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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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Given By 
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



.92. 



HEARINGS 'ff^^ 



BBFOBB THE OX "^ i 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOB ATTACK 

C0NGKES8 OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

(79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 2 

NOVEMBER 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, AND 30, AND 
DECEMBER 3 AND 4, 1945 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEABL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONGKESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS t-P/^7 
FIRST SESSIONS , ^ ^ 

PURSUANT TO /j j^ 

S. Con. Res. 27 /9% 

(79th Congress) /^£-, ^ J 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HAEBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 2 



NOVEMBER 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, AND 30, AND 
DECEMBER 3 AND 4, 1945 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT TRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WxiSHINGTON : 1946 



U. S. SUPE«IKTeND£NT Of OOCUMENIS 

AUG 13 1946 






JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 

HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 194G) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Geuhard a. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistatit CouHsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



II 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part Pages Transcript Hearings 

No. pages 

1 1- 399 1- 1058 ■ Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 

2 401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec, 3 and 4, 1945. 

3 983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 

4 1585-2063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 

5 2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 

6 2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 

7 2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 

8 3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 

9 3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 

10 4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 

11 5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 



12 
13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 through 25 

26 

27 through 31 

32 through 33 

34 

35 

36 through 38 

39 



Exhibits Nos. 

1 through 6. 

7 and 8. 

9 through 43. 

44 through 87. 

88 through 110. 

Ill through 128. 

129 through 156. 

157 through 172. 

173 through 179. 

180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 

Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



Ill 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15. 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5080-5089 
"'"3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

Mav 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

163-181 

"418-423" 
"451-464" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

'8"7"-B" 
205 

'B223-224" 
B65-66 
B229-231 
49-51 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


3 j I 1 1 1 1 i i ; i i i i 1 i i i i i 1 i 1 1 ; 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

14t) 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
495-510 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1914) 


Pages 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3190-3201" 
1928-1965 

3642-3643 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

179-184 
""165-114' 

96-105 

74-85 

'"§68-378" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
478-483, 
301-310 

1171-1178" 

1178-1180' 
1659-1663, 
170-198 

""812-843," 
1538-1571 
504-509 

2-32" 

365-368 

1747-1753" 


1 


Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN) 

'Crosley, Paul C, Comdr 

Curlev, J. .J. (Ch/CM) 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN 

Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen 

Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

Dillingham, Walter F 

DiUon, James P- 

Dillon, John H., Maj 

Dingeman, Ray E., Col 

Donegan, William Col 

Doud, Harold,' Col 

Dunlop, Robert H., Col 

Dunning, Mary J 

Dusenburv, Carlisle Clyde, Col 

Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0 

Earle, John Bajdiss, Capt., USN 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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WW 



VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1915, 

to May 31, 

1946 


i i 11 M M M ! i M M Ipsl i 11^^^ 

= i i i: i i i : i i i i i i i ; lUik^? i ;I§'5S 
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: 1 : ; 1 1 ! ; 1 1 ; 1 1 : 1 1 ^^ \\ ^o^ 
III 1 ! 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 : 1 II "^-^t- 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

E.\hibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


lllllllCCli-HlN -HI llll 

iliiilirtiOOOiilliOi llll 

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g. 1 1 ■ 1 II llll 

aiiiiiiKMiO Oi llll 

Qiiltillii-HiO illliOl llll 

1 1 1 1 1 1 |(N "-H 1 1 1 1 1.-H 1 llll 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
••^ 1 1 1 II 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

;Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1070-1076 

461-469 
""763-772" 

816-851 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 

(Army Pearl 

Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


lOr-l 1"* 1 lO(N 1 1 1 l->*l> III 100 1 1 

i05t^ it^ 1 iTj<Tf< 1 1 1 1^^ III il:^ 1 1 
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iCOiOi(Mii(NCOliiiO'-<iii it>.il 
lOCDi iiOilliiC<105iii 1 II 
i(M CO 1 1 1 (M 1 1 1 i(N -H 1 1 1 1 II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Ill 1 lO 1 

III 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ICO 1 

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Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


ililiir^lliiOiiCOili llll 

1 1 1 1 1 It- 1 1 1 it^ 1 il> 1 1 1 llll 

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^ 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator 

Hayes, Phihp, Maj. Gen 

Heard, Wilham A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron Charles D., Maj. Gen 

Hill, William H., Senator 

Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holt-viick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W., Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, John A., Col 

Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 



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XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION TEARL HARBOR ATTaCS 



Joint 

ConRres.sional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


lO O 111 III ( . (II 1 ( ( 1 

"-^O 1 ( 111 ((II 

i(MO III 111 ( (II ( ( ( 1 
1 iC >0 111 III 1 III 1(11 

"oil (II III ( 111 1 1 1 1 
53, 1 CO 111 111 ( III (111 

-O 1 CO 111 (11 1 

0, 1 o 111 111 ( 111 (111 

1 TJ( 1 ( ( 1 ( 1 ( ( 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhiliit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1915) 


Pages 

""387-388' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. Zi, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

45-46 

""179-181" 

232 

76^77" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


~ 1 ( 1 111 ' ! I ! II! ! ' ' 1 
(^ ' ' ' III 1 II III 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


i is i i i i i i i=:f?2S'^"S i i^ : :§§ 
1 1 IT i : : III 27^2;:;: i it i :?^ 
^ 1 If: 111 111 '^ftg^J.cii 1 1^ 1 lij. 

I IT* j:^ Jp: CO CO lO 1 I'* 1 I1C05 

II III 111 "-^ "•' O >— 1 >— 1 1 1 ( ( o 

II 111 111 ,— (i-Hi— (11 1(,-H 


Joint 
Committee 
ExhilMt No. 

145 

(Army Pearl 

Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160," 
1240-1252 

3635^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

1968^1988" 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


II II 1 ( 11,1111 

1 1^-feS 1 1 S Igts^ 1 ! IS^ 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1^72 ; 1 2 \^^^ ! ; 1^^ 1 1 1 1 
(^ 1 i^^4. ! ; i ijN^ 1 : icis ; 1 1 1 

11 ,-H((,— (1 1 III— 1 llll 


1 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, MUlard, Col 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj 

PoweU, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, William S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



xin 



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XIV COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



C tf. — u^ 1, ■>«• 



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INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 



«OiO>CO^^00TtH(M 


00 

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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



a 

c 

• ^H 
.4.3 

o 
O 



o 

<J 

Eh 
H 

<i 

K 
O 

« 

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12; 



Joint 

Co!i?re.ssional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 -rt- 1 

; ; i i ; ia i i ; i i i i i i i i i|i i 

?» 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,fo 1 1 

Oiiiiii'fOi iii.'coi 

^ i(M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 i^O < 

'-< 1 1 1 1 1 it^ 1 1 Xico 1 

1 ! 1 : : r : 1 ; ; : : ; ! i ; ; ;m=^ ; 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 ! lo 1 1 ! 1 1 icDCOIN lo 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 -H c/: lo o 1 'O 1 1 1 1 

»iiiiii-*i|iiiiiCOiOCDiT}iiii 1 

^S'llllllcjilllillci-^t^lcljlll I 

~< GOlllllil^-rCSl'^'lll 1 

1 1 1 1 1 i CO CO lO to 1 --j^ 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Comniittee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 1 1 I 1 1 l05 1 1 1 i lo 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 
1 1 1 1 1 1 iGO 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17 1 1 1 1 17 1 ! ! 1 1 'i 1 

„« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1> 1 1 1 1 1 >ra 1 

c^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 I ,—1 1 1 1 1 1 i-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 
I-*- llllll II 


Joint 
Committr-e 
Exhibit No. 

14G 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 iCT 1 1 

1 ; 1 ; 1 ; ; 1 ; : : ;2 1 1 : ; i i i i ; 
^ ; 1 : 1 ; ; 1 1 : : ici 1 1 : ; ! ; ; i : 

00 

1 1 lO 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 ,-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 

(Array Pearl 

Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
2722-2744 
3120-3124 

1989^2007' 
2456-2478 

i34&^i38i" 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683 

3750-3773 
3357-3586" 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15. 1944) 


Pages 
""279-288" 

379^382 


Joint 

Conmiittee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


Pages 

1311-1329 

496-499 

1830-1842 

1334^1340" 

""247-259" 

1525^1538" 
1683-1705 


a 


Wells, B. II., Maj. Gen 

West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., I3rig. Gen 

Wichiser, Rca B 

Wilke, \Vcslie T 

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Erie M., Col 

Wimer, Benjamin R., Col 

Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon H 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

Woolley, Ralph E 

Wright, W^esley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yee Kam 

Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 401 



[1059] ^ PEAKL HiKBOR ATTACK 



FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the In\t:stigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C. 

The joint committe met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster 
and Ferguson; and representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[1060] The Chairman. The committee will please come to order. 

Before Secretary Hull is called, the counsel has some documents, 
I understand, to present for the record. 

Mr. Gesell. That is correct. Senator. We are starting today with 
a series of witnesses from the State Department. I thought at the 
outset we should place in the record certain document material which 
can be used in the examination of certain witnesses. Additional docu- 
ments will be provided from time to time, but this is the basis of the 
initial set. 

We have placed comparable sets to those being introduced before 
each member of the committee. 

These are all documents that were put in the hands of the members 
of the committee sometime earlier. We simply arranged them and 
regrouped them in exhibit form, to facilitate the committee's reading 
the exhibits, but the material contained in these exhibits has been in 
the hands of the members of the committee. 

The first, to be marked as exhibit 15, is a series of three documents 
from Mr. Grew to the Department of State, dated January 27, 
November 3, and November 17, 1911, respectively. 

The first is the dispatch in which Mr. Grew referred to the possi- 
bility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and I want to call the 
committee's attention to the mimeographed [1061] sheet in 
that exhibit which shows the transmission of that document to the 
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet from the Chief of Naval 
Operations. I would like to offer that as Exhibit 15. 

The Chairman. Do you want that included in the transcript of the 
hearings ? 

Mr. Gesell. No, these are merely exhibits, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Without objection, it may be marked. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 15.") 

Mr. Gesell. As Exhibit 16, we would like to offer a series of docu- 
ments relating to the joint memorandum of General Marshall and 
Admiral Stark to President Roosevelt under date of November 5, 
1941. The memorandum itself, and certain material explaining the 

1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of 
testimony. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 2 2 



402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

origin of the memorandum and the circumstances have been under dis- 
cussion here and are all included in this exhibit. 

(The documents referred to were marked ''Exhibit No. 16.") 
Mr. Gesell. As Exhibit 17, a joint memorandum for the President 
from Admiral Stark and General ]M:n-shall dated November 27, 1941, 
entitled "Memorandum for the President." Subject: "Far Eastern 
Situation." 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 17.") 
[1062] Mr. Gesell. As Exhibit 18 a series of approximately 
20 or more documents relating to the so-called modus vivendi. This 
series of documents entitled "Draft Suggestions (November 11, 1941) 
to the Secretary of State" includes various drafts of the modus 
vivendi, the note of November 26, as well as communications between 
the United States Government and Government of other countries 
and memoranda prepared by Mr. Hull and others of his conference 
with representatives of foreign governments. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 18.") 
Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 19 is a single document which was a proposed 
message to the Congress. This document, as is indicated, was dis- 
cussed with the President by the Secretary of State and no further 
action was taken. The memorandum for the President is dated 
November 29, 1941. 

I would like to call the committee's attention to the fact that at 
the end of this memorandum there is a proposed message from the 
President to the Emperor of Japan dated November 29, 1941. 
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 19.") 
Mr. Gesell. As Exhibit 20 we wish to offer additional communi- 
cations concerning the proposed message from the President to the 
Emperor of Japan. This includes the draft of October 17 [1063^ 
and the message as actually sent by President Roosevelt dated 
December 6, 1941. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 20.") 
Mr. Gesell. Finally, as exhibit 21, a series of several communi- 
cations, most of which were received in the very last few days before 
the attack, from Ambassador Winant in England, and other sources, 
giving information as to the possible movement of Japanese forces. 
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 21.") 
Mr. Gesell. We will have occasion to refer to these exhibits during 
the testimony of the witnesses who are about to come, and of course 
we will have other exhibits to offer. 

I also want to refer briefly to the official publications of the Depart- 
ment of State which have been made available in three volumes to all 
of the members of the comniittee. These include a substantial number 
of memoranda covering conversations held with the Japanese Gov- 
ernment during the pei'iod witli which we are concerned. 

While the committee is no doubt familiar with the volumes, I want 
to call attention to page 806 of volume II, Foreign Relations of the 
United States— Japan, 1931-41. There is set forth on that page, 
as part of the index, and subsequent pages, a very detailed chronological 
presentation of the various [10(j4] economic measures and 
freezing orders which were entered from time to time beginning as 
early as the moral embargoes in 1938 and 1939, and continuing down 
to the Executive order freezing the Japanese and Chinese assets in 
the United States on July 26, 1941. 

All those basic orders and other material relating to them are con- 
tained in these official documents. I think the members of this com- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 403 

mittee will find the chronological presentation helpful in finding the 
specific dates and other information that may be pertinent. 

Iklr. Murphy. What page is that? 

Mr. Gesell. Page 80G. It starts in the index of volume II, Con- 
gressman Murphy. 

The Chairman. Is that all? 

Mr. Gesell. Those have all been received, have they, Mr. Chair- 
man ? 

The Chairman. Yes, these exhibits to which you referred will be 
marked as you have indicated, and will be available, and have already 
been available to the Chairman and members of the committee. 

Mr. Gesell. We would now like to call Mr. Hull as a witness. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, will you be sworn 'i 

[1065] TESTIMONY OE CORDELL HULL, FOEMEE SECKETARY 

OF STATE 1 

The Chairman. The counsel and the committee have discussed, Mr. 
Secretary, if you will permit me to make a brief observation here, 
the question of whether your statement, which has been submitted 
to the committee and which all members are presumed to have read, 
and have also been given to the press two or three days ago, should 
be read now, or whether it should be printed as a part of the hearing^ 
and based upon it the committee then proceed to examine you with 
reference to its contents, or any other matter that they might wish 
to inquire of you about. 

The committee cannot expect you to read this document itself 
because of its length and the condition of your health. I think it is 
a matter for the committee to decide, whether they wish it read by 
someone or whether they prefer that it be printed at this point as a 
part of the hearing, and then the committee inquire with reference 
to it. 

Does counsel have any suggestion in regard to this matter ? 

Mr. Gesell. Our suggestion, Mr. Chairman, would be that the 
statement be inserted in the transcript as if read, and that we proceed, 
in the time we have, with an examination of Mr. Hull. We discussed 
that with Mr. Hull, and I think that was the procedure we had all 
anticipated would be followed. 

[1066] The statement was made available to the members of 
the committee and they have had it in advance more than is usually 
the practice to be certain that everybody had an opportunity to study 
it thoroughly. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I might first ask you what your 
wishes are, if you have any preference in regard to it. 

Mr. Hull. Naturally I will defer to the desire of the committee. 
I had wondered whether, in view of the early release of the statement 
both to the committee and the press, whether the committee would 
decide to have it read at this time, assuming that the committee has 
read it. Naturally, if the members of the committee have been too busy 
to read it we could read it now. I defer to the wishes of the committee. 

The Chairman. Senator George. 

I will just go down the line and ask the committee what its wishes 
are about it. 

Senator George. Mr. Chairman, I think the statement ought to be 
inserted in the record as if read. I see no reason why it should be 
again read, unless the members of the committee have not had an 

1 See p. 5308, Infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Mr. Hull. 



404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

opportunity to read it. We have had it a sufficient length of time. 
1 have read the statement in its entirety and reread a great part of it 
a second time yesterday. So far as I am concerned I think it would 
be wise to put it into the record. And the Secretary will, of course, 
refer to [1067] it, and perhaps read portions of it in answer 
to questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I concur in the views expressed 
by Senator George and the recjuest made by counsel. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. I concur in the statement made by the able Senator 
from Georgia. 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark. 

Mr. Clark. I concur in Senator George's statement. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I have had the statement and I 
have read it. I have been deeply impressed. I feet that in deference 
to the Secretary, Mr. Hull, this carefully considered statement of his, 
which, as I understand, has been prepared under his direction and 
represents a very careful and well considered presentation of the 
events leading up to this affair, certainly it deserves the consideration 
which it would receive by being read. 

It is quite true that the members of the committee have had the 
statement. I have read it two or three times, I am perfectly ready 
to go ahead, but I think the committee as well as everybody else can 
profit by having it read. 

While perhaps it may seem that this is an extra judicial observation, 
and we are not primarily concerned with the audience [1068] 
immediately gathered here, w^e are speaking to an audience of 120 
million Americans that are concerned, and I think we realize very 
well, under modern conditions, that if we proceed immediately with 
whatever examination is to follow, that that will immediately pre- 
empt the statement, to the exclusion of Mr. Hull's statement, and 
I therefore believe that Mr. Hull's statement, which I assume would 
take the better part of the morning to read, should be read here at 
this time. 

It is so important that it certainly deserves that amount of consid- 
eration by this committee. We could permit Mr. Hull to return at 2 
o'clock and then take up whatever questions may be directed to him. 
And perhaps have it read by Mr. Gesell, who is very competent, cer- 
tainly, in this field. 

I feel quite strongly that the public interest would be served by 
having it read. 

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I have given a great deal of time and 
consideration to this statement. As far as I am concerned I am pre- 
pared to proceed without having it read. I concur in the statement 
of the gentleman from Georgia. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, while I have spent a consid- 
erable tiine upon the statement I was compelled to do so at intervals 
and not to read it all at one time. I think that [1069] it 
would be well for the committee to hear the entire statement, as a 
whole, read before the. committee, but I have no desire whatever that 
the Secretary remain here during that reading. I feel that he should 
not unless he so desires. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 405 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Of course, Mr. Chairman, I would not insist upon 
the Secretary himself reading the document, but, as it appears to me, 
Secretaiy Hull was one of the great actors in one of the greatest 
periods of our American history, and to take his carefully prei3ared 
statement and merely insert it in the record doesn't strike me as giving 
proper consideration to the statement of one who played so import- 
ant a part in the development of the world situation. 

I think it ought to be read in order that those of us who have already 
read his statement may have the essential points properly emphasized 
in our memory in this important day's proceeding. I would like to 
have it read. 

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. I agree with my colleague Mr. Gearhart. 

The Chairman. Well, the Chair has not expressed his view but in 
order that there be no partisan division in the committee the Chair 
will vote with the minority that the document be read at this time, 
and if agreeable, Mr. Gesell, who is competent in such matters, will 
proceed to read it. 

[1070] Mr. Secretary, if you do not wish to remain here while 
the document is being read you may retire and come back at 2 o'clock; 
just as you wish. 

Mr. Htill. Well, I would be disposed to retire unless my absence 
should be construed as a lack of interest by any of my friends who 
want it read. 

Senator Brewster. No. 

The Chairman. The Chair will assure the Secretary that, in view 
of his health, that his retirement while this document is being read, 
and about which no questions would be asked of the Secretary if he 
were sitting here while it was being read, his retirement at this time 
will not be interpreted as any lack of interest in the document on 
which he has spent, no doubt, weeks in preparation. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Hull. Then I will be expected to be here at 2 o'clock ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I think if it would simply appear 
that the Secretary has incorporated in the record that this is his con- 
sidered statement, very carefully prepared, of the background of all 
these events, that it does represent his considered conclusions and con- 
tribution, so that we will not understand that it is an incidental or 
minor document, [1071] it would be well. 

Mr. Hull. I think everyone understands that we took the unusual 
step immediately or soon after Pearl Harbor to publish, first in one 
volume and then in two, containing some 1,800 to 2,000 pages, virtually 
every conversation and its record that took place between the 
Japanese and myself and the President. When this hearing was 
projected I undertook to prepare a statement, with the cooperation 
of the experts who understood the nature and location of all relevant 
documents, undertook to prepare a statement, which is now before 
you. 

So far as I have observed, I consider it accurate and I would not 
under any circumstances want anyone to have any doubt about my 
standing for that statement. 

The Chairman. That is sufficient to identify it as a statement 
which you would yourself present in person except for the condition 
of your health. 



406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chaikman. Mr. Chairman, I ask the unanimous consent 
then that Mr. Hull have the permission and consent of the committee 
to retire during the reading of the statement and to return for an 
appearance before the committee at 2 o'clock this afternoon. 

The Chairman. Without objection that consent is given by the 
committee. 

Secretary Hull, you may sit here as long as you wish and [1072] 
retire when you wish. We will expect you back at 2 o'clock. 

Mr. Hull. I may return shortly or I may not. 

The Chairman. Go ahead, Mr. Gesell. 

Mr. Gesell. I will commence the reading of this statement and 
if I find that my voice gets tired I would appreciate permission of the 
committee to ask one or two of the men from the State Department 
here to spell me a bit on the reading. 

The Chairman. That is agreeable. The Chair will help you out if 
necessary. 

Those who desire to retire will do so as rapidly and in as good order 
as possible. 

The committee will come to order. You may proceed. 

Mr. Gesell. I will not commence reading with the table of contents 
but start at page 2. 

(The table of contents referred to follows:) 

[1073] TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 

I. Background of 1941 Conversations 1076 

A. Japan's Record of Aggression 1076 

B. Japan's Record of Duplicity 1081 

C. Divergence Between Japanese and American Policies 1084 

D. Situation in Europe 1093 

E. Situation in the United States 1095 

F. Decision to Enter into Conversations with the Japanese 1100 

II. Conversations and Developments Prior to July 1941 1103 

III. Japan's Warlords Disclose Their Intention of Further Aggression 1109 

IV. Japanese Proposal for Roosevelt-Konoe Meeting 1116 

V. Tojo Cabinet and Continuations of Conversations 1127 

VL Japanese Ultimatum of November 20 and Our Reply 1136 

VII. The Last Phase 1153 

11074] Annex A Record of the Secretary of State's Conference, Consul ta- 
tons and Telephone Conversations (as entered in engagement books) with 
Representatives of the War and Navy Departments, November 20 to Decem- 
ber 7, 1941 

Annex B Record of the Secretary of State's Conversations in the State Depart- 
ment with Representatives of the War and Navy Departments, October, 1940- 
December 7, 1941 

Annex C Arrangements for Contacts Between the Department of State and 
War and Navy Departments in 1940 and 1941 

Mr. Gesell. (reading) : 

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was 
preceded by months of conversations between the Government of 
the United States and the Government of Japan. The initiative in 
this matter came from Japan which, by the beginning of 1941, after 
nearly a decade of relentless pursuit of a policy of aggression and 
conquest, had apparently reached a stage in the development of 
that policy at which she felt the need for a showdown with the United 
States. 

A comprehensive documentary history of these conversations, as 
well as of the whole course of our relations with Japan during the 
fateful decade from 1931 to 1941, which began and ended with acts 
of aggression committed by Japan, was prepared and published by 
the Department of State shortly after the attack at Pearl Harbor. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 407 

It comprises well over 2,000 pages and is contained in the volume 
entitled Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, 
and much more fully in the two volumes entitled Foreign Relations 
of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941. It is, I believe, the most 
complete account of a diplomatic record every published so soon 
after the events to which it relates. 

I commend these volumes to the attention of the committee. In the 
present statement T shall attempt to supplement this documentary 
history with such additional [10761 material as might be of in- 
terest to the committee and with a personal analysis and interpreta- 
tion of the events which led up to the treacherous attack launched by 
the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. While the story I am about to tell 
relates primarily to the year 1941, it is necessary also to deal, to some 
extent, with the developments of the preceding decades in order to lay 
bare the roots of the events which immediately anteceded the Pearl 
Harbor attack. 

I. Background of 1941 Conversations 

The Japanese proposal for conversations was directed toward the 
conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States 
relating to the Far East. It was made early in 1941. Before accept- 
ing or rejecting this proposal, the President and I gave the subject 
thorough consideration against the background of such factors as 
Japan's record of international aggression, her record of duplicity in 
international dealings, the sharp divergence between the policies tra- 
ditionally and currently pursued by Japan and by the United States, 
and the current situation in the Far East, in Europe, and in the 
United States. 

A. japan's record of aggression 

The President and I had to bear in mind and to take into account 
Japan's past record of aggi'ession and the trend of contemporary 
developments in the Far East. 

Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern [1077] 
state she had been pursuing a policy of ndlitary aggrandizement. For 
the most part, expect during certain brief periods when forces of 
moderation appeared to be in the ascendancy, the intervals between 
one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation. 

In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China, Japan 
annexed Formosa and tried unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in 
Manchuria. 

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself 
securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory 
and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan 
also acquired southern Sakhalin. 

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pres- 
sure and intrigue. 

In 1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of her European 
allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious 
Twenty-one Demands. 

At the end of the first world war Japan participated in the Wash- 
ington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the treaties con- 
cluded there. Among those treaties was the Nine Power Treaty 
relating to principles and policies concerning China. That treaty 
envisaged the creation of conditions designed to provide the fullest 
and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and main- 



408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tain for her [1078] self an effective and stable jrovernment, 
Japan pledged herself to the policies of self-restraint toward China 
which the Nine Power Treaty rested. 

In 1928, hoAvever, following the advent of the cabinet of General 
Tanaka in 1027, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" polic}^ toward 
China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene 
m China's internal affairs. 

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established 
there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo." By that 
action, Avhich was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan 
broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon 
in the Washington Conference treaties. 

I recalled how early in 1034 I welcomed an approach by the 
Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 21, 1934) by Mr. 
Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated 
that he firmly believed that no question existed between the United 
States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solu- 
tion." In my reply (March 3. 1934) I concurred in that view and 
emphasized our Government's belief in adjustments of questions by 
pacific processes. 

Only a short time after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again 
unmasked the basic purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by 
powerful policy-making elements in Japan. [1079] On April 
17, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a truculent 
official statement known as the "hands off China" statement. In that 
statement Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow' 
Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with 
China only as Japan allowed. 

On December 29, 1934, Japan gave formal notice of its intention to 
withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed 
at Washington on February 6, 1922. That notice was another clear 
and significant move in the direction of a course of conquest. Follow- 
ing the giving of that notice, Japan proceeded energically to increase 
her armaments, preparatory to launching her invasion of China. 

About that time Japan entered into conversations with Nazi Ger- 
many which resulted in the conclusion bv the two countries, on 
November 25, 1036, of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1937 Italy ad- 
hered. While the fact was ostensibly for self -protection against 
communism, actually it was a preparatory move for subsequent meas- 
ures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations — the first step in 
the creation of the so-called "Axis." 

In July 1937, Japan deliberately took advantage of a minor incident 
between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near Pciping and began 
flagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China 
immense armies which spread {lOSO] fan-like over great areas, 
including industrial and other key centers. These armies raped, 
robbed, murdered, and committed all kinds of lawless acts. Par- 
ticularly barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following occupa- 
tion of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937. 

On December 12, 1937, Japanese* aircraft bombed and sank the 
U. S. S. Panay in the Yangtze River. 

To gain public support in Japan for its program of military ex- 
pansion, slogans were used such as "The New Order in Greater 'East 
Asia" and "The East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The United 
States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke 
Japan's development. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 409 

In August and September 1940 Japan with German assistance ex- 
torted an agi'eement from Vichy France under which Jaj)anese troops 
moved into northern Indo-china. 

In September 1940 Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with 
Germany and Italy. That alliance was aimed directly at the United 
States. It was designed to discourage the United States from taking 
adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had 
completed their programs of conquest in Asia and Europe, when 
they could turn on the United States then standing alone. 

On October 4, 1940, Premier Konoe was quoted by the press in a 
statement on the Tripartite Pact as having said in part : 

[1081] If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of 
Japan, Germany and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and 
acts * * * those powers will be forced to go to war. Jaijan is now endeavoring 
to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic relations and will make every 
effort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in 
diplomatic maneuvers to induce Russia, Britain and the United States to sus- 
pend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime. 

B. japan's record of duplicity 

The President and I also gave thought to the fact that Japan had 
a long record of duplicity in international dealings. This duplicity 
was due largly to the fact that the Japanese military were a law unto 
themselves and consistently overrode commitments which civilian 
Japanese had given. 

In 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial 
integrity. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea. 

In 1908, Japan pledged with the United States to support the 
independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal op- 
portunity there. In 1915, Japan presented to China the notorious 
"twenty-one demands." 

In 1918, Japan entered into an interallied arrangement whereby 
forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any 1 power, [1082] were 
to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be sub-^ 
sequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the or- 
ganization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czecho- 
slovakian forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enter- 
prise an opportunity, in which they were eventually unsuccessful, to 
annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops. 

In the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, Japan agreed to respect China's 
sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integ- 
rity. Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunity there. Japan's whole course in China 
Bince 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in 
violation of those pledges. 

On November 21, 1932, Mr. Matsuoka, then Japanese delegate to 
the League of Nations, said : "We want no more territory." By the 
end of 1932 Japanese forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria 
and in subsequent years they moved southward and westward occupy- 
ing a vast area of China. 

On July 27, 1937, Prince Konoe, then Japanese Premier, said : "In 
sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no 
other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to pre- 
serve the peace of East Asia." In order to "preserve the peace of 
East Asia," Japanese forces for 4 years had carried warfare and 
suffering over the greater part of China. 



410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1083] On October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said, 
"Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy * * */ 
Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing "Chinese civ- 
ilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of 
Chinese homeless and destitude, by mistreating and killing civilians, 
and by acts of horror and cruelty. 

On April 15, 1940, Mr. Arita, then Japanese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, said the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply con- 
cerned over any development * * * that may affect the status 
quo of the Netherlands East Indies." Following the occupation of 
the Netherlands by Germany that spring, Japan sent a commercial 
commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far reaching that, 
if granted, they would have reduced the Indies practically to a Jap- 
anese colony. 

After the outbreak of Japan's undeclared war against China in 
July 1937, Japanese civilian leaders time and again gave assurances 
that American rights would be respected. Time and again the Jap- 
anese military acted in violation of those assurances: To illustrate: 

On July 30, 1941, Japanese planes bombed the U. S. S. TutuUa at 
Chungking and struck within 400 yards of the American Embassy 
there. 

On Jlily 31, 1941, Japan assured our Government that Japan 
would discontinue bombing the city area of Chungking. \108I^\ 
On August 11, only 11 days later, the American Embassy at Chung- 
king reported that during the preceding 4 days Chungking had re- 
ceived unusually heavy and prolonged Japanese air raids. 

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American lives 
and property in China would be respected. Yet there were reported 
in steadily mounting numbers cases of bombing of American property 
with consequent loss or endangering of American lives. 

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty 
rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infring- 
ing those rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied areas. 
Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, 
American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American 
nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to 
indignities. 

C. DIVERGENCE BETMTDEN JAPANESE AND AMERICAN POLICIES 

The President and I had very much in mind the fact thnt the 
United States and Japan had widely different concepts and policies. 
We went over the successive steps our Government had taken to 
influence Japan to adopt peaceful policies. 

We recalled that Japan's action in 1931 in embarking on a course 
of aggression and expansion by force and of disregard of treaties 
had ushered in an ever widening conflict between forces of aggres- 
sion and those desirous of maintaining peace, [JOSS] Our Gov- 
ernment's opposition to Japan's course in Manchuria was set forth in' 
a communication addressed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Stim- 
son, to the Japanese Government on January 7, 1932, and in a further 
communication of February 25, 1933, to the Secretary General of the 
League of Nations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 411 

On January 17, 1933, the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, made 
clear his support of the principle of sanctity of international treaties 
by writing out, in reply to a question, a statement as follows : 

I am * * * wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies 
must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on 
which all relations between nations must rest. 

In his first inaugural address, on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt 
said that in the field of world policy he would dedicate this Nation 
to the policy of the good neighbor — "the neighbor who resolutely 
respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others — ■ 
the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of 
his agreements in and with a world of neighbors." 

Thus in 1931-33, when Japan was carrying forward its program of 
aggression, the American Government was moving steadily ahead in 
advocacy of world support of sanctity [1086] of treaties and 
peaceful processes. 

On May 16, 1934, I had a general conversation with Japanese 
Ambassador Saito, one of many conversations in which I endeavored 
to convince the Japanese that their best interests lay in following 
policies of peace. 

Three days later I talked again with the Japanese Ambassador. 
During the conversation the Ambassador repeated the formula which 
his Government had been putting forward publicly for some weeks to 
the effect that Japan had a superior and special function in connection 
with the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia. I brought to the 
Japanese Ambassador's attention the clear implications contained in 
the Japanese formula of the intention on the part of Japan to exer- 
cise an overlordship over neighboring nations and territories. 

On June 12, 1936, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador 
to Great Britain, I told the Ambassador that the impression of the 
American people was that Japan sought economic domination first 
of eastern Asia and then of other areas such as it might select, and 
that this would ultimately mean political as well as military domina- 
tion. I urged upon the Ambassador the benefit to Japan from its 
associating itself in a peaceful and constriictive program. 

Despite all our pleas and efforts, Japan in July 1937 proceeded to 
invade China. Therefore, on July 16 the [1087] Government 
of the United States issued a statement of fundamental principles of 
international policy which was directed at rallying all countries to the 
support of peaceful processes. 

In a further statement of August 23, 1937, 1 applied the principles 
of the July 16 statement expressly to the situation in China. I stated 
that the issues in that situation of concern to the United States went 
far beyond the immediate question of the protection of American 
nationals and American interests. Serious hostilities in any part of 
the world were of concern to all nations. Accordingly, I urged on 
both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from 
hostilities. 

On October 6, 1937, the American Government stated that the 
action of Japan in China was inconsistent with the principles which 
should govern relationships between nations and was contra rv to the 
provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Briand-Kellogg 
Pact. 



412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In November 1937 the United States participated with 18 other 
nations in a conference held at Brussels to "study peaceable means of 
hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the 
Far East. The conference was held in accordance with a provision 
of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922. The repeated refusals of the Japa- 
nese [^088] Government to participate in the conference effec- 
tively prevented efforts to bring about an end to the conflict by media- 
tion and conciliation. On November 2-t the conference suspended its 
sittings. 

In the fall of 1937 our Government was confronted with the deci- 
sion whether to apply the Neutrality Act to the hostilities between 
China and Japan. It was clear that the arms embargo authorized 
by the act would hurt China and help Japan, since China needed to 
import arms and Japan manufactured a large supply. The President 
used the discretion provided by law and refrained from putting the 
act into operation. 

On July 26, 1939, our Government notified the Japanese Govern- 
ment of its desire to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navi- 
gation of 1911. It was felt that this treaty was not affording adequate 
protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese 
occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of 
the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption 
of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. The treaty 
therefore terminated on January 26, 1940, and the legal obstacle to 
our placing restrictions upon trade with Japan was thus removed. 

Beginning in 1938 our Gevernment placed in effect so-called "moral 
embargoes" which were adopted on the basis of humanitarian consid- 
erations. Following the passage of the [1089] Act of July 2, 
1940, restrictions were imposed in the interests of national defense on 
an ever-increasing list of exports of strategic materials. These meas- 
ures were intended also as deterrents and expressions of our opposition 
to Japan's course of aggression. 

On April 15, 1940, the Japanese Foreign Minister issued a state- 
ment disclosing an underlying purpose to extend Japanese control to 
the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies. On 
April 17 I took cognizance of that statement. I pointed out the im- 
portance of the Netherlands Indies in international relationships. I 
said that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies 
or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes 
would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security, not 
only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific 
area. I urged that peaceful principles be applied not only in every 
part of the Pacific area but in every part of the world. 

TJiroughout this period the United States increasingly followed a 
policy of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. 
This took several different forms, including diplomatic actions in 
protest of Japan's aggression against China and of Japan's violation 
of American rights. Loans and credits aggregating some 200 million 
dollars were extended in order to bolster China's [1090] eco- 
nomic structure and to facilitate the acquisition by China of supplies. 
And later lend-lease and other military supplies were sent to be used 
in China's resistance against Japan. 

During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in 
mind — and I was explaining to members of Congress and other 
Americans with whom I came in contact — that it was apparent that 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINJ COMMITTEE 413 

the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest 
of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and 
extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out 
with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, 
and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations 
to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had 
arrogated to themselves. 

I was saying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I had com- 
menced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our 
relations with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly 
possible to find any new way to approach the Japanese and prevail 
on them to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging 
the Japanese to consider their own futuie from the standpoint of 
political, economic, and social aspects. The people of China were 
living on a very low standard. Japan, if it should conquer China, 
would keep China bled white and would not have the [1091] 
capital to aid in restoring purchasing power and social welfare. It 
meant everything for the development of that half of the world s 
population to use the capital of all nations, such as the United States 
and other countries, in helping China, for example, to develop internal 
improvements and increase its purchasing povrer. We had reminded 
the Japanese of our traditional friendship and our mutually profit- 
able relations. 

During these years we had kept before the Japanese all these doc- 
trines and principles in the most tactful and earnest manner possible, 
and at all times we had been careful not to make threats. I said that 
I had always felt that if a government makes a threat it ought to be 
ready to back it up. We had been forthright but we had been as tactful 
as possible. 

I was pointing out in these conversations that if we had not, by pre- 
viously modifying our Neutrality Act, been in a position to send 
militar}^ aid to Great Britain in the early summer of 1940 there might 
well have been a different story. Our aid assisted Britain to hold back 
the invaders for 7 months, while we had that 7 months in which to arm, 
and everybody knew that no country ever needed time in which to 
arm more than we did in the face of the world situation. 

With reference to charges which at times were made that the 
Government did not reveal everything to the public, I [109£] 
pointed out that a Government could not come out every morning 
before breakfast and give a blueprint of its plans and purposes in 
times of extreme crisis. If we should announce one day that we were 
not particularly assertive of any rights or interest in other parts of 
the world, almost overnight we would see the aggressor nations move 
into those parts. I said that for a while after I went to the State 
Department I thought that when I Avas talking to representatives of 
the aggressor nations they were gazing up in the air, but I soon dis- 
covered that they were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our 
defensive preparations — that was all that meant anything to rulers 
bent on violence. 

The President had an eye to the situation in the Far East when 
on January (5, 1941, in his address to Congress he declared that "at no 
previous time has American security been as seriously threatened 
from without as it is today." The President said that the whole 
pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling num- 



414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ber of independent nations and that the assailants were still on the 
march threatening other nations, great and small. The President 
defined our national policy as follows : 

We were committed to an all-inclusive national defense. We were 
committed to full support of resolute peoples everywhere who were 
resisting aggression and were thereby keeping war away from our 
hemisphere. 

[1093] We were committed to the proposition that principles of 
morality and considerations for our own security would "never permit 
us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors." 

On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the Lend-Lease 
Act before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Repre- 
sentatives, I said : 

It has been clear throughout that Japan has l)een actuated from the start 
by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position 
in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared 
their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms 
and thus to make themselves master of an area containing almost one-half of 
the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary 
control of the sea and trade routes in that region. 

I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruth- 
less, and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests, and 
that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the 
security of the Western Hemisphere." 

D. SITUATION IN EUROPE 

The President and I had to consider also the effect which would 
be produced on the European war situation if by any [1094-^ 
chance we should be successful in stabilizing the situation in the 
Pacific area. We knew that as the forces of aggression gathered 
strength in Europe and overran one unprepared victim after another, 
Japan's appetite to add to her empire by seizing rich territories 
increased. 

The record in Europe was an awful one. 

In 1933 Hitler had come into power in Germany. From that time 
the menace to peace from Japan in the Pacific and from Germany in 
Europe had developed concurrently. 

On October 14, 1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament 
Conference and also gave notice of withdrawal from the League of 
Nations. 

On October 3, 1035, Italian armed forces invaded Ethiopa. 

In March 1936 Hitler in flagrant violation of the Locarno Pact 
proceeded to occupy and fortify the demilitarized Rhineland. 

In July 1936 peace in Europe was dislocated further by the out- 
break of civil war in Spain. 

On March 11, 1938, Hitler sent his armed forces into Austria, and 
on March 13 proclaimed the union of Germany and Austria. 

In September 1938, at Munich, Hitler and Mussolini forced a set- 
tlement by which Germany acquired the Sudetenland. 

On March 14, 1939, Hitler, in violation of pledges given in the 
Munich settlement, invaded and occupied [10951 Czechoslo- 
vakia. 

In September 1939 war broke out in Europe. Continued Axis 
aggression which had been proceeding step by step for several years 
thus sent the European continent into conflagration. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 415 

This weakened the military position of all countries, including the 
United States, opposed to Japanese banditry in the Pacific. 

In the early summer of 1940 France's effective resistance collapsed. 
Britain was virtually under siege. Germany's vast and powerful 
military machine remained intact. 

Nazi submarines and long-range bombers were taking a heavy toll 
of ships and materials in the North Atlantic. Shipping was inade- 
quate. The countries resisting aggression desperately needed supplies 
to increase their defenses. 

It was clear tliat any aggravation of the situation in the Far East 
would have a serious effect on the already dangerous situation in 
Europe, while conversely, an easement of the Far Eastern tension 
would aid enormously the struggle against the Nazis in Europe. 

E. SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES 

Finally the President and I, in considering the suggestion regard- 
ing negotiations with Japan, had to take into account the situation 
in the United States, especially as it affected foreign policy. A review 
of this situation is [109S] presented not in a spirit of criti- 
cism, but merely to remind ourselves of the inner turmoil through 
which the whole Nation was then passing. 

In the years following 1931 the United States, like most of the 
world, was in the thi-oes of a severe economic crisis. Many of our 
people had a profound sense of disillusionment over our participation 
in World War I. The Nation was much more intent on internal 
affairs than on potential threats thousands of miles away. 

In the spring of 1933 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
rejected a proposal, supported by the administration, which would 
have authorized cooperation by the United States in an arms embargo 
against an aggressor nation. 

In January 1935 the President sent a message to the Senate, re- 
questing the advice and consent of the Senate to United States mem- 
bership in the World Court. He pointed out that Republican and 
Democratic administrations alike had advocated a court of justice to 
which nations might voluntarily bring their disputes for judicial 
decision. The President declared that the United States had an op- 
portunity "once more to throw its weight into the scale in favor of 
peace" at a time when "every act is of moment to the future of world 
peace." The measure, nevertheless, failed of passage. 

[1097'] In August 1935 in the shadow of a new European war, 
Congress passed a joint resolution known as the Neutrality Act pro- 
viding that upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between 
or among two or more foreign states "the President shall proclaim 
such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms, ammu- 
nition, or implements of war" from the United States to any belligerent 
country. In signing the joint resolution the President said he had 
done so "because it was intended as an expression of the fixed desire of 
the Government and the people of the United States to avoid any 
action which might involve us in war." But the President said, with 
emphasis, that the "inflexible" arms-embargo provisions "might drag 
us into war instead of keeping us out." A few months later I urged, 
in reference to the application of the Neutrality Act, the wisdom of 
leaving discretion to the Executive. 



416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In January 1936 a "neutralit}^" bill containinjj a provision for re- 
stricting the export to belligerents of abnormal quantities of war ma- 
terials Avas introduced in Congress at my request. Although extended 
hearings were held in which I and others urged the adoption of the 
measure, isolationist sentiment was so strong that it failed of passage. 

During this period our Nation still showed sigTis of deep suspicion 
of and hostility toward any line of policy which appeared to extend 
our commitments abroad. 

These signs wei-e interpreted by the aggressor nations as [lOOS] 
meaning that the United States would not oppose effectively their 
policies of conquest. 

A few examples of this public state of mind may be cited. 

Early in 1938 a relatively modest naval expansion program received 
a great deal of criticism and suspicion as to the use to which the 
program w^ould be put. So strong was this feeling that I made a 
public reply on February 10, 1938, to a letter from a member of 
Congress in which I gave reassurances that the proposed program did 
not contemplate the use of any of the units in cooperation with any 
other nation in any part of the world. I also stated that it was the 
desire of our Government that the United States not be drawn into or 
forced into war. I warned, however, that if every peaceful nation 
insisted on a policy of aloofness, the result would be to encourage 
nations inclined to play lawless roles. 

It was during this same period that the movement for a popular 
referendum as a prerequisite for a declaration of war was at its 
height. Such a proposal was rejected by the House of Representa- 
tives by a very narrow vote (January 10, 1938, by a vote of 209-188). 

Fortune published in April 1938 a poll which showed that 54 percent 
of those polled thought that we should withdraw entirely from China, 
and only 30 percent thought we should take steps to make the Japanese 
respect our rights. 

[1099] In the summer of 1939 an effort led by the President and 
myself to secure a revision of the neutrality legislation, which would 
have strengthened the hands of the western democracies against Hitler, 
was violently opposed and blocked on the wholly mistaken theory that 
no war was likely to occur and, if it did occur, no attack against us 
was likely. 

Following the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 our 
Nation began gradually to awaken to the awful peril of two aggressors 
on the rampage, one on our left hand, and the other on our right. 

Congress speedily enacted revision of the Neutrality Act. 

When the Nazis crushed France in June 1940 and Japan began to 
show strong interest in French, Dutch, and other territories in the 
Far East, we accelerated our rearmament program and adopted the 
Selective Service Act. 

But most of those measures were attended by strenuous public debate 
and dissension. Many well-meaning people of all political faiths were 
confused as to what our course should be in a w'orld apparently falling 
apart. A considerable number of our people were still clinging to the 
fundamental belief that no serious danger from foreign wars did or 
could threaten this country, and that about all the Nation had to do 
to keep out of war was to stay at home and mind its own business. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 417' 

During this period of internal debate, while the Nation [1100'] 
was gradually moving toward awai'eness of the menace from abroad,^ 
there was forced into the Selective Service Act inclusion of a provision 
that our new-citizen army could not be used outside the Western Hemi- 
sphere except in our owii possessions. In August 194:1, only by the 
narrow margin of a House vote of 203 to 202, did Congress extend the 
service of men inducted under the act, after the measure had been 
urged in the strongest terms by the President, myself and other mem- 
bers of the Administration. 

Throughout these years the President and I repeatedly called atten- 
tion in public addresses to the darkening clouds of war in the east 
and west and to their menace to ourselves. We attempted to explain 
the basic j^roblems confronting us, and at the same time we tried to 
avoid playing into the hands of the aggressors or causing irritations 
that would slam the door. The text of the more important public 
statements made by the President and by me is given in Peace and 
War. 

F. DECISION TO ENTER INTO CONVERSATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE 

The constantly growing danger in the Far East, the acuteness of 
the situation in Europe, the vast expanse of territory to be defended, 
the necessity of building up our own armaments, the necessity of sup- 
plying materials for defense of this hemisphere, of the British Isles, 
of the Near East and of the Far East, the generally divided attitude 
of the American [1101] public toward the world situation, and 
growing realization of the far-reaching consequences to the whole 
world which would follow the extension of the European war and of 
the hostilities in China to the entire Pacific area and of the importance 
of averting if possible such a development — all these constituted sig- 
nificant and inescapable factors which the President and I reviewed 
in considering the Japanese suggestion. 

In the light of Japan's past and current record and in view of the 
wide divergences between the policies which the United States and 
Japan had been pursuing in the Far East, I estimated from the outset 
that there was not 1 chance in 20 or 1 in 50 or even 1 in 100 of reaching 
a peaceful settlement. Existing treaties relating to the Far East were 
adequate, provided the signatory governments lived up to them. We 
were, therefore, not calling for new agreements. But if there was a 
chance that new agreements would contribute to peace in the Pacific, 
the President and I believed that we should not neglect that possibility, 
slim as it was. 

We had in mind doing everything we could to bring about a peaceful, 
fair, and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific 
area. Such a course was in accordance with the traditional attitudes 
and beliefs of the American people. Moreover, the President and I 
constantly had very much in mind the advice of our highest military 
[1102] authorities who kept emphasizing to us the imperative 
need of having time to build up preparations for defense vital not only 
to the United States but to many other countries resisting aggression. 
Our decision to enter into the conversations with the Japanese was,, 
therefore, in line with our need to rearm for self-defense. 

79716— 46— pt. 2 3 



418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The President and I fully realized that the Japanese government 
could not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in 
. Jaj^an's course of aggression. "We realized that so much was involved 
in a reconstruction of Japan's position that implementation to any 
substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses 
would require a long time. We were, therefore, prepared to be 
patient in an endeavor to persuade Japan to turn from her course of 
aggression. We carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were deter- 
mined to stand by a basic position, built on fundamental principles 
which we applied not only to Japan but to all countries. 

[1103] II. C0N\^RSATI0NS AND DEVELOPMENTS PrIOR TO JULY 1941 

On February 14, 1941, the President received the new Japanese 
Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, in a spirit of cordiality and said that 
they could talk candidly. He pointed out that relations between the 
United States and Japan were deteriorating and mentioned Japanese 
movements southward and Japanese entry into the Tripartite Agree- 
ment. The President suggested that the Ambassador might like to 
re-examine and frankly discuss with the Secretary of State important 
phases of American-Japanese relations. 

On March 8, in my first extended conversation with the Japanese 
Ambassador, I emphasized that the American people had become 
fully aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take 
charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary 
control and to profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims. 

On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. 
The President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that 
matters between our two countries could be worked out without a 
military clash and emphasized that the first step would be removal of 
suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese 
naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was 
naturally serious [1104-1 concern and suspicion. 

On April 16 I had a further conversation with the Japanese Am- 
bassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question 
about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance 
in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and 
power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to 
adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foun- 
dation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows : 

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each 
and all nations; 

(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal 
affairs of other countries ; 

(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of 
commercial opportunity; 

(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the 
status quo may be altered by peaceful means. 

I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing 
to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer 
such as would be consistent with those principles. 

On May 12 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal for a 
general settlement. The essence of that proposal was that the United 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 419 

States should request Chiang Kai-shek to [J ^05] negotiate 
peace with Japan, and, if Chiang should not accept the advice of the 
United States, that the United States should discontinue its assistance 
to his government; that normal trade relations between the United 
States and Japan should be resumed; and that the United States 
should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of 
natural resources — such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel — in the south- 
west Pacific area. There were also other provisions which Japan 
eventually dropped, calling for joint guaranty of independence of the 
Philippines, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the 
United States on a nondiscriminatory basis, and for a joint effert by 
the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the 
European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe. 

The proposal also contained an affirmation of Japan's adherence 
to the Tripartite Pact and a specific reference to Japan's obligations 
thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto if attacked 
by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Jap- 
anese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly ex- 
cepted. 

The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not 
defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that 
they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas 
whereby Japan would retain control [1106] of various stra- 
tegic resources, facilities and enterprises in China and would acquire 
the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for 
"joint defense against communism," for an indefinite period in exten- 
sive key areas of China proper and Inner Mongolia. 

Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Jap- 
anese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possi- 
bility of working out a broad-gage settlement, covering the entire 
Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this 
country stood. 

On May 14, Mr. Matsuoka, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
in the course of a conversation with Ambassador Grew, said that both 
Prince Konoe and he were determined that Japan's southward ad- 
vance should be carried out only by peaceful means, "unless," he added 
significantly, [1107] "circumstances render this impossible." 

In reply to the Ambassador's inquiry'as to what circumstances he 
had in mind, Mr. Matsuoka referred to the concentration of British 
troops in Malaya and other British measures. Wlien the Ambassador 
pointed out that such measures were of a defensive character, the 
Minister's reply was that those measures were regarded as provocative 
by the Japanese public, which might bring pressure on the Govern- 
ment to act. 

On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt proclaimed the existence of 
an "unlimited national emergency" and in a radio address on the 
same day he declared that our whole program of aid for the democ- 
racies had been based on concern for our own security. He warned 
of the conditions which would exist should Hitler be victorious. 

The President and I were sure that the proclamation would be no- 
ticed not only by Hitler but also by the Japanese war lords. 

[1108] On May 28 I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had it 
in mind before passing from our informal conversations into any ne- 



420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

gotiations with Japan to talk out in strict confidence with the Chinese 
government the general subject matter involved in the proposals. 

During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations 
for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas 
of difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points — 
the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case 
the United 'States should be involved in self-defense in the war in 
Europe ; application of the principle of noninterference in the internal 
affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from 
Chinese territory; application of the principle of nondiscrimination 
in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific and 
assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized 
that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agreement which 
would speak for itself as" an instrument of peace. 

The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals 
of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our 
views in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that 
redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that 
Japan was not committed to take action against the United States 
should the latter be drawn by [1109] self-defense into the Eu- 
ropean war. It was proposed that a further effort be made to work 
out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese 
troops in China and of the question of economic cooperation between 
China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the 
United States would discontinue aid to the Chinese Government. Var- 
ious other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarifica- 
tion or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with 
our stated principles. 

III. Japan's Warlords Disclose Their Intention of Further 

Aggression 

On June 22, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, and this action 
started a chain of developments in Japan. 

Following an Imperial conference at Tokyo on July 2, in which, 
according to an official announcement, "the fundamental national 
policy to be taken toward the present situation was decided," Japan 
proceeded with military preparation on a vast scale. One to two 
million reservists and conscripts were called up. Japanese merchant 
vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean were suddenly recalled. 
Restrictions were imposed upon travel in Japan. Strict consorship 
of mails and communications was carried out. 

During this period the Japanese press stressed the theme that 
Japan was being faced with pressure from many [HIO] coun- 
tries. It charged the United States with an intention to establish 
military bases in Kamchatka and with using the Philippine Islands 
as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." It warned that if the United 
States took further action in the direction of encircling Japan, Jap- 
anese-American relations would face a final crisis. 

In July our Government began receiving reports that a Japanese 
military movement into southern Indochina was imminent. This 
Japanese movement into southern Indochina threatened the Philip- 
pine Islands, the Netherlands East Indies, and British Malaya. It 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 421 

also threatened vital trade routes. We immediately brought these 
reports to the attention of the Japanese representatives, pointed out 
the inconsistency between such a military movement and the discus- 
sions which were then proceeding, and requested information as to 
the facts. 

On July 23, the Japanese Ambassador stated in explanation of the 
Japanese advance in Indochina that Japan needed to secure an unin- 
terrupted source of supplies and to ensure against encirclement of 
Japan militarily. The Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, replied 
that the agreement which was being discussed between the American 
and Japanese representatives would give Japan far greater economic 
security that she could gain by occupying Indochina. He pointed 
out [-?-?-?-?] that the United States policy was the opposite of 
an encirclement policy. He said that the United States could only 
regard the action of Japan "as constituting notice that Japan was 
taking the last step before proceeding on a policy of expansion and 
conquest in the region of the South Seas. Under instructions from 
me, he told the Ambassador that in these circumstances I could not 
see any basis for pursuing further the conversations with the Japanese 
Ambassador. 

Thereafter, no conversations were held on the subject of a general 
agi'eement with Japan until in August the Japanese Govermnent took 
a new initiative. 

On July 24 Presiednt Roosevelt made a proposal to the Japanese 
•Government that Indochina be regarded as a "neutralized" country. 
That proposal envisaged Japan's being given the fullest and freest 
opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food supplies and other 
raw materials which — according to Japanese accounts — Japan was 
seeking to obtain. The Japanese Government did not accept the Pres- 
ident's proposal. 

It is pertinent to allude briefly to the estimate which we made of 
the situation at this juncture. 

The hostilities between Japan and China had been in progress for 
4 years. During those years the United States had continued to fol- 
low in its relations with Japan a policy of restraint and patience. It 
had done this notwithstanding [11 1£] constant violation by 
Japanese authorities or agents of American rights and legitimate 
interests in China, in neighboring areas, and even in Japan, ancl not- 
withstanding acts and statements by Japanese officials indicating a 
policy of widespread conquest by force and even threatening the 
United States. 

The American Government had sought, while protesting against 
Japanese acts and while yielding no rights, to make clear a willingness 
to work out with Japan by peaceful processes a basis for continuance 
of amicable relations with Japan. It had been desired to give the 
Japanese every opportunity to turn of their own accord from their 
program of conquest toward peaceful policies. 

The President and I, in our efford to bring about the conclusion of 
an agreement, had endeavored to present to the Japanese Govern- 
ment a feasible alternative to Japan's indicated program of conquest. 
We had made abundantly clear our willingness to cooperate with 
Japan in a program based upon peaceful principles. We had repeat- 
edly indicated that if such a program were adopted for the Pacific, 
and if thereafter any countries or areas within the Pacific were men- 



422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

aced, our Government would expect to cooperate with other govern- 
ments in extending assistance to the region threatened. 

While these discussions were going on in Washington, [1113] 
many responsible Japanese officials were affirming in Tokyo and else- 
where Japan's determination to pursue a policy of cooperation with 
her Axis allies. Both Mr. Matsuoka and his successor as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs had declared that the Three Power Pact stood and 
that Japanese policy was based upon that pact. Large-scale prepara- 
tion by Japan for extension of her militarv activities was in progress, 
especially since early July. NotwithstancJing our efforts expressly to 
impress upon the Japanese Government our Government's concern 
and our objection to movement by Japan with use or threat of force 
into Indochina, the Japanese Government had again obtained by 
duress from the Vichy Government an authorization and Japanese 
armed forces had moved into southern Indochina, occupied bases there, 
and were consolidating themselves there for further southward 
movements. 

The Japanese move into southern Indochina was an aggravated, 
overt act. It created a situation in which the risk of war became so 
great that the United States and other countries concerned were con- 
fronted no longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from 
then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of 
their security. It was essential that the United States make a definite 
and clear move in self-defense. 

[1114-] Accordingly, on July 26, 1941, President Roosevelt 
issued an executive order freezing Chinese and Japanese assets in the 
United States. That order brought under the control of the Govern- 
ment all financial and import and export trade transactions in which 
Chinese or Japanese interests were involved. The effect of this was 
to bring about very soon virtual cessation of trade between the United 
States and Japan. 

On August 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which 
he said was intended to be responsive to the President's proposal re- 
garding neutralization of Indochina. In essence, the Japanese pro- 
posal was that ; 

1. The Japanese Government should undertake to refrain from 
stationing troops in regions of the southwest Pacific, to withdraw 
from French Indochina after "settlement of the China incident," to 
guarantee Philippine neutrality, and to cooperate in the production 
and procurement of natural resources in east Asia essential to the 
United States ; and 

2. The United States should undertake to "suspend its military 
measures in the southwestern Pacific areas" and to recommend similar 
action to the Governments of the Netherlands and Great Britain, to 
cooperate in the production and procurement of natural resources in 
the Southwestern Pacific [IH^^ essential to Japan, to take 
measures to restore normal connnerce between the United States and 
Japan, to extend its good offices toward bringing about direct nego- 
tiations between Japan and the Chungking Government, and to rec- 
ognize Japan's special position in Indochina even after withdrawal 
of Japanese troops. 

The proposals advanced by the Japanese Government completely 
ignored the President's proposal, and on August 8 I so indicated to 
the Japanese Ambassador. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 423 

The movement of Japanese forces into Indochina continued unabated 
after the President's proposal was made known to the Japanese Gov- 
ernment. Also since then Japanese forces bombed Chungking more 
intensely than ever before, Japanese troops were massing on the Thia- 
land frontier, Japan was making demands on Thialand, and Japanese 
troops were massing on the Siberian frontier of the Soviet Union. 

At the same time, on August 8 and again on August 15, an official 
Japanese spokesman declared that encirclement of Japan by the ABCD 
powers — the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Nether- 
lands — was an actual fact. The Japanese press, while affirming its 
approval of efforts by the Japanese Government to improve relations 
with the United States, stressed that the basis for any negotiations must 
be predicated upon there being under no circumstances [1116] 
any change in Japan's policies, namely, the "settlement of the China 
Incident, the firm establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and 
the Axis Alliance." 

IV. Japanese Proposal for Roosevelt-Konote Meeting 

In the conversation which I had with the Japanese Ambassador on 
August 8, the Ambassador inquired whether it might not be possible 
for the responsible heads of the two Governments to meet with a view to 
discussing means for reaching an adjustment of views. After review- 
ing briefly the steps which had led to a discontinuance of the informal 
conversations, I said that it remained to the Japanese Government to 
decide whether it could find means of shaping its policies along lines 
which would make possible an adjustment of views. 

At the Atlantic Conference in August, Mr. Churchill had informed 
President Eoosevelt that the British Government needed more time to 
prepare for resistance against a possible Japanese attack in the Far 
East. This was true also of our defense preparations. Furthermore, 
President Eoosevelt and Mr. Churchill had agreed that the American 
and British Governments should take parallel action in informing 
Japan that, in the event the Japanese Government should take further 
steps of aggression against neighboring countries, each of them would 
be compelled to take all necessary measures to [1117] safe- 
guard the legitimate rights and interests of its country and nationals 
and to insure its country's safety and security. The President and 
Mr. Churchill were also of the view that the' American Government 
should be prepared to continue its conversations with the Japanese 
Government and by such means to offer Japan a reasonable and just 
alternative to the course upon which Japan was engaged. 

Accordingly, President Roosevelt on August 17, the day of his return 
to Washington, informed the Japanese Ambassador that if the Japa- 
nese Government took any further steps in pursuance of a program of 
military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring coun- 
tries our Government would be compelled to take any and all steps 
necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests and 
toward insuring the security of the United States. At the same time 
President Roosevelt informed the Japanese Ambassador, in reply to the 
Ambassador's requests of previous weeks, that we were prepared to 
resume the conversations. 



•424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

At this meeting on August 17 the President also informed the 
Japanese Ambassador that before proceeding with plans for a meet- 
ing of the heads of the American and Japanese Governments, as 
suggested by the Japanese Government, it would be helpful if the 
Japanese Government would furnish a clearer statement than had 
as yet been given of its present attitude [m^^ and plans. 

On August 28 the President was given a message from the Jap- 
anese Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, urging that the meeting of 
the heads of the two governments be arranged to discuss all im- 
portant problems by Japan and the United States covering the en- 
tire Pacific area. Accompanying that message was a statement con- 
taining assurances, with several qualifications, of Japan's peaceful 
intent. 

The President in his reply given on September 3 expressed a 
desire to collaborate with the Japanese Prime Minister to see whether 
there could be made effective in practice a program such as that 
referred to by the Japanese Government and whether there could 
be reached a meeting of minds on fundamentals which would af- 
ford prospect of success for such a meeting. It was suggested that 
to this end there take place immediately in advance of the proposed 
meeting preliminary discussions on fundamental and essential ques- 
tions on which agreement was sought and on the manner in which 
the agreement would be applied. We felt that only in this way 
could a situation be brought about which would make such a meeting 
l)eneficial. 

On September 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a new draft of 
proposals. These proposals were much narrower than the assurances 
given in the statement communicated to [JJ19^ the President on 
August 28. In the September 6 Japanese draft the Japanese gave 
only an evasive formula with regard to their obligations under the 
Tripartite Pact. There was a qualified undertaking that Japan w^ould 
not "without any justifiable reason" resort to military action against 
any region south of Japan. No commitment was offered in regard 
to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to China; nor 
any assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China's territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in China's 
internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in wide 
areas of China, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination 
in international commercial relations. The formula contained in 
that draft that "the economic activities of the United States in China 
will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable hasis^^ 
[italic added] clearly implied a concept that the conditions under 
whicli American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to 
be conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan. 

On September 6 Prime Minister Konoe in a conversation with the 
American Ambassador at Tokyo indicated that the Japanese Govern- 
ment fully and definitely subscribed to the four principles which this 
Govornment had previously set forth as a basis for the reconstruction 
of relations with [1120] Japan. However, a month later the 
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated to the American Am- 
bassador that while these four points had been accepted "in principle," 
certain adjustments would be necessary in applying these principles to 
actual conditions. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 425 

A meeting between the President and Prince Konoe would have 
been a significant step. Decision whether it should be undertaken 
by our Government involved several important considerations. 

We knew that Japanese leaders were unreliable and treacherous. 
We asked ourselves whether the military element in Japan would 
permit the civilian element, even if so disf)osed, to stop Japan's course 
of expansion by force and to revert to peaceful courses. Time and 
again the civilian leaders gave assurances ; time and again the military 
took aggressive action in direct violation of those assurances. Japan's 
past and contemporary record was replete with instances of military 
aggression and expansion by force. Since 1931 and especially since 
1937 the military in Japan exercised a controlling voice in Japan's 
national policy. 

Japan's formal partnership with Nazi Germany in the Tripartite 
Alliance was a hard and inescapable fact. The Japanese had been 
consistently unwilling in the conversations to pledge their Govern- 
ment to renounce Japan's commitments [1121] in the alliance. 
They would not state that Japan would refrain from attacking this 
country if it became involved through self-defense in the European 
w^ar. They held on to the threat against the United States implicit in 
the alliance. 

Our Government could not ignore the fact that throughout the 
conversations the Japanese spokesmen had made a practice of offering 
general formulas and, when pressed for explanation of the meaning, 
had consistently narrowed and made more rigid their application. 
This suggested that when military leaders became aware of the 
generalizeecl formulas they insisted upon introducing conditions which 
watered down the general assurances. 

A meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister 
would have had important psychological results. 

It would have had a critically discouraging effect upon the Chinese. 

If the proposed meeting should merely endorse general principles, 
the Japanese in the light of their past practice could have been expected 
to utilize such general principles in support of any interpretation 
which Japan might choose to place upon them. 

If the proposed meeting did not produce an agreement, the Japa- 
nese military leaders would then have been in a position to declare that 
the United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting. 

{1122'] The Japanese had already refused to agree on any pre- 
liminary steps toward reversion to peaceful courses as for example 
adopting the President's proposal of July 24, regarding the neutrali- 
zation of Indochina. Instead they steadily moved on with their pro- 
gram of establishing themselves more firmly in Indochina. 

It was clear to us that unless the meeting produced concrete and 
clear-cut commitments toward peace, the Japanese would have dis- 
torted the significance of the meeting in such a way as to weaken 
greatly this country's moral position and to facilitate their aggres- 
sive course. 

The acts of Japan under Konoe's Prime Ministership could not be 
overlooked. 

He had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan 
attacked China and when huge Japanese armies poured into that 
country and occupied its principal cities and industrial regions. 



426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces attacked the 
U. S. S. Panay on the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937. 

He was Prime Minister when Jauanese armed forces committed 
notorious outrages in Nanking in 1937. 

He as Prime Minister had proclaimed in 1938 the basic principles 
upon which the Japanese Government, even through- [1123] out 
the 1941 conversations, stated that it would insist in any peace agree- 
ment with China. Those principles in application included stationing 
large bodies of Japanese troops in north China. They would have 
enabled Japan to retain a permanent strangle hold on China. 

He had been Prime Minister when the Japanese Government con- 
cluded in 1940 with the Chinese quisling regime at Nanking a 
"treaty" embodying the strangle hold principles mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph. 

Prince Konoe had been Japanese Prime Minister when Japan 
signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940. 

As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese over 
a period of months, in which they showed no disposition to abondon 
their course of conquest, we were thoroughly satisfied that a meeting 
with Kanoe could only result either in another Munich or in nothing 
at all, unless Japan was ready to give some clear evidence of a 
purpose to move in a peaceful direction. I was opposed to the first 
Munich and still more opposed to a second Munich. 

Our Government ardently desired peace. It could not brush away 
the realities in the situation. 

Although the President would, as he said, "have been happy to 
travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan," it was felt 
that in view of the factors mentioned [11^4-] the President 
could go to such a meeting only if there were first obtained tentative 
commitments offering some assurance that the meeting could accom- 
plish good. Neither Prince Konoye nor any of Japan's spokesmen 
provided anything tangible. 

At various times during September discussions were held with the 
Japanese. On September 27 the Japanese Ambassador presented a 
complete new redraft of the Japanese proposals. He urged an early 
reply. 

On October 2, I gave the Japanese Ambassador a memorandum 
of an "oral statement" reviewing^ significant developments in the 
conversations and explaining our Government's attitude toward vari- 
ous points in the Japanese proposals which our Government did 
not consider consistent with the principles to which this country was 
committed. Disappointment was expressed over the narrow char- 
acter of the outstanding Japanese proposals, and questions' were 
raised in regard to Japan's intentions regarding the indefinite station- 
ing of Japanese troops in wide areas of China and regarding Japan's 
relationship to the Axis Powers. While welcoming the Japanese 
suggestion of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime 
Minister, we proposed, in order to lay a firm foundation for such a 
meeting, that renewed consideration be given to fundamental prin- 
ciples so as to reach a meeting of the minds on essential questions. 
It was stated in [11£6] conclusion that the subject of the meet- 
ing proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought had 
engaged the close and active interest of the President and that it was 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 427 

the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental ques- 
tions might be so developed that such a meeting could be held. 

During this period there was a further advance of Japanese armed 
forces in Indochina, Japanese military preparations at home were 
increased and speeded up, and there continued Japanese bombing of 
Chinese civilian populations, constant agitation in the Japanese press 
in support of extremist policies, and the unconciliatory and bellicose 
utterances of Japanese leaders. 

For example, Capt. Hideo Hiraide, director of the naval intel- 
ligence section of Imperial Headquarters, was quoted on October 16 
as having declared in a public speech : 

America, feeling her insecurity ... is carrying out naval expansion on 
a large scale. But at present America is unable to carry out naval operations 
in both the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneou.ly. 

The imperial navy is prepared for the worst and has completed all necessary 
preparations. In fact, the imperial navy is itching [1126] for action, when 
needed. 

In spite of strenuous efforts by the Government, the situation is now approach- 
ing a final parting of the ways. The fate of our empire depends upon^how we 
act at this moment. It is certain that at such a moment our Navy should set 
about on its primary mission. 

[11£7] V. Tojo Cabinet and Continuation of Conversations 

On October 16, 1941 the Konoe Cabinet fell. On the following day 
it was replaced by a new cabinet, headed by General Tojo. 

The new cabinet informed our Government that it desired to continue 
the exploratory conversations looking to peace in the Pacific and to an 
agreement with the United States. But it showed no willingness to 
effect any fundamental modification of the Japanese position. In- 
stead, Japanese bellicose utterances continued. 

On October 17 the American press carried the following statement 
by Major General Kiyofuku Oamoto : 

Despite the different views advanced on the .Japanese-American question, our 
national policy for solution of the China affair and establishment of a common 
co-prosperity sphere in East Asia remains unaltered. 

For fultillment of this national policy, this country has sought to reach an 
agreement of views with the U. S. by means of diplomatic means. There is, how- 
ever, a limit to our concessions, and the negotiations may end in a break with the 
worst possible situation following. The people must therefore be resolved to cope 
with such a situation. 

Clearly, the Japanese warlords expected to clinch their [11^8^ 
policy of aggrandizement and have the United States make all the 
concessions. 

On October 30 the Japanese Foreign Minister told the American 
Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired that the conversa- 
tions be concluded successfully without delay and he said that "in order 
to make progress, the United States should face certain realities and 
:facts," and he thereupon cited the stationing in China of Japanese 
tirmed forces. 

The general world situation continued to be very critical, rendering 
it desirable that every reasonable effort be made to avoid or at least to 
■defer as long as possible any rupture in the conversations. From here 
on for some weeks especially intensive study was given in the Depart- 
ment of State to the possibility of reaching some stop-gap arrangement 
with the Japanese so as to tide over the immediate critical situation and 



428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

thus to prevent a breakdown in the conversations, and even perhaps to 
pave the way for a subsequent general ajrreement. The presentation to 
the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to keep alive the con- 
versations would also fjive our Army and Navy time to prepare and to 
expose Japan's bad faith if it did not accept. We considered every 
kind of suggestion we could find which might help or keep alive the 
conversations and at the same time be consistent with the integrity of 
American principles. 

[1139] In the last part of October and early November messages 
came to this Government from United States Army and Navy officers 
in China and from Generalissimo Chaing Kai-shek stating that he 
believed that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent. ^ The 
Generalissimo requested that the United States send air units to 
China to defeat this threat. He made a similar request of the British 
Government. He also asked- that the United States issue a warning 
to Japan. 

At this time the Chinese had been resisting the Japanese invaders 
for 4 years. China sorely needed equipment. Its economic and finan- 
cial situations were very bad. Morale was naturally low. In view 
of this, even though a Chinese request might contain points with 
which we could not comply, we dealt with any such request in a 
spirit of utmost consideration befitting the gravity of the situation 
confronting our hard-pressed Chinese friends. 

I suggested that the War and Navy Departments study this Chi- 
nese appeal. In response, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval 
Operations sent a memorandum of November 5 to the President 
giving an estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation. At the 
conclusion of this estimate the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval 
Operations recommended : 

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for [1130] intervention 
against .Japan in China be disapproved. 

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant M'ith the needs of 
Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces. 

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to 
the maximum practicable extent. 

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. 

I was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff 
and the Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces 
should not be sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed 
so far as American foreign policy considerations were involved that 
material aid to China should be accelerated as much as feasible, and 
that aid to the American Volunteer Group should be accelerated. 
Finally, I concurred completely in the view that no ultimatum should 
be delivered to Japan. I hacl been striving for months to avoid a 
showdown with Japan, and to explore every possible avenue for 
averting or delaying war between the United States and Japan. 
That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President and I 
were putting forth with our utmost patience. 

On November 14 the President replied to Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek, in line with the estimate and recommendations contained 
in the memorandum of November 5 of the Chief of Staff and the 
Chief of Naval Operations. The [llSl] Generalissimo was 
told that from our information it did not appear that a Japanese land 
campaign against Kunming was immediately imminent. It was indi- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 429 

cated that American air units could not be sent and tliat the United 
States Avoiild not issue a warning- but there were outlined ways, men- 
tioned in the memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval 
Operations, in which the United States would continue to assist Chinn. 

On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was 
the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to 
ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he 
turned to me and asked wliether I had anything in mind. I thereupon 
pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international 
situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with 
Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely 
critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack 
anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went 
around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. 
It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation mijiht 
well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if 
possible, be better prepared for such a development. 

Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an [1132] 
address on November 1 1, 1941 , in which he stated that we were not only 
confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in 
the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the 
other side of the world — on the far side of the Pacific" ; and the Pacific 
no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense. 

On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address 
stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had 
reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the 
Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all 
nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were 
breaking high both in the East and in the West", he said, and and were 
threatening, more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our 
own shores." He warned that the United States was in far greater 
peril than in 1917 ; that "at any moment war may be forced upon us." 

Early in November the Japanese Government decided to send Mr. 
Saburo Kurusu to Washington to assist the Japanese Ambassador in 
the conversations. 

On November 7 the Japanese Ambassador handed me a document 
containing draft provisions relating to Japanese forces in China. 
Japanese forces in Indochina, and the [1133] principle of non- 
discrinnnation. That proposal contained nothing fundamentally new 
or offering any real recessions from the position consistently main- 
tained by the Japanese Government. 

In telegrams of November 3 and November 17 the American Am- 
bassador in Japan cabled warnings of the possibility of sudden Jap- 
anese attacks which might make inevitable war with the United States. 

In the first half of November there were several indeterminate 
conversations with the Japanese designed to clarify specific points. 
On November 15 I gave the Japanese Ambassador an outline for a 
possible joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic 
policy. I pointed out that this represented but one part of the 
general settlement we had in mind. This draft declaration of eco- 
nomic policy envisaged that Japan could join with the United States 
in leading the way toward a general application of economic prac- 
tices which would give Japan much of what her leaders professed to 
desire. 



430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

On November 12 the Japanese Foreign Office, both through Ambas- 
sador Grew and through their Ambassador here, urged that the con- 
versations be brouglit to a settlement at the earliest possible time. In 
view of the pressing insistence of the Japanese for a definitive reply 
to their outstanding [^i34] proposals, I was impelled to com- 
ment to the Japanese Ambassador on November 15 that the American 
Government did not feel that it should be receiving such representa- 
tions, suggestive of ultimatums. 

On November 15 Mr. Kurusu reached Washington. On November 
17 he and the Japanese Ambassador called on me and later on the 
same day on the President. 

In those conversations Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Prime 
Minister, General Tojo, seemed optimistic in regard to adjusting the 
question of applying the principle of nondiscrimination and the ques- 
tion of Japan's relation to the Tripartite Alliance, but he indicated 
that it would be difficult to withdraw Japanese troops from China. 
Mr. Kurusu offered no new suggestions on those two points. This 
was further evidence that Japan was bent on exercising a position of 
military, political, and economic control and dominance of China. 
The President made clear the desire of this country to avoid war 
between our two countries and to bring about a settlement on a fair 
and peaceful basis in the Pacific area. 

On November 18 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called 
on me. In that conversation the question of Japan's relation to the 
Tripartite Pact was discussed at length. I asked the Japanese Am- 
bassador if he did not think that something could be worked out on 
this vital question. The [IISS] Ambassador made no helpful 
comment in regard to the continued stationing of Japanese troops in 
China. 

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu suggested the possibility of a 
temporary arrangement or a modus vivendi. The Ambassador brought 
up the possibility of going back to the status which existed before 
the date in July when, following the Japanese entry into southern 
French Indochina, the United States put freezing measures into effect. 

I said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo 
on the strength of such a step by Japan as the Ambassador had men- 
tioned, we would not know whether the troops to be withdrawn from 
French Indochina would be diverted to some equally objectionable 
movement elsewhere. I said that it would be difficult for our Gov- 
ernment to go a long way in removing the embargo unless we believed 
tliat Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had re- 
nounced purposes of conquest. I said that I would consult with the 
representatives of other countries on this suggestion. On the same 
day I informed the British Minister of my talk with the Japanese 
about the suggestion of a temporary limited arrangement. 

On November 19 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu again 
called on me at their request. During that conversation the Ambas- 
sador made it clear that Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite Al- 
liance and felt bound to carry out its obligations. 

[11361 VI. Japanese Ultimatum of November 20 and 

Our Reply 

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu pre- 
sented to me a proposal which on its face was extreme. I knew, as 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 431 

did other high officers of the Government, from intercepted Japanese 
messages supplied to me by the War and Navy Departments, that 
this proposal was the final Japanese proposition — an ultimatum. 
The proposal read as follows : 

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to 
make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern Asia 
and the Southern I'acific area excepting the part of French Indochina where the 
Japanese troops are stationed at present. 

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now etationed. 
in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and 
China or the establishment of an equitable peace in tbe Pacific Area. 

In the meantime tlie Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to 
remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to 
the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present ar- 
rangement which shall later be embodied [1137] in the final agreemept. 

3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view 
to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two coun- 
tries need in Netherlands East Indies. 

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to 
restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of 
the assets. 

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity- 
of oil. 

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such 
measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration^ 
of general peace between Japan and China. 

The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United 
States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspen- 
sion of freezing measures, for discontinuance by the United States 
of aid to China, and for withdrawal of moral and material support 
from the recognized Chinese Government. It contained a provision 
that Japan would shift her armed forces from southern Indochina 
to northern Indochina, but placed no limit on the number of armed' 
forces which Japan might send into Indochina and made no pro- 
vision for withdrawal of those forces until after either the restoration 
[1138] of peace between Japan and China or the establishment 
of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there were stipula- 
tions against further extension of Japan's armed force into south- 
eastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were 
no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh Jap- 
anese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the- 
north of Indochina — for example, China and the Soviet Union. The 
proposal contained no provisions pledging Japan to abandon aggres- 
sion and to revert to peaceful courses. 

On November 21 Mr. Kurusu called alone upon me and gave me a 
draft of a formula relating to Japan's obligations under the Tri- 
partite Pact. That formula did not offer anything new or helpful. 
I asked Mr. Kurusu whether he had anything more to offer on the 
subject of a peaceful settlement as a whole. Mr. Kurusu replied 
that he did not. 

On November 21 we received word from the Dutch that they 
had information that a Japanese force had arrived near Palao, the 
nearest point in the Japanese Mandated Islands to the heart of the 
Netherlands Indies. Our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon had been 
reporting extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment 
in Indochina. We had information through intercepted Japanese- 



432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

messages that tlie Japanese Government had decided that the negotia- 
tions must [1139] be terminated by November 25, later ex- 
tended to November 20. We knew from other intercepted Japanese 
messages that the Japanese did not intend to make any concessions, 
and from this fact taken together with Kurusu's statement to me of 
November 21 makinof clear that his Government had nothins; further 
to offer, it was plain, as I have mentioned, that the Japanese proposal 
of November 20 Avas in fact their "absolutely final proposal." 

The whole issue presented was whether Japan would yield in her 
avowed movement of conquest or whether we would yield the funda- 
mental pnnciples for which we stood in the Pacific and all over the 
world. By mid-summer of 1941 we were jDretty well satisfied that 
the Japanese were determined to continue with their course of ex- 
pansion by force. We had made it clear to them that we were stand- 
ing fast by our principles. It was evident, however, that they were 
playing for the chance that M'e might be overawed into yielding by 
their threats of force. They were armed to the teeth and we knew 
they would attack whenever and wherever they pleased. If by 
chance we should have yielded our fundamental principles, Japan 
would probably not have attacked for the time being — at least not 
until she had consolidated the gains she would have made without 
fighting. 

There was never any question of this country's forcing [11401 
Japan to fight. The question was whether this country was ready to 
sacrifice its principles. 

To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was 
clearly unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally 
of Japan in Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of col- 
laboration with Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japa- 
nese demand that the United States abandon its principles and 
policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under 
intimidation. 

The situation was critical and virtually hopeless. On the one 
hand our Government desired to exhaust all possibilities of finding 
a means to a peaceful solution and to avert or delay an armed clash, 
especially as the heads of this country's armed forces continued to 
empliasize the need of time to prepare for resistance. On the other 
hand, Japan was calling for a showdown. 

There the situation stood — the Japanese unyielding and intimi- 
dating in their demands and we standing firmly for our principles. 

The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically 
v^anished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws. 

Three possible choices presented themselves. 

Our Government might have made no reply. The Japanese 
[ll^n warlords could then have told their people that the Amer- 
ican Government not only would make no reply but would also not 
offer any alternative. 

Our Government might have rejected flatly the Japanese proposal. 
In that event the Japanese warlords would be afforded a pretext, 
although wholly false, for military attack. 

Our Government might endeavor to present a reasonable counter- 
proposal. 

Tlie last course was the one chosen. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 433 

In considering the content of a counter-proposal consideration was 
given to the inchision therein of a possible modus vivendi. Such a 
project would have the advantages of showing our interest in peace 
to the last and of exposing the Japanese somewhat in case they 
should not accept. It would, if it had served to prolong the conver- 
sations, have gained time for the Army and Navy to prepare. The 
project of a modus vivendi was discussed and given intensive con- 
sideration from November 22 to November 26 within the Department 
of State, by the President, and by the highest authorities of the 
Army and Navy. A first draft was completed on November 22 and 
revised drafts on Novembsr 24 and 25. It was also discussed with 
the British, Australian, Dutch, and Chinese Governments. 

The projected modus vivendi provided for mutual pledges by the 
United States and Japan that their national policies [114^] 
would be directed toAvard lasting peace; for mutual undertakings 
against advances by military force or threat of force in the Pacific 
area ; for withdrawal by Japan of its armed forces from southern 
Indochina; for a modification by the United States of its freezing 
and export restrictions to permit resumption of certain categories of 
trade, within certain specified limits, between the United States and 
Japan; for the corresponding modification by Japan of its freezing 
and export restrictions; and for an approach by the United States 
to the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to 
their taking similar measures. There was also an affirmation by the 
United States of its fundamental interest that any settlement between 
the Japanese and Chinese Governments be based upon the principles 
of peace, law, order, and justice. There was provision that the modus 
vivendi would remain in force for three months and would be subject 
to further extension. 

It was proposed as a vital part of the modus vivendi at the same 
time to give to the Japanese for their consideration an outline of a 
peace settlement which might serve as a basis for working out a com- 
prehensive settlement for the Pacific area alone broad and just lines. 
On November 11 there had been prepared in the Division of Far 
Eastern Affairs for possible consideration a draft of a proposal along 
broad lines. [1143] This draft like others was drawn up with a 
view to keeping the conversations going (and thus gaining time) and 
to leading, if accepted, to an eventual comprehensive settlement of a 
nature compatible with American principles. This draft proposal 
contained statements of general principles, including the four princi- 
ples which I had presented to the Japanese on April 16, and a state- 
ment of principles in regard to economic policy. Under this draft 
the United States would suggest to the Chinese and Japanese Govern- 
ments that they enter into peace negotiations, and the Japanese Gov- 
ernment would offer the Chinese Government an armistice during the 
period of the peace negotiations. The armistice idea was dropped 
because it would have operated unfairly in Japan's favor. 

A further proposal to which I gave attention was a revision in ten- 
tative form made by the Department on November 19 of a draft of a 
proposed comprehensive settlement received from the Treasury De- 
partment on the previous day. This tentative proposal was discussed 
with the War and Navy Departments. In subsequent revisions points 
to which objections were raised by them were dropped. A third pro- 
posal which I had under consideration was that of the modus vivendi. 

79716— 46— pt. 2 4 



434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

What I considered presenting to the Japanese from about 
[im] November 22 to November 26 consisted of our modus 
Vivendi draft and an outline of a peace statement which might serve 
as a basis for working out a comprehensive settlement for the Pacihc 
area along broad and just lines. This second and more comprehen- 
sive part followed some of the lines set forth in the November 11 
draft and in the November 19 draft. 

While the modus vivendi proposal was still under consideration, I 
emphasized the critical nature of this country's relations with Japan 
at the meeting of the War Council on November 25. The AVar Council, 
which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of State, War and 
Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort 
of a clearing house for all the information and views which we were 
currently discussing with our respective contacts and m our respective 
circles. The high lights in the developments at a particular juncture 
were invariably reviewed at those meetings. At that meeting I also 
gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were 
already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and 
desperate. They were likely to break out anywhere, at any time, at 
any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their 
plans. I felt that virtually the last stage had been reached and that 
the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the 
Army and the Navy. 

[1.14^5] In a "message of November 24 to Mr. Churchill, tele- 
graphed through the Department, President Roosevelt added to an 
explanation of our proposed modus vivendi the words, "I am not very 
hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon." 

On the evening of November 25 and on November 26 I went over 
again the considerations relating to our proposed plan, especially the 
modus vivendi aspect. 

As I have indicated, all the successive drafts, of November 22, of 
November 24 and of November 25 contained two things: (1) the pos- 
sible modus vivendi; and (2) a statement of principles, with a sug- 
gested example of how those principles could be applied — that which 
has since been commonly described as the 10-point proposal. 

I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese 
military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were 
demanding — and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and ex- 
tended later to November 29, for — acceptance by our Government of 
their extreme, last-word proposal of November 20. 

It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and 
other high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our 
proposal was remote. 

So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared [JH^] 
to the Japanese, it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape 
of some cotton, oil and a few other commodities in very limited quan- 
tities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were 
demanding. 

It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from 
American opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal espe- 
cially to the supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The 
Chinese Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested 
governments were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 435 

were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the 
plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrange- 
ment would have been a major blow to Chinese morale. In view of 
these considerations it became clear that the slight prospects of Japan's 
agreeing to the modus vivendi did not warrant assuming the risks 
involved in proceeding with it, especially the serious risk of collapse of 
Chinese morale and resistance and even of disintegration of China. It 
therefore became perfectly evident that the modus vivendi aspect 
would not be feasible. 

The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they 
were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge 
and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of 
appeasing Japan. In view [iH7] of the resulting confusion, 
it seemed important to restate the fundamentals. We could offer 
Japan once more what we offered all countries, a suggested program 
of collaboration along peaceful and mutually beneficial and progres- 
sive lines. It had always been open to Japan to accept that kind of 
a program and to move in that direction. It still was possible for 
Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's decision. Our hope 
that Japan would so decide had been virtually extinguished. Yet it 
was felt desirable to put forth this further basic effort, in the form of 
one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be worked out in our 
future conversations, on the principle that no effort should be spared to 
test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement. 

In the light of the foregoing considerations, on November 26 I 
recommended to the President — and he approved — my calling in the 
Japanese representatives and handing them the broad basic pro- 
posals while withholding the modus vivendi plan. This was done in 
the late afternoon of that day. 

The document handed the Japanese representatives on November 
26 was divided into two parts : 

The first part of the document handed the Japanese was marked 
"Oral." In it was reviewed briefly the objective sought in the 
exploratory conversations, namely, that of reaching if possible a 
settlement of questions relating to the [i^4S] entire Pacific 
area on the basis of the principles of peace, law and order and fair 
dealing among nations. It was stated that it was believed that some 
progress had been made in reference to general principles. Note was 
taken of a recent statement by the Japanese Ambassador that the 
Japanese Government desired to continue the conversations directed 
toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement. 

In connection with the Japanese proposals of November 20 for a 
modus vivendi, it was stated that the American Government most 
earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuance of 
discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working 
out a broad-gage program of peace throughout the Pacific area. 
Our Government stated that in its opinion some features of the 
Japanese proposals of November 20 conflicted with the fundamental 
principles which formed a part of the general settlement under con- 
sideration and to which each government had declared that it was 
committed. 

Our Government suggested that further effort be made to resolve 
the divergences of views in regard to the practical application of 
the fundamental principles already mentioned. Our Government 



436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

stated that with this object in view it offered "for the consideration 
of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement 
covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a 
prooram which this Government envisages as something to be worked 
out during our further conversations." 

The second part of the document embodied the plan itself which 
•was in two sections. 

In section I there was outlined a mutual declaration of policy con- 
taining afiirmations that the'national policies of the two countries were 
directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two coun- 
tries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and 
that they would give support to certain fundamental principles of 
peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations 
would be based. These principles were stated as follows : 

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
each and all nations. 

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. 

(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity 
and treatment. 

(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation ami conciliation 
for the provention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement 
of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. 

This statement of policy and of principle closely followed [1150'\ 
the line of what had been presented to the Japanese on several previous 
occasions beginning in April. 

In section I there was also a provision for mutual pledges to support 
and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other 
nations and peoples liberal economic principles. These principles were 
enumerated. They were based upon the general principle of equality 
of commercial opportunity and treatment. 

This suggested provision for mutual pledges with respect to eco- 
nomic relations closely followed the line of what had previously been 
presented to the Japanese. 

In section II there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the 
two governments. One unilateral commitment was suggested, an 
undertaking by Japan that she would withdraw all military, naval, air 
and police forces from China and from Indochina. Mutual conunit- 
ments were suggested along the following lines: 

(a) To endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the 
governnjents principally concerned in the Pacific area; 

(b) To endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments 
an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and not to seek 
or accept preferential economic treatment therein ; 

[1151] (c) Not to support any government in China other than the National 
Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking; 

(d) To relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor 
to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give 
up those rights; 

(e) To negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored- nation 
treatment ; 

(f) To remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds 
of the other; 

(g) To jigree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate with Japan 
and the United States each furnishing half of the fund ; 

(h) To agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third 
power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the funda- 
mental purpose of this agreement ; and 

(i) To use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic 
political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 437 

The document handed the Japanese on November 26 was essentially 
a restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country's 
foreign policy. The practical application of those principles to the 
situation in the Fur East, [1152] as embodied in the ten points 
contained in the document, was along lines which had been under dis- 
cussion with the Japanese representatives in the course of the informal 
exploratory conversations during the months preceding delivery of tlie 
document in question. Our Government's proposal embodied mutually 
profitable policies of the kind we were prepared to offer to any friendly 
country and was coaipled with the suggestion tliat the proposal be made 
the basis for further conversations. 

A vital part of our program of standing firm for our principles 
was to offer other countries worthwhile plans which would be highly 
profitable to them as well as to ourselves. We stood firmly for these 
principles in the face of the Japanese demand that we abandon them. 
For this course there are no apologies. 

Our Government's proposal Avas offered for the consideration of the 
Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be 
worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either 
Government was free to offer. 

We well knew that, in view of Japan's refusal throughout the con- 
versations to abandon her policy of conquest and domination, there 
"was scant likelihood of her acceptance of this plan. But it is the task 
of statesmanship to leave no possibility for peace unexplored, no 
matter how slight. [1153] It was in this spirit that the Novem- 
ber 26 document was given to the Japanese Government. 

When handing the document of November 26 to the Japanese repre- 
sentatives, I said that the proposed agreement would render possible 
practical measures of financial cooperation which, however, had not 
been referred to in the outline for fear that they might give rise to 
misunderstanding. I added also that I had earlier informed the Am- 
bassador of my ambition of settling the immigration question but that 
the situation had so far prevented me from realizing that ambition. 

It is not surprising that Japanese propaganda, especially after Japan 
had begun to suffer serious defeats, has tried to distort and give a false 
meaning to our memorandum of November 26 by referring to it as an 
"ultimatum". This was in line with a well-known Japanese char- 
acteristic of utilizing completely false and flimsy pretexts to delude 
their people and gain their support for militaristic depredations and 
aggrandizement. 

VII. The Last Phase 

After November 26 the Japanese representatives at their request 
saw the President and me on several occasions. Nothing new devel- 
oped on the subject of a peaceful agreement. 

On November 26 following delivery of our Government's proposal 
to the Japanese Ambassador, correspondents were [1154] in- 
formed by an official of the Department of State that the Japanese rep- 
resentatives had been handed a document for their consideration. This 
document, they were informed, was the culmination of conferences 
during recent weeks and rested on certain basic principles with which 
the correspondents would be entirely familiar in the light of many 
repetitions. 



438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

On November 27 I had a special and lengthy press conference at 
which I told the correspondents they were free to use the information 
given them as their own or as having come from authoritative sources. 

I said that from the beginning I had been keeping in mind, and I 
suggested that the correspondents keep in mind, that the groups in 
Japan led by the military leaders had a plan of conquest by force of 
about one-half of the earth with one-half of its population. They had 
a plan to impose on this one-half of the earth a military control of 
political affairs, economic affairs, social affairs, and moral affairs of 
each population very much as Hitler was doing in Europe. 

I said tliat this movement in the Far East started in earnest in 1937. 
It carried with it a policy of non-observance of any standards of con- 
duct in international relations or of any law or of any rule of justice 
or fair play. 

From the beginning, we, as one of the leading free countries, had 
sought to keep alive the basic philosophy and [11551 principles 
governing the opposing viewpoint in international relations, that is, 
government by law, government by orderly processes, based on justice 
and morals and principles that would preserve absolutely the freedom 
of each country ; principles of noninterference in the domestic affairs of 
other countries ; the preservation inviolate of the sovereignty and terri- 
torial integrity of other countries; the peaceful settlement of disputes; 
equality of commercial opportunities and relations. These and other 
principles that go along with them have been, I pointed out, the touch- 
stone of all of our activities in the conduct of our foreign policy. We 
had striven to impress them on other countries, to keep them alive as' 
the world was going more and more to a state of international anarchy. 
We had striven to preserve their integrity. That was no easy 
undertaking. 

I said that in the spring of 1941 there had come up the question of 
conferences with the Japanese on the subject of peace. The purpose 
was to ascertain whether a peaceful settlement relating to the entire 
Pacific area was possible. 

I mentioned that for a considerable time there had been two oppos- 
ing groups in Japan. One was the military group, sometimes led by 
military extremists. They had seemed to be in the saddle when the 
China undertaking in 1937 was decided upon. As the Chinese under- 
taking went on, there was an [HoG] opposing group in Japan, 
representing honest lovers of peace and law and order. Another por- 
tion of this group comprised those who personally favored the policy 
of force and conquest but considered that the time was not propitious, 
for different reasons, to undertake it. Some of this group were inclined 
to oppose Japan's policy because of the unsatisfactory experience of 
Japan in Cliina and of what they regarded as Japan's unsatisfactory 
relations with Germany under tlie Tripartite Pact. 

I said that our conference with the Japanese during the preceding 
several months had been purely exploratory. 

During that time I kept other countries who had interest in that 
area informed in a general way. 

I pointed out that for the previous 10 days or so we had explored 
all phases of the basic questions presented and of suggestions or ideas 
or methods of bringing Japan and the United States as close together 
as possible, on the theory that that might have been the beginning of 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 439 

some peaceful and cordial relations between Japan and other nations 
of the Pacific, including our own. 

During the conversations, I said we had to keep in mind many 
angles. We had to keep in mind phases not only of the political situ- 
ation but of the Army and Navy situation. As an illustration, I cited 
the fact that we had known for [11671 some days from the 
facts and circumstances which revealed themselves steadily that the 
Japanese were pouring men and materials and boats and all kinds of 
equipment into Indochina. One qualified observer reported the num- 
ber of Japanese forces in southern Indochina as 128,000. That may 
have been too high as yet. But a large military movement was taking 
place. There was a further report that the Japanese Navy might make 
attacks somewhere there around Siam, any time within a few days. 

I told the correspondents that we were straining Heaven and Earth 
to work out understandings that might mitigate the situation before 
it got out of hand, in charge, as it was to a substantial degree, of 
Japanese military extremists. 

Referring to Indochina, I said that if the Japanese established 
themselves there in adequate numbers, which they seemed to be doing, 
they not only had a base for operations against China but they would 
be a distinct menace to the whole South Sea area. When we saw what 
this signified in extra danger, naturally we explored every kind of 
way to avaid that sort of menace and threat. 

I said that we had had the benefit of every kind of view. Some 
charged us with appeasement, others with having let other countries 
down. All the time we had been working at just the opposite. All 
these various views were made in good faith and no fault attached 
to the proponents thereof. [1168] This was just a condition 
which was not without its benefits. 

We had exhausted all of our efforts to work out phases of this 
matter with the Japanese. Our efforts had been put forth to facili- 
tate the making of a general agreement. We wanted to facilitate the 
conversations and keep them from breaking down but at all times 
keeping thoroughly alive the basic principles that we had been pro- 
claiming and practicing during all those years. 

On November 26, I continued, I found there had been so much con- 
fusion and so many collateral matters brought in along with high 
Japanese officials in Tokyo proclaiming their old doctrines of force, 
that I thought it important to bring the situation to a clear perspec- 
tive. So I had recounted and restated the fundamental principles 
and undertook to make application of them to a number of specific 
conditions such as would logically go into a broad basic peaceful 
settlement in the Pacific area. 

There had been every kind of suggestion made as we had gone along 
in the conversations. I said that I had considered everything in the 
way of suggestions from the point of view whether it would facilitate 
keep alive, and if possible carry forward conversations looking toward 
a general agreement, all the while naturally preserving the fullest 
integrity of every principle for which we stood. I had sought to 
examine [1169] everything possible but always to omit con- 
sideration of any proposal that would contemplate the stoppage of the 
conversations and search for a general agreement for peace. 

To a correspondent's question whether I expected the Japanese to 
come back and talk further on the basis of what I gave them on No- 



440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

vember 26, 1 said that I did not know but, as I had indicated, the Japa- 
nese might not do that. I referred to the military movements which 
they were making and said I thought the correspondents would want 
to see whether the Japanese had any idea of renewing the conver- 
sations. 

In reply to a further question whether in order to conform to the 
basic principles of our Government's policy it would be necessary for 
the Japanese to withdraw the troops they were sending to the south- 
ward, I said, "Yes." In reply to another question as to whether it 
would not mean withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Indo- 
china, I said that of course our program announced in 1937 covered 
all that. The question of getting the troops out of China had been 
a bone of contention. 

In reply to a question whether the assumption was correct that there 
was not much hope that the Japanese would accept our principles and 
go far enough to afford a basis for continuing the conversations, I said 
that there was always a possibility but that I would not say how much 
[IIGO] probability there might be. 

In reply to a question whether the Japanese had proved adamant 
on the question of withdrawing from the Axis, I replied that they 
were still in it. 

In reply to a question whether the situation took action rather than 
words from the Japanese, I said this was unquestionably so, but it 
took words first to reach some kind of an understanding that would 
lead to action. 

In reply to a question how the Japanese explained these military 
movements to the south, I replied that they did not explain. 

On November 28, at a meeting of the War Council, I reviewed the 
November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese, and 
pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement 
being achieved with Japan. I emphasized that in my opinion the 
Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of con- 
quest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was 
in the hands of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I ex- 
pressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should 
include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of 
surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at 
various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of 
defense and of [-?-?^-?] coordination. 

On November 29 I expressed substantially the same views to the 
British Ambassador. 

I said the same things all during those days to many of my. contacts. 

On November 25 the American Consul at Hanoi, Indochina, had 
communicated to the Department a report that the Japanese in- 
tended to launch an attack on the Kra Peninsula about December 
1, and he reported also further landings of troops and military 
equipment in Indochina in addition to landings he had previously 
reported from time to time. On November 26 the American consul 
at Saigon had reported the arrival of heavy Japanese reinforce- 
ments in Southern Indochina, supplementing arrivals he had re- 
gorted earlier that month. On November 29 the Department of 
tate instructed its posts in southeast Asia to telegraph information 
of military or naval movements directly to Manila for the Com- 
mander in Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 441 

On November 30, I was informed by the British Ambassador that 
the British Government had important indications that Japan was 
about to attack Siam-and that this attack would inchide a sea-borne 
expedition to seize strategic points in the Kra Isthmus. 

In a message from Premier Tojo to a public rally on [llO^I 
November 30 under the sponsorship of the Imperial Kule Assistance 
Association and the "Great Japan East Asia League" he stated among 
other things that — 

The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, 
and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in 
his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and 
the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by putting 
(pitting?) the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony 
of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the United States. 

For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice 
fi'om East Asia with a vengeance. 

[1163] On that day, Sunday, November 30, after conferring with 
our military regarding the Japanese Prime Minister's bellicose state- 
ment and the increasing gravity of the Far Eastern situation, I 
telephoned the President at Warm Springs and advised him to 
advance the date of his return to Washington. Accordingly, the 
President returned to Washington on December 1. 

On December 2 the President directed that inquiry be made at 
once of the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in regard to the 
reasons for continued Japanese troop movements into Indochina. 

On December 3 I reviewed in press conference certain of the points 
covered by me on November 27. I said that we had not reached 
any more advanced stage of determining questions either in a pre- 
liminary or other way than we had in November. 

On December 5 the Japanese Ambassador called and presented a 
reply to the President's inquiry of December 2, containing the spe- 
cious statement that Japanese reinforcements had been sent to Indo- 
china as a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in bordering 
Chinese territory. 

On December 6 our Government received from a number of sources 
reports of the movement of a Japanese fleet of 35 transports, 8 
cruisers, and 20 destroyers from Indochina toward the Kra Pen- 
insula. This was confirmation that the [1161^] long-threatened 
Japanese movement of expansion by force to the south was under way. 
The critical character of this development, which placed the United 
States and its friends in common imminent danger, was very much in 
all our minds, and was an important subject of my conference with 
representatives of the Army and Navy on that and the following day. 

On December 6, President Roosevelt telegraphed a personal appeal 
to the Emperor of Japan that the "tragic possibilities" in the situation 
be averted. 

On December 7, the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor. 

Throughout the critical years culminating in Pearl Harbor and 
especially during the last months, the President, the Secretary of State, 
the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and the heads of our 
armed services kept in constant touch with each other. There was the 
freest interchange of information and views. It was customary for 
us to pick up the telephone and for the caller to ask one of the others 
whether he had anything new of significance on the situation and to 



442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

communicate whatever the caller may have had that was new. These 
exchanges of information and views were in addition to those which 
took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 
of the War Council, and in numerous other conversations. 

[1165] As illustrative of the contacts which I had with officers 
of the AVar and Navy Departments during the especially critical period 
from November 20, to December 7, 1941, 1 attach a record of the occa- 
sions when I talked with such representatives as compiled from the 
daily engagement books kept by my office (Annex A). That record 
may, of course, not be complete. 

In addition, I attach a statement of the record of the occasions on 
which I talked with representatives of the War and Navy Departments 
from October 1940 to December 7, 1941 (Annex B). 

I attach also a statement in regard to the arrangements for contacts 
during the years 1940 and 1941 between the State Department and the 
War and Navy Departments (Annex C). 

In the foregoing I have endeavored to give a simple narrative and 
analysis of what happened in this country's relations with Japan 
especially as they bear upon the inquiry of this Joint Committee. It 
I can throw light on any aspect of our relations not covered in this 
statement, I shall be glad to do so. 

Annex A 

[1166] 

Record of the Secretary of State's Conferences, Consultations and Telephone con- 
versations (as entered in engagement hooks) with Representatives of the War 
and Navy Departments, November 20 to December 7, 1941 

November 21. 9 : 55 a. m., Admiral Stark. General Gerow. 
November 24 : 12 : 15 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stlmson. 
12: no p. m., Captain Scluiirmann. 

3 : 30 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Knox. 
3 : 30 p. m., General Marshall, Admiral Stark. 

November 25 : : 80 a. m., Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox. 

12 : CO noon, Meeting at White House with President, Secretary Stimson, 
Secretary Knox. General Marshall, Admiral Stark. 

4 : 30 p. m.. Telephone call from Secretary Stimson. 
[1167] November 26: 

9 : 20 a. m.. Telephone call from Secretary Stimson. 

9 : 50 a. m.. Telephone call from Secretary Stimson. 

1 : 20 p. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark. 
November 27 : 

11 : 05 a. m., Telephone call to Secretary Stimson. 

4: 00 p. m.. Telephone call from Secretary Stimson. 

5: 10 p. m.. Telephone call to Captain Schuirmann. 
November 28: 

12:00 noon, Meeting at White House vpith President, Secretary Stimson, 
Secretary Knox, General Marshall, Admiral Stark. 

3: 20 p. m.. Telephone call from Secretary Stimson. 

4: 40 p. m.. Telephone call from Admiral Stark. 
November 30: 

10: 80 a. m.. Telephone call to Admiral Stark. 

12 : 08 p. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark. 
[1168] December 1 : 

12 : 00 noon, Admiral Stark at White House. 
December 3 : 

4 : 45 p. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 443 

December 6: 

10 : 45 a. m., Telephone call from Secretary Knox. 

11 : 50 a. m. Telephone call from Secretary Stimson. 

1 : 00 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson. 

1 : 15 p. m., Telephone call from Admiral Stark. 

1 : 50 p. m., Captain Schuirmann. 

5 : 15 p. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark. 

8 : 45 p. m., Telephone call to Secretary Knox. 
December 7 : 

10 : 30 a. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark. 

10 : 30 a. m., Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox. 

2 : 10 p. m., Telephone call from Admiral Stark. 
[1169] Witness Hull 

ANNEX B 

Record of the Secretary of State's Conversations in the State Department tdth 
Representatives of the War and Navy Departments. October 1940-Deceml)er 
7, 1941. 

With Secretaries Stimsoh and Knox: 

October 18, 1940. 

October 23, 1940. 

October 30, 1940. 

November 12, 1940. 

November 29, 1940. 

December 3, 1940. 

December 13, 1940 : Attended also by Admiral Stark, Captain Deyo, General 
Marshall. 

December 23, 1940: Attended also by Secretary Morgenthau, Senator Byrnes, 
Admiral Spear, Colonel Maxwell, Mr. Philip Young, Admiral Stark, Gen- 
eral Marsall, Major Timberlake. 

January 7, 1941. 

January 14, 1941 : Attended also by Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. Foley. 

January 23, 1941. 

January 28, 1941. 
[1170] February 11, 1941. 

February 14, 1941. 

March 31, 1941. 

April 8, 1941. 

April 10, 1941 : Atttended also by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Secretary Morgen- 
thau and Admiral Stark. 

April 22, 1941. 

April 29, 1941. 

May 5, 1941. 

May 13, 1941. 

May 20, 1941. 

May 27, 1941. 

June 3, 1941. 

August 12, 1941. 

August 19, 1941. 

August 29, 1941. 

September 30, 1941 : Attended also by General Marshall, Admiral Stark. 

November 25, 1941. 

December 7, 1941. 

[1171] With Secretary Stimson: 

October 14, 1940. 

Novemlier 1, 1940. 

December 3, 1940 : Lunch. 

March 4, 1941 : Attended also by Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. Foley, Mr. 

Forrestal and Mr. Harold Smith. 
May 9, 1941. 
August 8, 1941. 
October 6, 1941. 
October 28, 1941. 
December 10, 1941. 



444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

With Secretary Knox: 

November 4, 1041. 
November 10, 1941. 

"With other Army and Navy Officials: 

November 5, 1040: Admiral Stark, Admiral Greenslade, Captain Schuirmann. 

November 6, 1940: Admiral Stark. 

November 9, 10-JO : Captain Scbuirmann. 

November 2;"), 1940 : Admiral Stark, General Marshall, Colonel Turner, Cap- 
tain Schuirmann. 

November 27, 1940: Admiral Stark. 

December 2. 1940 : Captain Schuirmann. 

\in2] December 4, 1940: Admiral Stark. 

D-ecember 5, 1940: Captain Schuirmann. 

December 31, 1940: Captain Schuirmann. 

January 2, 1041 : Captain Kirk. 

January 3, 1941 : General Marshall, Admiral Stark. 

January 9, 1941: Colonel Bratton, Admiral Anderson, General Miles and 
Commander Cramei*. 

March 4, 1941 : General Marshall. 

April 11, 1941 : Colonel Betts. 

April 12, 1941 : Colonel Betts. 

April 16, 1941 : Colonel Betts. 

ApiMl 17, 1941: Colonel Betts. 

April 17, 1941 : Captain Schuirmann. 

April 18, 1941 : Colonel Mason. 

April 20, 1941 : Colonel Betts. 

May 1, 1941 : Admiral Stark. 

May 2, 1941: General Arnold. 

May 7, 1941: General Marshall. 

May 9, 1941 : Captain Schuirmann. 

May 13, 1041 : General Marshall and Admiral Stark. 

May 15, 1941: Admiral Stark. 
' May 21, 1941 : Commander Peal (Naval Attach^ Berlin). 

[Jf/731 .Tune 3, 1041: Colonel Betts. 

August 9, 1941 : Captain Schuirmann. 

August 21, 1941 : General Miles, Major Hansen, Captain Schuirmann. 

August 23, 1941 : Colonel Bratton. 

September 4, 1941 : Admiral Stark. 

October 4, 1941 : General Embick. 

October 14, 1941 : Admiral Turner, 

October 17, 1941 : Colonel Bratton and Maior Smett. 

October 27, 1941 : General ftliles, Captain Schuirmann. 

O -tober 30, 1941 : Admiral Stark. 

November 1, 1941: Captain Schuirmann and Commander McCollum. 

November 4, 1941 : General ^Tarshall, Admiral Ingersoll. 

November 8, 1941 : General Miles. 

November 19, 1041 : Captain Schuirmann. 

November 19, 1041 : Captain Schuirmann. 

November 21, 1941 : Admiral Stark, General Gerow. 

November 24, 1041 : General Marshall, Admiral Stark. 

November 24, 1041: Captain Schuirmann. 

December 6, 1041: Captain Schuirmann. 

December 12, 1941: Captain Schuirmann 

[117^] Annex C 

Arrangements for Contartft BeMveen the Department of State and War and 

Navy Departments in 19JiO and 1941. 

During the years 1940 and 1941 there vpere maintained arrangements for 
contacts between the Department of State and the War and Navy Departments 
as follows: 

(a) The regularly constituted Liaison Committee which began to function in 
April, 1938, and which consisted of the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of 
Staff and Chief of Naval Operations. That Committee customarily met at 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 445 

weekly intervals. The meetings of the Liaison Committee were for the purpose 
of taking up matters of mutual interest to the three Departments and for the 
interchange of views and information. 

(b) The Liaison Othce which was estahlished in the Deuartment of State 
in 1939 and which was responsible under the Under Secretary of State for the 
regular channeling and expeditious transmission of pertinent information to 
the War and Navy Departments. The information thus transmitted, in ad- 
dition to that having an obviously military and naval character, included basic 
related political and economic information needed for use in the preparation of 
estimates of the military and naval situation. 

[1175] (c) Arrangements which the political and functional divisions of the 

Department had for direct communication with representatives of the War and 
Navy Departments under whicli information of pertinent interest received by the 
Department of State from its representatives abroad was made available to the 
War and Navy Departments. Conversely, the War and Navy Departments kept 
the Department of State informed of data of interest. 

(d) Other conferences and conversations at frequent intervals between the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of AVar and the Secretary of the Navy as 
well as other representatives of the War and Navy Departments, including the 
Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. These conferences sought a 
full interchange of information and views relative to critical situations all over 
the world, including — of course — developments in the Pacific area. At those 
conferences the Secretary of State was given the benefit of the knowledge which 
representatives of the War and Navy Departments possessed of military factors 
involved in the world situation and the Secretary in turn took up the political 
factors in the world situation of which he had special knowledge. These con- 
ferences became increasingly frequent, as the world situation became more 
critical, especialy during the final stages of the conversations [1176] with 
the Japanese representatives. 

The Vice Ciiairmajst. Without objection, we will adjourn at this 
time and reconvene at 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 37 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the 
same day.) 

[1177] AFTFRNOON SESSION — 2 P. M. 

TESTIMONY OF CORDEIL HULL, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE 

(Resumed) 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, your statement was completed be- 
fore the recess, including the exhibits which were attached to it, so 
that you are now free to be examined by members of the committee in 
any way they see fit. 

lyir. Gesell. Counsel first. 

The Chairman. Yes, counsel first ; I beg the counsel's pardon. The 
counsel will proceed. 

Mr. Gessell. Mr. Hull, can you, as best you now recall it, fix the 
approximate time when you concluded that the possibility of solving 
the Japanese matter through diplomatic negotiations was most im- 
probable and that it was likely Japan, with or without a declaration 
of war, would strike at the United States, or its possessions in the 
Pacific? 

Mr. HuT.L. I might say by way of preface that we had been in 
conversation, through the late spring and summer and early fall, with 
the Japanese — that we maintain the basic principles that we started 
out with and the Japanese maintain the basic policies they started 
out with. 

There was some camouflage by them at times of some of [1178] 
their policies, but it was manifest, after long months of close-in con- 



446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

versation with the Japanese Ambassador, and taken in connection 
with information we were receiving from, among other sources, includ- 
ing our own Ambassador, Consuls, interceptions, and so forth. It was 
reasonably clear to me that they had no idea of yielding their policies, 
•which were policies of conquest and aggression by force, and enslave- 
ment of llie conquered peoples wherever they went. 

It was manifest that they were not going to depart from that and, 
we knew that we were not going to depart from our basic policies, 
which were the policies prevalent among civilized and peaceful na- 
tions. 

I will refer to that later, perhaps, and I am not sure that I should 
do it at this moment, except to refer to them as the policies of peace 
and law and order, and justice, and equality, and peaceful settlement 
of controversies. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, was it clear 

Mr. Hull. Now, during those early days in October, it looked 
more and more like they were prepared to, and were intending to, 
adhere to their policies. I take it you do not want me to cite any 
instances indicative of that attitude. But the situation floated along 
until Tojo's government came into power, about the 16th, I think, 
of October, the 15th [1179] or 16th, and the Konoe government 
fell. 

Wliile they started out with a professed disposition to keep up the 
conversations, we could detect circumstances and facts indicative of 
duplicity and double dealing, and the real purpose was to go forward 
more energetically with their plans, as was indicated by numerous 
demands on us to make haste, and statements that this matter could not 
go on without something serious happening. 

We were moving in those days on with the so-called temporary pro- 
posal of the Japanese, on November 20. 

Mr. Gesell. So that by November 20, the gradual process that you 
just outlined, it had become apparent to you and those with whom you 
were conferring in Government that the Japanese really had no bona 
fide intention of settling the matters under discussion in a peaceful, 
diplomatic manner? 

Mr. Hull. The impression we received, at least myself, and some 
others, was that during those months they tried to prevail on this 
Government by persuasion and threats and other methods, to yield its 
basic principles, so that Japan could maintain intact her policy and her 
continued course of aggression and conquest. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, did yon tell the Secretary of War and the Secre- 
tary of the Navy and the President, as these negotiations proceeded, 
your conclusions as to w^hether or [1180] not there was any 
chance of their being successful ? 

Mr. HuLL.^ It seemed to me that we were all very much like a family. 
We were seeing, talking among and with each other, making things 
known to each other in one way or another most of the time, and we 
made it a point to make known to each other whatever the other person 
might think of things that would be desirable to communicate. 

So at all times, I think it is accurate to say that each of us in the State 
House have always tried to impart to the other, and with reasonable 
diligence, anything new that we learned that would be of interest. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 447 

Mr. Gesell. I not only refer to anything new you might learn, but 
also the conclusions that you might have reached from the diplomatic 
side. 

Mr. Hull. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. As to the status of the negotiations, and the likelihood 
of their success? 

Mr. Hull. Well, after Mr. Kurusu — I might say Tvhen he reached 
here about the 15th or IGth of November, I had different talks with him 
in conjunction with the Ambassador and he had nothing new to talk 
about. He had no new ideas, no new information. He was simply 
pleading that we must agree on the diplomatic side of this, or some- 
thing awful would happen. About the first words he said to me were 
that \^1181'\ the Pacific Ocean was like a powder keg. Then, 
he went on and pretty soon made the statement that Japan had 
reached the explosive stage, so we were given the benefit of all such 
views. 

On the 20th, they came in and handed me a proposal that they well 
knew was an utterly impossible proposal for us, in the light of our 4 
or 5 years' explorations of each other's situations, and attitudes. 

The next morning, Kurusu came to my apartment in the hotel and 
was talking about the Tripartite Agreement, endeavoring to minimize 
that, and I suddenly inquired of him if his government had anything 
more to offer on the general peace situation, and he quickly said, "No," 

So there we had nailed down what he said was the last proposal, 
and what their interceptions had informed us was very final in the 
matter. 

Mr. Gesell. That was the proposal that you knew that, in the light 
of the principles which the United States Government had announced, 
would not be accepted, was it not? 

Mr. Hull. It was utterly incompatible with them. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, during this period — you have referred to 
the various sources of information you had — am I correct in the belief 
that the most reliable source of information, or the one upon which 
you placed the greatest [ii<5^] foundation, was the Japanese 
intercepted messages ? 

Mr. Hull. I looked on them as I would a witness who is giving evi- 
dence against his own side of the case. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, you were in a position during this time, 
in effect, through these intercepts, to know what they were saying 
between themselves, were you not ? 

[775-5] Mr. Hull. We knew something of that. It confirmed 
our course and our questions and our arguments about the situation, 
the true situation. 

Mr. Gesell. I gather from what you say that you saw the intercepts 
regularly as they were translated ? 

Mr. Hull. I understood that they were to come to my office, among 
other places, from the Navy and War Departments. I had, in particu- 
lar, one secretary who was exceedingly well-informed on all these 
things, and he would receive interceptions of messages, from the War 
or Navy Department, and if they contained anything of importance 
he brought them in to me at once. I looked at it and handed it right 
back to him because we were following the policy of the War and 



448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Navy Department to the effect that it was all-important that infor- 
mation about the interceptions should not get back to the Japanese. 

Mr. Gesell. You had no reason during his time, did you, to feel 
that the Japanese knew we were intercepting the messages? 

Mr. Hull. None Avhatever. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, is it your understanding, Mr. Hull, that you saw 
all the messages, or only those that had a diplomatic significance? 

Mr. Hull. Mainly, so far as I know, it was messages within my 
sphere of duties, and others, that were not important \i^S4] to 
me, or to what I was dealing with, were passed on to the Far Eastern 
Division. 

Mr. Gesell. But the State Department, one way or another, saw 
all of them, is your understanding, that were distributed? 

Mr. Hull. I wouldn't say that we saw all of them. T couldn't say 
that. Sometimes it would require a little time to decode them and get 
them to us. ^^^e would be late, sometimes, in getting them. But 
apparently that was unavoidable. There may be, and 1 am satisfied 
that there was, a number scattered through this entire list that we 
didn't see at all. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember at this time whether or not you saAv 
intercepted messages that were really of a non diplomatic nature, con- 
cerned with the ship movements in and out of Pearl Harbor, and the 
military installations at Pearl Harbor, reconnaissance being conducted, 
and other matters of what we might call a military espionage nature? 

Mr. Hull. My impression now is that I Avas aware of the circulation, 
but I myself didn't give them any attention, any real attention, so far 
as I recall. 

Mr. Gksell. These all came to you from the Army and Navy, did 
they not ? 

Mr. Hull. They would have come from there. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, during this period, in fact, at any time 
during this period, did you ever receive any informa- [JlSo] 
tion or any reports or any rumors to the effect that Japan was con- 
templating a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Mr. Hull. I never heard Pearl Harbor mentioned during the 
later months by anyone. 

The Chairman. May I suggest to the Secretary, that if you move 
the microphone a little closer, you can be more easily heard with less 
exertion. 

Mr. Hull. Pardon me. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember Mr. Grew's dispatch of January 
concerning the rumor that there was to be an attack on Pearl Harbor 
K'hich was transmitted by the State Department to the Navy Depart- 
ment? 

Mr. Hull. I remember his telegrams in the fore part of January 
and later telegrams. I overlooked whatever there was in reference 
to Pear] Harbor. 

Mr. Gesell. During the latter period that you have referred to, I 
understood you to say that you had no information. 

Mr. Hull. That was January of 1941? 

Mr. (tesell. Yes. 

Mr. Hull. Oh, yes. I was familiar with that. I misunderstood. 
I had November on my mind for some strange reason. I was entirely 
familiar with the one in January. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 449 

Mr. Gesell. Now, other than that do you recall any [1186] 
information that came to you in writing or orally from people in our 
own Government or from representatives of foreign governments or 
from the Piesident or any source that was to the elfect that the Jap- 
anese were planning or considering or were likely to make an attack 
on Pearl Harbor ? 

Mr. Hull. I saw nothing that came in during that period, the 
correspondence which I later saw, or knew of, between the Secretary 
of AVar and the Secretary of the Navy, which took place in January 
1941, that is all I know of, that and the Grew telegram. 

Mr. Gesell. You mean the letters of Secretary Knox and Stimson 
concerning preparations against an attack? 

Mr. Hull. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Well now, you have stated in your statement that was 
read today that beginning around the latter part of November you 
were remarking to all your contacts that it was quite likely that the 
Japanese would strike and strike with boldness and daring in any 
direction, and we introduced here this morning a memorandum of 
your conference with Mr. Halifax in which you referred to that 
subject. , 

I take it then from what you say that while you were considering 
and had in mind the possibility of some sort of a surprise action, 
you at no time had in your mind the possibility of an attack on Pearl 
Haibor. 

[1187] Mr. Hull. You may, or may not, recall that for some 
time we were receiving messages, constantly, almost, about the Jap- 
anese movements of men and ships and fleets bound to the lower end 
of Indochina. We knew that was the jumping-off place for an attack 
on the south — well, toward Singapore, Burma, Thailand, the Philip- 
pines, and other areas, and we were watching that pretty closely, very 
closely as the days passed by. 

So I just, myself, I didn't think anything either way about other 
places in the Pacific that might be attacked, including Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Gesell. Well now, do you recall 

Mr. Hull. Pardon me. Of course, I was in the diplomatic branch 
of the service. 

Mv. Gesell. Do you recall, Mr. Hull, that on November 27 a warn- 
ing message was sent to the Commanding General, Western Defense 
Command, at San Francisco and at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, 
and to other points, signed by General Marshall, which was appar- 
ently sent for the purpose of putting the armed forces at those points 
on notice of the possibility of some hostilities, do you recall that such 
messages were sent ? 

Mr. Hull. I think I do. 

Mr. Gesell. Secretary Stimson testified before the Army Board 
that in connection with that message, which he partici- [1188] 
pated in drafting, he had some conversations with you at the time. 
Do you recall any conversation with him? 

Mr. Hull. I never sat in on the drafting of Army and Navy instruc- 
tions to their field forces. Sometimes they would call me over the 
telephone about some particular thing. 

Mr. Gesell. Secretary Stimson states just that. 

Mr. Hull. He probably called me ; if he says he did I am sure he did. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 2 5 



450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. The phrases in the message reading as follows, which 
he discussed with you on the telephone, I wonder if you recall. The 
message at the outset reads: 

Negotiations with Japan appear to have terminated to all practical purposes 
with only the harest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back 
and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action 
possible at any moment. 

Mr. Hull. That first sentence, first line or two there is about the 
language I was using in talking to high officials during those last days 
about the situation. 

Mr. Gesell. Was the question of sending a warning message to the 
various theaters in the Pacific, to your recollection, ever discussed at 
any of the meetings with the President at the White House? 

Mr. Hull. I don't recall it. As I say, I didn't [1189] par- 
ticipate in the purely military phases, except as sort of an outsider, 
and more or less as a layman. That was given attention by the Army 
and the Navy heads and the President. 

For that reason I didn't sit in on the drafting of their orders, which 
would have contemplated, perhaps, previous conferences. I don't 
recall having any conferences on those particular orders. 

We did always, at these meetings, report to each other everything 
we knew in our respective lines of activities and sometimes we dis- 
cussed numbers of questions that were presented. 

Mr. Gesell. Well now, at about this time Secretary Stimson re- 
ports that there was a meeting at the White House, on the 25th of 
November, at which you and Secretary Knox and himself were 
present, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark. 

He says there : 

The President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up 
the event that we were likely to be attacked, as soon as, perhaps, next Monday, 
for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the 
Question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem. 

Do you remember any conferences at that time or at about that 
time with the War Council as to what should be done about the 
general problem ? 

Mr. Hull. The main point I was making during those and 
[1190] subsequent days Avas the very great improbability that 
Japan would seriously continue to participate in any conversations. 
We had learned through the interceptions not only that they had 
determined on their ultimatum but that they had ordered that con- 
versations cease on the 25th, and then finally they worried me almost 
sick after the 20th about getting a quick reply. 

I couldn't get them, couldn't prevail on them to give me the rea- 
son that was rushing them off their feet. I finally said, "Well, I 
can't make any reply before" — I think it was — "the 26th" — I am not 
sure but it went beyond the time they wanted me to make it, and I 
said, "If you can't get on with that situation that confronts me, why, 
you will have to do the best you can." 

I don't recall except they acquiesced in that. 

Then, as I say, I felt that first we should keep up these conversa- 
tions to the last split second, going on and ignoring their ultimatums, 
ignoring anything that went on, so long as we kept a consistent rec- 
ord, showing an earnest desire for peace and an earnest desire to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 451 

prevail on Japan finally, by some remote speculative possibility, to 
change her mind, and also automatically, as well as very desirable, 
to secure some more time. 

For some time, really during much of the summer, whenever 
[1101] I met any of our head military men or high British or Aus- 
tralian or Dutch officials, they would refer to this very great need, each 
of them had, for more time to prepare for defense. 

We proceeded then in an atmosphere of practically grabbing at 
straws, putting up a development, propositions that we would hope 
to put up to Japan, and force her to expose her duplicity, that we 
had overtaken so often. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now 

Mr. Hull. If you will pardon me, I left this out a while ago. 

So we hoped, I hoped that we could, by constant pressure, that 
if by any hook or crook it should prove possible for the Japanese to 
decide that they would be willing to wait a month or two it would 
be a fine thing for us, and I earnestly hoped we could get through 
with these diiferent arrangements, but when we reached this War 
College meeting that you talk about, on the 25th, there wasn't much 
discussion, except the various phases, including my statement that 
it would be a mistake to assume that this thing is going on. I said, 
"The Japanese are heavily armed; they have been on this move- 
ment for a number of years, this movement of conquest, yoked hard 
and fast with Plitler most of the time." 

And then I said — if I can, recall what I wanted to say, [1102] 
what I wanted to get in here — at any rate I said it will not do to trust 
any phase of that situation because they are in control of this whole 
movement; we are not in control of it. We can only effect that 
movement of the Japanese armies of invasion by surrendering to 
them the principles for which peace-loving nations, including our- 
selves, stand. 

[1193] Mr. Gesell. Well, now, was there anyone at that meeting 
who advocated a withdrawal from the principles which we had been 
taking in the negotiations? 

Mr. Hull. That never was done, so far as I know, by any high 
American official in the State, War, Navy, or the White House. 

Mr. Gesell. When you say it was not done you mean it was not 
urged upon you by anyone ? 

Mr. Hull. It was not. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember the President making a statement 
which I quoted from Mr. Stimson's diary, to the effect that at that 
meeting on the 25th he mentioned that there was a. likelihood that 
we might be attacked as soon as next Monday ? 

Mr. Hull. I do not recall definitely except that there was nothing 
new, really, if he said that because I was talking along those lines 
during those strenuous days after we got their ultimatum and other 
information about their purposes. 

Mr._ Gesell. Yes. Would it be fair to say that that view was the 
prevailing view among the Cabinet officers and militar3^ officers who 
attended the meetings at the White House of this war council group 
at this time? 

Mr. Hull. Well, only the Army and the Navy Cabinet [1104] 
heads attended it. 



452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Mr. Hull. So far as those Cabinet heads were concerned, I do not 
know really the precise state of mind they were in but I received th& 
definite impression that they felt that the outlook was critical and 
called for the closest attention. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, you have reviewed in your statement some 
of the meetings at this time and I do not want to go over it except I 
wanted to ask you about one specific meeting before taking up the 
note on the 26th with you in some detail, and that was a Cabinet meet- 
ing which the records of the White House indicate was held on De- 
cember 5th, at which you lunched with the President prior to the 
Cabinet meeting. 

Do you recall any discussion that took place at that meeting or with 
the President at that luncheon concerning the problems we are con- 
cerned with here? 

Mr. Hull. I might refresh my recollection in some way, somehow, 
but I do not remember just at the moment. 

You will understand that in justice to the Army and Navy, I in- 
formed them when I felt that diplomatic efforts to deal with the situa- 
tion had ended, that the security and safety of the country was then 
in the hands of the Army and [Ji05] the Navy, so I did not 
have so awfully much to talk about, in fact, concerning the difficulties 
that the Army and Navy were then dealing with, but I was frank to 
express any comment that I thought would be helpful. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, in that connection, do you recall discussing with 
representatives of the Army and Navy the question of whether or not 
you should abandon consideration of the proposed modus vivendi 
before it was done? 

Mr. Hull. As happened now and then in the State Department, 
when we would run into some terrific problem that called for affirma- 
tive action at once we would prepare different trial drafts on the sub- 
ject by different persons who had jurisdiction down in the Department 
and we would thresh out those questions in the most vehement manner 
sometimes. 

We did that in connection with our plan to the effect that we would 
keep up the conversations. W^e would not refuse to answer their 
ultimatum of November 20th ; we would not take any action that would 
deviate from our fixed policy of driving along, hit or miss, in the 
hope that somewhere even then that something might develop sud- 
denly and out of the sky. So we went along in that fashion. And 
your question now relates to 

Mr. Gesell. My question is whether before it was definitely decided 
that you would not attempt the modus vivendi [1196] you dis- 
cussed that specific decision with the Army and Navy? 

Mr. Hull. Yes. Pardon me, I was trying to bring out another 
thread or two of this thing. 

Mi;. Gesell. Yes. 

Mr. Hull. We discussed, I think elaboratedly, with the heads of 
the Army and the Navy up to and ending on the 25th. We had not 
decided that it would not be feasible to present it to the Japanese 
until perhaps the afternoon of the 25th, as I remember it, refreshing 
my mind as best I can from documents and other things. So we 
knew that the Army and Navy people were fairly familiar with it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 453 

They should have been because we sought to talk with them at any 
and all times that they might be interested in talking and to keep them 
informed. 

Mr. Gesell. I think it is clear from the documents and from what 
you have said that the Army and Navy knew what you were considering. 

Mr. Hull. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. And you consulted them. 

Mr. Hull. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, I wondered, however, whether you recall specifi- 
cally taking up with them the question of whether or not as a gov- 
ernmental matter it would be advantageous or disadvantageous to de- 
liver the modus vivendi to the Japanese ? 

[1197] Mr. Hull. As I say, we talked about the different phases 
of it right along and near the last we ran into so many terrific diffi- 
culties that those of us who were striving most actively to put this up 
to the Japanese and let them turn it down, as we thought the chances 
largely were that they would, it would clear the atmosphere and clarify 
to the public both here and in Japan some of the confusion that had 
arisen. 

I do not recall that we had conferences with the Army and Navy 
after we discussed that, I and my associates in the State Department 
and whoever we talked to, I do not recall that we had any further con- 
ferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy 
to the effect that it was possible to know. 

One reason, perhaps, was that Secretary Stimson, I think, expressed 
himself readily to the effect that the Japanese would not accept this 
because it was too drastic. 

Mr. Gesell. That I gather was generally the view as to the modus 
vivendi at that time. 

Mr. Hull. Yes. Now, as to Admiral Stark, at that last stage I do 
not recall what he was thinking or saying. 

Mr. Gesell. We introduced in evidence the memorandum from you 
to President Roosevelt recommending that the ten-point note be 
handed to the Japanese and that the modus [119S] vivendi not 
be handed to the Japanese. 

Mr. Hull. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. I was wondering whether you had any discussions 
with him on that subject or whether he acted on your memorandum 
without a conference. Do you recall on that point ? 

Mr. Hull. I was talking with him almost constantly on dift'erent 
phases of this highly acute situation and I do not remember whether 
I talked in any detail with him on this phase but the nature of my 
memorandum would indicate that I had talked with him. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, one other question with reference to this 
policy. You refer to the delay, the need for delay that you felt in talk- 
ing to our officials and to the officials of other governments so that steps 
could be taken for military preparations. Do you remember whether 
during this period you had any particular time limit in mind for which 
you were seeking to stretch the negotiations out to ? 

Mr. Hull. We were just trying our best, as we had been for weeks 
and really months. I felt that the Japs, as I say, were over here for 
the single purpose of inducing us to surrender our policies and prin- 
ciples and let her policy of war and conquest and so on continue intact. 



454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I still think [1109] that that was their business over here. At 
the moment I am not sure whether I understood fully your question. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, I would like to ask you one other question 
v^hich relates to a somewhat different subject. 

Mr. Hull, Maybe I did not answer all of this question. If I did not, 
I wish you would repeat it. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, I wanted to know whether there was any time 
limit 

Mr. Hull. Oh, yes. Pardon me. 

Mr. Gesell (continuing). For which you had been seeking to 
extend the negotiations to? 

Mr. Hull. No. We were doing our best to keep this going for at 
least three reasons. One was our interest in peace. Another was to 
save time for our Army and Navy 

The Chairman. The Chair would like to suggest to counsel and to 
the Secretary that under our arrangement we agreed not to question 
the Secretary more than 45 minutes at a time, but that is subject to 
the Secretary's desire if he is not growing tired. 

Mr. Gesell. I think I can probably in about 10 minutes cover the 
principal points that remain, if you feel that it is all right. Secretary 
Hull. 

Mr. Hull. It is perfectly all right, Mr. Chairman, to [IWO] 
run on for another 15 minutes, as far as I know. 

The Chairman. All right, we will go ahead. 

Mr. Hull. So the Army was speaking about certain preparations 
that it hoped to complete by the 5th or 8th of December. The Navy 
had some other date still further. In the memorandum by the Presi- 
dent the word "6 months" was written up at the top of it in longhand. 
He probably felt that if by any hook or crook the Japs should decide, 
on account of conditions in which they were interested, to keep this 
matter running along a few days or a few weeks, he would like to 
put in 6 months. Now, that is not a fact that I am undertaking to 
state. 

Mr. Gesell. We have that memorandum. 

Mr. Hull. Yes. It is all in there. 

Mr. Gesell. We have that memorandum with the "6 months" note 
handwritten on the top. 

Mr. Hull. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, there are only one or two other subjects, Mr. 
Hull. They are not related to the modus vivendi discussions. 

The first question is this : Do you know of any arrangement or agree- 
ment or understanding made by President Roosevelt or any other of- 
ficial of the United States Government prior to December 7 to the 
effect that in the event Great [1201] Britain or the Dutch or 
any other of the ABCD powers was attacked in the Pacific by the 
Japanese this country would go to war against the Japanese without 
its beinc: attacked ? 

Mr. Hull. I never heard of anything except, as the danger became 
more imminent, there was a conference among the staff people, first 
I think over at Singapore and then more or less discussion among the 
heads of the Army and the Navy. 

As to what the President said to them I do not know but, at any 
rate, I understood what took place to be that with Japan on the tip 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 455 

end, with all of its armies and navy and air forces marshalled for a 
general movement in Indo-China, that this was the jmnping off place 
and they were poised just like a diver on the end of a plank before 
the plunge. There they were, and we received and were receiving 
messages at all hours. 

Finally, the latest message we received was that they were actually 
moving, sailing, a bunch of, I think, about 8 cruisers, 20 destroyers, 
and 35 transports, sailing from Indochina straight across the Bay of 
Siam toward the — what is that "K" Peninsula? 

Mr. Gesell. Kra Peninsula. 

Mr. Hull. Kra is the specific pronounciation. 

At any rate, those were the things that greeter us and I think it was 
about that time that our Army and Navy officials [1'202] got up 
these statements, especially the one on the 27th of November. 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. Now, that one has been introduced and we are 
going to, of course, go into the events concerning the Singapore con- 
ferences, but I was really directing my questions to events before that 
time, at the Atlantic Charter conference meeting or any other meet- 
ing before that time, whether you got any intimation or any state- 
ment from the President or Mr. Welles or anyone else to the effect 
that we had made such a commitment with Great Britain or any other 
nation? 

Mr. Hull. No, I did not. I only knew what was contained in the 
order of November 5 by Admiral Stark and the other of November 
27. 

Mr. Gesell. Both of which we introduced this morning. 

Mr. Hull. That we might render some military course by this 
Government in case the danger reached that stage, that they would 
be derelict to their duty unless they had some plan to recommend 
to their government and that is as far as it got so far as I know. 

Mr. Gesell. With respect to the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, 
Admiral Richardson has testified to conversations that he had with 
you and has indicated that he felt the State Department was exercising 
some influence over the disposition of the fleet and I wanted to ask 
whether you had any [1203] information you could give us on 
that question. 

Mr. Hull. May I introduce that with what I said almost in my 
statement, in my written statement ? I said soon after I came to the 
State Department, when I would be talking with the representatives of 
these thugs at the head of governments abroad ,a government of ag- 
gression, that they would look at me in the face but I soon discovered 
that they were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our Army 
and that our diplomatic strength in dealing with governments that 
were not very honest, that were more or less dangerous, that have ul- 
terior purposes, the first thing they throw their ayes on is not you or me 
or any other official — it is on our Army and Navy. 

Now, diplomatic strength goes up or down with their estimate of 
what that amounts to. It does not mean that they expect to rush in 
to fight, perhaps, but it is like a desperado who goes around in a suspi- 
cious place and he sees somebody who is armed and he is just a little 
bit more cautious in exploring his plans to explode a safe or commit 
some other crime than he would be if there was no remote possibility of 
danger. 



45b CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That was the feeling that I absorbed during my 10 or 12 years over 
there as we moved through the awful conditions that finally led into 
the war. 

Now, I do not think our people have time and perhaps the oppor- 
tunity in this of terrifically critical periods to [1204] grasp 
the full facts and factors that are involved. They did not stop to 
think. 

Some person said, "Why, we were trying to bluff the Japanese." 
Well, if he was going into that why didn't he say we were trying to 
bluff Hitler and Tojo, because they were hooked together by links of 
steel in their plans. Why leave them out if you are going to take up 
that sort of a thing ? 

Now, the truth is, I have always said from my experience with 
them that a bandit government headed by such unmentionable persons 
as Hitler and Tojo, that such a government recognizes nothing, no- 
body, unless there is something translated into force, something it is 
able to rest its attention on. So I said the world is in a state of an- 
archy. 

Here are two great nations in the East and the West, leading mil- 
lions of people on armed to the teeth and using them to alter the peace. 
They are killing and massacring and robbing and conquering with all 
the methods of a savage. So just to illustrate, if I may, I happen to 
think of this: 

When the Tripartite agreement was entered into between the Jap- 
anese and the Germans in September 1940 the average citizen in this 
country or any ordinary person with a grasp of intelligence could not 
begin to know all of the ramifications and the factor and the facts that 
were related to this transaction. He just thought that they had agreed 
to fight [120-5] off each other. He did not know what they 
agreed to by any means. So I notice here a statement, a communi- 
cation by the Foreign Minister to the Japanese Ambassador in Wash- 
ington and if you will pardon me, it is two or three lines. 

Mr. Gesell. Would you like me to read it for you from the exhibits? 

Mr. Hull. All right. It is section 2 there. 

Mr. Gesell. All right. This is from Exhibit 1, section 2, message 
to Washington from Tokyo dated October 8, 1941, translated October 
8, 1941, on page 57 of the exhibit (reading) : 

When we conclude the Three Power Pact, we hoped while maintaining amicable 
relations with America, and to tell the truth through this very means, to conclude 
the China trouble. 

Mr. Hull. That is two points. 
Mr. Gesell (reading) : 

To win the Soviet over to the Japanese-German-Italian camp. 

Mr. Hull. Three. 
Mr. Gesell (reading) : 

To have Germany use her good offices between Tokyo and Moscow 
(STAHMER) 

Mr. Hull. Four. 

[1206] Mr. Gesell (reading) : 

(STAHMER said that Germany would be an honest go-between and would 
be sure to bring about the solution of our troubles with the Kremlin and OTT 
sent us a letter to the effect that he himself was going to work for an under- 
sanding between Japan and the Soviet). 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 457 

Mr. Hull. Five. 

Mr. Gesell (reading) : 

To guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy who, in turn, 
were to give us mechanical and technical assistance. But since then 

Mr. Hull. Six. 

Mr. Gesell (reading) : 

But since then times have changed and unexpected events have taken place. 
All that remains unchanged is Japanese-American relations and that is about the 
only thing that could be patched up. 

Mr. Hull. I just intruded to bring that out, to show the intermin- 
able factors that are and were in the international situation. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, Mr. Hall, we very much appreciate your coming. 

Mr. Hull. May I add one sentence ? 

Mr. Gesell. Certainly. 

[1207] Mr. Hull. I felt myself that any country that showed 
too much weakness in the face of these desperadoes and their armies 
would be much more likely to get into trouble and get all of us into 
trouble than if we maintained in our case a firm, a reasonably firm 
policy. I do not think I ever used the word "strong" policy unless 
I did it unintentionally. I always stood for what I called a firm 
policy and I do not know whether you asked me — no, you did not ask 
me about Hornbeck. 

Mr. Gesell. No. I thought perhaps I would do so at some other 
time. 

The Chairman. The Chair thanks the Secretary. He has now 
been on the stand for an hour and the Chair would like to inquire 
when it would be convenient for the Secretary to come back? 

Mr. Gesell. We will arrange that. 

The Chaikman. You will arrange that? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

The Chairman. You arrange then with counsel, Mr. Secretary, 
when you should reappear. 

Mr. Hull. Oh, I shall be glad to come here in the morning, attend 
the morning session. 

The Chairman. Tomorrow morning? 

Mr. Hull. Yes. 

[1208] The Chairman. That is agreeable with the committee. 

Mr. Gesell. We might see how our schedule runs and get in touch 
with Mr. Hull at the close of today's session or possibly get in touch 
with Mr. Hull Saturday and maybe work it out for Monday. 

The Chairman. There will be other witnesses that will go on in the 
interim between now and the time you are to reappear and counsel will 
get in tou(?h with you, Mr. Hull, and I want to say we appreciate the 
generosity you have displayed in your giving us the time you have 
given us today. We do not want to tax your strength and we do not 
want you to tax it yourself. 

Mr. Hull. I appreciate the courtesy of the committee in excusing 
me during the reading of my statement. 

The Chairman. Yes. You will be advised, Mr. Secretary, by coun- 
sel when you will be expected to return. Thank you very much. 

Who is the next witness? 

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Sumner Welles is the next witness. 

The Chairman. Mr. Sumner Welles. Please be sworn, Mr. Welles. 



458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1209] TESTIMONY OF SUMNER WELLES, FORMER UNDER 

SECRETARY OF STATE 

The Chairman. Mr. Welles, the Chair will suggest that you keep 
your microphone as close as possible on account of the acoustics in this 
room, which j^ou are probably familiar with already. 

Mr. Welles. All right, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gesell. I would like now to offer for the record as Exhibit No. 
22 a document entitled, "Draft of Parallel Communications To The 
Japanese Government," on the stationery of Mr. Churchill, dated 
August 10, 1941 ; two telegrams and a draft of a proposed communica- 
tion to the Japanese Ambassador brought to the Department by Mr. 
Welles following the conference between the President and Mr. 
Winston Churchill. 

That number will be No. 22 and copies of this are before the various 
members of the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Mr. Ferguson. May I inquire at this time whether or not we have 
had clearance from the other governments on the communications? 

Mr. Gesell. We have had clearance on practically all the docu- 
ments. There remain perhaps two on which we have not heard any- 
thing as yet one way or the other and as soon [I^IO] as they 
are available I will, of course, distribute them to the committee and 
if they seem to necessitate any examination of any of these witnesses 
on those points they, of course, will be available and be recalled before 
the committee on those documents. We have done our very best to 
get clearance. 

Senator Ferguson. Was this a special clearance on this particular 
exhibit that you now offer? We received it here at noon and I won- 
dered. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, you received part of it this noon and part of it 
had been in your hands before, I believe, Smator. The draft of the 
proposed communication that Mr. Welles brought back has been in 
your hands, I believe, for some time. The top document is being 
distributed now. 

The Chairman. That is Exhibit No. 22? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Consisting of this single sheet? 

Mr. Gesell. No, there are three documents that make a part of it; 
it is all in one. 

The Chairman. All of this is 22? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes, that is right. 

The Chairman. That which is mimeographed and that which is 
photostated ? 

Mr. Gesell. That is right. 

[1211] The Chairman. All right. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 22".) 

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Welles, as a starting point could you briefly indi- 
cate your position in the Department of State during the years 1940 
andi941? 

Mr. Welles. During those years my time and attention were pri- 
marily given to relations between the United States and the other 
American republics and, to a considerable extent, to our relations with 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 459 

European governments, I had no participation in the diplomatic dis- 
cussions which went on between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Gov- 
ernment representatives and only at certain times, when the Secretary 
was away on a much needed vacation or was not in the Department 
and I had to act as Acting Secretary of State did I take any active 
part. 

Mr. Gesell. You were present, were you not, during the meeting 
in the Atlantic between President Koosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill ? 

Mr. Welles. I was. 

Mr. Gesell, Did you at that time participate in any discussions 
between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning 
Japan or developments in the Far East ? 

Mr. Welles. No. During the meeting at Argentia the President 
delegated to me the work which had to do with the [1212'] 
drafting of the Atlantic Charter. My conversations were almost 
entirely taken up with talks with the British Under Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cadogan, and those conversa- 
tions related solely to the drafting of the Atlantic Charter text and 
to one of the diplomatic negotiations, none of which had to do with 
Japan. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you receive any information at that meeting as 
to any agreement or arrangement or understanding that had been 
arrived at, if there was any, between President Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Churchill concerning joint action of the United States and 
Great Britain in the Pacific? 

Mr. Welles. When I left the President, since he was due to return 
to Washington before myself, he told me that he had had a conversa- 
tion, or several conversations, with Mr. Churchill with regard to the 
Japanese situation and the increasing dangers in the Far East; that 
Mr. Churchill had suggested to him that the two governments, as a 
means which might be of some effect, should take parallel action in 
issuing a warning to the government of Japan. 

As I recall it, the President stated that what Mr. Churchill had 
suggested was that the Government of the United States should state 
to the Government of Japan that if Japan persisted in her policy of 
conquest and aggression the United States, in the protection of its 
legitimate interests and [1213] in order to provide for its own 
security would have to take such acts as were necessary in its own 
judgment. 

The President also asked me to tell Secretary Hull that he wished 
to see the Japanese Ambassador immediately upon his return and 
that warning which had been suggested as a parallel action by Mr, 
Churchill was communicated to the Japanese Ambassador by the 
President on August l7th of that year, 

Mr, Gesell. Were you present at the meeting ? 

Mr. Welles. I was not. You mean the meeting between the Presi- 
dent and the Japanese Ambassador ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, the Exhibit 22 which has just been introduced 
includes as the first document a document dated August 10, 1941, read- 
ing as follows : 



460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Draft of Paraixel Communications to the Japanese Government 

DECLARATION BY U. S. GOVERNMENT THAT : 

1. Any fnithor encroachment by Japan in the South West Pacific would 
produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take 
counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and 
Japan. 

[121^] 2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in 
consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President 
would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such 
Power. 

DECLARATION BY H. M. G. 

Same as above, mutatis mutandis, the last phrase reading: ". , . their sup- 
port of them, H. M. G. would give all possible aid to such Power." 

DECLARATION BY DUTCH GOVERNMENT. 

Same as that by H. M. G. 

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether 
they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration. 

Do you recall ever having seen tliis document? 

Mr. Welles. I do not remember having seen that document. I re- 
member seeing the draft, however, which I took from Argentina ta 
Washington and which is one of the exhibits itself in this collection. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, did you prepare that draft or do you know 
who prepared it ? 

Mr. Welles. As I recall it that was prepared after discussions be- 
tween the President and myself the last day of the Argentia meeting. 

[1215] Mr. Gesell. The last paragraph of that draft reads : 

The Government of the United States, therefore, finds it necessary to state 
to the Govei'nment of Japan that if the Japanese Government undertakes any 
further steps in pursuance of the policy of military domination through force 
or conquest in the Pacific region upon which it has apparently embarked, the 
United States Government will be forced to take immediately any and all 
steps of whatsoever character it deems necessary in its own security notwith- 
standing the possibility that such further steps on its part may result in con- 
flict between the two countries. 

Was that, in essence, your understanding of the agreement be- 
tween President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning 
the notice or threat which should be given to the Japanese? 

Mr. Welles. That is correct. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, referring to Volume 2, Foreign Relations of the 
United States with Japan 1931-194:1, where the conversations be- 
tween President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassador on August 
17, 1941 is reported. 

At page 556 I find in the paragraph beginning at said page what 
appears to be a somewhat different statement. This is the oral state- 
ment handed by the President to the [1216] Japanese Ambas- 
sador. It reads : 

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the 
Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps 
in pursuance of w policy or program of military domination by force or threat 
of force of neighlioring countries, the Government of the United States will be 
compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary 
toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States 
and Am-rican nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the 
United States. 

That statement that I have just read is a somewhat watered down 
version of the one you brought back, is it not, Mr. Welles ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 461 

Mr. Welles. That is correct. 

[1217] Mr. Gesell. Is it your opinion that the statement that 
I have just read from volume 11 is, in fact, the statement which was 
made at this meeting rather than the statement that you brought 
back? 

Mr. Welles. The statement was handed by the President, I under- 
stood, to the Japanese Ambassador in writing, as an aide-memoire, 
and that is the statement to which you refer. 

Mr. Gesell. Have you any information as to what accounted for 
the watering down process? 

Mr. Welles. I am not informed on that point, beyond the fact that 
the papers I brought back were given to Secretary Hull and he dis- 
cussed them with the President before the President handed them to 
the Ambassador. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, we have had reference already, in some other 
documents in this testimony, to the ABCD bloc. Can you tell us 
what the ABCD bloc is? Is that an association of powers based upon 
treaties and other understandings, or what is it? 

Mr. Welles. Those are the countries that were primarily concerned 
with the increasing march of aggression of the part of Japan. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you know of any arrangements existing between 
them as to joint military action in the Pacific [1'218] which any 
of them might take prior to December 7, 1941? 

Mr. Welles. None whatever. 

Mr. Gesell. Have you any information concerning the staff 
conferences held at Singapore, to which Mr. Hull referred in his 
testimony? 

Mr. Welles. I have no knowledge of that. 

Mr. Gesell. The documents indicate, in somewhat the same con- 
nection, Mr. Welles, that at the time of November 5, 1941, when 
there was under consideration, the request of the Chinese Govern- 
ment that the United States send assistance to meet the Japs who 
were proposing an attack on Kunming, and the Burma Road, that 
you participated in some of the conferences at that time. 

You may recall that there was a joint memorandum submitted to 
the President at that time by Admiral Stark and General Marshall. 
Do you recall those conferences? 

Mr. Welles. I am afraid, unless you give me some details as to 
who participated in the conferences and precise dates, I could not. 

I should make it clear at this point, perhaps, Mr. Chairm'an, that 
I have not kept a diary and that, except for some copies of conver- 
sations which I have had, I have had no means of refeshing my 
memory on these points. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, the joint memorandum was dated [J^i5] 
November 5, and there were minutes attached to it of the meeting of 
November 3, 1911, attended by various Army officials, at which you 
were not pi-esent, and there is reference of an earlier meeting at which 
you attended. 

Mr. Welles. I suppose the meeting of the Liaison Committee 
would be the one. 

Mr. Gesell. It possibly is. This is a conference at the State 
Department on the morning of November 1, and present were your- 
self. Secretary Hull, JVIr. Hornbeck, and other State Department 



462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

officials, and Captain Schuirmann of the United States Navy, at 
which the problem was discussed. 

[1220] Mr. Welles. Of course during that period there were 
many continuing conferences in the office of the Secretary of State in 
regard to the situation in the Pacific region. I was not generally 
present at those conferences on account of the burden of work I had in 
other parts of the world which took up the major part of my time, and 
I am unable for that reason to give you offhand an answer to your 
question. 

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted at all in connection with the 10- 
point note of November 26 which Mr. Hull delivered to the Japanese 
Ambassador ? 

IMr. Welles. The note of November 26 ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. No ; I was not. 

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted concerning the modus vivendi 
M^hich was under discussion prior to that time ? 

Mr. Welles, No. I was kept informed by Secretary Hull of what 
was going on, but I had no part in the formulating of policy with 
regard to that. 

Mr. Gesell. Now in looking over the various records we have of 
meetings which were held in the days immediately preceding the 
attack, I find three meetings which you apparently attended. I 
think I will mention them all and then ask you if you can tell us your 
recollection of the discussions at any of those meetings, as far as they 
are pertinent here. 

[1221] One was a meeting of November 24, attended by yourself, 
Mr, Hull, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark. 

Another, a meeting on December 2, which was attended by 
President Roosevelt, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and your- 
self — possibly a, Cabinet meeting on that same date ; the meeting of 
December 6, attended by yourself and Secretary Hull, Admiral 
Schuirmann, Mr. Hornbeck, and Mr. Hamilton. 

Do you recall any of those meetings and the discussions held? 

Mr. Welles. I think I have very little to add to what Secretary 
Hull has already testified this afternoon with regard to the trend 
of those conferences and conversations. It was uppermost in the 
minds of all of us, I think, that the situation was becoming more and 
more serious as the hours passed. The entire purpose of the State 
Department, under the orders of the President, was to find every means 
possible to prevent a break in the negotiations which had been con- 
tinued for so long a time. 

A very large part of those meetings, as I recall it, was taken up with 
the consideration of intelligence information which had come to us. 
Since no minutes were kept of which I am aware, I am afraid, after 
a period of 4 years, I cannot give you any details, 

Mr. Gesell, Now can you recall whether at that time, with 
[1222—3] reference to the intelligence information, you have any 
information, or any information was discussed at any of these meet- 
ings, which in any way pointed or indicated or suggested the possibility 
that the Japanese would strike at Pearl Harbor? 

Mr, Welles, I do not. During the preceding 7 or 8 weeks, after 
I think it had been perfectly apparent to all of us that the situation, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 463 

since the Japanese had moved into Indochina, meant in all human 
probability that the Japanese intended to extend further the opera- 
tions upon which they had already engaged. 

I do not recall at any time that anybody in high position in the Gov- 
ernment indicated to me that Pearl Harbor or Hawaii was a probable 
objective. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you hear Pearl Harbor even mentioned in those 
conversations, Mr. Welles? 

Mr. Welles. I did not, except — let me interrupt there — except as 
one of the strategic points in the Pacific in which we were vitally 
concerned. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember any discussions concerning Pearl 
Harbor in that connection, as to the question of its defenses, the ques- 
tion of it being alerted or not alerted, or any things of that sort '^ 

Mr. Welles. No. I should make it perfectly clear that at that 
time there was no reason why that should be discussed ll£24] 
with me by any high military or naval officer. 

Mr. Gesell. I take it you say it was not ? 

Mr. Welles. It was not. 

Mr. Gesell. Admiral Richardson has testified here to a conversa- 
tion he had with Secretary Hull concerning the question of the fleet 
being based at Pearl Harbor, or on the west coast, and I think, as he 
put it, you sat in on that conversation. Do you recall it? 

Mr. Welles. I remember the conversation with Admiral Richard- 
son very well. 

Mr. Gesell. What is your recollection of it ? 

Mr. Welles. I remember that the admiral expressed very grave 
concern at the situation resulting from the fact that the fleet was sta- 
tioned at Pearl Harbor. I remember that I discussed it afterwards 
with Mr. Hull. I think the feeling of myself was quite as strong 
as that of Mr. Hull, that if any change in the arrangement which 
then existed were undertaken the impression would inevitably be given 
to the Government of China that the United States was withdrawing 
from the protection of its own vitally important defenses in the Pacific, 
and that short of some overwhelmingly imperative reason for such a 
change the whole situation in the Pacific by such a step would be so 
vitally affected as to make it in the highest degree prejudicial to our 
own interests. 

[1225] I am not attempting to vouch for what conversations 
Mr. Hull may have had with the President with regard thereto, but 
that is the conversation, as I remember it. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any conversation with the President 
concerning it? 

Mr. Welles. No; because Mr. Hull was handling the question of 
the Far East with the President whenever he was in the Department. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall whether iVdmiral Richardson said any- 
thing at this meeting with Mr. Hull which indicate^ or suggested that 
the fleet was insecure in Pearl Harbor and subject to disaster through 
attack? 

Mr. Welles. I do not recall such exact expressions of opinion on 
the part of Admiral Richardson, but the very clear construction that 
I drew from what Admiral Richardson said in that meeting was that 
he believed the fleet was insecure if it remained stationed in, Hawaii. 



464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. Was he discussing the question of security or was he 
discussing the question of the readiness of the fleet for combat? 

Mr. Welles. To the average layman like myself I think there prob- 
ably would be very little diti'erence between the two expressions, I 
do not think the admiral went into any technical phases of the situa- 
tion in that sense. 

[1226] Mr. Gesell. He discussed, did he, the questions of better 
training on the west coast, the need of assembling a train, and matters 
of that sort ? 

Mr. Welles. No ; not so far as I recall it. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, one other topic that has to do with the Japanese 
intercepted diplomatic messages. Were you among those who saw 
those messages as they were intercepted? 

Mr. Welles. The custom in the Department at that time was that 
the diplomatic intercepts went first to the office of the Secretary of 
State and from his office they came to me. Occasionally, intercepts 
of a military character would also come to me, but whether all of 
them came to me or not, I could not undertake to say. I am quite con- 
fident to say, however, that all of the diplomatic intercepts did come 
to me. 

Mr. Gesell. Those came to Mr. Hull and to you from the Army and 
Navy, did they not? 

Mr. Welles. That is correct. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall seeing messages of an espionage or mili- 
tary nature concerning fleet movements in Pearl Harbor reconnais- 
sance ? 

Mr. Welles. No. 

Mr. Gesell. And matters of that sort? 

[1227] Mr. Welles. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you have any record or do you know of any record 
which indicates what intercepts were in fact distributed in the Depart- 
ment of State and which ones were not? 

Mr. Welles. That record would undoubtedly be available in the 
office of the Secretary of State, if it were kept. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you know whether any was kept? 

Mr. Welles. I could not answer that question. 

Mr. Gesell. I take it you, like Mr. Hull, returned the entercepts 
after you read them, for security reasons? 

Mr. Welij:s. They were taken back, as soon as I got through with 
them, to his office. 

Mr. Gesell. I think that is all, if the committee please. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you one question. 

Were your conferences on the far-eastern situation growing out 
of the fact that you were directly in charge of inter-American relations 
and European affairs, rather incidental, due to the absence of the 
Secretary ? 

Mr. Welles. They were entirely incidental, Mr. Chairman. The 
matter was handled in this way, that since occasionally I had to act as 
Acting Secretary of State it was necessary for me to be kept in touch 
with what the Secretary of State and the'President were doing in the 
far-eastei-n picture, and [1328] occasionally during any ab- 
sence of Mr. Hull I had to act as the mouthpiece of the President in 
order to communicate certain messages to the Japanese representa- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 465 

tives, or in order to act in accordance with the request of Mr. Hull, 
if he were not available. 

I think it is fair to say it was only in that connection that I was 
drawn into the picture. 

The ChxVirman. During that period who was the Assistant Secretary 
of State in Charge of Far Eastern Affairs, or was it the head of the 
Division ? 

Mr. Welles. There was no Assistant Secretary of State at that time, 
Mr. Chairman, who acted as being in charge of far-eastern affairs. 
Secretary Hull, probably from the o.me that he commenced his negotia - 
tions with the Japanese Ambassador in March 194:1, was in entire 
charge and took entire charge of those negotiations himself. The 
principal advisers whom Mr. Hull had in the Department at that time 
were Dr. Hornbeck, who was the political adviser for far-eastern 
Affairs, and Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine of the Far Eastern 
Division. 

The Chairman. During your conferences, or during your presence 
at any conference with the Secretary, or with the President, or with 
the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of War, or any of the high rank- 
ing military and naval officers of the Government, did the question of 
the use of the Navy [12'29] and its placement in the region of 
Hawaii for diplomatic reasons arise? 

Mr. Welles. Perhaps before I answer your question specifically, Mr. 
Chairman, it might be helpful for me to say that in the year 1939 a 
so-called liaison committee had been created, with Mr. Hull's ap- 
proval and the President's authorization, between the State Depart- 
ment and the War and Navy Depaitments, of which at the outset (Gen- 
eral Marshall, Admiral Stark and myself formed part, together with 
various assistants. That liaison committee was established pri- 
marily for the purpose of bringing the three Departments into closer 
touch, so that it could act as a clearinghouse for information among 
the three Departments more familiar with the policies which each one 
was pursuing. 

As the year 1941 came in Mr. Hull undertook himself to have 
weekly conferences, prolonged conferences, directly with the Secretary 
of the Navy and Secretary of War. In view of that, the meetings 
of the liaison committee, composed of General Marshall, Admiral 
Stark, and myself, dealt almost entirely with questions which affected 
the Western Hemisphere, questions of such vital importance, as to 
assistance which we might give to some of the Latin-American Repub- 
lics who desperately needed some means of defense, or questions which 
arose occasionally with regard to the bases which the United [12S0] 
States was acquiring in the Caribbean, and so on. 

As to matters which affected the far eastern picture, those very 
rarely name under the cognizance of that liaison committee. For 
that reason matters of the kind which you mentioned were being 
handled by Mr. Hull with Colonel Stimson and Colonel Knox, and I 
do not recall that the question which you bring up, namely, whether 
the fleet should be used for diplomatic purposes or not, was ever 
discussed by me with members of the War and Navy Departments, 

The Chairman. That is all. 

Congressman Cooper. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 2 6 



466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire of 
counsel for probably a little clearer understanding with respect to the 
exhibit, exhibit 22. 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. As a part of it I find about seven pages of 
the photostatic copy, and on the note, the first page, it states, "This 
draft was not given to the Japanese Ambassador. See communica- 
tions given by the President to the Japanese Ambassador on August 
17, 1941." 

Now then, the following photostatic pages, are they a copy of the 
document that was given to the Japanese Ambassador or the one that 
was not given ? 

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Welles has testified that it was not [1231'] 
given to the Japanese Ambassador. We have called attention to the 
text of the note which was given, which appears on page 556 of 
volume II of the reported conversations. 

I think I might say in that connection, with respect to the whole 
subject, that the first sheet, the draft of paralleling communications 
to the Japanese Government, comes from the files of the White House, 
as it is the text of the two telegrams sent by President Roosevelt to 
Mr. Hull arranging for a meeting with the Japanese Ambassador. 
The photostatic document which you reger to comes from the files of 
the State Department and the note on there, as you have pointed out, 
indicates that it was not handed to the Ambassador. 

The Vice Chairman. That was my understanding of it, but I wanted 
to be clear on that point. 

Mr. Gesell. That is a correct statement. 

Mr. Welles. That is my unaerstanding as being perfectly correct, 
Mr. Congressman. 

The Vice Chairman. And the document that was read from the 
book is the one that was delivered by the President to the Japanese 
Ambassador? 

Mr. Welles. That is correct, Mr, Congressman. What is published 
in that book as having been delivered by the President to the Japanese 
Ambassabor on Auiiust 16, 1941, is the document delivered. 

[1232] The Vice Chairman. I understood you, Mr. Welles, to 
say you participated in the drafting of one of these documents. Did 
you participate in the drafting of the one that was delivered to the 
Japanese Ambassador or the one that was not? 

Mr. Welles. The one that was not delivered, Mr. Congressman. 
That was merely a suggestion that was hastily drafted before I left 
Washington. 

The Vice Chairman. That is all. 

The Chairman. Senator George. 

Senator George. I believe I have no questions. 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark. 

Mr. Clark. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. I want to pass for just a moment while I am looking 
through some testimony. 

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Welles, as I understood your conversation with 
Admiral Richardson, you stated that he had informed you and Mr. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 467 

Hull that at Pearl Harbor the fleet was insecure, and then, as I under- 
stood you further, you said it would not be moved out of Hawaiian 
waters unless there was some matter of extreme importance. That 
is not the exact language used, but something of that implication. I 
was wondering if there was credence placed by Mr. Hull and your- 
self in the statement [1£SS] of the commander in chief of the 
fleet that the fleet was insecure in its position ; I wonder if that was 
not a matter of extreme importance, or would the fact that you did 
not want to back up and return it to the west coast overcome the state- 
ment of the admiral as to the security of the fleet. 

Mr. Welles. I am afraid I must have expressed myself badly, Con- 
gressman Murphy, if that is what you understood I said. 

Mr. Murphy. I so understood it. I would like to have it cleared up 
so there will not be any misunderstanding. 

Mr. Welles. I will be very glad to. My understanding was that 
the admiral stated that in his belief and opinion the fleet was in- 
secure in Hawaii, and that it was my feeling in consequence that in 
view of the fact of moving the fleet from Hawaii, leaving Hawaii 
defenseless, would have a highly important and prejudicial effect 
upon the willingness of the Chinese Government to consider resistance, 
and also in the sense that it would persuade the Japanese Govern- 
ment immediately to continue with its policy of aggression since it 
would have interpreted it as an indication that the United States 
was withdrawing and giving, a wide-open road to Japan to dominate 
the entire Pacific region. 

That is what I intended by saying "as of utmost importance" it 
seemed to me if the fleet was witlulrawn at that time. 

[X^<?4] Mr. :Mtjrphy. Well, now, to pursue that a little further, 
in the event that the Fleet was insecure — I mean, what would you 
understand the Admiral to mean by that — that it was subject to and 
likely to be attacked ? 

Mr. Welles. My understanding was, Mr. Congressman, that the 
Admiral believed that from the Navy standpoint, there was not suf- 
ficient security for the fleet at that point. 

Mr. Murphy. And you felt that even though there was — I don't 
want to misquote you — did you think at that time that there was any 
any likelihood that the fleet might be attacked at Pearl Harbor be- 
cause of the admiral saying that it was not secure there? 

Mr. Welles. In my judgment there was no immediate danger at 
that time, in the autumn of 1940. Having the greatest respect for the 
Admiral's opinion, it was an opinion as being necessarily deserving 
of every possible consideration, but I want to emphasize the fact that 
I believed that was a matter for the Navy Department, primarily, and 
for the President and the armed forces of the country to determine. 

From the diplomatic standpoint, the effect would be disastrous, I 
thought, if it were withdrawn. 

Mr. Murphy. So that the President would be confronted with the 
opinion of the commander in chief of the fleet from a purely naval 
standpoint and at the same time with the [l^SS] opinion of 
the Secretary and yourself from the diplomatic standpoint ? 

Mr. Welles. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And it would be up to him, as the President, under 
constitutional authority to make a decision based on all of the in- 
formation presented to him? 



468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Welles. From that standpoint, that would be his responsibility. 

Mr. Murphy. There have been rumors throughout the country, 
in several of the papers, to the effect tliat at the Atlantic Conference, 
there was a promise by the President of the United States to the 
Prime Minister of England, Mr. Churchill, that we would stall the 
Japanese for a period — that is a free translation — stall the Japanese 
for a period of about 4 months. 

Mr. Gearhart. Baby them. 

Mr, Murphy. I am using the word "stall." My colleague suggests 
"baby them" along. At any rate, was there any promise, so far as 
you know, on the part of the President of the United States, or scny 
commitment by him, to the Prime Minister of England, that we 
would stall, baby them along, or anything of that nature, for a period 
of 4 months? 

Mr. Welles. The only promise made by the President, [1236] 
Mr. Congressman, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is that I 
have already stated, namely that the United States would take parallel 
action with the British Government in warning the Japanese Govern- 
ment that we could not regard with indifference their continued 
expansion. 

Mr. Murphy. And nothing else? 

Mr. Welles. It was also the President's agreement, if it can be 
called that, an understanding was reached that the United States 
would again undertake the negotiations which, you remember, had 
been broken off when the Japanese moved into Indochina, would again 
undertake negotiations with the Japanese Government in an effort to 
avoid war. 

Mr. Murphy. One other question. 

Admiral Richardson said that having talked to you and having 
talked to Mr. Hornbeck, or Dr. Hornbeck, and having talked to Mr. 
Hull, that he gained the impression at the State Department and he 
said not from Mr. Hull, that we were trying to bluff the Japanese. 
Did you say anything to Admiral Richardson that would justify such 
an inference on his part, that we were trying to bluff the Japanese? 

Mr. Wellks. I never stated to Admiral Richardson in aivy conversa- 
tion that I had with him that we were engaged in blumng. Such 
j^ould not have been the facts. 

Mr. Murphy. No other questions. 

[1237] The Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Welles, I should like to direct your attention to 
the testimony of Admiral Richardson with respect to the statement 
you made on your impression as to the content of conversations you 
had with him about the security of the fleet and in order to make the 
record complete at this point, I am going to read what Admiral Rich- 
ardson said in a memorandum submitted to the Secretary of the Navy 
as to why the fleet should be withdrawn. He said : 

Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian area : 

(a) From a purely naval point of view tliere are many disadvantages attached 
to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are: 

(1) Difficulty, delay, and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies. 

(2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security. 

(3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due to difficulties of 
entry, berthing, and departure of large ships. 

(4) Congested and restricted operating areas in the air and on the surface. 



. PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 469 

(5) Inadequate facilities for Fleet services, training, [1238] and 
housing. 

(6) Prolonged absence from mainland of officers and men in time of peace 
adversely affects morale. 

(7) In case of war necessary for Fleet to return to mobilization ports on 
West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measure resulting 
in confusion and a net loss of time. 

On cross-examination, I think both counsel and myself asked the 
admiral if he had in mind, when he gave these reasons for withdraw- 
ing the fleet, an attack upon Pearl Harbor or a submarine attack, 
and he stated unqualifiedly "no." This was in 1940, at a time when 
we were pretty much at peace, when he gave this memorandum to the 
Secretary. 

In his testimony he did not take into consideration the question of 
the security of the fleet as was described to you, and I wanted to call 
your attention to that. 

Mr. Welles. Thank you. Senator. 
The Chair3iax. Is that all. Senator Lucas ? 
Senator Lucas. Yes. 
The Chairman. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Welles, whatever word is used, it was your 
understanding, was it not, that the fleet at Pearl Harbor at that 
time was not prepared for war, or for an offensive action ? 

Mr. Welles. I couldn't say. Senator Brewster, that it [l^SOl 
was my impression that the fleet was not prepared for war. 

Senatf»r Brewster, After what Senator Lucas has read of the testi- 
mony of Admiral Richardson, is your recollection affected? 

]Mr. Welles. I can only remember that in the conversation that I 
had with Admiral Richardson in 1940, I gained the impression that 
the admiral felt, in a general sense, that the fleet station at Hawaii 
was not secure, and that it would be in a better condition if it were 
removed from Hawaii to some other position. 

Senator BrtEWSTER. Did he indicate it was his idea that it should 
be based on the west coast ? 
Mr. Welles, Not to me. 

Senator Brev\'ster. He didn't indicate that he thought it ought to 
move toward the Philippines, I gather? 

Mr. Welles. There was no specific indication that I can recall that 
he gave me at that time. 

Senator Brewster. But your impression is that it was quite clear 
it was a matter of security rather than a readiness for war? 

Mr. Welles. I should say insecurity in the most general sense. Sena- 
tor Brewster, I do not remember that the admiral went into any de- 
tail as to why he thought so in his [,1^W\ conversation with 
me at that time. 

Senator Brewster. If you were to come to the conclusion that the 
fieet was not ready for war, as a result of Admiral Richardson's 
testimony, then the keeping of the fleet at Hawaii, in a condition not 
ready for war. would have some aspects of having your diplomatic 
position exceed your military power, would it not? 

Mr. Welles. It seems to me almost impossible. Senator Brewster, 
to divorce in a critical condition as existed at that time, the diplomatic 
from the military, because the military is a ver}^ essential part of the 
diplomatic picture. 



470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. Isn't it a fundamental principle that you should 
not take a position that you cannot sujoport? 

Mr. Welles. I think that is an admirable principle, but under con- 
ditions which then existed, I was hardly in a position to state or to 
judge for myself, as I know you will agree, whether the fleet was pre- 
pared or not prepared. 

Senator Brewster. Well, let's take a hypothetical question. If you 
were satisfied the fleet was not prepared for offensive action at Pearl 
Harbor, and you still kept it there as a diplomatic measure, your dip- 
lomatic position would be exceeding your military might, would it 
not? 

Mr. Welles. I will have to say again, Senator Brewster, that in 
my judgment, I don't think you can divorce the two [124^11 
things. I think the whole picture had to be taken into account. I 
still feel, as I did 5 years ago, that if the fleet had been moved, it would 
have been regarded by the Japanese as an invitation to move in and 
to expand to the south, or in our direction. 

Senator Brewster. Would your view on that have been affected 
prior to the moving of the fleet to Pearl Harbor, assuming the fleet 
were based on the west coast, whether or not it should be based at Pearl 
Harbor ? 

Mr. Welles. I think the Japanese have alwaj^s regarded Hawaii as 
essential to the protection of the west coast. That has always been 
my understanding, and an indication that we would abandon the de- 
fense of Hawaii would be regarded as open weakness on our part by 
them. 

Senator Brewster. You regarded the Navy as one of the elements 
in the defense of Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Welles. I did. 

Senator Brewster. Rather than Pearl Harbor as being the base 
from which the fleet would carry out offensive action? 

Mr. Welles. I would regard it as a combination of the two. 

Senator Brewster. With reference to the question by the Con- 
gressman as to deferring action by the Japanese [124^] .through 
the fall of 1941, do you accept the rather general understood story as 
to the use of the words "babying along"? 

Mr. Welles. I think the President's desire, if he used that phrase, 
and I do not remember that he used it to me, was to indicate that he 
desired to put off the jiossibility of war to the last possible moment. 

Senator Brewster. You do make that reference in your book; you 
apparently accept it as established as having been used. 

j^Ir. Welles. It has become almost classic, perhaps. 

Senator Brewster. You did consider that it was, in the light of 
the advice of our naval and military advisers to gain time, that tac- 
tics of that sort were very essential ? 

Mr. Welles. Through most of the autumn of 1941, Senator Brew- 
ster, I never failed in mj?^ understanding that both the Army and 
Navy were doing their utmost to persuade the President and the 
State Department that any break should be avoided, if possible; 
that negotiations should be continued for as long as possible. 

Senator Brewster. In order to build a proper picture, will you give 
your impressions of Nomura ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 471 

Mr. Welles. Did you ask me to give my impressions of Nomura ? 

[1^4^] Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. My impressions of Nomura, from the time I first met 
him in the winter of 1941, were that the Ambassador was actually 
desirous of trying to avert war with the United States. 

In the late autumn — and, of course, hindsight is always better 
than foresight — in the late autumn, I think it is incredible that he did 
not know in full detail what his Government intended ; but I think he 
came, primarily, at least, I always believe he came primarily to Wash- 
ing to try to avoid war, rather than to try to prepare for war. 

Senator Brewster. And you had a somewhat different impression 
of Mr. Kurusu ? 

Mr. Welles. A very different impression. 

Senator Breavster. What was that? 

Mr. Welles. Mr. Kurusu came here primarily oinder orders from 
General To jo to stall until they were ready for the attack which 
later came. 

Senator Brewster. Now, did you have a conversation with the 
Consul of the Japanese Embassy on August 4, 1941 ? 

Mr. Welles. I did. Senator Brewster. I had three conversations 
with Mr. Wakasuge. 

Senator Brewster. Will you give the substance of those? 

Mr. Welles. They are rather long and involved. Senator [1^44.'] 
Brewster. Do you want me to read from them? I have them here 
at hand. 

Senator Brewster. I think that would probabaly be the best way. 

Mr. Gesell. They are reported in volume II. 

The Chairman. Are those conversations reported in this bound 
volume ? 

Mr. Welles. I think they are all reported in full, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Are they quoted in the same language you have 
them there ? 

Mr. Welles. I think identical, Mr. Chairman. I see here there is 
one on July 21. 

Senator Brewster. I don't think it is necessary to read them then. 
If they are identical we can insert them in the record later. 

Mr. Welles. They are all in the record. They are all published. 

Senator Brewster. I mean in our record here. 

Mr, Gesell. Senator, when we had in front of us the problem of 
whether or not we should introduce as a formal exhibit these mem- 
oranda prepared at the time of the various conversations we felt it 
would burden the record to introduce them as an exhibit and have 
gone on the assumption that, so far [1^4^] as the actual re- 
ported conversations are concerned, that that material is available in 
the official Government publication to the members of the comm-ittee. 

Senator Brewster. How much spjice would it occupy ? I had the 
August 4 in mind. 

Mr. Gesell. Of course, there are many others. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. They represent at least several hundred pages of con- 
versations. 

Senator Brewster. I was addressing myself to Mr. Welles 

Mr. Gesell. I am sorry. 



472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster (continuing). And his conversations of August 
4. That was not very extensive? 

Mr. Welles. There were three conversations, Senator Brewster, 
one on July 21, one on August 4, and one on October 13. In addition 
to those conversations, Mr. Hull and I jointly saw Mr. Wakasuge on 
another occasion and those conversations in which Mr. Hull partic- 
ipated are also published in this bock. 

Would you care to have me read this? 

Senator Brewsti:r. No; not if they are available. We can decide 
subsequently as to what portions shall be incorporated in our record. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Brewster. Yes, 

[1^46] Mr. Murphy. You will find the August 2, 1941, conversa- 
tion at page 320. You will find the 

The Chairman. August 4 is the one he referred to. 

Mr. Murphy. There was a press release on August 2, 1941. 

The Chairman. Mr. Welles has not referred to a conversation on 
August 2. He referred to a conversation on July 21, August 4, and 
August 13. 

Mr. Welles. October 13. 

The Chairman. October 13. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Senator Brewster. That is all I have. We can decide later with 
counsel as to whether any portion of that shall go into the record. 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart, we only have 5 minutes 
until adjourning time. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is all I will need. 

The Chairman. All right, we will give it to you. 

INIr. Gearhart. Eeferring again, Mr. Welles, to your conversation 
with Admiral Richardson, did he or any other person give expres- 
sion to the idea that, because of the condition of unreadiness for war 
of the fleet, its presence in the Hawaiian waters could not operate as 
a restraining influence over the Japanese for the reason that Japan 
had a military government, the leaders of which thoroughly under- 
stood the lack of fighting [i^^7] capacity of the Navy at that 
time? 

Mr. Welles. That statement was not made to me, Mr. Congress- 
man. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was anything to that effect or along those lines 
said ? 

Mr. Welles. Not that T recall. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is all. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. It is about 3 minutes to adjourning time. Does 
the Senator want me to start? 

The Chairman. It has been suggested that we might, by running 
a few minutes overtime, conclude with Secretary Welles. 

Senator Ferguson. It will take me considerable time. 

The Chairman. Well, that being true, I suppose we may as well 
take a recess. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Welles could return at 11 o'clock in the 
morning. Secretary Hull will take, perhaps, an hour. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 473 

Mr. Gesell. We would like to inquire whether Secretary Hull will 
be available to come tomorrow morning before we make a definite 
arrangement with Mr. Welles. 

The Vice Chairman. I suggest that counsel notify Mr. Welles and 
Secretary Hull both. 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

[1£4S] The Chairman. Obviously, if Secretary Hull will be 
here at 10 o'clock there will be no need for Secretary Welles to be here. 
But you should be available, of course. 

The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morn- 
ing. 

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Sat- 
urday, November 24, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 475 



Vmm PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 



satubday, november 24, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Koom (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

{1260'] The Chairman. The committee will be in order. 

Mr. Welles, I believe, is to continue now. 

Mr. Gesell. That is right. 

Mr. Chairman, I think perhaps a word or two about the schedule 
would be helpful at this time. 

Mr. Grew is scheduled to follow Mr. Welles. He has engagements 
that he hopes very much to keep on Monday and Tuesday of next 
week, and so we thought we would put him on right after Mr. Welles 
to see if there was any opportunity of finishing with him today. 

Mr. Hull will come again Monday morning at 10 o'clock. 

Now, there has been placed before each member of the committee 
two documents which I would like to introduce into the record at this 
time. These are two documents which have been awaiting clearance 
by the British Government and were released last night. 

The first is a message dated November 26, 1941, to the Secretary of 
State, signed by "Winant," who was Ambassador to Great Britain. 
"Triple Priority" captioned "Most secret for the President from the, 
former naval person." The "former naval person" is Mr. Church- 
ill. The committee will recall that Mr. Churchill in his early career 
was active in the British Admiralty, and that phrase "the former 
naval person" was used to designate him in these communications. 

[1261] If the committee will recall, in exhibit 18, introduced 
yesterday, we placed in evidence President Roosevelt's message to Mr. 
Churchill concerning the modus vivendi which was sent on the basis of 
a draft prepared by Mr. Hull to which Mr. Roosevelt added the re- 
marks concerning being prepared for real trouble soon, and this 
message, which I would like to introduce, and have designated as Ex- 
hibit 23, is the reply of Mr. Churchill to President Roosevelt for- 
warded through State Department channels. 



476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Eead it into the record. 
Mr. Gesell. The messa^^e reads as follows : 

Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord 
Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign 
Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this 
business and we certainly do not want an additional war. Tliere is only one 
point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a 
very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse our joint dangers 
would enormously encrease. We are sure that the regard of the United States 
for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are 
most unsure of themselves. 

As I indicated, this was in repl}'- to the President's [1252'] 
message concerning the modus vivendi to Prime Minister Churchill 
and, of course, relates to that subject. 

The next and other document before the committee is another mes- 
sage forwarded in the same fashion to the President from "the former 
naval person," Prime Minister Churchill, dated November 30, 1941. 
This message we introduce because of its relation to the question of a 
commitment, which was discussed yesterday when Mr. "Welles was on 
the stand, at which time you will recall we introduced an exhibit which 
included a draft of a proposed joint position to be taken by the United 
States and Great Britain with respect to Japanese developments. 
This is somewhat later, dated November 80, 1911. The other docu- 
ment was dated in August, at the time of the Atlantic Charter. This 
appeal's to have some reference to the same general matter. 

The text of this message is as follows ; this is the message of Prime 
Minister Churchill : 

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war 
between Japan and onr two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or 
public as may he thought bef^t, that any further act of aggression by Japan will 
lead immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional diffi- 
culties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment withoiit 
having before her [12S5'\ fairly and squarely the dire character of a further 
aggressive step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge 
right, which may be very near, you should not say that "any further Japanese 
aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress" or 
words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share 
in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize 
our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such 
a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and 
prevent a melancholy extension of the war. 

I ask that those two documents be received in evidence. 

The Chairman. They will be printed as part of the hearing at this 
time. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 23 and 24," 
respectively.) 

Mr. Gkst^ll. Now I think it is appropriate for Mr. Welles to return 
to the stand. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Gesell, will you indicate what the name 
"Winant" at the bottom of each of those exhibits indicates? 

Mr. Gesetx. It is my understandinc; that IVIr. Winant was Am- 
bassador and he was simply transmitting the messages. 

[7^'54] Senator Lucas. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 477 

TESTIMONY OF SUMNER V/ELLES (Resumed) 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson, I believe, was on the verge of 
examining Mr. Welles when we recessed yesterday. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Secretary, when did you first receive in- 
formation that you were to go to the Atlantic Conference? 

Mr. Welles. About 3 days before the time for my departure, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you state the day that you departed for 
the Conference? 

JSlr. Welles. I believe that I left on the, left Washington on the 
evening of August 8, leaving Boston the morning of August 9. 
Senator Ferguson. And when did you arrive at the Conference? 
ISIr. Welles. I think I arrived the night of the 9th. 
Senator Ferguson. Did you travel with the President? 
Mr. Welles. I did not. The President went by sea and I went 
by airplane from Boston. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what day the President arrived 
at the Conference? 

Mr. Welles. The President, I think, had arrived the morning of 
the day on which I arrived there, which was either the 9th or the lUtk 
of August. 

[1255] Senator Ferguson. You say he either arrived the 9th or 
the 10th? 

Mr. Welles. I can't remember at the moment which date it was, 
but I think it was the 9th of August. 

Senator P'erguson. This conference was held on a battleship? 
Mr. Welles. That is correct. Senator Ferguson. 
Senator Ferguson. What was the name of the ship? 
Mr. Welles. The President was on the Augusta, as I recall it. 
Senator Ferguson. But the actual conference between the Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister ? 

Mr. Welles. I think all of the conferences took place on the 
Augusta. I think the President only visited the Prince of Wales, the 
warship upon which Mr. Churchill had come, on one occasion. That 
was to go to Sunday services. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a conference with the President 
prior to going to the Conference? 

Mr. Welles. I had a conference with the President as soon as I 
arrived there. 

Senator Ferguson. And will you state whether or not the Far 
Eastern question was discussed with the President? 
Mr. Welles. You mean when ? 
Senator Ferguson. When you arrived. 
Mr. Welles. No ; there was no discussion of it whatever. 
[1£56] Senator Ferguson. Was there an agenda ? 
Mr, Welles. May I repeat. Senator Ferguson, what I attempted 
to make clear yesterday. 

The only part of tlie conference in which I took part was in preji- 
aration of drafts for the Atlantic Charter and in discussions which 
took place on three or four occasions between Mr. Churchill and 



478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the President with regard to the Atlantic Charter. I was present at 
no conferences that had to do with military or naval subjects. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you consider that in the Atlantic 
Charter the far eastern question is involved? 

]Mr. Welles. In my judgment, Senator Ferguson, the text of the 
Atlantic Charter is applicable to all the world and not to any partic- 
ular part of the world. 

Senator Fp:rguson. Did it involve parallel action? 

Mr. Welles. You are now referring to the Atlantic Charter? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. I do not consider that it had any connection with the 
parallel declarations. 

Senator Ferguson. That took place afterward? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. The Atlantic Cliarter was, in my judgment, a 
joint statement of the two Governments of general policy with regard 
to the objectives which they hoped could be achieved when the war 
was over. 
* [1257] Senator Ferguson. After the war was over? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you are familiar with the exhibit that was 
handed to us yesterday, headed "10 Downing Street, Wliit^hall." 
Do you have it before you ? 

Mr. Welles. I have not got it before me, no. 

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, would you see that he gets a copy of it? 

Mr. Welles. Thanli you. 

Senator Ferguson. That is dated August 10, 1941, and "10 Down- 
ing Street" is in London, England ; that would be correct, would it not? 

Mr. Welles. That is correct, but my assumption was that the Prime 
Minister was using his official stationery which was available on his 
warship. 

[J2S8] Senator Ferguson. Did you consider that this was written 
on the 10th on the warship? 

Mr. Welles. I should assume that it had been prepared by the 
Prime Minister after his arrival or while he was on the way over. 

Senator Ferguson. You landed there the evening of the 9th ?* 

Mr. Welles. That is my recollection. 

Senator L'erguson. Now, on the 10th did you hear anything about 
this subject? 

Mr. Welles. My recollection, Senator, is that Mr. Churchill did 
not arrive until the evening of the 10th, 24 hours after my arrival. 

Senator P'erguson. He did not arrive until after you had arrived, 
and that was the evening of the 10th ? 

Mr. Welles. That is my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. So, on the whole date of the 10th you had never 
heard of this subject? 

Mr. Welles. I had not. 

Senator Ferguson. You had not been consulted about it? 

Mr. Welles. I had not. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for this being written on 
the 10th and Mr. Churchill not landing there until the evening of 
the 10th? 

Mr. Welles. I have taken it for granted that Mr. Churchill 
[12-59] was preparing various papers which he wished to discuss 
with the President, while he was on the way over. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 479 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with Mr. Hull's conference 
with Mr. Halifax, the Ambassador of Britain here, on the 9th? 

Mr. Welles. I could not have been familiar with that, Senator 
Ferguson, since I was on my way up North at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know there had been — at the time did 
yon know there was a conference between Mr. Halifax and Mr. Hull? 

Mr. Welles. Not so far as I can remember. 

Senator Ferguson. That could relate to this same question, as to 
the number of ships that we could use in the Pacific? 

Mr. Welles. No. 

Senator Ferguson. "\Mien did you first see this exhibit, draft of 
parallel communications to the Japanese Government? 

Mr. Welles. I don't rememeber having seen this document at that 
time. My recollection is that the President spoke to me about this 
question the last day of my stay in Argentia, told me of his conver- 
sations with the Prime Minister on this question and suggested that 
the matter be taken up as soon as I returned to Washington; and the 
draft which I brought back with me was prepared on that last day. 

[12G0] Senator Ferguson. The draft that you prepared, then, 
was prepared on what date ? 

Mr. Welles. On the last day of my stay in Argentia, which, I 
think, was the 13th. 

Senator Ferguson. On the day of the 13th. 

Mr. Welles. I think so, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Where, did you prepare the instrument that 
was handed to us as your notes. Do you have a copy of those? I do 
not have the exhibit number. It is dated August the 15th. 

Mr. Welles. This is dated August 15th. 

Mr. Gesell. Number 22, I think. 

Senator Fergus ox. It is Exhibit 22. August the 15th is the date. 

Mr. Welles. This must have been prepared after my return to the 
Department of State from a draft on notes which I had drafted before 
we left Argentia. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you know where the original 
notes would be? 

Mr. Welles. Unless they are in the Department of State they 
probably were destroyed after the clean draft was prepared. 

Senator Ferguson. This is not the instrument that you prepared 
at Argentia? 

\1261'\ Mr. Welles. I should think not. It is dated August 
15th and I think this is undoubtedly a clean draft which was prepared 
after my return to Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, the instrument of August 10, 1941, 
from 10 Downing Street, Whitehall — would you say that that was 
the Biitish idea as to what happened there? Does this fairly repre- 
sent that? Is that your understanding? 

Mr. Welles. My understanding is that this was a suggestion. 
drafted by Mr. Churchill for presentation to the President and for 
discussion with him and that this draft which is headed "10 Downing 
Street" had been drafted by Mr. Churchill before his arrival at 
Argentia. 



480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there is in exist- 
ence the actual agreement between the President and Mr. Churchill 
on this question? 

]Mr. Welles. So far as the President is concerned, the text of that 
agreement was presented to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17th 
by the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Might I ask counsel where this paper came 
from. August 10, 1941 ? Where did he get it ? 

Mr, Gesell. As I stated when it was introduced, this is from the 
files of President Roosevelt and it is in the files relating to the Atlantic 
Charter trip, so that is how we [1262] relate it to that event. 
There will be testimony about that later. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, this reads : "Declaration by United States 
Government That" — this is the draft of parallel communications to the 
Japanese Government. [Reading] : 

Any further encroachment by Japan in the South West Pacific would produce a 
situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter 
measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan. 

2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence 
of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would have 
the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power. 

Now, let us take the first declaration. There is nothing said in there 
about the President coming to Congress is there? That is correct, 
isn't it? 

Mr. Welles. That is correct, Senator, yes. 

Senator Ferguson, In other words, if Japan made any encroach- 
ments in the Southwest Pacific it would produce a situation in which 
the United States would be compelled to take counter measures even 
though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan ? 

[1263] Mr, Welles, It would assume, in my judgment, however, 
in view of the fact that it states that it is a declaration by the United 
States Government, that the British Prime Minister foresaw the 
need for the President to act in accordance with the United States 
Constitution. 

Senator Ferguson. But how do you account for the Prime Minister 
mentioning, however, that it would come to Congress in case a third 
power became the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of the 
counter measures, or their support, and not in the first situation where 
we would consider any further encroachment such conduct as we would 
go to war for ? 

Mr. Welles, You will, of course, understand. Senator that this is 
purely assumption and interpretation on my part. 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking to you as a member of the State 
Department at that time. 

Mr. Welles. My understanding would be that what is foreseen in 
article 2 is the possibility that the President in such circumstances 
would consider it desirable to enter into some kind of temporary rela- 
tionship with that third power which would envisage the treaty- 
making powers of the Senate in addition to the war-making powers 
of the Congress. 

Senator Ferguson. But that would not be involved in the first item, 
that we would go to war — be compelled to [1264-] take counter 
measures even though these might lead to war between the United 
States and Japan in case of any encroachment by the Japanese in the 
Southwest Pacific. Is that the way you read that ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 481 

Mr, Welles. I think that the declaration by the United States Gov- 
ernment constitutes, of course, a covering of tiie constitutional require- 
ments laid upon the President also. I can conceive of it being entirely 
possible that the counter measures envisaged in article 1 might involve 
measures of security which would possibly lead to a clash between the 
United States Government and the Japanese Government forces while 
the United States Government was attempting to take care of the 
security of our interests. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next is the proposal of the British 
Prime Minister, the last phrase reading : 

•'. . . their support of them. H.M.G." — meaning His Majesty's Government — 
"would give all possible aid to such Power",— that might become involved in 
resisting, is that correct? 

Mr, Welles. My interpretation is that the British Government, not 
being under the same constitutional provisions as the United States 
Executive, would make a flat declaration that it would give such 
aid to such Power. 

Senator Feeguson. It was not necessary that Mr, Churchill 
[126S] ask anyone for that consent ? 

Mr, Welles. That is my understanding. 

Senator Ferguson. And he was saying so by this instrument? 

Mr. Welles. That is my understanding. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the declaration by the Dutch Government. 
The Dutch Government agreed and this would indicate it had already 
agreed, the same as the British Government, is that correct? 

Mr. Welles. That is my understanding. 

Senator Ferguson, And then the last item was : 

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whetlier 
they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration. 

Now, when you drafted this instrument of August 15th — and, Mr, 
Gesell, I would like for you to inquire of the State Department whether 
or not there are any notes in existence that Mr. Welles made in relation 
to his conference with the President on this subject ? 

Mr. Gesell. We have seen none. We will inquire some more, how- 
ever. We have been through the papers pretty thoroughly.^ 

Senator Ferguson. Now, taking the instrument — have you the in- 
strument before you of August 15, 1941 ? 

[1266] Mr. Welles. I have it before me, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. You will notice that, in the beginning, on the 
first page, you use the words, "Joint Declaration." It reads : 

On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Gov- 
ernment through the Japanese Amb;\ssador in Washingt(»n iliat he was willing to 
suggest to the Governments of Great Britain, of The Netheiiands and of China 
that they concur in a joint declaration. 

Now, that is, however, distinguished from a parallel declaration, is 
it not? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the difference in diplomatic language? 

Mr. Welles. A joint declaration means that by prior agreement the 
governments concerned would make an identical declaration. A par- 

1 Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 22-A. 
79716 — 40— pt. 2 7 



482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

allel declaration, in my interpretation, means that two governments 
would agree that they would take action simultaneously but not neces- 
sarily in the same terms. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know who the President did con- 
sult on this question of the parallel action^ He did not consult you 
prior to entering into it? 

Mr. Welles. The President upon his return undoubtedly [1267] 
consulted fully with Mr. Hull in regard to these terms. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whom he may have consulted prior 
to that time? 

Mr. Welles. Prior to August 10th ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; or at the conference do you know whom he 
may have consulted with ? Would you name who was with the Presi- 
dent at the conference ? 

Mr. Welles. AVhen I arrived the President had with him only some 
of the highest ranking military and naval officers of the United States. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you give us their names? 

Mr. Welles. My only difficulty is remembering whether they came 
with the President or whether they arrived after the President arrived, 
but b}' the time that August 10th had come. Senator, General Marshall, 
Admiral Stark, Admiral King, and General Arnold were all there. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there anyone with you when you had the 
conference with the President? Was there any other person at this 
conference when he gave you these ideas that you made a memo of, 
or were you personally with him ? 

Mr. Welles. I think I was alone with the President in his sitting 
room on the Augusta^ the Admiral's cabin. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the last page — page 6 of this instru- 
ment — and I think that is the part that relates [1268] to the 
joint — or not the joint action — the parallel action. (Reading) : 

The Government of the United States, therefore, finds it necessary to state 
to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government undertakes any 
further steps in pursuance of the policy of military domination through force 
or conquest in the Pacific region upon which it has apparently embarked, the 
United States Government will be forced to take immediately any and all steps 
of whatsoever character it deems necessary in its own security notwithstanding 
the possibility that such further steps on its part may result in conflict between 
the two countries. 

Now, that is diplomatic language? 

Mr. Welles. That is diplomatic language; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And what is a fair interpretation of that? 
What does that mean ? 

Mr. Welles. That means that the United States Government would 
take such steps as it might judge necessary to protect its legitimate 
interests and its safety, notwithstanding the possibility — and that 
word "possibility" should be underlined — that those steps taken in its 
legitimate interest and for its safety might eventually result in 
hostilities. 

[1269] Senator Ferguson. How does that differ from No. 1? 
(Reading) : 

Any further enci'oachment by Japan in the South West Pacific would produce 
a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter 
measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 483 

Mr. Welles. In the first place, article 1 and the suggestion made 
by the British Prime Minister limits the field of encroachment by 
Japan to the Southwest Pacific. The last part of this draft is broader 
in its structure. It says, "In the Pacific region." 

Senator Ferguson. How inclusive would the Pacific regions be? 

Mr. Welles. I should think it would be all-inclusive in the broad- 
est sense of the word. 

Senator Ferguson. So it means the same, would you say, practically 
the same, except that the region is enlarged in what you drafted ? 

Mr, Welles. That is correct, and I also stress the need to underline 
the word "possibility." 

Senator Ferguson. Why do you stress the word "possibility"? 

Mr. Welles. Because it was still conceivable in August [1270'] 

1941 that Japan might turn from her then course and that steps which 
were legitimate on the part of the United States to safeguard its in- 
terests and to provide for its security would not lead to hostility or 
conflict between the two countries. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, Japan could have lived within 
this and there would have been no conflict? 

Mr. Welles. I think that is an entirely correct statement, Senator 
Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is why you used the word "possibility" 
here? 

Mr. Welles. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. It lay within Japan's power 

Mr. Welles. That is entirely correct. 

Senator Ferguson (continuing). To avoid the use of this rather 
than to have it exercised ? 

Mr. Welles. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. But a fair statement of this instrument would 
be that if Japan did not intend to live within it, then this would be- 
become operative even to the point of war ? 

Mr. Welles. What it implies — I think you are entirely accurate — 
what it implies is that the United States would have to take such 
measures as might be necessary for the safety of this country and for 
the preservation of this [1271] country's legitimate interests 
no matter what the consequences might be. 

Senator Ferguson. And that would be the same as the first item of 
Mr. Churchill's instrument, according to your interpretation? 

Mr. Welles. I have endeavored to point out the differences. Sena- 
tor Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the President returned to the United 
States on the morning of August 17, is that correct? 

Mr. Welles. That is my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. The two telegrams indicate, that we have re- 
ceived in evidence, that the President desired to communicate with the 
Jap Ambassador. 

Mr. Welles. In addition to those telegrams the President requested 
me to make all arrangements necessary so that he could see the 
Ambassador the moment after his return. 

Senator Ferguson. Then when you drafted this instrument which 
I have read froha, which says, "This draft was not given to the 



484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Japanese Ambassador," did you help to draft the instrument that 
actually went to the Ambassador? 

Mr. Welles. The draft which is dated August 15 was handed by me 
to Mr. Hull as an indication of what the President had in mind to say 
to the Ambassador. It was then re- \l'^7:i] drafted in the 
Department of State under Mr. Hull's supervision after consulting 
with various (.t!;er officials of the Department and the draft of August 
J7 represented the joint views of the officials of the Department of 
State together with those of Mr. Hull as to the proper connnunication. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you get back to Washington? 

Mr. Welles. My recollection is that I got back on the 14th. It may 
not have been until the morning of the 15th. 

Senator Ferguson. And you drafted this on that day that you 
returned ? 

Mr. Welles. It was drafted immediately after my return, as I re- 
member it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anyone in Washington that 
knew what this agreement was with the Prime Minister and with the 
Dutch other than you and the President? 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Welles. May I remind you, Senator Ferguson, that this was not 
in the nature of an agreement. It was a statement on the part of the 
President, which you can call a ])romise on the jxirt of the P.eside!it 
to the Prime Minister that this Government would make a parallel 
warning with the British Government to the Japanese but until 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know— — 

The Chairman. Let the witness finish his answer. 

{1273] Senator Fp:rguson. All right. Were you through ? 

Mr. Welles. Not quite through, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you continue. 

Mr. Welles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To answer your question more fully, Senator Ferguson, until my 
return to AVashington there was no one in Washington who was aware 
of the conversations which the President had had with Mr. Churchill. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I was getting at. So that until 
the President returned on the morning of the 17th, as far as you knew, 
no one knew of the understanding or promise or whatever we call it, 
other than you? You were the only man in Washington that you 
knew of that knew anything about it ? 

Mr. Welles. No. Only on the day when I returned I naturally 
informed the Secretary of State fully on everything that had taken 
place at Argentia of which I was informed. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he get any knowledge, did he seem to have 
any knowledge other than what you were giving him on this subject? 

Mr. Welles. There would not have been any means for him to have 
knowledge of it. Senator Ferguson, unless the President had tele- 
graphed him directly about it. 

\127Ji\ Senator Ferguson. He did not appear to have such 
knowledge? 

Mr. Welles. I am quite confident that he did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why tne language was used that 
was given to the ambassador? 

Mr. Welles. My recollection is that it was thought wiser at that 
time, in view of the fact that this Government was going again to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 485 

undertake to negotiate with the Japanese Government after the break 
in negotiations, to omit the phrase, "the possibility that such further 
steps on its part may result in conflict between the two countries." 

The language in the memorandum of August 17 omits that phrase- 
ology. 

\1276'] Senator Ferguson. How does that alter the instrument? 

Mr. Welles. I do not think it alters the purport of the instrument, 
Senator. I think it leaves out a concrete phrase. 

Senator Ferguson. The instrument amounts to the same thing? 

My. Welles. To all intents and purposes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know when the President, or when 
our Government, first made public this promise to the Prime Min- 
ister — I think those were your words, while I had used the word 
"agreement" — in relation to tliis parallel action? 

Mr, Y/elles. When the public was informed? 

Sepator Ferguson. Yes ; when it first came to the attention of the 
public. 

Mr. Welles. I am not able to answer your question, Senator Fergu- 
son, without going over the documentation to make sure. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you if you know when the white 
papers "Peace and War" were published. 

Mr. Welles. They were published as soon as possible, I under- 
stand, after the Pearl Harbor incident. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. They were not published until 1942 or 
1943, were they ? 

Mr. Welles. I do not remember the exact date. 

112761 Mr. Gesell. January 2, 1943, 1 believe is the release date, 

Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. January 2, 1943. Now, do you know whether 
or not the President sent a message to Congress on August 21 or 22, 
1941, in relation to the Atlantic Charter, the Conference? 

Mr. Welles. I do not remember the exact date. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have a copy of "Peace and War"? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. On page 717, Instrument No. 229, it is listed 
as "Message of President Roosevelt to Congress, August 21, 1941, em- 
bodying text of the Atlantic Charter." 

Will you glance over that message and see whether or not there is 
anything in it at all about the parallel action and promise to the 
Prime Minister of Britain? 

Mr. Welles. It had been my recollection, which is now refreshed, 
that there was no specific reference to it in that message. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there any reference to it ? 

Mr. Welles. None that I see. 

Senator Ferguson. None that you see. Did you ever discuss with 
the Secretary of State, or with the President, why that action was 
omitted from the message to Congress? 

Mr. Welles. It had been my understanding from the very 
[1277] beginning that was the moment when we were endeavoring 
to start negotiations again with the Japanese, in order to find some 
peaceful solution, in order to prevent war, if at all possible, that the 
publication of a warning of the character which had been given by the 
President to the Japanese Government would not be conducive to 
successful results in attempting to find a peaceful solution. Public 



486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

opinion in Japan would have been exceedingly inflamed and would 
have made it far less likely for any peaceful solution to have been 
found. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not Japan did — well, 
they got the message on the seventeenth, so they knew it. 

Mr. Welles. The Japanese Government certainly had it, but I 
have no recollection whatever that the Japanese Government per- 
mitted it to be made public in Japan. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, it was indicated in Mr. Churchill's state- 
ment that he desired the President would have the intention to seek 
authority of Congress to give aid to such powers. 

Mr. Welles. That, my understanding is, implied that in the event 
that Japan continued upon its path of aggression and conquest, and 
such action had been necessary, that only in that event would the 
President come to the Congress for the necessary declarations on the 
part of the Congress, if the Congress saw fit, but it was not the inten- 
tion of Mr. Churchill [1278] that the President immediately 
announce to the public that this was his intention. 

Senator Ferguson. It is a fair statement, then, that this was not 
made public either to Congress or to the people prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Welles. For the reasons which I have indicated. 

Senator Ferguson. You discussed that with the President? 

Mr. Welles. I do not remember discussing that specific question 
with him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with Mr. Hull ? 

Mr. Welles. Again I am sorry to say I cannot remember whether 
I did or not, but I imagine that every aspect of this question was dis- 
cussed in full. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Admiral Stark ever knew 
of this promise and this parallel action? 

Mr. Welles. I think the Navy Department and War Department 
undoubtedly were fully informed. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Admiral Kimmel or 
General Short ever had any information about this parallel action? 

Mr. Welles. I have no means of having such information, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you Imow whether Britain ever gave parallel 
action ? 

[i^7P] Mr. Welles. I take it for granted that the British Gov- 
ernment took parallel action at the same time and that the records 
of the Department of State will probably show that. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean our Department of State records? 

Mr. Welles. I would assume so. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why we do not have those records? 

Mr. Welles. I did not know we did not have them. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Did j^ou ever know that Britain did take the 
parallel action? 

Mr. Welles. I find it very difficult to answer that question spe- 
cifically. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel if we have any record on that 
question, that Britain did take parallel action. 

Mr. Gesell. We have no evidence that they did. We have not 
seen any documents on that subject. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you endeavor to find out whether or not 
there is any evidence? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 487 

Mr. Gesell. Certainly. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to hand you, Mr. Welles, a photostatic 
copy of the New York Times for August 13, 1941. Will you just 
glance at that article? I would like to have you read it. 

Mr. Welles. The U. S. and Britain Tell Tokyo To Keep [l^SO] 
Hands Off Thailand ? Is that the article ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles (perusing article). I have had a hasty reading of it, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Take the first part. Would you read that into 
the record ? Then I will ask you some questions on that. 

The Chairman. Would you mind giving the date line? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; August 13, 1941. 

[1281] The Chairman. From what point did this article orig- 
inate ? 

Senator Ferguson. Give the date line. 

Mr. Welles. This is an article sent by wireless to the New York 
Times, dated Tokyo, Wednesday, August 13, by Otto D. Tolischus. 

The American and British stand in the Far Eastern crisis, as expressed in 
recent statements by United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, was formally conveyed to the Japanese Gov- 
ernment by both United States Ambassador Joseph C. Grew and British Am- 
bassador Sir Robert L. Craigie in recent interviews with Vice Admiral Teijiro 
Toyoda, Japanese Foreign Minister, it was understood in political circles here 
today. 

As a result of these steps as well as direct discussions between Mr. Hull and 
Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura, the Japanese Government was 
oflicially informed that any action that would threaten the independence of 
Thailand would be a matter of immediate concern to Britain and the United 
States and that the United States and Britain were prepared to meet any step 
Japan might take, move for move. 

Do you wish me to continue? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[1282] Mr. Welles (reading) : 

And inasmuch as Mr. Eden has warned that any threat to Thailand's independ- 
ence threatens the security of Singapore, on which hinges the whole position 
both of Britain and the United States in the Far East, there is little doubt in 
Japanese minds today what the next step would be. 

Senator Ferguson. That will be sufficient. 

Now, Mr. Secretary, that indicates parallel action, does it not, along 
the same line ? ' 

Mr. Welles. This relates, as I understand it, specifically to the 
question of the independence of Thailand. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; of Thailand, and the instrument, the 
Churchill document goes to the Southwest Pacific, and our document 
on the I7th, handed to him on the I7th, goes to the entire Pacific. 
That is the distinction. 

Now I would like 

The Chairman. Let the witness answer that question. 

Mr. Welles. May I examine the book ? 

The Chairman. Yes; examine the document in the book. I think 
he is referring to the August 17 note handed to the Japanese Am- 
bassador by the President. That is on page 556. That is a different 
book, is it? 

Mr. Welles. I have a different book, Mr. Chairman. 



488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The final paragrapli in the document of August 17 reads : 

[1283] Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say 
to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any' further 
steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat 
of force of neigliboring countries, the Government of the United States will be 
conipplled to take inmuMliately any and all steps which it may deem necessary 
toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interest of the United States and 
American Nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United 
States. 

That, which is tlie actual document handed by the President to the 
Japanese Ambassador on August 17, states specifically to the Govern- 
ment of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further 
steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by 
force or threat of force of neighboring countries 

[1384^] Senator Ferguson, Now can you account for the fact 
that our Ambassador to Japan and the British Ambassador were tak- 
ing parallel action on Thailand as early as the 13th or the 18th — that 
is, the l-)th Tokio time and 12th Washington time, is it not? 

Mr. Welles. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you account for that ? 

Mr. Welles. Well, in regard to this specific event of August 13, I 
was not in Washington, not in the Department of State at that time, 
and naturally I had no participation in the instructions which may 
have been sent to Ambassador Grew. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you 

Mr. Welles. May I just conclude ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. It had been for some time the policy of this Govern- 
ment, whenever it saw fit, to take parallel action with regard to events 
that were happening in the Pacific which threatened not only the 
intei-est of the United States but the interest of the other counries 
that were also resisting — leave out the "also" — that were resisting 
action at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Would it be a fair statement to say tliat after 
you talked to the President, and from what you know of the instru- 
ment, on the parallel action, that from then [1£8S] on this 
country was to do the negotiating? 

Mr. Welles. To do the negotiating with the Japanese Government? 

Senator Ferguson. With the Japanese. 

Mr. Welles. I know of no such commitment. I know only that it 
was told to Mr. Churchill by the President that negotiations would 
be resumed after the President's return. 

Senator Ferguson. I assume that you know that from talking with 
the President. 

Mr. Welles. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. You had no conversation with Mr. Churchill 
on this parallel action? 

Mr. Welles. None whatever. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, are you familiar with anything in the 
foreign relations papers, or the white papers, any messages to Mr. 
Grew in relation to that parallel action taken with Mr. Craigie? 

Mr. Welles. I could not answer that offhand, Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like, after you leave the stand, to have 
you make a search. I have tried to fincl them, but I have not been 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 489 

able to. I would like to ask you to look them up, and I will then 
ask you that further question.^ 

Are you familiar with Mr. Churchill's remarks in, I believe 
[1286] ' this Avould be the House of Commons, on the 27th of Janu- 
ary? In Churchiirs address in the House of Commons on the 27th 
of January 19-1:2, as printed in the New York Times on the 28th of 
January 1942, he said : 

On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference at which I 
discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even 
if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make 
the final victory sure, seems to allay some of these anxieties, and that expecta- 
tions had not been falsified by the events. 

Did you discuss anything with the President that would confirm 
that statement by Mr. Churchill ? 

Mr. Welles. I at no time had any discussion with the President 
which would throw any light on this statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that that statement is in con- 
formity with the instrument drafted by you as a memo to the Presi- 
dent on the loth? 

Mr. Welles. It would seem not in conformity. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that it was in conformity with 
the instrument dated at Downing Street on the 10th? 

Mr. Welles. I again would say that it was not in conformity. 

Senator Ferguson. With that instrument? 

[1387] Mr. Welles. With that instrument. 

Senator Ferguson. You were somewhat familiar with the Far 
East, or the Far East situation, at the time you were at the Atlantic 
Conference ? 

Mr. Welies. With the general situation? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. Yes, Senator. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. In view of the fact that there have been so many 
requests made for original documents, I would like to see the original 
speech made by Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons, 
if you can get it. 

Mr. Gesell. I think I have it here. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you produce it, Counsel, to see if there is 
any variation from the language I read? I read it from the New 
York Times. 

Mr. Gesell. The speech is referred to in "The Beginning of the 
End," by Winston Cliurchill. Of course, it is not the manuscript 
which he read in the House of Commons, if he had one, or he may 
have just been talking ad lib, but here is the text of it, I believe. 

Senator F'erguson. Would counsel read that into the record so we 
will have it? 

[1£88] Mr. Gesell. Read the whole speech, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. No, just that part that I referred to. 

Mr. Gesell. I was afraid you would have me in for another read- 

Senator Ferguson. You need not do it right now. 
Senator Lucas. I am still asking for the original document. I am 
very concerned about the original documents which these statements 

1 See Exhibit No. 72. See also pp. 627-629, infra. 



490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

come from. I am not going to take the book, I want the original, 
Mr. Counsel. 

Senator Brewster. I assume that refers to what correspondence is 
in our Congressional Library. What is that? 

Mr. Welles. That is Hansard, isn't it, Senator? 

Senator Brewster, I assume that is in the Congressional Library. 

Mr. Welles. I imagine so, Senator. 

The Chairman. Counsel will endeavor to secure the original docu- 
ment ? 

Mr. Gessell. I will.^ 

Senator Fergitson. Mr. Welles, were you familiar with the fact that 
Mr. Eden on August 6, then Foreign Secretary, made the statement to 
the effect that the threat to the independence of Thailand would con- 
stitute a menace to Singapore and Indochina and would not be toler- 
ated by the British Government ? 

fl^SOl Mr. Welles. I remember, in general terms 

Senator Ferguson. That statement was made in the House of 
Commons. 

Mr. Welles. I am not familiar with that specific statement. I re- 
member in general terms that that was the position taken by the 
British Government. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you whether or not you knew that the 
Australian Government had taken the same position? 

Mr. Welles. I remember that there was the general position taken 
by the Australian Government. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you whether or not Prime Minister 
Fraser of New Zealand did not, on August 26, take the same position? 

Mr. Welles. That I do not remember. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the conversation be- 
tween Lord Halifax and Mr. Hull when Lord Halifax asked Mr. 
Hull what aid the United States would give should Singapore or the 
Dutch East Indies be attacked, and Mr. Hull answered that the Amer- 
ican discouragement of or resistance to the Japanese move would be 
affected by the number of American naval vessels the British would 
be requiring at that time in the Atlantic. - That took place on the 9th 
of August 1941. 

Mr. Welles. I was away from the Department of State on that 
date, Senator Ferguson. 

[1^90] Senator Ferguson. Did you become acquainted with that 
after you returned ? 

Mr. Welles. I undoubtedly read the memorandum on that conver- 
sation after my return. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the Roberts Com- 
mission, the Anny Board, or the Navy Board went into the question 
of this parallel action? 

Mr. Welles. I am unable to give you any information on that, Sen- 
ator. I had no conversations with Justice Roberts or the other mem- 
bers of the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with their report? 

Mr. Wellks. I, of course, have read their report. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall now whether there was anything 
in that report ? 

Mr. Welles. I do not recall it. 

1 Subsequently admitted as Exhibit No. 92. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 491 

Senator Ferguson. What would you say was the fair appraisal of 
the note of August 17 '? What does it mean ? What is it ? 

Mr. Welles. I think in essence it means, Senator Ferguson, that 
the United States had felt for some time past that the course which 
was being pursued by Japan threatened the legitimate interests of this 
country and the safety and future security of the United States, and 
that in its own self-defense should Japan persist in that course, the 
United States would inevitably and eventually be called upon to try 
and stop it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, Mr. Wells, where you were on 
the 6th of December 1941 ? 

Mr. Welles. I was in Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. You were in Washington ? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You were in the State Department at that time, 
on the 6th? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the memorandum of 
November 30 on a conference between the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, 
and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, to this effect: 

The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me the accompanying 
memorandum, which is self-explanatory. He was very desirous of ascertaining 
what the United States Government would do if the Britisli should resist any 
Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus. I said that the 
President was returning tomorrow morning and that I would lay all phases of 
the situation before him on Monday noon. This I proceeded later to do and 
the President agreed to notify and see the Ambassador with respect to his 
inquiry. Previously the Ambassador had sent me a [1292] telegram (copy 
attached) received from his Foreign OflSce on the same matter. 

The Ambassador continued his attitude of desiring more time for his Govern- 
ment to make preparations to resist in the Pacific area. He assured me that 
liis Government would be in harmony with any steps we might pursue to this 
end. 

This is dated November 30, 1941. Were you familiar with that ? 

Mr. Welles. I have seen that document, yes, but may I stress again 
the fact. Senator Ferguson, that I had no direct participation in any 
of the conversations that went on in regard to the far eastern situa- 
tion at that time, except during the days when Mr. Hull was ill and 
not in his office. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever know whether or not the 
President, when he returned in the morning, did take this matter up, 
and what the result was ? 

Mr. Welles. I could not attempt to give you an answer to that, 
but I am sure Mr. Hull could. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I want to ask you one question about the 
note attached to that. The note attached to that is marked "Most 
Secret," and I will read this from it 

Mr. Welles. What is the date of it. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. That is attached to the November 30 [1293] 
instrument that I just read. 

R. A. F. are reconnoitering on arc or 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for three 
days dommencing November 29 and our Commander in Chief, Far East, has 
requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air recon- 
naissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days. 



492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Were you familiar with that? 

Mr. AVeli.es, I do not reiiieiiiber this memoi'aiidnin at all. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, were you familiar with the fact that there 
was an agrreement between the countries known, as brought out yes- 
terday, as the ABCD Bloc ? 

Mr. Welles. I am not familiar with any aspects of any such 
understanding. 

Senator Ferguson. Would it not be necessary, if we were going to 
carry on diplomatic relations with a country, that we synchronize 
or at least collaborate between the Army, Navy, that is, our military 
powers, and the State Department? 

Mr. Welles. Decidedly so. 

Senator Ferguson. We could not hope to carry no negotiations 
without each understanding the other's acts? 

Mr. Welles. I quite agree. 

Senator Ferguson. And therefore it would be necessary for our 
military authorities to know what took place on this [1^94.] 
parallel action? 

Mr. Welles. I agree. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I am coming to the ABCD bloc and I am 
reading from page 203 of transcript of proceedings before the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board, Monday, October 2, 1944: "I will repeat 
that" 

Mr. Gesell. Who is talking? 

Senator Ferguson. This is General Marshall, I take it, who is 
speaking. Have you got a copy of it there ? 

Mr. Welles. I have not got the copy, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Here it is. It is General Marshall's testi- 
mony : j 

I will repeat that I must have known on the 26th of November that the 
negotiations weiv nearing an impasse, bpcaus=e Admiral Stark and I evidently 
directed the preparations of a draft of the 27th of November warning on that 
day, the 26th— 

the following is quoted from that statement — 

after consultation with each other, United States, Britain, and Dutch military 
authorities in the Far East agreed that .ioint military counteraction against 
Japan should bo undertaken only in case .Tapan attacked or directly threatened 
the territory, the mandated territoi'y of the United States, the British Com- 
monwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, [1295] or should the Japanese 
move forces into Thailand west of 100° east of or south of 10° north Portuguese 
Timor, New Caledt)nia, off the Loyalty Islands. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Are not you reading substantially the same as is in 
evidence in this case in exhibit No. 17, paragraph 2? 

Senator Ferguson. Substantially th.e same, but I wanted to read 
the actual record. 

Mr. Gesfxl. The actual record. Senator, was a memorandum 
handed to the President, Exhibit 17, from which the language you 
have read from General Marshall's testimony is quoted. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to know. Mr. Welles, whether or not 
you were familiar with this agreement between the military authori- 
ties? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 493 

Mr. Welles. I was not familiar with it, Senator, and the reason 
for that, as I have said before, is the fact that I had no direct 
participation in these ne<xotiations. Those were handled by Mr. 
Hull, by the President, and by the top military and naval authorities. 

Senator Ferguson. How would you be able to carry on at intervals 
if you were not familiar with it i 

[1396] ]Mr. Welles. Because under those circumstances, while 
generally familiar with the trend of events and with the discussions 
that were going on, I was acting merely as a mouthpiece, to communi- 
cate messages from the President, or from the Secretary of State. 
Undoubtedly if I had been in a position where I was obliged, on ac- 
count of the absence of ISlr. Hull, to undertake any part of the nego- 
tiations, I would have had to familiarize myself with all of this ma- 
terial to which you are now referring. 

[1297] Senator Ferguson. For you to properly carry on, you 
should have been informed about this military matter, should you not? 

Mr, Welles. I think that in the event that I had any participation 
in the discussions, in the events that were then participating, I cer- 
tainly would have been. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I ask you about a telegram sent by Mr. 
Winant, our Ambassador to London, dated December 2, 1941, re- 
ceived 10 : 40 a. m. This was sent to the Secretary of State, personal 
and secret to the Secretary and the President. 

Britist Admiralty reports that at 3 a. m. London time this morning two parties 
seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant 
in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 
transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers. 

Winant. 

Do you know why the British Admiralty would be notifying our 
State Department and the President about these ships if we did not 
have some agreement in relation to their movement ? 

Mr. Welles. Because the information given in this telegram, which 
I remember now very well, was a clear indication that the Japanese 
were already moving further, proceeding [1298] further on 
their course of domination of the Southwest Pacific region. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what effect would that have on our notice, 
or on our memorandum given to the Japs on the 17th of August 1941, 
which was given in conformity with the parallel agreement or 
promise ? 

Mr. Welles. I should regard it as information which gave a clear 
indication that the Japanese were disregarding what we had asserted 
to be our legitimate rights and our security. 

Senator Ferguson. And would bring that into action ? 

Mr. Gesell. Bring what into action \ 

Senator Ferguson. The notice that we had given. 

Mr. Welles. Well, the notice that we had given was that we would 
then, in our own judgment, take such steps as we might regard as 
necessary for our safety. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. 

Now, on December 6 there was another telegram, and I will read 
the whole matter, because I want to bring out your part in it. This 
is dated December 6 and is marked "Personal and secret for the 
Secretary." It refers to the last telegram that I read, and it states : 

My Number 5918 December 6, 4 p. m. 



494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Again from Cadogan, He was in the British Admiralty, was 
he not ? 

[1299] Mr. Weli^s. Cadogan was the permanent Under Secre- 
tary of Foreign Affairs. 

Senator Ferguson (continuing) : 

Admiralty conference on information just forwarded, Cadogan attending. 
They were uncertain as to whether destination of parties is Kra or Bangkok. 
Latter would not be reached before Monday. 

Note a discrepancy in time reported by me and time reported in our naval 
dispatch, latter stating 3 a. m., Greenwich time, my dispatch as given me 3 a. m., 
London time. Believe former correct. 

British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand, 
fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before 
British have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out Presi- 
dent's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax. 

Then I will read the rest so we will have it all in the record. 

Leaving to spend evening with Eden in order to go over with him youri 
Number .5682, December 5, although I had previously pressed on him each of 
the points you outlined prior to reception your message with the [1300] 
exception of paragraph 7 which I agree is not clear and which I will clear up with 
him this evening. I want you to know that I had nothing to do with the insertion 
of the reference to I. L. O. 

I am having lunch with the Prime Minister tomorrow at his usual place in 
the country and will be constantly in contact with the Embassy over private 
wires in case you wish to communicate with mo. 

WiNANT. 

Now, going back to the part that yon did, "to guarantee support 
but wanting to carry out President's wishes in message transmitted 
by Welles to Halifax," will you explain that? 

I will ask counsel if we have those messages. 

Mr. Gesell. We have asked for that message. 

Senator Ferguson. You have made a request for it? 

Mr. Gesell. We have asked for it, some time ago. No written 
record of such message can be found in the Department, so the as- 
sumption may be that it was an oral statement.^ 

Senator Ferguson. All right, Mr. Welles, will you give us your 
memory on it ? 

Mr. Welles. I feel that I have here available. Senator Ferguson, 
the only conversations with Lord Halifax which I had at that time. 
They are dated November 27 and November 28. 

Senator Ferguson. May I see those, Mr. Welles? 

[1301] Mr. Welles. I think they are published, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. They are published? 

Mr. Welles I will ask counsel: Are these published? 

Mr. Gesell. I do not believe so. What date are those, Mr. Welles? 

Mr. Welles. November 27 and November 28. 

[1302] Mr. Gesell. They are not published, so far as I know. 
I don't believe they are published, Mr. Welles, since volume 2 has only 
the conversations with the Japanese, not the conversations with repre- 
sentatives of other governments. 

Mr. Welles. I see. 

Shall I read these, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Well, I suppose so. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask the question. I will ask you to read 
them. 



^ See p. 508, infra ; see also Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1697-1700. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 495 



Mr. Welles. They relate in a sense to- 



The Chairman. Will you identify them? 

Mr. Welles. They relate in a sense to the modus vivendi discus- 
sions and — I am not certain — to the telegram. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I give you the telegram ? 

Mr. Welles. I have a copy here. Counsel has given me a copy. 

I am not certain whether they are illuminating on this subject. The 
first is November 27 and it is as follows : 

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning urgently at his request. 
The Ambassador said tliat 

May I say in parenthesis that Secretary Hull was laid up with a 
cold during these 2 days and that is the reason I saw the Ambassador. 

[1303] Mr. Gesell. This one you are reading has been intro- 
duced in evidence as part of Exhibit 18. The full text of that is three 
pages, is it not? 

Mr. Welles. Three pages ; yes. 

Mr. Gesell. That one is already in evidence. 

The Chairman. Unless the committee insists upon it, it won't be 
necessary to read it. 

Senator Ferguson. No ; there is no need of reading it, then. 

Now, the other instrument. 

Mr. Welles, The other is November 28. Has that been introduced ? 

Mr. Gesell. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you read the one of the 28th, please? 

Mr. Welles (reading) : 

The British Ambassador called to see me tliis morning. 

The Ambassador began the conversation by saying that he had expected to 
spend the week end in Philadelphia, but, since he had heard from his Embassy 
here that his government was "greatly excited," he had returned to Washington. 
He read to me a telegram from his government which indicated that our naval 
officials in London [1304] had been informed by the Navy Department that 
the negotiations between Japan and the United States had been broken off and 
that an immediate movement by Japan was anticipated, and that consequently 
precautionary measures must at once be undertaken. The Ambassador inquired 
whether this was in fact the case. I replied that the situation so far as I knew 
was exactly as it was last night, namely, that the Japanese Ambassadors had 
submitted a statement of the position of this Government, handed to them by the 
Secretary of State, to their government and that no reply from the Government 
of Japan had as yet been submitted to this Government through them. I said 
that consequently I could not say technically that the negotiations had been 
broken off, although it was, of course, the assumption on the part of the Govern- 
ment of the United States that the Japanese Government would not accept the 
basis proposed by the Government of the United States. I told the Ambassador 
of the various reports which had reached the Department of State regarding the 
situation in the Far East today. 

Tlie next paragraph, the final paragraph, is as follows: 

The Ambassador then said that his government was annoyed with him because 
he had not reported the conversation which had taken place yesterday between the 
two [1305] Japanese Ambassadors and the President and the Secretary of 
State. He asked me if I could give him a report on that subject. I informed the 
Ambassador consequently of the substance of the memorandum by the Secretary 
of State of the conversation which had taken place at the White House. 

Mr. Keefe. May I ask you to state the date of that memorandum 
again, please? 

Mr. Welles. November 28, Mr. Congressman. 



496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I will immediately see if in my records I have any copy of later 
conversations with the British Ambassador which have any light to 
throw upon the telegram which Senator Ferguson has read. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the one that you did not read, does it have 
anything that relates specifically to the language of the telegram that 
I read you? 

Mr. Welles. No. It has to do with the modus vivendi and the 
information given to the British Ambassador with regard to that 
matter. 

Senator Ferguson. The first paragraph reads : 

The Ambassador said that Secretary Hull had called him on the telephone 
last night to inform him of the nature of the document which he had handed the 
Japanese envoys. The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear [1306] 
in his own mind as to the reasons which prompted this sudden change in present- 
ing the Japanese Government with a document other than the modus vivendi 
document which had so recently been under discussion. 

This is dated November 27, 1941. 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that conversation ? 

Mr. Welles. I have that before me. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that conversation ? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that all that was said about that? Did you 
try to explain why we gave the note of the 26th rather than the modus 
vivendi note? 

Mr. WeivLes. I think the rest of the memorandum goes into that. 

Senator Ferguson. Goes into that ? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with why we gave the note 
of the 26th and not the modus vivendi ? 

Mr. Welles. I was familiar with the discussions which had taken 
place with regard to it, although I did not participate in the decisions 
reached. I wish to say, however, that I was wholly in accord with the 
decision which was reached. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how the Japanese treated 
[1307] it — whether they treated the note on the 26th as an ulti- 
matum ? 

Mr. Welles. My own understanding is that their note of November 
20 was in the nature of an ultimatum to us. 

Senator Ferguson. There wasn't any doubt about it that there note 
of the 20th was an ultimatum ? 

Mr. Welles. It seemed so to me, and any reply which we made short 
of complete acquiescence in the domination by the Japanese of the 
entire Pacific and eastern Asia would not have been regarded by them 
as complete. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you decide that war was inevitable, 
in your own mind, considering the note of the 20th ? 

Mr. Welles. It had seemed to me from the middle of September, 
more or loss, that there wasn't the remotest possi})le chances of reach- 
ing a satisfactory and peaceful solution of the didiculties which had 
arisen and that consequently hostilities would probably be inevitable. 

Senator Ferguson. And did it become more so after the Japanese 
note of the 20th of November? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 497 

Mr. Welles. The Japanese note of November 20 seemed to me an 
ultimatum which this Government couldn't possibly accept in its own 
self-defense and protection. 

Senator Ferguson. Would the modus vivendi proposal have been 
an acceptance of that note? 

Mr. Welles. Certainly not. 

[1308] Senator Ferguson. It would not? 

Mr. Welles. Certainly not. 

Ssnator Ferguson. It would have extended the matter, in your 
opinion ? 

Mr. Welles. That is, of course, a question I can't answer. I doubt 
if anybody can. I should say every probability existed that it would 
not have been regarded as satisfactory by the Japanese. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the intercepted mes- 
sages ; for instance, the one saying the 20th of November was the last 
day? 

Mr. Welles. Senator, I want to answer your question as clearly and 
as precisely as possible, but when you ask me if I had seen certain 
specific intercepted messages, I can only say that I saw, in my belief, 
all of the intercepted diplomatic messages received by us, but only a 
part of the intercepted naval or military messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that one about the 20th being the 
last day? 

Mr. Welles. I remember that messages 

Senator Ferguson. That is rather important. 

Mr. Welles. I remember messages which I saw which indicated 
that a time limit was set for the Japanese to receive acquiescence in 
their demand from us at that time. Later, it [1309] had been 
extended for a couple of days. 

Senator Ferguson. Up until the 29th. 

Mr. Welles. That is my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. And then we did not compromise, I mean we 
didn't do anything to change those dates, we didn't attempt to, because 
it was against our principles? 

Mr. Welles. My understanding is that, no matter what reply had 
been ma^e after the receipt of the note from the Japanese dated 
November 20 — the only reply that they would have regarded as satis- 
factory was a complete acquiescence in the demands made in that note. 

'Senator Ferguson. I wish you would go to the note of the 28th, the 
memorandum that you read. I haven't seen it. It had something in it 
about the breaking off of relations. I wish you would read that para- 
graph again. 

Mr. Welles. Certainly. [Reading] : 

He— 
that is the Ambassador — 

He read to me a telegram from his government which indicated that our naval 
officials in London had been informed by the Navy Department the negotiations 
between .Japan and the United States had been broken ofC and that an immediate 
movement by Japan was anticipated, and that consequently precautionary mea- 
sures must at once be undertaken. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he could be speaking 
[1310] about the language of Mr. Hull to Secretary Stimson as 
related in his diary ? 

79716^46— pt. 2 8 



498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAEL HARBOR- ATTACK 

Mr. Welles. I couldn't possibly undertake to answer that question, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. I will try to find the one I 
want. 

Page 119 of the Army Board Report : 

On the morning of the 27th of November, 1941 — 

Mr. Stimson's diary reads — 

the first thing in the morning I called up Mr. Hull to find out what his final 
decision had been with the Japanese, whether he had handed them the new pro- 
posal which we passed on 2 or 3 days ago, or whether, as he suggested yesterday, 
he had broken the whole matter off. He told me how he had broken the whole 
matter off, as he put it, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands 
of you and Knox, the Army and the Navy." 

Could the message from our Navy to the people in London have been 
that information ? 

Mr. Welles. I am not in position to answer that question. 

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with the instrument of the 
2Cth? 

Mr. Welles. I am. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that language that I read a fair [1311] 
interpretation of that instrument ? 

Mr. Welles. Namely, that it was a breaking off ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. I think it is fair in the sense that any reply handed to 
the Japanese representatives at that time which was not a full acqui- 
escence in their demands would probably have been regarded as 
necessary to be rejected by them. 

Senator Ferguson. So that would be a fair interpretation of the 
note of the 26th, that it was a breaking off? 

Mr. Welles. I shouldn't say that was a fair interpretation unless 
relations actually had been broken. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you say to Mr. Halifax in relation to 
that particular paragraph that you read; did you know anything 
about the situation ? 

Mr. Welles. I knew, of course, that the note of the i^Gth of Novem- 
ber had been handed to the Japanese representatives. I was'familiar 
with some of the intercepts which had to do- with the Japanese con- 
structions that were being said. And on page 2 of my memorandum 
which I have already read — may I quote it? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, please do. 

Mr, Welles. In reply to the Ambassador, I said : 

* * * that consequently I could not say technically that negotiations had 
been broken off, although it was, \JSi2] of course, the assumption on the 
part of the Government of the United States that the Japanese Government would 
not accept the bases proposed by the Government of the United States. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, our Government assumed that 
they would not accept and therefore it would be breaking the relations 
off? 

Ml'. Welles. I can only repeat, Senator, the statement which I 
liappened to have made to the British Ambassador. I said, "conse- 
quently I could not say technically that negotiations had been broken 
off * * ='=." 

Senator Ferguson. What did you mean by that? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 499 

Mr. Welles, So long as conversations continued, so long as diplo- 
matic negotiations still are in existence, diplomatic relations are not 
broken off. One can assume that they will be broken off, but that 
doesn't mean that they already are. 

Senator Ferguson. Asking you as an expert in the State Depart- 
ment, when does the State Department turn the matter over to the 
Army and the Navy ? 

Mr. Welles. I think it is very difficult, if not impossible, to give a 
precise answer to a very general question like that. It would depend 
on the individual circumstances in every case. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you agree that we did turn [ISIS] 
it over to the Army and the Navy on tl?e 27th as indicated by Colonel 
Stimson's note or language? 

Mr. Welles. I think that that is a question which only Mr. Hull 
himself could answer. 

Senator Ferguson. What would you say was meant by a de facto 
rupture of diplomatic relations, as indicated by our interception of a 
message from Tokyo to Washington, November 28, 1941 ? Have you 
got the printed copy before you ? 

Mr. Welles. I have not. 

[ISlJf] Mr. Gesell, Here is one. Wliatpage? 

Senator Ferguson. Page 195. 

The Chairman. May the Chair ask the photographers to finish their 
work. While the witnesses are testifying we thought that we would 
try to keep this space clear. We would appreciate it very much. 

Go ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. It starts : 

Therefore, with the report of the views of the Imperial Government on this 
American proposal, which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations 
will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. 

Do you find that language ? 

Mr. Welles. I have just found it, Senator, yes. 

What is the question ? 

Senator Ferguson. I want to know what is meant by this language. 

Mr. Welles. "De facto ruptured"? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. As a question of fact. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that be a breaking off of relations? 

Mr. Welles. That would be an actual breaking off, as a question of 
fact. 

[131S] Senator Ferguson. You used the word "technically" 
ruptured. The Japs, in their language, which we intercepted and 
knew^, that language was that it was a de facto rupture, that is, as a 
matter of fact it was a breaking off of relations; is that correct? 

Mr. Welles. That is their statement. 

Senator Ferguson. That is their statement. 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then here we have their statement as to how 
they are going to consider this. 

Mr. Welles. That is their statement. 

Senator Ferguson. The last sentence of your memorandum dated 
November 27, 1941 was, "The gravity of the situation, I thought, could 
not be exaggerated." Will you explain that ? 



500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ISIr. Welles. You ask me to explain my intention in making that 
statement!' 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; what you meant by it. 

Mr. Welles. My intention in making that statement was that in 
view of my belief that the Japanese would not accept the reply which 
had been given to their note of November 25, that there was no other 
way to accomplish any satisfactory result of the diplomatic negotia- 
tions, that they had ended in a blind alley ; consequently there was no 
hope of reaching a specific solution. 

[J316] Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation with 
any of our military men on that point? 

Mr. Welles. On this particfhlar point? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; that you thought that was true? 

Mr. Welles. I was present, as I remember, at several conversations 
in Secretary Hull's office in which intelligence was brought in with 
regard to increasingly alarming movements of Japanese troops and 
of Japanese naval vessels, all of which confirmed my belief, as ex- 
pressed in the sentence which you have quoted from my memorandum 
of my conversation with the British Ambassador. 

Senator Ferguson. Going back to your message of December 6^ 
and after the questions I have asked you, is your memory refreshed 
as to what you could have been referring to on the bottom of the 
message about wanting to carry out the President's wishes in the 
message transmitted by Welles to Halifax? 

]\Ir. Welles. I shall have to see if there is any document I have. 
I have not got it available. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you make a search and produce it, if you 
can, so that we may talk about that when you return? 

Mr. Welles. I shall be glad to.^ 

Senator Ferguson. Were you present at the Cabinet meeting re- 
lated yesterday by Secretary Hull that it was decided that some 
speeches would be made to the American public? I notice [13171 
that afterward you made an address and Secretary Knox made one. 

Mr. Welles. I was never present at any Cabinet meetings when 
Secretary Hull was present. I only attended when he was not 
available. 

Senator Ferguson. How did the fact reach you that there was a 
desire that certain State Department or public officials make some 
utterances to the public? 

Mr. Welles. To the best of my recollection the expression of that 
desire did not reach me. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you would say that your utterance was 
not made in compliance with that suggestion? 

Mr. Welles. To the best of my recollection the suggestion was not 
made to me. The address to which Mr. Hull referred in his state- 
ment of yesterday was an address made at the tomb of Woodrow Wil- 
son on Armistice Day and it was my desire to make as clear as pos- 
sible the gravity of the situation that the American people were then 
facing. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you were speaking as a member of the 
State Department and not speaking in relation to that, having, in 
mind that Cabinet meeting at all? 

Mr. Welles. I am frank to say, Senator Ferguson, that I do not 
remember any suggestion having been made to me. * 

1 See p. 508, infra ; see also Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1697-1700. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 501 

Senator Ferguson. Did you go over Secretary Knox's speech be- 
fore he gave it ? 

[1318] Mr. Welles. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. You were not familiar with that? 

Mr. Welles. I was not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you in any way contribute to the Davis- 
Lindley book on How War Came? They seem to write with some 
authority. 

Mr. Welles. I did not contribute to it in any way. Both Mr. Lind- 
ley and Mr. Forrest Davis had many conversations in the Department 
of State with officials, including myself, with regard to the events 
that had taken place. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I didn't mean in contribution, that you 
directly contributed. 

Mr. Welles. I see. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you give them any of the information they 
printed in the book ? 

Mr. Welles. I talked with them upon several occasions and I have 
no doubt that some of the information published in their book was 
written in the light of the conversations that were had. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not they used the note' 
of August 17 ? That is the parallel action note ? 

Mr. Welles. I haven't read the book for well over a year. Senator 
Ferguson. I couldn't attempt to remember. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what intermediaries our [1319] 
State Department may have used in their negotiations with Japan? 

Mr. Welles. To be accurate would be difficult 

Senator Ferguson. You may not describe them as intermediaries. 

Mr. Welles. To be accurate it would be difficult for me to be sure 
I was giving a correct answer since I individually had nothing what- 
ever to do with any conversations that such persons may have had. I 
think there again Mr. Hull can give you the full information since 
in my case it would be merely hearsay. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you known who was negotiating? 

Mr. Welles. I had understood, again I repeat, only by hearsay, not 
through direct participation 

Senator Ferguson. From whom did your information come? 

Mr. Welles. My information came both from Secretary Hull and 
other individuals. 

Senator Ferguson. I wouldn't consider that in the same category as 
ordinary hearsay. Who did Mr. Hull tell you was negotiating? 

Mr. Welles. I remember Frank Walker, then Postmaster (General. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you finish ? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Frank Walker, Postmaster General. 

[13£0] Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whom he was negotiating with? 

Mr. Welles. I think that he had conversations both with Admiral 
Nomurar and later, when Kurusu was here, with him, as well. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Walker confer with you on these 
questions ? 

Mr. Welles. Not at any time. That is the reason I did not attempt 
to answer with any assurance of accuracy. 



502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know of anyone else ? 

Mr, Welles. I couldn't be precise on that point. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear the* name of Jones? 

Mr. Welles. Rev. E. Stanley Jones ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. I have never understood that he took any such part. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the note to the Emperor, 
due to any work on that at all, on the Gth? It was sent the night of 
the Gth. 

Mr. Welles. I think that the President drafted that himself. I 
had nothing to do with it. 

Senator Ferguson. You had nothing to do with it? 

Mr. Welles. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn it was gone? 

\^1321] Mr. Welles. I think the following morning, if I remem- 
ber correctly. I may have known it that night but certainly not until 
after it had been prepared. 

Senator Ferguson. I note in your book The Time for Decision, 
you say that you were many times with the President in conference 
immediately following the attack. Now I ask you if you were in 
conference with him on Saturday or Sunday before the attack? 

[1322] Mr. Welles. Not so far as I can remember. The Presi- 
dent had been away December 6 as I remember it and I do not think 
that I saw him immediately before the attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know the President returned about De- 
cember 1 from Warm Springs ? 

Mr. Welles. I did not remember the exact date. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall any conferences, then, or any 
telephone messages between you and the President on the 6th or the 
7th, up to the time of the attack ? 

Mr. Welles. Undoubtedly I saw the President and was in com- 
munication with him but I cannot remember specifically now without 
a diary. As I told you, I have no diary. It is very difficult to be 
accurate on precise dates. 

Senator Ferguson. I am speaking about the day of the Gth and the 
morning of the 7th, prior to the attack. Do you recall any conver- 
sations you may have had in relation to any diplomatic negotiations 
or military operations? 

Mr. Welles. I can be perfectly specific on one point and that is 
that I had no communication with the President on the morning of 
the 7th. I had no communication with the President until he tele- 
phoned me to tell me of the attack ; it was first from him that I knew 
of it. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn, when was the first 
knowledge that you had of the Winant note that I read [132S] 
you this morning, the wire relating to the ships? 

Mr. Welles. The telegram you are speaking of, Senator Ferguson ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. The telegram of December 6? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. The telegram was undoubtedly put on my desk as 
Boon as the Department of State had decoded it. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it is possible that you had it on the Gth 
of December ; is that correct ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 503 

Mr. Welles. I will have to check on the precise time of that tele- 



gram. 



Senator Ferguson. It came m, I think, 10:40 a. m. 

Mr. Welles. Received 10 : 40 a. m., on December 6. I undoubtedly 
saw it shortly afterwards. 

Senator Ferguson. What did it mean to you in relation to your 
negotiations ? 

Mr. Welles. As I think I said before when you first read it, Senator 
Ferguson, it was an indication that the Japanese were moving, mov- 
ing fast in large force and, furthermore, that it confirmed the fact 
that they were having no further regard for the warning which had 
been given to them. 

Senator Ferguson. And the warning was particularly the [IS^^], 
one on the l7th of August 1941 ? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And did it mean war? 

Mr. Welles. As well as many other representations which were 
made to them after that. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it mean war? 

Mr. Welles. Well 

Mr. Murphy. Between whom? 

Mr. Welles. I should say that the chances had diminished from 
one in a thousand to one in a million that war could then be avoided. 

Senator Ferguson. And war between whom ? 

Mr. Welles. War between, the United States and Japan. 

Senator Ferguson. And Japan. Now, did you take that telegram 
up, that message, with the Army and Navy, with the military authori- 
ties ? You say that it was reduced from one in a thousand to one in 
a million. Did you take it up with the Army and the Navy? 

Mr. Welles. May I repeat again. Senator, that these matters were 
being handled by the Secretary of State, by the President, and by the 
highest military and naval officials. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you confer with Mr. Hull, the Secretary 
of State, about that telegram? 

Mr. Welles. I remember that on the morning of De- [13251 
cember 6 Mr. Hull received when I was with him, and probably during 
the rest of the day, considerable intelligence which came to us from our 
own officials, both of the War and Navy Departments, with regard to 
the Japanese movements, all of which were of the most serious and 
alarming character. 

Senator Ferguson. Did all of the messages on the day of the Gth 
lead you to the conclusion that you changed your average there from 
one in a thousand to one in a million, or did this telegram? 

Mr. Welles. I think this telegram was a factor in changing my 
belief. 

Senator Ferguson. It was the one that really changed your belief? 

Mr. Welles. That was one factor 

Senator Ferguson. Did you 

Mr. Welles. Excuse me. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. Go ahead. 

Mr. Welles. That was one factor among many. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, wdiat were the other factors that brought 
you to change the one in a thousand to one in a million ? 



504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. WrxLES. All of the other intellif^ence messages which were 
coming in and to which I have already referred. 

[13£6'] Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any discussion that 
you had with Mr, Hull in relation to this particular situation, on the 
change that was taking place as it would relate to the military^ 

Mr, Welles. Every bit of information, Senator, including this 
telegram, made it more and more clear that the Japanese movements 
were such that both our naval and military officials would have to take 
charge. 

Senator Ferguson, Did you know when they did take charge? 

Mr. Welles. No ; I coulct not attempt to answer that question with 
any precision. 
• Senator Ferguson. You cannot give us any idea as to the time. 

Now, going back into 1910, did you know that the Secretary of the 
Navy had communications with Admiral Richardson, then commander 
of the fleet, in relation to the blockade? 

Mr, Welles. I had no knowledge of the conversations which Sec- 
retary Knox had with Admiral Richardson. 

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, could you let me have the instrument 
that Admiral Richardson brought in? 

Mr. Mitchell. He brought a good many. 

Mr. Gesell. What instrument ? 

[1327] Senator Ferguson. The one in relation to the blockade. 

Mr. Gesell. The proposed escorting, is that what you are referring 
to? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well, it was more than an escort. It was 
a line. 

I show you the letter from the commander in chief of the United 
States Fleet to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet. You were 
not here, as I understand it, when Admiral Richardson testified. 

Mr. Welles. I was not present. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you just read that and read the last page? 

Mr. Welles, The final page? 

Senator Ferguson, Yes, Read the first few pages and then the 
final page. 

Mr. Welles [reading] : 

Long Beach, Calif., October 6 



Senator Ferguson. No ; read it just to yourself. 

Mr. Welles, I beg your pardon. 

Senator Ferguson, I want to ask you some questions about it. It 
is already in the record, 

Mr, Welles. Yes, Senator ; I have looked over that. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever have any knowledge of that? 

[133S] Mr. Welles. I had no knowledge whatever of the con- 
versations which Admiral Richardson had with the President or 
Secretary Knox. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any knowledge in relation to the 
Eo-called blockade, or call it whatever name you desire? 

Mr. Welles. The President discussed with me or, rather, told me 
of a plan which he had been formulating in his mind but always as a 
plan, to undertake a patrol of certain regions of the Pacific in order 
to limit the sphere of activity of Japan but I wish to emphasize the 
fact that he always discussed that with me as being in the nature of a 
project and not in the nature of any decision. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 505 

Senator FERGusoisr. Ho^y early did he discuss it with you ? 

Mr. Welles. I should assume about the middle of the autumn of, 
1940, some time in the latter part of 1940. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be about the time that this letter 
is dated, Ocober 11 ? 

Mr. Welles. About that time ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And would, in your opinion, that have meant 
war between the United States and Japan? 

Mr. Welles. I think it would have led to incidents which undoubt- 
edly would have made more likely the outbreak of [13£9] war 
between the two countries. 

Senator Ferguson. What incidents did you have in mind? 

Mr. Welles. If as a part of the patroling operations the United 
States naval vessels undertook to prohibit the passage of Japanese 
vessels with the Japanese flag from one part of the Pacific to the 
other, the Japanese Government undoubtedly would have regarded 
that as being in the nature of a hostile act. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Japanese had notified 
Mr. Grew to that effect ? 

Mr. Welles. I remember that there was some information which 
was available to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Just one moment. I want to find something. 

On May the 11th, 1941, reading from Foreign Eelations of the 
United States, volume 2, page 145, down near the bottom of the page, 
speaking about the Minister of Foreign Affairs down in the last part, 
"He said that by way of example" — do you have it, Mr. Welles? 

Mr. Welles. I have it before me, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read what he said ? 

Mr. Welles. Beginning with the second paragraph, I assume. 

Senator Ferguson. I want you to begin there where, "He [1330'] 
said" — well, you can start back one sentence. "He said he knew that 
Hitler." 

Mr. Welles (reading) : 

The Minister's subsequent remarks, whicli he said he was addressing to me as 
"an American friend and not as the American Ambassador" were bellicose both 
in tone and substance. He said tliat he was exceedingly worried lest the United 
States should proceed to convoy its ships to Great Britain, which would almost 
certainly lead to war with Germany. He said that to declare a neutral zone in 
the Atlantic or any other ocean was contrary to international law and tliat in 
the face of our supplying Great Britain witli war materials he thought that 
Hitler had shown great "patience and generosity" in not declaring war on the 
United States. He said he knew that Hitler desired to avoid such a war but 
that it Was doubtful whether his patience and restraint could continue indefinitely. 
He said by way of examiple that if the United States were to convoy its ships 
in bringing aid to Chiang Kai-shek they would be torpedoed by the Japanese 
Navy just as he would expect the American Navy to act similiarly in a reverse 
situation. He said that if, in spite of previous forbearance. Hitler should now 
sink our ships in the Atlantic and if we Americans should then attack the Ger- 
man submarines he would regard this as- an act of American aggression which 
would call for deliberation as to the applicability of article III of the Triple 
Alliance Treaty of September 27, 1940. and he thought there was no doubt that 
such deliberation would lead to war between Japan and the United States. 



Senator Ferguson. Now, Mr. Welles 

Mr. Welles. But mav I inject. Senator Ferguson? 
Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. That this message is dated May 14, 1941. 
Senator Ferguson. That is correct. 



506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Wklles. More than 6 months after the time you were asking 
me about. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that you and I "were talking about. 

Now, did we consider that this was bhiffing because he was saying 
it to the Ambassador not as Ambassador but as a friend ? Were you 
familiar with that note? 

Mv. Welles. I saw the note when it came in from Mr. Grew. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you consider it? 

. Mr. Welles. I considered it as confirmation of my belief which 
had been going on for some time and which is now [1332] borne 
out by proven facts, that the Germans were instigating the Japanese to 
provol-:e trouble with the United States and were in large measure re- 
sponsible for the attitude which the Japanese Government was taking. 

This message from Mr. Grew relating his conversation with the 
Japanese Foreign Minister related almost entirely to Germany and to 
the action which Germany might take against the United States and 
referred to the extraordinary forbearance and patience which Hitler 
had shown. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not place any significance then on that 
particular incident? 

Mr. Welles. I placed a great deal of significance on it. I placed 
the significance on it that the relations between Japan and Germany 
were becoming even closer than before and that Japan very often was 
moving as the Germans were indicating. 

Senator Ferguson. They would be the mouthpiece of Hitler, then, 
in effect? 

Mr. Welles. That was certainly the impression that I drew from 
that message. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, going back to October 8, had you any idea 
that if Admiral Richardson had carried out that memo that it may 
have meant war ? 

Mr. Welles. Well, may I say again, Senator Ferguson, [1333} 
that the President's conversations Avith me were always, with regard to 
this project, were always limited to it as an idea which he was thinking 
of, which he was considering; that no decision had been reached by 
the President in that regard. If it had been carried out, I think un- 
questionably incidents would have taken place, as I said before, which 
would have led to hostilities. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have any knowledge at the time 
the fleet was moved from the west coast to Hawaii, did you know it 
at the time it was moved? 

Mr. Welles. I probably had. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted prior to that in relation 
to the effect it might have upon your diplomatic relations with Japan, 
with our diplomatic relations with Japan? 

Mr. Welles. I am sorry to have to say the same thing so often, 
Senator, but I know you will understand the spirit in which I say it. 
I was not consulted because I was not taking part in making policy 
concerning the Far East. ^ 

Senator Ferguson. I may have used^he word "consulted" because 
you were in the Department ; you were Under Secretary. 

Mr. Welles. I knew of it. It was being talked of. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you knew of the fact, you knew about it ? 

I133ij Mr. Welles. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 507 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that it was being sent out to 
Hawaii in May of 1940 as an arm of the diplomatic negotiations? 

Mr. Welles. I could not possibly say "Yes" to that question. I 
think the action taken, as I 

Senator Ferguson. It went out, I think, in March. It went out in 
March on maneuvers, but then there was a telegram sent that there 
was to be a release from Hawaii that it was going to be detained there 
for some time. 

]SIr. Welles. May I finish my earlier answer, Senator? 

Senator Fergltsox. Yes; I want you to finish it, 

Mr, Welles. INly judgment was tliat it was done only as an integral 
part of over-all policy. 

In answer to a question of Senator Brewster yesterday, I said that 
I thought that under conditions such as those which existed in the 
prewar years you could not divorce what was done in the military 
field from what was done in the diplomatic field, or vice versa — that 
it was a part of the whole policy. In other words, that the military 
was not being made subservient to the diplomatic nor the diplomatic 
subservient to the military; that the policy was being worked out 
along parallel roads. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you through ? 

[1335] Mr. Welles. Thank you. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then do I understand that as part of the 
diplomatic negotiations and in cooperation with them it was decided 
by someone that the fleet would be transferred from the west coast to 
Hawaii ? 

Mr, Welles, JNIy recollection is that it was felt that in view of the 
situation which was existing the continued refusal on the part of the 
United States to take measures which it regarded as necessary for the 
protection of its legiiiniiite interests would be regarded as a sign of 
weakness and of acquiescence by the Japanese military leaders in their 
policies. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it was the opinion of someone in our own 
Department, in our State Department, someone in our Government, 
that we would strengtlion our position in the diplomatic field if we 
had the fleet stationed at Hawaii rather than on the west coast? 

Mr, Welles, Those decisions with regard to the over-all policy 
covering both the diplcmitic and the military and naval field were 
made, of course, by tlie President himself after consulting with the 
Secretary of State and his other advisers who were dealing with that 
question. 

Senator Ferguson, So that would be the decision of the President 
of the United States? 

[13361 Mr, Welles, It would have to be so. 

Senator Ferguson, Yes, Now, did you understand, when you were 
talking about the fleet back in those days, that the fleet was to protect 
and defend Pearl Harbor, the Islands ? Was that your understanding ? 

Mr, Welles. That the fleet was to defend Pearl Harbor? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. My understanding was that it was part of a general 
strategy which was looked upon by the Navy Department for the pro- 
tection of our interests throughout the Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson, Did you know why the Army had its installa- 
tions at Pearl Harbor ? 



508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Welles. In the same sense, as a means of protection of our 

Senator Ferguson. Was it to protect the fleet? 

Mr. Welles. As a means of protection of our interests throughout 
the Pacific. 

The Chairman. The hour of 12 liaving arrived, the, committee will 
stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon. 

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 
p. m. of the same day.) 

[1337] afternoon session — 2 p. m. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Mr. Welles, you may resume the witness chair. 
Senator Ferguson, you were inquiring. 
Senator Ferguson. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF SUMNEK WELLES (Kesumed) 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Secretary, were you able to find any of the 
messages I spoke to you about this morning? 

Mr. Welles. I think, Senator Ferguson, I have the information 
which you requested. 

Senator Ferguon. Will you read it, please ? 

Mr. Welles. May I fji ve you the information in full in my own way ? 

Senator Ferguon. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. You will remember that there has already been read 
the memorandum of my conversation of December 2 with the Jap- 
anese Ambassador and with Mr. Kurusu in wliich I communicated 
to them a message from the President. That is a part of the record, 
as I understand it. 

I found in my personal file, after the conclusion of the hearing this 
morning, a copy of a letter which I sent on the same date to the British 
Ambassador, I sent it by messenger. May I read the text of that? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; you may. 

[1-3.38] Mr. Welles. December 2d. 

Personal and strictly confidential. 
My dear Ambassador 

Senator Ferguson. It is 1941 ? 
Mr. Welles. December 2, 1941. 

My Dear Ambassador: In accordance with our telephone conversation I am 
enclosing herewith for your personal and confidential information copies of the 
two documents handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador 
November 26(h last. 

Mr. Hull asks that I request you to see that every possible precaution is taken 
to prevent any publicity. 

I am likewise enclosing a copy of the document which 1 handed the .Japanese 
Ambassador this morning and which, as you will recall, is a copy of a memoran- 
dum sent to me by the President. 

Believe me, yours<Very sincerely. 

My understanding is that the message from the President which I 
communicated to the two Japanese Ambassadors and of which I sent 
a copy to the British Ambassador on December 2 is the message 
referred to in the telegram which was read this morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Are those messages in the white papers 
[lo39] or in the Foreign Relations papers ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 509 

Mr. Welles, The message from the President which I communi- 
cated to the two Japanese Ambassadors and of which I sent a copy on 
l)ecember 2 to Lord Halifax is published as Document No. 2G2 in 
"Peace and War." 

Senator Ferguson. That is commonly known as the white papers? 

Mr. Welles. I imagine so. 

Mr. MuEPHY. What page ? 

Mr. Welles. Page 262, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Gesell. I might say the letters appear in volume II which 
many of the committee members have been using, the Foreign Rela- 
tions of the United States, at page 778. 

Senator Ferguson. One of the reasons I have asked you quite a 
number of questions, Mr. Welles, is that you had written a book, "The 
Time for Decision," and I noticed on the cover it had "Only a handful 
of men in the world have had access to the information on which this 
is based." Naturally I assumed that I had one of the men on the 
witness stand, or before me today, from whom I might get this in- 
formation. 

So I was trying to get as near the source as I could. I realize that 
it would be a great task for Mr. Hull to ask him the questions. So 
if you will just bear with me a little while I ask you questions 

{1340^ Mr. Welles. I am entirely at the disposal of the com- 
mittee and yourself. Senator Ferguson. 

If you will permit me to make an observation with regard to my 
own feeling of modesty, an author is not always responsible for the 
blurbs on the covers of his publications. 

Senator Ferguson. Even though he may benefit from that. 

I notice that on page 288 of your book you say : 

The wisdom of any foreign policy can generally be determined only by its 
results. Any impartial estimate of our policy during these crucial years from 
1936 to 1941 must, therefore, be appraised in that light. Our objectives, essen- 
tially, were those laid down for the Government by its chief military and naval 
advisers and in my own judgment our policy did delay the Japanese attack for at 
least a brief period. 

Now, were you familiar with the note — call it a note — it is a 
memorandum — of November 5, of Admiral Stark and General Mar- 
shall, in relation to "no ultimatum." That was used in that note, as I 
remember it. I just use that to refresh your memory. 

Mr. Welles. I have not got the text of that before me, but I do 
recollect it. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you show Mr. Welles that. Counsel ? 

Mr. Gesell. Here is the memorandum on the top and the [^13^1'\ 
related documents. [Handing.] 

Mr. Welles. Thank you. 

Senator Ferguson. You may proceed, Mr. Welles. 

Mr. Welles. I remember having seen this document. Senator. I 
couldn't at this moment say the precise date, however, upon which I 
first saw it. 

Senator Ferguson. We might assume that you saw it near its 
delivery ? 

Mr, Welles. Approximately J:hat time. 

Senator Ferguson. And that indicates it was delivered on Novem- 
ber 5? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 



510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know there was another document de- 
livered on the 27th, that either the Army pr the Navy board refers to, 
one or the other ? 

Will you show him the one of the 27th ? 

Mr. Gesskll. This is Exliibit 17 in this hearing. 

Senator Fergu:-on. Exhibit 17. 

Do you know how it happens that that was delivered following the 
day of the note by Mr. Hull on the 26th, why it was not obtained before ? 

Mr. Welles. 1 could not answer that question. I am afraid that is 
a question that only Mr. Hull could answer. 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't any knowledge on that? 

[134^] Mr. Welles. I have no knowledge on that point. 

Senator Ferguson. I think I asked j^ou this morning whether or 
not it wasn't true, to your knowledge, that we carried on the negotia- 
tions subsequent to the Atlantic Conference, the Atlantic Charter 
meeting, that we carried it on ? 

Mr. Welles. That we 

Senator Ferguson. The United States Government. 

Mr. Welles. The United States Government. 

Senator Ferguson. The United States Government rather than the 
other governments.- 

Mr. Welles. Yes. That, of course. Senator, was a resumption of 
the negotiations which had been commenced in the preceding month 
of March by Mr. Hull. In other words, there is nothing new about 
it. It is the result of negotiations which had been interrupted. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I see the instruments in exhibit 18, please. 

Mr. Gesell. I think you have that. 

Senator Ferguson. I may have it. 

I have ; if you will show Mr. Welles, the memorandum of November 
24, 1941, I have a copy now. It is "Proposed Modus Vivendi for 
Submission to Japanese Ambassador." 

Participants: Secretary of State Hull; the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax; 
the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih ; the Australian Minister, Richard G. 
Casey ; and the Netherlands Minister, Dr. A. Loudon. 

If you will turn to page 3, 1 read : 

They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any partic- 
ular tiiought of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I 
discovered that none of their governments had given them instructions relative 
to this pliase of tlie matter, except in the case of the Netherlands INIinister, I 
remarked that each of their governments was more interested in the defense 
of that area of the world than in tliis country, and at the same time they expected 
this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way 
and take the lead in defending the entire area. 

\J344] Are you familiar with that? 

Mr. Welles. I am familiar with the memorandum; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is initialed by Mr. Hull. 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with that fact at that time? 

Mr. Welles. I was not present at this conference, if that is what you 
have in mind. 

Senator Ferguson. No. How soon after this conference was had, 
did you become familiar with this memorandum or the information 
in the memorandum ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 511 

Mr. Welles. I remember that Mr. Hull spoke with me after the con- 
ference which he had had, and that he also saw the copy of this memo- 
randum shortly after it had been dictated. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall reading that? 

Mr. Welles. I recall reading it but my mind was more concentrated, 
perhaps, on the general conversation I had with him than on the precise 
phraseology of this memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what was meant by : 

I remarked that each of their governments were more interested in tlie defense 
of that area of the world than this country and at the same time they expected 
this country — 

I assume he means the other governments — 

[13451 in ease of a Japanese outbreali, to be ready to move in a military way 
and take the lead in defending the entire area. 

What is meant by that ? 

Mr. Welles. I think it would be perhaps more desirable, Senator, 
for you to get Mr. Hull to explain the language which he himself 
dictated, because this represents his own thinking at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. What was your understanding as to his 
meaning ? 

Mr. Welles. My understanding is that what he had said here arose 
from the warning given to the Japanese Government by the President 
on August 17. If the Japanese Government undertook to continue 
its policy of conquest and expansion, the United States would be 
obliged, in its defense and safety, to take such steps as it considered 
necessary, and,jobviously, those steps envisaged the possibility of mili- 
tary action. 

[1340] Senator Ferguson. In other words, did you understand 
that the note of — the parallel note that I referred to this morning of 
August 17 committed us to the action that he is now mentioning in this 
note and at the same time they expected this country in case of a Jap- 
anese outbreak to be ready to move in a military way and take the 
lead in defending the entire area? 

Mr. Welles. What I interpreted that note as meaning was that it 
envisaged the possibility that if Japan continued a policy of conquest 
and expansion in conflict with the legitimate interests of the United 
States the steps that this Government would then have to take to pre- 
serve its own security might lead to some form of conflict with Japan. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, so that there won't remain any misunder- 
standing about this in the record I will read the rest of the instrument. 
[Eeading :] 

And yet I said their governments, through some sort of preoccupation in other 
directions, do not seem to know anything about these phases of the questions 
under discussion. I made it clear that I was definitely disappointed at these 
unexpected developments, at the lack of interest and lack of a disposition to 
cooperate. They said nothing except the Netherlands Minister who then replied 
tliat he had heard from his [-?3^7] government and that it would support 
the modus vivendi proposal. I then indicated that I was not sure that I would 
present it to the Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views 
and attitude of their governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion. 

There were other details discussed but they were not of major consequence 
nor did they constitute anything new in the record. 



512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

And this is dated the 24th day of November 19-il, a note or a memo- 
randum of the conversation by Mr. Hull. 

Could you give us the sequence of events which led to our position 
of being the negotiator with Japan in relation to this language used 
here ? 

Mr. Welles. As the statement presented to the committee by Mr. 
Hull on yesterday shows, the effort was commenced in the month of 
JNIarch of 1941 to find through direct negotiations between the United 
States Government and the Japanese Government some pacific solu- 
tion of the crisis which was developing. 

Those negotiations were interrupted when Japan moved into Indo- 
china and occupied it and were later resumed shortly after August 17. 
The United States Government was, therefore, in a position of al- 
ready being a negotiator with Japan for a solution [i<5^<§] 
which, had it proved successful, would have solved all of the contro- 
versy arising in the Pacific area as an outgrowth of the militaristic 
policy of expansion and aggression upon which Japan had embarked. 
The other countries involved, because of their vital interests in that 
region would under such circumstances, had the negotiations proved 
successful, found a solution of their difficulties as well. It, therefore, 
seems to me entirely logical that the United States should have been 
negotiating rather than other governments which were already par- 
ticipating in a major war. 

Senator Ferguson. Frrom then on would you say that we were re- 
ceiving all of the information that the other governments, the ABCD 
part, all the military information in relation to the Pacific was com- 
ing to us from those governments because we were doing the nego- 
tiating? 

Mr. Welles. I should say that we were receiving the bulk of the 
intelligence and other information from our own naval and military 
authorities; that very frequently information of value as to the de- 
velopments was gained also from the British and Dutch and others of 
the governments primarily concerned. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not any of the other 
governments were breaking the Japanese diplomatic code? 

[1S49] Mr. Welles. My recollection is that the British Govern- 
ment was intercepting the messages just as we were. 

Senator Ferguson. So that the British Government had all the 
information from the intercepted messages that we would have? 
Mr. Welles. That is my clear recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know whether any of the other 
governments, the Dutch Goverment, was breaking the code? I mean 
by "breaking the code" intercepting the messages and translating 
them. 

Mr. Welles. My recollection is not clear on that point but my as- 
sumption would be that such information as was bemg obtained was 
made available to the Dutch Government by the British Government. 
Senator Ferguson. The British Government, then, would be keep- 
ing the Dutch Government informed ? 
Mr. Welles. That is my assumption. 

Senator Ferguson. And do you have any knowledge on the Chi- 
nese Government? 

Mr. Welles. I am not informed on that point. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 513 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear of the "winds" message, so 
described? 

Mr, Welles. I could not say that at that time I had any knowledge 
of it that I now recollect. As I said this [lo50] morning, Sen- 
ator, it is very difficult after 4 years 

Senator Fekguson. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Welles (continuing). To recollect with any accuracy, particu- 
larly when you have been reading the newspapers, as I have, with re- 
gard to the hearings and with regard to the matters that are coming 
up for discussion. 

Senator Ferguson. The word "winds" message or "wind execute" 
message, then, does not get a response ? 

Mr. Welles. I could not at this time say that I had ever seen it un- 
til I saw it in the press more recently. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you know what I am talking about when 
I speak of it ? 

Mr. Welles. Yes and 

Mr. Gesell. May I interpose. Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. I do not suppose Mr. Welles could have seen the exe- 
cute in the papers. The only discussion, or the only message released 
has been the code itself. The question of execute is something we are 
still 

Senator Ferguson. Working on. 

Mr. Gesell (continuing).. Working on, right. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, Mr. Welles, did you ever know that there 
had been an execute? In other words, if there had been a carrying 
out of the original message that they [1351] would indicate the 
break in diplomatic relations by using the direction of the wind. 

Mr. Welles. To the best of my recollection. Senator, I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear from any source that 
the Japanese Ambassadors in various places, for instance, here in 
Washington and in London, were destroying codes, or did you ever 
hear of it ? 

Mr. Welles. I recollect that shortly before December 7th an in- 
tercept gave an indication that the Japanese Embassy here was in- 
structed to destroy its papers. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall when that was ? 

Mr. Welles. Without referring to a record I could not give you 
the precise day or time. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it prior to the Tth ? 

Mr. Welles. Prior to the 7th. 

Senator Ferguson. What did that signify to you as a diplomat and 
Under Secretary of State? 

Mr. Welles. That signified to me that the last stage had been 
reached. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not catch that. 

Mr. Welles. That signified to me that the last stage had been 
reached. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say it indicated war? 
[1362'] Mr. Welles. A rupture of diplomatic relations at the 
very least and under the circumstances then existing the probability 
of war. 

79716— 46— pt. 2 9 



514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK ' 

Senator Ferguson. Did that help you to form your opinion on 
the percentage that you gave me this morning on the 7th ? 

Mr. Welles. That was decidedly one of the contributing factors. 

Senator Ferglson. I am reading now from a memo that Mas given 
tc us this morning. That is the telegram dated November the 30th, 
1941, received at 1 : 28 p. m., sent by our Ambassador, Mr. Winant. Do 
you have a copy of that ? That was given to us this morning. 

]Mr. Welles. Thank you. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, in the text, this being the sentence, the last 
part of the sentence that I want to inquire about [reading] : 

We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declara- 
tion, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action 
with yours. 

[1353] Now, it is the part, "And in any case arrangements are 
being made to synchronize our action with yours." What was he re- 
ferring to ? 

JNIr. Welles. The situation by November 30 had already reached 
such a point tFiat it was very clear that the possibility of hostilities 
was imminent and in that event I would assimie that the only construc- 
tion that could be given to the sentence which you have read. Senator, 
would be that those arrangements to be synchronized with ours re- 
ferred to naval and military operations. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever heard of that sjaichronizing of 
our military operations as being known as the ABCD bloc? 

Mr. Welles. No ; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. I asked you fehis morning if you recalled who 
were present at the Atlantic Conference. I have a copy of the New 
York Times here and it lists the names and I wonder whether you 
would check it to see whether it refreshes your memory. 

Mr. Welles. Certainly. 

Mr. Murphy. May we have the date for the record, please? 

Mr. Welles. The date is Sunday, August 17, Mr. Congressman. 
Yes, Senator. 

[1364] Senator Ferguson. Will you give the names of those 
listed as being present to see whether it refreshes your memory ? 

Mr. Welles. General Marshall, General. Arnold, General Burns, 
Colonel Bimdy, Admiral Stark, Admiral King, Admiral Turner, Cap- 
tain Sherman, Mr. Hopkins, Averell Harriman, General Watson, 
Captain Beardall, and Dr. Mclntire. 

Senator Ferguson. Captain Beardall was naval aide to the Presi- 
dent, was he not ? 

Mr. Welles. That is correct. Mr. Harriman had flown up with 
me at the time that I went. 

Senator Ferguson. What was his position at the time, Mr. Harri- 
man? 

Mf . Welles. He was stationed, as I recall it, in London at that time 
in connection with lend-lease operations. 

Senator Ficrguson. Mr. Hopkins' position? That was Harry 
Ilopkins. 

Mr. Welles. Harry Hopkins arrived some time after the Atlantic 
Charter Conference had started. I think that he flew over with Lord 
Beaverbrook, who had come down to see Mr. Churchill. My recol- 
lection is that they arrived 1 day or perhaps 2 days before the meet- 
ing broke up. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 515 

Senator Ferguson. Did 3^011 have any conversation with [1355] 
Mr. Hopkins about this parallel promise? 

Mr. Welles. None whatever. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he present when you discussed it with the 
President ? 

Mr. Welles. As I said this morning, Senator, my recollection is 
that I was alone with the President at the time that our conversation 
on this point took place. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, there is one other item in that book on 
the 24th that I have marked, and I would like to have you read that 
item from the New York Times of the 25th. I have marked the 
paragraph there. 

Mr. Murphy. The page ? 

Senator Ferguson. AVould you identify the paper that you are 
reading from? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. It is the New York Times, Monday, August 
25th. The article is headed: "Text of Prime Minister Churchill's 
address on meeting with President." The marked paragraph is as 
follows : 

It is certain tliat this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a 
peaceful settlement. The United States are hiborinsj with infinite patience to 
arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost 
reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations 
Mill succeed, [1356] but this I must say, that if these holies — 

there is a typographical error; I think the word must be "fail"— 

that if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly 
at the side of the United States. 

That is the marked paragraph. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would you say that that would be, in effect, 
carrying out this parallel arrangement ? 

Mr. Welles. I should not. Senator. I should say that at that time 
that was a unilateral declaration on the part of the British Prime 
Minister. 

Senator Ferouson. And had nothing to do, in your opinion, with 
the parallel action ? 

Mr. Welles. I think the parallel action should be regarded as 
separate from this. In my judgment this is a unilateral declaration, 
a unilateral declaration which, of course, arose from the fact that the 
two governments had agreed on a parallel course of action. 

Senator Ferguson. This was a radio broadcast to the world, was it 
not, this particular language? 

Mr. Welles. The heading of it as I read it, as I remember it, says, 
"Text of Prime Minister's Address." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. I do not remember whether it was or not. 

[1S57] Senator Ferguson. You would not say, then, that that 
was the carrying out of the British side of the parallel action ? 

Mr. Welles. I should not. I should interpret the British side of 
the parallel action as being a warning delivered to the Japanese 
Government by the British Government of the same character as the 
warning delivered by the President to the Japanese Government. 

Senator Ferguson. And it would be an exchange of diplomatic 
notes rather than a radio address? 

Mr. Welles. Most decidedly, in my judgment. 



516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at Peace and War — ^United 
States Foreign Policy — and see whether or not there are any notes 
between the date of the delivery of the note of August the 17th and 
their reply of the 28th ? 

Mr. Weli.es. I want to get your question clear, please, Senator. 

Senator FER(iUS0N. I want to know what diplomatic relations we 
had, as far as notes were concerned, between the I7th, Sunday, when 
the President returned, on August 1941, and the date of the reply of 
Japan to that note on August the 28th, if I am correct on my date of 
the reply, the 28th. 

Mr. Welles. There is nothing published here between August I7th 
and August 28th, except for the message of the President to the 
Congress. 

{1-3681 Senator Ferguson. That is the message of August what? 

Mr. Welles. August 21, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. 21st? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, at this place I would like to 
insert where I referred this morning, or we can do it right here, I 
would like to insert in the record the message of the President to 
Congress on the 21st, being the only paper in this book between those 
dates. 

The Chairman. Do you want it inserted as a part of the transcript? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; as part of the transcript. It is a short 
message ; it is only several pages. 

Mr. Gesell. May I interpose. Senator. While Mr. Welles has been 
looking at one book I have been looking at the other. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I want to get your help. 

Mr. Gesell. And I see in volume 2, Japan, Foreign Relations with 
the United States, refers to several conversations which were held 
with the Japanese Ambassador on various subjects, particularly a 
rather lengthy one I haven't read, "Memorandum by the Secretary of 
State on August 23rd of his talk with the Japanese Adbassaclor." 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I want to get in the record. 

[1359] Mr. Welles. My volume, Senator, is entitled "Docu- 
ments." There probably is a distinction made in the publication be- 
tween conversations and documents. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I have the message from 
the President inserted? 

The Chairman. Without objection, it will be inserted at this point 
in the transcript here. 

(The message referred to follows:) 

Message of Pkesident Roosevelt to the Congress, August 21, 1941, Embodying 

Text of the Atlantic Chaeter 

Over a week ago I held several important conferences at sea vpith the British 
Prime Minister. Because of the factor of safety to British, Canadian, and 
American ships, and their personnel, no prior announcement of these meetings 
could properly be made. 

At the close, a public statement by the Prime Minister and the President 
was made. I quote it for the information of the Congroiss and for the record : 

"The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, 
representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, have met at sea. 

"They have been accompanied by officials of their two Governments, including 
high-ranking officers of their military, navaL and air services. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 517 

[1360] "The whole problem of the supply or munitions of war, as provided 
by the Lease-Lend Act, for the armed forces of the United States, and for those 
countries actively engaged in resisting aggression, has been further examined. 

"Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply of the British Government, has 
joined in these conferences. He is going to proceed to Washington to discuss 
further details with appropriate officials of the United States Government. These 
conferences will also cover the supply problems of the Soviet Union. 

"The President and the Prime Minister liave had several conferences. They 
have considered the dangers to world civilization arising from the policies of 
military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite government of Ger- 
many and other governments associated therewith have embarked, and have 
made clear the steps which their countries are respectively taking for their 
safety in the face of these dangers. 

"They have agreed upon the following joint declaration : 

"Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the 
Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, X'epresenting His Majesty's Government in the 
United King- [1361] dom, being met together, deem it right to make known 
certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries 
on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world. 

"First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; 

"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the 
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned ; 

"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government 
under Avhich they will live ; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self- 
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them ; 

"Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to 
further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of 
access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which 
are needed for their economic prosperity ; 

"Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations 
in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, 
economic advancement, and social security ; 

[1362] "Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to 
see established a i)eace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in 
safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the 
men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want ; 

"Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and 
oceans without hindrance ; 

"Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well 
as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since 
no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to 
be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of 
their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent 
system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. 
They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will 
lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments. 

"Franklin D. Roosevelt 
"Winston S. Churchill." 

[lo65'] Senator Fekguson. Now, will counsel put in at least a 
memo on what the documents are between those dates ? 

INIr. Gesell. These are memos oi" conversations ; they are not docu- 
ments. 

Senator FerCxTJSOn. They are not documents. 

Mr. Welles, there were no exchanges of documents between those 
dates? 

Mr. Welles. According to publications I have, there were no ex- 
changes of documents between those dates. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask counsel to see whether or not we 
intercepted any messages during that period. 

Mr. Gesell. You mean translated, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Yes, there were a number of messages translated in 
that period. 



518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Do they relate in any way to this document? 

Mr. Gesell. Senator, I haven't had an opportunity to read them. 
They bcjjin witli the message on page 15 of exhibit 1, and they run 
through to — lot me see, what date I was going to; the 28th, is it not? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, up to the 28th. 

The Congress and the President having heretofore determined, through the 
Lend-Lease Act, on the national policy of [/3C.3] American aid to the de- 
mocracies which East and West are waging war against dictatorships, the mili- 
tary and naval conversations at these meetings made clear gains in furthering 
the effectiveness of this aid. 

Fnrtherniore, the Prime Minister and I are arranging for conferences with 
the Soviet Union to aid it in its defense against the attack made by the principal 
aggressor of the modern world — Germany. 

Finally, the declaration of principles at this time presents a goal which is 
worth-while for our type of civilization to seek. It is so clear-cut that it is 
difficult to oppose in any major particular without automatically admitting a 
willingness to accept compromise with Nazism ; or to agree to a world peace which 
would give to Nazism domination over large numbers of conquered nations. 
Inevitably such a peace would be a gift to Nazism to the take breath — armed 
breath — for a second war to extend the control over' Europe and Asia, to the 
American Hemisphere itself. 

It is perhaps unnecessary for me to call attention once more to the utter 
lack of validity of the spoken or written word of the Nazi government. 

It is also unnecessary for me to point out that the declaration of principles 
includes, of necessity, the world need for freedom of religion and freedom of 
information. No [ISG't] society of the world organized under the an- 
nounced principles could survive witliout these freedoms which are a part of 
the whole freedom for which we strive. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, with one or two that do not seem to be on that 
point, they run to page 21. I have not read them [1366] all. 
Then there are several in volume 2 that relate to espionage activities 
in that same period. 

Senator Ferguson. I notice in the one instance on page 17, Mr. 
"Welles, it is from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, August 16, 1941j 
which would be before this message was given, and part of it says: 
"That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of 
Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree." 

Now, that was sent prior to the I7th. Had you ever heard whether 
or not Japan was intercepting our messages? 

Mr. Welles. I had no reason to think so at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the State Department, to your knowledge, 
know that Japan knew we were intercepting their diplomatic mes- 
sages? ■^ 

Mr. Welles. The Department had no reason to think so. We were 
doing everything on earth, of course, to prevent such knowledge being 
obtained by them. 

Senator Ferguson. As far as you knew, they did not know that? 

Mr. Welles. So far as I knew, there was no chance that they did. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you recall any messages intercepted 
betAveen the delivery of that note and the reply? 

Mr. Welles. I do not offhand recall. Senator. I would [1367] 
have to refi'esh my memory by rea'ling these messages here. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I would like to go to the 6th of December 
1941. You were in your office on that particular day, as you told me 
this morning, is that correct? 

Mr. Welles. Yes, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. And on that day, will you relate from memory, 
unless you have some book or record, what occurred? I notice you 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 519 

stated once that you had a private file, that you obtained a paper 
from a private file. Did I understand you correctly? 

Mr. Welles. When I left the Department of State, Senator, all of 
my documents that related to official business became part of the 
archives of the Department of State, and I retained only copies of 
memoranda or conversations, and a small amount of personal cor- 
respondence. 

Senator Ferguson. But the originals of those copies of memoranda 
or conversations should be in the State Department? 

Mr. Welles. They are all on file in the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. So we would be able to find in the State De- 
partment anything that you have and there would be no need of 
going over your file ? 

Mr. Wi^xes. Absolutely. The originals of everything I had were 
left in the Department of State. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you anything relating to the 6th ? 

[1368] Mr. Welles. I have no diaries, as I said before, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. I mean any memo of conversations. 

Mr. Welles. I am afraid the files of the Department will have to 
be searched to find memorandums of conversations which I had on that 
day. I remember that the da}^ was unusually rushed. At that par- 
ticular moment I was exceedingly concerned with regard to the situa- 
tion in the Western Hemisphere, and a good deal of my thought, time, 
and attention was given to that phase of the world problem. At the 
same time, as I said this morning, I think I had received information 
which was brought to the Secretary of State, in his otHcc, when I was 
present, with regard to the Japanese troop movement, with regard 
to Japanese naval movement, all of which added to the gravity and 
burden of the day. 

Senator Ferguson. So that was a very important day in the history 
of the United States, as far as the State Department was concerned ? 

Mr. Welles. In every sense of the word. 

Senator Ferguson. You had received the message from Ambassa- 
dor Winant at 11 : 40. I will ask you when you first knew t]\^t Japan 
was replying to the note of the 2r)th. What time on the Cth did you 
know that they were replying to Mr. Hull's note of the 261:11 ? 

Mr. Welles. I could not attempt to give you the precise [13691 
hour. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you give it near the hour ? 

Mr. Welles. What you have in mind, I assume from your question, 
is when I had knowledge of intercepts which showed that the Japa- 
nese were replying. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. When did you first know or 
get information that the Japanese were replying? 

Mr. Welles. My present recollection is that I had no knowledge 
of it until the Sunday, not on the Saturday. 

Senator Ferguson. Even though the Army or Navy, or both, were 
getting parts of the message during the day, you do not recall now 
any information on that? 

Mr. Welij^.s. The best of my recollection, Senator, is that I knew 
nothing of that until the following morning. But it is not very 
surj:)rising that I should not have received any such message. Mr. 
Hull himself, as I said before, was in charge" of that particular ques- 



520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tioii. It was occupyinjT practically all of his time and attention, and 
I, since the Department of State had to continue operating notwith- 
standinof, was doing the best I could to handle any important or diffi- 
cult urgent problems which were coming up, and consequently my own 
feeling is that it was very natural that information of that important 
cliaracter should have been communicated directly to Mr. Hull and 
to the President and not to myself, 

[1S70] Senator Ferguson. Now, will you state to us the im- 
portant matters that you were handling on that day? 

Mr. Welles. I should have to go to the records of the Department 
in order to give you an accurate answer. 

Senator Ferguson. Could 3^ou do that? 

Mr. Welles. I think undoubtedly the records of the Department 
will show it. 

Senator Ferguson. They were at least relating to the Far East, 
that is, the Pacific area there, were they not? 

Mr. Welles. The matters that I was handling, Senator, at that 
particular time, as I have attempted to indicate, had to do primarily 
with the very grave situation which we were confronting in the West- 
ern Hemisphere, a grave situation in view of the fact that in the world 
situation as it then was it was to the highest degree necessary and 
desirable that the closest kind of cooperation and understanding be 
maintained between the United States and the other American Re- 
publics. That, in my judgment, was one of the foundations of our 
own security. 

Senator Ferguson. And if w^ar came, you felt it w^as necessary that 
we get the cooperation of the South American and Central American 
Republics at once? 

Mr. Welles. I regarded them as of the most vitally important to 
the security of this country. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be true because of the [1371'\ 
Panama Canal, if for no other reason ? 

Mr. Welles. If the United States was faced with the possibility of 
war on both oceans, which had been overshadowing all of our minds 
for weeks, it certainly was of the highest importance that we should 
not be faced with the possibility of any Axis machinations in the New 
World. 

Senator Ferguson. But the record shows, and parts of the testi- 
mony indicate, that parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 would be in Washington. I am 
talking now about the reply on the 26th, at 11 : 49 Washington time. 
That was a. m. But you do not recall now any information about that 
particular message until Sunday? 

Mr. Welles. I do not recall an}^ specific information in regard to it 
until Sunday morning. 

Senator Ferguson. And you would think that that kind of message, 
that kind of information that we were receiving their reply, would 
go directly to Mr. Hull and to the President? 

Mr. Welles. That is my understanding. It seems to me the logical 
thing under those conditions. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on Sunday, do you know what hour of the 
day you had heard that we had intercepted their message or their 
reply? 

Mr. Welles. I remember that I was informed in the early morning 
on Sunday when I rejjched my office that an appointment [1372'\ 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 521 

had been requested by the Japanese Ambassadors with the Secretary 
of State, at approximately the same time, my miderstanding was, 
that they were going to deliver the reply which was coming through. 
I did not see Mr. Hull that morning, I did not see him until after he 
got through, to the best of my recollection, with his interview with 
the Japanese Ambassadors. The first knowledge, as I think I said this 
morning, which I had of the attack upon Pearl Harbor, came through 
a telephone conversation which the President had with me when he 
gave me the information. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you to give us what the Presi- 
dent of the United States said to you in that telephone conversation. 

Mr. Welles. It would be very hazardous for me to attempt to give 
you anything that approached a textual version of what the President 
said to me on the telephone, and I would not attempt it. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you give us the substance of what the 
President said? 

[1373] Mr. Welles. The gist of what he told me was the fact 
that the attack on Pearl Harbor had taken place, and that he wished 
me to come over to the White House at some time which he fixed that 
afternoon. 

Senator Ferguson. It was a very short conversation ? 

Mr. Welles. It was a very short conversation. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you go to the White House ? 

Mr. Welles. I went to the White House at the time that the Presi- 
dent fixed. I should say it was about 3 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether or not the President had 
conferred with anyone Sunday morning? 

Mr. Welles. I could not undertake to answer that question, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. From what he had said 

Mr. Welles. The President did not tell me with whom he had 
spoken on the telephone. , 

Senator Ferguson. Did you then talk about the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, Sunday afternoon at 3 o'clock? 

Mr. Welles. In the first conversation which I had with him at that 
time he gave me certain reports which were reaching him. I remem- 
ber that some of the reports gave the impression that the Japanese 
were attempting to undertake landings on the islands, reports which 
were later disproved. At that time, as I remember it, he had no de- 
tailed or full information [1374] whatever as to the extent 
of the attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there anyone present other than you and 
the President? 

Mr. Welles. He was sitting alone in his office on the second floor 
of the White House. There wa^ nobody with him. 

Senator Ferguson. He was receiving messages on the attack ? 

Mr. Welles. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was solely on the attack that you were 
discussing, the Pearl Harbor incident? 

Mr. Welles. I rememlier, even in the first conversation — I think 
I had three with him that day — he discussed the need for him at the 
earliest possible moment either to appear before the Congress or to 
send a message to the Congress. 



522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Did you help him to i)repare the message to 
Con<T:ress ? 

JNIr. Welles. He asked me to undertake to help him take care of 
that message ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you helj^him prepare that message. 

Mr. Welles. I helped to prepare the original draft; yes. 

Senator Ferguson, That was delivered on Monday morning, was it ? 

]Mr. Welles. I would have to have my memory refreshed [1375'\ 
on that. 

Senator Ferguson. That was the 8th ? 

The Vice Chairman. Monday noon. 

Mr. Welles. Monday noon. 

Senator Ferguson. Do yon know wdien Congress recessed the time 
before; that is, before the 8th? Do you know whether they recessed 
on the 4th? I think my able colleague, the Senator from Illinois, 
moved that' it recess until Monday morning, or until Monday noon. 
Did you know that it had recessed ? 

Mr. Welles. On what day? 

Senator Ferguson. On the 4th. 

Mr. Welles. On December 4 ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. I undoubtedly knew at the time. I cannot at the 
moment say jnst when I knew it, or more about it, other than the 
fact that I did know it at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you worked on the message that is now in 
your file, that has been offered in evidence, but never delivered to 
Congress ? 

Would you show it to him, Mr. Counsel ? 

Mr. Welles. I do not know exactly what message you have in 
mind, Senator. 

Mr. Gesell. That is exhibit 19, Senator. 

\^376~\ Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 19. Will you just review 
exhibit 19 and see whether you had any part in it? 

Mr. Welles. I had no part in the drafting of that message whatever. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not, or did you know, 
that the President had in mind the delivery of a message such as we 
have here now in evidence ? 

Mr. Welles. The draft which is dated November 29, 1941, is that 
the one you have in mind? 

Senator Ferguson. Or any message prior to the 7th, to the day of 
the attack, on the Japanese far eastern question. 

Mr. Welles. I have no knowledge whatever of the preparation of 
this draft which you have just asked me to refer to. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted on any draft prior to Pearl 
Harbor in relation to our far eastern question? 

Mr. Welles. I do not remember that I was consvdted with regard 
to any other draft. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted with relation to the draft 
of the message to Congress on August 21, 1941, known as the Atlantic 
Charter message? 

Ml-. Welles. I had no part in the preparation of that draft, as I 
recall it. I remember that the President told nie that he intended to 
deliver such a message to the Congress at the first opportunity, but I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 523 

had nothing whatever to do [13771 with the preparation of the 
text. 

Senator Ferguson. Was the Atlantic Charter in writing and signed 
by the President and by Mr. Churchill, as indicated in the message? 

Mr. Welles. The Atlantic Charter, Senator, was a joint com- 
munique issued by the heads of two governments. As is very often the 
case, it was not a signed agreement, simply an agreement on a public 
release by the chiefs of the two governments in order to indicate what 
their respective policies were and what the objectives were which they 
sought for a better and more decent world at the end of the war. 

Senator Ferguson. It was what you would call, then, in the nature 
of a press or public release? 

Mr. Welles. I should say it was, technically, if you will permit the 
use of the word "technical," it was technically a joint communique, 
which is a joint release to the public opinion of the world. 

Senator Ferguson. And that may account for the fact that in the 
document now published in the address to Congress it indicates that it 
was signed by the authors of the communique ? 

Mr. Welles. They both agreed upon it. I remember, just before 
Mr. Churchill left, since he left before the President did, a final text 
was gone over, one or two slight changes were made, and it was then 
sent by the President to be retyped in order that it could be transmitted 
by radio to Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. And was so transmitted, in your opinion ? 

Mr. Welles. It was so transmitted to the White House. 

Senator Ferguson. No priBSs release or communique was given in 
relation to the parallel action that we have discussed earlier? 

Mr. Welles. No press communique was given in regard to that, 
because, in my judgment, the President's feeling must have been that it 
was impossible to conceive of any successful negotiation with the 
Japanese if it was publicly stated that we were delivering a warning to 
the Japanese. 

[1379] Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss -that with the 
President. 

Mr. Welles. I do not remember discussing that phase of it. 

Senator Ferguson. So that is your conclusion at the present time? 

Mr. Welles. That is my conclusion. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. As to why no release would be given ? 

Mr. Welles. That is merely my conclusion. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, just in connection with the Senator's 
insertion in the record of one paragraph of the New York Times on 
the speech of Mr. Churchill, the first sentence that the Senator had 
read was, "It is certain that this has got to stop." I think, in order 
to show what was being referred to in the previous paragraph, cer- 
tainly it ought to be incorporated, because Mr. Churchill talked about 
the menace to the Philippine Islands under the protection of the 
United States. 

Senator Ferguson. I will be glad to have that paragraph in the 
record. 

The Chairman. Wliy not let the whole speech go in ? 

Mr. MuRPHT. It should go in. 



524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(An excerpt from the New York Times, August 25, 1941, containing 
the text of Prime Minister Churchill's address, follows:) 

IISSO] Text of Prime Minister Cutjrchill's Address on Meeting With 

Pl{ESIDENT liOOSEVELT 
[The New York Times, August 25, 1941] 

(Following is the text of Prime Minister Winston Churchill's address yesterday 
as recorded by the New York Times:) 

I thought you would like me to tell you something about the voyage which I 
made across the ocean to meet our great friend, the President of the United 
States. 

Exactly where we met is a secret, but I don't think I shall be indiscreet if 
I go so far as to say that it was somewhere in the Atlantic. In a spar-ious, 
land-locked bay which reminded me of the west coast of Scotland, powerful 
American warships; protected by strong flotillas and far-ranging aircraft, 
awaited our arrival and, as it were, stretched out a hand to help us in. 

Our party arrived in the newest, or almost the newest British battleship, the 
Prince of Walest, with a modest escort of British and Canadian destroyers. And 
there for 3 days I spent my time in company, and I think I may say in comrade- 
ship, with Mr. Roosevelt, while all the time the chiefs of the staff and naval 
and military commanders, both of the British Empire and of the United States, 
sat together in continual council. 

President Roosevelt is the thrice-chosen head of the most powerful state and 
community in the world. I am the servant of King and Parliament, at present 
charged with the principal direction of our affairs in these fateful times. And 
it is my [1381] duty al.so to make sure, as I have made sure, that any- 
thing I say or do in the exercise of my office is approved and sustained by the whole 
Briti.sh Commonwealth of Nations. Therefore this meeting was bound to be im- 
portant because of the enormous forces, at present only a partially mobilized, but 
steadily mobilizing, which are at the disposal of these two major groupingsi 
of the human family, the British Empire and the United States, who, fortunately 
for the progress of mankind, happened to speak the same language and very 
largely think the same thoughts, or anyhow think a lot of the same thoughts. 

MEETING WAS SYMBOLIC 

The meeting was, therefore, symbolic. That is its prime importance. It sym- 
bolizes in a form and manner which every one can understand in every land 
and in every clime, the deep underlying unities which stir and, at decisive 
moments, rule the English-speaking peoples throughout the world. 

Would it be presumptuous for me to say that it symbolizes something even 
more majestic, namely, the marshaling of the good forces of the world against 
the evil forces which are now so formidable and triumphant and which have cast 
their cruel spell over the whole of Europe and a large part of Asia. 

This was a meeting which marks forever in the pages of history the taking up 
by the English-speaking nations, amid all this peril, tumult and confusion, of 
the guidance of the [1382] fortunes of the broad toiling masses in all the 

continents, and our loyal effort, without any clog of selfish interest to lead them 
forward out of the miseries into which they have been plunged, back to the 
broad high road of freedmn and justice. This is the highest honor and the most- 
glorious opportunity which could ever have come to any branch of the human 
race. 

When one beholds how many currents of extraordinary and terrible events 
have flowed together to make this harmony, even the most skeptical person 
must have the feeling that we all have the chance to play our part and do our 
duty in some great design, the end of which no mortal can foresee. Awful and 
horrible things I have seen in these days. 

BARBARISM PLUS SCIENCE 

The whole of Europe has been wrecked and trampled down by the mechanical 
weapons and barbaric fury of the Nazis. The most deadly instruments of war 
science have joined to the extreme refinements of treachery and the most brutal 
exhibitions of ruthlessness and thus have formed a combine of aggression, the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 525 

like of which has never been known, before which the rights, the traditions, the 
clianicteristics and the stniclure of many ancient, honored states and peoples 
have been laid prostrate and are now ground down under the heel and terror 
of a monster. 

Tlie Austrians, the Czechs, the Poles, the Norwegians, the Danes, the Bel- 
gians, the Dutch, the Greeks, the Croats and the U383] Serbs, above all 
the great French nation, have been stunned and pinioned. Italy, Hungary, 
Rumania, Bulgaria, have bought a shameful respite by becoming the jackals of 
the tiger. But their situation is very little different and will presently be in- 
distinguishable from that of his victims. Sweden, Spain, and Turkey stand 
appalled, wondering which will be struck down next. Here then is the vast pit 
into which all the most famous States and races of Europe have been flung and 
from which, unaided, they can never climb. 

But all this did not satiate Adolph Hitler. He made a treaty of non- 
aggression with Soviet Russia, just as he made one with Turkey, in order to 
keep them quiet until he was ready to attack them. 

And then, 9 weeks ago today, witliout a vestige of provocation, he hurled mil- 
lions of soldiers with all their apparatus upon the neighbor he had called his 
friend, with the avowed object of destroying Russia and tearing her in pieces. 

This frightful business is now unfolding day by day before our eyes. Here is 
a devil who, in a mere spasm of his pride and lust for domination, can condemn 
two or three millions, perhaps it may be many more, of human beings to speedy 
and violent death. Let Russia be blotted out. Let Russia be destroyed. Order 
the armies to advance. Such were his decrees. Accordingly, from the Arctic 
Ocean to the Black Sea, six or seven millions of soldiers are locked in mortal 
struggle. 

[13S4] RUSSIA NOT so EASY 

Ah, but this time it was not so easy. This time it was not all one way. The 
Russian armies and all the peoples of the Russian Republic have rallied to the 
defense of their hearths and homes. For the first time Nazi blood has flowed in 
a fearful flood. Certainly a million and a half, perhaps two millions of Nazi 
cannon-fodder, have bit the dust of the endless plains of Russia. The tremendous 
battle rages along nearly 2,000 miles of front. The Russians fight with mag- 
nificent devotion. Not only that, our generals who have visited the Russian 
front line report with admiration the efficiency of their military organization and 
the excellence of their equipment. 

The aggressor is surprised, startled, staggered. For the first time in his experi- 
ence mass murder has become unprofitable. He retaliates by the most frightful 
cruelties. As his armies advance, whole districts are being exterminated. 
Scores of thousands, literally scores of thousands of executions in cold blood are 
being perpetrated by the German police troops upon the Russian patriots who 
defend their native soil. Since the Mongol invasions of Europe in the sixteenth 
century (here has never been methodical, merciless butchery on such a scale or 
approaching such a scale. And, this is but the beginning. Famine and pestilence 
have yet to follow in the bloody ruts of Hitler's tanks. 

We are in the presence of a crime without a name. 

But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and [1385] devas- 
tated by aggression. For five long yeai's the Japanese military factions, seeking 
to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as if 
it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the nOO,- 
000,000 inhab'tants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about the 
vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin and coFruption, 
and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now, they stretch a grasping hand Into 
the southern seas of China. They snatch Ind.ochina from the wretched Vichy 
French. The menace by their movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British 
link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine Islands under the protection 
of the United States. 

JAPAN MUST BE HALTED 

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a 
peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to 
arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will giv» Japan the utmost reas- 
surance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will 
succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, 
range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States. 



526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

And tlnis we come back to the quiet bay, somewhere in the Athuitic, where 
misty sunshine plays on great ships wliich carry the White Ensign or the Stars 
and Stripes. 

We had the idea when we met there, the President and I, [1386] that 
without attempting to draw final and formal peace aims, or war aims, it was 
necessary to give all peoples, and especially the oppressed and conquered peoples, 
a simple, rough-and-ready wartime statement of the goal tmvard which the 
British Commonwealth and the United States mean to make their way and thus 
make a way for oil-.ers to march with them on a road which will certainly be 
painful and may b.' long. 

There are, however, two distinct and marked differences in this joint declara- 
tion from the attitude adopted by the Allies during the latter part of the last 
war and no one should overlook them. 

The United States and Great Britain do not now assume that there will never 
be any more war again. On the contrary, we intend to take ample precaution 
to prevent its renewal in any period we can foresee by effectively disarniing the 
guilty nations while remaining suitably protected ourselves. 

The second difference is this: That instead of trying to ruin German trade by 
all kinds of additional trade barriers and hindrances, as was the mood of 1917, 
we have definitely adopted the view that it is not in the interests of the world 
and of our two countries that any large nation should be unprosperous or shut 
out from the means of making a decent living for itself and its people by its 
industry and enterprise. 

FAR-REACHING CHANGES 

These are far-reaching changes of principle upon which all [13S7] coun- 
tries should ponder. 

Above all, it was necessary to give hope and the assurance of final victory to 
those many scores of millions of men and women who are battling for life and 
freedom or who are already bent down under the Nazi yoke. 

Hitler and his conferates have for some time past been adjuring and beseech- 
ing the populations whom they have wronged and injured to bow to their fate, 
and to resign themselves to their servitude and, for the sake of somie mitigation 
and indulgences, to collaborate — that is the word — in what is called the new 
order in Europe. 

What is this new order which they seek to fasten first upon Europe and, if 
possible — for their ambitions are boundless — upon all the continents of the 
globe? It is the rule of the Herrenvolk — the master race — who are to put an 
end to democracy, to parliaments, to the fundamental freedoms and decencies of 
ordinary men aiTd women, to the historic rights of nations, and give them in 
exchange the iron rule of Prussia, the universal goose step and the strict efficient 
discipline, enforced upon the working classes by the political police, with the 
German concentration camps and firing parties, now so busy in a dozen lands, 
always handy in the background There is the new order. 

Napoleon in his glory and genius spread his empire far and wide. There was 
a time when only the snows of Russia and tlie white cliffs of Dover with their 
guardian fleets stood between [J3S8] him and dominion of the world. 
Napoleon's armies had a theme. They carried witli them the surges of the 
French Revolution — "Liberty, equality, and fraternity." That was the cry. 
There was a sweeping away of outworn, medieval systems and aristocratic 
privilege. There was the land for the people — a new code of law. Nevertheless, 
Napoleon's empire vanished like a dream. 

But Hitler — Hitler has no theme — naught but mania, appetite, and exploita- 
tion. He has, however, weapons and machinery for grinding down and for 
holding down conquered countries which are the product — the sadly perverted 
product — of modern science. 

HOPE FOR THE CONQUERED 

The ordeals, therefore, of the conquered jieoples will be hard. We must give 
them hope. We must give them the conviction that their sufferings and their 
resistances will not be in vain. Tiie tunnel may be dark and long, but at the end 
there is light. That is^he symbolism and that is the message of the Atlantic 
njeeting. 

Do not despair, brave Norwegians, your land shall be cleansed, not only from 
the invader but from the filthy quislings wh,o are his tools. 

Be strong in your souls, Czechs, your independence shall be restored. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE " 527 

Poles, the heroism of your people, standing up to cruel oppressors, the courage 
of your soldiers, sailors, and airmen shall not be forgotten. Your country shall 
live again and resume its \_loS'J] rightful i^art in the new organization 
of Europe. 

Lift up your heads, gallant Frenchmen. Not all the infamies of Darlau and 
of Laval shall stand between you and the restoration of your birthright. 

Stout-hearted Dutch, Belgians, Luxemburgers, tormented, mishandled, shame- 
fully cast away peoples of Yugoslavia, glorious Greece, now subjected to the 
crowning insult ol the rule of the Italian jackanapes, yield not an inch. Keep 
your souls clean frum all contact with the Nazis. Make them feel even in their 
lieeting hour of brutish triumph that they are the moral outcasts of mankind. 
Help is coming. Mighty forces are arming in your behalf. Have faith, have 
hope, deliverance is sure. 

There is the signal which we have flashed across the waters and if it reaches 
the hearts of those to whom it is sent they will endure with fortitude and 
tenacity their present misfortune in the sure faith that they, too, are still 
serving the common cause and that our efforts will not be in vain. 

You will, perhaps, have noticed that the President of the United States and 
the Britisli representative in what is aptly called the Atlantic Charter have 
jointly pledged their countries to the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny. That 
is a solemn and grave undertaking. It must be made good. It will be made 
good, and, of coui-se, many practical arrangements to fulfill that purpose have 
been and are being organized and set in motion. 

HOW NEAR IS UNITED STATES TO WAR? 

[1390] The question has been asked: "How near is the United States to 
war?" There is certainly one man who knows the answer to that question. 
If Hitler has not yet ^declared war upon the United States it is surely not out 
of his love for American institutions. It is certainly not because he could not 
find a pretext. He has murdered half a dozen countries for far less. Fear, 
fear of immediately redoubling the tremendous energies now being eniployed 
against him is no doubt the restraining influence. But the real reason is, I 
am sure, to be found in the method to which he has so faithfully adhered and 
by which he has gained so much. 

What i-s that method? It is a very simple method. One by one — that is his 
plan. That is his guiding rule. That is the trick by which he has enslaved so 
large a portion of the world 

Three and a half years ago I appealed to my fellow countrymen to take the 
lead in weaving together a strong defensive union within the principles of the 
League of Nations, a union of all the countries who felt themselves in ever- 
growing danger. But none would listen. All stood idle while Germany rearmed. 

ONE BY ONE 

Czechoslovakia was subjugated. A French Government deserted their faith- 
ful ally and broke a plighted word in that ally's hour of need. Russia was 
cajoled and deceived into a kind of neutrality or partnershii^ ^^■hile the French 
Army was being annihilated. The Low Countries and the Scandinavian coun- 
tries, acting with France and Great Britain in good time even after the war liad 
[1391] begun, might have altered its course and would have had at any 
rate a fighting chance. The Balkan states had only to stand together to save 
themselves from the ruin by which they are now engulfed. But one by one they 
were undermined and overwhelmed. Never was the career of crime made more 
smooth. , 

Now Hitler is striking at Russia with all his might, well knowing the difficul- 
ties of geography which stand between Russia and the aid which the western 
democracies are trying to bring. We shall strive our utmost to overcome all 
difliculties and to bring this aid. We have arranged for a conference in Moscow 
between the United States, British, and Russian authorities to settle the whole 
plan. No barrier nmst stand in the way. But why is Hitler striking at Russia 
and inflicting this sullering on himself, or rather making his soldiers suffer this 
frightful slaughter? 

It is with the declared object of turning his whole force upon the British 
Islands and, if he can succeed in beating the life and strength out of us, which is 



528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

not so easy, then is the moment when he will settle his account, and it is already 
a long one, with the people of the United States and generally with the Western 
Hemisphere. 

One hy one — there is the process. There is the simple dismal plan which has 
served Hitler so well. It needs but one final successful applicalion to make him 
the master of the world. 

I am devoutly thankful that some eyes at least are fully [1392] opened 
to it while time remains. I rejoice to find that the President saw in their true 
light and proportion the extreme (hmgers by which the American people, as 
well as the British people, are now beset. 

IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES FLEET 

It was indeed by the mercy of God that he began 8 years ago that revival of the 
strength of the American Navy without which the New World today would have 
to take its orders from the European dictators, but with which the United States 
still retains the power to marshal her gigantic strength and, in saving herself, 
render an incomparable service to mankind. 

We had a church parade on Sunday in our Atlantic bay. The President came 
onto the quarter-deck of the Prince of Wah^s where there were mingled together 
many hundreds of American and British sailors and marines. 

The sun shone bright and warm while we all sang the old hymns which are 
our common inheritance and which we learned as children in our homes. We 
sang the hymn founded on the psalm which John Hampden's soldiers sang when 
they bore his body to the grave and in which the brief precarious span of human 
life is contrasted with the immutability of Him to whom a thousand ages are 
but as yesterday and as a watch that is passed in the night. 

We sang the sailors' hymn "For those in Peril," and there are very many in 
peril on the sea. We sang "Onward, Christian [1393] Soldiers," and in- 
deed I felt that this was no vain presumption, but that w^ had the right to feel 
that we were serving a cause for the sake of which a trumpet has sounded from 
on high. 

When I looked upon that densely packed congregation of the fighting men of 
the same language, of the same faith, of the same fundamental laws, of the same 
ideals and to a large extent, of the same interests and certainly in different de- 
grees facing the same dangers, it swept across me that here was the only hope 
but also the sure hope of saving the world from merciless degradation. 

And so we came back across the ocean waves uplifted in spirit, fortified in 
resolve. Some American destroyers, which were carrying mails to the United 
States marines in Iceland, happened to be going the same way, too, so we made 
a goodly company at sea together. 

And when we were right out in midpassage one afternoon a noble sight broke 
on the view. We overtook one of the convoys which carry the munitions and 
supplies of the New World to sustain the champions of freedom in the Old. The 
whole horizon — the whole broad horizon — seemed filled with ships. Seventy or 
eighty ships of all kinds, sizes, arrayed in 14 lines, each of which could have 
been drawn with a ruler, hardly a wisp of smoke, not a straggler, but all 
bristling with cannon and other precautions on which I will not dwell, and all 
surrounded by [139 J/] their British escorting vessels, while overhead 
the far-ranging Catalina airboats soared, vigilant, protecting "eagles" in the sky. 

And then I felt that hard and terrible and long drawn out as this struggle 
may be, we shall not be denied the strength to do our duty to the end. 

[1S95] Senator Ferguson. I would like to put to Mr. Welles one 
more question. 

Do you have anything that you want now to state in the record, 
that have been suggested or not suggested by any of my questions? 

Do you want to make any explanation whatever on the record so 
that we will have all of the facts? 

Mr. Welles. I thank you for that opportunity, Senator. I do not 
at this moment think of anything that I wish to add to what I have 
said this morning and this afternoon. * 

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Welles, I want to get clear in my mind the facts 
with reference to the .so-called Atlantic Charter. As I understand 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 529 

your testimony, and will you correct me if I misstate it, you assisted 
in drafting the memorandum which is known as the Atlantic Charter. 

JNIr. Welles. That is correct, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Keefe. This memorandum resulted from the conversations 
held at sea between the President and Mr. Churchill? 

Mr. Welles. That is correct, but may I interject and amplify in 
parentheses there? 

Mr, Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. The President had been considering such a statement 
of policy for some time before and had been seeking [1396] for 
an opportunity to make such a statement of policy. When we arrived 
at Argentia we found Mr. Churchill had some specific suggestions 
with regard to the statement of policy, and the Atlantic Charter 
contained both the President's original ideas as well as some of the 
original ideas which Mr. Churchill had brought with him. I make 
that statement in amplification of my reply. 

Mr. Keefe. The result was there was a clean typed document pre- 
pared, as you have indicated? 

Mr. Welles. There was a final clean copy made, Mr. Congressman, 
and that clean copy was then rushed to the radio operator so that the 
copy could be sent immediately to the White House for further release 
or for future release. 

Mr. Keefe. But that actual document, in whatever form it w^as, in 
the clean typed form that you indicated, as finally agreed upon, was 
not signed by either the President or by Mr. Churchill ? 

Mr. Welles. The revised text had been approved in detail by each 
of them and it was after that that the clean copy was made and then 
sent to be radioed to Washington and to London. 

Mr. Keefe. Of course there never was any signature of either of 
the parties to that document. 

Mr. Welles. There was no signature in that sense. There was full 
approval, of course, given by both of them to the [1S97] final 
text. 

Mr. Keefe. So that the interpolation of the signatures in the mes- 
sage of the President to the Congress, which appears on page 7l7 of 
the volume "Peace and War," that I have before me, results from what 
he did that got into the document ? 

Mr. Welles. As an indication that both of them had given the 
document their official approval as representing the respective policies 
which they desired to pursue and achieve. 

Mr. Keefe. So that there is actually not in existence a historic 
document known as the Atlantic Charter bearing the signatures of 
Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt? 

Mr. Welles. Not in the sense that it is an agreement between the 
two governments signed and sealed, but I may say to you, Mr. Con- 
gressman, as you undoubtedly know, very often heads of governments 
in a joint communique, after a meeting, announce their agreement 
upon certain policies which their respective governments are going to 
attempt to carry out. If you will permit this addition, I do not 
regard the Atlantic Charter as any less valid because it did not have 
the actual signatures or any official seals put upon it. It had been 
approved in every syllable by both Mr. Churchill and the I*resident 
and was released upon their instruction as containing the policies of 
their two governments. 

79716—46 — pt. 2 10 



530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. And that which appears in the President's [1398] 
speech to the Congress under date of August 21, 1941, is that identical 
agreement ? 

Mr. Welles. That is the text as agreed upon at Argentia. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you have any part in the drafting of the October 17 
proposed message to the Emperor of Japan ? ^ 

Mr. Welles. May I refer to the text of that before I answer you, 
Mr. Congressman ? 

Mr. Gessell. That is Exhibit 20, Congressman Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. I just said that so we would keep the record straight. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes ; Exhibit 20. 

Mr. Welles. I remember the draft very well now that I have had 
a chance to look at it again. I do not think I actually had any part 
in the preparation of it, either. 

Mr. Keefe. Were you consulted by Mr. Hull or anyone else in the 
State Department? 

Mr. Welles. I think I must undoubtedly have sat in on the confer- 
ence in Mr. Hull's office in which this was under consideration. 

Mr. Keefe. In the memorandum to the President under date of 
October 17, which is part of the same exhibit, there appears this 
language : 

There is attached a redraft of your proposed [1399} message to the 
Emperor of Japan. 

I call your attention to the word "redraft." 

Ill view of (a) the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister here in a two-hour 
conversation last evening with Mr. Welles and myself, 

and so forth. 

Now, this letter of transmittal indicates that there was a prior draft 
of the proposed message. Do you recall that ? 

Mr. Welles. I recall the fact that there had been several, at least 
one other if not more, drafts prepared. Whether the redraft was under- 
taken because the President desired it changed, or whether it had been 
undertaken because Mr. Hull had decided to undertake a redraft, I 
could not at this moment say. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, did the suggestion of the dis]^atching of the mes- 
sage direct to the Emperor result from this so-called 2-hour conversa- 
tion held on the evening of October 16 ? 

Mr. Welles. That 2-liour conversation, Mr. Congressman, as I think 
I indicated in my testimony of yesterday evening, was one of a series 
of conversations which I had with the Minister Counselor of the Jap- 
anese Embassy, Mr. Wakasubi, which was the only direct participation, 
as I said yesterday, in the Jai)anese negotiations, and this convei-sation 
took place in Mr. Hull's oflice. As this memorandum to the President 
shows, the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister, indicating that 
the Japanese Government desires to continue its exploratory 
[1400], conversations, coupled with the fact that the Japanese 
Minister, at his request, is coming to call again "this afternoon for a 
.further extended discussion and various other considerations," Mr. 
Hull told the President that he was inclined to the view it was prema- 
ture to send the proposed message to the Emperor, pending further 
clarification of the situation in Japan, and probably the attitude of the 
new government. 



1 See Exhibit No. 73, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1700-1702. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 531 

Mr. Keefe, May I ask you on that point, had there been discussions 
between the State Department and the President prior to the 17th of 
October 1941 as to the possibility of making some direct address to the 
Emperor of Japan ? 

Mr. Welles. If there were any conversations on that point, Mr. Hull 
would be the individual who had those conversations with the Presi- 
dent. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you have any knowledge of any such discussions 
yourself prior to the ITth of October 1941 'i 

Mr. Welles. I find it very difficult to say "Yes" or "No" categor- 
ically. I can only take it for granted, in view of the fact I was having 
these conversations with Mr. Wakasubi, that I must have been familiar 
with the general purport of the Secretary of State's conversation with 
the President. 

Mr. Keefe. I am now addressing you as a very experienced man in 
the diplomatic field, as an expert, and I would like to have your opinion 
on this. Was it ordinary or customary in [I4OI] crises such as 
were developing at this time in October, for the head of a government, 
such as the President of the United States, to address the message 
direct to the Emperor of Japan, or w^as that a departure from estab- 
lished diplomatic relations? 

Mr. MuRPiiY. The gentleman said "October." Do you mean Decem- 
ber? 

Mr. Keefe. I mean October 1941. 

Mr. Welles. There was notjiing unusual, Mr. Congressman, about a 
chief of a state sending a personal message to another chief of state. 
You will recall that after the so-called Panay incident the President 
sent a message directly to the Emperor of Japan. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, what was there in the situation that suggested the 
dispatching of a message such as the one that had been suggested here, 
direct to the Emperor ? 

Mr. Welles. What was in the situation, Mr. Congressman, was the 
fact that both the President and Mr. Hull were determined to leave 
no stone unturned to try to find some means of obtaining a pacific 
solution of the difficulties, to try to persuade the civilian elements 
particularly in Japan of the possibility of a pacific solution, and, 
beyond everything else, to avoid war, and if that proved impossible, 
to put off war to the last possible moment. That was the reason un- 
doubtedly for the decision to consider any form of communication 
with [1402] any form of individual in the Japanese Govern- 
ment which might possibly be use'ful for those purposes. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Now, this message was not in fact sent. You are aware 
of that, are you not? 

Mr. Welles. Yes ; it was not sent. 

Mr. Keefe. And matters drifted along until finally the exhibit 
indicates that another message was prepared, which bears the date 
of December 6, 1941, a message from the President to the Emperor 
of Japan. 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you have any part in the drafting of that message? 
Mr. Welles. I had no part in the actual drafting of it, that I re- 
member. I remember, however, knowing that it was to be sent. 
Mr. Keefe. Well, was it drafted in the State Department? 



532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Welles. My recollection is it. was drafted under the super- 
vision of the Secretary of State himself, but it may be possible that the 
President made the original draft himself, in view of his deep inter- 
est in the matter, and that that original draft of the President was 
later revised in th.e State Department. I could not attempt now to 
say, but I am quite sure Mr. Hull will be able to tell you. 

Mr. Keefe. Would there be any record in the State [14-OS] 
Department that would indicate at what time on the 6th day of Decem- 
ber 1941, this second appeal or message to the Emperor was prepared? 

Mr. Welles. Was prepared or sent, Mr. Congressman ? 

[1404] Mr. Keefe. Was prepared. 

Mr. Welles. I do not believe that there would be any indication as 
to what hour the draft was completed, no. 

Mr. Keefe. The record indicates that a dispatch was sent from the 
State Department to Tokyo to the American Embassy at 8 p. m., indi- 
cating that "an important telegram is now being encoded to you con- 
taining for communication by you at earliest possible moment text of 
message from the President to the Emperor." That bears the time 
imprint of 8 p. m. The State Department papers indicate that the 
message was sent at 9 p. m. on the 6th. 

Mr. Welles. That is not necessarily responsive to your question, 
Mr. Congressman. A draft might have been completed earlier in the 
afternoon. 

Mr. Keefe. What I am getting at is that indicates at least it was 
reaching the point so that the message went to the Embassy in Tokyo, 
that the message was being encoded at 8 p. m. 

Mr. Welles. That is undoubtedly true. 

Mr. Keefe. And later at 9 when it was dispatched. 

Mr. Welles. That is undoubtedly correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Would there be any record in the State Department to 
show when that message was actually completed ? 

Mr. Welle§. I think it is possible that Mr. Hull's [I4O6] rec- 
ords would show that he had an appointment with the President that 
afternoon, at what time that appointment was had, and also that he 
would remember whether or not, if such appointment was had by him 
with the President, the final draft of this proposed message to the 
Emperor was approved by the President. 

Mr. Keefe. As far as you are concerned, you were not called into 
the conference, as I understand, by either the President or Mr. Hull 
on the final drafting of this message which was actually sent. 

Mr. Welles. Not with regard to that message, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Keefe. But you believe Mr. Hull could, from records in the 
State Department, furnish that information? 

Mr. Welles. I should think it is very likely. 

Mr. Keefe. When a message such as the one of October 17, 1941, 
or the message that was finally sent on the 6th of December, is being 
drafted and under consideration, is it the custom of the State Depart- 
ment to call in the responsible heads of the Army and Navy to go over 
the matter before final action is taken ? 

• Mr. Welles. Mr. Hull at that time, Mr. Congressman, was having 
conversations with the Secretaries of War and Navy. He was also in 
constant communication with them, and I should [1406] think 
it in the highest degree probable that he would tell you, if you ask 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 533 

him the question, that he had consulted with them in regard to these 
two messages to which 'you refer. 

Mr. Keefe. Would there be any records in the State Department 
to show whether or not such consultations were had, aside from Mr. 
Hull's own memory? 

Mr. Welles. I think that he might have records showing the matters 
that he discussed with the Secretaries of War and Navy, but of that 
I am not certain. He would have to tell you that. 

[J407'\ Mr. Gesell. Congressman Keefe, may I interpose for a 
moment ? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. To call attention to appendix A to Mr. Hull's state- 
ment showing telephone calls made by him with representatives of 
the Army and Navy on the 6th. That perhaps is in part of the record 
that you are looking for. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes ; I am aware of that, but I am aware also that Mr. 
Hull further stated that he was not at all sure that this was all in- 
clusive of the telephone conversations or appointments which he had. 

Mr. Gesell. Right. 

Mr. KJEEFE. I note in this exhibit that we have been referring to, Mr. 
Welles, a written memorandum on White House stationery reading: 

Dear Cordell : 

Shoot this to Grew. I think can go in gray code. Saves time. I don't mind 
if it gets picked up. F. D. R. 

That would indicate, would it not, that the final drafting and final 
word on the matter came from the President himself to Hr. Hull? 

Mr. Welles. I think that is entirely clear from this file which I 
have before me. 

[J4O8] Mr. Keefe. Now, unfortunately that bears the stamp of 
the Secretary of State, December 6, 1941, with the word printed 
"Noted," but there is no time stamped on it to show when it was 
noted or when it was received. Is that customary in the State De- 
partment ? 

Mr. Welles. This question of stamping, Mr. Congressman, I think 
varies in many of the offices of the Department. I think it is an indi- 
cation that the Secretary of State's office received this from the White 
House and that it was immediately given to the Secretary of State. 
There is no kind of stamping in either his office or mine, so far as I 
know, certainly not in mine, wliich indicated the precise hour when 
the document from the White House would have been received. 

Mr. Keefe. I notice another part of this exhibit is a letter from 
the Department of State under date of December 6, 1941, which says, 
"Memorandum for the President." 

It says further : 

There is attached your message to the Emperor of Japan with page 3 of the 
message amended to take care of the point with regard to which I spoke to 
you on the telephone. If you approve the draft as it now stands we shall see 
that it gets off to Grew at once. 

Initials "C. H." 

Then on the bottom of this letter, in the handwriting of [14-09'] 
the President, appears "O. K., send the amended page 3 to the British 
Ambassador and send copy to me. F. D. E." 



534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That would indicate that the final draft of this message was being 
prepared in the State Department as a result- of telephone conversa- 
tions between Mr. Hull and the President, would it not? 
Mr. Welles. That is correct. 

Mr. I^EFE. Did you participate in or were you consulted in any 
manner in connection with the drafting of this final message to the 
Emperor ? 

Mr. Welles. As I think I have stated, I had no part in the actual 
drafting of it, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you know that it was going on in the Department? 
Mr. Welles. I knew such message was under contemplation and 
under preparation but, as I have said before, it was not always possible 
for me, in view of the volume of work which I myself was handling, 
and the urgency of this work, to sit in every conference which had to 
do with the situation in the Pacific. I doubt if I was able to sit in 
more than a very few of them^ a very small proportion of them. 

Mr. Keefe. I have been trjang to fix in my own mind, for specific 
purposes, the time when the message was actually finally completed as 
a result of the conversations between the [HW] President 
and Mr. Hull. Is there any record that you know of or could volun- 
teer to me in the State Department that would fix that time? 

Mr. Welles. I wish it were possible for me personally to give you 
the information you want, Mr. Congressman, but if Mr. Hull's recollec- 
tion or records don't give you this information I should think it highly 
possible that some of the officials of the Far Eastern Division, such as 
Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine, would be able to give 3^ou the infor- 
mation that you want, since they undoubtedly sat in in all of the con- 
ferences which had to do with the preparation, the drafting and the 
redrafting of this message. 

Mr. Keep-e. When was the notice, official notice from the State De- 
partment, given to American Nationals advising them to leave the 
Orient, issued ? ^ 

Mr, Welles. I again in that case would have to refer to the records 
of the Department to give you that information, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall there was an official notice issued by the 
State Department warning all American Nationals to leave the Orient? 
Mr. Welles. As the situation became more and more dangerous 
it was a matter of very necessary precaution on the part of the De- 
partment of State to safeguard the lives of our nationals [Ull^ 
who were still in those areas, and instructions were sent progressively 
during the autumn months from one point to another to our consuls 
instructing them to advise our nationals to leave, but I couldn't give 
you the full list without referring to the records of the Department 
of those instructions issued to our consuls or the dates when the 
instructions were sent. 

Mr. Keefe. I have the press releases as of October 9 of 1941 and 
as early as October 1940, all during that period, the first press release 
emanating October 9, 1940, and into the fall of 1941. 

Were those formal releases issued through our consuls and diplo- 
matic representatives in various parts of the Orient which would be 
published in the newspapers advising the nationals to leave? 

Mr. Welles. In certain cases the consuls, as I recall it, were in- 
structed to see the nationals and explain the situation to them and 
give them the advice required. 

1 See Exhibit No. 74, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1703-1705. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 535 

In other instances I tliink tlie consuls were instructed to take all 
measures necessary in their judgment to insure that our nationals 
•would be warned of the situation and of the need in our judgment 
for them to remove themselves. 

Mr. Keefe. The reason, Mr. Welles, that I have been endeavoring 
to locate some information through your testimony this afternoon 
arises from the statement that Mr. Hull himself [14^^] made 
when he was a witness when he said this : 

It seemed to me that we were all very much like a family. We were seeing, 
talking among and with each other, making things known to each other in any 
way or another most of the time, and we made it a point to make known to each 
other whatever the other person might think of things that would be desirable 
to communicate. So at all times I think it is accurate to say that each of us 
in the State House have always tried to impart to the other with reasonable 
diligence anything new that we learned that would be of interest. 

He made that general statement, and you were the Under Secre- 
tary of State, and it now appears from your testimony that there were 
many things transpiring in relation to the far eastern situation that 
3'ou were not personally involved in. 

Mr. Welles. I think that is a perfectly easy thing to explain, Mr. 
Congressman. 

During the autumn of 1941 the world situation was such that the 
interests of the United States were aflPected in every quarter of the 
globe. It was utterly impossible for Mr. Hull to take personal charge 
and supervision of the negotiations with the Japanese \ Government 
and the general situation in the Pacific which required all of his 
strength, all of his time and all of his abilities, and at the same time 
attempt to handle [14-^3] questions relating to what, in my 
judgment, was of the utmost moment to this country, and that is in- 
ter-American affairs, the maintenance and preservation of inter-Amer- 
ican solidarity, and the assurance that the United States would be 
safeguarded on account of its completely friendly and loyal relations 
with other American Republics, and at the same time attempt to 
handle the innumerable questions coming up in regard to the countries 
of Europe, and it was necessary for some high official, consequently, 
to undertake that other part of the heavy burdens involved. 

It fell upon my shoulders to attempt to handle that other part 
of the work. For that reason it was physically impossible for me 
to be receiving a great number of Ambassadors and Ministers and 
other foreign representatives and representatives of our own Gov- 
ernment, representatives of other Government departments, all day 
long, morning, noon and very often the afternoon and evening, and 
at the same time sit in on conferences in the office of the Secretary of 
State or in the White House which had to do solely with Far Eastern 
affairs. 

I made it a practice and a point of familiarizing myself through 
memoranda of conversations of the talks which the Secretary of 
State was having with regard to the far eastern situation, and Mr. 
Hull very frequently would talk to me about the developments in 
that field. 

mH] The reason why I am not able to give more precise infor- 
mation to you with regard to these detailed questions that you ask me, 
Mr. Congressman, is on account of the circumstances I have just en- 
deavored to indicate. 



536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. I cnn well np})reciate that, Mr. Welles, 

Mr. Welles. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall, Mr. Welles, where you were on the 
€'vening of December 6 ? 

Mr. Welles. I think when I left the Department of State I went 
straight home to niy own house, was there all night, and came in 
early the following moring to my office in the Department. 

Mr. Keefe. What time did you leave the Department of State that 
evening, if you now recall ? 

Mr. Welles I could not give you the exact time, but I should think 
undoubtedly it was fairly late in the afternoon. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you receive any telephone calls at your home that 
night Avith respect to the receipt of the reply by the Japanese? 

Mr. Welles. I did not. 

Mr. Keefe. At what time did you get to the State Department the 
next morning, Sunday morning? 

Mr. Welles. I should think probably a little before 10 o'clock. 

[74^-5] Mr. Keefe, Was there a conference in progress there 
that Sunday morning ? 

Mr. Welles. To the best of my recollection — and on this I may be 
wrong because my memory is not clear on this point — to the best of 
my recollection I did not see Mr. Hull that morning before he saw the 
Japanese envoys, but I want to emphasize that I am not clear on that. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you have any conferences with anybody that 
morning? 

Mr. Welles. I had several conferences with the officials of the De- 
partment, all of them, I think, relating, however, to inter- American 
or European affairs. I remember that I went out to lunch with Dr. 
Berle, then Assistant Secretary of State, and it w^as upon my return 
to the State Department, my office at the State Department, that the 
President telephoned me, as I have already explained to Senator 
Ferguson. 

Mr. Keefe. Then you knew nothing about the intercept of the Jap- 
anese reply that morning? 

Mr. Welles. To the best of my belief I knew nothing of the Japa- 
nese intercept until Sunday. What exact time on Sunday I learned of 
it I could not say. It may have been at the time when I knew that 
the Japanese had requested an audience, an interview, with the Secre- 
tary of State. It may have been subsequent. 

[74/6'] Mr. Keefe. Do you know from whom you got any in- 
formation at all with respect to the Japanese intercept that morning? 

Mr. Welles. I could not at this time endeavor to tell you. I think 
the officials in the Far Eastern Division were undoubtedly busy in 
Secretary Hull's office and I know that I had that morning some very 
urgent matters which had to do with the Western Hemisphere and I 
could not say now precisely when I learned of it nor from whom. 

Mr. Keefe. Can you advise, for the pur]30se of the record, how the 
Atlantic Conference originated? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield before he proceeds to that 
phase ? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy, I want to suggest that the gentleman had asked about 
the Japanese intercept on Sunday and there will be evidence of several 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 537 

intercepts on Sunday and it is not clear which he was referring to or 
about which the gentleman was answering. 

Mr. Keefe. I think the record will show what I was referring to. 
The Japanese intercept which was a reply to the message of the 26th. 

You so understood, Mr. Welles ? 

Mr. Welles. That wa« my understanding. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

[14^7] Mr. Keefe. Since the witness and counsel understand, 
why, it is unfortunate that one member of the committee does not. 

The Chaieman. Proceed. 

Mr. Keefe. Will you proceed in answer to my last question ? 

Mr. Welles. Will you restate your question, Mr. Congressman? 

Mr. Keefe. How did the Atlantic Conference originate ? 

Mr. Welles. I am unable to give you the precise background. The 
first I knew of it was when the President sent for me approximately 
a week or several days before the time of the meeting and told me that 
he had arranged to meet with Mr. Churchill, that Mr. Churchill was not 
taking Mr. Eden with him, but was taking the permanent Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the British Foreign Office 
with him, and that consequently the President desired me to accompany 
him, since I was the corresponding member in our Government to the 
Under Secretary from the British Government. 

Mr. Keefe. Were you advised that the military and naval staffs 
were going to be in attendance at this meeting ? 

Mr. Welles. The President gave me no information when he told 
me of his plans and his desire that I go with him as to what the precise 
nature of the conversations were to be ; nor, so far as I was concerned, 
were there any agenda. If there were any they did not come to my 
cognizance. He did [^4^8] tell me General Marshall and Ad- 
miral Stark and General Arnold were going to be at the meeting. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, as I understand your answer then, there was no 
agenda prepared prior to your going to the meeting ? 

Mr. Weli.es. So far as I was concerned. What I wanted to make 
clear is the fact that if there was any agenda with regard to other 
matters taken up at the Atlantic Charter meeting other than the draft- 
ing of the Atlantic Charter, itself, I was not aware of it nor did I 
see it. 

Mr. Kjjefe. So far as you know, as the Under Secretary of State, 
and the one designated to accompany the President, you had no prior 
notice that such a meeting was to be held until you were advised by 
the President of his desire to have you accompany him ? 

Mr. Welles. None until the President called me to his office to tell 
me of it. 

Mr. Keefe. Did the President prior to your leaving advise you 
as to what the meeting was called for or what it was proposed to 
discuss ? 

Mr. Welles. The President had during preceding weeks told me 
of his thought that in view of the increasingly serious world situation, 
in view of the spread of the war in Europe, that nothing would be 
more valuable from the standpoint of keeping alive in a very quickly 
darkening world some principles [H^O] of international law, 
some principles of moral and human decency, than for him to make 
some kind of a public statement of the objectives in international re- 
lations in which the Government of the United States believed. 



538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

He discussed that with me upon several occasions and when he told 
me of his plan to meet Mr. Churchill at Argentia, he informed me that 
he thought it would be an extremely desirable thing for such a state- 
ment to be made upon his return from that meeting. He did not at 
that time indicate to me that he had in mind a joint statement, but 
what he did say, and my memory is very clear, is that he felt the time 
would be very appropriate upon his return for him to make such 
a statement. 

Does that answer your question ? 

Mr. Keefe. It does. 

Now, do you have any knowledge as to whether or not the message 
to Emperor Hirohito which was dispatched at 9 o'clock, according 
to the memorandum of the State Department, by the President, was 
released at that time to the press ? ^ 

Mr. Welles. The records of the Department will show when it 
was released, but my very clear understanding would be that such a 
message would not be released until we had been informed by our 
Ambassador in Tokyo that the message had been received by the 
Emperor. 

[14^0] Mr. Keefe. The telegram to our Ambassador indicated 
that the press was being informed that the President was dispatching 
a message to the Emperor. Do you know as to what information was 
given to the press, if any ? 

Mr. Welles. The records of the Department will unquestionably 
show that in complete detail. I think probably the intention was to 
show that the President was doing everything in his power by com- 
municating directly with the Emperor to prevent any deterioration 
of the situation, but just how much was said to the press I, of course, 
do not now remember. 

Mr. Keefe. You were not at the White House at any time Decem- 
ber 6th ? 

Mr. Welles. To the best of my recollection I was not. 

Mr. Keefe. That is all. 

The Chairman. Does counsel have any further questions ? 

Mr. Gesell. One or two short questions, Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Welles, what did the President ask you to do when he men- 
tioned at the conference the preparation of a note to be handed to 
the Japanese Ambassador ? 

Mr. Welles. What did the President ask me to do ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. You are speaking of the meeting at Argentia? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

[14-^1] Mr, Welles. He asked me to see to it that the Secretary 
of State was immediately given his ideas with regard to the com- 
munications to be made to the Japanese Ambassador and asked me, 
myself, to see to it that tlie Ambassador should be called to the White 
House to meet with the President as soon as possible after his return. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you understand that the text that you were to pre- 
pare was to be final or that the text was to be worked out in collabora- 
tion with other Government oflicials ? 

Mr. Welles. My very definite recollection is that the text was to be 
regarded in no sense as final but simply as a basis for discussion. 

Mr. Gesell. What was your understanding of the parallel action 
to be taken which was agreed upon at this conference ? 

^ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1702. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 539 

Mr. Welles. My understanding of the parallel action was that a 
warning would be issued by the President to the Japanese Govern- 
ment through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington in more or less 
the terms in which the warning was finally conveyed, and that at the 
same time, acting in a parallel way, the British Government through 
similar methods would give a similar warning to the Japanese 
Government. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, each Government would give some 
warning but the exact text of the warning was to be worked out by this 
Government and the British Government, to use your phrase, 
unilaterally ? 

{142^] Mr. Welles. That is entirely my understandmg. 

Mr. Gesell. One further question. 

With respect to this draft on the stationery of the Prime Minister 
concerning which we have had discussion today, do I understand your 
testimony to be that you do not know whether or not this specific draft 
or parallel communications as proposed here was agreed upon by the 
President and the Prime Minister? 

Mr. Welles. Your question is not very clear to me. 

Mr. Gesell. I am afraid it is not. 

Do you know whether this specific suggestion as drafted by the 
Prime Minister was sent in those precise terms by the President? 

Mr. Welles. I have no reason whatever- to think so. On the con- 
trary, my understanding is that the President gave me the very clear 
impression when he talked with me about it that he would give a 
warning to the Japanese Government, that no agreement had been 
reached as to the phraseology of such warning, but that the promise 
which he had made to Mr. Churchill was limited to the fact that a 
waTning would be given. 

Mr. Gesell. That is all. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question ? 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Welles, the press disclosed that late \lJt23\ 
in November 1941 the President left Washington and went to Warm 
Springs for a rest. It also appeared in the press on or about Novem- 
ber 29, while the President was attending a belated Thanksgiving din- 
ner with the patients at that institution, that Mr. Hull called him on 
the long distance phone and conveyed to him a very urgent message, a 
message which the President received and returned to the table and 
announced that he was immediately leaving for Washington, arriv- 
ing here by December 1, if I remember correctly. 

I was wondering if you had any consultation with Mr. Hull prior 
to the placing of this emergency call ? 

Mr. Welles. I recollect no prior conversation with Mr. Hull with 
regard to his telephoning the President. My recollection, of course, 
however, is clear that the situation was becoming more and more 
serious, from all of the information coming to us, and that Mr. Hull 
very naturally telephoned the President, on account of that, that he 
had better return to Washington. 

Mr. Gearhart. But you clon't remember having overheard or par- 
ticipated in any conversations with Mr. Hull and other officials of the 
State Department in which the necessity of recalling the President to 
Washington was discussed? 



540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[14^4] Mr. Welles. My recollection is that it had to do with 
the information with regard to the increasing number of Japanese 
troops that were being sent to Indochina and that the President's 
memorandum to me of December 2, instructing me to communicate 
that message to the two Japanese Ambassadors, was one of the reasons 
why the situation was regarded as so urgent. 

The Chairman. Is that all? 

Mr, Gearhart. No. 

Now, wasn't there a message intercejDted between the Japanese on 
November 28, translated on the same day, which indicated that the 
Japanese were considering military action? 

Mr. Welles. The date of that. Congressman Gearhart, is Novem- 
ber 28? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. I have it now before me. That undoubtedly is an- 
other one of the factors which gave the impression, if not the assurance, 
that the situation was in the highest degree grave. 

Mr. Gesell. That is the message on 195 of exhibit 1 ? Is that the 
one you are referring to, Mr. Welles ? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. You saw the President immediately upon his return, 
did you not ? 

[14^5] Mr. Welles. I do not remember exactly when I saw the 
President after his return. I was trying to remember that this morn- 
ing when Senator Ferguson was asking me, and I cannot now 
remember. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, when you did see the President, did you dis- 
cuss with him as to why he had returned so unexpectedly, so preci- 
pitously ? 

Mr. Welles. The instructions given me by the President to com- 
municate the memorandum he had sent me to the two Japanese Am- 
bassadors was one of the reasons, in my judgment at that time, as it is 
now, which required the President's return in order that he himself 
could take charge of the communication. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was it not the prevailing opinion among all the 
leaders of the State Department at that time that war was just a 
matter of days, or perhaps hours ? 

Mr. Welles. I think, Mr. Congressman, I really answered that in 
my replies to Senator Ferguson this morning. I said that as the time 
passed toward the beginning of December the one in a thousand 
chance which I had thought still obtained for maintaining peace had 
become about one chance in a million. 

Mr. Gearpiart. That is all. 

The Chairman. Any further questions? 

[1426'] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois. 

Senator Lucas. I desire to ask just a few questions. 

Mr. Secretary, were you in the room yesterday when Secretary 
Hull testified? 

Mr. Welles. I was here a part of the time. Senator Lucas, not all 
of it. 

Senator Lucas. Have you had an opportunity to read his narrative 
and analysis of what happened in this country's relations with Japan ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 541 

Mr. Welles. I have read the full statement which was presented in 
testimony yesterday morning. 

Senator Lucas. You are familiar with the table of contents con- 
tained on the second page and the annexes, A, B, C, and D ? 

Mr. Welles. I think so, Senator Lucas ; yes. 

Senator Lucas. Do j^ou agree with Secretary Hull in this state-, 
ment that he made to the committee ? 

Mr. Welles. I agree with Mr. Hull completely in the statement 
which he has made to the committee. 

Senator Lucas. Let me asl^ you, Mr. Welles, how long have you been 
connected with the Government of the United States ? 

[14^7] Mr. Welles. I entered the foreign service in the year 
1915, Senator Lucas. I retired from the service in 1925. I came back 
when the President appointed me in 1933, and resigned in the late 
summer or early autumn of 1943. 

Senator Lucas. Now, during that time it is obvious that you drafted 
and saw many diplomatic messages over that period of years, and I 
desire to call or direct your attention again to exhibit 22, which is the 
so-called draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Govern- 
ment by Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of England, and spe- 
cially call your attention to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this exhibit which, 
has been referred to as the agreement, promise, discussion, suggestionv 

At the risk of repetition — I think you fairly and thoroughly ex- 
plained it — but at the risk of repetition I wish you would again at 
this point state for the record just what you understand this to bel 

Mr. Welles. I understand that this document was a suggestion 
made to the President by the British Prime Minister as to parallel! 
action to be taken by the British and United States Governments^ 
and possibly by the Dutch Government, and possibly by the Soviet 
Union. 

Senator Lucas. Well, there was no agreement at the time between 
the President of the United Startes and Winston Churchill upon this 
question? 

[14^8] Mr. Welles. The only agreement reached at Argentia 
with regard to this question, so far as I know, was that the President 
made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the Government of the United 
States, in its own words and in its own way, would issue a warning' 
to the Japanese Government of the character which actually was mad& 
by the President on August 17. 

Senator Lucas. Exactly so, and that is what he did ? 

Mr. Welles. That is what he did. 

Senator Lucas. Now, I should like also to direct your attention tO' 
the paragraph 1 of that exhibit, which says : 

Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwest Pacific would produce a 
situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter 
measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan,. 

Much has been said about that paragraph. What do you under- 
stand, again for the record, that Churchill was talking about when 
he was referring to the "United States Government"? 

Mr. Welles. That the Government of the United States would issue 
a warning to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese persisted 
in the policy of conquest and military expansion the Government of 
the United States would find itself compelled to take such steps as- 



542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in its own judgment were necessary to protect the legitimate interests 
of the [1429] American people and the safety of the United 
States. 

Senator Lucas. Now, one further question that I want to ask you 
about relates to Exhibit 24, which is the memorandum that was sent 
to our Ambassador by Winston Churchill on November 30, 1941, which 
states as follows : 

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war 
between Japan and our two countries, namely a pUiin declaration, secret or public 
as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead 
immediately to the gravest consequences. 

Now, did that come after the declaration was issued to Japan by this 
Government with respect to Mr. Hull's 10 points ? 

Mr. Welles. This came 4 days after the note of November 26 to 
which you referred had been delivered by Mr. Hull to the Japanese 
Ambassadors. 

Senator Lucas. Now, what was this Government doing at that time 
insofar as continuing of negotiations were concerned with the Japanese 
Government ? 

Mr. Welles. This Government at that time was waiting for some 
reply from the Japanese Government to its communication. 

Senator Lucas. Did that reply come ? If so, when ? 

[HSO] Mr. Welles. That reply came, as we all of us remember, 
on December 7, at the time that Pearl Harbor was attacked. 

Senator Lucas. You were interrogated about the conversation that 
took place between Admiral Eichardson and Secretary Knox in 1940 
with respect to the patrol that was discussed from Hawaii to the 
Philippines to Singapore, as I recall. You stated very clearly that 
you had discussed this with the President and that the President 
considered that only as a plan or a project at that particular time and 
I presume it goes without saying that such a plan or project was in 
line with what you have been testifying to here all along; that is, 
it was such a plan or project that was definitely in the interest of the 
safety and the security of this Nation ? 

Mr. Welles. That unquestionably w^as the President's intention 
when he was considering that plan. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. And the plan did not, of course, 
materialize after he had talked to the Secretaries of Navy and War 
and Admiral Richardson ? 

Mr. Welles. It did not materialize. 

Senator Lucas. When you spoke about the Atlantic Charter being 
adopted and that it might be applied to all the world after the war, 
obviously you were referring at that time to the European war? 

[1431] Mr. Welles. After the termination of the European 

war. * ^ 

Senator Lucas. One other question : Do you know from the records 

what time the message that was sent by the President on the night of 

December 6 was received by the Emperor of Japan ? 

Mr. Welles. Ambassador Grew, Senator Lucas, would be able to 

give you that reply with complete precision. 

'^ Senator Lucas. All right, sir. That is all. 
[14-32] Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman? 



te 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 543 

The Chairman. The Senator from Maine. 

Senator Brewster. I want to address one or two questions which 
I think may be within the purview of this inquiry but that have not 
been covered heretofore. They might possibly not be thought to be 
within tlie scope of the resohition but in my judgment they may be. 
While the chairman introduced it with respect to Pearl Harbor, I 
take it while it has the aspect of a post mortem in determining what 
transpired, we are finally and fundamentally concerned with the 
future and with this as a prologue to avoid difficulties and I have been 
impressed with your experience in the State Department for some- 
thing likp 20 years and your qualifications, therefore, as an expert. 

It struck me in your testimony that your opposite number to the 
Under Secretary was a permanent Under Secretary of State in Britain, 
indicating the difference in the conduct of our affairs. 

Would you express an opinion as to whether the development of a 

Eermanent secretariat in our State Department hierarchy than has 
eretof ore existed might be a constructive step ? 

Mr. Welles. I believe that it would. Senator Brewster, although I 
think it is fair to say that it is inconceivable that any President or 
any Secretary of State would be able to [IJf.So'] operate with 
success if permanent officials of that character were not in accord with 
the policies which they wished to follow. 

Senator Brewster. How do the British overcome such a possible 
conflict? 

Mr. Welles. Well, as you remember, Senator Brewster, the British 
Foreign Office has two under secretaries. One is the parliamentary 
under secretary, who changes with the government and who appears 
on the floor of tlie House of Commons to answer questions if the 
Foreign Minister is not available, with regard to foreign policy. The 
other is the permanent under secretary who is a member of the British 
ciA'i] service and who does not change. 

If you will permit me to express my opinion, I have often wished, 
as I say now, that there were some method by which either the Sec- 
retary of State or the Under Secretary of State could appear on 
the floor of the Senate or on the floor of the House in order to afford 
the Members of the Congress a far greater continuing measure of 
information than has previously been available to them. 

Senator Brewster. That brings me to my next question. 

In the past few years a special subcommittee of the Senate com- 
posed of eight members of a bipartisan character, four on a side, were 
actively associated with the develop- [1-^U] ment of the United 
Nations charter, in almost constant consultation, we have understood, 
with the State Department and apparently working out very fruit- 
fully. This was to constitute, we understand from recent reports, a 
more or less continuing arrangement. 

To what extent do you feel a liaison of that character with repre- 
sentative members of the committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen- 
ate that liRA^e constitutional responsibilities may in some measure 
accomplish the integration of the executive and legislative branches 
of the Government which sometimes seems to be required? 

Mr. Welles. I think. Senator Brewster, that it would contribute 
tremendously to the objectives which I have in mind. I think that 



544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

any continuing commission of that kind can do a great deal of work 
but it does not cover the entire fiekl, of course, to the extent which 
a representative of the State Department appearing on the floor either 
of the Senate or of the House and subjected to questions from the 
Members of the Congress would achieve. 

Senator BREWsniK. To what extent, now coming nearer to the event, 
would it have been at all feasible during this very critical period in 
the last 3 or 4 months of the Japanese situation if such a committee 
had been kept in any degree constantly informed as to the situation? 
Would it [i-^5J have been feasible, do you feel, as a diplomatic 
matter? 

Mr. Welles. I think it would have been both feasible and in the 
highest degree useful. 

Senator Brewster. Would it not be possible if eight members of 
the Senate were informed continuously in detail from week to week 
and told that they could furnish all pertinent and appropriate in- 
formation that might be desired by the Senate and thus by the coun- 
try, ansvvering in substantial measure the purposes which would bear 
properly upon it ? 

Mr. Welles. I think it would certainly accomplish a very great 
deal in that direction. 

Senator Brewter. That is all. 

The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask a question or two if 
the other members are througli. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have just a few but I am per- 
fectly willing to follow the Chair. 
The Chairman. Oh, no ; the Chair will wait. 

Senator Ferguon. At the time that these negotiations were going on 
during 1941 was there any liaison officer between the members of the 
Senate Foreign Eelations Committee and the Department of State 
such as Senator Brewster mentioned ? 

Mr. Welles. My recollection is that Secretary Hull himself en- 
deavored to keep in touch with the Foreign Rela- [i-^^^] tions 
Committee and to inform the members of the committee of the develop- 
. ments in the situation, but that matter was in his hands and not in 
mine. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar on November 24 with a state- 
ment by Senator Pepper in Boston that the United States had fixed — 
this was in 1941 — the United States had fixed a line in the Pacific 
and if the Japs crossed that line the American Navy would start 
shooting without paying attention to the technicality of a declara- 
tion of war? 

Mr. Welles. I do not at the present moment recollection that state- 
ment of the Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you check it and see whether or not the 
Department of State show such a statement and would you look, Mr. 
Welles, for counsel whether or not there was any such information in 
the State Department? ^ 

Mr. Welles. This was a statement. Senator Ferguson, which you 

tell me Senator Pepper made in Boston, which appeared in the 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; on November 24, 1941. 
IVIr. Welles. Which appeared in the press ? 
Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

1 See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1705. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 545 

Mr. Welles. Unquestionably then it was seen in the State De- 
partment. 

[14^)7] Senator Ferguson. And do you know whether there was 
any foundation in the State Department for that statement? 

Mr. Welles. I endeavored during my testimony this morning and 
this afternoon as well, Senator Ferguson, to make it clear that I know 
of no such arrangements as those indicated by Senator Pepper. 

Senator Ferguson. Would the instrument or the parallel action^ 
taking the document and the oral statement of the President to the 
Japanese Government on the 17th of August 1941 be such a state- 
ment ? 

Mr. Welles. In my judgment, decidedly not. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Senator Lucas asked you in relation to 
Exhibit 24 and he read to you : 

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war- 
between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or 
public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will 
lead immediately to the gravest consequences. 

Do you know of anything in the State Department, any record indi- 
cating that any such message was given, either secret or public ? ^ 

Mr. Welles. I know of no such message having been given. 

[14^8] Senator Ferguson. You would not consider the message- 
from the President of the United States to the Emperor on the night 
of the 6th or the morning of the 7th, whatever the facets will show 
later as to when Mr. Grew gave it, would be such a message as I have 
indicated? 

Mr. Welles. In my interpretations, no. I think the message from 
the President to the Emperor was in every sense of the word an at- 
tempt to avert war and not to bring it on. 

Senator Ferguson. But at that particular time the ships were on the- 
way to the Kra Peninsula, were they not, to our knowledge ? 

Mr. Welles. We had that information, of course, on December 6th. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. My strong impression is that the President regarded 
his message to the Emperor as the last possible appeal which could be 
made and I think I have attempted to bring that out in the testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that the message to the Emperor 
was a change in the nature of the 26th by Mr. Hull ? 

Mr. Welles. I should not. 

Senator Ferguson. Doesn't the nature of the sixth one relate to the 
withdrawal from Indochina and the message of [^4^9] Mr. 
Hull goes much further? Would you just refer to the language of the 
sixth? I am talking about the note to the Emperor. 

Mr. Welles. This message from the President in its final form 
says: 

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading 
Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom. 

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the 
Bast Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I 
would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Govern- 
ment of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China 
would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific- 
area. 



1 See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1705. 
79716— 46— pt. 2 11 



546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't that the only requirement that the 
President mentions in the instrument? 

Mr. Welles. That is the only specific requirement. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is not as broad as the hmguage on the 
26th ? 

Mr. Welles. On the other hand, Senator Ferguson, in my judg- 
ment the President's message can only be interpreted as a most urgent 
appeal to the Government of Japan to cease m40] in its policy 
of aggression and while the specific request was limited to the with- 
drawing of Japanese troops from Indochina, the whole spirit of the 
message, I think, can only be interpreted correctly as meaning a cessa- 
tion of a policy of aggression. 

Senator FERGUSONr Did you read in the State Department records 
there where Colonel Stimson, Secretary of War, and the Secretary 
of State had counseled with the President about sending such a mes- 
sage to the Emperor? 

Mr. Welles. I have read it. I have not, however, got it at hand. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the fact that there 
had been such a conference? 

Mr, Welles. I do not now recall the fact that I was familiar at the 
time. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

'The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say that 
the State Department took note of the fact that Senator Pepper made 
a speech in Boston on the 24th ? 

Mr. Welles. I did not attempt to say, Mr. Chairman, that the State 
Department took note. I said that a press report of that character 
would unquestionably have been brought to the attention of the Secre- 
tary of State. 

[144^] The Chairman. You do not mean thereby to intimate 
that the State Department had any advance information in regard 
to such a speech ? 

Mr. Welles. Certainly not. I am very glad that you made it 
clear. 

The Chairman. Well, would such a speech made by Senator Pepper 
or any otlier Senator in Boston or anywhere else have had any bind- 
ing effect upon the President or the State Department or upon Con- 
gress ? 

Mr. Welles. In my judgment, it would not. 

The CiiAiRiMAN. With reference to the message, the personal appeal 
of the President to the Emperor and the suggestion that it was an 
unusual course for the head of one state to pui-sue with reference to 
the head of another state, do you know whether it is true that Presi- 
dent Roosevelt appealed in the same way to Hitler prior to the out- 
break of war in 1939 to avert war and bloodshed that might involve 
large areas of the world? 

Mr. Welles. That is entirely true, Mr. Cliairman. 

The Chairman. Did he also make the same sort of an appeal to 
Mussolini? 

Mr. Welles. Upon several occasions to both of tliem. 

The Chairman. Is it true that the President sent you as a Special 
Ambassador to Europe to undertake to avert war prior to its out- 
break in 1939? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 547 

[1442] Mr. Welles. Thatisentirely true, Mr. Chairman. I was 
sent for the purpose of reporting to the President, after interviews in 
the four capitals, whether there existed any chances whatever for the 
negotiation of a just and decent peace. 

The Chairman. At the time of the suggested parallel messages 
which, as I understand it, were to be sent separately in the individual 
capacity of each government in 19 il, Congress had some time there- 
tofore passed a Lend-Lease Act under which the President was au- 
thorized to give aid to any nation whose survival in his opinion was 
essential to the security of the United States ? 

Mr. Welles. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And the President was executing that law not only 
in the Far East but in European regions ? 

Mr. Welles. He was, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Yesterday in reply to the Senator from Maine you 
suggested that— I will quote your answer. Probably I should quote 
the question. [Reading :] 

Senator Brewsteb. If you were to come to the conclusion that the Fleet were 
not ready for war, as a result of Admiral Richardson's testimony, then the 
keeping of the Fleet at Hawaii, in a condition not ready for war, would have 
some aspects of having your diplomatic position exceed your military power, 
would it not? 

Mr. Welles. It seems to me almost impossible, Senator Brewster, to divorce 
in a critical condition as existed at that time, the diplomatic from the military, 
because the military is a very essential part of the diplomatic picture. 

Ill his testimony Admiral Richardson stated that in his conversa- 
tion with the President on the 8th day of October 1940 the President 
indicated not only that he felt that the Fleet in the Hawaiian area 
would act as a deterrent against Japan, but, according to Admiral 
Richardson, he used the expression, 'T know that it has already exer- 
cised a deterrent influence upon Japan." 

Did you have any conferences or conversations with the President 
about that time in relation to that phase of keeping the Fleet in the 
Pacific? 

Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, when I saw the published text of Ad- 
miral Richardson's testimony my attention was drawn to that specific 
remark of Admiral Richardson with regard to the fact that the 
President had told; him that the stationing of the Fleet at Hawaii 
had had a deterrent eti'ect, and I could not at the moment, and I do 
not now, remember the exact facts that the President had in mind 
when he made that statement to the Admiral, but I am quite confident 
that members of [^444] the Far Eastern Division of the De- 
partment of State or Ambassador Grew or Mr. Hull could give you 
the information that you ask for. 

The Chairman. Well, in view of the fact that the President did 
feel at that time that the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii had had a 
deterrent effect upon Japan, in view of the fact that Japan did not 
actually attack until 14 months thereafter, in December of 1941, 
would you be willing or feel able to express any opinion as to whether 
if the Fleet did exercise a deterrent influence in October 1940 that it 
continued to exercise such an influence during the remaining 14 months 
prior to the actual attack ? 

Mr. Welles. I can only emphasize, Mr. Chairman, w^hat I have said 
before in the course of my testimony and that is my very definite 



548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

belief that if the Fleet had been withdrawn from Hawaii the Japa- 
nese military lords would have unquestionably interpreted that with- 
drawal as an indication that the United States was acquiescing in tha 
spreading domination of the entire Pacific and Asiatic region by 
Japan and would have begun an increasing encroachment upon the 
legitimate rights of this country. 

The Chairman, In other Avords, your view is that whether up to 
October 1940 it exercised by its presence a deterrent effect, or whether 
it during the following 14 months [^44^] exercised any such 
deterrent effect, its withdrawal at that time, in your judgment, would 
have exercised a very dangerous effect upon the safety and security of 
the United States because of the interpretation of such withdrawal 
placed upon it by Japan? 

Mr. Welles. That is precisely my feeling, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. That is all. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask one question? 

The Chairman. Yes, Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know, Mr. Secretary, under what cir- 
cumstances the Fleet first went to Hawaii ? Do you know that it went 
there first as a maneuver ? 

Mr. Welles. I could not at this time. Senator Ferguson, tell you. 
with any accuracy as to my memory with regard to the manner in 
which the Fleet first went to Hawaii. As you made that statement 
I seemed to remember that I did recall it but if you had not made 
the statement I could not have answered your question. 

Senator I'erguson. Now, I have one more question that was brought 
up by Senator Lucas, that the President had promised to give this- 
note of the 17th of August. 

Did the President tell you that Mr. Churchill or his government 
so far as I remember, did not make that specific statement, but when he- 

[nils'] Mr. Welles. The President in his conversation with me, 
so far as I remember, did not make that specific statement, but when he- 
told me that he had promised Mr. Churchill that the United States 
Government would make a parallel warning I took it for granted that 
Mr, Churchill must have made that statement to him. 

Senator Ferguson. The same promise to the President? 

Mr. Welles, Yes, 

Senator Ferguson. Thank you. 

Senator Brewster. Mr, Secretary, in connection with keeping the 
fleet at Hawaii, I think the record is clear that the fleet w^ent out to 
maneuver in March or April and that on May 3, 1940, a report was 
issued by Mr, Knox' oflice to the effect that Admiral liichardson had 
requested that the fleet remain in Hawaii and that the request is 
approved. 

Do you recall any conversations in the State Department at oi- 
about that time concerning that decision to keep the fleet at Hawaii 
and what considerations entered into it? 

Mr. Welles, My recollection is, Senator Brewster, that conversa- 
tions did take place between the Secretary of State and the Secretary 
of the Navy, and the Secretary of State and the President in regard 
to the fleet at Hawaii, I did not myself take part in any conversa- 
tions concerning that question, so far as I remember, except in the- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 549 

•conversation which I had with Admiral Richardson, to which I have 
already referred. 

Senator Brewster. That is all. 

[1447] The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the committee thanks you 
for your presence and for the patience with which you have responded 
to questions, which have, I am sure, helped to clarify the situation so 
far as it came within your knowledge. 

Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, may I to you and through you to the 
members of the committee express my very real gratitude for the con- 
sideration shown me by the committee. 

The Chairman. That is all now. Does counsel have any sugges- 
tions to make now ? 

Mr. Gesell. We are ready to keep right on plowing just so long as 
the committee wants to go ahead. 

There is one other matter. 

The Chairman. The Chair understood that earlier in the day it 
was suggested that Mr. Grew had engagements on Monday and Tues- 
day, I am informed, that might interfere with his appearance. Is 
that correct ? 

Mr. Gesell. That has been changed. 

Mr. Mitchell. He has decided to forego them in the interests of 
the committee. 

The Chairman. The committee appreciates that, Mr. Grew, and 
the plan now is that Secretary Hull will resume at 10 o'clock on 
Monday morning. 

[14-48] Mr. Gesell. And then, following him, Mr. Grew will 
take the stand. 

The Chairman. Well, with that understanding then, we will 

Mr. Gesell. I have one small matter, Mr. Chairman. 

Reference was made in exhibit 18 to a memorandum of a conver- 
sation between Dr. Hornbeck and Sir Ronald Campbell, dated Novem- 
ber 28, 1941, in which Sir Ronald Campbell refers to the fact that the 
British Army authorities have received a message from our Army 
authorities stating that, inasmuch as the United States-Japanese nego- 
tiations have broken down, and so forth. 

That reference, we believe, will appear — and I want to point this 
out to the committee now for purposes of clarity — is based upon the 
message of November 27, 1941, sent by the Navy, Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations, to the commanders in the Pacific and to London for informa- 
tion, the so-called war warning message which the committee has 
copies of, the text of that indicating that the London naval authorities 
of our Government are to inform the British of the war warning 
message sent. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could counsel tell us if we have 
a copy of the message to London ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes ; that is before all of the members of the committee 
in the Navy folder and communications under date of November 27, 
1941. 

[144^] Senator Ferguson. Thank you. 

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock on Mon- 
day morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 17 p. m., November 24, 1945, an adjournment was 
taken until 10 a. m. Monday, November 26, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 551 



[14S0-] PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK 



MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. G. 
The ]'oint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M, Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

\lJt.51'] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Secretary Hull, are you ready to resume ? 
Mr. Hull. Yes. 

TESTIMONY OF CORDEIL HULL, FOEMER SECRETARY OF STATE 

(Resumed) 

The Chairman. Counsel were still examining Secretary Hull when 
his testimony was recessed the other day. 

The Chair would like to state, in view of the request originally made 
that we not examine Secretary Hull more than 45 minutes at a time, 
that I hope the committee will keep that in mind notwithstanding that 
that time was extended the oth^r day at the suggestion of the Secre- 
tary himself. 

Mr. Hull. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, I would like to 
undertake to run for an hour and to come here just as often and just 
as long as any member of the committee may desire. I may not be 
able to come both in the afternoon and the forenoon. I will do the 
best I can about that. 

The Chairman. We appreciate your generosity in regard to time. 

Mr. Hull. It is my throat that gives me this trouble about tes- 
tifying. 

The Chairman. Counsel may proceed. 

{llf£2'\ Mr. Gesell. Mr. Hull, I inquired of you when you were 
last here as to what the Department of State's position was with respect 
to the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor and I do not believe you had an 
opportunity to complete your answer on that subject. We are anxious 
to know what position the Department of State took on that subject. 

Mr. HuLT>. We unhesitatingly felt that it would be to a more or less 
extent useful, especially after the Navy was based at Pearl Harbor, 
that it remain there during the critical state of relations between us 



552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and certain other countries, including Japan especially, on the policy 
that I stated the other day to the effect that we were dealing with 
one of the worst international desperadoes within the memory of man 
and that he was at large and on the rampage, dangerous, treacherous, 
undependable in every way. 

We felt at the State Department — I think we all felt that way — 
that it would be a little more wholesome in our many matters of dis- 
cussion and our many relations with that Japanese area for our Navy 
to be standing there and I think from all of the tangible and intangible 
reactions I had we were thoroughly justified in that view. 

Mr. Gesell. Did Admiral Richardson in discussing this matter 
with you state anything to you which to your mind indicated that the 
fleet was insecure or unsafe at Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Hull. My memory could be at fault but I do not think at any 
time that any person suggested the idea that the [^4^3] Fleet 
could not protect itself, that it would have to be moved somewhere 
where it could protect itself. I do not think anyone suggested that 
view. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, turning to another subject. We have in evidence 
here Exhibit 19, a draft of a proposed message to the Congress which 
you transmitted to President Roosevelt mider date of November 29. 

I would like to ask if you would tell the committee what the facts 
and circumstances were which led to the decision not to deliver that 
message to the Congress prior to December 7 ? 

Mr. Hull. In brief the Japanese were completely in charge of the 
war lords, as they were called, headed by Tojo. In this country the 
President and I, with other supporters in Congress and out of Con- 
gress, had a few weeks before dealt with the matter of the extension 
of the Conscription Act. 

We found that public opinion in the country was split wide open 
'On the question of nationalism, as some people call it, and a broader 
international viewpoint. I think the best that Congress could do, 
held down and held back as it was by public opinion, was to enact this 
law reenacted by one vote and to do that they had to continue as one 
of its provisions a prohibition against service by American soldiers 
beyond [14^4] this hemisphere and beyoncl our territories. 

I felt, and I did not have much doubt about it from my knowledge of 
the situation here and in Japan that to send a message to Congress 
stating that we were just in the act of getting into a fight with Japan, 
she assuming completely the offensive, that we were threatened with 
danger there that was very imminent. 

Knowing as we did that Japan was liable to break out on any day, 
it was apparent that we could do but little more by exploiting this 
situation at that time than to play into the hands of the Japanese 
military. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, you felt that this message if sent out 
might be seized upon in Japan and used as a provocation towards some 
action on their part? 

Mr. Hull. I got the impression that they did that jn-ecise thing 
when we passed the Conscription Act a year before. They saw our 
wide division here of opinion; we had just seen on any matter per- 
taining to foreign affairs we were extremely nationalistic in our ideas 
here to the extent of an immense portion of the public and of officials 
wherever one went. They were all equally patriotic and possessed 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 553 

of equally high purposes but that was an honest difference of view and 
that was the situation. 

We would have gotten nowhere with any kind of affirma [l-i^SI 
tive legislation, in the first place, and we would have had no time to 
have gotten anywhere in the second place. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, about this time, and indeed earlier, our records 
here in evidence indicate that messages to the Emperor of Japan were 
under consideration. We have drafts as early as October 17, 1941, 
and, as Congressman Keefe pointed out the other day, somewhere there 
is an indication that there were even earlier drafts. 

Now, I wanted to ask if you could tell us a bit about the discussions 
between you and President Roosevelt concerning the advisability of 
sending a message to the Emperor and why, specifically why, a mes- 
sage was not sent sooner than it wa.s. 

Mr. Hull. Specifically, it was not sent for this primary reason, that 
the military element in japan was in supreme, arbitrary control of the 
Government at this time and the little Emperor, so far as we could 
ascertain, was going along with them and under their domination. 

We felt that, in the first place, this whole military situation was 
being ruled with an iron rod by the military group, not by the Emperor, 
that he was going along with them and we remembered that some time 
along there they were so powerful, the military group, that they 
touched the Emperor on the shoulder and said, "You sign up in blank a 
declaration \_H56'\ of war." With what we knew was the fact, 
that the military group had him in control to all intents and purposes 
it was, we felt satisfied, that if they saw the President going over their 
heads to the little Emperor, as he was at that time, it would only react 
against the whole situation and the military group would merely 
tighten up — ^by reason of our action tighten up — their military situa- 
tion, all the while keeping the Emperor under their domination. That 
was the main reason. 

AVe analyzed every .phase and every available detail of conditions 
both in Japan and in this country in our efforts not to overlook any 
fact or factor that might shed any light on what would be the correct 
decision in the matter. 

m57^ Mr. Gesell. Now, if the committee please, we have no 
further questions from Mr. Hull. He is available for questioning 
by the committee. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I gather from your statement which 
was read last week that during these days prior to the transmission of 
your message of October 26 you had also considered the question of the 
modus Vivendi, and of course that meant a sort of temporary patching^ 
up method by which you would keep the negotiations alive for a short 
period of 3 months, as I gather, with the possibility of its extension, 
if it was entered into, and you decided against that because, among 
other reasons, it would have been regarded by China as an appease- 
ment movement, and by most of the nations with which we were con- 
ferring and with which we were concerned about that Far Eastern 
situation, and therefore it was not wise to sign that. 

Is that practically the situation? 

Mr. Hull. Yes. The fact was that Japan had come in with what 
seemed to be the most extreme demands and proposals that she had 
made during the 6 or 7 months of conversations with us. That was on 
the 20th. We could not, under on- \ iew, say "No" and stop right 



554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

there ; although Japan, as I have said here, Japan, after G or 7 months 
of intimate conversations with us, knew what our attitude was and 
that we could not think of accepting her proposal, not even remotely 
could we think of doing so, and, on the other hand, she knew how 
far we would go. 

Wlien we look back there and see that for 6 or 7 months we were 
at the closest possible grips with this American-Japanese situation in 
our conversations — I think I must have had 35 or 40 conversations 
in my Department with the Japanese, all in the most earnest effort 
to find some approach that would solve this threatened and threaten- 
ing situation without it getting out of hand — so we knew after fi 
months — and if we did not we ought to have been taken out and pil- 
loried — we knew by some very remote possibility, some bare possi- 
bility, we knew where each other stood. But our policy was not to 
say "No" to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20. It was not 
to remain silent even, it was to grab at every straw in sight, in an 
effort to keep up the conversations and to give time to our armies 
and navies here, and among our future Allies, to make further prepa- 
ration, and also to show our continuing interest in peace. 

So this modus vivendi was given every possible consideration and 
attention. On November 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 we made a desperate 
effort to get something worked out that might stay the hand of the 
Japanese armies and navies for a few days, or a few weeks, at any 
rate, by some possibility. I am sure [-?^-5P] I w^as making 
«very possible effort to get some dela3^ 

I am sorry I have to depart to some rather pointed remarks I made 
to the Chinese and to the British and the others because of my dis- 
appointment at their course and attitude with respect to this matter, 
but with all of my efforts, and those who were cooperating, it became 
clear by the end of the 25th or the 26th that this was not feasible. 
The Chinese, as I said some days ago, the Chinese made a terrific 
attack on the situation. Secretary Stimson agreed with others of 
us that he was satisfied the Japanese would not accept it, but it could 
be tried as another grabbing-at-a-straw proposition. 

Then you notice this last release of a dispatch from Mr. Churchill 
to the President where he went the whole distance in expressing his 
fear of a collapse generally of the Chinese situation. 

Now, this modus vivendi was tied in with our basic principles. 
We were to go right along discussing our plan, not the Japanese plan, 
which negatived their whole proposition of force and conquest, we 
were to go right along with them while we gave them what, as I have 
said, was just a little chicken feed compared to the vast amount that 
they had demanded in their ultimatum of November 20 and which we 
knew they would need if they were going forward with their plans 
of conquest, as they evidently were. 

\i4'^0] So we had every reason to feel, under every rule of 
chances, the chances were overwhelming, not quite unanimously so, but 
overwhelming that they would not accept it, but this would explore 
their attitude and let the public here and elsewhere see that we were 
offering something in the way of an inducement, even though it was 
a day-to-day concern, such as the consignment of oil, $600,000 worth of 
money, Avhich was nominal compared to what they had been getting 
before oil was cut off. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 555 

Now, it was in those circumstances, as I say, that I upbraided the 
other future Allied Governments for not taking more interest in this 
thing. 

As I strove, with my associates, to get this thing over, the opposi- 
tion, the difficulties, and virtually impossibilities from our standpoint 
got worse, so there was no other recourse except that that be laid 
aside. 

The Chairman. Then you stated in your original written state- 
ment the other day, and you state now, that you regarded, and the 
State Department regarded, their note of the 20th of November as 
an ultimatum and your note of the 26th, which is described as the 
ten-point note, was a reply to that ultimatum ? 

[14^1] Mr. Hull. Yes, that was the third alternative we had, 
either to refuse to accept the ultimatum, which was confirmed by their 
interceptions, as I recall, plus further interceptions directing the Am- 
bassador to discontinue conversations, first on the 25th and, later, on 
the 29th I believe it was, and so we took the third alternative, which 
was to keep alive the negotiations. The fact that they had put up 
an ultimatum to us did not prevent us from offering a proposal for 
them to consider, if by any speculative possibility they should decide 
to consider, at anytime. That was the first proposition. The second, 
in Japan they had lashed the public to the highest possible war pitch. 
They had ignored our set of policies and principles that we had talked 
about to them. They had put forth one or two false issues that 
they were being choked by the British in the Far East, by the Dutch 
and by ourselves, and they were being denied the creation of what they 
called the copr.osperity sphere. That was a spurious and false dis- 
guise of what they were really after in the Pacific area. In this 
country we were divided, unfortunately, among ourselves, with the 
result that our statement of principles had been confused in the pub- 
lic mind. They had almost been lost track of, and there was serious 
need to bring them back together, bring them up to date, especially 
as the Japanese were in the act of moving in the stage of events — they 
were going out. 

[14^2] Furthermore, the ten-point note contained at least five 
points that the Japanese would have found to their benefit had they 
accepted them. There has been more misinformation and more ig- 
norant misrepresentation^-unintentionally, no doubt — of really what 
we were faced with there, the many angles, many factors, and what the 
significance of this last proposal was. The Japanese knew any hour 
what they could get out of us after 6 months of conversation. It did 
not take a soothsayer or ^ome fortuneteller to make that clear to some- 
body who did not seem to know anything about it, but the fact was that 
there was nothing in there that any peaceful nation pursuing a peace- 
ful course would not have been delighted to accept. It was a broad, 
constructive, progressive, up-to-date proposal for the most desirable 
and mutually profitable relations between nations. The only trouble 
with this was that the Japanese were bent — if I did not see ladies 
present, I would say were hell-bent — on carrying forward their mili- 
'tary policy. They could not any more have abandoned that military 
policy at that stage, when they had their guns drawn, when their 
fleets were afloat, as we know since, for Pearl Harbor waters, when 
the conversations had been abandoned — there is nothing more clear 



556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that they would hunt excuses about the so-called ten-point note. The 
whole truth is that whenever we have peaceful nations pursuing peace- 
ful policies in their relations to each other, they will welcome, 
m^S] and would have welcomed, this formula that we suggested. 

Furthermore, as I say, the Japanese could, at anytime, have said : 
"Let us see if we cannot narrow this somewhat. We will decide 
whether we cannot consider it further." They knew exactly how we 
could resume the conversations, leaving off a few of these things not 
extremely essential but retaining those that were absolutely basic. 
They knew they could get back at anytime to the same basis of con- 
versations, if there was any difference in fact after we had rested 
our 6 months of discussions. 

The Chairman. Just one other question, and that is with reference 
to the Fleet. You are familiar with the evidence, I presume, that 
the Fleet had been sent out to Hawaiian waters in the spring of 
1940. . 

Mr. Hull. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did you discuss that matter with the President? 

[14^^] Mr. Hull. I don't undertake to recall everything that 
was said. I just know that I was favorably disposed toward it my- 
self, and the President naturally was. He Avas accustomed to ask me 
an oral question now and then about what I thought of the psychologi- 
cal effect of sending the Fleet, for instance, to Pearl Harbor, and other 
consideration that might occur to him — orally. But we have no rec- 
ord anywhere, so far as I can find in the State Department on that 
subject. 

The Chairman. Admiral Richardson testified that* on the 8th of 
October, 1940, he discussed the matter with the President and that 
there was a disagreement between them. That is, the Admiral 
wanted to get the Navy back to the Pacific coast. The President felt 
that it ought to remain out in Hawaiian waters. Admiral Richard- 
son says the President stated to him on that day in that conversation 
that he felt that the Navy's presence there, the Fleet's presence, was 
a deterren against Japan and that he knew it had been up to that 
time. Were you in a position to concur in that position of the Presi- 
dent at that time ? 

Mr. Hull. That was my judgment. I think we overlook some of 
the broader aspects of this situation. Japan, even before the Tri- 
partite Pact in September 1940 was working along under the so-called 
Anticommitern Pact with Germany, working along in the course 
of relations with Germany, and we did not know, dealing with wholly 
unreliable and treacherous persons as we were, we did not know what 
express relations might then exist between [146^5] Japan and 
Germany. Any evidence that w^e were preserving a fairly firm policy 
would find an echo even in Berlin at that time. 

It was a world situation, that was knit together increasingly by 
every imaginable agreement between these international desperadoes 
who were waging world conquest and nothing else. 

The Chairman. Now, in view of the fact that the actual attack oc- 
curred in December 1941, which was 1 month after the conversation 
related by Admiral Richardson, would you be in position to express 
any opinion as to whether during that period the presence of the 
fleet in Hawaiian waters continued to exert any deterrent influence 
over Japan ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 557 

Mr. Hull. Well, as I said, there were a vast number of facts and 
circumstances accumulating witli respect to the Japanese mind on this 
subject. They were not available to us, except to a very limited and 
occasional extent. I got the impression somewhat back there that 
the Japs wanted not only to tell us where to keep our fleet in the 
Pacific to move it out into the Atlantic, keep it over there. I may 
have been wrong in that impression, but I think it is worth checking on 
if you are interested in running down every minute phase of this 
matter. 

Now, someone suggested tliat the Government was trying to bluff 
the Japanese. The whole truth is that we were in our own waters, in 
our territory, on our own side of the Pacific, and that we were pursu- 
ing a perfectly peaceful and defensible course. In all our talks with 
the Japanese and all of our [I466] representations, we were 
pleading with them for peaceful relations and their continuance. If 
we happened to have a double-barreled shotgun sitting back in the cor- 
ner somewhere in the house when we are talking to a desperado, it does 
no harm, to say the least. I always feel a little better and I think he 
would feel a little worse if he could see the outlines of that gun back 
there. It is a psychological thing that nobody can escape. 

The Chairman. That is all. 

Mr. Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to invite attention to a few points made in 
your written statement presented to the commitee, and as a conveni- 
ence to you, I will quote tne points that I want to ask you about. 

On page 9, you include this statement : 

Tliroiighout this period the United States increasingly followed a policy of 
extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. 

Mr. Hull. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. It had been the historic policy of the United 
States for a long time to favor a policy of a strong China, had it not ? 

[14-67] Mr. Hull. That raises a bunch of questions. 

JBack during the period of our difficulties extending through the SO's 
and on up to Pearl Harbor in dealing with Japan and Germany, I 
recall only too vividly our terrific distress when some American citizen 
would get shot or their women and children outrageously injured, or 
their property seized or their merchant shipping, like Panay^ reck- 
lessly bombed and shot. When we protested to Japan, there were a 
few in our own country who would cry out and demand that we get out 
of there. "What are you doing over there on tliat side of the world, 
trying to start a war?" I think one of them lectured all over the coun- 
try and his slogan was "Get the hell out of China; come back home 
where you belong; mind your own business and keep out of trouble." 

That sounded to all of us people who were reared in a primitive 
section of this country very possible at first blush, but there were some 
points of opposition to that possible theory. 

In the first place, we were under solemn obligation in writing in 
the Nine-Power Treaty to cooperate to preserve the integrity of Chi- 
nese territory and the sovereignty of China and the equality of in- 
gress and egress to all nations alike in trading, in commerce, finance. 

In the second place, we had always been the friend of China, and 
there were four hundred-odd million of people to deal with in the 



558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

future, and we felt that we could not act in a course of bad faith and in 
almost a cowardly way in the light of our [l/^^S] obligations. 

In the third place, Japan and we were under solemn obligation under 
the Briand-Kellogg Pact. 

In the fourth phice, we, ourselves, stood for a policy of international 
cooperation for the peaceful settlement of any controversies that 
might come up between nations in the future. 

In the fifth place, we hdd discovered and proclaimed it as early as 
1936 in this hemisphere that a war of a course of aggression in one 
country was a nuitter of concern to all the countries of the world. 

On top of that we had discovered by this time that Germany and 
Japan were linked together, operating together as any two highway- 
men operate and as closely as any two could operate. We found this 
hiovement for each one to conquer his respective half of the world 
and to enslave the people just as they did enslave them later in both 
Europe and in parts of Asia. 

That whole thing was developed, all those considerations were de- 
veloped, right in front of us. We couldn't have retired and have come 
away. I would hate to look you gentlemen in the face and describe 
what I think would be our condition today had we done that. 

The Vice Chairman. You think undoubtedly that subsequent 
events have clearly demonstrated that the policy we had with China 
was sound ? 

[J460] Mr. Hi^i.L. It was sound and it has been testified to by 
the leading Japanese statesmen in power in loud, vociferous speeches 
which they made, not only from year to year but from month to month 
and from week to week. So, we didn't have to go outside of that range 
of testimony to convince ourselves about their plans and purposes. 

The Vice Chairman. Then, Mr. Secretary, on page 33 or your writ- 
ten statement there appear two brief paragraphs that I would like to 
read : 

There was never any question of tbis country's forcing Japan to fight. Tlie 
question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its principles. 

To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly ipithlnk- 
able. It woubl have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan's pro- 
gram of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with Hitler. It would 
have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandoti its 
principles and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position 
under intimidation. 

Mr. Hull. At that time — it is well to keep in mind a little of the 
background. At that time we could not tell just what would be the 
outcome of the German invasion of Russia. It was extremely critical. 
We did not know whether Japan intended [^4'^0] to carry her 
reported desire to invade Russia in Siberia. The whole situation 
seemed to be very critical and very doubtful, and it* was in those cir- 
cumstances that Japan came back to us with her final oifer and that, 
as I have said, was probably more extreme — substantially more ex- 
treme — than any she liad made. 

In the first place, she did not agree to abandon her policy of mili- 
tary conquest and aggression except in certain local areas and for QO 
days. 

In the second place, I think I must have observed dozens of times 
the Japanese ck)se military alliance with Germany aimed at the' 
United States primarily and paramountly. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 559 

[J47I] If a person could flinch before one could <>;et through 
speaking to him, the Japanese Ambassador would flinch before I could 
conclude my question about the Japanese hanging on to the Germans 
by this hard and fast pact aimed at the United States. They never 
came within sight of any acceptance of a proposal that they get out of 
that close military partnership with Hitler who, it seems now, was 
ordering not only the Jews but all the Poles, men, women, and children,, 
killed. 

This bunch of Japanese in extreme control, knowing what kind of 
a savage they were in partnership with, and Tojo and the others being 
savages themselves when they were at war or getting into war, they 
hung on to the Germans with this pact. They wouldn't talk about 
either stopping their military policy, their aggression policy, nor 
Avould they talk about getting out of this pact, but asked us to go into 
what they would call an honest and honorable agreement with them, 
while all the fruits of that agreement would go to Hitler as well as to 
themselves. 

To the extent that it was possible, they wanted us to furnish them 
all the oil that they would need to fight us as well as others. They 
were on their way then to an attack and they said you must give us 
all the oil we need now or we might have trouble in attacking — and 
for some reason we declined to do it. There were a number of im- 
possible things l^W^] like that in that ultimatum of Novem- 
ber 20. 

The Vice Chairman. Then you did regard the Japanese proposal 
of November 20 as nothing but an ultimatum? 

Mr. Hull. Well, they said so both in writing and orally, and we 
could only regard it as that from its very nature. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, was your reply of November 26 in any 
sense an ultimatum? 

Mr. Hull. Well, the truth is we were most anxious, as we have said 
here at different times, to go forward with the conversations, and we 
had every motive to desire to go forward with them, and we offered 
this, as I say, as an ordinary, normnl plan for international relations, 
on these lines, and I think everybody in the State Department, the 
President and others, were in agreement; and, as I say, the Japanese 
would have found a way at once, all they had to do was to announce 
that they were through with conquest and aggression and automati- 
cally they would have become the beneficiaries of these proposals. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you receive any information that the 
Japanese regarded your message of November 26 as an ultimatum? 

Mr. Hull. Not until sometime afterward. They then had their 
fleet on its way, as I say, to Hawaiian waters. They themselves had 
ordered the discontinuance of conversations. We were satisfied, of 
course, that they would attack at any [1473] time. We didn't 
know what time. They had that solely within their own })ower. But 
it wasn't until they proceeded to manufacture a falsehood in order to 
dodge the effect of their own ultimatum, the old fraudulent cry, "Stop 
thief," they thought if they could pretend to their own people, they 
knew that that wouldn't travel far in this country, except at the hands 
of people who might be a little prejudiced or a little extreme in their 
views, but they felt that they could put over the idea in their own 



560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

country just as Hitler put over one falsehood after another to shield 
and disguise his own plans and his own course to his armies of in- 
vasion. 

The Japanese alibi was taken up and adopted by a few people in 
other parts of the world but not to any very great extent. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have a few other questions 
but I observe that the Secretary has been before us about an hour. 
So I suggest we might suspend at this point with his testimony. 

The Chairman. We will excuse j^ou now, Mr. Hull, for the time 
being, and you may consult counsel as to when you will return. If 
3^ou wish to come tomorrow morning it will be entirely agreeable to 
the committee! 

Mr. Hull. I apologize to the committee. My throat is not quite 
as strong as it should be. It is improving so long [14'^-f\ as I 
give it a chance to improve. I don't want to give it a set-back. That 
is why I am taking these precautions that I am. 

The Chairman. The committee thoroughly understands that, Mr. 
Hull, and you do not need to apologize. You may be excused now 
until you return. 

Mr. Hull. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman. Mr. Grew. 

TESTIMONY OP JOSEPH CLAEK GREW, PORMER AMBASSADOR TO 

JAPAN ' 

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Grew, will you state your full name for the record, 
please. 

Mr. Grew. Joseph Grew. 

]Mr. Gesell. During what period of time were your our Ambassador 
to Japan ? 

Mr, Grew. I arrived in Japan on June 6, 1932; left on June 25, 
1942. 

]Mr. Gesell. And you were there more or less continuously during 
that period, particularly during 1941, were you not? 

Mr. Grew. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, if the committee please, before proceeding with 
Mr. Grew I want to direct specific attention to exhibit 15 in evidence, 
a series of throe dis]')atches from Mr. Grew to the Department of State 
dated January 27, November 3, [H'^S] and November 17, 1941, 
respectively. I would like to read portions of these into the record. 

The dispatch of January 27, 1941, states : 

My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from 
many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces 
plainied, in the event of trouble vpith the United States, to attempt a surprise 
mass attack on Pearl Harbor \ising all of tlieir various facilities. He added 
that altliougli the project seemed fantastic, the fact that he had heard it from 
many sources prompted him to pass on the infoi'mation. 

The second, the dispatch of November 3, is a lengthy one, and I 
simply want to call attention to the very last portion thereof, which 
reads as follows : 

It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on the belief that 
these preparations are merely in the nature of saber rattling the exclusive pur- 
pose of giving moral support to Japan's high-pressure diplomacy. Japan's 
resort to measures vv^hich might make war with the United States inevitably 
may come with di'amatic and dangerous suddenness. 

> See p. 2480 ; infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Mr. Grew. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 561 

The third dispatch, dated November 17, reads as follows: 

In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval actions 
by Japan in areas not at [i^/76] present Involved in the China conflict, I 
am taking into account as a probability that the Japanese vpould exploit all avail- 
able tactical advantages, including those of initiative and surprise. It is im- 
portant, hovrever, that our Government not place upon us, including the military 
and naval attaches, major responsibility for giving prior vrarning. The con- 
trol in Japan over military information, both primary and secondary is ex- 
tremely effective, and we have no expectation that any advance information 
would be obtained either through the press or from personal contacts with 
Fapanese; rhe few Americans left in Japan are mostly concentrated in Tokyo, 
Yokohama, and Kobe, and are in no position to observe military movements 
and the absence of American and other foreign vessels in adjacent waters al- 
most assures to the Japanese the ability to dispatch troop transports in various 
directioTis without foreign observation. Recent reports from our Consuls at 
Taihoku and at Harbin point to Japanese troop concentrations in both Taiwan 
and Manchuria, and all other available indications are that since the general 
mobilization of July last, troop dispositions have been made to enable new 
operations to be carried out on the shortest IH^J] possible notice in 
either Siberia or the southwest Pacific or in both. 

We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is to 
watch for premonitory indications of military or naval operations which might 
be forthcoming against such areas, and we are taking every precaution to guard 
against surprise. However, our field of military and naval observation is 
almost literally restricted to what can be seen with our own eyes, which is 
negligible. We would, therefore, advise that our Government, from abundance 
of caution, discount as far as possible the likelihood of our being able to give 
substantial warning. 

Now, with those dispatches in iiiiiid. Mr. Grew, I want to ask you 
whetlier, with the exception of tlie dispatch of January 27 which I 
have read referring to the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor, you had any information of any nature which indicated the 
possibility of the Japanese attackino; Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I had no specific information or information of 
any character. 

Mr. Gesell. I notice in your book, which I am sure will be referred 
to from time to time here, your note of that clay, for January 27, 1941, 
in which you say : 

[1478] There is a lot of talk around town to the effect that the Japanese in 
case of a break with the United States are planning to go all out in a surprise 
mass attack on Pearl Harbor. Of course, I informed our Government. 

Your reference to "a lot of talk around town" suggests that at that 
time you had heard the same rumor from sources other than the 
Peruvian Ambassador; is that correct ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Could you indicate to what extent there was talk 
around town at that time? 

Mr. Grew. I wouldn't say that talk was widespread, but it came 
from various sources. I could not now recollect from what sources, 
because they were not important, but this telegram which I sent on 
January 27 was based practically entirely on the report which had 
been brought to me by my Peruvian colleague. 

Mr. Gesell. Did that talk persist of a general rumor category or 
did it prevail only at or about the time of your dispatch? 

Mr. Grew. I would say only about the time of my dispatch. 

Mr. Geseix. You don't remember any talk about town subsequent 
to that time concerning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I do not. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 2 12 



562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[J4'^9] Mr. Gesell. Was there any talk or gossip or discussion 
of the possibility of an attack against the United States at any other 
point other than Pearl Harbor during this ])eriod from January on? 

Mr. Grkw. Well, do you refer to talk by Japanese, from Japanese 
sources ? 

Mr. Gesell. Well. I think my question was intended to be as broad 
as possible, but let's take the Japanese sources first. 

Mr. Grew. Well, we were very largely during that last year cut 
off from our Japanese contacts. The Japanese did not dare to be seen 
with us and did not dare come to the American Embassy, and most 
of my contacts had just slipped away, so it was very difficult to keep 
in touch with what people were thinking. You see, the secret police 
were constantly watching every Japanese who had contact with any 
foreigner, and' in many cases I am quite sure Japanese — in fact, I 
know — were arrested and kept in prison for some time as a result of 
having seen too much of foreigners. So it was very difficult to pick 
up what the people were thinking at that time apart from what was 
published in the press. 

[1480] Mr. Gesell. I suppose you received rumors second-hand, 
so to speak, through your other diplomatic colleagues who themselves 
maj^ have been in touch with Japanese ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, of course I received reports of what was going on 
from diplomatic colleagues constantly during all that year. 

]SIr. Gesell. Did you get from any of your diplomatic collengues 
any information indicating that Japan was to iattack the United States 
at any point subsequent to January 27, which was of a specific military 
nature? 

Mr. Grew. I couldn't ])ut my finger on any one conversation which 
would confirm that, but all the evidence which we accumulated during 
those years intensified as time went on, made it abundantly clear that 
thev were likely to attack. 

Mr. Gesell. And, of course, my questions have had to do more 
with specific military objectives rather than the broad question of 
likelihood of an attack. 

Now we have had here, Mr. Grew, the statement from a Navy 
officer concerning the Japanese plans for an attack, based upon cap- 
tured documents and prisoner interviews, and I want to ask you two 
or three questions based on that. 

The reports indicate that the Japanese task force left from Etoi*ofu 
Jima sometime around the 2Gth of November, Jap time. 

Did you have any information which indicated in any way that 
there was a Japanese task force at that Island at about that time? 

[14S1] ' Mr. Grew. None whatever. 

Mr. Gesell. The report also indicates that in August 1941 Admiral 
Yamamota ordered the fleet commanders and key staff members to 
Tokyo for war games ])rolimin:n'y to the final formulation of operation 
plans for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and that war conferences 
were thereafter continuously held at the Naval War College in Tokyo 
from the 2d of September t o the 13th of September. 

Did you have any information concerning those war plans or those 
coufei-ences that were being held Mhich indicated in any waV the 
possibility of a Pearl Harbor attack or an attack on the United States 
anvwhere else? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 563 

Mr. Grew. Those conferences were generally of a routine nature. 
They took place from time to time. We knew, of course, that they 
were going on, but what they were talking about we did not know. 

I may say here that we in our Embassy in Tokyo did not have access 
to any of the secret documents or intercepted telegrams. We didn't 
even know that they existed. 

Mr. Gesell. I want to ask you about that in a moment, but now 
let me ask you this. 

This report that I have been discussing indicates that on December 
1 the cabinet council met and approved the commencement of hostili- 
ties against the United States. 

[1482] Were you aware that there was a cabinet meeting in 
December, around December 1 or 2? 

Mr. Grew. I recollect we were informed at that time of such a 
meeting. 

Mr. Gesell. Was any announcement made or any information made 
available to you in any way indicating that one of the matters con- 
sidered at the cabinet meeting was the commencement of hostilities 
against the United States by an attack at Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir. That was all guess work. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you guess that tliat had been considered at that 
time ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gessell. Did you report that you had so guessed, to the State 
Department? 

Mr. Grew. Well, I think that my reports were complete in them- 
selves. I think that the warnings that I had issued covered the field. 
I very likely did report that meeting but I cannot tell you without 
consulting our files. 

Mr. GesIell. You don't recall, do you, any specific report that you 
made at that time to the effect that you thought the cabinet was con- 
sidering an attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Grew. I don't recollect any specific report to that effect. I 
would have to consult the records on that. 

[14S3] Mr. Gesell. I think we have j'our dispatch concerning 
the cabinet meeting. I will bring it forward in a moment. 

Now, I would like to ask you a general question. 

First I have this dispatch, your dispatch of December 1 to the De- 
partment of State, and with reference to the cabinet meeting the in- 
formation that you appear to have given at that time was to this 
effect : 

Tonight's newspapers report that the Cabinet at its meeting today, while 
realizing the difficulty of adjusting the respective positions of the two countries, 
nevertheless determined to continue the Washington conversations. 

[I4S4] Mr. Gesell. Does that refresh your recollection that you 
did not at that time have any information that you reported indicating 
that one of the matters discussed was the possibility of a Pearl Harbor 
attack ? 

Mr. Grew. I doubt if I reported that precise point at that time. 

Mr. Ge?ell. Now I would like to ask' you a general question by 
way of leading up to several others. 

During this period what was your general information as to the 
state of the Japanese preparations and readiness for war, the strength 



564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of their military and their general mobilization activities as you re- 
ported them to the Department of State ? 

Mr. Keefe. May I ask what period that is? ISIay I ask what period 
is embraced in your question. Counsel? 

Mr. Geseix. I would like to have him cover in a general way his 
period there, perhaps, progressively to show what steps he knew were 
being taken. 

Mr. Keefe. The whole 10 years? 

Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, if I may read a few passages that were 
written at that time as contemporary comments I think that that 
would be the best way to answer this question. May I do that, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

[14S5] Mr. Grew. Shortly after my arrival in Japan in the 
spring of 1932 I wrote a series of letters to Mr. Stimson who was then 
Secretary of State, after sizing up the situation as we saw it in Tokyo 
at that time. 

On August 13tli, in a letter to Mr. Stimson, I said I was surprised 

Senator Brewster. Would you give the year in each case so the 
record will be clear ? 

Mr. Gesell. The year, Mr. Grew. 

Senator Brewster. The year. 

Mr. Grew. 1932, Senator. I told Mr. Stimson how the Japanese 
were working up an antiforeign and an anti- American psychology in 
the country, as a matter of fact against all countries but especially 
against the United States, and I said to Mr. Stimson [reading] : 

This situation reminds me strongly of the efforts of tlie German Government, by 
calumniating foreign nations, to build up a public war psychology in 1914, the 
effort being repeated whenever some new venture, such as the indiscriminate 
submarine warfare, was about to be launched. Here in Japan the deliberate 
building up of public animosity against foreign nations in general and the United 
States in particular has doubtless a similar purpose — to strengthen the hand of 
the military [I'/SO] in its Manchurian venture in the face of foreign, and 
especially American opposition. 

I believe that on the part of the Japanese it is a sign of weakness, not of 
strength. * * * 

Such a national temper is always dangerous. The German military machine, 
supported by a carefully nurtured public war psychology, took the bit in its teeth 
and overrode all restraining influences in 1914. The Japanese military machine 
is not dissimilar. It has been built for war, feels prepared for war, and would 
welcome war. It has never yet been beaten and possesses unlimited self-confi- 
dence. I am not an alarmist but I believe that we should have our eyes open to 
all possible future contingencies. The facts of history would render it criminal to 
close them. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may we have the page in the book that 
the witness is reading from ? 

Mr. Grew. The page of that in my book is page 64. 

Then 2 years later I have some pages from a long report I sent to the 
Secretary of State which I think are probably pertinent to the point 
[reading] : 

Behind our day-to-day diplomacy lies a factor of prime importatice 

The Chairman. May I ask what is the date of that? 
[IWI Mr. Grew. The date of this, sir? 
The Chairman. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 565 

Mr. Grew. December 27, 1934, pa»e 145 in my book. This dispatch 
is on record in the Department of State. [Reading :] 

Behind our day-to-day diplomacy lies a factor of prime Importance, namely 
national support, demonstrated and reinforced by national preparedness. I 
believe that a fundamental element of that preparedness should be the mainte- 
nance of the present naval ratios in principle and the eventual achievement and 
maintenance of those ratios, so far as they apply to Japan, in fact. With such a 
background, and only with such a background, can we pursue our diplomacy with 
any confidence that our representations will be listened to or that they will load to 
favorable results. General Douglas MaoArthur, Chief of Staff of the United 
States Army, was recently reported in the press as saying : "Armies and navies, in 
being efficient, give weight to the peaceful words of statesmen, but a feverish effort 
to create them when once a crisis is imminent simply provokes attack." We need 
thorough preparedness not in the interests of war but of peace. 

It is difficult for those who do not live in [J-^i>^'] Japan to appraise the 
present temper of the country. An American Senator is reported to have recom- 
mended recently that we should accord parity to Japan in order to avoid future 
war. Wherever the Senator's views may be concerning the general policy that we 
should follow in the Far East, he probably does not realize what harm that 
sort of public statement does in strengthening the Japanese stand and in rein- 
forcing the aggressive ambitions of the expansionists. The Japanese press of 
course picks out such statements by prominent Americans and publishes them 
far and wide, thus contirming the general belief in Japan that the pacitist 
element in the United States is preponderantly strong and in the last analysis 
will control the policy and action of our Government. Under such circumstances 
there is a general tendency to characterize our diplomatic representations as 
bluff and to believe that they can safely be disregarded without fear of imple- 
mentation. 

It would be helpful if those who share the Senator's views could hear and 
read some of the things that are constantly being said and written in Japan, 
to the effect that Japan's destiny is to subjugate and rule the world (sic), 
and could realize the expansionist ambitions which lie not far from the surface 
in the U-i89] minds of certain elements in the Army and Navy, the patri- 
otic societies, and the intense nationalists throughout the country. Their aim is 
to obtain trade control and eventually predominant political influence in China, 
the Philippines, the Straits Settlement, Siam and the Dutch East Indies, the 
Maritime Provinces and Vladivostok, one step at a time, as in Korea and Man- 
churia, pausing intermittently to consolidate and then continuing as soon as 
the intervening obstacles can be overcome by diplomacy or force. With such 
dreams of empire cherished by many, and with an army and navy capable of 
taking the bit in their own teeth and running away with it regardless of the 
restraining influence of the saner heads of the Government in Tokyo (a risk 
which unquestionably exists and of which we have already had ample evidence 
in the Manchurian affair), we would be reprehensibly somnolent if we were 
to trust the security of treaty restraints or international comity to safeguard 
our own interests or, indeed, our own property. * * * 

When Japanese speak of Japan's being the "stabilizing factor" and the "guar- 
dian of peace" of East Asia, what they have in mind is a Pax Japonica with 
eventual complete commercial control, and, in the minds [1490] of some, 
eventual complete political control of East Asia*. While Ambassador Saito may 
have been misquoted in a recent issue ot the Philadelphia Bulletin as saying that 
Japan will be prepared to fight to maintain that conception of peace, nevertheless 
that is precisely what is in the minds of many Japanese today. There is a swa.sh- 
buckling temper in the country, largely developed by military propaganda, 
which can lead Japan during the next few yeai'S, or in the next few generations, 
to any extremes unless the saner minds in the Government prove able to cope 
with it and to restrain the country from national suicide. * * * 

I wish that more Americans would come out here and live here and gradually 
come to sense the real potential risks and dangers of the situation instead of 
speaking and writing academically on a subject which they know nothing what- 
ever about, thereby contributing ammunition to the Japanese military and 
extremists who are stronger than they have been for many a day. The idea 



566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that a great body of liberal though lying just beneath tlie surface since 1931 
would be sufficiently strong to emerge and assume control with a little foreign 
encouragement is thoroughly mistaken. The liberal thought is there, but it 
is inarticulate and largely impotent, and in all probability will remain so for 
some time to come. * * * 

In view of all these considerations, I have little hesitation in reiterating and 
empiiasiziiig the potential dangers of the situation and the prime importance of 
American national preparedness to meet it. As a nation we have taken the lead 
in international (fforts toward the restriction and reduction of armaments. We 
have had hopes that the movement would be progressive, but the conditions of 
world affairs as they have developed during the past twelve years since the 
Wa.shiiigton Conference have not afforded fruitful ground for such progress. 
Unless we are prepared to subscribe to a Pax Japonica in the Far East, with all 
that tliis movement, as conceived and interpreted by Japan, is bound to entail, 
we should rapidly build up our Navy to treaty strength, and if and when the 
Washington Naval Treaty expires we should continue to maintain the present 
ralio with Japan regardless of cost, a peacetime iusurnnce both to cover and to 
reduce the ri.sk of war. In the meantime every proper step should be taken to 
avoid or to offset the belligerent utterances of jingoes no less than the defeatist 
statements of pacifists in the United States, many of which find their way into 
the Japanese m02] press, because the utterances of the former tend to 

inflame public sentiment against our country, while the statements of the latter 
convey an impression of American weakness, irresolution, and bluff. 

Mr. Gesell. Would it be fair to say, Mr, Grew, that those views 
which you expressed in those early dispatches were repeated and 
strengthened by you from time to time as we come nearer to Decem- 
ber 7? 

Mr. Grew. Yes; definitely. 

Mr. Gesell. And that they represent your judgment that Japan 
was mobilizing both psychologically and militarily for gradual steps 
of aggression? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir ; definitely. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, when did you reach the conclusion in your own 
mind that war with the United States was inevitable? 

Mr. (trew. Mr. Chairman, I think my position on that is perhaps 
somewhat similar to the position of a candidate for political office 
who. knows that he is going to be defeated but he does not admit it until 
it is all over. 

Our foreign service is our first line of national defense and our duty 
is to hold that line if we can do it. For any diplomatic officer in the 
foreign service or for any foreign-service officer to go abroad and 
throw up his hands and say "War is inevitable" might as well go 
home because he [^W-^] would be a discredit to the service m 
which we are members. 

I cannot tell you of any moment at which I really felt that war was 
inevitable. 

Mr. Gesell, You recognized, I think, for a long period that it was 
a strong possibility? 

Mr. Grew. Definitely. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any views or opinions as to whether 
Japan was likely to strike without a declaration of war? 

Mr, Grew, When a criminal commits a crime I find that the FBI 
or Scotland Yard look up the technique of that crime and go back and 
look at previous crimes committted with the same technique and 
thereby spot the criminal. If we had remcmbeied our history we 
would have recollected that the Japanese did precisely the same thing 
at Port Arthur in 1905. It struck at Russia without a declaration of 
war, so that their attack on Pearl Harbor was exactly the same pattern. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 567 

Mr. Gesell. Would it be safe to say that in making references in 
your dispatches to the strong possibility of a surprise attack by Japan 
that you had in mind just those considerations of that part of history? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, in reaching your conclusion and in considering 
the developments I understood you to say that you [1494] did 
not know or have access to any information resulting from the inter- 
cept of the Japanese diplomatic messages. 

Mr. Grew. That is a fact. 

Mr. Gesell. No copies of intercepted messages were sent to you and 
you did not even know they were being intercepted ? 

Mr. Grew. I did not. 

Mr. Gesell. Have you any information which would indicate 
whether or not the Japanese knew we were intercepting their mes- 
sages ? 

Mr. GRE\y. I have no evidence to that efl'ect, no. 

Mr. Gesell. Tlie question has come up here, Mr. Grew, concerning 
the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

Did any information come to your attention which indicated that 
the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor had any effect one way or the 
other on Japanese opinion ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, definitely. The Japanese press from time to 
time and, as I remeniber, in public speeches took the position that 
relations between Japan and the United States could never improve 
until we removed our fleet completel}^ from the Pacific to the Atlantic 
because it was ahvays a source of suspicion to the Japanese. 

I do not think that that pre})osterous suggestion was ever advanced 
officially but it certainly was heard from time to time. 

[i^^^i Mr. Gesell. Of course, my question was directed to a 
more limited movement of the fleet from Pearl Harbor to the west 
coast. Was there any discussion of whether such a movement would 
have any effect or whether the movement in the opposite direction was 
having some effect ? 

Mr. Grew. I think the statement which I just mentioned had in 
mind the removal of the fleet completely from the Pacific, not merely 
to the west coast. 

Mr. Gesell. You do not remember, I take it then, any reaction to 
the movement of the fleet from the west coast to Pearl Harbor in 
1940, 1 believe it was? 

Mr. Grew. I cannot recollect at present any specific reaction. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, there has been considerable said here in the testi- 
many so far concerning the relationship between the civil and military 
government of Japan, and Mr. Hull and other witnesses have expressed 
opinions that the military branch of the government was in a position 
to considerably dominate the civil branch of the government. 

Have you any comments or information to give us on that subject? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. I think in order to shed light on that subject 
we ought to go back very briefly a little in history, to the middle of 
the last century we will say, [H^S] around the time of the 
restoration of the Emperor in 1868. 

The Japanese had watched what they considered the alleged en- 
croachments of Western powers in the Far East. They remembered 
the opium war, the second Chinese war, and they were afraid that 
the same thing might happen to them. Therefore, they put the re- 



568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sponsibility for the defense of the country entirely in the hands of 
the army and navy. 

As I remember it, in the constitution of 1889 it was confirmed that 
the army and navy should determine (heir own organization. In any 
case, after many years went by and things quieted down there and 
Japan began to gather confidence and believed she was not in danger, 
the control gradually passed from the military to the civil element; 
and in the twenties, I have been told — I was not there myself, but I 
have been told — that the prestige of the Japanese military was so low 
that officers when they went off duty did not wear a uniform in the 
streets. 

In any case, the days of the so-called Shidehara diplomacy then 
arose. Shidehara, who is now Prime Minister of Japan, was then 
Foreign Minister, and he and his associates did everything that was 
possible to bring about good relations with the United States, Great 
Britain, China, and the other countries. 

I have always thought, and I think it is a fair premise, [14^] 
that one of the principal reasons why the Japanese Army invaded 
Manchuria in 1931 was in order to put itself on the map again, to bring 
up their prestige. 

In any case, that is then what happened. The Japanese Army went' 
into Manchuria and it was a question of time. Of course, they imme- 
diately were in a position of control. 

Now, during that period a development came about which I do not 
think is provided for in any law, that the Navy and War Ministers 
in Japan could have their own access to the Emperor over the heads 
of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet ; so, of course, that gave them 
tremendous power. 

They also had it in their hands to make it impossible for the Em- 
peror to form any Cabinet of which they did not approve. In other 
words, if they did not like a Prime Minister they would refuse to 
appoint a War or Navy Minister and the Cabinet could not be 
formed. 

An illustration of that was in 1937, I think, where the Emperor 
asked General Ugaki to come forward and form a Cabinet. General 
Ugaki was a very fine military officer, but he was of a moderate type. 
He was not one of the extremists; he did not commend himself to 
the army as a whole and after working for 5 days he finally had to 
go to the Emperor and confess himself defeated, so that he never 
formed a cabinet, and he communicated to the press at that time that 
\J498] he never again would wear a Japanese military uniform. 
That was the way those things worked out during that period. 

Now, to come down to the question of the relative control between 
civilians and military, I would put it more relative control between 
the moderates and the extremists. 

You sometimes had a civilian Prime Minister, such as the first two 
ministries of Prince Konoye, in which the worst acts of international 
banditry in all history probably were carried out and yet, on the 
other hand, you had the cabinet of Admiral Yonai, who was a military 
and naval officer. His regime was one of the most moderate that there 
had been in Japan for a great many years. 

Mr. Gksell. Well, during the period from July 1911, say, to De- 
cember of 1941 were the extremists or the moderates in control of 
the government ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 569 

Mr. Grew. At the time of the Konoye cabinet, that was the third 
Konoye cabinet, np to during the snnnner of 1941, he, I believe, was 
doing his best to bring about an improvement of relations with the 
United States, but from the moment of his fall, when Tojo came in, 
it was quite clear that the extremists' policy prevailed. 

Mr. Gesell. Did the Japanese give any publicity to their note of 
November 20? Did they at that time indicate what position they had 
taken to their own people, that you recall ? 

\ 14-99] Mr. Grew. I do not recall that that note was published. 
It could have been. I will have to look up the records on that.^ 

Mr. Gesell. You do not recall any substantial publicity being given 
to their November 20 note ? 

Mr. Grew. I do not recall it now. 

Mr. Gesell. Did the Japanese give any publicity to our note of 
November 26 ? 

Mr. Grew. They did not until after Pearl Harbor and then when 
it was published in a newspaper that newspaper was promptly con- 
fiscated. The Japanese did not want that note to become known and 
certain prominent Japanese at that time said to me that they had been 
informed that the note was in the nature of an ultimatum but they were 
unable to confirm that and in the light of the contents of the note 
which I passed on to my Japanese friends they said if that were a 
fact, if the note was couched along those lines, the Japanese people 
would be definitely opposed to an intransigent attitude on the part 
of the Japanese Government in dealing with it. That is on record. 

[ISOO] Mr. Gesell. Did the Japanese attempt to characterize 
the note without revealing its contents at that time ? 

Mr. Grew. They definitely did. 

Mr. Gesell. In what manner did they characterize it? 

Mr. Grew. They characterized it as in the nature of an ultimatum. 

Mr. Gesell. What did they say about it? 

Mr. Grew. I do not know what more they said about it, because I 
have no access to the records. I suppose you are speaking of the Japa- 
nese press now ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. I cannot recollect exactly how that was put forward, 
but that was the impression created among the Japanese public. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you ask for any authority to release the text of 
the note of November 26 ? 

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect having asked that. It would not have 
done any good if I had. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, coming to a subsequent message, the message to 
the Emperor, which was transmitted by President Roosevelt to the 
Emperor on or about December 6, could you state to the committee 
the circumstances under which you received that note, when you first 
learned of it, and what steps you took to deliver it to the Emperor? 

[ISOl] Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. That was the evening of Decembei 
7, Japanese time. I was listening to the radio broadcasts from San 
Francisco on that evening and heard that the President had sent, or 
was sending a message to the Emperor. I promptly telephoned to Mr. 
Dooman, the counselor for the Embassy to stand by. Not long there- 
after I received a very brief, urgent message from Mr. Hull saying an 
important message for the Emperor was being then encoded and I 
should be ready to receive it. A long telegram containing the message 

> See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1705. 



570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was received in the Embassy at 10 : 30 p. m. The record on the face of 
the telegram showed it had been received in the Japanese post office at 
12 noon. It was, I understand, sent from Washington 9 p. m., which 
would have meant 11 a. m, Tokyo time, 14 hours difference. 8o, in 
other words, the telegram appears to have been delivered to the 
Japanese post office, which handled telegrams 1 hour after its receipt, 
and they held it up throughout that day, from 12 noon until 10 : 30 p. m. 

Finally, at 10 : 30 p. m., it came. I had already arranged for the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to stand by. I said I would probably 
be able to see him about midnight, which I did. When the message 
was finally decoded, I saw the Minister of Foreign xVffairs about a 
quarter past twelve, about 15 minutes after midnight. I showed him 
the communication and I said that I wished to ask for an audience 
with the Emperor to [1503] present it p^^rsouMlly. I did not 
want any doubt as to getting it in his hands. The Minister began to 
discuss the matter with me, and I said, "I am making a definite appli- 
cation for an audience with the Emperor," which is the right of every 
Ambassador, and Mr. Togo — not Tojo, the Prime Minister, but Togo — 
and the Minister finally said, "I will present your request to the 
Throne." 

I left the Foreign Office at about half-past 12 a. m., half-past 
midnight. I got to bed rather late. At 7 o'clock the next morning, 
the 8th of December, my telephone beside my bed rang, and Mr. Kasa, 
the private secretary to the iVIinister, said he had been trying to get 
me ever since 5 a. m. I said, "That is surprising, because the telephone 
is right beside my bed and it has not rung." He said, "Please, come 
over as soon as possible to see the MinisteK." 

I got to the Minister's official residence about 7 : 30 a. m. He came 
into his room dressed in formal clothes. Apparently he had been 
with the Emperor, and he had a document in his hand, he slapped it 
on the table, and he said, "This is the Emperor's reply to^the Presi- 
dent." I said, "I have asked for an audience in order to present that 
memorandum, that message, to the Emperor personally." Mr. Togo 
merely said — I remember his words — "I have no wish to stand between 
you and the Throne," but nothing more was said about it. Then he 
\J0S3] read it, and he asked me to notice especially the last para- 
graph. He said, "In view of the fact the conversations in Washing- 
ton had made no progress it had been decided to call them off." That 
did not strike me as very serious. They had been called before, when 
the Japanese first went into Indochina and they had been resumed at a 
later date. So I said, "Well, I am very sorry. I hope we can get 
them started again." The Minister made a little pleasant speech to 
me, thanking me for my coo])eration for peace, and came down and 
saw me off at the door. He said not one single word about the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, and yet that was at 7: 30 o'clock the next morning 
and the attack had occurred at about 3: 30 a. m. Japanese time, or at 
any rate it had o(;curred several hours previous. I never understood 
why he did not tell me, whether he did not have the courage to do it or 
whether he thought it was not diplomatic protocol — I have no idea. 

I went back to (he Embassy and a few minutes later we heard news- 
boys calling out "Gogi" in the street. "Gogi" is a special edition of 
the paper, it is a single sheet containing an important piece of news. 
I sent one of my secretaries out to get it and he brought it in and that 
is the wav I learned about the attack on Pearl Harbor, was when this 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 571 

news sheet was brought in and put on my desk. An hour later, the 
police came in and locked us up in the Embassy, and that is the story. 

[1504] Mr. Gesell. We have no further questions of Mr. Grew. 

The .Chairman. It is 10 minutes to 12. You became a diplomatic 
prisoner from then on vmtil you were exchanged ? 

Mr. Grew. Y^s, Mr. Chairman, from then on until we were ex- 
changed the following June. 

The Chairman. So that getting back to the morning on which you 
were told by the Foreign Minister practically that you would not be 
permitted to see the Emperor, the attack had already taken place some 
4 hours before that. When did you receive from the State Department 
here, or did you after that receive any dispatch from the State Depart- 
ment that was delivered to you in Tokyo 'i 

Mr. Grew. After the attack upon Pearl Harbor? 

The Chairman. After the interview with Togo. 

Mr. Grew^ No, sir; I think we did not receive any telegrams after 
that. I was able to establish a telephone connection with Mr. Hamil- 
ton of the State Department and we merely spoke for a minute about 
the attack and he said he hoped we were all well in the Embassy and 
a few personal remarks of that kind, but I recollect nothing else. 

The Chairman. Does your record show whether, after the Japanese 
Government took over the embassy and locked you up, any messages 
were sent to you that were not delivered by the Japanese Government, 
and I presume they would have been delivered [1S05] by the 
Japanese Government if you. had got them? 

Mr. Grew. I recollect no messages received. I sent two or three 
messages to Washington and I did not know whether they got through. 
As a matter of fact, they did get through. 

The Chairman. The testimony here shows that the Japanese Fleet, 
the task force, left the Kurile Islands headed toward Pearl Harbor 
on the 25th, United S'ates time, which would have been the 26th, 
Japanese time, and that Secretary Hull dispatched or gave to the 
Ambassador of Japan here on the 26th his reply to the Japanese 
message of the 20th. When did you receive information, if you did 
receive information, that that message to the Japanese Government 
had been delivered on the 26th ?^ 

Mr. Grew. I presumably received that in a telegram from the 
Department of State, which kept me informed of the exchange of 
documents and conversations going on in Washington. Without con- 
sulting records, Mr. Chairman, I could not tell you just what moment 
I received them. 

The Chairman. Your recollection is you did receive notification 
through the State Department that such message had been delivered? 

Mr. Grew. In all probability, I think I did. 

The Chairman. I do not think I want to ask any other questions 
now. 

Mr. Cooper. 

[1506] The Vice Chairman. I do not have any questions now. 

The Chairman. Senator George. 

Senator George. Nothing now, at this time. 

The Chairman. Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Clark. I want to ask you if you inquired from your diplomatic 
colleairue the source of his information in regard to the attack on 
Pearl Harbor ? 

* Exhibit No. 75. 



572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. GiiEW. I do not think I did, Mr. Congressman, After all, 
sometimes when an official, diplomatic official, receives information of 
that kind or even a rumor report of that kind, it may put him in a 
rather difficult position to ask him to reveal the source. I do not think 
I did ask that question. 

Mr. Clark. You did not ask him where he learned that there was 
likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor ? ' 

Mr. (7REW. What is that? 

Mr. Clark. You did not ask him where he learned that there was 
likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Mr, Grew\ I do not recollect having asked that question. 

Mr. Clark. Well, now, I do not mean to insist upon this, but you 
considered it important enough to make it the subject of a special 
dispatch to your Government, did you not? 

Mr. Grew. Definitely. 

Mr. Clark, You say now you made no effort to find out the source 
from which he obtained that information ? 

[1507] Mr, Grew. To have gone to my Peruvian colleague and 
said, "I would like to know the source from which you received that 
information," would have put him in a very difficult position, because 
most of those pieces of information were received from Japanese 
friends who would have been endangered by the knowledge that they 
had passed that information on, I think in all probability if I had 
asked my colleague for the source he probably would have felt that he 
could not give it to me. In any case, it is a rather difficult thing to do, 
to ask for such a thing as that. 

Mr, Clark. Did you know him pretty well? 

Mr, Grew. I knew him pretty well. He was a man I trusted. I 
trusted his word and I trusted his judgment. 

Mr. Clark. You made some reference in your testimony to some 
warlike activity by Japan, I think, in 1905 without a declaration of 
war. Was that against Russia? 

Mr, Grew. That was against Russia; yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark, There is just a hazy recollection in my mind that there 
was some activity by our fleet about that time. Probably it was 
headed entirely around the world as a kind of demonstration against 
Japan, Do you recollect about that? 

Mr, Grew. I recollect the sending of the fleet around South Amer- 
ica and into the Pacific. I do not recollect the date. 

Mr. Clartc, Well, did it have any connection with the military 
activity of Japan against Russia ? 

11508] Mr, Grew. I would have to refresh my memory on that. 

IVIr. (^lark. It is not material anyway, 

Mr, Grew. I am sorry ; that is a long time ago. It is a matter of 
history. I woi^ld not like to answer that question without looking 
it up, 

Mr. Clark, I was trying to refresh my own memory through you, 

Mr. Grew. I am afraid my memory is bad on that. 

The Chairman. There is one question I omitted to ask, if I may do 
it now, 

Mr, Grew, Yes. 

The Chairman. In regard to this rumor brought to your attention 
by the Peruvian Minister or Ambassador. 

Mr. Grew. Minister. . 



^ PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 573 

The CiiAiRMAK. Tlie testimony here shovTs that in January 1941, 
Admiral Yamamoto, I believe it is, the Japanese Admiral, had formu- 
lated some plan by which to attack Pearl Harbor at some indefinite 
date in the future. Would you be able to know whether the formula- 
tion of such plan by the Japanese Admiral might have had any con- 
nection with the rumors that the Peruvian Minister passed on to you ? 

Mr. Grew. I think that is very doubtful, Mr. Chairman. The Japa- 
nese were pretty effective in their secrecy. I think it is very unlikely 
that that information would have been allowed to leak out anywhere. 
It would have been probably retained in a very small group of the 
highest military and naval officers, so that I would doubt very much 
if the rumor which I telegraphed the Secretary of State on January 
27 had any connection whatever with the elaboration of the plan. 

The Chairman. The telegram — the dispatch — which you sent to 
Secretary Stimson in 1932 was sent to him as Secretary of State? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In the meantime, by the time you sent your dis- 
patch of 1934, Secretary Hull had become Secretary of State? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. He was at that time in the office of the State De- 
partment? 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 

The Chairman. That is all. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make one request of counsel 
befoi'e you adjourn? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I notice in the New York Times tliey have an article 
which is dated "Nuremberg, Germany, November 23" : 

The following excerpts from the official German report on discussions between 
Adolf Hitler and Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka in Berlin on 
April 4, U510] 1941, were introduced in the Nuremberg war criminals trial 
today. 

It shows the discussion of the plan of a war between Japan and the 
United States. I think that is pertinent in this inquiry in view of the 
interpretation that has been put by some people on the note of Novem- 
ber 26, 1941. I request that we obtain an authenticated copy of it. 

Mr. Gesell. We will try to do that.^ Is that mentioned in today's 
New York Times ? 

Mr. Murphy. Saturday's New York Times. 

The Chairman. All right, the committee will stand in recess until 
2 o'clock this afternoon. 

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the 
same day.) 

[1511] afternoon session — 2 p. M. 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH C. GREW, FORMER AMBASSABOR TO 

JAPAN (Resumed) 

The Chairman. The committee will be in order. The Chair thinks 
Mr. Clark had concluded his examination of Mr. Grew and Senator 
Lucas ^'ill now come to bat. 

Mr. Gesell. If the committee please, before Senator Lucas com- 
mences, my attention was called during the recess to the fact that I 

' Rrhihit Ne. 76. 



574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

had neglected to introduce the dispatch from Mr. Grew under date 
of December 1 referring to the meeting of the Cabinet, from which 
I have read fi;M-ing ^ns examination, and I think, to make the record 
complete, I should otl'er that document in the lecord now as Exhibit 25. 

The Chairman. That will be received as Exhibit 25. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 25.") 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas ? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Ambassador, do you have an opinion as to 
whether or not the message or memorandum that was issued by the 
President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan on the eve- 
ning of December 6 was ever delivered to the Emperor? 

Mr. Grew. No, Ssnator ; I have no evidence to indicate that it was 
delivered to the Emperor. 

Senator Lucas. Who was the Minister at that time of Japan with 
whom you conferred ? 

Mr. Grew. I conferred that night with the Foreign Minister, Mr. 
Togo, and I asked for an audience with the Emperor to present the 
document and he said that he would present my request to the Emperor 
and then I saw him the next morning at 7 : 30 and he said, "This is the 
Emperor's reply." 

Senator Lucas. Did he give you that reply in writing 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas ( continuing) . Or was it oral ? . 

Mr. Grew. In writing. 

Senator Lucas. Was it signed by the Emperor ? 

Mr. Grew. No,no, it was not signed by the Emperor. 

Senator Lucas. And you do not know, other than what he told you, 
whether the Emperor ever saw this last message? 

Mr. Grew. I do not know. 

Senator Lucas. I should like to direct your attention to a statement 
which was made by Mr. Hull in his treatise on this subject on page 3, 
in which he said the following [reading] : 

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 
1927, Japan adopted a sjo-called "positive" policy toward China under which it 
manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs. 

[1513] I should like to ask you whether or not you are familiar 
with the memorial presented to the Emperor of Japan on July 25, 
1927, by Premier Tanaka outlining the positive policy of Japan for 
the conquest of the world? 

Mr. Greav. Tliat is the so-called Tanaka memorial ? 

Ssnator Lucas. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Grew. Of course, 1 have seen it in times past but I have never 
known whether it was authentic or not. 

Senator Lucas. That is the question that I desired to ask you. I 
read it in a magazine entitled '"China at War" which was published 
in this country in March 1942 and I was wondering whether or not 
you had ever read the article, or in your experience in Japan whether 
you- had reached the conclusion that this memorial was an authentic 
document ? 

Mr. Grew. I never reached that conclusion, Senator. I do not 
recollect whether I read that precise article or not, but, of course, 
that was discussed at considerable length in the old days -and nobody 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 575 

that I ever saw was ever able to adduce any concrete evidence to prove 
its authenticity. 

[I0J4.] Senator Lucas. Thank you, sir. 

Now, I want to direct your attention, Mr. Ambassador, to the re- 
port made by the Army Board, inchiding George Grunert, lieutenant 
general ; Henry D. Russell, major general ; and Walter H. Frank, major 
General, United States Army, who investigated, as I recall, at the 
request of Secretary Stimson the attack on Pearl Harbor, and in that 
report — and this is on page 51 of the September issue of the United 
States News, which purports to have a full text of the official report 
concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor — the following information was 
found. Starting at the top of the page in the right-hand column 
it reads in this way : 

Apparently 0x1 the 26th, in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not to 
go through with the proposal sh,own the day before to the Secretary of War 
containing the plan for the three months' cruise. Evidently the action to kick 
the whole thing over was accomplished by presenting to tlie Japanese the counter 
proposal of the ten points which they took as an ultimatum. It was the docu- 
ment that touched the button that started the war, as Ambassador Grew so aptly 
expressed. 

Now, as I understand it, Mr. Ambassador, you were a witness before 
that General Board, and I should like to have you elaborate or com- 
ment, if you care to do so, upon this conclusion that was reached by 
the Army board making this independent investigation. 

[JtilS] Mr, Gri':w. Senator, may I read briefly the record of my 
actual testimony before that committee on that subject? 

Senator Lucas. I want the testimony read, sir. 

Mr. GREW^ I was asked what was the reaction of the Japanese peo- 
ple, both private and official, to that document, if you remember. 
That is Mr. Hull's memorandum of November 26, 1941. I replied 
[reading] : 

The reaction of the Japanese military people and also of probably the ma- 
jority of the civil governmt^nt officials, who took their cue from the military at 
that time, was that they characterized that memorandum as an ultimatum. , 

Senator Lucas. What page are you reading from, if I may ask? 
Mr. Grew. I am reading now my actual testimony before that Army 
Board. 

Senator Lucas. All right, sir. 
Mr. Grew [reading] : 

- If I may do so, I should like in that connection — 

I am still reading my testimony — 

I should like, in that connection, to express the personal opinion that that 
attitude of the Japanese officials to the memorandum as an ultimatum was 
totally unsound and wrongly based. 

Then I was asked : 

It is your considered opinion, therefore, that they [15 tG] used it as a 
pretext for the accomplishment of what they desired? 

My reply: 

Yes, sir. It was in no respect an ultimatum, either in tone or in substance. 

I continued 

Senator Lucas. What page is that on in the report? 



576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Grew. Tliat is on page 4208. 
Sonator Lucas. That is correct. 

Mr. Grew. I go on to 4215, where the point came up again. This 
was my testimony. [Reading:] 

Now, to go back and coming to your question, we will go back to the military 
people, the Army and the Navy. At what point did they decide definitely to 
attack? Naturally, they h:id all their plans made for years beforehand. In the 
case of war with America they were very far-sighted in those respects and they 
had their plans drawn up probably — 

Althougli I had no means of knowing that, of course — 

probably right down to the last detail, but as for the moment at which the bntron 
was pushed I do not myself know exactly how long it would have taken their 
carriers to get from where they were to the point at which they attacked Pearl 
Harbor, but it has always been my belief that it was about the time of the receipt 
of Mr. Hull's memo- [I'm] randum of November 26th that the button 
was pushed. I cannot prove that ; I have, no evidence. It is just my general 
feeling. 

Now, in that connection, Senator, I think that my testimony — a 
wrong impression has been given to my testimony because it appeared 
from the official report that I had said that Mr. Hull's memorandum 
actually touched the button that started the war. 

I never said that. I said it was my belief that the thing had been 
started at about that time; that is all. 

Then, if I may, as throwing light on this general subject, I would 
like to read the brief comment that I wrote in connection with Mr. 
Hull's memorandum. Shall I do that, sir? 

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grew. This is on page 482 of my book, "Ten Years in Japan." 

Senator Lucas. 482 ? 

Mr. Grew. Page 482 in my book, "Ten Years in Japan." 

Mr. MuRPHT. At the bottom of the page. 

Mr. Grew. That is not in. Foreign Relations. 

Senator Lucas. Proceed, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. Grew (reading) : 

[1518] November 29, 1041. 

Our Government has handed to the Japanese — 

mind you, this was written on the spot at the time in Tokyo — 

Our Government has handed to the .J^ipanese a ten-pfiint draft proposal for ad- 
justing the whole situation in the Far East. It is a broad-gauge, objective, and 
statesmanlike document, offering to Japan practically everything that she has 
ostensibly been fighting for if she will simply stop her aggressive policy. By 
adopting such a jjrogram she would be offered free access to needed raw mate- 
rials, free trade and commerce, financial co-operation and support, withdrawal 
of the freezing orders, and an opportiuiity to n(>gotiate a new treaty of commerce 
with us. If she wants a political and economic stranglehold on the countries 
of East Asia (euphemestically called the New Order in East Asia and the East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere): — which most of her extremists do want — and if she 
pursues her southward advance by force, she will soon be lat war with all of 
the ABCD iwwers and will unciuestionably be defeared and reduced to the status 
of a third-rate power. But if she jdays her cards wisely, she can obtain witliout 
further fighting all of the desideiata for which she allegedly started fighting — 
stmtegic, economic, financial, and social security. 

[loJO] Then I said further : 

I have had conversations with friends and after examining their feelings 
I have come to the ron'lnsinn that they believe, with no knowledge of the actual 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 577 

contents of the American document of November 26, that Washington has deliv- 
ei'ed an nUimatum — 

now, wait a moment. I beg your pardon, sir, I am wrong. I was 
quoting a statement made to me by a prominent Japanese. I will 
withdraw that and begin again, just that last passage, if I may. This 
is written on December 5, 1941. (Reading :) 

Yesterday I received in his own handwriting a letter from a prominent Japa- 
nese who is closely in touch with Government circles here. This letter reads in 
part as follows: "The situation is very regrettable. You Ii;now how I feel and 
I may understand your feelings. Permit nie to set forth frankly to you what 
is now in my mind. I have had conversations with friends and after examining 
their feelings I have come to the conclusion that they believe, with no knowledge 
of the actual contents of the American document of November 26, that Wash- 
ington has delivered an ultimatum to us. Such is the regrettable psychology 
of our people." 

Now, that document as I tliink I said this morning was [1520] 
not published in Japan until after Pearl Harbor and when it was 
published the paper publishing it was immediately confiscated. In 
other words, the authorities did not want the Japanese people to know 
what was in that document. 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you if you are acquainted with any of 
the members of the General Board that made this investigation and 
so made the report that I have read to you heretofore ? 

Mr, Grew\ I beg pardon, sir? 

Senator Lucas. Are you acquainted with any of the members of 
the Army Board that made this report which was described to you 
in the statement "it was the document that touched the button that 
started the war as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it"? 

Mr. Grew. Are you asking me the names ? 

Senator Lucas. I am asking you if you personally know any of the 
generals that made that report. 

Mr. Grew. Let me see. I do not recollect now. I may have met 
them. I did not know any of them well, certainly. Generally Rus- 
sell, it appears, was the officer who questioned me on this particular 
point. I did not know him well. 

Senator Lucas. Do you have any knowledge why the Army Board 
reached such a strained construction of your language and placed it 
in this report? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I never understood that. I think my evidence 
is clear. 

Senator Lucas. I certainly agree with you, from what you have 
read. I examined the transcript and it is rather difficult \_1522'] 
for me to understand why the Army Board used that statement of 
yours in the way it did. 

Another thing, while I am on that subject, it is difficult for me to 
understand why it was that the Army Board said practically nothing 
about the ultimatum that was issued by Japan, which has been testi- 
fied to here over and over again by Secretary of State Corclell Hull 
and Under Secretary Welles, and that they used the Ten-Point Pro- 
gram of Mr. Hull so far as their report on the question of ultimatum 
was concerned. 

One other question and then I am through. During your stay, Mr. 
Amdassador, in Japan, did you have any opportunity to discover what 

79716—46 — pt. 2 13 



578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the Japanese naval forces or military forces were doing in the way of 
building up their military or naval machines? 

Mr. Gkew. We had very little opportunity to get really inside infor- 
mation on that. As I say, the Japanese were past masters at secrecy 
and their secret police were constantly watching all foreigners and all 
Japanese who were regarded as possibly pro-American or in any way 
pro-foreign, watching them continually, and if they felt there was any 
chance of them having imparted information they would generally 
arrest them immediately. 

So it was very difficult to find out exactly what was being done, but 
those things dripped through from various [1523] channels 
from time to time. 

We had a pretty good idea in the Embassy, apart from the state- 
ment published in the press, that they were steadily strengthening 
both their army and navy. While, of course, there were various 
announcements made from time to time of the building up of both 
forces. 

Senator Lucas. Did you have any military or naval attaches in the 
Intelligence Department attached to your Embassy? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. How many did you have at that time? 

Mr. Grew. I think a military and a naval attache and several so- 
called language officers, young officers in the Army and Navy who 
were there to study the Japanese langTiage. 

Senator Lucas. Was that the only intelligence service that you had 
at that time in Japan that was connected with your department ? 

Mr. Grew. That was the only intelligence service we had, except 
insofar as we were able to receive information from various sources, 
our Consuls in the different places, and in some cases friendly foreign- 
ers, and in other cases I might say also friendly Japanese. 

Senator Lucas. The reason for these questions takes me back to 
April 1940, when Admiral Stark appeared before the [1S24-] 
Naval Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, of which I 
was a member at that time, and he gave the connnittee the information 
that it was practically impossible to learn just what Japan was doing 
at that time in the way of strengthening her military and naval forces. 

They knew from past treaties and past information as to the number 
of battleships, the number of cruisers, and so forth, but after the 
termination of the treaty in 1936 he advised us it was very difficult to 
obtain any information at that time as to what the Japanese were 
doing either in the way of building battleships or other ships. 

Incidentally, he thought they were building at that time two battle- 
ships, but he was not certain about it. I just call that to your atten- 
tion, l3ecause it seems to me their secrecy must have been of the highest 
order if our intelligence service was not able to ascertain whether or 
not they were building a couple of battleships. 

Mr. Grew. Admiral Stark was quite right about that. They took 
the utmost precautions to see that information of that kind came into 
the hands of no foreigner. I know, for instance, on the railway trip 
from Tokyo down to Shimoiioseki at the foot of Honshu Island, very 
close to one of the Japanese navy yards where they were building 
ships, they had a big stockade erected around the yard and as the 
train passed they \1-52S] always pulled down the curtains. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 579 



/ 



Of course, the police were watching all the time to prevent any for- 
eigner from coming into that area. That is just one little instance, 
but that was the wdiole system throughout Japan, and it was ex- 
ceedingly difficult to get accurate information about what they were 
doing. 

Senator Lucas. Did I understand you to say in your direct examina- 
tion that the ten-point program that was promulgated by Mr. Hull 
was published in one newspaper in Japan and that newspaper was 
immediately confiscated? Is that correct ? , 

Mr. Grew. That is correct, sir, yes sir. 

Senator Lucas. That was after the attack on Pearl arbor ? 

Mr. Grew. That was after Pearl Harbor. That, as far as I was 
concerned, was of course hearsay, because I was locked up in the 
Embassy and had no contacts with the outside. 

Senator Lucas. Did you have an opportunity while you were locked 
up in the Embassy to read the daily Japanese newspapers? 

Mr. Grew. After about two or three weeks of our interment, I have 
forgotten how long it was, they finally did allow the Japanese news- 
papers to come in to us. The first few weeks they did not. 

[1526] Senator Lucas. The first few weeks you were totally 
ignorant of what was going on ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes. I would not like to set a date on it. I would have 
to consult my record. 

Senator Lucas. Anyhow, they had no free press in Japan, as far as 
the publication of any document was concerned ? 

Mr. Grew. Absolutely not. It was completely controlled. 

Senator Lucas. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Ambassador, you have already been asked about 
the Army Pearl Harbor Report at page 51. So that the record will be 
clear, I would also like to ask you about the part at page 27, which 
reads as follows : 

This is tbe memorandum asking the President not to precipitate an ultimatum 
with the Japanese and to give tlie Army and Navy more time within wliich to 
prepare, but it was too late as the die had been cast by tlie Secretary of State iu 
handing the Ten-points counter-proposals to the Japanese on the previous day, 
and it was, as the Secretary of State remarked, washing his hands of the matter. 

Then, again, on page 56, and I quote : 

The Secretary of State— the Honorable Cordell Hull. The action of the Secre- 
tary of State in delivering the [^527] counter-proposals of November 26, 
1941, was used by the Japanese as the signal to begin the war by the attack on 
Pearl Harbor. To the extent that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with 
the efforts of the War and Navy departments to gain time for preparation for war. 
However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of irreconcilable 
disagreements between the Japanese Empire and the American Govei-nment. 

I would like to state for the record that the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board did not have the benefit of the testimony of Admiral Inglis, 
apparently. 

I am wondering if counsel is familiar with the report, whether the 
Army had the benefit of the testimony, to the effect that the Jap Fleet 
was advancing on November 25 in the direction of American waters? 
Are you familiar with that, counsel, whether there was such knowledge 
in the Army Board, or such evidence? 



580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. I believe at the time of the Army Board hearing, at 
least a good poi-tion of it was missing. There was even doubt as to 
Avhere the Jap transpoit started from. 

Mr. Murphy. Tlien, at any rate, this evidence which has been intro- 
duced would throw a new light on the advance of the Japs from Novem- 
ber 25, and you, Mr. Ambassador, would be right in saying it was about 
the time of the note of the 26th, but not \ 16^28] " that the note 
of the 26th was (lie cause of the act; is that right? 

Mr. Grew\ Tliat is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you answer? 

Mr. Grew. I said I think that is correct, sir. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. Now, then, Mr. Ambassador, I direct your attention 
to page 359 of your book — or first to page 358 of the book in which 
you stated that — and I am reading now from the second to the last 
paragraph : 

it may become open to question whether we can afford to await a British victory 
and whether we should allow Japan to dig in throughout the area where she now 
visualizes far-flung control. That question, I think, will dei)end upon the tempo 
of tlie .Japanese advance. In the meantime let us keep our powder dry and be 
ready — for anything. 

Those were your sentiments, I take it? That is on page 358. 

Mr. Grew. Page 358? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Those were your sentiments as of January 1, 
1941; is that right? That is the second to the last paragraph, near 
the bottom of the page. 

Mr. Grew. Yes; I have it. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you hear my question ? 

\lo29'] Mr. Grew. I would like to have it again. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you read the question, Mr. Stenogi-apher ? 

(The question w^as read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Murphy. I say, those were your sentiments as on the first of 
the year 1941 ? 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, will you turn to page 365? 

At page 365 you make a statement to the effect that the Germans 
were opposing the sending of Ambassador Nomura to Washington and 
that they were trying to break diplomatic relations with the United 
States. Was that your considered judgment as of January 3, 1941? 

Mr. Grew. Tha"t is true. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I direct your attention to page 366, to an 
editorial in the Kokumin. You refer there to a Japanese editorial and 
a warning of Avar with America. Is that the kind of editorials that 
were running in the papers in Japan on January 7, 1941? ^ 

Mr. Grew. Mr. Congi-essman, yes, that is the sort of editorial that 
was appearing at that time, but all sorts of editorials were appearing. 
The Japanese press, I would say, was totally irresponsible in its edi- 
torial statements and often in its actual reports. 

\1630^ Mr. MuRPiiY. Then, I direct your attention to page 366, 
the hmcheon at which you were present and at which Matsuoka prac- 
tically threatened the United States with war, on January 18, 1941. 
Did that occur? 

Ml'. Grew. What is that? 

Mr. Murphy. That is the first line of the second paragraph under 
your note of January 18. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 581 

The Chairman. He asked if that occurred. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; that did occur at that luncheon. I think it is 
rather important for the record that this whole passage should be 
read, that is, after I have looked into it. 

The Chairman. Read it. 

Mr. JMuRPHY. Will you read the pertinent part that you think 
should go in the record? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

January 18, 1941. 

At the Farewell Lunclieon giveu by Matsuoka for Admiral Noiiiura today I was 
talking with them both and was expressing the hope that the Admiral would be 
able to exert his influence — I didn't say where the influence was to be exerted — 
to improve American-Japanese relations. Matsuoka remarked : "They certainly 
couldn't be worse," and turned away. 

At the luncheon also practically threatened the United States with war, and I 
immediately replied to the [1531] following effect: "The Minister too has 
lived long enough in the United States to know that the American people are 
fundamentally peace-minded and furthermore that they stand for justice and 
equity. He also knows that the American people are tirnily determined on cer- 
tain matters among which, on the one hand, are their obligations and, on tlie 
other hand, their rights. Their profoundest wish is to see peace, prosperity, 
security, stability, and happiness assured to all nations. In the present state of 
world affairs we must inevitably realize that what counts in international rela- 
tionships today is the concrete evidence of facts and actions, regardless of the 
persuasive garb in which such facts and actions may be dressed. Let us say 
of nations as of men : 'by their fruits ye shall know them'." 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, Mr. Ambassador, you were asked about 
the Fleet being in the Pacific, and you stated certain Japanese felt the 
Fleet should be taken entirely out of the Pacific. I direct your at- 
tention to page 368 of your book, to an editorial, or rather an item 
in the Korean-Japanese language daily newspapers in which the fol- 
lowing occurs : 

Should Japan make a proposal it would be for instant withdrawal of the 
American Fleet from the Pacific. 

[1-532] Were editorials of that nature, or statements of that 
nature made in other papers in Japan? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. That thought appeared from time to time in 
the Japanese press. 

Mr. Murphy. I direct your attention to page 378 of your book and 
I note that you record the fact, under your entry of April 10, 1941, 
that "Matsuoka went to Europe." Is that right? 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 

[1533] Mr. Murphy. That, Mr. Chairman, is the reason for my 
asking for the exhibit from the Nuremburg trials, to follow up with 
the trip of Mr. Matsuoka at that time. 

I direct your attention to page 390 of your book. There was some 
testimony given to the committee by Admiral Richardson to the effect 
that his impression was that the United States was bluffing. In con- 
nection with the word "bluffing" and the idea of "bluffing" I direct 
your attention to page 390 o*f your book where you make reference 
to the fact that the Japanese had tried to intimidate you. 

Will you expand on that a little bit, please? I direct your atten- 
tion to the middle of the page. 

Mr. Grew. This statement, Congressman, as I remember it, was 
based on a long talk I had with Mr. Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, 
at his own private house, walking up and down his garden, and just 
chatting about the things, and I say : 



582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Minister thereupon makes perfectly clear his interpretation of the Tri- 
partite Pact to the effect that if the United States should convoy its ships to 
England and if Germany should sink such ships, and if war with Germany 
should result, he, Mr. Matsuoka, would rejiard the United States as an aasressor 
in the sense of Article III of the Pact, and it is his belief that war would there- 
upon ensue between Japan and the United [J53Jf] States. He adds that 
this is only his own opinion and that there would have to be a deliberation not 
only among his colleagues in the Japanese Govei-nment but with Japan's allies, in 
which deliberation Japan would have but one out of tliree votes. (In this connec- 
tion it is interesting to note that when Germany attacked Greece this spring, 
Mr. Matsuoka, according to the Greek Minister here, informed Mr. Politis that 
Japan herself would determine her obligation under the Tripartite Pact, that 
her decision would be guided by common sense, and that Mr. Matsuoka thought 
that it was quite clear what the decision would be. Nothing was then said of 
Japan having but one out of thi'ee votes.) 

I expressed my surprise at that statement. 

I also noted in that entry on that particidar day : 

Soon after Mr. Matsuoka took office he indicated that his platform would be 
that the United States could and should be intimidated into adopting an atti- 
tude of complete isolation with regard to both the Far East aad Eurojie. That 
platform was implemented by the Three Power Alliance, which action not only 
failed to have the desired effect but was one of the major factors in stimulating 
the trend of American opinion away from isolationism. It would seem that, 
despite the egragious [153')] failure of that attempt, Mr. MatsuolSa would 
prefer to persist in a course fraught with the gravest dangers than to chart a 
new course which would constitute admission on his part tliat he had completely 
misread the character and temper of the American people, and wliich would in- 
evitably make his position as Foreign Minister untenable. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate you did state in your entry on pa^e 390 
that : 

He at once expresses his astonisinnent that Mr. Hull had sent for Admiral 
Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, and had told him that Mr. 
Matsuoka had sought to "intimidate" me in our conversation on the 14th. 

Mr. Grew. That is true. 

Mr. Murphy. Finally, I direct your attention to pa^je 415 of your 
book. You were asked whether or not you knew of these Japanese 
intercepts. You were also asked the question, at least the question has 
been raised here, whether the Japanese knew of our messages. You 
make a statement on page 415 which would seem to indicate that the 
Japanese knew of some of our messages, except "one confidential code" ; 
is that correct? 

Mr. Grew. That is true. I can tell j'^ou how that came about. One 
of the high officials of the Japanese Government _ \lo36^^ wanted 
to send a secret message to our Government which they did not want 
the Japanese military to see and in passing this message on they 
asked me to please put it in our most secret code. I said of course I 
would do so. Then after a little hemming-and-hawing this official 
said to me, "We understand that you have one code which is un- 
breakable." 

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster, 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Ambassador, in connection with the basing 
of the Fleet at Hawaii, stationing it there, when did you first have 
knowledge of that? 

Mr. Grew. I beg your pardon, I didn't understand. 

Senator Brewster. When did you first have knowledge of the Fleet 
beino- retained at Honolulu? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 583 

Mr, GiiEW. Retained at Honolulu ? 

Senator Brewster. Retained ; yes. 

Mr. Grew. Well, I can't remember the precise date. 

Senator Brewster. I inquire with particular relation to whether 
or not you were advised in advance or whether you learned of it after 
the event ; that is what I am concerned with. 

Mr, Grew. Frankly, Senator, I couldn't answer that question without 
consulting the record. I have no recollection of having been specific- 
ally advised of it. 

Senator Brewster. Could you say whether or not you were 
[1637] asked for an opinion or whether you were consulted in 
advance, before that action was taken? 

Mr. Grew. I have no recollection of that, Senator. I would have 
to look at the record. 

Senator Brewster. You have no recollection that you were, but if 
you find that you were you will advise us ? ^ 

Mr. Grew. Right. 

Senator Brewster. So that if Ave have no further record we will 
understand that you were not consulted before the event. 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 

Senator Brewster. You understand that the Fleet went out to Pearl 
Harbor for maneuvers in March or April 1940 and subsequently on 
May 7 I believe the decision was notified to Pearl Harbor that the 
Fleet would be retained there and so far as the evidence now shows 
it remained there from then on, based at Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. You have just spoken about the code. Did you 
ever have any reason to think that the Japs had knowledge of our 
codes or were getting any of our messages ? 

Mr. Grew, Well, I think that, from that which the official men- 
tioned, to the effect that he understood that we had one code that was 
unbreakable, I think that implied that they were able to break our 
other codes, but I have no concrete evidence on that, Senator. 

Senator Brewster, Did you ever have reason to think that they 
knew we were breaking some or all of their codes ? 

Mr, Grew, I have no [1538] evidence to that effect. Senator. 

Senator Brewster, Nothing ever came to your attention which 
would indicate that they even had a suspicion of that? 

Mr, Grew, No, sir ; it did not. 

Senator Brewster, Did you receive copies of any of these intercepts 
at any time, of the diplomatic communications? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir ; I received no copies of such intercepts. 

Senator Brewster. Were you ever apprised of the information 
which they contained? 

Mr. Grew, No, sir. 

Senator Brewster, So you proceeded all through this period with- 
out whatever benefit there may have been to that knowledge in ap- 
praising the situation ? 

Mr, Grew, Yes, sir. 

Senator BREw^'^TER, As one of, perhaps, more experience than any 
other single person in our country with the Japanese, their prepara- 
tions and their psychology, would you give us your opinion as to 
whether there was any possibility that if the modus vivendi, which 

* See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1711. 



584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

we have heard discussed, which was under consideration in the latter 
part of November, had been submitted to the Japanese instead of the 
message that was sub- [loJO] mitted, that it would have made 
any difference in the action of the Japanese at that time^ 

]\Ir. Gkkw, My impression is that it would have made no difference. 

Senator Brewster. That they were determined on that course and 
that they, irrespective of our replies, short of a complete surrender to 
their message, would have continued on? 

Mr. Grew. I feel that. 

Senator Brewster. Was that because of their situation at the time 
in a military sense or did it rest on other factors? 

Mr. Grew. It was based mainly on the fact that throughout those 
many years the military had been developing the program, gradually 
exerting control over all of east Asia, which they called their pros- 
perity sphere, first economic control, to be followed by gradual polit- 
ical control, and every step taken by the Japanese military was to the 
way of implementing that program. 

Senator Brewster. Now, there had gone on, for a considerable pe- 
riod, over some years, the policy of allowing Japanese to secure scrap 
iron and aviation gasoline from our country before their right in 
that respect finally terminated. To what extent, if you recall, were 
you consulted in connection with the various decisions to permit that 
traffic to go on ? 

Mr. Grew. I cannot recollect now whether that precise [1540^ 
question was asked me or not, but I frankly expressed my own opinion 
from time to time in my reports. 

Senator Brewster. What were they? 

Mr. Grew. Those opinions were rather concisely stated in the Army 
Report. Would you wish to have me rehearse that statement? 

Senator Brewster. If you would; yes. 

Mr. Gre^v. Shall I read it? 

Senator Brewster. Whichever way you prefer. 

Mr. Grew (reading) : 

During the period up to, I tliinlt it was, the autumn of 1940, I took the 
position tliat economic embargoes against Japan — and embargoes are in the 
nature of sanctions and tlierefore are always interpreted as international 
insults — I took the position that we should not put embargoes on Japan, until 
we were prepared to go all the way through with whatever might result from 
those embar.s-'oes. 

I pointed out that when we put emI)argoes against .Tapan into effect, our rela- 
tions with that country were bound to go steadily downhill and it might, and 
probably would, end in war, and that until we wei'e prepared to go to war 
with Japan, I felt it would be very shortsighted to go into a situation where 
we might be obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. There is 
[/5.'//l nothing so conducive to a lowering of national prestige, reputation 
and authority as to make threats and then have to recall those threats or 
modify those threats. 

We saw that working out in the relations between Great Britain and Italy 
at the time of the Abysinnian campaign. 

But, in (he autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I felt 
that time had then come, since .Japan was threatening not only our national 
interests, l>ut, T would say, our vital national intei-ests ; I felt that the time 
had come to consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan's expansion, 
but when. It seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for 
war or not. that we must in our own interests put those embargoes into effect ; 
and shortly thereafter, those embargoes were put into effect. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 585 

Our relations then started directly on a downhill course, and they ended 
in war but at least we were more prepared for war at that time than we had 
been three years earlier. 

It was in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic sanc- 
tions. 

That, in general, expressed my views at that time. Senator. In 
other words, I didn't want to see us get into a [-?'54^] position 
with tlie Japanese where we might be obliged to step back in our tracks 
until we were ready to go ahead with whatever program we put into 
effect. 

Of course, at the same time, especially after the autumn of 1940, 
when we realized that there was always the risk of conflict, I felt 
we couldn't afford to continue to give these materials to the Japa- 
nese, that might eventually be used against us. 

Senator Brewster. So that you were of the opinion then, and events 
have seemed to justify it, that that did mean a very definite breach 
which might well eventually lead to war? 

]Mr. Grew. There was always that possibility. It was something 
to be taken into consideration. 

Senator Brewster. The economic impact of the embargo upon 
Japan would tend to force them to some move in order to maintain 
their present economic position? 

Mr. Grew. The longer those embargoes went on, of course, the more 
difficult their economic position became. They had very large stocks 
of those commodities themselves. 

Senator Brewster. Of this scrap iron and gasoline ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes ; very large stocks. So there was no telling at what 
point they would feel they must go down and get the oil by force. 
We couldn't possibly foresee that. 

Senator Brewster. Now, we were in the same position 

115/^3] Mr. Grew. I would like to add, if I may, this statement. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. Whether in the meantime they would be able to come 
to some kind of an agreement with the United States and satisfy the 
Netherlands Indies by which they would be able to have access to that 
oil without fighting. 

Senator Brewster. The negotiations with the Dutch East Indies 
went on following that time in their attempt to secure access to those 
supplies ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster, So that in both the case of the embargoes and 
the case of the fleet at Hawaii, they constituted action from which 
once taken we were compelled to follow through ? That is, we couldn't 
take then a backward step? 

Mr. Grew. It was merely my personal view that it would be a 
mistake to initiate that action and then have to withdraw that action. 

Senator Brewster. Both of those actions, the embargo and the sta- 
tioning of the fleet at Hawaii, constituted a show of firmness on the 
part of the United States in the situation, did they not? 

Mr. Grew. Yes; the policy which I had recommended. 

Senator Brewster. In the case of the embargo, the embargo was 
recommended by vou ? 

\1544] Mr. 'Grew. Yes. 



586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. So far as you know, the location of the fleet 
was not a matter on which you recollect being consulted ? 

Mr. Grew. I do not. 

Senator Brewster. Subsequent to the stationing of the fleet at 
Pearl Harbor, did you have occasion to express an opinion regarding 
its consequences or effects? 

]\Ir. Grew. Senator, that is perfectly possible, but I made, of course, 
a great many reports to Washington during those years, and I can't 
for the moment recollect wliether I actually touched on that point 
in some of my reports or not. I probably did. It would be rather 
diflicult to put my hands on it. 

Senator Brewster. Do you recall whether your opinion was ever 
asked regarding it ? 

Mr. Grew. I can't recall that particular i)oint; no. 

Senator Brewster. Would you examine the records and find out 
if you were and let us know subsequently, as it may be a matter that 
will be of considerable concern, as to any opinion which you did 
express as to the effect, as you were, naturally, the one on whom we 
would depend for an estimate of Japanese opinion? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.^ 

[1S4S] Senator Brewster. So far as you now recall, you do not 
recollect the expression of an opinion on that point? 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 

Senator Brewster. But you will let us know? 

Mr. Grew. I will do my best to check it. 

Senator Brewster. You served subsequently for a time after you 
returned here as Under Secretary of State, did you not? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. For how long a period was that? 

Mr. Grew. When I came back from Japan I was appointed assistant 
to the Secretary of State and spent most of that time going around 
the country making a great many speeches about what we were up 
against in fighting Japan, and I was later appointed Director of the 
Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department. I don't recollect 
the precise date. I held that position for something like six months 
or more. And then in December 1944 I was appointed Under Secre- 
tary of State and remained in that position until I retired from the 
service on September 30. 

Senator Brewster. 19 

Mr. Grew. 1945. 

Senator Brewster. How long did you spend in the , diplomatic 
service ? 

\IS40'] Mr. Grew. I have been in the service for 41 years. 
From the 10th of July 1904 to the 30th of September 1945. 

Senator Brewster. You heard our discussion with Mr. Welles yes- 
terday. I would like an expression of j^our opinion as to whether 
or not in the functioning of our diplomatic service the creation of a 
permanent Under Secretariat might be of benefit to the functioning 
of the service and of our foreign relations? 

Mr. Grew. T feel very strongly that it would be. 

Now, in our service, of course, no matter what party we may have 
belonged to, when we come into the service we are supposed to be 
absolutely nonpartisan. We are to serve the Government. 

1 See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1711. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 587 

For instance, William Phillips and I were both twice Under Secre- 
tary of State and we both served once under a Republican Adminis- 
tration and once under a Democratic Administration. So it is per- 
fectly possible to serve administrations of both parties over a period 
of time. 

Any officer who cannot go along with the policy of the Government 
in control at that time naturally wouldn't be wotth his salt if he felt 
he couldn't conscientiously carry out that -policy and should retire, 
without any question. 

Senator Brewster. In the instance which you mentioned, in con- 
nection with the service of both yourself and Mr. Phillips, [134-7] 
that illustrates the attempt of the administrations under which you 
served to accomplish this benefit of, let us call it, nonpartisan service, 
but did not give us the benefit of what the British accomplish by their 
permanent Under Secretariat, who are recognized officials, to con- 
tinue irrespective of a change of administration. 

So that, as I gather, you would feel tl^at development along those 
lines might well be beneficial ? 

Mr. Grew. In general, in principle, I feel very strongly that it 
would be. 

There is only one reservation I would make. That is this, that 
unless personal relations between the Secretary of State and his Under 
Secretary are of the closest and most intimate nature, with complete 
mutual confidence, it just doesn't work. So if a situation arose wdiere 
a new Secretary of State found that he could not establish those rela- 
tions with the permanent Under Secretary, or vice versa, I think there 
would have to be a change. 

Senator Brewster. I think Mr. Welles made the point that under 
the British system there were two Under Secretaries, one permanent 
and the other transitory. 

Mr. Grew. One is a Parliamentary Under Secretary; he is a i)o- 
litical appointee. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. Would it not also be true that [1548] 
the personal difficulties of which you speak presumably would be 
eliminated as far as an individual is concerned before he had risen 
to the rank of a permanent Under Secretary, that he never would 
^achieve such responsible position until he had demonstrated the 
capacity to serve varying points of view and varying administrations? 

Mr. Grew. In all probability that is true. 

Senator Brewster. That is all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Grew, there has been some discussion of what 
is and what is not an ultimatum. Would you define what you conceive 
an ultimatum to be ? 

Mr. Grew^ I think, sir, to give a technical definition I would have 
to look it up in the dictionary, but I would say it was, essentially, a 
last word. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, Mr. Hull has defined the Japanese message 
which was handed to him on November 20 as an ultimatum. 

That agreement would require the United States to abandon all of 
its time-honored principles, in the event we accepted the agreement 
the Japanese offered. You have so interpreted it? 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 



588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Geariiart. It would have required us to consent to the mainte- 
nance in China of the Japanese armies and the con- [i^'^W] 
tinuance of the Japanese armies in Indochina; it would have required 
us to confirm their occupancy of Manchuria ; it probably would have 
required us to abandon the principle of the open door; it would 
require us to acknowledge the existence of, if not to consent to, the 
agreement they had' made with the Axis; genornlly speaking that is 
true, isn't it? 

Mr. Grew. That is true, I would say. 

Mr. Gearhart. Therefore, if we had accepted the Japanese agree- 
ment of November 20 we would have had to give up everything that 
Americans call near and dear, pretty near? 

Mr. Grew. We certainly would have had to abandon principles for 
which we had stood. 

Mr. Gearhart. And had stood for for many yeai's? 

Mr. Grew. Exactly. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, we didn't do it. We offered on the 2Gth a 
counter-agreement which, if accepted, would have re(]uired the Japa- 
nese to have withdrawn their armies from Indochina ; would have 
required the Japanese to withdraAV their armies from China ; woidd 
have required the Japanese to withdraw their recognition of the Wei 
Government; would have required the Japanese to recognize the 
Chiang Kai-shek Government; would have required them to interpret 
the Axis agreement so as not to interfere with any of tliose matters. 

Now, if Japan had accepted our agreement she would simply 
[1550] have said, "Excuse, please," and withdrawn all her armies 
and abandoned her campaign of aggression and have gone back to 
Japan. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir ; but that is only a part of the story. 

In other words, Mr. Hull, in his proposal of November 2(), offered 
Japan a grent many assets. It offered Jajjan, as I said a few moments 
ago, eventually a relaxation of our economic measures. It offered 
access to raw materials, free trade and commerce, financial coopera- 
tion and support, and various other things. So that Japan would have 
had, I would say, not only a great deal to gain but everything to gain 
by accepting that proposal. 

Mr. Gearhart. There is no doubt but what there were some very 
generous inducements offered to tlie Japanese, but the other issues, 
the ones that I have named, were absolutely inconsistent with all that 
Japan had been trying to accom})lish during tlie last several years. 
She would have had to admit that she was mistakeji and would have 
had to withdraw and go back to Japan, witlidraw her armies and 
admit that she was wrong, which she would have done, but she was 
not prepared to do it at that time, was she ? 

Mr. Grew. She absolutely was not prepared to, but my feeling was, 
at that time, and I so stated in my diary, that Japan, since public 
opinion in Japan is rather easily molded \ lool] in a com- 
paratively short period, as the Government was able to bring pre^ssure 
to bear on the people, my feeling was that they could persuade the 
people that the Japanese Government, in the face of the military, 
could have persuaded the people that they had achieved by peaceful 
measures everything that they were ostensibly fighting for. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 589 

They were ostensibly fig'litiiig for economic, political, and social 
security. Those things would all have flown from the implementation 
of Mr. Hull's proposals if they had carried it out. Not at once, but 
over a period of time. In my opinion, the Japanese Government, if 
it had really wanted to come to some kind of an agreement, could have 
persuaded the people that this was all in their interest. 

Mr. Gearhart. But Japan would have had to abandon her ruthless 
campaign of aggression and conquest? 

Mr. Grew. Very definitely. That was fundamental. 

Mr. Gearhart. And that was what they had been doing. She had 
been spending millions of yen, whatever they were, she had sacrificed 
hundreds of thousands of lives, and if she had to give up and abandon 
her ruthless conquests that would have constituted an ignominious 
defeat for her statesmen who had led her into her awful position; 
isn't that true? 

Mr. Grew. When you speak of Japan you must realize that there 
is more than one Japan. You have your military [1552] 
extremists. 

Mr. Gearhart. They were running the show and had been ever 
since the so-called prosperity scheme of robbery began. 

Mr. Grew. They had been in control from time to time, but there 
were periods of relaxation, and there is no question but what some, 
at least, of their more intelligent statesmen, especially those who had 
been in our country and knew something about our powers of produc- 
tion, our national spirit, and all the rest of it, realized they would 
probably, in the case of war with the United States, ultimately be 
defeated, and nuist have realized at that time that they were on the 
brink of an abyss. 

If those statesmen had had the courage to take the bull by the horns 
they might then have shifted the whole situation. I don't say they 
could have done it, I don't say they would have tried to do it, but 
there was always that possibility. 

Mr, Gearhart. Well, statesmen were not running Japan ; the mili- 
tarists were running it at that time, weren't they ? 

Mr. Grew. That is perfectly true. 

Mr. Gearhart. They were' the ones who led the people of Japan 
into this terrible mistake, and they would be the last to admit it by 
adopting any suggestion of the United States which would require 
them to withdraw their troops from China and Indochina and Man- 
churia, 

[155S] Mr. Grew. True, and that is why the doubt was ex- 
pressed that this proposal of Mr, Hull would bring satisfactory 
results, 

Mr, Gearhart. Did Mr, Hull suggest that that statement was not 
an ultimatum ? Do you mean to say Mr, Hull was willing to negotiate 
the question as to whether or not Japanese soldiers should stay in 
Indochina ? 

Mr, Grew, If you read the document 

Mr. Gearhart. I have read it. 

Mr. Grew. I think you will se? it is not in itself an ultimatum, 

Mr. Gearhart, It is a tendered agreement, 

Mr, Grew. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. It is in the form of a tendered agreement. 



590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr, Grew. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. One of the specifications is that Japan should get 
her troops out of Indochina. 

Mr. Grew. Correct. 

Mr. Gearhart. If that wasn't an ultimatum in itself, that they 
should get their troops out of Indochina, then the United States was 
willing to compromise on that question and discuss something else. 

Mr. Grew. N >. AH I can say is that document contained a very 
important quid pro quo 

Mr. Gearhart. Don't talk about a quid pro quo. Whether 
[1554-] the Japs thought there was a quid pro quo in there is one 
question. The other question is, were we willing to temporize on 
that question of her getting out of Indochina and China. 

Mr. Grew. We were not willing to temporize. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then that was an ultimatum on that question, wasn't 
it? 

Mr. Grew. Can you say, Mr. Congressman, because there is a point 
in a document which definitely }nust be carried out that the whole 
document and all the points thereiii constitute an ultimatum? I would 
not say so. I would say that was a carefully balanced document. 
There is a great deal on the other side of the picture. 

Mr. Gearhart. There is another stipulation in the agreement pro- 
viding that Japan should get out of China and recognize the Chiang 
Kai-shek government. W^as that a point upon which we were willing 
to compromise and-tempoi-ize or consult? 

Mr. (jREw. I think in the long run if we were going to stand on our 
principles it was essential that Japan should give up all her policy of 
aggression. 

Now, I can't say that we would have demanded on the basis of that 
document that the Japanese get out of China in a week or in a month. 
They probably couldn't do it. But I think there was an opening there 
for an arrangement by which the Japanese could get out of Indochina 
and China and in the light [1555] of the great benefits which 
they would have received as a result could have done it. 

Mr. Gearhart. The question I am asking you as an expert in state- 
craft is this: Were we willing to compromise-or temporize or even 
discuss a change in that particular stipulation, in that contract, which 
required Japan to get out of China and recognize the nationalist gov- 
ernment there headed by Chiang Kai-shek? 

Ml". Grew. I couldn't answer that. I couldn't ansAvcr for what the 
administration might have done. 

Ml', (tearhart. I thought Ave were contending for principles when 
we tendei'ed that agreement to the Japanese. 

INIr. Grew. You thought that we were what? 

Mr. Gearhart. Wasn't it a fundamental principle in our demands 
ui)on Japan that Japan should get out of China and Indochina and 
recognize the nationalist government and respect the territorial in- 
tegrity of all those eastern countries? 

Mr. Grew. That had been a fundamental principle with us for 
years. 

Mr. Gearhart. Therefore that was not a matter which America 
would compromise on, was it? 

Mr. Grew. It was, not a matter on which we would haA'e willingly 
compromised. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 591 

Mr. Geakhaet. Then, insofar as that stipulation was concerned, tJie 
Hull tendered agreement constituted an ultimatum, didn't it? 

Mr. Grew. I would not say so. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then if it were not an ultimatum, it was an item 
upon which we, America, were willing to compromise ? 

Mr. Grew. I am sorry, I can't agree. In every document of that 
kind there are some points which are matters of principle which we 
do not accept. There are other points which would be open for 
modification. That doesn't mean that because there are two points 
in a document such as tliat, that the whole document is an ultimatum. 
As I say, there was a great deal on the other side of the picture. 

Mr. Gearhart. We undoubtedly would have offered greater induce- 
ments if she had negotiated further. At least 1 think we would have. 
if we could have gotten those other main concessions. If we had been 
able to induce her to sign an agreement by which she would get out 
of China and Indochina and would recognize the Chiang Kai-shek 
government we could give a lot. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Those were the things she would not concede. 

Mr. Grew. Without cjuestion. 

Mp. Gearhart. Those were the things we would not concede and 
neither would she. 

[1557] Mr. Grf:w. There were certain things we couldn't have 
conceded. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then the United States raised a stone w^all and 
Japan had a stone wall. They came to an impasse at that moment, 
didn't they? 

Mr. Grew. I don't think that that justifies us in calling that pro- 
posal an ultimatum, Congressman. 

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you see what I am trying to do? 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Mr, Gearhart. I am trying to get you to admit that that document 
is what every American in liis lienrt wanted it to be. I don't think 
you should dodge on this ultimatum word. That, in days to come, 
is going to be one of the most glorious incidents in American history. 
The time when we took our stand. Why, of course, we told the world 
that America stood for principles, for good international relation- 
ships, for good neighborliness, in that agreement. For some reason 
a lot of people are quibbling and saying we didn't really mean it; we 
were willing to discuss and talk further about Japan ending that des- 
picable program of hers called the coprosperity sphere for East Asia. 

[1558] The Chairman. Is that a question? 

Mr. Grew. Is that a question ? 

IVIr. Gearhart. Now, don't be hurrying me, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. I was simply asking whether the Ambassador un- 
derstood that that was a question. 

Mr. Grew. No; I did not, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. I did not expect you to answer. 

Mr. Greav. Was that in the form of a question. Congressman? 

Mr. Gearvart. Yes; I will put it in the form of a question. I 
would like to have your views on this subject. 



592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Grew. In answer to that Lean say that through all these years 
our Government stood on certain fundamental principles of interna- 
tional dealing; at least those were very comprehensively expressed 
in Mr. Hull's four points which had been put up to the Japanese Gov- 
ernment before. 

We have never, so far as I know, departed from those principles at 
any time. Mr. Hull said he supported those principles in every step 
he took, but at the same time in supporting those })rinciples and in 
expecting that the Japanese, in order to abide by the principles, would 
have to get out of Indochina and China, he was oflfering them some- 
thing which, as I say, would have completely justified their having 
accepted those points. 

[1550] Mr. Gearhart. All right. Then -uill you go this far 
with me, Mr. Ambassador : Will you admit that tliat pnvt of that docu- 
ment which would have required Japan if she had accepted it to get 
out of China and get out of Indochina and get out of Manchuria and 
quit the aggression, was that part of it an ultimatum? 

Mr. Grew. Mr. Congressman, I do not think you can take any part 
of any document and use the term "ultimatum" for it. The term 
"ultimatum" essentially applies to a complete document. I would not 
say that that term would apply to any part of that document ; no, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? I have 
Webster here on the question of "ultimatum." 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Noah Webster, ^Mr. Daniel Webster, or who'^ 
Do you want to read that into the record ? 

Mr. Murphy. I think it would help the record. 

Mr. Gearhart. How many definitions are there? 

The Chairman. The gentleman will read them all. 

Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

A final proposition, concession or condition ; especially, the final propositions, 
conditions or terms offered by either of the parties in a diplomatic negotiation ; 
the best terms that a negotiator will offer, the rejection of which usually ends 
the negotiations. 

[1560] Mr. Gearhart. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Mukphy. Webster's new International Dictionary. 

Mr. Gearhart. Will j'ou say that the stipulation in that tendered 
agreement that Japan should get out of China, out of Indochina, out 
of Manchuria, and to recognize the nationalistic government of China 
was not final? 

Mr. Grfav. The mere fact that we insisted that those things should 
be a prerequisite for a building up of relations between the United 
States an<l Ja]:)an does not, in my mind, characterize that proposal, 
that whole proposal as an ultimatum because there was another side to 
it and a very iuqjortant side and I think you have got to take the 
thing as a whole. I do not think you can take part of it and apply 
a definition to it. 

Mr. Gearhart. But, Ambassador Grew, you are not suggesting to 
ine that we were willing to take those things out of tlie agreement in 
order to placate Japan ? 

Mr. Grew. No; we were not going to take them out. They Avere 
part and parcel of the whole thing. 

Mr. Gkarhart. Yes; but 1 am talking about a ])art of the whole 
thing; insofar as those parts of the whole thing are concerned it 
was an ultimatum, wasn't it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 593 

Mr, Gkew. I would not say ?o. 

Mr. Gkariiart. Well, I would like to take tlie other view [1561] 
of it. 

The Chairman. That having been settled, you may go ahead now. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right. 

This phrase which you have used and which has brought you much 
fame, namely, that the document which Mr. Hull handed to Am- 
bassador Nomura and Special Envoj^ Kurusu constituted ''the docu- 
ment which touched the button which started the war." 

When did you first use that phrase ? 

Mr. Grew. I did not use that phrase, Congressman Gearhart. I, a 
moment ago, I think, read the testimony which is, I believe, before the 
Army Board, which I think makes perfectly clear that I did not. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is very true; I heard that testimony on that 
a moment ago. The question I am asking you now is when did you 
express that sentiment first? It could not have been at those hear- 
ings because we read it in the newspapers long before you gave that 
testimony. I want to know when you first expressed that sentiment? 

Mr. Grew. Well, I do not believe, Mr. Congressman, that I ever 
expressed that sentiment in those precise terms. I realized that the 
Japanese military people had seen fit to call that document an ulti- 
matum and to use it, as they alleged, to touch the button which started 
the war, but I do not think [1562] I have ever said that did, in 
itself, touch the button ; no. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, it constituted, if nothing else, a flat rejection 
of the Japanese tendered agreement of November 20, did it not ? 

Mr. Grew. I do not think you can say, Mr. Congressman, that it 
constituted a flat rejection of the Japanese proposal because it added 
a great deal to the Japanese proposal. It added things that the 
Japanese proposal had not even asked, had not ever been touched upon. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, considering its form, it utterly rejected the 
Japanese-tendered agreement of November 20 and stated a counter- 
proposal, didn't it? 

Mr. Grew. I do not know whether it was regarded as a counter- 
proposal or not. I. was not here at the time and I do not know all the 
ins and outs of its preparation, and so forth, but I cannot alter my 
opinion, which is very definite, that in that document we offered the 
Japanese everything that they were ostensibly fighting for. I do not 
say that they actually were fighting for, or anything of that kind, but 
ostensibly what they were fighting for, what they said they were fight- 
ing for. 

Mr. Gearhart. You heard the testimony of Mr. Hull the other day 
when he said they were forcing him and pressing [1563] him for 
an answer to the not of November 11 when he did not see any reason 
why he should answer it at all as ho was tendering a counterproposal ? 

Mr. Grew. I am not sure that I caught that particular point, but 
if Mr. Hull did say that perhaps it could be regarded as a counter- 
proposal. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. But, as I say, I was not here at the time. 

Mr. Gearhart. Since you have been back in America, have you 
looked over the intercepts or any part of them? 

Mr. Grew. No, Mr. Congressman. I have only seen a very few of 
them. From the moment I came back from Tokj^o I found myself 

79716 — 46— pt. 2 14 



594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

veiy busy immediately and I did not have much time to go into post 
mortems, but I have seen some of the main ones but I certainly have 
not seen them all. I think there are a very large number available. 
Mr. Gearhakt. Did you see the ones which the Judge Advocate 
General sums up in these words ^ [Reading:] 

16 November, translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington. 
Referring to message to change dead line of 25th November and to press nego- 
tiations with the United States. 

[1564] Mr, Grew. I do not recollect having seen that particular 
one. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know about the one which has been digested 
by the Judge Advocate General in a memorandum to the Secretary 
of War as follows? 

Mr. Gesell. What date, Congressman? 

Mr. Gearhart. Wait until I get my finger on it. [Reading :] 

22 November ; translated 22 November. 
From Tok.vo to Washington. 

Extends time for signing agreement from '25 November to 29 November. Lat- 
ter is absolute dead line. "After that things are automatically going to happen." 

Have you seen that? 

Mr. Grew. I think it was publlshecl, if I am not mistaken. 

Mr. Gearhart. Oh, yes; both of these have been in the newspapers. 

Mr. Grew. Oh, yes ; I have seen it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, the point is this : The State Department knew 
that the 29th was the dead line, and if the Japanese did not get an 
agreement acceptable to them by the 20th, "things were automatically 
going to happen." 

Now, since the State Department knew about that mes- [15651 
sage they knew that when they tendered the agreement of the 2Gth 
that tliere was no chance of averting whatever Japan was intending 
to do, having failed to get the agreement she wanted, didn't they ? 

Mr. Grew. Congressman, I saw one report in the press — I haven't 
seen the actual intercept — to the elfect that if the conversations be- 
tween the United States and Japan should come to a successful ter- 
mination the Japanese Fleet, even though it was already on its way 
to Pearl Harbor, would have been turned back. Am I right in that 
remark, Counsel? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. I think it is correct. In other worcls^I think that would 
answer that point. 

Mr. Gearhart. That was much earlier, I think. The Japanese 
Fleet was sent, the testimony shows, I think you will all agree, it 
left Japan on the 25th of November and sailed to a designated ren- 
dezvous northwest of Hawaii under instructions to stand by there, 
and if Ja^jan got the agreement it wanted, which would have required 
us to abandon all American principles for which w^e have contended 
for a generation, that they would turn back to their ports, but it all 
turned on Ja])nn getting the agreement she wanted, didn't it? 

Mr. Grew. I cannot answer that question. 

[1566] Mr. Gearhart. And the last tender of agreement which 
Japan made was the one which was delivered to Mr. Hull on Novem- 
ber 20, 1941, is that correct? 



PROCEEDINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 595 

Mr. Grew. Congressman, I still have to stand on my point that 
that memorandum of November 26 contained a great deal on the 
other side of the picture besides what Japan wanted, and what we 
were going to be able to give to Japan and we were going to be able 
to give her a great deal, as expressed in that document. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mind you, I am not criticizing the message of 
November 26. To me it was one of the grandest state papers ever 
delivered. I am not criticizing it. It might be a question as to 
timing, and on that I am reserving consideration, but it was a great 
document, upon which America announced its stand with clarity to 
the entire world, and we ought to be proud of it and not be ducking 
as to whether or not we really meant it as an ultimatum. 

Let us pass from that now. In your testimony you remarked how 
the Japanese press treated the presence of the American Fleet at 
Pearl Harbor. You had access to the press and read those statements 
from day to day as they appeared, did you not ? 

Mr. Grew. Oh, yes ; certainly. 

[1S67] Mr. Gearhart. Now, you knew that Japan had the 
totalitarian form of government that was run by the war cabinet, did 
you not? I guess nobody knew it better than you did. 

Mr. Grew. I would say that Japan had a totalitarian form of gov- 
ernment after the Tojo cabinet came in. Prior to that time I do not 
know that you could call it a totalitarian form of government. Japan 
was made u}) of a great many pressure groups, a great many different 
elements in the country, all of which had to be, to a certain extent, 
pacified by the administration, by the government itself. 

I do not think until the military dictatorship was actually estab- 
lished in October 1941, I do not think you could properly have called 
it a totalitarian government. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, after the Tojo government came into power 
and the militarists had a chance to consolidate their control of things, 
they first established a very rigid censorship, didn't they, over the 
press ? 

Mr. Grew. Very definitely. 

Mr. Gearhart. And that which the press printed for the consump- 
tion of the general public did not necessarily represent what the heads 
of the government were thinking ? 
^ Mr. Grew. True. 

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, they used the press as a propaganda 
agency, isn't that correct? 

Mr. Grew. Constantly. 

[1S68] Mr. Gearhart. So when you tell us that there were items 
appearing in the press from time to time expressing irritation because 
the American Fleet was kept in the Hawaiian waters your were speak- 
ing of a controlled press ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes ; I was speaking of a controlled press. 

Mr. Gearhart. And at that time the Japanese Government was 
busily engaged in promoting an anti-American feeling in Japan, 
were they not ? 

Mr. Grew. It was. 

Mr. Gearhart. And it served their purposes, did it not, at that time 
to instill a measure of fear in Japanese hearts that the American Navy 



596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was about to assault them, or to leave the impression that we were 
threatening to ? Wasn't that part of their program? 

Mr. Grew. To increase in the minds of the Japanese people what? 
I did not get that. 

Mr. Geaiuiart. To leave the impression with the Japanese people 
that the American Fleet at Hawaii was a definite threat against the 
security of Japan? 

Mr. Grew. Oh, yes ; that is true. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, the military heads of the government of 
Japan, being informed by their espionage system of the condition of 
the American Fleet, and so forth, did not necessarily feel that same 
way about it, did they? 

[L569] Mr. Grew. That is quite possible. I cannot answer, 
though. 

Mr. Gearhart. You heard the testimony of Admiral Richardson to 
the effect that the Japanese knew more about the American Fleet 
and battle positions in the Hawaiian Islands than the Americans did 
themselves, didn't you? 

Mr. Grew. Was that my testimony? 

Mr. Gearhart. No. You heard that testimony? 

Mr. Grew. Well, I would not know, Mr. Congressman. Very prob- 
ably, but I have had no evidence of being able to make a concrete state- 
ment on that. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, as a matter of fact, you are familiar with 
Oahu, aren't you, the island that appears on the map here? You 
know it is utterly impossible to conceal anything in Pearl Harbor 
from anybody that wants to go on those mountain sides with a pair 
of binoculars and wants to go up there and see what we have there ;■ 
so if there were any Japanese spies on the islands — and it is suspected 
that there were possibly two or three, it is suspected by everybody 
that possibly there were, there may have been one or two — they knew 
exactly what was going on in the ships and different things in Pearl 
Harbor. It was not possible to conceal from a nation conducting 
espionage against us what was going on there, isn't that correct? 

[1670] Mr. Grew. I think you are right. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. And those spies — if they had spies, and we 
suspect they did — reported, of course, to the militsirists and not to 
the people? 

Mr. Grew. That is true. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, do you thing, basing your answer upon 
the considerations I have just laid before you, that the military high 
command in charge of the Government of Japan felt any restraint 
upon what they were doing in belialf of their programs because of 
the presence of the American fleet in the Hawaiian waters? 

Mr. Grew. Congressman, that is a question purely of opinion. 

Mr. Gearhart. I have a very high respect for yours, Mr. Grew. 

Mr. Grew. I think that the presence of the fleet in Hawaii was 
always, to a certain extent at least, a deterring influence on the Jap- 
anese, including the Japanese Government. 

Mr. Gearhart. Would you have thought that if you had known, 
as the Japs undoubtedly did know, that our fleet was undermanned, 
understaffed, underammunitioned, and very much unready for war? 
Would you have believed that if you had known that, as a diplomat ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 597 

Mr. Grew. Well, that is a hypothetical question, isn't [1571] 
it, Congressman Gearhart ? I did not know, and I do not know whether 
I can satisfactorily answer your question or not. 

You merely wish my opinion as to whether it had a deterrent in- 
fluence on the Japanese Government, who knew that it was not pre- 
pared, is that your point? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. Well, if that were true 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the answer is obvious. 

Mr. Grew. All right, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, let the witness make it, though. 

Mr. Gearhart. If he wants to answer it I am willing to listen. 

Mr. Grew. If that were true. Congressman, if the fleet, whether 
fully prepared for war or not, if it had not had a deterrent influence 
on the Japanese administration or government or military people, 
why did they let their press come out from time to time and prac- 
tically ^demand, convey the preposterous demand that we were to 
withdraw that fleet from the Pacific ? 

Having the general knowledge which they did, if they felt that it 
was a nonentity, and they did have to bother with it at all, I doubt 
if the newspapers would ever have carried that sort of material. 

Mr. Gearhart. For the same reason you mentioned a moment 
[1572] ago, that the Japanese military people have used the press 
for the purpose of propaganda, to instill fear in the people and have 
used it for their own needs. That is the answer to that. The press 
means nothing. The question is what did the militarists know, and 
they had a spy system all over these islands and off our shores and 
they knew what the condition of the fleet was. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; all right, I yield. 

Mr. Murphy. In connection with the statement that the press means 
nothing, it has been stated that the Japan Times and Advertiser re- 
flected the attitude of the war department. I direct your attention 
to the editorial attack of the Japan Times and Advertiser as set forth 
on page 472 of the witness' book. 

Mr. Gearpiart. You are reading something that happened before 
1941, when the militarists took over. 

Mr. MuRPPiY. No; it happened after 1941, Avhen they took over. 

Mr. Gearhart. Your purpose in having me yield to you was what? 

Mr. Murphy. Read my statement, please. 

The Chairman. The Chair thinks that the colloquy ought to take 
place between the committeeman examining the witness [1573] 
and the witness and not go into a discussion between members of the 
committee over the testimony of the witness. Will you proceed ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I want to know what the gentleman had in mind 
when he throws a 400-page book at me. 

Mr. Murphy. There is a statement on page 472 as to the demands 
of Japan, taken from the Japan Times and Advertiser, very strong 
demands on America, stating the attitude of Japan toward America 
and it is supposed to reflect the attitude of the War Department in 
Japan. I want to get it in the record on the question of the press re- 
flecting the attitude of the War Department. 



598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Geakhart. That is precisely what the witness said before, that 
the totalitarians use the press for whatever purposes they want, to 
tell the truth or to tell falsehoods ; it makes no difference. 

Senator Lucas. Let us move on. 

[157 4] Mr. Gearhart. If you make a few more interruptions, 
you will probably speed it up. 

The Chairman. Let the committee proceed to examine the witness 
without further interruption by the members of the committee. 

Mr. Gearhart, All right. Then, I ask you, who, as a diplomat, 
believes that the presence of our American Fleet at Hawaii did have 
a restraining effect upon the Japanese, I will ask you what restrain- 
ing effect it had on the Japanese on December 7, 1941 ? 

Mr. Grew. In answer to the second question, definitely it had no 
effect. On the other hand, during all that preliminary period we al- 
ways kept the Japanese in some doubt. They could not have known, 
for instance, in the preceding period they were going to be able to do 
the damage to our fleet that they did. They could not possibiy have 
foreseen that. That was due to nothing that they could have calcu- 
lated in advance. Therefore, I think that the mere presence of our 
fleet there and lack of certainty as to what it was capable of was, with- 
out question, a deterring influence on them. That does not mean 
that they were not willing to at least make the gamble of the attack, 
which they did, but i^ was a gamble just the same. 

Mr. Gearhart. You will agree that the objective was to [1675} 
cripple the American Fleet in order that they could gain breathing 
time to consolidate their victories in the South Pacific, 

Mr. GrEw. Definitely. 

Mr. Gearhart. And if the American Fleet had been off the shore 
of California, they would have had to travel 2500 miles further in or- 
der to cripple it, would they not? 

Mr. Grew. That is geographically true. 

Mr. Gearhart. And if we, for reasons of policy or reasons of com- 
pulsion had to contemplate aggressive action against Japan in the de- 
fense of this country we would have had to travel 5,000 miles further 
in order to get at the Japs and we would have had to take the fleet 
from where they were stationed and take them to the coast for con- 
ditioning for war, isn't that correct? 

Mr. Grew. That is a naval question. Congressman. I do not think 
I am competent to answer that. 

Mr, Gearhart. You showed you were pretty good in geography 
just a moment ago, and it is still a geographic question. That is all. 

The Chairman, Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson, Mr. Secretary, do you have a copy of your testi- 
mony before the Army Board ? 

[1576] Mr. Greav. I have here only the pages which relate to 
that one single point. Senator, which was brought up today. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not understand. 

Mr. Grew. I have before me only the pages of my testimony before 
the Army which related to that one point which was brought up today. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you come to bring just two or three 
pages ? 

Mr. Grew. How? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 599 

Senator Ferguson. How did you come to have just those pages on 
that particular point ? 

Mr. Gkew. Because I happened to take occasion to acquire them 
because I thought that point might come up. I wanted to be prepared 
to read my testimony on that. 

Senator Ferguson. Had anyone suggested that they might ask you 
that question ? 

JNIr. Grew. Had anybody suggested ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; had anybody suggested that they might 
ask you that question ? 

Mr. Grevv'. No ; it was only guesswork on my part. 

Senator Ferguson. You had read the Army report then ? 

Mr. Grew. I had read the Army report ; yes, sir. 

[1S77] Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to refer you to some 
other pages of your testimony and if counsel has a copy, I will ask 
him to hand it to you. Apparently some of your testimony has been 
taken off the record. Is that true? 

Mr. Grew. I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you refer to page 4209 ? 

The Chairiman. May I inquire if the Senator means it has been 
taken off the record or whether he means that he gave it and it was not 
put on the record ? 

Senator Ferguson. It was taken and not put on the record. The 
record is clear on that. 

Mr. Gesell. There is no proof on that. 

Senator Ferguson. I am going to use the exhibit itself to show it. 
Then, I want you to refer to page 4211, and I read this language : 

Now, that is for the record. I shall now speak off the record. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, I see that. 

Senator Ferguson. What was taken off the record ? 

You may want to read back. 

Mr. Grew. I would like to just get the subject. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you start back and read it into the record 
so it may refresh your memory ? Will you read into the record, back 
a few questions so you will get what you did give off the record ? 

[1S78] Mr. Grew. Yes. This part which is on the record about 
Mr. Kurusu is, I think, entirely covered in my book. In fact, I could 
read the references, if you wished me to do so. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you give off the record what is in your 
book? 

Mr. Grew. Apparently not. You see, this took place some time ago. 
It was September 27 a year ago. I frankly do not recollect what was 
left off the record there or why. Senator. I have no recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, go back to page 4209 and see whether that 
may refresh your memory why you did not answer a question and they 
withdrew it because you wanted to give the answer off the record. 

Mr. Grew. Let me see what the question was. Do you know where 
that is? 

Senator Ferguson. On page 4209. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. I think you will find it at the bottom of page 
4208, being number 34, "General Russell," I take it that is the ques- 
tioner. So there is no doubt about it, "Mr. Kurusu came over in the 
fall of 1941, late in the fall,"— do you have that? 



cob CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it into the record — or I will 
read it. 

to participate in these negotiations. There has [^579] been discussion as 
to the type of man ho was, and his ontloolc on international relations and Japanese 
military ambitions and his friendship for the American Government. Would 
you care to discus? him for just a moment for us? 

Now, finally, General Frank says, "Or go off the record." 

General Russbh^l. Or go off the record. 

General Grunert. I would suggest, Mr. Ambassador, that you speak to us off 
the record, because I do not know who is going to get these records on thiei 
investigation. 

Mr. Grew. I can tell you the reason why that was off the record, 
and that is because this was while the war was still in progress, and 
anything I might have said about any Japanese individual could 
readily have gotten back to Japan and might have endangered that 
individual. 

Senator FERGusoisr. Will you give us the answer now ? 

Mr. Grew. What is precisely the question ? 

Senator Ferguson. At the bottom of page 4208 is the question. 

Mr. Grew. You mean the question marked "33" ? 

Senator Ferguson. No. 34. 

Mr. Grew, (reading) : 

General Russell. Mr. Kurusu came over in the fall of 1941, late in the fall, 
to participate in these negotiations. Thei'e has been discussion as to the type of 
man he was and his outlook on international relations and [J5S0\ Jap- 
anese military ambitions and his friendhhip for the American Government. 
Would you care to discuss him for just a moment for us? 

Senator Ferguson. Will you answer that question? 

Mr. Grew. I would be glad to tell you anything I can about it ; yes, 
What happened was this: Along about, I should say, toward the 
end of September or early in October 1941, before the Konoye Cabinet 
was formed. Admiral To jo wrote to the Foreign Minister and said 
the Ambassador was fatigued and he wanted to send somebody to 
help him. He said he was going to try to get the best English-speak- 
ing man in the Japanese diplomatic service. He 'said he had not yet 
approached him, he could not mention his name to him, but he just 
wanted me to know he was going to have sent somebody over for the 
reason he hoped I would cooperate in getting plans ready as quickly 
as possible. Before he could act, the Konoye Cabinet fell out and 
the Tojo Cabinet fell in, and in my first interview with Foreign 
Minister Togo, we brought up this point at once. He said he had 
picked Mr. Kunisu to come to Washington to help Admiral Nomura, 
as he had the best command of English in the Japanese service. 
There has been some question as to whether Admiral Nomura's report 
of the conversations in Washington were always completely accurate 
and completely comprehensive. His grasp of English was good, but 
it was not 100 percent- I used to 11581] check up on that. 
Every time a conversation took place in Washington, Mr. Hull would 
send me a report of it, and I would take the report and give to the For- 
eign Minister and he could check it up with his own report. I think he 
probably saw some of the reports from the Japanese Embassy here 
did not quite click with our report, and there was something lacking. 
Anyway, Togo asked if I would arrange to get Kurusu to Washington 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 601 

as soon as possible on a Clipper, ns it was important to carry on the 
conversations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible. I said 
I would do so. 

Kurusu came to see me that night. I had known him about 10 years 
in Japan. He spoke English almost perfectly, he had an American 
wife, and I negotiated with him, and I had seen him in a personal way 
in many respects. I always regarded him as decidedly pro-American 
in his outlook and sentiments, and the fact that he happened to be the 
Japanese Ambassador in Berlin at the time of the signing of the Axis 
agreement did not change my opinion of him very much, because after 
al] an Ambassador, when he is at a post, takes the instructions of his 
Government and carries them out whether he approves of that particu- 
lar document or not. 

Kurusu came to see me that night before he left. He threw up his 
hands and said, "I don't know what it is all about. I don't know any- 
thing about these conversations. I spent all the [1582] after- 
noon studying them, and I realize that things seem to be in a very bad 
mess, but I will go over and do my very best to pull them out because 
we cannot afford not to come to an agreement." He talked to me for 
some time about it in a very frank outspoken way. Frankly, he was a 
Japanese whom I, through long experience, 10 years' exprerience in a 
fairly intimate way, both officially and personally, had come to put a 
good deal of trust in. Anyway, that is the reason, I think, they sent 
him over here, was to support and cooperate with Admiral Nomura. 

As to whether Admiral Kurusu knew what was going to happen, 
knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor in advance, I have not seen all 
the secret documents, I have not seen all the intercepts, I have 
not seen all the statements received from Japan. Perhaps that ques- 
tion can be answered there. My guess is he did not know that Pearl 
Harbor was about to break, because I do not think the Japanese mili- 
tary people or naval people were taking any civilian into their con- 
fidence. The Foreign Office was always looked on askance by the 
Japanese military, and I doubt exceedingly if either of those men knew 
what was coming. They might, of course, have known pretty generally 
if the conversations had not come to a satisfactory conchision that 
hostilities might break out, but tJuit they knew where they would break 
out or how, I would find some difficulty in believing. 

[158S] That is the whole story, as far as I know. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the other part was that you 
gave off the record on page 4211? There is a colloquy off the record 
there. Do you know what that was? 

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect exactly what was said there that was 
off the record. Senator. My guess is it was something along the line I 
just told you about. Naturally, I did not want to say anything which 
would get back to Japan during the war and possibly put some Japan- 
ese into danger especially when I felt he had been friendly to our 
Government. I think that is probably the explanation of that "off the 
record." 

Senator Ferguson. Along the same line ? 

Mr. Grew. I think so. . ^ 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it now, you have given testi- 
mony here that you did not know that the fleet had been moved from 
the west coast, that is, the main part of the flefit other than the 



602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Hawaiian nuit, had been moved from the west coast sometime in the 
spring of 1940 to Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Grew. I do not think I gave that testimony, Senator. ' 

Senator Ferguson. Is that a fact, that you did or did not know it? 

Mr. Grew. 1 think my answer M'as that I coidd not answer that 
question specifically without looking up the record. I think I must 
have known that without any question. I could not [15S4-] say 
definitely that I receiA'ed a telegram from tlie Department of State, 

Senator Fer(juson. I am going to try to refresh your memory. Will 
you take your Foreign Relations Book on page 69, and I will ask you 
this question: What was Arita in the Japanese Cabinet? 

You were speaking about Arita. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, I have it here. 

Senator FEROUsoisr. "After his opening remark ahove referred to, 
the Minister had commented that the bulk of the United States Fleet 
remains in Hawaiian waters. My reply was that Hawaii is American 
territory and that one of our most important naval ports is that of 
Pearl Harbor, and I went on to say that the fact that our fleet re- 
mains in Hawaiian waters represents no threat whatsoever to Japan. 
The Minister, however, replied," 

Will you read what he said to you? 

Mr. Grew. I see exactly, and, frankly there is so much material 
available over those 10 years of my stay in Japan 

Senator Ferguson (interposing). I am not criticizing you. 

Mr. Grew. There it is. It shows that not only in the news- 
papers 

Senator Ferguson (interposing). What did the Minister say? 

[1585] The Chairman. Let the witness complete his answer, 
please. 

Mr. Grew. Not only informal suggestions were made that it would 
be well to withdraw our fleet from Honolulu, but official representa- 
tions appear to have been made. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, will you read what the Minister 
said ? 

Mr. Grew (reading) : 

After I had completed the presentation of my views, Mr. Arita said, "I agree 
in spirit and in principle with everything you have said." He remarked, "Off 
the record" on the diflBculties experienced by the Japanese Government in en- 
deavoring to cope with various elements in this country whicli advocate a 
reapproachment with the totalitarian nations, and although he spoke in guarded 
language he conveyed beyond a doubt that the Government (mentioning espe- 
cially the Prime Rlinister and liimself) wi.shed to see a different orientation 
developed. Judging by remarks which he made previously and subsequently, 
it was evident th.'it this reference was to a desire on their part for closer rela- 
tions between our two countries. 

Senator Ferguson. Read on then what he said after that. 
Mr. Grew (reading) : 

After his opening remark above referred to, the Minister had commented that 
the bulk of the United States Fleet remains in Hawaiian waters. My reply was 
that Hawaii is American territory and that one of our most important naval 
[ 158(1 \ ports is that of Pearl Harbor, and I went on to say that the fact that our 
Fleet remains in Hawaiian waters represents no threat whatsoever to Japan. The 
Minister, however, replied that the continued stay of our Fleet in those waters 
constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Nether- 
lands East Indies and the South Seas, and he desired categorically to assert 



i 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 603 

that Japan entertained no territorial ambitions. Quite to the contrary, he added, 
Japan is exerting her best effort to promote good relations with her neighbors, 
• and hp cited as an example that a non-aggression pact is to be signed within a 
few days with Thailand. The emphasis which the Minister placed upon this 
matter is an indication of the important effect on Japanese consciousness of 
the stay of our naval forces in Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. I think that is sufficient. 

Now, at that time, Mr. Grew, the State Department had not con- 
sulted you as to why they had the fleet out there, had they? Or had 
they consulted you ? 

Mr. Grew. That is the point. Kemember when I was asked that 
before, Senator, I said I could not answer that point without looking 
up the records on whether they consulted me or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you check up the records ? ^ 

Mr. Grew. I will check up and see. 

[1587] The Chairman. The hour of 4 o'clock has arrived. 

Senator Ferguson. We will have to recess until tomorrow morning. 

The Chairman. We will suspend to 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

W^hereupon, at 4 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m. of the 
following day.) 

* See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1711. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 605 



[1S88] PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK 



tuesday, november 27, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. 
Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

\^1589\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

When we recessed yesterday. Secretary Hull, I think Mr. Cooper 
was questioning you. You may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OE COEDELL HULL (Eesumed) 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I notice on page 44 of your 
written statement you said : 

On December 6 our Government received from a number of sources reports 
of the movement of a Japanese Fleet of 35 transports, 8 cruisers and 20 de- 
stroyers from Indo-China toward the Kra Peninsula. This vpas confirmation 
that the long threatened Japanese movement of expansion by force to the south 
was under way. The critical character of this development, which placed the 
United States and its friends in common imminent danger, was very much in 
all our minds, and was an important subject of my conferences with representa- 
tives of the Army and Navy on that and the following day. 

You kept the responsible officials of the War and Navy Department 
constantly advised of any information you received? 

Mr. Hull. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Anything the State Department had with 
respect to the situation in the Far East and especially as to Japan ? 

Mr. Hull. I did my best to comply with that function and 
[1590] duty of the State Department, and I am satisfied my asso- 
ciates did likewise. It is due, however, to the Navy to say that they 
were getting large amounts of information themselves directly — for 
example, all the interceptions came to them first. We received in- 
formation about this threatened danger, I think, on the 6th from a 
British dispatch and from dispatches, one or more, of our consuls and 
other officials stationed in the Indo-French area, and that whole situa- 
tion was naturally a matter for discussion, as w^ll as the mere circula- 
tion of information among each other. 



606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. I believe it was on November 7 that you stated 
that at a Cabinet meeting you spoke at some length covering the situa- 
tion fully, and it was your opinion that all of the forces of our country 
should be on the alert and should be expecting any development that 
might eventuate in the Pacific. 

Mr. Hull. Yes, and that the military situation might break at any 
time, and I think the Cabinet agreed entirely to that view, especially 
when by that stage there was so much information almost daily in the 
press, dispatches about bitter speeches of Japanese statesmen, dis- 
patches about their continuing their movement down the China coast 
to Indochina, and other phases of information which, on their face, 
indicated clearly what was on hand. 

The Vice Chairman. One other question, if I may, Mr. [1591] 
Secretary. 

Evidence was presented to this committee by Admiral Inglis, of our 
Navy, which came from Japanese sources through intercepted mes- 
sages and from Japanese prisoners who had been questioned, indicat- 
ing that the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, and the special 
envoy, Mr. Kurusu, did not know of the planned attack on Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, 1941, and as I recall the statement of Mr. Sum- 
ner Welles, he indicated that he thought Ambassador Nomura was sin- 
cerely anxious to maintain peace between Japan and the United 
States but he indicated that he did not have such a high opinion of 
Mr. Kurusu. 

As I understood the testimony of Mr. Grew on yesterday, he in- 
dicated that he had a rather high opinion of Mr. Kurusu. I was 
wondering whether you had any information or whether you desire to 
give an expression of your opinion as to that situation? 

Mr, PIuLL. I had this impression, in a general way, and that is that 
they both knew by that time that they were here primarily to prevail 
on us to abandon our doctrines and policies and yield entire control 
of the Pacific beyond Hawaii, to and including India, all the im- 
portant trade routes coming out of the Far East, yield the political, 
economic, and other kinds of arbitrary domination to Japan. That 
was what they were primarily concerned about, to clear the way for 
Japan to go [1592] forward with her plans of conquest with- 
out having to fight us. 

So they went considerably in a superficial way along that route. 
They must have known, from what they said to us so often, so con- 
stantly, "We want to hear from you at once or something awful may 
happen ; the situation is explosive now in Japan", and urging us, be- 
yond all the ordinary rules of conversation between two governments. 
I think these two gentlemen must have been morally certain, if not 
absolutely so, that their Government was going on with this move- 
ment, that they must clear the way by having us get out of the way, 
if humanly possible, and if not, they must have known that the 
Japanese military forces were going on anyhow. 

Now as to just when and where they would attack, I would not un- 
dertake to say definitely, because I could not. As to whether they, 
or either of them knew that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked, they may 
have known or they may not, I would hesitate to say. 

The Vice Chairm.\n. The conferences with those two representa- 
ti ves of Japan were continued right up to the time of the attack, were 
they not ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 607 

Mr. Hull. Yes. The main phase of the conference with them was 
due to the fact that when the President returned from Warm Springs 
about the 30th of November he asked us to call on the Japanese 
Government to find why they were concentrating all [15 OS] 
these troops in Indochina, and other phases relating to that question. 
They did not make a reply after the first conference, and they did not 
make a reply, I think, until about the 5th of December. I could be in 
error about this date. 

However, there was nothing new about our general proposition for 
a basis of conversations. They made some reference to it and we 
would not have known but what they were going on with the conver- 
sations with us with that as a basis. 

That was our last proposal on the 26th. But it will be borne in 
mind that, according to the interceptions, Kurusu and Nomura were 
instructed, from about the 27th or somewhere back there, to continue 
talking with us as tliough they were in earnest, when they were not. 

[1594] The Vice Chairman. As I recall the press reports about 
that time, I think you expressed yourself in rather strong terms to 
them when you found out about the attack and they had been in con- 
ference with you right up to that time. 

Mr. Hui.L. Up somewhere — it must have been up around midday, 
I received a telephone message from the White House stating that 
there was a report that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. After a 
few preliminary words, I said, "Can you have that confirmed ? I have 
an appointment with the Japanese representatives here in my office at 
1 o'clock." He said it had not been confirmed but they would give 
that attention. The upshot was that the last I heard from that source 
was that, until the Japanese came in'. 

I discussed before they came whether I would accredit that report 
as the unquestioned truth of the situation and refuse to admit them 
or whether in view of the extremely delicate relations I would leave 
open the 1 chance in 10 or more that the report was not correct. I 
proceeded to receive and confer with them although I felt that the 
chances were altogether virtually certain that the report was true. 

So the proposal they made was comprised of a few pages defining the 
Japanese attitude just the reverse of what it was. It was, "Peace, 
peace, peace." And then they took our attitude and defined it as just 
the reverse of what it was. 

[1S95] Well, I felt and knew of the extreme probability that the 
Pearl Harbor report was true. I felt like taking liberties in talking 
to them about their Government in what would not be diplom^atic 
language in ordinary times. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Secretary, do you have any further state- 
ment you desire to make ? 

Mr. Hull. I don't know of much more that I can give the committee. 
Two volumes of publications are here. A 7o-page statement was given 
to you at the outset. Every effort has been made to give you anything 
we can that is material in connection with your investigation. 

The Vice Chairman. I thank you. 

The Chairman. Senator George. 

Senator George. Mr. Secretary, I merely wish to ask one or two 
questions. 



608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The statement first made in your prepared statement for the com- 
mittee emphasizes the meeting of November 7 with the Cabinet pre- 
ceded by a detailed statement of the continuing critical situation in 
the world and especially with Japan. 

Now, I would like to read, just briefly, from your statement: 

On November 7 I attended the regular Cabinet meetinji. It was the President's 
custom either to start off tiie discussion himself or to aslc some member of tlie 
[15yG\ Cabinet a question. At this uieeliii.i^ lie turned to me and asked 
whether I had any thing in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes 
the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the 
conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion tliat relations were 
extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack any- 
where by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the 
Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of 
the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in 
order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a develop- 
ment. 

Now, that was the first Cabinet meeting at which you had drawn 
special and direct attention to the critical situation developing in 
the world and especially in the Pacific? 

Mr. Hull. That v.as the first recent meeting, at least, where there 
had been an elaborate detailed consideration of the situation. 

Senator George. They previously had been general. 

Mr. Hull. At all Cabinet meetings, with few exceptions, either the 
President or I dealt with some phases of the situation as it was 
developing. 

Senator George. Yes. 

[1597] Now, Mr. Secretary, on November 25 — read from your 
statement : 

* * * I emphasized the critical nature of this country's relations with 
Japan at the meeting of the War Council on November 25. The War Council, 
which consisted of the Presiiient, the secretaries of State, War and Navy, the 
Chief of Stalf and the Chit^f of Naval Operations, was a sort of clearing house 
for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with 
our respective contacts and in our respective ciicles. The highlights in the 
developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meet- 
ings. At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then liad that the Japa- 
ne.se military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were de- 
termined anil desperate. They were likely to break out anywhere, at anytime, 
at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plans. 

Now, particularly : 

I felt that virtually the last stage had b?pn reached and that safeguarding 
of our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. 

Is the committee to understand that you made substantially that 
statement last read at this meeting on November 25? 

[-5198] Mr. Hull. That is my recollection. I think you will find 
that right soon after that date, when the Roberts Commission was 
functioning, I gave that original statement. 

Senator George. Yes. 

Mr. Hull. Merely in justice to the Army and the Navy and to the 
diplomatic branch of the Government, for them to understand, which 
they doubtless did anyhow, that the diplomatic establishment had 
exhausted its efforts to every practical extent to maintain or preserve 
peace. 

Senator George. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 609 

Now, again, Mr. Secretary : 

On November 25, at the meeting of the War Council, I reviewed the November 
26 proposal which we hud made to the Japanese and pointed out that ithere 
was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. I 
emphasized that, in my opinion, the Japanese were likely to brealv out at any 
time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national 
security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I 
expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include 
an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central 
point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously 
with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination. 

Mr. Hull, That was mainly a repetition of what we had been 
[1599] saying among ourselves individually and sometimes in 
groups for a few days prior to that. In other words, I think every- 
body who was following this closely w^as obliged to have made up their 
minds by this time about the seriousness of the situation and the im- 
minence of the danger. They knew that Hitler was not going to stop. 
They knew that the Japanese war party in supreme control in Japan 
was tied in hard and fast with Hitler, and we didn't know what elfect 
that might have on the Japanese move in addition to their own 
initiative. 

So it was a most complicated and delicate and dangerous situation 
with these factors that would not ordinarily exist in the case of jyst 
one country. So after all these discussions back and forth with the 
Japanese and among ourselves, I think everybody reasoned the dan- 
ger was imminent after their ultimatum. They couldn't have been 
more definite in that respect. And wherever we met after that we 
were discussing the increasing dangers and increasing imminence. 

Senator George. That is, the constantly developing world condi- 
tions which were drawing more and more serious ? 

Mr, HxjLL. Exactly. 

Senator George. And on these dates that I have directed attention 
to in your formal statement, you had reached a conclusion that the 
matter was largely in the hands of the Army and the Navy ; that is, 
the security of the country ? 

[1600] Mr. Hull. Yes; that was my judgment; and I think the 
developments as they existed during those days, soon after the 20th 
of November, the Japanese movements forward, plans of attack — 
I think that confirms fully our estimate of what was imminent at that 
time. 

[1601] Senator George. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Secre- 
tary, 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark. 

Mr. Clark. Mr. Secretary, I want to direct your attention to the 
decision not to withdraw the fleet from Pearl Harbor and its prepara- 
tion for action and its being exposed to attack on account of being 
based at Pearl Harbor, and in that connection I desire to read you 
briefly from the testimony of Admiral Kichardson when he was being 
interrogated by the gentlernan from California : 

Admiral Richardson. Yes; but I think when you consider the many, many 
other things that had to be done before active war operations could be under- 
taken, the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the West 
Coast would have little effect on the over-all time, because you had to assemble 
a train, you might have to build some, and you might have to have drydocks. 
you might have to have repair facilities, you had to have a terrific amount of 

79716—46 — pt. 2 15 



610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

stores and all kinds of equipment for building roads and airfields and every- 
thing else, none of which was ready, * * * 

So the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the West 
Coast when actual war started it was a matter of no moment, in my opinion, 
because other things controlled the time of getting ready. 

[1(102] Mr. Geakiiakt. Well, considering the other situation, the one which 
actually happened, by having our lleet in Hawaiian waters we had our fleet 2,500 
miles closer to the enemy lor their sneak attack. 

Admiral R chardson. Do you want an opinion on that? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes ; unless it is a question of geography, unless it is a matter 
of going over water, or something else. 

Admiral Richardson. In my opinion, Congressman Gearhart, a Japanese Fleet 
that could cross most of the Pacatic Ocean and deliver an undiscovered attack 
on Pearl Harbor woiild quite likely have been able to deliver the same attack on 
Puget Sound. 

Mr. Ge:arhart. Well, that is amazing. 

Admiral Rtohardson. But the whole question is the amount of oil they have 
got in the ships. 

I wonder if you care to comment on whether such considerations as 
those may have been discussed or entered into the decision not to with- 
draw the fleet from Hawaiian waters under existing conditions? 

Mr. Hull. I should say that, of course, none of us in tlie State De- 
partment would jirofess to have a technical knowledge of the construc- 
tion side of the Navy, the matter of enlarging its equipment or its 
supplies, all that kind of thing are matters [1603] for Navy 
people primarily and .not for a layman. 

I knew that we hiid a most touchy and delicate situation extending 
around the world and that the opposition was interlocked and working 
in many devious ways. I thought I knew at the same time as a matter 
of psychology that the worst bandit — and they were bandits of the 
most savage type, the leaders of Japan and Geormany — the worst 
bandit, as he prowls about and he looks about, has always got his eyes 
open to see if any pistols or any guns or any weapons are in sight. He 
does not like for the most innocent citizen to point an unloaded pistol 
or an unloaded gun at him. None of us care for that, as a matter of 
fact. And it was the same way as a matter of psychology with this 
bunch of overlords who were running rife over the earth. 

They will take cognizance of naval establishments, somewhere on 
the high seas, whether fully equipped or not, and for that reason I 
thought that, especially after it was out there, I thought that it should 
stay there. 

Mr. CLAmc. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

11604] The Chairman. Senator Lucas? 

Ssnator Luoas. Mr. Secretary, when did you first see the President 
of the United States on December 7, 1941 ? 

Mr. Hull. We had a meeting that evening at the White House. I 
talked with him over the telephone during the day; I do not recall 
at this moment whether I was in the White House during the afternoon 
or not. 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall whether or not you talked to him over 
the telephone on the morning before the attack? 

Mr. Hull. He called me. 

Senator Lucas. Do you remember about what time? 

Mr. Hull. Oh, it was up somewhere — it was after Mr. Stimson and 
Mr. Knox had left my office and they remained there until 

Senator Lucas. Was that after the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 611 

The Chairman. He had not finished his answer. 

Senator Lucas. I am sorry. I beg your pardon. 

Mr. Hull. They remained in my office until, I think it was, a little 
after 12 o'clock, but I am giving my best impression. 

Senator Lucas. Was that before you received word that Pearl 
Harbor had been attacked? 

Mr. Hull. I had not received that word until the Presi- [16051 
dent called me. That is the first information I had on the subject. 

Senator Lucas. But that morning you did have a conversation with 
Secretary Knox? 

Mr. Hull. And Stimson. 

Senator Lucas. And Stimson ? 

Mr. Hull. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Now, what was the subject of the conversation be- 
tween the three of you on that morning, as you recall ? 

Mr. Hull. According to my best recollection it was in line with our 
increasingly frequent conferences over the telephone or in person as 
the dangers and the threatened outbreak in Japan increased. 

For instance, on the day just before we had received all of this in- 
formation from our consuls and from a British dispatch that this 
Japanese armada had left its jumping-off point and was sailing to- 
ward the Kra Isthmus and that Prime Minister Tojo had made a 
speech some time about that time or a little before — ^yes ; it was a little 
before this. But that, along with these actual movements, especially 
these movements, was the occasion, the chief occasion, I tliink, of our 
conference. Tojo's speech was some days before, but it shed further 
light on what was happening then. 

[loos'] Senator Lucas. Well, now, did you see the President of 
the LTnited States on Saturday, December 6th ? 

Mr. Hull. Oh, I do not recall at this moment. 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall whether you had conversations with 
him at that time ? 

Mr. Hull. Oh, I was in touch in some way on each of those days, 
with somebody at the White House or the Navy and the Army. 

Senator Lucas. In the conversations that yoa had with Secretary 
Knox and Secretary Stimson on Sunday morning of the Tth was there 
anything said in that conversation about the likelihood of Japan at- 
tacking Pearl Harbor ? 

Mr. Hull. Nothing. As you understand, the attack was then on ap- 
parently. The fleet was moving toward the Kra Peninsula, which 
would greatly endanger the situation. 

Mr. Keefe. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman; I could not get your last 
answer. Will you read it, please ? 

Mr. Hull. I said the attack was under way, according to the dis- 
patches, on the sixth. This fleet was moving, not up north in the Bay 
of Siam or Thailand, but it was, so far as my impression extended, 
moving toward the Kra Isthmus, which was probably a threat all the 
way down toward Singapore, down the peninsula, and not far from 

Malaya. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Hull, I was interested m your [1607] 
statement in regard to the conversations you had with the Japanese 
envoys. 



612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

You stated that while they apparently were lookhig at your eyes 
they were looking over your shoulder, out of the window, to determine 
the strength of our armed forces and that in dealing with a nation 
whose leaders were dangerous outlaws the only thing that they con- 
sidered in these diplomatic talks was the question of how much mili- 
tary and how much naval power we had. 

Am I correct about that? 

Mr. Hull. Yes. That was based on tliis further view — and I never 
criticize anybody for their opinions. T accord to every American full 
patriotism and the highest motives in dealing with public affairSj but 
if we had — we and the British and the other peace-loving countries — 
had maintained when we saw Hitler moving as he did from 1933 on 
and when we saw the Japs moving as they did from 1933 on, if we 
peaceful nations had had sort of a Military Establishment all we 
would have had to do at that early stage would have been to turn to 
them and say, "We don't want you to take that course, we don't want 
you Japs to go into China on this sort of an outrageous expedition." 
The chances are overwhelming that they would not have done it but, 
of course, that is one of the unfortunate phases of human experience. 

[1608] Senator Lucas. Well, I assume from that answer that 
it is your view that any diplomatic or political relations of Japan 
with this country were definitely tied in with their own naval and 
military forces in their homeland? 

Mr. iHuLL. Well, To jo was the head of the whole concern. The 
military were in control from 1937, when they moved into China, 
and they controlled the Army and officials. They were in supreme 
control of Japan and everything Japan possessed, including the Navy 
and its direction. 

Senator Lucas. Well, therefore am I correct in my assumption 
that, as a result of having to deal with a nation of that kind who 
tied their diplomatic and political relations with the military and 
ithe navy, that it was also necessary for us in dealing with Japan 
more or less to take a like course; and that that was one of the 
reasons why the fleet was in the Pacific at that time ? 

Mr. Hull. Exactly. That is a part of the psychology. As I tried 
to make clear a day or two ago, when a nation is dealing with lawless 
nations and governments, with every kind of dishonest and dishonor- 
able and ulterior purposes in view, that the diplomatic influence is 
not much stronger than the military organization behind it. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, the fleet based in Pearl Harbor 
was a tremendous factor in our political and in our [1609] dip- 
lomatic dealings with Japan at that time? 

Mr. Hull. Oh, T think it was. We do not know — nobody knows 
with all of those machinations going on daily and nightly between 
representatives of Hitler and Tojo, planning every imaginable step — 
we do not know just how much influence the Navy at Pearl Harbor 
had in inducing a little more circumspection on their part and a little 
more consideration for this Nation and this Government, but I could 
not help but feel that it did have that restraining effect. 

Senator Lucas. Well, a nation that lives on force, the only thing 
that it fears is force, isn't it? 

Mr, PIuLL. Precisely. That is the old saying at least. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 613 

Senator Lucas. Now, in your manuscript which was prepared and 
presented to this committee I direct your attention to page 15, and 
I desire to ask one or two questions. 

You state there that [reading] : 

Existing treaties relating to the Far East were adequate, provided the signa- 
tory governments lived up to them. We were, therefore, not calling for new 
agreements. But if there ^^•as a chance that new agreements would contribute 
to peace in the Pacific, the President and I believed that we should not ueglect 
that possibility, slim as it was. 

In other words, as I understand it, and I think the [lOlO] 
English is very clear on it, the agreements that we had in effect at 
that time were sufficient to keep the peace in the Pacific if Japan 
had recognized the sanctity of international treaties? 

Mr. Hull. Oh, we had copper riveted agreements with the Nine 
Power Treaty as tlie central point in the framework of international 
relations in the Pacific. 

As I said, outside of the local agreements, outside of international 
law, outside of the Nine Power Treaty, outside of anything moral 
that the League of Nations provisions might have affected the mind 
of a person at all disposed to be law abiding and along with that I 
think that covers the main structure. 

Senator Lucas. Now, on that same page you state [reading] : 

We carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a 
basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not only to 
Japan but to all countries. 

Now, the truth of the matter is that the 10-point program was 
based upon those fundamental American principles that you were 
talking about in that statement? 

Mr. Hull. To be sure there is nothing new in it and nothing that 
any law-abiding nation would not be delighted [1611] to sup- 
port and practice. 

Senator Lucas. And how long has this Nation stood upon those 
fundamental basic principles that you have talked about? 

Mr. Hull. We have from over an indefinite period in the past stood 
for all of the doctrines that you see set out. Other law-abiding and 
peaceful nations, law abiding and civilized, have stood for the same 
thing. 

Senator Lucas. And that was regardless of what political party was 
in power, those fundamental basic American principles have been the 
same? 

Mr. Hull. Oh, to be sure. 

Senator Lucas. I direct your attention, Mr. Secretary, to the re- 
port of the Army Board that investigated the Pearl Harbor disaster. 
I will ask you whether or not you were a witness before that Board ? 

Mr. Hull. I was not. I sent some little data to them and I in- 
formed them that I would be pleased to appear before the Board at 
any time on any phase of the matters about which I might make con- 
tribution, but they sent word that they would not need my presence 
before the Board. 

Senator Lucas. So they never called you as a witness after that? 

Mr. Hull. No. 

[1612] Senator Lucas. Now, you are familiar with that report, 
Mr. Secretary ? 



614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Hull. Oli, I have been over it. 

Senator Lucas. Did they ask you for any data or any statement 
concerning tlie 10-point program that was handed to the Japanese 
by yoii ? 

:Mr. Huix. No. 

Senator Lucas. In this report in chapter 4, headed "Responsibilities 
in Washington," I read the following : 

Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience with the 
Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secretary of State to 
this siovernment, was concerned at the situation, for his diary continues : 

"We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Depart- 
ment, and I got hold of Marshall." 

Now, this is the finding of the Board : 

Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipitated by 
the action of the Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief 
of Staff immediately of the threatened diflBculty. 

They also in that same report, in the next paragraph or two, state 
[reading] : 

[1613] Apparently on the 26th in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his 
mind not to go through with the proposals shown the day before to the Secretary 
of War containing the plan for the "Three Months' Truce." 

Evidently the action "to kick the whole thing over" was accomplished by 
presenting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the "Ten Points" which they 
took as an ultimatum. 

It was the document that touched the button that started the war, as Ambas- 
sador Grew so aptly expressed it. 

Now, they have charged in this report by direct charges and by 
implication and innuendo that you issued the ultimatum that started 
the war. I think you have demonstrated to any fair and impartial 
hearer at this hearing that that just is not true, but would you care 
to elaborate anv further upon these comments? 

Mr. Hull. That is not a very pleasant topic to me. I strove to co- 
operate with the Army and Navy Board without success and then 
I was gratuitously brought into the picture, apparently on the theory 
that Tojo and the military element moving abreast with Hitler on 
a world rampage, were not doing so and were not guiltj^ of doing so, 
but that this Government of peaceful people, with no preparations in 
the Paci IJ^H] fie to fight, with no two-ocean Navy on hand, 
with only peace appeals for months to the Japs, that this Government 
was the cause and that it forced poor, innocent, peace-minded Tojo and 
that bunch of savages and outlaws into war. 

If I could express myself as I would like I would want all of you 
religious minded people to retire. I stood under that infamous charge 
for months, when every reasonable minded person knew that the Japs 
were on the same march of invasion in the Pacific area to get supreme 
control over it in every way so that we could not even land a boat load 
of goods on the other side of the Pacific except under extortionate 
terms — every person knew that they were on this move because if 
he had not known it in any other way, the heads of their Govern- 
ment were telling the world every week, sometimes every 2 or 3 days, 
precisely what they were doing and what they were going to do; and 
yet, somebody who knows little and cares less, now says, "Why didn't 
the United States make concessions and save us from the war," when 
any person knows, and if you look back at the situation as it existed 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 615 

during those last 10, 12, 14 days any rational person knows just what 
the Japs were doing. 

They were off on this final attack and no one was going to stop 
them unless we yielded and laid down like cowards, and we would 
have been cowards to have lain down. 

[161S] The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, your hour is up and the 
committee appreciates the fact that you have furnished so much in- 
formation here. The committee feels that probably you are entitled 
to a rest for 2 or 3 days before resuming and, therefore, counsel will 
get in touch with you as to when you shall reappear. 

Mr. Hull. Well, I do not desire to inconvenience the committee in 
carrying out its schedule in any way. I will do my best to cooperate 
with you in that respect. 

The Chairman. The committee appreciates that. 

Mr. Hull. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman. Mr. Grew, you may resume. 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH C. GREW (Resumed) 

Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, before the questions begin, may I clarify 
a point in the record in my testimony of yesterday ? 

The Chairman. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. Grew. The record indicates that I said, in answer to a question, 
that after the Cabinet meeting in Tokyo of December 1, 1 guessed that 
they had discussed the attack, on Pearl Harbor. 

Now, I camiot recollect exactly how I phrased my answer but it was 
far from my intention to leave that impression because I did not and 
could not have guessed that. What I did [ISIG] guess was 
that the Cabinet may have been discussing the opening of hostilities 
with the United States, but knowing the way that things work in 
Japan I do not believe for a moment that the military high command 
would ever have taken the civilian members of the Cabinet into their 
confidence as to their precise plans. 

They had every reason to keep those plans in the utmost secrecy, 
so while I do think that that Cabinet meeting may well have discussed 
the question of opennig hostilities, I do not think that they discussed 
the question of the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson, I believe, was in the process 
of examining Mr. Grew when we recessed yesterday. 

You may proceed, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, did you correspond with the Presi- 
dent when you were in Tokyo as the Ambassador ? 

Mr. Grew. As I recollect it. Senator, I had only one exchange of 
letters with him. Those have been published. It is possible that I 
wrote him personally on other occasions but I do not think so. I 
think that was the only exchange, the exchange publishd. 

Senator Ferguson. Where were they published ? 

Mr. Grew. They are published in my book. I think they may have 
been published in Foreign Relations. I am not certain [16171 
of that. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you have someone check that to see if 
they are? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. I can give you the date pretty quickly. 



616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. I will give you the date to check that up. 

Senator Ferguson. Please. I think on page 360 you have a nota- 
tion of one. 

Mr. Gesell. 359. 

Mr. Grew. What is that? 

Mr. Gesell. Page 359, on December 14. Is that the letter? 

Senator Ferguson. December 14. 

Mr. Grew. December 14, 1940, was it? 

Senator Ferguson. On page number 359? 

Mr. Gesell. Page 359 of the book. 

Mr. Grew. Page what ? 

Mr. Gesell. Page 359 of the book. 

Mr. Grew. Yes ; that is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. What year? 

Mr. Gesell. 1940 that is. 

Mr. Grew. December 14, 1940. Let me see whether there is any- 
thincf here or not. 

[1G18] Mr. Gesell. I am quite sure that is not in volume 2, 
since that reports conversations. 

Mr. Grew. I do not believe it would be in volume 1. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, could you have Mr. Hamilton check 
that while we go along with some questions on it? 

Mr. Grew. It does not appear to have been published in Foreign 
Relations. 

S3nator Ferguson. It does not appear to be published? 

Mr. Grew. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you furnish copies to Mr. Hull? I am 
wondering how it would get into Foreign Eelations if it went to the 
President direct. 

Mr. Grew. Well, I have no record of that. I assumed that I sent 
copies to the Department of State, probably, without any question. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you refer to your letter to the 
President? • 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you review the foreign relations with Japan 
as of that time? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; I did. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the substance of the relation? What 
was the point at issue? 

Mr. Grew. The point at issue appeared to be stated as [^6191 
follows: 

The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle — 

that is the angle of the American Embassy in Tokyo — 

to be : 

(1) Whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war; 

(2) Wliether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to 
Britain in Europe as to make the dilference to Britain between victory and 
defeat ; 

(3) To what extent our own policy in the Far East must be timed with our 
preparedness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American 
and the Japanese navies now and later. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you refer to page 360, where you use 
this language : 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 617 

The principal point at issue, as I see it, is not wliether we must call a halt 
to the Japanese program but when, 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you elaborate on that and explain what 
you meant there ? 

Mr. Grew. The Japanese had moved out all through East Asia. 
They were into China, Indochina and they were in a position to 
thraten what I considered our vital interests. [1620] They 
were in a position to threaten the Philippines and they were also in a 
position to cut off one of the lines to Great Britain for her supplies 
to enable her to continue the war. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you through with your answer? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would it be fair to say that at that time you 
saw in the near future a war between the United States and Japan ? 

Mr. Grew. Senator, during all my period in Tokyo I was doing 
everything in my power to prevent a war between the United States 
and Japan, up to the very end. As I said yesterday, that is the only 
position that I think any diplomatic representative should take. 

Senator Ferguson. It is not a question of questioning your motives 
at all. I just wanted to know whether that sentence would indicate 
that at that time you saw a war between the United States and Japan 
and it was only a question of when the war was going to be ? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir ; I do not think that that is the whole story. It 
was a question of whether we were going to be able to take steps which 
would prevent a war between the United States and Japan, which 
would prevent a war between the United States and Japan. 

[1621] Senator Ferguson. Well, I will read another sentence 
from page 360 of your book. 

We are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan. 

It is not quite the whole sentence that I am reading. 

The Chairman. I suggest you read the whole paragraph, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, I will read the whole paragraph. 

Mr. Grew. Which paragraph is that, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Will the Ambassador read the paragraph? 

Mr. Grew. On page 360? 

Senator Ferguson [reading] : 

It therefore appears that sooner or later * * *. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. [Reading:] 

It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we are prepared, with General 
Hugh Johnson, to withdraw bag and baggage from the entire sphere of "Greater 
East Asia including the South Seas" (which God forbid), we are bound eventually 
to come to a head-on clash with Japan. 

Now, that clash need not have been a military clash. In other 
words, it was always my hope that the economic [1622] meas- 
ures which we had taken against Japan would finally bring Japan to 
a position where she might come to a reasonable agreement with us. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, you were warning the President that 
it would be necessary for America to take some definite steps along 
definite lines if we were to prevent a military clash with Japan? 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 



618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. And that Japan would have to take certain 
steps ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. I said that I thought that there were risks 
(involved both in a positive policy and a laissez faire policy, but I 
thou<2;ht that the risks of a laissez faire policy were greater than the 
risks of a positive policy. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, was it a question then when we should 
take these steps? 

Mr. Grew. Well, this letter was written in December 1940. 

Now, the record show that our step on freezing Japanese assets took 
place on July 25, 1941, but in the meantime during that period we 
were tightening; up, as I recollect it, all along the line in our embargoes 
of commodities to Japan which the Japanese could use for military 
purposes. 

Senator Ferguson. When did we freeze aviation gas for \^1623'\ 
Japan? 

^Ir. Grew. The date on which we put on an embargo on oil? 

Senator Ferguson, Well, on aviation gasoline. 

Mr. Grew. Aviation gasoline ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know when that was? 

Mr. Grew. That, I think, is contained in Foreigii Relations. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it July 31, 1940? 

Mr. Grew. I could not say that, confirm that date without looking 
it up, "July 31, 1940, announcement of limitation by the Western 
Hemisphere of the exportation of aviation gasoline." 

Senator Ferguson. That was at least a limitation on the exporting 
to Japan of aviation gasoline ? 

Mr. Grew. That was what, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. A limitation, at least ? 

Mr. Grew. Oh, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it an absolute prohibition of any gasoline? 

Mr. Grew. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Aviation gasoline. All right. 

Now, what was the President's reply to your letter of December 
1940? 

Mr, Grew. The President's reply is published on page \^162^'\ 
359 of my book. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what would" you say was a fair appraisal, 
without reading the whole letter? 

Mr. Grew. Well, the President's appraisal was that the whole prob- 
lem was a global problem and that every development in any part of 
the world would affect other parts of the world. 

In other words, he said [reading] : 

I am giving you my thoughts at this length because the problems which we 
face are so vast and so inter-rolated that any attempt even to state them com- 
pels one to think in terms of five continents and seven seas. In conclusion, I 
must emphasize that, our problem being one of defense, we cannot lay down 
hard-and-fast plans. As each new development occurs, we must, in the light of 
the circumstances then existing, decide when and where and how we can most 
effectively marshal and make use of our resources. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he agree or disagree with your opinion? 
Mr. Grew. He says at the beginning of his letter : 

I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusion. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 619 

Senator Fergusoist. Now, can you give us the reason why [1625^ 
you corresponded directely with tlie President rather tlian through 
Mr, Hull and the State Department ? 

Mr. Grew. I had been in the United States on leave of absence in 
1931 and when I saw the President he said, "When you have some 
thoughts on the situation, drop me a line." In other words, this let- 
ter was written to him at his invitation. 

Senator Ferguson. You say in 1931 that he suggested that? 

Mr. Grew. No, 1939. 

Senator Ferguson. 1939. 

Mr. Grew. I was here in the summer and autumn of 1939. 

Senator Ferguson. I misunderstood you. 

Mr. Greav. 1939. 

Senator Fergusox. I misunderstood you. In 1939 he suggested 
that and then you wrote him ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. At that time were you of the opinion that 
Japan would fight or were they bluffing? 

Mr. Grew. I never thought that Japan was bluffing. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. From what you heard and what you saw in 
Japan vou wei'e of the opinion then that they were not bluffing? 

[lese] Mr. Grew. I was. 

Senator Ferguson. That they would fight under certain conditions? 

Mr. Grew. Under certain circumstances. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did j^ou ever notify the State Department 
or the President as to what those circumstances were that they 
would fight for or under ? 

Mr. Grew. Senator, my reports to the State Department were con- 
tinuous and many. I was constantly expressing my views to the 
Department of State and the Secretary of State. I cannot tell you 
without an examination of the records whether and when that par- 
ticular point was covered. 

Senator Ferguson. But would it be a fair appraisal of your com- 
munications to the State Department that you had told them that 
Japan was not bluffing, that they would fight under certain circum- 
stances and you related from time to time the circumstances? 

Mr. Greav. I think the record shows that completely, Senator; 
from my arrival in Japan in 1932 I quoted to you yesterday a state- 
ment which I made in a letter to Mr. Stimson, the Secretary of State 
at that time, shortly after my arrival in Japan, in which I said the 
Japanese Army has been built for war and it wants war and I said 
it would be criminally somnolent for us to close our eyes to any 
possible eventualities in the Far East. 

[1627] Senator Ferguson. On page 4219 of your testimony be- 
fore the Army Board, I notice that you give this as part of your an- 
swer: 

Frankly, I could not answer that question without looking into it, but I am 
sure that everything I wrote was not published by any means. 

What did you have in mind by that statement? You better look 
at the whole answer. 

The Chairman. The Chair suggest you might also look at the 
question that you answered in order to get the context. 

Mr. Grew. I would just like to read the record on that. 



620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. If the Chairman please, the witness has the 
whole instrument before him. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson, There is no desire to get an answer except as 
to what he had in mind. 

Tlie Chairman. The Chairman simply wants him to refresh his 
recollection as to the question that he was answering, so he may have 
the whole thing in mind. 

Senator Ferguson. Does the Chair think the witness might need 
his memory refreshed? 

The Chairman. That is an academic question. I was merely sug- 
gesting that he look at the question that he was asked in order to 
refresh his recollection. 

[IG£S] Mr. Grew. Yes. The question was: "Do the various 
books to which you made reference in your testimony convey all the 
information that you conveyed to Washington on the likelihood of 
war?" 

And I replied, according to the record: "I could not say that, I 
do not believe, because I sent a great deal of material during all of 
that time to the State Department both by telegram and by written 
dispatch, and it would have been impossible, within the confines of 
two volumes" — I was referring to our Foreign Relations — "to have 
published all of that material. I think the highlights have been 
published, but I could not say it has all been published. Frankly, 
I could not answer that question without looking into it, but I am 
sure that everything I wrote was not published by any means. It 
would have been practically impossible to publish the tremendous 
volume of reports that I sent in during those 10 years." 

Senator Ferguson. Who would determine as to what was ta be 
published in the books? 

Mr. Grew. I think that would have been determined by the various 
officials. I cannot tell you, because I had nothing to do with the 
publishing. 

Senator Ferguson. You would have no part in it ? 

Mr. Grew. I would have nothing to do with the publication of For- 
eign Relations. 

1 1 629] Senator Ferguson. I will ask you to refer to foreign re- 
lations in May of 1939. It is in relation to a telegram to the Depart- 
ment of State containing a message from the Foreign Minister. 

Mr. Grew. Will you tell me what page that is. Senator? ^ 

Senator Ferguson. Just ai moment. 

Mr. Grew. May 18, 1939, volume I? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is the message from the Foreign 
Minister. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir ; I have that before me. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you notice that the message is published 
in volume II. 

Mr. Grew. The first document in volume II ? 

S?nator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, the reply of the Secretary of State to this 
message is on pages 6 or 8 of that same volume. Will you look at the 
reply? 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ^ 621 

Senator Ferguson. It says : 

♦ * * this Government is sincerely interested in the suggestion contained in 
Your Excel- 11GS0\ lency's message, and in giving further consideration 
to that suggestion would be pleased to have such further information as Yuur 
Excellency may find it agreeable to offer by way of amplifying and making 
more definite Your Excellency's concept as to the steps which might usefully 
be taken toward moderating the situation in Europe. 

Now, did the Prime Minister at that time give you a more definite 
statement than the one that is stated there in tlie book ? 

In other words, do you know whether or not the Japanese Govern- 
ment ever gave you the "definite concept" requested in the Secretary 
of State's reply? 

Mr. Grew. Well, sir, I do not believe that the Prime Minister gave 
me any further information on this correspondence at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I ask counsel to search the files to see 
whether or not there is any information on that? 

Mr. Gesell. We will do that. Senator.^ 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall, Mr. Grew, to refresh your mem- 
ory, that there was a definite statement and that it is not printed in 
the book ? 

Mr. Grew. To which statement do you refer? The press releases? 

Senator Ferguson. No; I am referring to the statement that the 
Prime Minister gave you in May of 1939. 

Mr. Grew. Yes; as far as I am aware, that is the complete 
[1631] statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you access now to the Secretary of State's 
files? 

Mr. Grew. Have I what? 

Senator Ferguson. Access to the Secretary of State's files, 

Mr. Grew. No; I am out of the Department now. I have no con- 
tact with the Department. 

Senator Ferguson. So you could not help us to get that? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you referred to a green light telegram in 
your book. Do you recall that ? 

Mr. Grew. That was merely a phrase which I applied to it in- 
formally. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you turn to your book, to where you have 
that in your book ? 

Mr. Grew. That is published also, I think, in Foreign Relations. 

Senator Ferguson. I think you said it was one of the most impor- 
tant telegrams that you had sent. 

Mr. Grew. That was in December 1940, 1 think. That was sent in 
December. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it December or September 1940? 

Mr. Greav. It is September 1940. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at page 334 of your book? 

[1632] Mr. Grew. Yes ; I have it here. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is what you call the green light tele- 
gram ? 

Mr. Grew. It is. 

[1633] Senator Ferguson. Now will you see whether or not it is ? 
What else do you say about it there, about it being important? 



1 See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2068. 



622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Grew. In Foreign Relations? 

Senator Fei!GUSon. Will you see whether it is in Foreign Relations, 
anion <>: the white papers? 

Mr. Grew. It does not appear to be in Foreign Relations. It might 
possibly be in Peace and War. 

Senator Fergt 'On. Peace and AVar is there before j^on. Will you 
look and see v,i>'^ther it is in Peace and W^ar? 

Mr. Grew. 'Jhere is a telegram in Peace and War that I sent from 
the Embassy in Tokyo on September 12, 1940, published on page 569. 
That was not the precise telegram referred to, however. 

Senator Ferguson. So it is not in Peace and War or in Foreign 
Relations. 

Now getting back to your telegram, will you tell me something 
about that telegram ? What is it ? What does your book say about it ? 

Mr. Grew. It is a fairly long comment here. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you refer to it as one of your most important 
documents ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes ; I do. 

Senator Ferguson. What is that language? 

[16S4] Mr. Grew. What? 

Senator Ferguson. Read that language about the importance of the 
insti^ument. 

Mr. Grew. In the last part of that telegram I said : 

If, by a firm policy, we ciui maintain conditions in tlie Pacific in status quo 
until such time as Britain may be successful in the European war, Japan will be 
confronted with a situation which will render it impossible for the present 
outlook of opportunism to remain dominant. After tliat time it might be feasible 
to set about a readjustment of the entire probiem of the Pacific to the permanent 
benefit both of the United States and of Japan — on a just basis. Until the time 
when a thorough going regeneration of outlook takes place in Japan, only a show 
of force, coupled with the intention to utilize it if necessary, can effectively 
conduce to the attainment of such an outcome, as well as to the future security 
of the United States. 

In view therefore of actual conditions here in Japan, and the present outlook, 
it is my belief that the time has arrived when a continuance of the use of patience 
and restraint by the United States may and probably will tend to render I'ela- 
tions between the United States and Japan increasingly uncertain. I [16351 
cherish the hope that, if the Japanese Government and people can be brought to 
believe that they are overplaying their hand, eventually the pendulum will swing 
the other way, at which time it will be possible to reconstruct good relations 
between our cotmtry and Japan. To me the alternative appears hopeless. 

Senator Ferguson. I will read from page 334 what you said, if you 
will just check it: 

Another important event, from my point of view, was the sending to Washington 
in September of what I can only call my "green light" telegram, perhaps the most 
significant message sent to Washington in all the 8 years of my mission to 
Japan. 

Now will you tell us why you describe it in that way? 

Mr. Grew. Because, Senator, I felt that the time had come to apply 
economic measures against Japan, and that is precisely what was done. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for it not being in Foreign 
Relations, if it is so important ? 

Mr, Grew. Senator, franklv, I had nothing whatsoever to do with 
the preparation of Foreign Relations. I was not in a position at that 
time to have anything to do with it, so I do not know. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 623 

Senator Ferguson. Does the committee have a copy of your 
[16S6] diary? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir; the diary was a purely personal and private 
document. The important parts of my diary are published in my 
book, what I call the highlights. 

Senator Ferguson. Does the committee have a copy of your diary ? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir; the diary Avas a purely personal and private 
document. The important parts of my diary are published in my 
book, what I call the highlights. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand, Mr. Grew, the committee does 
not have access — I am talking about counsel for the committee — does 
not have access to your diary to determine what might be important 
to this committee ? 

Mr. Grew. Senator, I would like to have the record straight on this, 
if you will permit me. 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would make the record straight. 

Mr. Grew. I will read a copy of my letter to Mr. Mitchell, the Gen- 
eral counsel. 

Senator Ferguson. You may read it. 

Mr. Grew. This is dated November 12, 1945. 

My Deiab Mr. Mitchell: I have received your letter of November 8 enclosing 
a copy of a letter of November 6 from Senator Brewster, as well as a copy of 
your reply to the Senator. Mr. Brewster requested you in his letter to secure 
for him a copy of the 13 volumes of my diary from which my book "Ten Years 
in Japan" was prepared. Your .inquiry of the State Department brought the 
answer that there is nothing [lb37] of the kind in its possession. 

You may be sure thaf I shall do everything iu my power to facilitate, support, 
and further the nationally important work of the Joint Committee and to be 
helpful in every way to Senator Brewster and the other members of the Commit- 
tee. I strongly believe that all the facts bearing upon the Pearl Harbor attack 
should be brought out and laid before the American people, and that no pertinent 
material should be concealed. You yourself can depend equally on my full 
cooperation in eliciting these facts. 

The few ofBcial documents contained in my book "Ten Years in Japan," which 
was published in 1944, were taken not from the diary but from two ofBcial publi- 
cations already issued in 1943 by our Government : "Peace and War, United States 
Foreign Policy, 1931-41" and "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 
1931-41" in two volumes. All official documents that passed between the Depart- 
ment of State and the Embassy in Tokyo covering the period of my ambassador- 
ship to Japan, both incoming and outgoing, are on file in the State Department 
and, under the President's directive as published, any and all of these documents 
pertinent to the investigation are presumably available to the Joint [1638] 
Committee. 

As to the diary itself, this is in no respect an official document. It is a private 
work, headed "Daily Personal Notes," containing my own personal records and 
prepared foi- my own guidance in analyzing and assessing day to day develop- 
ments. The diary is in the nature of a private sketch book in which tlie main 
lines of my eventual official reports to the Seci'etary of State were traced, and it 
contains many inaccurate and sometimes misleading statements, hurriedly jotted 
down from day to day, which had to be ironed out and, so far as possible, correct- 
ed or confirmed before taking shape in my official reports. Only tlie official 
reports should therefor govern. Private matters of interest only to my family 
and myself are, as in any diary, contained in it, and it includes furthermore 
frank comments on individuals, comments wliich can only be regarded as of a 
strictly personal and private character and which I am in honor bound not to 
reveal. 

It is my belief that all of the material in my diary which would be helpful 
to the investigation of the Joint Committee has been published in my book 
"Ten Years in Japan." To make assurance doubly sure, however, i have 
carefully examined these daily personal notes [1639] covering the months 



624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, and I have found no comment 
or material, other than that already published, which would, in my opinion, be 
helplul to any pliase of the Committee's investigation. It is my belief that all of 
the main facts on this subject, so far as my own observations and reports from 
Tokyo are concerned, have been published in the four volumes mentioned above. 

Senator Ferguson. Now will you repeat what those four volumes 
are? 

JNIr. Grew. Yes, sir. I just want to see whether there is something 
else in this letter that would be pertinent. 

Senator Ferguson. I would ask you then to read the last of your 
letter. 

Mr. Grew. Just the last paragraph : 

If there is any further phase of this subject which Senator Brewster or any 
other member of the Joint Committee would like to explore and will let me know, 
t will, with pleasure, cooperate to the best of my ability. 

Those four volumes are : 

1. Peace and War. 

2. United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41, published in 1943. 

3. P'oreign Kelations of the United States-Japan, 1931-41, 
[1640] in two volumes, also published in 1943. 

4. My book entitled "Ten Years in Japan." 

Senator Ferguson. Of course the last, your book Ten Years in 
Japan is not an official publication. 

Mr. Grew. No, sir; it is not an official publication. 

Senator Ferguson. Now do I understand that you submitted your 
diary to the State Department to determine what you might put in 
this book Ten Years in Japan ? 

Mr. Grew. That is always done. Senator, especially in wartime. 
That, to my recollection is done in every case. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. My question was : 
Did you submit it to the State Department? 

Mr. Grew. I submitted the manuscript of my book. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they take anything out ? 

Mr. Grew. I do not think they made any actual demand, but they 
suggested that certain passages might be eliminated; some of them 
because they could have caused embarrassment or actual danger to 
individuals, sometimes, where they might have been misinterpreted 
by the foreign governments, and points of that kind. 

Frankly, after receiving the suggestions of the Publications Com- 
mittee in the Department of State I found myself in entire accord 
with it. There is nothing that I reluctantly withdrew. 

[1641] Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation with 
them about the green-light telegram of September 1940? 

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect any precise conversation on that subject. 

Senator Ferguson. I might ask counsel. Has counsel ever seen that 
telegram ? Do we have a copy of it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. What telegram do you refer to? 

S9nator Fi-^rguson. The telegram of September 1940. I have been 
referring to it for quite a while. 

Mr. MrroHELL. We have never seen it. 

Senator Ferguson. Will counsel get us a copy from the State Depart- 
ment file? 

Mr. MrrciiELL. We will try.^ 



1 Subsequently admitted as Exhibit No. 26. See infra, p. 634 et seq., for text. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 625 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, what is a fair appraisal of that tele- 
gram of September 1940? What were you trying to do, and why did 
you try to do it ? 

Mr. Grew. I think the passage that I read to you covers the appraisal 
of the telegram. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, why did you come to write it ? 

Why did you send it to the State Department ? 

Mr. Grew. Because I was continually sending to the State Depart- 
ment my views about the situation and, in many cases, recommenda- 
tions, steps which I thought ought to be taken. That is the duty of any 
Ambassador abroad. 

[164^3] Senator Ferguson. Do you think your diary may have 
helped counsel to obtain from the files, which I understand are very 
voluminous, some of the important documents? For instance, this 
document ? 

Mr, Grew. I do not think so, Senator. I think, as I say, the high 
lights of the correspondence appear in my diary and then the running 
comment from day to day of what I was thinking at the time. I 
think the diary would not be an appropriate document in this investi- 
gation, and I would like to explain why, if I may. 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would. 

Mr. Grew. You will find in my book, on page 348, under date of 
November 1, 1940, 1 made the following entry in my diary: 

In the light of fast-moving developments I scarcely dare read back in the 
diary nowadays hecause of its many inconsistencies which show it up for the 
patchwork sort of day-to-day scribbling it is. At least it shows our thoughts 
and our Information, some of it reliable and some of it wholly unreliable, at any 
given moment — the moment of writing. It shows how often we are groping and 
fumbling in the dark. Less and less are we able to know what is going on 
behind the scenes, simply because many of our reliable contacts are no longer 
available and [16Ji3] also because, even behind the scenes, the right hand 
often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, when you were referring there to 
"we," you were talking about the Embassy in Tokyo ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; I was. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you send that information to the State De- 
partment, the substance of it ? 

Mr. Grew. Oh, certainly. I reported to the State Department that 
our Japanese contacts, sources of information were falling away 
simply because they were being very carefully watched by the secret 
police and most of them did not dare come to the Embassy any more, 
they did not dare meet me outside, and even when I went to the Tokyo 
Club, which was sort of a neutral meeting ground for Japanese and 
foreigners, I found the Japanese I knew would quietly slip away into 
other rooms or corners. They just did not want to be seen talking to 
me; they did not dare. Therefore, it was extremely difficult, under 
those circumstances, for us to keep in touch with everything that was 
going on there. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, that brought you to the conclusion 
that things were getting serious between the two countries, that mat- 
ters were growing worse, and much worse, between the two countries? 

Mr. Grew. Well, "worse" to the extent that the totalitarian 
[1644-] regime was working in full force and the secret police was 
controlling all Japanese individuals. 

79716—46 — pt. 2 16 



626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did I understand that the.y had a totali- 
tarian government in Japan as early as you are talking about? I 
understood you yesterday to say you considered it came in when Tojo 
came in. 

Mr. Grew. I said wlien Tojo came in, it was a complete military 
dictatorship, and everything was leading in that direction for a long 
time, but up to that point there were pressure groups in Japan who 
had to be listened to, and were listened to, and I would not say that it 
was completely a totalitarian regime up to that moment. 

Senator Ferguson. But they had to have the secret police at that 
time ? 

Mr. Grew. They always had the secret police. It was just a ques- 
tion to what extent they should intensify it. They were functioning. 

[164^5] Senator Ferguson. In 1941, in the spring, were you get- 
ting any information from the British as to the military activities 
of the Japanese ? 

Mr. Grew. I cannot state any definite information. Senator, but, of 
course, I came in close contact with my various diplomatic colleagues, 
and in many cases we exchanged information. That is one of the 
ways we were able to keep in touch. So I have no doubt that during 
the period you mention my British colleague occasionally passed on 
to me information in his possession as I did to him. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any information with relation to 
the Japanese being nearer Singapore, that you obtained from the 
British? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir ; I do not recall any precise information at this 
time. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall any specific information that 
you may have received on the Japanese military movements at or near, 
toward, Singapore? 

Mr. Grew. No ; I do not recall any precise information on that sub- 
ject. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get any information in relation to 
any landings of troops on the Kra Peninsula? 

Mr. Grew. Japanese troops ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; or on the isthmus. 

[164-6] Mr. Grew. You mean after they had been landed? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; or of their landing. I am talking about 
prior to December 7. 

Mr. Grew. Well, no, sir. It would be utterly impossible for any 
foreigner in Japan to acquire information of something that the 
Japanese military were going to do. We might guess that they were 
going to do it, but certainly not know until it had been done. All 
those steps were shrouded in military secrecy. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that you discounted any- 
thing that came in in relation to the Jap movements because you be- 
lieved that no such information could get out of the war authorities, 
military or naval authorities? 

Mr. Grew. Very little such information did come out. Of course, 
when information did reach me I sifted it and assessed it on the basis 
of my other knowledge, and in that light I was able to decide whether 
it was authentic or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you send only what you believed to be 
authentic to the State Department ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 627 

Mr. Grew. I was in the habit of reporting a great deal to the State 
Department. Sometimes only rumors, as in the case of that telegram 
of January 27. 

Senator Fkrguson. That is the Peruvian 

Mr. Grew. The rumor that in case of trouble they would attack 
[I647] Pearl Harbor. I sent many telegrams and dispatches of 
that kind. In many cases it was utterly impossible to confirm those: 
rumors. 

Senator Ferguson. By the way, did you ever get a reply to that 
Peruvian message? 

Mr. Grew. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. That was nothing unusual, that you did not 
get a reply 'i 

Mr. Grew. That was not unusual. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't recall, though, any information in 
the spring of 1941 from the British about landings or to-be-landings 
on the Kra Peninsula or Kra Isthmus ? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir ; I do not recall any specific information in that 
respect. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, were there rumors of troop movements 
at that time ? 

Mr. Gfew. Well, we knew from a variety of sources that the Japa- 
nese had moved down, were moving out all through that area there^ 
and, frankly, we were ready for anything, but if the Japanese were 
going to land in a certain place at a certain time we in all proba- 
bility would not and could not know. 

Senator Ferguson. That brings me now to the note of August 17. 
Are you familiar with that note 'i 

Mr. Grew. Note from whom, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. From the United States to Japan. It is the 
[164s] parallel action. It is the note of August 17. 

Mr. Grew. August 17. 

Mr. Gesell. 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. 1941. 

Mr. Gesell. Page 556. 

Mr. Grew. All of these papers. Senator, were as a rule cabled over 
to me ; the records of conversations and letters. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with the particular docu- 
ment? 

Mr. Grew. I shall have to read it first. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you read it so that you become familiasr 
with it? 

Mr. Grew (perusing paper). Yes; I recall that document per- 
fectly. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you refer to your message of Au- 
gust 18 — no. I have in mind the conversation you had with Toyda 
on August 18. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. 1941. 

Mr. Gesell. Page 560. 

Mr. Grew. I have it. 

\_16Jt9'] Senator Ferguson, Yes. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, I am fully familiar with that note; that record 
of conversations with the foreign ministers. 



628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Will you check and see whether or not it is in 
the white papers? 

Mr. Grew. It is in foreign relations. 

Senator Ferguson. But not in the white paper ? 

Mr. Grew. What do you call the white paper? 

Senator Ferguson. The Peace and War. 

Mr. Grew. That was an incomplete publication but I will see. 

It does not appear to be in the volume Peace and War. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to show you an article in the New York 
Times on August 13, Mr. Grew. 

Will counsel pass him the article? 

(The article was passed to the witness.) 

The Chairman. What year is that? 

Mr. Murphy. 1941. 

The Chairman. 1941. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, Senator, I have seen it. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with that article? 

Mr. Grew. Well, I have heard about it recently. I haven't read 
the whole article, no, but I know the pith of it. 

Senator Ferguson. You know the what ? 

11650] Mr. Grew. I know the principal point in it. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. ^ 

Mr. Grew. The report that the British Ambassador and I made 
representations to the Japanese F'oreign Minister 

Senator Ferguson. Will you talk into the microphone, please. 

Mr, Grew. Pardon me. 

I believe the principal point in it is a report that the British Am- 
bassador and I had made representations to the Japanese Foreign 
Minister. 

Senator Ferguson. Along what line? 

Mr. Grew. It appears to be an indication that any action by Japan 
which would threaten the independence of Thailand would be of 
concern both to the American and British Governments. 

Senator Ferguson. Who is the by-line; under what name? 

Mr. Grew. It is under the by-line of Otto D. Tolischus. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know him? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversations with him 
from wliich that could be written ? 

Mr. Grew. I often had conversations with him. 

Senator Ferguson. From which that could be written? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir. I would like to point out that in this article 
it is stated, "It was understood in political [1651'] circles here 
today." It was understood. In other words that is not a 

Senator F'erguson. Well, did you have any conversation with him 
from whicli that could be written? 

Mr, Grew. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say then that that was not a true 
statement? I 

Mr. Grew. I can refer to my records. I made a point of keeping a 
record of my calls at the Foreign Office in Japan. My calls on the 
Foreign Minister in August were, August 1, August 15, 18, and 22. 
And I have the subjects discussed at that time — just a moment. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 629 

No, sir, I find conferences with the Foreign Minister only on Aug- 
ust 15, 18, and 22. Of course, a good many talks were going on also 
between members of my staff and subordinate officers in the Japanese 
Foreign Office. I only saw the Foreign Minister on most important 
matters. 

Senator Ferguson. What am I to understand, that that is a true 
statement or not a true statement, that you did have such a talk with 
the Foreign Minister or you did not ? 

Mr. Grew. In the light of my own records, I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever taken up the question involved 
in that article with Japan ? 

Mr. Grew. I have no recollection of having done so. 

[lOS^] Senator Ferguson. Had you ever had any information 
from the State Department that that was our understanding? 

Mr. Grew. That that was taken up by the State Department ? 

Senator Ferguson. No; that that was where they stood on the 
proposition, that they stood as stated in the article ? 

Mr. Grew. That is a matter on which I would have to consult the 
records. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you consut the records so that you can 
give us information on that ? 

Mr. Grew. I will. As to whether I was ever informed by the State 
Department ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Mr. Grew. That they took this position ? 

Senator Ferguson. Thcit is right. 

Mr. Grew. As to the independence of Thailand ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

As I understand it, you don't recall ever taking it up with the 
Japanese Government. 

Now, going back to the note of the 17th of August 1941, do you 
know when that first came to your attention ? 

Mr. Grew. I couldn't tell you the elate on which it came to my atten- 
tion, but, as I say, most of these documents and records of conversa- 
tions were telegrams to me. I am not sure that they were in every 
case, but generally they were. I [165S] couldn't answer that 
question without examining the files of the Department of State and 
eee whether they did actually send that information to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever take that note up with the 
Japanese Government? You have a memorandum, you say, that you 
talked to them on the 18th. What did you talk about on the 18th? 

Mr. Grew. I have the record here, sir. 

I saw the Foreign Minister August 15 [reading] : 

I told the Minister that I was supporting the representations made by the 
Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on August 13, witla 
regard to recent cases of interference witli American rights and interest ia 
Japan and in Japanese occupied areas in China and I thereupon read to the 
Minister and left with him a copy of the Department's telegram with the exception 
of paragraph numbered three. I then discussed this situation at length, pointing 
out the fact that these cumulative interferences with American citizens and 
American interests were assuming a serious aspect both in Japan and in Jap- 
anese occupied areas in China and emphasizing the radical discrepancy between 
this treatment of American officials and citizens of their activities by the JafH 
anese and our treatment [1654] of Japanese officials and subjects and their 
activities in the United States. I expressed the belief that relief from these 



630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

interferences could be obtained only by the communication by the Japanese Gov- 
ornmont to Japanese authorities and Japanese sponsored authorities of eatejrorical 
instructions to desist from the interferences and obstructions under complaint. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat is the date? 

Mr. Grew. Th?it was on August 15. 

Senator Ferguson. August 18, just glance at that. Did it relate 
to the note of August 17? 

Mr. Grew. On August 18 the Minister asked me to come to see 
him, and it was a very long conference which lasted 2i/^ hours, and 
the whole question of Japanese relations was therein discussed. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss the note of the 17th? 

Mr, Grew. Nothing was said about Thailand in that conversation. 

Senator Ferguson. No. Was anything said about the note of the 
I7th where the British and the United States Governments were to 
take parallel action? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir; nothing whatsoever was said about that. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know about that at the time, on the 
18th? 

[16551 Mr. Grew. Did I — I don't quite understand — did I 
know that that action 

Senator Ferguson. That Britain and the United States had agreed, 
or at least there were promises, that we were to. take certain parallel 
action. 

Mr. Grew. I would have to consult the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read the last paragraph on page 556. 
It may refresh your memory as to what I am talking about. 

Mr. Grew. Of foreign relations? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. Five hundred and fifty-six? 

Senator Ferguson. Five hundred and fifty-six. 

Mr. Grew. The was the statement handed by President Roosevelt 
to the Japanese Ambassador. 

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say 
to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes 
any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination 
"by force or tlireat of force of neighlioring countries, the Government of the 
United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which 
it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests 
of the TTnited States and American nationals [1656] and toward insuring 
the safety and security of the United States. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, my question is, Did you take that matter 
up with anyone in Japan ? 

Mr. Grew. I do not think I did so. I have no record of having 
done so, but if I did so I certainly would have reported that step to 
the Department of State, and they would have it on file. I do not 
recollect having done so. 

The Chairman. It is now 12 o'clock. Before recessing the Chair 
would like, if the committee is willing, inasmuch as paragraphs have 
been read from Mr. Grew's letter to the President, of December 14, 
and the President's reply of January 21, the Chair will ask that the 
full text '^f both those letters be printed in the transcript of the record 
at this point. 

(The letters referred to follow :) 

Dear Frank: * * * About Japan and all her works. It seems to me 
to be increasingly clear that we are bound to have a showdown some day, and 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 631 

the principal question at issue is whether it is to our advantage to have that 
showdown sooner or to have it later. 

Tlie chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle, to be: 

(1) Whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war; 

[1657] (2) Whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap 

our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between vic- 
tory and defeat ; 

(3) To what extent our own policy in the Far East must be timed with our 
prepardness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American 
and the Japanese Navies now and later. 

Those are questions which, with our limited information here, I am not 
qualified even approximately to answer. 

From the Tokyo angle we see the picture roughly as follows : 

Alter eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive 
in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by 
trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept 
away as if by a typhoon, with little or nothing remaining to show for it. 
Japan has become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and 
part of a system which aims to wreck about everything that the United 
States stand for. Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent the Japanese from 
digging in permanently in China and from pushing the southward advance, 
with economic control as a preliminary to political domination in the areas 
marked down. Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American em- 
bargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they 
tend to push the Japanese onward in a [1658] forlorn hope of making 
themselves economically self-sufficient. 

History has shown that the pendulum in Japan is always swinging between 
extremist and moderate policies, but as things stand today we believe that the 
pendulum is moi'e likely to swing still further toward extremes than to reverse 
its direction. Konoye, and especially Matsuoka, will fall in due course, but 
under present circumstances no Japanese leader or group of leaders could 
reverse the expansionist program and hope to survive. 

Oxu- own policy of unhurried but of inexorable determination in meeting every 
Japanese step with some step of our own has been eminently wise, and that policy 
has sunk deep into Japanese consciousness. But while important elements 
among the Japanese i)eople deplore the course which their leaders are taking, 
those elements are nevertheless inarticulate and powerless and are likely to 
remain so. Meanwhile the Germans here are working overtime to push Japan 
into war with us. I have told Matsuoka point-blank that his country is head- 
ing for disaster. He has at least seen that his efforts to intimidate us have 
fallen flat and have had an effect precisely the reverse of that intended. 

It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we are prepared, with Gen- 
eral Hugh Johnson, to withdraw bag and baggage from the entire sphere of 
"Greater East Asia including [1659] the South Seas" (which God forbid), 
we are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan. 

A progressively firm policy on our part will entail inevitable risks — especially 
risks of sudden uncalculated strokes, such as the sinking of the Panay, which 
might inflame the American people — but in my opinion those risks are less in 
degree than the far greater future dangers which we would face if we were to 
follow a policy of laissez faire. 

In other words, the risks of not taking positive measures to maintain our 
future security are likely to be much greater than the risks of taking positive 
measures as the southward advance proceeds. So far as I am aware, the great 
majority of the American people are in a mood for vigorous action. The 
principal point at issue, as I see it, is not whether we must call a halt to the 
Japanese program, but when. 

It is important constantly to bear in mind the fact that if we take measures 
■"short of war" with no real intention to carry those measures to their final 
conclusion if necessary, such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the 
Japanese, who will proceed undeterred, and even with greater incentive, on their 
wa.v. Only if they become certain that we mean to fight if called upon to do so 
will our preliminai'y measures stand some chance of proving effective and of 
removing the necessity for war — the old story of Sir Edward Grey in 1914. 

[1660] If by such action we can bring about the eventual discrediting of 
Japan's present leaders, a regeneration of thought may ultimately take shape in 
this country, permitting the resumption of normal relations with us and leading 
to a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem. 



632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In a nutshell that is about the way I regard the present and future situation. 
No doubt you have seen some of my telegrams which have tried to paint the picture 
as clearly as has been possible at this post where we have to fumble and grope 
for accurate information, simply because among the Japanese themselves the 
right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Their so-called "new 
structure" is in an awful mess and the bickering and controversy that go on 
within the Government itself are past belief. Every new totalitarian step is 
clothed in some righteous-sounding slogan. This, indeed, is not the Japan that 
we have known and loved. 

* * * You are playing a masterly hand in our foreign affairs and I am 
profoundly thankful that the country is not to be deprived of your clear vision, 
determination, and splendid courage in piloting the old ship of state. 



[1661] TuE White House, 

M'ashington, Januarij 21, JOJfl. 

Deab Joe : I have given careful consideration to your letter of December 14. 
First, I want to say how helpful it is to have your over-all estimates and re- 
flections — based as they are upon a fare combination of first-hand observation, 
long experience with our Japanese relations, and masterly judgment. I find my- 
self in decided agreement with your conclusions. 

I also want you to know how much I appreciate your kind words of congratu- 
lation on my re-election and your expression of confidence in my conduct of our 
foreign affairs. 

As to your very natural request for an indication of my views as to certain 
aspects of our future attitude toward developments in the Far East, I believe 
that the fundamental proposition is that we must recognize that the hostilities 
in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single world conflict. We 
must, consequently recognize that our interests are menaced both in Europe and 
in the Far East. ■ We are engaged in the task of defending our way of life and 
our vital national interests wherever they are seriously endangered. Our 
strategy of self-defense must be a global strategy which takes account of every 
front and takes advantage [1662] of every opportunity to contribute to our 
total security. 

You suggest as one of the chief factors in the problem of our attitude toward 
Japan the question whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap 
our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory 
and defeat. In this connection it seems to me that we must consider whether, 
if Japan should gain possession of the region of the Netherlands East Indies and 
the Malay Peninsula, the chances of England's winning in her struggle with 
Germany would not be decreased thereby. The British Isles, the British in those 
isles, liave been able to exist and to defend themselves not only because they have 
prepared strong local defenses but also because as the heart and the nerve 
center of the British Empire they have been able to draw upon vast resources 
for their sustenance and to bring into operation against their enemies economic, 
military, and naval pressures on a world-wide scale. They live by importing 
goods from all parts of the world and by utilizing large overseas financial re- 
sources. They are defended not only by measures of defense carried out locally 
but also by distant and widespread economic, military, and naval activities which 
both contribute to the maintenance of their supplies, deny certain sources of 
supply to their enemies, and prevent those enemies from concentrating the full 
force of their armed power against the heart and the nerve center of the Empire. 
[1663] The British need assistance along the lines of our generally estab- 
lished policies at many points, assistance which in the case of the Far East is 
certainly well within the realm of "possibility" so far as the capacity of the 
United States is concerned. Their defense strategy must in the nature of things 
be global. Our strategy of giving them assistance toward ensuring our own 
security must envisage both sending of supplies to England and helping to prevent 
a closing of channels of communication to and from various parts of the world, 
so that other important sources of supply will not be denied to the British and 
be added to the assets of the other side. 

You also suggest as chief factors in the problem the questions whether and 
when BiMtain is likely to win the European war. As I have indicated above, the 
conflict is world-wide, not merely a European war. I firmly believe, as I have 
recently declared publicly, that the British, witli our help, will be victorious in 
this conflict. The conflict may well be long and we must bear in mind that when 
J]ngland is victorious she may not have left the strength that would be needed to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 633 

bring about a rearrangement of such territorial changes in the western and 
southern Pacific as might occur during the course of the conflict if Japan is not 
kept within [I664] bounds. I judge from the remarks which appear at 
the bottom of page 4 and at the top of page 5 of your letter that you, too, attach 
due importance to this aspect of the problem. 

I am giving you my thoughts at this length because the problems which we face 
are so vast and so interrelated that any attempt even to state them compels one 
to think in terms of five continents and seven seas. In conclusion, I must em- 
phasize that, our problem being one of defense, we cannot lay down hard-and-fast 
plans. As each new development occurs we must, in the light of the circum- 
stances then existing, decide when and where and how we can most effectively 
marshal and make use of our resources. 

With warmest regards. 
As ever, 

Franklin D. Rooseve3.t. 

The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 2 : 00 
o'clock, 

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2:00 
o'clock of the same clay.) 

[1665] AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 : 00 P. M. 

The Chairman, The committee will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLASK GEEW (Resumed) 

Mr, Gesell,, Mr. Chairman, may I interpose a moment, with Senator 
Ferguson's permission ? I think I can clear up one question that came 
up during his examination. 

Senator Ferguson. There were quite a number. 

Mr. Gesell. This may be helpful. The question came up with re- 
spect to the green-light dispatch. We made an inquiry over the noon 
recess and find that an extract and paraphrase of that green-light 
dispatch will be found printed as Document 182 at page 569 of Peace 
and War, and inasmuch as that is an extract, we have obtained from the 
Sta;te Department the entire text of the dispatch, and we wish to offer 
that in evidence, in order that the record will be complete. This would 
be Exhibit 26. 

Senator Ferguson. Could you explain why this instrument was not 
among those delivered to us before by the State Department, if it was 
Mr, Grew'smost important instrument? 

Mr, Gesell. Our inquiry into State Department documents has been 
■confined to the year 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that the counsel had made 
no request for anything back of 1941 ? 

Mr. Gesell, We have not requested any of Mr. Grew's dispatches 
back of 1941, Senator. 

[1666] Senator Ferguson. Had the committee requested any 
State Department records back of 1941 ? 

Mr. Gesell. I think there may have been a few instances where we 
liave gone behind 1941, but very few. 

Senator Ferguson. Will Counsel state for the record the reason for 
that limitation ? 

Mr. Gesell. Senator, the effort was to stay around the period which 
we thought was of major concern to the committee, the events leading 
up to Pearl Harbor. 



634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. In view of the fact that extracts have been referred 
to and Mr, Grew has been examined about it, don't you think, Counsel, 
that the instrument itself ought to go into the transcript of the hearing 
instead of being an exhibit ? 

Mr. Gesp]ll. I think that would be a good idea. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Senator, I would like to have it read at thia 
time. 

The Chairman. It may be read at at this time, but I think it ought to 
go into the transcript of the hearing and not simply filed as an exhibit. 
With the consent of the committee, that will be the order. 

Senator Ferguson. Would Counsel read it into the record so -Mr. 
Grew will be familiar with it ? I have not had time to read it. 

Mr. Gesell. Perhaps, Mr. Grew could read it. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Let Mr. Grew read it. 

Mr. Grew. I have a copy of it here. 

[1667] Senator Ferguson. You have a copy ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Read it. 

The Chairman. You may read it, Mr. Grew, if you wish. 

Mr. Grew. Read the whole thing ? 

The Chairman. Read the whole document. 

Mr. Grew. All right. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 26.") 

Mr. Grew. This is a telegram to the Secretary of State. 

827 September 7, 9 p. m. 
Strictly Confidential. 

Mr. Keefe. What is the date of that again, please ? 

Mr. Grew. September 12, 1940. 

Senator Ferguson. Does your book give the date of it, Mr. Grew. 

Mr. Grew. Does what, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Does your book state the date ? 

Mr. Grew. No. I used the substance of the telegram in the comment 
in my diary on October 1, but it was only the substance, it was not the 
text. 

Senator Ferguson. In your book, it is under date of October 1, 1940? 

Mr. Grew. That is right, yes, sir. The telegram was sent on Sep- 
tember 12. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[1668] One. The observations of Mr. A. T. Steele. 

Senator Ferguson. Just one moment, Mr. Grew, if I might inter- 
rupt. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. There would not be any way of telling that the 
instrument that you speak about on page 334 was the one of Septem- 
ber 12, 1940? 

Mr. Grew. That is in my book? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I mean without your information. 

Mr. Grew. No ; you are quite right. I used that merely as comment 
in my diary. I considered in September was one of the most momen- 
tous periods in Japanese history and in American-Japanese relations. 
I discussed the general situation and then I referred to the material 
used in that telegram, although it was not the telegram itself. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 635 

Senator Ferguson. Thank you. 
Mr. Grew. Shall I proceed to read ? 
Senator Ferguson. I wish you would. 
The Chairman. Yes. 
Mr. Grew (reading) : 

One. The observations of Mr. A. T. Steele concerning ( ?) in Japan conveyed 
in Peiping's 300, August 31, 3 p. m., recently received here by mail, have had my 
careful attention. In general terms I believe that Mr. Steele's observations are 
well founded and [1669] sound, a belief which applies equally to the impor- 
tant considerations advanced in the final two paragraphs of the summary of Mr. 
Steele's statement. 

I think, in order to make this perfectly clear, that telegram would 
probably be helpful to the committee and could be produced undoubt- 
edly, Mr. General Counsel. 

Senator Ferguson. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the counsel get 
a copy of it. 

The Chairman. Is that the telegram from Mr. Steele ? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir; that is a telegram from our then location in 
Peiping, No. 300, August 31, 3 p. m. That could be found in the files 
and could be produced. 

The Chairman. The counsel will produce it for the record.^ 

Who was Mr. Steele, if I might inquire ? 

Mr. Grew. Mr. Steele was a prominent correspondent of the Far 
East. He was on one of the Chicago papers. I am not quite sure at 
the present time which — I think the Chicago Daily News, but I am 
not quite sure. He had a high reputation in the Far East. 

The Chairman. All right, go ahead. 

Mr. Grew (reading) : 

His thesis that "firmness is the soundest and safest American naval policy" 
and that "the rislis involved are much less than is commonly supposed in the 
United States" is however of such far-reaching gravity as to deserve carefully 
studied analysis and comment. In presenting the [1670] present trend of 
my thoughts on this general subject I have constantly in mind the fact that the 
shaping of our policy vis a vis Japan must depend upon the broader viewpoint 
of the administration in Washington and upon many factors which may not be 
apparent to this Embassy. 

Two. The situation and circumstances which led to the series of exploratory 
conversations with the former Foreign Minister Arita (my 400, June 3, noon) 
and to the recommendations for considering steps leading toward the negotia- 
tion of a new treaty of commerce with Japan (my 562, July 11, 9 p. m.) have 
now obviously passed. I earnestly hope that the time will come when I shall 
feel justified in renewing those recommendations, but with the fall of the Yonai 
cabinet and the radically altered policy and outlook of the present set up in 
Japan, further initiative on our part in proposing conciliatory measures at the 
present time would appear to be futile and unwise. 

Three. Whatever may be the intentions of the present Japanese Government, 
there can be no doubt that the army and other elements in the country see in 
the present world situation a "golden opportunity" to carry into effect their 
dreams of expansion ; the German victories have gone to their heads like strong 
wine; until recently they have believed implicitly in the defeat of Great 
[1671] Britain; they have argued that the war will probably (*) (end) in 
a quick German victory and that it is well to consolidate Japan's position in 
greater East Asia while Germany is still acquiescent and before the eventual 
hypothetical strengthening of German naval power might rob Japan of far 
flung control in the Far East; they have discounted effective opposition on the 
part of the United States although carefully watching our attitude. The ability 
of the saner heads in and out of the Government to control these elements has 
been and is doubtful. 

•The above asterisk indicates an apparent omission. [Footnote in original.] 

* Subsequently admitted as Exhibit No. 77. For text see Hearings, Part 4, p. 1712 et seq. 



636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Four. Now, however, I sense a gradual change in the outburst of exhilaration 
which greeted the new Government on its inception. The Japanese Government, 
the arm.v and nav.v and the public are beginning to see that Germany may not 
defeat Great Britain after all, a hypothesis which I have constantly emphasized 
to my Jnpanese contacts in the plainest language and now to add to that dawn- 
ing realization, they see the United States and Great Britain steadily drawing 
closer together in measures of mutual defense with the American acquisition 
of naval bases in British possessions in the Atlantic and with our support of 
the British fleet by the transfer of fifty destroyers. They hear reports of our 
haste to build a two-ocean nav.v and of our considering the strengthening of our 
naval bases [^672] in the Pacific and even rumors of our eventual use 
of Singapore. These developments and rumors are having their logical effect on 
Japanese consciousness. On the one hand they tend to emphasize the potential 
danger which Japan faces from eventual positive action by the United States 
and Great Britain* acting together (the danger of combined Anglo-American 
measures has long been appreciated in Japan as evidenced by efforts to avoid 
irritating the United States and Great Britain simultaneously) or by the United 
States alone. On the other hand they furnish cogent arguments for those ele- 
ments in Japan who seek economic and political security by obtaining markets 
and source of raw materials wholly within the control of Japan. As for Ger- 
many, the Japanese are beginning to question whether even a victorious Ger- 
many would not provide a new hazard to their expansionist program both in 
China and in the southward advance. Meanwhile the future position and atti- 
tude of Soviet Russia is always an uncertain factor in their calculations. These 
various considerations are beginning to give them concern- 

[1673^ High pressure diplomacy, especially in the Netherlands East In- 
dies, will continue, but the fact that the Japanese Government was able even 
temporarily to restrain the military forces from their plans for a headlong 
invasion of Indo-China indicates a degree of caution which I do not doubt 
was at least partially influenced by the attitude of the United States. What 
Mr. Steele describes as the "nibbling policy" appears likely to continue until 
the world situation, and especially the attitude of the United States, becomes 
clearer. 

Five. In previous communications I have expressed the opinion that sanc- 
tions by the United States would set Japanese-American relations on a down- 
ward curve. It is true that our own newly instituted program of national 
preparedness now justifies measures which reed not fall within the realm of 
outright sanctions. On the other hand we must envisage the probability that 
drastic embargoes on the export of such important products as petroleum, 
of which the United States is known to possess a superabundance, would be 
interpreted by the Japanese Government and people as actually ( ?) sanc- 
tions which [167/f] might and probably would lead to some form of 
retnliation. The risks whif^h Mr. Steele sees as "much less than is commonly 
supposed in the United States" will depend less upon the careful calculations 
of the Japanese Government than upon the uncalculating "do or die" temper 
of the army and navy in case they should attribute to the United States the 
responsibility for the failure of their expansionist plans. Such retaliation 
might take the form of counter measures by the Government but there would 
be even greater likelihood of some sudden stroke by the army or navy without 
the Government's prior knowledge or authorization. These risks constitute 
an imponderable factor which cannot at any given moment be weighed with 
assurance. It would be short, however, to deny their existence or to proceed 
with the formulation of policy and the adoption of measures without giving 
these potential risks full consideration and determining the wisdom of squarely 
facing these risks. 

Six. In the ensuing observations I am carefully considering both of the 
fundamental purposes of my mission, namely the protection and advancement 
of American interests and the mnintenance of good relations between the 
United States and Japan. When these two \7675] desiderata conflict, 
the preponderant emphasis to be placed on the one or the other is a matter 
of high policy which does not lie within my competency. My obiect is merely 
to place liofore the administration in Washington the outstanding factors in 
the situation as we see them from the angle of this Embassy. Having care- 
fully set forth the inevitable hazards involved in a strong policy I now re- 
spectfully turn to the hazards involved in a laissez faire policy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 637 

Seven. In discussing the specific question of American-Japanese relations 
it is impossible to view that problem in its proper perspective without con- 
sidering it as part and parcel of the world problem which, briefly, presents the 
following aspects: (A) The United States and Great Britain are the leaders 
of a great group of English spealiing nations around the world standing for a 
"way of life" which is being appallingly threatened today by a group of Ger- 
many, Italy, Soviet Russia and Japan whose avowed purpose is to impose by 
force of arms their will upon conquered peoples. In attempting to deal with 
such powers the uses of diplomacy are in general banlirupt. 

[i676'] Diplomacy may occasionally retard but cannot effectively stem the 
tide. Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers from attain- 
ing their objectives. Japan today is one of the predatory powers ; she has sub- 
merged all moral and ethical sense and has become frankly and unashamedly 
opportunist, seeking at every turn to profit by the weakness of others. Her' 
policy of southward expansion is a detiuite threat to American interests in th6 
Pacific and is a thrust at the British Empire in the east. 

(b) American security has admittedly depended in a measure upon the exist- 
ence of the British fleet which in turn has been, and could only have been, sup- 
ported by the British Empire. 

(c) If we conceive it to be in our interest to support the British Empire in 
this hour of her travail, and I most emphatically do so conceive it, we must 
strive by every means to preserve the status quo in the Pacific at least until the 
European war has been won or lost. In my opinion this cannot be done nor can 
our interests be further adequately and properly protected by merely registering 
disapproval and keeping a careful record thereof. It is clear that Japan has 
[1677] been deterred from taking greater liberties with American interests 
only out of respect for our potential power; it is equally (*) that she has 
trampled upon our rights to a degree in precise ratio to the strength of hear 
conviction that the American people would not permit that power to be used. 
Once conviction is shaken it is possible tliat the uses of diplomacy may again 
become accepted. 

(d) If then we can by firmness preserve the status quo in the Pacific until 
and if Britain emerges successfully from the European struggle, Japan will be 
faced with a situation which will make it impossible for the present opportunist 
philosophy to maintain the upper hand. At a moment it might then be possible 
to undertake a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem on a fair, frank, and 
equitable basis to the lasting benefit of both the United States and of Japan. 
Until such time as there is a complete regeneration of thought in this country, 
a show of force, together with a determination to employ it if need be, can 
alone contribute effectively to the achievement of such an outcome and to our 
own future security. 

[1678] Eight. Passing from the general to the specific problem that now 
confronts us, and with the foregoing picture in mind, I applauded the timeliness 
of the instruction contained in the second part of Department's 331, August 
23, 6 p. m. concerning the Shanghai defense sectors. The Department will have 
seen from my 791, September 4, 11 p. m. paragraph No. two that the Foreign 
Minister's complaint as to alleged threats on our part was met with the state- 
ment that what we have in mind is "a logical reciprocal adjustment of interna- 
tional relations". I feel that^he appropriate time has come to proceed, gradually 
but progressively, with that adjustment. In the present situation and outlook 
I believe that the time has come when continued patience and restraint on the 
part of the United States may and probably will lead to developments which 
will render Japanese-American relations progressively precarious. It is my 
hop§ that if the Japanese Government and people can be led to believe that 
tlieir hand is being overplayed, there will eventually ensue a reverse swing of 
the pendulum in which a reconstruction of good relations between the [1679] 
United States and Japan will be possible. The alternative seems to me to be 
hopeless. 

Nine. The foregoing analysis, which has been drafted with care over a period 
of several days, has the expressed complete concurrence of the Naval, Military 
and Commei-cial Attaches and all other members of the immediate stafE of this 
Embassy. 

(End of message.) 
^^^^^^ (Signed) Grew. 

(The ahoTe asterisk indicates an apparent omission.) 



638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[J 680] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, that was a very well con- 
sidered instrument. 

You had spent considerable time on that instrument and it was well 
considered ? 

Mr. Grew. I had. 

Senator Ferguson. And will you give us the specific reason, if you 
had one, for sending it? 

Mr. Grew. I can't say that there was any specific reason other than 
my duty to express to our Government from time to time my under- 
standing of the situation in Japan and the Far East and from time to 
time my representations as to what policy could be followed in Wash- 
ington. 

Senator Ferguson. You wanted Washington to have the informa- 
tion that they might know how you felt. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, is it true that that was a change of attitude 
as far as you were concerned? 

If you will look at page 272 of your book, I would like to have you 
read into the record what your attitude was on December 5, 1938, on 
that same question. 

I think it is expressed in "meanwhile there were buzzings * * *." 

Mr. Grew (reading) : 

Meanwhile there were buzzings as to possible financial help to Chiang Kai-shek 
from American and British sources, and discussions as to possible economic 
measures [1681] against Japan. As to the latter, no matter how much I 
might personally like to see retaliation for the things that Japan is doing to us 
and to our interests in the Far East, I have consistently recommended against 
such measures unless we are prepared to see them through to their logical con- 
clusion, and that might mean war, for sanctions are always a potential incentive 
to ultimate war. The British, at least some British, believe that Anglo-American 
economic sanctions would bring Japan to her knees in short order. I disagree 
with that thesis. I know Japan and the Japanese pretty well. They are a hardy 
race, accustomed throughout their history to catastrophe and disaster ; theirs is 
the "do or die" spirit, more deeply ingrained than in almost any other people. 
They would pull in their belts another notch and continue. They can live on rice 
and, if necessary, fight on rice. The deprival of oil, rubber and other necessities 
of war might cramp their style, once their considerable supplies had given out, 
but it would take a long time to bring about capitulation, I think. 

Foreign support to Chiang Kai-shek is another matter altogether, and this does 
not need to be done oflScially, no matter what official blessings might accompany 
the unofficial act. 

Thus lay the land up to the end of November. 

1938. 

IJG82] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, can you state to the com- 
mittee what there was that changed you from that statement and belief 
in 1938 to the statement of September 12, 1940? 

Mr. Grew. Well, a great deal of water had gone over the falls. Sen- 
ator, between those two messages; there was 2 years between them. 
The Japanese Army was steadily encroaching further into the Far 
East and into East Asia. They were potentially threatening our vital 
interests. And from that point of view the situation had very much 
changed indeed. That, I think, was the main reason why I sent that 
telegram, but one must remember that my so-called green-light tele- 
gram was not something which had developed in a question of a few 
hours or a few days. It meant a progressive line of thinking over a 
period to the crux of the situation. 



PROCEEDINllS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 639 

Senator Ferguson. You wanted the State Department to know of 
your change ? 

Mr. Grew. Oh, very definitely. 

Senator Ferguson, Now, I will ask you to look on page 359 of your 
book, the letter beginning "Dear Frank," on that same page. That 
is to the President ? 

Mr. Grew. 359? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

The Chairman. That is on page 359 but the following page looks 
like 358 ; the pages seem to be misnumbered there. 

[1683] Senator Ferguson. It is all right in my copy, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

Mr. Grew. That is my letter to the President of December 14, 1940. 

Senator Ferguson. I ask you to read where it begins "After eight 
years of effort." Eead that paragraph. 

Mr. Grew. This is my letter to the President of December 14, 1940. 

After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in 
American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends 
and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as 
if by a typhoon, with little or nothing remaining to show for it. Japan has 
become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part of a 
system which aims to wreck about everything that the United States stands for. 
Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent the Japanese from digging in perma- 
nently in China and from pushing the southward advance, with economic control 
as a preliminary to political domination in the areas marked down. Economic 
obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap 
Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese onward 
[16S4] in a forlorn hope of making themselves economically self-sufficient. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that you felt that diplo- 
macy had failed and that we were going from a stage of diplomacy to 
some other instrument to settle the differences? You say : 

* * * I find that diplomacy has been defeated' * * ^. 

Mr. Grew. I said diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces 
at that moment. As I recollect it it was after the fall of the Konoye 
Cabinet with which I had been able to work fairly closely in the hope 
of being able to build up our relations. When this Cabinet fell and a 
new Cobinet came in I saw that that work had been pretty well 
wrecked. 

Senator Ferguson, What Cabinet came in in December of 1940? 

Mr. Grew. December 1940. I think that was one of Konoye's Cabi- 
nets. I will look, I have the complete record here. 

That is Konoye's. The second Konoye Cabinet came in on July 22, 
1940, 

Senator Ferguson. What is the next step if diplomacy failed ? You 
use this expression : 

Only insuperable obstacles will not prevent the Japanese from digging in perma- 
nently in China and from pushing the [1685] southward advance * * * — 

and so forth. 

What is the next instrument? 

Mr. Grew. Senator, I had in mind all the time- 



Senator Ferguson. Wliat were you trying to convey to the State 
Department ? 



640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEIRL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Grew. I was trying to convey to the State Department that the 
time had come to take strong measures. 

[1686] Senator Ferguson. Of course, this is to the President. 

Mr. Grew, Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And he is the one in charge of foreign rela- 
tions. So you took it right to the top. 

Mr. Grew. No. I was also reporting to Mr. Hull at that time, of 
course, along the same lines as indicated by that so-called green-light 
telegram. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I do find in the records your reports to 
Mr. Hull along this same line in December, and let us have that. 

Mr. Grew. Well, the one in Sept-ember covers that ground. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, the one in September covers that? 

Mr. Grew. The so-called green-light telegram covers that ground 
completely. 

Senator Ferguson. I see. So the one in September covered it to 
the State Department and this one was to the President, on the 14th 
of December ? 

Mr. Grew. That Is right ; that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Thank you. 

Mr. Grew. There were probably other telegrams to Mr. Hull along 
the same lines but I haven't the full records before me so I cannot 
tell you. 

My thought was that by taking these measures we would [1687] 
eventually bring at least the thinking, the sane-minded statesmen in 
Japan to the realization that unless they stopped in their tracks they 
were going to have war with the United States and Great Britain 
and other countries. 

Now, that is precisely what happened. Wlien Prince Konoye came 
into power for the third time, his third Cabinet, with all his black 
background and record and, certainly, as Mr. Hull pointed out the 
other day, he had been responsible for one of the worst train of acts 
of international banditry in world history, he still was an intelli- 
gent man and he, in my opinion, as a result of the policy that we 
followed, the measures we had taken, he saw the handwriting, on 
the wall. 

He knew a good deal more about our country than the hot-headed 
militarists did; he had been to our country, knew something about 
our productive capacity, knew something about our national spirit. 
In my opinion, he realized that Japan, if she got into war with us 
and with other countries, other western powers, would probably in 
the end be defeated and would emerge as a third or a fifth rate power. 

In other words, I think at that time some of those more intelligent 
statesmen in Japan reali2Jed that they were on the brink of an abyss 
and it was my belief at that time that they tried their best to reverse 
the engine. It was too late to do it but they tried to do it. 

[1688] Therefore, this policy which I had recommended had led 
up to that position where these intelligent Japanese statesmen, quite 
apart from the hot-headed militarists and all the rest of them, real- 
ized that they ought to step back and it was my hope that they would 
step back and, as I said in this telegi^am, that this would lead to a 
complete remolding of our relations with Japan and a remolding of 
the entire situation in the Far East. That was always my hope. 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 641 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, on the bottom of page 360, in the- 
same letter, you say this : 

It is important constantly to bear in mind the fact that if we take measures— 
and this is in quotations — 

"short of war" with no real intention to carry those measures to their final 
conclusion if necessary, such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the 
Japanese, who will proceed undeterred, and even with greater incentive, on their 
way. Only if they become certain that we man to fight if called upon to do sa 
will our preliminary measures stand some chance of proving effective and of 
removing the necessity for war — the old story of Sir Edward Grey in 1914. 

So you had in mind to convey to the President that it was your opin- 
ion and the time had come for the State Department, for our foreign 
relations to be such that we would [J689] indicate that we were 
willing to go the whole way and that would be even to the point of war. 

Mr. Grew. I felt at that time entirely certain about that. Senator,, 
for the very reason that unless we were willing to build up our forces, 
and to build up our armanents to the point where we would be ready 
for anything, the Japanese would know it in a hurry and we never- 
could get away with any bluff of any kind. I wanted our forces built 
up as an insurance against war. 

Senator Ferguson. And you had in mind then that we should build 
an army and a navy that we could implement every policy that you 
were telling the President that we should take ? 

Mr. Grew. I felt that that was an essential part of the policy,. 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, I will ask you whether or not when 
the President in his letter of January 21, 1941 said [reading] : 

I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusion, 

And then I turn to page 362, you are talking about that we go to the 
point of even going to war, I will ask you to read what he said to you 
on page 362, beginning with, "You suggest as one of the chief factors." 

[1690] He is talking now, as I understand it, the President, 
about war. Will you read that? 

Mr. Grew. Which paragraph is that on 362 ? 

Senator Ferguson. It is the first paragraph. 

Mr. Grew. "You suggest" ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew (reading) : 

You suggest as one of the chief factors in the problem of our attitude toward 
Japan the question whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap 
our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory 
and defeat. In this connection it seems to me that we must consider whether, 
if Japan should gain possession of the region of the Netherlands East Indies and 
the Malay Peninsula, the chances of England's winning in her struggle with Ger- 
many would not be decreased thereby. The British Isles, the British in those 
Isles, have been able to exist and to defend themselves not only because they have 
prepared strong local defenses but also because as the heart and the nerve center 
of the British Empire they have been able to draw upon vast resources for their 
sustenance and to bring into operation against their enemies economic, military, 
and naval pressures on a world-wide scale. They live by [1691] importing 
goods from all parts of the world and by utilizing large overseas financial re- 
sources. They are defended not only by measures of defense carried out locally 
but also by distant and widespread economic, military, and naval activities which 
both contribute to the maintenance of their supplies, deny certain sources of supply 

"iOTlG— 46— pt. 2 17 



642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to their enemies, and prevent those enemies from concentrating the full force 
of their armed power against the heart and the nerve center of the Empire. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, we could take that as meaning that not- 
withstanding your warning the President was conveying to you that 
he felt that it was necessary to go all out on this question; that he 
understood you, in other words. 

Mr. Grew. Well, you mean that it would appear from this para- 
graph that the President accepted that position? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. Well, I think, Senator, from the letter as a whole that 
would be clear. 

Senator Ferguson. That would follow. 

Mr. Grew. That would be clear. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, I will ask you in the telegram 
that you read, the original, the "green light" telegram, whether or 
not there is not a clause in there about us using the Singapore base! 
Do you remember that? ' 

[1692] Mr. Grew. Yes. It was, as I remember it, we might 
have. Let me see how that was stated about that. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you express that ? 

Mr. Grew. I have it right here. That is the reference. Senator, on 
page 3, paragraph numbered 4 of my telegram 827, September 12, 
9 p. m. I had better read the whole paragraph to make the context 
clear. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew (reading: 

Now, however, I sense a gradual change in the outburst of exhilaration which 
greeted the new Government on its inception. The Japanese Government, the 
army and navy and the public are beginning to see that Germany may not defeat 
Great Britain after all, a hypothesis which I have constantly emphasized to my 
Japanese contacts in the plainest language and now to add to that dawning 
realization, they see the United States and Great Britain steadily drawing 
closer together in measures of mutual defense with the American acquisition of 
naval bases in British possessions in the Atlantic and with our support of the 
British fleet by the transfer of fifty destroyers. They hear reports of our haste 
to build a two-ocean navy and of our considering the strengthening of our naval 
bases in the Pacific and even rumors of our eventual use of [1693] Singa- 
pore. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. There was nothing more definite than that. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, had you heard any rumors or infor- 
mation from the State Department — first, had you any rumors in 
relation to any agreement we might have, or some rights that we 
might have to use Singapore as a naval base? 

Mr. Grew. So far as I recollect I received nothing of that kind 
from the State Department, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you heard rumors there ? 

Mr. Grew. Well, no, sir ; I cannot say that I heard rumors. 

Senator Ferguson. Did your Navy or Army attache there in Tokyo 
■give you any information on that? 

Mr. Grew. They passed on to me, so far as I know, all the impor- 
tant information that they received. I do not recollect that either of 
them passed on to me any information to that effect. 

Senator Ferguson. Could you give us any opinion as to where you 
may have received that information of rumors? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 643 

Mr. Grew. I did not receive that information, Senator. It is clear 
from the telegram that that was information which the Japanese had 
heard unci were considering. I do not know where they got it from. 

11694-] Senator Ferguson. Had they advised you that they had 
such information ? 

Mr. Grew. Well, of course, going back to this telegram, after all 
these years I cannot tell you exactly how that came to me. It was 
very likely in the Japanese press ; it may have been passed on to me by 
individuals. All I can say was, "They hear reports." I cannot be 
more definite than that. I could not clamp that down. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not know, though, but what the Army or 
the Navy attache there may have given you the information also ? 

Mr. Grew. I could not answer that question. Senator, without look- 
ing back in the records. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the British Ambassador ever give you that 
information ? 

Mr. Grew. I do not believe so. I have no recollection of it. 
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know of any agi'eement between 
the United States and Great Britain as to the defense of Singapore? 
Mr. Grew. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Now we will go to page 556 of Foreign Rela- 
tions. That is the note of August the 17th, 1941. 
Mr. Grew. Five hundred and what ? 
[1695] Senator Ferguson. 556 of Foreign Relations. 
Mr. Grew. 556 ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I am particularly interested in the last para- 
graph, the one I had you read this morning. 
Mr. Grew. Yes, we had that this morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, will you tell me, if you can, when you 
first considered that message and what did it mean to you ? 

Mr. Grew. Well, I cannot tell you on what date I received the mes- 
sage. I probably received it on the day of its delivery. You must 
remember there is a day difference between Tokyo and the United 

States, so that anything that appeared in the print 

Senator Ferguson. It was delivered in Tokyo 

Mr. Grew. On August 18. 

Senator Ferguson. It was delivered on Sunday and you probably 
got it Monday ? 

Mr. Grew. I probably would have gotten it IMonday. Monday 
would have been the 19th. 

Senator Ferguson. What did that message — what did that infor- 
mation mean to you ? That was coming from Washingtoii to you. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. It meant that we were following the policy which 
I had constantly advocated. 

[1696] Senator Ferguson. That was the policy that you had 
advocated ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the State Department give you any other 
information on that instrument ? 
Mr. Grew. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Did your Army or Navy attache give you any 
information ? 

Mr. Grew. Not to my knowledge. 



644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Would you consider that an ultimatum? 

Mr. GuEW. By no means. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I want to read to you on page 2 of exhibit 
16 this information, and ask you whether it was conveyed to you. 

This is a document to the President of the United States dated 
November the 5th, 1941, and signed by — this particular one is signed 
by W. P. Scobey, colonel, G. S. C. secretary, and it is on a message, 
attached to a message by the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, to the- 
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and it is being delivered io 
the President. [Reading:] 

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China — At the request 
of Admiral Starli, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action takem 
at [1697] the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 

1, at vphich a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captlain 
Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang 
Kai-shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against 
making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United 
States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed 
out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting a,t 
sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it 
would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further^ 
Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that 
there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back 
them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be preparecj 
to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was 
held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was pro- 
posed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan 
should be warned against movement into Siberia. 

Now, was that ever called to your attention, that the Army and the 
Navy had considered that instrument of August the 11th as an ulti- 
matum ? 

[1{)98] Mr. Grew. I do not think that that was ever called to my 
attention, Senator, but I would like to say right here that the appli- 
cation of the term "ultimatum" to that document could not be well 
taken owing to the fact that the conversations between the United 
States and Japan continued for a long time thereafter and if you 
submit an ultimatum to a country, you do not talk any more; it is 
finished. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, the ultimatum was on this point, as 
I understood this morning, Mr. Grew. 

Senator Lucas. Whom is that from? 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement. * * * 

He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the 

meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to 

Japan that it would be necesary for the United States to take action in ciase 

of further Japanese aggression. 

In other words, if Japan made further aggression after the I7th 
of August 1941 that we would act and that that was an ultimatum. 

Mr. Grew. The fact remains. Senator, that the Japanese did take 
a great deal of action after that date and no such action was taken by 
us and meanwhile the conversations in [1699] Wasliington 
continued right along. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to read another statement and ask you 
whether it was ever conveyed to you, or whether it was your under- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 645 

standing that you had ever conveyed this information to the State 
Department. On page 4 of the same instrument [reading] : 

Discussing tlie situation Admiral Ingei'SoU pointed out that the fleet strength 
at the present time is seriously handicapped — 

and that is October the 5, 1941. 
Now, reading again : 

by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the i-epair 
yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to 
get brash. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schuir- 
mann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for 
the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be 
issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll 
felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be 
defeated in military action in a few weeks. 

Now, did you ever give any information to our State Department 
that would lead our State Department to the notion that in case we 
got into war with Japan that they could be [1700] defeated in 
a military action in a few weeks ? 

Mr. Grew. I definitely did not, Senator, because I did not — — 

Senator Ferguson. Did you give them the opposite, that it would 
be a longer war than that ? 

Mr. Grew. I cannot tell you whether I gave any definite estimate at 
that time or not ; probably not. But they had plenty of reports from 
me as to the toughness of the Japanese Army and Navy. I can bring 
out passage after passage to indicate that; that they were a fanatical 
race, they were a do-or-die sort of people, they would probably fight 
to the last ditch and that they were exceedingly military. I brought 
that out continually right from the very beginning of my stay in 
Tokyo, when I wrote that the Japanese Army is built for war, pre- 
pared for war, and anxious to go to war. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did the State Department ever con- 
vey to you that that was the attitude of the State Department of the 
United States? 

Mr. Grew. I do not remember that they ever did. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you would remember such a statement, 
don't you think? 

Mr. Grew. I think I would. 

Senator Ferguson. It is so contrary to what your views were that it 
probably would have impressed you very keenly. 

[1701] Mr. Grew. I think I would have come back very quickly 
on a statement of that kind. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I have read you from the exhibit here. 
Whose views, when they speak about the State Department, whose 
views would that be ? Mr. Hull was the head, was he not ? 

Mr. Grew. I cannot tell you who expressed those views, Senator, 
because I was not here. I frankly do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Hull that question, 
as to whether or not that was his views of October 5 or near October 5, 
1941? 

Mr. Grew. I do not think that I ever have. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Hornbeck? 

Mr. Grew. I do not believe I ever did. 



646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Fekguson. Did you have any correspondence with Mr. 
Hornbeck ? 

Mr. Grkw. I had a certain amount of correspondence from time 
to time of an informal nature but I do not recollect 

Senator Ferguson. Official correspondence? 

Mr. Grew. I beg pardon? 

Senator Ferguson. Official correspondence? 

Mr. Grew. No ; it was unofficial correspondence ; purely personal 
correspondence, and I do not recollect that that [1702] subject 
was ever touched upon in our correspondence. I doubt that it was. 

Senator Ferguson. When you were here in 1939 you had a conver- 
sation with the President and with Mr. Hull ? 

Mr. Grew. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you state as to whether or not at that time 
you told the President your opinion about the Japanese as far as 
fighting is concerned, that they could not be bluflfed, as you used the 
expression this morning, and as to how strong they were in a military 
sense ? 

Mr. Grew. I have no record of that conversation but it is my opinion 
that in all probability I did do just that. 

Senator Ferguson. And would you say that you had the same kind 
of a conversation with Mr. Hull ? 

Mr. Grew. I would say that I probably did but, also, I have no 
record of that conversation, so I cannot answer your question definitely, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, how would you account, you being 
in Japan and knowing the situation, for our State Department to get 
the idea that I have just read to you as Admiral Ingersoll felt, that 
the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be 
defeated in a military action in a few weeks? 

Mr. Grew. That is a question. Senator, which I frankly [1703^ 
am not competent to answer. I was not here at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, it certainly was not from anything that 
you gave the State Department? 

Mr. Grew. It was not what? 

Senator Ferguson. From anything that you ever gave the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Grew. No; it certainly was not. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, getting back to Captain Schuir- 
mann's idea of the note of August 17. That note — have you got it 
before you there? 

Mr. Grew. The note itself? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. \ 

Mr. Grew. Or Admiral Schuirmann's ? 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Schuirmann. Have you got that ? 

Mr. Grew. Which page is that on ? . ' 1 

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 3. 

Mr. Grew. Can you find that for me, where it is? 

Mr. Gesell. I think there may have been some confusion about the 
exhibit. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, it is marked on the outside, "Exhibit 16." 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. Only the first two or three pages are a memo- 
randum to the President. The remaining portion is a [1704.1 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 647 

minute of a meeting which amplifies the memorandum to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you understand then that the memo- 
randum attached never went to the President? 

Mr. Gesell, I have no evidence that it ever did. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, have you any evidence that it did not? 

Mr. Gesell.' I have no evidence either way. 

Senator Ferguson. The reason is I got that as one exhibit and it is 
attached and the President has acted on the instrument, as I under- 
stand it, when we come 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? 

Senator Ferguson. The next is November 14, 1941. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. The memorandum is dated, however, under date of 
November 5, 1941, and the notes of the meeting are dated November 3, 
1941. 

Senator Feirguson. That would be correct. 

Mr. Murphy. And they are separate papers apparently. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but there isn't any showing here that it all 
did not go to the President because it is all on the same subject. 

I ask, Mr. Chairman, that the counsel read the whole [170S] 
instrument into the record so it will be clear. 

Mr. Murphy. May I just make this one statement? 

The Chairman. What is it, Congressman ? 

Mr. Murphy. I just wanted to say that the statement, the memo- 
randum that went to the President would carry the signatures of the 
Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, and on the body of the 
statement itself there is nothing incorporated in it, there isn't any 
reference at all to the minutes of the meeting. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, it is difficult — that is the difficulty we 
run into when the committee only gets photostatic copies. We cannot 
tell whether this is a signed one or what. 

Mr. Murphy. But there is no reference 

Senator Ferguson. This is a mimeographed copy rather than a 
photostatic copy. 

Mr. Murphy. But there is no incorporation of the minutes in the' 
message by reference, at least. 

Senator Ferguson, I would like to have read into the record at this 
place the instrument, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Which one is that? The memorandum to the 
President ? 

Senator Ferguson. No, the whole thing; November 5, the one from- 
the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval [1706] Operations. 
It is addressed to the President. It is an estimate concerning the far 
eastern situation. 

Mr. Murphy. Thirteen pages. 

The Chairman. Well, it is a very lengthy document. It is not in 
the transcript, it has not gone into the hearings as yet? 

Mr. Murphy. It has been offered. 

The Chairman. It has been offered as an exhibit, but has it been 
printed in the hearing? 

Mr. Gesell. No; it has not. Senator. I suggest we could just 
an^ange to have it spread upon the record at this point. 



'648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Seniitor Fekguson. If we could have it spread upon the record at 
this point. 

The Chairman. That is agreeable, and it will be put into the record 
here at this point and made a part of the transcript. 

(Exhibit No. 16 follows:) 

[1707] War and Navy Department, 

Secret Washington, November 5, lOJ/l. 

Serial 0130012 

Memorandum for the President : 

Subject : Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation. 

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the 
military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently 
received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, 
•and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be 
Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and 
that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United 
States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The 
Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Govern- 
ment should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma 
Road. 

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma 
Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The 
result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that 
Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If use 
of the Burma Road is lost, United States [1708] and the British Com- 
monwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If re- 
sistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops 
in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after 
the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal. 

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in 
northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, 
although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The 
advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, 
with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of 
supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would 
have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops 
alone, provided those troops are adequate in quality and numbers. 

The question that the Chief of Naval Oporations and the Chief of Staff have 
taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in 
undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to 
prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such oper- 
ations, however well-disguised, would lead to war. 

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the 
Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the 
Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strength- 
■ened [1709] by withdrawing all ^ naval vessels from the Atlantic except 
those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific 
Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be with- 
drawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from 
the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United King- 
■doni to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future. 

The only existing^ plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to con- 
duct offensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense 
of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are 
now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will 

* Precefled by handwritten insertion "practic.nlly." 

' The preceding words struck out, and handwritten word "current" substituted. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 649 

make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of 
December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines 
will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of 
Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached 
[1710] the projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency 
of this thi-eat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a 
deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west 
of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforce- 
ments to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the 
entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached 
impressive proportions. 

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang- 
Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. 
These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying 
increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and 
acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group. 

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the 
following conclusions : 

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States- 
British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two 
nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remained 
undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited 
offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would 
greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic 11711] against Ger- 
nany, the most dangerous enemy. 

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while 
building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks 
or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very 
great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in 
one or more of the following contingencies : 

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or 
mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the 
Netherlands East Indies ; 

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° 
East or south of 10° North ; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the 
Loyalty Islands. 

(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines 
of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, 
with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position. 

[1712] (d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kun- 
ming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, 
would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan. 

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended tO' 
the Chinese Central Government. 

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete co- 
ordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be 
undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and 
the Netherlands East Indies. 

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the 
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions. 
Specifically, they recommend : 

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against 
Japan in China be disapproved. 

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of 
Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces. 

That aid to the American Volunteer Group [1713] be continued 
and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent. 
That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. 



Chief of Staft. Chief of Naval Operations. 



650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Joint Board 
washington 

8KCRET 

Minutes of Meeting, November S, 1941. 

At the call of the Senior Member, the weekly meeting scheduled for November 5, 
1941, was held today in Room 2003, Munitions Building. The meeting was called 
to order at 3 : 40 p. m. 

Present : 

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Oi>prations, Presiding ; 

General G. C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff ; 

Rear Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations ; 

Major General William Bryden, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff ; 

Major General H. H. Arnold, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff for Air; 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, U. S. N., Chief of the Bureau [17 U] of 
Aeronautics ; 

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U. S. A., Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War 
Plans Division ; 

Captain O. M. Read, TJ. S. N., War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, in 
absence of Rear Admiral R. K. Turner ; and 

Colonel W. P. Scobey. U. S. A., Secretary. 

Additional Officers Present : 

Major General R. C. Moore, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff ; 

Colonel C. W. Bundy, U. S. A., War Plans Division, War Department General 
Staff; 

Captain R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations : 

Commander F. P. Sherman, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations ; and 

Lieutenant Commander A. H. IMcCollum, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence. 

The Presiding Officer directed the minutes of the meeting of October 22, would 
stand approved unless there were objections. The minutes were approved. 

The Secretary then announced the agenda for the meeting as follows : 

Serial 693 — Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain. 

Serial 732— Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action [1715] of the Army 
and the Navy." Communications between Ship and Shore. 

Serial 665-11 — Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the 
Navy. 

Serial 725 — Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West 
Indian Islands where United States Bases are being Established. — Revision 
requested by the British. 

Discussion — Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China. 

Discussion — Alternate Route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes to the 
Far East. 

Action taken on the several subjects was as follows: 

Serial 693 — Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain. Following a discussion of 
this subject, during which General Arnold stated that the development of airplane 
ferrying facilities to the British Isles was provided for in Serials 683-1 and 723, 
the Board approved the Joint Planning Committee report of October 23, 1941, and 
directed that the subject be stricken from the calendar. 

Serial 732 — Revision of Paragraph 109, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy. 
The Joint Planning Committee report was approved. 

Serial 665-11 — Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and 
the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report recommendation of October 30, 
1941, was accepted and [171G] the Committee of Experts' report was 
approved. 

Serial 725 — Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West 
Indian Islands where United States Bases are being established. The Secretary 
announced that the Joint Planning Committee report before the Board, recom- 
mended certain revisions in the United States-United Kingdom initial agreement, 
which was approved by The Joint Board on September 19, 1941 ; and that the 
revisions now requested by the British had been accepted by the United States 
representatives. Following a properly seconded motion, the Board voted to 
approve the Joint Planning Committee report of October 29, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 651 

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China. — At the request 
of Admiral Stai'k, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at 
the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a 
discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states 
that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-shek and General 
Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on 
China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain 
to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, 
following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the 
President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the 
United [1717] States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. 
He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue 
any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know 
If the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by 
the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on 
Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send 
some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into 
Siberia. 

Following Captain Schuirmann's presentation, Admiral Stark read a Navy 
Department estimate of the recent dispatches received from Chungking. Admiral 
Ingersoll, gave his personal review of the situation. A summary of this review 
was that : 

a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation, made several months ago, is to 
make the major effort in the Atlantic,' and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage 
in a limited offensive effort. The policy was stated in the U. S.-British Staff 
Conversations Report ABC-1. 

6. A major war effort in the Pacific would reqviire an enormous amount of 
shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas. 

c. A U. S. war in the Pacific would materially affect United States aid to 
England. 

d. The requirements In tankers alone for support of a Pacific war would create 
a serious oil shortage in this \1718] country, and the United States fleet 
cannot be supported in the Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate 
supplies. 

e. The shortest line of communication is flanked by Mandated Islands, and is 
vulnerable to Japanese attack. Two other routes are available for communica- 
tions to the Far Eastern Theater : one via Australia ; the other via Cape of 
Good Hope. 

f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities 
are available at either Manila or Singapore ; while there are docks, nevertheless 
the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present. 

(/. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet due to the lack of adequate 
antiaircraft protection for the anchorage. 

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launohinc; an attack in five 
directions : viz, against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against 
Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five opera- 
tions. United States' action should be: In case of Japanese attack aeainst 
either the Philippines or- British and Dutch positions the United States should 
resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China 
through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study con- 
cludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East 
until the [1719] augmentation of United States military strength in the 
Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and ai'my forces, 
becomes available. 

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength 
at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval 
units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the 
present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further 
the State Department conferences, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State 
Department did not 'feel that it was necessary for the United States to take 
immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, 
he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Depart- 
ment was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military 
action in a few weeks. 

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be 
Naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to 



652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his 
information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action 
to bo taken under the present situation. The information which he had received 
indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the 
national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the 
strength of tlie United States forces in the Far East and [11120] em- 

phasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present sta- 
tion in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army 
Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines 
or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief 
that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be 
of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on 
Japanese operations. 

Admiral Ingersoll gave summary of naval reinforcements scheduled for the 
Philippines. A stated number of submarine units en route to the Philippines. 
A stated number of submarine units en route to the Philippines were now in 
Guam. Other submarines scheduled for transfer to the Philippines were about 
to leave Hawaii. With reference to Japanese decision on National policy he felt 
that United States forces and shipping now being moved to the Philippines 
might be in danger if a decision adverse to United States interest should be made 
on November 5th. General Marshall emphasized the point that Japan could 
hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful air and submarine 
force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when United States 
power is sufficiently developed in the Philippines, we would then have something 
to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces had been built 
up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situa- 
tion. It appeai-ed that the basis of U. S. policy should be to make [1721] 
certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These 
concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade 
restrictions. 

Following these discusssions the Board adopted the following proposal sub- 
mitted by Admiral Ingersoll and amended by suggestions made by Admiral Stark 
and General Marshall : 

War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a 
memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed 
policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following 
ines: 

Oppose the issuance of an ultinsatum to Japan. 

Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan. 

Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support 

of Chiang Kai-Shek. 

Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as 

long as possible. 

Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next 

several months. 

Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East would 

have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the 

U. S. 

Emphasize the existing limitations on [1722] shipping and the 

inability of the U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without 

the transfer of the major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to 

the Pacific. 
On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines' Army Air Forces. General 
Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and 
were investigating reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying 
all United States and British requirements. 

At this point, General Mnrshall presented a list of items of equipmcMit con- 
sidered necessary by the China Mission to enable China to maintain her war 
effort. He pointed out that the War Department was beset with many trials 
and difficulties in the nllocatinn of Lend-Lonse items as related to Great Britain, 
Russia, Dutch East Indies. China and other countries. In the case of Russia, 
a large amonnt of equipment allocated to that country would have to go via 
Archangel. Vladivostok or Basra. The shortage of shipping, the long lines of 
commun'cations. and the difficult transport situation from the ports of debarka- 
tion might cause an inability to make prompt delivery of all equipn>ent to its 
final destination. Under some conditions, this would mean piling up unused 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 653 

equipment at various localities, while at the same time other localities would 
suffer from shortage of equipment. The matter resolves itself into a question 
as to whom Lend-Lease material should be released. It was General Marshall's 
[1723] opinion that control of Lend-Lease distribution, and diversions inci- 
dent thereto, is a strategic decision which should be made by The Joint Boaid. 
Since the matter of ocean tonnage is a critical feature in the delivery of Lend- 
Lease items and is related to the strategic situation, General Marshall felt that 
Admiral Land of the Maritime Commission should be called in to sit with The 
Joint Board in deciding matters of this nature. The Board agreed that Admiral 
Land should be asked to detail a member of his department to work with the 
Joint Planning Committee on reports , involving the disposition of Lend-Lease 
materials. Navy members agreed to take the necessary steps to inform Admiral 
Land of this request. 

Referring to the merchant shipping situation. Admiral Stark felt that merchant 
tonnage is so short and prosijective requirements are so great that an effort 
should be made to get the 1942 merchant vessel construction program moved up 
to an A-l-a priority. 

At the direction of Admiral Stark, Commander Sherman then read a report 
from War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, to the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations concerning the movement of airplanes to the Middle East for ultimate 
delivery to Russia. This report recommended that the Normandie be acquired 
to meet future requirements for transporting aircraft; that three additional sea 
trains also be acquired and placed in service without conversion; and that deliv- 
ery of aircraft to the Middle East be effected by the use of these three sea 
[1724] trains plus the two sea trains U. S. S. Kitty Haxvk and U. S. S. Hani- 
mondsport, already acquired and converted for Navy use. Copy of this report 
was furnished to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. 

Alternate Route Via Canton Island for Movement of Airplanes. — Following a 
discussion of this subject the Board instructed that the following directive be 
given to the Joint Planning Committee: 

It is directed that the Joint Planning Committee submit a report as to the 
action to be taken to complete the, establishment of an additional landplane route 
between Hawaii and Australia, less vulnerable to hostile interference than is 
the existing route via Wake Island, and as to the defenses of additional air- 



dromes and landing fields acquired. 



W. P. SCOBEY, 

Colonel, O. S. C, Secretary. 



[1725] NovEMBEB 3, 1941. 

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: 
Subject : Far Eastern Situation. 

/. Discussion. 

1. A conference was held at the State Department during the morning of 
November 1, 1941. Present were Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Mr. 
Hornbeck, other lesser State Department officials, and Capt. Schuirmann, U. S. N. 
The subject of discussion was the action which should be taken on the Magruder 
radiogram of October 28, 1941. Question arose as to the strength of U. S. forces 
in the Far East as affecting diplomatic pressure on Japan. Measures were dis- 
cussed, such as sending U. S. Army Air Forces to China, which might lead to 
immediate involvement in war with Japan. Apparently, the statement of Chiang 
Kai-Shek, that an immediate Japanese attack on Kunming threatened and that 
this could be defeated only by the intervention of air forces, was accepted. 

2. a. The War Department G-2 estimate (Tab A) does not support Chiang 
Kai-Shek's conclusions as to immediate initiation of a Japanese move toward 
Kunming. G-2 believes that : the movement if contemplated will not be initiated 
in less than two months ; the movement will be very difficult over nearly 300 miles 
of roadless, broken country ; the Chinese, in favorable defense terrain, can defeat 
this offensive by proper concentration and use of ground troops alone. 

[1726] h. G-2 (Col. Bratton) agrees with the Magruder statement that 
with the fall of Kunming, Chinese resistance to Japan would be very seriously 
affected. 

c. The Gr-2 estimate also covers the broader viewpoint of expected Japanese 
action. 

3. An air estimate of the Far Eastern situation (Tab B) brings out the follow- 
ing : the most effective air aid to China can be given by units based in the Philip- 



654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

pines; there are, at present many shortages in ammunition and gasoline supply 
which will militate against a sustained effort ; logistical difficulties, aside from 
general policy, make it undesirable to undertake operations of U. S. Army Air 
Force units in China. 

4. The status of the Lend-Lease program for China is shown in Tab C. 

* * * * * * * . 

5. The status of ground troops and defense reserves in the Philippine Depart- 
ment is shown in Tab D. The garrison lias not reached the effective strength 
desired by General MacArthur. Deficiencies are being overcome by the dispatch 
of personnel and supplies from the United States and by accelerating the training 
and equipping of the Philippine Army. The present combined air and ground 
forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. The dispatch 
of any considerable portion of the air garrison to China would leave Luzon open 
to serious risk of capture. 

[1727] 6. Informal contact with officers of the local British Staff Mission 
indicate that the British have incomplete air forces for the defense of Singa- 
pore, would refuse to allow units of the Royal Air Force to support Chinese 
troops in Yunnan, and are of the firm opinion that the British Chiefs of Staff 
would strongly disapprove any action in China which might bring on war with 
Japan. 

7. War Plans Division is strongly of the opinion that : 

a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations remain 
sound, viz: 

(1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany. 

(2) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war. 

(3) Military counter-action against Japan should be considered only in case 
of any of the following actions by Japan : 

(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or 
Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to 
define accurately what would constitute '-a direct act of war". It is possible 
for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could 
be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized [1728] that the deci- 
sion as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Govern- 
ment concerned. 

(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the 
west of 100° East or to the south of 10° North. 

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy 
of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and 
course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the 
Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° 
North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to 
Waigeo Island, or the Equator east of Waigeo. 

(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor. 

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty 
Islands. 

6. Germany must be defeated. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain 
undefeated, decision is not reached. The means to defeat Japan, (Army, Navy, 
and tonnage,) must be withdrawn in quantity from the effort against Germany. 
To defeat Germany will require the utmost total effort. 

[1729] c. It is desirable that large Japanese forces be kept involved in 
China. However, from the larger viewpoints, prospective Chinese defeat would 
not warrant involvement of the United States, at this time, in war with Japan, 

d. Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective to deter 
Japanese action. 

e. Most effective aid to China, as well as to the defense of Singapore and the 
Netherlands East Indies, is now being built up by the reinforcement of the 
Philippines. The safety of Luzon as an air and submarine base should soon be 
reasonably assured by the arrival of air and ground reinforcements. Strong 
diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint 
at the earliest about the middle of December, 1941, when the, Philippine Air 
Force will have become a positive threat to Japanese operations. It would be 
advantageous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure 
until February or March, 1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached 
its projected strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in oi)eration. 

f. Material aid to China should be accelerated consonant with the studied 
needs of Russia and Great Britain. 

g. Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China should be continued and accel- 
erated as far as practicable. . 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 655 

II. Recommendations. 

Substitution of tlie words "War Department" for "War Plans Division" ia 
paragrapli 7 above and approval of that [1730] paragraph as a statement 
of the War Department's iwsition on the Far East situation at this time. 

L. T. Gebow, 
Brigadier General, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff. 
6 Incls.^ 

#1— Tab A— G-2 Estimate 
#2— Tab B— Air Estimate 
#3 — Tab C — Lend-Lease Program for China. 
#4— Tab D— Ground Troops & Def. Res. Phil. Dept. 
#5 — Tab E — Ground Reinforcements, Phil. Dept. 
#6— Tab F— Rad. fr. Gen. Magruder (10-28-41). 



[1731] Department of State, 

Division of Fab Eastern Affairs, 

Nov. 14, 1941. 

The President's reply vpas handed to Hu Shih at 6 p. m. by Mr. Hornbeck. 

M. M. H. 



The White House, 
Washington, November 11, 1941- 
Memorandum for General Watson. 

I want to see Hu Shih for five minutes on Wednesday, and give this to me whea 
he comes. 

F. D. R. 



Strictly Confidential 

Memorandum foe the President 



November 10, 1941. 



There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 
wliich was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply 
meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador 
here to call and [1732] that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with 
the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 

Enclosure : 
Draft 
message. 

FE : JWB : HES FE PA/H 



Address Official Communications to 

The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. 

Dep.-vrtment of State, 
Washington, November 10, 1941. 
Strictly Confidential 

Memorandum for the President 

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 
which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply 
meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador 
here to call and that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with tlie request. 
that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 

(Signed) Hull. 
Enclosure : 

Draft message. 

* Tab A is included in Exhibit No. 33 ; other tabs not included. 



656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1733] Strictly Confidential 

To Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt: 

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 vphich 
was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4 ; also, 
your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. V. Soong on 
October 30. 

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the 
menace of a Japanese attack against Kunming from Indochina to which you 
call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under ref- 
erence, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department 
of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in 
order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems 
underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would 
be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not 
appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had 
advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of 
an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain and the formidable 
resistance which your land forces would offer in Yunnan, an invasion of that 
province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and 
extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important 
that your forces be adequately prepared, equipped and disposed in all branches. 
Under existing circumstances, taking into [173^^ cconsideration the 
world situation in its political, military and economic aspects, we feel that the 
most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line 
of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating 
the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in 
equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many 
quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China 
and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union and some twenty other 
countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addi- 
tion, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly ex- 
panding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great 
promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition 
of increasing amounts of material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging 
views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the 
tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinat- 
ing of efforts in the most practicable ways possible. 

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, 
together with such aa the British doubtless are considering, adopted and im- 
plemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the de- 
fenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding 
against [1135] such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be de- 
veloping. Indirectly influencing that situation : American military and naval 
defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, 
and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any 
Japanese military movement into China from Indochina, ai'e ever present and 
significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and 
Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south. 

This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government 
of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of aggression and 
conquest. We shall continue to impress this point of view upon Japan on 
every appropriate occasion. 

In tiie present state of world affairs, I feel — and I am confident that you will 
agree with me — that there rests on the United States, in connection with every 
move which it considers and every decision which it makes, extraordinary obli- 
gation to give intensive thought to widespread political stresses and strains, to 
both long-swing and short-swing potentialities, and to the weight of various 
possible and probable advantages in comparison with the weight of other pos- 
sible or probable disadvantages. The world conflict is now being waged in 
many theaters and with a great variety of weapons, both physical and moral. 
\imC)] Resistance to the forces of conquest takes many forms. In all prob- 
ability, the efforts of all of us who are engaged in that resistance, efforts of 
China and of the United States and of many other countries, will have to be 
continued and be sustained over a long period of time before our countries, 
one and all, will again be made secure and our people again be enabled to turn 
their whole thought and effort to peaceful and constructive pursuits. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 657 

I assure you that the situation and the problems which are the subject of 
this correspondence will continue to have my own and my country's constant 
attention. 

FE:.1WB:HES 

PA/H :SKH 

11-10-41 FE. 

[17S7~\ Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield for just one 
observation ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

-Mr. Murphy. On page 5 of the minutes, the recommendation of the 
Board, after hearing these references which the gentleman read, was 
that they opposed the issuance of an ultimatum. 

The Chairman. Well, that will show from the document itself. 

Senator Ferguson. That will speak for itself. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, in the President's message, on page 3, the 
President's message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, from Presi- 
dent Roosevelt, on page 3 of that same document [reading] : 

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, 
together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and im- 
plemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses 
of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against sucli threat 
of an attack upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that 
situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine 
Islands, which are being steadily increased, [1738'] and the United States 
Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military 
movement into Cliina from Indo-China, are ever present and significant factors 
in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive prep- 
arations in their territories to the south. 

Was that your understanding of the situation, Mr. Grew? 

Mr. Grew. Well, Senator, as I said, I was not here in this country 
at that time; I was not in a position to check up on all these steps 
that were reported as being taken. Frankly, I cannot give you an 
opinion on that. 

Senator Ferguson. No, but, Mr. Grew, had you an idea that the 
fact that our fleet w^as on the flank was deterring the Japanese from 
taking action? 

Mr. Grew. I said that this morning. I do agree; I do think that, 
yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You think that that was true ? 

Mr. Grew. I think that that was true. I think it had a deterrent 
effect. In other words, I think if • 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, Mr. Grew, you think 

Mr. Grew. I would like to finish, please. 

Senator Ferguson. I beg your pardon. Go ahead. 

Mr. Grew. I think it had a deterrent effect. More than [173,9] 
that, I think to withdraw the fleet would have had a disastrous effect 
psychologically. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, Mr. Grew, if it had an effect and there 
was going to be war between the United States and Japan, how do you 
account for us allowing that fleet to be there and being attacked as 
it was at Pearl Harbor? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that that is a totally 
unfair question. 

The Chairman. The witness can take care of himself. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 2 18 



658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Grew can take care of himself, but we have 
been running along here with one question after another that the 
witness absolutely does not know anything about and I think it is a 
question that other authorities and other witnesses should answer 
directly in the time to come. I do not object to it, because the wit- 
ness is undoubtedly taking care of himself. It just seems to me that 
we are wasting a lot of time. Maybe I am wrong. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, I am of the opinion that you are 
wrong. 

The Chairman. If the witness has any additional opinion as to why 
the fleet was there than the reasons that he has already assigned for 
it being there and the effect of it being there he may state. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand that the Chair rules W^^O] 
that the witness cannot answer that question. 

The Chairman. The Chair makes no such ruling. On the contrary, 
he is suggesting that the witness answer. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Grew. I am simply stating my opinion that I believe that the 
fleet at that time was there and I assumed that the fleet would be in 
perfect condition. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean by "in perfect condition" that it 
would be properly protected for all events * 

Mr. Grew. I assumed that the fleet would fulfill its functions in 
case of necessity. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you understand, Mr. Grew, that the 
fleet was there and it would defend itself, or that the Army base was 
there to defend the fleet in Pearl Harbor and to defend Pearl Harbor ? 

Mr. Grew. Senator, I did not go into those very strategic details; 
naturally, I could not. You asked me merely what my opinion is 
about keeping the fleet in Pearl Harbor and I have expressed my 
opinion that the fact of the fleet being there, to me that had a deter- 
rent influence on the Japanese and to have withdrawn tl^.e fleet from 
Pearl Harbor would have had just the reverse. It would have had a 
very disastrous influence. That was always my opinion and I haven't 
changed it. 

[i7^7] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, I read to you last night 
from the Foreign Relations, I think it was May of 1940, where you 
expressed to one of the Japanese Ministers that it was not there as 
a threat to Japan. How do you account for that statement ? 

Mr, Grew. Very definitely it was not there as a threat to Japan 
because we had no idea of offense. Our whole policy was one of 
defense and nothing else. That was fundamental in our policy. What 
reason had we for offense? Our whole policy was based on defense 
pure and simple. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if our whole policy was one of defense — 
and was that told to Japan ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. I think that time after time our basic princi- 
ples were fully explained to Japan, not only by myself in conversa- 
tions with Japanese officials, not only in written documents to the 
Japanese Government, but by high officials of the United States Gov- 
ernment in public speeches. That was constantly being expressed. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you would say that the fleet was there as 
a defense, and as far as a defense was concerned it was a deterrent to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 659 

Japan but as an offensive weapon it was not a deterrent to Japan 
because we had never expressed that it was there for that purpose. 

Is that a correct understandin<2:. Mr. Grew. 

[1742] Mr. Grew. Well, sir, I merely made the statement that 
our whole policy was one of defense because we had no reason for 
offense. We did not want any more territory or anything of that 
kind. From that point of view, as I say, our whole policy was based 
on defensive position. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, is that your answer to my question ? 

Mr. Grew. Well, that is my opinion of the situation. Of course, 
as I say, I am not competent to go into military and naval strategy. 
There are cases, of course, where defensive measures require taking 
temporary offense. I do not know the strategy, that is not my business. 

Senator Ferguson. No, I am not trying to get your opinion of the 
Navy strategy. I am trying to get your opinion as expressed to Japan, 
and the reason I am questioning you in detail, it is only for one purpose, 
Mr. Grew, and that is to try to find out what AVashington knew, what 
the officials — I am covering all branches — what they knew here in 
Washington in relation to Japan, as far as their military force was 
concerned, as far as our diplomatic relations were concerned, so that 
the committee may judge what was known by Washington and what 
was known by you so that you could convey back to Washington your 
opinion from what they knew here in Washington. 

[1743] Mr. Grew. Senator, as I said in reading that letter this 
morning, my whole desire is to be helpful as possible to the committee 
and to give every bit of evidence that I am capable of giving. 

Now, the story from my point of view of Japan has been, I would 
say, pretty thoroughly spread on the records in the four volumes which 
I have mentioned. \Vliere I can piece them out I am only too glad 
to do so and I will do my best, but some of the questions that you are 
asking me I am not in a position to answer. I could not do it. 

For instance, I dare say that our military or naval attaches may 
have made technical reports to their respective departments which I 
did not see ; I do not know. But I have given you everything that I 
can give you with regard to my own position and my own observations 
in Tokyo during that period. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, the only way, of course, I can find out 
whether you can answer my questions is for me to ask them. 

Mr. Grew. Right. 

Senator Ferguson. And I do not wish to convey the idea that you 
are not trying to answer the questions at all. I merely want to try 
to get answers, if we can, because you were the one man in Tokyo, 
in Japan, that could give to the vari- [1744] ous agencies in 
Washington — the Government, in other words — the information and 
there is only one way we can find out, as I view it, is from you, what 
information Washington had on the 7th, or the 7th of December, so 
that the committee may draw some conclusions as to what should or 
should not have been done; or the facts, rather, would draw the 
conclusions as to what should or should not be done. 

Now, going to this instrument of August the 17th, do I understand 
that you place little significance on that instrument of August 17, 
1941, which Admiral Schuirmann called an ultimatum? 



660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Grew. As I said, Senator, in my opinion it was not in the 
nature of an ultimatum for the very reason tliat we did not act on it as 
an ultimatum. We continued the conversations in Washington with 
a view to trying to reach an agreement. You do not deliver an 
ultimatum to a country and then continue to negotiate after that. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you here, ISIr. Grew, when I asked some 
questions of Mr. Welles about the parallel action that was to be taken 
by Great Britain on this instrument? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, I heard that question. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I will ask you whether or 
not you had any opinion then that Japan — no, that Great Britain 
took parallel action on this meeting between the President and Mr. 
Churchill on the Augusta in the Atlantic in [17 4^] relation 
to the message that we gave notice to the Japs on the ITtli of 
August, 1941 ? 

Mr. Grew. I knew nothing about that whatever, Senator, and so 
far as I am aware no step of that kind was taken by me in Tokyo. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, the information that came to 
you, Mr. Grew, was merely this instrument, which does not indicate 
that parallel action was to be taken, does it? 

Mr. Grew. Probably so. 

Senator F'erguson. Well, will you look at it and see whether or 
not it indicates parallel action ? 

Mr. Grew. Which document do you refer to now ? 

Senator Lucas. Of course, Mr. Chairman, there is no evidence 
before this committee that there was ever any agreement that parallel 
action should be taken. The Senator from Michigan is assuming 
in every one of these questions that parallel action was agreed upon. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, Mr. Chairman, the record will speak 
for itself as to what Mr. Welles told us. 

The Chairman. The Chair does not know whether it is customary 
when one government sends a message to another to include in that 
message things that another government has sent a similar message. 
Evidently tliat did not appear in this case. [1746^ 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think the record is clear here 
from what Mr. Welles said. 

The Chairman. Well, if it is, it will speak for itself. 

Mr. Grew. I could speak only from the point of view, less frankly, 
of Tokyo and I recollect neither having been instructed to take, nor 
having taken such parallel action on this issue. 

Now, what happened in Washington I, frankly, do not know. I 
do not even know whether I was informed at that time. T would 
have to check the records to find out. 

[17^7] Senator Ferguson. AVell, I will ask you, Mr. Grew, 
whether you had any knowledge that parallel action was to be taken? 

Mr. (iREw. Not so far as I recollect, Senator. But, after all these 
years, I find myself in a very diflicult position to give a categorical 
answer to a question of that kind without looking at the record. Some- 
times my memory may be at fault. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be a rather important matter, would 
it not? 

Counsel, would you let me have the 10 Downing Street instrument? 
I do not recall the exhibit number. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 661 

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 22. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to show it to you, Mr. Grew, and have you 
interpret it for me. 

(The document was handed to Mr. Grew.) 

Mr. Grew. I take it from this document these were to be declarations 
by these various governments. 

Senator Ferguson. What is meant by a "draft of parallel communi- 
cations to the Japanese Government" ? 

Mr. Grew. That would have meant definitely a note to the Japanese 
Government which might have been presented by the Secretary of State 
here to the Japanese Ambassador, or might have been presented by 
me to the Minister of Foreign [^7-^] Affairs. 

Senator Ferguson. Might we have the notes of August 17? 

Mr. Gesell. They are attached to this exhibit, Senator. 

The Chairman. Are you prepared to answer the question Mr. Grew ? 

Mr. Greav. May I ask w^iat exactly was the question again ? 

Senator F'erguson. I was looking through the instrument, if the 
Chairman please. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. At the top of the page on Exhibit 22, the seal 
of the Prime Minister, what would that indicate as to where that in- 
strument was drawn up, the "Seal of Prime Minister, 10 Downing 
Street, Whitehall"? It would be very difficult to tell what was meant 
by that without seeing the original instrument, would it not? 

Mr. Grew. The only thing that is clear from this is that it was 
apparently written on the official paper of the British Prime Minister. 
I do not know that there is any indication further than that. 

Senator Ferguson. Now does that instrument indicate to you that 
it was contemplated, if it was to be carried out, that it would be car- 
ried out by parallel action of the governments mentioned? 

Mr. Grew. I do not see any indication here that it would, [-?7'4'9] 
Senator. There is no indication whatsoever of parallel action here 
that I can see. 

Senator Ferguson. What is meant by "draft of parallel communi- 
cations to the Japanese Government"? 

Mr. Grew. Well, it would mean presumably that each government 
would send communications along these general lines in its own 
language. 

Senator Ferguson. It states : 

Declaration by H. M. G., His Majesty's Government — same as above, mutatis 
mutandis, the last phrase reading: * * * their support of them, H. M. G. 
would give all possible aid to such power. 

"Mutatis mutandis" means using the proper language, does it not? 

The Cpiairman. There might be some dispute about that. It might 
mean necessary changes having been made in the instrument. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the witness' opinion on the word? 

Mr. Grew. Senator, I do not think, frankly, I am competent to 
answer the questions that you are asking about this, because I had 
nothing whatsoever to do with it. 

Senator Ferguson. As a diplomat, can you answer it? I do not 
know that I will get a better expert on it. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 



662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[17S0] The Chairman, Will the Senator yield to the Congress- 
man ? 

Senator Ferguson. Does he want to be the better expert? 

Mr. Murphy. Haven't we already heard on the record from Mr. 
Welles, who was at the Atlantic Charter meeting, saying that another 
version was used and not the version that was asked the witness? Is 
not that already in the record ? 

Senator Ferguson. I already have had the instrument of the Presi- 
dent read by Mr. Grew. He knows what went on, and I assume he 
received it in Tokyo. 

Is that correct ? 

Mr. Grew. I assume I did, but as I say, I would have to consult 
the record.^ 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Not at the present moment. 

The Chairman. Let us get along. 

Mr. Grew. I think we have gone over all this. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, then, as I understand it, you did 
not know of any parallel action to be taken, as far as the instrument 
is concerned on page 556 of Foreign Relations ? 

Mr. Grew. From my recollection, I doubt it. As I say, in order to 
give a categorical reply to that question I would have to look up the 
records and see. 

Senator Ferguson. May we have this understanding, that if you 
do not return it is because you find nothing in the [17S1] 
record on that question, and if you do find something you will bring 
it back or have it delivered to counsel ? 

Mr. Grew. That will be understood, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that understood ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, were you familiar with the voluntary 
Air Corps in China ? 

Mr. Grew. I know of its existence. You mean the American Corps 
that went out there ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. Of course I knew of its existence at the time, but I know 
very little about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it ever discussed with you in the Japanese 
Government ? 

Mr. Grew. Tlie Japanese Government from time to time would 
make representations to me about our aid to Chiang Kai-shek which, 
they said, prevented their coming to a peaceful conclusion of the 
so-called China incident. They never called it war but the China in- 
cident. In the course of those representations it is quite possible that 
they did mention our assistance in connection with the Air Corps, but 
I cannot recollect any specific statement to that effect. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you advised by our Government as to just 
what that Air (vorps was? 

1176B] Mr. Grew. Well, I presumably was. 

Senator Ferguson. You were advised? 

Mr. Greav. I cannot tell you without going into the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Again might I ask you to get the records? 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 



^ See p. 710, infra. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 663 

Senator Ferguson. And I assume if you do not come back then you 
have found nothing in the records on that point. 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. So that we will understand that. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.^ 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first get an idea that Konoye, the 
Prime Minister, wanted to meet with the President ? 

Mr. Grew. The proposal was, as broached to me in a long talk with 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 18, 1941 

Senator Ferguson. I did not get the date. 

Mr. Grew. On August 18, 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. You had no information prior to that? 

JVlr. Grew. I understand that the matter had been taken up by the 
Japanese Ambassador at Washington. I do not think that I was in- 
formed prior to that. I think that was the first information I had. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, as far as you are concerned, Mr. Grew, 
did you know of any outside intermediaries in the negotiations be- 
tween Japan and the United States? 

[1763] Mr. Grew. Outside intermediaries? 

Senator Ferguson.' Yes. It has been mentioned here that Mr. 
Walker, the Postmaster General 

Mr. Grew (interposing). I know nothing about that. 

Senator Ferguson. You have no knowledge about that whatsoever? 

Mr. Grew. None whatsoever. 

Senator Ferguson. Your sole point of contact was either the State 
Department or the President, as you have indicated ? 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now will you tell us something about this pro- 
posed meeting of Konoye, as to what significance it could have had, as 
you saw it ? I want to know merely as you saw it and conveyed it to 
our State Department, to find out what knowledge they had. 

Mr. Grew. Konoye himself arranged a meeting with me on Sep- 
tember 6 in order to discuss a meeting with President Roosevelt. As 
I have said this afternoon, Konoye is saddled with the responsibility 
for some of the war acts of banditry on the part of Japan which have 
been recorded in international history, but, as I also said, he, I think, 
saw the handwriting on the wall and realized that Japan was on the 
brink of an abyss and wanted, if possible, to reverse the engine. That 
is only opinion. Anyway, on September 6 he asked me to dinner, 
[17S4] and he was very much afraid of any possibility of the 
military extremists learning of that meeting. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you meet? Under what circum- 
stances? 

Mr. Grew. I will tell you, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Grew. Ordinarily a Japanese Prime Minister does not consort 
with diplomats. The contact is always with the Foreign Minister. 
Most prime ministers stay off it completely. But in this case Konoye 
wanted to talk the thing over directly. So we proceeded to the house 
of a mutual friend, and automobile tags on diplomatic and official 
automobiles were changed so nobody could recognize us. We had the 
dinner. All the servants were sent out and the dinner was served by 
the daughter of the house. We talked for 3 hours. 

^ See Mr. GeseU's statement in Hearings, Part 4, p. 1715. 



664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Diirino; that time Konoye sketolied out to me what he had in mind. 
It is a pretty long story. It is all on record. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you point out in the Foreign Relations 
where it is on record ? . ' 

]\Ir. Grew. Yes, sir ; I will. 

Senator Ferguson, So we will have the record clear. 

Mr. Grew. The report of the dinner is recorded on page 604 of 
Foreign Relaticnis and my analysis of the purpose of the meeting is 
contained in a long telegram which I sent to the [1755] Sec- 
retary of State on September 29, 1941, on page 645 of Foreign Rela- 
tions. I would like to read to the committee, if I may, the last 
paragraph of that message from myself to the Secretary of State : 

In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so in all defer- 
ence — 

I might say that all these telegrams were paraphrased by the State 
Department. 

Senator Ferguson. So we might clear the record on that, all these 
messages in here are either substance or paraphrased? 

Mr. Grew. Yes; and in some cases I regret to say I think the para- 
phrases are very awkward. I think sometimes the language is being 
obscured rather than clarified. 

Senator Ferguson. Do they always convey what you intended to 
.convey? Would a person reading them get an idea as to what you 
were trying to convey? 

Mr. Grew. I think so. I do not think there has been any distor- 
tion of the meaning, but I do not think they are as clear an exposition 
as contained in the original text. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it would be more difficult to convey what 
you intended to say? 

Mr. Grew. I think my meaning is clear, in any case. These para- 
phrases were essential because we had to protect our code. The last 
paragraph reads: 

In sulimitting the foregoing discussion, the [1756] Ambassador does so 
in all deference to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and 
Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the 
matter is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan. 

I preface everything I said in the position I took on this matter 
with that premise. In the first place, as I have told you already, I 
did not have access to any of the telegraphic intercepts, I did not even 
know that they existed, and I had no access to any of the secret docu- 
ments which have appeared since, so my analysis of the situation 
was based entirely on my observation from the standpoint of our 
Embassy in Tokyo, what 1 could see at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, you say that the meeting was held 
as an absolutely secret meeting and you described how you changed 
the plates on the automobiles. Was it your understanding that this 
was to be a good faith meeting? 

Mr. Grew. It was my understanding, and also after the meeting 
had taken place that was my understanding. 

Senator Ferguson. There was not anything that happened at the 
meeting that would indicate to you that it was not a good-faith 
meeting, was there? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 665 

Mr. Grew. No, sir ; there was not anything happened at the meeting: 
that would indicate there was any lack of faitli. 

[1757] Senator Ferguson. And did you, in your opinion, prop- 
erly report that to the State Department ? 

Mr. Greav. Well, sir, my report is all contained in that telegram. 

Senator Ferguson. A fair appraisal of that telegram would be that 
you did express that it was a good faith meeting, is that correct ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, very definitely ; and that was developed still further 
in my telegram of September 29. 

Senator Ferguson. Now did you get any opinions from Konoye, 
from what he said, that if he could get such a meeting his Cabinet 
may fall ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, very definitely. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you advise the State Department to that 
effect? 

Mr. Grew. That is contained in that telegram of September 29, Sen- 
ator. I think I better stick to the record here. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I wish you would. 

Mr. Grew. This is a very long telegram. 

Senator Ferguson. I want you to boil it down. 

Mr. Grew. I think that the story as I saw it is pretty fully brought 
forward in this telegram, but there is no particular passage that I can 
pick out. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you sum it up ? 

[1768'} Mr. Grew. What is that? 

Senator Ferguson. I want to know now about the Cabinet falling, 
if that is your opinion from what he said, that his Cabinet would fall 
if he could not get the meeting. 

Mr. Grew. I, in my telegram, said this : 

The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and 
the formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition 
or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you were of the opinion, and conveyed it 
to the State Department, that if the meeting did not take place that 
would mean a military dictatorship in Japan? 

Mr. Grew. That was my opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you convey to the United States, or the 
State Department, what that would mean or could mean ? 

Mr. Grew. I do not think anything much could have been added 
to this statement here, Senator, "formation of a military dictatorship 
which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid 
colliding head-on with the United States." 

Senator Ferguson. When you say "colliding head-on with the 
United States," is that another way of saying "war"? 

Mr. Grew. I think that would be. 

[1759] Senator Ferguson. That is a fair interpretation? 

Mr. Grew. A fair deduction. 

Senator Ferguson. A fair deduction. Then you were of the 
opinion, and conveyed it to the State Department, that if the meeting 
did not take place and the Cabinet fell, and you were of the opinon 
it would fall, it meant war with the United States? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir ; I did not go as far as that. No, indeed. 

Senator Ferguson. How far did you go ? 



666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Grew. I said that risk would be present, but I think the fact 
that, as far as I was concerned in Tokyo, I was working for peace up 
to the last minute, and conversations were going on in Washington. 
I do not think at any time it could be said any particular step or lack 
of step definitely meant war. No ; I would not subscribe to that. 

Senator Ferguson. How far did you go in that note as a warning 
to the State Department in Washington ? 

Mr. Grew. That is clear in the telegram. 

The Chairman. Let me ask the Senator, has that note been made 
a part of the record ? 

Senator Ferguson. I would like now to have the whole note read in. 

The Chairman. It speaks for itself, and should be made [1760] 
part of the record. 

Mr. Grew. It speaks for itself. . 

The Chairman. When it is made a part of the record it speaks for 
itself, in its own terms. 

Mr. Grew. I should think so. 

The Chairman. Therefore it will now be made a part of the record, 
part of the transcript. It is a lengthy document. 

Mr. Grew. That is telegram 1529, Tokyo, September 29, 1941, noon. 
That is on page 645 of Foreign Relations. 

(The telegram referred to follows:) 

(1) In regard to the preliminary conversations taking place at Washington 
and Tokyo, the Ambassador points out that a review of telegraphic correspond- 
ence on this subject since last spring reveals the Japanese Government's efforts, 
increasing steadily and intensified lately, to arrange a meeting between Prince 
Konoye and President Roosevelt without further delay. While admitting his 
role to be chiefly that of a transmitting agent in these conversations, the Am- 
bassador naturally wishes to aid in any constructive way, particularly by 
endeavoring to appraise accurately for the President and the Secretary of State 
the Japanese factors and conditions having direct or indirect bearing on the 
subject and also by trying to bring the Japanese Government to adopt meas- 
ures and policies such as the United States Government deems to be [It 61] 
essential for a mutual understanding or agreement between Japan and the 
United States. Since the fall of Admiral Yonai's Cabinet in July of 1940, 
American diplomacy in Japan has been in eclipse temporarily through force of 
circumstances. However, when the Konoye-Toyoda regime began last July, 
American diplomacy obtained a very active new lease of life. The Ambassador 
expresses his earnest hope therefore that so propitious a period be not per- 
mitted to slip by without a new foundation having been laid with enough 
stability to warrant a reasonable amount of confidence that the structure to be 
erected gradually and progressively thereon can and will endure. 

(2) The Ambassador recalls his statements in the past that in Japan the 
pendulum always swings between moderate and extremist policies; that it was 
not then possible under the existing circumstances for any Japanese leader or 
group to reverse the program of expansion and expect to survive ; that the per- 
manent digging in by Japanese in China and the pushing of the .Japanese 
advance to the south coulcT be prevented only by insuperable obstacles. The 
Ambassador recalls likewise his views that the risks of taking positive measures 
to maintain United States security in the future were likely to be far smaller 
than the risks of not taking such measures ; that only respect for potential 
power of the United States has deterred Japan from taking more liberties with 
American 11762] interests; and that .Japan's program of forcible expan- 
sion could be brought to a halt only by a show of force and by a demonstra- 
tion of American willingness to use this force if necessary. The Ambassador 
recalls also his statement that if Japan's leadership could be discredited even- 
tually by such American action, there might take shape in Japan ultimately a 
regeneration of thought which would allow Japan to re.sume formal relations 
with the United States, leading to a readjustment of the entire prolilem of the 
Pacific. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 667 

(3) The Ambassador suggests that the United States has been following very 
wisely precisely this policy which, furthered by other developments in the world, 
has helped to discredit Japanese leadership, notably that of former Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka. The Ambassador cites as world developments arousing a 
positive reaction from the United States the conclusion by Japan of the Tripartite 
Alliance and Japan's recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime at Nanking, 
which preceded Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Germany's action upset 
the basis for the Tripartite Pact, Japan having joined the Italo-German Axis 
in order to obtain security against Russia and thereby to avoid the peril of being 
caught between the Soviet Union and the United States. At the present time 
Japan is attempting to correct tMs miscalculation by getting out of an extremely 
dangerous position. The Ambassador recalls his reports to tlie Department to 
the effect [1763] that Japanese foreign policies are inevitably changed by 
the impact of events abroad and that liberal elements in Japan might come to 
the top In due course as a result of the trend of events. He considers that such 
a time has arrived. He sees a good chance of Japan's falling into line if a pro- 
gram can be followed of world reconstruction as forecast by the declaration of 
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. American policy — of for- 
bearance, patient argumentation, efforts at persuasion, followed for many years, 
plus a manifest determination of the United States to take positive measures 
when called for — plus the impact of world developments upon Japan, has rendered 
Japan's political soil hospitable to the sowing of new seeds which, the Ambassador 
feels, if planted carefully and nourished, may bring about the anticipated regenera- 
tion of Japanese thought and a complete readjustment of relations between Japan 
and the United States. 

(4) Cei'tain quarters have advanced the thought — and no doubt it is promi- 
nently in the mind of the United States Government — that at this juncture an 
agreement between Japan and the United States will serve merely as a breathing 
spell to Japan. During such a breathing spell, Japan, having successfully un- 
tangled itself with American aid from the China conflict, will recoup and strengthen 
its forces in order to resume at the next favorable opportunity its [176 Jf] 
expansionist program. This thought cannot be gainsaid with certainty. The 
same school of thought also holds that Japan will be forced to relinquish its 
expansionist program because of the deterioration of Japanese domestic economy 
and because of the threat of financial, economic and social collapse due to a 
progressive intensifying of economic measures by the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Netherlands against Japan. The Ambassador adds that should 
this thesis be accepted as reasonabl.v sound, the position will confront the United 
States of choosing one of two methods to approach its objective, namely, either 
the method of progressive economic strangulation or the method of constructive 
conciliation, not so-called appeaseiuent. The Ambassador sees the second method 
as the definite choice of the United States Govei-nment following the beginning 
of the Washington preliminary conversations and President Roosevelt's acceptance 
in principle of the Japanese Prime Minister's proposed meeting. Indeed, the 
Ambassador remarks, the United States has never departed from its readiness to 
negotiate on any issues with Japan (see the American note dated December 30, 
1938), despite the fact that Japan already had embarked at that time on its 
expansion by force program. He feels that, from the viewpoint of farseeing 
statesmanship, the wisdom of the American choice seems to be beyond cavil. 
Should failure greet the con- [1765] structive, conciliatory method of 
approach now or later, there will always be available the other method, the 
application of progressive economic sanctions. In the opinion of the Ambassador, 
whether the trend of American relations with Japan is for better or for worse, 
the United States obviously will have to remain for a long time to come in a 
state of preparedness. The thought that eventual British victory in the world 
war will solve automatically many problems may, meanwhile, afford whatever 
degree of encouragement is justified. 

(5) The Ambassador, while admitting that risks will inevitably be involved 
no matter what course is pursued toward Japan, offers his carefully studied 
belief that there would be substantial hope at the very least of preventing the Far 
Eastern situation from becoming wor.se and perhaps of ensuring definitely con- 
structive results, if an agreement along the lines of the preliminary discussions 
were brought to a head by the proposed meeting of the heads of the two Govern- 
ments. The Ambassador mentions his previous expressions of opinion that the 
principal point at issue between the United States and Japan is not whether the 
former must call a halt to the expansionist program of the latter, but when. 
He raises the questions whether the United States is not now given the oppor- 



668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tunity to halt Japan's program without war, [1766] or an immediate risk 
of war, and further whether, through failure to use the present opportunity, the 
United States will not face a greatly increased risk of war. The Ambassador 
states his firm belief in an affirmative answer to these two questions. 

(6) Certain quarters hold the view that it is altogether improbable under 
existing circumstances that counteraction will be deliberately taken by Japan 
in response to any American action likely to be taken in the Pacific which would 
bring about war with the United States. The Ambassador states his inability 
to agree that war may not supervene following actions, whether irrational or 
deliberate, by elements either in Japan or in the United States tending so to 
inflame public opinion in the other country concerned as to make war unavoidable. 
He recalls in this regard the cases of the Maine and the Panay. 

(7) The Ambassador stresses the importance of understanding Japanese psy- 
chology, fundamentally unlike that of any Western nation. Japanese reactions 
to any particular set of circumstances cannot be measured, nor can Japanese 
actions be predicted by any Western measuring rod. This fact is hardly sur- 
prising in the case of a country so recently feudal istic. The Ambassador con- 
ceives his chief duty to be an attempt to interpret accurately Japanese [1765] 
psychology, and he states that he has aimed to do this in his numerous reports 
during the last several months and years to the Department. Keeping this 
thought constantly before him, the Ambassador ventures at the risk of repeti- 
tion to advance the considerations set forth below. 

(8) Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese 
Government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut commit- 
ments which will satisfy the United States Government both as to principle and 
as to concrete detail, almost certainly the conversations will drag along indef- 
initely and unproductively until the Konoye Cabinet and its supporting elements 
desiring rapprochement with the United States will come to the conclusion that 
the outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United States Government 
is only playing for time. If the abnormal sensitiveness of Japan and the 
abnormal effects of loss of face are considered, in such a situation Japanese 
reaction may and probably will be serious. This will result in the Konoye Gov- 
ernment's being discredited and in a revulsion of anti-American feeling, and 
this may and probably will lead to unbridled acts' The eventual cost of these 
will not be reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame Americans, while 
reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will bring about a situation in which 
it will be difficult to [1768] avoid war. The logical outcome of this will 
be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the formation of a military dictator- 
ship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding 
head-on with the United States. There is a question that such a situation may 
prove to be more serious even than the failure to produce an entirely satisfactory 
agreement through the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince 
Konoye, should it take place as planned. Worded otherwise, the question remains 
whether it will not prove to be a less serious case for the negotiations under- 
taken in good faith to fail of complete success than for the United States to 
demonstrate its unwillingness to enter any such negotiations. 

(9) The Ambassador continues by stating that he has been emphatically told 
on numerous occasions — and such declarations he considers must b'^ accepted 
at their face value — that pi'ior to the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting and 
formal negotiations it is impossible for the Japanese Government to define 
its future assurances and commitments more specifically than hitherto stated. 
The Ambassador explains that one reason for this Japanese iiosition, as given 
him very confidentially, is that former Foreign Minister Rlatsuoka. after his 
retirement in July, recounted in complete detail to the German Ambassador in 
the course of the [1769] Washington conversations up to that time. 
Because many supporters of Matsuoka remain in the Tokyo Foreign Office, the 
fear has been expressed that these men will not scruple to reveal to both the 
Germans and the Japanese extremists any information which would render the 
present Cabinet's position untenable. Although certain basic principles have 
been accepted provisionally by the Japanese Government, the defiintions and 
formulae of Japan's future objectives and policy, as advanced so far during 
the preliminary conversations, and the statements supplementary to those defi- 
nitions, are so abstract or equivocal and are open to such wide interpretation that 
they rather create confusion than clarify commitments which the Japanese Gov- 
ernment is ready to undertake. The Ambassador states that at the same time 
he has been told the Prince Konoye Is In a position in direct negotiations with 
President Roosevelt to offer him assurance which, because of their far-reaching 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 669 

character, will not fail to satisfy the United States. The truth of this statement 
cannot be determined by the Ambassador, who, however, points out that, in 
regard specitically to Japan's Axis relations, the Japanese Government, though 
refusing consistently to give an undertaking that it will overtly renounce its 
alliance membership, actually has shown a readiness to reduce Japan's alliance 
adherence to a dead letter by its indication of willingness to enter [1770] 
formally into negotiations with the United States. The Ambassador therefore 
does not consider unlikely the possibility of Prince Konoye's being in a position 
to give President Roosevelt directly a more explicit and satisfactory engagement 
than has alieady been vouchsafed in the course of the preliminary conversations. 

(10) In the opinion of the Ambassador, on the basis of the above observations 
which he has every reason to regard as sound, American objectives will not be 
reached by insisting or continuing to insist during the preliminary conversations 
that Japan provide the sort of clear-cut, specific commitments which appear in 
any final, formal convention or treaty. Unless a I'easonable amount of confidence- 
is placed by the United States in the professed sincerity of intention and good 
faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters to mould Japan's future policy upon the 
basic principles they are ready to accept and then to adopt measures which grad- 
ually but loyally implement those principles, with it understood that the United 
States will implement its own conmiitments pari passu with the steps which Japan 
takes, the Ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be successfully 
created in Japan to lead to a general improving of Japanese-American relations 
and to the hope that ultimate war may be avoided in the Pacific. The sole 
way to discredit the [177/] j'apanese military machine and army is 
through wholesale military defeat, and the Ambassador sees no present prospect 
of this. The only alternative (and the only wise one in the view of the Ambas- 
sador) is an attempt to produce a regeneration of Japanese thought and outlook 
through constructive conciliation, along the lines of American efforts at present. 
The Ambassador inquires whether the better part of wisdom and of statesmanship 
is not to bring such efforts to a head before the force of their initial impetus is 
lost, leaving it impossible to overcome an opposition which the Ambassador 
thinks will mount inevitably and steadily in Japan. 

(11) III submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so in all 
deference to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary 
Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter is 
limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan. 

Geew. 

[1772] Mr. Gesell. Senator, I just want to call attention again 
to the fact that these are official Government publications, and we 
have assumed that all of the conversations recorded in these publi- 
cations are available to the committee and may be drawn upon in 
making any conclusions or anything of that sort. 

We simply have not physically offered them as exhibits. 

The Chairman. If an interpretation is to be made of the document 
which is part of the record, or which has been filed as an exhibit, it 
seems to the Chair instead of undertaking to have a verbal interpre- 
tation of a record of that sort, it ought to be allowed to speak for 
itself in its own terms. 

Mr. Grew. I agree with you. It is all set out here. • 

Mr. Keefe. May I interrupt? 

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman from 
Wisconsin ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. I would like to inquire whether or not the original 
document entitled "War and Peace" has been offered as an exhibit 
and is in evidence, the entire book, or is it considered that the com- 
mittee is at liberty to consider anything in that book as a matter of 
reference, it being a so-called public document? 



670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[177S] Mr. Gesell. Congressman Keefe, it is the latter. We 
have assumed the committee may take judicial notice of these three 
official publications, Peace and War, and the two volumes containing 
the actual notes of the conversations in Foreign Relations of the 
United States : Japan, 1931-41. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, Mr. Chairman, in order that there may not be 
any mistake at any time in the future in connection with these hear- 
ings, I think it would be perfectly proper to have the documents 
referred to offered as exhibits so we may have them. 

I would like also to have offered as an exhibit the original, what 
I understand to be the original, short version published by the State 
Department in 1942, entitled "Peace and War," of which I have a 
copy, consisting of some 143 pages. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 

Senator Ferguson. I will yield. 

The Chairman. Let us clear this matter up. 

Mr. Murphy. Is not the proper legal procedure, Mr. Chairman, to 
incorporate that by reference, and was not that incorporated by ref- 
erence? Since they are legal documents they are part of the record 
by reference. 

The Chairman. In effect, there is not much difference between in- 
corporating by reference and by making them exhibits which are 
available to the committee. The fact that they are \^177Jf\ 
Government publications puts upon them the stamp of authenticity, 
I presume. Is there any reason why they cannot be referred to as 
exhibits ? 

\_1775'] Mr. Gesell. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. I think we can 
refer to Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41, as 
the next exhibit, Exhibit No. 27; and I might say to Congressman 
Keefe that it is my understanding that includes in the front portion 
the document the Congressman has in his hand, the initial short 
summary which was originally released. 

Mr. Keefe. The reason I suggest that this initial short summary be 
incorporated as an exhibit is because I have found in going through 
these four volumes after they have been edited and reedited and 
changes have been made in the arrangement of the matrial so that it 
becomes difficult for me to follow a lot of this material. I find that 
there is a lot helpful in this short volume, which can be identified 
promptly and quickly, and which tells in short form this story. 

Mr. Gesell. We could make the short form the next exhibit. 

The Chairman. The Chair suggests that it be made Exhibit No. 
27 because it seems to have been published previously and that the 
full volume be made Exhibit No. 28. 

Mr. Gesell. Very well. 

As Exhibit 29, the two volumes, volumes I and II, Foreign Relations 
of the United States; Japan, 1931-41, which contains the actual docu- 
ments of reported conversations held. 

The Chairman. That will be done. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to now make 
[1776] Mr. Grew's book No. 30. 

The Chairman. Well, the Chairman sees no objection to making it 
an exhibit. I do not know whether that would increase the circula- 
tion or not, but the committee will be glad to have it made an exhibit. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 671 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits 27, 28, 29, and 
30", respectively.) 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you, Mr. Grew, when Mr. Dooman 
came to the United tStates? When did he come to the United States? 

Mr. Grew. Mister — who? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Dooman. 

Mr. Grew. Nomura? 

Senator Ferguson. Dooman. 

Mr. Grew. Dooman. Well, he was the counselor of the Embassy 
in Tokyo. He came out there — I don't remember precisely what date. 

Senator Ferguson. My question was, when did he return to the 
United States before Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Grew. I would have to check. Of course, he did not return 
while I was away, because he had to be charge d'affaires. 

Senator Ferguson. Does page 139 of Foreign Relations refresh 
your memory on that? 

[1777] 'Mr. Murphy. Which volume? 

Senator Ferguson. I think No. 2. 

Mr. Grew. 139 of Foreign Relations, volume II ? 

Senator Ferguson. Page 138. 

Mr. Grew. "Memorandum by the Counsellor of Embassy in Japan." 

Senator Ferguson. He had a conversation with Ohashi. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember that conversation? 

On page 139, 1 will ask you to read beginning down about 15 lines, 
"It would be absurd to suppose that the American people * * *." 

Mr. Grew (reading) : It would be absurd to suppose that the American people 
while pouring munitions into Britain, would look with complacency upon the 
cutting of communications between Britain and the British Dominioiis and Col- 
onies overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice 
the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by placing herself 
in a position to menace those communications, she would have to expect to come 
into conflict with the United States. There are many indications of the Jap- 
anese moving down slowly toward Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. 
The United States cannot be concerned by the various initiatives [i778] 
taken by the Japanese in Indo-China and elsewhere for the reason that if Japan 
were to occupy these strategically important British and Dutch areas, it could 
easily debouch into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and create havoc 
with essential British lines of communication. The United States for its part 
was well aware that an alternative source of supply for Japanese purcha.se of 
petroleum and certain other products of the United States is the Netherlands 
East Indies, and for that reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on 
the sale to Japan of commodities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese 
must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United States in this respect 
springs from a desire not to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead 
only to the most serious consequences- 
Senator Ferguson. That is far enough for my purposes, unless 
you want to read further. 

Does that refresh your memory that Dooman had been here and 
obtained an opinion in the United States? 

Mr. Grew. I think, as I recollect, that was the opinion he received 
from moving around the United States, but not necessarily from of- 
ficial sources. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he convey this idea to you? 



672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Grew. Well, I have no doubt of it. He returned [1779] 
from a leave of absence shortly before that, didn't he ? 

I don't know if the record shows. I think he undoubtedly told me 
of his general impressions. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I ask you to refer to page 137, "The 
Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State," No- 5397. 
1 ask you to read the second paragraph. 

. Mr. Grew (reading) : The presentation by Mr. Dooiuan of his impressions of 
the position of the United States as gathered during his recent furlough ap- 
peared to cause Mr. Ohashi astonishment. Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, ex- 
traordinary direct and sparing of words. Upon listening attentively to what 
Mr. Dooman described as the philosophy of the American position, Mr. Ohashi 
remained perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of time and then burst forth 
with the question, "Do you mean to say that if Japan were to attack Singapore 
there would be war with the United States?" Mr. Dooman replied, "The logic 
of the situation would inevitably raise that question.'' Mr. Ohashi then left 
that subject and adverted to the character of the reports sent to Loudon by the 
British Ambassador. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what did Dooman, in your opinion, 
mean by that phrase ? 

Mr. Grew. Well, that referred definitely, when he said, "The logic 
of the situation would inevitably raise that question" that meant 
exactly what it says. It would come under considera- [1780] 
tion. It doesn't mean that it would necessarily bring about war. 
Inevitably raise that question. Of course, it would be raised. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, your telegram, on page 143, being No. 334, 
will you read that? It is in relation, I take it, to the same matter. 
If it isn't, I wish you would explain it. 

Mr. Grew. My short telegram ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, the short one. 

Mr. Grew (reading) : 

Yesterday, I told Matsuoka that I entirely concun*ed in and approved T»f all 
that Dooman had said to Ohashi on February 14. As the latter had given only 
an oral report of the conversation to Matsuoka I read him the whole memoran- 
dum of it. I was somewhat surprised when the Minister stated his entire agree- 
ment with what Dooman had said. Today I am sending Matsuoka for his per- 
sonal use a copy of the memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever hear from the State Depart- 
ment on this particular matter after you sent this information to the 
State Department? 

Mr. Grew. Not to my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. So that they were fully advised as to what you 
had advised the Japanese ? 

Mr. Grew. I advised the State Department of every step [1781] 
taken, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you look up and see whether or not you 
did get an answer? 

Mr. Grew. I think I can answer that. 

Senator Ferguson. You say that you did not ? 

Mr. Grew. Definitely that I did not, but I will have it looked up.^ 

Senator Fp:rguson. Now, Mr. Grew, did you send a telegram on 
November 3, 1941? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, I did. 

Senator Ferguson. At that time — will you get that telegram ? 

I would like to have that telegram go into the record at this place, 
Mr. Chairman. 



^ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Pa'-t 4, p. 1715. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 673 

Have you it before you ? 

Mr. Grew. I know it pretty well by heart. 

Mr. Gesell. That is an exhibit, Senator. 

The Chairman. You want it printed in the hearings? 

Senator Ferguson. I think it should be, Mr. Chairman. It is an 
important telegram, is it, Mr. Grew ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; it is a very important telegram. 

Senator Ferguson. Giving information to the Secretary of State? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. It was addressed "Strictly Conti- [1782] 
dential for Sacretary and Under Secretary Only." 

Senator Ferguson. So that it was to go to the Secretary and the 
Under Secretary? 

Mr. Grew. Very definitely. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to discuss that with you. 

The Chairman. Are you going to have Mr. Grew read it ? 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have it read. 

The Chairman. Read it into the record. 

How long is it ? 

Mr. Grew. You wish me to read it ? 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to ask you questions about it. 

The Chairman. How long is it ? 

Mr. Grew. I think I can get through it in about 6 or 7 minutes. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

The Chairman. Just a minute. Inasmuch as it is an exhibit and 
has been made in that form a part of the record, do you insist on it 
being read. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. No ; except that I wanted to ask him some ques- 
tions, and I thought we could save time by reading it. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[1783] Mr. Murphy. Before we go into the telegram, since the 
distinguished Senator from Michigan has had parts of the document 
on page 138 read, and since there are qualifying parts of it subse- 
quently which are just to the opposite, I thing that the whole thing 
might go in. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have it all go in. 

The Chairman. Let it all go in, but it will not be read here. 

(Excerpt from exhibit No. 29, Foreign Relations of the United 
States-Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, p. 138 :) 

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman) 

[Tokyo,] February 14, 1941. 

I called this afternoon by appiontraent on Mr. Ohashi, the Vice Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. He greeted me quite politely, saying that although we had 
several mutual friends it was, so far as he knew, the first time we had met. I 
replied that I had on various occasions taken notice of statements which he had 
made in various capacities of the past, in Manchuria, and elsewhere, but I had, 
unfortunately, not been able to profit by opportunities which had presented 
themselves to make his acquaintance. Mr. Ohashi said he understood that I had 
just I'eturned from leave in the United States and that he supposed I had 
received a number of interesting impressions in the [/7S-'/] United States. 

I replied that my furlough in the United States coincided with one of the most 
significant and important periods in the history of our country, and that if 
he had time I would be glad to tell him briefly of what I had seen and heard 
while at home. Mr. Ohashi said that fortunately he was not busy that day and 
that I could stay as long as I wished. 

79716 — 46— pt. 2 19 



674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I gave Mr. Olmshi a fairly long account of the trends in opinion with regard 
to tlie war iu Europe as they developed during the election campaign. I dwelt 
on the remarkably swift crystallization of opinion at home with regard to the 
question of American aid to England, which I attributed in large part first to 
the disclosure on the part of the British that they were rapidly approaching 
the end of the resources in dollar exchange, and second to the belief that the 
effects on Britain's capacity to produce aircraft and other munitions of German 
bombing raids had been more serious than the British communiques would 
lead one to suppose. I said that although the large majority of the American 
people abhorred the idea of American involvement in war, the fact was that an 
equally large majority of the American people believed that there was one con- 
sideration which transcends even that of avoiding involvement in the war, and 
that is helping England to the limit of our capacity. 

I said that all this was not without direct bearing on relations between the 
United States and Japan. I had found [1785] that American opinion is 
pretty clearly opposed to the taking of action by the United States which would 
make war with Japan inevitable. Nevertheless Mr. Ohashi could readily under- 
stand that the American people, being an eminently practical people, are quite 
aware that an adequate supply of airplanes and other munitions is not the only 
prerequisite to a British victory : the supply to England of foodstuffs and raw 
materials by the British dominions and colonies and the maintenance of British 
commerce with the outside world are equally essential to a British victory. It 
would be absurd to suppose that the American people, while pouring munitions 
into Britain, would look with complacency upon the cutting of communications 
between Britain and British dominions and colonies overseas. If, therefore, 
Japan or any other nation were to prejudice the safety of those conununica- 
tions, either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace those 
communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict with the United 
States. There are many indications of the Japanese moving down slowly toward 
Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. The United States cannot but be 
concerned by the various initiatives taken by the Japanese in Indo-China and 
elsewhere, for the reason that if Japan were to occupy these strategically impor- 
tant British and Dutch areas, it could easily debouch into the Indian Ocean 
and the South Pacific and create havoc with essential British lines of com- 
[1786] munication. The United States for its part was well aware that an 
alternative source of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and certain 
other products of the United States is the Netherlands East Indies, and for that 
reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan of com- 
modities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese must clearly understand 
that the forbearance of the United States in this respect springs from a desire 
not to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead only to the most serious 
consequences. I recalled the axiom in geometry that two bodies cannot occupy 
the same space at the same time: However greatly Japan's security might be 
enhanced by occupying the Netherlands East Indies it must be realized by Japan 
that any such move would vitally concern the major preoccupation of the United 
States at this time, which is to assist England to stand against German assault. 

Mr. Ohashi then took the floor and launched into an impassioned apologia of 
Japanese policies in recent years. He started by describing conditions in Japan 
during the middle 20's, the lack of employment in Japan at that time was driving 
young Japanese to despair; communism began to spread in amazing fashion, the 
estimates being that there were at one time more than 50,000 Japanese com- 
munists and there was fear of decay and disintegration of the Japanese political 
system. There developed at the same time a growing antagonism in China 
[1787] toward Japan, General Chiang Kai-shek initiated a series of military 
campaigns which fiimlly resulted in the downfall of the northern group of Chinese 
generals, including Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and others. General Chang 
Tso-lin made his historic trip to Nanking to consolidate himself with General 
Chiang Kai-shek, and upon his return to Mukden he raised the flag of Chinese 
nationalism and proclaimed that his action manifested the complete unification 
of China and at about this time, Mr. C. T. Wang, then Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, publicly declared in a speech at Nanking that China was now prepared 
to "drive Japan off the Continent of Asia". There had occurred elsewhere other 
events which also gave grounds for complete pessimism in Japan. Pressure by 
the United States on England had led to the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance, which England discarded after it had served British purposes ; the 
United States in 1924 excluded Japanese from emigrating to the United States, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 675 

even though the granting of a small quota of 140 would have amply served to 
prevent Japanese pride and honor from being injured, and when Australia fol- 
lowed with its White Australia Policy and other parts of the British Empire 
had also taken action to exclude Japanese, the Japanese had found themselves 
effectively prevented from expanding into areas which could use their industry 
and initiative. At the same time the United States and Great Britain encouraged 
China in every possible way to implement the policy [J788] proclaimed by 
Dr. C. T. Wang to drive Japan off the Asiatic Continent. He recalled travelling 
with Admiral Kanji Kato in 1930 from Mukden to Japan. Admiral Kato ex- 
pressed himself as being extremely despondent of the future if matters were 
allowed to proceed as they were then proceeding, and he disclosed to Mr. Ohashi 
the determination of certain elements in the Japanese Army and Navy to take 
action toward opening up a way for Japanese expansion. This determination 
manifested itself finally in the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931; Mr. 
Ohashi said that the League of Nations had placed upon Japan the responsibility 
for seeking to alter by force the status quo in the Far East. However, it was 
clear that it was China and not Japan which had taken the initiative in seeking 
to alter the status quo, and the responsibility for the deplorable conflict now taking 
place between China and Japan must largely be borne by those nations which 
encouraged China to pursue this disastrous policy. The United States and Eng- 
land must also be responsible in some measure for Japan's aligning itself with 
Germany and Italy, for the present Sino-Japanese conflict would never have 
occurred if the Anglo-Japanese alliance had not been abrogated. The United 
States and England had further driven Japan into a position of complete isolation, 
and it was accordingly necessary for Japan to find friends. Japan has no special 
friendly feelings towards Germany and Italy and certainly has no ideological 
association 11789] or identity with either of those two countries. Never- 
theless Germany, Italy, and Japan have a close identity of interests in revolting 
against attempts to keep them permanently under subjection. It would be a 
great mistake to suppose that Japan would not honor its commitments under the 
alliance if the United States "were to attack Germany". 

I observed that Mr. Ohashi's presentation of Japan's case had the eloquence 
of one suffering under a sense of grievance. We do not deny that Japan has 
grievar»'es, but we object to the methods pursued by Japan to rectify those 
grievances. After the war in Europe is over, there is bound to be a more 
rational world, and in the creation of the more intelligent world economy 
which we must earnestly hope will be brought into being after the war, 
there would be ample room for entirely satisfying Japan's legitimate needs. 
I then quoted Mr. Churchill's remark "If we allow the past to quarrel with 
the present, we shall lose the future," As difficult and important as were 
the problems arising in China, they had not led to a war between the United 
States and Japan. It was certainly not the intention of the United States 
to seek a war with Japan, but at the same time I wished to make it clear 
that it would be idle and extravagant to believe that, so long as .Japan 
remained a partner of Germany and Italy and so long as she was unable to 
re-solve her troubles with China on a mutually satisfactory and equitable 
basis, a stabilization [i790] of relations between the United States 
and Japan could be hoped for. I believed that it was quite possible to pass 
over the present critical period without war, but that one essential condition 
to this more or less happy issue out of our diflSculties must be the realilzation 
on the part of the Japanese that they cannot substantially alter the status 
quo in Southeast Asia, particularly, without incurring the risk of creating 
a very .serious situation. 

Mr. Ohashi asked whether he was correct in understanding me to say that 
war could be averted only by Japan standing still and allowing itself to be 
tied hand and feet by the United States and Great Britain. I replied that 
it was not my intention to give him specifications as to what Japan should 
or should not do, but I wished to express my opinion that if Japan did no't 
exercise the same degree of restraint and forbearance as that being exer- 
cised by the United States, it was very difficult to see how a war could be 
averted. 

Mr. Ohashi then asked me whether we had been sending to AVashington such 
extravagant and sensational reports as those being sent by Sir Robert Craigie 
to London. Without waiting for a reply he said that Mr. Ii!den had recently 
called in the Japanese Ambasador at London and had talked to Mr. Shigemitsu 
very harshly about recent Japanese moves in Siam and Indo-Cliina. Mr. Eden 



676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was apparently greatly excited by telegrams which he had received from Sir 
Robert Craigie. Mr. Ohashi said that he [1791] liad just had a talk 
with Sir Robert Craigie and that he had reminded Sir Robei't that he had 
repeatedly given the latter assurances that Japan had no intention whatever 
of moving toward Singapore and the Dutch East Indies unless Japan was 
"pressed" by other nations through the imposition of embargoes by the United 
States or by the sending of an American fleet to Singapore. I said to Mr. 
Ohashi that, in my opinion, the award by Japan to Slam of the provinces of 
Laos and Cambodia would undoubtedly lead to the most serious disorders in 
Indo-China, as the French are strongly opposed to any substantial cession of 
territory to the Siamese. I asked Mr. Ohashi what Japan would do in the event 
that the disorders were beyond the French control. He replied "we shall have to 
suppress these disorders". I then went on to say "once having occupied Indo- 
China, Japan would be in a position to control Siam and to undertake operations 
toward Burma or the Malay States. You see how this intervention in Southeast 
Asia is capable of having the most widespread consequences". I asked whether 
he should not consider, in the light of Japanese intervention in the dispute be- 
tween Indo-China and Siam, whether alarm over Japanese policies in this area is 
not justified. Mr. Ohashi protested that Japan's interests in Southeast Asia were 
predominantly economic. Was it our intention to prevent Japan from entering 
into more satisfactoi-y and closer economic relations with Indo-China and the 
Netherlands East Indies? [11192-1793] I replied that we were not con- 
cerned with arrangements calculated to be mutually profitable and which were 
entered into freely and not as a result of demands with menaces, open or implied. 
He would understand that proposals concerning trade ari-angements presented 
under the guns of naval vessels could hardly be regarded as ordinary trade ar- 
rangements. Mr. Ohashi said that no Japanese warships were in the Indies and 
that the commercial negotiations now being carried on by Japan with the Neth- 
erlands Indies and Indo-China were of a normal character. 

Mr. Ohashi said that he was waiting with great interest reports which Admiral 
Nomura would be sending in shortly of his forthcoming interviews with the 
President and the Secretary of State. I had then been in Mr. Ohashi's office 
more than an hour. I rose to go. I said that upon my return to Tokyo I asked 
various colleagues what sort of a man Mr. Ohashi was and that they had all 
replied that he was extremely frank — that some had added that he was frank 
to the point of unpleasantness. I went on to say that I was vei-y glad that he 
had been both frank and courteous with me, and that he could count on me to 
maintain equal frankness and courtesy with him in our future conversations. 
A faint smile came to Mr. Ohashi's face and he said that he would be glad to 
receive me at any time. 

E(ugene) H. D(ooman) 

[J794] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, we will discuss that tele- 
gram. I would like to have you go to No. 4 paragraph. Will you just 
read part of that so that you are familiar with it? You need not read 
it aloud. 

Mr. Grew. Section 4? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, just glance at it. 

Mr. Grew. Well, this is all mixed up. I have the true reading here. 
Possibly you have the paraphrase. 

Senator Ferguson. I have the paraphrase. 

Mr. Grew. That is quite different. I hope the true reading will be 
made the record and not the paraphrase. 

The Chairman. The exhibit is the true reading of the message. 

Mr. Grew. Can you tell me how the passage begins that you wish 
to refer to ? 

Senator Ferguson. It begins in the book, "If the fiber and temper of 
the Japanese people are kept in mind." 

Mr. Grew. I will see if I can find that. 

Yes, I have it here. Do you wish me to read that part ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. This is the original text. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 677 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Will you read the original text? 
Mr. Grew (reading) : 

Having in mind the temper and fibre of the Japanese people, the view that 
the progressive imposition of [1795] drastic economic measures, while 
attended with some risk of war, would probably avert war, is a dangerously un- 
certain hypothesis upon which to base the considered policy and measures of 
the United States. Our own view is that if such a course is taken would not 
avert war. Nevertheless both views are no more than opinion, and it is therefore 
our belief that it would be contrary to our national interests to postulate the 
correctness of either opinion and to erect thereon a definite policy. To do so 
would be to put the cart before the horse. The primary point for decision would 
appear to involve the question as to whether our national needs, policies and 
objectives justify war with Japan in the event that diplomacy, our first line of 
national defense should fail, for only on the basis of such decision could the 
Administration follow a course divested so far as possible of elements of opinion, 
speculation and uncertainty. I do not doubt that such decision, which might 
well prove to be irrevocable, has ah*eady been fully debated and adopted, for the 
sands are running fast." 

Senator Ferguson. What did you mean by "the sands were running 
fast"? 

Mr. Grew. I meant that the risk of war was steadily increasing. 

Senator Ferguson. Another part of the telegram, under section 4, 
1736 — I have just received the original copy : 

[1796] The view therefore that war in the Far East can best be averted 
by continuation of trade embargoes and, as proposed by some, the imposition 
of a blockade is not supported by what has thus far occurx*ed. 

Were you of that opinion on the 3d of November ? 

Mr. Grew. What part is that ? Is that a separate telegram ? 

Senator Ferguson. This is No. 1736. It is marked 1736, and it is 
November 3, 3 p. m., at the top, section 4. 

Mr. Grew. Can you tell me what paragraph it is ? 

Senator Ferguson, Will you vshow it to him, Counsel? 

It is underscored with red in my copy. I will show you my original. 

Mr. Grew. All right, I have itv 

The Chairman. Is there any significance to the underscoring in 
red? 

Senator Ferguson. Not unless the chairman wants to make some- 
thing of it. 

The Chairman. I don't know who underscored it. 

Mr. Grew. I have it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what did you mean by that paragraph? 

Mr. Grew (reading) : 

The view therefore that war in the Far East can thus be averted by continua- 
tion of trade embargoes [1797] and, as proposed by some, the imposition 
of blockade is not supported by what has thus far occurred. 

It is obvious that by November 3 our trade embargoes had not served 
to restrain the Japanese Army from its expansion. They were going 
right ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. Am I correct that in 1938 you were somewhat 
of the opinion that embargoes would not avert war or they might 
cause war and then that you changed in 1940 your opinion and advised 
a different course, as you did in the telegram of October 12, 1940 — or 
was that September 12, 1940? 

Mr. Grew. September 12. 

Senator Ferguson. And you letter to the President of December 
14, 1940, that you changed your attitude. 



678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And now, are you changing back on November 3 ? 

Mr. Grew. Very definitely. You see, the pohcy which I had advo- 
cated in September, 1940, and which was put into effect brought up 
precisely the situation which I had envisaged, namely, that the Japa- 
nese intelligent leaders would realize that they were on the brink of an 
abyss and that they had better pull back. I think they tried to do so 
at that time. Unfortunately, those efforts failed and a military dic- 
tatorship [1708] cabinet came in and from that moment on 
the chances were very, very slim of being able to bring the thing about. 
So, naturally, I, under those circumstances, my views as reflected here, 
were of that particular moment. 

Senator Ferguson. You wanted to convey that to the State De- 
partment, that your views had changed, and that is why you sent this 
telegram of November 3 to the Secretary of State and the Under Sec- 
retary of State, so that it would receive their attention ? 

Mr. Grew. Naturally, Senator, every telegram which I sent the 
Secretary I wanted to have receive attention. 

Senator Ferguson. Where you designated the Secretary and the 
Under Secretary, did that place more importance upon it ? 

Mr. Grew. That places more importance upon a telegram, that is 
true. I did want that telegram to receive special attention, without 
question. 

Senator Ferguson. Because it was a change in your views ? 

Mr. Grew, It was a definite change, undoubtedly, because of changes 
of circumstances. 

Senator Ferguson. From the original telegram, I would like to 
have you go to the last sentence. 

Mr. Grew. The last sentence of the whole telegram ? 

Senator Ferguson. Well, it is in the book as "Action by Japan 
which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the 
[1790] United States"- — 

Mr. Grew. "It would be similarly short-sighted to base our policy 
on the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber 
rattling the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan's 
high-pressure diplomacy. Japan's resort to measures which might 
make war with the United States inevitable may come with dramatic 
and dangerous suddenness. 

The Chairman. The Chair would indicate that it is now after 4 
o'clock and unless the Senator from Michigan can conclude, we will 
recess. 

Senator Ferguson. I cannot finish, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Then, we might as well recess. 

The Chair is advised that Secretary Hull will return at 10 o'clock 
tomorrow morning. So, Mr, Grew, your further punishment will be 
deferred for an hour or so. 

Mr. Grew. I shall be glad to be here. Thank you. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 02 p. m., a recess Avas taken until 10 a. m., Wed- 
nesday, November 28, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 679 



\.i800-\ PEAKL HAKBOE ATTACK 



WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to fidjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[1801'\ The Chairman. The committee will be in order. 

Yesterday when the examination of Secretary Hull was suspended, 
the Chair announced that the committee would excuse him for 2 or 
3 days, to enable him to rest a little. Before we recessed yesterday 
afternoon, he sent word that he wanted to return this morning, but 
on account of the weather it is not thought advisable to bring Secre- 
tary Hull out, and therefore the committee is glad to excuse him for 
today, and until such time as it is convenient for him to return. 

Therefore, Mr. Grew may return to the stand. 

Senator Ferguson. 

TESTIMONY OP JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed) 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, I think we were on the last sentence 
in the November 3 message. You had just read that the the com- 
mittee. I would rather you look at the original, rather than the 
paraphrased version. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there a correction on the original ? 

Mr. Grew. I see no correction. 

Oh, yes. Apparently the text must have been garbled in transcrib- 
ing, Senator ; so there appear to be two corrections. Shall I mention 
those ? 

\_1802'\ Senator Ferguson. Yes, that is what I wanted to have 
you do. I wanted to know if you could tell us how it was when you 
sent it. 

Mr. Grew. I think it was probably sent as it now appears corrected : 

Japan's resort to measures which might make war with the United States 
inevitable. May come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness. 

So far as I recollect that was the way the telegram was sent. 



680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, you put in your book at page 470, 
you headed it "National hara-kiri not only possible but probable." 

Mr. GuEw. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So, when j^ou wrote the message on November 
3, you felt — that was how you were feeling, that Japan would "do or 
die," as you expressed it ? 

Mr. Grew. I thought that that danger, that risk, very definitely 
existed. 

Senator Ferguson. And you end your quotation in your book, your 
paragraph, by saying "that important telegram is on the record for 
all time." 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what did you mean by that? 

[1803] Mr. Grew. Well, I wanted to have my views and position 
perfectly clear. That is what that means. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you want to indicate that you had conveyed 
to our Government and the State Department that war may come with 
dramatic and dangerous suddenness ? 

Mr. Grew. Did I what, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Did you want to convey that ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes ; very definitely. 

Senator Ferguson. You felt that you were conveying that by the 
message ? 

Mr. Grew. I felt that I was conveying that thought. 

Senator Ferguson. You felt at that particular time, when you sent 
the message, that war was near, did you ? 

Mr. Grew. I felt that there was the risk and the danger of war. As 
I have already said, I never gave up hope up to the last minute. 

Senator Ferguson. I realize you had the hope, but you felt the risk 
was great at that time. 

Mr. Grew. I felt that the risk and danger of war was very great and 



increasing. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you hear the statement of Mr. Welles when 
he changed his opinion from, I think it was, 1,000 to a million ? 

Mr. Grew. Well 

[I8O4] Senator Ferguson. Were you increasing 

The Chairman. Let the witness finish his answer. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, I heard that statement of Mr. Welles. I have never 
tried to use percentages of risk because it was an imponderable ques- 
tion. I merely stated, and felt the danger of the risk of war was very 
great at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. In relation to the note of the 17th of August, I 
don't know whether I put the direct question to you, but I want to put it 
now; did you ever have any knowledge as to whether or not Great 
Britain gave any parallel notice or action similar, or along the same 
line as that note of August 17?^ 

Mr. Grew. I have no recollection to that effect. Senator. I have 
asked the officers in the Department to look that up, go into the files, and 
they have promised to do it. I don't know whether they have yet found 
anything or not. I think they will find nothing. 

Senator Ferguson. The Ambassador was Mr. Craigie. 

Mr. Grew. Sir Robert Craigie. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall any conversations with 
Craigie about parallel actions, or parallel notices. 

1 See Exhibit No. 71, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1695-1696. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 681 

Mr. Grew. I recall no definite conversation to that effect. 

Senator Ferguson. That article in the New York Times [1805] 
on August 13, 1941, that you read yesterday, doesn't refresh your 
memory ? 

Mr. Grew. No. Senator, as I recollect, that article stated definitely 
that this statement in the New York Times 

Senator Ferguson. Would you care to see it ? 

Mr. Grew (continuinfj). Was a report of what was being said in 
political circles in general. I don't think that that report was ascribed 
to any individual. 

[1S06] Senator Ferguson. Now, in relation to the Konoye gov- 
ernment, there is one other question I wanted to ask you. I think 
you said yesterday, did you not, that if there was a failure of the 
President and Konoye to meet, you felt that the Cabinet would fall 
and there would be a new dictatorship Cabinet; is that correct? 

Mr. Grew. I did and I so reported. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Now, did you also gather from that that the Japanese, that is, the 
Government, would be convinced that the United States was stalling 
for time and that war might be counted upon at any time ; was that 
connected with the Konoye-President meeting? 

Mr. Grew. During that particular Konoye administration I did 
not feel that war was likely to break out at any moment ; no, sir, not 
at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you think it would take some time after 
the Konoye Government fell before that would crystallize? 

Mr. Grew. You mean before war should break out? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, before war would crystallize. 

Mr. Grew, That was a matter which we could only guess about. 
After the Tojo government came in, Mr. Togo, the Foreign Minister, 
said that they were going to continue the conversations and try to 
come to an agreement with the United [1807] States and the 
conversations did continue, but, frankly, I felt that the possibility 
of coming to an agreement between the United States and Japan, 
after the Tojo Government had come into power, had very much 
decreased. 

[1808] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, did you know at any time 
that we had in mind that if Japan went across a certain line — let 
me get that line ; exhibit 15, 1 think. 

Mr. Keefe. I think it is exhibit 17, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have the November 5 letter? Counsel, 
please get me the November 5 letter of General Marshall and Admiral 
Stark. 

Mr. Gesell. The 27th, isn't that the one you want, Senator, Novem- 
ber 27, the joint memo of November 27 ? 

Senator Ferguson. 1 think it is probably in this one. [reading] : 

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military 
authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against 
Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens 
the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Common- 
wealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into 
Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New 
Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. 



682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Grew. So far as I can recollect, Senator, I was not informed 
of that fact. 

Senator Ferguson. You had no knowledge along that line 
[J809'} at all? 

Mr. Grew. So far as I can recollect I had no knowledge along that 
line at all. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar, Mr. Grew, about the time 
or prior to the time you wrote your telegram of November 3 of the 
editorials that were appearing in the New York Tribune and also 
the New York Times? They appeared in September; that is, as 
to what our Government's opinion was on the Japanese question in 
relation to the fact that the economic pressure would have results. 

Mr. Grew. No, Senator. Those leading editorials were often sent 
to me by our pouch, by mail. They arrived in Japan anywhere from 
3 weeks to a month later. It may have been possible that on certain 
occasions an editorial or the substance of .an editorial may have been 
cabled me but, frankly, I have no recollection of such messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you sent your telegram of the 3d and 
you considered that a very important message to our government. 

Was there anything then existing as far as you were concerned 
that caused you to send that, "that our Government may not be think- 
ing along the same lines", and that you did it as a warning? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir. I recollect no such thought. My [1810] 
position was purely objective. I was trying to report the situation as 
I saw it from that point of view at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the significance, Mr. Grew, of your 
message that "the Cabinet has made up its mind and told the Em- 
peror" ? 

Mr. Grew. What message is that ? 

Senator Ferguson. I think it is in the November 3. It is in one 
of your messages and I am quite sure it is in the November 3 mes- 
sage. Do you remember the fact that they hold told the Emperor? 

Mr. Grew. I would like to refresh my memory on that passage if 
I may. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. Can you tell me in what section of the telegram that 
appears ? 

Mr. Murphy. It is a most indefinite question. 

Senator Ferguson. It is the part that the Cabinet had made up its 
mind and had told the Emperor. I may be paraphrasing the lan- 
guage. 

Mr. Grew. I do not find that passage. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that fact, Mr. Grew? 

Mr. Grew. That I reported that the Cabinet had made a- 



Senator Ferguson. No, that the Cabinet did make up its mind and 
told the Emperor what it was going to do. 

[18 11] Mr. Grew. Well, you mean that I have reported that 
statement ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, in effect. 

Mr. Grew. I would like to have that. 

Senator Ferguson. No, I will try and find it later for you, Mr. Grew. 

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect reporting that fact. 



& 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 683 

Senator Ferguson, I tried to keep the Foreign Relations memo after 
my information but I do not liave it on that one. 

Mr. Grew. Of course, I could not possibly have known what the 
Cabinet had decided, so if I stated that it must have been merely 
opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know whether or not you ever had 
that knowledge that the Cabinet had made up its mind ? I am talking 
about the To jo Cabinet. 

Mr. Grew. Had made up its mind to go to war ? 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what it was going to do ? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir. It was practically impossible to ascertain what 
went on in Cabinet meetings. There were always a great many rumors 
in the press, a great many rumors flying around town, but to get at 
the actual facts of the procedure of any Cabinet meeting was practi- 
cally impossible. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, I think you gave in your [18121 
testimony earlier the fact that Japan might strike without a declara- 
tion of war and you had in mind what they did in 1904 at Port Arthur. 

Mr. Grew. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say the last paragraph of your 
November message conveyed the same idea ? 

Mr. Grew. I think that idea is conveyed more definitely in my tele- 
gram of October 17. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, we will go to your telegram of 
November 17. 

Mr. Grew. Of November 17, that is right. 

Senator Ferguson. November 17, and will you give the part of the 
telegram that you think contains that on November 17 ? 

Mr. Grew. Will you find that for me ? 

Senator Ferguson. I think you may find it on 743. 

Mr. Grew. I said in that telegram : 

In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval actions 
by Japan in areas not at present involved in the China conflict I am taking into 
account as a probability that the Japanese would exploit all available tactical 
advantages, including those of initiative and surprise. 

I think that is the passage that you have in mind. 

[1813] Senator Ferguson. So you think that that more nearly 
conveys the idea that they may strike without a declaration of war? 

Mr. Grew. Very definitely. 

Senator Ferguson. And you had in mind what they had done at 
Port Arthur? 

Mr. Grew. I think that word "surprise" comprises that thought. 

Senator Ferguson. And you conveyed that to our Government on 
the 17th of November? 

Mr. Grew. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that that strengthened your former 
message of November 3? 

Mr. Grew. I think it supplemented it. 

Senator Ferguson. Supplemented it. You felt that you were con- 
veying this knowledge that you had to the Government in as direct 
language as you could ? 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 



684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 485 of Foreign Relations, II, I 
think the statement is made that : 

I said in that case I feared that everything was over and that I would soon be 
leaving Japan. 

Mr. Grew. You said in "Foreign Relations." Isn't that in my book ? 
IISI4] Senator Ferguson. I think it is in your book, maybe. 
Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, 485. 
Senator Ferguson. That was page 485 of your book [reading] : 

I said that in that case I feared that everything was over and that I would 
soon be leaving Japan. Soon afterwards, however, the press announced that 
the conversations would be continued. But my friend seemed crushed. 

Will you give us an explanation of that remark? That was made 
on December 1, 1941. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. Well, if it had been true under the circumstances 
then obtaining that the Cabinet had decided to break off the conversa- 
tions completely, I would have thought at that time that the situation 
was hopeless. As a matter of fact, my friend was wrong because the 
Cabinet decided, at least ostensibly, to carry on the conversations 
further. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, I notice in your book, the same 
page — do you have your book before you ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, I have. 

Senator Ferguson. In capital letters and quotations on the same 
page, at the bottom of the page, before "December 5, 1941" : 

"WASHINGTON HAS DELIVERED AN ULTIMATUM TO US." 

[181^'] Do you see that! 

Mr. Grew. Yes, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. "Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us." 

Mr. Grew. T think it is a little misleading, perhaps, to take that 
sentence out of its context. I was discussing the whole telegram here. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not taking it out of its context. I am ask- 
ing if you see it. I am trying to call it to your attention. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, I have it before me. 

Senator Ferguson. And it is in capital letters? . 

Mr. Grew. Not in capital letters in my book. 

Senator Ferguson. The heading; I am talking about the heading. 
I am trving to convey to you the heading. 

Mr. Grew. Oh, well, that is in quotation marks, that heading. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I said it was in quotation marks. 

Mr. Grew. The headings were put in there purely arbitrarily. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. Grew. They were not necessarily put in there to emphasize or 
to supplement the text. 

[iSlO'] Senator Fergson. Well I am trying to get you now to 
look at what T am looking at. 

Mr. Grew. I see it. 

Senator Ferguson. And then I will ask you some questions. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the word "ultimatum" is used in that 
quotation. WiH you tell us why you used the word "ultimatum" in 
the quotation? 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 685 

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman from 
Pennsylvania ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I yield. 

Mr. Murphy. Isn't it a fact that the gentleman who wrote the book 
is quoting the Japanese spokesman's feeling that it was an ultimatum ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Someone who was not familiar with the message of 
the 26th? 

Senator Ferguson. The word "East" means the Japanese. This is 
the Japanese speaking. Isn't that correct, Mr. Grew? 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. It was not an American at all. 

[1817] Mr. Grew. That is correct, that was a Japanese who was 
speaking and it was reflecting his point of view. 

I think it is very important, in this connection, Senator, to have this 
whole passage put on the record. 

Senator Ferguson. I want you to read the whole passage now. Will 
you read it ? 

Mr. Grew. I will do so. [reading :] 

December 5, 1941. 

Yesterday I received in his own handwriting a letter from a prominent Japanese 
who is closely in touch with Government circles here. This letter reads in part 
as follows : "The situation is very regrettable. You know how I feel and I may 
understand your feelings. Permit me to set forth frankly to you what is now 
in my mind. I have had conversations with friends and after examining their 
feelings I have come to the conclusion that they believe, with no knowledge of 
the actual contents of the American document of November 26" — 

and I think that that passage should be emphasized — 

"that Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us. Such is the regrettable 
psychology of our people * * *." 

That is the pertinent part of that passage, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, all right. 

Now, as I understand it, without any knowledge — we [1818] 
are talking now about the Japanese — without any knowledge on their 
part they were treating the instrument, the note of November 26 of 
the United States to the Japanese, as an ultimatum. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. I can tell you why, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I mean that is what you were conveying. 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us why, in your opinion, the 
Japanese in Japan were treating it as an ultimatum? 

Mr. Gp^w. The Japanese military government were clearly putting 
out the impression that that document was an ultimatium. It suited 
the military to do so. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that at the same time that the note 
was delivered that the Ambassador here, the Japanese Ambassador, 
was treating the note to the same effect? 

Mr. Grew. I assume that 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, in Foreign Relations, 766, that 
the American proposal was unacceptable and was to be interpreted as 
tantamount to meaning the end. 

Will you look at page 766 ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. That is in that long conversation beginning on 
page 756? 



686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[J819] Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. The statement that you refer to is on some other page. 

Senator Ferguson. What page is it on ? 

Mr. Grew. I will have to look. 

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 766. [Heading:] 

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be 
interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end and asked whether we were not 
interested in a modus vivendi. 

It is on page 766, at the top. I starts, "Mr. Kurusu." It was written 
by Joseph W. Ballantine. 

[J8£0] Mr. Grew. You say that is at the top of page 756? 

Senator Ferguson. No, 766. 

Mr. Grew. I beg your pardon. All right. 

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be in- 
terpreted as tantamount to meaning the end, and asked whether we were not 
interested in a modus vivendi. 

Senator Ferguson. Now were you familiar wi,th the fact that here 
they were also treating, in effect, the note of the 26th as an ultimatum ? 
I am talking about "they" as meaning the Japanese. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. In the book of the gentleman who is the witness he 
refers to "certain people in Japan," but the gentleman does not pretend 
to say who they were. 

Mr. Grew. Senator, all I can say to that is the records of most of 
the conversations which took place in Washington between the Japa- 
nese Ambassador and the Secretary of State were telegraphed to me 
in Tokyo. Sometimes they were slow in coming, sometimes they were 
delayecl for several days, and sometimes they were so garbled in trans- 
mission that I had to ask for repeats. They were very often delayed. 
I do not know whether this particular record was sent me or not. I 
will [LS^l] have to check up on that.^ 

Senator Fekguson. Did you ever convey to the State Department 
that at least some of the people, in Japan were treating the note of the 
26th as an ultimatum ? 

Mr. Grew. I find, Senator, in a telegram' which I sent to the Secre-" 
tary of State on December 5, that I repeated the pertinent part of that 
conversation with that prominent Japanese which I have just men- 
tioned. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you tell me what it is, from that tele- 
gram ? 

Mr. Grew. Would you like me to read the whole telegram ? 

Senator Ferguson. Just that part, unless you want to read it all. 

Mr. Grew. I think it would be well to read" the whole thing for the 
record. 

Secretary of State (rush) 

1895, December 5, 5 : 00 p. m. 

Strictly confidential for the Secretary and Under Secretary only. 

You will no doubt be aware that the American proposal — 

that refers to the memorandum of November 26 — 

is being represented here to the press and to the public as a mere restatement of 
"fanciful principles which ignore the realities of the situation", and that no 
intimation [1822] . whatever has been given out that the proposal, if im- 

1 Exhibit No. 75. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 687 

plemented, would provide Japan by peaceful and orderly processes with that 
security — political as well as economic — which she affects to seek by exercise of 
force. The response of most Japanese to whom we have said — 

presumably to whom we have talked, there must be a mistake there — 

The response of most Japanese to whom we have 

Mr. Mitchell. Shown. 

Mr. Grew. I think this is the meaning : 

The response of mose Japanese to whom we have said that the American 
proposal, far from being a formulation of fanciful principles designed to pre- 
serve the old order of things, is a well-balanced, constructive, practical and 
forward-looking plan for creating order out of the disorders of the past, has been 
to express strong disappointment that the private individual is not in a posi- 
tion to form any intelligent opinion with regard to a matter of such supreme 
importance, while some have said that if the American proposal is actually 
such as we have described it to be, an attitude of intrasigence on the part of 
the Japanese would be viewed with regret by the masses. 

It is impossible to forecast precisely what effect [1823] publication of 
our proposal would have. Undoubtedly reaction to certain phases of the pro- 
posal, notably complete evacuation of China, would be strong and indeed might 
be so violent as to eliminate the last possibility of an agreement. However, 
there would seem to be even greater risks of the elimination of that possi- 
bility if the points at issue continue in Japan to be befogged by ignorance and 
misrepresentation. I feel sure that you will have considered the wisdom of 
publishing the proposal as soon as possible after consultation with the Japanese 
Government, but even without the latter's assent if that should not be forth- 
coming, publication to be accompanied by a statement substantially along the 
lines of the thought expressed in paragraph two of my 1874, December 1, 
8 : 00 p. m. 

A prominent Japanese in close touch with government circles wrote to me in 
handwriting yesterday inter alia : 

"The situation is most deplorable. I may understand how you feel and you 
know how I feel. Allow me to write to you frankly what I have now in my mind. 
After speaking with friends and studying their frame of mind I come to conclude 
that they feel without having the knowledge of the true nature of your docu- 
ment of the [182Jt] 26th November as if we received an ultimatum from 
Washington. Under such unfortunate psychology of your people" — 

I think that is "our" people. I think he is referring to his own people 
there and I think it is garbled — 

"Under such unfortunate psychology of our people the only way left us, I think, 
that your Government will broadmindedly take our proposal as a base of 
discussion for the modus vivendi with a view of arriving at final settlement 
on the line of your proposal. From sheer desire for happy ending I have to write 
you." I believe — 

this is my statement — 

this letter to be a fair criterion of public opinion here. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Mr. Grew, do you know how many mes- 
sages you sent to Washington between the 27th, which would be 
our 26th, and the 7th ? I think the book shows two. Is that all you 
sent? 

Mr. Grew. I think I undoubtedly sent more than that. 

Senator Fergusox. Would you look it up for the committee and see 
whether you sent any more than that, so that the committee might have 
all that you sent ? ^ 

Mr. Grew. There were certain telegrams which I sent to the Secre- 
tary of State subsequent to the commencement of war. 

Senator Ferguson. I am just talking about up to and including 
the 7th. 

1 See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 5, p. 2066. 



688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[182S] Mr. Grew. I will look. I will have the files examined 
and see. 

Senator Ferguson. Just to try and refresh your memory as to what 
was going on in Japan I will ask you if they have a paper known as 
Asahi? 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you pronounce it? 

Mr. Grew. Asahi. 

Senator Ferguson. Under the December 1 date line the newspaper 
Asahi, in a dispatch from Washington, asserted that the closing of 
the Japanese consulates in the United States was imminent, and froni 
the New York Times of December 5, 1941, 1 am quoting : 

Tokyo, Friday, December 5. — Tokyo was struck by a bombshell, in the words 
of the newspai)er Asahi today, with the revelation of the substance of the Japa- 
nese-American negotiation by President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull. 

Then— 

Domei, .Japanese news agency, said last night : "It is utterly impossible for 
Japan to accept the stipulations of the American document." 

Were you familiar with those quotes? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I never saw those messages, but I might say 
that everything that went out over the newspaper [1826] 
agency Domei was carefully controlled by the Japanese Government. 

Senator Ferguson. I am assuming that in the question. 

Mr. Grew. In effect the Japanese Government owns it. So any- 
thing that went out is simply what the Japanese Government wanted 
to have passed on to the public. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, our State Department should 
have been taking that kind of a message as the Government speaking 
rather than the people? 

Mr. Grew. Very definitely. There was not any question about that. 

[1S£7] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, the last question in the 
Navy report was this : 

Can you remember any information received from our State Department as 
to the probability of the United State?: coming into armed conflict with the 
Japanese if Japan was at war with the British in the Pacific? 

Here is your answer, on page 1068 of the Navy report : 

I could not answer that, sir, without exploration. 

Do you recall that question and that answer? 

Mr. Grew. I do not happen to recall that particular question; 
no. sir. That hearing took j^lace long ago. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I will read the question again to you, 
because I would like to have it answered. 

Can you remember any information 

The Chairman. The Secretary was about to make a further answer. 
Mr. Grew. No, sir. Thank you, I think not, Mr. Chairman.^ I 
will listen to the statement. 

The Chairman. All right, go ahead. / 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Can you remember any infoi-mation received from our State Department as 
to the probability of the United States coming into armed conflict with the 
Japanese if Japan was at war with the^Hritish in the Pacific? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 689 

Mr. Grew. I recollect no such statement. 

[18£8] Senator Ferguson. Do you remember the answer that 
you gave there, "I could not answer that, sir, without exploration." 
What would that mean ? 

Mr. Grew. That would mean I would wish to examine the official 
files of the State Department to see whether anything had been sent 
to me on that subject. I do not think it was, but I do not like to give a 
categorical answer in a case of that kind without exploration. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you make such exploration so we will get 
the benefit of that ? 

Mr. Grew. I will. Senator. I want to be sure that the various 
points which you asked me to explore will be taken down. 

Senator Ferguson. I assume that counsel will give you that. I do 
not want you to have to rely on your own memory either. 

Mr. Grew, were there any confidential or secret communications 
from the State Department of our policy toward Japan that were not 
published by the State Department ? Do you know of any now ? 

Mr. Grew. Senator, as I said the other day, there is a very large 
amount of material which passed between the State Department and 
the Embassy at Tokyo, and vice versa, during those years. If all that 
material had been published [1829] it would probably take a 
dozen or more volumes. I know of a great deal of material which 
was not published, but I cannot say that that material would have been 
pertinent to this investigation. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of* any of it that would be per- 
tinent ? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir ; offhand I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you think of some after you leave the 
witness stand, will you convey that information to the committee, so 
you may return with it so that ;we may all have the facts ? 

Mr. Grew. You wish me to think the matter over and see if I can 
remember anything which might be helpful to the committee? 

Senator Ferguson. After you leave the stand. You do not have 
to do it now. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, I will do that. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, when you destroyed — does the chair- 
man want to put something on the record ? 

The Chairman. No, I do not. If I do want to put something on I 
will do it. I was just talking to my colleague here. 

I did not mean to interrupt the Senator. Go ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, do you remember when you 
[1830] destroyed the Code in the Embassy at Tokyo? 

Mr. Grew. We, as I recollect it, Senator, destroyed some of our 
codes a few days before Pearl Harbor, but we kept certain codes for 
use up to the last moment, which were destroyed actually after we had 
learned that war had broken out. 

Senator Ferguson. What codes did the Embassy destroy prior to 
Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, just a moment. Are we going to 
reveal the American code? 

The Chairman. The Chairman is not able to answer that question. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not understand the Congressman. 

79710—46 — pt. 2 20 



690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. The question is does the gentleman now want the 
Ambassador to go into the discussion of the codes that America was 
using in its diplomatic relations? 

Senator Ferguson. No. 

JNlr. Murphy. Does he want him to name which ones we were using? 

Senator Ferguson, No. 

Mr. Grew. I could not do it anyway. 

Senator Ferguson. Will the reporter read the question please? 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

[ISSl] Mr. Murphy. I am wondering if the gentleman wants 
to press that? We have codes that we are using all over the world, 
and I do not suppose we have changed them. I am wondering if you 
want to spread on the record for the world the kind of codes we were 
using during the war? 

Mr. Grew. I could not possibly answer that question in any case. 
I could not recollect. As a matter of fact I had very little directly 
to do with the handling of the codes, and in any case, I would not 
know which codes were kept and which were destroyed. 

Senator Ferguson. But some were destroyed prior to December 7, 
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Mr. Grew. That is my belief. I think there is some reference to 
that in the record. I would have to look it up. 

Senator Ferguson. There is reference to it. I am not bringing out 
anything new, except I wanted your knowledge on it. 

Mr. Grew. I am afraid I cannot enlighten you on that. I did not 
know very much about it at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, do you recall any messages to you 
or to the Embassy that you were to destroy codes prior to the Pearl • 
Harbor attack? 

Mr. Grew. I do not recall a message having been received to that 
effect. I shall have to look that up,' [ISS^] Senator.^ 

Mr. Gesell. May I interpose. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. In Exhibit 18, under date of November 27, is a message 
to the Ambassador from Secretary Hull, which, in the last portion, 
while not mentioning codes specifically, appears to look toward the 
destruction of codes at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. May I see the instrument ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Senator George. What is the date of it? 

Mr. Gesell. November 27, Senator. 

Mr. Grew. Is that published ? 

Mr. Gesell. That is one of the exhibits in this case. 

Mr. Grew. But not published in Foreign Relations? 

Mr. Gesell. I do not think so. 

[1833] Senator Ferguson. Will you just show the instrument 
to Mr. Grew ? 

[The document was handed to Mr. Grew.] 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it, Mr. Grew, and give us your 
interpretation of it? 

Mr. Grew. I have read the telegram. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it into the record? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, if you wish. 

1 See Mr. Grew's testimony, p. 743 et seq., infra. See also Hearings, Part 5, p. 2066 
for statement by Mr. Gesell. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 691 

Washington, November 27, 19Jtl. 
793 Confidential for the Ambassador. 

In the light of the attitude of Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu when they 
were handed on November 26th for consideration the document described in 
a separate telegram and of such indications as we have cumulatively had of 
the general attitude of the Japanese Government, it appears that the discussions 
up to the present tinse have not yet afforded any basis which gives much promise 
of a satisfactory comprehensive settlement. It is of course too early to adopt 
any definitive opinion whether the discussions will continue or will lapse, but 
the probability that they may lapse should not be lost sight of. 

The existence of such probability makes it appear advisable that we give 
some advance consideration to [iSJ4] various problems which may as a 
consequence arise in connection with our Foreign Service establishments in 
Japanese territory. As lapse of the conversations might result in withdrawal 
of our diplomatic and consular representation from Japan, it would seem to us 
that, without any intention of being alarmist or of too hastily envisaging serious 
contingencies, this question should be brought to your attention so that you may 
have it well in mind in case it should become necessary for the Department to 
consult you in regard to the making of arrangements for the packing of official 
and personal effects and the expeditious handling of other matters which would 
be involved in the closing of our Embassy and Consulates. It is, of course, desired 
that all phases of the matter be considered confidential that that discussion of 
it be kept to a minimum. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you receive that telegram, Mr. Grew ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir ; undoubtedly I must have received it. 

Senator Ferguson. Did that convey to you the idea that you were 
to dispose of some codes? 

Mr. Grew. Not necessarily. This is the sort of telegram that any 
government, out of mere precaution, would send to its representatives 
abroad, as a pursely preparatory message, to \^1835^ guard 
against possible contingencies that might arise but would not neces- 
sarily arise. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you or did you not have the codes destroyed 
as the result of that telegram ? 

Mr. Grew. That, Senator, I cannot answer definitely. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, will you look up and see whether 
or not you received any telegram from which you obtained the informa- 
tion that you were to or that you did destroy any codes ? 

Mr. Grew. I will. 

Senator Ferguson. And then will you get us that information? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now you had a naval attache at the Embassy? 

Mr. Grew. We did. 

Senator Ferguson. What was his name? 

Mr. Grew. His name was Commander Smith-Hutton. 

The Chairman. Smith what? . 

Mr. Grew. Smith-Hutton, S-m-i-t-h-H-u-t-t-o-n. 

Senator Ferguson. If he received a message to destroy his code it 
would come through your Embassy, or would it be directly to him ? 

Mr. Grew. It may have come either way. It might have come to me 
or it might have come directly to him, I don't know. 

[1836\ Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any messages to the 
naval attache to destroy codes? 

Mr. Grew, No, sir; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to the attack. 

Mr. Grew. I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was the Army attache in the Embassy? 



692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Grew. The military attache was colonel — it has gone out of 
my head at the moment. We had so many different attaches from 
time to time, that I would like to check up on it. 

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel know, so he can help Mr. Grew? 

Mr, Grew. It was Lt. Col. Harry I. Creswell. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any messages — was he a lieu- 
tenant? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Lieutenant colonel, he said. 

Mr. Grew. He was lieutenant colonel at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember any messages to the lieutenant 
colonel to destroy any codes at that time? 

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now going to the President's message to the 
Emperor, what time did you get it, Mr. Grew ? 

Mr. Grew. I received the message in final form, after being de- 
coded, at approximately 10 : 30 p. m. on December 7, [18S7'\ 
Japanese time. 

Senator Ferguson. What time would that be in Washington and 
what date? 

Mr. Grew. That would be 14 hours later. I understand that the 
message was sent from Washington at 9 p. m. on the 6th. I think the 
records show that. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. The records show it reached the Japanese Tokyo post 
office at 12 noon on the 7th. In other words, it arrived in just 15 hours. 
There was 14 hours difference in time, and allowing for 1 hour in 
transmission. 

Senator Ferguson. So it took 1 hour to transmit it? 

Mr. Grew. It took approximately 1 hour to transmit it. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. The telegram was stamped "12 noon", and the telegram 
was delivered to me at the Embassy at 10 : 30 p. m. that day. It was 
held up all that time. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that delay if somebody 
did not know the contents of that instrument ? 

Mr. Grew. If somebody did not know the nature of it ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. Well, my guess would be when that message came it was 
probably turned over to certain authorities of the Japanese Govern- 
ment, who could have readily decoded it, because [1838] it was 
in what we called our nonconfidential code at that time, the gray code 
which was perfectly open to anybody, and my guess would be that 
the military authorities did not want this message to get to the Em- 
peror at that time. That was always my belief. 

Senator Ferguson. It was held 15 hours by the Japanese before it 
was delivered to you ? 

Mr. Grew. It was held from noon to 10 : 30 that evening. 

Senator Ferguson. That night? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You had some reasons then for believing that 
the military authorities were holding it up so that it would not possi- 
bly reach the Emperor? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 693 

Mr. Grew. Very definitely, because, as a rule, the Japanese were 
expeditious in getting the telegrams through. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the explanation you want to convey ? 

Mr. Grew. That would be my opinion, my guess. I cannot prove it. 

Senator Ferguson. Does that indicate that they knew our code, or 
do you think it would come from the fact that the President here made 
a press release that he was sending a note to the Emperor ? 

Mr. Grew. I think that must have been taken in conjunction 
[18S9] with the other. Undoubtedly the Japanese had picked up 
the radio messages, which I picked up myself. I picked that up in the 
early evening, that the President had sent the message to the Emperor, 
I picked that up from Station KGI in San Francisco, which went all 
over Japan. 

So the military authorities must have known that such a message was 
coming and they must have been on the lookout for it. 

Senator Ferguson. So it would not be due to the fact that they 
were decoding the message because they did not know what was in 
the message, they could get it from the President's announcement here ? 

Mr. Grew. The President did not give the text at that time, did he ? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? , ■ 

The ChxMrman. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman from 
Pennsylvania ? 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to say I understand that it was only a 
press release, that the message had been sent, and when the President 
sent the message he said he wanted it sent in the gray code, so it could 
be easily uncovered, and he did not care whether it was uncovered 
before the Emperor got it. That is in evidence. 

Senator Ferguson. I remember this "Dear Cordell" note. [IS^OI 
I remember the note, "Shoot this to Grew". 

Mr. Grew. Tlie President evidently did not mind if it was picked up. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. "\'\nien you got the message 15 hours later 
and it was 10 something at night, you took it immediately, as I under- 
stand it, to Tojo. 

Mr. Grew. To Togo, the Foreign Minister, not the Prime Minister, 
but the Foreign Minister Togo. I had made a provisional appoint- 
ment as soon as I received the note over the radio that this was coming, 
and then as soon as I receive Mr. Hull's brief message, which was 
labelled "Triple ^Priority" and which did come to me — I do not know 
whether that was held up or not — saying this message was on its way, 
I promptly telephoned the message to the foreign Minister and made 
an appointment around midnight. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not go into the contents of the note ? 

Mr. Grew. Of the President's message? 

Sentor Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. I did not know the contents until the document had been 
decoded. 

Senator Ferguson. I mean after you received it you did not discuss 
its contents with the Minister tliat you were delivering it to? 

\18Jf]~\ Mr. Grew. I did not. He asked to see it. I handed it 
to him to read, and he did read it. Then I asked that I be accorded 
an audience with the Emperor in order that I could present that mes- 
sage to him personally. The Foreign Minister quibbled on that. He 
said he would like to study it first. I said, "That is a very urgent 



694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

matter and I now ask for an andience at the earliest possible moment." 
So he finally said, "I will present your request to the Emperor." That 
is all. 

Senator Ferguson, That was what hour? 

Mr. Grew. That was about a quarter past midnight, about 12 : 15 
a. m. 

Senator Ferguson. What time would that be in Washington? 

Mr. Grew. Fourteen hours later. That, in Washington, would have 
been 10 a. m. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be 10 o'clock Sunday morning? 

Mr. Grew. Ten o'clock Sunday morning, December 7. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, did you give your diary to the State 
Department when they checked your manuscript for your book ? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have the parts that the State Depart- 
ment deleted from your book ? 

[184^] Mr. Grew. I had them at the time, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have them now ? 

Mr. Grew. A good many of them were deleted by me mj^self, be- 
cause when I prepared the original manuscript it is always easier to 
prepare too much rather than too little material, and many passages 
were already marked "cut" before they were handed to the State De- 
partment at all. I do not have that manuscript now. I sent it to my 
publishers at the time, nearly 2 years ago now, and I suppose it has 
been destroyed. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not have anything then that would give 
us what was cut out or deleted by the State Department? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir, I could not. 

Senator Brewster. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. In connection with the matter of the diaries, you 
read into the record yesterday the letter, the reply which you sent in 
response to my request. I can appreciate the personal aspects of the 
matter. I certainly would have no desire to embarrass you. On the 
other hand, I think you will also recognize that there perhaps has 
never been a matter that is of more profound national concern. Wliile 
1 can recognize your position, your desire to cooperate, which you 
have demonstrated, your own convicticm that .you have made 
[184^1 available everything that should be of possible interest and 
concern, that statement is made in your book with the addition of the 
phrase that there were things which it would not be proper for you 
to publish at that time. 

On page X you speak of this. You say "Many of the items in the 
original possess no permanent historic value. Others overlap. Still 
others cannot properly be published now." Which, I take it, is a 
fairly frank recognition on your part that there was material there 
which would be of public interest, and important, but which, owing 
to the exigencies of the war it would not be proper to make available 
at that time. 

[1844] Of course I think the rule, as far as court procedure is 
concerned, is entirely well established, that documents or diaries 
which are used for refreshing one's memory, or informing one's self 
are available for examination. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 695 

I, at the same time, recognize all the other aspects involved, and that 
this is not a court proceeding, although it is perhaps more important, 
and it has perhaps more important aspects. 

So I wondered, Mr. Grew, whether or not, you might feel justified, 
and properly so on your part, if you should permit our counsel, At- 
torne}'^ William Mitchell, in whom we all, I am sure, have confidence, 
as to his discretion, intelligence, and integrity, at least to make such 
examination as might seem warranted, to be sure that his judgment 
entirely coincided with yours as to the public or private character of 
any items that might be involved. 

That is simply and solely in the interest of doing complete justice to 
probably one of the most important matters with which certainly 
Congress has ever had to deal. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield? 

Senator Brewster. I would like to have Mr. Grew's comment on 
this now. 

Mr. Grew. I fully appreciate that position. Senator. In making 
the comment in my book that certain material "could [184S] 
not be published now," I had in mind at least some of the documents 
which have been presented to this committee, quite apart from the 
publications of the Department of State. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. One telegram came up today with re^rd to our codes. 
That is the sort of thing that would not have been proper to publish at 
the time my book came out. I do not even know whether I had a 
record of that or not, but that is the sort of thing I had in mind. 

Now, as I say, my diary was a private, personal document. I used 
it as a sort of sketchbook to get my ideas in order. It was a sort of 
scribbling from clay to day, and many of the passages in it were incor- 
rect, and could be misleading. 

After ironing them out, and after checking up and trying to confirm 
the information which had come in to me, to elaborate my own 
thoughts on the situation at the time, that material then took shape in 
my official report to the Government, and all those official reports are 
on record, are on file and are available to the committee. 

I would like, i^I may once again, to read one little passage from my 
book, a very brief passage, on page 348. I will read this again. It is 
already in the record, but I will read it to you, to explain a little more 
clearly my [iS46] attitude about this. This was written on 
November 1, 1940. 

In the light of fast-moving developments, I scarcely dare read back in the diary 
nowadays because of its many inconsistencies which show it up for the patchwork 
sort of day-to-day scribbling it is. At least it shows our thoughts and our infor- 
mation, some of it reliable and some of it wholly unreliable, at any given 
moment — the moment of writing. It shows how often we are groping and fum- 
bling in the dark. Less and less are we able to know what is going on behind 
the scenes, simply because many of our reliable contacts are no longer available 
and also because, even behind the scenes, the right hand pf ten doesn't know what 
the left hand is doing. 

That indicates my diary was not the sort of material which ought to 
be used as a criterion of anything. It was full of inconsistencies, full 
of inaccuracies, and for that reason alone, apart from its private and 
personal character, I would feel very reluctant to make any of it public. 

Senator Brewster. That was not my question. My question was 



696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

■whether or not, in view of the tremendous public concern -which is man- 
ifest in this situation, in order to obviate any possible personal ques- 
tion of purely personal adjustment, where both the wisdom and cor- 
rectness of your official acts and that of others is necessarily under 
[IS47] scrutiny, and where, as you have indicated, you have used 
this diary as a basis for refreshing your own recollection and deter- 
mination as to any public questions that were involved, that the counsel 
for this committee, in whom everyone has confidence, should be per- 
mitted to make such an examination, in order that he might, at any 
rate, form his own judgment as to whether it concurs with yours. 

That would at least be some measure of reassurance to the people of 
this country that no individual, as the chairman of the committee has 
said in presenting the resolution in this case, he emphasized very 
greatly that the public interest was so transcendant that no individual, 
high or low, living or dead, could possible hope to be exempt from the 
proper scrutiny which this resolution was designed to give. 

In view of questions which have been raised regarding possible lim- 
itations of members of the committee in any impartial consideration, I 
make this suggestion on that account, with the sole hope of serving the 
great public interest that is involved. 

[184^] Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement? 

The Chairman. Yes. The Chair recognizes Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. MiTCHELli? Since this hearing commenced, I have taken the 
position with every department of government that any papers 
that came into my hands, and that are entrusted to me, would be 
open to every member of the committee and to the full committee. 
I have stood on that from the start and I don't want to make any 
restrictions now. I think that I will have to take the position with 
Mr. Grew and the committee that if he, Mr. Grew, turns anything 
over to me to look at, I shall not withhold it from the committee 
members or the committee itself. 

I furthermore feel an embarrassment about being put in the posi- 
tion of passing judgment on the materiality of Mr. Grew's material 
now', after one member of the committee has examined him for over 
5 hours. My judgment as to what is pertinent and material and the 
judgment of some members of the committee might Radically differ. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Mitchell, am I correct in stating it to be 
the law and the procedure of courts that a document of that character 
is available for the examination of counsel in a court proceeding? 

Mr. Mitchell. If a witness brings a memorandum into court and 
uses it to refresh his recollection in the courtroom [1840] it 
may be examined by counsel and the court, and introduced. Whether 
or not Mr. Grew has a right to withhold a private memorandum 
which he doesn't want to turn loose is a legal question that I haven't 
considered. I don't know what action the committee would be able 
to take if Mr. Grew stands on his position. You might have to bring 
a lawsuit against him, or a subpoena to, compel him to produce it, 
and if he asserted his rights, then you would have a case in court 
for the next year or two to decide whether he had a right to withhold 
it or not. 

That is all I can say about that. 

The Chairman. Does Mr. Grew wish to make any statement about 
that? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 697 

The question whether the committee would, under any circum- 
stances, feel called upon to issue a subpoena to Mr. Grew to bring 
his diary in before the committee on the theory that he had or had 
not testified by refreshing his own recollection from it as to all the 
pertinent facts in regard to this inquiry, that is a matter which I 
don't think the committee could pass on here under snap judgment 
and might have to consider before any action would be taken. 

In the meantime, the Chair feels that Mr. Grew's examination 
should not be suspended or held up, while the committee might enter 
into a discussion on that subject. 

[ISSO] So, Senator Ferguson, you may proceed. Is that all 
you wanted. Senator Brewster? Is there anything further on that, 
Senator Brewster ? 

Senator Brewster. Well, I quite appreciate, of course, what the 
Chairman says and I certainly have no desire to embarrass Mr. Grew 
or compel him here publicly to discuss further the various aspects 
of this situation. I am quite willing to let the matter rest here at- 
the present time. 

I should like to consider it further myself and I am sure that 
probably the members of the committee would like to consider also 
all aspects involved. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield ? 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson has this time. 

Senator Ferguson. I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. I wonder if there was any document, of any nature, 
exchanged between Mr. Grew and the State Department, from the 
State Department to Mr. Grew, or from Mr. Grew to the State 
Department, official document that is not available. It is my under- 
standing that everyone of them are available. 

Mr. Mitchell. I might add to that that they are all available and we 
have gone over scores and scores of them and exercised a judgment 
as to what was material or not. 

We have also had laid out all the exchanges which we don't think 
are material, and if any member of the committee [ISSl] wants 
to exercise his independent judgment on that, we will have all of the 
documents exchanged between them made available at once. There 
are hundreds of them. Kelating to visas and passports, and all sorts 
of things. But everyone of them has been laid out so that any member 
of the committee who wants to see them, any official exchange between 
Mr. Grew and the State Department that we haven't thought worth 
while to produce, it is available. 

As Mr. Gesell said yesterday, we only went back to January 1, 1941. 
Now, if you want us to go back of that, way back into 1940, why, that 
can be done. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, I 

Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to make my own 
attitude about this whole matter abundantly clear. I have tried to do 
so heretofore. It is as was expressed in my letter to Mr. Mitchell with 
regard to Mr. Brewster's request, in which I said I wished to do every- 
thing in my power to support and further the important work of this 
committee. I felt all of the pertinent facts should be brought out and 
laid before the American people. I believed that nothing of a perti- 



698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

nent nature should be concealed. And I think — I hope — I have shown, 
in my testimony, that [1862'] I am not trying to conceal any- 
thing. I am trying to give every possible piece of information which 
will be helpful to this committee. 

I also said in my letter that I had gone through the last several 
months in my diary before Pearl Harbor very carefully to see if I 
could find anything that might be pertinent to this hearing and, 
frankly, I found nothing. 

That is my position, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. All right. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, you do feel, however, that your posi- 
tion does place in you the determination as to what is material or not 
material to this inquiry? 

Mr. Grew. Senator, as I have said constantly, after all, the control- 
ling factor in all of these matters is the official correspondence. The 
official correspondence, everything that passed between the Department 
of State and myself is on the record here on file, and, as Mr. Mitchell 
said, available to the committee. 

Now, the material on^which those official reports were based, I don't 
think would be helpful to the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. But it does place in you, in you solely, that 
determination, the attitude that you take ; isn't that true ? 

Mr. Grew. That is a question of interpretation, possibly [1853] 
legal interpretation, and I don't believe I would want to try to answer; 
the question as to whether any man has a right to retain his personal 
and private documents, that is a legal matter I couldn't answer. 

Senator Ferguson. I have just a few more questions. 

Was it your custom to make over-all reports to the Secretary of State 
or the President, for instance, when you returned in 1939 to the United 
States to make a report to the President? 

Mr. Grew. Well, of course. Senator, whenever I came back on leave 
of absence from my post, I saw the President and had a talk with him 
and saw the Secretary of State and had a talk with him, and naturally 
in those talks I painted the picture as I saw it at that time. I did not, 
I am afraid, keep records of those talks. When I came back I was in 
Washington only a short time and kept no records of those talks. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the Secretary of 
State kept records of those talks ? 

Mr. Greav. That I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Would counsel inquire if he did? ^ 

Mr. Grew, it was customary then to make over-all reports when you 
finally returned after the war had started? I think you returned — 
in what year? 

[185J^] Mr. Grew. I returned on August 25, 1942. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you report to Mr. Hull at that time? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you report in writing? 

Mr. Grew. Everything had been written pretty well up to date. 

Senator Ferguson. That isn't quite my question. 

Mr. Grew. No ; I don't recollect having submitted at that time any 
report in writing. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you think about that? That could be an 
important report. 

^ See Mr. Gesell's statement; Hearings, Part 5, p. 2066. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 699 

Mr. Grew. I can answer that question now. I did not submit, I 
did not file any report, any written report. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you make any report, did you have a report? 
You say you didn't file it. What do you mean by that ? 

Mr. Grew. Well, I — what was the question, what did I mean by a 
report ? 

Senator Ferguson. You said that you didn't file it, and that brought 
to my mind "what did you mean by you didn't file it." Did you have 
one, and not give it to him, or what do you mean by that ? 

Mr. Grew. I had notes, of course, which I had taken [1855] 
down which appeared in my diary, and I used those notes, of course, 
in any talks with the Secretary. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you have those notes now ? 

Mr. Grew. I have not. 

Senator Ferguson. Where are those notes ? 

Mr. Grew. They have been destroyed long ago. 

Senator Ferguson. They have been destroyed ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You made a report then in 1942 to the Secre- 
tary from notes that you had ? 

Mr. Grew. Notes to refresh my memory. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; to refresh your recollection. 

Mr. Grew. But all of that material, as a matter of fact, is all here, 
in these books, all of it ; the whole story is complete. 

Senator Ferguson. You had at that time original notes that you 
used to refresh your memory to report to the Secretary ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes ; I had taken notes down from time to time. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you suggest that you wanted to make such 
a final report in writing? 

Mr. Grew. Of course I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be an important report, [1856] 
would it not ? 

Mr. Grew. No, sir ; not necessarily, because all of the records, every- 
thing that I had to report up to the last minute, was contained in the 
official communications in the Department of State. 

Senator Ferguson. Then there is no way the committee could get 
what was in those particular notes that you had to refresh your 
memory; those have been destroyed? 

Mr. Grew. They have been destroyed. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you speak to Mr. Hull about giving him a 
memorandum rather than just an oral statement? 

Mr. Grew. I talked it over with him and I discussed some of the 
notes that I had taken and the whole thing was completely on the 
record. That was the whole story. 

[1857] Senator Ferguson. Then it was not his desire to have you 
report in writing or not report in writing, he didn't express himself 
either way? 

Mr. Grew. After I had expressed my views about the situation no 
request was made for a written report because all the facts were already 
on file in the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe. 



700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, before asking any questions of Ambassa- 
dor Grew I would ask the privilege of making a short statement in 
order to make certain requests of counsel. 

The Chairman. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, there is in evidence before the committee 
as part of exhibit 18 a document which contains a draft of a message 
from the President of the United States to the British Prime Minister 
dated November 24, 1941. This draft message was prepared by Mr. 
Hull. It contains a description of the so-called modus vivendi pro- 
posal for Japan. 

The draft message is accompanied by a memorandum for the Presi- 
dent signed by Mr. Hull which states : 

If you approve of this draft telegram I shall arrange to have it forvparded. 

The same document contains the notation, "O. K., see addition. 
F. D. R." 

[ISSS] And it also contains an addition to the draft message 
of Mr. Hull suggested by the President. 

It appears that that draft telegram prepared by Mr. Hull describ- 
ing* the modus vivendi proposal as approved by the President and with 
the President's additional paragraph added was actually sent to the 
British Prime Minister. 

We also have in evidence a message from Ambassador Winant to 
the Secretary of State dated November 26, 1941, which bears the title 
"Most secret. For the President from the former Naval Person." 
This message from Mr. Churchill acknowledges the President's mes- 
sage about Japan, presumably his description of the modus vivendi 
proposals, and raises the question whether Chiang Kai-shek was not 
"having a very thin diet". 

It appears from the evidence that the modus vivendi proposal was 
thereafter discarded by the Secretary of State and the so-called 10- 
point note of November 26 was handed to the Japanese Government. 

It seems entirely probable to me that the President of the United 
States having described at some length the modus vivendi proposal 
to the British Prime Minister in a personal message and having re- 
ceived Mr. Churchill's views thereon, would also have described the 
American note of November 26 which was actually handed to the Japa- 
nese representatives and to the British Prime Minister. 

\1859'] Moreover it seems equally probable that the President 
of the United States would acknowledge the British Prime Minister's 
message as contained in the telegram of Ambassador Winant to the 
State Department of November 26. 

No such acknowledgement of the British Prime Minister's message 
of November 26 by the President has been introduced before us. 
Nor do we have in evidence any message from the President to the 
British Prime Minister describing the American note of November 26 
in the same manner in which we describe the modus vivendi proposal 
in an earlier message. 

Again on November 30 wo have in evidence before us a communica- 
tion to the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant containing a 
message from the British Prime Minister to the President of the 
United States outlining what Mi-. Churchill described as "an important 
method remaining unused to avert war between Japan and our two 
countries." 



4 
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 701 

It seems to me most probably that the President forwarded some 
reply to Mr. Churchill's message of November 30. 

It now clearly appears from the evidence before us that the British 
Prime Minister and the President of the United States communicated 
messages directly to each other. 

It is also obvious that we have no complete file of such communica- 
tions before us. 

We have no evidence or statement from counsel that the [1860'\ 
messages from Mr. Churchill to Mr. Roosevelt and the messages from 
Mr. Roosevelt to Mr. Churchill which have been introduced in evi- 
dence constitute the only communications between those two parties in 
this critical period of American-Japanese relationships. 

Consequently I feel obliged to make the ^ following requests of 
counsel : 

1. Will counsel produce from the files of the State Department all 
communications from Mr. Winant, Ambassador to Great Britain, to 
the State Department, and from the State Department to Mr. Winant, 
for the period from November 24, 1941, and including December 7, 
1941, together with a certificate from the custodian of such files in the 
State Department that the communications presented to the committee 
constitute all the communications from the State Department to Mr. 
Winant or from Mr. Winant to the State Department for the period 
specified. 

I observe that the British Prime Minister in communicating with the 
President described himself as the "former naval person." This de- 
scription and the Prime Minister's previous affiliation with the Ad- 
miralty suggests the probability that the President may have com- 
municated with the British Prime Minister through the medium of 
the communications system of the Navy Department or the War De- 
partment, and that [1861] the British Prime Minister may have 
also communicated with the President through the medium of the 
British Admiralty and the Navy Department. 

Consequently, 1 feel obliged to make the following request of coun- 
sel in order that we may be certain of all the facts : 

Will counsel produce from the files of the War or Navy Department 
all communications from the President of the United States to the 
British Prime Minister, or to any intermediary of the British Prime 
Minister, such as the British Admiralty for the period from November 
24, 1941, to and including December 7, 1941, together with a certificate 
from the custodian of such files, if any exists, and I do not know or 
say they do exist, in the War and Navy Departments, that the files 
presented to the committee contain all of the communications from the 
President to Mr. Churchill, or from Mr. Churchill to the President 
transmitted via the War or Navy Departments communications sys- 
tem, as the case may be, for the period from November 24 up to and 
including December 7, 1941. 

If either Department informs counsel that there are no such files in 
existence in such Department, will counsel produce for the committee 
a certificate to that effect from the custodian of the files in either the 
War or Navy Department? 

[-1862] _ Now, will counsel also produce all records and copies 
of communications to and from Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill for 
the period from November 24, 1941, to December 7, 1941, which exists 



702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

among the papers in the custody of the Roosevelt Estate, together 
with a certificate from the custodian of such papers that they consti- 
tute all such papers relating to the period specified in his or her cus- 
tody or possession. 

We are now examining important officials of the State Department 
dealing with the critical phase of the Japanese-American negotiations 
in the year 1941. We have affirmative evidence before us of direct 
communications from the British Prime Minister to the President and 
from the President to the British Prime Minister. 

The communications which we have before us indicate, to me at 
least, the likelihood of their being other communications not only in 
reply to certain of the communications which we now have before us 
but on the same general -topics covered by such communications. 

Now, knowing this situation, I do not see how this committee or 
counsel can completely and adequately discharge their respective 
obligations without presenting the complete file from whatever 
source. War, Navy, or State Department, or the personal files of Mr. 
Roosevelt, of all communications between him and the British Prime 
Minister for the period of [1S63] November 24 to December 
7, 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. Will the Congressman yield? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Mitchell, could you give us information on 
the request that was made for all the admiralty messages, as to whether 
or not we have, as a committee, received all the admiralty messages 
that I requested many weeks ago ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes 

The Chairman. The Chair thinks counsel should answer first the 
request propounded by the Congressman from Wisconsin. 

Senator Ferguson. I though this might answer that one question 
about the admiralty. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is included. 

Mr. Congressman. Would you mind letting us have a copy of that 
memorandum? 

Mr. Keefe. I will be very happy to. Pass it over to him, Mr. 
Murphy. 

Mr. MiTCiiEiJ.. So we will be able to work on it. 

Mr. Keefe. Just hand it over. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. 

I might say, without going into detail, that many of these things 
have been under examination and investigation to [186^] de- 
termine what there is. We would have to go over this memorandum 
carefully and see what we have done and see what more you would 
like to have us do. For instance, the White House records, we weren't 
going to rely on any certificate from Miss Tully. She was listed as 
a witness, and she would explain everything asked for. I mention 
that as one of the things involved. But you may be assured, Mr. 
Congressman, that we will do our very best, after we have studied this 
memorandum, to report to you what we have done and what we 
can do.^ 

[J8GS] Now, as far as Senator Ferguson's request is concerned— 
his request put in, I think, 2 or 3 weeks ago — my memory is that 
he asked for all communications that passed between the British 



1 See Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3839-3842. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 703 

Admiralty and the Navy Department during the years 1940 and 
1941. 

We submitted 

Senator Ferguson. That related to the Far East. 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, no. The request did not say what it related 
to. It said all of them, on the theory, I think that — I was not to be 
the judoe as to whether they were material or not — probably he 
wanted about all of them. 

We made that request to the Navy Department. Their report, first 
orally to me, was that during those years while the battle of the 
Atlantic was going on and we were involved in the escorting and 
naval work on the Atlantic, thousands of messages passed between 
the Admiralty and the Navy Department. 

They also told me that the communications to and from the Ad- 
miralty to the Navy Department were not all kept in one file. They 
were put in different files, according to the subject to which they 
related. That to comply with the member's request would require 
the investigation of files including over 375,000 papers and they said 
it would take 11 men I have forgotten how long, some extraordinary 
time to do it. 

11866\ Realizing what that mealit I asked the Navy if they 
would please at least start with December 7, 1941, and work back- 
wards for a month or two and dig out everything they could and 
I reported that orally to the Senator, I think, at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Mitchell, have you got all those that they 
have already dug out ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, we have all those that they dug out but it is 
only for a limited time and I would say this : If the Senator would 
only be willing to tell the Navy what subject matter he is interested 
in they may be able to locate it in one of these 375,000 papers much 
easier than it is with the information we have. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire? If counsel 
will give me what he already has I will be glad to point it out. I 
have not received them and I haven't anjj word that they received 
them. I haven't seen any except what you have placed here on the 
table. 

Mr. Mitchell. Neither have I. One of my assistants reports that 
material of that kind came in 2 or 3 days ago and I haven't honestly, 
had a chance to look at it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then you do not want to criticize the 
member of the committee for not giving you the information when 
he has not even seen it. 

[1867] Mr. Mitchell. Well, I suggested that if you would be 
willing to state what subject matter these messages relate to, which 
you are interested in, it would greatly facilitate the work of the Navy 
and they might go much farther back than they have done. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I see now what you have ? 

Mr. Mitchell. You can see it as soon as we recess. I haven't it 
in the room. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I have in mind. Then I will give 
you definite information as to what I desire. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. That will help. 



704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. That will clear the matter up. 

Senator Lucas. Mr, Chairman, do I understand now that the Navy 
at the present time is investigating 375,000 messages ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. When I found that problem confronting them 
I said we won't do it. We will start with December 7, 1941, and 
work backwards a month or two or three and get out some of this 
material and when you give it to us I will show it to the Senator 
and see if that is the sort of thing he wants. So it was finally im- 
possible to do it as originally requested, but I am not criticizing 
the Senator. I am just answering his question and stating what the 
situation is. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, may I say to the [ISGS] 
distinguished counsel that the request which I have made is very 
specific. It does not cover 375,000 telegrams. It is very specific as 
to the type and character of information requested and very limited 
as to time. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the way we like to have them. This covers 
November 24 to December 7 and it is not an impossible proposition. 

Mr. Keefe. In making that request I had in mind the fact that 
there must have been innumerable communications between the Ad- 
miralty and our Navy and War Departments and I am only asking, 
for my purposes, for the specific information contained in that written 
request. 

Senator Lucas. May I ask if the Congressman from Wisconsin will 
yield? 

The Chairman. Congressman, will you yield to the Senator from 
Illinois? 

Mr. Keefe. I am very happy to yield. I have not taken much 
time, but I will yield to the Senator from Illinois. 

Senator Lucas. I am not going to take much time, only to con- 
gratulate you in what^you have done here in asking counsel for 
express information which they can get, which they can go into in 
a hurry and obtain the information. 

The Chairman. All right. Proceed with your examination of Mr. 
Grew. 

[I860'] Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Now, Mr. Grew, I have listened carefully to your testimony and 
the rather extended cross-examination and my purpose in asking the 
few questions that I shall ask is to try and clarify some questions 
that have arisen in my mind and to get them into some sort of 
chronological order if possible. 

Now, as I understand the situation, you reported to the State De- 
partment as our Ambassador in Japan beginning shortly after your 
arrival there, giving your impressions from time to time of the state 
of mind of the Japanese people and your observations and you made 
them rather full and complete; and during the period of time from 
1932 on there developed, as I gathered from your testimony, a grad- 
ual disintegration, just gradual disintegration, with little spurts up 
and then spurts down diplomatically in the relationship between the 
United States and Japan. 

I o-athered from your testimony that there were in Japnn some 
elements that were inclined to be bellicose and warminded and 
obsessed with their powers of greatness and expansion and aggrjes- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 705 

sion and that there were other groups that were fighting for peace. 
Is that correct ? 

Mr. Grew. That is correct, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Keefe. And you reported to the State Department from time 
to time what you observed with reference to the activi- [1870] 
ties of these various groups ? 

The Chairman. You had better make your answers orally so that 
they get into the record, instead of nodding your head, Mr. Ambassa- 
dor. The stenographer does not get your nod. 

Mr. Grew. That is correct, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Keefe. And you observed the development of this Japanese 
war-minded spirit and the determination to expand as it developed in 
the years from 1934, 1935, 1936, on up to the final outbreak of war? 

Mr. Grew. I did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you tried to impress upon the State Department 
in those messages your conception as to the Japanese state of mind 
as it existed over those years, did you not ? 

Mr. Grew. That, obviously, was my duty, Mr. Congressman, and 
I tried to carrj'' it out continuously during those years. 

Mr. Keefe. And in line with that attitude on your part, I was 
greatly interested in the report which you made to the Secretary of 
State on February 26, 1941, which transmitted to the Secretary of 
State a memorandum by the counsellor of the Embassy in Japan, 
Mr. Dooman, which had your full and complete approval. That is 
correct ? 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 

[18711 Mr. Keefe, The message of transmittal appears on page 
137 of volume 2 of Foreign Relations of the United States, and then 
follows on pages 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, and 143 the report of Mr. 
Dooman's conversations with Mr. Ohashi. You recall that, Mr. Grew ? 

Mr. Grew. I do, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And then follows a memoranda from you to the Secre- 
tary of State advising of the conversation which you had on Febru- 
ary 26 Tokyo time, with Matsuoka in which you told him that you 
concurred entirely in the statement that Mr. Dooman had made to 
Ohashi on February 14. Do you recall that? 

Mr. Grew. I do recall that. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, in this report of the Counsellor of the 
Embassy, dated February 14, 1941, he goes into great detail in setting 
forth the conversations which he had with Mr. Ohashi who was the 
Vice Minister for Foreign Atl'airs of Japan, and you are very familiar 
with that report? 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Dooman, it appears from the report, had been on 
furlough to the United States in the fall of 1940 and had, as he 
said, and I quote from it [reading] : 

Mr. Ohashi said he understood that I had just returned from leave in the 
United States and that he sup- [1872] posed I had received a number of 
interesting impressions in the United States. I replied that my furlough in the 
United States coincided with one of the most significant and important periods 
in the history of our country, and that if he had time I would be glad to tell 
him briefly of what I had seen and heard while at home. Mr. Ohashi said 
that fortunately he was not busy that day and that I could stay as long as I 
wished. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 2 21 



706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

And then follows the statement to Mr. Ohashi by Mr. Dooman of 
his observations jrleaned from his trips around the country during 
the fall of 1940 which, by the way, was an election year and he refers 
to it in this statement and it finally ended up by his general state- 
ment to Mr. Ohashi that in the event tliat Japan continued the course 
that it was following it would inevitably be considered that it might 
lead to a diplomatic rupture and then Mr. Ohashi took the floor, 
do you recall? 

The report says on page 140 of volume 2 of Foreign Relations : 

Mr. Ohashi then took the floor and launched into an impassioned apologia 
of Japanese policies in recent years. He started by describing conditions in 
Japan during the middle twenty's. 

and going on for two or three pages here setting forth the [1873] 
Japanese attitude. 

Now, does that statement of Mr. Ohashi — I will not take the time 
to read it into the record because it is now in evidence — in your judg- 
ment, Mr. Grew, fairly express the Japanese attitude as you under- 
stood it? 

Mr. Grew. Mr. Congressman, I haveni't read this record of that 
conversation for a long time and while my recollection is that it was 
a fair presentation, I do not want to answer that question categorically 
without studying it. I believe it was, as I recollect it, a fair presenta- 
tion of the Japanese position. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, in view of your transmitting it to the State De- 
partment and your approval of the whole message I assume that it 
could safely be said that except for any omissions that might properly 
have been included it is a fair statement of at least the position of 
Mr. Ohashi as reflecting what the Japanese attitude was during the 
years from 1920 on down. 

Mr. Grew. It is a fair statement. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, it appears that the Lease-Lend Act was 
approved by the President on March 11, 1941, and that on June 6, 1941, 
an act was approved for taking over foreign ships lying idle in United 
States ports. Do you recall that? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. That was in connection with the [i874] 
freezing of Japanese assets. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, the freezing of Japanese assets did not come until 
July 25, 1941. 

Mr. Grew. That is right. 

Mr. Keefe. That came later. 

Mr. Grew. Well, I do not remember the exact dates. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I have a memorandum. I have a paper showing 
these chronological dates. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. The freezing of Japanese assets took place on July 25, 
1941. Now, when did the Konoye Cabinet fall? I just want to get 
that correctly. 

Mr. Grew. As I recollect it, it fell on October 16. I can look that 
up very quickly if you wish. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, my recollection is I think .you are correct. 

Mr. Grew. I think it is October 16. 

Mr. Keefe. It was along about coincident with the proposal to 
reopen the Burma Road on the I7th of October, wasn't it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 707 

Mr. Grew. That is right. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, on August 1, 1941, President Roosevelt banned 
the export of aviation fuel to Japan. Do you recall that? 

[J875] Mr. Grew. I did not hear your statement, Congressman. 
Mr. Roosevelt passed what, the aviation what ? 

Mr. Keefe. Read it, please. 

(Whereupon the reporter read the question as follows: "Now, on 
August 1, 1941, President Roosevelt banned the export of aviation 
fuel to Japan. Do you recall that?") 

Mr. Grew. Oh, yes, I recollect it perfectly. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, these were intended to be sort of economic sanc- 
tions or pressures applied to Japan in hopes that they would be effec- 
tive in implementing the diplomatic conversations that were going 
on, isn't that true? 

Mr. Grew. They were. Those steps were taken with the thought 
that it would lead Japan to such a position that the more intelligent 
and liberal-minded statesmen might possibly come into a position 
where they would control. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. That is a fact, yes. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, it was intended to implement our general 
diplomatic attitude? 

Mr. Grew. That is true. 

Mr. Keefe. That is true, is it not ? 

Mr. Grew. That is true. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, as a matter of fact the imposition of [18761 
these trade embargoes and the other economic sanctions that were 
imposed against Japan did not in any sense deter the war lords of 
Japan in their purposes and policies, did it? 

Mr. Grew. They did not in the long run, in the end, no. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, can you point to any specific indication of 
any action on the part of Japan that indicated a change in their 
continued policy made and brought about as a result of the applica- 
tion of these economic sanctions? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, Mr. Congressman, I think I touched on that yes- 
terday. I think that is contained, the story is contained, in my 
telegram of September 29, 1941, in which I said that this economic 
situation in which Japan found herself had, in my opinion, brought 
about among the more intelligent statesmen in Japan the thought that 
they were approaching the brink of an abyss and it was my belief that 
at that time they tried to reverse the engine. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I understood your testimony, pardon me, Mr. 
Grew, in that regard, but my question does not relate definitely to 
that. There were intelligent people in Japan who could see the 
brink of the precipice, as you have indicated it so well, and that they 
were about to fall off into the abyss as you have stated, or as you 
stated it in September; but as a matter of fact those war lords who 
were running the show were not stopped at all. It may have had 
some effect on [1877] the other crowd, but not on the war 
lords. Isn't that true, Mr. Grew? 

Mr. Grew. That is, in general, true, but I would like to point out 
in that telegram of September 25, which is already on the record 



708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. The chairman might suggest that the hour of 12 
having arrived, and obviously you cannot conchide before recessing, 
that we will take a recess until 2 : 00 o'clock and you will have time 
to refresh your recollection. 

Mr. Keefe. Very well. 

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. 
of the same day.) 

[1878] AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 P. M. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Before proceeding further the Chair wishes to state that inquiry 
has been made of him concerning the question of having a session 
on Saturday. The Chair is advised that the Congressman from Wis- 
consin, Mr. Keefe, will be unable to be here on Saturday, Congress- 
man Murphy of Pennsylvania will be unable to be here Saturday, 
and that probably two or three other members of the committee will 
find it impossible to be here on this particular coming Saturday. 

So that the committee has felt it wise not to attempt to held a ses- 
sion on Saturday of this week. That has no relationship to any 
program for Saturday meetings hereafter and in view of the im- 
portance of the hearing and the large number of witnesses, the Chair 
hopes that we will be able, after this week, to hold sessions on Sat- 
urday. For this coming Saturday there will be no session of the 
committee. 

Now, Mr. Keefe, you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed) 

Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, before the questions 

Mr. Keefe. Just a moment, please, Mr. Grew. 

May I say to the Chairman that I want to thank him for his con- 
clusion not to hold a meeting Saturday, so far as I am concerned, 
and having mentioned my name may I state, for [1879] the 
purpose of the record, that my interest in not being here Saturday 
was not prompted by the Army-Navy football game at Philadelphia. 

The Chairman. Well, the Chair understands that, Congressman 
Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. I am compelled, because of illness in my family, as the 
chairman knows, to get away from here for at least one day. 

The Chairman. The chairman is glad to confirm that and his 
announcement that there will be no session Saturday had no relation 
whatever to the Army-Navy game. 

Mr. Keefe. May I say, observing the smiles on the faces of some 
of those in the room, they, p)erhaps, are likewise afflicted, Mr. 
Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to say that several days ago Con- 
gressman Keefe advised him that on account of the illness of his 
wife he felt compelled to be away this coming Saturday, and the 
Chair is able to appreciate fully how the Congressman feels about it. 

So this recess for this approaching Saturday has, for the benefit of 
anybody who may smile — over which the Chair has no control — no 
relationship whatever to the Army-Navy football game. 

All right, Mr. Keefe, go ahead. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 709 

[1880] Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, may I correct one misstate- 
ment of this morning for the record ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. Is it agreeable to you, Mr. Keef e ? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. Grew. I would like to correct one inaccuracy in my testimony 
of this morning and also bring forward two documents which were 
requested by Senator Ferguson and which I found in the meantime. 

This morning Senator Ferguson asked me if I had on returning 
from Japan in August 1943 submitted a report to Mr. Hull. 

Well, 3 years have gone by since that time and, frankly, I had for- 
gotten the fact that I did submit to Mr. Hull a series of dispatches, 
quite a number of reports, covering the whole story of the last days 
before Pearl Harbor, the events as they occurred in Japan, all of 
which is on the record, completely on the record and has been brought 
out, I think, before this committee, and also a general statement with 
regard to the period of our internment in Japan from December 1941 
until June 1942. 

Those reports which were turned in to the State Department are all 
available but, as far as I am aware, all the pertinent information in 
them has been already brought before this committee. 

[2881] Senator Ferguson. Might I, Mr. Chairman, inquire from 
counsel if we have a copy of the information that Ambassador Grew 
is now talking about. 

Mr. Mitchell. He is talking about some reports he made to Mr. 
Hull. They haven't been distributed. We haven't seen them. We 
will get them. 

The Chairman. Does the Chair understand those were reports 
made to Secretary Hull after the Ambassador returned from Japan 
in August 1942, after he was exchanged? 

Mr. Grew. That is true. 

The Chairman. Along with certain other Americans held by the 
Japanese Government for certain Japanese held by the Government 
of the United States. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

The Chairman. Such reports as you now refer to were made upon 
your return in August 1942 ? 

Mr. Grew. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson : Mr. Chairman, will counsel get for the com- 
mittee that information? 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean get the report? 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.^ 

The Chairman. Go ahead, Mr. Keefe. 

The Vice Chairman. I think Mr. Grew had another state- 
ment [1882] to make. 

Mr. Grew. The second point, Mr. Chairman, is this: I was asked, 
with relation to my so-called green-light telegram, which I think 
was in December 1940, which referred to an article by Mr. A. T. 
Steele, far-eastern correspondent of the Qiicago Daily News, I was 
asked to obtain that. 

I find in the State Department files a long telegram from Mr. 
Smythe, who was our charge d'affaires in Peiping at that time, in 
which he gives a complete summary of that article. 

^ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2068, for statement by Mr. GesselL 



710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

He says in this telegram : 

Mr. A. T. Steele, Far Eastern Correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, 
returned last week from home leave in the United States spending some days 
in Japan and Manchuria before coming hero. As Mr. Steele is an experienced 
and able observer, the Embassy asked him to prepare a statement of his im- 
pressions, and a summary thereof is respectfully submitted below as of in- 
terest to the Department. 

As it is a very long telegram shall I pass it on to the general 
counsel ? 

The Chaikman. Yes; I think that would be appropriate. 

[1883] The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Grew. The other document that I was asked about, I was asked 
whether I had ever been informed in Tokyo on the conversation be- 
tween the President and the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 
1941. 

Well, practically, as far as I knew, a report of all those conversa- 
tions was telegraphed to me in Tokyo. I did not recollect this par- 
ticular conversation but I have here the record in the shape of a 
telegram from the Secretary of State to myself dated August 18, 
in which it sets forth the record of the conversation between the 
President and the Japanese Ambassador on August 17. 

Shall I also turn that over to the counsel ? 

Senator Feeguson. Mr. Chairman, might I see that through 
counsel ? 

The Chairman. Yes. I am sure that counsel will be glad to pass it 
on to the Senator. 

Is that all now, Mr. GreAv ? 

Mr. Grew. That is all I have now. 

The Chairman. All right, sir. 

Mr. Grew. I am still making an examination, I am still exploring 
for certain other documents which Senator Ferguson asked me to 
try to find and if we find them we shall pt*omptly produce them. 

[1884] The Chairman. All right, Congressman Keefe, 

Mr. Keefe. When we concluded at the noon hour, Mr. Grew, I had 
asked you to state specifically a fact that would indicate that the im- 
position of economic sanctions upon Japan had restrained Japan in 
her warlike attitude and you stated, as I recall, that you wanted to 
make reference to a certain telegram. 

Now, I repeat that question to you this afternoon. 

Mr. Grew. The answer to that question, Mr. Congressman,'! think 
is contained in two telegrams, the report of my conversation with 
Prince Konoye on September 6, 1941. the then F'rime Minister of 
Japan 

Mr. Keefe. Well, will you refer to that telegram ? 

Mr. Grew. That is on the record, sir. It has been already referred 
to, I think, several times. Do you wish me to produce it ? 

Mr. Keefe. Well, what is there in that telegram that indicates 
specifically any action on the part of Japan that was retarded as a 
result of our imposing economic sanctions? 

Refer to the telegram, if you please, and point out what there is 
in it that specifically indicates that the Japanese were ever retarded 
as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions. 

Mr. Grew. All right, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 711 

[188S] I think there is nothing in that telegram which would 
precisely answer your question but I think you. will find material in 
the telegram which I sent to the Secretary of State on September 29, 
1941, which would. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, will you point out in that telegram of 
September 29, 1941, specifically the incidents that you refer to? 

Mr. Grew. I would like to get the original text if I may, Mr. Con- 
gressman. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Mr. Grew. September 29. It may be in my bag there. 

I think to answer your question, Mr. Congressman, I would have 
to read a considerable passage from this telegram. Shall I do so? 
It is a very long telegram of September 29, of which I have before 
me only the paraphrase. I have not the true text. I shall be glad to 
read those passages. 

Mr. Gesell. That is at page 645 of volume II. 

Mr. Keefe. I have it before me. 

Mr. Gesell.. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. Where do you propose to read ? 

Mr. Grew. I would like to read from the second paragraph. 

Mr. Keefe. Very well. 

Mr. Grew. The second and third paragraph, I think, will [18861 
cover it. 

The Chairman. What page? 

Mr. Grew (reading) : 

The Ambassador recalls his statements 

The Chairman. What page is it? 
Mr. Mitchell. 645 and 646. 
The Chairman. 645 and 646, all right. 
Mr. Grew (reading) : 

The Ambassador recalls his statements in tfie past that in Japan the pendulum 
always swings between moderate and extremist policies ; that it was not then 
possible under the existing circumstances for any Japanese leader or group to 
reverse the program of expansion and expect to survive; that the permanent 
digging in by Japanese in China and the pushing of the Japanese advances to 
the south could be prevented only by insuperable obstacles. The Ambassador 
recalls likewise his views that the risks of taking positive measures to main- 
tain United States security in the future were likely to be far smaller than the 
risks of not taking such measures; that only respect for potential power of 
the United States has deterred Japan from taking more liberties with American 
interests; and that Japan's program of forcible expansion could be brought to 
a halt only by a show of force [1887] and by a demonstration of Ameri- 
can willingness to use this force if necessary. The Ambassador recalls also 
his statement that if Japan's leadei'ship could be discredited eventually by 
such American action, there might take shape in Japan ultimately a regenera- 
tion of thought which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with the 
United States, leading to a readjustment of the entire problem of the Pacific. 

The Ambassador suggests that the United States has been following very 
wisely precisely this policy, which furthered by other developments in the 
world, has helped to discredit Japanese leadership, notably that ol' former 
Foreign Minister Matsuoka. The Ambassador cites as world developments 
arousing a positive reaction from the United States the conclusion by Japan 
of the Tripartite Alliance and Japan's recognition of the Wang Ching-Wei 
regime at Nanking, which preceded Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. 
Germany's action upset the basis for the Tripartite Pact, Japan having joined the 
Italo-German Axis in order to obtain security against Russia and thereby to 
avoid the peril of being caught between the Soviet Union and the United States. 



712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

At the present time Japan is attempting to correct tliis miscalculation by getting 
out of an extremely dangerous position. The [ISS8] Ambassador recalls 
his reports to the Department to the elfect that Japanese foreign policies are 
inevitably clninged by the impact of events abroad and that liberal elements 
in Japan might come to the top in due course as a result of the trend of events. 
He considers that such a time has arrived. He sees a good chance of Japan's 
falling into line if a program can be followed of world reconstruction as forecast 
by the declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Amer- 
ican policy — of forebearance, patient argumentation, efforts at persuasion, fol- 
lowed for many years, plus a manifest determination of the United States to 
take positive measures when called for — plus the impact of world developments 
upon Japan, has rendered Japan's political soil hospitable to the sowing of new 
seeds which, the Ambassador feels, if i)lanted carefully and nourished, may 
bring about the anticipated regeneration of Japanese thought and a complete 
readjustment of relations between Japan and the United States. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Mr. Grew, I appreciate your courtesy in 
reading these two paragraphs from your message to the State De- 
partment of September 29, 1941. I must confess, however, that the 
reading does not in any sense answer the question which I asked you, 
[1889] I would like to have you point out, if you can, either 
from this message or from any fact within your knowledge any 
specific fact which demonstrates that Japan was deterred in its mil- 
itaristic policy of expansion and aggression by the imposition of 
economic sanctions. 

Here you are talking about going forward with military and naval 
force. I am referring and limiting my questions alone to the appli- 
cation of economic sanctions. 

Mr. Geew. The point which I am trying to bring out, Mr. Congress- 
man, is this, that the imposition of economic sanctions on Japan 
had placed Japan in an exceedingly dangerous position economically, 
socially, and in every other way. The result of this policy that we had 
followed had, in my opinion, brought certain leaders in Japan — I do 
not refer to the militarists; I refer to certain leaders 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Mr.* Grew, if I may interrupt right there. 

Mr. Grew. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. We are interested in the impact upon those who were 
formulating and carrying out the policy of Japan, not isolated leaders 
that were iiitimate with you, that were intimate in talking with you in 
terms of peace, but the people that were actually formulating and 
carrying out the policies. 

Mr. Grew. I am talking about the very person who was [ISW] 
formulating and carrying out the policy, namely, the Prime Minister 
at that time. 

Mr, Keefe. Very well. 

Mr. Grew. Prince Konoye. He was the man. My talk with him, 
which is recorded on September 6, and the conversation which this 
telegram aims to analyze ; that he, in spite of all his appalling record, 
which was set forth by Mr. Hull the other day, which, as I said, was one 
of the worst trains of events of international banditry in all history, he 
was responsible for many of the things which had been done by Japan 
through these years; at the same time he was intelligent enough, I 
think, to see the handwriting on the wall and to realize that Japan had 
got herself into an exceedingly dangerous position and that there were 
only two ways out : One way out was by war and the other way out was 
an arrangement and agreement with the United States. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 713 

Now, he had been in our country, he knew something about our pro- 
ductive capacity, he knew something about our national spirit, of 
which the militarists did not know, to which they paid no attention, 
and I think he realized at that time, I gathered from evidence which 
appeared from time to time, that he realized that Japan, if she should 
go to war with the United States and Great Britain, might readily be 
defeated and emerge from that war as a third- or a fifth-class power. 

[1891] I think he realized the country was on the brink of an 
abyss and I think that with all his appalling record he honestly tried to 
reverse the engine. 

Now, that is my precise answer to what effect our economic policy 
had on Japanese leaders and when I say the Prime Minister himself, I 
know that he was backed and supported by a considerable element 
among what I call the liberal leaders of Japan, 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, can you point to one single objective of the 
Japanese war lords or militarists who were in control that they receded 
from or refrained from carrying out as a result of the imposition of 
economic sanctions ? 

Mr. Grew. I might read one more passage to answer that question, 
Mr. Congressman, I go back to 

Mr. Keefe. Well, do you have any present recollection yourself ? 

Mr. Grew. Yes, I have and I can state it but I can state it more pre- 
cisely by reading one passage from my report here of my conversation 
with the Prime Minister on September 6. 

Now, nobody can possibly say how much weight we should attach to 
the following statement which I am about to read. It is one of those 
things that can never be proved, whether it was genuine or whether it 
was not genuine, whether Prince [189'2'] Konoye in trying to 
see President Roosevelt had wished to pull the wool over our eyes and 
cause a delay so that it would give Japan more time to arm and prepare, 
nobody can answer that question. The Japanese militarists seemed to 
be, so far as I could understand at that time, completely self-confident 
of their power ; I do not think they needed more time and I think they 
realized that time would play in our hands. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now. Ambassador Grew, pardon me. I do not 
Want to interject myself into your answer but perhaps I am not making 
myself clear. 

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir ; you are. My answer will answer your question. 

Mr. Keefe. For the purpose of getting a clear answer may I state this 
at this time : 

During the summer of 1941 and in the fall and especially in Septem- 
ber Japan steadily continued her march to the south and her infiltra- 
tion into Indo-China. 

Mr. Grew. That is absolutely true. 

Mr. Keefe. Which caused you and the State Department and the 
President great concern. 

Mr. Grew. Certainly. 

Mr, Keef