we  would  not  [684]  enter  the  war, 
that  if  they  even  attacked  the  Pliilippines  he  doubted  whether  we 
would  enter  the  war,  but  that  they  could  not  always  avoid  making  mis- 
takes and  that  as  the  war  continued  and  the  area  of  operations  ex- 
panded sooner  or  later  they  would  make  a  mistake  and  we  would  enter 
the  war. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Does  that  complete  your  statement  of  the  conver- 
sation ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Tliat  is  about  all  of  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  want  to  adjourn? 

The  Chaikman.  Four  o'clock  having  arrived,  the  Chair  thinks  we 
might  recess  until  10  o'clock  tomorrow  morning. 

(Whereupon,  at  4  p.  m.,  a  recess  was  taken  until  10  a.  m.,  Tuesday, 
November  20, 1945.) 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  267 


[685]  PEAEL  HAEBOE  ATTACK 


TUESDAY,  NOVEMBER  20,   1945 

Congress  of  the  United  States, 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation 

OF  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

The  joint  committee  met,  pursuant  to  adjournment,  at  10  a.  m.,  in 
the  caucus  room  (room  318) ,  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Alben  W. 
Barkley  (chairman)  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Barkley  (chairman),  George,  Lucas,  Brewster, 
and  Ferguson  and  Representatives  Cooper  (vice  chairman),  Clark, 
Murphy,  Gearhart,  and  Keefe. 

Also  present:  William  D.  Mitchell,  general  counsel;  Gerhard  A. 
Gesell,  Jule  M.  Hannaford,  and  John  E.  Masten,  of  counsel,  for  the 
joint  committee. 

[686]         The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  be  in  order. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  you  were  examining  the  witness  when  we  adjourned. 
You  may  proceed. 

Before  you  proceed,  Mr.  Mitchell — this  is  not  necessarily  on  the 
record. 

(Discussion  off  the  record.) 

The  Chairi^ian.  All  right,  Mr.  Mitchell. 

Mr.  JSIitghell.  Very  well. 

TESTIMONY  OF  ADM.  JAMES  OTTO  EICHAEDSON  (Resumed) 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral  Richardson,  in  the  correspondence  which 
you  have  there  appears  to  be  a  memorandum  from  the  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations  dated  October  9,  1940,  made  by  you.  That  was  the  day 
following  this  visit  with  the  President  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  was. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  wonder  if  counsel  will  permit  me 
to  interpose. 

Last  week  I  requested  from  Admiral  Inglis  a  chart  which  he  said 
he  would  have  ready  for  me  yesterday  showing  the  disposition  of  the 
ships  in  the  Pacific  from  May  1941  to  December  7,  1941.  I  would  like 
to  have  that  at  this  moment,  if  I  could. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  am  informed  that  they  have  been  working 
[687]         on  it ;  they  ought  to  have  it  any  time ;  they  haven't  sent  it  yet. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  am  most  anxious  to  have  it  before  I  am  permitted 
to  examine  the  witness  now  on  the  stand.  I  want  to  ask  him  questions 
concerning  those  figures.  So  if  a  chart  can  be  supplied  me,  I  will  ap- 
preciate it  very,  very  much. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  satisfied  that  Admiral  Inglis  and  the  Navy 
Department  will  make  the  chart  available  as  soon  as  possible,  and  as 
soon  as  it  is  available  it  will  be  presented  here.^ 

» Exhibit  No.  86. 


268       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Go  ahead,  Mr.  Mitchell. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  made  that  memorandum  of  October  9,  1940, 
following  your  visit  the  day  before  with  the  President? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did.  In  order  that  the  Chiei  of  Naval  Op- 
erations might  be  informed  as  to  the  decisions  of  the  President  and 
as  to  his  views  as  expressed  to  me. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  first  item  on  that  memorandum  is :  "Go  ahead 
with  assembly  of  train." 

What  does  that  mean? 

Admiral  Richardson.  There  had  been  some  discussion  as  to  as- 
sembling auxiliary  vessels,  transports,  repair  ships,  supply  ships.  I 
had  urged  that  it  be  done  as  one  evidence  of  our  intention  to  be  pre- 
pared. The  President  stated  that  [688]  we  would  go  ahead 
with  the  assembly  of  a  train. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Item  2  is :  ''Have  we  fuel  oil  in  Samoa  adequate  to 
fill  four  old  light  cruisers?" 

Is  that  a  question  the  President  asked,  or  one  you  wanted  to  know 
about  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  President  asked  me.  I  knew  we  did  not 
have  it.  So  I  wanted  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  informed  that 
he  might  find  it  necessary  or  advisable  to  have  a  supply  of  fuel  oil  in 
Samoa. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Item  3 : 

Give  me  a  chart  showing  British  and  French  bases  or  possible  bases  for  sur- 
face ships,  submarines,  or  airplanes  in  islands  in  the  Pacific  east  of  the  interna- 
tional date  line. 

Was  that  another  request  from  the  President? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No.  That  was  a  request  by  me,  as  I  remem- 
ber it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then,  in  paragraph  4,  you  stated : 

The  British  Ambassador  stated  that  Ghormley 

That  is  Admiral  Ghormley,  is  it? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  is  Admiral  R.  L.  Ghormley. 

Mr.  Mitchell  (reading)  : 

was  busy  transmitting  to  the  Department  information  regarding  technical 

materials,  and  the         [69S]        British  Admirality  felt  that  they  should  have 
offices  prepared  for  staff  conferences. 

Were  you  reporting  a  thing  that  the  President  had  said  to  you  ? 
Admiral  Richardson.  I  was. 
Mr.  Mitchell.  No.  5 : 

The  British  believe  the  Germans  will  iitteinpt  to  oceiipy  Dalcar  from  Spain 
overland  through  Africa. 

Under  that,  in  brackets,  "F.  D.  R." 

What  does  that  mean? 

Admiral  Richardson.  "F.  D.  R."  belongs  to  the  next  paragraph. 
The  first  is  a  bit  of  information.  The  next,  the  sixth  paragraph  is 
intended  to  read: 

I,  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  can  be  convinced  of  the  desirability, 

because  that  is  what  the  President  stated  to  me. 
[670]        Mr.  Mitchell  (reading) : 

I  can  be  convinced  of  the  desirability  of  retaining  the  battleships  on  the  West 
Coast  if  I  can  be  given  a  good  statement  which  will  convince  the  American  peo- 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  269 

pie,  and  the  Japanese  Government,  that  in  bringing  the  battleships  to  the  West 
Coast  we  are  not  stepping  backward. 

That  was  informing  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  what  the  Presi- 
dent had  said  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true.  I  was  at  that  time,  just  before 
going  to  Washington,  on  board  a  flagship  on  the  west  coast  with  ap- 
proximately one-third  of  the  battleships.  We  had  returned  to  the 
west  coast  for  replenishment  and  for  recreation  and  for  overhaul  and, 
if  my  memory  serves  me  correctly,  I  was  at  that  time  flying  my  flag 
on  the  New  Mexico. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Item  7,  the  last  on  the  memo,  is  this  [reading]  : 

The  President  indicated  that  he  might  approve  sending  a  Division  of  old  Light 
Cruisers  to  visit  Mindinao  as  a  gesture.  He  did  not  appear  favorably  disposed 
toward  sending  a  stronger  force. 

That  was  just  passing  on  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  an  item 
of  information  ? 

\_691'\        Admiral  Eichaedson.  It  was. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Going  back  now.  Admiral,  to  July  1940,  prior  to  this 
visit  in  October  1940,  j^ou  made  a  visit  to  Washington  in  July  1940, 
did  you  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  At  my  suggestion,  before  I  left  the  west  coast 
for  the  Hawaiian  area,  I  was  ordered  to  proceed  by  air  to  AVashington 
for  a  conference  with  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Presi- 
dent. 

I  actually  started  and  France  capitulated  and  mj^  trip  was  delayed. 
I  later  came  by  air,  arriving  in  Washington  on  July  8  and  departing 
from  Washington  for  Honolulu  on  July  11. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  appointment  book  at  the  White  House  states 
that  on  July  8  you  had  a  luncheon  engagement  with  the  President  at 
1  p.  m. ;  on  July  11  another  appointment  with  the  President  at  12  noon. 
What  is  your  memory  about  that  ? 

Achniral  Richardson.  As  to  the  appointment  on  July  8, 1  had  lunch 
with  the  President  and  talked  with  him  for  2  or  3  hours  and  my  mission 
at  that  time  was  primarily  to  find  the  thought  back  of  our  retention  in 
Hawaii,  to  explore  and  endeavor  to  ascertain,  if  possible,  the  duration 
of  our  stay  and,  from  my  point  of  view,  stress  the  necessity  of  in- 
creasing the  number  of  men  in  the  Navy  because  we  were  at  that  time 
building  a  very  large  Navy ;  we  had  on  board  ship  \692'\  ap- 
proximately 85  percent  of  the  number  of  men  required  to  man  the 
ships. 

In  normal  times,  in  normal  peacetimes,  you  can  build  a  destroyer 
quicker  than  you  can  train  the  men  to  man  them.  Therefore,  I  was 
very  strongly  of  the  opinion  that  all  the  ships  in  active  commission 
in  the  fleet  should  have  on  board  them  all  the  men  that  they  could  carry 
in  order  that  the  ships  themselves  might  be  prepared  and  that  nucleus 
crews  should  be  trained  for  the  new  ships,  because  they  would  be 
required  whether  we  had  peace  or  had  war.  I  was  also  desirous  of 
securing  the  retention  of  officers  in  the  fleet  without  the  normal  change 
of  duty. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Were  those  the  subjects  that  you  discussed  with  the 
President? 

Admiral  Richardson.  They  were. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  want  to  state  in  your  own  way,  as  near  as  you 
can  recollect,  what  the  general  tenor  of  the  conversation  was? 

79716— 46— pt.  1 20 


270        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Eichardson.  Well,  the  President  was  rather  loath  to  in- 
crease the  number  of  men  because  he  felt,  as  expressed  to  me,  that  men 
of  mechanical  trades  in  civil  life  could  be  quickly  inducted  and  made 
adequate  sailormen  if  their  services  were  suddenly  required. 

Mr.  MrrcHELL.  What  about  the  second  appointment  at  [693] 
12  noon  on  July  11  with  the  President?  Do  you  remember  about  that 
and  what  was  said  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  believe  that  that— well,  I  know  that  that 
meeting  lasted  only  a  few  minutes  and  I  went  by  to  tell  the  President 
good-bye  and  no  subjects  of  any  moment  were  discussed. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  have  any  appointment  with  Mr.  Hull  or 
Mr.  Welles,  or  both  of  them,  during  July  1940  ?  Their  record  shows 
an  appointment  on  July  9. 

Admiral  Richardson.  During  that  visit  I  saw  Secretary  Hull  and 
Under  Secretary  Welles  and  talked  to  both  of  them  at  the  same  time, 
or,  rather,  I  talked  to  Secretary  Hull  in  the  presence  of  Under  Secre- 
tary Welles  for  an  hour  or  so, 

I  saw  Senator  Byrnes  on  the  10th  of  July.  I  had  lunch  with  Gen- 
eral Marshall  on  the  10th  of  July.  I  saw  Dr.  Stanley  Hornbeck  on  the 
11th  of  July  and  outside  of  naval  personnel  I  think  those  were  the  only 
officials  that  I  saw.  I  wanted  to  see  the  then  Congressman  Sci-ugham, 
who  was  chairman  of  the  subcommittee  of  the  Appropriations  Com- 
mittee of  the  House  that  handled  naval  appropriations,  but  he  was  not 
in  town. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  remember  the  subject  of  your  discussion  with 
Mr.  Hull  on  that  meeting  of  the  9th  of  July,  what  the  general  tenor  of 
it  was  ? 

[694]  Admiral  Richardson.  I  saw  Mr.  Hull  to  fully  explore  and 
learn  all  that  I  could  as  to  why  the  fleet  was  retained  in  Hawaii,  how 
long  they  would  probably  stay  there  and  what  the  future  intentions 
were,  because  I  had  been  directed  to  retain  the  fleet  in  Hawaii  and 
anounced  that  it  was  retained  there  at  my  request  and  naturally,  since 
I  had  made  no  such  request,  1  wanted  to  know  what  was  back  of  the 
whole  thing. 

I  also  felt  so  strongly  the  need  for  men  that  I  wanted  to  impress 
on  both  the  Secretary'  of  State  and  the  Under  Secretary  of  State  that 
I  felt  that  they  should  assist  insofar  as  possibly  they  could  in  seeing 
that  the  fleet  was  fully  manned. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  this  correspondence  file  is  a  letter  from  you  to  Ad- 
miral Stark  dated  June  22,  1940,  dated  at  Lahina  Roads,  is  it? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Lahaina  Roads. 

Mr.  MncHELL.  Will  you  please  look  at  that  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  cannot  find  that. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  I  will  hand  it  to  you,  my  cop3^ 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have  it.    My  letter  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Your  letter. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes ;  I  have  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Your  letter  refers  to  the  fact  that  General  Herron, 
then  commanding  the  Hawaiian  department,  had  [69S]  re- 
ceived an  alert  from  the  War  Department.  Do  you  remember  that 
incident  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Vividly. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  any  alert  ordered  from  W^ashington  for  the 
Navy  at  the  same  time  ?  Just  go  on  in  your  own  way  and  tell  us  about 
it.  Admiral. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  271 

Admiral  Kichardsox.  Lieutenant  General  Herron,  commanding  the 
Hawaiian  department,  received  from  the  War  Department  a  dispatch 
on  July  17, 1940,  which  read : 

Immediately  alert  complete  defensive  organization  to  deal  with  trans-Pacific 
trade  to  greatest  extent  possible  without  creating  public  hysteria  or  projecting 
undue  curiosity  of  newspapers  or  alien  agents.  Suggest  maneuver  basis.  Main- 
tain alert  until  further  orders.  Instructions  for  secret  communication  direct 
with  Chief  of  Staff  will  be  furnished  you  shortly.     Acknowledge. 

At  that  time  I  was  at  sea.  Lt.  Gen.  Charles  D.  Herron  visited 
Admiral  Claude  C.  Bloch  on  June  17,  informed  him  of  the  receipt  of 
these  orders  and  requested  the  Navy  establish  a  distance  reconnais- 
sance.   This  is  hearsay  and  gained  from  official  correspondence. 

Admiral  Bloch,  in  company  with  General  Herron,  either  had  Vice 
Admiral  Andrews  come  in  or  visited  him  and  requested  him  to  estab- 
lish the  long  range  reconnaissance  be-  [696]  cause  the  patrol 
planes  were  under  Vice  Admiral  Andrews.  Vice  Admiral  Andrews 
was  the  senior  officer  afloat  in  Pearl  Harbor. 

I  was  informed  of  what  had  been  done  by  both  Admiral  Andrews 
and  I  believe  Admiral  Bloch,  so  I  sent  to  the  commandant  of  the 
Fourteenth  Naval  District,  Admiral  Bloch,  the  following  message: 

Would  like  to  know  whether  request  of  Commanding  General  Hawaiian  De- 
partment for  additional  air  patrol  is  a  part  of  Army  exercises  or  is  it  based  upon 
information  from  the  "War  Department? 

I  received  at  0945  local  time  on  June  19,  1940  the  following  reply : 

Request  of  Commanding  General  was  based  upon  a  directive  from  the  War 
Department.     He  has  no  information  as  to  whether  or  not  it  is  an  exercise. 

I  had  received  no  information  from  the  Navy  Department.  There- 
fore, despite  what  anybody  else  believed,  I  knew  that  it  could  not  be 
other  than  a  drill. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Other  than  a  what? 

Admiral  Richaedson.  Other  than  an  exercise,  because  I  firmly 
believed  that  no  important  information  would  be  available  to  General 
Marshall  that  was  not  available  to  Admiral  Stark  and  if  the  informa- 
tion was  of  such  a  character  as  to  [697]  necessitate  alerting  the 
Army,  the  Navy  would  be  equally  alerted;  but  in  order  to  be  cer- 
tain I 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Are  you  looking  for  your  letter  of  the  22d  ? 

Admiral  Kichardsox.  No.  On  June  21  I  had  a  plane  come  out 
from  Pearl  Harbor,  pick  me  up  at  0745,  take  me  into  Pearl  Harbor, 
where  I  had  a  conference  with  Admiral  Bloch  ^nd  General  Herron. 
I  read  the  order.  I  asked  General  Herron  whether  it  was  a  real  alert 
or  a  drill.  He  said  he  did  not  know.  I  assured  him  that  it  could  not 
be  anything  but  an  exercise. 

I  sent  a  dispatch  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  requesting  in- 
formation.    No  reply  was  ever  received. 

In  compliance  with  General  Herron's  request  to  establish  a  patrol 
Vice  Admiral  Andrews  modified  the  patrol  that  was  then  in  effect. 
I  had  established  a  plane  patrol  centered  on  Lahaina,  wliich  covered 
the  arc  from  220  to  335  degrees  to  a  distance  of  180  miles.  Admiral 
Andrews  changed  this  patrol  to  cover  the  arc  from  south,  through 
west  to  north  to  a  distance  of  300  miles.  He  also  established  a  dawn 
and  dusk  patrol,  reported  his  action  to  me  in  a  letter  dated  June  18 


272        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

and  requested  that  I  confirm  this  action.     I  sent  to  Vice  Admiral  An- 
drews the  following  dispatch : 

Affirm  patrol. 

Do  you  want  me  to  go  on  ? 

[69S]  Mr.  Mitchell.  That  report  from  Admiral  Andrews  is  the 
document  in  the  .correspondence  file  dated  June  18,  1940,  "Memor- 
andum from  the  Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Fleet."  You 
have  it  before  you,  have  you  ? 

Admiral  Kichardson.  I  forwarded  that  with  a  letter  from  Admiral 
Bloch  to  me,  with  the  dispatch  exchange  between  me  and  the  com- 
mandant of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  in  my  letter  to  the  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations  in  order  that  he  might  be  fully  informed  as  to 
the  whole  incident. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  report  of  Admiral  Andrews  states  that  the 
sector  you  spoke  of  from  south  through  west  to  north  to  a  distance  of 
300  miles  would  be  searched. 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  With  what  types  of  planes  was  that  reconnaissance 
conducted  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  "Well,  the  pati'ol  planes,  a  type  then  known 
as  VP,  which  is  a  seaplane,  unarmed,  used  later  in  this  war,  primarily 
as  a  rescue  plane. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  How  long  did  you  keep  that  plane  reconnaissance 
operation  on  that  scale? 

Admiral  Richardson,  In  order  that  the  committee  may  be  fully 
informed  with  respect  to  long-range  reconnaissance  which  prevailed 
for  a  number  of  months,  it  will  be  necessary  for  me  to  cover  some 
correspondence  and  make  a  comprehensive  [699]        statement. 

Shall  I  proceed? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  If  you  are  ready  to. 

Admiral  Richardson.  In  connection  with  the  annual  fleet  exercises, 
it  had  always  been  the  custom  to  simulate  war  conditions,  and  there- 
fore, when  the  fleet  arrived  in  the  Hawaiian  area,  about  April  10,  and 
all  of  the  heavy  ships  anchored  off  Lahaina  Roads,  I  established,  as  a 
part  of  the  exercises,  a  dawn  and  dusk  inner  patrol  of  planes,  which 
extended  to  a  distance  of  about  80  miles.  I  established  an  antisubma- 
rine patrol  of  destroyers  at  all  the  entrances  to  Lahaina  Roads,  and  I 
established  a  long  range  reconnaissance  of  approximateh'  180  miles. 

This  reconnaissance  was  established  solely  as  an  exercise.  It  was 
not  adequate  either  as  to  the  density  of  the  planes  or  as  to  the  distance 
searched  to  j^rovide  warning  of  any  impending  attack  from  a  prospec- 
tive enemy.  Because  of  the  frequent  warnings  which  I  had  received 
from  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  in  personal  letters,  because  of  my 
orders  to  remain  in  the  Hawaiian  area  with  the  fleet  for  reasons 
unknown  to  me,  I  continued  this  patrol  and  gradually  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  maintained  was  somewhat  modified. 

It  was  continued  for  three  purposes:  First,  for  training;  next,  be- 
cause of  my  knowledge  of  the  Japanese,  and  the  Panay  incident. 
Although  I  "felt  there  was  absolute-  \700']  ly  no  danger  at  that 
time  of  an  attack  by  the  Japanese  fleet,  I  feared  that  there  was,  at  any 
time,  a  possibility  that  some  fanatical,  ill-advised  officer  in  command 
of  a  submarine  or  a  ship  might  attack. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  273 

Also  I  felt — and  this  may  have  been  Avrong,  but  I  felt  that  Admiral 
Stark  might  not  have  all  the  information  that  there  was  available,  or 
he  might  not  f uUj  miderstand  the  implications  of  all  tlie  information 
that  he  had,  and  that  partly  as  a  personal  defensive  device,  he  was 
warning  me  to  be  on  the  alert  against  a  possible  attack,  and  being  an 
ofiicer  of  long  experience,  I  wanted  the  same  protection,  and  therefore 
I  flew  this  patrol  so  it  could  not  be  said  of  me  after  the  thing  happened 
that  I  was  warned  and  did  nothing  about  it. 

It  was  in  effect  from  that  point  of  view  a  token  reconnaissance. 

That  Avas  continued  until,  in  November  ^8,  1940,  in  a  letter  to 
Admiral  Stark,  I  said,  in  part — that  is  my  letter  of  the  28th  of 
November — 

Tour  last  two  letters,  touching  on  the  security  of  the  Fleet  while  operating  in 
the  Hawaiian  area  and  the  prospective  operations  of  the  Second  Brigade  of  the 
Fleet  Marine  Force  with  the  Fleet  during  the  third  quarter  have  been  received. 

With  regard  to  the  first  of  these  matters,  i  will  take  this  [701]  up  with 
Bloch  on  my  arrival  back  in  Hawaii. 

The  third  paragraph  states : 

The  security  of  the  units  while  carrying  out  routine  operations  gives  me 
greater  concern 

Mr.  Mitchell  (interposing).  You  might  read  that  fully,  that  sec- 
ond paragraph. 

Admiral  Kighardson.  That  relates  to  another  item,  but  I  will  do 
that. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson  (reading)  : 

With  regard  to  the  first  of  these  matters,  I  will  take  this  up  with  Bloch  on  my 
arrival  back  in  Hawaii.  This  feature  of  the  problem  does  not  give  me  a  great 
deal  of  concern,  and,  I  think,  can  be  easily  provided  for.  I  think  torpedo  nets 
within  the  harbor  are  neither  necessary  nor  practicable.  The  area  is  too  re- 
stricted and  ships  at  present  are  not  moored  within  torpedo  range  of  tiie  entrance. 

The  security  of  the  units  while  carrying  out  routine  operations  gives  me 
greater  concern,  because  to  provide  a  reasonable  degree  of  security  calls  for 
employment  of  a  great  number  of  fleet  units  for  security  alone,  which  will  con- 
sume both  time  and  effort  that  could,  otherwise,  be  well  directed  toward  training 
and  indoctrination.  I  feel  that  the  fleet  must  opei'ate  on  either  of  two  assump- 
tions, i.  e.,  (a)  that  [702]  we  are  at  peace  and  no  security  measures  are 
required ;  or  (b)  that  wartime  measures  of  security  must  be  carried  out. 

Heretofore,  we  have  carried  out  limited  security  measures  largely  as  a  basis 
for  training,  and  on  the  assumption  that  no  foreign  power  would  choose  to 
bring  on  a  war  by  an  attack  on  the  fleet,  but  that  some  misdirected  or  fanatical 
nationals  might  undertake  individual  and  irresponsible  attack  on  fleet  units. 

Now,  however,  in  the  light  of  your  concern  over  these  matters,  and  in  view 
of  your  better  information  and  position  to  evaluate  the  possibilities,  I  have  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  I  must  operate  on  the  basis  of  (b)  above.  I  enclose  tenta- 
tive draft  of  a  directive  which  I  plan  to  issue  upon  arrival  at  Pearl  Harbor. 
It  is  bound  to  result  in  the  curtailment  of  badly  needed  basic  training  of  new 
personnel,  particularly  in  destroyers  and  planes  and  some  degree  of  extra  dis- 
comfort, but  under  the  assumption,  this  will  have  to  be  accepted. 

Now,  Admiral  Stark  replied  to  that  letter  in  a  letter  dated  Decem- 
ber 23,  the  third  paragraph  of  which  says — have  you  got  it  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral,  I  have,  but  I  was  wondering  if  you  would 
not  get  the  thread  of  this  a  little  better  if  you  went  back  to  Admiral 
Stark's  letter  to  you  of  November  22,  [703]  the  reply  to  which 
you  just  read?  You  refer  to  that  in  the  reply.  That  is  November 
22, 1940. 


274       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Richardson.  Mr.  Counsel,  there  are  two  points,  there  are 
two  lines  of  thought.  There  are  two  chains  of  action,  and  I  am 
pursuing  one. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  All  right.  Go  ahead.  You  may  go  back  to  that, 
if  necessary. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Go  back  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  What  I  am  now  discussing  is  long  range 
reconnaissance.  In  Admiral  Stark's  letter  of  December  23,  he  stated, 
in  paragraph  3 : 

First,  in  regard  to  security,  I  endeavored  to  outline  to  Murphy — 

Murphy  was  at  that  time  Commander  Vincent  R.  Murphy,  my  war 
plans  officer,  whom  I  had  left  in  "Washington  to  discuss  matters  with 
the  War  Plans  Division  of  Naval  Operations.     [Reading :] 

[704]  I  endeavored  to  outline  to  Murphy  my  idea  as  to  the  extent  security 
measui'es  should  be  prosecuted,  namely,  that  while  the  extent  of  security  meas- 
ures required  his  increasing,  it  has  not  yet  reached  the  demands  of  full  wartime 
security.  As  I  discussed  with  Murphy,  there  will  be  an  advantage  in  making 
occasional  sweeps  by  aircraft  and  surface  craft  but  it  is  not  yet  necessary  to 
make  these  continuous.  I  agree  with  you  that  the  wear  and  tear  on  equipment, 
and  the  detrimental  effects  on  training,  of  full  security  measures  should  be 
given  due  weight. 

Upon  receipt  of  that  letter  of  December  30,  IDttO,  in  a  letter  addressed 
to  the  fleet,  the  number  of  the  letter  being  "U.  S.  Fleet  Confidential 
Letter  No.  8CL  1-40;  Subject:  Security  of  fleet  units  operating  in 
the  Hawaiian  area",  which  is  the  finished  product,  the  tentative  draft 
of  which  I  sent  to  Admiral  stark 

The  Vice  Chairman.  AMiat  is  the  date  of  that,  please  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  December  30,  1940.  I  doubt  whether  the 
committe  has  a  copy  of  this  letter,  because  I  myself  received  it  just 
yesterday,  and  I  secured  this  letter  because  the  counsel  indicated  to 
me  his  intention  to  interrogate  me  with  respect  to  long  range  recon- 
naissance. Undoubtedly  the  counsel  will  supply  the  members  of  the 
committe  with  a  copy  of  this  letter,  if  he  has  not  already  done  so. 

[705^         Mr.  Gesfxl.  It  has  not  been  supplied  as  yet. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral,  you  are  not  referring  to  the  report  of 
December  30,  1940,  from  the  commandant  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  They  are  different  documents  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Mr.  Counsel,  there  are  two  chains  of  circum- 
stances and  letters  originating  at  about  the  same  time.  I  am  pursuing 
one  of  them. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  letter  you  refer  to  is  from  you  to  Admiral 
Stark,  is  it  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  'N^Hien  Admiral  Stark  informed  me  that  he 
felt  it  was  no  longer  necessary  to  do  other  than  sweep  operating  areas 
and  do  what  his  letter  of  December  23,  said  to  do,  then  I  had  no 
concern  over  doing  other  than  what  I  thought  was  necessary.  I  dis- 
continued then  long  rang  reconnaissance  of  any  kind  except  the  sweep- 
ing of  operating  areas. 

I  present  this  letter  primarily  to  show  that  I  discontinued  patrol 
plane  reconnaissance.     I  also  issued  this  directive : 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  275 

Ships,  except  submarines,  shall  not  anchor  in  unprotected  anchor- 
ages. Pearl  Harbor  is  a  protected  anchorage.  Hilo  and  Kahului 
may  be  considered  as  such  if  boat  patrols  are  maintained  at  the  en- 
trance and  ships  are  so  moored  as  not  to  be  subject  to  torpedo  fire 
from  outside  the  harbor. 

Now  if  counsel  so  desires,  I  will  pursue  the  other  [706^  chain 
of  circumstances. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  the  precise  date  that  Admiral  Kimmel 
assumed  command  there? 

Admiral  Richardson.  After  issuing  this  directive,  8CL-40  of 
December  30,  1940,  I  felt  that  this  letter  was  not  sufficiently  compre- 
hensive to  provide  for  the  security  of  the  fleet,  so  I  immediately 
started  the  preparation  of  a  revision  of  that  document.  I  was  en- 
gaged— at  least  my  staff  was — in  revising  that  when  I  received  in- 
formation of  my  prospective  detachment.  So  I  amplified  that  very 
much.  But  inasmuch  as  I  was  to  be  relieved  in  the  near  future, 
I  asked  that  my  staff  confer  with  the  prospective  staff  of  the  pros- 
pective commander  in  chiefs  to  ascertain  their  views.  So  the  docu- 
ment that  was  later  issued  under  the  title  of  "Pacific  Fleet  Con- 
fidential Letter  No.  2CL-41,  date  of  February  15,  1941"  was  signed 
by  Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  who  was  the  commander  in  chief  of  the 
Pacific  Fleet  having  relieved  me  on  February  1,  1941. 

Had  I  remained  in  command  of  the  U.  S.  Fleet  this  order  would 
have  borne  my  signature  and  it  would  have  been  substantially  the 
same  order. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  now,  let  us  go  back  for  a  moment  to  Admiral 
Stark's  letter  to  you  of  November  22,  1940,  which  I  have  before  me. 
He  says : 

While  you  were  here  early  in  October  we  sent  a  dispatch  [707]  to  Com- 
fourteen  to  ascertain  from  Admiral  Bloch  whether  or  not  the  protection  being 
afforded  to  the  vital  element  of  the  naval  establishment  in  Hawaii  was  satisfac- 
tory, this  in  order  that,  if  required,  we  could  make  representations  to  the  War 
Department  to  direct  more  thorough  protection  on  the  part  of  its  Hawaiian  De- 
partment. 

Admiral  Bloch's  answers  to  this  dispatch  and  to  a  second  dispatch  on  the 
same  subject  were  not  very  definite,  and  did  not  provide  bases  for  further  action 
by  the  Department. 

Since  the  Taranto  incident  my  concern  for  the  safety  of  the  Fleet  in  Pearl 
Harbor,  already  great,  has  become  even  greater.  This  concern  has  to  do  both 
with  possible  activities  on  the  part  of  Japanese  residents  of  Hawaii  and  with 
the  possibilities  of  attack  coming  from  overseas.  By  far  the  most  profitable 
object  of  sudden  attack  in  Hawaiian  waters  would  be  the  Fleet  units  based 
in  that  area.  Without  question  the  safety  of  these  units  is  paramount  and 
imposes  on  the  Commander  in  Chief  and  the  forces  afloat  a  responsibility  in 
which  he  must  receive  the  complete  support  of  Commandant  Fourteen,  and 
of  the  Army.  I  realize  most  fully  that  you  are  giving  this  problem  compre- 
hensive thought.  My  object  in  writing  you  is  to  find  out  what  steps  the  Navy 
Department  and  the  War  Department  should  be  taking  to  provide  additional 
equipment  and  additional  protective  measures. 

[708]  For  instance,  is  it  desirable  to  place  torpedo  nets  within  the  harbor 
itself?  I  will  appreciate  your  comment  and  those  of  Comfourteen  on  this 
question. 

Anti-aircraft  protection  can  be  provided  first  by  units  of  the  Fleet,  actually 
in  Pearl  Harbor  with  guns  ready  at  all  times ;  by  stationing  about  the  Navy 
Yard  of  Army  A.  A.  defense  measures  including  mobile  batteries,  and  possibly 
by  utilization  of  Marine  Defense  Battalion  Anti-Aircraft  Units  now  available 
in  the  Pearl  Harbor  area,  or  that  could  be  made  available.  Also  by  keeping 
carrier  fighters  squadrons  alerted  and  ready  to  go. 


276        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

And  SO  on. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  you  responded  to  that  letter  on  the  28th  of 
November  and  you  said : 

With  regard  to  the  first  of  these  matters,  I  will  take  this  up  with  Blnch  on  my 
aiTival  back  in  Hawaii. 

Now  you  did  take  it  up  with  Admiral  Bloch  ? 

Admiral  RicHARDSoisr.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Just  tell  us  what  you  did  about  that. 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  letter  of  Admiral  Stark  to  me  dated 
November  22,  1940,  is  one  of  a  series  of  letters  and  incidents  about 
which  at  least  three  witnesses  in  addition  to  me  will  testify,  and  in 
order  that  that  matter  may  be  initially  understood  I  think  it  advis- 
able to  cover  the  whole  series. 

When  I  was  in  Washington  the  7th,  or  the  11th  of  October  [709] 
I  discussed  with  Admiral  Stark  the  position  of  the  fleet  when  in  Pearl 
Harbor,  the  inadequate  provision  that  had  been  made  both  by  the 
Army  and  Navy  to  protect  the  fleet,  and  before  I  returned  to  Pearl 
Harbor  Admiral  Stark  sent  to  Admiral  Bloch,  commandant  of  the 
Fourteenth  Naval  District,  a  dispatch  requesting  certain  information, 
as  indicated  in  his  first  paragraph  of  the  letter  of  November  22. 

I  remained  on  the  A^etv  Mexico  on  the  west  coast  and  did  not  arrive 
in  Pearl  Harbor  until  the  6th  of  December.  Admiral  Bloch  was  the 
commandant  of  the  district,  and  he  was  exceedingly  busy  w^ith  work 
under  construction.  I  felt  that  it  was  essential  that  I  personally  know 
what  we  had,  and  what  the  Army  had,  therefore  I  arranged  with  Lt. 
Gen.  Charles  D.  Herron  to  inspect  everything  that  the  Army  had  to 
defend  the  Army  and  Navy  installations  in  Hawaii  from  all  forms 
of  overseas  attack. 

I  asked  General  Herron  to  have  the  officers  who  were  subordinate 
to  him,  who  Avere  directly  responsible  for  any  part  of  the  defense, 
prepared  to  show  me  what  they  had,  to  give  me  a  list  of  what  they  had, 
give  me  a  list  of  what  the  plans  called  for  them  to  have,  and  the  best 
estimate  they  could  make  of  when  they  would  receive  what  they  re- 
quired. 

The  flagship  was  going  to  sea  on  individual  exercises  which  did 
not  require  my  presence.  Therefore,  on  December  19,  [710]  in 
company  witli  General  Herron,  I  reviewed  the  Army  equipment  and 
received  the  data  requested.  I  delivered  this  data  to  Admiral  Bloch 
and  told  him  that  inasmuch  as  he  represented  the  fleet  in  relation?  with 
the  Army  in  Hawaii,  because  I  might  be  away  at  any  time,  that  I 
wanted  him  to  use  this  data  and  prepare  a  letter  to  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment setting  forth  his  views  and  forward  the  letter  through  me,  which 
Admiral  Bloch  did  in  a  letter  dated  December  30,  1940.  The  subject : 
"Situation  Concerning  the  Security  of  the  Fleet  and  the  Present  Abil- 
ity of  the  Local  Defense  Forces  to  Meet  Surprise  Attacks." 

[_711~\  That  letter  was  forwarded  by  me  to  the  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations  with  the  first  endorsement  dated  January  4,  1941.  I  have 
been  informed,  and  I  believe  that  rear  admiral,  now  Admiral  Rich- 
mond Kelly  Turner,  then  on  duty  in  the  War  Plans  Division  of  Naval 
Operations,  prepared,  for  the  signature  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  a 
letter  dated  January  24, 1941,  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Reference  to  this  letter  appears  on  page  5,  section  7  of  the  report  of 
the  Roberts  Commission. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  277 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  letter,  Admiral,  of  December  oO,  1940,  signed  by 
Admiral  Bloch  and  addressed  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  is  in 
evidence  here.     Have  you  it  before  you  ? 

Admiral  Kichardson.  I  have. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Would  you  mind  reading  paragraphs  1  and  2  of  that 
leiter,  or  shall  I  read  it  for  you  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  will  read  it : 

In  view  of  the  inquiries  contained  in  references  («) — wlaich  is  Stark's  dispatch 
of  October  1940 — (&)  and  (c),  I  consider  it  desirable  to  write  this  letter  to  set 
forth  the  present  ability  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  to  meet  surprise  hostile 
attacks  of  an  enemy  with  the  equipment  and  forces  at  hand. 

Aircraft  Raids : 

[712]  Aircraft  attacking  the  base  at  Pearl  Harbor  will  undoubtedly  be 
brought  by  carriers.     Therefore,  there  are  two  vpays  of  repelling  attack. 

First,  by  locating  and  destroying  the  carrier  prior  to  launching  planes.  Sec- 
ond, by  driving  off  attacking  bombers  with  antiaircraft  guns  and  fighters.  The 
Navy  component  of  the  local  defense  forces  has  no  planes  for  distant  recon- 
naissance with  which  to  locate  any  enemy  carriers,  and  the  only  planes  belonging 
to  the  local  defense  forces  to  attack  carriers  when  located  would  be  the  Army 
bombers.  The  Army  has  in  the  Hawaiian  area  G9  B-18  bombers.  All  of  these  are 
classified  as  being  obsolete.  The  model  is  6  years  old  and  the  planes  tliemselves 
are  5  years  old.  Therefore,  it  is  my  opinion  that  neither  numbers  nor  types  are 
satisfactory  for  the  purposes  intended.  New  bombing  planes  are  expected  some- 
time in  the  future.  However,  not  before  July  1941.  For  distant  reconnaissance, 
requisition  would  have  to  be  made  on  the  forces  afloat  for  such  as  could  be  spared 
by  the  fleet. 

To  drive  o£E  bombing  planes  after  they  have  been  launched,  will  require  both 
fighting  planes  and  antiaircraft  guns.  The  Army  has  in  the  Hawaiian  area,  36 
pursuit  planes,  all  of  which  are  classified  as  obsolete.  Some  of  them  are  6  years 
old,  and  some  of  them  are  4  years  old.  [71S]  In  numbers  and  models  there 
is  a  serious  deficiency  existing.  New  fighters  are  expected  when  the  P-40  is  in 
production  to  the  extent  that  the  185  projected  for  Hawaii  can  be  delivered.  This 
does  not  appear  to  be  probable  before  the  end  of  1941;  this  number  does  not 
appear  adequate. 

The  Army  is  charged  with  the  protection  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Base  by  anti- 
aircraft guns.  There  are  in  Hawaii  twenty-six  fixed  3-inch  guns  and  forty- 
four  mobile  3-inch  guns.  There  are  projected  twenty-four  more  to  be  delivered 
in  1941.  There  are  no  37-millimeter  and  only  109  .50-calibre  out  of  the 
projected  120  37-millimeter  and  308  .50-calibre  machine  guns.  The  Army  plans 
to  place  the  greater  part  of  the  3-inch  guns  around  Pearl  Harbor  and  only  a 
few  near  other  military  objectives.  In  my  opinion,  it  will  be  necessary  to  in- 
crease the  number  of  guns  around  Pearl  Harbor  greatly  to  have  any  semblence 
of  antiaircraft  defense.  Furthermore,  I  express  my  doubt  as  to  the  eflicacy  of 
a  3-inch  gun  with  a  21-second  fuse  for  driving  off  high  altitude  bombers.  The 
Army  has  made  no  plans  for  the  antiaircraft  defense  of  Lualualei  or  Kaneohe ; 
furthermore,  it  will  be  necessary  to  have  a  considerable  concentration  of  anti- 
aircraft guns  to  defend  the  shipping  terminals  and  harbor  of  Honolulu  in 
order  that  lines  of  communication  may  be  kept  open.  With  a  limited  knowledge 
of  the  density  of  antiaircraft  barrages  [714]  abroad,  I  am  of  the  opinion 
that  at  least  500  guns  of  adequate  size  and  range  will  be  required  for  the  efficient 
defense  of  the  Hwaiian  area. 

This  number  is  in  addition  to  37-millimeter  and  .50  calibre  machine  gims. 
[715]         In  addition  to  the  above,  the  Army  has  planned  an  aircraft  warning 
service  which  will  consist  of  8  radar  stations.     Three  of  these  stations  are  fixed 
and  55  are  mobile.    When  completed  at  an  indefinite  time  in  the  future,  this 
warning  net  should  be  adequate. 

May  I  also  read  the  last  paragraph  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Any  part  of  it  that  you  think  is  material.  Admiral. 

Admiral  Richardson.  This  is  paragraph  11 : 

It  is  considered  highly  undesirable  from  my  point  of  view  that  the  War 
Department  should  in  any  way  come  to  believe  that  there  is  lack  of  agree- 
ment between  the  Army  authorities  and  Navy  authorities  here,  or  that  the 
officials  of  the  14th  Naval  District  are  pressing  the  Navy  Department  to  do 
something  in  regard  to  Army  matters. 


278        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  then  on  January  7, 1941,  you  placed  an  endorse- 
ment on  that  communication  of  Bloch's  ? 

Admiral  Kichakdson.  I  think  that  is  January  4,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Is  it? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Oh,  yes.     It  is  blotted  up.     January  4. 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  Saturday,  and  I  wanted  this  away 
as  quickly  as  I  could  and  I  know  I  would  not  hold  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  expresses  directly  your  individual  [716] 
views  about  the  situation,  did  it  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  did.  I  think  that  Admiral  Bloch  and  I 
were  in  complete  agreement,  because  we  fully  discussed  the  matter. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Would  you  care  to  read  the  portions  of  that  that 
you  think  are  especially  useful  ?  The  first  paragraph  probably  covers 
the  ground  really,  and  the  second — I  will  read  it  if  you  like. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  think,  if  I  may  be  permitted  to  suggest  it, 
that  the  first  and  third  paragraphs  ought  to  be  read,  because  the  third 
paragraph  contains  the  matter  that  has  been  mentioned  several  times. 
Paragraph  1: 

Forwarded.  The  Coaimander-in-Chief  has  conferred  with  the  Commandant 
14th  Naval  District  and  the  Commanding  General  of  the  Hawaiian  Department. 
As  a  result  of  the  conference  with  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Depart- 
ment, and  an  inspection  in  company  with  him,  information  was  furnished  the 
Commandant  14th  Naval  District  who  prepared  the  basic  letter.  The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief concurs  with  the  Commandant  14th  Naval  District  in  the  opin- 
ion that  the  Army  Pursuit  Squadrons  and  anti-aircraft  batteries  are  inadequate 
to  protect  the  Fleet  and  Pearl  Harbor  against  air  attack.  When  established 
the  proposed  pursuit  strength  will  be  adequate.  The  proposed  total  of  68  mobile 
three-inch  gunds  for  this  area  is  not  1717]  considered  adequate.  With 
the  almost  continuous  high  ceiling  prevailing  in  this  area  a  materially  greater 
number  of  larger  and  longer  range  anti-aircraft  guns  are  necessary  to  counter 
liigh  altitude  bombing  attaclis  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

[718]         Mr.  Mitchell.  I  will  read  "2"  for  you,  to  relieve  your 
voice,  Admiral. 
Admiral  Richardson.  All  right. 
JVIr.  Mitchell  (reading)  : 

2.  As  neither  the  increased  antiaircraft  batteries,  nor  the  augmented  pursuit 
squadrons  will  be  available  for  an  extended  period,  the  defense  of  the  Fleet  units 
within  Pearl  Harbor  will  have  to  be  augmented  by  that  portion  of  the  Fleet 
which  may  be  in  Pearl  Harbor  in  the  event  of  attack  by  hostile  aircraft.  Plans 
for  cooperation  with  the  local  defense  forces  are  being  made.  At  present,  the 
continuous  readiness  of  carrier  fighter  squadrons  or  anti-aircraft  batteries  is 
not  contemplated.  The  improbability  of  such  an  attack  under  present  conditions 
does  not,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  warrant  interrupting  en- 
tirely the  training  i*equired  by  Fleet  Air  Units  which  would  have  to  be  largely 
curtailed  if  constant  readiness  of  a  fighter  squadron  were  required. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Paragraph  3: 

There  does  not  appear  to  be  any  practicable  way  of  placing  torpedo  baffles 
or  nets  within  the  Harbor  to  protect  the  ships  moored  therein  against  torpedo 
plane  attack  without  greatly  limiting  the  activities  within  the  Harbor,  particu- 
larly the  movement  of  large  ships  and  the  landing  and  takeoff  of  patrol  squad- 
rons. Inasmuch  as  Pearl  Harbor  is  the  [7i9]  only  operating  base  avail- 
able to  the  Fleet  in  this  ai-ea,  any  pressure  defense  measures  that  will  further 
restrict  the  use  of  the  base  as  such  should  be  avoided. 

Considering  this  and  the  improbability  of  such  an  attack  under  present  condi- 
tions the  unlikelihood  of  an  enemy  being  able  to  advance  carriers  sufficiently 
near  in  wartime  in  the  face  of  active  Fleet  operations,  it  is  not  considered  it  is 
necessary  to  lay  such  nets. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  279 

That  paragraph  was,  in  part,  based  on  information  from  the  Navy 
Department;  insofar  as  was  known  torpeclos  launched  from  aircraft 
would  not  operate  in  water  of  the  depth  of  Pearl  Harbor. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  spoke.  Admiral,  of  the  fact  that  following  that 
report  of  Admiral  Bloch  of  December  30,  forwarded  with  the  endorse- 
ment you  have  just  read,  there  resulted  the  letter  from  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Knox,  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  which  you  stated 
was  prepared  for  him  by  Admiral  Turner. 

Admiral  Eichaedson.  Admiral  Turner  so  informed  me. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  that  letter  here  and  it  hasn't  been  offered  in 
evidence  yet.    Probably  I  had  better  read  it  if  the  committee  is  ready. 

The  Chairman.  Go  ahead. 

Will  you  identify  that  ? 

[7W]  Mr.  Mitchell.  These  are  letters  which  we  will  mark  Ex- 
hibit 10. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibit  No.  10.") 

Mr.  Mitchell.  It  follows  right  along  logically  after  this  Bloch 
report.  It  is  a  letter  from  Secretary  Knox,  dated  January  24,  1941, 
addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Mr.  Keefe.  What  is  the  date  of  it  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  January  24,  1941. 

[721]  My  Deab  Mb.  Secbetaky  :  The  security  of  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  while 
in  Pearl  Harbor,  and  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Naval  Base  itself,  has  been  under 
renewed  study  by  the  Navy  Department  and  forces  afloat  for  the  past  several 
weeks.  This  reexamination  has  been,  in  part,  prompted  by  the  increased  gravity 
of  the  situation  with  respect  to  Japan,  and  by  reports  from  abroad  of  success- 
ful bombing  and  torpedo  plane  attacks  on  ships  while  in  bases.  If  war  eventuates 
with  Japan,  it  is  believed  easily  possible  that  hostilities  would  be  initiated  by  a 
surprise  attack  upon  the  Fleet  or  the  Naval  Base  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

In  my  opinion,  the  inherent  possibilities  of  a  major  disaster  to  the  fleet  or 
naval  base  warrant  taking  every  step,  as  rapidlj^  as  can  be  done,  that  will  increase 
the  joint  readiness  of  the  Army  and  Navy  to  withstand  a  raid  of  the  character 
mentioned  above. 

The  dangers  envisaged  in  their  order  of  importance  and  probability  are  con- 
sidered to  be : 

(1)  Air  bombing  attack. 

(2)  Air  torpedo  plane  attack. 

(3)  Sabotage. 

(4)  Submarine  attack. 
[722]   (5)  Mining. 

(6)  Bombardment  by  gun  fire. 

Defense  against  all  but  the  first  two  of  these  dangers  appears  to  have  been 
provided  for  satisfactorily.  The  following  paragraphs  are  devoted  principally 
to  a  discussion  of  the  problems  encompassed  in  (1)  and  (2)  above,  the  solution 
of  which  I  consider  to  be  of  primary  importance. 

Both  types  of  air  attack  are  possible.  They  may  be  carried  out  successively, 
simultaneously,  or  in  combination  with  any  of  the  other  operations  enumerated. 
The  maximum  probable  enemy  effort  may  be  put  at  twelve  aircraft  squadrons, 
and  the  minimum  at  two.  Attacks  would  be  launched  from  a  striking  force  of 
carriers  and  their  supporting  vessels. 

The  counter  measures  to  be  considered  are : 

(a)  Location  and  engagement  of  enemy  carriers  and  supporting  vessels  before 
air  attack  can  be  launched ; 

(2)  Location  and  engagement  of  enemy  aircraft  before  they  reach  their 
objectives ; 

(c)  Repulse  of  enemy  aircraft  by  anti-aircraft  fire. 

(d)  Concealment  of  vital  installations  by  artificial  smoke; 

(e)  Protection  of  vital  installations  by  balloon  barrages. 

The  operations  set  forth  in  (a)  are  largely  functions  of  the  Fleet  but,  quite 
possibility,  might  not  be  carried  out  in  case  [723]  of  an  air  attack  initiated 
without  warning  prior  to  a  declaration  of  war. 


280       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Pursuit  aircraft  in  large  numbers  and  an  effective  warning  net  are  required 
for  the  operations  in  (b).  It  is  understood  that  only  thirty-six  Army  pursuit 
aircraft  are  at  present  in  Oahn,  and  that,  while  the  organization  and  equipping 
of  an  Anti-Air  Information  Service  supported  by  modern  fire  control  equip- 
ment is  in  progress,  the  present  system  relies  wholly  on  visual  observation  and 
sound  locators  which  are  only  effective  up  to  four  miles. 

Available  Army  anti-aircraft  batteries  appear  inadequate  if  judged  by  the 
standards  of  the 'war  in  Europe.  There  are  now  in  Oahu  26  3"  fixed  anti-air- 
craft guns  (of  which  something  over  half  are  grouped  about  Pearl  Harbor),  56 
mobile  3"  guns,  and  109  .50  caliber  machine  guns.  The  anti-aircraft  batteries 
are  manned  in  part  by  personnel  which  is  also  required  to  man  parts  of  the  sea 
coast  artillery.  Should  an  attack  on  Oahu  combine  air  attack  with  a  gun 
bombardment,  one  of  the  other  countering  fires  would  suffer  from  lack  of  men. 
If  the  prevailing  high  ceiling  is  taken  into  account  the  caliber  of  the  anti-aircraft 
guns  might  be  inadequate  against  high  altitude  bombing  attack. 

By  late  summer  the  defenses  wil  be  considerably  strengthened  by  additions  in 
guns,  planes,  and  radio  locators.  It  is  understood,  sixteen  additional  3"  Mobile, 
twenty-four  90-mm.,  [7241  and  one  hundred  twenty  37-mm.  guns  will  be  on 
hand ;  the  pursuit  aircraft  strength  is  to  be  expanded  to  a  total  of  149 ;  the  new 
radio  locators  will  have  an  effective  range  of  100  miles.  Although  the  caliber  of 
the  guns  will  still  be  small  for  effective  action  against  high  altitude  bombers,  this 
augmentation  will  markedly  improve  the  security  of  the  Fleet.  It  does  not,  of 
course,  affect  the  critical  period  immediately  before  us. 

The  supplementary  measures  noted  in  (d)  and  (e)  might  be  of  the  greatest 
value  in  the  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor.  Balloon  barrages  have  demonstrated 
some  usefulness  in  Europe.  Smoke  from  fixed  installations  on  the  ground  might 
prove  most  advantageous. 

To  meet  the  needs  of  the  situation,  I  offer  the  following  proposals  : 

(1)  That  the  Army  assign  the  highest  priority  to  the  increase  of  pursuit  air- 
craft and  antiaircraft  artillery,  and  the  establishment  of  an  air  warning  net  in 
Hawaii. 

(2)  That  the  Army  give  consideration  to  the  questions  of  balloon  barrages, 
the  employment  of  smoke,  and  other  special  services  for  improving  the  defenses 
of  Pearl  Harbor. 

(3)  That  local  joint  plans  be  drawn  for  the  effective  coordination  of  naval 
and  military  aircraft  operations,  and  ship  and  shore  anti-aircraft  gun  fire, 
against  surprise  aircraft  raids. 

(4)  That  the  Arniy  and  Navy  forces  in  Oahu  agree  on  appropriate  degrees  of 
joint  readiness  for  immediate  action  in  defense  against  surprise  aircraft  raids 
against  Pearl  Harbor. 

[725]  (5)  That  joint  exercises,  designed  to  prepare  Army  and  Navy  forces 
in  Oahu  for  defense  against  surprise  aircraft  raids,  be  held  at  least  once  weekly 
so  long  as  the  present  uncertainty  continues  to  exist. 

Your  concurrence  in  these  proposals  and  the  rapid  implementing  of  the  measures 
to  be  taken  by  the  Army,  which  are  of  the  highest  importance  to  the  security  of 
the  Fleet,  will  be  met  with  the  closest  cooperation  on  the  part  of  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment. 

Then  attached  to  that  is  the  reply  of  Mr.  Henry  L.  Stimson,  Secre- 
tary of  War,  dated  February  7, 1941 : 
[726]  War  Department, 

Washington,  Fel.  7, 1941. 
Subject :    Air  Defense  of  Pearl  Harbor,  Hawaii. 
To:  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

1.  In  replying  to  your  letter  of  January  24,  regarding  the  possibility  of  surprise 
attacks  upon  the  Fleet  or  the  Naval  Base  at  Pearl  Harbor,  I  wish  to  express  com- 
plete concurrence  as  to  the  importance  of  this  matter  and  the  urgency  of  our 
making  every  possible  preparation  to  meet  such  a  hostile  effort.  The  Hawaiian 
Department  is  the  best  equipped  of  all  our  overseas  departments,  and  continues 
to  hold  a  higli  priority  for  the  completion  of  its  projected  defenses  because  of  the 
importance  of  giving  full  protection  to  the  Fleet. 

2.  The  Hawaiian  Project  provides  for  one  hundred  and  forty-eight  pursuit 
planes.  There  are  now  in  Hawaii  thirty-six  pursuit  planes;  nineteen  of  these 
are  P-36's  and  seventeen  are  of  somewhat  less  efficiency.  I  am  arranging  to 
have  thirty-one  P-36  pursuit  planes  assembled  at  San  Diego  for  shipment  to 
Hawaii  within  the  next  ten  days,  as  agreed  to  with  the  Navy  Department.    This 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  281 

will  bring  the  Armv  pursuit  group  in  Hawaii  up  to  fifty  of  the  P-3G  type  and 
seventeen  of  a  somewhat  less  efficient  type.  In  addition,  fifty  of  the  new  P-40-F 
pursuit  planes,  with  their  guns,  leakproof  tanl^s  [727]  and  modern  armor 
will  be  assembled  at  San  Diego  about  March  15  for  shipment  by  carrier  to 

3  Tliere  are  at  present  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  eighty-two  3-inch  AA  guns, 
twenty  37  mm  AA  guns  (en  route),  and  one  hundred  and  nine  caliber  .50  AA 
machine  guns.  The  total  project  calls  for  ninety-eight  3-inch  AA  guns,  one 
hundred  and  twenty  37  mm  AA  guns,  and  three  hundred  and  eight  caliber  .uO  AA 
machine  guns.  ,  ^  ^,        * 

4  With  reference  to  the  Aircraft  Warning  Service,  the  equipment  therefor 
has  been  ordered  and  will  be  delivered  in  Hawaii  in  June.  All  arrangements 
for  installation  will  have  been  made  by  the  time  the  equipment  is  delivered. 
Inquiry  develops  the  information  that  delivery  of  the  necessary  equipment 
cannot  be  made  at  an  earlier  date. 

5.  The  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department,  is  being  directed  to  give 
immediate  consideration  to  the  question  of  the  employment  of  balloon  barrages 
and  the  use  of  smoke  in  protecting  the  Fleet  and  base  facilities.  Barrage 
balloons  are  not  available  at  the  present  time  for  installation  and  cannot  be 
made  available  prior  to  the  summer  of  1941.  At  present  there  are  three  on 
hand  and  eighty-four  being  manufactured— forty  for  delivery  by  June  30,  1941, 
and  the  remainder  by  September.  The  Budget  now  has  under  consideration 
funds  for  two  thousand  nine  hundred  and  fifty  balloons.  The  value  of  smoke 
for  screening  vital  areas  on  Oahu  is  a  controversial  subject.  Qualified  [728] 
opinion  is  that  atmospheric  and  geographic  conditions  in  Oahu  render  the  employ- 
ment of  smoke  impracticable  for  large  scale  screening  operations.  However,  the 
Commanding  General  will  look  into  this  matter  again. 

6.  With  reference  to  your  other  proposals  for  joint  defense,  I  am  forwarding 
a  copy  of  your  letter  and  this  reply  to  the  Commanding  General,  Hawiian 
Department,  and  am  directing  him  to  cooperate  with  the  local  naval  authorities 
in  making  those  measures  effective. 

Signed  by  Henry  L.  Stimson,  Seci-etary  of  War. 

[7£9]  Attached  to  that  is  a  letter  of  transmittal  from  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations  to  the  commander  in  chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 

"Subject:  Air  Defense  of  Pearl  Harbor,  Hawaii,"  and  copy  of 
Secretary  Knox's  letter,  and  one  of  Secretary  Stimson's  letters ;  trans- 
mitted under  date  of  February  11, 1941. 

And  another,  addressed  to  the  the  commanding  general,  Hawiian 
Department,  signed  by  General  Dick,-  Adjutant  General,  dated  Feb- 
ruary 7,  1941,  inviting  attention  to  the  correspondence  I  have  just 
read  between  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  the  Secretary  of  War. 

And  attached  then  is  a  document  dated  February  13,  1941,  signed 
by  Carl  Grosse,  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  Headquarters,  Hawiian 
Department,  acknowledging  receipt  of  the  Adjutant  General's  letter 
of  February  7,  together  with  the  two  enclosures  noted. 

They  are  all  part  of  the  same  exhibit  (No.  10) . 

[730]  Now,  Admiral  Kichardson,  had  you  left  Hawaii  before 
February  11  and  13  when  this  Knox-Stimson  matter  was  up? 

Admiral  Richaedson.  I  was  relieved  of  command  of  the  fleet  on 
the  1st  of  February  1941.  Thereafter  I  knew  nothing  about  fleet 
matters,  although  I  did  not  actually  leave  the  islands  until  the  14th 
of  February. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  then,  this  correspondence  between  the  Navy 
and  the  War  Department  that  I  have  just  read,  that  reached  there 
February  11  and  13,  would  not  have  come  to  your  hands? 

Admiral  Richardson.  This  is  the  first  time  it  has  come  to  my 
notice. 

Mr,  Mitchell.  Now,  going  back  to  your  visits  with  Secretary  Hull 
and  Secretary  Knox,  which  was  your  first  trip  here  in  1940,  along  in 


282       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

July,  you  said  you  went  to  Mr.  Hull  and  others  to  find  out  what  the 
situation  was,  why  you  were  being  kept  at  Pearl  Harbor.  I  neglected 
to  ask  you  what  Mr.  Hull  said,  if  he  gave  the  reason  for  it. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Mr.  Hull  in  a  very  complete  and  comprehen- 
sive manner  presented  to  me  his  views  of  the  relationships,  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan.  He  felt  that  we  should  take  a 
very  strong  position  with  respect  to  Japan  and  that  the  retention 
of  the  fleet  in  Hawaii  was  a  reflection  of  that  strong  attitude. 

[7S1]  I  did  not  receive  this  impression  from  Secretary  Hull,  and 
I  cannot  state  with  certainty  how  I  received  it,  but  I  left  here  with  the 
distinct  impression  that  there  was  an  opinion  in  Washington  that 
Japan  could  be  bluffed. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  when  you  were  here  during  that  trip  you 
visited  with  Admiral  Stark,  I  suppose  ? 

Admiral  Eichardson.  I  did.  I  stayed  with  Admiral  Stark  at  the 
Admiral's  house. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  your  contact  with  him  did  you  gather  any  differ- 
ent impression  about  his  attitude  toward  basing  the  fleet  at  Pearl 
Harbor  instead  of  on  our  west  coast  than  he  expressed  in  these  letters? 

Admiral  Richaedson.  It  is  my  belief  that  had  Admiral  Stark  been 
uninfluenced  by  other  considerations  he  would  have  wholeheartedly 
agreed  with  me. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  just  what  did  he  say  about  it  in  your  meetings 
with  him,  if  you  remember. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  his  letters,  I  think,  in  many  places 
show  that  he  hoped  that  the  fleet  would  return  to  the  west  coast,  and 
after  the  fleet  had  been  in  Hawaii  for  some  time  he  authorized  me  to 
return  approximately  one-third  of  the  fleet  to  the  coast  at  a  time 
for  recreation  and  replenislunent  and  the  securing  of  additional  men, 
and  when  he  informed  me  that  I  might  do  that  he  said  that  he  in- 
formed me  with  great  [732]  pleasure.  And  I  believe  that  I 
came  with  either  the  first  or  the  second  one  of  those  task  forces  that 
visited  the  coast. 

Mr.  JMiTCHELL.  During  1940^  when  you  were  in  command  of  the 
fleet,  did  you  have  fleet  war  games  out  in  the  Hawaiian  area  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  We  had,  wliile  I  was  in  command  of  the  fleet, 
only  one  big  fleet  exercise  which  involved  two  fleet  propers.  They 
took  place  between  the  first  of  April  and  the  9th  of  May. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  any  of  those  exercises  involve  a  simulated  air 
attack  by  an  enemy  carrier  force  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Those  exercises  did  not.  The  exercises  were 
planned  by  my  predecessor.  They  did  not  include  a  carrier  attack 
on  Pearl  Harbor.  And  joint  exercises  with  the  Army  were  discussed 
by  Admiral  Stark  with  me  in  letters,  and  it  was  too  late  to  modify 
the  plans,  and  in  those  exercises  the  only  exercises  in  which  the  Army 
participated  was,  I  believe,  on  the  8th  or  9th  of  April.  I  sent  some 
heavy  cruisers  in  to  simulate  an  attempted  raid  in  order  to  exercise 
the  forces  stationed  in  Hawaii,  the  Navy  patrol  planes,  in  locating  the 
force  and  the  Army  bombers  in  bombing  it,  and  the  submarine  stations 
normally  in  Pearl  Harbor  in  attacking  the  force,  which  was  simulating 
an  attack,  so  that  there  was  not  a  large  scale  joint  exercise  between 
[73S]  the  Army  and  the  Navy  in  which  a  carrier  raid  on  installa- 
tions in  Hawaii  occurred,  although  in  previous  years,  when  I  was  in  a 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  283 

position  other  than  commander  in  chief,  I  had  been  present  in  the  fleet 
when  such  attacks  were  made. 

[734-]  Mr.  Mitchell,  I  think  we  are  ready  for  the  committee  to 
inquire  of  the  witness. 

The  Chaikman,  Admiral,  who  was  your  immediate  predecessor  as 
commander  of  the  United  States  Fleet  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  relieved  Admiral  Claude  C.  Bloch. 

The  Chairman.  Wliat  is  the  technical  relationship  between  the 
commander  in  chief  of  the  fleet,  such  as  that  which  you  were  com- 
mander of,  and  the  commandant  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  commandant  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval 
District  is  a  subordinate  of  the  commander  in  chief.  He  is  also  under 
the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  with  respect  to  other  than  fleet  matters. 

The  Chairman,  ^Vlien  the  fleet  is  at  sea  does  the  commandant  of  the 
Fourteenth  Naval  District  have  complete  authority  within  that  district 
or  is  he  still  subject  to  orders  of  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  fleet? 

Admiral  Richardson,  He  is  always  subject  to  the  orders  of  the 
commander  in  chief.  Because  the  commander  in  chief  may  not  be 
present  in  Pearl  Harbor  he  is  the  representative  of  the  commander 
in  chief  in  dealings  with  the  commanding  general. 

The  Chairsian.  Yes.  Now,  up  to  the  time  when  you  were  detached, 
the  force  of  which  you  were  commander  in  chief  was  [735] 
known  as  the  United  States  Fleet,  is  that  true  ? 

Admiral  Richardson,  That  is  correct,  because  at  that  time  the 
commander  in  chief  of  the  United  States  Fleet  had  command  of  all 
the  ships  in  the  Atlantic  that  were  in  commission  and  not  operating 
directly  under  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  as  a  ship  would  be  were 
she  undergoing  shake-down  preparatorj'  to  joining  the  fleet. 

The  Chairman,  So  that  during  the  time  when  you  were  com- 
mander in  chief  of  the  United  States  Fleet  that  meant  that  you  were 
the  commander  in  chief  of  the  entire  fleet  ? 

Admiral  Richardson,  That  is  true. 

The  Chairman.  No  matter  where  it  was  located  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true. 

The  Chairman.  Now,  there  was  a  reorganization  that  was  some- 
what coincident  with  your  detachment  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Absolutely  coincident. 

The  Chairman,  And  they  divided  the  fleet  into  the  Pacific  Fleet  and 
the  Asiatic  Fleet? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No. 

The  Chairman.  No? 

Admiral  Richardson.  There  had  always  been  a  small  force  known 
as  the  Asiatic  Fleet  that  was  not  under  the  command  of  the  commander 
in  chief  of  the  United  States  Fleet  but  passed  under  his  command  in 
case  the  United  States  Fleet  moved  [736]  to  the  western 
Pacific. 

The  Chahiman.  Well,  on  the  1st  of  February,  then,  1941  approxi- 
mately, the  Pacific  Fleet  as  such  came  into  existence  ? 

Admiral  Richardson,  It  did.  The  title  and  the  position  of  com- 
mander in  chief  United  States  Fleet  disappeared  and  in  lieu  thereof 
there  was  established  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet, 
which  commanded  all  the  ships  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  that  were  not 
part  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  and  were  not  operating  directly  under  the 


284       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  There  was  a  commander  in  chief  Atlan- 
tic Fleet,  who  commanded  all  the  combatant  ships  in  commission  in 
the  Atlantic  Fleet  except  those  that  were  operating  directly  under 
the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

The  Chairman.  When  did  you  become  commander  in  chief  of  the 
United  States  Fleet? 

Admiral  Eichardson.  On  January  6,  1940. 

The  Chairman.  So  that  you  were  in  command  of  the  fleet  approxi- 
mately 13  months  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

The  Chairman.  Was  Admiral  Kimmel  associated  with  the  fleet 
under  j^our  command  in  the  Pacific? 

Admiral  Richardson.  He  was.  He  was  in  the  fleet  under  the  com- 
mand of,  or  the  immediate  senior  under  Admiral  Stark  before  I  be- 
came commander  in  chief  and  before  Admiral  Stark  [737]  be- 
came Chief  of  Naval  Operations.  In  fact,  he  relieved  Admiral  Stark 
as  commander  of  the  cruisers  and  from  that  position  he  relieved  me. 

The  Chairman.  What  relationship  did  he  occupy  in  authority  with 
respect  to  you  as  commander  in  chief  of  the  fleet?  Was  he  senior 
officer  under  you  or  how  far  down  the  line  did  he  go  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Admiral  Kimmel  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  he  was  very  far  down.  He  was  a 
rear  admiral  and  under  me  came  first  the  commander  of  the  battle 
force,  who  was  an  admiral.  Then  commander  of  the  scouting  force 
and  commander  of  battleships,  who  were  both  vice  admirals.  Then 
Admiral  Kimmel  commanded  the  cruisers  and  as  such  he  was  on  the 
same  level  as  the  commander  of  the  battleships,  the  commander  of 
the  destroyers  and  the  commander  of  the  aircraft. 

The  Chairman.  And  he  was  commander  of  all  the  cruisers  then  in 
the  force? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  what  we  call  a  type  commander. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  Now,  in  this  correspondence  between  Ad- 
miral Stark  and  you,  you  continuously  emphasized  your  belief  that 
the  fleet  should  be  based  on  the  Pacific  coast  rather  than  in  the  Hawai- 
ian Islands  or  Oahu? 

[738]         Admiral  Richardson.  I  did  that. 

The  Chairman.  And  there  were,  as  I  gather  from  the  correspond- 
ence, manj'  reasons  for  that  opinion  on  your  part,  one  among  them 
being  that  you  had  larger  areas  for  training  of  the  aircraft  force  and 
the  other  activities  of  training  the  men  and  also  that  you  believed  that 
the  morale  of  the  men  would  be  improved  by  being  closer  to  their 
homes  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true. 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  presented  solely  the  naval  point  of  view. 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  There  are  other  considerations  that  at  times 
determined  the  disposition  of  the  fleet  or  the  units  thereof. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  And  in  your  correspondence  with  the  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations  and  in  your  conversations  with  him  in  Washing- 
ton and  with  the  Secretary  of  State  and  with  the  President  you  were 
impressed  with  their  belief  that  in  addition  to  naval  reasons  that  there 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  285 

was  probably  a  diplomatic  or  other,  maj^be  psychological,  reason  for 
keeping  the  fleet  in  that  area  as  a  deterrent  against  activities  on  the 
part  of  Japan? 

Admiral  Riciiardsox.  Absolutely. 

[739]  The  Chairman.  Now,  when  you  were  in  Washington  you 
3mphasized  the  fact  that  you  needed  more  men  and  that  the  Navy  was 
beign  vastly  expanded  and  that  men  were  not  coming  in  as  fast  as  ships 
were  being  built  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

The  Chairman.  That  you  needed  more  men  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did  it  in  and  out.  of  port,  everywhere. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  Then  you  referred  to  5,000  men  that  were 
allotted  to  you  on  one  of  your  trips  here,  or  while  you  were  here  on 
one  of  your  trips  and  that  you  sent  them  out  to  the  Hawaiian  area  on 
a  carrier,  did  you  say  ? 

Admiral  Ricpiardson.  Those  that  I  was  unable  to  accommodate  in 
the  ships  that  came  with  me  to  the  west  coast  I  sent  out  to  Pearl  Harbor 
in  a  carrier. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  Following  3"our  detachment  from  the  fleet 
you  became  a  member  of  the  General  Board  of  the  Navy  here  in 
Washington  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  that  is  all  I  want  to  ask  at  this  time.  Sen- 
ator George? 

Senator  George.  I  don't  care  to  ask  aii}^  questions  at  the  present 
time. 

Tlie  Chairman.  Congressman  Cooper? 

[740']  The  Vice  Chairman.  I  don't  think  I  have  any  questions 
now,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Lucas? 

Senator  Lucas.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  should  like  to  ask  the  admiral 
two  or  three  questions. 

In  your  memorandum  of  September  12,  19i0,  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  you  submitted  a  number  of  pertinent  points  to  be  considered, 
among  which  were  the  operations  of  the  fleet  and  in  that  part  of  the 
memorandum  you  discussed  the  problems  involved  if  the  fleet  was 
to  be  retained  in  Hawaiian  waters. 

As  I  understand  it,  those  points  of  disadvantage  that  you  stressed 
in  that  memorandum  were  purely  problems  from  a  naval  standpoint 
and  nothing  else? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Oil,  absolutely. 

Senator  Lucas.  All  right.  Now,  you  set  forth  seven  points,  seven 
disadvantages  to  basing  the  fleet  in  that  area.  Those  points  have 
been  gone  over  by  counsel  and  yourself  and  I  was  anxious  to  determine 
from  you  as  to  whether  or  not  at  that  time  you  considered  the  question 
of  the  possibility  of  a  hostile  air  attack  from  some  aggressor  nation, 
in  connection  with  not  basing  the  fleet  in  the  Hawaiian  waters? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  had  not  considered  that  it  was  likely  that 
the  fleet  would  be  attacked  by  a  carrier  raid  T^^-?]  and  I  so 
stated  repeatedly  in  security  orders  issued  to  the  fleet. 

The  Chairman.  Will  the  admiral  desist  for  a  moment?  The  Chair 
announced  at  the  beginning  of  these  hearings  that  the  photographers 
would  not  be  permitted  in  this  areaway.     It  interferes  with  the  wit- 

79716— 46— pt.  1 21 


286       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

nesses,  with  the  counsel,  and  with  the  committee,  and  I  hope  that  my 
friend  will  observe  that  rule  hereafter.     You  may  proceed,  Senator. 

Senator  Lucas.  This  memorandum  was  in  June  1940,  and  if  I  un- 
derstand you  correctly.  Admiral,  the  possibility  of  a  hostile  air  attack 
on  the  fleet  was  not  considered  in  making  up  the  recommendations 
which  the  authorities  here  in  Washington  should  study  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Lucas.  And  the  question  of  a  submarine  attack  was  not  con- 
sidered either  in  connection  with  those  plans  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have  difficulty  in  hearing  the  Senator. 

Senator  Lucas.  I  say  the  question  of  a  submarine  attack  by  a  hostile 
force  was  not  considered  in  1940  either  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No.  I  think  my  view  is  clearly  presented  in 
a  document  before  the  committee  which  says : 

The  security  of  the  Fleet  operating  and  based  in  the  Hawaiian  Area  may  rea- 
sonably be  based  on  two  assump-        [7^2]        tions : 

(A)  That  no  responsible  foreign  power  will  provoke  war,  under  present  exist- 
ing conditions,  by  attack  on  the  Fleet  or  Base,  but  that  irresponsible  and  mis- 
guided nationals  of  such  powers  may  attempt ; 

(1)  sabotage  from  small  craft  on  ships  based  in  Pearl  Harbor, 

(2)  to  block  the  Entrance  Channel  to  Pear  Harbor  by  sinking  an  obstruc- 
tion in  the  Channel, 

(3)  lay  magnetic  or  other  mines  in  the  approaches  to  Pearl  Harbor. 

So  that,  actually,  before  I  left  the  fleet  we  were  sweeping  the  channel 
against  magnetic  mines. 

Senator  Lucas.  How  long  was  it  after  you  gave  your  seven  points 
of  disadvantage  to  keeping  the  fleet  in  Hawaii  that  the  order  of 
Admiral  Andrews  was  issued  to  start  the  patrol  which  you  discussed? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Admiral  Andrews'  order  did  not  start  a 
patrol  . 

Senator  Lucas.  What  was  that  order  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  modified  the  patrol  that  I  had  in  existence. 

Senator  Lucas.  I  see,  all  right.  And  when  did  that  patrol  go  into 
existence  that  you  had.  Admiral  ? 

[7^]  Admiral  Richardson.  It  started  the  day  that  the  fleet  ar- 
rived in  the  Hawaiian  area  on  the  10th  of  April. 

Senator  Lucas.  1940? 

Admiral  Richardson.  1940,  purely  as  a  part  of  the  fleet  exercise  for 
training  purposes. 

Senator  Lucas.  For  training  purposes  only  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Lucas.  And  how  long  did  that  continue  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  continued  until,  I  think,  the  30th  of 
December  1940. 

Senator  Lucas.  Well,  how  did  the  admiral's  order  augment  that? 
I  had  just  forgotten  your  statement  a  moment  ago. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Initially  the  long-range  patrol,  so-called,  but 
it  was  not  a  long-range  patrol,  it  was  to  180  miles  centered  on  Lahaina 
between  the  arc  of  220  and  235,  as  I  remember,  but  I  can  verify  that — 
220  to  335  to  180  miles. 

Now,  when  the  Army  received  an  alert  Admiral  Andrews  shifted 
the  center  from  Lahaina  to  Pearl  Harbor  and  increased  the  distance 
to  300  miles  and  changed  the  arc  from  180  through  west  to  north. 
Later  on  I  modified  that  patrol. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  287 

Senator  Lucas.  Yes.  Now,  before  you  leave  the  patrol,  how  long 
did  that  continue  ? 

Admiral  Kichabdson.  The  patrol  established  by  Admiral  Andrews  ? 

[744]         Senator  Lucas.  That  is  right. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  am  not  certain,  but  I  think  it  continued  as 
long  as  the  Army  maintained  their  alert  which  was,  as  I  remember, 
almost  a  month. 

Senator  Lucas.  Now,  how  many  planes  were  being  used  on  that 
patrol  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  haven't  the  faintest  idea. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  is  an  Army  question  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  haven't  any  idea. 

Senator  Lucas.  Did  the  Navy  use  any  planes  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Oh,  the  Army  used  no  planes. 

Senator  Lucas.  But  you  don't  know  how  many  planes  the  Navy 
used  on  that  patrol  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No. 

Senator  Lucas.  Well,  who  would  know  that  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  doubt  if  anybody  would  know 

Senator  Lucas.  Well,  weren't  you 

Admiral  Richardson — Because  you  cannot  remember,  at  least,  the 
commander  in  chief  cannot  remember,  details  of  activities  after  5 
years. 

Senator  Lucas.  Well,  did  you  make  any  record  of  the  daily  patrols 
that  were  made  by  these  planes  from  the  ships  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No.  You  established  it  in  an  order  and  for- 
got it,  assuming  that  it  would  be  carried  out. 

[745]  Senator  Lucas.  You  do  not  recall?  You  wouldn't  want 
to  make  a  guess  as  to  how  many  planes  daily  went  out  on  this  patrol 
to  cover  this  arc  that  was  established  by  the  admiral  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No  ;  I  would  not  hazarf'.  a  guess  and  the  only 
possible  source  of  information  of  any  reliability  would  be  in  the  files 
of  the  commander  in  chief  and  the  files 

Senator  Lucas.  Of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  ? 

Admiral  Richardson  (continuing).  Become  very  voluminous  and 
are  normally  retained  active  only  about  2  or  3  years. 

Senator  Lucas.  Do  I  understand  that  at  that  particular  time  the 
planes  that  were  on  the  sea  on  the  Enterprise,  that  were  making  daily 
flights  in  training,  that  there  was  no  record  of  the  number  of  planes 
that  went  out  and  when  they  came  back  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  every  ship  keeps  in  her  log  a  record  of 
everything  that  it  does. 

Senator  Lucas.  Well,  that  is  what  I  thought. 

Admiral  Richardson.  AncJ  in  the  patrol  squadrons  there  would 
undoubtedly  be  maintained  a  record  of  when  the  planes  left  and  when 
they  returned. 

Senator  Lucas.  Now,  who  would  have  the  record  of  the  patrol,  of 
the  men  who  were  making  the  determination  of  the  number  of  planes 
that  were  going  out  on  this  patrol  in  line  [74(j]  with  the  order 
that  was  augmented  by  Admiral  Andrews  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  Admiral  Andrews'  order  to  the  officer 
in  command  of  the  patrol  wing  would  tell  him  how  many  planes  to 


288       CONGRESSIOI^AL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

use,  when  to  start  out,  how  far  they  would  go,  when  they  would 
return. 

Senator  Lucas.  Well,  was  that  Admiral  Andrews'  responsibility 
then? 

Admiral  Kichaedson.  What? 

Senator  Lucas.  Would  that  be  Admiral  Andrews'  responsibility 
for  issuing  the  order  and  for  the  keeping  of  the  record  of  the  planes? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No  ;  he-  would  not  keep  a  record.  In  con- 
sultation with  the  commander  of  the  patrol  wing,  which  I  think  was 
Patrol  Wing  2,  he  would  issue  the  order  in  general  terms.  The  com- 
mander of  Patrol  Wing  2  would  implement  it  and  record  his  com- 
pliance. . 

Senator  Lucas.  All  right.  Later  on,  Admiral,  you  modified  this 
order  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did. 

Senator  Lucas.  Just  how  did  you  do  it,  now  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Because  of  the  number  of  planes  that  were 
available  and  because  of  the  need  for  training  men,  I  modified  the 
patrol  to  cover  periodically  an  arc  between  170°,  which  is  10°  to  the 
east  of  south  and  [74-7]  350°,  and  I  covered  daily  an  iarc,  a 
sector  of  that  arc  and  in  order  that  it  might  not  be  evident  to  Japanese 
residents  of  Oahu  that  I  was  searching  the  same  sector  every  day,  I 
rotated  that  sector. 

Senator  Lucas.  All  right.  Now,  one  further  question  and  then 
I  will  be  through. 

With  respect  to  the  letter  that  you  wrote  to  Admiral  Stark  after 
General  Herron,  as  I  understood  you  to  say,  had  been  notified  that 
an  alert  was  on  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  you  did  not  receive  any  in- 
formation at  that  time  from  anyone  in  Washington,  D.  C,  about 
that? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Not  at  that  time. 

Senator  Lucas.  You  later  said  that  you  wrote  to  Admiral  Stark 
about  the  type  of  alert  that  was  on  and  that  you. had  never  received 
any  answer  from  him. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Oh,  I  telegTaphed  him,  I  mean  I  sent  him 
a  radio  and  asked  him  what  it  was  all  about. 

Senator  Lucas.  And  you  never  received  any  reply  to  that  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Never. 

Senator  Lucas.  Did  you  ever  talk  to  Admiral  Stark  after  that  as 
to  why  he  did  not  reply  to  that  important  message  of  yours? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  talked  to  both  Admiral  Stark  and  [748] 
General  Marshall. 

Senator  Lucas.  What  did  Admiral  Stark  say  as  to  the  reason  he 
did  not  reply  after  this  type  of  alert  went  out  to  the  islands  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  He  said  it  was  an  exercise,  an  Army  exercise. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  is  what  Admiral  Stark  said  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Lucas.  And  he  did  not  think  it  was  sufficiently  important, 
even  though  he  had  received  a  message  from  you,  he  did  not  think  it 
was  important  enough  to  make  reply  to  you? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  he  knew  that  I  had  enough  confidence 
in  him  to  know  that  if  it  were  the  real  thing  he  would  have  told  me. 

Senator  Lucas.  But  vou  did  send  him  a  wire  ? 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  289 

Admiral  Richardson,  I  did. 

Senator  Lucas.  And  asked  him  about  it  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did. 

Senator  Lucas.  You  wanted  to  find  out  for  yourself  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  wanted  an  answer,  too. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  is  right.  One  other  question,  if  I  may.  Over 
in  one  of  these  letters  in  reading  this  correspondence  I  note  this, 
Admiral.  In  your  letter  of  May  13,  [749]  1940,  addressed  to 
Admiral  Stark — at  that  time  you  were  then  still  discussing  the  reasons 
pro  and  con  as  to  why  the  fleet  should  or  should  not  be  based  in 
Hawaiian  waters — in  this  letter  you  state  this : 

It  seems  that  under  present  world  conditions  the  paramount  thing  for  us  is 
the  security  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  This,  in  my  opinion,  transcends  every- 
thing, anything,  certainly,  in  the  Far  East,  our  own  or  other  interests.  South 
America  is  the  greatest  prize  yet  remaining  to  be  grabbed. 

Who  did  you  expect  to  grab  South  America  in  that  letter? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  Senator,  I  haven't  a  copy  of  that 
letter. 

Senator  Lucas.  It  would  be  interesting  to  loiow  because 

Admiral  Richardson.  May  what? 

Senator  Lucas.  This  is  May  13, 1940. 

The  Chairman,  If  the  Admiral  is  in  a  position  to  answer  that  ques- 
tion he  may  do  so.    We  have  gone  past  our  adjourning  hour. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Oh,  I  have  that. 

Senator  Lucas,  I  am  sure  you  and  I  agree  on  the  same  thing,  prob- 
ably, as  to  who  we  thought  might  grab  South  America,  but  it  was 
just  interesting  to  get  your  further  reactions. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  I  didn't  want  anybody  to  grab  [750'] 
South  America. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  stand  in  recess  until  2  o'clock. 

(Wliereupon,  at  12 :  05  p.  m.,  a  recess  was  taken  until  2  p,  m.  of  the 
same  day.) 

[751]  AFTERNOON  SESSION — 2  :  00  P.  M. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

When  we  recessed  Senator  Lucas  was  examining  Admiral  Richard- 
son.   You  may  resume. 

Senator  Lucas.  Admiral  Richardson,  in  one  of  your  statements 
made  before  the  committee  this  morning  you  stated  that  you  were 
certain  that  the  Navy  could  have  been  alerted  as  well  as  the  Army 
had  it  been  any  other  thing  than  a  drill. 

Admiral  Richardon.  Correct, 

Senator  Lucas.  Later  on  you  told  the  committee,  and  told  me  on 
examination,  that  you  wired,  you  radioed,  I  think  you  said,  Admiral 
Stark,  asking  him  directly  in  this  radiogram  what  the  alert  meant, 
and  you  received  no  reply. 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Lucas  Later  on  you  had  a  talk  with  Admiral  Stark  here 
in  Washington  and  in  that  conversation  with  the  Admiral  he  advised 
you  that  it  was  merely  a  drill  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Lucas.  You  also  said  that  while  you  were  here  you  had  a 
conversation  with  General  Marshall  on  that  same  question. 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 


290       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Lucas.  Will  you,  give  to  the  committee  what  General 
Marshall  said  about  the  alert? 

[7S£]  Admiral  Richardson.  I  told  General  Marshall  that  the 
commanding  general  of  the  Hawaiian  Department  had  received  an 
alert,  that  I  was  certain  that  it  was  a  drill,  but  a  situation  had  been 
created  where  there  was  some  uncertainty  and  some  uneasiness,  and 
that  I  would  like  to  know  what  was  the  purpose  of  the  alert  dispatch 
sent  by  him. 

He  said : 

Oh,  that  was  simply  an  exercise  and  I  thought  if  I  did  not  state  that  it  was  an 
exercise  the  exercise  would  be  carried  out  more  completely. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  is  about  the  end  of  the  conversation,  I  take  it! 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  is  all,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Murphy. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Admiral,  you  stated  previously 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  will  state  that  Congressman  Clark  would 
be  the  next  in  order  but  he  is  not  here  at  the  moment. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Admiral,  you  stated  in  your  examination  that  you 
and  Admiral  Stark  were  close  personal  friends  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Had  been.  Admiral  Stark  entered  the  Naval 
Academy  1  year  after  I  did., 

Mr.  Murphy.  When  in  Washington  you  stayed  at  his  home? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did.  He  served  with  me  when  we  [753] 
were  both  ensigns. 

Mr.  Murphy.  What  was  the  attitude  of  Admiral  Stark  in  regard  to 
the  location  of  the  fleet  at  Hawaii  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  from  all  that  he  said  to  me,  and  from 
all  that  he  wrote  to  me,  I  gathered  that  he  was  fully  in  sympathy 
with  me.  Of  course,  he  was  more  closely  in  touch  with  diplomatic 
considerations  than  I  was. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Did  you  receive  a  message  from  Admiral  Stark  dated 
March  15, 1940? 

Admiral  Richardson.  A  letter  ? 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  understand  that  on  March  15,  1940,  Admiral  Stark 
sent  you  a  message  in  which  he  declared,  despite  your  many  doubts, 
that  the  policy  of  keeping  the  fleet  units  in  Hawaiian  waters  was  sound, 
and  that  the  State  Department  was  very  strong  for  it.  Did  you  re- 
ceive such  a  communication  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  communication  did  not  refer  to  the 
retention  of  the  fleet  in  the  Hawaiian  waters,  for  the  reason  that  the 
fleet  had  not  arrived  in  the  Hawaiian  waters  at  that  date.  That  re- 
ferred to(  the  Hawaiian  detachment  which  was  sent  to  the  Hawaiian 
area  the  fall  preceding,  I  think,  September  or  October  1939. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Do  you  know  of  any  written  memorandum,  by  letter 
or  otherwise,  where  at  any  time  Admiral  Stark  stated  his  position  as 
to  whether  or  not  the  fleet  should  be  assigned         [7-54]         to  Hawaii  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  He  stated  repeatedly  that  he  hoped  we  would 
return  and  that  our  delay  in  Hawaiian  waters  would  not  be  unduly 
prolonged. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Will  you  state — give  me  a  reference  to  any  communi- 
cation that  you  know  where  Admiral  Stark  made  his  position  clear  in 
writing? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  291 

Senator  Brewster.  May  I  be  permitted  to  speak? 

Mr.  Murphy.  Do  you  want  to  help  me  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  On  the  7th  of  May  in  a  letter  to  mei  he  says : 

Just  hung  up  the  telephone  after  talking  with  the  President  and  by  the  time  this 
reaches  you  you  will  have  received  word  to  remain  in  Hawaiian  waters  for  a 
couple  of  weeks. 

When  the  Fleet  returns  to  the  Coast  (and  I  trust  the  delay  will  not  be  over  two 
weeks,  but  I  cannot  tell)     *    *    * 

He  said : 

Of  course,  you  know*  the  thought  behind  the  above    *    *    * 

Mr.  Murphy.  Are  you  following  the  letter  ? 
Admiral  Richardson.  No,  I  am  skipping. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Well,  you  stopped  at  "but  I  cannot  tell"  in  the  second 
line  in  the  second  paragraph,  did  you? 
Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  right. 
Mr.  Murphy.  Then  you  go  from  there  to  where  ? 
[755]        Admiral  Richardson.  The  fourth  paragraph? 

Of  course,  you  know  the  thoughts  behind  the  above  and  that  is  that  the  Italian 
situation  is  extremely  delicate,  the  two  weeks  ahead  regarded  as  critical; 
then ?????  nobody  can  answer  the  riddle  just  now. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Where  is  Admiral  Stark's  position  in  that? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  all  I  know. 

[756]         Mr.  Murphy.  All  right. 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  is  manifest  that  he  trusted  that  the  fleet 
would  not  remain  there  long. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Well,  where  is  his  position,  I  mean  as  to  whether 
it  should  or  not  ?  Can  you  refer  to  anything  in  writing  at  any  time, 
anywhere,  where  Admiral  Stark  states  his  position  to  you  that  he  is 
in  agreement  with  you,  or  that  he  disagTees  with  the  proposition  of 
having  the  fleet  there  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  whatever  he  said  I  firmly  believe  that 
he  wholeheartedly  agreed  with  me. 

Mr.  Murphy.  But  can  you  give  us  a  reference  to  anything  in  writ- 
ing anywhere  ?      If  so,  state  it. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  refer  you,  Admiral,  to  the  letter  of  May  22 
to  you,  the  first  paragraph  of  which  is  [reading]  : 

Replying  to  your  letter  of  May  13th — 

in  which  I  think  Admiral  Stark  made  his  position  very  clear. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Unfortunately,  I  have  not  a  copy  of  that 
letter. 

Mr.  Murphy.  May  I  suggest  to  the  Chairman  that  inadvertently 
the  Chair  has  overlooked  that  this  would  be  the  turn  of  Senator 
Brewster,  the  Senator  from  Maine,  to  examine  the  witness. 

The  Chairman.  .  Well,  the  Chairman  exercised  his  right  [757] 
at  the  beginning  and  I  examined  following  the  examination  of  counsel 
and  did  examine  the  Admiral  but  not  upon  this  point. 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  beg  your  pardon,  you  misunderstood  me.  I  meant 
that  after  Mr.  Clark  it  would  then  have  been  the  turn  of  Senator 
Brewster. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  have  placed  no  objection  to  your  examining 
the  Admiral. 

Mr.  Murphy.  And  then  I  would  follow. 


292       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Brewster.  That  is  quite  all  right,  Congressman  Murphy, 
and  I  hope  you  will  accept  my  suggestion  which  is  simply  in  the  in- 
terest of  saving  time. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  is  subject  to  correction.  In  the  absence 
of  Mr.  Clark  the  next  in  order  by  the  alternation  would  have  been  the 
Senator  from  Maine,  Mr.  Brewster. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  am  quite  willing  to  let  Mr.  Murphy  proceed. 

The  Chairman.  I  apologize  to  the  Senator  from  Maine  for  that 
omission. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  know  that  my  rights  are  being  saved,  Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr,  Murphy.  Now,  do  you  have  the  letter  of  May  22  suggested  by 
the  gentleman,  the  Senator  from  Maine  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  doubt  if  I  can  find  anywhere  a  specific 
statement  saying : 

I  am  opposed  to  retaining  the        [758]        fleet  in  the  Hawaiian  area. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Can  you  find  a  specific  statement  saying  that  he 
agrees  with  you  categorically  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  This  is  what  he  says  on  the  22d  of  May. 
[Reading:] 

When  we  sent  our  dispatch  it  looked  as  if  Italy — 

that  means  the  dispatch  to  return — 

it  looked  as  if  Italy  were  coming  in  almost  immediately  and  that  a  serious 
situation  might  develop  in  the  East  Indies,  and  that  there  was  a  possibility  of 
our  being  involved.  However,  the  recent  "blitzkrieg"  events  in  Europe  have 
certainly  altered  the  picture  for  the  time  being.  Personally  I  think  it  has 
made  more  remote  (for  the  moment  at  least)  th'e  question  of  a  westward  move- 
ment of  the  fleet.  I  agree  with  the  tenor  of  your  letter  and  you  will  be  glad 
to  know  I  had  already  so  expressed  myself. 

Mr.  Murphy.  That  is  the  only  written  memorandum  to  which  you 
can  refer? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  I 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  mean  is  that  the  only  one  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Congressman  Murphy,  since  the  receipt  of 
this  correspondence  I  have  been  almost  constantly  in  attendance  here. 
If  I  had  time  to  search  through  all  of  the  papers  carefully  I  have  no 
doubt  that  I  would  find  suflB-  [7S9]  cient  evidence  of  his  con- 
currence with  me  as  to  convince  anyone. 

Mr.  Murphy.  If  you  find  it  will  you  produce  it,  please? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  will,  or  I  shall. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Now,  then,  you  had  a  meeting  with  the  President 
about  which  you  prepared  a  memorandum  in  October  of  1940.  Did 
you  prepare  any  memoranda  after  the  previous  meetings? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did  not. 

Mr.  Murphy.  I  think  that  is  all,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Brewster  ? 

Senator  Brewster.  Pursuing  further  the  question  which  the  Con- 
gressman has  been  asking,  I  think  it  should  be  clear  what  was  the 
representation  in  your  letter  to  which  Admiral  Stark  expressed  his 
view  on.  It  was,  as  I  understand  it,  your  letter  of  May  13,  in  which 
you  used  the  following  language  [reading]  : 

I  feel  that  any  move  west  means  hostilities.  I  feel  that  at  this  time  it  would 
be  a  grave  mi.'^take  to  become  involved  in  the  West  where  our  interests,  although 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  293 

important,  are  not  vital,  and  thereby  reduce  our  ability  to  maintain  the  security 

of  the  Western  Hemisphere  which  is  vital.  -,tt„„<. 

If  the  Fleet  is  to  go  west  it  can  only  start,  properly  prepared,  from  the  West 

Coast  where  it  can  be         [760]         docked,  manned,  stocked  and  stripped,  and  a 

''^ReSVsS'r'irtS^Luhough  I  am  entirely  without  information  I  realize  your 
position  and  I  want  you  to  know  that  If  the  situation  becomes  such  that  higher 
authority  decides  we  should  go  West,  all  of  us  are  ready  to  give  all  we  have. 

That  is  the  end  of  the  quotation  from  your  letter,  to  which  I  under- 
stand Admiral  Stark  in  his  letter  of  May  22  replied.     [Reading : J 

I  agree  with  the  tenor  of  your  letter  and  you  will  be  glad  to  know  I  had  already 
so  expressed  myself. 

Would  that  lead  you  to  believe,  or  would  that  leave  you  in  any 
doubt.  Admiral  Richardson,  as  to  the  position  of  Admiral  btark  m 

this  matter?  .  -,     ,  ,    ,      ^  i  •  -i.-  ^ 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  was  never  m  any  doubt  about  his  position. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  what  was  the  situation,  Admiral,  of  the 
fleet?  With  the  fleet  which  you  had  at  Pearl  Harbor— was  it  what 
would  be  considered  in  naval  parlance  as  a  fleet? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  it  was  a  combatant  fleet  but  it  did  not 
have  in  company  with  it  the  auxiliaries  that  would  be  essential  to 
active  operations.  ,       .^..  m'^n 

Senator  Brewster.  So  that  if  there  were  hostihties  [762] 
that  should  develop,  what  would  have  been  the  mission  of  the  fleet 
under  anv  plans  that  were  in  existence  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Under  the  existing  plans  it  would  have  been 
necessary  for  the  fleet  to  return  to  the  west  coast  to  mobilize,  assemble  a 
train,  fill  the  ships  with  the  regulation  number  of  personnel,  provi- 
sions, supplies,  stores,  fuel,  strip  the  ships  of  needless  articles  which 
necessarily  appear  on  a  ship  during  a  long  period  of  peace  and  prepare 
them  for  offensive  operation.  _  .       ^ 

Senator  BitEWSTER.  State  whether  or  not  the  fleet  on  December  7 
was  in  such  a  condition  as  would  have  required  its  return  similarly  ? 

Admiral  Ricpiardson.  It  had  been  more  comletely  prepared  for  war 
action  because  before  I  returned  to  Pearl  Harbor  with  a  portion  of 
the  fleet,  arriving  thereon  the  6th  of  December,  we  had  placed  m 
storage  a  lot  of  inflammable  material  that  we  carried  m  time  of  peace. 
The  ships  had  been  degaussed. 

The  Chairman.  Had  been  what  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Degaussed. 

The  Chairman.  I  don't  get  that  word. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  it  is  a  French  word  which  means  rmi- 
ning  a  coil  of  wire  around  them  which  energized  will  probably  prevent 
the  magnetic  field  of  the  ship  from  exploding  a  magnetic  mine. 

I'/e^]  Senator  Brewstek.  Under  the  plans  existing  prior  to 
December  7,  so  far  as  your  own  knowledge  goes,  what  was  it  con- 
templated should  be  the  mission  of  the  Navy  during  the  earlier  period 
of  any  hostilities  with  a  Western  Pacific  power  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  the  plans  then  in  existence  were  called 
the  "Orange"  plan  or  the  "0-1"  plan  and  it  was,  in  my  opinion,  a 
fairly  sound  plan  theoretically,  but  the  time  element  bore  no  relation 
to  reality  and  some  time  in  October  I  wrote  a  comprehensive  letter  to 
the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  presenting  my  conception  of  the  then 
existing  "Orange"  plan,  which  is  in  the  hands  of  the  committee. 


294        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK  " 

Senator  Brewster.  That  was  in  1940  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  1940. 

Senator  Breavster.  And  did  that  contemplate  some  manner  of  of- 
fensive action  by  the  fleet  ? 

•  Admiral  Richardson.  It  did,  early  action  to  reconnoiter  and  attack 
some  of  the  mandated  islands  and  a  progressive  step-by-step  movement 
westward  with  the  taking,  eventually,  of  Truk  in  a  time  stated  that 
absolutely  could  not  be  realized. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  want  to  quote  to  you,  because  I  think  we  all  are 
going  to  be  vitally  concerned  with  this  matter  of  naval  defense.  You 
were  Assistant  Chief  of  Naval  [76S]  Operations  during  1937 
and  1938  under  Admiral  Leahy  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  One  year. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  am  quoting  from  Admiral  Leahy's  statement 
before  the  Naval  Affairs  Committee  on  the  function  of  the  Navy,  as 
I  think  it  will  contribute  to  this  matter,  and  I  want  to  know  whether 
you  would  agree  with  this  concept.  I  quote  Admiral  Leahy  on  the 
first  page  of  his  testimony  at  the  1938  hearings.     [Reading:] 

In  defending  our  territory  in  war,  we  cannot  assume  an  attitude  of  passive  de- 
fense and  simply  beat  off  an  attack  at  one  place  and  later  at  another.  In  such 
a  case  we  would  see  our  coasts  blockaded,  our  outlying  possessions  seized,  our 
commerce,  both  coastwise  and  foreign,  driven  off  the  seas,  and  we  would  undergo 
the  costly  experience  of  finding  the  war  lasting  just  as  long  as  the  enemy  willed 
it;  that  is,  until  he  had  attained  every  objective  and  everything  he  wanted. 
The  only  way  that  war,  once  begun,  can  be  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion 
is  by  making  the  enemy  want  to  stop  fighting — ^by  injuring  him  before  he  reaches 
our  shores  so  badly  that  he  will  be  anxious  to  make  peace.  Prompt  and  effective 
injury  to  an  enemy,  at  a  distance  from  our  shores,  is  the  only  correct  strategy 
to  be  employed. 

[764]  We  have  outlying  possessions  in  Alaska,  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  Guam, 
Samoa.  Panama,  Canal  Zone,  Puerto  Rico,  and  the  Virgin  Islands.  The  Philip- 
pine Islands  are  still  United  States  territory  and  will  remain  so  until  complete 
independence  is  attained.  All  of  these  outlying  island  possessions  are  more 
or  less  vulnerable,  and  their  defense  depends  upon  two  factors.  One  is  a 
local  defense  by  mobile  forces  and  fortifications.  The  other,  and  the  dominant 
factor,  is  sea  power.  A  superior  Navy  can  prevent  powerful  attacks  being 
made  on  all  those  island  possessions  that  lie  closer  to  our  home  territory  than 
they  do  to  those  of  an  enemy  or  enemies.  A  sufficient  Navy  can  keep  open 
the  lines  of  supply  to  the  defenders  of  such  possessions,  and,  if  they  are  secure 
in  their  own  local  defenses  against  minor  attacks,  the  Navy  can  use  them  as 
bases  from  which  to  operate  against  the  enemy  or  enemies.  Defense  of  those 
possessions — Guam,  the  Philippines  and  Alaska — which  lie  nearer  to  the  home 
territory  of  another  power  or  powers  than  they  do  to  the  continental  United 
States,  is  dependent  solely  upon  sea  power  and  the  ability  of  sea  jwwer  to 
support  forces  in  those  areas. 

[765]         I  presume  you  would  be  in  full  agreement  with  that? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Complete  accord. 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes.  Now,  I  have  here  an  exhibit  which  has 
been  furnished  us,  which  is  extracts  from  the  joint  Army  and  Navy 
Avar  plan,  Rainbow  No.  1.  That  is  a  part  of  the  extracts  ftom  joint 
Army  and  Navj^  war  plan.  Orange  1938. 

I  assume  that  was  in  the  process  of  development  year  by  j^ear,  but 
this  does  not  contain  any  of  the  tasks  that  were  assigned  under 
section  6  and  others.  In  section  6,  the  presentation  apparently  con- 
fines itself  to  the  defense  plans  of  the  Hawaiian  area  without  includ- 
ing therein  anything  regarding  the  tasks  which  I  assume  were  the 
function  of  the  Navy  to  carry  out,  the  task  forces,  or  tasks. 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true.    What  is  the  date  of  that? 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  295 

Senator  Brewster.  This  one  is  dated  1938,  the  Orange  plan.  I 
think  that  was  Orange  No.  1.  This  was  approved,  it  says,  by  the 
Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  August  14,  1939, 
verbally  by  the  President  October  14,  1939,  by  the  Joint  Board  April 
10,  1940.  That  is  April  10,  1940,  brought  down  current.  That  was 
finally  Rainbow  No.  1. 

You  have  that  before  you,  do  you? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have  it. 

Senator  Brewster.  Now,  whether  or  not 

[766]  Admiral  Richardson.  But,  Senator  Brewster,  these  are 
copies  of  extracts  from  plans  that  were  modified  from  time  to  time. 
They  are  not  complete ;  some  of  them  were  made  after  I  left  the  fleet ; 
some  of  them  were  in  process  of  being  made,  so  any  questions  that  I 
answer  with  respect  to  this  is  certainly  to  be  most  confusing  because 
here  is  one  that  is  dated  March  28, 1941.     I  know  nothing  about  it. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  think  my  question  won't  involve,  perhaps,  any 
confusion.  The  point  which  I  wish  to  inquire  about  is  whether  or  not 
the  appointment  of  the  tasks  as  they  are  called,  which  I  assume  were 
the  functions  of  the  Navy,  the  affirmative  tasks,  would  be  essential 
to  an  appraisal  of  the  responsibility  of  the  commanders  in  that  area? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  I  think  it  would  be  but  it  would  not 
be  anything  other  than  confusing  to  consider  any  other  plans  than 
the  plans  that  were  in  existence  on  the  7th  of  December  1941,  about 
which  I  know  nothing. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  I  don't  intend  to  enter  into  that  field. 
My  point  is  in  attempting  to  appraise  the  responsibility  of  those  who 
were  in  authority  at  Pearl  Harbor,  as  to  whether  or  not  their  respon- 
sibility in  taking  aggressive  action  with  the  fleet  under  their  charge 
must  not  necessarily  be  known  in  order  to  determine  as  to  the  wisdom 
of  their  course  at  any  given  time  ? 

[767]  Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  of  course,  no  plans  ever  made 
by  the  Army  or  the  Navy  of  the  United  States  visualized  their  being 
put  in  effect  without  either  a  declaration  of  war  or  an  attack  upon  us, 
so  if  you  take  the  joint  Army  and  Navy  Basic  Plan  Orange  1938,  that 
was  the  basic  plan  on  which  the  Navy  drew  its  war  plan  and  on  which 
the  Army  drew  its  war  plan. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  reading  these  excerpts,  these  extracts  I 
have  given  you,  which  are  apparently  exclusively  of  a  defensive  char- 
acter, one  might  draw  the  impression  that  the  Navy  had  no  function 
than  to  be  there  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  assist  in  its  defense.  That,  of 
course,  would  not  be  a  warranted  conclusion,  would  it.  Admiral? 
The  Navy  had  another  job  to  do  under  all  plans,  did  it  not? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Oh,  absolutely,  and  the  Navy's  job  was  to  be 
aggressive. 

Senator  Brewster.  That  is  right. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Now,  the  pages  of  this  refer  specifically  to 
the  joint  responsibilities  of  the  Army  and  Navy  in  the  Hawaiian  area 
and  it  does  not  refer,  as  I  can  find  here,  to  anything  about  what  the 
fleet  is  going  to  do. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  over  on  page — I  should  say  it  is  No.  2. 
For  instance,  on  that  first  page  we  have  section  1.  We  then  have 
section  2  on  the  first  page.  There  is  no  [768]  section  3  ap- 
parently.    It  becomes  section  4,  then  section  5,  section  6.     Then  we 


296        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

come  to  extracts  of  Joint  Arni}^  and  Navy  Basic  War  Plans,  Rainbow 
No.  1,  section  6.    [Reading :] 

Tasks     *     *     *    Joint  Tasks     *     *     * 

Now,  I  take  it  those  refer  to  omissions  as  to  the  naval  tasks  which 
they  were  supposed  to  undertake. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Brewster.  It  is  a  part  of  the  function  of  both  the  Navy 
and  the  Army  to  keep  in  constant  preparation  for  possible  war  plans 
under  any  eventualities,  is  it  not  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  If  you  will  turn  to  pa<i;e  o,  under  paragraph 
35,  "Naval  tasks"; 

(F)  Prepai'e  to  capture  and  establish  control  over  the  Caioline  and  Marshall 
Island  areas. 

Now,  all  war  plans  that  I  am  familiar  with  for  the  Navy  contained 
a  task  along  those  lines. 

[769]  Senator  Brewster.  What  you  were  reading  answers  my 
question,  I  guess.  It  is  a  function  of  the  Army  and  Navy  to  keep  in 
constant  operation  Avar  plans  in  the  event  of  any  eventualities  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true. 

Senator  Brewster.  When  this  came  up,  orders  were  immediately 
issued,  were  they  not,  to  execute  war  plan  46  against  Japan? 

Admiral  Rich.virdson.  I  have  no  idea. 

Senator  Brewster.  On  that  date  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have  no  idea. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  heard  you  mention  when  the  order  came 
through.  That  was  what  impressed  me.  I  do  not  know  what  it  meant. 
I  assumed  it  was  the  plan  which  had  been  prepared. 

Acbniral  Richardson.  In  every  war  plan  there  is  a  provision  for 
putting  it  into  effect,  and  it  is  defined  and  known  how  the  plan  will 
be  put  into  effect,  and  when  that  order  is  received  it  goes  into  effect 
and  everybody  knows  it  is  in  effect,  but  during  the  latter  part  of  1940 
and  the  early  part  of  1941,  due  to  changing  world  conditions,  the 
Navy  war  plans  were  in  a  constant  state  of  flux,  in  an  effort  to  have  a 
plan  that  was  in  accordance  with  the  existing  situation. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  is  in  this  correspondence  a  [770] 
letter  from  me  with  respect  to  the  plan  that  was  being  developed,  in 
which  it  is  stated  that  the  plan  and  that  letter  was  prepared  with  the 
knowledge  and  approval  of  my  successor.  We  worked  on  it  jointly 
during  the  week  or  10  days  before  I  was  relieved. 

The  numbers  of  the  plans  are  so  numerous  and  the  provision  of  every 
plan  is  so  different,  the  assumptions  are  so  different,  that  it  would  be 
impossible  for  me  to  recall  now  the  assumptions  in  Rainbow  1,  2,  3,  4, 
or  5. 

Senator  Brewster.  But  you  would  be — had  you  finished? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No.  In  fact,  there  was  a  plan  which  was 
known,  I  think,  as  "plan  dog"  for  a  while.  "Dog"  being  the  Navy 
name  of  the  "D". 

The  Chairman.  "Dog"? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Dog,  d-o-g. 

The  Chairman.  Common  cur. 

Senator  Brewster.  But  all  of  these  plans  contemplated  aggressive 
action  by  the  Navy  as  contrary  to  merely  defensive  action  in  fixed 
positions  ? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  297 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  Navy  had  always  believed  that  the  only 
way  you  could  defend  the  country  was  by  aggressive  action. 

Senator  Brewster.  The  basing  of  the  fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor  then 
would,  of  necessity,  mean  a  return  to  the  west  [7711  coast,  in 
time  of  war,  and  did  inevitably  affect  the  time  element  very  seriously, 
the  time  involved  in  the  return  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  there  is  a  difference  of  opinion  on  that 
point.    I  thought  it  did. 

Senator  Brewster.  What  would  be  the  approximate  time  for  the 
return  to  the  west  coast  and  making  the  preparations  under  the  condi- 
tion when  you  were  there? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  it  is  about  a  little  over  2,000  miles,  and 
the  fleet  would  only  make  about  15  knots,  and  that  is  360  knots  a  day, 
or  about  a  week  to  get  back. 

Senator  Brewster.  In  the  matter  of  the  patrol  reconnaissance,  the 
difficulty,  so  far  as  the  air  reconnaisance  was  concerned,  was  with  the 
shortage  of  planes,  was  it  not  ? 

Admiral  Rchardson.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Brewster.  Are  you  familiar  with  the  naval  expansion  bill 
of  1838,  which  provided  for  3,000  naval  aircraft? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  I  am  familiar  with  it  to  a  very  limited 
extent. 

Senator  Brewster.  Was  that  during  your  period  as  Assistant  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  but  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions in  those  days  concerned  himself  primarily  with  administrative 
matters.     Relations  with  the  committees         [773]  of  Congress, 

with  the  other  executive  departments,  and  with  the  President  were 
handled  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

Snator  Brewster.  It  was  becoming  evident,  more  evident  each 
year,  was  it  not,  as  to  the  part  which  airplanes  would  play  in  naval 
as  well  as  land  war? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Np  doubt  about  that. 

Senator  Brewster.  That  was  a  constantly  expanding  activity? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  You  spoke  about  getting  the  impression  while 
you  were  in  Washington,  but  not  from  Cordell  Hull,  that  Japan  could 
be  bluffed.  Do  you  recall  where  you  gained  that  impression  ?  Could 
I  recall  to  you,  did  you  confer  with  Stanley  Hornbeck  while  you  were 
here  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did. 

Senator  Brewster.  Wliether  or  not  you  gained  any  impression  of 
that  through  your  conferences  with  him  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  whether  T  was  correct  or  not,  I  was 
distinctly  of  the  impression  that  Dr.  Hornbeck  was  exercising  a 
greater  influence  over  the  disposition  of  the  fleet  than  I  was. 

Senator  Brewster.  Could  you  develop  that  at  all  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  only  way  in  which  I  can  develop  that  is 
this : 

I  saw  Dr.  Hornbeck  on  July  11.  I  talked  to  him  from  [773] 
10 :  30  to  noon. 

According  to  my  notebook  I  said  he  is  the  strong  man  on  the  Far 
East  and  the  cause  of  our  staying  in  Hawaii  where  he  will  hold  us 
as  long  as  he  can.  And  that  was  an  impression  that  I  wrote  in  my 
notebook  when  it  happened. 


298       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[774-]  On  October  9  I  saw  Hornbeck,  who  was  unwilling  to  ac- 
cept the  responsibility  for  retaining  the  fleet  in  Hawaii.  Now  I  may 
have  been  entirely  wrong,  but  that  was  the  impression  I  gained. 

Senator  Brewster.  Did  j^ou  express  to  him,  Admiral,  in  your  con- 
versations, the  same  opinion  that  you  had  expressed  to  the  President 
as  to  the  psychology  of  the  Japanese  military  authorities  on  the  situa- 
tion? 

Admiral  Eichardson.  Well,  inasmuch  as  Dr.  Hornbeck  was  the 
advisor  of  the  State  Department  on  far  eastern  affairs  and  had  written 
many  books  on  the  subject,  some  of  which  I  had  read,  I  doubt  whether 
I  told  him  that  he  was  completely  wrong,  but  I  expressed  my  view 
fully. 

Senator  Brew^ster.  He  was  at  that  time  the  one  in  charge  of  what 
they  called  the  far  eastern  desk  in  the  State  Department? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No.  I  had  known  Dr.  Hornbeck  for  some 
time. 

Senator  Brewster.  His  first  name  is  Stanley  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Dr.  Stanley  K.  Hornbeck,  and  I  think  he  had 
been  relieved  as  head  of  the  Division  of  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  and  had 
been  superseded  by  Mr.  Max  Hamilton,  if  I  remember  correctly,  whom 
I  had  also  known  for  many  years.  Dr.  Hornbeck  was  the  advisor 
of  the  State  Department  on  far         [77S]         eastern  affairs. 

Senator  Brewster.  In  connection.  Admiral,  with  your  service  in 
Hawaii,  was  there  a  local  influence  in  leaving  Hawaii? 

Admiral  Richardson.  If  there  was  it  was  unknown  to  me. 

Senator  Brewster.  You  did  not  have  any  situation  of  that  kind 
locally  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  None  at  all. 

Senator  Brewster.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Clark,  when  your  name  was  reached 
you  were  temporarily  absent.  Do  you  have  any  questions  of  the 
Admiral  ? 

Mr.  Clark.  I  have  no  questions. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Gearhart. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Am  I  next  in  order,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

The  Chairman.  I  think  in  order  to  balance  between  the  two  sides, 
inasmuch  as  the  Chairman  has  assumed  to  do  the  first  interrogating 
on  the  Senate  side,  that  you  would  come  next. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Admiral,  pursuing  the  questions  that  have  been 
asked  just  a  moment  ago  by  the  Senator  from  Maine,  I  think  you 
testified  that  the  fleet,  as  you  commanded  it  in  1940,  was  under- 
manned, undertrained,  understaffed,  under  provisioned  and  underam- 
munitioned. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  no  American  force  was  ever  [776] 
underprovisioned.    We  eat  better  than  anybody  in  the  world. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  But  did  you  have  a  sufficient  supply  of  edibles  to 
keep  you  going  for  a  long  time,  for  instance,  through  a  war  engage- 
ment, a  war  responsibility? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  normally  we  carried  dry  provisions 
for  about  60  days,  if  I  remember  correctly.  Insofar  as  I  remember, 
there  was  no  question  of  provisions.  The  ships  did  not  carry  the  full 
wartime  allowance  of  ammunition  because  of  the  needless  expendi- 
ture of  fuel  in  pushing  that  much  weight  through  the  water.  There 
was  a  deficiency  in  certain  types  of  ammunition. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  299 

For  example,  we  had  little,  if  any  bombardment  ammunition  whdch 
would  be  necessary  in  effecting  a  landing. 

As  to  enough  men,  never  within  my  knowledge,  except  in  war,  has 
the  Navy  had  on  board  enough  men  to  fight  the  ship.  We  have  been 
lucky  if  we  could  secure  sufficient  appropriations  to  maintain  85  per- 
cent of  complement.  Men  of  experience  were  being  removed  from 
the  ships  in  order  to  train  new  men. 

Mr,  Gearhart,  Now  to  place  it  on  a  percentage  basis,  what  would 
be  the  percentage  of  fighting  efficiency  of  the  Navy  as  you  commanded 
it? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  that  would  be  a  highly  theoretical 
question.     No  answer  would  be  of  any  value. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  You  consider  you  were  85  percent  manned? 

[777]  Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  we  had  85  percent  enough 
men  to  man  the  battery  and  steam  at  full  power  for  more  than  a  xery 
short  time,  and  as  an  instrument  of  war  their  value  was  prospective. 
They  coulcl  be  fully  realized  in  a  short  space  of  time  by  the  addition  of 
men,  because  men  in  war  learn  far  more  rapidly  than  they  do  in  time  of 
peace. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  then,  the  Navy  under  your  command  was  not 
in  a  condition  of  readiness  to  commence  the  war  with  Japan? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Absolutely  not. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  And  if  it  were  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to 
commence  a  war  with  Japan  the  ships  would  have  to  return  first  to 
the  west  coast,  spending  a  week  in  travel  and  a  week  in  coming  back — 
and  how  many  weeks  being  put  in  shape  for  striking  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  in  my  letter,  one  of  my  letters,  I  stated 
that  in  the  event  active  war  operations  were  undertaken  it  would  either 
be  necessary  to  return  to  the  coast  for  mobilization  or  preparation  or 
accept  the  handicaps  of  preparing  m  Pearl  Harbor.  I  could  not 
hazard  a  guess  as  to  how  soon  they  would  be  ready  from  Pearl  Har- 
bor, returning  to  the  coast  and  being  ready  to  start  again,  because 
I  do  not  know  how  quickly  you  could  have  assembled  the  ships,  the 
tankers,  and  done  the  training.  Actually  it  was  a  year  or  so,  was  it 
not? 

[778]        Mr,  Gearhart.  You  say  a  year  or  so? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  before  we  really  got  going  well  in  this 
war  it  was  not  a  matter  of  weeks. 

Mr,  Gearhart.  Then  in  order  to  prepare  the  fleet  to  strike,  say, 
Japan  originally,  it  would  have  to  travel  from  Hawaii  to  the  United 
States,  spending  a  week,  then  uncertain  weeks  in  the  United  States 
being  equipped  for  war,  and  then  travel  back  a  week,  and  that  would 
mean  really  b}^  leaving  it  in  Hawaii  it  was  4,500  miles  further  away 
from  the  enemy  than  it  would  be  if  it  had  been  in  the  United  States  ? 

Admiral  Richardson,  Yes,  but  I  think  when  a'ou  consider  the 
many,  many  other  things  that  had  to  be  done  before  active  war  opera- 
tions could  be  undertaken,  the  question  of  whether  it  was  in  Hawaii 
or  whether  it  was  on  the  west  coast  would  have  little  effect  on  the 
over-all  time,  because  you  had  to  assemble,  train,  you  might  have  to 
build  some,  you  might  have  to  haA'e  drydocks,  you  might  have  to  have 
repair  facilities,  you  had  to  have  a  terriffic  amount  of  stores  and  all 
kinds  of  equipment  for  building  roads  and  airfields,  and  everything 
else,  none  of  which  was  ready. 


300        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  So  that  the  question  of  whether  it  was  in 
Hawaii  or  whether  it  was  on  the  west  coast,  when  actual  war  started 
it  was  a  niat,ter  of  no  moment,  in  my  opinion,  because  [779] 
other  things  controlled  the  time  of  getting  ready. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  considering  the  other  situation,  the  one  which 
actually  happened,  by  having  our  fleet  in  Hawaiian  waters  we  had 
our  fleet  2,500  miles  closer  to  the  enemy  for  their  sneak  attack? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Do  you  want  an  opinion  on  that? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes,  unless  it  is  a  question  of  geograjphy,  unless 
it  is  a  matter  of  going  over  water,  or  something  else. 

Admiral  Richardson.  In  my  opinion,  Congressman  Gearhart,  a 
Japanese  fleet  that  could  cross  most  of  the  Pacific  ocean  and  deliver 
an  undiscovered  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  would  quite  likely  have 
been  able  to  deliver  the  same  attack  on  Puget  Sound. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  that  is  amazing. 

Admiral  Richardson.  But  the  whole  question  is  the  amount  of  oil 
they  have  got  in  the  ships. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Now  you  have  outlined  the  deficiencies  in  our 
Navy's  strength  at  that  time.  Were  those  deficiencies  known  to  the 
Japanese?  Have  you  any  way  of  knowing  whether  they  were  or 
not? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  I  never  had  any  doubt  that  the  Japa- 
nese knew  everything  they  wanted  to  know  about  our  fleet,  and  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  told  me  himself  that  they  knew  more  about  it 
than  I  did. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  then  in  the  light  of  what  you  have  [780] 
just  said,  do  you  think  that  the  President  was  correct  when  he  said  he 
thought  the  presence  of  the  Fleet  in  Hawaiian  waters  had  a  I'estrain- 
ing  effect  on  the  Japanese  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did  not  think  so  when  I  was  talking  to 
him,  and  I  have  not  changed  my  mind. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Now  while  you  were  in  command  of  the  ship — or 
of  the  fleet  in  1940,  and  during  the  months  of  1941  when  you  were 
in  charge  of  the  fleet,  were  any  of  your  battleships,  aircraft  carriers, 
cruisers,  destroyers  or  service  vessels  transferred  to  the  Atlantic? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Mr.  Chairman,  my  memory  is  not  active, 
and  certainly  with  changes  made  during  my  incumbency  as  to  the 
ships  in  the  Atlantic  and  ships  in  the  Pacific,  because  new  ships  were 
being  built,  and  joining  the  fleet,  and  some  ships  were  being  trans- 
ferred from  that  part  of  the  United  States  Fleet  in  the  Pacific  to 
that  part  of  it  in  the  Atlantic,,  so  I  have  here  something  that  has  just 
been  prepared  for  me,  expecting  that  this  question  might  be  asked 
me,  from  the  records  of  the  Navy  Department  the  transfers  that  were 
made. 

Before  I  can  answer  that  I  would  need  about  5  minutes  to  look 
over  the  data  which  has  been  compiled  at  my  request. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Will  you  take  a  minute  or  two  and  see  if  there 
were  any  considerable  or  important  transfers  made  one  [781] 
way  or  the  other  ? 

Senator  Brewster.  Mr.  Chairman,  it  might  be  well  to  have  it 
incorporated  in  the  record. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  301 

Mr.  Geseix.  We  were  hoping  to  get  the  final  answer  on  that, 
Senator. 

The  Chairmax.  The  committee  will  be  in  order. 

Admiral  Richaedsox.  Mr.  Chairman,  in  lieu  of  presenting  at  this 
time  a  hurriedly  prepared  presentation  of  this  kind,  may  I  request 
that  the  counsel  secure  that  information  from  the  Department  and 
present  it  to  the  committee  i 

The  ChaiemAx.  The  Chair  understands  that  the  counsel  is  in 
process  of  doing  that  and  it  is  to  go  in,  as  it  no  doubt  should.  It 
ought  to  be  accurate  to  the  last  item.  Therefore  the  Chair,  as  far 
as  he  is  concerned,  and  I  am  sure  the  committee,  will  be  glad  to 
accede  to  the  Admiral's  request. 

Mr.  Geaehaet.  That  will  be  entirely  satisfactory. 

Senator  Lucas.  What  does  that  include? 

Mr.  Geaehaet.  With  the  understanding  it  will  be  incorporated  in 
the  record  as  soon  as  it  can  be  made  available. 

The  Ctiairmax.  That  compilation  will  include  the  date  at  the  be- 
ginning of  any  transfer  and  the  end,  the  final  date  covering  the  transfer 
period. 

Admiral  Richardson.  What  I  propose  is  that  they  give  me  a  list 
of  the  transfer  of  vessels  to  and  from  the  Atlantic,  [782]  the 
Pacific  and  Asiatic  Fleets  between  May  1,  1940,  and  February  1,  1941. 

The  Chaiemax.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richaedsox.  They  might  have  been  numerous,  but  within 
my  recollection  they  were  not  substantial,  except  possibly  some  cruisers 
and  destroyers. 

The  Chaiemax.  Will  that  record  show  the  class  of  ship  ? 

Admiral  Richaedsox.  Yes. 

The  Chairmax.  All  classes  of  ships  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  even  show  the  name  of  them  and  the 
class. 

Senator  Brew^ster.  Mr.  Chairman,  can  you  bring  that  down  to 
December  7, 1941  ? 

The  Chairmax.  The  Chairman  would  suggest,  from  other  sources 
and  under  the  testimony  of  other  witnesses,  it  ought  to  be  brought 
down  to  the  Ttli  of  December. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  have  already  requested  that,  Mr.  Chairman. 
That  was  promised  me  yesterday. '  I  presume  it  w^ill  be  coming  along 
pretty  soon.^ 

The  Vice  Chairmax.  :Mr.  Chairman,  I  assume  the  reason  the  ad- 
miral requested  the  material  on  February  1  is  because  that  was  the  time 
of  the  change  of  his  command. 

Admiral  Richaedsox.  Exactly,  Mr.  Cooper. 

The  Vice  Chaiemax.  As  the  Chairman  suggests,  of  course  [783] 
for  our  purposes  we  will  probably  want  it  to  come  on  doAvn  to  the  date 
of  this  happening  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

Admiral  Richaedsox.  That  has  previously  been  requested. 

The  Chairmax.  You  can  only  speak  for  the  time  in  which  vou  were 
in  command. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chaiemax.  That  will  undoubtedly  be  furnished. 

Mr.  Geaehaet.  Did  you,  during  your  command,  have  occasion  to 
protest  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  against  tlie  detachhient  from 

'  See  footnote  1.  p.  125,  supra. 
79716 — 46 — pt.  1 22 


302        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

your  command  of  ships  and  their  transfer  to  the  Atlantic  or  any  other 
place  for  duty  ? 

Admiral  Kichardson.  Not  to  my  present  recollection. 

Mr.  Gearhakt.  Can  j-ou  tell  us,  as  a  naval  expert,  as  to  whether 
or  not  your  fleet,  the  one  you  commanded,  was  numerically  inferior  to 
the  Japanese  in  the  Pacific,  or  superior  ? 

Admiral  Riciiardsox.  Well,  our  knowledge  of  the  Japanese  Fleet 
and  its  composition  was  not  complete  and,  therefoi'e,  any  answer  I 
give  might  later  be  proved  inaccurate,  in  the  light  of  better  informa- 
tion. But  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge  and  belief,  the  Japanese  Fleet 
was  either  equal  to  or  superior  to  that  part  of  the  fleet  that  I  had  with 
me  in  the  Pacific. 

Mr.  Gearhakt.  Then  calling  for  an  opinion  answer  too,  this  being 
addressed  to  you  as  a  naval  expert,  which  you  undoubtedly  are,  what 
effect  would  the  detachment  of  three  ['^(^4-]  battleships,  one 
aircraft  carrier,  four  cruisers,  and  nine  destroyers  in  May  1941  have 
upon  that  numerical  comparison  of  strength  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  would  have  made  the  Pacific  Fleet  rela- 
tively weaker  than  the  Japanese  Fleet. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  And  wasn't  it  that  transfer  which  caused  the  change 
in  the  name  of  the  fleet  that  you  have  been  the  commander  of,  it  having 
been  known  as  the  United  States  Fleet  and  because  of  these  detach- 
ments it  was  actually  known  thereafter  as  the  Pacific  Fleet? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  think  that  had  no  bearing  on  it,  insofar  as 
I  know. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  When  did  the  change  occur,  Admiral  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  change  in  the  name? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  1st  day  of  February  1941.  In  my  opin- 
ion it  was  occasioned  by  the  increasing  importance  of  naval  activity 
in  the  Atlantic. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Then  really  you  were  the  last  commander  in  chief 
of  the  United  States  Navy  ? 

Admiral  Richardson,  Until  Admiral  King  was  made  one,  and  a 
bigger  one. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Is  there  a  United  States  Fleet  now  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Admiral  King  is  commander  in  chief  of 
[785]  the  United  States  Fleet  and  Chief  of  Naval  Operations — 
at  least  he  was  during  practically  all  the  war. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  That  is,  he  is  commander  of  every  naval  ship  afloat, 
is  that  correct? 

Admiral  Richardson.  He  was  and  is  today. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  You,  as  commander  of  the  United  States  Fleet, 
were  commander  of  all  ships  afloat  except  those  that  composed  the 
Asiatic  detachment? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No,  Mr.  Gearhart.  I  will  answer  that  ques- 
tion this  way:  As  commander  in  chief  of  the  United  States  Fleet  I 
was  in  command  of  every  combatant  ship  in  commission  in  any  ocean 
that  did  not  belong  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet  or  was  not  serving  direlctly 
under  the  orders  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations.  Many  ships 
serve  directly  under  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  because  when  a 
new  ship  is  built,  until  she  has  had  some  cruising,  some  target  prac- 
tice, some  training,  some  tests  of  new  equipment,  she  is  not  considered 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  303 

worthy  of  joining  a  fleet,  and  she  may  be  in  an  ocean,  but  she  does  not 
belong  to  the  fleet  in  that  ocean. 

Mr  Gearhart.  I  see.     Thank  you  very  much,  Admiral. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  all? 

Mr.  Gfarhart.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Ferguson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral  Richardson,  can  you  tell  us  when 
[786]  the  fleet  went  from  the  west  coast  to  Hawaii  in  the  spring 
of  1940,  if  there  was  a  definite  date  for  its  return,  or  whether  there 
was  not  a  definite  date  for  its  return  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  There  was  a  definite  published  schedule 
available  to  all  officers  in  the  fleet. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  what  was  that  date? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Based  upon  dates  that  occur  in  this  cor- 
respondence, it  is  my  opinion  that  it  was  on  May  9. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  9th  of  May  1940? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  9th  of  May  1940. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wlio  would  fix  that  date  ?  Would  you  fix  that 
date,  or  would  it  be  fixed  here  in  Washington  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Actually  it  had  been  fixed  either  by  me  or 

Sossibly  by  my  predecessor  and  approved  by  the  Chief  of  Naval 
operations. 

Seator  Ferguson.  So  it  would  be  really  an  order  of  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations? 

Admiral  Richardson.  A  fleet  schedule  is  prepared  well  in  advance 
that  shows  all  the  exercises  planned,  all  the  fleet  activities  well  in 
advance.  The  over-all  plan  is  prepared  in  the  fleet  and  is  approved 
by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  then  it  is  carried  out  without 
any  further  orders.  In  accordance  with  that  approved  plan  all  of 
the  ships  participate  in  the  annual  fleet  exercises  and  leave  the  west 
coast,  and  the  [787]  Hawaiian  detachment  left  Hawaii  to 

join  the  fleet  in  the  exercises  of  the  fleet. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  there  any  delay,  Admiral,  in  leaving  the 
west  coast  at  that  time  to  go  to  Hawaii  or  did  you  go  on  the  scheduled 
day? 

Admiral  Richardson.  We  went  on  the  scheduled  day. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  you  first  get  word  that  you  might 
not  return  in  May  of  1940  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  received  it  in  the  dispatch  which  I  put  in 
the  record  yesterday,  on  the  4th. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  the  dispatch  that  you  were  to  make  a 
press  release? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No.  This  is  the  dispatch  from  OPNAV  to 
CINCUS : 

It  looks  probable  but  not  final  that  Fleet  will  remain  Hawaiian  waters  for 
short  time  after  May  9.  Will  expect  to  apprise  you  further  Monday  or  Tuesday 
next. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  you  received  that  were  you  out  in  the 
Hawaiian  waters? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No,  I  had  finished  the  fleet  exercises  and  we 
were  all,  except  the  big  ships,  big  carriers,  in  Pearl  Harbor. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  sir. 


304        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Eichardson.  Because  at  the  end  of  a  fleet  exercise 
[788]         all  of  the  senior  officers  are  assembled. 

Senator  FERGUSOisr.  Did  you  give  us  the  date  of  that  order? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Which  order? 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  one  you  just  read.    I  haven't  seen  it. 

Admiral  Richardson.  May  4. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  4th  of  May  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  the  date  of  the  memo  that  you  were  to 
release  a  press  release? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  received  that  on  May  7. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  7th  of  May? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  ever  discussed  that  with  Admiral 
Stark  or  anyone  here  in  Washington  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Before  the  event? 

Senator  Ferguson.  No,  after  the  event.  After  you  had  that  paper 
asking  you  to  make  a  press  release,  did  you  ever  discuss  that  with 
Admiral  Stark  or  anyone  else  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No,  sir.  No,  I  never  discussed  it  with  any- 
one. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  ever  discussed  your  testimony  here 
with  anyone  other  than  the  counsel?  You  have  never  written 
[789]  any  books  about  it,  or  magazine  articles,  or  anything  of 
that  kind,  have  you  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No,  I  have  never  talked  to  anybody  about  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  when  did  you  first  receive  definite  informa- 
tion that  the  fleet  would  be  kept  at  Pearl  Harbor  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  W^e  never  received  any  definite  information 
as  to  the  duration  of  our  stay  in  Hawaii.  We  just  gradually  drifted 
into  staying. 

Senator  Ferquson.  At  that  time  were  you  receiving  any  diplomatic 
information  between  our  country  and  Japan? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you,  while  you  were  commander  in  chief, 
receive  any  diplomatic  information  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  As  I  understand  it,  you  came  here  to  Washing- 
ton to  receive  your  instructions  as  far  as  any  diplomatic  relations  were 
concerned. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  came  here  to  find  out  the  background  of 
our  stay,  the  purposes  back  of  it,  and,  if  possible,  how  long  we  would 
stay. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  did  you  get  the  background  from  the  State 
Department  or  anyone? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  I  acquired  the  information  that 
[790]  we  would  stay  there  as  long  as  it  was  considered  essential 
for  us  to  support  diplomatic  representations  by  being  there. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  were  you  told  what  the  diplomatic  repre- 
sentations were  that  you  were  supporting?  Were  you  taken  in  on 
those  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No,  but  I  can  read  it  in  the  paper. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  will  you  state  what  your  opinion  was  as 
to  what  were  the  diplomatic  relations  that  were  going  on  at  that  time  ? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  305 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  the  United  States  has  always  believed 
in  a  strong  China,  a  China  that  could  stand  alone,  and  we  were  doing 
all  that  we  could,  without  going  to  war,  to  induce  Japan  to  cease 
what  we  considered  was  aggressive  action  in  China.  We  also  were 
opposed  to  the  extension  of  Japanese  activities  and  Japanese  influences 
further  south  in  Asia. 

[JQl]  Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  discuss  with  anyone  the 
question  of  a  patrol  line  from  Hawaii  to  the  Asiatic  coast? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  tell  us  whom  you  discussed  such  a 
matter  with  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  read  a  memorandum 
on  that  subject  which  I  prepared  several  weeks  ago,  thinking  that  I 
might  be  asked  that  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  The  committee  will  be  very  glad  to  have  it, 
Admiral. 

May  the  Chair  ask  what  sort  of  a  line  that  was  you  were  inquired 
about  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  A  patrol  line. 

In  presenting  this,  I  would  like  to  state  that  my  war  plans  officer 
accompanied  me  to  Washington,  and  I  discussed  with  him  most  of 
the  things  that  were  talked  about.  He  was  a  man  whose  judgment 
I  held  in  very  high  esteem,  and  when  I  prepared  this  he  went  over  it  so 
that  I  discussed  with  him  what  I  might  present  here  as  part  of  my 
testimony,  and  I  did  it  in  the  interest  of  accuracy. 

On  October  10,  the  day  that  I  had  reservations  to  return  to  the  wesf 
coast  by  plane 

The  Chahjman.  That  is  1940? 

Admiral  Richardson.  1940 ;  October  10,  1940. 

[792]  About  5  p.  m.  Colonel  Knox,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
sent  for  me  and  Admiral  Stark  to  come  to  his  office.  I  was  accom- 
panied by  Commander  Vincent  R.  Murphy.  Admiral  Stark  was 
accompanied  by  Admiral  Ingersoll,  and  Capt.  C.  M,  Cook,  who  is 
now,  I  think,  perhaps  a  vice  admiral. 

The  Secretary  stated  that  he  had  important  information  bearing  on 
the  employment  of  the  fleet.  He  stated  that  he  had  just  talked  to  the 
President,  and  that  the  President  was  concerned  as  to  the  Japanese 
reaction  to  the  British  on  the  reopening  of  the  Burma  Road  scheduled 
for  October  17.  In  the  event  the  Japanese  took  drastic  action,  he,  the 
President,  was  considering  shutting  off  all  trade  between  Japan  and 
the  Americas,  and  to  this  end  was  considering  establishing  a  patrol  of 
light  ships  in  two  lines  extending  from  Hawaii  westward  to  the  Philip- 
])ines,  and  from  Samoa  toward  the  Dutch  East  Indies. 

The  question  was  raised — I  do  not  recall  by  whom — as  to  whether 
this  included  stopping  Japanese  ships  as  well  as  others,  and  the  view 
was  expressed  that  this  would  be  an  act  of  war,  and  I  asked  whether  the 
.  President  was  considering  a  declaration  of  war. 

The  Secretary  stated  that  the  President  hadn't  said,  and  that  all  he, 
Knox,  knew  was  what  he  was  told. 

I  was  amazed  at  the  proposal  and  stated  that  the  fleet  [793] 
was  not  prepared  to  put  such  a  plan  into  effect,  nor  for  the  war  which 
would  certainly  result  from  such  a  course  of  action,  and  that  we 
would  certainly  lose  many  of  the  ships. 


306       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Parenthetically,  I  had  seen  that  thing  tried  in  the  war  plans,  and  it 
didn't  work. 

There  was  some  further  discussion  that  a  line  of  light  ships  as  pro- 
posed would  entail  such  dispersal  as  to  expose  the  ships  to  destruction 
in  detail,  and  that  the  best  way  to  accomplish  the  President's  purpose 
was  to  control  the  source  of  the  trade  by  patrol  of  the  relatively  few 
ports  involved. 

The  Secretary  appeared  displeased  at  the  general  reaction  and  mine 
in  particular,  and  said : 

I  am  not  a  strategist ;  if  you  don't  like  the  President's  plan,  draw  up  one  of  your 
own  to  accomplish  the  purpose. 

The  conference  closed  with  the  understanding  that  Stark  and  I, 
with  our  w^ar  plans  officers,  would  draw  up  a  statement  of  assumptions, 
proposed  decisions,  and  tentative  plan  of  operation  in  connection  with 
the  reopening  of  the  Burma  Road. 

An  outline  plan  was  drawn  up.  It  envisaged  the  transfer  to  the 
Pacific  of  additional  patrol  planes,  an  aircraft  carrier,  some  destroyers, 
and  possibly  a  cruiser  or  two. 

Admiral  Stark  was  not  prepared  to  approve  these  transfers, 
[794-]  and  stated  that  he  would  talk  the  matter  over  with  the 
President  and  let  me  know  later  what  decisions  were  arrived  at. 

When  the  plan  was  completed,  the  Secretary  and  the  President  were 
away  from  Washington,  and  I  returned  to  the  west  coast  on  the  11th. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Are  you  through,  Admiral,  with  that  answer? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  am  ready  for  another  question,  sir. 

[795]  Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  hear  anj?^  more  about  the 
plan  after  you  left  Washington?  You  say  that  the  Secretary  and 
President — you  mean  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  the  President — 
were  not  in  Washington  when  the  plans  were  completed,  and  you  left 
Washington. 

Now,  did  you  hear  anything  further  about  the  plan? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  received,  after  my  return  to  the  New 
Mexico  at  Long  Beach,  a  dispatch  from  Admiral  Stark  directing  me 
to  send  to  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  a  copy  of  the 
assumptions  and  the  tentative  United  States  Fleet  disposition,  and 
operations  to  meet  the  situation,  which  I  did  in  a  letter  dated  16  Octo- 
ber 1940,  and  my  recollection  is  that  I  sent  this  to  Admiral  Hart,  the 
commander  in  chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

The  Vice  Chairman.  Asiatic? 

Commander  Richardson.  Asiatic  Fleet.  By  the  commanding  offi- 
cer of  the  H(mston^  which  was  bound  out  from  Long  Beach. 

I  sent  this  letter  out  by  Captain  Jesse  B,  Olindorf,  now  either  a 
rear  admiral  or  vice  admiral,  and  this  [indicating]  is  the  paper. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Counsel,  do  you  know  what  paper  the  admiral 
is  referring  to  ?    Have  we  a  copy  of  it? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Wliat? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  asked  counsel  if  we  had  a  copy,  if  [796'] 
they  knew  what  memorandum  you  were  referring  to,  and  if  we  had 
a  copy  of  it. 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  date  is  IG  October,  1940,  and  the  subject 
is  "Liternational  Situation  Re  Enforcement  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet." 

You  had  this  duplicated. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Let  me  see  it. 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  light  paper  doesn't  belong  with  it.  I 
would  like  to  have  that. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  307 

Mr.  Mitchell.  All  right,  sir.    I  will  tear  the  light  paper  off. 

(A  document  was  handed  to  Senator  Ferguson.) 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  admiral  is  ri^ht.    We  do  have  a  copy  of  it. 

This  is  it,  isn't  it,  Admiral  ?    [Indicating.] 

Admiral  Eichardsox.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman,  Are  we  ready  to  proceed? 

Senator  Ferguson,  I  haven't'had  time  to  read  this,  but  I  will  come 
back  later  to  it. 

Admiral  Richardson,  If  I  may  add,  this  plan  was  never  carried  out. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Can  you  give  a  reason  why  it  was  not  carried 
out? 

Admiral  Eichardson.  Well,  it  served  as  a  base,  I  mean  [797] 
it  influenced  in  some  way  the  development  of  succeeding  plans,  but 
I  never  heard  any  more  about  it. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Well,  at  that  time  we  did  not  have  an  embargo 
on,  did  we,  in  October  of  1940?  That  did  not  come  until  July  25,  was 
it  not,  in  1941  ? 

I  notice  the  "B"  item  here  is : 

Declaring  a  complete  embargo  ou  shipments  to  and  from  Japan. 
C.  Attempting  to  stop  all  trade  between  Japan  and  America. 

At  that  time  we  did  not  have  an  embargo  on,  did  we  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  As  far  as  I  know,  we  did  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  of  any  embargo  prior  to  sometime 
in  July  of  1941? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  do  not  remember  when  the  embargoes,  any 
embargoes  were  placed,  but  there  was  either  a  limitation  on  the  ship- 
ment of  aviation  gasoline  under  consideration  or  in  effect  before  I 
relinquished  command  of  the  fleet. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  did  I  understand  you  to  saj^  that  you  said 
something  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  about — that  this  would  mean 
war  or  would  not  mean  war,  if  you  put  this  into  effect  that  he  had 
suggested  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  I  thought  it  would  mean  war,  and  I  so 
stated  to  the  Secretary, 

[795]         Senator  Ferguson,  Will  you  tell  us  his  reply  to  that? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  he  said  that  he  didn't  know  whether  the 
President  meant  war  or  not.  And  I  further  stated  that  the  fleet  was 
not  ready  for  any  such  plan — was  not  ready  for  war. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  you  told  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  that  you  were  not  in  position  to  put  this  plan  that  he  was  putting 
up  to  you  into  effect  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No  ;  I  never  stated  that  I  couldn't  put  it  into 
effect.     I  could  have  tried  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliat  was  the  substance  of  Avhat  you  said  to  him  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  in  my  opinion  it  would  mean  war;  in 
my  opinion  we  would  lose  the  ships;  and  in  my  opinion  we  couldn't 
stop  trade  between  South  America  and  Japan  without  being  in  trouble 
with  both  of  them. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Do  you  know  of  anything  else  you  can  add  to 
what  you  have  said  that  took  place  at  that  time  in  relation  to  this 
embargo  or  patrol  of  the  Navy  ? 

Admiral  Richardson,  No;  except  as  I  stated  before  that  the  Secre- 
tary stated,  if  you  are  unwilling,  deem  it  inadvisable,  highly  inadvis- 


308        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

able  to  establish  this  line  of  ships  to  shut  off  trade  between  Japan  and 
America,  draw  up  a  plan  by  which  you  would  shut  off  such  trade, 
if  ordered  to  do  so. 

[799]         Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  the  plan? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  the  plan. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  read  this  over  and  come  back  to  it. 

Will  you  refer  to  your  long-hand  letter  of  January  26,  1940,  please  ? 
It  is  the  part  where  you  are  talking  of  Admiral  Leahy  as  "'Bill  Leahy." 
Do  you  have  your  letter,  Admiral  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  you  say : 

I  use  to  say  to  Bill  Leahy  "be  sure  to  impress  on  the  boss  that  we  do  uot 
want  to  be  drawn  into  this  unless  we  have  allies  so  bound  to  us  that  they  can- 
not leave  us  in  the  lurch." 

There  is  a  possibility  that  this  constant  repetition  had  something  to  do  with 
the  trip  of  Ingersoll. 

Now,  do  you  remember  that  part  ?  Whom  were  you  talking  about — 
"the  boss"? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  President  of  the  United  States,  who  is 
also  known  as  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy  by 
the  Constitution. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  there  is  a  paragraph  in  that  same  letter, 
on  the  first  page : 

When  this  understanding  was  reached  it  had  some  value,  [800]  but 
under  present  conditions  it  has  little  value  as  it  alfords  us  the  use  of  a  base  in 
exchange  for  an  obligation  to  protect  about  two  and  one-half  continents. 

What  were  you  talking  about  there? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well  that  might  be  some  slight  exaggeration. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  were  you  exaggerating  about  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  About  the  21/0  continents.  But  my  recol- 
lection of  that  is  this,  that  Rear  Admiral  Royal  R.  Ingersoll — I  think 
that  is  his  initial — Royal  Ingersoll  anywa}^,  then  a  rear  admiral,  had 
made  a  trip  to  London  to  have  some  exj^loratory  conferences  with  the 
British  Admiralty,  because  if  there  appears  a  possibility  of  nations 
being  associated,  it  is  always  customarj',  in  my  opinion  for  the  miltarj' 
or  the  naval  staffs  to  discuss  with  each  other  what  might  happen  if 
such  association  becomes  a  reality,  so  they  would  not  be  taken  by 
surprise. 

So  I  was  expressing  my  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  explora- 
tory discussions  betwen  the  Navy  Department  and  the  British  Ad- 
miralty, as  what  might  be  considered  by  them  as  reasonable  steps  to 
be  taken  if  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  shoiAld  become  asso- 
ciated in  an  effort. 

Senator  Ferguson.  At  that  time  Admiral  Ingersoll  held  what  posi- 
tion in  the  United  States  Navy  ? 

[801]  Admiral  Richardson.  I  am  not  certain,  but  I  believe  at 
least  there  is  a  possibility,  that  he  was  Assistant  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations. 

Senator  Ferguson.  AYlio  was  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  at  that 
time?     It  was  Admiral  Stark,  was  it  not? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Admiral  Stark ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  when  you  had  been  saying  to  Bill  Leahy, 
as  you  describe  hime — Admiral  Leahy — what  position  did  he  hold 
in  the  Navy  when  you  were  telling  him  to  "impress  the  boss"? 


PKOCEEDINGS   OF   JOIXT   COMMITTEE  309 

Admiral  Richardsox.  Well,  when  the  China  incident  started,  Ad- 
miral Leahy  was  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  I  was  Assistant 
Chief  of  Xaval  Operations.  •    .1    ^ 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  what  base  were  you  speakmg  about  in  that 

letter  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  My  recollection  is  that  it  was  Singapore. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  we  were  to  have  the  use  of  the 
base  at  Singapore? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  what  were  we  to  do  for  that  use^  lou 
expressed  it  as  "protect  two  and  a  half  continents,"  which  you  now 
say  was  a  slight  exaggeration.     But  what  were  we  to  do? 

[8021  Admiral  Richardson.  What  I  meant  was  this,  that  when 
this  understanding  of  what  might  take  place  in  the  event  of  closer 
association  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  that  we 
would  have  the  use,  in  case  we  were  drawn  into  the  war,  would  have 
the  use  of  Singapore,  and  we  would  have  the  assistance  of  the  British 
in  the  Western  Pacific. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Assistance  to  do  what  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  this  was  all 

Senator  Ferguson  (interposing).  I  understand. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Drawn  on  the  assumption. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  your  letter  here  you  stated  that  we  were  to, 
in  case  the  agreement  went  through,  we  were  to  have  Singapore  as  a 
base  for  at  least  part  of  our  Fleet;  is  that  correct? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  our  part  in  that  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  it  was  all  based  on  the  assumption 
that  we  would  be  drawn  into  the  war  as  an  associate  of  Great  Britain, 
and  she  would  be  occupied,  and  we  would  have  the  rest  of  the  bag 

to  hold.  ,  ,      .,, , 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  will  you  explain  what  you  mean  by  the 
rest  of  the  bag"  ?     What  would  we  be  holding  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  we  would  be  protecting  North  America, 
South  America,  and  Australia. 

[SOS]         Senator  Ferguson.  This  was  in  January  1940,  was  it  not  i 

Admiral  Richardson.  1940. 

Senator  Ferguson.  1940. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  say  that  Admiral  Ingersoll  did  go  to 
London ;  is  that  correct  ? 

[8O4.]        Admiral  Richardson.  Oh,  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  month  or  what  time  he  went 
to  London  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  don't  remember.     I  have  forgotten. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  familiar  with  the  war  games  of  1932 
that  were  discussed  in  the  Reader's  Digest,  I  believe,  in  an  article? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  was  in  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  were  in  it? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  recall  whether  or  not  he  put  on  a  war 
game  wherein  we  took  airplane  carriers  north  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
and  made  an  attack  from  those  carriers? 


310       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Eichardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  the  opinion  of  the  judges? 

Admiral  Eichardson.  1932?  I  was  in  command  of  the  U.  S.  S. 
Augusta  at  that  time  and  I  played  such  a  minor  part  in  that  that  my 
memory  is  not  vivid  and  whatever  I  might  try  to  say  would  be  wholly 
memory,  and  while  I  think  I  have  a  good  memory,  it  isn't  that  good. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  when  you  were  commander-in-chief 
of  the  Fleet  did  you  have  any  enemies — they  were  not  an  enemy  at  that 
time — but  any  submarines  that  were  near 'Pearl  Harbor  that  did  not 
belong  to  the  United  States? 

[BOS']  Admiral  Eichardson.  That  is,  in  my  opinion,  largely  a 
matter  of  opinion.  I  had  several  reports  from  destroyer  patrols  of 
the  presence  of  foreign  submarines  in  that  area,  their  opinion  being 
derived  from  underwater  or  sound  of  supersonic  listening  devices  and 
at  one  time,  particularly  on  the  16th  of  December,  the  presence  of  a 
submarine  in  the  prohibited  area  right  off  the  entrance  to  Pearl  Har- 
bor was  reported  to  me.  This  report  was  believed  by  several  officers, 
including  the  connnander  of  the  destroyer,  the  sound  officer,  the  com- 
mander of  destroyers,  about  three-fourths  of  my  staff,  but  it  was  not 
believed  by  me  and  two  other  officers  on  my  staff  and  we  later  proved 
to  everybody  else  that  all  the  manifestations  of  the  existence  of  a  sub- 
marine at  that  time  could  be  attributed  to  something  else. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  was  that  reported  to  Washington,  do  you 
kno^y,  or  after  you  decided  that  you  thought  it  was  a  false  alarm  did 
you  just  forget  the  incident? 

Admiral  Eichardson.  I  do  not  remember  whether  that  was  re- 
ported or  not  but  at  that  time  I  issued  an  order  for  the  destroyers 
to  drop  depth  charges  on  any  such  contacts  they  made  and  then  after 
further  consideration,  without  being  influ)fenced  by  any  superior 
authority,  I  rescinded  that  order;  but  in  looking  over  this  corre- 
spondence I  do  find  in  one  letter  somewhere  that  Admiral  Stark  said 
to  me  that  he  regretted  [SOG}  the  destrover  had  not  followed 
the  contact  for  a  longer  period  and  I  think  that  referred  to  another 
reported  contact  with  a  submerged  submarine,  the  contact  having 
been  lost  after  several  hours. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  assume,  then,  that  you  never  had  occasion  to 
use  the  depth  bombs  on  any  subs  and  that  you  revoked  the  order.  Now 
was  a  copy  of  that  order  sent  to  Washington  ?  ' 

Admiral  Eichardson.  So  far  as  I  know,  no ;  it  was  not.  Well  I  am 
certain  it  was  not.  ' 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  you  gave  yesterday  the  conversation  that 
you  had  at  the  Whii^  House  with  the  President  and  Admiral  Leahy 
did  you_finish  reading  your  entire  statement  ? 

xidmiral  Eichardson.  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Can  you  recall  anything  more  that  took  place  at 
that  conversation  ? 

Admiral  Eichardson.  No.  In  a  conversation  of  the  length  of  2 
hours,  some  of  it  about  Puerto  Eico,  some  of  it  about  the  fleet,  some  of 
It  about  a  selection  system,  some  of  it  about  retiring  officers,  it  is  im- 
possible to  remember  more  than  what  impressed  one  at  the  time  as  being 
of  grave  import. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  had  some  very  definite  opinions  on  the  siib- 
jert  that  you  were  discussing  with  the  President,  did  you  not? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  311 

Admiral  RicHARDsoisr.  I  did. 

[807]  Senator  Ferguson.  And  he  had  some  very  definite  opin- 
ions on  the  subject  that  he  was  discussing  with  you  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  He  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  will  you  tell  us— or,  first,  you  told  us, 
as  near  as  you  can  state  it,  what  the  President  had  said.  Will  you 
state,  as  near  as  you  can,  what  you  said  to  the  President?  Did  you 
make  a  written  memo  based  on  that  ?     I  thought  that  you 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  read  that  for  you  yesterday.  Shall  I  read 
it  again  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  you  said  to  the  President? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  anything  to  add  to  that  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  then,  did  you  hear  from  the  President  on 
that  subject  again? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  never  heard  from  the  President  again  and. 
never  saw  him  again. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  when  was  that  conversation  at  the  White 
House  in  relation  to  your  conversation  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
about  the  convoys — or  not  convoys— patrols  ?  Was  the  White  House 
conversation  prior  to  the  one  that  you  had  with  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  Secretary  Knox  ?  This  exhibit  that  you  passed  to  me  is  dated 
October  16,  1940.  [808]  What  was  the  date  you  were  at  the 
White  House? 

Achniral  Richardson.  I  was  at  the  White  House  on  the  8th  of 
October.  The  conversation  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  with 
respect  to  the  opening  of  the  Burma  Road  and  the  line  of  patrol  ships 
was  on  the  11th.    I  left  Washington— no,  it  was  on  the  10th. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  at  the  time  you  were  at  the  Wliite  House 
and  talked  with  Admiral  Leahy  and  the  President  you  did  not  know 
anything  about  this  patrol  that  the  Secretaiy  of  the  Navy  discussed 
with  you  on  the  10th  or  the  11th  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Absolutely  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  And  I  was  amazed  with  the  presentation  of 
facts  made  by  the  Secretary,  but  everything  is  influenced  by  after- 
knowledge.  I  assume  now  that  the  question  of  fuel  oil  at  Samoa 
might  have  had  some  relation  to  the  intention  to  establish  this  patrol, 
or  the  prospective  consideration. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  think  now  that  some  part  of  your  dis- 
cussion with  the  President  brought  up  this  subject  of  the  patrol? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  feel  fairly  certain  that  nothing  that  I  said 
or  did  had  anything  to  do  with  creating  the  idea  that  the  establishment 
of  this  patrol  should  be  undertaken. 

[809]  Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  discuss  this  patrol  question 
with  anyone  in  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy — or  no,  pardon  me,  the 
Secretary  of  State's  office  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  discuss  it  with  Dr.  Hornbeck? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No;  although  I  saw  him  after  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  you  did  not  discuss  it  with  him? 


312       CONGRESSIONAL.  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  insofar  as  I  know,  I  did  not  discuss  it 
with  him,  but  at  about  that  time,  and  I  think — well,  I  know — on  the 
10th  of  October  1940  I  had  sent  Dr.  Stanley  Hornbeck  a  part  of  my 
memorandum  of  September  12,  1940  which  I  had  given  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy  and  it  is  possible  and  highly  probable  that  I  dis- 
cussed with  him  some  of  the  contents  of  this  memorandum. 

Senator  Ferguson.  May  I  inquire  now  from  counsel  whether  or  not 
we  have  any  data  or  memorandums  or  any  information  of  Dr.  Horn- 
beck  upon  this  question,  any  memo  that  he  may  have  written  after  he 
talked  with  Admiral  Eichardson?  As  I  understand  it,  it  is  the 
custom  of  the  State  Department  after  they  have  a  conversation  they 
record  that  conversation  in  a  memorandum. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  have  asked  for  all  their  material  on  that,  and 
nothing  of  that  kind  has  come  forward  as  yet.  We  have  not  re- 
ceived all  that  we  have  asked  for. 

[810]  Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  will  you  inquire  specifically  for 
that  ?     I  would  like  to  defer  that  question  for  the  time  being. 

Were  you  ready  for  a  question,  Admiral  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  if  I  may,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  humili- 
ated to  be  compelled  to  request  that  I  be  permitted  to  change  a  state- 
ment which  I  have  made  here.     I  made  it  honestly  but  it  is  a  mistake. 

The  Chairman.  Go  ahead,  Admiral. 

Admiral  Richardson.  After  a  further  search  of  the  records  of  the 
dispatches  exchanged  between  me  and  Admiral  Stark  I  find  that 
I  did  receive  a  reply  to  my  inquiry  about  the  alert  of  the  Hawaiian 
Department. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  read  that? 

Admiral  Richardson.  And  this  is  my  dispatch. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  give  us  the  date  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes.  The  dispatch  from  Admiral  Richard- 
son to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  dated  22  June  1940  read  as  fol- 
lows [reading:] 

Commanding  General  Hawaiian  Department  received  orders  War  Department 
placing  forces  on  alert  against  hostile  trans-Pacific  raid  and  since  no  informa- 
tion received  Navy  Department  have  assumed  this  exercise.  Navy  patrol  planes 
are  participating. 

[Sn]  In  testimony  that  I  gave  somewhere  I  stated  that  I  had 
received  no  reply,  but  it  appears  that  I  did  receive  a  reply  which  reads 
[reading :] 

War  Department  directive  concerning  alert  issued  as  precautionary  measure 
after  consultation  with  Navy  and  State  Department.  Request  you  continue 
cooperation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  would  indicate,  Admiral,  that  it  was  not  a 
war  game  or  practice  alert,  would  it  ?  What  would  you  say  about  that 
reply  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  I  will  say  that  I  was  completely  wrong, 
because  this  is  the  first  time 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  asking  now.  I  realize  that  and  we  are 
glad  to  have  you  correct  your  testimony,  but  would  this  order  that 
you  read  indicate  that  it  was  not  a  war  game  that  was  going  on  but 
it  was  something  that  was  considered  both  by  the  War  Department 
and  the  Secretary  of  State's  office? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  indicates  that  to  my  mind. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  313 

Senator  Fergusox.  That  being  true,  how  do  you  account  for  the 
Army  bemg  alerted  and  the  Navy  not?  What  is  the  date  of  that 
last  instrument  that  you  read  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  dispatches  that  I  have  read  apparently 
are  contained  in  a  report  of  Admiral  Hewitt's  investigation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know,  Admiral,  whether  you  were 
[812]  a  witness  before  Admiral  Hewitt?  His  investigation  took 
place  after  May  of  1945. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  know  that  I  was  not  a  witness. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  were  not  a  witness  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No  ;  and  this  is  the  first  that  I  have  seen  of 
any  part  of  his  report. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  would  you  just  make  the  record  clear 
now?  Wliat  refreshed  your  memory?  One  of  your  officers  gave  you 
this  information,  did  he  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  He  just  handed  it  to  me  now. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  just  handed  it  to  you? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  reading  that,  can  you  account  for  the  fact 
that  the  Navy  was  not  alerted  and  the  Army  was  alerted  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  passes  my  comprehension. 

The  Chairman.  You  were  asked.  Admiral,  the  date  of  those  two 
communications. 

Admiral  Richardson.  They  are  both  dated  22  June. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  see  that  the  hour  of  recess  has 
come  and  I  have  considerably  more.    Do  you  want  to  adjourn  at  this 

time? 

The  Chairman.  Very  well,  we  will  stand  in  recess  until  10  o  clock 
tomorrow  morning. 

[813]  ("\Miereupon,  at  4  p.  m.,  Tuesday,  November  20,  1945,  an 
adjournment  was  taken  until  10  a.  m.,  Wednesday,  November  21, 1945.) 


PROCEEDINGS   OP  JOINT   COMMITTEE  315 


ISUI  PEiEL  HAEBOE  ATTACK 


WEDNESDAY,   NOVEMBER   21,    1945 

Congress  of  the  United  States, 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation 

OF  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack, 

Washington.,  D.  C. 
The  joint  committee  met,  pursuant  to  adjournment,  at  10  a,  m.,  in 
the  caucus  room  (Room  318),  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Alben 
W.  Barkley  (chairman)  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Barkley  (chairman),  George,  Lucas,  Brewster, 
and  Ferguson,  and  Representatives  Cooper  (vice  chairman),  Clark, 
Murphy,  Gearhart,  and  Keefe. 

Also  present:  William  D.  Mitchell,  general  counsel;  Gerhard  A. 
Gesell,  Jule  M,  Hannaford  and  John  E.  Masten,  of  counsel,  for  the 
joint  committee. 

ISIBI        TESTIMONY    OF    ADMIRAL    JAMES    OTTO    RICHAEDSON 

(Resumed) 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

Senator  Ferguson,  you  were  in  the  process  of  examining  Admiral 
Richardson.     You  ma}^  proceed. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral  Richardson 

Admiral  Richardson.  Could  I  make  an  opening  statement  with 
respect  to  the  testimony  of  yesterday  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have  not  had  an  opportunity  to  verify 
whatever  evidence  there  is  in  official  records  with  respect  to  dispatches 
exchanged  between  me  and  Admiral  Stark  regarding  the  Army  alert, 
and,  therefore,  I  request  that  the  members  of  the  committee  hold  in 
abeyance  their  judgment  on  that  subject  until  I  have  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  search  the  original  records. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  be  glad  to  grant  you  that  privi- 
lege, Admiral  Richardson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral  Richardson,  I  want  to  speak  to  you 
about  this  instrument  that  you  handed  to  me  yesterday  which  I  did 
not  have  time  to  read  yesterday,  dated  October  the  16th,  1940. 

I  ask  counsel  when  he  received  a  copy  of  that,  when  the  committee 
received  a  cop}?^  of  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  Senator,  the  Admiral  tells  me  [816~\ 
that  he  handed  me  not  the  one  you  have  but  this  document  here,  which 
is  a  copy  of  it,  2  or  3  days  ago.  I  had  it  in  my  files.  I  had  not 
studied  it  myself  or  felt  that  it  was  pertinent  to  what  I  was  inquiring 
of  him  about  so  I  did  not  pursue  it  further. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  there  is  no  question  about  that.  I  just 
wanted  to  know  when  you  had  received  it. 


316        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Mitchell,  I  don't  think  the  committee  has  had  it  at  all  yet. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  counsel  has  had  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  yes ;  in  the  way  I  state. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  the  Admiral  may  use  the  one  copy  and  I 
will  use  the  other,  so  that  we  will  know  that  we  are  talking  about  the 
same  thing. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have  a  copy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  have  a  copy? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes, 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  assume,  Admiral  Richardson,  that  that  ex- 
hibit— and  might  we  have  it  marked  exhibit — what  is  the  last  exhibit 
number,  General? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  will  be  Exhibit  11. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Exhibit  11. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  A  communication  dated  October  16,  1940,  directed 
to  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  by  [S17^  the 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  United  States  Fleet. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral  Richardson,  the  first  three  pages,  if 
you  will  refer  to  it,  were  written  by  you  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  was. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  written  about  the  time  of  October  the  16th, 
1940? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Approximately  on  that  date. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  Do  you  know  whether  it  was  written  on  the 
flagship  New  Mexico? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  was. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  this  is  the  instrument  that  you  indicated 
as  being  delivered  to  Admiral  Hart,  Thomas  C.  Hart,  Commander  in 
Chief,  U.  S.  Asiatic  Fleet? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  what  is  the  last  page  on  this  Exhibit  11 
dated  ?  The  same  day,  October  the  11th  ?  The  photostat  does  not  give 
the  initialling  or  writing  at  the  top — at  least  on  mine  it  does  not.  Does 
it  on  yours? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  says: 

Secret,  October  the  11th,  1940 : 

U.  S.  Fleet  Dispositions  and  Operations  to  Meet  Special  Situation  in  Western 
Pacific. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  read  it? 
[8181         Admiral  Richardson  (reading:) 

Assumptions :  The  gravity  of  the  situation  existing  today  is  intensified  by  the 
opening  of  the  Burma  Road  by  Great  Britain. 

(2)  The  Japanese  announce  or  indicate  that  the  opening  of  the  Burma  Eoad 
is  an  unfriendly  act  to  Japan. 

(3)  The  Japanese  undertake  retaliatory  measures  to  enforce  cooperation  with 
Japan  by  Great  Britain  in  the  Far  East. 

(4)  Japan  undertakes  positive  aggressive  action  to  enforce  full  cooperation 
by  the  Dutch  East  Indies. 

(5)  The  United  States  proclaims  complete  embargo  on  shipments  from  the 
United  States  or  United  States  possessions  to  Japan  and  non-intercourse  with 
Japan. 

(6)  The  United  States  undertakes  by  diplomatic  and  naval  action  to  prevent 
Japanese  trade  in  Japanese  ships  and  in  ships  of  other  nations  with  the  Western 
Hemisphere. 

(7)  The  United  States  will  support  British  forces  in  the  Western  Pacific — 
in  Australia  and  Singapore — and  Dutch  forces  in  the  Dutch  East  Indies  in 
stopping  Japanese  trade  south  of  China  Sea — Celebes  Sea  area. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMirPEE  317 

(8)  The  United  States  is  prepared  to  accept  war  [819]  if  the  measures 
taken  cause  Japan  to  declare  war.  .       .     *v,    w^c^^^r,  Atlantic 

(9)  Great  Britain  will  prevent  any  naval  aggression  in  the  Western  Atlantic 
against  the  western  Hemisphere  by  the  Axis  powers. 

(10)  The  situation  and  decisions  by  the  United  States  assumed  herein  may 
arise  17  October  1940. 

[820]         Senator  Ferguson.  Let  us  speak  about  the  last,  No   10, 
that  "The  situation  and  decisions  by  the  United  States  assumed  here- 
in may  arise  17  October,  19-10." 
As  i  understand  it,  you  wrote  this  memo  that  you  ]ust  read. 
Admiral  Richardson.  Ko  ;  I  did  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  ^Yho  did  write  it  ?     Where  did  you  get  it  i 
Admiral  Richardson.  May  I  explain  ?       ^ 
Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  I  want  you  to  explain. 

Admiral  Ricil\rdson.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  directed  me  and 
Stark  to  draw  up  a  plan  of  action  sheuld  decision  be  reached  to  stop 
trade  between  Japan  and  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

In  order  to  draw  any  war  plan,  you  must  start  with  some  assump- 
tions as  to  bases  for  the  plan.  This  whole  document  which  I  have 
read  is  nothing  but  the  assumptions  that  the  officers  who  drew  up 
this  plan  set  up  as  the  basis  for  their  plan.  It  was  drawn  up  by  the 
officers  in  the  War  Plans  Division  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
in  collaboration  with  me  and  Admiral  Stark  and  my  war  plans  officer, 
Commander  Vincent  R.  Murphy,  now  rear  admiral. 

So  that  these  assumptions,  when  I  left  Washington,  had  not  been 

seen  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  or  by  the  President  of  the  United 

States,  neither  one  of  whom  was  in  Washington         [821]         that  day. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  this  the  substance  of  what  you  had  received 

from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  a  few  days  previous  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  was  our  joint  conception  of  what  the  Sec- 
retary informed  us  the  day  before,  on  October  10. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes;  and  you  made  a  memo  of  what  he  in- 
formed you,  and  this  is  the  memo? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  made  no  memorandum.  I  did  not  write 
one  word  of  this.  It  was  drawn  up  by  the  War  Plans  officers  of  the 
Office  of  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  in  collaboration  with  the  War 
Plans  officer  of  the  United  States  Fleet. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  did  he  get  the  information  to  put  m  tins 
document  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  He  was  present— all  of  them  were  present 
when  the  discussion  was  had  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  say  then  that  this  represented  a  fan- 
statement  of  what  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  said  to  you  at  a  previous 
date? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  sir ;  this  is  a  more  formally  stated,  com- 
prehensive presentation  of  the  assumptions  arising  from  what  he  did 
state  to  us. 

[822]  Senator  Ferguson.  Getting  to  the  date  of  the  17th  of  Oc- 
tober, can  you  explain  that  any  more  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  i7th  of  October? 
Senator  Ferguson.  It  is  on  the  last  line,  the  No.  10  item. 
Admiral  Richardson.  That  was  the  day  that  Great  Britain  was  to 
reopen  the  Burma  Road,  and  it  was  thought  that  the  Japs,  or  the 
Japanese,  might  take  some  aggressive  action  in  connection  Avith  the 
reopening  of  the  Burma  Road. 

79716— 46— pt.  1 23 


318        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  about  when  Admiral  Hart  received 
this  instrument  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Of  my  own  knowledge,  I  do  not  know,  but 
I  think  it  entirely  possible  that  I  may  have  somewhere  among  my  pa- 
pers a  letter  from  Admiral  Hart  written  in  December,  informing 
me  that  he  had  received  this  document. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  when  the  document  went  to  Admiral  Hart,, 
it  had  the  sheet  on  it  which  you  read ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Had  what? 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  had  the  sheet  on  that  you  read?  Tlie  last 
sheet  was  on  it  when  j^ou  sent  it  to  Admiral  Hart? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Oh,  absolutely.  It  is  Enclosure  A  in  this 
letter. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  Will  you  now  read  your  letter  which  you 
wrote  on  the  flagship  New  Mexico^  October  16, 1940. 

\823'\  Admiral  Richardson.  May  I  have  your  cop}'  ?  That  is  my 
own  copy  and  it  is  clearer  than  this  photostatic  copy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  I  will  ask  you  what  these  things  are  on  the 
margin. 

Admiral  Richardson.  You  can  see  them  better  on  that  copy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  use  this  one.  Before  you  read  it,  on  the 
last  page  where  your  signature  appears,  at  the  top  is  01  in  the  margin 
and  a  line  drawn.     Do  you  know  what  that  means  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  numbers  in  the  right-hand  margin  of 
the  last  page  of  the  letter  indicate  numbers  of  my  staff.  01  is  the  chief 
of  staff.  The  initial  which  is  rather  indistinct  is  "T"  for  Taffender, 
who  is  rear  admiral,  who  was  my  chief  of  staff.  11  is  the  operations 
officer.  "B"  stands  for  Beery,  !Rear  Adm,  Bernard  H.  Beery,  then 
captain.  16  is  the  war  plans  officer.  VRM  stands  for  Vincent  R. 
Murphy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  would  those  lines  crossed  through  those 
numbers  indicate  that  those  respective  officers  had  seen  this  instrument 
prior  to  sending  it,  or  signing  it? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Those  marks  are  the  initials  of  the  officers, 
and  the  initials  I  recognize  as  their  own. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Does  it  indicate,  when  the  line  is  \S^h^ 
drawn  through  their  number,  that  the}'  have  seen  the  instrument  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  My  memory  is  not  definite  on  that,  but  the 
line,  I  think,  means  that  they  are  to  see  it,  and  an  initial  indicates  that 
they  have  seen  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  will  you  read  that  instrument? 

Admiral  Richardson.  This  is  "CinC  File  No.  A16/01687." 

Long  Beach,  California.     October  16,  1940. 

From:  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet. 

To:  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Asiatic  Fleet. 

Subject:  International  Situation — Reinforcement  of  the  A.siatie  Fleet. 

Enclosures:  (A)  Copy  of  Assumptions.     (B)  Copy  of  Tentative  Operations. 

1.  During  the  recent  visit  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet  to  Washing- 
ton and  on  October  10,  the  Secretary  told  the  Commander-in-Chief  that  the  Presi- 
dent was  considering,  in  connection  with  possible  retaliatory  measures  taken 
against  Great  Britain  upon  opening  of  the  Burma  Road  the  following: 

[825]         (a)  Reenforcement  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  as  a  peacetime  move. 

(b)  Declaring  a  complete  embargo  in  shipments  to  and  from  Japan. 

(c)  Attempting  to  stop  all  trade  between  Japan  and  the  Americas.  To  accom- 
plish this  latter  measure,  he  (the  President)  proposed  establishment  of  patrol 
lines  of  light  forces  from  Honolulu  westward  to  the  Philippines  and  a  second  line 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  319 

roughly  from  Samoa  to  Singapore,  "in  support  of"  the  flrst  line.  The  impracti- 
cability of  this  and  other  suggestions  was  explained  to  the  Secretary,  and,  after 
some  further  conversations  dealing  with  eventualities  and  at  the  direction  of  the 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  his  War  Plans  Officer 
in  conjunction  with  the  War  Plans  Division  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operation's 
office,  submitted  a  memorandum  (Enclosure  A)  of  assumptions  outlining  the 
situation  presented  by  the  Secretary  and  a  brief  outline  sketch  of  operations 
(Enclosure  B)  by  the  U.  S.  Fleet  to  meet  the  assumptions  in  a  more  practicable 
manner.  This  was  submitted  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  on  October  11 
for  submission  to  the  Secretary  and  the  President  as  to  what  the  Navy  proposed 
to  do  if  directed  to  proceed  on  the  proposed  assumptions  and  tentative  decisions. 

2.  To  date,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet,  has  had  no  further  word  in 
regard  to  the  memorandum  referred  to  above,  [826]  but  received  a  dispatch 
today  from  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  directing  that  a  copy  be  forwarded  to 
you  via  the  Houston.  It  is  believed  that  further  study  in  the  Department  and  in 
the  Fleet  will  result  in  some  modifications  in  the  operations  proposed  for  the 
Fleet,  particularly  as  regards  distribution  of  patrol  planes  and  cruisers. 

3.  The  further  operations  indicated  in  para  grab  9  of  Enclosure  (B)  are  measures 
for  the  reduction  and  occupation  of  the  Marshall  Islands,  or  a  feint  in  the 
Mid-Pacific  which  will  be  initiated  when  a  train  is  assembled  and  transports  are 
ready.  Due  to  the  situation  in  the  Atlantic,  the  Department  did  not  feel  that 
our  main  Fleet  should  get  too  far  in  the  Pacific,  as  it  might  be  necessary  to  call 
it  back  on  short  notice.  It  was  felt,  however,  that  active  operations  against 
ORANGE  possessions  might  have  a  deterring  effect  on  ORANGE  full  scale  opera- 
tions in  the  South  China  Sea  and  Dutch  East  Indies. 

4.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  above  operations  parallel  very  closely  the  present 
ORANGE  Plan,  modified  by  the  dispatch  of  an  Advance  Force  to  the  Asiatic  and 
further  modified  by  the  restriction  of  main  Fleet  operations  in  the  Mid-Pacific 
area. 

5.  I  was  further  told,  in  the  Department,  that  no  Army  forces  would  be  available 
and  that  the  British  had  agreed  to  the  United  States'  use  of  Singapore. 

[821]  6.  In  the  event  that  the  assumptions  are  not  realized  prior  to  about 
January  1,  1941,  or  decision  is  not  reached  to  dispatch  the  Advance  Detachment 
before  that  time,  there  was  discussion  of  assembling  a  train  and  transports  in  West 
Coast  ports  and  holding  a  full  dress  rehearsal  of  operations  against  an  atoll, 
as  a  Fleet  exercise,  utilizing  Christmas  Island  as  a  site.  Steps  are  being  taken 
for  the  acquisition  and  conversion  of  the  necessary  transports,  etc.,  to  be  ready 
around  that  time.  If  this  is  done,  the  reenforcement  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  may 
take  place  coincidentally  with  this  exercise,  the  idea  being  that  Japan  will  be 
impressed  by  this  evidence  of  United  States  determination  to  protect  its  interests. 
I  presume  you  will  be  further  informed  of  this  eventuality  as  plans  are  more 
fully  developed. 

7.  My  secret  serial  A16/01683  of  this  date,  covering  the  composition  and  prepa- 
ration of  the  tentative  detachment  slated  for  reenforcement  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet,  in 
case  such  a  move  is  ordered,  was  forwarded  to  you  by  clipper  locked  box,  a  copy 
being  sent  on  the  HOUSTON  with  this  letter. 

8.  It  is  hereby  certified  that  the  originator  considers  it  to  be  impracticable 
to  phrase  this  document  in  such  a  manner  as  will  permit  a  classification  other 
than  secret. 

J.  O.  RiCHAEDSON. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  there  anything  under  your  name?  I 
[^8281         see  some  marks  here  which  are  illegible. 

Admiral  Kichaedson.  "Copy  to  OPNAV  via  air  mail.  This  copy 
to  be  acknowledged  by  dispatch"^-no,  "This  copy  acknowledged  by 
dispatch  132,000  of  October"  something  blank  "1940".  It  is  very 
vague. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  offer  in  evidence 
now  Exhibit  11,  two  parts  of  which  have  been  read,  so  that  the  other 
part  will  be  in.  It  is  the  Enclosure  (B).  Let  it  all  be  contained  in 
the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Without  objection  it  will  be  inserted  at  this  point 
as  Exhibit  No.  11. 


320       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  11".) 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral  Kichardson,  do  you  have  any  com- 
ment to  make  on  this  document  Exhibit  11  that  I  may  not  have  cov- 
ered, anything  that  you  may  want  to  put  in  tlie  record  to  clarify  it? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  have  no  comment  on  it  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  During  your  tenure  as  Commander  in  Chief  did 
we  have  any  convoys  in  the  Pacific  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Only  on  one  occasion  was  a  single  ship  con- 
voyed by  a  ship  under  my  command  from  Pearl  Harbor  to  [8291 
Guam,  from  Guam  to  Cavite,  by  a  ship  under  the  command  of  Ad- 
miral Hart,  and  the  ship  on  her  return  voyage  was  convoyed  in  like 
manner  from  Cavite  to  Guam  and  from  Guam  to  Pearl  Harbor. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  recall  the  name  of  that  ship?  Do  you 
recall  that? 

Admiral  Richardson.  My  memory  is  not  certain,  but  I  believe  it 
was  the  Chaumont. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  the  occasions  were  for  con- 
voying that  ship  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  received  orders  to  escort  her  to  Guam,  to 
have  the  escort  await  for  her  return,  that  she  would  be  escorted  from 
Guam  to  Cavite  by  a  ship  from  the  Asiatic  Fleet  and  likewise  escorted 
from  Cavite  to  Guam  by  a  ship  from  the  Asiatic  Fleet,  and  escorted 
from  Guam  to  Honolulu  by  the  escort  which  accompanied  her  outward 
bound.  I  have  no  information  or  knowledge — or  I  had  no  informa- 
tion or  knowledge  at  the  time  as  to  why  she  was  escorted,  what  she 
was  guarded  against,  or  what  her  cargo  was. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  you  received  an  order  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  received  a  dispatch  from  the  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations  directing  me  to 

Senator  Ferguson  (interposing).  From  the  CNO? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  CNO. 

[830']  Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  ask  counsel,  do  we  have  a  copy 
of  that  dispatch  ? 

Mr,  Mitchell.  I  doubt  it  because  I  have  never  seen  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral  Richardson,  do  you  know  where  we 
could  locate  a  copy  of  the  dispatch  to  you  to  convoy  that  ship,  and 
could  you  give  us  about  the  date  of  it? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have  frequently  endeavored  to  recall  when 
this  incident  occurred,  and  I  have,  unfortunately,  no  record  in  any 
of  my  papers  as  to  the  time.  Any  statement  I  made  would  be  a  pure 
guess,  but  I  should  say  around 

Senator  Ferguson  (interposing).  After  the  instrument  of  October 
11  that  we  just  read? 

Admiral  Rictlvrdson.  My  guess  would  be  that  it  was  in  December 
of  that  year,  because  I  received  a  dispatch  to  escort  her  when  I  was  in 
the  Hawaiian  area.  I  did  not  return  to  the  Hawaiian  area  until  the 
6th  of  December  1940,  so  my  guess  is  that  it  would  be  within  the 
month  of  December  1940. 

{831]  Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  you 
wrote  an}^  letters  about  it?  Is  it  mentioned  in  any  of  this  corre- 
spondence that  we  have  ? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  321 

Admiral  Richardsox.  I  wrote  no  letters  about  it.  I  sent  a  dispatch, 
however,  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  inquired  as  to  whether 
the  escorting  of  this  ship  indicated  an  intention  to  escort  all  U.  S. 
Government  vessels,  or  an  intention  later  to  escort  all  United  States 
flag  vessels.     That  is,  ships  flying  the  American  flag. 

I  promptly  received  a  reply  from  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
saying,  "Negative  to  your  inquiry." 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  the  only  knowledge  you  have  about  that 
convoy  that  you  have  given  us,  that  you  recall  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have  an  impression;  I  cannot  state  as  an 
absolute  certainty,  that  after  I  was  relieved  and  after  I  returned  to 
Washington,  purely  as  a  matter  of  curiosity  I  asked  the  then  Assist- 
ant Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  Admiral  Ingersoll,  as  to  why  I  was 
ordered  to  escort  this  vessel,  and  he  stated  that  it  was  rumored  that 
there  were  German  raiders  operating  in  the  mid-Pacific  area  within 
the  Marshall  Islands  or  north  thereof  and  that  I  was  directed  to 
escort  this  vessel  to  protect  her  against  possible  attack  by  German 
raiders. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  there  anything  else  you  wish  to  add  to  that? 

[8S2]  Admiral  Richardson.  No.  That  is  as  complete  an  an- 
swer as  I  can  give. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  understand  that  you  stated  you  left  the  posi- 
tion as  comander  in  chief  of  the  fleet  February  1, 1941. 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  at  that  time  were  succeeded  by  Admiral 
Kimmel  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  also  stated  that  he  was  a  commanding 
officer  under  you  in  charge  of  cruisers  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  He  was  a  type  commander,  not  commanding 
officer,  because  with  us  commanding  officers  command  a  single  ship. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  see.  Now,  do  you  know  how  Admiral  Kimmel 
came  to  succeed  you ;  have  you  any  information  on  that  you  could  give 
the  committee? 

Admiral  Richardson.  When  I  was  in  Washington  in  October  1940, 
in  conversation  with  Admiral  Stark  and  Admiral  Nimitz,  who  was 
then  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Navigation,  now  Bureau  of  Naval  Per- 
sonnel, I  stated  that  in  my  opinion  they  should  have  in  mind  the  names 
of  officers  whom  they  would  consider  favorably  as  the  relief  of  all 
of  the  important  officers  in  the  fleet,  as  any  officer  of  the  age  of  most 
of  the  flag  officers  of  senior  rank  might  break  down  in  health  or  might 
be  detached  ^SS]  for  other  reasons,  and  that  in  order  that 
they  might  not  be  taken  unawares  I  thought  they  should  have  a  ten- 
tative slate  of  prospective  reliefs,  and  they  agreed  with  me  and 
asked  me  to  suggest  the  names  of  possible  reliefs. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  make  any  suggestions? 

Admiral  Richardson.  After  some  consideration  I  submitted  a  list 
of  names  and  in  that  list  was  the  name  of  Rear  Admiral  Husband  E. 
Kimmel. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  tell  us  who  else  was  in  the  list? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  do  not  remember  with  certainty,  and  I 
hoped  I  would  not  be  required  to  answer  that  question,  because  I  have 
very  many  friends  in  the  Navy  and  I  would  hate  for  them,  any  of 
them,  to  feel  that  their  name  was  not  on  that  list. 


322       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  have  no  desire  to  press  for  an  answer. 

About  how  many  were  in  the  list,  so  that  they  may  feel  that  they 
were  included  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  think  probably  five  or  six. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  what  was  your  suggestion 

Admiral  Richardson.  Just  a  minute. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Pardon  me. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Much  to  my  surprise,  and  as  evidence 
[834]  of  how  uncertain  some  testimony  may  be  after  5  years,  I 
thought  that  in  that  letter  I  stated  that  I  had  not  included  Admiral 
King's  name,  because  he  was  already  afloat  in  the  Pacific — I  mean 
in  the  Atlantic — but  in  looking  over  some  old  papers  I  was  surprised 
to  find  this  entry,  29  October,  letter  from  Nimitz  agreeing  to  King's 
shift  up  if  I  had  to  be  taken  out. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  have  in  mind  when  you  made  that  sug- 
gestion about  replacement  of  officers  that  you  might  be  replaced  in 
the  very  near  future  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Not  at  all. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Not  by  one  of  the  names  that  you  mentioned. 

Admiral  Richardson.  When  I  left  Washington  in  October,  Admiral 
Stark  and  Admiral  Nimitz  informed  me  that  it  was  their  belief  that 

1  would  remain  in  command  until  I  completed  2  years'  service  as 
commander  in  chief,  and  I  had  no  reason  for  suggesting  this  excepting 
that  when  a  man  is  over  60,  in  a  strenuous  job,  he  might  not  hold  out. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  the  normal  tour  of  duty is  that 

how  you  express  it  in  the  Navy  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  how  we  express  it,  but  there  is  no 
such  thing,  because  there  have  been  officers  remain  Commander  in 
Chief  one  year;  there  have  been  officers  remain  two  years.  My  prede- 
cessor remained,  I  think,  2  years. 

[SS5]         Senator  Ferguson.  The  normal,  you  would  say,  then,  is 

2  years — average  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  it  was  not  normal  for  a  number  of 
years,  and  I  believe  that  a  feeling  grew  up  in  the  Navy  that  a  1-year 
tenure  of  office  was  too  short,  and  there  was  a  tendency,  as  exemplified 
by  actual  practice,  to  extend  the  cruise  of  a  commander  in  chief  to 
2  years. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  13  months  an  average  tour  of  duty? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  know  of  one  or  two  flag  officers  who  were 
detached  as  commander  in  chief  after  1  year. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  you  say  the  commander  in  chief,  that 
would  be  in  the  same  position  as  you  were  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Same  wav. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  seniority  recognized  in  the  Navy,  for  in- 
stance as  it  is  recognized  in  the  Senate,  that  the  next  in  fine  would 
take  your  position  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Seniority  is  recognized  in  the  Navy  in  the 
assignment  of  officers  to  duty  up  to  and  including  that  of  captain, 
but  in  the  selection  of  officers  for  flag  assignments  an  effort  is  made 
to  base  assignments  on  an  estimate  of  the  officer's  ability  rather  than 
upon  his  lineal  position  on  the  list. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  how  long  of  a  notice  did  you  have  that 
you  were  going  to  be  removed,  when  vou  were  commander  in  [SSO] 
chief  of  the  fleet? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  323 

Admiral  Richardsox.  I  received  a  dispatch  on  5  January,  about 
11 :  30  in  the  morning  Honokiki  time,  Sunday. 

Senator  Fergusox.  And  from  whom  did  j-ou  receive  that  dispatch  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  am  not  positive.  I  think  it  came  from  the 
Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Naval  Personnel,  who  was  Admiral  Nimitz, 
and  was  charged  with  the  preparation  of  all  orders,  but  it  came  to 
me  in  a  secret  code  that  was  held  by  no  one  in  the  fleet  except  me, 
and  the  reason  it  was  in  a  secret  code  was  that  the  same  message  in- 
volved many  other  changes  of  flag  officers,  and  I  was  directed  in 
the  message  to  inform  all  of  the  officers  concerned  but  to  inform 
no  one  else  in  a  public  release  of  the  impending  changes  made. 

Senator  Fergusox.  When  was  the  first  public  release  that  you  were 
retired  from  that  position  as  commander  in  chief  of  the  Navy  ? 

Admiral  Richardsox^  Mj^  recollection  is  tliat  it  was  on  the  6th  of 
January  or  possibly  the  7th,  Tuesday. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Do  you  know  who  made  that  release? 

Admiral  Richardsox^.  I  haA-e  no  idea. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Did  it  come  from  Hawaii  or  did  it  come  from 
Washington  ? 

Admiral  Richardsox.  Well,  I  read  it  in  the  newspapers  in  [837] 
Hawaii. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  did  you  ever  discuss  your  retirement  from 
that  particular  position  with  anyone  in  the  service,  I  mean  in  the 
Navy  ? 

Admiral  Richardsox.  Ma^^  I  correct  the  word.  It  was  not  a  re- 
tirement. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  w^as  it  ? 

Admiral  Richardsox.  It  was  relief  or  detachment. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Detachment.  Did  you  ever  discuss  that  de- 
tachment with  anyone  ? 

Admiral  Richardsox.  I  did  not — ^}'es.  I  discussed  it  with  one  offi- 
cial in  the  Navy  Department. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Will  you  tell  us  who  that  official  was? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  tell  us  your  discussion  with  him  about 
your  detachment? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  I  said  to  the  Secretary  upon  reporting 
here 

Senator  Ferguson.  First,  will  you  give  us  about  the  date,  if  joii  can. 
Admiral. 

Admiral  Richardsox^  Well,  my  orders  directed  me,  my  orders  de- 
taching me  from  command  of  the  United  States  Fleet  directed  me  to 
report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  for  duty.  I  reported,  as  nearly  as 
I  can  remember,  on  the  24th  day  of  [SSS]  March,  1941.  I  can 
verify  that  date. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  it  is  near  enough. 

Admiral  Richardson,  By  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  I  was  ordered 
on  25  March  1941  to  report  to  duty  with  the  General  Boards  When  I 
went  in  to  report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  I  said,  in  effect,  in  my 
experience  in  the  Navy  I  have  never  known  of  a  flag  officer  being- 
detached  from  command  of  the  United  States  Fleet  in  the  same  man- 
ner that  I  was,  and  I  feel  that  I  owe  it  to  myself  to  inquire  why  I  was 
detached,  and  he  stated  that  the  President  would  send  for  nio-nnd  talk 
the  matter  over  with  me. 


324        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[839]  Senator  Ferguson.  Did  the  President  ever  send  for  you 
and  talk  the  matter  over  with  you  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  He  did  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  seek  to  go  to  the  President  on  the 
matter  after  being  told  that  he  would  send  for  you  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  By  no  means. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  have  any  other  discussion  with  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy — the  Secretary  at  that  time  was  Mr.  Knox,  was 
it  not? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  have  any  other  discussion  about  your 
detachment?     Will  you  give  us  the  full  story  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No,  I  had  no  more  discussion  about  my  de- 
tachment. I  had  some  discussion  about  my  duty,  to  which  I  was  to 
be  assigned. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  tell  us  something  about  the  duties? 
Was  it  a  promotion  that  you  were  going  to ;  was  this  general  board  a 
promotion  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Oh,  no. 

In  accordance  with  the  law,  upon  detachment  from  the  position 
of  commander  in  chief  of  the  United  States  Fleet,  I  reverted  from  the 
rank  of  admiral  to  that  of  rear  admiral,  and  from  being  senior  to  many 
people  to  whom  I  had  been  [S40~\  senior  only  temporarily 
I  reverted  to  my  normal  position  on  the  Navy  list. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  the  duty  of  this  general  board  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  it  was  a  board  that  has  been  held  in 
high  esteem  by  many  people  for  many  years.  It  is  a  board  of  senior 
officers  of  the  Navy  that  consider  matters  referred  to  it  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy  and  advise  him  on  any  subject  that  is  referred  to 
them.  The  primary  duty  in  time  of  peace  was  the  consideration  and 
recommendation  as  to  the  building  program,  and  the  type  and  char- 
acteristics of  the  ships  to  be  built. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  have  any  conversation  with  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy  that  would  indicate  that  he  knew  why  you  were 
detached  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  He  said  to  me,  "The  last  time  you  were  here 
you  hurt  the  President's  feelings." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  he  say  what  the  occasion  was  that  you  had 
hurt  the  President's  feelings? 

Admiral  Richardson.  He  did  not  sa.j. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ask  him. 

Admiral  Richardson.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  on  what  occasion  you  could  have 
hurt  the  President's  feelings? 

[84^1']  Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  it  would  hurt  my  feelings  if 
a  senior  subordinate  under  me  disagreed  with  me  and  I  couldn't  make 
him  change  his  mind. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  you  feel  that  probably  the  conversation 
that  you  had  then  on  the — was  it  the  8th  of  October  at  a  Imicheon  with 
Admiral  Leahy  and  the  President — was  the  occasion  that  you  may 
have  hurt  his  feelings? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  think  so. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  the  occasion  that  you  told  us  that,  you 
were  rather  definite  in  your  opinions? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  325 

Admiral  Richardson.  Unfortunately,  I  am  definite  in  most  of  my 

°^SmiTtor  Ferguson.  Did  you  have  any  other  conversation  with  the 

Secertary  of  the  Navy  as  to  why  you  were  removed— Pardon  m^ 

detached.     I  want  to  use  that  word  mstead  of  ^'removed.      Detached. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  say  somethnig  oil  the 

record  ? 

The  Chairman.  Off  the  record. 

(Discussion  off  the  record). 

The  Chairman.  Go  ahead.  ^  ,,       ^  ^  .        i    k„ 

Senator  Lucas.  Mr.  Chairman,  in  view  of  the  statement  made  by 
the  \dmiral,  it  is  apparent  that  he  doesn't  think  that  is  material  and 
pertinent  and  I  seHously  doubt  whether  [Sm  ^,  >ve  should  go 
fisliino-  in  every  direction  here  in  view  of  the  Admiral's  last  statement. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have  no  humility  about  making  this  state- 
ment.    I  am  perfectly  willing  to  make  it,  if  it  is  useful.    It  is  a  trivial 

*  The  Chairman.  The  Chair  thinks  probably  the  Admiral  had  better 

^Admiral  Richardson.  There  is  a  requirement  in  the  Navy  that  on 
every  annual  fitness— I  mean  on  every  fitness  report  submitted  an 
officer  indicates  his  preference  for  duty,  and  inasmuch  as  I  had  been 
informed  that  I  would  remain  at  sea  longer  if  that  were  carried  out,  i 
would  have  only  a  short  time  remaining  on  the  active  list  when  1  was 
detached,  and  therefore  I  did  not  want  to  move  my  household  effects 
from  Washington  to  some  naval  station.  I  did  not  want  to  be  assigned 
to  a  resDonsible  position  in  the  Department  for  only  a  short  time,  and 
really,  as  a  joke,  I  entered  on  my  last  fitness  report  that  I  preferred 
duty  on  the  Naval  Examining  Board. 

In  all  my  experience  in  the  Navy— and  I  have  had  4  years  m  the 
Bureau  of  Navigation,  charged  with  assigning  officers  to  duty,  i  never 
heard  of  anyone  looking  at  a  fitness  report  of  a  flag  officer  to  see  where 
they  would  assign- him  to  duty.  So  before  I  reported  to  the  Secretary, 
I  read  [8431  in  the  paper,  or  heard  a  rumor,  that  1  was  to  be 
assigned  to  the  Naval  Examining  Board  in  aocordance  with  my  re- 
quest, and  when  I  reported  to  the  Secretary,  I  said,  "Mr.  Secretary, 
I  have  reported  for  duty.  I  am  willing  to  do  any  duty  that  can  m 
any  way  contribute  to  the  preparation  of  the  Navy  for  war  but  having 
heard  or  read  a  rumor  that  I  was  going  to  the  examining  board  at  my 
request  I  want  to  tell  you  that  if  I  am  ordered  to  the  examining  board, 
I  am  going  there  gladly,  willingly,  rather.  I  will  do  the  ]ob  to  the 
limit  of  my  ability,  but"^if  a  press  release  is  made  that  I  was  assigned 
to  the  examining  board  at  my  request,  I  will  inform  the  press  that 
it  is  a  lie."  ,  . 

He  said.  "Well,  Admiral,  you,  of  course,  won't  go  to  the  examining 
board.    Where  do  you  want  to  go  ? " 

And  I  said,  "Any  other  place  you  send  me." 

So  I  went  to  the  general  board.  .     r^^       •      n  .i 

The  Chairman.  That  completes  that  statement?  Ihat  is  all  there 
is  to  that? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral,  had  you  put  on  a  long-distance  recon- 
naissance at  Pearl  Harbor? 


326        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Eichardson,  I  had,  Senator  Ferguson,  and  I  think  in  the 
previous  testimonv  I  have  covered  it  as  com-  [S44]  prehen- 
sively  as  I  can. 

Senator  FerCxUSun.  You  have  given  us  all  of  the  data  on  that? 

Admiral  KrcHARosoisr.  I  have. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  have  anything  to  do  with  the  recon- 
naissance orders  or  directives  as  of  1941,  that  is  what  I  was  getting  at. 
"Were  you  consulted  in  relation  to  that  after  you  left  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  discontinued  prior  to  my  detachment  long- 
range  reconnaissance  of  the  type  that  I  established  upon  arrival  in  the 
Hawaiian  area,  and  in  lieu  thereof  I  established  a  search  of  the  oper- 
:iting  areas  and  a  search  off  the  entrance  of  Pearl  Harbor  before  ships 
left  the  harbor.  That  was  incorporated  in  a  security  order  which  was 
in  process  of  revision  when  I  was  detached. 

The  first  order,  that  revision,  that  was  issued  after  I  was  detached, 
was  issued  over  the  signature  of  Admiral  Kimmel  on  15  February,  and 
I  knew  what  was  in  that  order,  and  I  previously  stated  that  had  I 
rernained  there,  while  I  had  not  read  this  order  thoroughly,  it  is  my 
belief,  based  on  the  fact  that  the  officer  who  prepared  it  on  my  staff 
remained  with  Admiral  Kimmel  until  after  that  order  was  issued,  it  is 
my  belief  that  had  I  remained  there  the  order  would  have  been  sub- 
stantially as  it  is  now,  and  would  have  [S4^]  been  over  my 
signature. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  were  the  places  that  you  could  anchor 
the  fleet?  What  places  were  there  to  anchor  this  fleet  at  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  The  main  anchorages  were  within  Pearl  Har- 
bor, in  Lahaina  Roads  off  the  Island  of  Molokai,  and  for  carriers,  off 
Oahu,  between  the  entrance  to  Pearl  Harbor  and  Diamond  Head,  and 
small  vessels  used  Hilo  and  Kahoolawe. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  all  anchorage  considered  open  anchorage 
except  Pearl  Harbor? 

Admiral  Richardson.  All  were  open  anchorages,  except  that  it  was 
possible  for  small  ships  to  enter  the  harbor  of  Hilo  and  enter  Kahoo- 
lawe. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  antiaircraft  protection  was  placed  to  cover 
what  anchorage?     Lahaina  Roads  or  Pearl  Harbor? 

Admiral  Richardson.  There  was  no  antiaircraft  protection  any 
place  except  Pearl  Harbor. 

Senator  Ferguson.  At  the  time  that  you  left  did  you  consider  the, 
antiaircraft  protection  sufficient  to  protect  the  fleet  in  Pearl  Harbor  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  By  no  means.  I  so  indicated  in  my  endorse- 
ment on  the  letter  that  was  prepared  by  Admiral  [S40]'  Bloch 
under  date  of  30  December  1910,  my  endorsement  being  dated  4  Janu- 
ary 1941. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  we  were  given  maps  here,  we  were  shown 
that  the  fleet  was — that  the  battleships  were  moored  in  pairs.  Do  you 
know  why  that  would  be?     Is  that  the  way  you  kept  them  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  the  only  way  you  could  get  them  in 
the  Harbor.  There  wasn't  room  for  putting  the  ships  at  individual 
berths. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  it  was  so  congested  that  it  was 
necessary  to  put  them  in  pairs  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  was  habitual  practice. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  327 

Senator  Ferguson.  Could  they  have  been  placed  in  any  other  posi- 
tion, all  the  fleet  as  we  have  seen  it  on  these  plats  i 

Admiral  Richardson.  No,  there  vrere  not  separate  berths  adequate  to 
berth  each  big  ship  separately. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  start,  durinp;  the  period  that  you  had 
the  fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor,  to  place  it  in  shape  for  active  duty,  war 
duty  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did  everything  within  my  power  to  make 
the  oflicers  and  men  of  the  fleet  become  war-minded,  and  one  great 
deterrent  of  my  effective  accomplisliment  of  that  aim  was  the  fact 
that  many  officers  who  were  long-time  friends  [84-7]  would 
say,  in  effect,  "Joe,  we  cannot  be  on  the  verge  of  war,  otherwise  they 
would  give  us  enough  men  to  man  the  ships." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  tell  me  who  told  you  that  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  One  specifically  will  be  a  witness  before  this 
committee,  I  think,  possibly.  His  name  is  John  Henry  Newton.  I 
think  his  rank  is  vice  admiral. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  would  j-ou  say  that  the  fleet  was  a  liability 
or  an  asset  in  the  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor,  being  in  the  Harbor,  was 
it  a  liability  or  an  asset  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  You  are  not  on  very  safe  ground  in  express- 
ing an  opinion  5  years  or  4  years  after  the  occurrence  of  an  event  in 
hopes  that  your  mind  will  not  be  conditioned  by  after-knowledge. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  feel  that  you  wouldn't  want  to  give  an 
opinion  on  that  question  at  the  present  time. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  prefer  not  to= 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right. 

You  have  had  considerable  experience  in  the  Far  East  in  your 
previous  years  in  service,  vou  stated  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true. 

Senator  Ferguson.  After  you  were  retired  as  Commander  in  Chief, 
was  that  experience  utilized  in  any  way  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

[84s]  Senator  Ferguson.  You  were  not  consulted  on  an}'  mat- 
ters in  the  Far  East  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  was  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  After  the  5th  of  January  when  you  received 
your  first  notice  of  detachment,  did  you  confer  with  anyone  in  the 
State  Department? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Between  that  time  and  the  time  of  my  detach- 
ment ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  No  ;  after  your  detachment,  did  you  confer  on 
any  questions  with  anyone  in  the  State  Department  officially  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Oh,  no ;  I  had  no  official  standing  that  would 
entitled  me  to  confer  with  anybody  in  the  State  Department. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  were  not  consulted  by  anyone  in  the  State 
Department  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Not  on  official  business;  no. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Keefe. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Admiral,  I  have  just  one  question  that  I  think  hasn't 
been  pursued  fully. 

You  were  asked  yesterday  by  Senator  Ferguson  as  to  Naval  games 
or  maneuvers  early  in  1932  or  1936. 

Admiral  Richardson.  In  1932,  I  think,  only. 


328        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[849]        Mr.  Keefe.  1932  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  think  only  1932. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Only  1932. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes. 

Mr.  KjiEFE.  In  which  simulated  attacks  by  air  power  were  made 
upon  Pearl  Harbor. 

Admijal  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  IvEEFE.  But  the  matter  was  not  pursued  so  that  I  have  any  very 
dehnite  ideas  as  to  just  what  the  conclusion  of  those  Naval  games  was 

Now,  there  would  be  a  record  maintained,  would  there  not,  of  the 
character  of  the  simulated  attack  upon  Pearl  Harbor  at  that  time'^ 

Admiral  Richardson.  Undoubtedly.  I  cannot  recall  the  part  that 
1  played  m  fleet  exercises  of  1932,  but  I  know  that  at  that  time  I  was 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Augusta,  which  was  the  fla<r- 
ship  of  the  scouting  force,  and  that  ship  participated  in  whatever 
exercises  we  had. 

I  do  not  remember  what  those  exercises  were  in  the  Hawaiian  area, 
but  I  believe  there  must  have  been  a  simulated  air  raid.  I  know  that 
on  return  to  the  United  States,  the  task  force  to  which  the  Auqusta 
was  assigned,  did  conduct  a  simulated  air  raid  on  the  west  coast  of 
California,  somewhat  north  of  Santa  Barbara.  However  I  know 
that  many  carrier  [SSO]  raids  against  Pearl  Harbor  have  been 
simulated  previous  to  the  1941  fleet  exercises. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  Admiral,  the  purpose  of  conducting  those  ma- 
neuvers and  those  exercises  and  simulated  attacks  is  for  the  benefit  of 
the  fleet  in  considering  the  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor,  in  connection 
with  the  Army? 

Admiral  Richardson.  No;  the  purpose  was  primarily  to  exercise 
the  Army  m  Hawaii  and  the  local  Naval  defense  forces  which  was 
composed  of  submarines,  long-range  patrol  planes,  and  in  the  War 
Plans 

Mr.  Keefe.  Pardon  me.  Admiral.  What  I  am  getting  at  is  this 
.fudges  were  appointed  to  judge  the  effectiveness  of  the  attack  in  those 
cases,  were  they  not  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  My  impression  is  that  we  did  not' have  um- 
pires to  determine  the  success  or  the  failure  of  the  attack,  but  at  the 
conclusion  of  every  fleet  exercise,  there  was  what  is  called  a  critique 
attended  by  all  senior  officers  and  at  which  those  who  played  an  im- 
portant part  in  exercises  present  their  views  as  to  what  took  place  and 
what  lessons  were  learned  and  the  commander  in  chief  himself  sums 
up  his  conception  of  how  well  the  job  was  done  and  how  much  was 
learned  and  what  mistakes  were  made. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  is  a  record  kept  and  filed  with  anybody  for  future 
study? 

[SSI]        Admiral  Richardson.  The  whole  thing  is  printed. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Printed  by  whom? 

Admiral  Richardson.  'Printed  in  a  document  and  sent  to  the  Naval 
War  College  or  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  or  should  be. 

Mr.  Keefe.  If  there  were  maneuvers  in  1932  and  subsequent  to  that 
time  when  simulated  attacks  by  air  were  made  upon  Oahu  and  Pearl 
Harbor  within  Oahu  there  would  be  some  place  in  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment a  printed  report  showing  the  actual  character  of  those  attacks  and 
the  summaries? 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  329 

Admiral  Kichardson.  That  is  my  belief. 

[85:2]         Mr.  Keefe.  Have  we  such  reports,  Mr.  Mitchell? 

Mr.  MrrcHELL.  Mr.  Congressman,  there  was  laid  on  my  desk  this 
morning  at  10  minutes  to  10  from  the  Xavy  Department  a  document 
which  I  think  is  the  report  or  material  on  the  1932  war  game. 

Mr.  IvEEFE.  Is  it  a  voluminous  report? 

Mr,  Mitchell.  I  haven't  had  time  to  examine  it.  I  came  in  only 
about  5  minutes  before  I  came  to  the  committee  room  this  morning.  I 
understand  that  the  Army's  report  of  this  game,  of  some  of  the  1932 
games,  is  already  in  the  hands  of  Senator  Ferguson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  I  will  be  very  glad  to  have  it  sent  from  my 
office.    I  just  received  it  recently.    I  haven't  had  the  time  to  study  it. 

Mr.  Keefe.  May  I  ask  counsel  whether  or  not  there  are  any  records 
or  files  in  the  hands  of  the  committee  showing  the  results  of  any  war 
maneuvers  or  simulated  attacks  on  Pearl  Harbor  subsequent  to  1932 
and  prior  to  1941  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  think  not.  We  have  asked  for  them  but  we  have 
not  received  them.  I  asked  the  Admiral  about  the  war  games  of  1940 
when  I  examined  him  and  his  information  was  not  as  definite  as  we 
wanted.  We  have  asked  for  the  report  of  1940  in  so  far  as,  I  think, 
they  relate  to  attacks  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

[853]  Mr.  Keefe.  Will  that  report  be  made  available  to  the 
individual  members  of  the  committee  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  As  soon  as  we  get  it  we  will  let  you  have  it. 

Senator  Brewster.  Well,  could  the  Admiral  make  a  statement? 

Admiral  Kichardson.  I  know  that  in  the  annual  fleet  exercise 
He  apparently  has  one  in  mind. 

while  I  was  commander  in  chief  there  was  no  simulated  carrier  at- 
tack on  Pearl  Harbor.  I  also  know  that  many  such  attacks  have 
been  simulated  in  preceding  j^ears.  Some  times  they  have  one  of 
these  simulated  attacks  and  some  years  they  do  not  have  them,  so 
that  I  could  not  state  which  years  they  had  them. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  one  other  question.  Admiral.  Prior  to  the  time 
that  you  took  the  fleet  from  the  West  coast  to  conduct  manoeuvers 

in  1940,  I  believe  in  January 

*  Admiral  Kichardson.  I  think  the  1st  of  April. 

Mr.  Keefe.  The  1st  of  April? 

Admiral  Richardson.  When  I  took  them  out. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Yes.  Prior  to  that  time  the  base  of  the  fleet  had 
always  been  at  San  Diego  and  San  Pedro,  do  I  so  understand  your 
testimony,  except  the  Hawaiian  detachment  and  the  Asiatic  Fleet, 
perhaps  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  "always"  is  a  long  time.  [8S4] 
Within  my  memory  we  had  practicall}^  no  ships  in  the  Pacific.  I 
never  served  in  the  Pacific  except  on  the  Asiatic  station,  until  I  went 
out  there  in  the  Augusta  about  1932,  so  that  in  30  years  service  I  was 
never  on  duty  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  except  when  I  was  on  the  Asiatic 
station. 

From  1932  until  1940  the  normal  bases  of  the  fleet  were  in  the  San 
Pedro,  Long  Beach,  and  San  Diego  areas. 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  Admiral,  T  want  to  ask  you  a  question  or  two 
prompted  by  other  questions. 


330       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Richardson.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  In  this  October  10th  or  11th  memorandum  in 
which  you  set  out  a  number  of  assumptions  from  which  war  plans 
were  based,  those  were  all  theoretical  assumptions? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Wholly. 

The  Chairman.  And  did  any  of  this  materialize  while  you  were 
in  command? 

Admiral  Richardson.  My  recollection  is  that  that  never  materi- 
alized. They  opened  the  Burma  Road  and  the  Japanese  never  did 
disturb  us  or  the  British  very  much,  so  that  the  plan  was  never 
implemented. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  Now,  let  me  ask  you  this  question :(  While 
you  were  in  command  had  the  practice  arisen  of  having  the  fleet  go 
into  Pearl  Harbor  periodically  for  recreation  [8SS]  or  for 
any  other  reasons  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Oh,  yes.  In  fact,  it  is  probable  that  there 
were  more  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor  in  December  1940  than  there  were 
in  December  1941. 

The  Chairman.  So  that  this  was  a  recognized  practice  of  the  fleet 
to  assemble  in  Pearl  Harbor? 

Admiral  Richardson.  A  ship  cannot  remain  at  sea  or  anchored  out 
in  the  open  roadstead  all  the  time.  They  must  go  in  now  and  then 
for  replenishment  of  provisions,  for  recreation,  for  upkeep,  disabling 
engines  if  necessary  and  for  the  material  maintenance  of  the  ships  and 
it  Avas  my  custom  for  ships  to  go  in  periodically,  all  of  them,  not  at 
the  same  time  but  for  every  ship  to  have  a  turn  in  Pearl  Harbor. 

The  Chairman.  In  the  correspondence  between  Admiral  Stark  and 
you,  all  through  it  is  emphasized  the  caution  in  regard  to  practices 
or  exercises  or  maneuvers  to  do  nothing  that  would  create  the  im- 
pression of  any  offensive  step  being  taken  with  reference  to  Orange, 
which  I  understand  is  Japan. 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true. 

The  Chairman.  And  in  your  conferences  here  in  Washington  with 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  with  Admiral  Stark  and  with  the  Presi- 
dent was  any  further  emphasis  placed  upon  that  precaution  in  con- 
nection with  your  exercises  and  maneuvers  ? 

[856]  Admiral  Richardson.  No;  because  I  had  been  so  thor- 
oughly indoctrinated  with  that  idea  over  a  great  many  years  that 
I  needed  no  further  instructions. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  That  is,  of  course,  I  presume,  always  a  pre- 
caution that  the  Navy  takes  and  always  takes  regardless  of  circum- 
stances under  which  it  exercises  and  maneuvers,  that  it  is  not  to  be 
understood  as  an  offensive  action  against  any  country  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Absolutely. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  all. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  one  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Murphy. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Admiral,  in  your  statement  about  the  meeting  at  the 
White  House  October  8,  1940,  you  quoted  the  President  or  said  in 
effect,  and  I  am  reading  from  tlie  record  at  page  684  [reading]  : 

That  if  they  even  attacked  the  Philippines  he  doubted  whether  we  would 
ehter  the  war. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  331 

You  are  quite  clear  that  the  President  said  that  about  the  Philip- 
pines ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  according  to  m}^  firm  conviction,  my 
best  opinion  and  belief. 

Mr,  Murphy.  Now,  at  the  time  that  you  were  at  the  White  House 
we  did  have  ships  based  at  Manila,  did  we  not  ? 

[8-57]  Admiral  Richardson.  They  were  on  an  Asiatic  station. 
They  might  or  might  not  have  been  at  Manila,  but  they  were  in  the 
Avestern  Pacific  area.  They  might  have  been  in  the  southern  Philip- 
pines, they  might  have  been  in  Manila  and  some  of  them  might  have 
been  on  the  China  coast. 

Mr.  Murphy.  But  what  I  mean  is,  Manila  was  the  base  of  the  fleet. 
That  was  its  home  port,  wasn't  it,  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Quite  right. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Now,  then,  I  notice  in  the  letter  of  December  23, 
1940,  a  letter  from  Admiral  Stark,  apparently,  to  Admiral  Hart,  the 
following  on  page  2  [reading]  : 

In  regard  to  your  next  paragraph  I  am  completely  with  you  and  have  sought  at 
every  turn  to  improve  the  security  of  Manila  Bay  and  the  Philippines.  I  might 
say,  in  this  connection,  that  opinion  in  general,  in  regard  to  how  far  we  should 
go  in  maintaining  our  position  in  the  Philippines  seems  to  be  changing  upwai'd. 
While  such  a  change  is  going  on,  it  is  not  always  practicable  to  be  definitely  final 
on  questions  that  arise. 

Apparently  the  view  was  changing  as  to  the  Philippines. 

Do  you  have  any  other  thing  on  that  subsequent  to  October  the  8th, 
1940,  as  to  our  attitude  as  to  what  would  have  happened  if  the  Philip- 
pines were  attacked  ? 

[8S8^  Admiral  Richardson.  I  have  not.  I  liave  nothing  fur- 
ther to  add. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Thank  you  very  much. 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  any  further  questions  by  members  of  the 
committee 

Senator  Lucas.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  The  Senator  from  Illinois. 

Senator  Lucas.  I  would  like  to  ask  one  or  two  questions. 

Admiral,  the  question  was  asked  you  by  one  of  the  members  of  the 
committee  as  to  whether  or  not  in  January  1940  the  Pacific  Fleet,  of 
which  you  were  in  charge,  was  ready  for  war  duty  and  you  unquali- 
fiedly answered  "No,  it  was  not." 

Now,  even  though  this  may  be  somewhat  repetitious  I  would  like 
to  ask  you,  Admiral,  how  many  men  were  in  the  Navy  under  your 
command  at  that  time,  in  January  1940,  if  you  know  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  do  not  know  how  many  men  were  there  at 
that  specific  time  but  I  would  like  to  further  amplify  my  statement 
regarding  lack  of  readiness  of  the  fleet  by  stating  that  it  was  as  ready 
at  that  time  as  it  had  been  ready  in  many  j^ears  preceding. 

Senator  Lucas.  Yes.  All  right.  Now,  you  stated,  as  I  recall,  the 
percentage  of  men  that  were  attached  to  the  battleships  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

[8S9]  Senator  Lucas.  And,  as  I  recall,  you  said  it  was  about 
85  percent  of  its  actual  strength. 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  had  been  the  long  custom  in  the  Navy, 
to  maintain  about  85  percent  of  the  required  complonicnt  on  board 


332        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

ships  because  the  Navy  was  faced  with  two  alternatives:  Based  on 
the  number  of  men  allowed  by  Congress  they  must  either  limit  the 
number  of  ships  in  commission  to  those  that  they  could  fully  man, 
thereby  curtailing  the  opportunity  for  officers  to  acquire  experience 
in  command,  or  they  had  to  maintain  in  commission  ships  that  could 
not  be  fully  manned  for  war  operations. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  is  correct.  Now,  one  further  question :  With 
respect  to  the  auxiliary  equipment  that  would  have  been  necessary  to 
have  placed  the  fleet  of  which  you  were  in  command  upon  a  wartime 
basis,  will  you  give  to  the  committee  just  as  near  as  you  can  what 
you  believed  in  1940,  at  that  time,  would  have  been  necessary  in  the 
way  of  auxiliary  cruisers  or  whatever  ships  were  necessary  and  what- 
ever implements  were  necessary  to  have  had  it  on  a  war  footing  basis 
in  1940  when  you  were  in  command? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  would  be  unwilling  to  hazard  without  a 
thorough  study  a  curbstone  opinion  as  to  the  number  of  ships,  auxil- 
iary ships,  that  would  have  been  required  [S60]  to  accom- 
pany the  fleet  and  service  it  in  war  operations. 

Senator  Lucas,  Well,  whatever  would  have  been  necessary  in  Jan- 
uary 1940  in  order  to  put  this  fleet  upon  a  wartime  basis  as  has  been 
suggested  here  by  you,  that  was  a  matter  that  was  wholly  in  the 
hands  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  as  to  the  supplying  of 
the  men  and  the  supplying  of  equipment  and  the  tools  to  put  it  on 
a  wartime  basis? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Absolutely. 

Senator  Lucas.  Now,  one  other  statement  that  I  want  to  read  into 
the  record  liere  from  a  letter  that  is  already  in  the  record  as  one  of 
the  exhibits,  and  it  is  a  letter  that  you  wrote,  Admiral,  to  Admiral 
Stark  dated  September  the  18,  1940.  The  fourth  paragraph  of  that 
letter  says  this  [reading]  : 

During  the  past  six  months  the  Fleet  has  been  visited  by  two  Secretaries. 
During  the  last  visit  the  Secretary  made  a  most  favorable  impression  upon  the 
officers  and  men  of  the  Fleet,  and  I  have  frequently  heard  officers  say,  "I  hope 
that  Colonel  Knox  remains  as  Secretary  regardless  of  the  outcome  of  the  election." 

That  is  all. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  a  question,  please? 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Geai'hart. 

[861]  Mr.  Gearhart.  Admiral  Richardson,  during  the  early 
part  of  your  testimony  you  testified  while  you  were  making  one  of 
your  visits  to  the  LTnited  States  during  the  days  you  were  commander 
in  chief  that  you  picked  up  at  San  Francisco  5,000  men  to  take  back 
to  your  fleet.     Is  that  correct  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  If  I  made  such  a  statement  it  was  erroneous. 
I  did  not  pick  them  up  at  San  Francisco.  There  were  5,000  men  made 
available  to  me  on  the  West  coast  ports.  I  think  the  majority  of  them 
were  made  available  to  me  in  the  San  Pedro,  Long  Beach,  and  San 
Diego  area,  although  some  of  the  5,000  might  have  reported  to  ships 
that  had  proceeded  to  Mare  Island  and  those  that  had  proceeded  to 
Puget  Sound  for  repairs.  The  point  I  make  is  that  they  were  not 
made  available  to  me  at  San  Francisco  but  on  West  coast  ports. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Will  tlie  gentleman  yield  ? 

Mr.  Gkarhart.  Wait  a  minute. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  333 

I  did  not  want  to  insist  on  the  San  Francisco  and  I  was  not  making 
any  point  on  that.    The  point  that  I  want  to  start  from  m  this  exami- 
nation, you  did  obtain  5,000  additional  men  on  the  West  coasts 
Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true.  ^    ^    •      .i 

Mr.    Gearhart.  And    they    were    taken    to    your    fleet    m    the 

[Se^]         Pacific? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true. 

Mr  Gearhart.  That  suggests  to  me  a  question.  I  would  like  to 
know  how  many  men  you  had  with  your  fleet  before  you  obtained  these 

additional  5,000  ?  .  ,  -,  ,      •  -i  i     j; 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  thmk  it  would  be  impossible  for  anyone 
to  answer  that  question  at  this  time. 

Mr  Gearhart.  Without  endeavoring  to  be  accurate,  can  you  gi\e 
me  round  figures  as  to  what  the  complement  and  manpower  would  be 
of  a  fleet  such  as  you  were  commanding  at  that  time? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Congressman  Gearhart.  the  commander  m 
chief  of  a  fleet,  with  constant  changes  in  the  number  of  men,  with 
changes  now  and  then  in  the  number  of  ships,  could  not  discharge  his 
responsible  position  if  he  burdened  his  mind  with  such  details. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Well,  you  testified  that  your  fleet  was  about  8o 
percent  of  what  it  should  have  been  in  manpower? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Tliat  is  true.  t  i  •.    ir    . 

Mr  Gearhart.  "Wliat  I  am  trying  to  find  out  is,  how  did  it  aiiect 
that  percentage  that  vou  have  fixed  at  85  percent  by  the  addition  of 
5,000  additional  men?"^    That  is  the  point  that  I  am  leading  up  to. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  if  the  committee  is  willing         1863 \ 

to  accept  a  wild  stab.  ,,.,,.         xi  •  •     +u 

Mr   Gearhart.  Well,  I  don't  thmk  that  anything  you  say  m  the 

way  of  opinion  is  wild.     I  have  that  much  respect  for  your  opinion. 
Admiral  Richardson.  It  would  be  a  wild  stab. 
The  Chairman.  Well,  make  a  stab.  ^        .  ^ 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  would  be  somewhere  between  1  and  7 

^^Mr!^  Gearhart.  Well,  then  the  5,000  improved  the  situation  con- 

siderably  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Five  men  would  have  improved  the  situation. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Thank  you  very  much. 

The  Chairman.  Any  further  questions? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  one  question. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Ferguson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral  Richardson,  you  were  asked  by  a  inom- 
ber  of  the  committee  as  to  whether  or  not  it  was  not  Congress  whose 
duty  it  was  to  furnish  men  for  the  Navy  and  I  thmk  your  answer 
was  that  it  was. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Well,  I  would  like  to 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  wish  you  would  elaborate  on  that. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  would  like  to  change  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  elaborate  on  it  or  change         L<^o4j 

Admiral  Richardson.  It  was  not  Congress'  duty.  Congress  alone 
had  the  power  to  do  it.  .     ,       , 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know.  Admiral,  what  requests  were 
made  to  Congress  at  or  about  that  time  for  men  and  materiel  for  the 
Navy  '^ 

"f»716-    4(3     pt.  1    —    24 


334        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Eichardson.  Well,  of  course,  I  have  no  knowledge  but 
having  served  as  director  of  the  office  of  personnel,  Bureau  of  Naviga- 
tion, for  almost  3  years  and  having  been  budget  officer  of  the  Navy 
Department  for  1  year,  having  been  assistant  chief  of  naval  operations 
for  1  year,  having  been  chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Naval  Personnel  for  1 
year,  I  know  that  we  always  asked  for  more  men  than  we  had  any 
hopes  of  getting. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  were  you  acquainted  with  the  fact 
that  the  Navy  would  make  a  request  and  then  the  Budget  Director  and 
his  force  would  pass  on  it  and  then  it  would  come  to  Congress  as  an 
estimate  of  the  Budget  Director  ?     Are  you  familiar  with  that  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  am. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  do  you  know  whether  the  period  that  you 
were  talking  about,  that  it  was  Congress',  at  least,  power  to  give  more 
men;  do  you  know  what  the  Navy  had  requested  and  how  much  it 
had  been  reduced  or  increased  by  the         [8(JS]         Budget  Director'^ 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have  no  knowledge. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  haven't  those  figures  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  But  I  am  perfectly  willing  to  volunteer  the 
statement  that  I  believe  that  the  President  had  it  within  his  power 
by  an  act  of  Congress  to  increase  the  number  of  men  in  the  fleet  faster 
than  he  did  do  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right.  Now,  you  stated  som_ething  that 
you  had  a  conversation  with  someone  relative  to  the  fact  that  if  we 
needed  men  in  the  Navy  we  could  take  machinists  or  mechanically 
inclined  people  and  use  them  in  the  Navy. 

Will  you  tell  me  more  about  that?  Where  did  you  get  that  idea 
and  whom  did  you  discuss  it  with? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Everything  that  you  stated.  Senator  Fergu- 
son, is  in  accordance  with  my  statement  except  that  you  did  not  add 
the  name  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  which  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  you  would  say  that  you  got  that  idea 
from  the  President? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  were  you  at  that  time  discussing  with 
the  President  the  amount  of  men  that  you  felt  that  you  needed? 

[866]  Admiral  Richardson.  I  was.  I  discussed  it  Avith  every- 
hodj.        Everybody  thought  I  was  a  nut  on  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  what  month  was  it  that  you  had  that  dis- 
cussion with  the  President  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  On  both  occasions. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  would  be  when  you  had  luncheon  with 
Admiral  Leahy  and  the  President? 

Admiral  Richardson.  If  my  memory  serves  me  correctly,  I  think 
that  I  would  never  forego  the  opportunity  to  urge  that  additional 
men  be  added  to  the  fleet.  Therefore,  I  think  I  discussed  the  matter 
with  the  President  at  my  meeting  with  him  in  July  and  also  in 
October. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  j'ou  discuss  it  with  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  when  3'ou  received  the  information  that  is  now  at  least  partly 
contained  in  Exhibit  11  in  relation  to  the  embargo  or  the  patrol, 
whichever  you  want  to  call  it,  in  the  Pacific  ? 

[«?^]  Admiral  Richardsox.  No;  at  that  time,  in  my  discus- 
sion with  the  Sccrelaiy  of  tlic  Navy,  I  cannot  state  that  T  said  any- 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  335 

thing  with  respect  to  the  inadequacies  of  personnel,  but  I  did  state 
thatlhe  fleet  was  not  ready  for  action  that  might  involve  us  in  war, 
and  the  Secretary  said,  "Eichardson,  we  have  never  been  ready,  but 
we  have  always  won." 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  all  I  have. 

The  Chairmax.  May  I  ask  you  on  that  point,  the  only  way  to  get 
men  in  the  Xavy  at  that  time  was  by  voluntary  enlistment,  is  that 
true  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  true. 

The  Chairman.  And  during  that  period  was  it  true  that  the  Navy, 
through  posters  and  recruiting  stations  and  by  methods  that  the 
Navy  usually  adopts,  was  seeking  to  urge  enlistment  in  the  Navy? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  cannot  answer  specifically. 

The  Chairman.  Now,  Admiral 

Admiral  Richardson.  Do  you  want  me  to  finish  ? 

The  Chairman.  Go  ahead,  yes.  I  do  not  want  you  to  answer  unless 
you  feel  free  to  do  so. 

Admiral  Richardson.  When  I  became  chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Naval 
Personnel  we  had  on  the  waiting  list  thoroughly  acceptable  qualified 
young  men  that  wanted  to  enlist  in  the  Navy  as  apprentice  seamen. 
We  had  8,000  of  them.  Some  of  them  had  been  on  [868]  that 
list  for  4  or  5  months. 

The  Chairman.  Were  they  later  taken  on  the  ships  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Th&j  were  taken  on  under  a  quota  system 
in  accordance  with  their  position  on  the  waiting  list  as  funds  ap- 
propriated by  the  Congress  made  it  possible  for  them  to  do  so. 

The  Chairman.  Does  counsel  wish  to  ask  any  further  questions? 

Mr.  Clark.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  ask  just  one  question. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Clark. 

Mr.  Clark.  Insofar  as  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  is  concerned, 
what,  in  your  opinion,  would  have  been  the  difference  in  the  attack, 
or  the  result  of  the  attack  if  there  had  been  a  full  complement  of 
men  on  each  of  the  ships  involved? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  am  not  now  aware  of  the  state  of  per- 
sonnel in  the  fleet  11  months  after  my  detachment. 

Mr.  Clark.  Assuming  it  was  only  85  percent  of  the  full  comple- 
ment, what  difference  would  it  have  made  if  it  were  a  full  complement? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  being  the  only  change  ? 

Mr.  Clark.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  think  the  difference  would  have  been 
infinitesimal. 

[869]         Mr.  Clark.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  Counsel  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Mr.  Chairman, 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman,  Does  the  Senator  want  to  ask  any  more  questions? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  not  quite  clear.  Admiral,  on  two  of  your 
statements  to  reconcile.  I  understood  one  of  your  answers  indicated 
that  the  amount  of  men  in  the  Navy  was  limited  by  the  money  appro- 
priated by  Congress,  and  in  another  statement  you  indicated  that  the 
President  could  have  put  more  men  on. 


336       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Now  I  am  not  undertaking  to  quote  your  testimony,  but  just  to 
refresh  your  memory  probably  as  to  what  you  did  say  on  those  two 
items.  How  can  we  reconcile  those  two?  The  reporter  may  be  able 
to  read  that  to  you. 

Admiral  Richardson.  There  is  no  need  for  him  to  read  me  that, 
because  normally  Congress  does  not,  in  its  annual  appropriation,  limit 
the  number  of  men.     It  provides  so  much  money. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  But  there  is  a  general  limitation  on  the  num- 
ber of  men.  Now  it  is  my  belief,  which  I  am  certain  I  can  verify, 
or  it  can  be  verified,  that  under  legislation  [870]  the  Congress, 
the  President,  had  the  authority  to  increase  the  number  of  men 
allowed  in  the  Navy,  and  I  believe  that  there  were  substantial  appro- 
priations made  available  to  the  President  which  he  could  allocate 
for  purposes  that  were  not  specifically  stipulated  by  Congress. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So  he  could  have  used  it  for  increasing  the 
Navy  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  So  I  think  he  could  have  used  it  had  he  $een 
so  fit. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Now  if  you  wish — and  I  think  it  has  no 
bearing — but  if  you  wish  I  can  go  into  this  further. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  reconciles  it. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  all? 

Mr.  Keefe.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  call  the  attention  of  the 
Admiral  to  the  fact  that  subsequent  to  the  short  question  which  I 
asked  him  with  relation  to  the  1932  maneuvers  there  has  been  placed 
before  me  what  purports  to  be  the  report,  and  the  preliminary  reports 
incident  to  those  maneuvers,  consisting  of  a  bundle  of  perhaps  1,000 
or  more  pages,  of  the  preliminary  work  done  preparing  for  the  maneu- 
vers. One  is  a  report,  Copy  No,  1,  entitled  "Confidential  Report  of 
the  Chief  Umpire  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Exercises,  Grand  Joint 
Exercise  No.  4." 

[871]  There  is  another  large  report  entitled,  "Confidential 
Black  Report  (Army)  on  Grand  Joint  Exercise  No.  4,  February 
6-12,  1932." 

Then  a  bound  volimie  containing  many  pages  which  appears  also 
to  be  a  report,  confidential,  of  Army  participation  in  the  grand  ex- 
ercise No.  4. 

Now  from  these  reports  that  had  been  furnished  a  few  moments 
ago  it  appears  quite  clear  that  in  initiating  these  exercises  umpires 
were  appointed  by  both  the  Army  and  the  Navy  to  observe  the  results 
of  those  exercises  and  maneuvers,  and  to  make  a  full  and  complete 
report,  confidential  in  character. 

Now,  as  commander  in  chief  of  the  fleet,  when  you  assumed  com- 
mand, did  you  have  the  benefit  of  the  examination  of  these  reports  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Not  those  specific  ones,  but  later  ones. 

Mr.  Keefe  Then  you  are  sure  now.  Admiral,  that  so  far  as  the 
record  now  appears,  those  exercises  were  meticulously  conducted  ap- 
parently, according  to  a  long  preparation  by  both  the  Army  and  Navy, 
and  that  reports  were  filed  by  the  umpires  appointed  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  feel  sure,  I  feel  sure  that  I  was  on  perfectly 
safe  ground  when  I  said  that  I  thought  you  could  find  evidence  of  the 
holding  of  those  exercises. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  337 

[87£]         The  Chairman.  Is  that  all? 

Mr.  Keefe.  Mr.  Chairman,  at  some  time  or  other  m  the  course  of 
these  proceedings  it  would  be  interesting  if  some  of  us  had  time  to  read 
these  reports.  I  do  not  know  when  anybody  will  get  time,  when  they 
are  presented  on  such  short  notice,  but  I  think  that  question  should  be 
explored,  and  I  assume  counsel  will  explore  it,  to  bring  it  to  us  in  con- 
cise form  so  we  can  understand  what  the  report  of  the  umpires  was 
on  those  maneuvers.  • 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  was  going  to  ask  if  that  is  the  1932  maneuvers « 

Mr.  Keefe.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  am  frank  to  say  I  have  not  gone  back  to  1932  lor 
maneuver  reports.  I  sup]3osed  we  were  more  directly  interested  m 
war  games  along  a  year  or  two  before  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack,  which 
would  deal  witirsimulated  air  attacks,  and  on  that  is  where  our  inquiry 
Avas  directed.  . 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  you  know  whether  these  reports  contain  the  report 
of  a  simulated  air  attack  upon  Pearl  Harbor  ?  Are  they  part  of  those 
maneuvers  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  do  not  know.  They  were  brought  in  at  the  request 
of  one  member  of  the  committee  who  asked  for  the  1932  maneuver 
report.  If  I  thought  that  were  directly  involved  here  I  would  have 
had  them  long  ago,  'I  think.  ,.,.,.  -r        i      .      i 

[SrS]  Mr.  Keefe.  All  right.  Now,  Admiral,  if  I  understand 
your  testimony  in  response  to  questions  by  Senator  Ferguson,  you  at 
one  time  served  as  Budget  Oflticer  of  the  Navy  Department. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did.  j.  i.  -^ 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  you  had  experience  in  coming  before  subcommit- 
tees of  the  Appropriations  Committee. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have. 

Mr.  Keefe.  To  present  the  Navy's  budget  estimate. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  have. 

Mr.  I^EFE.  I  think  in  your  testimony  yesterday  you  stated  that  you 
made  an  effort  to  see  the  chairman  of  that  subcommittee  upon  one  of 
your  visits  here.  jv     .  , 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  did.    I  saw  one  and  made  an  effort  to  see 

the  other. 

Mr.  Keefe.  The  former  Senator  from  Nevada,  I  believe. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  saw  the  then  chairman  of  the  Senate  sub- 
committee, the  present  Secretary  of  State.  I  endeavored  to  see  Gov- 
ernor Scrugham,  who  was  at  that  time  a  Congressman  and  chairman 
of  the  subcommittee  of  the  Appropriations  Committee  of  the  House. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Admiral,  when  the  Navy  pre- 
pares its  request  in  the  first  instance  for  each  fiscal  year  it  makes  up 
the  request  which  is  submitted  to  tlie  President's  Bureau  of  the  Budget 
first,  isn't  that  true?  . 

[87i']  Admiral  Richardson.  The  preliminary  estimate  made  by 
the  Navy  bureaus  and  officers  of  the  Navy  Department  are  submitted 
to  the  budget  officer  of  the  Navy  Department. 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  understand  that.    That  is  the  first  step. 

Admiral  Richardson.  And  he  himself,  with  the  approval  of  the 
Secretary,  frequently  reduces  the  estimates,  in  the  hope  that  his  action 
will  preclude  more  drastic  action  by  the  Bureau  of  the  Budget.' 

Mr.  Keefe.  In  any  event,  following  that  the  procedure  is  that  the 
request  from  the  Navy  goes  then  to  the  Bureau  of  the  Budget?   . 


338       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Richardsox.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  And  you  make  a  presentation  to  the  Bureau  of  the 
Budget? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  On  the  Navy's  request. 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  E^EEFE.  After  the  individual  departments  of  the  Navy  have 
submitted  their  request  to  the  budget  officer  of  the  Navy  he  finally 
prepares  the  presentation  for  the  Bureau  of  the  Budget  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Then  when  the  Bureau  of  the  Budget  finally  acts,  that 
budget  is  then  submitted  by  the  President  to  the  [875]  Con- 
gress ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  In  his  annual  budget  message.    That  is  true,  is  it  not? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

[S76]  Mr.  Keefe.  And  during  the  course  of  the  year  there  may 
be  supplementary  estimates  submitted? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  By  the  Bureau  of  the  Budget  to  the  Congress? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  when  you  come  before  the  Congressional  com- 
mittee to  present  the  request,  do  you  have  instructions  to  defend  and 
present  the  budget  as  submitted  by  the  President  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  If  my  memory  serves  me  correctly,  an  act 
of  Congress  provides  that,  as  a  representative  of  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment, I  would  be  subject  to  imprisonment  if  I  asked  for  funds  in 
excess  of  those  set  up  in  the  budget. 

Mr.  Keefe.  So  that,  as  a  matter  of  law,  and  as  a  matter  of  practice, 
the  executive  officers  coming  before  a  Congressional  committee  to 
present  a  budget  support  the  President's  Budget  as  submitted  to 
the  Congress  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  In  accordance  with  an  act  of  Congress. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Yes.  Now,  have  you  ever  examined  the  complete  sub- 
mission of  estimates  by  the  Navy  Department  to  the  Bureau  of  the 
Budget? 

Admiral  Richardson.  For  what  year  ? 

Mr.  KJEEFE.  In  the  fiscal  years,  say,  1934r-41. 

[877]  Admiral  Richardson.  I  certainly  did,  in  1934—35,  because 
I  was  the  budget  officer  of  the  Navy,  but  that  is  the  only  time. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  might  suggest  that  those  budget  esti- 
mates are  matters  of  record  which  could  be  obtained  from  the  Depart- 
ment and  from  the  budget  messages  of  the  President  and  the  Appro- 
priations Committee.  The  Chair  doubts  whether  the  admiral  could 
remember  all  of  them. 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  could  not. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  I  have  before  me,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  may  I  say. 
Admiral,  figures  submitted  to  me  by  the  Navy  Department  showing 
in  each  fiscal  year  the  appropriations  requested  by  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment, the  budget  estimate  of  appropriations  submitted  to  the  Con- 
gress and  the  amounts  in  each  fiscal  year  made  aA^ailable  by  the 
Congi'ess. 

Now,  I  assume,  of  course,  that  you  have  no  familiarity  with  those 
figures  except  perhaps  the  estimates  which  you  examined  when  you 
were  budget  officer  for  the  Navy. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  339 

Admiral  Eichardson.  That  is  correct. 

The  Chaieman.  Is  that  all,  Congressman  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  is  all  at  this  time. 

The  Chairman.  Does  counsel  wish  to  ask  further  questions? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  one  question  of  the  admiral. 

Admiral,  you  testified  that  following  the  letter  from  [878] 
Admiral  Stark  to  you  of  November  22,  suggesting  you  examine  mto 
the  question  of  security  of  the  fleet  in  port  against  a  possible  an- 
raid,  and  your  reply  of  November  28,  when  you  got  back  to  Pearl  Har- 
bor, you  made  that  inquiry  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr,  Mitchell.  That  is  the  one  you  described  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Which  led  up  to  the  Bloch  report  and  the  Knox- 
Stimson  letter.     Had  you  made  any  study  of  the  proposition  before? 

Admiral  Richardson.  I  had  not. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  your  memorandum  of  September  12  to  Secretary 
Knox  in  which  you  listed  the  objections  that  you  had  to  basing  the  fleet 
at  Pearl  Harbor  there  was  no  reference  there  or  statement  about  peril 
to  the  fleet  in  part,  was  there  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  That  consideration  had  not  arisen  in  my 
mind. 

Mr,  Mitchell.  So  it  was  in  your  representations  about  basing,  or 
your  objections  about  basing  the  fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor  which  you  had 
'in  that  document  and  which  you  presented  to  other  officials  of  the 
Government,  including  the  President,  you  had  not  included  any  point 
of  that  kind  in  there  ? 

Admiral  Richardson.  Not  air  raids;  not  protection  against  air 
raids. 

[879]         Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  the  only  question  I  have. 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  any  further  questions  by  the  committee  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  make  a  request. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  a  request  of  the  admiral  ? 

Mr.  Gearhart.  A  request  of  the  counsel.  I  would  like  to  have  the 
log  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Wrif/ht,  the  war  vessel  that  I  think  was  a  part  of 
Admiral  Halsey's  task  force,  the  log  from  the  25th  of  November  on  to 
the  fatal  day  of  December  7. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  If  we  can  get  it,  it  will  be  made  available.^ 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Likewise  if  there  is  a  log  available  of  the  cruiser 
Helena,  which  I  understand  was  in  the  harbor  and  went  through  the 
attack.- 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  just  like  to  ask  the 
admiral  one  concluding  question,  and  that  is,  if  he  has  anything  now 
that  he  wants  to  "volunteer  to  the  committee,  rather  than  a  direct 
question,  relative  to  this  issue  that  he  believes  to  be  relevant. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  was  about  to  ask  the  admiral  about  the 
same  thing.  If  the  members  of  the  committee  are  through  with  their 
questions,  and  I  assume  that  they  are.  Admiral,  if  you  have  any  further 
statement  that  you  wish  to  make,  the  committee  will  be  glad  to  re- 
ceive it. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  thank  you  for  this  oppor- 
tunity to  state  that  I  never  bore  any  resentment  toward         f^^^l 

'■  Subsequently  admitted  to  the  record  as  Exhibit  No.  125. 
-  Subsequently  admitted  to  the  record  as  Exhibit  No.  163. 


340       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

President  Koosevelt  because  of  my  detachment  from  command  of  the 
United  States  Fleet. 

He  was  tlie  constitutional  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  and 
Navy.  I  was  one  of  his  senior  subordinates;  there  was  a  difference  of 
opinion;  each  of  us  frankly  expressed  his  views;  neither  could  induce 
the  other  to  change  his  opinion;  I  was  relieved  of  command  of  the 
Fleet.  Had  I  been  constitutional  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army 
and  Navy,  I  would  have  taken  the  same  action. 

Because  of  this  conviction,  on  January  28,  1941,  4  days  before  I  was 
relieved  of  command  of  the  Fleet  with  orders  to  proceed  to  Washing- 
ton for  duty,  I  sent  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  by  an  officer,  the 
following  oral  message : 

The  day  I  was  made  commander  in  chief  I  realized  then  and  thereafter  that 
the  same  power  which  made  me  commander  in  chief  could  unmake  me  at;  any 
time.  When  I  arrive  in  Washington  I  shall  keep  my  lips  sealed  and  my  eyes 
in  the  boat  and  put  my  weight  on  the  oar  in  any  duty  assigned. 

Living  up  to  this  resolution  has  resulted  in  the  circulation  of  many 
rumors  which  bear  little  relation  to  fact. 

I  hope  my  testimony  given  here  has  clarified  the  situation  to  some 
extent. 

The  Chairman.  On  behalf  of  the  committee.  Admiral,  the  Chair 
wishes  to  thank  you  for  your  frank  and  forthright  [SSI]  testi- 
mony and  to  say  that  the  Chair  feels  sure  that  every  member  of  the 
committee  has  undoubted  respect  for  your  ability,  your  opinion,  and 
yoyr  patriotism,  in  the  diligence  with  which  you  have  sought  to 
follow  your  duty  before  the  committee,  as  well  as  while  you  have  been 
in  the  Navy  of  the  United  States. 

Admiral  Richardson.  Thank  you,  sir. 

(The  witness  was  excused.) 

The  Chairman.  Now  counsel  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  Admiral  Leahy  has  been  waiting 
quite  a  while.  His  engagement  has  been  quite  severe.  I  wonder  if 
you  could  not  call  him  right  now?  The  committee  can  sit  a  few 
minutes  longer. 

The  Chairman.  If  it  is  agreeable  to  the  committee.  Admiral  Leahy 
has  been  waiting  here  a  couple  of  days,  and  counsel  desires  to  call 
Admiral  Leahy  now. 

Senator  Breavster.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  do  not  know,  of  course,  the 
scope  of  Admiral  Leahy's  testimony,  but  I  think,  in  view  of  the  posi- 
tion which  he  held  as  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  during  the  period 
covered  today  by  something  contained  in  Admiral  Richardson's  tes- 
timony, and  in  view  of  the  importance  and  magnitude  of  the  issues, 
any  suggestion  of  disposing  of  him  in  any  brief  fashion  is  unjust  to 
his  position,  his  prestige,  and  the  importance  of  the  issues  with  which 
he  was  necessarily  concerned.  I  am  sure  his  testimony  is  worth  at 
least  an  afternoon's  session. 

[8S2]  The  Chairman.  The  Chair  is  not  advised  as  to  what  par- 
ticular point  counsel  wishes  to  call  Admiral  Leahy  on  now.  Admiral 
Leahy  is  on  the  list  of  witnesses,  I  imagine,  to  testify  in  a  compre- 
hensive way.  The  Chair  does  not  know  whether  counsel  wishes  to 
interrogate  him  with  respect  to  this  luncheon  about  which  Admiral 
Richardson  testified. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Under  the  circumstances,  I  think  it  would  be  useless 
to  try  to  finish  his  examination  before  lunch. 


l>ROCt:EDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  341 

Admiral  Leahy,  I  believe,  retired  from  the  Navy  in  1939.  He  was 
Governor  of  Puerto  Rico  in  1940,  and  he  went  to  Vichy  in  the  fall  of 
1940,  and  he  was  not  serving  in  the  Navy  in  1940  and  1941.  When  I 
arranged  to  call  him,  I  did  not  suppose  he  had  contacted  the  Navy 
during  those  2  years,  and  it  would  make  his  testimony  on  other  matters 
particularly  wanting,  although  as  an  expert  witness  he  might  testify 
to  anything. 

I  had  proposed  to  ask  him  as  to  his  attendance  at  that  luncheon  at  the 
White  House.  I  felt  if  any  witness  is  called  to  testify  to  a  conversa- 
tion with  the  deceased  President,  every  other  person  who  was  present 
in  the  room  should  properly  be  called  too.  That  was  the  reason  I 
called  Admiral  Leahy,  and  his  description  in  that  regard  would  be  very 
short. 

[88S]  It  is  up  to  the  committee  to  say  how  much  they  want  to  go 
into  expert  matters  with  him.  If  they  say  that  they  will,  then  let  us 
call  Admiral  Leahy  back  at  2  o'clock. 

Senator  Brewster.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  it  is  evident  from  the 
scope  of  Admiral  Richardson's  examination  that  the  preparedness  of 
the  Navy  and  of  the  United  States  defense  forces  during  the  decade 
preceding  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  is  one  of  the  relevant  matters 
about  which,  of  course.  Governor  Leahy  speaks  with  considerable 
authority  as  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  for  4  years.  How  far  that  may 
be  gone  into  I  do  not  know,  but  I  do  think  it  deserves  some  time. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  obvious  to  the  Chair  that  we  cannot  conclude 
with  Admiral  Leahy,  and  therefore  this  committee  will  recess  until  2 
o'clock. 

(Whereupon,  at  12:  05  p.  m.,  the  committee  recessed  until  2  p.  m., 
of  the  same  day.) 

[884-]  AFTERNOON  SESSION 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order.  Counsel,  will 
you  call  the  next  witness  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral  Leahy. 

The  Chairman.  Admiral  Leahy,  will  you  come  around  and  be 
sworn  ? 

(The  witness  was  sworn  by  the  Chairman.) 

TESTIMONY  OF  ELEET  ADMIRAL  WILLIAM  D.  LEAHY,  UNITED 

STATES  NAVY 

The  Chairman.  You  ma}^  be  seated  there,  Admiral.  You  may 
proceed,  counsel. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral,  your  rank  is  that  of  admiral  of  the  fleet? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Fleet  admiral. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Fleet  admiral? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Fleet  admiral.  United  States  Navy. 

The  Chairman.  Admiral,  will  you  talk  into  that  microphone?    The 
acoustics  in  this  building  are  not  excellent  and  Ave  have  to  do  that 
in  order  to  be  heard. 
.    Mr.  Mitchell.  How  long  have  you  served  in  the  Navy  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  1  entered  the  Navy  as  a  midshipman  in  1893  and  I 
have  served  continuously  since  except  for  appi-oxirnately  2  years,  from 
1939  to  1942,  duiing  Avhich  time  1  was  part  time  (lovernoi-  of  Puerto 
Rico  and  the  rest  of  the  time  Ambassador  to  France, 


342        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  were  Governor  of  Puerto  Rico  during  [886] 
all  of  the  year  1940  up  to  December? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  went  to  Puerto  Rico  as  Governor  in  the  fall  of 
V.y.VJ  and  left  there  in  November,  about  the  end  of  November  1940. 

jVfr.  Mitchell.  And  then  you  went  to  Vichy  and  how  long  were  you 
there  as  our  Ambassador? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  went  to  France  as  ambassador,  arriving  in 
France  on  January  2, 1941,  and  I  left  about  the  end  of  April  1942. 

Mr,  Mitchell.  You  were  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  at  one  time, 
Admiral.     What  was  that  period  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  was  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  from  January  2, 
1937,  mitil  August  1,  1939. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  is  your  present  duty?  What  duties  are  you 
now  performing  as  Fleet  admiral? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  am  at  present  assigned  to  duty  as  Chief  of  Staff 
to  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  and  NaA^y  of  the  United 
States. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Were  you  in  Washington  in  October  1940? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Were  you  present  at  the  White  House  at  a  lunch- 
eon on  or  about  October  8  of  that  year  at  which  Admiral  Richardson 
was  present? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  did  have  luncheon  with  the  President  [886] 
on  October  8,  1940,  and  Admiral  Richardson  was  also  present  at  the 
luncheon. 

Mr,  Mitchell.  AVill  you  state  in  your  own  way  just  what  occurred  at 
that  luncheon  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  was  at  that  time  in  Washington  on  duty  con- 
nected with  the  Government  of  Puerto  Rico  and  the  President  asked 
me  to  have  luncheon  with  him  on  October  8,  I  found  after  I  arrived 
that  Admiral  Richardson  was  also  to  be  at  lunch. 

Many  matters  were  discussed  at  the  luncheon,  some  in  connection 
with  my  affairs  in  Puerto  Rico  and  some  with  Admiral  Richardson 
in  regard  to  the  condition  of  the  fleet. 

Perhaps  it  would  be  best  for  this  inquiry  for  me  to  state  as  well  as  I 
can  remember  the  discussion  that  took  place  between  Admiral  Rich- 
ardson and  the  President  in  regard  to  the  condition  of  the  fleet.  My 
memory  in  that  matter  is  good,  principally  because  I  was  exceedingly 
surprised  to  learn  that  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  fleet  did  not  con- 
sider the  fleet  prepared  for  war  and  at  that  time  I  was  apprehensive 
in  regard  to  an  early  war  situation  in  the  Pacific,  although  I  was  veiy 
far  from  sources  of  information  and  I  had  no  late  information  in 
regard  to  that  matter, 

I  do  not  remember  how  the  subject  Avas  brought  up  but  Admiral 
Richardson  told  the  President  that  the  fleet  in  [887]  Honolulu 
was  not  ready  for  war  for  numerous  reasons. 

He  said  the  ships  did  not  have  their  war  complements ;  that  the  facil- 
ities in  Pearl  Harbor  were  not  sufficient  to  keep  the  ships  in  a  top  con- 
dition at  all  times ;  that  he  had  not  a  sufficient  number  of  fuel  ships 
to  make  it  possible  for  him  to  operate  the  fleet  at  any  distance  from 
the  Hawaiian  Islands ;  that  the  personnel  of  the  fleet,  the  officers  and 
the  crews,  did  not  know  why  they  were  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands ;  that 
apparently  nobody  expected  to  be  called  upon  for  war  duty;  that  the 
families  of  Ihe  men  and  officei's  were  in  the  continental  United  States 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  343 

and  they  wanted  to  get  home  and  see  their  families ;  that  the  recreation 
facilities  and  the  means  for  taking  care  of  his  men  when  they  were  on 
shore  in  Honolulu  were  almost  nonexistent,  at  least  they  were  entirely 
insufficient  and  that  he  felt  that  if  there  was  a  prospect  of  calling 
upon  the  fleet  for  war  service  it  could  be  done  much  more  advantage- 
ously in  a  port  on  the  Pacific  Coast  of  the  United  States  where  he  could 
clear  his  ships  for  action,  get  the  additional  things  that  would  be 
needed  and  reinforce  his  peacetime  crews. 

I  think  that  covers  very  well  all  of  the  conversation  that  went  on 
between  the  President  and  Admiral  Richardson  at  this  luncheon  which 
I  attended  with  them  in  the  President's  office. 

[SSS]  Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  the  President  himself  say  anything 
about  basing  the  fleet  there  that  you  heard  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  do  not  remember  that  the  President  made  any 
comment  whatever  as  to  why  the  fleet  was  in  Pearl  Harbor  or  as  to 
whether  or  not  it  might  be  required  to  remain  there.  He  may  have 
made  a  remark  of  that  kind  but  I  have  no  recollection  of  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  leave  the  White  House  with  Admiral 
Richardson  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  We  left  the  White  House  together  and  we  rode  to 
where  we  were  going,  he  to  the  Navy  Department  and  I  to  the  Interior 
Department,  either  in  a  car  which  I  had  or  in  his  car. 

During  this  short  ride  I  expressed  to  Admiral  Richardson  my  sur- 
prise to  find  that  the  fleet  was  in  the  condition  which  he  had  stated 
to  the  President  and  I  said  that  I  hoped  he  would  manage  to  correct 
as  many  of  the  deficiencies  as  possible  w^ithout  any  delay  because  I 
had  been  telling  the  Congress  and  the  people  of  this  country-  for  some 
time  that  the  Xavy  was  ready  for  war  and  I  was  distressed  to  find 
that  it  was  not. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  At  the  meeting  at  the  White  House  did  you  partici- 
pate with  Admiral  Richardson  in  discussing  the  condition  of  the 
fleet?  Did  you  take  part  in  that  conversa-  [889]  tion  or  were 
you  a  listener  ? 

Admiral  Leahy,  Well,  I  was  very  generally  a  listener,  I  do  not 
remember  having  said  anything  about  it  although  I  may  have  inter- 
jected a  remark  from  time  to  time,  I  do  not  remember  anything  that 
1  may  have  said  in  regard  thereto  at  the  White  House, 

Mr,  Mitchell.  The  committee  may  examine. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chairman  has  no  questions  at  this  time.  Con- 
gressman Cooper? 

The  Vice  Chairman.  No  questions  now,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  George? 

Senator  George,  No;  I  have  no  questions  at  this  time,  Mr,  Chair- 
man, 

The  Chairman,  Congressman  Clark  is  not  present.  Senator 
Lucas  ? 

Senator  Lucas.  I  have  no  questions. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Murphy. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Admiral,  there  was  some  statement  made  by  Admiral 
Richardson  to  the  eflPect  that  the  President  said  something  relative  to 
what  we  would  do  in  the  event  that  there  was  an  attack  on  the  Philip- 
pines.    Do  you  have  any  recollection  of  any  such  conversation? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  have  not. 

Mr.  Murphy.  No  questions,  Mr.  Chairman. 

[890]        The  Chairman.  Senator  Brewster, 


344       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Senator  Brewster.  Did  you  hear  all  of  Admiral  Kichardson's 
testimony  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  did  not,  Senator.  I  only  heard  very  small  parts 
during  the  time  I  was  here  waiting  to  be  called  as  a  witness. 

Senator  Brewster.  Did  you  read  in  the  papers  the  full  account  of 
his  statement  as  to  his  conversation  with  the  JPresident  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  did  not,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  He  referred  not  only  to  the  incident  which  has 
been  cited  as  to  the  Philippines,  but  also  as  to  the  reasons  which  seemed 
to  the  President  sufficient  for  a  fleet  to  be  stationed  in  Pearl  Harbor, 
and  the  effect  that  it  might  have  on  the  Japanese.  Do  you  recall  any 
conversation  along  that  line  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  have  no  recollection  of  any  conversation  in  the 
White  House  that  might  have  a  bearing  on  that  question,  Senator. 

Senator  Brewster.  Admiral  Richardson  said  he  expressed  himself 
lather  strongly  to  the  President  as  to  what  he  felt  about  the  effect 
on  a  military-minded  government,  such  as  the  Japanese,  of  the  location 
of  an  inadequately  prepared  fleet  in  Pearl  Harbor.  Do  you  have  any 
recollection  of  anything         [^91]         of  that  kind? 

Admiral  Leahy.  No  ;  I  do  not  remember.  Senator,  anything  that  was 
said  about  that  in  this  conversation  at  the  luncheon. 

Senator  Brewster.  Do  you  recall  as  to  whether  Admiral  Richardson 
queried  at  all  as  to  the  reasons  why  the  fleet  was  laying  at  Pearl 
Harbor  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  As  I  remember  he  stated  none  of  the  officers  or 
men  knew  why  they  were  in  Pearl  Harbor,  and  that  he  personally  felt 
that  they  could  accomplish  preparations  for  war  service  to  much  better 
advantage  in  a  port  on  the  Pacific  coast.     That  is  all  I  remember. 

Senator  Brewster.  You  do  not  recall  that  the  President  made  any 
rejoinder  or  any  remark  as  to  the  reasons  why  he  felt  the  fleet  should 
be  there  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  No ;  I  do  not.  Senator. 

Senator  Brewster.  Did  you  make  any  memorandum  of  the  conver- 
sation at  that  time? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  did  not.  I  am  spealdng  entirely  from  memory. 
The  only  thing  that  impressed  me  was  the  fact  that  the  commander  in 
chief,  in  whom  I  had  great  confidence,  and  have  always  had,  reported 
officially  to  the  President  that  the  fleet  was  not  prepared  for  war,  and 
I  thought  at  that  time  that  a  war  was  a  very  likely  contingency. 

Senator  Brewster.  You  referred  to  the  commander  in  chief. 

[892']  Admiral  Leahy.  I  mean  the  President — the  commander 
in  chief  of  the  fleet. 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 

Admiral  Leahy.  Admiral  Richardson. 

Senator  Brewster.  Admiral  Richardson  had  served  under  you  as 
Deputy  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  for  a  period  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  correct,  and  I,  of  course,  have  served  with 
him  in  other  places  in  the  fleet  at  various  times. 

Senator  Brewster.  You  would  have  considerable  confidence  in  his 
recollection  of  events  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Well.  I  would  have  complete  confidence  in  Ad- 
miral Richardson,  but  whether  or  not  he  remembers  the  conversa- 
tion, I  could  not  say. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  345 

[893]  Senator  Brewster.  He  apparently  was  rather  positive 
and  rather  careful  in  his  statement  as  to  the  matters  to  which  he  had 
given  considerable  thought,  and  he  had  written  out  the  purpose  of  his 
conversation,  so  his  testimony  was  affirmative,  that  "I  do  recall  this 
as  the  conversation."  Your  evidence  is  apparently  of  a  negative  char- 
acter, as  to  not  recalling  certain  items  of  this  testimony,  is  that 
correct? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  correct,  sir.  I  cannot  say  the  conversa- 
tions did  not  take  place,  but  I  do  not  remember  them. 

Senator  Brewster.  You  would  not  have  any  question  if  Admiral 
Richardson  said  he  recalled  it  that  he  did  recall  it  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  have  no  doubt  whatever  he  would  be  correct. 
He  may  have  made  notes  following  the  conversation  or  he  may  not. 

Senator  Brewster.  In  any  event  it  was  true  that  the  particular 
inatter  in  discussion  was  one  with  which  he  was  very  vitally  concerned, 
was  it  not  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  He  was  very  serious  in  his  statement  to  the  Pres- 
ident, so  much  so  as  to  definitely  make  an  impression  on  me  so  that  I 
have  not  forgotten  what  he  said  about  the  fleet. 

Senator  Brewster.  He  had  come  there  and  he  rather  definitely  in- 
dicated that  he  wanted  to  find  out  what  the  reasons  were,  or  at  any 
rate,  he  posed  questions  which  were  calculated  [S94]  to  elicit 
that  information  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  I  do  not  know,  Senator,  but  I  presume  so. 

Senator  Brewster.  From  his  statement  that  he  and  the  officers  of 
his  fleet  did  not  know  the  reason  why  they  were  there  you  apparently 
implied  that  he  was  in  Washington  to  find  out  if  he  could? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Well,  he  made  that  statement.  What  his  purpose 
was,  of  course,  I  could  not  say. 

Senator  Brewster.  As  far  as  you  were  concerned,  it  was  not  a  matter 
with  which  you  were  at  that  time  officially  concerned  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  No  ;  I  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  it  at  that 
time.  Senator,  because  I  had  separated  myself  from  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment and  I  had  very  little  information.  Perhaps  that  accounts  for  my 
surprise. 

Senator  Brewster.  Your  presence  was  in  that  respect  that  of  a 
casual  bystander,  as  far  as  official  relations  were  concerned  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  correct.  I  think  I  just  happened  to  be  in- 
vited to  luncheon  at  the  same  time  that  Admiral  Richardson  was.  1 
usually  lunched  with  the  President  once  or  twice  when  I  came  to 
Washington. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  there  were  some  Puerto  Rican  matters 
[895]  discussed  at  the  luncheon,  and  he  apparently  was  killing  two 
birds  with  one  stone  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  We  discussed  some  of  the  problems  before  the 
Puerto  Rican  Government  at  that  luncheon. 

Senator  Brewster.  You  naturally  were  interested  in  the  naval 
aspects  of  the  matter,  as  one  who  had  been  so  long  actively  associated 
with  the  service? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  was  very  much  interested  in  it,  Senator. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  you  had  been  for  4  years  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  No;  about  214  years,  Senator. 

Senator  Brewster.  What  period  did  that  cover? 


346       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Leahy.  It  was  from  January  2, 1937,  to  August  1, 1939. 

Senator  Bkeavster.  And  during  that  period  you  were  the  naval  of- 
ficer primarily  responsible  for  the  preparation  of  our  naval  defense  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  the  development  of  the  fleet  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  were  associated  with  the  presentation  of 
the  expansion  program  of  the  fleet  in  the  1938  expansion  bill? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  correct. 

[S96]  Senator  Brewster.  Which  you  submitted  before  the 
Naval  Affairs  Committee  as  of  that  time  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  also  the  preparation  of  the  budget  for  the 
Navy  during  that  period  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Yes;  I  was  charged  with  the  preparation,  with 
I  he  supervision  of  the  preparation  of  the  budget  in  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment at  that  time. 

Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 

Mr.  Keefe.  May  I  have  that  time  exactly  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  From  January  2, 1937,  to  August  1, 1939. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  you  heard  this  morning  the  outline  of  the 
procedure  in  the  preparation  of  naval  budgets  in  the  discussions  be- 
tween Congressman  Keefe  and  Admiral  Richardson  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  heard  that  this  morning.  Senator. 

Senator  Brewster.  And  that  was  an  accurate  presentation  of  the 
procedure  in  the  preparation  of  the  budget  and  submission  to  the 
Congress  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  think,  from  what  I  heard,  it  is  an  accurate  pre- 
sentation of  the  procedure. 

Senator  Brewster.  The  only  thing  I  was  not  clear  about — and  per- 
haps you  may  have  answered  this — was  the  manner  of  the  Congres- 
sional presentation  of  the  question  of  increased  items  in  the  Navy. 
I  always  understood  that  was  a  matter  of  [S97]  Executive 
order,  that  the  officials  in  the  Navy  Department  could  not  testify  in 
support  of  items  in  excess  of  the  Executive  budget,  and  I  think 
Admiral  Richardson  spoke  of  it  as  a  Congressional  provision. 

Are  you  familiar  with  that? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  am  unable  to  answer  that,  Senator. 

I  know  we  were  not  permitted  to  introduce  items  that  were  in 
excess  of  those  that  were  transmitted^  to  Congress  by  the  Budget 
Bureau  with  the  President's  approval.  Whether  it  is  a  statutory 
provision,  or  whether  it  is  an  Executive  order,  I  am  unable  to  say, 
but  it  is  a  fact  we  were  not  permitted  to  do  it. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  am  familiar  with  that  fact.  I  was  simply 
surprised  at  that  statement.  I  wanted  to  clarify  it.  It  was  the  usual 
experience  for  the  Budget  Bureau  to  reduce  somewhat  your  estimate  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Well,  during  the  time  I  had  the  Office  of  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations,  they  always  reduced  our  estimates  after  we 
had  cut  them  as  much  as. we  thought  we  could  with  sasf  ety.  They  did 
it  carefully,  always,  with  consultation  always,  to  find  out  from  the 
Navy,  from  me,  what  damage  would  be  done  if  they  did  cut  an  amount 
from  the  budget,  and  we  always  told  them,  and  they  said,  "We  have 
only  a  certain  amount  of  money  which  can  be  obtained,  and  we  must 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  347 

[S98]  divide  it  amonp;  the  different  departments,  so  yon  will  have 
to  take  so  much  of  a  cut." 

Sometimes  they  would  say,  "Where  do  you  want  it?" 

Then,  if  they  were  kincl  enough  to  give  us  a  choice  of  the  lesser 
of  the  evils,  we  would  choose  the  place  where  the  cut  should  be  made, 
if  it  must  be  made. 

Senator  Brewster.  Do  you  recall,  admiral,  the  episode  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Naval  Expansion  Program  of  1938,  the  question  of  the 
limitations  proposed  on  naval  aircraft  to  not  exceed  3,000? 

Admiral  Leahy,  I  would  be  unable  to  answer  that  without  looking 
at  the  records.  Senator.  I  remember  there  was  such  a  limitation, 
but  beyond  that  I  would  not  like  to  make  a  statement,  and  probably 
it  might  not  be  correct. 

Senator  Brewster.  If  there  were  a  limitation  of  3,000  at  that  time, 
then  the  later  events  have  demonstrated  the  wisdom  of  a  very  great 
increase  in  naval  aircraft  that  has  since  occurred  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  quite  correct,  Senator.  The  Xavy  Depart- 
ment was  quite  desirous  of  a  large  increase  in  naval  aircraft  at  that 
time.  I  know  at  the  time  I  was  associated  with  it,  we  were  extremely 
anxious  to  build  up  the  air  arm  as  much  as  we  could.  There  was  a 
limitation  in  the  number  of  carriers  that  were  available. 

[890]         Senator  Brewster.  Yes. 

Admiral  Leahy.  It  would  not  have  been  worth  while  to  get  more 
planes  than  could  have  been  taken  on  the  carriers.  Perhaps  you 
remember  well  that  we  were  advocating  more  carriers  all  the  time. 

Senator  Brewster.  Prior  to  that  time,  the  limitation  on  naval  air- 
craft had  been  whatever  was  commensurate  with  a  treaty  navy,  isn't 
that  correct?  That  is,  there  had  never  been  an  actual  limit  at  that 
time.     Is  that  not  correct  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  do  not  remember,  Senator,  that  the  treaty  limita- 
tion limited  the  number  of  aircraft  that  we  were  permitted  to  have. 

Senator  Brewster.  No;  it  did  not.  It  simply  set  forth  a  number 
commensurate  with  the  treaty  navy,  which  might  have  been  am^  num- 
ber that  the  development  of  the  naval  art  might  have  made  advisasble. 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  correct,  sir,  and  also  what  we  could  carry 
with  the  vessels  that  were  permitted  to  us  by  the  treaty  navy. 

Senator  Brewster.  It  was  after  that  time  that  you  began  to  develop 
land-based  aircraft  in  the  Navy? 

Admiral  Leahy.  No;  we  had  developed  land-based  aircraft  long 
before  that  time.  Senator,  but  in  a  very  limited  number.  There  was 
a  question  as  to  whether  the  Navy  should  have  any  [900]  land- 
based  aircraft.  Finally  it  was  adjudicated  with  the  understanding 
that  the  Navy  would  have  a  limited  number  of  land-based  aircraft 
for  the  purpose  of  patrolling  about  their  bases. 

Senator  Brewster.  That  was  a  matter  of  agreement  with  the  War 
Department  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  An  agreement  between  the  AVar  Department  and 
a  predecessor  of  mine,  as  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

Senator  Brewster.  Was  the  custom  developed  at  that  time  of  carry- 
ing two  or  three  or  four  times  the  number  of  planes  required  for  the 
complement  of  a  carrier? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  do  not  remember  that  we  had  such  a  policy  at 
that  time,  Senator.     I  doubt  it  very  much.    We  were  having  difficulty 


348       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

getting  the  planes  that  we  really  wanted  without  getting  a  multiple  of 
three  in  capacity. 

Senator  Brewster.  To  refresh  your  recollection,  I  have  before  me 
the  act  of  1938  as  presented  by  you  to  the  committee,  which  provided 
for  the  authorization  of  the  construction  of  additional  naval  airplanes, 
the  number  not  exceeding  3,000.  That  was  the  increase  proposed  at 
that  time.  They  at  the  same  time  imposed  a  limit.  I  do  not  know 
whether  you  recall  the  circumstances,  but  on  the  floor  that  was  amended 
by  striking  out  the  words  so  it  read  "not  less  than  3,000." 
'  [901]         Admiral  Leahy.  I  remember  that,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  You  remember  that  episode  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brewster.  So  after  that  you  did  have  the  authority  for 
any  number  of  planes  in  excess  of  3,000,  providing  you  could  get  the 
appropriations  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  would  hazard  the  guess  that  the  reason  for 
the  limit  of  3,000  was  a  bugetary  limit  which  had  been  imposed  upon 
us,  but  I  am  not  certain.  We  wanted  more  than  that,  I  am  quite  sure, 
and  we  had  some  friends  in  the  House  who  arranged  it  for  us. 

Senator  Brewster.  That  is  all. 
'The  Chairman.  Congressman  Gearhart. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Admiral  Leahy,  according  to  your  testimony,  when 
you  left  the  White  House  with  Admiral  Kichardson,  you  expressed 
your  surprise  over  what  Admiral  Kichardson  had  said  to  the  President 
about  the  fleet  not  being  ready.  You  further  testified  that  you  were 
distressed  as  you  regarded  war  as  "a  very  likely  contingency." 

Was  anything  said  by  the  President  at  the  White  House  which 
caused  you  to  accept  that  thesis  that  a  war  was  a  very  likely  con- 
tingency ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  have  no  recollection  of  the  President  saying 
anything  in  regard  to  that  matter,  but  I  had  thought  [902] 
that  war  was  a  likely  contingency  for  several  years,  and  I  was  prac- 
tically certain  in  my  own  mind  that  it  was  going  to  come  at  some 
time  in  the  reasonably  near  future. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Was  anything  said  at  that  luncheon  by  Admiral 
Kichardson  which  added  to  your  conviction  that  war  was  a  very  likely 
contingency  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  On  the  contrary,  the  fact  of  Kichardson  saying 
that  his  fleet  was  not  ready  for  war  should  have  led  me  to  believe 
that  many  people  did  not  agree  with  me  that  war  was  a  contingency — 
a  likely  contingency. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  among  all  Navy  and  Army 
experts,  war  with  Japan  had  been  regarded  for  many  years,  perhaps 
as  long  as  30  years,  as  inevitable,  is  that  not  correct  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Well,  I  would  not  like  to  use  the  word  "inevitable." 
It  was  considered  a  reasonable  probability  at  some  time  in  the  future. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Army  and  Navy  experts  have  to  keep  themselves 
informed  with  respect  to  the  manifested  plans  of  other  countries  in 
respect  to  expansion,  do  they  not  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  They  make  every  possible  effort  to  get  all  of  the 
information  that  can  be  obtained  in  regard  to  those  very  questions. 

Mr.  Gearhart,  It  was  quite  apparent  to  you,  and  I  [903] 
presume,  to  others  in  a  similar  position,  that  Japan's  expansion  pro- 


PROCEEDINGS   OB^   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


i49 


gram  was  bound,  in  time,  to  bring  her  into  clash  with  the  interests 
of  the  United  States  ?  ..,-,. 

Admiral  Leahy.  Well  it  seemed  inevitable  to  me. 

I90n  Mr.  Geariiart.  Then,  not  being  airaid  ot  that  word 
"inevitable,"  it  really  was  inevitable  to  anybody  that  understood, 
even  people  beyond  the  exact  range  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  that 
we  were  in  for  trouble  with  Japan  ?  i    ^    ^i 

Admiral  Leahy.  Of  course  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  say  what  other 
people  thought.  I  know  what  I  thought  myself,  and  I  would  think 
your  statement  would  be  correct. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes.  ^^       . 

Admiral  Leahy.  But  of  course  what  they  thougnt  I  could  not  say. 

Mr  Gearh  vrt.  In  other  words,  you  had  no  reason  for  believing  that 
vou  alone  entertained  that  opinion,  but  it  was  a  general  opinion-^ 
"  Admiral  Leahy.  I  am  quite  sure  a  great  many  other  people  enter- 
tained that  opinion.  ,     .rm  •.    xt  i    ^ 

Mr  Gearhart,  At  the  time  you  were  at  the  White  House  and  at- 
tended this  luncheon  the  inevitability  of  war  was  becoming  more  and 
more  a  question  of  imminency  of  war  in  the  estimation  of  people  who 
were  closely  watching  the  events  in  the  Pacific,  is  that  not  correct  i 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  think  that  is  exactly  correct,  but  again  I  must 
say  that  I  cannot  tell  vou  what  was  in  the  minds  of  other  people,  but 
the  development  in  Asia  indicated  that  the  difficulty  with  Japan  was 
approaching  much  more  rapidly         [90S]        than  it  had  been  m 

the  past.  .  ^ ,  ^        1111 

Mr  Gearhart.  Now  as  you  got  along  into  1941  and  had  become 
the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy 
of  the  United  States,  vou  became  informed  from  day  to  day,  did  you 
not,  of  the  intercepted  messages  that  were  being  exchanged  between 
the  Japanese  diplomatic  and  military  and  naval  authorities? 

Admiral  Leahy.  In  1942  I  assumed  my  present  office,  and  subse- 
quent to  that  time  I  probably  received  all  of  the  information  that  was 
available  to  the  State,  War,  and  Navy  Departments,  I  probably  did. 
[906]  Mr.  Gearhart.  Yes.  That  is,  the  question  is  based  upon 
the  assumption  that  you  were  there  in  1911.  What  were  you  doing 
there  in  the  year  of  1911  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  was  Ambassador  in  France. 
Mr.  Gearhart.  While  you  were  in  France  did  you  receive  any 
information  in  respect  to  the  plans  of  the  Japanese  which  you  trans- 
mitted to  the  White  House  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  received  from  time  to  time  rumors  from  my 
acquaintances,  and  so  forth,  from  other  countries,  as  to  what  their 
information  was  in  regard  to  Japanese  activities  and  I  reported 
them  at  once,  of  course,  to  the  Department  of  State,  under  which 
I  was  serving. 

I  had  much  information  of  sharp  interest  at  the  time  that  the  Jap- 
anese moved  into  Indochina  because  they  were  dealing  with  the  Gov- 
ernment of  France  at  that  time  and  the  Government  of  France  kept 
me  fully  informed  as  to  their  demands  and  what  they  proposed  to  do. 
That,  of  course,  was  immediately,  instantly  reported  to  our  Depart- 
ment of  State. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  It  was  reported  in  the  pubUc  ])rints  that  the  Jap- 
anese went  into  Indochina  with  the  premission  of  the  Vichy  Govern- 
ment; is  that  true? 

79716 — 46— pt.  1 25 


350        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  correct ;  under  pressure  from  the  German 
friends  of  the  Japanese. 

[907]  Mr.  Gearhart.  Did  you  ever  see  any  written  assurances 
from  the  Japanese  Government  to  the  Vichy  Government  that  they, 
the  Japanese,  would  withdraw  as  soon  as  they  had  accomplished  their 
objectives  in  other  spots  in  the  Oi'ient  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  did  not.  I  was  told  by  Marshall  Petain  the 
details  of  the  agreement  with  the  Japanese.  I  saw  no  written  com- 
munication. 

I  thought  of  telling  a  story  but  I  better  not. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  would  be  very  interested  in  hearing  it,  Admiral. 

Admiral  Leahy.  There  are  too  many  of  my  friends  in  the  news 
business  here. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  The  next  time  I  see  you  at  the  Army  and  Navy 
Club  I  will  get  that  story  in  private. 

Admiral  Leahy.  All  right. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  will  ask  this  concluding  question.  Admiral. 

Did  anything  occur,  or  was  anything  brought  to  your  attention 
while  you  were  in  Vichy  representing  the  United  States  to  the  Vichy 
Government,  that  caused  you  to  feel  that  a  war  with  Japan  had  be- 
come any  less  a  very  likely  contingent  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  At  the  time  that  the  Japanese  moved  into  Indo- 
china with  the  permission  of  the  Government  of  France  I  told  the 
Chief  of  the  Government  that  that  convinced  me  that  we  would  be 
at  war  with  Japan  over  the  Philippines  in  the  near  [908] 
future. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  And  did  you  advise  Washington  of  that  informa- 
tion which  had  come  to  you  leading  you  to  that  conviction? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  did. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Did  you,  while  you  were  in  France,  receive  any 
information  w^hich  would  lead  you  to  believe  that  there  was  a  danger 
of  Hawaii  coming  under  attack  by  the  Japanese? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  did  not. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  I  believe  that  is  all.     Thank  you  very  much. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Ferguson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral  Leahy,  you  were  speaking  about  the 
French  Vichy  Government's  agreement  with  the  Japs  in  their  occu- 
pation of  Indochina.  Do  you  recall  whether  Marshal  Petain,  then 
acting  as  head  of  the  Vichy  Government,  informed  you  as  to  what  the 
agreement  provided  for  in  the  number  of  men  that  the  Japs  could 
put  in  there  under  that  forced  agreement? 

Admiral  Leahy.  He  did  give  me  such  information.  Senator,  but  I 
cannot  remember  the  number.  It  was  a  small  number  of  Japanese 
that  were  by  agreement  to  remain  in  a  small  part  of  Indochina. 
The  French  were  to  be  permitted  to  continue  the  government  of 
Indochina  and  the  Japanese  were  to  withdraw  as  soon  as  they  had 
accomplished  their  purpose,  which  was  to  facilitate  their  movement 
to  the  south.     That  was  related  to  me         [909]         by  the  Marshal. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  have  no  doubt  it  was  true. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  later  did  they  violate  the  agreement  as 
to  the  number  of  men  they  were  to  send  in  under  the  alleged 
agreement  ? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  351 

Admiral  Leaht.  They  later  sent  in  more  men  than  they  had  agreed 
to  send  in  and  they  took  more  widespread  action  in  seizing  control 
of  the  Government  than  was  stated  in  the  original  agreement. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you,  as  Ambassador  for  the  United  States, 
make  protest  to  the  Vichy  Government  that  they  were  doing  this, 
did  you  protest  that? 

Admiral  Leahy.  No,  I  did  not,  because  I  got  my  information  from 
the  French  Government,  It  was  the  only  way  we  could  get  that 
information  and  they  told  me  about  it  and  expressed  their  regrets 
and  I  transmitted  that  to  our  Government. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  what  I  am  getting  at.  They  seemed 
to  be  claiming,  at  least,  that  they  were  unable  to  stop  this  flow  of 
Jap  troops  into  Indochina. 

Admiral  Leaht.  They  were  unable  to  stop  it.  It  Avas  unnecessary 
for  them  to  tell  me  that  because  I  knew  that  quite  well. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  vou  notified  the  State  Department 
\_910']         here? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  was  transmitted  to  the  Department  of  State 
as  it  came  to  me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  make  more  than  one  protest  during 
1941,  up  until  Pearl  Harbor  date? 

Admiral  Leahy.  As  I  remember  it — you  are  speaking  of  Indochina 
now? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Leahy.  As  I  remember,  the  only  protest 

Senator  Ferguson.  Let  me  straighten  out  about  the  protest.  You 
notified  your  own  Government,  our  Government,  that  they  were  vio- 
lating the  agreement  and  what  the  French  had  told  you  about  it ;  is 
that  correct  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  did  you  get  awy  information  back  from 
the  State  Department  to  take  up  with  the  French  Government  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  do  not  think  so,  Senator,  because  I  had  already 
taken  it  up  with  the  French  Government  immediately  when  I  got  the 
information  from  them. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliat  did  you  take  up,  what  was  the  tenor  of 
your  conversation  with  tliem^  Did  you  tell  them  you  thought  this 
increase  would  mean  war  or  not  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  No;  it  was  not  that,  Senator.  The  tenor  of  my 
conversation  with  the  French  Government  in  regard  to  [.911] 
Indochina  was  always  the  same,  that  the}-  should  refuse  officially  and 
diplomatically  to  agree  to  these  things. 

Now,  I  doubt  very  much  if  they  ever  agreed  to  the  increase  in  the 
number  of  troops  that  went  to  Indochina,  Japanese  troops,  but  they 
knew  it,  and  there  wasn't  any  purpose  in  disagreeing  with  it,  there 
was  nothing  they  could  do  about  it ;  it  was  done  by  force  of  arms. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  it  was  a  violation  of  the  original  agree- 
ment as  to  the  number  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  There  is  no  doubt  about  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  Admiral,  1  wanted  to  be  a  little  more 
specific  than  the  others  have  been  on  what  happened  at  the  White 
House  on  the  8th,  when  you  had  lunch  with  the  President  and  Admiral 
Richardson. 


352       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

I  am  going  to  use  the  direct  quotes  from  the  official  record.  Admiral 
Richardson  said: 

which  I  prepared  in  the  quiet  of  my  liorae,  where  I  could  thinic  and  refresh  my 
memory  to  a  maximum  extent  possible. 

The  Chairman  said : 

You  may  proceed,  Admiral,  to  do  that. 
Admiral  Richardson. 

apparently  reading,  and  was  reading,  from  a  memorandum. 

I  took  up  the  question  of  returning  to  the  Pacific  Coast  all  of  the  Fleet  except 
the  Hawaiian  detachment. 

[91£]         Do  you  know  whether  or  not  that  was  discussed? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  do  not  remember  that  it  was  discussed  in  that 
way.  I  have  already  stated,  Senator,  that  Admiral  Richardson  said 
in  my  hearing  that  he  considered  it  wise  to  bring  the  Fleet  back  to  the 
Pacific  Coast  in  order  that  it  could  be  prepared  for  war  if  that  was 
the  purpose. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  that,  of  course,  would  include  all  except  the 
Hawaiian  detachment  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  would  say  that  Admiral  Richardson,  having 
made  these  notes  on  the  same  day  of  the  conversation,  is  propably  much 
more  accurate  than  I  am. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Admiral  Leahy,  he  does  not  purport  to  have 
made  that  memorandum  on  that  day.     He  made  the  notes  recently. 

Admiral  Leahy.  Oh,  recently. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Leahy.  Well,  stated  another  way,  this  was  a  matter  in 
which  Admiral  Richardson  was  interested  in  detail.  To  me  it  was 
only  a  matter  of  general  interest.  And  his  recollection  should  be  more 
accurate  than  mine. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  he  says  that  he  remembers  very 
little  of  what  you  and  the  President  talked  about  about  Puerto  Rico, 
because  that  was  your  problem,  about  some  housing,  and  you  remember 
that,  do  you  ? 

[91S]         Admiral  Leahy.  I  remember  that  very  well. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes ;  because  you  were  directly  interested  in  that 
part  of  the  conversation. 

Admiral  Leahy.  But  there  would  be  a  difference.  Senator.  I  was 
also  very  much  interested  in  the  Navy,  and  perhaps  Admiral  Richard- 
son never  heard  of  Puerto  Rico,  for  all  I  know. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well  now,  I  am  reading  from  the  official  record 
Admiral  Richardson's  language : 

The  President  stated  that  the  Fleet  was  retained  in  the  Hawaiian  area  in  order 
to  exercise  a  restraining  influence  on  the  actions  of  Japan. 

Are  you  prepared  to  say  now  that  that  did  not  take  place? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  cannot  say  that  it  did  not  take  place.  Senator. 
I  can  only  say,  as  I  said  before,  that  I  do  not  remember  it,  but  it  is 
quite  likely  that  that  statement  was  made,  because  a  great  many 
people,  belore  I  left  the  Navy  Department,  had  exactly  that  idea, 
that  if  we  would  send  small  forces  to  various  places  it  would  be  a 
deterrent  on  the  Japanese. 

I  was  in  complete  disagreement  with  them  always. 

[914]         Senator  Ferguson.  You  did  not  agree  then  with  the  fact, 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  353 

the  idea,  that  the  fleet  being  in  Hawaii,  in  the  Hawaiian  area,  would 
be  a  restraining  influence  on  the  action  of  Japan  ^ 

Admiral  Leahy.  Not  if  it  was  unread}^  for  battle.  Senator,  but  I 
assumed  that  it  had  been  made  ready,  and  then  it  would  have  been 
a  deterrent  and  a  very  useful  one. 

Senator  Fergusox.  But  you  received  your  first  information  on 
that  particular  day  from  Admiral  Richardson  that  it  was  not  ready 
for  action? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Xow,  reading  on,  and  giving  you  a  direct  quote 
again  from  Admiral  Eichardson's 

Mr.  MuRPiiY.  Will  the  gentleman  cite  the  page? 

Senator  Fergusox.  Yes.  Page  682,  "Witness  Richardson,  questions 
by  General  Mitchell : 

I  stated  that  in  my  opinion  the  presence  of  the  Fleet  in  Hawaii  might  influence 
a  civilian  political  government,  but  that  Japan  had  a  military  government  which 
knew  that  the  Fleet  was  undermanned,  unprepared  for  war,  and  had  no  train 
of  auxiliary  ships  without  which  it  Cduld  not  undertake  active  operations. 
Therefore,  the  presence  of  the  Fleet  in  Hawaii  could  not  exercise  a  restraining 
influence  on  Japanese  action. 

[PiJ]  Are  you  prepared  to  sa}^  that  that  was  not  said  at  that 
meeting  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  that  it  was  not  said.  I 
do  not  remember  a  statement  of  that  kind. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Do  you  recall  anjthing  about  the  Japanese 
being  a  military  government  rather  than,  as  it  is  expressed  here,  a 
civilian  political  government? 

Admiral  Leahy.  No,  sir.  Senator ;  I  do  not  remember  that  but  that 
is  the  kind  of  thing  I  would  not  remember  because  I  knew  that  so 
thoroughly,  so  somebody's  saying  it  would  make  no  impression  on  me. 

Senator  Fergusox.  That  was  in  your  mind  as  an  exact  fact,  that  it 
was  a  military  government  rather  than  a  civilian  political  govern- 
ment ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  an  exact  statement  of  fact  according  to 
my  opinion  at  that  time,  and  up  until  the  other  claj^  wl^en  it  ceased 
being  a  government. 

Senator  Fergusox.  And  that  kind  of  a  government,  a  military 
government,  is  much  harder  to  negotiate  with  along  diplomatic  lines 
than  a  civilian  political  government,  isn't  it  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  should  think  so,  unless  you  have  something  with 
which  to  negotiate. 

Senator  Fergusox.  You  mean  by  that  that  unless  you  have 
[916]         a  military  force  that  you  can  really  use. 

Admiral  Leahy.  Exactly  what  I  mean. 

Senator  Fergusox.  That  is  exactly  what  you  mean.  Now,  quoting 
Admiral  Richardson  further  from  the  record,  page  683,  he  further 
stated : 

I  further  stated  we  were  more  likely  to  make  the  Japanese  feel  that  we  meant 
business  if  a  train  were  assembled  and  the  Fleet  returned  to  the  Pacific  Coast, 
the  complements  filled,  the  ships  docked  and  fully  supplied  with  ammunition, 
provisions,  stores,  and  fuel  and  then  stripped  for  war  operations. 

Now,  are  you  prepared  to  say  that  that  didn't  take  place  at  the 
meeting  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  that  it  did  not.  I  doubt 
very  much  if  it  went  that  far  into  detail  without  its  impressing  itself 


354       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

on  my  memory  to  some  extent,  but  I  should  like  to  say  that  I  am  in 
complete  agreement  with  the  statement. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  quoting  further  Admiral  Richardson,  and 
I  have  very  little  more : 

The  President  said,  in  effect,  "Despite  what  you  believe,  I  know  that  the 
presence  of  the  Fleet  in  the  Hawaiian  area  has  had  and  is  now  having,  a  re- 
straining influence  on  the  actions  of  Japan." 

[917]  Do  you  recall  that,  or  are  you  prepared  to  say  that  that 
did  not  take  place  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  that  it  did  not  take  place, 
and  I  do  not  recall  that  statement.  I  would  not  be  surprised  to  learn 
that  it  was  made,  because  there  was  a  general  impression  in  this 
country  that  the  presence  of  ships  in  Honolulu  was  exercising  a 
restraining  influence  on  the  Japanese. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  from  a  military  viewpoint  you  differed 
with  that  opinion,  knowing,  after,  at  least,  after  Admiral  Richardson, 
that  it  was  not  prepared  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  would  not  say  that  I  was  in  disagreement  with 
that  line,  Senator.  I  would  be  in  disagreement  with  the  effectiveness 
of  it,  but  I  would  not  say  it  did  not  exercise  a  restraining  influence. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  am  inclined  to  think  it  did.  But  it  would  have 
a  much  more  effective  restraining  influence  if  it  had  been  prepared 
for  war. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then,  Admiral,  do  I  understand  that  you  wovild 
have  anticipated  that,  if  war  was  coming,  that  they  might  attack  the 
fleet  in  the  harbor  at  Pearl  Harbor  if  war  was  coming? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  would  have  been  afraid  of  that,  Senator,  because 
it  was  possible — it  was  a  difficult  operation  for  [91S]  the  Jap- 
anese, but  it  was  a  possible  one,  and  I  would  have  been  afraid  of  it, 
and  as  a  matter  of  fact,  I  was  always  fearful  that  such  a  thing  might 
happen  to  us,  and  many  other  officers  were  as  well. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  you  knew  the  conditions  at  Pearl 
Harbor,  the  size  of  Pearl  Harbor,  and,  as  the  admiral  said  this  morn- 
ing, the  neces^ty  of  docking  the  ships  in  pairs,  and  that  that  did  create 
a  hazard  as  far  as  the  fleet  was  concerned? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  was  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  situation  in 
Pearl  Harbor.  I  have  been  there  in  the  fleet  myself  and  I  know 
exactly  what  it  looks  like  and  how  easy  it  is  to  hit  from  the  air. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  quoting  again  from  page  683,  Admiral 
Richardson : 

I  said.  "Mr.  President,  I  still  do  not  believe  it  and  I  know  that  our  Fleet  is 
disadvantageously  disposed  for  preparing  for  our  initiating  war  operations." 

Are  you  prepared  to  say  that  that  did  not  take  place  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  am  quite  prepared  to  say  that  I  remember  that 
Admiral  Richardson  told  the  President  that  Honolulu  was  not  a  suita- 
ble place  to  prepare  the  fleet  for  war  service,  which  is  approximately 
the  same. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Approximately  this  statement. 

[919]  Adniiral  Leahy.  I  am  only  speaking  from  memory  of  3 
years  ago. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  understand.  That  is  why  I  am  giving  the  cor- 
rect quotes  of  the  admiral. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  355 

On  page  683,  again  reading : 

The  President  then  said.  ''I  ran  be  convinced  of  the  desirability  of  returniiis: 
the  battleshii)S  to  the  West  Coast  if  I  can  be  ^jiven  a  good  statement  whicli  will 
convince  the  American  i^eople  and  the  Japanese  Government  that  in  bringing  the 
battleships  to  the  West  Coast,  we  are  not  stepping  backwards." 

Are  you  prepared  to  say  that  that  did  not  take  phice  at  that  meeting? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  that  it  did  not  take  place, 
but  I  do  not  remember  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  remember  any  conversation  about  step- 
ping backward  or  taking  the  fleet  out  of  the  Hawaiian  area  would  be  a 
step  backwards? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  have 

Senator  Ferguson.  Or  a  surrender  of  something? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  have  some  kind  of  recollection,  which  I  cannot 
locate  at  that  luncheon,  that  there  was  a  fear  expressed  that  moving 
our  ships  away  from  the  Hawaiian  Islands  might  be  interpreted  by 
Japan  as  a  withdrawal  from  our  advance  into  the  [9£0]  Pa- 
cific, but  I  do  not  remember  where  that  was,  it  might  have  been  in  the 
Navy  Department.  I  do  not  know  whether  it  was  at  the  talk  with 
the  President. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  it  could  have  been  at  the  President's  lunch- 
eon? 

Admiral  Leahy.  It  could  have  been. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Because  that  was  a  fact  as  far  as  you  know; 
that  is,  someone  had  related  it,  or  stood  for  that  proposition  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  There  were  people  in  America  who  had  that  atti- 
tude at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Reading  again  from  page  683 : 

Later  I  asked  the  President  if  we  were  going  to  enter  the  war. 

The  sentence  before  that  is : 

"This  is  embarrassing."    I  didn't  quite  see  how  that  was  in  there. 
The  Chairman.  Admiral  Richardson  made  the  statement. 
Mr.  Murphy.  That  is  what  the  admiral  said.     I  heard  him. 
Senator  Ferguson.  It  is  part  of  his  answer  then. 

This  is  embarrassing. 

Later  I  asked  the  President  if  we  were  going  to  enter  the  war. 

Are  you  prepared  to  say  that  that  did  not  take  place,  [931] 
those  two  sentences,  Admiral  ? 

Mr.  Murphy.  Will  the  gentleman  yield  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Murphy.  The  gentleman  has  asked  the  witness  about  the  two 
sentences.     Certainly  you  are  not  asking  about  "This  is  embarrassing." 

Senator  Fj:rguson.  Xo;  but  I  had  to  read  that  because  it  is  in  tlie 
record.     This  is  the  sentence  I  wanted  an  answer  on : 

Later  I  asked  the  President  if  we  were  going  to  enter  the  war. 

Are  you  prepared  to  say  that  that  did  not  take  place  at  the  luncheon  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Well,  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  that  question  was 
asked  but  whether  it  was  made  in  those  words  or  not,  I  do  not  know. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  the  substance  of  what  was  said  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  was  made  by  Admiral 
Richardson. 


356       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGA^TlON  PEARL  HARBOR  ATtACK 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  did  the  President  reply? 
Admiral  Leahy.  I  do  not  remember. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now,  I  will  give  you  the  answer  Admiral  Kich- 
ardson  gave,  quoting  from  page  683 : 

He  replied  that  if  the  Japanese  attacked  Thailand,  or  [922]  the  Kra 
Peninsula,  or  the  Dutch  East  Indies  we  would  not  enter  the  war,  that  if  they 
even  attacked  the  Philippines  he  doubted  whether  we  would  enter  the  war,  but 
that  they  could  not  always  avoid  making  mistakes  and  that  as  the  war  continued 
and'  the  area  of  operations  expanded  sooner  or  later  they  would  make  a  mistake 
;and  we  would  enter  the  war. 

Are  you  prepared  to  say  that  that  did  not  take  place  at  the  meeting  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  am  very  much  surprised  to  hear  that  the  Presi- 
dent made  a  statement  that  he  would  or  would  not  enter  the  war  under 
any  conditions,  because,  of  course,  I  talked  the  war  situation  over 
with  the  President  many  times  and  at  length  during  the  time  I  was 
Chief  of  Operations,  and  the  President  never  indicated  to  me  that  he 
could  declare  war.  That  would  be  a  function  of  other  branches  of 
the  Government.  He  might  have  said  that  he  would  recommend  that 
we  go  to  war,  I  am  surprised  also  to  hear  Richardson's  recollection 
that  the  President  said  he  would  not  go  to  war  if  they,  if  the  Japa- 
nese, invaded  the  Philippines. 

From  my  knowledge  of  the  President  and  my  relations  with  him 
in  the  matter  of  war  for  the  preceding  years  I  feel  quite  sure  that  if 
the  Japanese  had  invaded  the  Philippines,  which  was  then  under  our 
Government,  the  President  would  have  recommended  a  declaration  of 
war. 

[92-3]  Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  you  had  conversa- 
tions with  the  President  that  brings  you  now  to  this  answer  that  if 
the  Japs  had  invaded  the  Philippines  he  would  have  recommended 
to  Congress  that  we  go  to  war  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  my  thought  from  a  very  intimate  knowl- 
edge of  what  the  President  was  thinking  about  and  doing. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  cannot  believe  that  he  would  not  have  recom- 
mended war  if  the  Japanese  had  invaded  our  territory. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  May  I  interrupt  for  a  minute  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  think  the  witness  misunderstood  the  quotation. 
Admiral  Eichardson  said  the  President  said  we  will  not  go  to  war  over 
the  Kra  Peninsula  or  Thailand.  I  think  the  Admiral  here  today 
understood  you  to  ssij  "he"  would  not  go  to  war. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  I  will  read  it  again. 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  quite  all  right,  then.  I  have  no  disagree- 
ment.    He  meant  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Murphy.  So  there  is  no  mistake,  Mr.  Chairman,  would  it  be 
permissible  to  have  the  stenographer  read  back  the  exact  words  of 
the  Senator  from  Michigan. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Does  General  Mitchell  think  that  I  said  "he"? 

[924-1  Mr.  Mitchell.  No.  I  say  the  Admiral  here  misunder- 
stood. 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  misunderstood.  I  thought  you  said  '"he",  the 
President. 

Senator  Ferguson.  No.     I  will  read  the  language  again. 

Later  I  asked  the  President  if  we  were  going  to  enter  the  war.  He  replied 
that  if  the  .Lipanese  attacked  Thailand,  or  the  Kra  Peninsula,  or  the  Dutch  Bast 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  357 

Indies  we  would  not  enter  the  war,  that  if  they  even  attacked  the  Philippines 
he  doubted  whether  we  would  enter  the  war,  but  that  they  could  not  always  avoid 
making  mistakes  and  that  as  the  war  continued  and  the  area  of  operations 
expanded,  sooner  or  later  they  would  make  a  mistake  and  we  would  enter  the 
war. 

Now,  do  you  understand  the  quotation  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  understand  it  now. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Are  you  prepared  to  say  that  that  did  not  take 
place  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  cannot  say  that  it  did  not  take  place  or  that  it 
did.  I  think  it  is  not  in  discord  with  the  President's  ideas,  as  I  under- 
stood them,  at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  would  be  in  accord  with  what  the  Presi- 
dent had  been  thinking  as  far  as  he  had  expressed  himself  on  other 
occasions  to  you,  at  least? 

Admiral  Leahy.  It  would  not  have  been  in  disaccord,  Senator.  I 
should  think  it  would  have  been  in  accord  with  his  [925] 
thoughts. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Thank  j-ou.     That  is  all. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  one  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  Well,  let  the  Chair  go  down  the  line  first. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Congressman  Keefe. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Admiral  Leahy,  in  view  of  the  cross-examination  of 
Senator  Brewster,  I  think  it  is  perhaps  proper  to  place  in  the  record 
at  this  time  specific  facts  with  respect  to  the  budget  estimates  for 
appropriations,  the  amounts  requested  by  the  Navy  Department  and 
the  appropriations  actually  made  by  the  Congress. 

Now,  I  have  before  me,  secured  as  a  result  of  my  request  of  the 
Navy  Department,  a  statement  prepared  by  the  Navy  Department, 
signed  by  E.  G.  Allen,  Bear  Admiral,  U.  S.  Navy,  Director  of  Budget 
and  Reports,  which  is  dated  November  14,  1945.  It  appears  that 
these  reports  cover  the  period  covering  the  fiscal  years  1932  to  1941, 
inclusive. 

The  annual  appropriation  act  of  the  fiscal  year  1932,  Admiral, 
shows  that  appropriations  were  requested  by  the  Navy  Department 
in  the  sum  of  $354,809,746. 

That  request  was  submitted  to  the  Congress  by  the  President  in  his 
annual  budget  in  the  sum  of  $347,794,248. 

The  Congress  appropriated  in  that  year  $358,262,123,  plus  [926] 
contract  authority  of  $7,700,000. 

Now,  Admiral,  do  you  understand  that  contract  authority  is  a 
vehicle  adopted  by  the  Appropriations  Committees  of  the  Senate  and 
the  House  which  authorizes  the  Department  to  which  contract  authority 
is  granted  the  authority  to  go  ahead  and  carry  out  plans  requested  even 
though  the  money  is  not  then  made  imm.ediately  available ;  do  you  so 
understand  that  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  my  understanding  of  it,  Mr.  Keefe.  Of 
course,  that  was  a  matter  for  legislative,  legal  decision,  but  that  is  my 
understanding. 

Mr.  I^efe.  Well,  I  think,  if  I  may  state,  as  a  member  of  the  Appro- 
priations Committee  of  the  House,  that  that  has  been  my  understand- 
ing of  it,  while  the  money  itself  is  not  made  immediately  available 
contract  authority  is  granted  to  the  agency  so  that  expenditures  may, 


358        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

or  contracts  for  expenditures  may,  be  incurred  and  the  appropriation 
subsequently  made  to  cover  it. 

Admiral  Leahy,  It  is  practically  a  promise  for  a  future  appropria- 
tion to  cover  that  authority. 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  is  ri<rht,  generally  speaking.  I  understood  Ad- 
miral Eichardson  to  say  that,  in  the  preparation  of  the  Navy  budgets, 
they  always  anticipated  that  there  would  be  some  cuts  by  the  Bureau 
of  the  Budget  and  the  Congress,  perhaps.  Did  you  so  understand  that 
when  you  were  in  charge  ? 

[9B7]  Admiral  Leahy.  I  have  often  heard  that  statement  made, 
Mr.  Keefe.  When  I  was  charged  with  supervision  of  the  budget  prep- 
arations I  endeavored  to  cut  our  requests  for  money  to  the  lowest  point 
that  was  consistent  with  the  preparations  of  the  Navy. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Now,  for  the  fiscal  year  1933,  the  annual  appropriation 
act,  the  Navy  Department  requested  of  the  Bureau  of  the  Budget 
$399,139,886. 

In  that  same  year  they  had  supplemental  and  deficiency  appropria- 
tion requests  amounting  to  $10,000,000;  or  a  total  in  the  fiscal  year 
1933  of  $409,139,886. 

For  similar  items  for  the  regular  annual  appropriation  plus  the 
supplemental,  the  budget  submitted  to  the  Congress  by  the  President 
called  for  an  appropriation  in  the  fiscal  year  1933  of  $351,677,450. 

The  Congress  actually  appropriated  for  that  fiscal  year  $327,583,591, 
plus  $5,715,000  contract  authority. 

In  the  annual  appropriation  for  the  fiscal  year  1934  you  requested — 
rather,  the  Navy  Department  requested  $352,717,786. 

The  President's  budget  submitted  to  the  Congress  requested 
$308,669,562. 

Congress  gave  to  the  Navy  in  response  to  the  President's  budgetary 
request  $308,669,562,  plus  $8,100,000  of  contract  authority, 

[928]  In  the  annual  appropriation  act  of  1935  the  Navy  re- 
quested during  the  fiscal  year  1945,  $335,410,918. 

The  President's  Budget  cut  that  amount  to  $303,407,649. 

The  Congress  gave  in  response  to  the  President's  Budget  estimate 
$301,734,056,  plus  $2,800,000  of  contract  authority. 

In  1936  the  Navy  requested  in  its  annual  appropriation  act  and 
in  supplemental  and  deficiency  acts  during  the  fiscal  year  1936  a  total 
of  $526,787,542. 

The  President's  Budget  submitted  to  the  Congress  was  $509,375,572. 

The  Congress  appropriated  $482,600,230,  plus  $6,590,000  of  con- 
tract authority. 

In  1937  the  annual  appropriation  requested  plus  supplemental  and 
deficiency  appropriation  acts  for  that  fiscal  year,  was  $586,932,284. 

The  President's  Budget  cut  that  amount  to  $551,512,599. 

The  Congress  appropriated  $528,467,832,  plus  $13,000,000  of  con- 
tract authority. 

In  1938  the  annual  appropriation  act,  plus  the  supplemental  and 
deficiency  appropriation  acts,  for  the  fiscal  year  1938,  amounted  to 
$599,035,223. 

The  President's  Budget  reduced  that  amount  to  $567,191,709. 

Congress  appropriated  $519,139,808,  plus  $15,000,000  of  contract 
authority. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  359 

[9'29]  In  the  fiscal  year  1939  the  annual  appropriation  requested 
by  the  Navy  plus  the  supplemental  and  deficiencv  request  amounted  to 
$719,380,009. 

The  President's  Budget  cut  that  request  to  $650,246,411. 

The  Congress  appropriated  $623,526,194,  plus  $15,000,000  of  con- 
tract authority. 

In  1940  the  annual  appropriation  and  supplemental  and  deficiency 
appropriations  requested  by  the  Navy  amounted  to  $1,077,377,889. 

Tlie  President's  Budget  cut  that  budget  request  of  the  Navy  to 
$976,430,769. 

Congress  appropriated  $943,375,249,  plus  $22,450,000  contract  au- 
thority. 

[930]  In  1941,  the  fiscal  year  1941,  the  requests  of  the  Navy,  an- 
nual appropriation  and  supplemental  and  deficiency  appropriation  re- 
quests amounted  to  $5,236,629,902.  The  President  s  Budget  cut  those 
requests  as  submitted  to  the  Congress  to  $3,561,405,919.  The  Congress 
appropriated  for  the  fiscal  year  1941  $3,549,383,345,  plus  $946,098,112 
of  contract  authority. 

Now,  I  have  totaled,  Admiral,  the  figures  beginning  with  the  fiscal 
year  1934  from  this  statement  prepared  by  the  Navy  Department  and 
the  total  asked  by  the  Navy  Department  for  the  fiscal  years  1934  to 
1941,  inclusive,  amounts  to  $9,434,271,533.  The  amounts  submitted 
to  the  Congress  in  response  to  those  requests  by  the  President  in  his 
annual  Budget  and  supplemental  Budget  estimates  was  $7,428,240,190. 
The  Congress  appropriated  in  the  same  period  $7,256,896,276  plus 
$1,029,038,112,  or  a  total  of  $8,285,934,388. 

The  estimates  indicate  that  in  the  period  from  the  fiscal  year  1934 
to  1941  inclusive,  the  Budget  cut  the  Navy's  requests  for  appropria- 
tions $2,006,031,343  and  the  Congress  exceeded  the  Budget  estimates 
in  making  appropriations  and  contract  authorizations  in  the  same 
period  $857,694,198. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  the  gentleman  yield  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  yield. 

[9S1]  Mr.  Murphy.  I  am  just  wondering  if  the  gentleman  is 
going  to  have  the  witness  swear  to  the  testimony.  It  seems  to  me  if 
it  is  relevant,  and  I  believe  it  is,  that  there  ought  to  be  some  way  to 
bring  it  out  so  that  it  might  be  thoroughly  examined.  Certainly,  we 
do  not  want  to  examine  the  gentleman  from  Wisconsin.  If  it  is  rele- 
vant and  important  I  am  wondering  if  this  is  the  way  to  approach  it. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  the  figures  right  here  and  they 
have  been  submitted  to  counsel  also,  may  I  say,  and  I  think  counsel 
has  the  figures  and  the  figures  which  I  am  quoting  are  accurately  those 
which  have  been  submitted  by  the  Navy  Department.    Is  that  not  true  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  assume  3'ou  have  got  a  document  directed  from 
the  Navy  as  to  the  Navy  budget. 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  have  no  objection  to  submitting  the  letter  from  the 
Navy  Department  and  other  figures  which  I  have  before  me. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  does  not  raise  any  question  as  to  the 
accuracy  of  the  figures.  The  regular  way  in  which  it  should  be  pre- 
sented, however,  would  be  to  present  an  official  copy  of  the  naval  bud- 
get and  the  President's  budget  and  the  appropriation  acts  of  Congress 
for  these  various  years,  which  would  be  official  documents. 


360       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Keefe.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  say  that  that  can  be  [93^] 
done.  That  would  require  a  tremendous  amount  of  work  because  of 
the  tremendous  number  of  supplemental  estimates  that  were  submitted 
during  many  of  these  years.  I  have  before  me  not  only  the  estimates 
submitted  by  the  Navy  Department  but  I  also  have  those  from  the  Bu- 
reau of  the  Budget  itself. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  would  like  to  ask  the  Congressman 
this  question:  In  your  total  tabulation  of  the  amount  asked  by  the 
Navy  for  the  fiscal  years  1934  to  1941,  inclusive,  that  includes  only 
appropriations.  Does  thati  include  any  authority  or  any  contract 
authority,  or  is  that  the  dollars- and-cents  figure  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  includes  the  actual  money  appropriations,  plus 
contract  authority,  and  I  so  designated  it. 

The  Chairman.  I  don't  think  the;  Congressman  understood  my 
question.  In  the  Budget  estimate  requests  of  the  Navy,  do  they  re- 
quest an  appropriation  in  money  or  do  they  add  to  that,  from  your 
tabulation  also  the  amount  thej  wish  in  contract  authority? 

Mr.  Keefe.  If  I  understand  you  correctly 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  does  the  recommendation  of  the 
Navy  include  only  appropriations  asked  for  in  money,  or  does  it  in- 
clude also  contract  authority? 

Mr.  Keefe.  The  figures  which  have  been  submitted  to  me  by  the 
Navy  Department  do  not  include  an}^  submission  of  [933]  con- 
tract authority  or  any  requests  for  contract  authority. 

The  Chairman.  So  that  the  contract  authority,  then,  is  a  figure 
that  was  put  into  the  appropriation  bills  by  the  Congress  itself  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  And  is  not  included  in  the  Navy  estimate,  and  not 
included  in  the  President's  Budget ;  is  that  true  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  is  true. 

The  Chairman.  So  that  your  last  figure  there  which  shows  that 
the  Congress  for  the  total  period  exceeded  the  requests  of  tlie  Budget 
hj  some  $800,000,000  includes  contract  authorizations  put  in  the  bill 
by  Congress,  which  in  your  last  year  were  more  than  a  billion  dol- 
lars ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  No;  that  is  not  true.  The  contract  authorizations  in 
the  last  year,  in  the  fiscal  year  1941,  was  797  million  in  round  figures. 

The  Chairman.  What  would  be  the  total  amount  of  comparative 
appropriations  for  those  years 

Mr.  Keefe.  I  gave  those  figures. 

The  Chairman  (continuing).  If  you  eliminated  the  contract  au- 
thority which  increased  in  1941  and  1940  as  the  situation  developed? 

[93^]  Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  the  situation  is  perfectly  clear,  Mr. 
Chairman,  and  you  are  as  familiar  with  that  situation  as  I  am  and  I  am 
quite  well  aware  of  the  fact,  as  a  member  of  the  Appropriations  Com- 
mittee of  the  House,  that  very  frequently  any  department  such  as  the 
Navy  or  the  Army  may  ask  for  a  direct  appropriation  of  money  and 
the  House  or  the  Senate,  as  the  case  may  be,  might  take  the  position, 
"You  cannot  spend  that  money  in  this  fiscal  year  as  money.  We  will 
give  you  so  much  money,  but  we  will  give  you  authority  to  go  ahead  and 
carry  on  your  program  and  buy  the  material  or  the  ships  or  whatever 
you  want  and  we  will  appropriate  the  money  for  you  when  you  need 
it ;"  and  that  is  the  vehicle  that  has  been  adopted  by  both  the  House 
and  Senate  Appropriations  Committees.     When  they  give  contract 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  361 

authority  it  is  as  good  as  an  appropriation  because  it  is  an  authority 
to  the  agency  to  whom  it  is  extending  the  power  to  go  ahead  and  ex- 
pend the  money. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  is  making  no  question  about  that  policy 
but  the  point  that  the  Chair  wanted  to  clarify  was  that  the  excess  to 
which  you  referred  is  made  up  in  part  of  contract  authority  as  well  as 
appropriations. 

Mr.  Keefe.  There  isn't  any  question  about  that  at  all.  The  actual 
appropriations  of  money  that  were  made  during  that  period  by  the 
Congress  were  $7,256,896,276  and  the  [935]  contract  authority 
extended  to  them  in  that  same  period  was  $1,029,000,000. 

The  Chairman.  And  that  contract  authority,  if  carried  out  to  the 
full,  would  be  included  in  a  subsequent  year's  appropriation,  in  a  sub- 
sequent fiscal  year's  appropriation  ? 

Mr.  Keefe.  It  might  be. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  if  contracts  were  entered  into  ac- 
cording to  the  authority  given,  naturally  the  cost  of  those  contracts 
would  be  presented  and  paid  for  in  the  subsequent  fiscal  year's  appro- 
priations. 

Mr.  Keefe.  May  I  say  this,  Mr.  Chairman.  The  question  is  the 
Navy  comes  in  and  says,  "We  want  so  many  ships,  we  want  so  many 
airplanes,  we  want  so  much  ammunition,  we  want  so  many  guns,"  and 
so  on  and  so  forth,  "and  we  have  requested  an  appropriation  for  that 
amount." 

Now,  when  they  come  before  the  House  or  Senate  committees  that 
committee  may  find  that  it  is  all  right  for  them  to  have  the  ships  that 
they  asked  for  or  the  guns  or  what  not,  or  the  ammunition,  but  they 
won't  be  able  to  spend  the  money  in  that  fiscal  year,  so  they  give  them 
contract  authority  to  go  ahead,  which  is  just  as  good  as  money,  with 
the  assurances  that  it  will  be  provided.  That  is  the  fact  of  the 
matter. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  is  sure  that  all  members  of  the  [OSd] 
committee  are  familiar  with  the  practice  and  there  is  nothing  in  it  that 
is  subject  to  criticism.  It  is  a  practice  that  Congi'ess  indulges  in  by 
o;iving  authority  to  the  Navy  and  the  Army  and  other  departments, 
if  they  see  fit,  to  make  contracts  for  things  to  be  supplied  m  the  future. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Yes ;  that  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  But  the  actual  payment  for  those  things  comes  in 
a  later  period. 

Mr.  Keefe.  That  is  right,  but  the  Congress  has  committed  itself, 
Mr.  Chairman.  When  it  gives  contract  authority  it  has  committed 
itself  to  so  much  money  toward  that. 

The  Chairman.  There  is  no  question  about  that. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Then  I  am  rather  surprised  the  Chairman  would  raise 
that  question. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  was  trying  to  differentiate  between  the 
net  amount  of  appropriations  and  the  amount  of  contract  authority, 
that  is  all  the  Chair  was  seeking  to  do. 

Senator  Lucas.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  know  whether  the 
gentleman  has  finished. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  the  committee  has  finished  with 
the  Admiral  I  would  like  to  have  him  excused.  I  have  kept  him  here 
on  a  false  alarm  twice  and  he  is  a  busy  man. 


362        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  any  more  questions  ? 

[937]  Mr.  Keefe.  I  would  like  to  ask  in  view  of  this  colloquy 
that  has  taken  place,  Admiral  Leahy,  you  have  heard  the  statement 
that  I  have  made  with  respect  to  the  manner  in  which  these  appro- 
priations have  been  made  in  the  past  at  the  request  of  the  Navy  and 
these  contract  authorizations.  You  have  heard  my  statement,  have 
you  not  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  have  heard  it,  sir. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  you  consider  that  it  is  substantially  correct  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  Of  course,  with  regard  to  the  figures  I  have  no 
knowledge.  In  regard  to  the  procedure,  it  is  quite  correct.  When  I 
was  in  charge  of  the  business  of  getting  money  for  the  Navy  we  found 
it  impracticable  to  spend  in  a  fiscal  year  all  of  the  money  that  was 
asked  for  and  the  subcommittee  of  the  Appropriations  Committee 
would  give  contract  authorization  for  so  much  of  the  business  as  they 
felt  should  not  be  financed  within  that  fiscal  year. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  that  contract  authority  would  permit  you  to  let 
the  contract 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  quite  correct, 

Mr.  KJEEFE  (continuing).  For  the  construction  of  the  ships  and  what 
not  and  go  on  with  your  program,  as  it  were  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Keefe.  The  program  that  vou  asked  for,  isn't  that  [9'3S] 
true? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  true. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Although  the  actual  money  that  you  asked  to  pay  for 
that  work  might  not  be  needed  until  the  next  fiscal  year  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  It  could  not  be  obtained  until  the  next  fiscal  year 
except  by  deficiency  appropriation. 

Mr.  Keefe.  So  that  when  the  authority  was  given  you  to  enter  into 
these  contracts  you  were  in  effect  assured  that  you  could  go  ahead 
with  your  program  to  that  extent? 

Admiral  Leahy.  That  is  correct,  Congressman  Keefe. 

Mr.  Keefe,  Well,  now,  Mr.  Chairman,  it  seems  to  me  in  order  that 
there  not  be  any  question,  that  I  would  like  to  ask  if  the  counsel,  or  I 
will  offer  in  evidence  this  document,  if  there  is  any  question  about  it, 
the  report  from  the  Navy  at  this  point  as  to  these  appropriations,  so 
that  it  may  appear  in  the  record.  I  have  read  it  in  the  record,  if  there 
is  any  question  about  it. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  understood  counsel  had  some  document, 
too,  on  that  subject.    If  you  are  mistaken  about  it  he  can  clarify  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  comparison  between  department  requests, 
budget  allowances  and  appropriations  was  requested  from  the  War  and 
Navy  Departments  at  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  [PSO]  Keefe  and 
I  assume  it  is  in  just  the  form  he  wanted  it  and  the  document  itself 
is  undoubtedly  sufficiently  authenticated  to  be  offered  here  as  an 
exhibit. 

The  only  question  I  have  about  the  figures —  I  don't  suppose  it  is 
any  of  my  business — is  whether  or  not  there  may  not  be  a  duplication, 
because  where  there  is  a  contract  authority  and  in  the  very  next  year 
the  appropriation,  the  same  figures  to  pay  the  bills  come  in  and  if  you 
use  the  authority  in  one  year  and  the  appropriation  in  another  you 
might  have  a  duplication. 

Now,  suppose  we  check  it  and  you  can  offer  the  exhibit  that  way  and 
we  will  find  out  whether  you  need  any  more  figures. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  363 

jNIr.  KEErE.  AVell,  I  haven't  any  objection  to  doing  that.  I  personally 
understand  what  you  are  talking  about,  but  as  to  the  comparison  be- 
tween ^Yllat  the  Navy  asks  and  what  the  budget  gives  and  what  the 
Congress  gives,  that  is  carried  forward  year  from  year,  year  after 
year. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  have  the  document.  I  will  offer  it  as  Exhibit  12, 
as  a  report  from  the  Navy.    Have  you  the  Army  figures,  too '? 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  I  have  those,  too.  Those  little  notes  on  the  bottom 
of  the  page  are  my  notes. 

Mr.  Murphy.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment.  If  the  counsel  have  the  [9^0] 
same  document  or  similar  documents  from  the  War  Department  it 
might  be  well  to  put  them  in  togetlier. 

Mr.  I^EFE.  Well,  I  have  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  don't  know  that  I  have  it  for  the  Army. 

The  CHAuniAN.  Well,  if  there  is  any  occasion  to  check  it  and  see 
whether  there  is  any  duplication,  it  can  be  done  and  the  figures  cor- 
rected later. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  I  find  that  the  Army  and  Navy  have  not  yet 
sent  us  a  copy  of  these  documents.  This  is  dated  November  14th  and 
I  have  not  received  it,  but  let  us  offer  it  and  we  can  check  it  later. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Well,  here  is  the  one  from  the  War  Department  right 
here.  You  can  see  there  is  the  letter  and  here  is  the  enclosure,  except 
that  penciled  memoranda  of  mine  on  there,  Mr.  Mitchell.  I  did  not 
know  you  were  going  to  offer  these.     I  thought  you  would  offer  yours. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  we  haven't  any. 

Mr.  Keefe.  But  you  may  have  my  copy.  Let  me  have  my  letters 
back.  Do  you  want  those?  Those  are  simply  the  letters  of  trans- 
mittal. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  suggest  that  they  go  in  with 
the  exhibit. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Yes ;  you  can  put  the  letters  of  transmittal  right  in  with 
them. 

[94J]         The  Chx\irman.  Minus  the  personal  notations. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  pencil. 

The  Chairman.  In  pencil,  all  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  will  offer  in  evidence  as  Exhibit  12  the  letters 
from  the  Navy  Department  to  Congressman  Keefe  dated  November  14, 
1945,  together  with  the  enclosure  which  is  a  revised  statement  on  naval 
estimates  and  appropriations  for  the  years  1932  to  1941,  inclusive, 
and  a  similar  letter  from  the  War  Department  to  Mr.  Keefe  dated 
November  7,  1945,  and  an  enclosure  detailing  the  appropriations  for 
the  War  Department  Military  Establishments  for  the  fiscal  years  1932 
through  1941,  inclusive. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Except  the  penciled  memoranda  at  the  bottom. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  It  is  understood  that  the  penciled  notations  on  these 
exhibits  are  not  offered. 

The  Chairman.  All  right.     Are  they  marked  as  Exhibit  No.  12  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  12. 

The  Chairman.  Both  as  Exhibit  12? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  It  is  one  exhibit. 

The  Chairman.  Tluit  iroes  into  the  record. 


364       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  I  understand  that  the  figures  which  are  on  the  ex- 
hibit which  has  been  offered  will  be  copied  in  the  record  ? 

[94^]         The  Chairman.  That  is  my  understanding. 

Mr.  Keefe.  Do  we  so  understand  it  ? 

The  Chairmax.  It  will  be  printed  as  a  part  of  the  hearing  at  this 
point. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  right.  The  reporter  will  put  the  schedules 
right  in  his  daily  transcript,  if  you  like. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.     All  right. 

(The  documents  referred  to,  without  Mr.  Keefe's  penciled  nota- 
tion, were  marked  "Exhibit  No.  12"  and  follow  herewith.) 

Address  Reply  to 

Executive  Office  of  the  Secretary 

Navy  Department, 
Washimjton  25,  D.  C,  J 4  November  19Jf5. 
And  Refer  to 
EXO  S :  OBR/G-Tn 
Hon.  Frank  B.  Keefe, 

House  of  Representatives,  Washington,  I).  C. 
My  Dear  Mr.  Keefe:  I  am  enclosing  a  revised  statement  on  naval  estimates 
and  appropriations  for  the  years  1932  to  1941  inclusive  to  be  siibstituted  for  the 
one  enclosed  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy's  letter  sent  you  on  yesterday. 

This  revised  statement  was  prepared  after  collaboration  between  this  office  and 
the  Bureau  of  the  Budget  in  studying  [dJfSI  the  records  of  the  years  in 
question,  and  the  figures  appearing  thereon  will  agree  with  those  furnished 
you  by  the  Bureau  of  the  Budget.  While  the  records  concerning  the  regular 
Naval  Appropriation  Bills  for  each  year  were  complete,  information  concerning 
deficiency  and  supplemental  estimates  i-equested  by  the  Navy  Department  vi^as 
lacking  in  many  cases  and  required  extended  search  through  the  files  for  the 
years  in  question. 

Sincerely  yours, 

E.  G.  Allen. 
Rear  Admiral,  U.  8.  Navy, 
Director  of  Budget  and  Reports. 
(Enclosure.) 

[94^]         Appropriatio^is,  Navy  Department,  fiscal  years  1932  to  1941,  inclusive 


Appropriations 
requested  by 
tbe  Navy  De- 
partment 

Budget  esti- 
mate of  appro- 
priations sub- 
mitted to  the 
Congress 

Amounts  made  available  by 
the  Congress 

Appropriation? 

Contract 
authority 

1932 
Annual  appropriation  act 

$354,  809,  746 
0 

$347,  794,  248 
0 

$358,  262, 123 
0 

$7,  700, 000 

Suppemental  and  deficiency  appropria- 

0 

Total 

354, 809,  746 

347,  794,  248 

358,  262, 123 

7,  700,  000 

1933 

Annual  appropriation  act - . . 

Supplemental  and  deficiency  appropria- 

399, 139, 886 
10,000,000 

341,  677, 450 
10, 000, 000 

317,  583, 591 
10, 000, 000 

5,  715, 000 
0 

Total- -.- 

409, 139, 886 

351,  677,  450 

327,  583,  591 

5,  715,  000 

1934 

352,  717,  786 
0 

308,  669, 562 
0 

308, 669,  562 
0 

8, 100, 000 

Supplemental" and  deficiency  appropria- 
tion acts        -        .  

0 

Total' 

352,  717.  786 

308, 669, 562 

308,669,562 

8,100,000 

PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


365 


Appropriations,  Navy  Department,  fiscal  years  1932  to  ISJfl,  inclusive — Continued 


Appropriations 
requested  by 
the  Navy  De- 
partment 

Budget  esti- 
mate of  appro- 
priations sub- 
mitted to  the 
Congress 

Amounts  made  available  by 
the  Congress 

Fiscal  year 

Appropriations 

Contract 
authority 

1935 

$318,  324,  414 
17,086,504 

$286, 332, 392 
17,  075,  257 

$284, 658,  799 
17,075,257 

.$2,800,000 

Supplemental  and  deficiency  appropria- 

0 

Total -- 

335,  410,  918 

303,  407,  649 

.301,734,056 

2,800,000 

1936 

502, 855,  817 
23,931,725 

485,  443,  847 
23, 931,  725 

458.  684. 379 
23.  915, 851 

6, 590, 000 

Supplemental  and  deficiency  appropria- 

0 

Total 

526,  787,  542 

509, 375,  572 

482. 600,  230 

6,  590, 000 

[9^6]                         1937 

585, 010, 984 
1,921,300 

549,591,299 
1,921,300 

526, 546, 532 
1,921,300 

13,000,000 

Supplemental  and  deficiency  appropria- 

0 

Total 

586, 932,  284 

551,512,599 

528, 467, 832 

13,000,000 

1938 
Annual  appropriation  act        . 

594, 269,  223 
4, 766, 000 

562, 425, 709 
4, 766, 000 

516, 258, 808 
2,881,000 

15,000,000 

Supplemental  and  deficiency  appropria- 

0 

Total 

599, 035, 223 

567,191,709 

519, 139, 808 

15,000,000 

1939 
Annual  appropriation  act 

629,665,104 
89, 714, 905 

564,406,461 
85,839.950 

546, 866, 494 
76,659,700 

15,000,000 

Supplemental  and  deficiency  appropria- 

0 

Total 

719,380,009 

650,246,411 

623, 526, 194 

15,000,000 

1940 

788,  775, 549 
288, 602, 340 

790, 342, 453 
186, 088, 316 

773,049,151 
170,326,098 

20, 000, 000 

Supplemental  and  deficiency  appropria- 
tion acts  ..     .- 

2,450,000 

Total 

1, 077, 377, 889 

976, 430,  769 

943, 375, 249 

22,450,000 

1941 
Annnnl  apprnpriatinn  ac>t 

1, 384, 44?,  202 
3, 852, 187,  700 

1,337,311,577 
2,  224, 094,  342 

1,  274, 171, 138 
2, 275,  212,  207 

148, 741, 612 

Supplemental  and  deficiency  appropria- 
tion acts    

797,356,500 

Total 

5,  236, 629,  902 

3,561,405,919 

3,  549, 383, 345 

946, 098, 112 

[9^6]  War  Department, 

Washington,  Novemhcr  7,  19-'t5. 
Honorable  Fbank  B.  Keefe, 

House  of  Representatives,  Washington.  D.  C. 
Dear  Mr.  Keefe:  Attached  is  a  statement  which  contains  for  the  War 
Department  Military  Establishment,  data  on  amounts  requested  of  the  Bureau 
of  the  Budget,  amounts  approved  by  the  Bureau  of  the  Budget,  and  funds  and 
contract  autliorizations  made  available  to  the  War  Department  for  the  fiscal 
years  1932  through  1941.  These  data  were  requested  by  you  on  October  19th 
for  use  as  a  member  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  investigating  committee. 

Insofar  as  can  be  determined,  there  is  no  copy  in  the  files  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment, of  a  speech  delivered  by  the  President  of  the  Philippine  Islands,   Mr. 
Quezon,  in  Manila  some  time  in  November  1941. 
Sincerely  yours, 

RoBEaiT    P.    Patterson, 
Secretary  of  War. 
Incl.  Stmt. 

79716— 46— pt.  1 ^26 


366        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


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368       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[94B]  The  CHAiRMAisr.  Any  further  questions  of  Admiral 
Leahy  ? 

Admiral,  the  Charman  would  like  to  ask  you  just  one  question. 
When  you  were  testifying  about  the  agreement  between  the  Vichy 
French  Government  and  the  Japanese  Government,  with  respect 
to  certain  troops  going  into  Indochina,  did  I  understand  you  to  say 
that  that  was  done  under  pressure  of  the  Government  against  the 
Vichy  French  Government? 

Aclmiral  Leahy.  At  the  time  that  was  brought  up  to  the  French 
Government  Marshal  Petain  sent  for  me  and  told  me  about  it  and 
told  me  that  the  pressure  from  the  German  invaders  of  France  in 
behalf  of  the  Japanese  was  so  heavy  that  he  could  not  refuse  to  allow 
the  Japanese  into  Indochina  in  the  small  number  that  they  asked 
for  and  under  an  agreement  that  they  would  withdraw  when  they 
had  accomplished  their  purpose. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  whether  under  the  same  pressure 
later  they  were  unable  to  prevent  other  numbers  from  going  in  in 
violation  of  the  agreement? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  do  not  see  how  they  could  have  prevented  other 
numbers  going  in,  Senator,  because  they  had  very  few  troops  in 
Indochina  and  they  were  outnumbered  by  the  Japanese. 

The  Chairman.  At  that  time,  the  Vichy  Government  was  [94^] 
pretty  generally  understood  to  be  under  pressure  constantly  from  the 
German  Government  ? 

Admiral  Leahy.  I  am  sure  it  was  constantly  under  pressure  for 
whatever  the  Germans  thought  they  needed  to  help  them  with  the 
war. 

The  Chairman.  Any  further  questions,  Mr.  Counsel? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  None. 

The  Chairman.  "Well,  the  committee  thanks  you,  Admiral,  for 
your  testimony  and  for  your  cooperation,  and  regrets  that  you  were 
held  so  long  before  you  could  go  on  the  stand. 

Admiral  Leahy.  Thank  you  very  much,  Senator.  I  am  very 
pleased  indeed  to  contribute  any  little  thing  I  had  to  thi,s  very  diffi- 
cult investigation  you  have,  and  my  short  detention  here  was  no 
trouble  whatever,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Anything  further  now,  Mr.  Counsel? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  some  documents  that  ought  to  go  into  the 
record  at  this  point. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  we  will  receive  them. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  First,  I  would  like  to  read  into  the  record  extracts 
from  a  letter  dated  January  25,  1941,  dated  at  Pearl  Harbor,  from 
the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  United  States  Fleet — that  was 
Admiral  Eichardson — to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  in  Washing- 
ton. It  follows  along  this  investigation  about  the  air  conditions — the 
air  defense  con-         [950]         ditions  at  Pearl  Harbor  (reading :) 

1.  Reference  (a)  was  received  by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet,  one 
day  prior  to  the  arrival  of  Commander  McCrea  at  Pearl  Harbor  en  route  to  the 
Navy  Department.  It  is  considered  desirable  to  take  advantage  of  his  return 
to  inform  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  of  the  views  of  the  Commander  in 
Chief  as  to  the  new  situation. 

2.  In  view  of  reference  (a)  and  some  degree  of  urgency  implied  therein,  it  is 
considered  that  study  of  the  new  situation  and  the  preparation  of  plans  there- 
for should  take  priority  over  the  preparation  of  plans  for  Rainbow  No.  3.  Unless 
advice  to  the  contrary  is  received,  this  will  be  done. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  369 

3.  The  new  situation,  as  visualized  by  the  Commander  in  Chief,  alters  the 
assumptions  and  concepts  of  Rainbow  No.  3,  principally  in  that  the  major  ofEen- 
sive  effort  of  the  United  StatPs  is  to  be  ex'-ripd  in  the  Atlantic,  rather  than  in 
the  Pacific,  and  in  that  a  "waiting  attitude"  will  be  taken  in  the  Pacific,  pending 
a  determination  of  Japan's  intentions.  If  Japan  enters  the  war  or  commits  an 
overt  act  against  United  States'  interests  nr  territory,  our  attitude  in  the  i'acitic 
will  be  primarily  defensive,  but  opportunities  will  be  seized  to  damage  Japan  as 
situations  present  themselves  or  can  be         [951]         created. 

4.  Under  the  foregoing  general  conception,  it  is  deemed  desirable  to  outline, 
as  briefly  as  possible,  certain  tentative  assumptions,  upon  which  the  actions  of 
the  U.  S.  Fleet  in  the  Pacific  will  be  predicated.    These  are : 

(a)  The  United  States  is  at  war  with  Germany  and  Italy. 

(b)  War  with  Japan  is  imminent. 

(c)  Units  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  may  be  detached  to  the  Atlantic  on  short  notice. 
The  numbers  and  types  of  these  units  are  at  present  unknown. 

(d)  At  least  three  German  raiders  are  in  the  Pacific. 

(e)  Japan  may  attack  without  warning,  and  these  attacks  may  take  any 
form — even  to  attacks  by  Japanese  ships  flying  German  or  Italian  flags  or  by 
submarines,  under  a  doubtful  presumption  that  they  may  be  considered  German 
or  Italian. 

(f)  Japanese  attacks  may  be  expected  against  shipping,  outlying  possessions 
or  naval  units.  Surprise  raids  on  Pearl  Harbor,  or  attempts  to  block  the  channel, 
are  possible. 

(g)  Local  sabotage  is  possible. 

[952]  5.  Under  the  foregoing  :assumptions,  the  U.  S.  Fleet  in  the  Pacific 
will  assume  the  tasks  listed  below.  Where  deemed  appropriate,  measures  to  be 
taken  under  the  tasks  will  be  included. 

WAITING    ATTITUDE 

(1)  Take  full  security  measures  for  the  protection  of  Fleet  units,  at  sea  and 
in  port. 

In  the  performance  of  this  task,  the  Fleet  is  severely  handicapped  by  the 
existence  of  certain  marked  deficiencies  in  the  existing  local  defense  forces 
and  equipment,  both  Army  and  Navy.  These  deficiencies  will  be  set  forth  in 
detail  later,  but  are  mentioned  here  in  order  that  certain  measures  listed 
below  may  be  more  clearly  understood. 

At  present,  the  following  measures,  among  others,  will  be  required  to  ac- 
complish the  above  task : 

(a)  Expand  patrol  plane  search  to  the  maximum,  reenforcing  Patrol  Wing 
Two  with  units  from  Patrol  Wing  One. 

(b)  Establish  inner  air  patrol  over  Pearl  and  Honolulu  Harbor  entrances 
and  approaches,  augmenting  Army  planes  with  naval  and  marine  planes  as 
necessary. 

(c)  Arrange  for  alertness  of  a  striking  force  of  Army  bombers  and  pursuit 
planes ;  supplemented  by  available  Navy  or  Marine  planes. 

(d)  Augment  Army  A. A.  defenses  with  A. A.  batteries  [953]  of  Fleet 
units  in  Pearl  Harbor. 

(2)  Keep  vessels  of  all  types  in  constant  readiness  for  distant  service. 

(3)  Assist  in  local  defense  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District. 

This  task  will  require  augmentation  of  District  forces  by  the  assignment  of 
Fleet  units  until  suitable  vessels,  including  those  of  the  Coast  Guard,  become 
available  to  the  Commandant. 

•    (4),  (5),  (6),  (7),  (8),  (9)  and  (10)  I  will  omit.     They  relate  to  operations 
away  from  Pearl  Harbor. 

6.  It  will,  of  course,  be  realized  that  the  effectiveness  with  which  the  tasks 
set  forth  above  can  be  prosecuted  is  dependent  upon  the  forces  available, 
especially  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  Atlantic  reenforcements.  If  a  carrier 
is  to  be  included  in  the  Atlantic  reenforcement,  one  of  the  Lexington  class  should 
be  selected,  due  to  difficulties  of  handling  in  Pearl  Harbor.  There  is,  however, 
definite  need  for  all  four  carriers  under  the  tasks  assigned  this  fleet. 

7.  In  connection  with  the  execution  of  the  foregoing  tasks,  and  with  particular 
reference  to  the  early  initiation  of  offensive  operations,  it  must  be  pointed  out 
that  the  existing  deficiencies  in  the  defense  of  Oahu  and  in  the  Local  Defense 
Forces  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  impose  [95^]  a  heavy  burden 
on  the  Fleet  for  purely  defensive  purposes.  Ideally,  a  Fleet  Base  should  afford 
refuge  and  rest  for  personnel  as  well  as  an  opportunity  for  maintenance  and 


370       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

upkeep  of  material  installations.  When  Fleet  planes,  Fleet  guns  and  Fleet 
personnel  are  required  to  be  constantly  ready  for  defense  of  its  own  Base,  the 
wear  and  tear  on  both  men  and  material  cannot  but  result  in  impaired  readiness 
for  active  operations  at  sea.  The  most  outstanding  deficiencies  affecting  this 
readiness  of  the  Fleet  are : 

(a)  The  critical  inadequacy  of  A.  A.  guns  available  for  the  defense  of  Pearl 
Harbor,  necessitating  constant  manning  of  ships'  A.  A.  guns  while  in  port. 

(b)  The  small  number  and  obsolescent  condition  of  laud-based  aircraft,  neces- 
sitating constant  readiness  of  striking  groups  of  Fleet  planes  and  use  of  Fleet 
planes  for  local  patrols. 

(c)  Lack  of  suitable  local  defense  vessels  for  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District, 
necessitating  detail  of  Fleet  units  to  this  duty.  The  detail  of  Fleet  units  to  this 
duty  not  only  results  in  loss,  to  the  Fleet,  of  the  availability  of  important  vessels, 
but  also  results  in  the  forced  employment  of  ships  whose  more  valuable  char- 
acteristics will  be  largely  wasted  due  to  the  nature  of  their  tasks.  This  is  par- 
ticularly true  where  destroyers  must  be  diverted  to  local  A/S  patrol,  off-shore 
[9551  patrol  and  local  escort.  These  duties  could  better  be  performed  by 
submarine  chasers,  converted  gunboats  and  converted  escort  vessels. 

(d)  Lack  of  aircraft  detection  devices  ashore. 

8.  It  is  considered  imperative  that  immediate  measures  be  undertaken  to 
correct  the  critical  deficiencies  enumerated  above.  It  is  further  believed  that 
these  measures  should  take  priority  over  the  needs  of  continental  districts,  the 
training  program,  and  material  aid  to  Great  Britain. 

9.  It  is  recommended  that  the  Alaskan  and  Hawaiian  reenforcements  re- 
ferred to  in  paragraph  2103  (a)  (5)  of  W.  P.  L.  44  (advance  copy)  be  dispatched 
as  soon  as  possible  in  order  that  necessity  for  heavy  escort  may  not  embarrass 
the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  in  its  later  operations. 

10.  This  letter  has  been  prepared  in  collaboration  with  the  prospective  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet.  Rear  Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  N.  It 
represents  his,  as  well  as  my  own,  views. 

J.  O.  Richardson. 
Copy  to :  Rear  Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel. 


[OSS]  The  Vice  Chairman.  Mr.  Chairman,  do  I  understand 
that  is  a  letter  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Oper- 
ations here  in  Washington  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  right,  dated  January  25,  1941.  It  is  al- 
ready in  the  volume  that  the  committee  has.  We  are  occasionally 
pulling  out  the  documents  and  putting  them  in  the  record,  so  it  con- 
nects up  the  story. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  next,  if  you  want  to  sit  and  listen  to  it  tonight, 
the  defense  plans  having  to  do  with  Pearl  Harbor.  They  cover  a 
wide  field  beyond  that,  and  we  had  prepared  extracts  from  that  vol- 
ume which  has  reference  particularly  to  the  air  defense.  It  is  true, 
as  one  of  the  members  said  the  other  day,  this  book  of  extracts  of  de- 
fense plans  does  not  cover  a  great  many  operations  that  go  far  afield 
from  Pearl  Harbor.  We  think  it  ought  to  be  brought  into  the  record 
at  this  point,  and  I  will  preface  that  statement  by  calling  the  atten- 
tion of  the  committee  to  the  fact  that,  as  the  result  of  Admiral  Stark's 
letter  of  November  22,  to  Richardson  asking  him  to  look  into  the  air 
defense  system,  Richardson  went  back  to  Honolulu  and  did  that  work 
in  December. 

It  resulted  in  the  report  which  has  been  read  in  already.  That 
inspired  the  letter  from  Secretary  Knox  to  Stimson  which  started  in 
motion  the  set  of  revisions  of  plans,  field  [9S7]  orders,  and  so 
forth,  that  dealt  with  air  defense  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

We  have  two  purposes  in  bringing  that  in : 

One  is  to  show  the  extent  to  which  the  possibility  of  an  attack  at 
Pearl  Harbor  was  in  the  year  1941,  in  the  minds  of  people  here  in 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  371 

Washington,  and  people  at  Honolulu,  and  the  other  purpose  is  to 
show,  in  as  brief  form  as  we  can,  the  respective  functions  that  have 
been  assigned  to  the  Army  and  Navy  forces  in  Pearl  Harbor  in  con- 
nection with  air  attack. 

The  Chairman.  This  document  you  have  here  in  your  hand,  the 
document  you  have  referred  to,  is  the  one  which  you  want  to  plfice 
in  the  record? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  do  not  want  to  place  it  all  in.  The  committee  has 
it,  but  there  are  certain  paragraphs  of  it  that  I  would  like  to  read 
into  the  record. 

I  would  say  the  original  plans  are  here  that  cover  everything. 
General  Gerow  was  War  Plans  Officer  of  the  General  Staff  at  that 
time,  and  I  found  out  he  is  the  most  appropriate  witness  to  explain  the 
plans  to  the  committee  as  you  may  require.  With  the  understanding 
he  will  be  here  shortly  to  authenticate  these  plans  and  explain  them 
further,  and  on  the  assumption  he  is  going  to  do  so,  I  propose  next 
to  place  in  the  record  at  this  stage  certain  extracts  that  I  think  bring 
out  the  air-defense  plans  there  as  they  were  [958]  worked  out 
locally  and  in  Washington. 

The  Chairjvian.  If  it  is  agreeable  to  the  committee,  we  might  hear 
that  now. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  It  will  take  you  more  than  10  minutes,  I  am  sorry 
to  say. 

The  Chairman.  We  might  sit  a  little  longer  than  that. 

Senator  Brewster.  Mr.  Chairman,  in  connection  with  that,  I  think 
it  might  be  very  well  to  have  the  extract  of  which  he  speaks,  but  I 
think,  also,  there  should  be  available,  as  exhibits,  the  complete  plans. 
Wliile  the  extracts  that  he  presents  to  the  committee  relate  to  the 
defense  of  Pearl  Harbor,  the  functions  of  the  Navy  went  very  much 
afield.  I  think  for  an  accurate  appraisal  of  the  relative  responsi- 
bilities of  the  Navy  and  Army,  it  may  be  very  relevant  to  know  what 
the  Navy  was  supposed  to  do  in  the  event  of  a  war,  which  might  have 
a  very  definite  bearing  on  the  appraisal  of  the  whole  situation. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Senator,  here  is  the  original  material  from  which 
these  extracts  were  obtained.  Now,  would  you  like  to  have  these 
duplicated  in  the  same  way,  or  do  you  just  want  to  examine  them? 

Senator  Brewster.  Are  those  the  only  copies  which  you  have  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  They  have  not  been  asked  to  reproduce  [9-59] 
them.     It  might  be  possible  we  could  get  one  or  two  other  copies. 

Senator  Brewster.  I  think  one  copy  is  all  that  is  necessary  as  an 
exhibit  in  the  case. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  them  here  for  that  purpose,  and  I  was  plan- 
ning to  have  General  Gerow  offer  them  generally  and  tell  you  what 
they  are.  We  have  not  gone  to  the  trouble  and  expense  of  copying 
this  mass  of  stuff. 

Senator  Brewster.  Will  you  find  out  if  they  will  allow  us  to  keep  it  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  am  keeping  it  now  so  you  will  have  access  to  it, 
if  you  want  to  borrow  it.  I  planned,  as  I  say,  to  have  the  general 
authenticate  them. 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  go  ahead  with  the  reading  of  these  extracts. 

Mr.  INIiTCHELL.  I  will  do  the  best  I  can. 

The  Chairman.  Would  it  be  feasible,  gentlemen,  to  have  these  ex- 
tracts printed  in  the  record  without  reading  them  ? 


372       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  do  not  see  why  not.  If  the  committee  does  not 
want  to  hear  me  read  them,  1  will  hand  these  to  the  reporter,  and 
ask  him  to  transcribe  into  the  daily  transcript  the  sections  I  have 
marked  in  pencil,  that  have  particular  relation  to  our  air  defenses. 

The  Chairman.  Each  member  of  the  committee  has  the  [960] 
document  itself  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Exactly. 

The  Chairman.  Each  member  of  the  committee  has  the  transcript 

daily. 

If  it  is  agreeable  to  the  committee  to  have  these  extracts  printed  m 
the  daily  transcript  of  the  record,  it  would  be  available  to  us  tomor- 
row, as  well  as  the  documents  from  which  the  extracts  were  taken. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  am  glad  to  be  relieved. 

Senator  Lucas.  That  will  give  the  committee  an  opportunity  to 
study  these  over  tomorrow,  if  they  desire,  and  if  they  want  to  ex- 
plore further  any  extract  that  you  have  here,  it  may  go  into  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  If  there  is  no  objection,  that  will  be  done. 

(The  extracts  referred  to  follow  :) 

[961]        ExTEACTs  Feom  Joint  Abmy  and  Navt  Basic  Wab  Plan — Orange 

(1938) 
******* 
This  JOINT  ARMY   AND  NAVY  BASIC  WAR  PLAN— ORANGE  shall  con- 
stitute the  basis  upon  which   all  Army  Plans— ORANGE,  All  Navy   Plans— 
ORANGE,   all  Joint   Plans— ORANGE,  and  all  supporting  allocations  for  an 
ORANGE  war  shall  be  formulated  and  developed. 

******* 
Tliis  plan  is  applicable  to  any  probable  situation  between  UNITED  STATES 
and  ORANGE  which  requires  action  by  the  armed  forces.     The  character  of  the 
particular  situation  that  may  arise  cannot  be  predicated,  but  in  general  it  may 
be  assumed  that : — 

1.  There  will  be  a  period  of  strained  relations  preceding  the  outbreak  of  war 
with  ORANGE,  during  which  period  preparatory  measures  prior  to  mobiliza- 
tion can  be  taken. 

2.  Active  hostilities  against  the  UNITED  STATES  by  ORANGE  will  be 
precipitated  without  a  formal  declaration  of  war. 

3.  The  superiority  of  the  UNITED  STATES  naval  strength  over  that  of 
ORANGE  will  be  adequate  to  permit  operations  by  the  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 
to  the  westward  of  OAHU ;  and  any  assistance  which  may  be  given  to  ORANGE 
or  to  the  UNITED  STAT'ES  by  other  powers  will  not  materially  reduce  this 
superiority. 

:!.■****** 

[962]         2.  COASTAL  FRONTIER  DEFENSE. 

******* 
6.  HAWAIIAN  Coastal  Frontier. 
(1)   Boundaries. 

The  HAWAIIAN  Coastal  Frontier  consists  of  OAHU  and  such  adjacent  land 
and  sea  areas  as  are  required  for  the  defense  of  OAHU. 

******* 

(3)  Missions. 

(a)  Joint  Mission. 

To  hold  OAHU  as  a  main  outlying  Naval  Base,  and  to  control  and  protect  ship- 
ping in  the  Coastal  Zone. 

(b)  Mission  for  the  Army. 

To  hold  OAHU  against  attacks  by  sea,  land,  and  air  forces,  and  against  hostile 
sympathizers;  to  support  the  Naval  forces. 

(c)  Mission  for  the  Navy. 

To  patrol  the  coastal  zone  and  to  control  and  protect  shipping  therein ;  to 
support  the  Armed  forces. 

******* 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  373 

EIXTBACTS  FBOM  JOINT  ASMY  AND  NAVY  BaSIC  WaE  PlAN — RAINBOW  NO.  1  ^ 

:if  *  ^!  *  *  *  * 

HOLD  OAHU  AS  A  MAIN  OUTLYING  NAVAL  BASE  AND  CONTROL  AND 
PROTECT  SHIPPING  IN  THE  COASTAL  ZONE. 

Joint  Decisions: 

a.  Boundaries: 

[963]  The  Hawaiian  Coastal  Frontier  consists  of  Oahu  and  such  adjacent 
land  and  sea  areas  as  are  required  for  the  defense  of  Oahu. 

6.  Category  of  Defense: 

Category  D,  as  defined  iu  Section  III,  Chapter  V,  "Joint  Action  of  the  Army 
and  the  Navy,  1935." 

c.  Army  Task: 

To  hold  Oahu  against  attacks  by  land,  sea,  and  air  forces,  and  against  hostile 
sympathizers ;  to  support  the  Naval  forces. 

d.  Navy  Task: 

To  patrol  the  Coastal  Zone  and  to  control  and  protect  shipping  therein ;  to 
support  the  Army  Forces. 

if  *  *  :^  *  *  * 

f.  Joint  Plant  to  be  Prepared :  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan. 


ExTBACTs  From  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Basic  War  Plan — Rainbow  No.  5 ' 


The  Pacific  Area 


33.  Army  Tasks. 


[964]  d.  In  cooperation  with  the  Navy  defend  Coastal  Frontiers,  Defense 
Command  Areas  and  specified  localities  in  categories  of  defense  prescribed  in 
paragraph  47. 

******* 

35.  Nary  Tasks. 

**-::**** 

,   h.  In  cooperation  with  the  Army  defend  Coastal  Frontiers  and  specified  locali- 
ties in  categories  of  defense  prescribed  in  paragraph  47. 

*  ,       *  *  *  *  *  * 

Hawaiian  Coastal  Frontier Category  D 

******* 

e.  Coordination  between  Army  and  Navy  forces  in  coastal  frontier  operations 
shall  be  by  the  method  of  mutual  cooperation,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  para- 
graph 9  b. 

******* 

36A.  Hawaiian  Coastal  frontier. 

a.  Boundaries. 

The  Hawaiian  coastal  frontier  consists  of  Oahu,  and  all  of  the  laud  and  sea 
areas  required  for  the  defense  of  Oahu.  The  coastal  zone  extends  to  a  distance 
of  500  miles  from  all  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  including  Johnston  and  Palmyra 
Islands  and  Kingman  Reef. 

b.  Commanders. 

Army. — The  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department. 

[965]  Navy. — The  Commandant,  Fourteenth  Naval  District,  who  is  desig- 
nated as  the  Commander,  Hawaiian  naval  coastal  frontier.  This  oflScer  also 
commands  the  assigned  Naval  local  defense  force,  and  will  arrange  for  its  joint 
tactical  and  strategical  employment,  in  cooperation  with  the  Army. 


'  Approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  14  August  1939, 
verbally  by  the  President,  14  October  1939  ;  revised  by  the  Joint  Board,  10  April  1940. 

2  Approved  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  28  May  1941,  and  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
2  June  1941. 


374       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
ExTRAcrrs  FKOM  Wab  Department  Operations  Plan  Rainbow  No.  5* 


30.  HAWAIIAN  COASTAL  FRONTIER. 

,  Extent. 

a.  OAHU  and  such  adjacent  land  and  sea  areas  as  are  required  for  the  defense 
of  OAHU. 

b.  Category  of  Defense:  D  (as  defined  Section  III,  Chapter  V,  J.  A.  A.  &  N., 
1935). 

c.  Missions. 

(1)  Joint — Hold  OAHU  as  a  main  outlying  Naval  base  and  control  and  pro- 
tect shipping  in  the  Coastal  Zone. 

(2)  Army — Hold  OAHU  against  attacks  by  land,  sea,  and  air  forces,  and 
against  hostile  sympathizers.  Support  Naval  forces  in  the  protection  of  the  sea 
communications  of  the  Associated  Powers  and  in  the  destruction  of  Axis  sea  com- 
munications by  offensive  action  against  enemy  forces  or  commerce  located  within 
tactical  operating  radius  of  occupied  air  bases. 

[566]  (3)   Navy. — Patrol  the  Coastal  Zone:  control  and  protect  shipping 

therein  ;  support  the  Army. 


Extracts  From  Hawaiian  Defense  Project,  Revision  1040 
******* 
BRIEF  ESTIMATE  OF  THE  SITUATION 

1.    a.  Missions. 

(1)  Joint  Mission:  To  hold  Oahu  as  a  main  outlying  naval  base,  and  to  con- 
trol and  protect  shipping  in  the  Coastal  Zone. 

(2)  Mission  for  the  Army:  To  hold  Oahu  against  attacks  by  sea,  land  and  air 
forces  and  against  hostile  sympathizers ;  and  to  support  the  naval  forces. 

(3)  Mission  for  the  Navy:  To  patrol  the  Coastal  Zone  and  to  control  and  pro- 
tect shipping  therein;  to  support  the  Army  forces  (Joint  Army  and  Navy  Basic 
War  Plan — Orange). 

6.  Category  off  Coastal  Frontier  Defense:  Category  "D"  defense,  prescribed 
by  the  War  Department  for  this  department,  assumes  the  possibility,  but  not 
the  probability,  of  a  major  attack.  Defense  measures  specified  envision  the  em- 
ployment of  seacoast,  air,  and  antiaircraft  elements,  and  the  use  of  a  general  i*e- 
serve  (Joint  Action  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  1935) 

•  •  **  *  *  *. 

d.  Forms  of  hostile  attacks:  The  basis  of  the  forms  of  attack  listed  below  is 
the  War  Department  Assignment  of  Category  1967]  "D"  to  this  Depart- 
ment. 

(1)  Possible  enemy  attacks  against  the  OAHU  area  in  the  order  of  probability 
are: 

(a)   Submarine — torpedo  and  mine. 

(a)   Sabotage. 

(c)  Disguised  merchant  ship  attack  by  blocking  channels,  by  mines,  or  by  air 
or  surface  craft. 

(d)  Air  raids,  carrier  based. 

(e)  Surface  ship  raids. 

(/)   Major  combined  attack  in  the  absence  of  the  U.  S.  Fleet. 

*****  *  * 

5.  a.  Basis  for  Planning. 

(1)  Missions  and  Conditions. 

(a)  All  defense  plans  of  Oahu  will  be  based  upon  the  following  conditions: 
The  currently  assigned  category  of  defense  will  be  Category  D  (see  par.  1  b). 
The  defense  of  Oahu  will  be  joint  defense  by  Army  and  Navy  forces  under  the 
missions  as  stated  in  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Basic  War  Plan — Orange  (see  par.  la). 
(6)  Possible  and  Probable  War  Situations  are: 
******* 

(2)  That  the  most  probable  form  of  attack  is  [968]  a  surprise  attack 
consisting  of  raids,  and  bombardments  by  ships'  fire  and  air  forces,  and  action 
by  local  sympathizers. 


'  Approved  by  the  Chief  of  Staff,  19  August  1941. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  375 

b.  Conclusion. 

To  adopt  a  defense  plan  adequate  initially,  to  meet  an  enemy's  maximum 
effort.    This  plan  is  outlined  to  the  next  paragraph. 

c.  Scheme  of  defense,  command  organization,  and  missions  assigned  to  major 
echelons  upon  initial  deployment : 

(1)  The  defense  of  Oahu  combines  an  air,  naval,  antiaircraft,  seacoast  and 
beach  and  land  defense,  together  with  the  supervision  and  utilization  of  civilian 
activities  and  utilities  and,  under  martial  law,  their  control.  To  effectively 
accomplish  this  defense,  particularly  vphen  its  elements  must  be  controlled  simul- 
taneously, the  Department  Commander  decentralizes  his  command  function  by 
assignment  of  definite  missions  of  responsibility  to  major  echelon  commanders, 
as  follows : 

(a)   To  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Division: 

The  beach  and  land  defense  of  Oahu.     (For  details,  see  paragraph  6.) 

The  beach  and  land  defense  is  based  upon  the  principle  of  the  "position  in 
readiness",  which  permits  concentration  of  forces  in  critical  areas  and  assures 
flexibility  to  meet  external  and  internal  attacks. 

[965]  (b)  To  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Sepan^te  Coast  Artillery 

Brigade: 

The  antiaircraft  and  seacoast  defense  of  Oahu  and  in  addition  furnishing 
the  necessary  support  to  the  beach  and  land  defense  and  the  naval  forces. 
( See  paragraph  6. ) 

(c)  To  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Air  Force: 

In  carrying  out  the  air  defense,  he  may  conduct  independent  operations  or  may 
operate  in  conjunction  with,  supported  by,  or  in  support  of  naval  air  forces,  or 
temporarily  under  the  direction  of  the  Naval  Air  Force  Commander  as  provided 
in  Chapter  II,  Joint  Action  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  and  will  cooi)erate  with  all 
forces  in  direct  defense  of  Oahu. 


[970]       HEADQUARTERS 
HAWAIIAN  DEPARTMENT 
Fort  Shafter,  T.  H. 

11  April  1941  HEADQUARTERS 

FOURTEENTH  NAVAL  DISTRICT 

Pearl  Harbor  Navy  Yard,  T.  H. 

11  April  1941 

Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan — Hawaiian  Coastal  Frontier 

HAWAIIAN   department  AND  FOLTRTEENTH   NAVAL  DISTRICT 

Section  1. — Directives 

1.  ResponsibiUtj/. — This  joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  is  prepared  un- 
der the  direction  of  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department,  and  the 
Commandant,  Fourteenth  Naval  District. 

2.  Basis. — This  plan  is  based  on  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Basic  War  Plan  RAIN- 
BOW No.  1,  and  Section  V,  pages  61,  Joint  Action  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy, 
1935,  and  will  constitute  the  basis  on  which  all  subsidiary  peace  and  war  proj- 
ects, joint  operating  plans,  and  mobilization  plans  are  based. 

3.  Method  'of  Coordination'. — The  Commanding  General  of  the  Hawaiian  De- 
partment and  the  Commandant  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  have  deter- 
mined that  in  this  joint  plan  the  method  of  coordination  will  be  by  mutual  co- 
operation and  that  this  [97i]  method  will  apply  to  all  activities  wherein 
the  Army  and  the  Navy  operate  in  coordination,  until  and  if  the  method  of  unity 
of  command  is  invoked,  as  prescribed  in  Joint  Action  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy, 
1935,  Chapter  2,  paragraph  9&. 

4.  Planning  Representatives. — The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  War  Planning 
(G-3),  Headquarters  HAWAIIAN  DEPARTMENT,  and  the  War  Plans  Officer, 
Headquarters  FOURTEENTH  NAVAL  DISTRICT,  are  designated  as  planning 
representatives  respectively  for  the  Army  and  Navy  Commanders  in  the 
HAWAIIAN  COASTAL  FRONTIER.  (Par.  40  a,  page  61,  Joint  Action  of  the 
Army  and  the  Navy,  1935). 

5.  Joint  Planning  Committee. — A  Local  Joint  Planning  Committee  is  estab- 
lished to  consist  of  the  Chiefs  of  Staff,  HAWAIIAN  DEPARTMENT  and 
FOURTEENTH  NAVAL  DISTRICT  and  such  other  Army  and  Navy  Officers 
as  may  be  appointed  by  the  Commanding  General,  HAWAIIAN  DEPART- 
MENT, and  the  Commandant,  FOURTEENTH  NAVAL  DISTRICT  (Section  VI, 


376       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

page  133,  Joint  Action  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  1935).  The  Joint  Plannnig 
Committee  shall  take  cognizance  of  all  matters  affecting  joint  coordination  in 
all  subsidiary  Plans  or  Projects  constituting  the  Joint'  Defense  Plans,  HA- 
WAIIAN COASTAL  FRONTIER.  The  senior  member  thereof  is  authorized 
to  designate  such  standing  or  special  subcommittees  as  from  time  to  time  may 
be  necessary. 

[972]  13.  The  estimate  of  the  situation  applicable  to  the  respective  forces 
is  found  in  Estimate  of  the  Situation,  Hawaiian  Department,  and  Estimate  of 
the  Situation,  Fourteenth  Naval  District,  RAINBOW  No.  1. 

14.  TASKS. 

a.  Joint  Task. — To  hold  OAHU  as  a  main  outlying  naval  base,  and  to  control 
and  protect  shipping  in  the  Coastal  Zone. 

&.  Army  Task. — To  hold  OAHU  against  attacks  by  sea,  land,  and  air  forces, 
and  against  hostile  sympathizers ;  to  support  the  naval  forces. 

c.  Nax>y  Task. — To  patrol  the  Coastal  Zone  and  to  control  and  protect  shipping 
therein ;  to  support  the  Army  forces. 

15.  FORCES. 

a.  Army  Forces. — The  present  garrison  augmented  by  personnel  and  facilities 
to  be  obtained  locally  and  by  reinforcements  from  Continental  United  States  as 
provided  for  in  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Basic  War  Plan,  RAINBOW  No.  1. 

&.  Naval  Forces. — Naval  Local  Defense  Forces  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District, 
augmented  by  personnel  and  facilities  to  be  obtained  locally  and  by  reinforce- 
ments as  provided  for  in  the  Navy  Basic  War  Plan,  RAINBOW  No.  1. 

c.  Overseas  Reinforcements. 

[97S]  (1)  Army  garrisons  and  Naval  Local  Defense  Forces  in  the  HA- 
WAIIAN COASTAL  FRONTIER  will  be  reinforced  at  the  earliest  possible  date ; 
to  the  extent  practicable,  this  will  be  done  prior  to  M-Day. 

******* 

17.  ARMY.— The  Commanding  General,  HAWAIIAN  DEPARTMENT,  shall 
provide  for : 

a.  The  beach  and  land,  seacoast  and  antiaircraft  defense  of  OAHU  with  par- 
ticular attention  to  the  PEARL  HARBOR  NAVAL  BASE  and  naval  forces  present 
thereat,  HONOLULU  HARBOR,  CITY  OF  HONOLULU,  and  the  SCHOFIELD 
BARRACKS-WHEELER  FIELD-LUALUALEI  area.  The  increasing  importance 
of  the  KANEOHE  area  is  recognized. 

b.  An  antiaircraft  and  gas  defense  intelligence  and  warning  service. 

c.  Proctection  of  landing  fields  and  naval  installations  on  outlying  islands  con- 
sistent with  available  forces. 

d.  Defense  of  installations  on  OAHU  vital  to  the  Army  and  Navy  and  to  the 
civilian  community  for  light,  power,  water,  and  for  interior  guard  and  sabotage, 
except  within  naval  establishments. 

e.  Defense  against  sabotage  within  the  HAWAIIAN  ISLANDS,  except  within 
naval  shore  establishments. 

f.  Establishment  of  an  inshore  aeri&l  patrol  of  the  waters  of  the  OAHU 
D.  C.  A.,  in  cooperation  with  the  Naval  [^74]  Inshore  Patrol  (see  par. 
IS.  a.),  and  an  aerial  observation  svstem  on  outlying  islands,  and  an  Aircraft 
Warning  Service  for  the  HAWAIIAN  ISLANDS. 

g.  Support  of  naval  aircraft  forces  in  major  offensive  operations  at  sea  con- 
ducted within  range  of  Army  bombers. 

h.  Provide  personnel  for  and  Army  communication  facilities  to  harbor  control 
post  provided  for  in  paragraph  18.  e. 

i.  In  conjunction  with  the  Navy,  a  system  of  land  communications  (coordinated 
by  means  of  teletype,  telegraph  loops,  and  radio  intercepts,  and  detailed  joint 
instructions)  to  insure  prompt  transmittal  and  interchange  of  hostile  intelligence. 
Radio  communication  between  the  Army  and  the  Navy  will  be  governed  by 
"Joint  Army  and  Navy  Radio  Procedure,  The  Joint  Board,  1940." 

j.  An  intelligence  service,  which,  in  addition  to  normal  functions,  will  gather, 
evaluate,  and  distribute  both  to  the  Army  and  to  the  Navy,  information  of 
activities  of  enemy  aliens  or  alien  sympathizers  within  the  HAWAIIAN  ISLANDS. 

k.  Counter-espionage  within  the  HAWAIIAN  ISLANDS. 

I.  Control  of  dangerous  aliens  or  alien  sympathizers  in  the  HAWAIIAN 
ISLANDS. 

m.  Army  measures  to  assure  effective  supervision,  control,  and  censorship  over 
communication  systems  which  will  conform  to  Joint  Action  of  the  Army  and 
the  Navy,  1935,  Chapter  IX. 
[575]         ******* 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  377 

18.  2V^^yY.— The  Commandant,  FOURTEENTH  NAVAL  DISTRICT,  shall 
provide  for : 

a.  An  inshore  patrol. 
6.  An  offshore  patrol. 

c.  An  escort  force. 

d.  An  attack  force. 

*  *        *        *        *      '  *        * 

i.  Distant  reconnaissance. 

;.  Attacking  enemy  naval  forces. 

*  l|:  *  *  *  *  * 

I.  In  conjunction  with  the  Army,  as  provided  for  in  paragraph  17i,  a  local 
communication  service  to  insure  prompt  transmittal  and  interchange  of 
intelligence. 

tf  ^:  if  tf  if  if  * 

n.  Operation  of  a  Naval  intelligence  system,  including  counter-espionage,  for 
the  collection,  evaluation,  and  dissemination  of  hostile  information. 

if  if  *  if  *  if  if 

(3)  Mobilization  plans  will  provide  that,  where  facilities  do  not  exist  for  the 
defense  of  OAHU,  all  work  possible  under  current  appropriations  will  be  done 
to  prepare  them  so  that  M-Day  operation  will  be  possible. 

if  *  if  *  if  if  * 

21.  This  agreement  to  take  effect  at  once  and  to  remain  [976]  effective 
until  notice  in  writing  by  either  party  of  its  renouncement,  in  part  or  in  whole, 
or  until  disapproved  in  part  or  in  whole  by  either  the  War  or  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment. This  HCF^l  (JCD^2)  supersedes  HCF-39  (JCD-IB)  except  that  the 
Annexes  Nos.  I  to  VII  of  latter  remain  effective  and  constitute  Annexes  I  to  VII, 
inclusive,  of  this  plan. 

(Signed)     C.  C.  Bloch, 
C.  C.  Bloch, 
Rear-Admiral,  U.  S.  Navy,  Commandant, 

Fourteenth  Naval  District. 
(Signed)     Walter  C.  Short, 
Walter  C.  Shobt, 

Lieut.  General,  U.  S.  Army,  Commanding 
Hawaiian  Department. 


[577]         HEADQUARTERS 
14th  NAVAL  DISTRICT 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 

HEADQUARTERS 

HAWAIIAN  DEPARTMENT 

Fort  Shafter,  T.  H. 

Joint  Coastal  Frontiee  Deifense  Plan 

HAWAIIAN    department    AND    FOURTEENTH    NAVAL    DISTRICT 

1939  28  March  1941. 

Annex  No.  VII 
Joint  Agreements 
Section  VI — Joint  Agreements 
JOINT  SECURITY,  PROTECTION  OF  FLEET  AND  PEARL  HARBOR  BASE. 
I.  GENERAL. 

1.  In  order  to  coordinate  joint  defensive  measures  for  the  security  of  the 
fleet  and  for  the  Pearl  Harbor  Naval  Base  for  defense  against  hostile  raids  or 
air  attacks  delivered  prior  to  a  declaration  of  war  and  before  a  general  mobili- 
zation for  war,  the  following  agreements,  supplementary  to  the  provisions  of 
the  HCF-39  (14  ND-JCD-13),  are  adopted.  These  agreements  are  to  take  effect 
at  once  and  will  remain  effective  until  notice  in  writing  by  either  party  of  their 


378       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

renouncement  in  whole  or  in  part.  Frequent  revision  of  these  agreements  to 
incorporate  lessons  determined  from  joint  exercises  will  probably  be  both 
desirable  and  necessary. 

[978]         II.  JOINT  AIR  OPERATIONS. 

2.  When  the  Commanding  General  of  the  Hawaiian  Department  and  the 
Naval  Base  Defense  Officer,  (the  Commandant  of  the  14th  Naval  District), 
agree  that  the  threat  of  a  hostile  raid  or  "attack  is  sufficiently  imminent  to  war- 
rant such  action,  each  commander  will  take  such  preliminary  steps  as  are 
necessary  to  make  available  without  delay  to  the  other  commander  such  propor- 
tion of  the  air  forces  at  his  disjposal  as  the  circumstances  warrant  in  order 
that  joint  operations  may  be  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  following  plans : 

a.  Joint  air  attacks  upon  hostile  surface  vessels  will  be  executed  under  the 
tactical  command  of  the  Navy.  The  Department  Commander  will  determine 
the  Army  bombardment  strength  to  participate  in  each  mission.  With  due 
consideration  to  the  tactical  situation  exisiting,  thhe  number  of  bombardment 
airplanes  released  to  Navy  control  will  be  tlie  maximum  practicable.  This 
force  will  remain  available  to  the  Navy,  for  repeated  attacks,  if  required,  until 
completion  of  the  mission,  when  it  will  revert  to  Army  ocntrol. 

ft.  Defensive  air  operations  over  and  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Oahu  will 
be  executed  under  the  tactical  command  of  the  Army.  The  Naval  Base  Defense 
Officer  will  determine  the  Navy  fighter  strength  to  pai'ticipate  in  these  missions. 
With  due  consideration  to  the  tactical  situation  existing,  the  number  of  fighter 
aircraft  released  to  Army  control  will  be  [.07.9]  the  maximum  practicable. 
This  force  will  remain  available  to  the  Army  for  repeated  patrols  or  combat  or  for 
maintenance  of  the  required  alert  status  until,  due  to  a  change  in  the  tactical  sit- 
uation, it  is  withdrawn  by  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer  (Commandant,  14th 
Naval  District),  and  reverts  to  Navy  control. 

c.  When  naval  forces  are  insufficient  for  long  distance  patrol  and  search 
operations,  and  Army  aircraft  are  made  available,  these  aircraft  will  be  under 
the  tactical  control  of  the  naval  commander  directing  the  search  operations. 

d.  In  the  special  instance  in  which  Army  pursuit  protection  is  requested  for 
the  protection  of  friendly  surface  ships,  the  force  assigned  for  this  mission  will 
pass  to  the  tactical  control  of  the  Navy  until  completion  of  the  mission. 

III.  JOINT  COMMUNICATIONS 

*  •   *  *  *  *  *  * 

5.  Pending  the  establishment  of  the  Aircraft  Warning  Service,  the  Army  will 
operate  an  Antiaircraft  Intelligence  Service  which,  using  wire  and  radio  broad- 
casts, will  disseminate  information  pertaining  to  the  movements  of  friendly 
and  hostile  aircraft.  It  should  be  understood  that  the  limitations  of  the  AAAIS 
are  such  that  the  interval  between  receipt  of  a  warning  and  the  air  attack  will 
in  most  cases  be  very  short.  Radio  broadcasts  from  the  AAAIS  will  be  trans- 
mitted on  900  kilocycles.  All  information  of  the  presence  or  move-  [980] 
ments  of  hostile  aircraft  offshore  from  Oahu  which  is  secured  through  Navy 
channels  will  be  transmitted  promptly  to  the  Command  Post  of  the  Provisional 
Antiaircraft  Brigade. 

6.  Upon  establishment  of  the  Aircraft  Warning  Service,  provision  will  be 
made  for  transmission  of  infonnation  on  the  location  of  distant  hostile  and 
friendly  aircraft.  Special  wire  or  radio  circuits  will  be  made  available  for 
the  use  of  Navy  liaison  officers,  so  that  they  may  make  their  own  evaluation 
of  available  information  and  transmit  them  to  their  respective  organizations. 
Information  relating  to  the  pesence  or  movements  of  hostile  aircraft  offshore 
from  Oahu  which  is  secured  through  Navy  channels  will  be  transmitted  without 
delay  to  the  Aircraft  Warning  Service  Information  Center. 

7.  The  several  joint  communications  systems  listed  in  paragraphs  3  and  4 
above,  the  Antiaircraft  Intelligence  Service,  and  the  Aircraft  Warning  Service 
(after  establishment)  will  be  manned  and  operated  during  combat,  alert  periods, 
joint  exercises  which  involve  these  communications  systems,  and  at  such  other 
periods  as  may  be  agreed  upon  by  the  Commanding  General  Hawaiian  Department 
and  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer.  The  temi)orary  loan  of  surplus  communica- 
tion equipment  by  one  service  to  the  other  service  to  fill  shortages  in  joint  com- 
munication nets  is  encouraged  where  practicable.  Prompt  steps  will  be  taken 
by  the  service  receiving  the  borrowed  [9Si]  equipment  to  obtain  replace- 
ments for  the  borrowed  articles  through  their  own  supply  channels. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  379 

IV.     JOINT'  ANTIAIRCRAFT  MEASURES. 

S.  Arrival  and  Departure  Procedure,  Aircraft. — During  joint  exercises,  alert 
periods,  and  combat,  and  at  such  other  times  as  the  Commanding  General  Ha- 
waiian Department  and  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer  (Commandant  Fourteenth 
Naval  District)  may  agree  upon,  all  Army  and  Navy  aircraft  approaching  Oahu 
or  leaving  airfields  or  air  bases  thereon  will  conform  to  the  Arrival  and  Departure 
Procedure  prescribed  in  Inclosure  A.  This  procedure  will  not  be  modified  except 
when  a  departure  therefrom  is  essential  due  to  combat  (real  or  simulated  during 
exercises)  or  due  to  an  emergency. 

^  if  Hf  ^  *  *  * 

11.  Aircraft  Warning  Service. — The  Army  will  expedite  the  installation  and 
placing  in  operation  of  an  Aircraft  Warning  Service.  During  the  period  prior 
to  the  completion  of  the  AWS  installation,  the  Navy,  through  use  of  RADAR 
and  other  appropriate  means,  will  endeavor  to  give  such  warning  of  hosf'e 
attacks  as  may  be  practicable. 

m  *  *  *  *  *  * 

Approved  :  2  April  1941. 
[982]  (Signed)     Walter  C.  Short, 

Walter  C.  Shout, 
Lieutenant  General,  U.  S.  Army,  Commanding, 

Hawaiian  Department. 
(Signed)     C.  C.  Bloch, 
C.  C.  Bloch, 
Rear  Admiral,  U.  S.  Navy,  Commandant, 
Fourteenth  Naval  District. 


[983]  Mabch  31,  1941. 
Comdr.  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force, 

Commander  Patron  Wing  TWO,  Commanding  General 

Naval  Air  Station,  Hawaiian  Air  Force, 

Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.  Fort  Shafter,  T.  H. 

Joint  estimate  covering  Joint  Army  and  Navy  air  actiiMi  in  rhe  event  of  sudden 
hostile  action  against  Oahu  or  Fleet  Units  in  the  Hawaiian  area. 

I.  Summary  of  the  Situation. 

(a)  Relations  between  the  United  States  and  Orange  are  strained,  uncertain 
and  varying. 

(b)  In  the  past  Orange  has  never  preceded  hostile  actions  by  a  declaration  of 
war. 

(c)  A  successful,  sudden  raid,  against  our  ships  and  Naval  installations  on 
Oahu  might  prevent  effective  offensive  action  by  our  forces  in  the  Western  Pacific 
for  a  long  period. 

(d)  A  strong  part  of  our  fleet  is  now  constantly  at  sea  in  the  operating  areas 
organized  to  take  prompt  offensive  action  against  any  surface  or  submarine  force 
which  initiates  hostile  action. 

(e)  It  appears  possible  that  Orange  submarines  and/or  an  Orange  fast  raiding 
force  might  [984]  arrive  in  Hawaiian  waters  with  no  prior  warning  from 
our  intelligence  service. 

II.  Survey  of  opposing  Strengths. 

(a)  Orange  might  send  into  this  area  one  or  more  submarines  and/or  one  or 
more  fast  raiding  forces  composed  of  carriers  supported  by  fast  crui.sers.  For 
such  action  she  is  known  to  have  eight  carriers,  seven  of  which  are  reported  to  be 
capable  of  25  knots  or  over  and  four  of  which  are  rated  at  30  knots  or  better. 
Two  of  the  carriers  are  converted  capital  ships,  armoured  and  armed  with  10-8" 
guns  each  and  reported  to  have  heavy  AA  batteries.  Two  others  are  small  (7000 
treaty  tons)  and  limited  to  25  knots.  Exact  information  on  numbers  and  char- 
acteristics of  the  aircraft  carried  by  these  ships  is  not  available.  However  the 
best  estimate  at  present  available  is  that  the  small  carriers  can  accommodate  from 
20  to  30  planes  and  the  large  ones  about  GO.  Probably  the  best  assumption  is  that 
carrier  complements  are  normally  about  equally  divided  between  fighter  and 
bomber  types.    Lacking  any         [985]         information  as  to  range  and  armament 


380       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

of  planes  we  must  assume  that  they  are  at  least  the  equal  of  our  similar  types 
There  probably  exist  at  least  12  eight  iuch  gun  and  at  least  12  six  inch  gun  fast 
modern  cruisers  which  would  be  suitable  supports.  Jane's  Fighting  Ships  (1939) 
shows  over  forty  submarines  which  are  easily  capable  of  projection  into  this 
area.  An  Orange  surface  raiding  force  would  be  far  removed  from  their  base  and 
would  almost  surely  be  inferior  in  gun  power  to  our  surface  forces  operating  at 
sea  in  the  Hawaiian  area. 

(b)  The  most  difficult  situation  for  us  to  meet  would  be  when  several  of  the 
above  elements  were  present  and  closely  coordinated  their  actions.  The  shore- 
based  air  force  available  to  us  in  a  constantly  varying  quantity  which  is  being 
periodically  augmented  by  reinforcements  from  the  mainland  and  which  also 
varies  as  fleet  units  are  shifted.  Under  existing  conditions  about  one-half  of 
the  planes  present  can  be  maintained  in  a  condition  of  material  [986] 
readiness  for  flight.  The  aircraft  at  present  available  in  Hawaii  are  inadequate 
to  maintain,  for  any  extended  period,  from  bases  on  Oahu,  a  patrol  extensive 
enough  to  insure  that  an  air  attack  from  an  Orange  carrier  cannot  arrive  over 
Oahu  as  a  complete  surprise.  The  projected  outlying  bases  are  not  yet  in  condi- 
tion to  support  substained  operations.  Patrol  planes  are  of  particular  value  for 
long  range  scouting  at  sea  and  are  the  type  now  available  in  this  area  best  suited 
for  this  work.  If  present  plans  are  used  to  bomb  well  defended  ship  objectives  the 
number  available  for  future  use  will  probably  be  seriously  depleted.  In  view 
of  the  continuing  need  for  long  range  overseas  scouting  in  this  area  the  missions 
of  those  planes  for  operations  as  contemplated  in  this  estimate  should  be 
scouting.  Certain  aircraft  of  the  Utility  Wing,  although  not  designed  for 
planes.  Other  types  of  aircraft,  in  general,  [987]  can  perform  functions 
that  accord  with  their  type. 
III.  Possible  enemy  action. 

(a)  A  declaration  of  war  might  be  preceded  by : 

1.  A  surprise  submarine  attack  on  ships  in  the  operating  area. 

2.  A  surprise  attack  on  OAHU  including  ships  and  installations  in  Pearl 
Harbor. 

3.  A  combination  of  these  two. 

(b)  It  appears  that  the  most  likely  and  dangerous  form  of  attack  on  OAHU 
would  be  an  air  attack.  It  is  believed  that  at  present  such  an  attack  would  most 
likely  be  launched  from  one  or  more  carriers  which  would  probably  approach 
inside  of  three  hundred  miles. 

(c)  A  single  attack  might  or  might  not  indicate  the  presence  of  more  sub- 
marines or  more  planes  awaiting  to  attack  after  defending  aircraft  have  been 
drawn  away  by  the  original  thrust. 

(d)  Any  single  submarine  attack  might  indicate  the  presence  of  a  consider- 
able undiscovered  surface  force  probably  composed  of  fast  ships  accompanied 
by  a  carrier. 

[988]  (e)  In  a  dawn  air  attack  there  is  a  high  probability  that  it  could  be 
delivered  as  a  complete  surprise  in  spite  of  any  patrols  we  might  be  using  and  that 
it  might  find  us  in  a  condition  of  readiness  under  which  pursuit  would  be  slow  to 
start,  also  it  might  be  successful  as  a  diversion  to  draw  attention  away  from  a 
second  attacking  force.  The  major  disadvantage  would  be  that  we  could  have 
all  day  to  find  and  attack  the  carrier.  A  dusk  attack  would  have  the  advantage 
that  the  carrier  could  use  the  night  for  escape  and  might  not  be  located  the  next 
day  near  enough  for  us  to  make  a  successful  air  attack.  The  disadvantage  would 
be  that  it  would  spend  the  day  of  the  attack  approaching  the  islands  and  might 
be  observed.  Under  the  existing  conditions  this  might  not  be  a  serious  disad- 
vantage for  until  an  overt  act  has  been  committed  we  probably  will  take  no 
olfensive  action  and  the  only  thing  that  would  be  lost  would  be  complete  sur- 
prise. Midday  attacks  have  all  the  disadvantages  and  none  of  the  advantages 
of  the  above.  After  hostilities  [989]  have  commenced,  a  night  attack 
would  offer  certain  advantages  but  as  an  initial  crippling  blow  a  dawn  or  dusk 
attack  would  probably  be  no  more  hazardous  and  would  have  a  better  chance  for 
accomplishing  a  large  success.  Submarine  attacks  would  be  coordinated  with 
any  air  attack. 
IV.  Action  open  to  us. 

(a)  Run  daily  patrols  as  far  as  possible  to  seaward  through  360  degrees  to 
reduce  the  probabilities  of  surface  or  air  surprise.  This  would  be  desirable  but 
can  only  be  effectively  maintained  with  present  personnel  and  material  for  a 
very  short  period  and  as  a  practicable  measure  cannot,  therefore,  be  undertaken 
unless  other  intelligence  indicates  that  a  surface  raid  is  probable  within  rather 
narrow  time  limits. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  381 

(b)  In  the  event  of  any  form  of  surprise  attack  either  on  ships  in  the  oper- 
ating areas  or  on  the  islands  : 

1.  Immediate  search  of  all  sea  areas  within  reach  to  determine  the  location  of 
hostile  surface  craft  and  whether  or  not  more  [990]  than  one  group  is 
present. 

2.  Immediate  arming  and  preparation  of  the  maximum  possible  bombing  force 
and  its  dispatch  for  attack  when  information  is  available. 

(c)  In  the  event  of  an  air  attack  on  OAHU,  in  addition  to  (b)  above: 

1.  The  immediate  dispatch  of  all  aircraft  suitable  for  aerial  combat  to  inter- 
cept the  attackers. 

\_991]  2.  The  prompt  identification  of  the  attackers  as  either  carrier  or  long 
range  shore  based  aircraft. 

3.  The  prompt  dispatch  of  fast  aircraft  to  follow  carrier  type  raiders  back  to 
their  carrier. 

(d)  In  the  event  of  a  submarine  attack  on  ships  in  the  operating  area  in  addi- 
tion to  (b)  above: 

1.  Hold  pursuit  and  fighter  aircraft  in  condition  of  immediate  readiness  to 
counter  a  possible  air  raid  until  search  proves  that  none  is  imminent. 

2.  Dispatch'  armed  shore  based  fleet  aircraft  to  relieve  planes  in  the  air  over  the 
attack  area. 

3.  Establish  a  station  patrol  by  patrol  planes  two  hundred  twenty  mile  radius 
from  scene  of  attack  at  one  hour  before  daylight  of  next  succeeding  daylight 
period. 

(e)  None  of  the  above  actions  can  be  initiated  by  our  forces  until  an  attack  is 
known  to  be  imminent  or  has  occurred.  On  the  other  hand,  when  an  attack 
develops  time  will  probably  be  vital  and  our  actions  must  start  with  a  minimum 
of  delay.  It  therefore  appears  that  task  forces  should  be  organized  now,  mis- 
sions assigned,  conditions  of  readi  [992]  ness  defined  and  detailed  plans 
prepared  so  that  coordinated  immediate  action  can  be  taken  promptly  by  all 
elements  when  one  of  the  visualized  emergencies  arises.  To  provide  most  ef- 
fectively for  the  necessary  immediate  action,  the  following  joint  task  units  will 
be  required: 

1.  Search  Unit. 

2.  Attack  Unit. 

3.  Air  Combat  Unit. 

Carrier  scouts,  army  reconnaissance  and  patrol  planes  can  be  employed  with 
very  widely  varying  effectiveness,  either  for  search  or  attack.  Under  varying 
conditions  some  shifts  of  units  between  the  search  and  attack  groups  may  be 
desirable.  Also,  the  accomplishment  of  these  two  tasks  must  be  closely  coordi- 
nated and  therefore  these  two  groups  should  be  controlled  by  the  same  task  group 
commander.  ^ 

V.  Decisions. 

1.  This  force  will  locate  and  attack  forces  initiating  hostile  actions  against 
OAHU  or  fleet  units  in  order  to  prevent  or  minimize  damage  to  our  forces  from 
a  surprise  attack  and  to  obtain  information  upon  which  to  base  coordinated 
retaliatory  measures. 

2.  Subsidiary  decisions. — In  order  to  be  in  all  1993]  prepared  to  promptly 
execute  the  above  decision  : 

(a)  Establish  a  task  organization  as  follows  by  the  issue  of  a  joint  air  operation 
plan: 

1.  Search  and  Attack  Cfroup  (Commander  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force  [Com- 
mander Patrol  Wing  TWO) ). 

The  following  units  in  accordance  with  current  conditions  of  readiness : 
Patrol  squadrons. 
Shore-based  VO-VS  units. 
Shore-based  carrier  VB  and  VT  squadrons. 

Shore-based  carrier  VS  planes  not  assigned  to  the  air  combat  group. 
Shore-based  Marine  VS  and  VB  squadrons. 
Army  bombardment  squadrons. 
Army  reconnaissance  squadrons. 
Navy  Utility  Squadrons. 

2.  Air  Combat  Group  (Commander  Hawaiian  Air  Force). 

The  following  units  in  accordance  with  current  conditions  of  readiness : 
Army  pursuit  squadrons. 
Shore-based  carrier  VP  squadrons. 
Shore-based  Marine  VF  squadrons. 

One  division  of  shore-based  carrier         [994]        VS  planes.     (Primarily  for 
trailing  aircraft.) 


382       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(b)  Assign  missions  to  the  above  groups  as  follows  : 

[994a]  1.  Seach  and  Attack  Group.— Liocate,  report  and  track  all  hostile 
surface  units  in  position  to  take  or  threaten  hostile  action.  Destroy  hostile  ships 
by  air  attack.  Priority  of  targets:  (1)  carriers  (2)  large  supporting  ships.  If 
choice  of  location  is  presented  priority  should  be  given  to:  (1)  carrier  involved 
in  attack  (2)  vessels  beyond  reach  of  our  surface  vessel  interception. 

2.  Air  Comhat  Group. — Intercept  and  destroy  hostile  aircraft.  Identify  and 
report  type  of  attacking  aircraft.  Trail  attacking  carrier  tyi^e  planes  to  carrier 
and  report  location  to  commander  search  and  attack  group.  As  a  secondary 
mission  support  search  and  attack  group  upon  request. 

(c)  Provide  a  means  for  quickly  starting  all  required  action  under  this  plan 
when : 

(a)  An  air  attack  occurs  on  OAHU. 

(b)  Information  is  received  from  any  source  that  indicates  an  attack 
is  probable. 

(c)  Information  is  received  that  an  attack  has  been  made  on  fleet  units. 
[99Jth]         (d)  Define  conditions  of  readiness  for  use  with  this  plan  as  follows : 

Conditions  of  readiness  shall  be  prescribed  by  a  combination  of  a  letter  and  num- 
ber from  the  tables  below.  The  letter  indicating  the  part  of  a  unit  in  a  condition 
of  material  readiness  for  its  assigned  task  and  the  number  indicating  the  degree 
of  readiness  prescribed  for  that  part. 

MATERIAL   READINESS 

A.  All  assigned  operating  aircraft  available  and  ready  for  a  task. 

B.  One-half  of  all  aircraft  of  each  functional  type  available  and  ready  for 
a  task. 

[99.5]  C.  Approximately  one  quarter  of  all  aircraft  of  each  functional  type 
available  and  ready  for  a  task. 

D.  Approximately  one-eighth  of  all  aircraft  of  each  functional  type  available 
and  ready  for  a  task. 

E.  All  aircraft  conducting  routine  operations,  none  ready  for  the  purposes 
of  this  plan. 

DEGBia:   OF   READINESS 

1.  For  pursuit  and  VF  types — four  minutes.  Types  other  than  fighters — fifteen 
minutes. 

2.  All  types — 30  minutes. 

3.  All  types — one  hour. 

4.  All  types — two  hours. 

5.  All  types — four  hours. 

The  armament  and  fuel  load  for  each  type  under  the  above  conditions  of  readi- 
ness are  dependent  upn  the  tasks  assigned  in  contributory  plans  and  orders  and 
will  be  prescribed  therein. 

[996]  (e)  Establish  a  procedure  whereby  the  conditions  of  readiness  to  be 

maintained  by  each  unit  is  at  all  times  prescribed  by  the  Senior  oflicers  present  of 
the  Army  and  Navy  as  a  result  of  all  information  currently  available  to  them. 
In  using  the  above  conditions  it  should  be  noted  that:  CONDITION  A-1  i-e- 
quires  a  pi-eparation  period  of  reduced  operations  and  can  be  maintained  for 
only  a  short  time  as  it  is  an  all  hands  condition.  CONDITIONS  B-1  and  B-2 
require  watch  and  watch  for  all  personnel  and  pei'sonnel  fitness  for  air  action 
will  decrease  rapidly  if  they  are  maintained  too  long.  Any  condition  1,  2,  or 
3  will  curtail  essential  expansion  training  work.  CONDITIONS  C,  or  D,  4  or 
5  can  be  maintained  without  unduly  curtailing  normal  training  work. 

*  *  *  *  ie  ^n  m 

(Signed)     F.    L.    Martin, 
F.   L.   Martin, 
Major  General,   U.  S.  Army. 
Commanding  Hawaiian  Air  Force. 
(Signed)     P.  N.  L.  Bellinger, 
P.  N.  L.  Bellinger, 

Rear  Admiral,   U.   S.  Navy, 

Co^mmander  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force, 
(Commander  Patrol  Wing  TWO) 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  383 

[997]  Standing  Operating  Pbocedure 

hawaiian   department 

5  Novt:mber  1941. 
Section  I — General 

4c  4c  *  *  H:  4:  H! 

10.  Antiaircraft  Defense. — a.  Antiaircraft  defense  is  a  responsibility  of  every 
unit. 

it  Hf  *  *  *  *  * 

d.  All  unit  commanders  will  be  held  responsible  for  the  following: 

(1)  Maintenance  of  air  guards  to  give  timely  warning  of  the  approach  of 

hostile  aviation. 

*  *  *  *  *.  if  ^ 

(3)  Reduction  of  vulnerability  to  air  attack  and  observation  by  dispersion 

of  personnel  and  matleriel  when  in  bivouac  or  in  position  and  by  increased 

speed  during  movement. 

*  *  *  *     .  *  0  0 

Section  II — Alerts 

13.  All  defense  measures  are  classified  under  one  of  the  three  (3)  Alerts 
as  indicated  below.  Operations  under  any  Alert  will  be  initiated  by  a  Depart- 
ment order,  except  in  case  of  a  surprise  hostile  attack.  See  paragraph  15f  (8) 
below. 

14.  Alert  No.  1. — a.  This  alert  is  a  defense  against  acts  of  sabotage  and 
uprisings  within  the  islands,  with  no  threat  from  without. 

[998]  b.  At  DEPARTMENT  HEADQUARTERS,  all  General  and  Special 
Staff  Sections  will  continue  with  their  usual  duties  at  their  present  stations, 
pending  further  orders. 

c.  DEPARTMENT  TROOPS  will  carry  on  their  normal  training,  pending  in- 
structions from  this  Headquarters. 

d.  Each  INFANTRY  DIVISION  will: 

(1)  Suppress  all  civil  disorders,  including  sabotage,  in  its  assigned  sector. 

(2)  Maintain  one  (1)  infantry  battalion  with  motor  transportation  sufficient 
to  transport  it,  prepared  to  move  on  one  (1)  hour's  notice. 

(8)  Protect  the  SCHOFIELD  BARRACKS  Reservation  and  all  vital  installa- 
tions (except  those  on  garrisoned  Army  and  Navy  Reservations)  in  its  assigned 
sector,  not  protected  by  the  Territorial  Home  Guard. 

******  0 

15.  Alert  No.  2. — a.  This  alert  is  applicable  to  a  condition  more  serious  than 
Alert  No.  1.  Security  against  attacks  from  hostile  sub-surface,  surface,  and  air- 
craft, in  addition  to  defense  against  acts  of  sabotage  and  uprisings,  is  provided 

b.  At  DEPARTMENT  HEADQUARTERS,  only  the  G-2  and  G-3  Sections  will 
be  required  to  operate  on  a  24-liour  basis.  All  other  sections  of  the  General  and 
Special  Staffs  will  continue  with  their  normal  schedule. 

[999]  c.  DEPARTMENT  TROOPS  will  carry  on  their  normal  training,  pend- 
ing instructions  from  this  Headquarters. 

******  0 

(1)  Occupy  initial  seacoast  and  antiaircraft  defense  positions,  except  that 
railway  batteries  will  remain  at  FORT  KAMEHAMEHA  or  where  emplaced. 

(2)  Release  the  53d  AA  Brigade  to  the  Interceptor  Command  for  operational 
control. 

******* 
f.  THE  HAWAIIAN  AIR  FORCE  WILL : 

(1)  Maintain  aircraft  and  crews  in  condition  of  readiness  as  directed  by  this 
headquarters.     See  paragraph  17. 

(2)  Release  without  delay  all  pursuit  aircraft  to  the  Interceptor  Command. 

(3)  Prepare  aircraft  for  dispatch  to  fields  on  outlying  islands  and  ujKtn  arrival 
thereat,  disi)erse  on  fields.  ^ 

(4)  Disperse  bombers  with  crews. 

(5)  Disperse  pursuit  planes  with  crews  to  bunkers. 

79716 — 46— pt.  1 ^28 


384       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(8)   In  case  of  surprise  hostile  attack : 

(a)  Release  to  Navy  for  operational  control  all  bombers  in  condition  of 
readiness  "A."  The  bomber  [1000]  commander  will  report  to  the  Com- 
mander of  Patrol  Wing  TWO. 

(b)  Receive  all  available  shore  based  Naval  and  Marine  Corps  fighter  planes 
in  appropriate  condition  of  readiness  and  release  them  to  the  Interceptor  Com- 
mand for  operational  control. 

4:  I*:  4:  *  «  *  * 

(i)  The  DEPARTMENT  SIGNAL  OFFICER  will: 

(1)  Insure  occupation  of  all  battle  stations  by  the  Aircraft  Warning  Service 
and  then  release  it  to  the  Interceptor  Command. 

(2)  Insure  that  joint  Army-Navy  communications  are  in  readiness  for  imme- 
diate employment. 

(j)   The  INTERCEPTOR  COMMAND  will: 

Coordinate  and  control  the  operations  of  pursuit  aircraft,  antiaircraft  artillery 
(including  available  Naval  and  Marine  Corps  AA  Artillery),  the  Aircraft  Warn- 
ing Service,  and  attached  units,  and  will  provide  for  the  coordination  of  anti- 
aircraft measures  of  units  not  under  military  control,  to  include : 

(1)  Arrival  and  departure  of  all  friendly  aircraft. 

(2)  The  coordination  of  the  antiaircraft  fire  of  Naval  ships  in  PEARL  and/or 
HONOLULU  HARBORS. 

******* 

[1001]  16.  Alert  No.  3-a.  This  alert  requires  the  occupation  of  all  field  posi- 
tions by  all  units,  prepared  for  maximum  defense  of  OAHU  and  the  Army 
installations  on  outlying  islands. 

******* 

f.  The  HAWAIIAN  AIR  FORCE  will : 

(1)  Destroy  enemy  aircraft. 

(2)  Can-y  out  bombing  missions  as  directed. 

(3)  Cooperate  with  Naval  air  forces. 

(4)  On  OAHU,  defend  all  posts  garrisoned  by  air  forces  against  sabotage, 
air  and  ground  attacks. 

******* 

(8)  Disperse  bombers  with  crews. 

(9)  Disperse  pursuit  planes  with  crews  to  bunkers. 
******* 

}.  T^he  INTERCEPTOR  COMMAND  will  coordinate  and  control  the  operations 
of  pursuit  aircraft,  antiaircraft  artillery  (including  available  Naval  and  Marine 
Corps  AA  Artillery),  the  aircraft  warning  service,  and  attached  units,  and  will 
provide  for  the  coordination  of  antiaircraft  measures  of  units  not  under  military 
control  to  include : 

(1)  Arrival  and  departure  of  all  friendly  aircraft. 

(2)  The  coordination  of  the  antiaircraft  fire  of  [1002]  Naval  ships  in 
PEARL  and/or  HONOLULU  HARBORS. 

(3)  Transmission  of  appropriate  warnings  to  all  interested  agencies. 

[1003]  Section  III — Condition  of  Readiness  foe  Aieckaft 

17.  Condition  of  readiness  for  aircraft  will  be  prescribed  by  a  combination  of 
a  letter  and  a  number  as  indicated  in  paragraphs  a  and  6  below.  The  letter  in- 
dicating the  part  of  a  unit  in  a  condition  of  material  readiness  for  its  assigned 
task  and  the  number  indicating  the  degree  of  operational  readiness  prescribed 
for  that  part. 

a.  MATERIAL  READINESS. 

A.  All  assigned  operating  aircraft  available  and  ready  for  a  task. 

B.  One-half  of  all  aircraft  of  each  functional  type  available  and  ready  for  a 
task. 

C.  Approximately  one-quarter  of  all  aircraft  of  each  functional  type  available 
and  ready  for  a  task. 

D.  Approximately  one-eighth  of  all  aircraft  of  each  functional  type  available 
and  ready  for  a  task. 

E.  All  aircraft  conducting  routine  operations,  none  ready  for  the  purposes  of 
this  plan. 

ft.  DEGREE  OF  OPERATIONAL  READINESS. 

All  times  listed  in  this  table  are  the  maximums  allowed  for  the  first  plane  of 
a  unit  to  be  in  the  air  armed  and  prepared  to  carry  out  the  assigned  task. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  385 

1.  For  pursuit  and  VF  types :  Four  minutes.    Types  other  tlian  fighters  :  Fifteen 
minutes. 

[IOO4]         2.  All  types:  30  minutes. 

3.  All  types :  One  hour. 

4.  A4I  types :  Two  hours. 

5.  All  types :  Four  hours.  ' 


[1005]  Operations  Ordeks — Hawaiian  Department 

PABT  VI — ^FIELD  OKDEE  NUMBER  1  NS    (NAVAL  SECURITY) 

FiBiD  Orders!  Headquarters  Hawaiian  Department, 

No.—     Ins—/  Fort  Shafer,  T.  H. 

******* 

(2)  In  the  current  unsettled  international  situation,  it  is  assumed  that  it  is 
possible  that  a  declaration  of  war  upon  the  United  States  may  be  preceded  by  a 
surprise  raid  or  attack  upon  the  Pearl  Harbor  Naval  Base  and  ships  of  the 
Pacific  Fleet  by  hostile  aircraft,  submarines,  or  surface  ships  with  a  view  to  the 
destruction  or  damaging  of  naval  installations,  ships,  and  facilities.  Such  a 
raid  or  attack  may  be  accompanied  by  acts  of  sabotage  committed  by  hostile 
sympathizers. 

ft.  The  Pacific  Fleet  and  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District,  while  continuing  nor- 
mal training  and  operations,  are  taking  certain  security  measures,  which  include  : 

(1)  By  the  Pacific  Fleet : 

(a)  Daily  air  patrols  of  areas  in  which  elements  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  are 
operating. 

(b)  The  organization  of  a  striking  force  of  cruisers  and  destroyers  to 
cooperate  with  Army  and  Navy  aviation  in  the  attack  on  hostile  surface  ships. 

(c)  The  organization  of  a  destroyer  attack  unit  [1006]  to  locate 
and  destroy  hostile  submarines. 

(d)  The  organization  of  four  air  defense  groups  for  the  control  and  dis- 
tribution of  the  antiaircraft  fire  of  all  ships  anchoreaJ  in  Pearl  Harbor. 

(2)  By  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Force  (Fourteenth  Naval  District  and  attached 
units)  : 

(a)  Establishment  of  an  inshore  patrol  consisting  of  a  destroyer  patrol 
at  the  (jntrance  to  the  Pearl  Harbor  channel,  a  boom  patrol,  a  harbor  patrol, 
and  daily  mine  sweeping  operations. 

(b)  The  organization  of  an  air  striking  force  consisting  of  Patrol  Wing 
TWO,  attached  Fleet  aircraft,  and  attached  aircraft  from  the  18th  Bombard- 
ment Wing  to  search  for  and  attack  hostile  surface  ships. 

2.  The  Hawaiian  Department,  supported  by  Naval  Units  placed  under  the  tacti- 
cal control  of  the  Army,  will  operate  to  defend  OAHU  from  attacks  by  hostile 
aircraft  and  hostile  naval  vessels,  will  take  prevautionary  measures  to  prevent 
acts  of  sabotage  by  hostile  sympathizers,  and  will  support  naval  forces  conducting 
aerial  attacks  on  hostile  naval  vessels. 

*  «  *  *  «  «  * 

c.  The  Hawaiian  Air  Force,  in  cooperation  with  fieet  aircraft,  will  defend 
OAHU  against  attacks  by  aircraft,  [lOOl]  will  attack  hostile  Naval 

vessels,  and  in  furtherance  thereof,  will  conduct  operations  as  follows: 

(1)  Offensive  Action. — Conduct  air  operations  against  hostile  naval  vessels. 
Bombardment  and  reconnaissance  aircraft  participating  in  joint  air  operations 
will  be  placed  under  the  tactical  control  of  the  Navy. 

******* 

(3)  Reconnaissance. — Conduct  reconnaissance  essential  to  the  combat  efficiency 
of  the  Air  Force  and  to  supplement,  where  practicable,  that  of  naval  air  forces 
in  securing  information  of  hostile  fleet  movements. 

•  '  *  *  *  *  *  * 

(5)  Conditions  of  Readiness. — Aircraft  and  crews  thereof  will  be  maintained 
in  the  condition  of  readiness  directed  by  this  headquarters. 

(6)  Hostile  Air  Attack. — Air  operations  directed  above  will  be  instituted  with- 
out further  orders  from  this  headquarters  by  all  aircraft  maintained  in  condi- 
tion of  readiness  therefor  upon  receipt  of  information  of  an  air  attack  upon 
OAHU  or  an  attack  upon  fleet  units  in  Hawaiian  waters.  All  other  aircraft  and 
crews  thereof  will  be  alerted  and  this  headquarters  advised  of  action  taken. 

******* 


386        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(2)  Hostile  surface  ships  and  aircraft  will  not  be  taken  under  fire  except  under 
the  following  conditions  • 

[1008]  (a)  After  hostile  offensive  action,  such  as  the  use  of  bombs,  tor- 
pedoes, mines  and  other  ammunition,  has  been  observed. 

(b)  After  receipt  of  a  verified  report  of  a  hostile  attack. 

(c)  Upon  orders  from  this  headquarters. 

*  *  *  *  *  *  * 

By  command  of  Lieutenant  General  SHORT ; 

(S)   Philip  Hayes, 
Philip  Hayes, 
Colonel,  General  Staff  Corps, 

Chief  of  Staff. 


[1009]         Cincpac  File  No. 
A2-11/FF12/ 
A4-3QL/(13) 
Serial  01646 


United  States  Pacific  Fleet, 
U.  S.  S.  "Pennsylvania."  Flagship, 
Pearl  Harhor,  T.  H.,  October  I4,  194I. 


(b)  That  a  declaration  of  war  may  be  preceded  by : 

(1)  a  surprise  attack  on  ships  in  Pear  Harbor, 

(2)  a  surprise  submarine  attack  on  ships  in  operating  area, 

(3)  a  combination  of  these  two. 
******* 

(2)   Air  Patrols: 

(a)  Daily  search  of  operating  areas  as  directed  by  Aircraft,  Scouting  Force. 
•  ••**•• 

(G)   DEFENSE  AGAINST  AIR  ATTACK: 

(1)  The  principal  Army  anti-aircraft  gun  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor  consists 
of  several  three-inch  mobile  batteries  which  are  to  be  located  on  the  circum- 
ference of  a  circle  of  an  approximate  radius  of  five  thousand  yards  with  center 
in  the  middle  of  Ford  Island.  The  Army,  assisted  by  such  units  of  the  Marine 
Defense  Battalions  as  may  be  available,  will  man  these  stations.  Machine  guns 
are  located  both  [1010]  inside  and  outside  the  circle  of  three-inch  gun 
positions. 

(2)  In  the  event  of  a  hostile  air  attack,  any  part  of  the  Fleet  in  Pearl  Harbor 
plus  all  Fleet  aviation  shore-based  on  Oahu,  will  augment  the  local  air  defense. 

(3)  Enclosure  (A)  defines  the  air  defense  sectors  in  Pearl  Harbor  and  is  the 
basis  for  the  distribution  of  ships  within  the  harbor  for  anti-aircraft  fire.  Hos- 
tile planes  attacking  in  a  sector  shall  be  considered  as  the  primary  targets  for 
ships  in  that  sector.  However,  ships  in  other  sectors  may  augment  fire  of  any 
other  sector  at  the  discretion  of  the  Sector  Commander. 

(4)  The  Senior  Officer  Embarked  in  Pearl  Harbor  (exclusive  of  Commander- 
in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet)  shall  ensure  that  ships  are  disposed  at  berths 
so  that  they  may  develop  the  maximum  anti-aircraft  gunfire  in  each  sector 
commensurate  with  the  total  number  of  ships  of  all  types  in  port.  He  is 
authorized  to  depart  from  the  normal  berthing  plan  for  this  purpose.  Battle- 
ships, carriers,  and  cruisers  shall  normally  be  moored  singly  insofar  as  available 
berths  permit. 

(5)  The  Senior  Officer  Present  in  each  sector  prescribed  in  sub-paragraph 
(G)  (3)  above,  is  the  Sector  Commander,  and  responsible  for  the  fire  in  his 
own  sector. 

(6)  The  Commandant  Fourteenth  Naval  District  is  the  Naval  Base  Defense 
Officer  (N.  B.  D.  O.) .    As  such  he  shall : 

[1011]  (a)   Exercise  with   the  Army  joint   supervisory   control   over   the 

defense  against  air  attack. 

(b)  Arrange  with  the  Army  to  have  their  anti-aircraft  guns  emplaced. 
**•**•• 

Condition  I. — General  Quarters  in  all  ships.  Condition  of  aircraft  as  pre- 
scribed by  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer. 

Condition  II. — One-half  of  anti-aircraft  battery  of  all  ships  in  each  sector 
manned  and  ready.  Condition  of  aircraft  as  prescribed  by  Naval  Base  Defense 
Officer. 

Condition  III. — Anti-aircraft  battery  (guns  which  bear  in  assigned  sector)  of 
at  least  one  ship  in  each  sector  manned  and  ready.     (Minimum  of  four  guns 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  387 

required  for  each  sector).     Condition  of  aircraft  as  prescribed  by  Naval  Base 
Defense  Officer. 

******* 

[1013]  Mr.  Mitchell.  We  have  a  study  dated  August  20,  1941, 
five  months  before  this  attack  made  by  General  Martin  of  the  Air 
Corps  and  Admiral  Bellinger  of  the  Naval  Corps,  which  is  a  most 
voluminous  document. 

I  think  the  committee  have  had  copies  of  it,  and  have  had  it  for  some 
time.     I  would  like  to  offer  that  as  Exhibit  13. 

The  Chairman.  Without  objection,  it  is  so  ordered. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  would  like  to  have  the  body  of  that  report  trans- 
scribed  into  the  record,  except  the  diagrams.     It  is  only  a  few  pages. 

The  Chairman.  That  will  be  done.  The  general  counsel  will  mark 
the  part  to  be  copied  so  the  reporter  will  understand. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  13"  and  fol- 
lows herewith:) 

[1013]  Headquarters  Hawaiian  Air  Force, 

Office  of  the  Aib  Force  Commander  (T-3), 

Hickam  Field,  T.  H.,  20  August  W,!. 
In  reply  refer  to : 

Subject :  Study  of  the  Air  Situation  in  Hawaii. 
To :  Commanding  General,  Army  Air  Forces,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Thru:  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department,  Fort  Shatter,  T.  H. 

1.  In  compliance  with  copy  of  corrected  memorandum  for  the  Commanding 
General,  Army  Air  Forces,  OCS  17234-25,  from  the  Secretary,  General  Staff, 
dated  July  17,  1941,  "that  a  study  be  made  of  the  air  situation  in  Hawaii", 
there  is  attached  for  consideration  of  the  War  Department  a  plan  for  the  em- 
ployment of  long-range  bombardment  aviation  in  the  defense  of  Oahu.  This 
plan  clearly  presents  the  air  defense  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  Attention  is  called 
to  the  recommendations  therein. 

2.  No  increase  in  personnel  of  the  permanent  air  garrison  of  Hawaii  is  neces- 
sary to  bring  the  actual  heavy  bombardment  strength  to  one  group.  Under 
provisions  of  Table  of  Basic  Allowances  No.  1,  War  Department,  dated  Decem- 
ber 1,  1940,  fourteen  additional  heavy  bombardment  airplanes  will  be  required 
to  provide  a  total  strength  of  one  group  of  thirty-five  B-17D  type  airplanes. 
This  force  is  so  small  for  the  mission  to  be  performed  that  it  is  considered  en- 
tirely inadequate. 

3.  When  the  RDF  installation  is  completed  and  the  15th  [101^]  Pur- 
suit Group  has  its  full  complement  of  80  fighters  no  further  increase  for  pursuit 
aviation  is  considered  necessary.  Provision  should  be  made  to  maintain  at  all 
times  the  14th  Pursuit  Wing  at  full  combat  strength  of  80  fighters  and  105  intei-- 
ceptors.  It  is  contemplated  that  pursuit  aviation  will  perform  its  normal  mis- 
sion in  the  defense  of  these  islands  by  intercepting  and  destroying  enemy  aircraft 
in  the  vicinity  of  or  over  the  island  of  Oahu.  This  is  considered  an  adequate 
force  to  i)erform  the  pursuit  mission  in  the  defense  of  these  islands. 

4.  A  combination  medium  bombardment-torpedo  force  is  considered  highly 
desirable  in  order  that  attack  can  be  made  under  conditions  of  low  visibility 
when  horizontal  bombing  is  not  feasible  and  is  therefore  recommended  as  a 
component  part  of  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force.  (See  Study  No.  2  in  attached 
plan.) 

5.  On  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  possibility  of  enemy  surface  craft  reach- 
ing the  shores  of  Oahu,  one  squadron  of  dive  bombers  is  considered  necessary 
to  assist  the  ground  forces  in  withstanding  an  invasion  effort  by  concentrating 
on  denying  the  enemy  any  opportunity  to  establish  beach  heads.  The  quick  and 
accurate  striking  power  of  dive  bombers  makes  them  particularly  effective  for 
close-in  support  on  the  ground  forces  and  this  premise  is  borne  out  by  informa- 
tion contained  in  intelligence  reports  received  on  the  war  in  Europe.  Dive 
bombers  would  also  be  employed  against  hostile  surface  craft  and  submarines 
[1015]         which  had  penetrated  close  to  the  shores  of  Oahu. 

6.  With  the  addition  of  the  force  of  medium  boml)ardment- torpedo  airplanes 
and  one  squadron  of  dive  bombers  no  further  increase  in  the  number  of  light 
bombardment  airplanes  is  required. 

7.  One  additional  observation  squadron  should  be  assigned  the  Hawaiian 
Air    Force    to    supplement    the    new    ground    organization    of    the    Hawaiian 


388       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Department  which  is  being  re-organized  into  two  triangular  divisions.  The 
ground  forces  of  the  Hawaiian  Department  should  be  provided  with  three 
observation  squadrons.  At  present  there  is  assigned  one  observation  squadron 
(C  &  D)  and  one  light  bombardment  squadron  which  could  be  diverted  to  ob- 
servation duty. 

8.  To  increase  the  number  of  aircraft  in  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force  as  outlined 
in  this  letter  and  in  the  attached  pMn  it  is  estimated  that  approximately  3,871 
additional  men  should  be  assigned.  A  minimum  of  216  combat  crews  and  180 
maintenance  crews  are  necessary  to  operate  180  B-17D  type  airplanes.  SuflS- 
cient  personnel  are  now  present  in  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force  to  man  70  combat 
crews  and  70  maintenance  crews  for  heavy  bombardment  aircraft.  Additional 
personnel  equal  to  the  difference  above  should  be  assigned  to  the  Hawaiian  Air 
Force  to  meet  these  requirements.  Further  personnel  increases  should  be  made 
to  activate  two  medium  combination  bombardment-torpedo  squadrons,  one  dive 
bomber  [1016]  squadron,  one  additional  observation  squadron  and  five 
air  base  squadrons.  The  five  air  base  squadrons  will  be  used  to  maintain  the 
Outlying  fields  tabulated  below  which  will  house  heavy  bombardment  squadrons 
as  indicated.  The  two  Air  Base  Groups  (S)  are  to  be  used  to  maintain  Bellows 
Field  and  the  site  selected  for  the  station  of  the  15th  Pursuit  Group. 

Barking    Sands 2 

Morse  Field 2 

Hilo 1 

Lanai 1 

Parker    Ranch 1 

9.  The  dive  bomber  squadron  and  three  observation  squadrons  with  allied 
services  will  become,  in  effect,  air  support  command  and  will  be  stationed  at 
Bellows  Field. 

10.  Tables  of  Organization  prescribe  five  enlisted  men  for  each  heavy  bombard- 
ment combat  crew.  For  continuous  daily  operation  a  minimum  of  fourteen  men 
will  be  necessary  for  each  heavy  maintenance  crew.  Using  these  figures  as  a 
basis,  personnel  requirements  have  been  computed  as  shown  in  Inclosure  No.  2. 

11.  There  is  at  present  available,  under  construction  and  awaiting  approval 
of  the  War  Department,  housing  for  12,288  enlisted  men.  This  study  will  require 
housing  for  a  total  of  12,813  men  to  provide  for  all  Air  Corps  and  associated 
personnel.  [^0/7]  This  leaves  but  525  men  to  be  cared  for  in  a  future 
project  which  will  be  submitted  when  this  study  has  been  approved.  For 
detailed  analysis  of  housing  see  Inclosure  No.  3. 

12.  It  is  my  conviction  that  by  increasing  the  pi-esent  strength  of  the  Hawaiian 
Air  Force  by  one  observation  squadron,  a  minimum  of  one  dive  bomber  squadron, 
two  squadrons  of  combination  medium  bombardment-torpedo  airplanes  and  by 
increasing  the  strength  of  long-range  bombardment  to  a  total  of  180  airplanes 
a  positive  defense  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  can  be  assured  without  any  assistance 
whatever  from  the  naval  forces  giving  the  Navy  complete  freedom  of  action. 

F.  Li.  Mabtin, 
Major  General,  V.  S.  Army, 

CoTrwianding. 

3  Incls: 

Incl  #1 — Plan  for  the  Employment  of  Long-Range  Bombardment  Aviation 

in  the  Defense  of  Oahu.     (In  triplicate.) 
Incl  #2 — Personnel  Requirements  Recapitulation.     (In  triplicate.) 
Incl  #3 — Air  Force  Housing  Facilities.     (In  triplicate.) 

[1018]         Plan    fob    the    Employment    of    Bombardment    Aviation    in    the 

Defense  of  Oahu 

i.  genixal 

1.  The  key  to  this  plan  is  found  in  the  provision  for  first,  a  complete  and 
thorough  search  of  the  Hawaiian  area  daily  during  daylight ;  secondly,  an  attack 
force  available  on  call  to  hit  a  known  objective  located  as  a  result  of  the  search 
and  thirdly,  if  the  objective  is  a  carrier,  to  hit  it  the  day  before  it  could  steam 
to  a  position  offshore  of  Oahu  where  it  could  launch  its  planes  for  an  attack. 

2.  The  most  difficult  problem  presents  itself  when  nt  is  necessary  to  search 
through  360°.  This  might  occur  daily  and  it  is  the  only  one  considered  in  this 
study.  It  is  possible,  of  course,  that  intelligence  obtained  from  advanced  naval 
bases  and  ships  at  sea  might  implement  this  plan  and  reduce  the  search  area 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


389 


to  270°,  180°  or  even  90°.     In  this  case,  the  striking  force  would  be  augmented 
by  those  planes  not  required  for  search. 

3.  All  computations  in  connection  with  air  operations  under  this  plan  are  based 
on  the  B-lTD  airplane.  This  type  of  airplane  is  considered  available  for  either 
a  search  mission  or  an  attack  mission  and  consequently  no  reference  is  made  to 
reconnaissance  or  bombardment  aviation  as  such  but  to  the  search  or  the  attack 
forces.  The  combat  crew  training  of  both  will  be  identical  and  search  and 
attack  missions  will  [1019]  be  rotated  for  the  purpose  of  resting  crews 
and  maintaining  aircraft. 

n.    THE   PBOBI^M 

1.  To  analyze  the  mission  of  heavy  bombardment  aviation  in  the  defense  of 
Oahu  with  a  view  to  promulgating  a  plan  in  accordance  therewith. 


III.  FACTS  BEARING  ON  THE  CASE 

1.  Facts: 

a.  The  Army  mission  is  :  "To  defend  the  Naval  Base  of  Oahu." 

b.  The  bombardment  mission  is  : 

(1)  When  Navy  reconnaissance  is  adequate: 

To  attack  and  destroy  enemy  surface  craft  within  radius  of  action. 

(2)  When  Navy   is  absent   or   not   present  with   equipment   in  Numbers   of 
Quality: 

To  search  for,  attack  and  destroy  enemy  surface  craft  within  radius  of 
action. 


[1020] 


G.  Capabilities  *  of  B-17D  type  airplanes  are  : 


Gal  Fuel 
used 

Miles 
flown 

(1)  Search  at  45%  Power  at  5,000'  Altitude  (No  bombs— 2500  gallons  fuel): 

One  hour  full  throttle  operations                                        _            

432 

272 

30 

1766 

214 

Two  hour  fuel  reserve -  - 

Climb 

10 

Cruise  at  143  knots  at  136  gal/hr     .                 ...           

1910 

2500 

2134 

Radius  of  Action  in  nautical  miles                              .                 

1067 

(2)  Search— Attack  at  45%  at  5,000'  (4-600#  bombs— 2100  gallons  fuel) : 

One  hour  full  throttle  operation     

432 

272 

30 

1366 

214 

Two  hours  fuel  reserve 

Climb- .    .. 

10 

Cruise  at  143  knots  at  136  gal/hr 

1485 

2100 

1709 

Radius  of  Action  in  nautical  miles .  ._ 

854 

]WtOl  (3)  Attack  at  65%  Power— Return  at  45%  Power  at  15,000'  {4-600#  bombs— 2100 
gallons  fuel): 
One  hour  full  throttle  operation 

432 
272 
90 
687 
612 

236 

Two  hours  fuel  reserve  at  45%  power 

Climb.. :.    

27 

65%  Power— 193  knots  at  208  gal/hr 

643 

45%  Power— 150  knots  at  136  gal/hr 

643 

2093 

1549 

Radius  of  Action  in  nautical  miles.  .         .            

775 

(4)  Attack  at  65%  Power— Return  at  45%  Power  at  15,000'  (8-600#  bombs— 1700  gal- 
lons fuel) : 
One  hour  full  throttle  operation .  .      .        .        ... 

432 
272 
90 
485 
408 

236 

Two  hours  fuel  reserve  at  45%  power 

Climb- 

27 

65%  Power— 193  knots  at  208  gal/hr 

450 

45%  Power— 150  knots  at  136  gal/hr 

450 

.   .   . 

1687 

1163 

Radius  of  Action  in  nautical  miles 

1700 

581 

1  Note.— The  capabilities  were  taken  from 
tests. 


[1022]       curves  in  the  B-17D  handbook  and  checked  by 


390       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

d.  To  perform  its  missions,  tlie  Fleet  must  have  freedom  of  action  without 
responsibility  for  the  defense  of  its  base. 

e.  If  the  solution  to  a  problem  is  designed  to  meet  the  most  adverse  condi- 
tions, any  less  adverse  condition  will  facilitate  the  solution. 

f.  Army  Air  Force  units  at  present  are  not  charged  with  the  reconnaissance 
mission  for  the  defense  of  Oahu. 

g.  The  combatant  force  having  the  longer  range  weapon  has  a  basic  advantage, 
other  factors  being  equal. 

h.  The  bombardment  airplane  is  the  longest  range  weapon  which  the  Depart- 
ment Commander  has  at  his  disposal. 

2.  Assumptions: 

a.  The  following  are  the  assumed  or  known  maximum  capabilities  of  enemy 
equipment : 

(1)  Some  of  his  carriers  can  steam  at  30  knots  for  at  least  24  hours.  (Best 
available  intelligence  indicates  ORANGE  has  three  carriers  with  this  per- 
formance. ) 

(2)  His  carrier  bombing  planes  have  600  nautical  miles  range  and  cruise 
at  180  knots  (based  on  performance  data  of  the  U.  S.  Navy  carrier  planes 
[1023]  and  no  allowance  is  made  for  take-off,  rally  after  attack,  full  throttle 
operation  and  landing). 

ft.  The  following  are  the  assumed  probable  capabilities  of  enemy  equipment: 

(1)  His  carriers  steam  at  27  knots  for  24  hours.  (28  knots  is  the  mean 
top  speed  of  his  carriers;  1  knot  reduction  is  made  for  foul  bottoms.) 

(2)  His  carrier  bombing  planes  have  400  nautical  miles  range  and  cruise 
at  180  knots  (reduction  in  range  from  600  to  400  nautical  miles  is  made  to  allow 
for  take-off,  rally  after  attack,  full  throttle  operation  and  landing). 

Note. — In  the  discussion  that  follows  it  is  assumed  that  hostile  carriers 
operating  under  conditions  a  and  ft  above  once  committed  to  action  will  steam 
straight  in  to  their  launching  radius.  Any  maneuvering  by  the  enemy  when 
within  our  search  area  will  simplify  our  problem  for  it  will  give  the  search 
force  more  time  in  which  to  locate  the  enemy. 

c.  The  Hawaiian  Air  Force  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  destruction  of 
hostile  carriers  in  this  vicinity  before  they  approach  within  range  of  Oahu 
where  they  can  launch  their  bombardment  aircraft  for  a  raid  or  an  attack  on 
Oahu. 

[1024]  d.  An  enemy  will  not  venture  an  attack  against  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  until  control  of  sea  lanes  of  communication  is  obtained.  Then  as  the 
enemy  fleet  approaches  those  islands,  raids  by  surface  vessels,  submarines  and 
carrier-based  aircraft,  may  be  expected. 

e.  Our  most  likely  enemy,  ORANGE,  can  probably  employ  a  maximum  of 
6  carriers  against  Oahu. 

f.  A  25-mile  visibility  is  assumed.  This  assumption  is  based  on  standard 
U.  S.  Navy  search  and  patrol  methods  employed  in  thisi  area. 

g.  For  the  purpose  of  this  problem  the  day  is  divided  into  13  hours  of  daylight 
and  11  hours  of  darkness.  These  assumptions  are  based  on  the  following  com- 
putations : 

(1)  June  22,  20°  N.  Lat. : 

Sunrise 0521 

Sunset 1842 

Hours  of  daylight 1321 

Add: 

Morning   twilight 25 

Evening   twilight 24 

Total  hours  of  daylight 14:10 

[1025]         (2)  December  21,  20°  N.  Lat. : 

Sunrise 0630 

Sunset 1750 

Hours  of  daylight 1120 

Add: 

Morning   twilight *  24 

Evening  twilight 24 

Total  hours  daylight 12:08 

Average  (1)  and  (2) 13:09 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  391 

[1026]  IV.   DISCUSSION 

Part  1:  The  Search. 

1.  The  only  manner  in  which  the  Hawaiian  area  can  be  thoroughly  searched 
for  enemy  surface  craft,  particularly  aircraft  carriers,  in  the  event  of  a  situation 
requiring  such  action,  is  to  provide  a  sufficient  number  of  aircraft  to  conduct 
a  daily  search  of  a  desired  area  during  daylight  hours  with  100  percent  coverage 
through  360°.  A  method  of  searching  5°  sectors  through  360°  to  a  radius 
of  883  nautical  miles  from  Oahu  employing  72  B-17D  airplanes  is  indicated 
in  Chart  No.  1.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  out.side  lines  of  visibility  for  the 
diverging  tracks  cross  at  the  600  nautical  mile  circle,  the  overlap  area  inside 
of  that  distance  becoming  a  noncovered  area  beyond  that  distance.  The  width 
of  the  noncovered  area  increases  as  the  distance  increases  beyond  600  nautical 
miles  with  the  corollary  that  the  probability  of  finding  the  target  decreases  as 
the  search  continues  out.  However,  as  can  be  seen  on  the  chart,  each  search 
plane  on  the  search  back  covers  the  area  not  covered  between  any  two  planes 
on  the  search  out  and,  in  addition,  covers  the  area  previously  searched  by  the 
plane  on  its  left  on  the  search  out  but  uncovered  on  the  search  back,  100  percent 
coverage  of  the  area  is,  therefore,  obtained  on  the  search  out  and  back. 

[1027]  2.  In  order  to  have  available  for  ready  reference  a  means  of  deter- 
mining coverage  and  noncoverage  of  areas  on  the  search  out  using  3°,  4°  and  5° 
sectors,  there  is  attached  Chart  No.  2.  The  method  of  constructing  the  curves 
thereon  is  indicated  on  the  chart.  It  will  be  observed  that,  with  the  assumed 
visibility  of  25  miles,  100  percent  coverage  on  the  search  out  is  obtained  to  a 
radius  of : 

a.  600  nautical  miles  with  airplanes  in  5°  sectors. 

6.  750  nautical  miles  with  airplanes  in  4°  sectors. 

c.  1,000  nautical  miles  with  airplanes  in  3°  sectors. 

3.  Under  any  given  set  of  operating  data  for  the  search  planes  and  enemy 
carrier,  the  radius  of  action  of  the  search  force  is  determined  by : 

a.  Rate  of  closure  of  the  carrier  and  search  planes. 

6.  Minimum  distance  the  carrier  can  be  offshore  and  allow  the  search  force 
to  make  interception  and  relay  the  information  to  the  attack  force. 

c.  Minimum  time  required  for  the  attack  force  to  make  interception  beyond 
the  radius  of  action  of  the  carrier  planes. 

4.  In  developing  this  plan,  all  search  aircraft  take  off  at  daylight.  They 
might  take  off  during  darkness  in  order  to  be  at  a  certain  location  at  dawn  if 
definite  information  as  to  the  movements  of  enemy  surface  vessels  is  reiwrted 
from  some  source  such  as  our  search  of  a  previous  day,  friendly  surface  vessels 
or  Navy  patrol. 

[1028]  Part  2:  This  part  of  the  discussions  deals  with  the  maximum 
capabilities  of  enemy  equipment  namely  his  carriers  steam  at  30  knots  and 
his  bombing  planes  have  600  nautical  miles  range  and  cruise  at  180  knots.  See 
Chart  No.  3. 

1.  Section  No.  1: 

a.  An  enemy  should  be  primarily  interested  in  obtaining  the  maximum  cover 
of  darkness  for  his  carrier  approach.  This  section  illustrates  four  possible  uses 
of  darkness  by  an  enemy  to  cover  his  approach.  In  each  case  the  distance  out 
for  dusk  and  dawn  is  computed  from  the  most  distant  aircraft  launching  circle, 
or  350  nautical  miles.  This  figure  is  based  on  the  fact  that  after  launching,  the 
carrier  planes  will  be  in  the  air  3 :  20  and  during  that  time  the  carrier  steams 
in  100  nautical  miles  to  recover  its  planes. 

b.  lA  shows  a  carrier  launching  its  aircraft  at  midnight,  attacking  and  re- 
covering during  darkness ;  IB  shows  the  launching  at  dusk  with  the  attack  and 
recovery  during  darkness ;  IC  shows  the  launching  at  noon  with  the  attack  and 
recovery  during  daylight ;  and  ID  shows  the  launching  at  dawn  with  the  attack 
and  recovery  during  daylight. 

c.  It  will  be  noted  that  each  time  schedule  has  a  daylight  period  within  the 
radius  of  action  of  the  attack  force  but  that  ID  permits  the  least  time  interval 
for  our  forces  to  operate  against  an  enemy  and  requires  it  to  attack  [1029] 
at  the  longest  range.  The  early  morning  attack  is,  therefore,  the  best  plan  of 
action  open  to  the  enemy. 

d.  It  is  the  opinion  of  some  individuals  that  a  late  afternoon  attack  is  highly 
probable  since  it  permits  an  enemy  carrier  to  escape  under  cover  of  darkness. 
This  presupposes  that  search  operations  are  impracticable.  This  headquarters 
cannot  subscribe  to  this  opinion  for  the  following  reasons : 

(1)  A  minor  surprise  raid  such  as  a  single  carrier  is  not  a  logical  method  of 
attack  to  reduce  the  defenses  of  Oahu. 

(2)  It  permits  us  to  operate  against  him  for  a  long  period  on  D  Day  at  close 
range. 


392       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(3)  The  enemy  will  be  more  concerned  with  delivering  a  successful  attach 
than  he  will  be  with  escaping  after  the  attack.  He  will  have  carefully  con^ 
sidered  the  cost  of  the  enterprise,  will  probably  make  a  determined  attack  with 
maximum  force  and  will  willingly  accept  his  losses  if  his  attack  is  successful. 

2    SiPCtiofh  No    2 ' 

a.  This  section  illustrates  a  routine  daily  search  by  the  search  force  which 
will  be  made  in  order  to  prevent  an  [1030]  enemy  from  making  an  unde- 
tected approach  on  Oahu. 

6.  Specifically,  with  the  carrier  approaching  at  30  knots  and  the  search  force 
taking  ofC  at  dawn,  interception  must  be  made  no  closer  to  Oahu  than  435  nauti- 
cal miles  and  no  later  than  3 :  03  after  dawn  on  D  Day.  This  permits  40  minutes 
to  send  a  radio  message  to  the  home  base  and  get  the  attack  force  in  the  air  and 
2 :  10  for  it  to  intercept  and  deliver  its  attack  before  the  carrier  can  launch 
its  planes.  The  attack  force  will  strike  the  carrier  at  its  dawn  plus  5 :  34  D 
Day,  359  nautical  miles  out. 

c.  On  a  time  distance  basis,  dawn  D  Day  for  a  carrier  is  526  nautical  miles 
from  Oahu;  dusk  D  Day— 1  is  856  nautical  miles  out  and  dawn  D  day— 1  is 
1,246  nautical  miles  from  Oahu.  Solving  the  rate  of  closure  problem  for  the  two 
forces  1,246  nautical  miles  apart,  it  is  found  that  contact  will  be  made  at  1,030 
nautical  miles  from  Oahu  at  carrier's  dawn  plus  7 :  12  an  D  Day— 1. 

d.  It  must  be  pointed  out  that  this  solution  is  the  maximum  radius  of  action 
for  the  search  force,  yet  not  necessarily  the  most  difficult  problem  presented  to 
our  attack  force.  While  a  carrier  arriving  at  the  1,030  nautical  mile  circle  at 
dawn  plus  7 :  12  on  D  Day— 1  cannot  be  attacked  that  day,  it  can  be  attacked 
the  following  day  as  shown  in  &  [1031]  above  when  it  must  come  within 
easy  range  of  the  attack  force  if  it  is  to  attempt  to  steam  to  within  its  launching 
radius. 

3.  Section  No.  3: 

a.  This  section  illustrates  the  most  difficult  problem  which  the  attack  force 
has  to  solve.  It  is  the  same  problem  that  is  illustrated  in  Section  No.  ID.  The 
critical  point  here  is  the  carrier's  position  at  his  launching  radius  at  dawn. 
Under  these  circumstances  he  is  able  to  launch  his  aircraft  before  we  intercept 
him  and  deliver  an  attack  against  him  on  D  Day.  Therefore,  we  must  hit  him  D 
Day— 1,  or  the  day  before  he  arrives  at  this  position. 

&.  Specifically,  if  his  dawn  position  D  Day  is  350  nautical  miles  from  Oahu, 
his  dusk  position  D  Day— 1  must  be  G80  nautical  miles  out  and  his  dawn  posi- 
tion D  Day— 1  must  be  1,070  nautical  miles  out.  If  he  makes  good  this  schedule, 
interception  by  the  search  force  will  be  made  at  884  nautical  miles  out  at  his 
dawn  plus  6 :  11  on  D  Day — 1.  Allowing  40  minutes  to  transmit  a  message  and 
to  get  the  attack  force  in  the  air,  the  attacking  force  will  strike  the  carrier  at 
its  dawn  plus  10 :  43  D  Day— 1  at  a  distance  of  748  nautical  miles  from  Oahu 
and  can  operate  against  it  during  the  remaining  2 :  16  before  dusk.  Under  the 
most  favoraMe  conditions  for  the  enemy  the  enemy  carrier  can  be  subjected  to 
attack  by  our  attacking  force  during  a  period  of  2:16  on  D  Day—1. 

[1032]         4.  Section  No.  4-'  This  section  shows  the  radius  of  action  of  the 
B-17D  type  airplane  with  full  load  of  bombs  and  1700  gallons  of  fuel. 
5.  Effect  of  Visibility  (See  Chart  No.  2): 

a.  To  cover  the  required  search  area  under  the  above  conditions  120  airplanes, 
each  covering  a  3°  sector,  would  be  needed  to  operate  to  a  distance  of  1030  nautical 
miles.  This  number  of  planes  would  permit  100%  coverage  of  the  entire  360° 
otr  the  search  out. 

b.  Obviously  any  decrease  in  the  number  of  planes  employed  will  increase  the 
sector  to  be  searched  by  each  plane  and  therefore  reduces  the  probability  of  finding 
the  target.  Any  uncovered  area  would,  however,  with  a  lesser  number  of  search 
planes  be  covered  on  the  search  back,  and  depending  upon  the  location  of  the 
carrier  and  the  hour  of  the  day,  might  permit  an  attack  to  be  made  on  D  Day—1 
or  D  Day. 

Part  3:  This  part  of  the  discussion  deals  with  the  assumed  probable  capabilities 
of  enemy  equipment  (see  Chart  No.  4).  It  is  believed  that  his  maximum 
capabilities  will  be  reduced  from  those  assumed  for  Sections  1  to  4,  inclusive, 
(Chart  No.  3)  by  the  following  factors: 

1.  His  average  carrier  top  speed  will  be  27  knots.  This  statement  is  predicated 
upon  the  fact  that  the  average  top  [103S]  speed  of  ORANGE  carriers  is 
28  knots,  and  the  belief  that  on  his  run  across  the  Pacific,  foul  bottoms  will 
probably  further  reduce  his  speed. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  393 

2.  The  cruising  range  of  his  carrier  aircraft  will  be  400  nautical  miles.  No 
allowance  is  made  in  previous  computations  for  full  throttle  operation,  for  fuel 
reserve,  or  for  time  required  to  take  off  from,  and  land  aboard,  the  carrier. 

3.  He  will  not  have  unlimited  avenues  of  approach  for  his  attack. 
a.  He  must  avoid  the  shipping  lanes  to  negate  detection. 

[1034]  b.  Any  approach  to  Oahu  which  is  made  from  east  of  the  158th  meri- 
dian materially  increases  his  cruising  distance  and  the  probability  of  detection  by 
friendly  surface  vessels.  It  seems  that  his  most  probable  avenue  of  approach  is 
the  hemisphere  from  0°  counter-clockwise  to  180^  around  Oahu ;  the  next  most 
probable,  the  quadrant  180°  counter-clockwise  to  90° ;  the  least  probable,  90°  to  0°. 

c.  The  tactical  search  enunciated  above  is  not  the  only  source  of  information  as 
to  his  movements.  Office  Naval  Intelligence,  surface  scouting  forces,  commercial 
ships  at  sea,  radio  intercept  and  proposed  advance  naval  line  patrol,  will  tend  to 
disclose  his  general  location  and  might,  therefore;  reduce  the  search  area  for 
our  forces. 

d.  He  will  want  to  take  the  shortest  distance  to  his  objective,  although  this  will 
be  of  minor  consideration  if  his  range  is  sufficient  to  permit  him  the  long  approach. 

4.  Sectimx  No.  5: 

a.  This  section  has  been  drawn  to  show  one  possible  plan  of  attack  of  the 
enemy  under  his  assimied  probable  capabilities.  Here  consideration  has  been 
given  to  the  factors  enumerated  in  paragraphs  1,  2  and  3  immediately  above, 
with  the  result  that  his  performance  characteristics  have  been  reduced  to  27 
knots  speed  for  his  carrier  and  to  400  nautical  miles  range  for  his  [1035] 
airplanes.  Under  these  conditions  it  will  be  necessary  for  the  carrier  to  approach 
within  233  nautical  miles  of  Oahu  before  it  can  launch  its  aircraft ;  recovery  would 
be  made  at  167  nautical  miles.  Accoi'dingly,  the  radius  of  search  can  be  reduced  to 
833  nautical  miles  and  still  permit  the  search  force  to  locate  the  carrier  and  the 
attack  force  makes  its  attack  before  the  carrier-based  aircraft  can  be  launched. 
These  assumed  characteristics  can  reduce  the  required  search  radius  to  833  nauti- 
cal miles  and  still  i)ermit  the  carrier  being  attacked  before  it  reaches  the  position 
from  which  aircraft  can  be  launched. 

&,  If  on  D  Day — 1  the  carrier  force  is  at  a  distance  of  991  nautical  miles 
steaming  in  at  27  knots  and  the  search  force  takes  off  at  dawn,  interception  will 
occur  at  the  carrier's  dawn  plus  5 :  49,  S33  nautical  miles  away,  the  maximum 
radius  of  search  under  these  conditions.  Allowing  40  minutes  to  order  the  attack 
force  out  and  3 :  42  for  the  flight,  the  carrier  can  be  attacked  at  its  dawn  plus 
10 :  11  D  Day— 1,  715  nautical  miles  out  and  can  operate  against  it  during  the 
remaining  2  :  49  before  dusk. 

c.  Further,  should  the  carrier  be  missed  on  D  Day— 1  there  still  remains  an 
opportunity  to  attack  it  on  D  Day.  Interception  must  be  made  by  the  search 
force  not  nearer  than  carrier's  dawn  plus  2 :  02,  288  nautical  miles  out  on  D  Day 
in  order  to  make  an  attack  prior  to  launching.  This  attack  would  occur  at  dawn 
[1036]        plus  3  :  56,  237  nautical  miles  out. 

5.  Section  No.  6:  The  problem  here  is  the  same  as  that  shown  in  paragraph  3, 
Part  2,  above,  i.  e.,  the  most  favorable  plan  of  action  open  to  an  enemy.  With 
the  carrier  making  good  its  time  schedule  to  arrive  at  its  airplane  launching 
position  at  daylight,  interception  by  the  search  force  will  be  made  at  dawn  plus 
5 :  11  of  carrier's  D  Day— 1.  Allowing  40  minutes  to  transmit  the  message  to  the 
home  base  and  for  the  attack  force  to  take  off,  the  attack  force  can  reach  the 
carrier  at  dawn  plus  9:08  of  carrier's  D  Day— 1  and  can  operate  against  the 
carrier  during  the  remaining  3:  42  before  dusk.  Under  the  most  profitable  plan 
of  action  of  an  enemy  carrier,  a  B-11D  attacking  force  can  operate  against  the 
carrier  for  S:  42  of  the  day  prior  to  his  attack  on  Oahu. 

6.  Effect  of  Visibility: 

a.  In  Section  No.  5,  a  5°  search  spread  should  give  adequate  coverage.  The 
search  time  schedule  is  such  that  if  interception  is  not  made  on  the  search  out 
it  can  be  made  on  the  search  back  in  time  to  transmit  the  information  and  to 
deliver  an  attack  by  the  striking  force  before  dusk  on  D  Day— 1.  There  is  75% 
coverage  at  800  nautical  miles  on  the  search  out,  but  on  the  search  out  and  back 
there  is  100%  coverage.     72  airplanes  would  be  used  for  the  search. 

[1037]  b.  In  Section  No.  6,  with  5°  search  sectors,  the  probability  of  finding 
the  target  at  740  nautical  miles  is  85%  for  the  search  out  and  as  stated  in  a  above, 
100%  for  the  search  out  and  back.  72  airplanes  would  be  sufficient  for  complete 
coverage  in  this  case,  for  if  interception  is  not  made  on  the  way  out,  it  can  be 
made  on  the  search  back  in  time  to  transmit  information  and  deliver  an  attack. 


394       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

V.    CONCLUSION 

1.  Action  by  enemy  carrier-based  bombing  planes  against  Oahu  should  be 
figured  on  the  basis  of  their  having  400  nautical  miles  range  and  a  speed  of  180 
knots. 

2.  a.  The  most  favorable  plan  of  action  open  to  the  enemy,  and  the  action 
upon  which  we  should  base  our  plans  of  operation,  is  the  early  morning  attack 
in  which  the  enemy  must  make  good  the  following  time  schedule : 

(1)  Cross  circle  881  nautical  miles  from  Oahu  at  dawn  of  the  day  before  the 
attack. 

(2)  Cross  circle  530  nautical  miles  from  Oahu  at  dusk  of  the  day  before  the 
attack. 

(3)  Launch  his  planes  233  nautical  miles  from  Oahu  at  dawn  the  day  of  the 
attack. 

(4)  Recover  his  planes  167  nautical  miles  from  Oahu  2:  30  after  dawn  the  day 
of  the  attack. 

[103S]  b.  Any  variation  from  the  above  time  schedule  permits  our  attack 
force  to  strike  the  enemy  during  daylight  of  the  day  before  his  attack  over  a 
greater  time  interval  and  at  a  shorter  range ;  or,  permits  our  attack  force  to  strike 
him  during  daylight  of  the  day  he  attacks  but  before  he  is  within  his  radius  of  ac- 
tion of  Oahu.  If  an  enemy  carrier  succeeded  in  slipping  in  undetected  by  our 
search  force  and  launched  an  attack,  we  could  and  would,  of  course,  attack  as  soon 
as  possible  in  order  to  destroy  or  disable  the  carrier  prior  to,  or  during,  the  recov- 
ery of  its  planes. 

3.  The  area  between  the  circles  with  radii  530  nautical  miles  and  833  nautical 
miles  from  Oahu  is  the  operating  area  for  the  solution  of  this  problem  under  its 
most  adverse  condition. 

4.  a.  With  the  Army  Air  Force  responsible  for  its  own  reconnaissance,  72 
B-17D  airplanes  will  be  required  to  search  daily  the  area  within  the  circle  of 
833  nautical  miles  radius  from  Oahu,  each  plane  covering  a  5°  sector. 

ft.  Based  upon  the  assumption  of  visibility  used  in  this  study,  72  arplanes  em- 
ployed to  search  a  360°  sector  should  result  in  100%  coverage  with  some  overlap 
to  600  nautical  miles,  857c  coverage  at  700  nautical  miles  and  75%  coverage  at 
800  nautical  miles  in  the  search  out.  In  every  case,  the  search  out  and  in 
would  permit  100%  coverage  within  the  time  interval  which  would  [1039] 
allow  the  launching  of  the  bombing  attack  prior  to  dusk  on  D  Day — 1. 

5.  If  a  similar  search  could  be  conducted  from  Dutch  Harbor,  Midway,  John- 
ston or  Palmyra  the  possibility  of  enemy  surface  ships  approacliing  Hawaii  and 
the  west  coast  of  the  United  States  undetected  would  be  practically  non-existent. 

[lO/fO]  6.  Search  must  be  conducted  during  daylight  hours  because  of  the 
extreme  difficulty  of  locating  what  will  be  an  unlighted  objective  proceeding  under 
cover  of  darkness.  The  B-17D  airplane  is  capable  of  searching  for,  and  attacking, 
an  enemy  force  the  day  prior  to  its  arrival  within  its  striking  distance  of  Oahu. 

7.  With  this  plan  in  actual  operation  the  defenses  of  these  islands  can  be 
assured  without  assistance  from  the  Navy.  This  will  permit  complete  freedom 
of  action  of  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

8.  The  B-17D  airplane  is  capable  of  operating  beyond  the  combat  range  of 
any  known  enemy  carrier-based  aviation. 

9.  Attack  must  be  conducted  during  daylight  hours  because  it  is  considered 
impracticable  to  locate  and  bomb  a  maneuvering  precision  target  during  dark- 
ness. 

10.  Based  on  the  worst  situation  that  could  arise,  i.  e..  the  employment  of  6 
enemy  carriers  against  Oahu  simultaneously  each  approaching  on  a  different 
course,  an  attack  force  of  36  B-17D's  would  be  required  to  disable  or  destroy 
the  carriers.  It  is  expected  that  6  B-17D's  with  bomb  loads  of  seven  600# 
bombs  would  be  sufficient  to  accomplish  the  desired  result  ( see  Study  No.  1 ) .  It 
is  contemplated  that  this  attack  force  will  be  augmented  by  36  additional  B-17D's 
of  the  maintenance         [lOJfl]         and  reserve  force  if  in  commission. 

11.  This  at.tack  force  should  be  further  augmented  by  a  minimum  of  36  long- 
range  planes  of  the  B-26  or  similar  tyi>e,  capable  of  carrying  torpedoes  to  be 
used  as  the  striking  force  under  conditions  of  low  ceiling  and  visibility  when 
high  altitude  level  bombing  technique  is  not  practicable.      (See  Study  No.  2). 

12.  A  reserve  of  72  planes  will  be  needed  to  provide  for  maintenance,  replace- 
ment and  reserve  for  both  the  search  and  attack  forces.  As  was  stated  in  para- 
graph 10  above,  36  of  this  number  may  be  employed  as  part  of  the  attack  force 
if  in  commission. 

13.  In  order  to  operate  the  above  number  of  B-17D's,  a  minimum  of  216  combat 
crews  will  be  needed  as  indicated  in  Chart  No.  5. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  395 

\I.   BECOMMENDATIONS 

1.  It  is  recommended  that  the  War  Department  give  immediate  consideration 
to  the  allotment  of  180  B-17D  type  airplanes  or  other  four-engine  bombers  with 
equal  or  better  performance  and  operating  range  and  36  long-range  torpedo- 
carrying  medium  bombers  to  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force  for  the  performance  of 
search  and  attack  missions  in  an  area  bounded  by  a  circle  whose  radius  is  833 
nautical  miles  and  center  is         [10^2]         Oahu,  as  follows : 

72  for  daily  search  missions. 

36  for  attack  missions   (these  airplanes  will  be  in  readiness  daily,  fully 

armed  and  loaded  with  bombs,  for  a  mission). 
72  for  maintenance  and  reserve  from  which  36  may  be  used  to  augment 

the  attack  force. 
180  total  B-17D's. 
36  torpedo-carrying  medium  bombers  of  the  B-26  or  other  suitable  type. 

2.  While  this  number  of  bombardment  airplanes  could  not  be  accommodated 
at  Hickam  Field  and  there  are  no  other  suitable  bases  available  on  Oahu,  it 
should  be  only  a  matter  of  time  until  projects  submitted  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment for  the  construction  of  airdromes  on  outlaying  islands  of  the  Hawaiian 
group  are  completed  which,  with  Hickam  Field,  will  be  adequate  for  operations 
of  the  above  number  of  planes.  Existing  plans  for  the  dispersion  of  the  18th 
Bombardment  Wing  (H)  provide  for  units  of  one  and  two  squadrons  to  operate 
from  dispersed  airdromes.  Modification  of  the  plan  to  apply  to  operations 
therefrom  are  anticipated  and  will  be  made. 

3.  It  is  further  recommended  that  in  making  future  allotments  of  officers 
and  enlisted  men  to  the  Hawaiian  Air  [JO^S]  Force  consideration  be  given 
to  providing  a  minimum  of  216  B-17D  combat  crews  and  36  medium  bomber- 
torpedo  combat  crews.     In  this  connection,  see  paragraph  8,  basic  letter. 

4.  Our  leading  tacticians  and  strategists  hei'e  concur  in  the  opinion  that 
this  plan  will  solve  the  defense  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  that  to  their 
knowledge  it  is  the  best  and  only  means  that  can  be  devised  to  locate  enemy 
carriers  and  make  attacks  thereon  before  said  carriers  can  come  within  launching 
distance  of  Oahu.  The  sole  purpose  of  the  existence  of  the  military  establish- 
ment on  Oahu,  ground  and  air,  is  for  the  defense  of  Oahu  as  an  outlying  naval 
base.  The  best  defense  is  an  aggressive  and  well-organized  offense.  The  basis 
of  this  plan  is  offensive  action.  We  have  had  clearly  demonstrated  to  us  in 
Europe  the  fallacy  of  depending  upon  passive  measures  of  defense.  We  must 
not  base  our  plans  of  action  on  the  "Defense  of  Hawaii",  but  rather  upon  a 
vigorous  offensive.  We  must  ferret  out  the  enemy  and  destroy  him  before  he 
can  take  action  to  destroy  us. 

It  has  been  said,  and  it  is  a  popular  belief,  that  Hawaii  is  the  strongest  out- 
lying naval  base  in  the  world  and  could,  therefore,  withstand  indefinitely  attacks 
and  attempted  invasions.  Plans  based  on  such  convictions  are  inherently  weak 
and  tend  to  create  a  false  sense  of  security  with  the  consequent  unprepared- 
[IO44]        ness  for  offensive  action. 

In  order  to  initiate  offensive  action,  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force  must  have  at  its 
immediate  command  well-organized,  equipped  and  trained  combat  crews.  It 
should  be  remembered  that  while  reinforcements  from  the  Mainland  can  be 
made  available  on  short  notice  their  expeditious  presence  here  ivill  not  solve 
the  problem.  Upon  their  arrival  they  must  be  given  an  opportunity  to  undergo 
a  certain  amount  of  indispensable  indoctrination  and  training  in  the  plane  of 
action  of  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force.  If  this  plan  is  to  be  effective  the  force 
recommended  above  must  be  made  a  reality  and  maintained  in  existence  in 
Hawaii  for  combat  at  any  time.  With  the  United  States  living  and  working 
under  a  condition  of  unlimited  National  Emergency,  Japan  making  its  southward 
movement  and  the  world  in  general  in  a  complete  state  of  turmoil  we  must  be 
prepared  for  D  Day  at  any  time.  Reinforcements,  therefore,  must  be  considered 
from  the  standpoint  of  replacements  for  losses  only.  Any  delay  in  placing 
this  plan  in  operation,  such  as  would  be  necessary  for  the  above  reasons,  would 
mitigate  against  its  success. 

It  is  believed  that  a  force  of  180  four-motored  aircraft  with  36  long-range 
torpedo  airplanes  is  a  small  force  when  compared  with  the  importance  of  this 
outpost.  This  force  can  be  provided  at  less  cost  to  the  Government  than  the 
cost  [10-'f5]  of  one  modern  battleship.  It  is  further  believed  that  this 
force  should  be  made  avaflable  as  soon  as  possible  even  at  the  expense  of  other 
units  on  the  Mainland. 


396       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

STUDY  OF   THE   BOMBS   REQtriBED  TO  DISABLE   AN   AIKCKAFT   GABBIER 

1.  It  is  assumed  that  two  direct  hits  by  500-pound  or  600-pound  demolition 
bombs  will  be  sufficient  to  disable  an  aircraft  carrier. 

2.  From  the  tables  of  probability  of  direct  hits  by  bombing,  results  obtained 
by  units  of  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force  in  bombing  sleds  towed  by  Navy  surface 
craft  and  from  previous  experiences  by  bombardiers  who  have  made  attacks 
of  this  nature,  it  is  determined  that  about  90  percent  probability  of  two  direct 
hits  may  be  expected  from  6  B-17D's  or  similar  type  airplanes  attacking  a 
maneuvering  carrier  from  15,000  feet,  each  dropping  seven  600-pound  bombs  in 
train.    Bombardiers  are  assumed  to  be  capable  of  at  least  a  20  mil  accuracy. 

3.  In  arriving  at  the  number  of  bombs  and  airplanes  required,  several  methods 
of  attack  are  considered : 

a.  Attack  by  individual  airplanes  from  different  directions,  attacking  in  close 
succession. 

ft.  Formation  attacks  by  three  plane  elements  from  different  directions  and 
in  close  succession. 

c.  Formation  attack  on  a  six-plane  flight. 

[lOJfG]  In  all  cases  bombs  are  assumed  to  have  been  dropped  in  train  by  each 
airplane  with  a  spacing  of  80  feet  between  bombs.  The  number  of  bombs  (42)  and 
airplanes  (6)  required  to  give  a  90  percent  probability  of  two  effective  hits  was 
determined  to  be  nearly  the  same  for  each  tyi)e  of  attack. 

[lO^t]  NEED  FOR  TORPEDO  PLANES  IN  THE  HAWAIIAN  AIR  FORCE 

1.  a.  Any  or  all  of  the  following  factors  could  be  exi)ected  to  partially  or 
wholly  prevent  the  successful  accomplishment  of  the  bombardment  mission : 

(1)  Inability  to  find  enemy  force  (navigation). 

(2)  Lack  of  bombing  accuracy. 

(3)  Enemy  fighter  action. 

(4)  Hostile  antiaircraft  artillery  fire. 

(5)  Weather  obscuring  objectives, 
ft.  Consideration  of  these  factors ; 

(1  and  2)  Navigational  and  bombing  accuracy  are  primarily  matters  of  train- 
ing and  practice.  Efficient  standards  can  be  and  are  being  attained  by  the 
training  of  combat  crews  in  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force. 

(3)  The  critical  altitude,  high  speed  and  defensive  armament  of  the  present 
heavy  bombardment  aircraft  is  such  as  to  provide  excellent  defense  against 
enemy  fighters.  It  is  not  believed  that  carrier  based  fighters  will  be  very 
effective  against  the  B-17D's  at  high  altitude. 

(4)  Reports  from  abroad  indicate  that  antiaircraft  fire  will  be  only  partially 
effective  and  will  not  prevent  the  accomplishment  of  the         [lOlfS]         mission. 

(5)  The  weather  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  is  probably  the  best  in  the  world  from 
a  standpoint  of  flying  conditions  and  yet  a  very  definite  percentage  of  bombing 
missions  fail  because  of  overcast  conditions  which  obscure  the  objective.  Heavy 
bombardment  as  such  is  useless  against  surface  craft  when  low  ceilings 
(200-1,000  feet)  prevail,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  it  could  be  used  below  5,000  feet 
without  prohibitive  losses  from  antiaircraft  fire  before  reaching  the  bomb  release 
line.  Enemy  surface  craft  may  be  expected  to  take  full  advantage  of  all  cloudiness 
conditions  and  even  to  wait  until  such  conditions  occur  before  launching  an 
attack.  At  present  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force  has  no  weapon  to  effectively  combat 
surface  craft  under  such  conditions. 

2.  The  following  is  submitted  as  a  solution  to  this  problem : 

a.  The  most  effective  action  against  surface  craft  under  poor  weather  condi- 
tions is  believed  to  be  a  torpedo  attack  from  low-flying  aircraft.  This  is  sub- 
stantiated by  results  from  abroad,  i.  e.,  Bismarck  sinking,  Taranto  attack,  etc. 
A  torpedo  plane  flying  just  off  the  water  can  operate  [10Jf9'\  under  a  very 
low  ceiling  and  with  guaranteed  accuracy  against  all  surface  craft.  The  torpedo 
plane  should  be  land-based,  of  long  range,  fast  and  capable  of  being  accurately 
navigated.     It  should  operate  in  conjunction  with  heavy  bombardment. 

3.  a.  The  only  type  airplane  that  could  be  adapted  to  this  purpose  at  present 
in  the  Hawaiian  Department  is  the  A-20A.  It  is  believed  that  this  adaptation 
can  be  made  and  the  problem  is  under  consideration  and  test  at  present. 

b.  It  is  believed  that  tlie  medium  bombardment  airplane  of  the  B-26  type 
will  be  even  more  satisfactory  because  of  its  longer  raAge. 

c.  It  is  recommended  that  adaptation  of  some  such  airplane  be  made,  preferably 
in  such  a  manner  as  not  to  interfere  with  the  normal  bombardment  mission. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  397 

[1050]  Mr.  Mitchell.  Before  I  forget  it,  I  want  as  the  next  ex- 
hibit, No.  14,  to  introduce  a  letter  from  Headquarters,  Hawaiian 
Department,  Office  of  the  Department  Commander,  dated  14  April 
1941.  Subject :  "Air  Defense  of  Pearl  Harbor,"  addressed  to  the  Ad- 
jutant General,  Washington,  D.  C.,  and  signed  for  the  Commanding 
General  of  the  Hawaiian  Department  by  Carl  Grosse,  assistant  ad- 
jutant general.  It  has  a  notation  on  it,  "Copy  to  Commandant  14th 
Naval  District." 

I  will  not  read  that  letter.  It  contains  reference  to  several  of  these 
air  defense  plans. 

The  Chairman.  You  want  that  printed  in  the  daily  transcript? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  I  want  to  put  that  in. 

(The  letter  referred  to  was  marked  Exhibit  No.  14  and  follows 
herewith:) 
[lOSl]  Headquarters  Hawaiian  Department, 

Office  of  the  Department  Commandeb, 

Fort  Shatter,  T.  H.,  H  April  1941. 
In  reply  refer  to : 
AG  3Sl/67a  JDP. 

Subject :  Air  Defense  of  Pearl  Harbor. 

To :  The  Adjutant  General,  Washington,  D.  C. 

1.  Reference  is  invited  to  secret  letter  from  The  Adjutant  General  to  Head- 
quarters Hawaiian  Department,  above  subject,  dated  7  February  IMl,  file  AG 
381  (1-24-41)  M.  There  are  enclosed  herewith  for  your  information  copies  of 
the  principle  directives,  orders,  and  estimates  which  have  been  issued,  in  coop- 
eration with  the  local  naval  authorities,  to  provide  for  the  joint  defense  of  the 
Pearl  Harbor  Naval  Base  and  ships  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  in  Hawaiian  waters 
against  surprise  raids  or  air  attacks. 

2.  Inclosure  1,  joint  letter  HHD-14th  ND,  dated  14  February  1941,  initiated 
the  study  by  joint  committees  of  Army  and  Navy  ofiicers  of  the  joint  problems 
of  the  defense  which  were  mentioned  in  the  correspondence  between  the  Secre- 
taries of  War  and  Navy,  inclosed  in  the  letter  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  above, 
and  also  included  study  of  additional  problems  Which  were  raised  by  Admiral 
Kimmel,  commander  in  chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

[1052]  3.  Inclosure  2,  Annex  No.  VII  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense 
Plan  (HCF-39)  is  a  new  joint  agreement  with  the  local  naval  authorities  which 
pertains  to  joint  security  measures.  Attention  is  particularly  invited  to  Section 
II  of  this  document  whigh  relates  to  joint  air  operations.  This  joint  agreement 
covers  the  major  points  which  were  studied  by  the  joint  committees  organized  in 
inclosure  1.  Inclosure  A  to  this  Annex  No.  VII  has  not  yet  been  completed, 
however  tests  are  now  being  conducted  to  determine  the  most  effective  means 
of  positive  identification  of  friendly  aircraft  and  insure  its  protection  from  anti- 
aircraft artillery  fire. 

4.  Inclosure  3,  Joint  Estimate  Hawaiian  Air  Force  and  Patrol  Wing  TWO 
(Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force)  is  self  explanatory  and  will  serve  as  the  basis 
of  joint  air  operations  orders  to  be  issued  in  the  near  future.  These  joint  orders 
are  required  since  it  will  be  noted  that,  in  the  conduct  of  air  operations,  aircraft 
of  one  service  passes  to  the  tactical  control  of  the  other  service. 

5.  Inclosure  4.  Field  Order  No.  1  NS  (Naval  Security)  is  a  new  operations 
order  for  this  Department  covering  the  measures  which  will  be  taken  during 
an  alert  period  and  initially  upon  a  sudden  raid  or  air  attack.  This  order  has 
been  coordinated  with  comparable  security  orders  of  [1053]  the  Pacific 
Fleet  and  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Force.  This  order  is  in  addition  to  and  does  not 
replace  the  existing  Field  Orders  No.  1  and  No.  1  W  which  are  contained  in 
OHD-38. 

For  the  Commanding  General:  Carl  Grosse, 

Major,  A.  G.  D., 
Assistant  Adjutant  Oeneral. 
Copy  to  Commandant  14th  Naval  District. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  all,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Is  counsel  in  a  position  to  advise  the  committee  as 
to  who  will  be  called  next  ? 


398       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Hull  is  our  first  witness  on  Friday  morning. 

Senator  Lucas.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  The  Senator  from  Illinois. 

Senator  Lucas.  In  the  interrogation  of  Admiral  Richardson  there 
were  some  facts  that  he  did  not  know  which  I  would  like  to  have  the 
Navy  liaison  officer  attempt  to  discover  for  me.  Here  are  the  questions 
I  am  going  to  ask : 

How  many  naval  planes  were  attached  to  the  fleet  when  Admiral 
Richardson  took  it  over? 

[1054]  How  many  naval  planes  were  attached  to  the  fleet  when 
Admiral  Richardson  was  relieved  of  his  command? 

How  many  planes  were  capable  of  doing  reconnaissance  duty  during 
that  time  ? 

How  many  planes  were  actually  on  reconnaissance  work  every  day 
after  the  reconnaissance  orders  issued  by  Admiral  Richardson  were 
augmented  by  Admiral  Andrews  which  directed  reconnaissance  on 
dawn  and  day  patrol  300  miles  covering  a  western  semicircle  of  180°  ? 

That  is  the  information  I  would  like  to  have. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Gearhart. 

Mr.  Gearhart.  May  I  ask  a  question  of  counsel  ? 

In  the  event  Mr.  Hull  is  not  able  to  appear,  or  for  some  reason  does 
not  appear,  would  you  be  able  to  give  me  who  the  witness  will  be 
to  substitute  for  him  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  There  are  a  group  there :  Mr.  Sumner  Welles,  Mr. 
Grew,  and  Mr.  Hamilton.  Our  idea  is  if  Mr.  Hull  gets  tired  and  has 
to  retire  in  order  to  return  later,  we  will  bring  on  some  of  these  other 
witnesses  and  keep  going  on  with  the  State  Department  story  as  rap- 
idly as  we  can.  We  had  to  assure  Mr.  Hull  and  his  family  that  the 
committee  will  not  detain  him  for  questioning  more  than  45  minutes 
at  a  time.     He  tires  very  rapidly.     That  upsets  our  schedule  a  little. 

[JOSS]  The  Chairman.  In  connection  with  that,  copies  of  the 
written  statement  of  Mr.  Hull  have  been  furnished  to  all  members 
of  the  committee. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  I  presume  it  will  be  read  by  the  committee  before 
Mr.  Hull  comes  on. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 

We  have  given  you  copies  of  it  in  advance  so  you  can  study  it  before- 
hand. 

The  Chairman.  As  to  whether  the  other  statement  should  be  read 
by  somebody  in  the  meeting,  they  do  concern  matters  on  which  the 
committee  may  want  to  take  action  after  it  has  been  examined. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Ferguson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  want  to  inquire  of  General  Mitchell  whether 
or  not  the  committee  has  received  all  of  the  exhibits,  or  all  of  the  writ- 
ten information  in  relation  to  the  State  Department  witnesses? 

Mr.  ISIitchell.  Mr.  Gesell  will  answer  that. 

Mr.  Gesell.  We  have  received  from  the  State  Department  all  of 
the  documents  which  we  intended  to  introduce  in  connection  with  the 
testimony  of  the  State  Department  witnesses,  with  the  exception  of 
one  or  two  documents  which  are  being  [10S6]  cleared  with 
other  governments,  and  we  expect  that  the  clearance  will  be  obtained 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  399 

before  we  go  ahead  Friday  morning.  All  of  the  documents  which 
we  have  obtained  have  been  distributed  to  each  of  the  members  of  the 
committee,  I  think  the  bulk  of  them  went  to  the  committee  about  a 
week  ago,  and  we  have  from  time  to  time,  I  think,  including  this  morn- 
ing, handed  additional  documents  on  the  subject  to  the  members  of 
the  committee. 

Senator  Ferguson,  So  then,  at  the  present  moment,  we  have  all  of 
the  documents  that  the  committee  counsel  desire  to  use,  except  those 
that  you  must  receive  clearance  on  ?  As  I  understand  it,  you  are  being 
delayed  from  getting  certain  information  from  the  State  Department 
because  other  governments  will  not  clear  the  committee  getting  those 
documents. 

Mr.  Gesell,  There  has  been  no  refusal  to  clear,  Senator,  by  any 
Government. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  the  situation? 

Mr,  Gesell,  The  situation  is  this:  There  is  an  understanding,  I 
am  informed,  which  has  prevailed  between  the  United  States  and 
other  governments  with  which  we  are  in  friendly  relations  that  they 
will  not  give  publication  to  notes  and  documents  they  received 
from  our  officials,  and  we  will  not  give  publication  to  similar  material 
we  received  from  the  officials  for  a  period  of  15  years,  unless  specific 
authorization         [10S7]         is  obtained. 

Now,  we  have  not  received  any  refusal  from  any  government  to 
release  the  documents  which  we  wish  to  present  to  the  committee. 

There  are  one  or  two  situations  where  we  have  not  yet  heard  either 
way,  and  we  expect  to  hear  in  those  situations  before  Friday  morning. 

[JOSS]  Senator  Ferguson.  Then  if  you  get  the  approval  we  will 
receive  those  copies  of  those  papers  prior  to  the  hearing? 

Mr.  Gesell.  That  is  correct,  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  would  be  difficult  to  examine  witnesses  on 
documents,  as  I  said  before,  unless  we  get  them  sometime  before  the 
witnesses  are  put  on  the  witness  stand. 

Mr.  Gesell.  You  are  quite  right.  I  can  assure  the  Senator  in  this 
instance  the  volume  of  documents  to  which  I  refer  is  extremely  small. 
We  hope  it  may  be  even  possible  to  get  them  to  you  tomorrow,  if  the 
clearance  comes  through.  We  will  do  the  best  we  can  on  that,  of 
course. 

Senator  Ferguson.  As  one  of  the  members  of  the  committee,  I  think 
I  have  quite  a  few  questions  on  the  documents  that  I  have  not  received. 
They  are  included,  I  take  it,  among  those  that  the  other  governments 
must  clear. 

Mr.  Gesell.  I  do  not  know  about  that. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  will  have  to  check  the  rest  to  be  sure  it  is  what 
you  have  in  mind.  They  come  in  pretty  fast.  We  have  a  system  set 
up  of  taking  them  and  trying  to  keep  up  with  them. 

The  Chairman.  If  there  is  nothing  further,  the  committee  will 
stand  in  recess  until  10  o'clock  Friday  morning. 

(Whereupon,  at  4  p.  m.,  the  committee  recessed  until  10  a.  m.,  Friday 
November  23,  1945,) 


Part  2— November  23,  24,  26,  27,  28,  29,  and  30,  and  December  3 
and  4,  1945 — follows. 


X 


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