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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORB THB 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEARL HARBOB AHACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION . , " 

PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

(79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THB ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 3 

DECEMBER 5. 6. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, AND 13, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S, Con. Res. 27 

(79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 3 

DECEMBER 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, AND 13, 1945 



Printed for the use of the 
mittee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
7<;716 WASHINGTON : 194G 






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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hanxaford, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samdel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
JOHN E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov, 


. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


Nov, 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945, 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-20G3 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946, 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 

No. Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5269-5291 

3814-3826 
3450-3519 

'"5089-5122 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 i 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 



"471-516" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 1-^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i,*CO 1 
iiCOi iiiiiiiiOSOl 

511 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1 1 

g. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Oi 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarice 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 ! 1 ! 1 ! ! ! 1 ! 1 1 ! 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 l(N 

, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 T-T 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
""660-688" 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

3105-3120' 

2479-2491" 

4022-4027" 
148-186 

2567-2580' 

3972-3988 

2492-2515 

1575-1643" 

3720^3749" 
1186-1220 

1413-1442' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

""391-398" 



"115-134' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1911, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
203-209 

1127-1138 
1033-1038 

1719-1721" 

1219-1224' 

"886-951" 
1382-1399 

""377-389" 
1224-1229 

""314-326" 


1 


Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Anstey, Alice 

Arnold, H. H., Gen 

Asher, N. F., Ens 

Ball, N. F., Ens 

Ballard, Emma Jane 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlett, George Francis 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berry, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bicknell, George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 
5080-5089 

3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

Mav 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
163-181 

"'418^423' 
"451-464" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

205 

B223-224' 
B65-66 
B229-231 
49-51 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^1 llllll 111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

140 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
495-510 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3196-3261" 
1928-1965 

3642-3643 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

179-184 
""165-114" 

96-105 

74^85 

"368-378" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

478-483, 
301-310 

1171-1178" 

1178-1180' 
1659-1663, 
170-198 

"812-843," 
1538-1571 
504-509 

2-32" 

365-368 

1747-1753" 


Witness 


Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN) 

Crosley, Paul C, Comdr 

Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM) 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN 

Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen 

Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

Dillingham, Walter F 

DiUon, James P 

DiUon, John H., Maj 

Dingeman, Ray E., Col 

Donegan, Wilham Col 

Doud, Harold,' Col 

Dimlop, Robert H., Col 

Dunning, Mary J 

Dusenbury, Cariisle Clyde, Col 

Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0 

Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


S t-OiO,^ g00CO(M 
* li CO'-'"^7 ICO^OO 

||l'<44|||llllllllll COIlTtllll 

' 1 : 1 I ', ! 1 ! 1 1 1 I ! 1 1 "^ : 1 yisoJs 
! ! I 1 1 1 ! 1 1 ! ! 1 ! ! ! 1 II c^-^t^ 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

428^32 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 IcO '^(N 1 1 1 1 I-H 1 llll 
lliiiii-<iO00 Ol llll 

«lllllll<Nl'-H^IIIII'-l| llll 
o, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 llll 

a 1 1 1 1 1 1 i(M lO O 1 llll 

ft, ^ lO O 1 llll 

IIIIIIKNli-H IIIII.-II llll 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept.'l4 to 

16, 1944: July 

13 to Aug. 

4. 1945) 


[S ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 1 ' ' 1 1 ' 1 ' ' ' 1 I I 1 

1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 llll 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

;Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

1070-1076 
461-469 

"763-772' 
816-851 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


I III llll III III 

iO^ !■* 1 iO(N 1 1 1 i-'J'tv 111 100 1 1 

icir^ it^ 1 1 ->t"^ 1 1 1 1^^ III ii^ 1 1 

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1 05 1 II 03 1 1 1 1 (M 05 III 1 II 

i(N CO 1 1 1 (M 1 1 1 i(N — 1 1 1 1 1 II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ICO 1 

Mil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r^ 1 

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Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


Pages 

1571-1574' 

1664-1676 
"469-473" 


1 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator 

Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen 

Heard, William A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

Hill, William H., Senator 

Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwiek, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W., Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, John A., Col 

Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


O 1 1 1 1 1 lOO S^o ' ' 

>o 1 1 1 1 1 1 cr. CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 £2 ^ (M 1 1 

•o 1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1 ^S":! ' 1 

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a,in 1 1 1 1 1 iGC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 ig2rH 1 1 

lO TfH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 iS^"^ ' ' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


CO i(M 1 1 i(M 1 1 II 

lO 1 Ci Tt< 1 1 II 

» lO 1 <M 1 1 , 1 rH 1 1 II 

1 1 , 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , . . 1 1 I 1 1 1 , 1 I 1 

O 1 1 1 1 1 rH 1 !N 1 1 1 C 1 1 1 1 1 1 O 1 1 II 

(^ ^lOOll Tt<ll II 

IClrH ^11 II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1915) 


iiiCOiii(Miiiiiiiiiii<C<M IMi 
iiiOii"-' a)(M Oi 

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"H 1 1 1 <N 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

IG. 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 rH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 
•° 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

904^918 

628^643 

""734-740" 
""852-885" 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2665-2695" 
3028-3067 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54" 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214^225 
363-367 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


iHOiT-(i(M'Oiiii-Oiiii'*iiiiiO I(M|0> 

1 iiO 1 t^ 1 CO Cl 1 1 1 00 1 1 1 lO 1 1 lO 1 iC CO lO 

« 1 1 ,-1 1 rH 1 1 1 1 i<M 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 iCO iCO-*CD 

^llrHlrHir}<rtlllrHllllllllrH 1 \ <£) ^ 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 rH 

tt| 1 itD lO 1 GO 1 1 i<N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO i(M 
1 1 M< 1 m 1 1 1 1 f~- 1 1 1 1 LO 1 1 1 05 1 CO 

1 1 ^ 1 rH 1 1 1 1 IM t- 1 


Witness 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Ivroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adiu- 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Maj 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

MacArthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L,, Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 






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XII 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION TEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1915) 


Pages 

"387-388" 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investieafion, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 
45-46 

""179-181" 

232 

76^77" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clirke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


§ 1 1 1 III III 1 III 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 IIO _-rM""rX"<^'~I^*'M 1 1^ 1 lOOOO 

1 lO III III r^ rl f!: 00 CO lo i i^* i lOo 

1 1 17 III III 7^^2;::: i 17 i i?;: 
§■ I Iti. Ill III -^^ 1 1 1 7 1 li^ 1 lob 1 

&, , ll^ III III rfj— ICOrH 1 1^ 1 It^r-I 

iiTjH III III t::^|;^gco|o.iTtH ii'^g 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xliibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160," 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2323-2933 
3885-3915 

1968-1988' 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


II II 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 

1 1 . -t^ Tti 1 1 O 1 ,^-,^00 1 1 1 CO ^ 1 1 1 1 

iit:00OJii lOiJ^'SiNl liOOMiiii 

S 1 iI^i^J^ ' ' f^ 'SlI^ 1 I il>00 1 1 1 1 

^ 1 \iiJ, 1 I i ig^ ! 1 i<a:^ 1 1 1 1 


a 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj 

Powell, C. A., Col 

Powers, R, D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, William S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col . 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



xm 



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coco 






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COl- 

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a. CO 02 02 CO 



XIV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15. 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


'<N 1 1 1 1 i£;lO 1 ,o • 'S^^m"-"^ ' '^^ ' ' ' 

o« '?^ ! 1 1 1 \-^^ 1 ;§ 'i ;g2:Se^ ' '^^ < ' ' 

Q.IO iiii.J§OiiO..£^2m'^''-^'*''' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

4-9 
"'335-375" 

411-413 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

69" 
195-197 

203-204 
185' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1045) 


I 1 1 1 IcN 1 1 1 1 l(N 1 1 III III 

II III II III II III III 
. II III II III II III III 

•311 III II III II III III 

^11 III II III II III III 

II III II III II III III 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct 19, 1944) 


■ IIIIKN ^111 1 /■ /-O III III 
it^ 1 1 1 1 it^ 00 1 1 1 i^pj-' ' 1 ' ' ' ' 

g i(N 1 1 1 . lie . 1 1 is?:?^' 

1 i^ i 1 ; : i?^ il i i i \^ii \ \ \ ; i i 

iC^ uOt^liliX^t^ III III 

1 1 1 1 1 '^ 111 111 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Ilarbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3644-3650 
276-541, 
4411-4445 

32G5"-3286' 

1539-' 1575 

4037-4094 

C 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
32-65" 

323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dee. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


lOt^Oiiili iC^iiOOO 1 

iCD-*»Oiilll i'<ti|i CT. III III 

w 1,-ICD^ 1 1 1 1 1 lb- 1 lr-(CO III III 

.olt^llMllll! I'TIIT'T' 111 ill 

"< 1 CO r^ »o 1 1 1 1 1 1 00 1 1 lo III III 

i.-^Tjiiiiii iCOiiOOO III III 
10 it^ii^CO 


1 


Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN-. 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-IIutton, H. H., Capt., USN_1..- 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

StUphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 



ci< 



) m o -^ ^ 00 -t* <N 

) to 00 O ^ CO lO t^ 

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i'f Oi I I .11 
I to t^ (M fO O C5 >0 
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fO'-i -^ 



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CO 



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I I 
(NOO 
^O 
OO 

eo(N 



i 



(NC;(M O 
CO"* TfiM 



CO 00 



i' 



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05 CO 1^00 
00 00 CO Tt< 

! T OCCO 

cr. --^ CD 00 
o CO CO ■* 

00 GO 



(N COiM -*! 



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CO t- — '^ 
(M COC<J 



<1 



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ff sj 03 c3^ 



O 



'o 



o 



tf 



o^- 



ftf 



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go o 

o3 _- tH 
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s a c 3 J5 
E-iHc-iE-'H 



tacK 
^ u 

. ' 3i 
^^ 

ex - 
^ o 



o 



^ 9, <U - 1> c3 

■^ . 5f ^ « J 

O - Ph o o 

-pQ aj^ I- «- 

If 5 S3 c3 03 o3 



T3 rt t; 

Or/ ■" 
cytZJ — 1 

I— I O C3 0) 

■g ooa 

:| - 2 m" 

0) Jli O ID 






•S5 



6jC O 
53 -S 



XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1915. 

to May 31, 

1916 


! 1 : : ; 12 ; : 1 : ; ; : ; \ \ i 'Mn \ 

? 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 'v' 1 1 

1 ! ! : 1 : ;g5 1 1 ; 1 1 I 1 : : ; ; :cc§ i 

>-, 1 1 1 1 1 a^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 • 1 1 1 1 1 1 ^ CO 1 

; 1 1 ; ; r 1 ; : 1 1 ! 1 1 ; i i ;??^ i 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


iiiiiiO COCOlMiOiii 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 —1 1 1 1 1 1 1 00 lO o 1 i-o 1 1 1 1 

•jiiiiii'TfiiiiiiCOiOCDi'^iii 1 

1 ; I ; I : Id ; i ; ; 1 ici-^ti ic^. i : ; i 

6,iiiiiiCC'iiiiiiI:^'^C5iT}<iii 1 
iiiiiiCO iCOiOiOi-'tiii 1 


Joint 

Coniniittee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 lO O 

1 1 1 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1 1 O 

E 1 1 1 1 1 1 17 !! 1 i 17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l^ 1 1 1 1 iiO 1 1 

>-^ ooiiiiioi iiiii 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1914; July 

13 to Aug. 

4. 1945) 


^ i i i i i i i i i i i 1 i i i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 

IIIII iCTi 1 1 

« 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 

c:^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 *-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 

s, \ \ ', ] I icJ^ 1 i : 1 : : ; 1 : 

IIIII 00 

1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
2722-2744 
31 '20-3 124 

1989^2007" 
2456-2478 

1345^1381' 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683" 

3750-3773 
3357-3586" 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
""279-288" 

379^382 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
1311-1329 
496-499 
1830-1842 

1334^1340" 

""247-259" 

1525^1538" 
1683-1705 


3 
1 


Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen 

West, Melbonrne H., Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., Brig. Gen 

Wichiser, Ilea B 

Wilke, Weslie T 

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, P]rle M., Col 

Wimer, Benjamin R., Col 

Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon 11 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, P'arnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

Woolloy, Ralph E 

Wright, Wc-sley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yee Kam 

Zacharias, EUis M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 983 



[^557] ^ PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK 



WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. G. 
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., 
in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William EH Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A, 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[^588'\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
General Gerow, will you be sworn, please ? 

TESTIMONY OF IT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW, UNITED 

STATES ARMY 2 

(Having been duly sworn by the chairman.) 

The Chairman. Is counsel ready to proceed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I want to make a short statement to the committee 
which I think may help it in connection with the next two or three 
witnesses, including General Marshall. 

Calling General Marshall out of turn, of course, upset our order of 
proof, and we are bringing up some matters now which we had not 
intended to present to the committee until sometime later. 

One, I think, is the story of the so-called "winds" message, and the 
other is the detailed record in handling, analytically, and so on, what 
is know as the fourteenth part of the message which came in on 
December 6 and 7. 

Our order of proof originally was for taking those things up as a 
special order of proceeding. We intended to call all our witnesses 
on that at one time, and in advance of General Marshall's testimony. 

Now that he is coming on he will have to be asked about that. 

My statement is intended to sort of orient the committee as to what 
we know about the situation, so that they will [2589] under- 
stand the testimony and be better equipped to do something about it 
until General Marshall comes in. 

Now^, the first thing is this "winds" message. That is a sort of a 
romantic term. I want to report now just generally what the state 
of the inquiry is in regard to the "winds" message, so the committee 
will understand. 



1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript 
of testimony. „,„„ „ . , .... 

- See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2490, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitteed 
by General Gerow. 

79716— 46— pt. 3 2 



984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The winds message, originally the winds code, which is found on 
page 154 of the diplomatic intercepts^ exhibit 1, I want to call the 
attention of the committee to the fact at the start that if the Japanese 
had used that method of communication and we had intercepted their 
diplomatic message what you would have learned was that the diplo- 
matic relations between the United States and Japan were in danger, 
and that instructions had to be given to burn the code. 

My first reaction to the winds message was, if we had intercepted 
it, we would have had little more than we had already, because we 
knew our diplomatic relations were in danger and we knew they had 
given orders to burn the code. So my original reaction was there 
was much ado about nothing in the winds message. 

But passing that I want to also call to the attention of the committee 
the fact that the code, as set up by its very terms, provides : 

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our [2590] diplomatic 
relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following 
warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language shortwave 
news broadcast : 

That shows on its face that the Jajjs only set this method up for 
an emergency system, in case the}^ could not use the ordinary means 
of communication. 

Now the proof already shows that they were using the ordinary 
means of communication right up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So 
the question arises at once whether they did send out those messages. 

Heretofore all the assumptions have been that they did, and there 
has been an inqury by the other boards as to who received them and 
what was done with them. 

Now we have made a plan to dig out all the facts on that, and I 
just want to report the present status of that. 

In the first place, in our effort to find out whether the message ever 
was sent we have already the FCC report from one of the best moni- 
toring stations, we have the exact report from them as to just what 
they picked up. That report was that one of the messages picked up 
on the 4th of December by the Japanese listener on the FCC station, 
which he picked up because it resembled — did not exactly comply with 
the code but resembled the code — had the statement in it, "North wind 
cloudy," which [2591] meant war with Russia and not with 

the United States and Great Britain, and that we can talk about as 
the false winds message, which was probably a real broadcast and not a 
code broadcast, and caused, of course, confusion among ^^'itnesses as to 
whether they ever saw the message or not. 

We also had from the FCC the report that on the afternoon of 
December 7, after the attack on Pearl Harbor and after the ordinary 
means of international communication had been closed, a winds mes- 
sage was received. That message said nothing about "East wind 
rain," which meant war with the United States, because that was 
already known all over the world, but it did use the expression which 
meant war with England. 

That is the message received by the FCC after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, and was an implementing message to warn the Japanese 
people abroad that they were about to have war with Great Britain. 

The next thing we did was to inquire from the Dutch and British 
and Australia, through the State Department, as to whether either of 



PROCEEDINGS OB^ JOINT COMMITTEE 985 

those nations had any record of intercepting, ])rior to December 7, 
an implementing message whicli said "East wind rain,'' which meant 
war with the United States. We heard from the Australians and they 
say no, they did not. We have not yet had our report from the Dutch 
and British. 

Now we also had sent to General MacArthur some time ago 
[2592'] a request that he endeavor to find from the Japanese, from 
their records, whether tliey ever sent a winds implementing message 
prior to December 7. The report from General MacArthur is that the 
Japs say they sent none out until the afternoon of December 7, which 
covers this implementing message they sent out which we intercepted, 
the FCC intercepted, showing a warning of war with Great Britain. 

That report, for whatever it is worth, did not indicate that the Japs 
sent out any messages other than those picked up by the FCC. 

Now we also have had communications from and have been busy 
bringing here witnesses from every one of the monitoring stations, 
witnesses who were in the stations during the critical period Novem- 
ber 28 to December 7, and witnesses who were present at the stations 
at the time, and those witnesses will be here and we will find out all 
they know about the situation. 

[2593] Now, there is just one other point about the winds mes- 
sage. There has been a statement to the effect that there was a mes- 
sage numbered 7001 in the Navy files. The tab in it shows the number 
is canceled, and there is no message in there. It has been thought 
that this missing 7001 was a winds message. The Navy reports, which 
are quite voluminous, in their search and effort to find what 7001 was, 
shows, among other things, that if the winds message had ever been 
received, it is not the type of message that would have been put in the 
file with the serial numbers which 7001 would require, for the simple 
reason that they filed under 7001 only coded intercepts. 

Of course, this was in Japanese broadcasting language and would 
not have have been put in that file, if it had ever been received. 

Now, that is as far as we have gone up to date with the winds mes- 
sage, and as long as we are to have General Marshall, I thought we 
ought to have a review of the situation. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I don't understand, do I, from 
counsel that he is intending this morning to determine what the evi- 
dence will show, or what his opinion of certain evidence in other hear- 
ings is ? 

Do I understand that you are passing upon what the evidence will 
be? 

[2S94] Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am trying to explain to the com- 
mittee what kind of witnesses we are going to call, and what the result 
of our present inquiry has been. If I have expressed any opinion 
about the weight of the evidence, I didn't intend to. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't wish to convey to the committee the 
weight of any of this evidence? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I have my opinion about the weight of the 
evidence, and if it has crept out in this hearing, why, I don't think 
I need to apologize. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, you do not wish to express 
to the committee what you think about the weight of the evidence? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know what you understand. My words 



986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

speak for themselves. As I stated, I am trying to report to the 
committee what the situation is. That is my only object. 

The Chairman. As the Chair understands, counsel is, in a sense, 
forecasting for the benefit of the committee what the testimony will be. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Now, I want to turn to the 1 p. m., and four- 
teenth part messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire [2595] 
whether there will be any conflict on this winds message, that it did 
come in ? 

Mr, Mitchell. There was a great deal of conflict, as you know, 
among various witnesses called before the other boards of inquiry as to 
whether they saw a message of that kind. Great conflict with it. 
And that is one reason I was anxious to get at the root of the matter 
and find out whether the message was really sent or not. I don't 
understand that there is any conflict about anything I have told you 
except I haven't yet talked to the witnesses who had charge of the 
monitoring stations and I don't know what they are going to say about 
ever having received it, or anything they have to say about the de- 
struction of their records. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel when it is contem- 
plated that the testimony with respect to the winds message will be 
submitted to the committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. As soon as this inquiry is complete. Our original 
plan, Mr. Congressman, as our record shows, submitted on November 
2, called for the story of the winds message pretty well down the line, 
and a great many witnesses before it, and the only reason I bring it up 
now out of order is because General Marshall has been advanced and 
that has upset our schedule. But it is hard for me to predict with 
certainty when the witnesses will be called because I can't tell how 
[2596] long the examination of each witness is going to be. 

We intend to, as soon as we can get around to it, and just as soon as 
it is ready, we will bring in all the witnesses that bear on the winds 
message and make a special order of it and give you everything we 
have. The only reason I am bringing it up today is to report on the 
extent and direction of our inquiry and what it relates to. And the 
things I stated as to what the record shows that we have already got 
are not in dispute so far as I can see. 

Mr. Keefe. Of course, Mr. Chairman, you would expect a member 
of the committee to give consideration to the testimony when it comes 
in and the weight to be given to it is a matter for determination when 
the testimony is in. 

Mr. Mitchell. Of course. 

Mr. Keefe. Any conclusions to be drawn must necessarily await 
the conclusion of the introduction of all of the testimonv relating to 
this subject. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, have I said anything to the con- 
trary this morning? 

Mr. Keefe. I make that statement because there seems to be an im- 
pression that your own conclusions are already formed in certain as- 
pects of the situation, and while that may be proper, yet I think you 
would concede that as a member of this committee I should be con- 
pelled to await any conclusions on it [2597] until the testimony 
is all in. That would be proper, would it not ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 987 

Mr. Mitchell. I haven't any question about it. If you really want 

to know what my present impression is, for what it is wortli, I confess 
that on the state of the inquiry up to date 1 have very, very grave 
doubCs whether the Japs ever sent out a winds implementing message 
prior to the afternoon of December 7, but that is a matter for the 
committee to decide when they hear all of the proof, and I didn't 
intend to express an opinion that the committee would have to accept. 
1 was just trying to give you a picture of our inquiry up to date so you 
would know. 

[2S9S] Mr. Keefe. So it will not be necessary to cross-examine 
General Miles or General Gerow, or anybody else, with respect to their 
knowledge of this winds message now. The whole subject, if they 
have any testimony to give on the subject, or were in any way inter- 
ested and can produce any proof, that will be submitted at the time 
you take up the winds message ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the way I would like to have it, but General 
Miles was already asked about the winds message, as I understand it, 
yesterday morning, although I wasn't here. 

Mr. Keefe. I think only just a few questions. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was that all? 

Mr. Keefe. At the end of his testimony ; yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is quite agreeable to me to leave the winds mes- 
sage out of the picture as far as these two generals are concerned, but 
not General Marshall, because we won't have him back. So what he 
knows about it the committee will want to ask him about. That is 
the reason I made this statement, so you would be able to frame your 
questions in the light of the report as to how far our investigation has 
gone and what questions we have sought to resolve. 

Mr. Keefe. You referred to a communication from General Mac- 
Arthur this morning. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. I understand you have such a communication. 
[2S99] Has the committee been supplied with it? 

Mr. Mitchell. No; we haven't given you any of those documents, 
I have been told, but we were planning to do that well in advance of 
our proof about the winds message. You see, General Marshall is 
coming and I wanted you to know what we had. If you want to look 
at anything we have up to date before General Marshall is called, you 
may. 

Mr. Keefe. Will the committee be furnished copies of this before 
tomorrow ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you see General Marshall's inquiry has been 
advanced so rapidly, it has so disarranged it, that we haven't had time 
to have these reports mimeographed. I have only one copy. If you 
would like to have the information up to date on it, I will try and 
have it mimeographed. But I tried to tell you in a general way what 
these documents consist of. 

The Chairman'. The Chair would like to ask counsel whether after 
General Marshall's testimony, and such information as we may get 
from him with reference to the winds messacre, in view of his early 
departure and his probable absence during the rest of the hearings, 
is it then planned to go back as far as possible on to the original sched- 
ule and deal with the winds message, subject to, of course, General 
Marshall's testimony ? 



988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. Precisely. Of course, our winds message [2600] 
inquiry isn't complete. When I get reports from the British and 
Dutch as to whether they received the message or not, why, if they say 
they did, I would recast my doubts about it ever having been sent. I 
am not in a position to express any opinion on it as yet. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. The other thing I wanted to call attention to was the 
so-called 14 part and 1 p. m. messages. Before General Marshall was 
supposed to be called we had intended to call all the basic witnesses 
to show the exact routing of those messages and how they were 
handled and the hours it was done and what was done. That might 
take us a week, to call those witnesses, or more. So we have to go on 
with General Marshall leading up to that subject, and we haven't had 
an opportunity to present that proof. 

Now, there are one or two things I have which I hoped would aid 
the committee. One of those things is the document which has been 
distributed this morning in mimeograph entitled "Information from 
Documentary Evidence on Messages No. 901, 902, 907, 910." That is 
the 14 part and 1 p. m. messages. The pilot message that came in. 
And the code-burning message afterward. 

This document which I am going to oifer in evidence now, for what- 
ever use the committee wants to make of it, will be [2601'] 
Exhibit 41. 

The Vice Chairman. It is this one [indicating] ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Prepared by the Army and Navy and is 
understood to state in detail all the information as to the handling of 
these messages. That is a matter of documentary proof, of course. 
They haven't attempted to put in any information that depended on 
recollection or memory of a witness. 

So you find the history of the detailed handling of the fourteenth 
part message and the 1 p. m. message as far as documentary support of 
the routing is contained in this exhibit. And as to each part of the 
message. 

The committee will remember that 13 parts were discussions by the 
Japs as to our position and the fourteenth part was the part of the 
message in which they said they had broken off negotiations. And 
the 1 p. m. message which followed was the message requiring or 
directing Ambassadors to deliver their message at 1 p. m. on Sunday, 
December 7. 

[260i^] Also, on this Exhibit 41 you will find there are references 
on the margin to exhibit pages on which the text of the parts, various 
parts, appear. 

The Chairman. That refers to the pages in Exhibit 1 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry about that of 
counsel ? 

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. On page 6, at the top of the page, page 6 of Exhibit 
41, at the top, will you have a witness, or will you sujDply the informa- 
tion as to when each of those processes was completed 'i 

Mr. Mitchell. Wherever there is a gap in the information shown 
on this, it means that there are no documents, and we will have to call 
witnesses. So that whenever you find a gap — and there are gaps — 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 989 

which you would like to fill, you will know we haven't the documents, 
but have to call witnesses and depend on their niemoi-y and recollec- 
tion. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

The Chairman. This will be No. 41, and it is now before the com- 
mittee as an exhibit ? 

Mr. Mi*rcHELL. Yes; I just offered it. 

The Chairman. All right. 

\2603] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 

41.") 

The Chairman. Tliank you, Counsel, ±v)r your explanation. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, will you state your present rank and 
station ? 

General Gerow. Leonard T. Gerow, lieutenant general; station. 
Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 

Mr. Mitchell. What are your duties at Fort Leavenworth? 

General Gerow. I am in command of the post and also commandant 
of the Command and General Staff School. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is that the principal general staff instruction point 
of the Army ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were you in the War Plans Division in the War 
Department in 1941 ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. When did you receive that assignment ? 

General Gerow. I reported, sir, in November 1940, and left the War 
Plans Division in February 1942. 

Mr. Mitchell. You were head of the War Plans Division during 
that period ? 

General Gerow, Yes, sir; Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans 
Division. 

Mr. Mitchell, Had you had experience prior to that time in war- 
plans work? 

[2604] General Gerow. Yes. sir. I had served previously in the 
War Plans Division as Executive for War Plans Division, during the 
period, as I recall, the early part of 1935 to the early part of 1939, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. When you left the War Plans Division, what was 
your next command? 

General Gerow. I was assigiied to command the Twenty-ninth Divi- 
sion, sir, at Fort Meade, Md. 

Mr. Mitchell. And you had charge of training and the prepara- 
tion of that division? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Lifantry division? 

General Gerow. I had complete command and trained the division 
as an infantry division. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was your next move ? 

General Gerow. I took the division to England in October of 1942, 
sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And remained in command how long? 

General Gerow. LTntil approximately June 1943 when I was as- 
signed to command the Fifth Corps. 

Mr. Mitchell. The Fifth Corps? 



990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. How many divisions in the Fifth Corps ? 

General Gerow. The number of divisions varied from [2605'\ 
time to time. The average, I should say, was three divisions at that 
time, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did yon take your Fifth Corps into France? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. Tlie Fifth Corps was one of the corps 
that was designated to assault the Normandy beaches and the Fifth 
Corps landed on the Omaha beach on D-day, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And how long did you remain in command of the 
Fifth Corps? 

General Gerow. I remained in command of the Fifth Corps until 
January 16, as I recall, 1944, shortly after the Von Runstedt break- 
through, when we started the counteroffensive. I was then assigned 
to command the Fifteenth Army. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have 3^011 ever been stationed in the Hawaiian 
Islands ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What were the functions of the War Plans Division 
in 1941? 

General Gerow. Those functions, sir, are as stated in Army Kegu- 
lations No. 10-15. If I may, I would like to read those. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. You may. Just a i)art of the regulations re- 
lating to the War Plans Division. 

[2606'] General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

I quote paragraph 12 : 

War Plans Division, general duties: 

a. The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War 
Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for the use 
in the theatre of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with 
the naval forces, in the national defense. 

b. The War Plans Division is specifically charged with the preparation of 
plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning — 

(1) Location and armament of coast and land fortifications; 

(2) Estimate of forces required and times at which they may be needed 
under the various possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the 
national defense; 

(3) The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the move- 
ment of troops to execute the initial deployment to be the duty of the Opera- 
tions and Training Division) ; 

(4) Actual operations in the theatre of war; 

(5) Consultation with the Operations and Training Division and the 
Supply Division on major items of [2601} equipment. 

Those are the responsibilities of War Plans Division, 1941, sir. 

[2608'] Mr. Mitchell. I would like to offer in evidence now as 
exhibit 42 a copy of Army Regulations No. 10-15 dated August 18, 
1936, which includes all amendments up to December 7, 1941. 

The Chairman. All amendments, did you say ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It includes all amendments. It is an up-to-date 
copy of the Army Regulations, defining the War Department General 
Staff duties, each department. It not only relates to War Plans but 
to G-2 and gives a short picture of the complete set-up. 

The Chairman. It will be filed as Exhibit 42. 

Mr. Mitchell. Each member of the committee has it. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 42.") 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 991 

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, do you remember that during the 
time you were in the War Plans Division there were certain conversa- 
tions with the British with respect to a joint war plan in case the two 
nations were drawn into the war? 

General Gerow. I do, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is called the ABC, which means American- 
British Conversations, does it? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir; ABC-1. 

1:^609] Mr. Mitchell. ABC-1 ? 

General Gerow. And there was an ABC-2. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was also a British staff plan, was it, a joint 
plan with Britain? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember whether during that time there 
were conversations between military officers of the United States and 
Canada with respect to a joint operation with Canada in case we were 
drawn into the war? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; there were such conversations conducted. 

Mr. Mitchell. And do you remember also tliat there was a similar 
conference held at Singapore or some place in the Far East betw^een 
oflBcers of the Army and Navy of the United States and with the 
British and Dutch, which resulted in a plan or recommendations made 
by that conference out there ? 

General Gerow\ Yes, sir; there was such a conference conducted. 

Mr. Mitchell. I show you a document here which is entitled, "Amer- 
ican-Dutch-British conversations, Singapore, April 1941." You have 
seen that document, have you? 

General GERow^ Yes, sir; I have seen this document. It is a re- 
port of the conversations at Singapore, sir, betw^een the Americans, 
Dutch, and British. 

[2610] Mr. Keefe. Is that Exhibit 43 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I haven't had it reproduced. If the committee want 
it, we can do it. It is an elaborate staff plan. 

These plans, I might say, the British-Canadian and the one with 
the Dutch, Americans, and British are brought up now with a view 
to ascertaining whether we can ascertain from them whether there 
was any commitment by the United States to engage in war with Japan, 
that is the purpose of it, but if the committee want it reproduced we 
will have that done. 

Did you have anj^thing to do with setting up the personnel 

Mr. Keefe. Before you finish I personnaly would very much like, in 
view of General Marshall's previous testimony, I would like to have 
that exhibit made available. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will have it mimeographed. You mean copies to 
each member of the committee ? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

The Chairman. Will the Congressman yield to his colleague ? 

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering if it would not be better to defer 
your request that it be reproduced until we see what significance there 
is to it and how much of it you might [2611] need? Maybe 
only a portion of it would be necessary for the examination of General 
Marshall or maybe we could use the original. 



992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. The exhibit has been available for some time and it 
has been loaned out to one member of the committee or another off and 
on, but we never have had it reproduced for all of them. 

Mr. Keefe. That has always been the trouble, Mr. Counsellor, that 
when you ask for a thing it is always in the hands of some other mem- 
ber of the committee. Now, I would like to see that. 

The Chairman. Well, if it is possible to have it all mimeographed 
the Chair would suggest that it be done so that each member can be 
furnished a copy. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will do that. 

The Chairman. It is rather difficult to see it when any member gets 
it and keeps it for awhile. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, my question, General, was whether you had 
anything to do with the assignment of United States Army or Navy 
officers to attend that conference at Singapore in April 1941 ? 

General Gerow. The assignment was made, sir, by the Chief of Staff 
as I recall now, sir. The War Plans Division did make certain recom- 
mendations to the Chief of Staff with [2612] regard to such 
assignment. 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice that the document states that the representa- 
tives of the United States were Capt. W. B. Purnell, U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Staff of the Asiatic Fleet: Col. A. C. McBride, U. S. A., As- 
sistant Chief of Staff of the United States Military Forces in the Phil- 
ippines; Capt. A. M. R. Allen, U. S. Navy, United States Naval Ob- 
server at Singapore ; and Lt. Col. F. G. Brink, U. S. A., U. S. Military 
Observer at Singapore. 

You think they were selected by the staff here, by the Navy and 
Army ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. I would like to change my statement with 
regard to that. I think the commanders out there were instructed to 
furnish suitable representatives for this conference; that is, the Naval 
and Army commanders out there, sir, the Com.manding General of the 
Far East and the Commanding Admiral of the Asiatic Fleet. That is 
my recollection at the moment. 

Mr. Mitchell. On page 6 of this document I find under the head 
of "Introduction" the following statement : 

The following conditions apply : 

(a) State of war between Germany, Italy and Japan on one hand and British 
empire with its present allies and the United States of America, referred to 
[2613] herein as associated powers, on the other. 

(b) No political commitment is implied. 

(c) Any agreement is subject to ratification by the government concerned. 

Now, is that the usual system that our staff plans had of making 
certain assumptions ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. Practically all staff plans have 
as one of their initial provisions the assumptions under which the plan 
is drawn. 

Mr. Mitchell. You called this "Conditions." Was that a British 
or i\.merican term ? 

General Gerow. That was a British term, sir. This paper was 
apparently handled largely by a British secretariat. 

Mr. Mitchell. "Terms of Reference," it says. [Reading] : 

(2) Prepare plan for conduct of military operations in the Far East on the basis 
of report of Washington conversation. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 993 

(3) Particular points for afiroement are: plan for employment and disposition 
of forces in the whole area, Indian Ocean, Pacific, Australian and New Zealand 
waters before and after arrival of the Far East Fleet as agreed in Washington 
conversations and sum- [2614^ marized in Admiralty telegram 1848, of 
4th of April. 

(b) Details of arrangements for cooperation, eg. communications, exchange 
of liaison officers. 

You have examined this document thoroughly, have you ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MiTCHi;jj^. Well, from your knowledge of War Plans and the 
systems of getting up war plans, how would you characterize this? 
AVhatisit? 

General Gerow. It is a technical agreement between military per- 
sonnel for the conduct of operations in the event that the powers 
referred to should become engaged in war. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you find anything in the document to the effect 
that Captain Purnell or any of his associates had attempted to commit 
the United States to engage in war? 

General Gerow. They had no authority to commit the United States 
to engage in war, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What is meant by this term, "No political commit- 
ments and any agreement is subject to ratification by the government 
concerned" ? Does that mean what it says ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; exactly what it says. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, this document refers to British-American con- 
versations and I will ask you to refer to an- ■[2615'] other staff 
plan I have here which is labeled "ABC-1 and 2." Have you examined 
this document? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I have, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You are quite familiar with it, are you? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice this document, the first part of it, is dated 
March 27, 1941. That was prior to the Singapore meeting? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. It states that: 

The staff conversations were held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to 
March 27, 1941 between the United States staff committee representing the Chief 
of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army and the United King- 
dom delegation representing the Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of the Chiefs 
of Staff of the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were associ- 
ated with United Kingdom delegates during the course of these conversations 
but were not present at joint meetings. 

It says that the United States representatives were Maj. Gen. S. D. 
Embick; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles; Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow; Col. J. 
T. McNarney ; Kear Adm. E. L. Ghormley ; Rear Adm. R. K. Turner; 
Capt. [£616] A. G. Kirk; Capt. DeWitt C. Ramsey; Lt. Col. 
O. T. Pfeiffer. 

You yourself were a member of that delegation ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And took part in those conferences ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And in framing this document? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 



994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice that under the head of "Purpose" it says : 

(a) To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United 
States and the British Commonwealth, with its present allies, could defeat Ger- 
many and the powers allied with it should the United States be compelled to 
resort to war. 

Witliout going through the details of this staff plan, is there any- 
thing in it, or was there any understanding reached or attempted to 
be reached that the United States would engage in war ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. Those were purely staff discussions. 

Mr. Mitchell. On assumptions that she might be drawn into war? 

General Gerow. She might be compelled to resort to war. [2617] 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any authority on behalf of the United 
States to make any commitment that the United States would en- 
gage in war under any conditions ? 

General Gerow. We did not have such authority, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. This document then is entitled "A Report." To go 
to whom, the Chiefs of Staff? 

General Gerow. To be submitted initially to the Chiefs of Staff, 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know whether this ABC 1 and 2 were even 
approved by higher authorit}^ in the United States? 

General Gerow. My recollection, sir, is it was approved by the 
Chiefs of Staff, by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the 
Navy. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman permit an inquiry 
at that point, as to whether or not the question which you now relate, 
as I understand it, to the A-B-C agreements Nos. 1 and 2 having been 
approved by the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of War and Navy, 
have you asked or will you ask the same question with respect to the 
other agreement, the A-B-C-D agreement? 

Mr. Mitchell. I should have done it before, but I was now getting 
to that. 

I show you. General Gerow, copy of a memorandum taken [^^i^] 
from the files of the War Department, dated June 9, 1941, which ap- 
pears to be signed by W. P. Scobey, lieutenant colonel. General Staff 
Corps, secretary of the Joint Board, and a letter dated June 2, 1941, 
preceding that, addressed to the President at the White House by 
Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War and Frank Knox, Secretary of 
the Navy. 

I had better read those. They ought to go into the record. 

The letter from Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox to the President, dated 
June 2, 1941, is as follows [reading] : 

Dear Mb. President: The Joint Board has prepared Joint Army and Navy 
Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 which with the report of United States-British 
Staff Conversations concluded on March 27, 1941, we have approved, and now 
transmit them for your consideration, recommending your approval. Joint Army 
and Navy Basic "War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 is based upon agreements contained in 
the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations. 

Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan— Rainbow No. 5 states the concept of 
war and provides for initial dispositions and operations of United States forces, 
should the United States associate in war with the Democracies against the 
totalitarian powers. As such [2619] it constitutes the basic directive 
for United States Army and Naval Forces in a war effort. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 995 

The War and Navy Departments have been advised that the Report of United 
States-British Staff Conversations has been agreed to provisionally by the British 
Chiefs of Staff and that it has been submitted to the Britisli Government for 
approval. 

Now, the second document, a letter of June 9, 1941, or memorandum 
for the Chief of Staff, signed by Colonel Scobey, reads as follows : 

Subject: J. B. No. 325 (Serial 642-5)— Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan- 
Rainbow No. 5 and Report of United States-British Staff Conversations — 
ABC-1. 

The President on June 7, 1941 returned the two subject plans without approval. 
In explanation of the President's failure to approve or disapprove the plans, his 
Military Aide, Major General E. M. Watson, stated to the Undersigned in sub- 
stance as follows : 

The President has familiarized himself with the two papers ; but since the 
report of the United States British Staff Conversations, ABC-1, had not been 
approved by the British Government, he would not approve the report at this 
time ; neither would he now give ap- 12620'\ proval to Joint Army and 
Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, which is based upon the report ABG-1. 
However, in case of war the papers would be returned to The President for his 
approval. 

(Signed) W. P. Scobey. 

Now, you said that this ABC-1 had been approved by the two 
secretaries. Did it ever get any farther than that, do you recollect, 
in the way of approval ? 

General Gerow. To the best of my knowledge and belief it was never 
approved by the President. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I notice that this document says not only 
ABC-1 but ABC-2. I should have asked you what ABC-2 is. 

General Gerow. ABC-2 was a report of a special committee that 
was set up to consider air collaboration only. 

Mr. Mitchell. Air? 

General Gerow. Air collaboration only; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Air what ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Air collaboration. 

The Chairman. I see ; air collaboration. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was the same type of document as ABC-1, a 
staff plan for a proposed plan of joint operations in case the Nation 
should be drawn into war? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

[£621] Mr. Mitchell. Now I would like to ask you whether you 
know whether the Singapore report, the Dutch-British-and-American 
joint report from Singapore about joint military plans, was ever 
approved ? 

General Gerow. That document was never approved either by the 
Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Mr. Mitchell. So if it was not approved by them it never went to 
the President for approval, I suppose. 

General Gerow. As far as I know it never went to the President, 
sir, and I do not believe it was submitted to either the Secretary of 
AVar or Secretary of the Navy for formal approval, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, let us turn to the Canadian document. 

There were certain other staff conferences with Canada at about that 
time, were there not? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Which one of these documents would contain that 
report ? 



996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. That would be ABC-22, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. ABC-22 ? 

General Gerow. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. You have that before you, have you, and have you 
examined it ? 

\26'22'] General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I have examined it and I have 
a copy. 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice on the first page of that under date of August 
12, 1941, is a memorandum from the Joint Planning Committee to 
the Joint Board (reading) : 

Subject : Joint Canadian — United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Sliort Title — 

ABC-22). 
Enclosure: (A) Subject Plan (draft of 28 July 1941) with permanent Joint 
Board on Defense letter of transmittal, dated : Montreal, 30th July, 1941. 
The subject plan, which was prepared in collaboration with the War Plans 
Division of the War and Navy Departments, is transmitted herewith with recom- 
mendation that it be approved. 

(Signed) L. T. Gebow. 

Did you personally represent the United States at that conference 
in Montreal ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice the signatures of our representatives are 
S. D. Embick, major general, United States Army ; H. W. Hill, captain, 
United States Navy; Forrest Sherman, commander. United States 
Navy; Clayton Bissell, lieutenant colonel, United States Army. 

Did you have anything to do with the selection or appointment of 
our representatives ? 

[2623'] General Gerow. I cannot recall specifically that War 
Plans did make such a recommendation to the Chief of Staff, but I 
imagine that it did recommend to the Chief of Staff who our repre- 
sentatives should be. 

Mr. Mitchell. The section 1 of this document under the title, 
"Purpose of this plan," says (reading) : 

1. There has been submitted to the Government of the United States and to 
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a report of Staff Conversa- 
tions held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941. The United 
Kingdom Government has referred this report to the Canadian Government 
for their concurrence. The report, which bears the short title "ABC-1," in- 
cludes a Uaited States-British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan. 

2. ABC-1 assumes that joint agreements between Canada and the United 
States for common action in war under. the concepts of ABC-1 will conform 
generally to the agreements reached in the United States-British Staff Con- 
versations. This plan is intended to supplement those agreements, and to 
provide for the most effective use of Canadian and United States Forces for the 
purposes listed in paragraph 3, should the United States and the British Com- 
monwealth be associated in a war against Germany and her allies. 

3. Under such circumstances, cooperative action by Canadian and United 
States Forces will be required primarily for purposes connected with : 

(a) the protection of overseas shipping within the northern portions of 
the Western Atlantic and Pacific Areas ; 

(b) the protection of sea communications within the coastal zones; 

(c) the defense of Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland (which includes 
Labrador) and the northern portion of the United States. 

You have examined this document and, of course, know its general 
tenor and purpose ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 997 

Mr, Mitchell. Was it anything different in scope or nature than 
any other United States or Joint Staff plan for joint operations in 
case of war ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. It followed generally the other war 
plans. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was this Canadian-United States joint plan 
approved ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; it was approved by the Chief of Staff and 
the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of [3625] War 
and the Secretary of the Navy and approved by the President. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have here a document obtained from the War De- 

gartment, dated August 20, 1941, signed by Secretary Stimson and 
ecretary Knox, addressed to the President at the White House as 
follows [reading:] 

Dear Mb. President: The Joint United States-Canadian Permanent Defense 
Board has prepared Joint United States-Canadian Defense Plan No. 2 (Short 
Title ABC-22) providing for common action in war against Germany and her 
allies in the defense of continguous territories, including Newfoundland and 
Alaska, and adjacent waters. 

This plan has been examined and approved by The Joint Board, and we also 
have approved it. It is transmitted herewith for your consideration with 
recommendation that it be approved. 

Following that is the other document from the War Department, 
dated August 29, 1941, as follows [reading] : 

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff : 

Subiect: Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title — 
ABC-22), J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717). 

[2626] 1. You are advised that The President has, on August 29, 1941, 
given approval to the subject serial by indorsing the Joint Planning Committee 
report as follows : "OK, F. D. R." 

(Signed) W. P. Scobey, 
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C, Secretary. 
And bears the endorsement : 

Sep. 4, 1941 

Noted— Chief of Staff 

Noted— Deputy Chief of Staff. 

So that of these three plans the Canadian was the only one that 
ever was finally approved by the President ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have here a document which we will mark ex- 
hibit 43 — the committee has this — captioned: "Statement by the 
Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff." 

Have you a copy of that ? 

General Gerow. I have a copy ; yes, sir. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 43.") 

[2627] Mr. MrrcHELL. This document is a document of instruc- 
tions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the representatives of the 
United States at the American-British Staff conferences that resulted 
in the report which has been marked ABC-1 and 2 ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; these are the instructions to the United 
States delegation, sir. It is a joint statement that was to be made by 
the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations before a meeting of 
the Joint Committee, both United States and British. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you mean it was prepared and not given to 
the representatives, or wouldn't you know about that? 



998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. Well, sir; it was furnished the United States rep- 
resentatives and I think it was presented verbally at a joint meeting 
to the combined British and United States representatives. 

Mr. Mitchell. I see. That document offered as exhibit 43 I think 
ought to be read into the record. I will read it. 

1. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army of the 
United States are aware of the advantages that will accrue to both nations in 
the prosecution of any war in which the United States and the British Com- 
monwealth may participate as associates, [2628] should tentative under- 
standings be reached in advance concerning military cooperation. Therefore, 
they have prepared this statement in the hope that it will clear the way for 
the discussions whicli are to follow. 

2. As understood by these two officers, the purpose of these staff conversa- 
tions is to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United 
States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and the powers allied 
with her, should tlie United States be compelled to x'esort to war. 

3. The American people as a whole desire now to remain out of war— — - 

The date of the document, I should have read, is January 27, 1941. 
ts that right? 
General Gero\v. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Mitchell (continuing reading) : 

and to provide only material and economic aid to Great Britain. So long as 
this attitude is maintained, it must be supported by their responsible military 
and naval authorities. Therefore, no specific commitments can now be made 
except as to technical methods of cooperation. Military plans which may be 
envisaged must, for the present, remain contingent upon the future political 
action of both nations. All such plans are [2629] subject to eventual 
\)fficial approval by the two Governments. 

4. The present national position of tlie United States is as follows : 

(a) A fundamental principle of United S'tates policy is that the Western 
Hemisphere remain secure against the extension in it of non-American 
military and political control. 

(b) The United States has adopted the policy of affording material and 
diplomatic assistance to the British Commonwealth in that nation's war 
against Germany. 

(c) The United States by diplomatic means has opposed any extension of 
.Tapane.se rule over additional territory. 

5. If the United States Government decides to make war In common with the 
British Commonwealth, it is the present view of the Chief of Naval Operations 
and the Chief of Staff that : 

(a) The broad military ob.iective of United States operations will be the 
defeat of Germany and her allies, but the United States necessarily must also 
maintain dispositions which, under all eventualities, will prevent the ex- 
tension in the Western [2630] Hemisphere of European or Asiatic 
political and military power. 

(b) The objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the United 
States exerting its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the 
Mediterranean regions. 

(c) The United States and British Commonwealth should endeavor to 
keep Japan from entering the war or from attacking the Dutch. 

(d) Should Japan enter the war, United States operations in the mid- 
Pacific and the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facili- 
tate the exertion of its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in 
the Mediterranean. 

(e) As a general rule, United States forces should operate in their own 
areas of responsibility, under their own commanders, and in accordance 
with plans derived from United States-British joint plans. 

(f) The United States will continue to furnish material aid to Great 
Britain, but will retain for building up its own forces material in such pro- 
portion as to provide for future .security and best to effectuate United States- 
British joint plans for [2631] defeating Germany. 

6. The scope of the staff conversations should preferably cover the examination 
of those military efforts which will contribute most directly to the defeat of 
Germany. As a preliminary to military cooperation, tentative agreements should 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 999 

be reached concerning the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the 
major lines of the military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of 
the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfac- 
tory command ari-angements, both as to supreme control, and as to unity of field 
command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations. Staff conversations 
should also include an examination into the present military situations of the 
United States and the British Commonwealth, and also into the probable situa- 
tions that might result from the loss of the British Isles. 

7. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff would appreciate it if 
the British Staff Representatives could furnish the United States Staff Rep- 
resentatives with an estimate of the military situation of the British Common- 
wealth as a preliminary to the staff discussions. 

Now, General Gerow, do you know of any other Joint Staff 
\ 26321 conversations between the United States and Great Britain, 
and the Dutch and the Canadians and the Australians or anybody 
else during that period in 1941, other than those I have adduced? 

General Gerow. No, sir; other than informal conversations be- 
tween members of our own staff and the members of the British mis- 
sion and the missions of other nations that were assembled in Wash- 
ington at that time. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I mean conversations of a more formal char- 
acter that would produce some kind of a joint staff plan for possible 
future operations. 

General Gerow. To the best of my knowledge and belief there were 
no such conferences. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you at any time during your service in the 
War Plans Division see or hear of any agreement which had been 
entered into by anybody, any executive officer of the United States, 
War, and Navy, or anybody else, including the President, which as- 
sumed to bind the United States to engage in war against Japan 
before Japan attacked the United States ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. There have been discussions here in the committee 
based on memoranda, I think, including this Singapore plan and 
memoranda by General Marshall and Admiral [2623'\ Stark, 
in which they recommended that no military operations should be 
conducted against Japan unless certain eventualities occurred, such 
as an attack by the Japs on the Philippines, and one of the even- 
tualities was said to be "or unless the Japs should cross a certain 
latitude and longitude line." Do you remember that? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was a recommendation and report based on 
the Singapore report, carried on forward to the Secretai-y of War 
and Secretary of the Navy by the INIarshall memorandum, is that 
right? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I think that statement appeared initially 
in the Singapore conversations, in the recommendation of the con- 
ferees at that conference. 

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 17 has already been offered in evidence. 
It is a memorandum dated November 27, 1941. [Reading:] 

Subject : Far Eastern Situation. 

Signed by General Marshall and Admiral Stark and addressed 
to the President. On the second page the report says: 

79716 — 46 — pt. 3 3 



1000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It is recommended that : 

prior to the completion of the Philippines reinforcement, military counter- 
action be considered only [2634] if Japan attacks or directly threat- 
ens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined ; 

in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the 
United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond 
the lines indicated may lead to war ; prior to such warning no joint military 
opposition bo undertaken ; 

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and 
Dutch for the issuance of such warning. 

Do you knoAV or did you know at the time whether the President 
took any action on that recommendation ? 

General Gerow. I do not know whether the President took any 
action on it or not, sir. 

[2635~\ Mr. Mitchell. There ^Yas offered in evidence yesterday 
as exhibit 40, a messa<re from the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic 
Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations, marked "Information to the 
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet," dated December 7, eastern 
time, I suppose, Philippine time, 1941, which reads as follows: 

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three 
or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you. 

Do you know of any assurances that we had given the British at 
Singapore of armed support under three or four eventualities? 

General Gerow. I know of no such assurances, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. May this report, that has been obtained from Singa- 
pore, have been founded on this Dutch-American-British conference 
report to which we referred? 

General Gerow. It may have been ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. May I have the last answer? 

Mr. Mitchell. I asked him if it was possible that this report that 
Admiral Hart had might have referred to this Singapore plan. He 
said he does not know; it might. 

We have tried to get Admiral Stark's reply to this message, but 
we have not succeeded in doing it up to this morning. 

[2636] Senator Ferguson. I might help counsel on the Ad- 
miralty report 

Mr. Mitchell. I would be glad to get any help I can. 

Senator Ferguson. We asked that we have the Admiralty reports 
cleared up with the British. 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean the messages from the British Ad- 
miralty ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; to our Navy. 

Mr. IVIitchell. Well, those, as I told you in our conversation yes- 
terdaj'-, Senator, ought to go through clearance. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I say. I ask you now to get them 
cleared so we can clear up this point, 

Mr. Mitchell. You were going to give me a list of those you wanted 
cleared so we could narrow it down as much as possible. 

It is quite a job to send messages to England and to get the British 
Government to clear the message. 

Senator Ferguson. I think you can clear that up later. 

Mr. Mitchell. All right, we will try. 

Now, General Gerow, getting back to another subject, I show you 
a document dated December 30, 1940, signed by Admiral Bloch, ad- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1001 

dressed to the Chief of Naval Operations [26371^ which is 
already introduced in evidence here, which is a report by Admiral 
Bloch on the problem of aircraft raids on Hawaii. It bears the en- 
dorsement of Admiral Richardson, who forwarded it under date of 
January 7. 

Do you remember whether you ever saw that ? It went to the Chief 
of Naval Operations and not to the War Department ? 

General Gerow. I do not recall having; seen that at the time, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. The record shows that the document I referred to 
is part of exhibit 9. 

I call your attention now to exhibit 10, which is a letter from 
Secretary Knox to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, and 
part of the same exhibit, a letter dated February 7, 1941, from the 
Secretary of War Stimson to the Secretary of the Navy, in which, 
to refresh your memory. Secretary Knox said that the dangers at 
Pearl Harbor in the order of their probability, were — 

1. Air bombing attack ; 

2. Airtorpedo plane attack; 

3. Sabotage. 

Do you remember having seen that correspondence ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I did see it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember whether, as the result \2638\ 
of the correspondence so instituted and during the year 1941, follow- 
ing this correspondence, various reports and plans were made dealing 
with air defense at Pearl Harbor? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. There has been offered in evidence here a book con- 
taining extracts from various plans, not joint plans but United States 
Army and Navy plans having to do with the defense of Pearl Harbor 
against air attack. 

I think this document itself, which the committee has, was not 
offered as an exhibit, but extracts of it were read into the record. 

I think it advisable at this time to mark as exhibit 44 this docu- 
ment which is entitled "Copies of Defense Plans" and contains extracts 
from various basic Army and Navy plans dealing directly with the 
question of defense against air attack. 

The Chairman. Let it be filed as exhibit 44. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 44.") 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you a copy of this document before you ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I have, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you produced here the various plans on which 
this document. Exhibit 44, is based, as listed in [2639'] the 
index in 13 items, that is, the War Department part of it? 

General Gerow. I do not understand the question, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell, Have you checked these basic plans that have been 
produced here against the index ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Of Exhibit 44? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. There are 13 items in the list of contents. Have 
you checked these documents against tha tindex ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I have, sir. 



1002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. Are all the documents that are listed in this index 
present here? You have checked them, haven't you ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MiTHELL. I will ask you to look at them and just state generally, 
as you go over each item, what they are. The first is extracts from 
joint Army and Navy basic war plan — orange (1938) ; is that right? 

General Gerow. This is the joint Army and Navy basic war 
plan — orange, 1938, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What does that mean ? 

General Gerow. That means it is a war plan that per- [26.^] 
tains specifically to operations against Japan. Japan was known as 
"orange." 

Mr. Mitchell. And item 2, extracts from joint Army and Navy 
basic war plan — Rainbow No. 1, Avhat is that? 

General Gerow. This document is the joint Army and Navy basic 
war plan, Rainbow No. 1. 

Mr. Mitchell. What is Rainbow No. 1 ? Can you tell us what the 
relation of it is to the other plans, or something of that kind ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. If I might refer to the document, I can 
give the scope of the plan, rather than from memory. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is what I want you to do. 

Mr. Keefe. Why not do the same thing with respect to the orange 
plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Start with orange, and tell the committee, in a gen- 
eral way, so we can orient these various plans and understand what 
they were and what their relations were to eacli other. 

General Gerow. This joint Army and Navy basic war plan, orange, 
1938, constitutes the basis upon w^iich all Army plans, orange, and all 
Navy plans, orange, and all joint plans, orange, and all supporting al- 
locations for an orange war shall be formulated and developed. 

[£641] Orange, as I stated, was the code name for Japan. The 
document contains assumptions with regard to such a war, the concept 
of the war, the means assigned jointl3" to the Army and Navy and 
means assigned to each of the Army and Navy forces ; joint decisions 
that were made by the Joint Board approving this plan ; categories of 
defense. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that plan covered any sort of operations in that 
area in a war with Japan ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; limited to the Pacific area. 

Mr. Mitchell. Limited to the Pacific ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And that, of course, included Hawaii? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. As part of the area? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, give us the same information about Rainbow 
No. 1, which is the second item. What is the date of Rainbow No. 1 ? 

General Gerow. Rainbow No. 1, sir, was approved on August 14, 
by the Acting Secretary of the Navy. 

The Vice Chairman. August 14, what year? 

General Gerow. 1939, and August 14, 1939, by the Acting Secretary 
of War. This document was prepared prior [264^] to my 
assignment to duty in the War Plans Division. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1003 

Mr. Mitchell. I understand that. I am asking you, as a War 
Plans man, to tell the committee in a very general way, what that plan 
dealt with, and what its relation was to orange, 1938. 

General Gekow. Yes, sir. 

The general situation on which this plan was based, was that at the 
time this directive was issued, the European war was in progress, 
which may involve other nations, and expand the field of military 
action. 

There is an ever present possibility of tlie United States being drawn into this 
war. There is also the possibility that peace in Enroix^ may be followed by a 
situation in which the United States will be forced to defend without allies the 
integrity of the Monroe Doctrine and our interest in the Pacific. 

Mr. Mitchell. Does that plan cover operations in the Atlantic and 
Pacific ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Does it assume a possible engagement with Japan ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I should like to read the reference to the 
special situation on which it was based, sir, 

\26If3] Mr. Mitchell. All right. 

General Gerow. Special situation for Rainbow No. 1 [reading] : 

The termination of the war in Europe is followed by a violation of the letter 
or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine in South America by Germany and Italy. This is 
coupled with armed aggression by Japan against United States interest in the 
Far East. Other nations are neutral. 

The purpose of the plan was "to provide for the most effective use of naval and 
military forces to defeat enemy objectives, particularly those in the territory 
and waters of the Western Hemisphere north of the approximate latitude 13 
degrees south. This plan will restrict initially the projection of U. S. armed 
forces to the American Continents and their outlying islands, north of 13 degrees 
south latitude, and to the United States possessions in the Pacific westward to 
include Unalaska and Midway. This plan will visualize the subsequent exten- 
sion of United States control into the western Pacific as rapidly as possible, 
consistent with the accomplishment of United States objectives in the West- 
ern Hemisphere, but no plan for such extension of operations will be prepared 
at this time." 

Mr. Mitchell. Go to the third item in the joint Army and Navy 
basic war plan, Rainbow No. 5 ; please look at that [^^44] and 
give us the date of that and briefly just what the scope of that plan 
is, or was? 

General Gerow. This plan was approved on November 19, 1941, by 
the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. I think I caii 
best describe this plan by reading from the plan the general assump- 
tions on which it was based, and that is : 

That the associated powers, comprising initially the United States, the British 
Commonwealth (less Eire), China, and the "Free French" are at war against 
the Axis powers, comprising either : 

a. Germany, Italy, Roumania. Hungary, Bulgaria, or 

b. Germany. Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Indochina, and 
Thailand. 

That the associated powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1 and 
ABC-22. 

That even if .Tapan, Indochina and Thailand are not initially in the war, the 
possibility of their intervention nnist be taken into account. 

That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be 
able to fill logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and tech- 
nical materials, from sources in that general region. 

That Latin American republics will take measures to [2645] control 
subversive elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected 



1004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to direct attack ; in general the territorial waters and land bases of these re- 
publics will be available for iise by United States forces for purposes of Hemis- 
phere defense. 

Those were the assumptions on which this plan was based. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, turn to the next item, extracts from War De- 
partment Operation Plan — Rainbow No. 5. What is that ? 

General Gerow. After the joint Army and Navy basic war plans 
were prepared, the Army and Navy then separately prepared their 
own plans, based on that joint plan. This War Department Opera- 
tions Plan, Rainbow No. 5 of 1941, is the Army plan that was pre- 
pared, based on the joint Army and Navy basic plan — Rainbow No. 
It contains many of the statements that are contained in the basic 
plan. It contains the concept of the war, the assumptions under 
which the war will be foufrht, the means of allotment of forces, the 
directions to subordinate commanders to prepare subordinate plans, 
the coordination that must be had with other departments of the 
Government. 

Mr. Mitchell. It includes in its scope the area of the Hawaiian 
Islands, does it? 

General Gerow. It does ; 3^es, sir. 

[2646] Mr. Mitchell. Did you give the date of that ? 

General Gerow. This document does not contain on it the date of 
approval, but I am sure it was in August 1941, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 44 has a note on it "Approved by the Chief 
of Staff, August 1941." 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I think I have that somewhere in my 
documents. 

Mr. Mitchell. Never mind. That is near enough. 

General Gerow. I know it w^as sent out to Hawaii in August 1941, 
and the receipt was received back from the War Department on 
September 3, 1941. 

Mr. Mitchell. The next item here is extracts from Hawaiian De- 
fense Project, Revision 1940. Will you look at that and tell us 
the scope and nature of that document, and the date? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. This document was prepared initially 
in Hawaii. It is a local plan based on the War Department plan 
which I have just discussed. 

Mr. IVIiTCHELL. A plan worked out by the local commanders in 
1940? 

General Gerow\ Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. By the commanding officer of the Hawaiian De- 
partment ? 

[2647] General Geroav. By the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department. 

]\Ir. JNIitchell. And the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval 
District? 

General GER0W^ No, sir; this is not a joint plan. This is an Army 
plan. It is a little different from a plan, sir. It is what we call a 
defense project. 

Mr. Mitchell. I see. 

General Gerow\ It contains the objective to be accomplished, but 
is primarily directed toward setting up the means that are required to 
carry out that war mission in considerable detail. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1005 

The Chairjmax. May I ask of the General : You say this was in 
1940, and based on that previous item which you have just discussed 
which seems to have been approved in August 1941. Is not there some 
divergence as to dates ? 

General Gerow. This defense project is prepared annually and re- 
vised annually. This is the 1940 edition. The 1941 edition had not 
been completed at that time, but the orange plan of 1938 and the rain- 
bow plan No. 1, contained the war missions for Hawaii, and those plans 
were taken together with the other data with which to revise the defense 
project which was in existence at that time, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. The next item is joint coastal frontier \26JtS'\ 
defense plan, Hawaii. What is that ? 

General Gerow. This is a joint plan that is prepared by the local 
commanders in Hawaii, Army and Navy, based on the joint plans. Army 
and Navy plans furnished by the War Department. 

Mr. Mitchell. What is the date of it ? 

General Gerow. This document was aj^proved at the Headquarters 
of the Hawaiian Department, the 11th of April 1941, and Headquarters 
Fourteenth Naval District, 11th of April 1941. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will state that that document is in Exhibit 44, set 
forth in full, not a mere extract of it. The whole thing is in this 
exhibit 44. 

The next item is No. 7, annex No. VII, to joint coastal frontier defense 
plan, Hawaii. What is the date of that, and what is it ? 

General Gerow. Will you repeat that question, sir? 

Mr. Mitchell. The next item is annex No. VII to joint coastal fron- 
tier defense plan, Hawaii. Wliat is that document, the nature of it, 
and the date of it ? 

General Gerow. Annex No. VII, sir; to that document is a local plan 
prepared by the Fourteenth Naval District and the Headquarters, Ha- 
waiian Department. It is dated the 28th of March 1941, and covers 
joint security measures, protection of the fleet and Pearl Harbor base. 

[26Jf9'] Mr. Mitchell. The next item in the same volume, No. 8, 
is the Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement). 

What exhibit is that ? 

Mr. Gesell. Forty-four. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you q\qv see the report dated August 20, 1941, 
entitled "A Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii"? 

Mr. Keefe. What is the date of that, please? 

Mr. Mitchell. August 20, 1941. 

It is entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii," addressed to 
the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C, 
through Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Fort 
Shafter, T. H., which has heretofore been marked Exhibit 13. Did 
you ever see that report? 

General Gerow. I cannot recall at this time as having ever seen that 
report, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the report which considered the vulnera- 
bility of Hawaii to an air attack at a time that it would likely come, 
in the morning, from carriers, and things of that kind, and then went 
on to estimate the ways of defeating it, and the number of planes that 
would be required to run a 360° long-range reconnaissance to detect 
the Jap carriers the evening before. 



1006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. I have read the document since, just prior to this 
investigation. 

[i^650] Mr. Mitchell. You didn't see it at the time? 

General Gerow. At the time I don't recall having seen it, sir, 

Mr. Mitchell. No. 9, the next item in the index, "5 November 1941 
Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department." 

Will you look at that and tell us what it is? 

General Gerow. That document, sir, is contained in the opera- 
tion orders of the Hawaiian Department dated 1941, sir. It is, as 
stated, a standing operating procedure. 

Mr. Mitchell. Promulgated by whom? 

General Gerow. By the commanding general, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. 

Mr. Mitchell. On his own, not a direction from Washington? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; on his own. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is that the document in which General Short di- 
rected his air alerts 1, 2, 3, or am I wrong about that? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; they are included in this document. 

Mr. Mitchell. Alert 1, sabotage without threat from without, and 
so on? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you see that document before December 7, 1941 ? 

General Gerow. I don't recall ever having seen it before [2651] 
December 7. I think the records of the War Department show it 
came in later in 1942. 

Mr. Mitchell. The 10th item is "Field Order No. 1," and 11, "Ex- 
tracts from Navy Basic War Plan"; 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential 
Letter 2 CL-41." 

Those are Navy documents and Admiral Turner can aescribe them 
more fully, but just to complete the story here will you look at them 
and tell us in a general way what the nature of them is? 

General Gerow. That is number 10, sir? 

Mr. Mitchell. 10, 11 and 12. Ten is the first, "Field Order No. 1 
NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department." Give the date of it 
and, if you can from inspection, the general nature of it. 

General Gerow. No. 10, sir, "Field Order No. 1 (Naval Security)," 
is an Army document. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. And it is the operations order as got- 
ten out by the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. 
It has no date. It is intended as an order to be put into effect when 
the emergency arrives. 

Mr. Mitchell. What is No. 11? 11, 12, and 13, they are Navy 
documents ? 

General Gerow. No. 11 is a Navy document, sir, based, as [2662] 
this paper indicates, on Rainbow No. 5. 

Mr. Mitchell. It would be a corresponding document to the Army 
operations plan on Rainbow 5, similar? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. It was prepared in compliance with the 
directive contained in the joint Army-Navy basic plan, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. The next item is 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Let- 
ter 2 CL-41 (revised) — Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating 
Areas." 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1007 

What is the date of that? 

General Gekow. That is dated, sir, October 14, 1941. 

Mr. MrrciiKLL. By whom is that issued or authorized? 

General Gekow. The headin<>- shows that it is issued by the Com- 
mander of the Pacific Fleet. 

Mr. Mitchell. The 13th item is "Operations Plan No. 1-41. 
Headquarters Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District." 

What is the date of that and by whom issued or autliorized? 

General Gerow. That is dated 27 February 1941 and is issued by the 
Headquarters of the Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District, 
Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, General Gerow, you have gone over these docu- 
ments and also you have gone over Exhibit 44 which contains either 
extracts or complete copies of tliem, have you not? 

[2653\ General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitc^iiell. And I asked you to prepare on the basis of your 
study of all these plans a condensed statement giving as a War Plans 
man, your analysis and conclusions as to the respective functions of 
the Army and the Navy or the 14th Naval District or the Fleet at Pearl 
Harbor. Have you done that ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you coordinate that with Admiral Turner wdio 
w^as War Plans Officer in the Navy when you were in the War Plans in 
the War Department? Did you submit the matter to him and get his 
consideration of your memorandum, your conclusions? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I took tliis paper, after I prepared it, over 
to Admiral Turner and informally discussed it with him and asked 
him if he concurred, and he said he did, sir, and T furnished him a copy. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you give to the committee the answer to the 
question I submitted to you ? That is, the question is to present to the 
committee a brief statement of your analysis and conclusions of all 
these plans with a view^ to stating what the respective functions of the 
Army and the Navy were against an air attack in the defense of Oahu. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. May 1 read from this paper that I have 
already prepared? 

[2654] Senator Ferguson. Mi'. Chairman, could the record 
show the date of the request and whether the instrument was written 
]*ecently ? 

Mr. Gesell. It has been distributed to all members. 

Senator Ffjujuson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, but that brings up the 
question of distributing these papers on the morning. It is just im- 
possible to go through and read these papers while we are listening 
to a witness. Is it possible to get these papers in the evening and not 
have them jDut before us in the morning? This is an example. I 
have been trying to read these papers and listen to witnesses. 

The Chairman. The Chair can't answer the question. 

Senator Ferguson. Can we get an answer from counsel right now? 

Mr. Mitchell. We got this document late last evening. We have 
had the mimeographing agencies of about every department of the 
Government chasing up and down getting these copies out, we have 
been running them ragged about it, and we are doing the very best 
we can. 



1008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I didn't get this summary, or even a draft of it, from General 
Gerow until a day or two ago, and then we had to have it mimeo- 
graphed, and we got it last night. 

Senator Ferguson. How long has counsel had these other papers 
that were put before us? 

[S6oS] The Chairman. Might the Chair suggest that we go into 
other papers at a different time from a time when we are on the verge 
of hearing General Gerow read the paper that he prepared. You 
asked when it wag prepared and I thilik that is proper. But let's 
not go to the other papers. 

Senator Ferguson. We will go back to this one. Did we not have 
a rule, or at least a semblance of a rule, that we were to get any state- 
ments read by a witness 24 hours in advance? 

The Chairman. We had an understanding that where a witness 
testified from a manuscript we would attempt to get the manuscript 
at least 24 hours in advance. The Chair does not understand that 
that applies to a mere memorandum that a witness would use during 
his testimony which is oral. If the Chair misunderstood, he is sub- 
ject to correction. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, this is an answer to a direct 
question that was given to this witness sometime ago. Why could 
the committee not have had this answer in advance? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have answered that question. I have stated that 
I asked the witness to give us his estimate. I didn't know that he 
wanted to write it out, necessarily, but to come here and testify to it. 
When he got to work on it he found he could do it better if he put it 
in memorandum form [26S6] and consulted Admiral Turner 
about it. He did that within the last day or two and we didn't get the 
statement until late last night. If the committee wants him to state 
his conclusions orally he will do it. He has asked permission to read 
this document and comment on it so that his statement may be more 
accurate and better organized. 

Senator Brewster, Mr. Chairman, as I understood counsel, the 
statement was received a day or two ago and then it had to be mimeo- 
graphed. Did I understand correctly ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't remember of having seen it at all until yester- 
day. Yesterday was Tuesday, wasn't it? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. Don't you have a record 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to know whether we are examining this 
witness or cross-examining counsel. I stated we have done our best 
in this matter and I don't see that counsel's office is under any criticism, 
proper criticism, in a case like this. You understand the facts fully. 
The witness was asked to prepare his conclusions and an analysis of 
those plans as to the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy. 
He went to work on it. At the last minute he wanted to put it in writ- 
ing so that he could read it. ' He having put it in that shape we wanted 
to have it mimeographed so that the committee could follow it. It was 
done late last evening [26S7] and delivered last night. 

The Chairman. The Chair suggests that General Gerow proceed to 
read his statement. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman 

The Chairman. The Senator from Maine. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1009 

Senator Brewster. I think this thing; should be clarified. I gather 
from what has been said that it may be that additional help is required 
to enable counsel to perform what the committee agreed was most 
desirable. 

I have followed the practice with every document which I have 
received from counsel of noting not only the date but the hour. That 
practice is followed in all Government departments. I would like to 
know the day and hour when this document was received. And then, 
if counsel has not adequate mimeographing assistance, with all the 
facilities of the Government at his disposal, we ought to see that he 
gets more. 

This is an illustration of what can be found in connection with Pearl 
Harbor, that they didn't have adequate help. We agreed we needed 
these things in advance. I see no reason why the committee shouldn't 
provide whatever facilities are necessary to do that in this matter. 

The Chairman. The Chair does not know how many mimeographing 
outfits there are in Washington. All those that are available for our 
use are being utilized, I understand, for that purpose. 

[£668] The Chair does not think that a memorandum, in the 
midst of oral testimony, comes within the rule that we provided for that 
in advance manuscript testimony should be furnished to the commit- 
tee 24 hours in advance, or any other length of time in advance. 

General Miles the other day read a memorandum which he wanted 
to read in the midst of his oral testimony and no question was raised 
about it. The Chair thinks General Gerow should be permitted to 
read this memorandum if he thinks it is more accurate than he could 
give it orally. 

The Vice Chairman. As a suggestion, it is now 5 minutes to 12. 

1 suggest that we recess at this point and that will give the members 

2 hours to read this memorandum which is now before them and we 
can meet at 2 o'clock and hear General Gerow read it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Gesell reminds me also that one of the difficulties 
we are up against right now is, as indicated by this situation, due to 
the complete disarrangement of our order of proof. 

General Gerow was not on the list until w^e got through with General 
Miles. Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner also came ahead of 
him. We had to jam him on the stand today in order to give some basic 
material as a basis for General Marshall's testimony. 

[2659] If General Gerow had come in his regular order we 
would not have this situation. We must take that into account. 

The Chairman. The committee undoubtedly understands that it 
has been necessary to improvise due to the change of schedule, which 
is due to General Marshall's appearance this week. 

Mr. MuEPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I make a short statement? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. The statement about which so much fuss is being 
made is 6i/^ pages. Substantially all of what the witness has covered 
has been in the hands of the committee for over 2 weeks. 

The Vice Chairman. I suggest that we recess. 

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 
p. m. of the same day.) 



1010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
[2660^ AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 P. M. 

The Chairman. The eommittee will come to order. 
Counsel will proceed with General Gerow. 

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW 
(RESUMED) 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add something to my 
statement this morning. Since the noon recess, at half past twelve 
I received a report from the State Department. They heard from the 
British and Dutch about the intercept messages. 

I reported this morning tlie Australians reported they did not get 
any such message, and that the British reported tliey haven't, but that 
report was not quite complete. They say some message got into 
Singapore 6 hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, and we are taking 
steps to get the text of that, to see what kind of message it was. 

The Dutch said they haven't. 

I also should have said this morning that the FBI have reported 
to us they have no trace of ever having had it, and having it in their 
file. 

About this difficulty about mimeographing, I want to state addi- 
tions to my staff would not help us any. It is a question of getting 
the mimeographing and photostatic equipment and the trained men. 
We are using now the mimeographing [2661] and photostatic 
equipment and personel of the Navy Department, and that in the War 
Department, and the central mimeographing and photostatic equip- 
ment, and if there are any other mimeographs stationed around that 
I could get hold of I would be glad to take possession of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, will the committee be presented 
with that information? I have in mind the exact information that 
comes in on this so-called winds message. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I have not had it mimeographed because it is 
not complete. I wanted to do a complete job and hand it all to the 
committee in advance of our proposed arrangement to have the winds 
message taken up as a special order. 

I have now one report from the FBI, and I have letters from the 
State Department. I have one copy, I think, and maybe more, and 
I think that has been mimeographed, of the report from General Mac- 
Arthur. I will give you mimeographed copies as we get them. 

The Chairman. The Chair understands that the counsel is now 
reporting informally but later he will give the committee the official 
report to which he referred. 

Mr. Mitchell. The only reason I brought this up this morning was 
that once before I was criticized by allowing certain members of the 
committee to proceed in an examination that assumed certain facts 
to be so when I had information in [2662] my possession and 
kept quiet on it, so that they were proceeding on a false assumption. 
1 was merely trying to aid the committee so they can guide their own 
questions and not make assumptions of fact which might not turn out 
to be so. 

I also did it because, as I say, before General Marshall was called 
we expected to give the committee the full record on the thing, and, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1011 

not being able to do it, I thought I ought to make an attempt, at least, 
to show the state of the inquiry. 

The Chairman. The committee appreciates that. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, the thing that disturbs me, as a 
member of the committee, is the fact — and it can be indicated here — 
that counsel has drawn certain conclusions. I am unwilling to draw 
any conclusions at this time, until the committee has all of the sworn 
testimony and evidence before it. 

I am quite disturbed over the fact that, on this particular evidence, 
it api^ears that counsel is drawing certain conclusions at this particular 
moment, prior to the committee getting the exact evidence upon which 
those conclusions are drawn. 

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to state that he hopes, and I am 
sure the whole committee hopes, that the committee as a w^hole and 
as individual members will draw no conclusions about any phase of 
this investigation until the whole testimony [2663] is in. The 
Chair understood counsel to be merely trying to bring the committee 
up to date as of today, in view^ of the disarrangement of the program 
and schedule made necessary by General Marshall's earlier appearance. 
The chairman did not understand that counsel was drawling any con- 
clusions, except reporting up to this hour, or up to this morning, what 
had been found or had not been found in regard to official records and 
documents. 

Mr. Mitchell. I did say this. Senator, I said on the record as it 
stood up to date I had grave doubts as to whether the wnnds intercept 
messages, indicating war with the United States, had ever been sent 
out, and I expressly reserve the right to change my view after I have 
heard all the rest of the testimony on it. 

Now, I do not think a man is going to be blamed for having serious 
doubt, on the present state of the record, about it. I am guilty of that, 
I admit, for whatever it is worth. I never got this far in a lawsuit 
before without having some idea of what the probabilities of the case 
were. I do not think I would be worth anything as a lawyer if I didn't. 

The Chairman. Of course the committee understands that any of 
our doubts, or I might say any of our preconceived notions can be 
subject to change in view of evidence that may be brought to the com- 
mittee, and therefore we have all proceeded [2664.] on the 
theory that we are open-minded on any proposition respecting this 
investigation until the whole evidence is in. 

At any stage of the hearing we may have some doubts about some- 
thing that has been done up to date, but we will not make up our minds 
until all the evidence is completed. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering whether or not 
the difficulty does not arise somewhat from the unusual relationship 
of the counsel in this hearing. We all more or less recognize our 
places. I take it that the counsel necessarily takes a position that 
this hearing is quasi-judicial, so that his expression of opinion in this 
fashion, before the evidence is all in, does have a little anticipatory 
aspect. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Brew^ster. Certainly. 

The Chairman. It will undoubtedly be overcome by evidence that 
any such message was received. 



1012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let us hear the witness. 

The Chairman. The committee will proceed with the witness. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. General Gerow, you were about to give a statement 
of your summary of the respective functions of the Army and the 
Navy at Oahu under the existing plans with respect to defense in an 
air attack. 

General Gerow, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is, the plans up to December 7, 1941. 

[2665] General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you please do that. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. [Reading:] 

1. The broad responsibilities of the Army and Navy in Hawaii were contained 
in Army and Navy war plans prepared and issued to the Army and Navy Com- 
manders in Hawaii. These responsibilities were expi*essed in the various plans 
in terms of joint missions and separate Army and Navy missions. With the 
exception as indicated below, these missions are stated identically in all war 
plans current in 1941, as follows : 

JOINT MISSION 

To hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect ship- 
ping in the Coastal Zone. 

NAVY MISSION 

To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to 
support the Army forces. 

ARMY MISSION 

To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces, and against hostile 
sympathizers ; to support the Naval forces. 

2. In the most recent plan the phrase in the Army mission "to support the 
Naval Forces" was deleted, and the following was substituted : "Support Naval 
Forces in the [2666] protection of the sea communications of the Asso- 
ciated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive 
action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius 
of occupied air bases." 

That is the statement of the Army mission as it appears in Rain- 
bow 5. 

I desire to invite the attention of the committee to : 

3. It should be noted that in all cases the missions called for mutual support. 

4. Based on these broad missions the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, and the Navy Commander in Hawaii agreed to accept certain responsibili- 
ties for defense against air attack. These agreements are to be found in the 
various local joint plans and the separate plans of the Army and Navy In Hawaii. 
The basic current plans in Hawaii on December 7, 1941 were : The Joint Coastal 
Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941, and the Army and 
Navy Operations Orders and agreements based thereon. These plans and agree- 
ments contain the following major provisions pertaining to defense against air 
attack : 

I shall discuss, first, antiaircraft defense. 

The responsibility of the Army for antiaircraft defense was as 
follows : 

Army— (1) "Shall provide for: a. The * * * anti- [266^] aircraft 
defense of Oahu." 

(2) Army Antiaircraft, "supported by Naval Units placed under the tactical 
control of the Army, will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by hostile aix- 
ci-aft." 

(3) The Army, "Arrange for such coordination of the antiaircraft artillery 
fire of naval ships in Pearl Harbor and the Army antiaircraft defense as may 
be practicable. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMltTEE 1013 

The Navy's responsibility was : 

"The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District * * * are taking cer- 
tain security measures, which include : 

"(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and distri- 
bution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Ilarhor. * * * 

In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus 
all Fleet aviation shorebased on Oahu, will augment the local air defense. 

"The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District * * * shall: (a) exercise 
with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, (b) 
Arrange with the Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced." ♦ * * 

"(d) Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the base defense." 

I have drawn some conclusions from those different agreements. 
They are mine. 

[2668] I believe that the commanders on the ground that made 
these agreements are in a much better position to interpret them, and 
say exactly what their intentions were at the time, than I am, but 
these are the conclusions that I have drawn from those paragraphs : 

The orders and agreements on the part of the local Army and Navy Com- 
manders lead to the conclusion primary responsibility for antiaircraft defense 
rested with the Army but that the Navy had a secondary responsibility in con- 
nection therewith. 

I go next to the Aircraft Warning Service. 

The responsibility of the Army for antiaircraft warning service was : 

(1) The Army "shall provide for : * * * 

b. "An antiaircraft * * * intelligence and warning service.'' 

The Navy responsibility was : 

During the period prior to the completion of the aircraft warning service instal- 
lation, the Navy, through use of radar, and other appropriate means will endeavor 
to give such warning of hostile attacks that may be practicable." 

My conclusion with regard to the aircraft warning service is as 
follows : 

The Army had primary responsibility for the establish- [2669] ment of 
an aircraft warning service. The Navy, however, agreed to furnish such means 
as it had, pending the installation of the Army facilities then under construction. 

Mr. Mitchell. Does that relate to what we have called radar, or is 
it broader than that ? 

General Gerow. It relates to radar, sir. 

I might say in that connection that I understand that the radar on 
Navy ships is not particularly effective when there is an intervening 
terrain obstacle. It is all right across the water, but not so effective 
when close to an intervening article. 

Aircraft defense : I have broken it down into three phases ; the re- 
connaissance phase, the defensive air phase, and the offensive air phase. 
I state first the reconnaissance phase. 

The responsibility of the Army : 

(1) "Shall provide for: 

* * it: 

"Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the Oahu Defensive 
Coastal Area in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol." 

The responsibility of the Navy : 

(1) Navy "shall provide for: a. An inshore patrol, b. An offshore patrol 
* * * i. Distant reconnaissance. 

[2670] (2) "When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and 
search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be 



1014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search opera- 
tions." 

Defensive air, I shall discuss next. 

The Army 's responsibility for defensive air operations is: 

The Army was responsible for : 

b. "Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will 
be executed under the tactical command of the Army." 

The Navy responsibilities were . 

(1) "Each commander will * * * make available without delay to the 
other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the cir- 
fumstances warrant." 

(2) "With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of 
tighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable." 

I turn now to offensive air operations. 
The Army will : 

"(7. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea within 
range of Army bombers." 

The Navy's responsibility 

[£671] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may we have order? 
I can't hear the witness for the buzzing that is on the right. 
The Chairman. The committee will be in order. 
General Gerow. The Navy responsibilities. The Navy : 

(1) "Shall provide for * * * j. Attacking enemy naval forces." 

(2) "Joint air attacks upon ho.'^tile surface vessels will be executed under the 
tactical command of the Navy." 

My conclusions, as to the responsibility for aircraft operations in 
defense of Oahu against attack from aircraft are as follows : 

The Navy was primarily responsible for close and distant aerial reconnaissance 
and offensive air operations against hostile surface craft. The Army was pri- 
marily responsible for defensive air operations. Regardless of the service pri- 
marily responsible, the opposite service was charged with supporting the opera- 
tion within the means available to it. 

To summarize, it will be seen from the above analysis that : 

(a) Definite plans and agreements existed in Hawaii for defense against 
aircraft ; 

(b) Although the Army had the primary responsibility [261/2] for anti- 
aircraft defense, aircraft warning service and defensive air operations and the 
Navy had the primai-y responsibility for close and distant reconnaissance, and 
offensive air operations, each sei-vice was charged with augmenting the forces 
of the other with the means available to them in order to provide the maximum 
effective defense. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, returning for a moment to these 
three joint plans, the Singapore plan, the British conversations, and 
the Canadian plan that we took up this morning, were any deploy- 
ments, or steps ever taken by the United States prior to December 7 
to put any of those plans into operation? December 7, 1941. You 
told us that the British and Dutch plans were never approved and 
only the Canadian had been finally approved. I want to know 
whether approved or not approved, the United States ever put those 
plans, or any part of them into effect before December 7, the joint 
plans, if you know? 

General Gerow. I don't believe, sir, I can answer that question 
oft'hand. We certainly made some preliminary dispositions so we 
would be prepared to carry out those plans but without studying the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1015 

liistory of the orders prior to December 7, sir, I prefer not to answer 
that question. 

[^6'/'^] Mr. MrrciiELL. You will kindly look tluil up for us so 
that when you return to the stand after General Marshall has testified 
you may be able to answer, please. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could any of these other nations, as you read these 
joint plans, put them into effect without the consent of the United 
States, so as at any time to obligate or make necessary that the United 
States do likewise ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, in this matter of preparation of war plans, 
whether our own plans or jointly with some other nation, has it been 
the practice of the War Plans Division from time immemorial to make 
all sorts of plans about war operations on the contingency that some 
day or other we might be involved in hostilities with other nations? 

General Gerow. Oh, yes, sir. We had at all times kept current 
plans for operations against any major power or combination of 
major powers, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is, you didn't make any distinction, generally, 
between those we wei'e friendly with and those we were unfriendly 
with. Do you have plans against everybody practically^ 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, at one time I think we had plans against 
most everybody, sir, and I think that is the [2674] practice 
of every general staff of every nation. 

]\Ir. Mitchell. It is partly a matter of training in drawing plans 
and partly a matter of being ready if trouble comes ; is that it 'i 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And that is especially true, of course, in the situa- 
tion where our foreign relations with any particular nation are be- 
coming tense? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. We concentrate then on a particular 
plan that pertains to that nation. 

Mr. Mitchell. If the General Staff did not do that and got caught 
without any plans if hostilities started, it would be a rather sickly 
situation for the General Staff, would it not? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. We would be accused of neglecting our 
duty. 

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to this pink book, telegraph 
messages between the War Department and Hawaii from July 8 to 
December 7, 1941. It has been offered in evidence as Exhibit 'V2. You 
have examined that, have you? 

General Gerow\ Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell us whether you knew about those 
messages or had copies available to you at or about the time they 
were sent, what the practice was about that? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I knew about most of these [2676] 
messages. There are one or two that I didn't know about, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Can you identify those that you didn't know about? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I do not believe that I had the copy 
of the message referred to in this document at page 19, sir, dated the 
4th of December. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 3 4 



1016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchfxj:,. That is a dispatch from the commanding general 
at Hawai to the Chief of the Army Air Corps ; is that the one you 
refer to? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; on page 19, sir. 

Mr. MiTciiFXL. How did these dispatches come to you? Some of 
tliem you participated in preparing, did you ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. Some of them are what might be called 
joint messages prepared by the war plans of both the Army and Navy 
working together. Others were messages that were prepared in the 
War Department for submission to the Chief of Staff for approval. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Counsel, if I may interject, this exhibit you 
are now referring to, the folder I have shows December 10. That 
must be an error, 

Mr. Mitchell. What page ? 

Senator Lucas. Page 19. Exhibit 32. Is that the correct date? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

[2676'] Senator Lucas. That came after the Pearl Harbor 
attack. 

Mr. Gesell. There is an earlier message, Senator Lucas, from Gen- 
eral Short, which appears earlier. This one, however, I think, was 
dated December 10. 

Senator Lucas. All right. I apologize for interrupting. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Mr. Gesell. That may have been sent somewhat earlier. I think 
the December 10 date is the arrival date. 

Mr. Mitchell. It says on it, "Received December 10." 

Mr. Murphy. It says, at the beginning, "December 4, No. 1033." 
"No. 1033 December 4th." Right below "Chief Army Air Corps," 
top of the page on the left. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. Sent on the 4th, received on the 10th. 

The Chairman, All right. 

[2677] Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, on November 21, 1941, I 
understand you attended a conference with Secretary Hull, Admiral 
Stark, and Messrs. Hornbeck, Hamilton, and Ballantine, of the State 
Department, and I will ask you to refer to your memorandum of 
November 21 to the Secretary of State, part of Exhibit 18. Have you 
that before you? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I have that exhibit, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was a memorandum you made of the conference 
that was held on the 21st, was it, at the time you made it ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And it correctly records the proceedings at the meet- 
ing as you remembered them on the 24th of November 1941 ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Why don't you read it? 

Mr. Mitchell. Shall I read it? It is in evidence. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is a memorandum to the Chief of Staff". "Subject : 
Far Eastern Situation," dated November 24, 1941, and signed by 
General Gerow. It says [reading from Exhibit No. 18] : 

A conference was held in the State Department at 9 : 45 a. m., November 21, 
1941. Present : Secretary Hull, Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, Admiral Stark, and 
[2678] General Gerow. Secretary Hull requested the Army and Navy rep- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1017 

representatives to express tlieir iiifonnul views from a military standpoint on a 
draft of a; tentative outline of a basis for agreement with Japan. (Tab A.) 
He explained that the outline was in a formative stage and had not been adopted 
by the State Department. 

The varions provisions were discussed. Both Admiral Stark and General 
Gerow were of the opinion that, in general ; the document was satisfactory 
from a military viewpoint. They requested, however, an opportunity to make 
a more detailed study of its possible effect on the military situation. It was 
agreed that comments would be submitted early the same afternoon. 

The comments of Admiral Stark (Tab B) and my own (Tab C) are attached. 
I informed Admiral Stark verbally that I regretted the reference to Army forces 
in the Navy comments on provisions A 1. I feel that no restrictions should be 
placed on Army's preparations to make the Philippines secure. 

I informed the Secretary of War and General Dryden verbally of the con- 
ference. 

(Signed) L. T. Gerow, 

Brigadier General. 

Do you remember what that related to? 

[2679'] General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was it? That is, the document that Secre- 
tary Hull said was a tentative outline of a basis for agreement with 
Japan? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; it was a proposal, a tentative draft pro- 
posal for delivery to Japan of a modus vivendi. 

Mr. Mitchell. You got into the modus vivendi picture at that time 
then, did you? 

General Gerow\ Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you make a subsequent memorandum for the 
Secretar}^ of State on that subject? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I did. 

Mr. Mitchell. Or was it an earlier one ? 

General Gerow. I made one the same afternoon of the conference, 
November the 21st, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I see. The memorandum I just read to you to the 
Chief of Staff was made on the 24th and related to the conference on 
the 21st. Now, the memorandum I am just calling your attention to 
was made on the same day as the conference, was it? 

General Geroav. Yes, sir. It was agreed we would put in our views 
on the State Department paper that same afternoon, sir. 

[2680'] Mr. Mitchell. And this one I have just referred to is 
your view on that? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. As 3^ou made it then ? 

General Gerow. The one dated November the 21st. 

Mr. Mitchell. That has been offered but not read. Shall I read it? 

The Chairmax. Read it; yes. 

Mr. Keefe. What is the exhibit number? 

Mr. Mitchell. It was part of Exhibit 18. There were several docu- 
ments together. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is a memorandum for the Secretary of State. 
Maybe you should take a shot at it. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I will read it. 

Senator Ferguson. May I interrupt ? Both are part of Exhibit 18 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 



1018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Tlie Chairman. Go ahead. General. 

General Gerow. This is a nieniorandnm headed [reading; from 

Exhibit No. 18] : 

War Department, 
War Department General Staff, 

War Plans Division. 
Washington, l<lovemher 21, 19^1. 

[268/1 

Meinoi'aiKluiri foi' the Secivtary of State. 

Subject : Far Eastern Situation. 

War Plans Division has made a hasty study from a military viewpoint of your 
tentative "Outline of Proposed Bases for Agreement between the United Statjes 
and .Japan." and perceives no objection to its use as a basis for discussion. The 
adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives — 
the avoidance of war with .Tapan. Even a tempf)rary peace in the Pacific would 
permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same 
time insure continuance of material assistance to the British — both of which 
are highly important. 

The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to all 
the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. War Plans Division wishes to 
emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe 
that we reach a modus vivendi with .Tapan. 

War Plans Division suggests the deletion of paragraph B. — 5. The proposal 
contained in that paragraph would probably be entirely unacceptable to Russia. 
The geo- [2682^ graphical lay-out in the Manchurian-Siberian area is such 
that military time and space factors are all in favor of Japan. Furthermore, it 
would be most difficult to reach an agreement as to what are "equivalent forces" 
and the measures to be taken to insure tliat no unauthorized increases are made 
in those forces. Such an arrangement would increase the vulnerability of the 
Russian position, particularly in the Maritime Provinces, and at the same time 
remove the very real threat to Japanese cities of the Russian air bases therein. 
From the United States viewpoint, it is greatly to our advantage to have the pos- 
sibility of access to Silierian airfields securely guarded by a potential ally. 

The' paper has been considered as a whole. If major changes are made in its 
provisions, it is requested that the War Department be given an opportunity to 
consider the military aspects of such changes. 

The Thief of Staff is out of the city and consequently this paper has not been 
presented for bis consideration. War Plans Division believes that he would 
concur in the views expressed above. 

(Signed) L. T. GEn?ow, 

Brigadier General, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff. 

[26SS] Mr. Mitchell. Now, you had a meeting again on No- 
vember 24. General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Under Secretary 
Welles, and yourself, and possibly others, were present. Have you 
any memorandum of that meeting? Do you have a record of such a 
meeting? Do you remember anything about it? 

General Gerow. I cannot recall at this time, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, at this meeting on the 21st, when this 
proposed modus vivendi message was under consideration, do you 
remember the discussions that took place at that meeting beyond your 
memorandums? 

General Gerow. No, sir. The memorandum would be much more 
correct than my memory at this time, sir. I cannot recall the details. 

Mr. Mitchell. During your conferences with the State Department 
people about the modus vivendi, do you recollect having had your at- 
tention called to a message from Mr. Churchill in which he said it 
was all right with Great Britain, but how about the Chinese, and it 
was rather thin diet for the Chinese? Do you remember having 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1019 

l)rouglit to your attention the message from Chiang Kai-shek in which 
he protested against the modus vivendi because it would result in the 
collapse of the Chinese Army and defense? Do you remember any- 
thing about that? 

General Gerow. I do not recall this message; no, sir. [2684-] 
I attended this particular conference in the absence of the Chief of 
Stalf, and that may have been discussed at some other conference at 
which I was not present. I do not recall that, however. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have more than one meeting that you at- 
tended with State De])artment people — here was Welles, of the State 
Department, not Mr. Hull — that dealt with this modus vivendi? Can 
30U recall more than the one? 

General Geroav. I can only recall the one, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, did you know at the time that the modus 
vivendi idea was going to be abandoned ? 

General Geroav. I do not recall that I knew that, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have a part in drafting the warning mes- 
sage sent by the War Department to General Short on November 27, 
1941? 

General Gerow^ Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What function had the War Plans Division in send- 
ing a message of that character ? 

General Gero\v. It was the responsibility of War Plans Division to 
prepare such draft messages for consideration of the Chief of Staff 
or the Secretary of War, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, do I understand that it was not your 
function to send merely information messages? Weren't you con- 
fined to sending messages that had to do with [2685] active 
operations or orders? 

General Gerow\ Yes, sir. The responsibilities of War Plans Divi- 
sion were confined to operational messages. The sending of purely 
information was the responsibility of the G-2 Intelligence Section, 
sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. So the reason that you were brought into this warn- 
ing message was because it had something in it that directed some 
deployments or action on the part of the addressee; was that it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. It would require operations on the part 
of the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you your memorandum of November 27, 1941, 
to the Chief of Staff about that? Do you have a copy of it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have a photostat copy of it. 

Mv. Mitchell. We will mark that Iilxhibit 45. It has not j^et been 
introduced. I offer it. 

The Vice Chairman. It has been distributed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. It was distributed yesterday. Congressman Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. It may be received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 45" and 
follows.) 

[%'86] Mr. Mitchell. Will you please read that memorandum 
that you wrote to the Chief of Staff? Read all the notes at the top 
of it as well. 



1020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(ieneral Gerow, Yes, sir. [Reading:] 

War Department 
wae department general staff 

War Plans Division 

Washington. 
WPD 4544-13. 

Mr. Mitchell. How does the first sentence start out so I can be sure 
I have the same thing? 

General Gerow. "The Secretary of War sent for me." 

Mr. Mitchell. That is it. Well, you read the photostat then. 

General Gerow. Very well, sir. 

Dated 11/27/41. Initials "C. A. G." Dated November 27, 1941. 
There is a number "4544-13." Under that, "November the 28th, 1941. 
Noted: Chief of Staff" with initials that I cannot decipher. Also 
"Noted : Deputy Chief of Staff," with the same initials which I cannot 
decipher. [Reading from Exhibit No. 45 :] 

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff : 
Subject : Far Eastern Situation. 

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9 : 30 a. m., November 27, 1941. 
General Bryden was present. [2687] The Secretary wanted to know what 
warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. 
I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. I then 
showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. 
He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. 
Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility 
of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. 
I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and preimre an appropriate cablegram. 

2. Later in the morning, I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, 
Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and 
Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General 
MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached). The Secretaries 
were informed of the projwsed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be 
prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the 
memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President 
that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that 
point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries 
before dispatch. 

[2688] 3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the 
Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. 
These were made (copy attached). 

(Signed) L. T. Gerow, 

Brigadier General, 
Acting Chief of Staff. 

Then there is a notation, "Filed in O. C. S." "2 Incls : Memo, for 
President, 11-27-41; Memo, for TAG, 11-27-41." 

And then written in : "Copy in General Gerow's book" and initials 
which I cannot decipher. The figures "11-28," Other figures 
"—11-27-41." 

Then "Memorandum for TAG, 11-27-41." Then written in, "File 
in OAS record room." Then at the bottom lower right hand corner, 
"OCS-18" — it appears to be "36-125." Two letters there which I 
cannot decipher. Then "11-28-41." 

The Vice Chairman. Is this Exhibit 45 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of counsel if that 
does correctly represent the copy furnished the committee ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1021 

Mr, ISIiTCHELL, No. The only difference is these different routings 
and notations on the bottom of it. 

[£6S9] Senator Ferguson. But it does show who received it on 
the photostatic copy but not on the other? 

Mr. Mitchell. The mimeogi^aphed copy contains these notations: 
"Noted: Chief of Staff, November 28" and "Noted: Deputy Chief of 
Staff" with the same date. The only difference is some of these rout- 
ings or dates that are immaterial. The notations of who received it 
are on the mimeograph. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, at this meeting that you spoke about 
where the Secretary of War sent for you, was there considered at that 
meeting a draft of a proposed message to Hawaii, Panama, and other 
places, or only at that time the MacArthur message ? Do you remem- 
ber about that? 

General Gerow. The conference w^as directed primarily to the 
message to the Philippines and the commanding general of the Far 
East, but the other messages, as I recall, were discussed and I referred 
in my memorandum to that fact. There were various messages to 
the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre discussed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Can you tell in your own way, independently of this 
memorandum, just what happened at that meeting, or can you add any- 
thing to the memorandum? 

General Gerow. I believe now, sir, that I w^as in the office at the 
time that the Secretary of War telephoned to the [2690'] Sec- 
retary of State. I believe that I heard one end of the conversation. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is, you were in the Secretary's office? 

General Gerow. In the Secretary of War's office, yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell, And you heard him telephone the Secertary of 
State? 

General Gerow. That is my recollection ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And you heard one end of the conversation ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Mitchell. And then what did the Secretary of War report 
that vou remember as to what the other end of the telephone had 
said?"' 

General Gerow. The Secretary, after he had completed this conver- 
sation, stated to me that it is too abrupt to say the negotiations shall 
terminate, that the Secretary of State won't quite go along with that. 
"He says to all intents and purposes," I recall, "with the barest possi- 
bilities of their being resumed" and based on that I cannot recall 
whether I noted the exact wording in the message that was sent, or 
whether the Secretary wrote it down in his own handwriting. I can- 
not recall at this time, sir. 

\2€91'] Mr. Mitchell. Well, you are speaking now of the mes- 
sage to the Philippines? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; the message to the Philippines, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you used that same phrase in your message 
later to Hawaii, didn't you? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. The Philippines message, which was, I 
know, definitely approved by the Secretary of War, formed a basis for 
the preparation of the other messages to the other three commanders 
in the Pacific area. 



1022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. In other words, the War Plans Division took upon 
itself the task of drafting in its own way the messages to the other 
commanders on the basis of the one that had been agreed upon for 
the Philippines, was that what had happened ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; but I cannot recall whether all of them 
were presented to the Secretary of War later on for approval or not ; 
I cannot recall at this time, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I notice that so far as concerns the dispatch to 
General Short and the one from the Navy to Admiral Kimmel, the 
Navy did not put any qualification about negotiations being resumed, 
did they ? 

General Gerow. I cannot remember exactly what happened about 
the Navy message that was sent. I believe it was [^692] 
written earlier, prior to the conversation that I had with the Secre- 
tary of War, and I believe that it might have been sent prior to the 
dis])atch of the message that was sent by War Plans Division. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the Navy was not present then when this con- 
versation between the Secretary of War with Secretary Hull over the 
telephone took place. Is that your recollection? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I believe that the Secretary of the Navy 
and Admiral Stark were both there at the time of that conversation 
but I cannot be sure, sir. I cannot accurately state whether that was 
my first conference that I had with the Secretary of War when he 
called up or the second one, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well. I will call your attention to this : The message 
which you drafted for General Marshall, to go over General Marshall's 
name to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department says : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with 
only the barest possibilities that the .Japanese Government might come back 
and offer to continue. 

That was put in there at the suggestion of Secretary Stimson after 
talking with Mr. Hull over the telephone, as I understand it. 

[2693] General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, the Navy message of the same date from the 
Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief of the Pacific 
Fleet says this : 

This dispatch is to* be considered a war warning. Stop. Negotiations with 
Japan looking towards stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased 
and aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. 

Now, there is a difference between those and it is evident, I think, 
that the Navy dispatch did not know anything about the conversation 
with Mr. Hull or the man who wrote the Navy dispatch. So are 
you sure that the Navy was pfesent at this conference that you spoke 
about, which you and General Bryden attended with the Secretary 
of War? 

General GER0w^ I am sure that the Navy was not present at the first 
conference. I am positive that Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark 
were present at the second conference. 

Mr. Mitchell. You say : 

Later in the morning I attended a conference with Secretary of War and 
Navy and Admiral Stark. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE . 1023 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you romember whether at that second confer- 
ence at which the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral \3694^\ 
Stark were present their attention was called to the fact that Mr. Hull 
wanted to water down the statement that it was a complete breach or 
termination of negotiations with Japan ( Do you have any recollec- 
tion about that ? 

General Gerow. Well, the entire message was discussed. I cannot 
recall now^ whether there was any particular reference to that par- 
ticular sentence. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, do you remember anything further about the 
discussion other than what you have stated in your memorandum 
here of November 27, 1941 ? Does anything come back to you that I 
haven't asked you about ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I cannot remember anything else, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, the original draft of the message that was 
prepared to send to the commanding general of the Hawaiian De- 
partment contained, I understand, some phrase about sabotage, did 
it not? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you seen Exhibit o(\, the photostat copy of the 
original draft? 

General Gerow\ I have a photostat copy, sir. I imagine it is the 
same one that you have, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is it. I call your attention to the fact that in 
this draft, dated November 27, which was a memo- [3695] ran- 
dum for the Adjutant General through the Secretary of the General 
Staff, says : 

The Secretary of War directs that the following, considered as a priority- 
message, be dispatched by cable, radio, or telegraph to each of the following : 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department ; Commanding General of 
the Caribbean Defense Command. 

Then there is a line : 

also to the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command. 

and that seems to be stricken out. 

Do you see that? 

General Gerow\ Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And then at the bottom of that page in the draft 
are these words : 

Needed measnres for protection against subversive activities should be taken 
immediately. 

A line is draw^n through those words and the initials "L. T. G." 
there. Did you cause both those deletions to be made ( The upper 
. one does not seem to be your deletion. 

General Gerow. No, sir, the upper one is not my initials. I do not 
know who made that, sir, but I do positively recall making the 
deletion which referred to subversive activities, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. How" did that, or at whose instance did \3696] 
that original statement about subversive activities get into the draft, 
do you know"? 

General Gerow. No, sir. Some time during the preparation of this 
message by the officers of AVar Planes Division under ni}^ instructions 
that phrase was inserted. Whether it was done after a conference 



1024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

with G-2 or not, I do not recall it, but when it was brought to me 
for approval I objected to the inclusion in the message. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. On what ground? 

General Geeow. This message Avas intended to warn the command- 
ing general of the Hawaiian Department of the possibility of an 
attack from without, not against subversive activities, so I asked for 
a meeting — 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean not only against surversive activities? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, but primarily directed against the possi- 
bility of an attack from without. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, except for that sentence that you struck out, 
there isn't a word in the draft about subversive activities or sabotage? 

General Geroav. No, sir. That was primarily a responsibility of 
G-2, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And you state you struck it out because you did not 
want it limited, is that the idea, or you did not [2697] want 
any specific danger to be mentioned. What is your recollection about 
that? 

General Gerow. AVell, I wanted to be sure that this message would 
cover only — that this message could be interpreted only as warning 
the commanding general in Hawaii against an attack from without. 

Mr. Mitchell. So it was stricken out at your suggestion? 

General Gerow. At a conference held that afternoon in the oj(Rce 
of General Bryclen, attended by General Miles and Colonel Bundy 
and myself, there was quite a considerable discussion. It was finally 
agreed that the phrase should be stricken out and it was also agreed 
that General Miles would send a message to G-2 of the Hawaiian 
Department with regard to being on guard against subversive 
activities. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, can you remember anything more about the 
discussion relating to striking out those two lines? 

General Gerow. No, sir, except the fact that I did not feel it to 
be appropriate to include a reference to subversive activities in this 
War Plans Division operational message. 

Mr. Mitchell. You made that point at the conference, you mean? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

[2698] Mr. Mitchell. And who urged the other view, if any- 
body did, that the subversive activities be mentioned in the main 
dispatch ? Do you have any recollection about that ? 

General Gerow. General Miles felt very strongly, as I recall, sir, 
that some reference to subversive activities, protection against subver- 
sive activities should be transmitted to the commanding general in 
Hawaii. 

Mr. Mitchell. And it was settled that it should not be in the main 
warning but would take the form of another sabotage dispatch from 
the G-2 in Washington to the G-2 officer on General Short's staff? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know at the time of the sending of the sec- 
ond subversive and sabotage message over General Adams' signature 
and the other one over General Arnold's, at his request? Did you 
know about those ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I attended a conference with regard to 
that message, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1025 

Mr. Mitchell. Whom was the conference with? 

General Gerow. As I recall 

Mr. Mitchell. There are two messages I am referring to, one over 
Adams' name and the other one over the Chief of the Air Corps' 
signature. 

General Gerow. I do not recall the one over the signa- [2699] 
ture of the Chief of Air Corps. I do recall the one that was sent over 
the signature of Adams. That was a conference attended by General 
Miles and, as I recall, General Scanlon and myself. I do not recall 
who else was present. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember the nature of the discussion ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. The discussion revolved, as I recall, 
largely around the fact that General Miles was concerned that in pre- 
venting subversive activities that the military might exceed authority 
and cause some difficulties. 

Mr. Mitchell. That the miiltary might what ? 

General Gerow\ Might apply 

Mr. Mitchell. Illegal measures ? 

General Gerow. Well, not illCigal measures, no, sir, but measures 
that might antagonize the 

Mr. Mitchell. People ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I am not clear in my mind, sir, on that 
particular message because that was a G-2 responsibility and I was 
called into that conference only incidentally. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, do you remember anything about the other 
message, sabotage messages that went forward over General Arnold's 
signature ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was addressed to the commanding gen- 
[2700] eral of the Hawaiian Department ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not recall that message. 

Mr. Mitchell. Under date of November 28. It was sent over Gen- 
eral Adams' signature, but the last two words are "Signed — Arnold." 
That would be an Air Corps message? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I do not recall being in on the prepara- 
tion of that message, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have referred to you for examination the 
reports of the various commanders to whom these warning messages 
had been sent, the Army commanders? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. Those reports came over my desk, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You saw the report from General Short on Novem- 
ber 28, 1941, 5 : 57 a. m. ? Would that be Honolulu time? 

General Gerow. May I find the report, sir? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is on page 12 of exhibit 32, the pink book cover- 
ing telegraph messages between the War Department and Hawaii. 
Do you have it ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. 5 : 37 a. m. That means Honolulu time as you under- 
stand it? 

General Geroav. I do not know, sir. That is put on by the Signal 
Corps and I do not know, sir. 



1026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. I see. That report reads this way : 

[2701] Report Department alerted to prevent Sabotage Period Liaison 
with Navy REURAD Pour Seven Two Twenty Seventh. SHORT. 

Now. I will ask you to look at the one from MacArthur on the pre- 
vious page, page 11, which reads: 

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnaissance 
has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy Stop Ground 
security measures have been taken Stop Within tlie limitations imposed by 
present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readi- 
ness for the conduct of a successful defense Stop Intimate liaison and coop- 
eration and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy. 

You got also a telegram from General Andrews, Is that Frank M. 
Andrews in the Caribbean area? 

General (tekow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Under date of November 28, on page 10 of PLxhibit 
32. His answer is: 

REURAD four six one November twenty seven signed Marshall report re- 
(piested being foi'warded air mail. 

And on page 18, 18-A and 18-B of this Exhibit 32 we find (General 
Andrews' report that came in by air mail in response to the message 
you sent hiuL He says : 

[2702] Naval measures. At the present time, it is believed that the de- 
fensive measures for the Caribbean Defen.«e Command center largely around 
the Panama Canal; however, a plan for furnishing Army support to the Navy 
has been worked out and coordinated with the various Naval commanders in 
the Cai'ibbean Theater. In the Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th 
Naval District is cunducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within 
the Pamana Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft 
at his disposal, by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th 
Naval District does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control 
for adequate reconnaissance. 

Did you see that report from General Andrews? 

General Gerow. I believe that I did, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you see also the one from General Dewitt on 
page 15, which goes at length into the measures he had taken? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, I believe that I did. 

Mr. INIrrcHELL. Was (leneral Marshall out of the city on the 27th 
Avhen the w^arning message was sent over his name? 

General Gerow. To the best of my recollection and belief he was, 
sir. 

[2703] Mr. ]\Iitchell. Do you know whether he had anything 
to do with the draft of it before he left? 

General Gerow. There was some discussion of a message, informal 
discussion, at the Joint Board meeting. I do not recall the details 
of that discussion, sir. 

Mr. ^Iitchell. That was a meeting at which General Marshall was 
in attendance? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. How long before the 27th ? 

General Gerow. That was the day preceding, sir; the 26th. 

Mr. Mitchell. On the 26th ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. At the time you received Short's reply was your at- 
tention directed to the brevity of it as compared with the other re- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1027 

ports, the reports that you had received from other commanding 
officers ? 

General Gerow. No, sir, it was not. The procedure in the War 
Plans Division at that time was for the executive officer to bring to my 
desk for information copies of important messages and letters. This 
document came to my desk and was initialed by me. It was then routed 
to the proper section of War Plans Division, which in this instance 
would be the Plans group, headed by Colonel P)un(ly who is now 
dead. I did not see this message from General Short again prior to 
December the 7th. I stated in my 

[2704] Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute. I show you a photostat 
of General MacArthur's report of action taken of November 28, to 
which is attached a photostat of General Short's report, and attached 
to that is a routing sheet, and I will ask you, have you that before you? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, I have that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would the routing sheet show w^iether those two 
reports were attached together as they were routed through the de- 
partment. Could you tell? The routing sheet shows two message 
numbers, doesn't it ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I am trying to identify those numbers. 

Mr. Mitchell. Look at the lower right-hand corner of each of the 
two messages, and you get the number as shown on the routing sheet, 
do 3^ou not ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. So it is quite obvious, is it not, from these docu- 
ments that MacArthur's report and Short's report were fastened to- 
gether w^ith a single routing sheet as they came to your hand ? I no- 
tice, "Noted W. P. D." with your initials on it on the first message. 
That is right, isn't it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And the same thing on the second message? 

[2705] General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will offer this in evidence as Exhibit No. 46. 

The Chairman. All right, that will be accepted as Exhibit 46. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 46.") 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice also on the MacArthur message "Noted 
H. S." Is that Secretary Stimson ? 

General Gerow. It looks like his signature ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Like his own writing? It says under it "Stimson." 
What does that mean? Is that somebody's else writing? 

General Gerow. I should say so ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Are the initials in "Noted H. S." Mr. Stimson's 
initials, do you know? 

General Gerow. They look to me like they are, sir, from what I can 
remember of his writing. 

Mr. Mitchell. And underneath that "Noted L. T. G." Can you 
tell which one of you saw it first? Would the routing message show 
that? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I cannot tell from this who saw it first. 

Mr. Mitchell. The same thing appears on the Short [2706] 
report on the next photostat page. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 



1028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice at the top of MacArthur's message on the 
fight, the words "To Secretary of War, G. C. M." Is that in General 
Marshall's handwriting ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That means that General Marshall probably saw it 
before Secretary Stimson saw it, does it not ? He was directing it to 
be forwarded to the Secretary of War ? 

General Gerow\ It would indicate that ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice General Marshall's initials do not appear on 
the next page, which is the Short report, but only on the first one. Is 
that correct ? 

General Gerow. His initials do not appear on the Short message. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire where General 
Marshall's initials are on the photostat? 

Mr. Mitchell. On the right-hand corner. 

Senator Ferguson. Up at the top of the page? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

The Chairman. The Chairman might also note that the "Noted 
Stimson" looks like there are three initials there [2707] instead 
of "H. S." 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, his middle initial, "H. L. S." 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, does the original have on the 
bottom of it "Noted, Chief of Staff," and no initials under that? Both 
of them have "Noted, Chief of Staff," and then one has a special note 
up at the top of the initials. What does this stamp mean? Does 
counsel know ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I suppose it was stamped on there for the Chief of 
Staff to initial. He did not do it, but instead of that he noted up at 
the top "To Secretary of War G. C. M." 

Senator Ferguson. What is the "0-4-c"? 

Mr. ]\Iitchell. I will have to ask the witness about that. I am 
not in a position to guess about it. 

The first question. General, is on the first message, the first page 
being the MacArthur report, a photostat of it. Above the words 
"Noted W. P. D." and your initials, " L. T. G." are the stamped words, 
printed with a stamp, "Noted Chief of Staff," and under it there 
are no initials to the effect that General Marshall noted it. Now, 
can you understand why that stamp would be put on there? Would 
it be in preparation of a signature, or what? When the thing came 
to you, were the words "Noted W. P. D." stamped on there? 

[2708] General Gerow. Yes, sir, they would be stamped thereon 
by my office. The "Noted Chief of Staff" would be stamped by the 
Office of the Chief of Staff. 

Mr. Mitchell. I see. Before it was shown to him ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. By the way, it was stamped "Noted W. P. D." be- 
fore it was shown to you ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. So you infer instead of noting his initials down 
there, the general put the message up at the top, "To Secretary of 
War G. CM."? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1029 

May I bring up, sir, the question of this routing slip? 

Mr, Mitchell. Yes; anything you think of that we ought to know, 
General. 

General Gerow. You will note that the routing slip is a routing 
slip from the office of the secretary, General Staff. That would 
normally come down to the War Plans Division, as is indicated here 
with those two papers attached. My executive may or may not have 
kept the routing slip on there. He may have removed it, or put the 
War Plans Division slip on it. What they did I do not know, sir, 
but, it is necessarily true that that routing slip appeared on these 
[2709] messages when they were brought to me, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. This is the way the record stands in the War De- 
partment, that it was put on there at some time? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean after you saw it. 

General Gerow. No, sir. When these messages went into the Of- 
fice of the Chief of Staff, for example, sir, the secretary of the Gen- 
eral Staff would put his routing slip on it to send it to the War 
Plans Division, attaching the two messages, and the messenger would 
bring it down to my executive and my executive would receipt for it, 
and then that paper may or may not continue to keep the same 
routing slip. 

Mr. Mitchell. What would be your conclusion from that? I 
do not quite get the drift ? 

General Gerow. No conclusion, sir, except I understood a minute 
ago you asked me if that routing slip was on it when it came to my 
desk. That was my understanding of the question, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, is that correct? You know that these two 
documents came together, do you ? 

General Gerow. I cannot testify to that fact. I do not recall that 
now, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is only because there is a routing ^ \2710'] 
slip, with both numbers on the same routing slip that you infer they 
did come together? 

General Gerow\ Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think we would like to be sure about it. 

Is it your conclusion that the routing slip does not show that they 
were together when they were presented to you, or that it does ? 

General Gerow. They show that they were together when they 
were presented — handed to my executive officer because he initialed 
it. Whether it continued on there I cannot testify at this time. I 
think it is rather immaterial as to whether it did or not, sir. 

[2711'] Mr. MiTCHEiJv. Well, where did your executive officer 
initial it? 

General Gerow. He initialed, if you notice, on the routing slip, sir. 
You see "A. C. of S., WPD, noted WPD, GAG." That was Colonel 
Galey, those initials, my executive officer. 

Mr. Mitchell. This assistant secretary, or assistant chief of staff. 
War Plans Division, noted and those initials, are your secretary? 

General Gerow\ My executive, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Your executive? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, 



1030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr, Mitchell. Well, he initialed the routing slip covering both 
messages ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. So the routing slip must have been on there when 
it got to your office. 

General Gerow. When it reached the War Plans Division; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Why do you think it would be detached when it was 
handed to you ? 

General Gerow. It might have been detached, sir, since that was 
tlie routing slip from the Office of the Chief of Staff. Whethec my 
executive might have put on other papers afterwards to route it to a 
cii vision section within the War ['^712] Plans Division, I can- 
not state at this time, sir, but we had certain routing slips within the 
War Plans Division itself, just as the Office of the Chief of Staff had a 
routing slip. 

Mr. Mitchell. You say you saw both messages? 

General Gerow. I saw both of those messages ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You are in doubt whether you saw them both at- 
tached together at the same time? 

General Gerow. I am in doubt, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it is certain that they both came together to 
your executive, did they not? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And where was your executive's office? 

General Gerow. His office was adjacent to mine, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then is it your theory that after the two papers 
with the routing slip came to your executive, he detached the routing 
slip before he handed it to you for initialing? 

General Gerow. I do not remember his exact procedure. 

Mr. Mitchell. Why should he take the routing slip off? If the 
two messages came in with the routing slip and he initialed the routing 
slip showing both messages were there and then he brought it into 
your office to show it to you, why would he take the routing slip off? 

General Gerow. Well, you see, sir, the routing slip is [2713] 
a routing from the office of the Chief of Staff to the Office of the War 
Plans Division. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

General Gerow. Now the War Plans Division itself had routing 
slips if the executive routed the paper from the executive office to the 
chief of plans group, for example, or the chief of projects group. 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean the routing slip was prepared in your 
War Plans Division then ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. This routing slip was apparently the rout- 
ing slip that was prepared, as you notice, by the Office of the Secretary, 
General Staff. 

Mr. Mitc;hell. It got to your office with both these messages at- 
tached to it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then your theory is it may have been taken off 
before you saw it ? 

General Gerow. The messages may have been separated by the 
executive officer in War Plans Division for routing to the section of 
the War Plans Division which would handle that message. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1031 

Mr. Mitchell. After you saw it? 

General Gerow. I do not know, sir, whether it was before or after, 
but I saw both the messages, sir. 

[271Jf] Mr. Mitchell. You may have a chance later to clear 
that up. I do not believe I quite get the result. 

When you saw the Short message did you then know about the 
joint arrangement required under which the Navy would conduct long 
distance air reconnaissance and that the Army would supply to the 
Navy for that purpose such heavy bombers as it had available for 
that work ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I knew of the agreement in Hawaii, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. When you saw General Short's reply I wish you 
would state, in your own way, General, just what your reaction was 
to it, and what you thought about it. 

General Gerow. AVell, sir, as I testified before the Roberts Commis- 
sion, I assumed when that message came through that it was an answer 
to the G-2 message that Avas sent out by General Miles to the Hawaiian 
Department the evening before. I was probably led to that assump- 
tion by the fact that the question of sabotage hacl been discussed quite 
at length after that conference on the evening before, 

I do not remember now, at this late date, what my reaction was to 
the message. 

The message was then sent out, as I stated before, to the plans 
group, which was headed by Colonel Bundy, who is now dead. I do 
not know what Colonel Bundy's reactions were to [271S] that 
message. I don't remember ever discussing it with him. It is reason- 
able to assume that he may possibly have interpreted the message to 
mean, or that part of the message which said "liaison with the Navy," 
that the commanding general out there had instituted protective 
measures against sabotage and was working with the Navy to arrange 
for other defensive measures, including reconnaissance. 

I do not know that that was Colonel Bundy's thought, but it was 
a reasonable assumption from the way the message was worded. I 
did not see the message after it was sent to Colonel Bundy prior to 
December 7. 

The message contained two short sentences : One, "Alerted against 
sabotage," and the other stating "liaison with the Navy." It also 
contained a reference to a No. 472, as I recall. That message meant 
nothing to me at that time. 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean the number meant nothing? 

General Gerow. The number meant nothing to me, sir, because 
that number was put on by the Signal Corps and it was not the num- 
ber assigned to that particular document by the War Plans Division. 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean you had to go to the Signal Corps office 
to find out what the dispatch was that was numbered 472 ; is that it ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. Insofar as I know, sir, no [2716] 
inquiry with regard to that message was sent to General Short. In 
the light of subsequent events, I feel now that it might have been 
desirable to send such an inquiry, and had such inquiry been sent 
it would probably have developed' the fact that the commanding gen- 
eral in Hawaii was not at that time carrying out the directive in the 
message signed "Marshall." 

79716— 46— pt. 3 5 



1032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

If that had been done, there would have been an opportunity to 
correct the situation, but I do not believe that the message could 
necessarily be interpreted as meaning that sabotage measures only 
were being taken. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there was nothing there to suggest that there 
was anything else but sabotage measures, except the words "liaison 
with the Navy" ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And what interpretation did you place then, if you 
know, on the words "liaison with the Navy"? 

General Gerow. As I testified, sir, I had assumed that the message 
was in answer to the G-2 message and it was then routed to a section 
of War Plans Division. I did not see that message again, so I did 
not have an opportunity at that time, or did not make any assump- 
tion regarding what the phrase "liaison with the Navy" meant. I 
think my executive officer, or the chief of my plans group, might 
possibly have interpreted the message that way, and that is why it 
was not brought back [2717] to me and my attention invited 
to the fact that it did not explicitly cover the operation. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, if you interpreted this message as an answer 
to G-2, or Adams, as a salDotage message, then you were left in the 
position of having no report at all from Short about the main warning 
message that you sent over Marshall's signature ? 

General Gerow. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. To strengthen that position ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did it occur to j'ou to wonder why Short did not 
respond to the main warning message? 

General Gerow. Well, sir, I was handling a great many papers at 
that time, and it was the responsibility of the officers in my division 
to check the messages and correspondence and bring to my attention 
anything of importance that required action on my part, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Even if your staff had the responsibility of follow- 
ing up on these things, the comparison between the two-lines dispatch 
from Short and the elaborate report from MacArthur and Andrews, 
and the western base command was rather sharp, was it not, General? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Mitchell. The message that you helped draft on [^TIS] 
November 27, No. 472, was not a mere transfer of information. It 
was a command, was it not, involving an order or directive? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Let me read it again. We all know it. It says : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with . 
only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and 
offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action 
possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided 
the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy 
should not rei)eat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that 
might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are 
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem neces- 
sary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil 
population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period A separate 
message is being sent to G dash two Ninth Corps area re subversive activities 
in United States period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks 
assigned [^719] ip Rainbow flve so far as they pertain to Japan period 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1033 

Limit dissemination of this higlily secret information to minimum essential 
oflScers. 

Now, there is a direct order there, is there not ? It says : 

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you 
deem necessary. 

Now, did that mean if you did not deem it necessary, you were not 
going to take any reconnaissance or other measures? 

General Gerow. No, sir. The intent of that message was to invite 
his attention to the necessity of conducting reconnaissance. 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean he was supposed to take some measures, 
but the extent of them and the nature of them you left to the discretion 
of the local commander; is that it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You had given him an order then and you got a 
report that as you interpret the order, this message of Short's had 
been a response, or you thought it was a response, to 472, and it would 
be a report by Short that he failed to carry out your instructions, 
would not it ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is that why you thought it was a report about the 
sabotage messages ? 

General Gerow. Well, it never occurred to me, sir, that [27£0] 
General Short would not take some reconnaissance and other defensive 
measures after the receipt of this message. He was an experienced 
commander and it never entered my mind that he would not take such 
action. 

[2721] Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I have been' following this 
testimony very closely, and I would like to ask counsel at this time, 
if he can, to pin down this one thing : This message is directed from 
Fort Shafter to the Chief of Staff. Short's message is directed to 
the Chief of Staff. 

Now, if it had been a reply to the G-2 message, to whom would the 
reply to the G-2 message normally be directed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you answer that question. General? You say 
you thought it might have been a report of Short's about the sabotage 
message. Now, one of those was Adams', wasn't it; that is. Adjutant 
General ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. The other was Adams over the signature of the 
Army Air Forces man. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. The third one was signed Miles. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Of G-2. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, the Congressman would like to know, and so 
would the committee, the reply to any one of those three, when it was 
addressed to the Chief of Staff, wouldn't Short have wired back to the 
man who sent the message he was reporting about ? 

[£722] General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell, So that right on the face of it, it showed that it was 
a report on your message 472. 



1034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is, if you stop to think the other messages 
weren't signed, "Marshal L" 

General Gekow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. My. Chairman, may I ask counsel right there, because 
I would like to get this pinned down while we are going through it, 
do I understand the witness to testify now that upon further recol- 
lection and consideration of this message, the reply of General Short 
to the message that went to him from IVIarshall, the fact that the 
message is directed to the Chief of Staff is in itself proof that it was 
a direct reply to the Marshall message and not a reply to any message 
sent by G-2 or anyone else ? 

Mr. Mitchell. He has just stated that. Is that correct? 

General Gerow, Yes. In my mind, the message in question was a 
reply to the message from General Marshall. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is a little more than that. It is clear that it was, 
apparently, but I am asking you whether on the face of the message 
that ought not to have been clear to you when you saw it? 

[272S^ General Gerow. I didn't notice that fact, sir, when the 
message came over my desk. 

Mr. Mitchell. Assuming that you thought it was not a reply to your 
main instruction to take reconnaissance and other measures, on that 
theory you never got a report from Short about your 472 message, al- 
though you asked him to report measures taken ; isn't that correct? 

General Gerow\ Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. So far as you know there was no follow-up by you 
or any member of your staff to elicit from General Short a more com- 
plete report or further information or any word as to what he had 
done, no follow-up prior to December 7 ? 

General Gerow. No, sir; there was no follow-up sent to the best of 
my knowledge and belief. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that 
counsel follow what Congressman Keefe had in mind. The message 
from General Short was routed to Secretary Stimson's office also by 
the Chief of Staff. Whether that would make any difference as to 
whether it was a reply to the INIiles or the other message when the Chief 
of Staff routed it to the Secretary of War. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an inquiry. 

I understand the anxiety of the distinguished Senator [2724-] 
from Michigan, and I understand the anxiety of the distinguished 
Congressman. But there is an order of procedure here. I have a lot of 
questions I would like to ask too. 

I realize they are anxious to get information, but the rule w^as to be 
that counsel would conduct the examination and then the witness would 
be turned over to each of us to dissect his testimony. If we are going 
to have suggestions, I have four or five to make too. 

The CHAmMAN. The Chair would like to state that the rule which 
we adopted doesn't seem necessarily to preclude the members of the 
committee from asking counsel to clear up a point that he is inquiring 
about at the time. 

The rule applied to the examination of the witness by members of 
the committee by rotation after the counsel had concluded. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1035 

Mr. Mitchell. Within reasonable limits, it doesn't bother me. 

Mr. Murphy. I want to say that I agree that the suggestion of the 
Senator from JMichigan and of the Congressman are excellent sug- 
gestions, in view of the fact that we are going to have General Mar- 
shall here in the morning. 

The Chairman. Let's go ahead. 

Senator Fergusox. That was the reason I suggested counsel ask- 
ing that question, because General Marshall will [2725^ be here 
in the morning. 

The Chairman. The Chair has ruled. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't want to ignore the suggestions any- 
way. 

I am going to ask the General whether he knows from this routing 
slip, or the notations on it, whether when it came to him, it had the 
notation by General Marshall to send it to the Secretary of War, and 
whether it had Mr. Stimson's handwriting, the word in Mr. Stimson's 
handwriting "Noted." Could you tell us about that? 

General Gerow. I can't recall now^, sir, whether it was on at the 
time it came to me. 

Mr. Mitchell. In the ordinary course of procedure, would it have 
reached you before it went to the Chief of Staff? What was the prac- 
tice with a message like this? Would it go directly to the Chief of 
Staff and then to you ? 

General Gerow. I would say that in this particular case it would 
go to the Chief of Staff first. Messages did come both ways. There 
were messages coming to me that I would send up to the Chief of 
Staff. This, I believe would have gone to the Chief of Staff first. 

I think the way the initials are shown on there, we could presume 
that it had gone through that channel. 

Mr. Mitchell. So your inference is that it went to \2726^ 
General Marshall first, went to the Secretary of War next, and then 
came down to you ; is that right? 

General Gerow. I would presume that, yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. So that at that stage of the game, you know that the 
report had gone directly to General Marshall, being in answer to a 
message that had gone out over his signature ? 

General Gerow. I didn't understand. 

Mr. MiTCHEi>L. You knew from the face of it that it had gone — the 
Short rei:»ort — had come first to General Marshall, because it was an 
answer to the message sent over General Marshall's signature. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. If General Marshall signed a telegram and his name 
w^as appended to it, and the answer came in, it was the practice to send 
it to him, was it, or did it come to you first? 

General Gerow. I believe the practice would be it would go to him 
first, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know at the time you saw General Short's 
report that he had established locally what he called Alert No. 1, 
which said "Look out for sabotage with no threat from without"? 
Did you know about that ? 

I think maybe I asked you that this morning. Did I ? 
[2727] General Gerow. No, sir; you didn't ask me that. 



1036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. I did ask you if you had prior to December 7 seen 
the local order of General Short establishing what he called Alert No. 
1, and you said it didn't come in until the following year sometime. 

General Gerow. That is correct. It came in sometime, I think, in 
March 1942, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you have had any way of knowing what his 
Alert No. 1 was, if you didn't have that order before you ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I would not have known what Alert No. 1 
was. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember after the Short report was re- 
ceived that you had any discussion with anybody, with General Mar- 
shall or anybody in the AVar Plans Division, about the Short report, or 
the question of its sufficiency, or the question of whether it ought to be 
supplemented, or a f uther report should be asked for ? 

General Gerow. I do not recall any such discussion, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell, General Gerow, I am going to read to you a para- 
graph in Secretary Stimson's report on the Pearl Harbor incident, in 
which he says this : 

Again, as I have pointed out, General Short, in [2728] response to a 
message which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and 
a request for a report of actions, had sent a message to the War Department 
which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against 
Babotage only, and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. 

While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of 
bis message, nevertheless, a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive com- 
parison of the messages exchanged, would have invited further inquiry by the 
War Plans Division of General Short and his failure to go on the necessary 
alert might well have been discovered. 

The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report 
of the measui-es taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's 
reply was brought to the attention of the chief of the division. A clear and 
satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done, and a more 
efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that careful inquiry 
as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity 
permitted. 

Do you think that is a fair statement of the situation? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I do, and if there was any responsibility 
to be attached to the War Department [2729] for any failure 
to send an inquiry to General Short, the responsibility must rest on 
War Plans Division, and I accept that responsibility as Chief of War 
Plans Division. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, we find that the Short report and an oppor- 
tunity to compare it with the MacArthur report went up higher than 
you. It went to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War. It wasn't 
their function to follow up things like this ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I was a staff adviser to the Chief of Staff, 
and I had a group of 48 officers to assist me. It was my responsibility 
to see that those messages were checked, and if an inquiry was neces- 
sary, the War Plans Division should have drafted such an inquiry and 
presented it to the Chief of Staff for approval. 

As I said, I was chief of that division, and it was my responsibility. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering whether the com- 
mittee would be willing to sit a little longer tonight. 

I have some other matters that we ought to go into before General 
Marshall is called. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1037 

The Chairman, The Senate is not m session. It lias already ad- 
journed for the day. Is it agreeable to the committee to sit a little 
while longer ? 

[2730] Without objection that will be done. 

Senator George. Let me ask how long. 

The Chairman. About how long, Senator George asks. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is hard for me to estimate. I will keep going 
until you think I ought to stop. 

The Chairman. All right. 

The Vice Chairman. Might I offer one brief suggestion to counsel. 
General Marshall initialed this top paper, which is the MacArthur 
message. I think it would be helpful to find out whether this Short 
message was also attached to that and whether it would be reasonable 
to assume that those initials of General Marshall applied to both of 
these. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have done all I can with the general about that. 
Those two were brought in together. The two documents were at- 
tached, and he saw them both together. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest that General Marshall has already 
testified on his impressions on that very thing and will do so tomorrow. 

The Chairman. Let's get going and get to him. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, I show you four intercepted Japanese 
messages concerning military installations and ship movements that 
I found at pages 12, 13, 14, and 15, in exhibit 2, which is entitled 
"Japanese Messages Con [2731] cerning Military Installa- 
tions, Ship Movements, etc." 

We turn first to the one on page 12. You have examined that mes- 
sage, have you not ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 
September 24, 1941, and translated October 9, which directs the spies 
or somebody in Honolulu — Jap spies — to divide the harbor area, the 
Pearl Harbor waters, into five different areas, and calls for specific 
information, not merely as to ship movements, but as to location of 
the vessels specifically in each one of those areas. 

Then on page 13 is a message from Honolulu to Washington. The 
message states : 

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels. 

This is dated September 29, translated October 10 

It is suggested repair dock in navy yard will be called KS. 

Navy dock in the navy yard, KT. 

Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island, FV. 

And the east and west sides will be differentiated by A and B re- 
spectively. 

Then there is one in tlie same series on page 14 which is a report 
from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18, [2732] trans- 
lated December 6. That is rather late, but I will refer to it. It is a 
report of battleships and other vessels in specified areas. 

Finally, there is one on page 15, Tokyo to Honolulu, November 18, 
translated December 5, and one dated November 29, translated De- 
cember 5, which reads : 



1038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements but in future 
will you also report even when tliere are no movements. 

I have called your attention to those messages before, have I not, 
and their possible significance ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

IVIr. Mitchell. Did they come to your attention at or about the 
time they were translated? 

General Gerow. I believe they did, sir. Most of those important 
intercepted messages were brought to my attention, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you any personal recollection of their having 
been received by you? 

General Gerow. Not of these particular messages; no, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. AVould tliere be any record in the War Department 
by which it could be told whether they were shown to you or not? 

[2733] General Gerow. No, sir. These messages were brought 
to me in a locked dispatch case by an officer. He unlocked the dispatch 
case and stood there while I read the messages. Sometimes there would 
only be 1 message, and other times 10 or 15. I kept no record and I 
believe he kept none of the ones I actually saw. 

Mr. Mitchell. And after you saw them, the officer would go out with 
the messages? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. They were not left with you for evaluation ? 

General Gerow. No, sir; they were not. 

Mr. Mitchell. Unless something was shown you that was so appar- 
ent that you saw it instantly, and made an evaluation of it, you wouldn't 
do any evaluation work on it, would you? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you have been allowed to keep these dis- 
l^atches in your possession for some time for the purpose of studying 
them if you wanted to? 

General Gerow. No, sir. Under the instructions I had received, 
they were to be returned immediately to the officer presenting them 
to me. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where would they go for evaluation ? 

General Gerow. G-2, sir. 

[2734] Mr. Mitchell. And I suppose you don't know, not being 
in the Signal Corps, what the explanation may be for the delay between 
the actual interception of some of these Japanese messages and the time 
when they were actually translated ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. That was a Signal Corps responsibility, 
and I never had occasion to inquire into it. I did at one time ask a 
Signal Corps officer how it was done and he told me that he had positive 
orders not to divulge that excejit on order of the Chief of Staff. 

Mr. Mitchell. You don't mean as to the delay ? 

(xeneral Gerow. No, sir ; not the delay. 

Mr. Mitchell. You never noticed that? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose a message came in and was shown to you 
that was of a character that, when evaluated, would call for action by 
War Plans Division, not merely transmission of warning, or informa- 
tion, but a directive, such as the message you sent to General Short on 
November 27. As I understand it, the War Plans only interfered in 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1039 

these messages when there was an operational directive involved? Is 
that right? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you depend on G-2 for evaluation of [273o] 
messages intercepted which might lead to directional orders by you? 

General Gekow. Yes, sir; I depended on G-2 for the evaluation of 
all enemy intelligence. 

Mr. Mitchell. Why were they shown to you ? 

General Gerow. For information, sir, and to keep me abreast of the 
general situation. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, is there any doubt in your mind about the 
respective responsibilities of G-2 and the War Plans Division for 
evaluating messages about the military installation '( 

General Gerow. There is no question in my mind at all si)\ That 
is a responsibility of G-2. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, to put it bluntly, suppose one of these mes- 
sages intercepted from the Japanese was brought in to your office in 
a pouch and that message had stated boldly "Be all ready on Decem- 
ber 7. That is the date we are going to attack." Would you have 
any responsibility to do anything with that message ? 

General Gerow. I certainly would have had ; yes, sir. 

I would have taken it and prepared at once the warning message 
for the approval of the Chief of Staff and submitted it to him as quickly 
as possible. 

Mr. Mitchell. That would be a message directing him [2736] 
to take measures to meet the attack ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. That would have been an operational 
message. 

Mr. Mitchell. So, if the evaluation of the message was obvious, 
then you were supposed to make an evaluation of it. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. If the message obviously indicated oper- 
ations were necessary on the part of our Army forces, I would take 
action, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. The question was asked General Miles : 

Then, in other words, while you weren't as a matter of fact or procedure send- 
ing the text of the messages or the gist of them or a summary of them to the 
theatres, it was, even in the fact of these security considerations, always open 
to the Chief of Staff to send speciiic instructions or directions to the Commander 
at Hawaii or tlie Philippines, or elsewhere, based on the information whicli 
had been obtained from intercepts? 

General Mixes. That is true, and at this point I think I should like to go 
further and point out that from early August, I think the 5 of August, 1941, we 
discontinued, by direction of the Chief of Staff, presenting magic in evaluated 
form. So the Chief of Staff and the Chief of War Plans Division, Secretary of 
War, were from then on [2737] doing their own evaluating of the raw 
material that we were presenting to them in the form of magic. 

Do you remember anything about that ? 

General Gerow\ I am sure I was never informed that G-2 had dis- 
continued evaluating magic. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know whether there was any direction of 
the Chief of Staff that'you should make your own evaluations? 

General Gerow. I do not. There was no such direction issued to 
me, sir. 



1040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have you refer to your memorandum 
of November 3 to the Chief of Staff on the far eastern situation, ex- 
hibit 16. It is one of the documents in exhibit 16. Have you that 
before you ? 

General Gerow. I have it; yes, sir. That is the memorandum of 
November 3, sir. 

The Chairman. The Chair asks that the committee be in order. 
There is a good deal of confusion — conversation. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr, Chairman, before we get into another subject, it 
is my understanding that General Miles' testimony was that he was 
ordered in xVugust to pass on the raw material, but there was nothing 
in General Miles testnnony, as I understand, that he was to discon- 
tinue acting as G-2 in evaluating in addition to supplying the raw 
material. 

[27S8] Mr. Mitchell. I guess you are right, because the next 
question on this page, that I could have read to the general, was this : 

Mr. Gesell. You mean that from August on G-2 had no responsibility to evalu- 
ate the intercepted material ? 

General Miles. No, sir, I do not moan that, but I do mean that our responsi- 
bilit.v in that respect was somewhat lessened by the direction of the Chief of 
Staff that he wanted not only the evaluation of the Military Intelligence Division, 
but he wanted to see the material itself, the raw material itself, presented to him. 

That seems to clear the matter up, doesn't it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. From that time did you still continue to get evalua- 
tions from G-2? 

General Gerow. I received from G-2 estimates. 

Mr. Mitchell. And you had also the opportunity, under this pouch 
delivery system and inspection, a chance to at least read over the raw 
material, did you? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Your memorandum of the 3d of November, 1941 to 
the Chief of Staff, part of exhibit 16, speaks of a conference held at 
the State Department on the morning of November 1. Do you want 
to add anything to the incident [2739^ that isn't contained in 
your memorandum ? 

General Gerow. I don't believe there is anything I can add at this 
time from memory, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. In that memorandum you speak of the policy derived 
in the American-British Staff conferences. Does that include the 
Singapore conference, preliminary conference — on page 2 of the 
memorandum ? 

General Gerow. That would apply to both the ABC conference held 
in Washington, and the Singapore conferences as well. 

Mr. Mitchell. You speak there of the fact that one of the recom- 
mendations is that the movement of counteraction against Japan should 
be considered only in case of any of the following actions by Japan, 
and one of those is the movement of Japanese forces into any part of 
Thailand to the west of 100° east or south of 10° north, meaning there a 
recommendation that had been made by the Singapore conference? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will offer now, Mr. Chairman, as exhibit 47, some 
supplementary documents that are underlying documents for this 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1041 

memorandum, or report, of General Gerow on November 3, which is 
contained in exhibit 16. 

This document I am now offering contains a telegram [274.0'] 
from Chungking to the Secretary of State in Washington, signed by 
Mr, Gauss. I think he was the State Department man out there. 
Dated November 3. Another one of the same date from Chungking 
to Washington, signed by Chiang Kai-shek. 

The Chairman. Are they both included in exhibit 47? 

Mr. Mitchell. They are both included. 

There is also another one in exhibit 47. This is Navy Department, 
office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, 
Washington, memorandum for the Director, dated November 1, 1941. 
signed by R. A. Boone for A. H. McCollum. 

And a telegram from Alusna. That means the Chungking naval 
attache. 

The Chairman. The documents will be received as exhibit No. 47. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 47".) 

Mr. Mitchell. I will not stop to read them now. 

General Gerow, you remember that there is in the record what we 
call a 14-part message and a 1 p. m. message, which was the Japanese 
diplomatic messages from Tokyo to their Ambassadors in Washington 
which came in on the 6'th and 7th of December, 1941. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

[^7^i] Mr. Mitchell. We offered this morning in evidence, as 
exhibit 41, a summary of the movements of that message and the date 
of its interception, and when it was received in Washington, and when 
it was decoded and so on, and so far as the documentary proof shows, 
eliminating matters that have to be established by witnesses — I am 
just reminding you what the message was so that I can ask you ques- 
tions about it. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have anything to do with that message 
or know if its receipt on the 6th or any part of it ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. I did not know of the existence of the 
message and I did not see it on the 6th of December. I understand 
there has been some testimony in previous investigations to the effect 
that it was presented to the War Plans Division. It was never pre- 
sened to the War Plans Division on the 6th of December. 

Mr. Mitchell. The message, according to this record, which we 
will assume is correct for the present, 13 parts of it, if I may remind 
you, consisted of a long discussion by the Japanese about their diplo- 
matic positon and about ours. 

The fourteenth part of that 14-part message was the clause 
[274^] that said they were through, that they thought negotiations 
were no longer necessary. 

The record here shows that that fourteenth part, the breaking off, 
was translated at least after midnight December 6, because it bears 
the translation date of December 7. Then there followed what we call 
a 1 p. m. message, which was a supplementary message directing the 
Ambassadors at Wasington to present that final message to the Sec- 
retary of State at 1 p. m., on Sunday, December 7. 

That, according to this record, was translated on the 7th, which was 
sometime after midnight. 



1042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Does that refresh your recollection any on it at all as to the message, 
that is, as to any of the incidents connected with it ^ 

[274^1 General Gerow. Well, the first time the 14-part message 
or the 1 p. m. message was in the office of the Chief of Staff on the 
morning of December 7th was about 11 : 30 o'clock. 

Mr. Mitchell. Can you remember what you were doing on the 
evening of December the 6th ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I cannot recall at this time. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you have any record ? Do you keep a diary ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That is a great contribution to this cause. 

Mr. Mitchell. You cannot recall what you were doing. You had 
a good many things since December 7 to engage you, including such 
little things as the Omaha Beach attack, haven't you ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And you tried to cast your memory back to those 
events as far as you could ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; and I cannot recall what I was doing. 

]Mr. Mitchell. What you were doing on the night of December 6 ? 

General Gerow. What I was doing on the night of De- [2744] 
cember 6 ; no, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You do not remember whether you were at your 
office or at your quarters or what not ? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I cannot recall. If there was a large 
volume of work I probably worked down at the office until 6 or 7 or 8 
o'clock. If there was not I probably was home. I do not recall being 
out to dinner on that particular evening. 

Mr. Mitchell. But you are confident that you never saw that 14-part 
message, or any part of it, or the 1 p. m. message until you got into 
General Marshall's office around 11:30 on the morning of the 7th? 

General Gerow. I am positive, yes, sir, of that fact. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest one thing ? As I under- 
stand it he did not see the 13 parts either. 

Mr. Mitchell. What is it ? 

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, his testimony is that he did not 
see any part of the 14 parts, either one. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is what he said. 

The Chairman. That is what he says now. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you seen lately this memorandum from you 
that is already in Exhibit 39 in evidence, dated December 15, 1941, 
called a "Memorandum for Record" and signed by you, recording 
the events of the morning of De- [274^] cember 7? Have you 
examined that lately? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I read it recently, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose you take a look at it. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That memorandum states that about December — I 
suppose that this document is a more reliable record of what had 
occurred because it was made December 15, 1941, than your present 
recollection would be ? 

General Gerow. It will be, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You will have to depend on this, will you not ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1043 

Mr. Mitchell^ That states that : 

About 11:30 A. M. on Sunday, December 7, l'J41, General IMnrshall called mo 
to his office. 

That was the occasion for your going to his office'^ 

(leneral Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Does that mean that you were in your office? 

General Geroav. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And called to his [reading] : 

General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred 
to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note 
to the [^746'] State Department at 1 P. M., December 7, 1941. He felt 
that the Japanese Governmient instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour 
and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message 
to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East; CG Caribbean Defen.se 
Command; CG Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by 
General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed 
to take the pencilled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it 
sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in 
a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned 
over to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about thirty minutes. 
The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record. 

Do you remember anything more about that meeting in General 
Marshall's office on the morning of December 7, 1941, than is stated 
here in this meo 'i 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not. 

Mr. Mitchell. This message was one which was obviously import- 
ant, especially when it got down to part 14 and the 1 p. m. part of it. 
Is that message which in the ordinary course of practice in the War 
Department somebody with [^2747^ a pouch would probably 
have brought into your office in the Department? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Had that been done prior to your going to Gen- 
eral Marshall's office? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever make any inquiry as to why it had not 
been delivered to your office before 11 : 80, when it had been translated 
at an earlier hour? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I did not. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, have you a memorandum of No- 
vember 17, 1941, that you presented to General Marshall regarding 
efforts of the Army and Navy to arrange a unity of command in 
Hawaii and at other points? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have here a copy of such a memoran- 
dum, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. What is the date of that, Mr. Mitchell? 

Mr. Mitchell. This is November 17, 1941. 

Your memorandum to the Chief of Staff, dated November 17, 1941. 
"Subject : Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers," 
is a short one and a longer one on the same date. 

Were they both presented at the same time ? I have two memoranda 
for the Chief of Staff dated November 17, 1941, \27It8~\ signed 
by you, both of which relate to the method of coordination of command 
in coastal frontiers. Have you both of them before you? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I have both copies. 

Mr. Mitchell. Both documents? 



1044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. Both documents ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to number as exhibit 48 and no^Y offer 
in evidence three documents, all in one exhibit: November 17, 1941, 
memorandum from General Gerow to the Chief of Staff about the 
method of coordination of command in Coastal Frontiers; another 
one, memorandum of the same date on the same subject from General 
Gerow; and a letter which clears up the story, dated December 20, 
1941, "Personal and Confidential", addressed to "^Sly dear Emmons." 
That is General Emmons who succeeded to the command of the Ha- 
waiian Department about that time? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. This memo or letter is signed by "G. C. Marshall." 

Senator Lucas. Was this memorandum dated December 20 issued 
after the Pearl Harbor attack? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, that is November 17. 

Senator Lucas. Oh, I see; November 17. 

Mr. Mitchell. The letter of General Marshall directed [2749] 
to General Emmons and dated December 20, 1941, was after the attack 
on Pearl Harbor. That letter was directed to General Emmons, who 
succeeded General Short. The two letters of General Gerow are dated 
November 17. 

Senator Lucas. I see. 

Mr. Mitchell. They both relate to coordination of comands in 
Coastal Frontiers and, among other things, do they include Hawaii? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell in your own way. General, just 
how 

The Chairman. Those documents will be received under the title 
of exhibit 48. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 48"). 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you just state in your own language how this 
subject happened to come up for consideration and who considered 
it and what the proposal was ? 

General Gerow. I just saw these papers yesterday, sir, 

Mr. Mitchell. I see. Would you rather have me read them first ? 

General Gerow. I can read them, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, read them into the record. They are some- 
what important. 

[2750'] General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. And I think the committee would like to hear them. 
Read the short ones first. 

General Gerow. The short one of November 17 first. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the memorandum from you to the Chief of 
Staff? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. (Reading:) 

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff : 

Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers. 

1. The attached Joint Board case has been before the Joint Planning Commit- 
tee since last February. At a recent meeting of The Joint Board, Admiral Stark 
suggested that the Army take action on the Navy proposal. 

2. The case is divisible into two main subjects — Changes in Coastal Frontiers 
and the assignment of Command in the Caribbean, Panama, Hawaii and Philip- 
pine Coastal Frontiers. The Army and Navy sections of The Joint Planning Com- 
mittee have reached an agreement with regard to changes in Coastal Frontiers. 
They disagree, however, as to the service that should exercise Unity of Command 
in the Coastal Frontiers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1045 

3. The proposals of the Army and Navy Sections on command are outlined in 
the attached Memorandum to you. [2751] The Memorandum also embodies 
my views on the question of unity command in the Caribbean Area, Hawaii, and 
the Philippines. 

4. If the Joint Board desires definite action on this case, I recommend that you 
approve the attached Memorandum. I believe the Navy will agree with the 
solution proposed, which simply means that we will continue to operate by mutual 
cooperation. If you do not wish to raise the question of command at this time I 
can hold the case in suspense for the time being. 

(Signed) L. T. Gerow, 

Brigadier General, 
Acting Assista7it Chief of Staff. 

The second and longer memorandum reads as follows : 

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff : 

Subject : Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers. 
I. Discussion. 

1. Joint Board case (J. B. No. 350, Serial 678) prescribing coordination of 
command is now before the Joint Planning Committee. 

2. The Navy section proposes changes in command relations in the following 
coastal frontiers : 

a. Cai'ibbean. 

12752] Coordination by the method of unity of command, command being 
vested in the Commandant of the 10th Naval District. 

ft. Panama. 

Coordination by unity of command, command being vested in the Commanding 
General, Panama Canal Department except when major naval forces are based 
in the frontier for general strategic naval operations in either the Caribbean Sea 
or the Pacific Ocean. In this contingency command would be vested in the Com- 
mandant of the 15th Naval District. 

c. Hawaii. 

Coordination by unity of command as follows : 

(1) Command vested in Commanding General, Hawaiian Department when 
the most important strategic problem is one of territorial defense of the Hawaiian 
Islands and when major naval forces have been withdrawn and not based in the 
frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity or at a 
distance. 

(2) Command vested in the Commandant of the 14th Naval District when 
major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations 
either in the vicinity or at a distance. 

3. The Army section proposes the following, appli- [2753] cable to all 
coastal frontiers : 

a. Unity of command over forces assigned to the defense of a coastal frontier 
is vested in the Army, except when the United States Atlantic or Pacific Fleet or 
the major portion thei'eof is operating against comparable hostile forces within 
the radius of possible support by Army aviation operating from bases within the 
coastal frontier. In the excepted case, unity of command is vested in the Navy. 

&'. In a specific operation, luiity of command in coastal frontiers may be trans- 
ferred from the Army to the Navy and vice versa, when the senior Army and 
Navy commanders concerned agree that such change is necessary and further 
agree as to the servise that shall exercise such command. 

c. Unity of command does not authorize the service in which it is vested to 
assign missions that will require the forces of the other service to operate from 
bases outside the coastal frontier. 

4. The Army and Navy sections of the Joint Planning Committee have been 
unable to reach an agreement on a compromise solution of the problem of unity of 
command. The Army section does not believe that unity of command in coastal 
frontiers is essential. It is believed that [2754] the Navy section will 
agree to a continuation of coordination by mutual cooperation. 

5. The vesting in a single individual of full responsibility for a military opera- 
tion is a generally accepted principle for the accomplishment of effective military 
action. In theory at least, no amount of personal willingness to cooperate can 
eliminate the objections inherent in the committee system of control of military 
forces. The most frequently cited recent example of the effect of such divided 
responsibility is that of failure of the defense of Crete as contrasted with the 



1046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

successful attack on that island in which the attacking force presumably was 
commanded by a single individual. , 

6. Unity of command is the accepted method of coordination within tlie Army 
and within the Navy, themselves. However, the many practical difficulties en- 
countered in the application of that principle as applied to joint operations of the 
Army and Navy have usually led to the adoption of the method of coordination by 
mutual cooperation except when specific tasks are planned. 

7. The difficulty of determining the service in which unity of command should 
vest in the defense of a coastal frontier lies in the inability to determine in 
[2755] advance when hostilities will begin and the nature and the extent of 
the operations. For that reason it is difficult to foresee which service will play 
the major part in the defense and will have primary interest. The major re- 
sponsibility may well pass from one service to the other during defensive opera- 
tions. On the other hand, overseas landing expeditions or land operations re- 
quiring support from Naval forces, such as those in Libya, present problems 
in which the service having preponderance of responsibility can readily be deter- 
mined. The time such an operation should begin, as well as terminate, and its 
nature and extent can be forecast and the service having the preponderance of 
responsibility definitely agreed upon between the two services, thereby indicating 
the service in which unity of command should vest. In such operations the 
preponderance of responsibility will not fluctuate from one service to the other as 
might be the case in defense of coastal frontiers. 

A fact frequently lost sight of in consideration of the method of coordination 
under the principle of mutual cooperation is that although the major operation 
is being conducted under that principle, joint operations subordinate thereto 
may still be conducted under the principle of unity of command if so agreed to 
by the [2756'] Army and Navy commanders concerned. This method is 
particularly applicable to joint operations by forces having similar combat char- 
acteristics, such as the air forces of the two services. 

II. Action recommended. 

That coordination of joint operations in the Caribbean, Panama and Hawaiian 
Coastal Frontiers continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recom- 
mendation is approved, such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section 
of the Joint Planning Committee. 

[2757] Mr. Mitchell. Now that report states the fact that the 
Army and Navy representatives on the Joint Planning Committee 
were in direct disagreement about this question of unity of command 
in Hawaii and other coastal frontiers? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

IVIr. MrrcHELL. And your statement there is that the Army does not 
think the unity of command is essential. Was the Army making any 
eft'ort to secure unity of command at that time ? 

(Teneral Gerow. I think that statement means essential under the 
conditions which we had at that time. I think the only way you can 
have effective unity of command is for the tops of the services .to 
say, "So and so is in command, and he is in command from now on." 
You cannot vary that command from day to day depending on what 
the operation is. One man must be responsible for preparing that 
place for operation, and he must be responsible for commanding it 
after he has prepared it. 

Mr. Mitchell. This report of yours would indicate that the people 
in that conference of the Planning Board wanted a scheme by which 
that command would shift back and forth from the Army to the Navy 
and from the Navy to the Army depending on the nature of attack 
or defense ? 

General GERow^ That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. You did not believe in that ? 

['27SS] General Gerow. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1047 

Mr. MiTCHioLL. The result was, because of these differences between 
the Army and Navy you came in and recommended the only thing you 
can do is to get mutual cooperation ? 

General Gekow. Yes, sir; 1 thought mutual cooperation would be 
better than a continual switching of command. I did not think either 
the Army or Navy planning group would agree to say wholeheartedly, 
''You take everything and it will be agreeable to us." Neither would 
agree to that. That is the only way I saw it could be done. 

Mr. MiCHELL. • That somebody at the top had to knock their heads 
together and tell them what to do ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You remember that in the local plans — I call 
them "plans'" but it may not be the right word — arranged between 
General Short and Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor there was a pro- 
vision there that they had agreed, if they did agree to it, there would 
be unity of command if the two got together and fixed on one of them 
for the commandant, do you remember that provision ? 

General Gerow\ Yes, sir ; they do have authority, the commanders 
on the ground out there, to agree to such unity of command and who 
would exercise it. 

Mr. Mitchell. But you had no information on that, as to [2759] 
whatever was attempted by the commander prior to December 7? 

General Gerow. I have no information that such an agreement was 
entered into. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now I will read this letter from General Marshall 
to General Emmons on December 20, 1941 : 

My Dear Emmons : Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a few days 
ago assigning unity of command to ttie Navy in Hawaii. At the same time unity 
of command was assigned to the Army in Panama. 

For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following 
circumstances : In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the 
Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as to 
responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year 
to secure unity of command in various critical regions had been unavailing. 
All sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the 
coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives, and similar matters 
had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I 
must say at the same time that some of the Army staff brought up somewhat 
similar objections to Naval control. Both [2760] Stark and I were 
struggling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the diflSculties 
seemed, at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, 
the two decisions I have just referred to have been made and further ones are in 
process of being made, all of which I feel will add immeasurably to our security, 
whatever the local embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping 
stones to larger decisions involved in our relations with allies. 

I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the 
problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work 
with Nimitz in complete understanding. 

Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought 
to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. These 
days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency. 

This is a very hasty note, but I want General McCoy to take it off with him 
this morning. 

You have my complete confidence and I will do everything possible to support 
you. 
[2761] Faithfully yours, 

(Sgd) G.C.Marshall. 

General Delos C. Emmons, 

Commanding Hawaiian Department, 
Honolulu, T. H. 

79716—46 — pt. 3 6 



1048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, if the committee please, I have not finished entirely with 
General Gerow, but I feel I have finished everything that I can do 
tonight which will help in the Marshall examination. 

The Chairman. Under those conditions we will recess until 10 
o'clock tomorrow. 

General Gerow, you will come on later after General Marshall. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

(Whereupon, at 4:40 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., 
Thursday, December G, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1049 



PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK 



THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington., D. C. 
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark. 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel, Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M.Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee, 

[2703^ The Chairman. The committee will cojne to order. 
General Marshall, will you be sworn ? 

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES GEORGE C. MARSHALL, 
SPECIAL ENVOY TO CHINA ^ 

The Chairman. Counsel may proceed. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, when were you appointed Chief 
of Staff? 

General Marshall. I was appointed Acting Chief of Staff on July 
1, 1939, and formally appointed and confirmed Chief of Staff on the 
1st of September 1939. 

Mr. Mitchell. And you served until what date? 

General Marshall. I think it was until November 20 just past. 

Mr. Mitchell. Of this year? 

General Marshall. Of this year. 

Mr. Mitchell. During your service in the Army have you evei- had 
any service in the Far East ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I spent about 5 years in the Philip- 
pines and a little short of 3 years in China. 

Mr. INIiTCHEix,. What was your service in China ? 

General Marshall. I was either in command or executive officer 
of the 15th Infantry at Tientsin. 

The Chairman. General Marshall, will you move a little closer to 
the microphone, please. 

\27'(]/f] Mr. Mitchell. Did you learn the Chinese language 
when in China? 

General Marshall. I wouldn't admit that to a language student, 
but I can carry on a conversation. 

Mr. Mitchell. The gentleman who said you didn't know anything 
about China the other day will have to revise his ideas, probably. 

' See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2483, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted 
by General Marshall. 



1050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, will you state in voiir own way what the functions of the 
Chief of Staff of the Army were during 1940 and 1941 ? 

General Marshall. With your permission I will read the Army 
regulations on the subject. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is Exhibit 42. 

General Marshall (reading) : 

The Chief of Staff is the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all 
matters relating to the Military Establishment, and is charged by the Secretary 
of War with the planning, development, and execution of the military program. 
He will cause the War Department General Staff to prepare the necessary plans 
for recruiting, mobilization, organizing, supplying, equipping, and training the 
Army of the United States for use in the national defense and for demobiliza- 
tion. As the agent, and in the name of the Secretary of War, he issues such 
orders as will insure that the plans [2765] of the War Department are 
harmoniously executed by all agencies of the Military Establishment, and that 
the military program is carried out speedily and efficiently. 

As Commanding General of the Field Forces. — The Chief of Staff, in addi- 
tion to his duties as such, is, in peace, by direction of the President, the Com- 
manding General of the Field Forces and in that capacity directs the field opera- 
tions and the general training of the several Armies, of the oversea forces, 
and of the GHQ units. He continues to exercise command of the Field Forces 
after the outbreak of war until such time as the President shall have specifically 
designated a Commanding General thereof. 

Those are the resfulations. 

Mr. Mitchell, During 1940 and 1941 will you state in a general 
way what your general activities were and what problems you were 
dealing with ? 

General Marshall. They rather subdivided themselves into about 
four categories. In the first place, there was the mobilization of the 
Army which referred specifically to personnel and the organization 
of that personnel. The mobilization procedure was carried out into 
the corps areas of which there were nine of the United States under 
my direction. The [2766] organization and creation of the 
Army I delegated in large measure to a command I set up at what 
used to be the Army War College with General Leslie McNary as my 
deputy and he with his staff was held by me directly responsible for 
the organization and the training of the Army in the continental 
United States. 

The relations with the overseas theaters, the Philippines, Hawaii, 
Caribbean, that is, Panama, were carried out as to detail, as to plans, 
proposals for me by what was then called the War Plans Division 
of the General Staff, now the Operations Division. 

[£767] The materiel aspects of the activities were in the hands 
of a series of bureau chiefs — Chief of Ordnance, the Chief Quarter- 
master, Chief Signal Officer — and in the case, for example, of the 
Chief Signal Officer he not only had the problem of procurement of 
material but also certain operational responsibilites. 

I dealt with them partly in person but largely through the medium 
of the four sections of the General Staff which coordinate supply and 
the plans and policies relating to supply. 

In addition to that, there were special groups on which I had to 
depend, notably, that of the allocation of materiel which was probably 
one of the most trying problems of the day in relation to the Russians, 
the Chinese, the British, and to our own training and to our overseas 
theaters for their defense. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1051 

There was also the problem of priority which a special board, Army 
and Navy Board, operated and with which I was directly concerned. 
There was a subdivision of responsibility here, in that the Assistant 
Secretary, now the Undersecretary of the War Department, was 
chargeable under the law for the procurement activities in the field of 
civilian production. 

The ordinary administrative point of the Army, as to [27681 
records and matters of that kind, I depended largely on the Adjutant 
General's Department. The general coordination of administration 
details, I depended at that time on the senior Deputy Chief of Staff, 
but I created a second deputy who looked after for me the materiel 
factors concerned. 

I think that is the general outline. 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice in Secretary Stimson's report, in this Pearl 
Harbor Army inquiry, he makes this statement : 

It is not the function of the Cliief of Staff specifically to direct and personally 
supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the 
General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secretary 
of War and make plans for and supervise the organization, equipment, and 
training of the great army for global war, to advise on and himself to make 
decisions regarding the basic problems of military strategy in the many possible 
theaters in whicli the war might develop, and in any other fundamental and 
broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hopelessly 
cripple the performance of those great and paramount duties, should the Chief 
of Staff allow himself to become emerged in administrative details by which the 
plans for defense are carried out in our Army outposts. 

Does that fairly picture in your mind the situation of [27691 
the Chief of Staff? 

General Maeshall. I think it does, sir. Throughout all of that, of 
course, it was my responsibility to determine, as far as it was humanly 
possible, what were the critical affairs in all these activities. 

I omitted one reference, which was a very responsible duty, and a 
very difficult duty. That was in the preparation of the budget esti- 
mates of the War Department, and the representation before the 
committees of Congress. 

Mr. Mitchell. What policy did you have during your term as Chief 
of Staff with respect to the responsibility of commanders in the field, 
including overseas comanders, in respect to their independent initia- 
tive and responsibility and decentralization of action ? 

General Marshall. My endeavor was to select the ablest people 
available at the time, have their missions defined, and give them the 
responsibility for the positions which they occupied. 

Mr. Mitchell. You attended the Atlantic Conference at Argentia, 
did you not ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I did. 

Mr. Mitchell. What part did you take in that? 

General Marshall. I was concerned with what amounted to a first 
getting-together, coming to know the British Chiefs [27701 of 
Staff. We had no agenda for our meeting. 

We met and discussed general matters, largely regarding the ma- 
teriel desired by the British, and then we broke up into groups, my- 
self and Field "Marshal Sir John Dill, the head man of the ground 
forces of the British Army. 

There was no question of materiel between us because we had given 
them all of the materiel we could afford to dispense at that time. 



1052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I believe on the Navy side, and I am quite certain on the Air side, 
there was considerable discussion on materiel. 

With Field Marshal Sir John Dill and myself, our conversations 
were almost entirely devoted to a general resume of the war situation, 
what the hazards were, what the anticipations were, particularly as 
to the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and Singapore. 

[2771'] Mr. Mitchell. Did you at that meeting know of any 
commitment that the United States made at that meeting to engage 
the Nation in war if we were not attacked? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I did not. I was not involved in the 
political discussions. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you learn anything at that meeting about this 
proposal to make the parallel protests to the Japanese by England and 
the United States? 

General Marshall. My recollection as to that is that I knew nothing 
of that until a meeting of the liaison group of the State, War, and Navy 
Departments in Mr. Sumner AVelles' office after my return from Ar- 
gentia. 

Mr. Mitchell. And what did you learn then about that, do you 
remember ? 

General Marshall. I was given either the information, general in- 
formation with regard to, or heard read — I do not recall which — a 
message the President had sent. 

Mr. Mitchell. After he had sent it? 

General Marshall. After he had sent it. 

Mr, Mitchell. Have you seen, or did you know about certain con- 
ferences that were had by representatives of the Army and Navy with 
the British on the one hand, called the ABC-1 and 2 conferences, with 
the Dutch and British in the Far East and with the Canadians? 

[2772] General Marshall. Yes, sir. Admiral Stark brought up 
the proposition and I acquiesced. He arranged the meeting. I w^ent 
to his office when we were receiving these officers the day they arrived. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was the British here in the United States? 

General ]\Iarshall. Yes sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know about similar staff conferences that 
were being held at Singapore between the Americans, Dutch, and 
British? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; I was familiar with that. 

Mr. Mitchell. And the one with the Canadians? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. My recollection of that is, though, 
that except for the defense board we afterward created, of which 
Mr. LaGuardia, I think, was the senior American member, we only 
had one meeting and that was an informal meeting at dinner and 
after dinner at the home of the Chief of Naval Operations out near 
the Naval Observatory. That is the only time I saw them. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you had an opportunity to look over those 
three reports ; do you have copies of them ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And are you familiar with them? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

[277S] Mr. Mitchell. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I think we 
will offer those in evidence. We had only one copy heretofore but 
now they have been mimeographed. I will offer in evidence as ex- 
hibit 49^— 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1053 

The Chairman. All three as one exhibit ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir; I had better separate it. The report of the 
United States-British staff conversations in the United States; as 
Exhibit 50 the American-Dutch-British conversations at Singapore in 
April 1941 ; and as 51 the report of the conference with the Canadians. 

The Chairman. They will be filed as 49, 50, and 51 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is it. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 49, 50, and 
51," respectively.) 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you any knowledge as to which, if any, of 
those conferences were finally approved, the reports, I mean? 

General ISIarshall. The report on the Canadian, with the Canadi- 
ans was, I believe, formally approved by the President. My recollec- 
tion is and my knowledge is at this time he gave no formal approval 
of any of the others. 

Mr. Mitchell. In ^'onr examination of those reports do yon find 
anything in that other than the ordinary military [277I^\ and 
naval plans to be used on the contingency that you get into trouble with 
somebody ? 

General Marshall. Would you please repeat that question ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Wliat I want to know is whether you interpreted 
those plans as committing the Government of the United States to 
engage in war with anybody prior to our being attacked? 

General Marshall. No, sir: I do not think they do. It was not 
our intention that they should ; quite the contrary. It was our effort 
to be prepared against what appeared to be a possible eventuality. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. Did the Army make any deployments or disposi- 
tions of troops pursuant to those plans that you remember prior to 
December?, 1941? 

General Marshall. I do not think there were any definite moves 
unless it may have been into Iceland and I do not recall that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever hear, during your service as Chief of 
Staff, of any commitment that the President or anyone else had at- 
tempted to make with any of these other nations by which the United 
States was committed to engage in war without being attacked ? 

General Mitchell. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was there anything about these plans that [2775'] 
you can see by which one of the other nations who participated at the 
conferences by their action could bring us into war? 

General Marshall. I do not think there is. 

Mr. INIrrcHELL. I call your attention to what we called in this case 
the Herron alert in 1940 and at this time, Mr. Chairman, I will offer 
in evidence as exhibit 52 the book containing the communications 
between the War Department and General Herron concerning the 1940 
alert at Hawaii. General Herron was commander of the Hawaiian 
Department at that time. 

The Chairman. It will be so filed. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 52.") 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you examined those communications as con- 
tained in that book. General ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I read it through yesterday morning. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember the fact that the alert was given 
to General Herron in June 1930? 



1054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember the circumstances under which 
that was done? 

General Marshall. My recollection of the matter is that it was on 
the recommendation of Gen. George V. Strong of [2776] the 
General Staff of the War Department as a result of several branches of 
information, largely "magic," that there was a possibility of a threat 
by the Japanese in that area and, therefore, the alert. 

Mr. Mitchell. The alert, the book shows, was given to him over the 
signature of Adjutant General Adams. 

General INIarshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was that at your direction? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And the book shows that he continued in his state of 
alert, though somewhat diminishing, for several weeks after that.. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You are familiar with General Herron's reports that 
in obedience to the alert he puts his entire command on alert, kept his 
pilots out at daylight every day ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Ran reconnaissance by air? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And did all those things, kept his gunners at their 
guns with live ammunition? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And with the report he made that there was very 
little, if any, excitement among the population [£777] of Ha- 
waii about it ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know how it happened that the Navy did 
not send any corresponding alert to Admiral Richardson? 

General Marshall. I do not recall the circumstances. I recall, 
apropos of the reconnaissance, that either through the Chief of the 
Air Corps or otherwise there was great concern over our wearing out 
the engines and we had no replacements in the planes. The problem 
was how long we could continue that ; and, also, we were wearing out 
the crews. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the alert continued for several weeks? 

General Marshaix. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And you have noticed the reports of General Her- 
ron to the effect that there was no serious destruction of materiel ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Or wearing out of personnel even during that length 
of time? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, General, Admiral Richardson has said that 
he had some conversation with you on one of his visits here respecting 
that alert and he quoted you as saying : 

That was simply an exercise and I thought if I did [2778] not state it 
was an exercise, the exercise would be carried out more completely. 

Do you remember any such conversations with Admiral Richard- 
son? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1055 

General Marshall. No, sir. Admiral Richardson came out to my 
house for lunch and we had a talk then after lunch. There were some 
other guests at the time who also happened to be in Washington that 
day and I think there must be a misunderstanding in his mind be- 
cause there was never any question about the purpose of that alert. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this time 1 would like to make on 
behalf of Admiral liichardson a correction he wanted made in his 
testinlony. He stated that he wired in to the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions and wanted to know what this was all about, this Herron alert, 
and never got any reply.- 

The Chairman. Will you read it into the record now ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. I will not read his whole letter but the sub- 
stance of it is that he has checked up on that, examined the original 
record and that there was a reply sent to him on June 22 which reads 
as follows: 

War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measure 
after consultation with Navy and State Department. Request you continue co- 
operation. 

[2779] And he says that he has checked the records and found 
that that was actually sent and that he was mistaken. He actually 
received it. 

The Chairman. Put the whole letter in the record. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will put the whole letter into the transcript. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman^ could we have the date of the 
letter? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. The letter he writes me is dated the 28th of 
November 1945, and he said in his testimony that he would write 
such a letter after he had checked it up. 

The Chairman. All right. 

(Admiral Richardson's letter follows:) 

Navy Department, 
Washington 25, D. C, 28 November 19^5. 
Hon. Wrr.TTAM D. Mitchell, 

General Counsel, Joint Committee on the 

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack* 
DExVr Sm : On 21 November, 1945, I stated to the Committee : "I have not had 
an opportunity to verify what- [2780'] ever evidence there is in official 
records with respect to dispatches exchanged between me and Admiral Stark 
regarding the Army alert and, therefore, I request that the members of the 
committee hold in abeyance their judgment on that subject until I have had an 
opportunity to search the original records" (Page 815 of Report of Proceedings). 
I have examined microfilm and photostatic copies of the original records and 
I find that ; 

(a) On 22 June 1940 I sent to the Chief of Naval Operations by radio a dis- 
patch reading: 

"Commanding General Hawaiian Department received orders War Depart- 
ment placing forces on alert against hostile trans-Pacific raid and since no infor- 
mation received Navy Department have assumed this exercise. Navy patrol 
planes are participating" (Page 810 of Report of Proceedings). 

(b) On 22 June 1940 in reply to the above dispatch the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations sent to me by radio a priority dispatch reading: 

'War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measure 
after consultation with Navy and State Department. Request you continue co- 
operation" (Page 811 of Report of Proceedings). 



1056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[2781] The last quoted dispatch was sent from the Navy Department at 
10 : 10 p. m. and was received by me in person as is shown by my initials on the 
photostatic copy of the dispatch. This dispatch was received by me after 5 : 00 
p. m. Honolulu time on Saturday 22 June when my mind was fully occupied with 
secret sortie of the major portion of the Fleet which was to take place early 
Monday morning and since the reply left me in doubt as to the reality of the 
warning the fact that I received any reply escaped my mind with the result 
that in early July in Washington I asked both Admiral Stark and General 
Marshall whether the Army Alert was a real one or an exercise and testified 
before this Committee that I never received a reply to my dispatch. 

J. O. RiCHAEDSON, Admiral, USN {Ret.) 

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to the document which is in our 
exhibit 16, being a joint memorandum presented by you and the Chief 
of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, to the President under date of 
November 5, 1941; that is in evidence. Have you examined that 
memorandum ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I read that yesterday. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you state in your own way what that incident 
was and how you happened to make that report or [^782] 
memorandum ? 

General Marshall. My recollection of the matter is that there was 
a very urgent appeal from the generalissimo, Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, 
for assistance in meeting what he thought was a dangerous Japanese 
threat in an advance from the south toward Kunming. He wished 
American and British air assistance and other assistance that might be 
made possible for him. That, of course, would terminate the Burma 
Road if successful. That is my recollection of the basis of this particu- 
lar joint memorandum to the President from Admiral Stark and 
myself. 

Mr. Mitchell. And your recommendations were? 

General Marshall (reading) : 

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan 
in China be disapproved. 

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, 
Great Britain, and our own forces. 

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the 
maximum practicable extent. 

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were you asked to prepare the memorandum ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall, sir. 

[£783] Mr. Mitchell. There is another memorandum, joint, by 
you and Admiral Stark under date of November 27, 1941, that is our 
exhibit 17. Will you kindly look at that and state the circumstances 
or the occasion under which that was made ? 

General Marshall. The circumstances, as nearly as I can recall them 
now, were a combination of affairs : The quite evident threat south 
through the China Sea toward Malay, Malasia, and the Dutch East 
Indies, the development of Japanese power in Indochina, the report 
of the conversations recently completed at Singapore. Those, as I 
recall, were the principal factors which brought about this particular 
memorandum. 

Mr. Mitchell. Your recommendations were what? 

General Marshall (reading) : 

That prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counter- 
action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, 
British, or Dutch territory as above outlined ; 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1057 

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United 
States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indi- 
cated may lead to war ; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be 
undertaken ; 

Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements [278.^] with the 
British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning. 

Mr. IMiTCiiELL. I notice a little earlier in the memorandum this 
statement : 

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military 
authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against 
Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens 
the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Com- 
monwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces 
into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New 
Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. 

Were you there referring to this military conference held at Singa- 
l)ore in April 1941 that we have just discussed ? 

General Marshall. That, I believe, was the basis of their recom- 
mendation, their conclusions there. 

Mr, Mitchell. Wlien you say there that the Dutch, British, and 
the United States military authorities had agreed to that action did 
you mean that they had made an agreement on behalf of the United 
States, or agreed to recommend it to their governments ? 

[2785] General Marshall. Agreed to recommend it. They had 
no power whatever to agree for our government and it was so stip- 
ulated, I think, in the 

Mr. ISliTcnELL. Now, you made a recommendation at that time that 
the Preisident join with the other nations in giving warning to Japan 
that if they did certain things or advanced beyond a certain point it 
might lead to war. Was that recommendation carried out, was any 
such message or warning sent to the Japanese at that time 'i 

General Marshall. Not that I know of, sir. 
. Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to exhibit 24, dated November 
30, 1941. It is a message for the President of the United States from 
the former naval person — that was the term used to describe Mr. 
Church — in which he says [reading] : 

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war be- 
tween Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public 
as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead 
immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your coii.stitutional dif- 
ficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment with- 
out having before her fairly and squarely the direct character of a further ag- 
gressive step. I [2786] beg you to consider whether, at the moment which 
you judge i-ight which may be very near, you should not say that "any further 
Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Con- 
gress" or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declara- 
tion or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being 
made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for 
presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might 
make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war. 

That was just 3 days after your recommendation was made. Did 
you ever see this communication from Mr. Churchill ? 

[2787] General Marshall. I don't recall if I ever saw it. 

Mr. Mitchell. It was the same proposal, wasn't it, to make some 
kind of joint message? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir, that is the way I understand it. 



1058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. Or some kind of threat to Japan as to what would 
happen? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Your recollection is that no such recommendation, 
either from Mr. Churchill or yourself, or Admiral Hart, was actually 
carried out ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall. 

Mr. Mitchell. I now go back to the question of preparations in 
defense of an air attack at Hawaii. 

Admiral Kichardson has testified that during 1940 he protested 
against keeping the fleet in Hawaii. He has also testified, and his 
documentary protests to the Secretary of the Navy show, that he based 
his protest not on the question of security of the fleet in port, but 
because the facilities for training, equipment and preparing the fleet 
for war were inadequate and he wanted to go back to the coast to do it. 

Then it appears he testified when he went back to Honolulu, or 
Pearl Harbor, in December 1940, at the suggestion of Admiral Stark, 
he started the investigation as to the [£788] situation, as to 
the defense against an air attack, and we have in evidence what I call 
the Bloch report, which is a report that he sent in under date of 
December 1940 to the Chief of Naval Operations, which was signed 
by Admiral Stark who was the commander of the Fourteenth Naval 
District out there, and endorsed by Admiral Richardson. 

Did 5^ou have that called to your attention when it came in, or do 
you remember seeing that before ? 

General Marshall. As nearly as I can recall, this is the first time I 
have ever seen it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, following that report the Secretary of the 
Navy wrote the Secretary'- of War under date of January 24, 1941 — 
that is our exhibit 10 — in which letter he hade some very strong state- 
ments, and he said : 

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con- • 
sidered to be : 

(1) Air bombing attack. 

(2) Air torpedo plane attack. 

(3) Sabotage. 

(5) Submarine attack. 

(5) Mining. 

(6) Bombardment by gun fire. 

He called on the Secretary of War to give his attention to the matter, 
and the Secretary replied that he thoroughly [2789] agreed 

with him, and from that time on the subject was considered ended. 

Did you see that correspondence of the Secretary of War. 

General Marshall. Yes. My recollection on this particular matter 
is that I must have been absent when the letter was received, but the 
draft of the reply for the Secretary of War's signature to the Secre- 
tary of the Navy came to me from the War Plans Division. 

As I recall that draft, they did not think there was any materiel 
that could be made available, or virtually no materiel that could be 
made available earlier than October. I am not quite certain about 
that, but that is the impression I have now. That, I felt, whatever 
the circumstances, would put the Secretary of War in a rather im- 
possible position, and therefore I started in with the War Plans Divi- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1059 

sion, with General Moore, my Deputy for Supply, and with General 
Arnold on the air side, to see what radical measures we might take to 
meet, to a degree at least, some of the requirements set forth by the 
Secretary of the Navy. 

I might insert here apropos of your question as to whether or not 
I had seen — did you call it the Bloch letter ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The Bloch report, yes. 

General JNIarshall. That I had thought it was not Admiral Bloch 
but it was Admiral Kimmel that had generated this letter [2790] 
from the Secretary of the Navy up until almost this moment. 

The measures we took under the circumstances were, first, as to 
planes. After discussing the matter with General Arnold I made 
the decision that we would rob practically all the Combat Pursuit 
Squadrons of the United States of most of their P-36 planes which 
was our then most serviceable type as the new P-40 had certain engine 
defects which had not yet been eradicated. 

My recollection is — General Arnold can give you the positive testi- 
mony — that we cut most of the squadrons in the United States down 
to three planes. The difficulty there was, of course, that stopped the 
training of the x\ir Corps, which had to be expanded from about 1,800 
men to two million and a quarter. 

I took up with Admiral Stark over the telephone the problem of 
getting these planes to Hawaii without the necessity for crating them, 
which takes time for disassembling and which takes time for assem- 
bling. Whatever the conversations were, it was determined that a 
carrier could come into San Diego in February and pick up those 
planes, and I think there were other naval and 'marine materiel to 
go on the same carrier. 

A number of these planes were sent out, thirty odd, I think, suf- 
ficient, with the 19 P-36's then in Hawaii, to make an even 50. 

[2791] I also directed General Arnold to take up with the Curtiss 
people in Buffalo the expediting of their production schedule, to turn 
out the new P-40, which had more modern equipment and presum- 
ably would have eradicated the engine difficulties of the original 
model, in time for them to be shipped out to Hawaii at an early date. 
The date was fixed as March 15, as I recall now, as the only time a 
carrier could be spared from Hawaii to come into San Diego to pick 
up the planes. Just why that time was fixed I do not recall now. 

Therefore the schedule of the Curtiss-Wright plant had to be greatly 
expedited. General Arnold can give you the facts. 

My understanding of the matter was that the head of the firm 
came to Washington to see General Arnold and stated that he could 
not expedite the program. General Arnold brought this to my atten- 
tion and I directed General Arnold to go to Buffalo and bring heavy 
pressure to bear on those people to at least make the effort. He did 
that and was successful, they made the effort, and the last planes were 
cleared on March 9, in time to fly to San Diego and take off in the 
carrier on March 15. 

The other details as to materiel are covered in the letter of the Sec- 
retai-y of War in reply to the Secretary of [2792] the Navy. 

In all these matters the great problem was how we could meet the 
requirements of developing an army, which had to have the tools 



1060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

with which to train and without which it cannot train; how we could 
get something for the Philippines, which literally had nothing; how 
we could develop the Panama Canal defenses, which were very defi- 
cient, and how we could met certain commitments that we had with 
our Allies, notably the British, in order that they might not be found 
wanting at a critical juncture in the coming fighting. 

It stated — do you wish me to read the letter of the Secretary of War ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

General Marshall. This is addressed to the Secretary of the Navy, 
February — and I cannot read the date — 1941. 

In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise 
attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express 
complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of 
our making every posible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The 
Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and 
continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses 
because of [2793] the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. 

The Hawaiian project provides for 148 pursuit planes. There are now in 
Hawaii 36 pursuit planes ; 19 of these are P-36's and 17 are of somewhat less 
efficiency. I am arranging to have 31 P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego 
for shipment to Hawaii within the next 10 days, as agreed to with the Navy 
Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to 50 of the 
P-36 type and 17 of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, 50 of the new 
P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will 
be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii. 

There are as present in the Hawaiian Islands 82 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, 
20 37-millimeter anti-aircraft guns (enroute), and 109 caliber 50 anti-aircraft 
machine guns. The total project calls for 98 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, 120 37- 
millimeter anti-aircraft guns, and 308 caliber 50 anti-aircraft machine guns. 

With reference to tjie Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has 
been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arangements for 
installation will have been made i)y the time the [279Jf] equipment is 
delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary 
equipment cannot be made at an earlier date. 

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give 
immediate consideration to the question of the employment of ballon barrages 
and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and Base facilities. Barrage balloons 
are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made avail- 
able prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and 84 being 
manufactured— 40 for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. 
The Budget now has under consideration funds for 2,950 balloons. The value 
of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified 
opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the em- 
ployment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, 
the Commanding General will look into this matter again. 

With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a 
copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian De- 
partment, and am directing him to cooperate with the [2795] local Naval 
authorities in making those measures effective. 

Signed, "Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War." 

Mr. MrrcHELL. Now during the remainder of 1941 did you keep in 
touch with the resulting plans that were made for defense against air 
attack at Pearl Harbor? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. We have in evidence as our exhibit 44 a joint esti- 
mate made by General Martin as commander of the Army Air Force 
at Hawaii, and Admiral Bellinger, who was commander of the Naval 
Air Force of the 14th Naval District, dated March 31, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1061 

[£796] The estimate was: 

(a) Relations bPtwoen the United States and Oi'ange — 
that was Japan — 

are strained, uncertain and varying. 

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of 
war. 

(c) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on 
Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western 
Pacific for a long period. 

(d) A strong part of our Fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas 
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine 
force which initiates hostile action. 

(e) It appears pos.sible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raid- 
ing force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our In- 
telligence Service. 

In paragraph III they say : 

Possible enemy action : 

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by: 

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area; 

2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor. 

3. A combination of these two. 

[2797] They say also : 

It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would 
be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most 
likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach 
inside of 300 miles. 

They say also : 

A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines 
or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away 
by the original thrust. 

They say: 

Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable 
undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by 
a carrier. 

Then, they go on on at great length, and I will not read the rest 
of it, but visualizing the way the situation could be handled and the 
possibility of long-range reconnaissance, and keeping track of the 
Japanese the night before. 

Do you remember seeing that report ? 

General Marshall, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. There is another one that came in later by General 
Martin, a study of the air situation in Hawaii, addressed by him, 
under date of August 20, 1941, to the [2798] Commanding 
General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., and forwarded by 
General Short. That is exhibit 13. Have you had your attention 
called to that? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir, I recall seeing it at the time. 

Mr. Mitchell. He deals there very vividly with the possibilities of 
an air attack and the possible defen.se against it. You have that before 
you. 

Now, I will offer in evidence as exhibit 53, a book containing the 
correspondence between 



1062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. May I interrupt? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, do so. 

General Marshall. Before we pass these last two documents by, 
there was a memorandum from me regarding this air situation in 
Hawaii which more or less started up these various reports. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you that memorandum with you ? 

General Marshall. I haven't it with me, but I will obtain it and 
have it sent to you. I was shown it yesterday. It was signed by 
Colonel Orlando Ward. 

Mr. Mitchell. Signed by whom ? 

General Marshall. Signed by Colonel Orlando Ward, the then 
Secretary of the General Staff. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will get that later. 

[2799'] Senator Brewster. It is dated July 17, 1941. That is in 
exhibit 13. 

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 13 is the letter from General Short to the 
Commanding General of the Air Forces. 

Senator Brewster. The first paragraph. 

Mr. Mitchell. It says in the first paragraph : 

In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding 
General, Army Air Forces, OCS, 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, 
dated July 17, 1941 

General Marshall. That is what I am talking about. 
Mr. Mitchell (reading) : 

that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii, there is attached for con- 
sideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range 
bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the 
air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations 
therein. 

That is the memorandum that you referred to, and that you pre- 
pared, that called for this report ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Has the whole memorandum been available? 

General Marshall, I will obtain it and send it to the committee. 

[2800'] I interrupted you, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am glad you did. 

General INIarshall. You started to read that correspondence. 

Mr. Mitchell. We were about to offer in evidence as exhibit 53, 
a book of correspondence between General Marshall and General 
Short, commencing in February 1941. 

Before we go into that, I will call your attention to a memorandum 
dated Februarv 6, 1941, of a conference in the Office of the Chief of 
Staff. The initials are "O.W." 

Whom does that mean, do you remember ? 

General Marshall. I think that is Col. Orlando Ward, the Secre- 
tary of the Genera] Staff. 

Mr. Mitchell. This memorandum states that the conference was 
held and present were yourself and General Arnold, General Miles, 
and General Gerow, and the subject was defense of Pearl Harbor. 

General Marshall. Do you wish me to read it, sir? 

Mr. Mitchell. I will save your voice a little and read it myself. 

General Marshall. I do not mind. 

Mr. Mitchell. Try it, then. I will relay you occasionally. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1063 

General Marshall, (reading) : 

Present: General Marshall, General [2801] Arnold, General Miles, 
General Gerow 

Subject : Defense of Pearl Harbor. 

General Marshall indicated that the Navy had insufficient nets for defense 
against either submarine or plane carried torpedoes. He further indicated that 
there was a possibility of a Japanese attack. 

This is February 6, 1941. 

General Miles stated that nothing in G-2 indicated any such probability. 

General Marshall stated that the planes in Honolulu were, in general, obso- 
lescent, and that we should have a reasonable number of top flight planes which 
would out-perform any the Japanese could bring on their carriers. 

General Arnold recommended that 31 P-36s be sent immediately in a Navy 
carrier to Honolulu, and that 50 P-40Bs be sent as soon as available (in March). 

General Marshall stated that we really had two active defense issues — one, 
Panama, and the other, Honolulu. 

General Arnold was to make the necessary preliminary arrangements In 
connection with changing plans and i-eport to the Chief. 

Mr. MrrCHELL. When you said we had two active defense issues: 
one, Panama, and the other, Honolulu, will you develop what your 
idea was at that time? What was your idea in [2802'] men- 
tioning those two points ? 

General Marshall. They were the great outposts of our conti- 
nental defense. We had the Philippines at that time but the equip- 
ment there and the number of troops was so inadequate that no de- 
fense against a first class power was conceivable; it would be just a 
desperate sacrifice. 

( The correspondence between General Marshall and General Short, 
referred to above, was marked "Exhibit No. 63.") 

Mr. Mitchell. There is a letter from you to General Short which 
is dated February 7, 1941, in this Exhibit 53, which I will read for 
you, General. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is addressed [reading from Exhibit No. 53] : 

Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Shobt, 
Fort Shafter, 

Territory of Haivaii. 

My Dear Shoet: I believe you take over command today, however, the reason 
for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark. 

He spoke of Admiral Kimmel, the new Fleet Commander, regarding his per- 
sonal characteristics. He said Kimmel was very direct, even brusque and un- 
diplomatic in his approach to problems ; that he was at heart a very kindly man, 
though [2803] he appeared rather rough in his methods of doing business. 
I gathered that he is entirely responsive to plain speaking on the part of the 
other fellow if there is frankness and logic in the presentation. Stark went 
so far as to say that he had, in the past personally objected to Kimmel's man- 
ners in dealing with officers, but that Kimmel was outstanding in his quali- 
fications of command, and that this was the opinion of the entire Navy. 

I give you this as it may be helpful in your personal dealings with Admiral 
Kimmel, not that I anticipate that you would be supersensitive, but rather 
that you would have a full understanding of the man with whom you are to 
deal. 

Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the de- 
ficiencies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred 
specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he 
represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber 
.50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiaircraft gun is on a better basis. What 
Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel 
throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other 
command in the Army. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 3 7 



1064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration 
for us, there can be little question [2S0-'t'] about that ; but the Navy itself 
makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult 
for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark 
yesterday — he had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft 
guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected 
a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet — at the present 
time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little 
for Corregidor. By unobtrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments 
now in the field in active training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for im- 
mediate shipment to the Pliilippines. However, before the shipment had been 
gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of' these guns for Marine battalions 
to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am 
left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, 
and until quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult 
situation in these matters. 

I have not mentioned Panama, but the Naval requirements of defense there are 
of immense importance, and we have not been able to provide all the guns that 
are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with luodern equipment. However, in 
this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in [2805] one 
day, some of it in four hours. 

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is 
humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installa- 
tions, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of the 
P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days. This 
will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the Japanese 
carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it gives you 50 
of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 P40-B pursuit 
planes about IMarch 15tli by Naval carrier from San Diego. These planes just 
came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of about 8 a 
day by the first week in March. 

The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in 
China, according to our information, has a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very rapid 
ability to climb and mounts two .20 mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-proof 
tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour with two 
.50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to climb 
of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and armor. 

We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, [2806] delivered be- 
tween August and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to 
Hawaii because of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights 
over water. Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium 
bomber or a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into produc- 
tion, if not quantity production. ThLs plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 
miles, carries 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour — a tremendous 
improvement oji the old B18 which you now have. It can operate with bombs 
640 miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give 
you first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at 
least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii. 

I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up, 
but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regard- 
ing barrage balloons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manu- 
facture and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our estimates. 
However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looking into 
the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking us and 
not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries in June will 
probably be made in Hawaii. 

[2807] You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the 
limited materiel we have for Alaska, for Panama, and, most confidentially, for 
the possible occupation of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases. How- 
ever, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first con- 
cern is to protect the Fleet. 

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is 
done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing 
defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk 
of sabotage and the risk involved in a siirprise raid by Air and by submarine, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1065 

constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing 
threat in tlie Hawaiian Islands so long as we iiave air sui>eriority. 

Please keep elearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to 
protect the hase and the Naval concentrations, and that purpose should be made 
clearly apparent to Adinii-al Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yester- 
day, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy 
feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, w'ith the usual fallacious argu- 
ments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We nuist 
be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and 
irritations are concerned. [2808] Fortunately, and happily I might say, 
Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has 
enabled us to avoid many serious diflSculties. 
P^iithfully yours, 

[Stamped] (Sgd) G.C.Marshall. 

Does that letter to General Short fairly reflected the difficulties you 
had at that time in obtaining materiel, planes, and other equipment? 

General Marshall. I tliink it does, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. All through this letter in your discussions, were you 
considering equipment, planes, and guns needed for defense against 
an air attack? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention now to the minutes of a meeting 
. of the General Council, February 19, 1941.^ 

What was the General Council as it stood at that time? 

General Marshall. I haven't the regulation here which creates the 
General Council. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was that established by some regulation? 

General Marshall. It was established, I think, by General Mac- 
Arthur. That involved all the principal chiefs of the War Depart- 
ment, 

Mr. Mitchell. It was a War Department council and not a general 
council ? 

[2809] General M.vrshall. Purely War Department. It was 
the basis for keeping all the various and numerous chiefs of the War 
Department coordinated and aware of the general situation and 
requirements. 

Mr. ]\Iitchell. The minutes of this General Council meeting show 
you were present. Major General Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff, Major 
General Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Infantrv, tlie 
Chief of Cavalry, Chief of Field Artillery, Chief of Coast Artillery, 
Chief of Air Corps, General Brett, and many other officers. 

The minutes start out with the statement that this is not a complete 
record of the minutes, but contains extracts and the statement which 
we understand you made there was : 

To give you a further view of the special circumstances we have been pressed 
by the Navy to provide more security for the Fleet that has been gathering at 
Manila. 

And you discuss the Manila situation and the general Philippine situa- 
tion and then you proceed : 

Out in Hawaii, the Fleet is anchored, but they have to be prepared against 
any surprise attack. I don't say any probable attack, but they have to be pre- 
pared against a surprise attack from a trick ship or toiijedo planes. Our whole 
Navy power in general is concentrated there ; they can't cruise for the next six 

months. 



Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 54. 



1066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[2810] And you discussed at some length the question of anti- 
aircraft guns and planes which might be available. 

General Mauborgne said that another question has to do with change in pri- 
orities ; 

General Mauborgne, is that? 

General Marshall. General Mauborgne, Chief of the Signal Corps. 

Mr. Mitchell (continuing) : 

these pursuit people can't work without their detectors and if the situation is 
such that you need guns for the protection of the Navy somewhere in Hawaii, 
that you are going to have to change priorities and get some aircraft warning 
units mobilized. 

General Marshall said we are on that right now. 

General Moore said that we are making a complete study of that whole ques- 
tion on aircraft warning and also with refex'ence to priorities and where we are 
going to establish this service first. The question came up in connection with 
the Alaskan aircraft warning service. 

General Marshall said that with reference to priorities, he had put the cards 
on the table with Admiral Stark and said, where do you want it. The protec- 
tion of the Fleet is of major consideration. He said that Admiral Stark was quite 
embarrassed. "When the next planes come out over and above the .50 millimeter 
planes, it is a question of where [2811] they go, to Panama or the Phil- 
ippine Islands. That will be up to the Navy. "I am going to allow them to practi- 
cally dictate where those planes sliould go until we reach a certain degree of 
security." We haven't any modern medium bombers. They are just begin- 
ning to come off the line. The question is where do they go. That is a Navy 
decision, for the protection of the Fleet, and at the present time for the pro- 
tection of our shores. I don't think they want the first ones in Manila. They 
will probably say that they want them first in Hawaii. Then how many in 
Panama. The Navy can almost tell us. Those priorities will all have to be 
solved in terms of protection of the Navy in the immediate situation. 

Was that your policy all through this period? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

[2813] Mr. Mitchell. Do you want to add anything to what the 
tniiiutes of the meeting report ? 

General Marshall. I can think of nothing at the moment. 

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to a letter from General Short 
to 3^ou under date of February 19, 1941, in this book we have just offered 
in evidence, Exhibit 53. 

He says [reading from Exhibit No. 53] : 

I was very glad indeed to have your letter of February 7, as it gave us some 
very definite information on aircraft we did not have. 

He says that he is getting along w^ell with Admiral Kimmel and 
Admiral Bloch, 

I have told them that from my point of view there will be no hair-splitting, 
but that the one thing that would affect any decision where there is an apparent 
conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities would be the ques- 
tion of what could produce the greatest combined effort of the two forces. 

As a result of my short study of the conditions here, I believe that the follow- 
ing are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary 
changes. 

1. Cooperation with the Navy. 

2. Dispersion and protection of aircraft and the repair, maintenance and 
servicing of aircraft. 

\_2S13] 3. Improvement of the antiaircraft defense. 

4. Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. 

5. Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. 

6. Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement 
in roads and trails. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1067 

7. Bomb-proofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and Communi- 
cations Centers. 

8. Increase in the number of Engineer troops. 

Then he discusses the dispersion and protection of aircraft and bomb 
ers; improvement of the antiaircraft defense; and other activities 
that didn't directly relate to antiaircraft defense. 

He also mentions bomb-proofing of vital installations, such as com- 
mand posts and communication service. 

That is a defense movement against air attack, is it not, bomb-proof- 
ing of vital installations? 

General MARSiiALii. Against air attack, against, maybe, fleet bom- 
bardment and against, maybe, a landing, if it should take place. 

Mr. Mitchell.. Have you any comments to make on that letter, 
General Marshall? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. It did make you aware of the fact that [2814-] 
General Short had taken your letter of February 7 to heart and was 
actively interested in aircraft, antiaircraft measures out there? 

General Marshall. Very much so. 

Mr. Mitchell. I call j^our attention to the minutes of a meeting of 
the "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff" Tuesday, Feb- 
ruary 25, 1941. 

I think I did not offer this in evidence, the one of February 19, 
which I should have offered, as Exhibit 54. That is "Notes on General 
Council Meeting," February 19, 1941. 

I offer it as exhibit 54 and I will offer the minutes of the con- 
ference of February 25, 1941, in evidence as Exhibit 55. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 54 and 55," 
respectively.) 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you go through that, General Marshall, and 
make any comments on it that occur to you, I will read it if you like. 

General Marshall. No, sir. I am scanning it here. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think maybe I had better read it. 

General Marshall. I can read it for you. 

Mr. Mitchell. All right, sir. 

General Marshall (reading Exhibit No. 55) : 

Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff at 10 : 00 a. m., Tuesday, Feb- 
ruary 25, 1941. 

[2815] Present : Chief of Staff, General Emmons, General Arnold, General 
Brett, General Spaatz, General Gerow, Colonel McNarney, Colonel Anderson, 
Colonel Twaddle. 

Chief of Staff. In view of the Japanese situation the Navy is concerned with 
the security of the fleet in Hawaii, and apparently the new commander of the 
fleet there has made a check and reported it to Washington and the Secretary 
of the Navy has outlined the situation to the Secretary of War. Their particular 
point is the type of air force in Hawaii, particularly Pursuit. They are in the 
situation where they must guard agaiust a surprise or trick attack. It is 
necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are par- 
ticularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even 
a probability but they must guard against everything. We also have' informa- 
tion regarding the possible use of torpedo planes. There is the possible sudden 
introduction of Japanese carrier-based planes of the Messerschmidt type which 
has a speed of 322 miles per hour, armored, etc. The Navy viewpoint is that 
the whole fleet is involved and tliat the sea power of the United States might 
be [2816] jeopardized. We have already arranged to send 31 P-36 ships 
there. The Curtis plant has moved up the delivery date of 50 additional planes 



1068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to March 10th ; the Navy is sending a Carrier back for these ships. The issue is 
the priority with regard to new equipment. Admiral Hart has six new sub- 
marines, one old cruiser, and not one AA gun. They have now brought up the 
question of moving some armament from Corregidor. The planes in the Philip- 
pines are of the Swedish type which the Chinese turned down. If we had a 
single squadron of modern planes in the Philippines, it would at least give the 
Japanese something to think about. Then we have the question of Panama — 
no modern planes. I understand that the P-40s have some engine trouble which 
makes them dangerous flying over water. Consequently, our original allocation 
will be changed by the Japanese situation. Also I have a memorandum with 
reference to a British request for 50,000 airplanes, to be delivered in 1942. We 
have a deficiency of 10,000 in organizing the 14,000 program. We are con- 
cerned with the reduction of the assignment to the GHQ Air Force. It was 
thought to our advantage to have as many as possible in foreign garrisons. 
I have just been talking about pursuit. We have started [2817] a prop- 
osition to fill up outlying garrisons, those close to home aren't so much of a 
problem. 

Colonel Anderson. We have made a tentative allocation of planes as follows: 
First priority : to the Philippine Islands — one interceptor squadron, one medium 
bomber squadron. To Alaska — one composite group. To Hawaii and Panama- 
sufficient strength to meet a two-carrier attack. To Puerto Rico — one pursuit 
group and two bomber groups. Second priority: The equipment for an emer- 
gency force to South and Central America — three groups of heavy or medium 
iKimbers, two groups of light bombers, and two groups of intercept. Third 
priority: Remainder of the GHQ. minimum training requirements for the re- 
mainder of the 54 group program. We will complete training requirements before 
January 1942; will complete the 54 group in intercept pursuit in January 1942; 
lighter pursuit in July 1942: heavy bonihers in April 1942; medium bombers in 
December 1941 ; light bombers in April 1942. 

Chief of Staff. What do you think about this, Emmons? 

He was the commander of the GHQ Air Force. 

General Emmons. We have little means to accomplish \2618] or plans 
in GHQ Air Force. We are 850 officers short on the 25-group program and we 
won't get the .shortage made up until July, then we will only have graduates of 
training centers. If we make the normal assignments to staff echelons, we 
will have less than 100 officers with 2 years service to distribute over 34 groups. 
With respect to planes, we have 500 combat types for instance. With regard to 
the P-BO we liad to get 31 to send to Hawaii, it took all we had (71) to get the 
31 out, due to repairs, ships on the ground, etc. The backbone of our present 
airplane strength is the B-18 of which we have 140. Of the 193 P-40's we now 
have only 175, many are out of commission for lack of spare parts. We have 
50 B-17's, also 4 P-39's and 5 A-20A. We are also short of spare parts. Al- 
though we have on paper about 500 planes, I doubt that we could put 300 in the air. 

General Aknoed. The 25 group program is supposed to be completed by July 
1941 ; the 54 group by April 1942. 

General Emmons. Witli regard to sending equipment on foreign service it 
would be a mistake to send new planes overseas until the defects inherent with 
new materiel have been ironed out. We have changes on the 50 P-40B's to go 
to Hawaii, probably won't make much [2819] difference except with the 
engine. 

General Brett. The engine is improving all the time. The P— iOD has a new 
engine. 

Chief of Staff. How about the Air Depot in Hawaii? 

General Emmons. It functions very well. 

General Aenold. With regard to this shortage of parts, we are going to have 
to manufacture parts in the depots — we used to do it before. 

General Brett. The shortage in parts is due to the fact that we have pushed 
the plane manufacturers so far the planes that they have been forced to neglect, 
in a measure, the production of spare parts. 

General Emmons. With regard to organization equipment, we are in pretty 
good shape. The only shortage is in cameras and octants. With regard to the 
allocation, T don't know what to s'ay. With regard to a tactical point, Hawaii 
has a peculiar situation — pursuit is of little value at night, at which time — due 
to phosforesence in the water — primary targets, dry-docks, the fleet, etc., stand 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1069 

out on the darkest night. They will have no warning service until they get 
detectors and pursuit would be useless. I would have long I'ange bombers 
and not send pursuit, but bombers. 
Conference Adjourned. 

[28£0] Mr. Mitchell. Does that reflect the problems you were 
dealing with at that time ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you any comment to make on that situation 
that is developed by that conference? 

General ISIarshall. No, sir; I don't think of anything that isn't 
pretty well covered. 

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to a letter you wrote to General 
Short on March 5, 1941. It says [reading from exhibit No. 53 :] 

My Dear Short : I would appi'eciate your early review of the situation in the 
Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establish- 
ment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end 
is a matter of first priority. General Chaney has prepared a report of recent 
exercises held in the United States and incorporated therein his views and recom- 
mendations based on his experience in these exercises and his observation of 
the system and method employed by the British. A copy of this report is being 
sent to you. 

An air defense exercise is contemplated for the West Coast in the Spring. This 
exercise is to include an establishment similar to that which has been set 
[2821] up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast and tested 
during January. It is highly desirable that representatives from Hawaii be 
present to observe the details of this exercise. If this is found to be impractica- 
ble, we will consider having officers sent to the exercise who shortly thereafter 
are due for station in Hawaii. 

Now, what inspired that request for an early review at that date 
from General Short of the situation in the Hawaiian Department ? 

General ISIarshall. The fact that we were beginners at the business 
of organizing for the meeting of air attacks, the employment of radar 
and operation of these boards where all the movements of the ships 
were kept graphically illustrated, the directions to meet varying at- 
tacks. The British, of course, had developed that to a high degree in 
the Battle of Britain. General Chaney was directed to observe all 
the details of their procedure in England. He was an air officer. 
I recalled him to the United States, stationed him at Mitchel Field 
in Long Island, with directions to develop there a practical method 
of handling aircraft and antiaircraft in resisting air attacks and the 
employment of radar. 

He carried on quite a development and finally had maneuvers. We 
carried those maneuvers eventually down the entire coast [38'22'\ 
and also finally out on the west coast. 

I was concerned that everbody in the Air Corps, eveiybody con- 
cerned with the anti-aircraft, understood the technique and its applica- 
tion. I, therefore, wished General Short to be brought into the picture 
and to have the last word so far as we could determine as to the best 
method of meeting air attacks. 

Mr. Mitchell. "Well now, your letter was dated March 5, and there 
appears in this book a letter from General Short to you dated March 6. 
That could not have been a reply to your letter. It doesn't so state. 
The letters probably crossed in the mail. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 



1070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. That letter to you of March 6, 1941, in it General 
Short says [reading from Exhibit No. 53] : 

Dear General Marshall : One of the first projects which I investigated in this 
Department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the 
defense of these Islands. At the present time the maximum distance an approach- 
ing airplane can be detected is about 5 miles. The radio detector equipment 
of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to 120 miles, and in these 
Islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by \_2823] which the 
detection distance can be increased. With the present international situation 
it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now 
here. 

The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the Fleet in 
Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. The Commander in 
Chief of the Fleet has expressed his concern about this and had communicated 
this concern to the Navy Department; as you know, the Secretary of War has 
advised the Secretary of the Navy that the equipment would be received in this 
Department sometime in June and the stations be operating shortly thereafter. 
I have discussed this matter with Admiral Kimmel and have assured him that 
personnel would be trained and the stations in operation within 30 days after 
receipt of the equipment. 

I probably ought to read the rest of it. 

All this leads up to a radiogram of 3 Mai'ch 1941 just received from the 
Adjutant General regarding the Haleakala installation. A copy of this radio and 
a paraphrase of my reply are enclosed for ready reference. The Adjutant 
General's radio indicates to me that the seriousness of this situation has not 
yet been [2824] appreciated in the War Department. It lists certain 
restrictions regarding construction, and if it is necessary to comply with these, 
the completion of this station will be unduly delayed. The fixed station at the 
summit of Haleakala is one of the two most important in the warning net ; its 
commanding location gives it greater coverage than any of the others, and its 
early completion is vital. I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to 
be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission cannot 
be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala 
installation without the necessity of submitting detailed plans for consideration 
by the National I'ark Service. 

Defense of these Islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet 
is so dependent upon tlie early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that 
I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was 
very thoroughly studied by a Board of ofiicers in this Department who made 
several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic deci- 
sions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved 
by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be [2825] 
decentralized and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts 
and other details to expedite its completion. 

Do you remember that Secretary of War Stimson was especially 
interested in these radar detectors ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir, he was very much interested in that 
particular development. 

Mr. Mitchell. It may be anticipating, but do you know how many 
mobile or fixed radar detector outfits were sent to Hawaii before De- 
cember 6 ? 

General Marshall. My recollection is that there were six mobile 
sets in operation at that time and three fixed sets known in operation. 

Mr. Mitchell. In your letter of March 13 to General Short you say : 

The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local 
Naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your De- 
partment, is most gratifying. 

Since the Navy deployment in Kaneohe Bay has exceeded the project originally 
contemplated, I agree with you that the Army should consider assuming respon- 
sibility for its defense, and meanwhile defend it within the means available. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1071 

[2826] The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant Gen- 
eral requesting personnel, materiel and funds are being processed. To avoid 
delay in initiating projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including 
$3,000,000 in the estimates now being prepared. 

Here is a letter from General Bryden to General Short, dated May 
15. That wasn't one of your letters. 
Senator Lucas. March 15. 
Mr. Mitchell. March 15, 1941. It says. 

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establish- 
ment of the Aircraft Warning Service stations in the Hawaiian Department. 
However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those 
cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department 
of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the 
temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, 
but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary 
building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also 
very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at 
such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance 
[2827] of the reservation. 

I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with 
officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 
12, 1941 outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time. 
The War Department finds it necessary to ask the Department of the Interior 
for the use of many tracts of land in the National Parks, and for their coopera- 
tion in the transfer of large areas of public land. It is not believed that it would 
be advisable to attempt to alter the informal decisions of the Department of 
the Interior by carrying this matter to higher authority, or to prolong the dis- 
cussion through official channels. 

We are as anxious as you are to work out a solution for these problems 
with the least practical delay, and I know that I can count on you for fullest 
cooperation. 

Signed "William Bryden. in the absence of the Chief of Staff." 
Senator Fergusox. Would counsel read the distribution of that 
letter? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. It says : 

Distribution : 1 Chief of Staff. 

Showing a copy of the letter went to the Chief of Staff. 

[SSSS] Here is another letter from General Short to you dated 
March 15, 1941. It appears to be in answer to your request for a re- 
port from him about the air situation. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, before counsel proceeds, I am won- 
dering if General Marshall would care to comment on that letter of 
March 15. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. I should have asked him for a com- 
ment. I get so interested in these myself that I forget. 

General, you heard me read this letter of March 15 which related 
to sites for the installation of fixed radar stations in Hawaii and the 
discussion as to the attitude of the Department of the Interior. 

General Marshall. My recollection of the situation here was Gen- 
eral Short pressing very hard to have early action taken to permit the 
installation of that radar. Pie had selected a point in one of the Na- 
tional Parks which was a volcanic peak to which the Department of the 
Interior, or the National Park Service, rather, on the ground objected, 
and that objection was supported for the time being at least by the 
Department of Interior National Park Service here in Washington. 



1072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[2829'] Another site was proposed but that site would have 
involved about either 25 degrees or 25 percent of the total arc of 
observation or, rather, of registration of the radar, so that being the 
case any planes that approached within that arc could not have been 
detected. 

Therefore, General Short was very much concerned to have the 
radar established on the peak, which gave all around service. He 
can, of course, tell you the details of this much better than I can. 

He was pressing us to get the authority out of the Department of 
the Interior and the National Park Service. He was also pressing 
us to secure authority to proceed with the building without any delay 
which would be involved in sending the plans to the United States 
for approval here by the National Park Service in the Department 
of the Interior. 

We had been endeavoring through the ordinary channels, so far 
as I can recall, that follow any business between two separate de- 
partments of the Government represented by Cabinet heads and had 
quite a difficult time obtaining authority to establish the radar sec- 
tion on the peak of the volcano most desired by General Short. That 
authority was obtained. 

However, we were unable, and I think that was the situation at the 
time of this letter of General Bryden's, though I am not accurate 
about that, to secure authority for General [2830] Short to 
proceed with the building without the delay of submitting plans to 
Washington. General Bryden evidently wrote this letter in order 
to make clear to General Short our difficulties here and just why we 
could not obtain that necessary authority. 

The records will show, I think, and my recollection is that General 
Short sent another message or two pressing again that we go after 
this more vigorously. I then personally went into the matter and 
talked by telephone with the head of the National Park Service, I 
believe it was the head, I do not remember the gentleman's name, 
to secure authority to go ahead with the construction of the station 
without the delay involved in sending the plans back to the United 
States. 

He told me that could not be; that in each case, notably those where 
we were constructing similar radar station sites in Maine, along the 
coast of New England, each one had to be approved in the Depart- 
ment, in the Department of the Interior, before any building could 
be gone ahead with, if the site lay in any National Park area. 

Mr. Mitchell. This letter 

General Marshall. I might finish, though, by saying that that 
conversation ended with the statement that they could not grant the 
authority for General Short to go ahead; and, incidentally, what he 
was trying to do was to get the [2831] station installed and 
ready to receive the equipment that was then due in June. 

Later, and as I recall that afternoon, word came either from the 
National Park Service or the Department of Interior or otherwise 
which permitted, as I recall, us to go ahead with the plan, sending 
just the general statement of the plan by air mail. I think the 
records will show that development. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this letter from General Bryden to General 
Short states that the reason the National Park Service and the In- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1073 

terior Dei)iutnient require the structure plans to be submitted to them 
in full before they would permit the reservation to be used for such 
a purpose was based on the question as to whether they were archi- 
tecturaly attractive or altered the natural appearance of the reser- 
vation. 

Is that your understanding of their basis ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, this letter of March 15, 1941, from General 
Short to you appears to be a report in response to your letter of the 
5th in which you asked him for a review of the air defense situation 
there. He starts out and says (reading from Exhibit No. 53:) 

The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability 
of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack. 

He develops that at length and reports on the anti- [28S£] 
aircraft artillery. He says : 

In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only 16 
guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no provision 
has been made for 90-mm antiaircraft guns. 20 out of 135 37-mm antiaircraft 
guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the others is not 
known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns. Perhaps the most 
serious shortage is 8 long range detectors (AWS) 

What does "AWS" stand for? 

General Marshall. Air Warning Service. 

Mr. Mitchell (continuing to read from Exhibit No. 53:) 

— which are supposed to arrive in June. Our present sound locators have a 
range of only 41/2 miles so they are practically useless. The new detectors will 
have a maximum range of 120 miles. 

Then he discusses the shortage in personnel, which he says is serious. 
The coordination of antiaircraft defense. He says of that : 

The cooi'dination of Antiaircraft defense presents quite a different picture at 
Hawaii from that existing in most places on the mainland. The island is so 
small [2833] that there would not be the same degree of warning that 
would exist on the mainland. After the installation of our new detectors we 
shall have some warning from the different islands and almost continuous 
service in the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The pursuit 
aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum 
amount of time. 

On account of the congestion in the areas at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and 
Baibers Point, the coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the Anti- 
aircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem. We have had a committee 
of the Army and Navy working on this subject. 

Then he refere to the w^est coast defense exercise which you have 
mentioned and said he would like to send both General Martin and 
General Gardner. 

When that report came to your attention did you consider that it 
showed a sufficiently lively and active interest in the antiaircraft de- 
fense on the part of General Short ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir, 

Mr. Mitchell. You said in your letter to him of INfarch 28 [read- 
ing from Exhibit No. 53] : 

I was very glad to receive your letter of March 15 reviewing the air defense 
situation in your depart- [2S3.'f] ment. 

Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional 
field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing 
airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sutficient details 



1074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for these purposes 
will be included in estimates. 

A company of aviation engineers will be sent to you during April, and fur- 
ther increases in your engineer garrison are contemplated when the necessary 
personnel can be made available. 

Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service materiel to complete your project 
requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows. 

Then you give him a list of guns and their dates [continuing to read 
from Exhibit No. 53] : 

I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your antiaircraft 
garrison. 

I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their 
Executives, to the West Coast Defense Exercise. 

Have you any comments to make about that? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

[£835] Senator Lucas. Those dates, Mr. Counsel, in the fourth 
paragraph are pretty important. 

Mr. Mitchell. The fourth paragraph? 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Mr. ]\Iitchell. Yes. I did not want to tire the committee or keep 
the general waiting on account of my reading too long [reading from 
Exhibit No. 53] : 

Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service materiel to complete your project 
requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows : sixteen 3" 
antiaircraft guns, December, 1941 ; one hundred and fifteen 37mm antiaircraft 
guns, February, 1942; caliber .50 antiaircraft machine guns, in 1942; four SCR 
No. 268, April, 1941. 

That means four outfits? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were they mobile or fixed, those SCR's, or don't 
you happen to know about that ? 

General Marshall, I do not know offhand. I think they were 
mobile. 

Mr. Mitchell, (reading) : 

Five SCR No. 270 and three SCR No. 271, April and May, 1941. 

Do you happen to remember whether those antiaircraft [2836] 
warning instruments, AWS, for radar were sent out there on the ex- 
pected dates or would you have to look your records up on that? 

General Marshall. I think you will have to go to the records for 
that. All I can tell you offhand at the moment is that there were six 
mobile stations in operation, as I understand it, on December 7, 1941 
and tliree fixed setups not in operation. 

Mr. Mitchell. I only mention General Short's letter to you of 
April 14 to call attention to the fact that in that letter he concludes 
with this statement [reading from exhibit No. 53] : 

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making 
in cooperating with the Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made with 
them: 

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth 
Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure. 

2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Com- 
mander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement. 

3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army 
the provisions of the joint agreement. 

[2837] Would you have had time to examine those documents 
at length, or do you remember having done so ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1075 

General Marshall. I think that I remember the documents, al- 
though I am not quite certain, that arranged for the coordination 
of air action and defense. I became somewhat familiar with them 
for the reason that the air officials of the War Department — I do not 
recall whether it was General Arnold personally or part of his staff, 
or both — brought objections to me to General Short's arrangements 
in the coordination in this matter with the Navy, which had to do 
Avith the Army Air Corps reluctance in regard to the over-water 
reconnaissance responsibilities which in this coordinated agreement 
was naval, and the Air Corps was thinking of their long-range four- 
engine bombers and what later developed into the great strategical 
air bombing force. 

I did not think their position was sound and I thought General 
Short's arrangement was sound under the then circumstances which, 
incidentally, included the fact that he had very few B-17's, about 
12 of them, and possibly some old B-18's, that the agreement with 
the Navy, with its PBY's of long range and considerable endurance 
at the time, supplemented as might be considered necessary by the 
Naval Chief by Army planes, was the efficient method of meeting the 
conditions under the circumstances. 

[2838] Mr. Mitchell. You thought that the long over-water 
reconnaissance ought to be handled by the Navy with such assistance 
as the Army Air Forces could give it? 

General Marshall. Certainly, under the conditions that then 
existed as to equipment on both sides. 

Mr. Mitchell. You understood at that time then that the arrange- 
ment was between the commanders out there that if the naval com- 
mander needed additional long range planes to make reconnaissance 
he would call on the Army for them ? 

General Marshall. And those planes would operate under naval 
direction. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

General Marshall. The complicated part of the procedure, of 
course, was not that. It was the control of the various fighter planes 
and the antiaircraft in the very restricted area, particularly of Oahu, 
especially if the Fleet were there. That was made the responsibility 
of the Army commander and I thought in terms that were practical 
of accomplishment. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you agree with General Short's conclusion when 
he spoke in his letter about radar equipment, that even if they had 
radar equipment of a range of maybe 130 or 150 miles it would 
necessitate very prompt take-off of pursuit planes in order to respond 
to such a warning? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I do not know just to what [£8S9'] 
specific reference that you are referring in connection with that but 
this is certainly the case. One hundred and twenty miles represents 
a very few minutes of flying time and that study by General Martin 
presents possibly other factors which would make the issue even more 
complicated unless the force is picked up at a great distance. 

The planes have to be ready all the time for immediate action and 
a certain number warmed up. We had that same problem in Panama 
where it went on week in and week out, almost year in and year 
out, making it a very difficult problem to meet, the more so where 
enemy action was not always evident. 



1076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. After he sent yoii his letter on the 14th enclosmg 
the joint plans and estimates concerninn; possible air action you seem 
to have written General Short on May 5, 1941, as follows [reading 
from Exhibit No. 53] : 

My dear Short : 

Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans and the estimate 
concerning possible air action. It is evident that you have been on the job, 
and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation. 

You say at the end of the letter : 

It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely 
well and do not hesitate [2840] to write at any time. 

I take it you were assured by his report that this matter of anti- 
aircraft defense — I mean the defense against air attack — was being 
given very diligent attention out there ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. This is a good time to stop. The committee will 
recess until 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon at 12 noon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same 
day.) 

[284^] AFTKRNOON SESSION 2 P. M. 

The CiLviRMAX. The committee will come to order. 

Counsel may proceed with the examination of General Marshall. 

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed) 

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, I know the reading of these docu- 
ments is tedious, but there are only a few documents left that I want 
to call 3'Our attention to before I ask you some general questions. 

The next one is a document signed by Harry J. Malony, brigadier 
general, addressed to the Chief of Staff on May 13, 1941. 

I see that it generally relates to "installation of dispersed protec- 
tion bunkers for 263 pursuit ships, and 95 bombers," and paragraph 3 
says [reading from Exhibit No. 56] : 

War Plans Division believes : 

a. That the danger of sustained air attack against air fields in Hawaii from 
carrier based aviation is not serious. 

Would you tell us what would be meant from a military standpoint 
by the word "sustained" ? 

General Marshall. My reaction to that at the moment — [28421 
I couldn't tell you specifically what it might have been at the time — 
would be that he was referring to a continuous attack on Hawaii, such 
as occurred at Okinawa during the landing and heavy fire, rather 
than a raiding attack, which is of short duration. 

Mr. Mitchell. And he thought for that reason the bunkers against 
gas and bombs of secondary importance; is that the idea? 

General Marshall. That would be my conception of it now. I don't 
recall what conception I had at the time. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will offer that memorandum in evidence as 
exhibit 56. 

The Chairjvian. So ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 56.") 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1077 

Mr. Mitchell. 1 have here a inemoranduni of a conference in the 
oflice of the Secretary of War under date of May 19, 1941. Have you 
tliat before you? 

General IVIarshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. "Wouki you mind reading it? 

General Marshall. This is a conference on May 19, 1941, in the 
office of the Secretary of War : 

Present : The Secretary of War — Mr. Stinison 
The Under Secretary of War — Judge Patterson 
[-28^3] The Assistant Secretary of War— Mr. McOloy 
The Assistant Secretary of War for Air — Mr. Lovett 
The Chief of Staff 

myself — two deputies — three deputies at that time: General Bryden, 
General Moore, and Generald Arnold. 

The Secretary, General Staff — Colonel Ward. 

Mr. Mitchell. You might omit the first subject. 

General Marshall. The first subject relates to Martinique which I 
understand you wish me to omit. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. The next paragraph having to do with boats 
for the First Division. 

General Marshall (reading) : 

The French cruiser in Martinique is a first class cruiser ship with a top speed 
of 40 knots. 

The Secretary of War asked whether she was in good condition, and was 
informed that she was. 

General Marshall indicated that it would take about ten days for the Navy 
to get boats for the First Division. He further indicated that it was primarily 
a naval mission but that the Army Air should participate, both for the help it 
could give and the experience it would gain. He indicated that the B-lS's in 
Puerto Rico would be staged at St. Croix. Puerto Rico is almost 400 miles from 
Martinique. 

General Marshall then indicated that there were now in the United States 14 
B-17's of the most modern type which l2S4-i] he thought should not be 
sent out of the country in view of the current situation. These had been with- 
held from the Hawaiian Department .contingent. 

T'he Secretary of War asked if this would affect the impregnability of Hawaii. 

General Marshall said that it would not. He further said that we need some 
B-17's (but not of the most modern type) in Panama, and that he is recommend- 
ing that 9 be sent there. This matter is under consideration. 

General Arnold. There is now available 50 B-17's without leak-proof tanks and 
without armor. 

General Marshall. High bombing is possible in the Caribbean area, due to 
weather conditions, and these ships without leak-proof tanks could be effectively 
used there. 

\28JiS'\ Mr. Mitchell. We will offer that in evidence as Ex- 
hibit 57. 

The Chairman. That is dated May 19. 1941 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. May 19, "Conference in the Office of the Secretary 
of War." 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 57".) 

Senator Brewster. You read it as if St. Croix was in Puerto Rico. 

General Marshall. I missed the punctuation. I should have given 
the distance from St. Croix to Puerto Rico. 

Senator Brewster. That is in the Virgin Islands, is it, St. Croix? 

General Marshall. I am confused at the moment. I don't know. 

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention further to a letter dated May 
29 from General Short to you. Page 35. Have you found it? 



1078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General MarshalIj. I have a copy of it here, 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you kindly refer to that and read the first two 
paragraphs. 

General Marshall. It is dated May 29, 1941, signed Walter C. 
Short (reading from Exhibit No. 53) : 

[2846] Dear General Marshall: I know that you will not have time to 
look over a detailed account of our recent maneuvers but feel that you might like 
to have a birdseye view of what we did and the purpose back of it. 

The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of 
the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of Engineer Supplies for 
Field Fortifications and of Engineer Tools. During the air phase our bombers 
acted under Navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons 
and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The 
movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the Navy patrol planes had 
the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made 
the attack. Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by Naval planes and 
our own bombers when they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt 
of the warning for this phase our bombers were sent to fields on outlying Islands 
and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this 
phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of the Army Air 
Force, Navy Air Force, and antiaircraft than we had during any previous exer- 
cise. Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been actually [2847] 
issued before and we got considerable data in regard to the time and transpor- 
tation required to complete the issue. 

Mr. Mitchell. You understand that relates to training or practice, 
simulated attack by air on Hawaii ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

[£848] Mr. Mitchell. The rest of the document relates to the 
other phases that were not related directly to the air attack, were 
they? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. On July 25 it appears that there was a joint Army 
and Navy dispatch to Hawaii about economic sanctions. That dis- 
patch was sent by the Navy under date of July 25, from the Chief 
of Naval Operations to the commanding general of the — or to the 
commanding chief of the Pacific Fleet and others and it bears in it 
a statement that it was a joint dispatch from the C. O. and the Chief 
of Staff of the United States Army. It is on page 2 of Exhibit 32. 

Was it the practice at that time occasionally for one department to 
send a -dispatch and in it have a request that it be communicated to 
the other clepartment in Hawaii ? 

General INIarshall. Yes, sir; that was a very common practice all 
the way through in order to protect our codes. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was the occasion of your notifying the Army 
and Navy commanders at Hawaii of the placing of these embargoes 
and restrictions? 

General Marshall. I did not hear the last word. 

Mr. Mitchell. Through these embargoes and restrictions on 
commerce. 

General Marshall. That was to apprise them of the de- [£849] 
velopments of the situation in relation to Japan. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, was there any idea in your head that the 
imposition of those embargoes might probably intensify the strain 
between Japan and the United States ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1079 

General Marshall. My best recollection is that it was as we say 
here: 

Do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of 
military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may 
take appropriate precautionary measures. 

Mr. Mitchell. There is a letter under date of August 19 from you 
to General Short. Would you kindly look at that? 

General Marshall. Is that on page 40 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Page 40, yes. You might read the whole letter, 
General. 

General Marshall. All right, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think it relates all to air matters. 

General Marshall (reading from Exhibit No. 53) : 

August 19, 1941. 

Dear General Short : Your letter of July 11 has been received recommending 
the selection of Kipapa Field rather than the Kahuku Point Field as a base for 
the 15th Pursuit Group. The [2850] advantages and disadvantages of 
each site have been considered. As a result, I feel that the advantages of the 
Kahuku Point Field outweight those of the Kipapa Field sufficieutly to result in 
my decision to establish the base on Kahuku Point. 

The following factors are among those having a bearing upon my decision : 

a. Low clouds and ground mist frequently obtain over the Wheeler Field-Ki- 
papa area, while at the same time on the north shore of Oahu visibility conditions 
are good. It is believed tactically unsound to place two pursuit groups in an area 
subject to the same adver.se weather conditions. Pursuit operations in defense 
of Oahu would be seriously hampered during such weather conditions. Selection 
of the Kahuku Point site places one gi-oup in a location where relatively favor- 
able weather may exist when the reverse is true in the Kipapa area. 

b. The close proximity of two Army and two Navy air bases in the Schofield 
Bari'acks — Pearl Harbor area has resulted in a situation under present condi- 
tions which necessitates continuous coordination and control of air traflic in the 
interests of safety. The addition of a fifth air base in this area will appreciably 
ag- [2851] gravate this situation. 

I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance of ade- 
quate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and accordingly, will entertain 
favorably and proposal which will implement the efficiency of such defense. I 
hope, therefore, that they will be agreeable to our proposal to establish an air 
base at Kahuku Point to the extent of releasing any claim they may have pre- 
viously established to any part of the area involved. 
With best personal regards. 
Faithfully yours, 

(Stamped) (Sgd.) G. C. Marshall, 

Chief of Staff. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you happen to remember whether the site you 
recommended was actually selected? 

General Marshall. I do not recall right, sir. 

]\Ir. IMiTCHELL. I will ask you to turn. General, to the letter from 
General Short to you dated October 14, 1941, appearing on page 43. 

General Marshall. Do you wish me to read that, sir? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, if you please. 

General Marshall (reading from Exhibit No. 53) : 

[2852] Fort Shafter, T. H., October If,, 19J,1. 

General George C. Marshall, 
Chief of Staff of the Army, 

War Department, Washington, D. C. 
Dear General Marshall: I have your letter of October 10th with reference 
to the use of men of the Air Force on other than .strictly air duties. At the time 
our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7229 

79716— 46— pt. 3 8 



1080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,885 meu for the planes 
and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no 
assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment 
vpas to give these men something to do during the INIaneuvers. Another reason 
was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu would 
come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our planes had 
been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of. action. It 
is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would not look 
plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were detailed 
to protect them and their air fields. The training after the first two weeks takes 
up only about four hours per [2853] month of their time. It seems to me 
that they should continue to be trained as Riflemen in the immediate defense 
of air fields. As regards their use as Military Police that was not correct. The 
plan was to use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require 
team training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just 
passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be 
able to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad 
bridges, etc. 

If it is not desired to train Air Corps men for their own protection and for the 
final defense of the air fields I would like to be so advised. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, that was a proposal of General Short's to 
train Air Corps men for guard duty, wasn't it? 

General Marshall. Well, it was Military Police duty. 

Mr. Mitchell. And to defend the planes on the ground? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And on the next page I think is your letter in which 
you disapproved of that proposal. 

General Marshall. I will read that if you wish me to, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

General Marshall (reading from Exhibit No. 53) : 

[2854'1 October 28, 1941. 

Dear Short : With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand 
your motives in giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel which at 
present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of 
expansion of the Air Foi'ce is such that they are having considerable difficulty 
in obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be per- 
mitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics, re- 
gardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize 
all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without 
assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period. 

I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the 
assumption that the Air P^irce has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. 
This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for 
ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense 
tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their 
own specific requirements. 

It would appear that the best policy would be to [2855] allow them to 
concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their 
expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary 
mission is concerned. War Department Training Circular 47, which was issued 
July 18, 1941, can be accepted as a guide except in extreme situations. 
Faithfully yours, 

G. C. Marshall. 

Chief of Staff. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember how many divisions General Short 
had at the time ? Were there two divisions ? 

General Marshall. I think he had a division and a fraction; 
roughly a reinforced division. I am not quite certain. That is read- 
ily obtainable from the figures. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1081 

Mr. Mitchell. Do I understand your idea was that lie sliould use 
part of his Infantr}^ divisions for work of that kind rather than the 
Air Corps ? 

General Marshaix. To the extent indicated in that. What was 
going on there back of the letters was this: The Air Corps was en- 
gaged in an unprecedented expansion both as to the extent of expansion 
and the speed with which we had to make it and the Air Corps people 
themselves were very sensitive to anything that diverted their per- 
sonnel from the development under that expansion and their repre- 
sentatives [285G] here in Washington, General Arnold and his 
staff, appealed to me to get this modification so that nothing should in- 
terfere with the completion of the technical training of the Air Corps 
personnel. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, there is just one other document I want to refer 
to and that is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 
November 2-lr, 1941, addressed to the Commander in Chief of the 
Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, and commandants of the 11th, 12th, 13th, 
and l-tth naval districts. 

It was a joint dispatch with instructions in it to inform the senior 
Army officers. It states : 

' Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This 
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Governnjent and movements their 
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive 
movement in any direction including attack on Philippine or Guars? is a possibility. 
Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to 
inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not 
to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam 
will be informed separately. 

Do you remember having authorized that dispatch ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

[2857] Mr. MrrcHELL. Now, General Marshall, with all these 
documents before us showing your contacts with Hawaii and your 
knowledge about the situation there and the question of defense against 
air attack, will you cast your mind back, if you can, to the latter part 
of November 1941 and give us the estimate you then had as to the 
capacity of the forces at Hawaii to resist an air attack, an air raid? 
I am not asking you now whether you expected one but w^hat your esti- 
mate then was of the situation and the capacity with the materiel they 
had to resist such an attack successfully. 

General Marshall. The Hawaiian garrison on the Army side was 
short of four-engined bombers, only having 12; it was short a few 
three-inch antiaircraft guns and it was short more seriouslj^ in lesser 
calibers of antiaicraft guns. It had been built up to a considerable 
extent in fighter aircraft. 

It had a moderate radar set-up of the portable type then functioning. 
It had what I thought were ample troops to defend the beaches suc- 
cessfully against a landing attack. 

The military forces on Hawaii were in numbers and in equipment 
more nearly up to the desired standards than any other installation in 
the Army. My own impression was that the garrison was sufficiently 
established and equipped and organized to prevent a landing and to 
successfully resist an [-^SSS] air attack and to defend the naval 
base. 



1082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I was always of the opinion, as indicated particularly by my letter 
to General Short of February 7, I believe, that the principal problem 
there was to be prepared against an emergency of a surprise attack 
which might come at any time, presumably with the least possible ad- 
vance notice. In that letter I stated, if you recall : 

My impression of the Hawaiian problem lias been that if no serious harm is 
done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing 
defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk 
of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, con- 
stitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing tlireat 
in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superioi'ity. 

Would you repeat your question again to me, please, to see if I got 
it straight ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I was trying to draw out your judgment as of 
the latter part of November 19ll and the early part of December as 
to the capacity of the forces at Hawaii, assuming they used all they had 
to the best advantage to 

General Marshall. I think they had a sufficient amount of materiel 
at their disposal there to successfully resist [2859] an enemy 
effort in the form of either a raid or a more serious attack. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, these reports of Admiral Bloch and the 
Martin-Bellinger reports and all these other documents we have in 
evidence dealt very heavily with the question of reconnaissance. The 
general tenor of them was the conclusion that if you wanted a complete, 
sure defence against a carrier-borne air attack you should have a re- 
connaissance the evening before and catch the carriers at dusk before 
they started their night run, and the alternative, if that was not 
done, was to try to get the planes out and break up the attack after the 
carrier planes left the carriers the next morning, which was not so 
certain. 

Now, the studies that were presented there that we have been offer- 
ing and considering this morning indicate that a pretty large number 
of patrol planes would be needed for the long reconnaissance and then a 
very large number of bombing planes would be needed to go out and 
smash the carriers after they were discovered and I notice that in 
the recommendation of General INIartin made in his study of the air 
situation in Hawaii under date of August 20, 1941, exhibit 13, which 
we referred to this morning, he made this recommendation [reading 
from Exhibit No. 13] : 

It is recommended that the War Department give [2860'\ immediate 
consideration to the allotment of 180 B-17D type airplanes or other four-engine 
bombers with equal or better performance and operating range and 36 long- 
range torpedo-carrying medium bombers to the Hawaiian Air Force for the per- 
formance of search and attack missions in an area bounded by a circle whose 
radius is 833 nautical miles and center is Oahu, as follows : 

72 for daily search missions. 

86 for attack missions (these airplanes will be in readiness daily, fully armed 
and loaded with bombs for a mission). 

72 for maintenance and reserve from which 36 may be used to augment the 
attack force. 

ISO total B-17D's. 

36 torpedo-carrying medium bombers of the B-26 or other suitable type. 

Now, his report shows that he was considering a 360° reconnais- 
sance, all around the circle and which was the extreme requirement 
for a perfect defense against any attack from any direction. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1083 

Now, there are other figures in his report as to reconnaissance over 
limited arcs. 

Now, compared with w^hat Martin recommended on August 20 for 
a complete security there against air attack we had [2861] a 
very slim equipment, did we not? 

General Marshall. Well, I stated, if you recall, we had a serious 
shortage in four engine bombers. We only had 12. 

[286'^] Mr. Mitchell. As an aid to Navy PBY air reconnais- 
sance, that was practically nothing, wasn't it, or almost nothing? 

General INIarshall. Little more than that, sir. Not only a small 
supplement to the Navy reconnaissance, but it left no striking force. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is it. After you located them, you had not any 
bombers to sink the carriers ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. It seems to be the fact, according to these figures, 
and your judgment is, isn't it, that as far as security by long-distance 
reconnaissance and bombing the carriers the night before the pro- 
posed air attack is concerned, the equipment was quite inadequate. 

General Marshall. Was deficient. 

Mr. Mitchell. What would be the result of that — that they would 
have to confine their long-distance reconnaissance to the limited sector 
that you stated, or what could they do under those circumstances? 

General Marshall. The provision of General Martin there is for 
complete and perfect reconnaissance. That is all right. That cer- 
tainly is to be done, if you can provide the planes. I might, inciden- 
tally, say even at the top of our production, we were never able to give 
Hawaii, in 1943 and 1944, what the commander of Hawaii wanted, 
any more than [286S] we were able to give any commander all 
he wanted. That was an unavoidable situation always, in a war of 
the character we Avere involved in. However, there were ways to im- 
prove the situation by increased vigilance, by the operation of the 
attack planes, the interceptor planes, in every way we could in that 
fashion. 

There was also this to be considered, which we always had in mind, 
and that is the great hazard the enemy undertook in sending his people 
so far from home. A surprise is either a triumph or a catastrophe. 
If it proved to be a catastrophe, the entire Japanese campaign was 
ruined, and advance into Malaysia, and advance into the East Indies 
would have been out of the question. 

Singapore would not have been captured, the Burma Road would 
not be cut olf, and the attack on New Guinea probably would not have 
occurred. So you have an enemy hazarding a great risk in this stroke. 
Therefore you measure somewhat your means of defense against the 
hazard he is accepting in doing it. 

I agree with General Martin that if the planes were available that 
was a very appropriate assignment. It was on the side of conserva- 
tism which is certainly a good side to take in the defense of a fortress 
such as Hawaii, and the fleet more than the fortress against air attack. 
Does [286'J^] that explain my point of view ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Your answer deals with two problems : One 
is the question whether you expected an attack and the other one, what 
position you were in to defeat it. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 



1084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell.. I was intending to confine my first question to this 
proposition : Assuming the attack is made, to what extent, under the 
circumstances, and with the material they had available, would you 
conclude that they had adequate means for either breaking up the 
attack at sea, or on the carriers, or else destroying it, mitigating it the 
next morning. 

General Marshall. I think they had at least the means to so have 
broken up that attack that it could do limited harm. 

The Vice Chairman. What was your last answer? 

General Marshall. I think they had sufficient means to sufficiently 
break up the attack so it could only have done limited harm. 

Mr. Mitchell. By that, you mean if everybody had been on the 
alert and the radar oj^erating and reporting planes at distances of 130 
to 150 miles, and every pilot was in the seat, the motor going, everybody 
on the alert, and the antiaircraft men with ammunition, with that 
amount of [2865] warning that you could get from that sort 
of reconnaissance, you could have mitigated the attack. 

General Marshall. Roughly, six*. I would not say every pilot in 
his seat, but in a condition of alert. 

Mr. Mitchell. Your idea is with the forces available, they could 
have broken up the Jap planes in the air to an extent ? 

General Marshall. It would have greatly lessened the damage done. 

Mr. Mitchell. These reports which you had and considered laid a 
great deal of emphasis on the need for an aerial reconnaissance, did 
they not? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I might add at this time the question 
was the availability of materiel. I think at that time we had about 148 
B-l7's of which an appreciable number were of the old model, without 
leak-proof tanks and with other deficiencies of equipment; we had 
12 B-24's altogether. 

Mr. Mitchell. You do not mean in Hawaii, do you. 

General Marshall. I mean altogether. 

Mr. Mitchell. The whole army ? 

General Marshall. The United States Army. We had four in 
Panama ; we had 35 in the Philippines ; we had 12 in Hawaii ; we had 
a few on the West Coast, and we had 50 to 60 to [2866] develop 
the pilots for the production of planes then in prospect. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know here in Washington at that time, or 
keep track of the number of bombers that were in commission and 
those that were not ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. That was a continual check with us, 
because we had so few, and everybody wanted them. 

I might add there again in connection with this, that the greatest 
trouble was we had to have crews prepared to fly these planes as they 
came off the production line which, as I say, was then approaching 
the full quantity production. That demanded planes that had to be 
in the air almost constantly, and tremendous maintenance, while at 
this time we only had about 50 or 60 altogether to produce crews for 
the flow of planes then in prospect. 

[2867] Mr. Mitchell. The first days of our hearing we had 
figures introduced by Colonel Thielen and Admiral Inglis as to the 
types of planes, both Naval and Army planes, in Hawaii on December 
7, and how many were in commission and how many were out. It is 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1085 

given by fields there in that data, bnt we attempted to total it, and 
while our coni])ilation may not be absolutely correct, the way we 
calculated it, it means the Navy had available on the Hawaiian Islands 
on December 7 the following: Patrol planes, many of wliich were 
not in full condition for use — bnt I am giving you the total planes 
and some of them were out of commission — they had 54 PBY-5, 27 
PBY-3, and 8 PBY-1, or a total of 89. And oii that day there were 
in addition, I think, 7 fighter Naval planes left by carrier. 

On the same day the Army had 50 bombers of various types. B-l7's, 
they had a total of 12, and only 6 in commission. That is the four- 
engine bomber. Then the B-18, what is that? 

General Marshall. That is a two-engine bomber of an earlier type. 

Mr. Mitchell. Fit for reconnaissance work? 

General Marshall. They are good for reconnaissance, not because 
of great range, but they are a sturdy, reliable plane. 

Mr. Mitchell. There were a total of 33 there, of which 21 were in 
commission. The A-20, what type is that? 

[2868] General IMarshall. That is a fighter or interceptor 
plane. 

Mr. Mitchell. WTiat is the B-12? 

General Marshall. That is a rather obsolete bomber type. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, they had in addition 152 fighters of various 
types, of which less than 100 were in full readiness for use, I mean 
fit to fly. 

General Marshall. For operation. 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. Yes, for operation. So there was a great shortage 
of both fighters and bomber planes. 

Now the Jap attack was made with six carriers, and I ought to 
remember but I think there were two or three hundred planes, which 
would greatly outnumber anything in the way of fighting planes that 
existed at Hawaii. 

Is it your idea that with that very large power of the Japs in the 
air, with our limited fighter forces at Hawaii we could have mitigated 
the attack very considerably or only partially? 

General Marshall. I think so. They could not stop it, but they 
could have greatly lessened the damage that was done. They could 
disorganize it, taken it off its targets. 

Mr. Mitchell. You say you had to weigh the situation there and 
the risk by considering not only the materiel that \2869] you 
had but tiie probability or possibility of the Japs risking an attack. 
Your idea, as you stated it, as I understand, was it would be a risky 
performance for the Japs and they might not have hazarded a con- 
siderable part of their carrier fleet for such an enterprise. 

General Marshall. It was accepting 'a hazard to do that, for several 
reasons: One was the effect in bombing by a few planes on carriers. 
It does not take very many hits to do grievous harm. The other was 
the action of our shipping that was not damaged in the fight. 

Mr. Mitchell. It might turn out in a chase and sink the Jap task 
force? 

General Marshall. We had some carriers in the Hawaiian district. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, with the Japs planning an attack down along 
the Asiatic Coast as their main venture, the smart officers over there 
would feel, would they not, that it would be a great stroke to protect 



1086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

their flanks and give them more time if they made a surprise attack 
that is temporary but at least it would cripple the United States 
Fleet at Hawaii? 

General Marshall. That was the whole purpose of it. It was a 
subsidiary raid in order to protect the Japanese operations in the south 
against any action by our fleet. 

Mr. Mitchell. That would be an objective that any smart 
[£870] oflicer would think about as a thing to be attained, if he 
could, wasn't it? In other words, the Japs, in their plan of attack, 
stick that up as number one. Their proposal was to cripple the 
American fleet at Hawaii, if they. could. 

General Marshall. The distances in their advance south toward 
Singapore were very great. If there was an effective fleet on their 
flank their hazard M'ould have been greater. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would your judgment as to the probability of the 
Jap attempt by air attack be affected by tlie knowledge that the Japs 
had an espionage system in Hawaii which made them completely 
familiar with our whole situation there, our forces, our movements, 
their habits and nonalertness, nonreconnaissance, and that they had, 
up to an hour of that attack, free use of commercial cables and other 
international means of communication to report that situation to their 
home country, would not that have encouraged them very considerably 
to take the risk that you spoke of? 

General Marshall. It could have. My own reactions, as nearly as 
I recall them, which is extremely difficult to disassociate with the back 
sight, is that that specific operation was not visualized by me. I was 
more inclined to feel that the hazards were too great and that they 
would not risk it, which w^ould mean that in their movement to the 
south they would have to proceed somewhat conservatively rather 
than 12871] dash in to great distances, as they actually did, 
once our fleet was crippled. I think that is, as nearly as I can give 
it, a fair estimate of my thinking at the time. 

Mr. Mitchell. In other words, you were 2,000 miles away and you 
might not visualize or be conscious of the local conditions, and you 
would expect your local commanders to be conscious of the local con- 
ditions ? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I do not mean that. I mean regardless 
of the distance from here to Hawaii my thinking, as nearly as I can 
recreate it now, was that the hazard of coming in there, with the 
sizable naval force, was so great, in my opinion, that they would not 
risk it, but would rather proceed on a more conservative basis of actual 
operations to the southward, to the China Sea, toward Malaysia. As 
it was, they went without regard to any fears, and went out on the end 
of the plank through all of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the New Guinea 
district. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, if they knew exactly what the conditions 
were at Hawaii, the lack of reconnaissance and alertness and all that 
during the few days in December, their risk would not appear to them 
to be quite so great. 

General Marshall. You have to take into consideration the length 
of time involved in that movement, and of course it could be recalled 
at any time by radio message, and the [2872] great change 
that had been effected if active offensive-defensive measures had been 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1087 

taken, as to what would happen to their air force, as to the loss of one 
or two carriers alone. 

They knew we had other planes. Whether or not they knew they 
were en route there, whether or not they knew they were only passing 
through there, all those are factors to be considered. 

As a matter of fact, as you know, the leinforcenient planes from 
MacArthur, that finally took off after the delay due to adverse winds, 
arrived during the middle of the attack. All those were considera- 
tions that the Japanese general staff, the Japanese naval staff, would 
have to take into consideration themselves, and they could have made 
quite a difference in the result. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, all the time, I think the record shows or will 
show, they had complete data of the conditions right down to De- 
cember 6. 

General Marshall. No question about that at all. 

Mr. Mitchell. And they could have recalled their flight at the 
time if they got information that an alert really had been made ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell Were you aware of the fact that the merchant ship- 
ping had been diverted from the northern ship [2S7'S] lanes 
and sent down to the Torres Strait area in October and that left a 
wide swath of the ocean without any traffic in it ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I was aware of that situation, and 
the reasons for it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know tliat during the end of November 
and the first week in December the Navy, particularly its direction- 
finding system in the Pacific, for a week prior to Pearl Harbor had 
lost complete track of all but one division of the Japanese carriers? 

General Marshall. I have a faint recollection that I did not know 
all the time where all the Japanese ships were. I do not recall being 
a^ya^e of the fact that it was the carrier divisions that were the 
missing ones. It may be I knew it, but I do not recall. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have anything to do with the decision to 
shift the merchant fleet, merchant vessels into the Torres Strait area, 
or was that purely a naval matter ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall. It may have been discussed 
with me, and it probably was, but I have no recollection. I do recall 
the shift. 

Mr. Mitchell. The shift? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was it a safety measure, to prevent the [^874] 
loss of the merchant shipping ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. From Jap attack ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. Admiral Stark, of course, can give 
you more direct information on that, but that was the reason. It 
was a more secure voyage, in the light of the developing situation. 

Mr. JNIitchell. You used the words "merchant shipping." I think 
technically it would be more correct to say the slow boats. 

General Marshall. The slow boats? 

]VIr. Mitchell. The slow boats. 



1088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. It was those that made something around, 
probably, I will say, under 12 knots, maybe under 10 knots. The 
faster ships, like the Dollar Lines, w^ent straight through to the 
north of Guam. 

Mr. Mitchell. During the last week or two in November and 
early in December did you have frequent conferences with the Sec- 
retary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Stark, and pos- 
sibly the President about the situation? 

General Marshall. I had practically daily conversations with 
Admiral Stark over the phone or personally, and the same with the 
Secretary of War personally, and very frequently with the Secretary 
of State, during which, I think on [2875] practically every 
occasion, the Secretary of the Navy was present, and usually Admiral 
Stark, when I was present. 

Mr. Mitchell. What did those discussions relate to? In other 
words, did they have anything to do with the imminence of war and 
prospects of an attack by the Japanese ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. They had to do with the measures 
to be taken diplomatically, on a high Government level, toward Ja- 
pan. Tliey had to do with the military situation, as Admiral Stark 
and I viewed it. They had very specifically to do with our hope that 
action, war action in the Pacific, could be delayed as long as possible. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will offer in evidence at this time as exhibit 58 a 
document labeled as follows : 

1. List taken from President Roosevelt's appointment book specifying his 
engagements with the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, General Marshall 
and Admiral Stark, for period October 1 to December 7, 1941. 

2. Teleplione calls made from outside through White House switchboard on 
December 6, 1941, and December 7, 1941, as compiled from oi)erators notes avail- 
able. 

I understand that means calls from outside through the White House 
switchboard with persons outside of the White [2876] House, 
not messages to people in the White House — 

3. List of dinner guests at White House Saturday evening, December 6, 1941. 

4. List showing the President's appointments Saturday, December 6, 1941. 

5. List showing the President's appointments Sunday, December 7, 1941. 

The Chairman. That is all exhibit 58? 

Mr. Mitchell. All that is exhibit 58. 

The Chairman. That will be filed. 

(The document referred to Avas marked "Exhibit No. 58.") 

Mr. Mitchell. During these conversations you say they related 
quite often to the question of postponing Japanese attack, if possible, 
until you could get better prepared. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was the situation at Hawaii discussed specifically 
in any of those conversations or conferences ? 

General Marshall. I think so. We covered the whole Pacific: 
Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will 3^011 tell us in your own way just what, if any- 
thing, you can remember about the conversations at those discussions? 

General Marshall. From a purely military side Admiral [2877] 
Stark and I together endeavored to put forward the policy of the 
necessity of taking every measure that we could think of, politically 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1089 

or diplomatically, to carry alon<^ the situation in the Pacific without 
disruption, at least until we had an opportunity to prepare the forces 
there. The first consideration at that time in the matter of prep- 
aration was in relation to the Philippines, which up until April 1941 
had literally iiothinc: in terms of numbers and equipment. As early 
as P'ebruary we had taken the women and children out. 

I had gotten authority to double the number of Philippine Scouts 
from 6,000 to 12,000, aiid then I issued an order which stopped the 
return of men who only had 2 years, who had completed their 2-year 
tour, which I believe possibly was illegal; I do not recall now. In 
order to provide experienced people to assist General MacArthur, 
or to assist General Grunert at that time, in the development of 
additional scout organizations and also in the development of a 
Philippine Army, basic training, we also had to have the time to 
collect the shipping, to go through the lengthy procedure of with- 
drawing these sliips from South American runs, against which there 
was very serious opposition from all sides virtually, and to obtain 
troops sufficiently trained at that time to be sent out there. 

We were then in the process, beginning roughly the 1st [3S78] 
of August, of receiving the first of real quantity production, and we 
were trying to rush that through to the Philippines primarily, until 
we gave them sufficient reinforcements to make it dangerous for the 
Japanese to make any movement either against the Philippines or, 
more particularly, to the south of the Philippines, leaving them free 
to be attacked on the flank. 

We needed time for this. It was estimated that the principal 
reinforcements and materiel could be gotten out there by about the 
5th of December. Of course, there were the delays in obtaining the 
ships, there were the delays in delivering the planes, and there were 
the delays produced by adverse head winds to that then difficult and 
considered dangerous flight by a B-17 in that period from the west 
coast to Hawaii. 

On the naval side. Admiral Stark, of course, can speak for himself, 
but I recall very specifically he was struggling to get a delay until 
about the 1st of February, in order that the fleet could be outfitted. 
I believe the fleet training was the main consideration. That I can- 
not testify to with any authority. I refer to most of the items that 
pertain to the Army side of the affair. 

Now in all these discussions we analyzed the situation as it changed 
from week to week, as delays developed which [B879] would 
not permit us to reach the stage of defensive security that we had 
hoped by the limiting date that had been suggested, some time in 
December, and a discussion of the measures that might be taken ap- 
propriately by the Government toward the Japanese which would at 
least maintain the status quo until we were in better shape. 

Of course, in those matters I was not a factor, you might say, in 
the discussions, except where it had a military implication, although 
there was complete freedom for expression if I cared to inject myself 
into the diplomatic statement in the communications proposed. 

But, of course, it was more appropriate for me to confine my obser- 
vations to the phases of the discussion or the documents that had a 
direct military implication. 

Does that give you a fair idea, sir? 



1090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. That gives me a fair idea. You were kept informed, 
I suppose, of the diplomatic developments. 

General Marshall. I think in the main I knew about all that was 
going on, because I not only sat in on a great many of the discussions 
personally, but in addition to that Mr. Stimson would always talk to 
me when he returned from any of his discussions with Mr. Hull. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember whether,, in that latter period, 
the latter part of November and early December of 1941, [£880] 
in any of these discussions the question was raised about the security 
of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, or whether, because of lack of prepared- 
ness and the chances out there something ought to be done with the 
fleet, that it either put to sea or move back toward the coast? Was 
there any discussion of that kind ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall discussions of that kind once 
the fleet was in Hawaii. I have a very faint recollection, a very defi- 
nite recollection, as a matter of fact, of a long series of discussions 
regarding the location of the fleet before it went out to Hawaii. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was in 1940 ? 

General Marshall. Well, at the time it went out there. I must 
admit that I have forgotten a good many of the pros and cons that 
were being discussed at the time. 

Mr. Mitchell. Those discussions related to the suitability of F'earl 
Harbor as a training place for the ships. They did not have any ques- 
tion at that time, prior to December 1940. after the fleet had gone out 
there, as to the question of the security of the fleet in port. I am won- 
dering whether in any of these conversations, as you approached 
December 7, you or Admiral Stark in your presence, or the Secretary 
of War or Navy raised anj' question about the dangers to the fleet in 
Pearl Harbor at that time, and the question whether, [2881] if 
air attacks were at all possible and you were not in perfect defense, 
you should do something about it ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall that specifically, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember with whom you had your discus- 
sions in 1940 about the question of basing the fleet originally at Pearl 
Harbor in the spring of 1940 ? 

General Marshall. I think they were with Admiral Stark, with 
the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Nav}^, and I believe the 
President, although I do not know whether the discussion was with 
him directly or whether I got the result of his statement and then we 
made the presentations, I do not recall. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember yourself what objections were 
made or advanced at that time toward puting the fleet at Pearl 
Harbor? 

General Marshall. As I said a little previously, I am sorry to have 
to state to you that I do not recall the details well. I do not recall 
the argument between the Atlantic and the Pacific, which at that tirne 
was a great issue, as to how much of the fleet would be in the Atlantic, 
how much would be in the Pacific. We had a tremendous problem 
then of the sea lanes across the Atlantic, the deficiency of the British 
in guarding the convoys, and the hazardous position of the [2882] 
British Isles during that period. 

Now I do not recall exactly, as I say, the pros and cons of that, but 
I know it was going on at that time and I was in the middle of it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 109] 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, we come up to this question of the modus 
vivencli. You and Admiral Stark had been working for more time. 
Were you aware that on November 20 the Japs liad made a proposal 
to the United States that involved })ractically our termination of aid 
to China and our opening up of the freezing regulations and furnish- 
ing the Japs with oil ? 

General ISIarshall. I have no definite recollection, but I am quite 
certain there was. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have access to those diplomatic intercepts 
during that period, that is, the decoded Japanese messages to and from 
Tokyo and Washington ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. The majority of them went over my 
desk, those that were supposed to be critical. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember seeing any of those in which the 
Japs instructed their Ambassadors here to get an affirmative agreement 
first by the 25th of November and later at least by the 29th ? 

General ]\Iarshall. I remember that very well, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember those messages which said, if 
they did not get it signed, sealed, and delivered at that [2883] 
date something automatically would happen ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; I remember that. 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. Well, then, when the modus vivendi came up — what 
date was it. do you remember? Around the 25tli or 26th? 

General Marshall. I think it was earlier than that. About the 
21st, was it not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The 21st? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Wliat part did you have in that discussion ? 

General Marshall. I Avas absent on that particular day on an in- 
spection trip, as I recall, and I learned of the matter on my return 
from General Gerow. I believe there was a memorandum from him 
to me. He had attended the meeting with Admiral Stark and he had 
expressed a view in regard to the outcome. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

General Marshall. And he submitted the memorandum to me 
describing the conditions and giving me the data. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you agree with General Gerow's position ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Which he reported in that memo ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; particularly that portion where he 
states that he informed Admiral Stark verbally that [288.!^] he 
regretted the reference to Army Forces in the Navy comments on 
proposition A-1. He felt that no restrictions should be placed on the 
Army's preparations to make the Philippines secure. 

The point was we had almost nothing there, we had everything to 
put there, and if we did not do anything we were helpless, and we 
continued helpless if the thing broke. 

Mr. Mitchell. You learned that that proposal had been dropped ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I learned that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you learn at that time of the fact that Mr. 
Churchill had wired him about it and that it was sent back for the 
Chinese, and did you know about Chiang Kai-shek's protest in which 
he said the Chinese Army would collapse if anything like that oc- 
curred ? 



1092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of seeing Mr, Churchill's 
message, but I have a very clear recollection of Mr. Hull describing 
the Generalissimo's reaction. Whether or not I read his message I 
do not know, but I know I was clearly aware of his very energetic 
opposition to the proposal. 

Mr. Mitchell, In the light of what j^ou just said and what you 
knew, were you reconciled to the Secretary's decision not to attempt 
the modus vivendi proposal ? 

[£88S] General Marshall, I think I was, sir, I recall this, that 
we were very much disappointed that we could not get this through, 
because it looked like a very slender hope of delaying matters to give 
us more time, and as I also recall, and the records will show, we had 
movements on the ocean at that time that were very critical, Marines 
coming out of Shanghai, and hazard to some movement, a more serious 
one was a group, I think, of four vessels of fair speed that were moving 
to the north of Guam straight into the Philippines and a large convoy 
of slow vessels that was moving south toward Torres Strait. 

Mr. Mitchell, Now did you know, in advance of its submission to 
the Japanese, the contents of Mr. Hull's statement to them of November 
26,1941? 

General Marshall. No, sir; I did not. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were you consulted about that? 

General Marshall. I do not think I was, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. To go back shortly to something I omitted, I call 
your attention to a document called "Aide Memoire — Defense of Ha- 
waii." It is a photostat. It seems to have some writing at the head of 
it. Do you know whose handwriting that is ? 

General Marshall. I do not think that is mine. The writing at 
the bottom is distinctly mine. 

[^886] Mr. Mitchell. That is a memorandum you gave to the 
President, is it, at or about the time that it is dated, 5-3^1 ? 

General Marshall. I am told — this is purely hearsay — ^I am told 
that I was called to that conference at the White House to discuss — 
I have forgotten what the issue was, it did have a relation — I think it 
was the movement of the fleet — and I made a hurried call — this was 
sent me, and I made these notes on the face of it, and gave copies to 
the President, I made this note at the bottom of the page, 

Mr, Mitchell. I am told, and it will appear later, that this hand- 
writing at the top is 

Mr. Gesell. General Watson's, the Military Aide to the White. 
House. 

Mr. Mitchell, We will offer this in evidence as Exhibit 59. 

The CiiAiRMAX. Let is be identified and filed as Exhibit 59, 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 59.") 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you mind reading it for us, General ? 

General Marshall (reading from Exhibit No, 59) : 

[2887] AIDE MEMOIRE 

Defense of Haxvaii 

The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical 
characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world. 

To reduce Oahu the enemy must transport overseas an expeditionary force 
capable of executing a forced landing against a garrison of approximately 
35,000 men manning 127 fixed coast defense guns, 211 antiaircraft weapons, and 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1093 

more than 3,000 artillery pieces and automatic weapons available for beach 
defense. 

Air Defense. With adequate air defense, enemy carriers, naval escorts and 
transports will begin to come under air attack at a distance of approximately 
Tr>0 miles. This attack will increase in intensity until when within 200 miles 
of the objective, the en(>my foi'ces will be subject to attack by all types of 
bombardment closely supported by oui- most modern pursuit. 

Hatvaiian Air Defense. Including the movement of aviation now in progress 
Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium 
range bombers, 13 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which 105 are of our most 
modern type. In addition Hawaii is capable of reinforcement by heavy bombers 
from the mainland by aii-. With this force [288S] available a major 
attack against Oahu is considered impracticable. 

In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very 
limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure 
strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the 
islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East. 

Now, the footnote refers back to the paragraph, "Hawaiian Air 
Defense," which reads as follows : 

Including the movement of aviation now in progress, Hawaii will be defended 
by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses * * * 

Due to make a mass flight from mainland to Hawaii May 20. A number of 
this type of plane could be dispatched immediately if the situation grew 
critical. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that number of the most modern flying for- 
tresses that you visualized in May, did they arrive at Hawaii ? 

General Marshall, They did not, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. So this estimate was made then on the supposi- 
tion 

General Marshall. As to the prospective delivery of planes. 

[2889'] Mr. Mitchell. Wliich couldn't be made? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember how you happened to give that 
memorandum to President Roosevelt? What was the occasion of it? 

General Marshall. That was what I was trying to recall. I have 
forgotten at the moment just exactly what the discussion was. I 
will try to stir up my memory. There was some definite thing that 
was under discussion. I have forgotten what it was. Rather, a 
definite consideration under discussion. 

Mr. ]\riTCHELL. General Watson has in his handwriting at the top : 

Modern Planes have completely changed the situation as to defensibility. 

Was that a subject of discussion on your part, that memorandum 
by him ? 

General Marshall. I had no discussion with General Watson at 
all that I can recall. I have a vague recollection that there was 
something about the capability of Hawaii to defend itself without 
the presence of the Fleet, but I will check up on that and try to 
refresh my memory. 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice in the paragraph in the memorandum en- 
titled "Air Defense," you assume here that "enemy [2890] car- 
riers, naval escorts, and transports will come under air attack at a 
distance of approximately 750 miles." That visualized a sufficiently 
adequate patrol force at Hawaii, air reconnaissance to detect the 
enemy carriers at that distance? 

General Marshall. It visualized the available reconnaissance force 
and also the available striking force. 



1094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. To hit them after they were discovered? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell, That is pretty nearly the limit of the Martin- 
Bellinger requirement, isn't it? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Mitchell, There is a reference in that memorandum to "sabo- 
tage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause 
great damage," 

Was that your point of view in ]\Iay 1941 that sabotage would be a 
greater peril than any other kind of an attack on Pearl Harbor? 

General Marshall. Not a greater peril, but it was, as expressed 
here, the first in sequence, because sabotage was always one of the 
difficult points — the disposing of troops to meet it without unduly 
exciting everybody, and the maintenance of them in that dispersed 
condition to control it. And, of course, military control of the islands 
would have exercised a very great restraint on all of the people, which 
[2891] would have lessened the hazard decidedly, just as was done 
when we got on a war basis, 

Mr. Mitchell, In this "Aide Memoire" you also assume a state of 
alertness and the best use of the equipment at Pearl Harbor, a state 
of alertness against air attack ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell, We have. General, a memorandum for the President 
on the subject of ground forces, submitted to him by the Chief of Staff. 
It is undated. It does not seem to have so much to do with air attacks 
as the furnishing of additional ground forces for distant installations, 
and outposts. Have you a copy of it before you? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; in skeleton form. 

Mr. Mitchell. The only thing it says about Hawaii is on page 3, 
In the first full paragraph, it says : 

Hawaii. Authorized and present 41,000. Naval in.stallation (Kaneohe Bay) 
being expanded requiring additional defenses. Presence of Fleet reduces threat 
of major attack. Reinforcements can be deferred as long as Fleet remains in 
Pacific. Reinforcements must be available in the United States to give Fleet 
freedom of action. 

Did that paragraph refer whollj^ to the ground forces in Hawaii as 
distinguished from — when I say ground forces I mean forces to defend 
against landing attacks — or did it 

[^SO^I General Marshall. It is a resume of the entire Ground 
Forces. The idea was to so build up that command in Hawaii that 
it required no naval assistance; that a secure base was maintained, 
with the task of defense resting in the hands of the Army. 

Mr. Mitchell. In the margin of the paragraph I read about Ha- 
waii, are the words "O. K. Leave as is." It will later appear that 
that is in the President's handwriting. 

The Chairman. Is that made an exhibit ? 

Mr. Mitchell. We will make it one now. Exhibit 60 is the memo- 
randum to the President, subject "Ground Forces" just referred to. 

The Chairman. It will be filed as No. 60. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 60.") 

Senator Ferguson. Has the date of that been fixed yet? Could 
counsel place the date ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I can't. It is a document we obtained from the 
White House files, but it is undated. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1095 

Genoral Marshall. We have been unable to find any record of it 
in the War Department. 

The Vice CHAiR:\rAN. This was a memorandum from General Mar- 
shall to the President? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right, on the subject of Ground [£893] 
Forces in all areas, a great many places. 

The Vice Chairman. Does the General have any idea what time it 
was submitted ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you happen to have any idea yourself. General? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of it at all. It doesn't 
show here on this copy that I even signed it. Sometimes it was the 
case, and it may have been here, that the President would call me 
to appear very quickly to discuss a certain subject, on which I had 
no notes at all, and they would give me some papers that pertained 
to it and I would do the best I could with those papers. 

There may have been something of that sort here. I don't know. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, we have here a transcript of pro- 
ceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, volume 35, as of 
Tuesday, September 26, 1944, and on page 4050 there is testimony 
given by Mr. Stimson about a statutory war council meeting in the 
Department. 

Secretary Stimson said : 

General Marshall read a long letter from General MacArthur In the Philip- 
pines, telling us of the progress of the reorganization of the Philippine Army 
and the construction of airports throughout the Islands. 

[2894] Then again — I think Mr. Stimson was reading from his 
own diary here. 

Well, i started too soon. I meant to start with November 25, 1941. 
He read : 

'At 9 : 30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull 
showed us the proposal for a three-months' truce which he was going to lay 
before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all of our 
interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't think there is any chance of the 
Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic' 

Then we had a long talk over the general situation there which I remember. 

Then he quotes from his diary : 

We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Depart- 
ment, and I got hold of Marshall. At 12 o'clock I went to the White House 
where we were until nearly half past one. 

He says : 

That's an hour and a half. 

Then the diary proceeds as follows : 

At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the 
President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event 
that were [2895] likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as— perhaps 
next Monday for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, 
and the question was what we should do. 

We conferred on the general problem. 

The diary continues : 

When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that a Japanese 
War had started. Five divisions had come down from Shantung and Shansi to 
Shanghai, and there they had embarked on ships, 30, 40, or 50 ships and have 
been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it 
and sent copies to him and to the President, of the message. 

Do you remember that conference ? 

General Marshall. I have no detailed recollection of the conversa- 
tions back and forth, but I have a very distinct recollection of the 

79716— 46— pt. 3 9 



1096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

situation that was developing at that particular moment in the 
China Sea. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you any recollection of this beyond the state- 
ment of President Roosevelt, have you any memory of that? 

General Marshall. I don't remember, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was on the 25th. 

Now, I call your attention to this message that was sent to General 
Short over your signature on November 27. Were you in the city on 
the 27th ? 

[3896] General Marshall. I was not, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where were you ? 

General Marshall. I was in North Carolina. 

Mr. Mitchell. Wliat was goinoj on there ? 

General Marshall. General McNair was having a very large 
maneuver, I imagine about 300.000 troops, or thereabouts. It was a 
vital day, and I flew down on the afternoon of the 26th to see the 
operations on the 27th, and flew back late that evening, so that I 
appeared in the office on the early morning of the 28th. 

Mr. Mitchell. Before you left on the 26th, had this proposal to 
send a warning message out to the overseas outposts been discussed 
with you ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. My recollection of it, which is rather 
confirmed by the memorandum of General Gerow under date of the 
27th, I believe that we had a considerable discussion on the joint 
board on the morning of the 26th, at which it was decided that an 
alert should be drafted and dispatched immediately. 

General Gerow had the task of drafting the alert. Whether or 
not he had a draft copy with him at the time or whether he was to 
prepare it after he returned to the War Plans Division I do not recall. 
I left in the afternoon following this meeting of the joint board in 
the [^8,97] morning. Present at the meeting was Admiral 
Stark, myself, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, General 
Bryden, General Gerow, and I believe at that time the officers of the 
Air Corps, and their opposites were present from the Navy. 

Mr. Mitchell. The message was sent over your name then while 
you were away ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ISIiTCHELL. When did you see the draft after you returned ? 

General Marshall. I saw it, the actual message, as it was sent, I 
think, the moment 1 reached my desk on the morning of the 28th. 

Mr. Mitchell. This memorandum referred to by General Gerow 
of November 27 is the one in which he states "The Secretary of War 
sent for me about 9 : 30 a. m. November 27, 1941." That is the one 
you refer to, is it ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. When you saw the message of the 27th to General 
Short after you returned from maneuvers, what was your reaction as 
to its contents and sufficiency ? 

General Marshall. I concurred in the message and the manner in 
which it was drawn. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you see at the same time the [2898] iden- 
tical message sent to the Commander on the West coast ? 

General Marshall, I saw the message 



1>R0CEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1097 

Mr. Mitchell. To all the commanders ? 

General Marshall. Pacific commanders. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you see General Short's response and the re- 
sponses of the other commanders to the warning message that had 
been sent to them ? 

General Marshall. I assume I did. I find in looking at the copy 
1 did not initial it. I assume I must have seen it. 

[2899] Mr. Mitchell. Have you seen this photostat? 

General ]\La.rshall. Well, I saw the actual 

Mr. Mitchell. The original of it? 

General Marshall. The original of it. 

Mr. Mitchell. The photostat showing the report of General Mac- 
Arthur of November 28 and the report of General Short on Novem- 
ber 28. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is our exhibit 46. 

You are not relying on your present recollection but on the existence 
of this document? 

General Marshall. In what respect ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To know whether you received it or not? 

General Marshall. Well, I know I i-eceived this because there is my 
ov/n reference of that to the Secretary of War and my initials on the 
copy, and the two were clipped together. 

Mr. Mitchell. You remember that they were both clipped to- 
gether ? 

General Marshall. No; I don't remember the clipping together. 
When I checked back to find out about the thing I found them clipped 
together and noticed I had not initialed the under copy but I assumed 
that I saw it. 

Mr. Mitchell. How did you happen to route it to the Secretary of 
War? 

[2900] General Marshall. Because I thought it was very im- 
portant that he should see this particular message. It had been my 
custom always when there was anything up that was out of the ordi- 
nary that he might miss I always initialed it for him and had it tak-en 
directly to his room. 

Mr. Mitchell. The fact that he participated in your absence in the 
drafting of the message to which these were responses, did that have 
anything to do with your sending it to him ? 

General Marshall. It might have; I don't recall, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What do you remember now about your appraise- 
ment of or reaction to General Short's message of the 28th ? 

General Marshall. I have not a clear-cut recollection at all because 
shortly after the attack — I presume about an hour and a half — I was 
in conversation with Colonel Bundy in regard to the measures we were 
then taking to reestablish ourselves on the west coast, to get the con- 
voys straightened out, and see what other measures we had to take 
throughout the United States for security, and he mentioned this mes- 
sage, which he apparently had reexamined, and referred to the sabo- 
tage factor in it, and also referred to the implication he had gotten 
from the liaison with the Navy which is included in the message, 

[2901] He did that while he was standing at my desk just be- 
fore his departure from my room, when we concluded the other part 



1098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of the conversation, which was the virtual redeployment of all our 
military sources to meet the situation as it developed. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was the date of that talk with Colonel Bundy ? 

General Marshall. I would say that was an hour and a half or an 
hour, thereabouts, after the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Mitchell. On December 7? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well then, at that time Colonel Bundy brought up 
with you the question of Short's report of November 28 ? 

General Marshall. My recollection of it is that when we finished 
this business I had him in there for, he being the officer in immediate 
charge of all details relating to the Pacific, that was his subsection 
of the War Plans Division, or the section of the War Plans Division, 
he would be in charge, and so I was doing business with him direct as 
to what we were to do to reestablish the situation, and when we fin- 
ished that, as I recall the incident he was leaving the room and stopped 
about halfway out of the room and made a reference to the message, 
which he evidently had looked back [£902] on it to see what 
M'as going on, and referred to this sabotage clause, and I have forgot- 
ten just what his reference to it was. I recall his reference to liaison 
with the Navy. He referred to that. They had gone ahead with the 
procedure. 

[£90Z] Now, my difficulty in answering your question was it 
is very hard for me to associate myself with the statement about what 
came next because from that instant on I was completely involved 
in the most active period during the war, the next 6 weeks. 

Mr. Mitchell. AVell, I was referring more especially to your ap- 
praisement of or reactions to this message of Short's on November 
28 when it was shown to you, or you saw it on the 28th ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you notice the brevity of it or the difference 
in contents 

General Marshall. I have no recollection regarding it at all. 

Mr. IVIiTCHELL. (Continuing) — by comparison with any of the other 
reports that you received ? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection regarding it at all, other 
than the fact that I find the two messages together and that I signed 
the upper one. 

Mr. Mitchell. In the ordinary course of operations in the depart- 
ment of the General Staff where would the messages have gone for 
consideration ? 

General Marshall. It would have gone to the War Plans Division 
and by the Executive officer there would have [2904-] been 
routed to the particular section that had that, which was Colonel 
Bundy's section. 

Mr. Mitchell. At no time between November 28 and the 7th of 
December did anybody ever come back to you and mention the Short 
report or question its sufficiency or anything of that kind? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of any comment. 

Mr. Mitchell. Had you any information that after the warning 
message was sent there was no air reconnaissance being conducted at 
Hawaii for any distance, any considerable distance ? 

General Marshall. No, sir; I had no intimation of that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1099 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, did you after November 27, when this warn- 
ing was sent out, make any inquiry as to what measures were being 
taken at Hawaii ? 

General Marshall. None that I recall. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you make any inquiry, any further inquiry 
about what measures were being taken at these other posts where the 
warning message had been received, or one like it? 

General Marshall. None that I recall. We were deeply engaged 
in the business of trying to get our materiel rerouted to General 
MacArthur as rapidly as we possibly could and we had, as you will 
see, in magic, picked up the fact of the [2905] report that he 

was unloading at night. I learned that from the Japanese. I did 
not learn that from MacArthur. 

Mr. Mitchell. To make my question clear, I was talking of the 
period between November 28 and December 7, as to what informa- 
tion, if any, you had about the stage of the alert or what steps were 
being taken in Hawaii for defense against 

General Marshall. I said as to Hawaii, I had no information and 
I thought you then asked me about the other places. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

General Marshall. And I said there, I think, that I had nothing 
regarding the alert but we had information regarding what was 
going on which we obtained through magic, as related to the Philip- 
pines. I have forgotten the date of the magic but it is in the record, 
as to unloading and rushing of supplies ashore being carried out at 
night so that the Japanese could not see exactly what was going on. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I take it then that your recollection about 
Short's reply of November 28 in the very brief examination you made 
of it you are not in a position now to remember and to state what 
3^our reactions were to it? 

General Marshall. I cannot state any reactions that I had to it. 
It came through the office. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was there any consideration given in the War De- 
partment that you had knowledge of after November 28 [2906] 
and before December 7 of sending any additional warnings to General 
Short or any other commander? 

General Marshall. I had no recollection of such. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was the liaison committee? 

General Marshall. The liaison committee was a group consisting 
of the Under Secretary of State, representatives of the War Depart- 
ment — usually two would go over — the same from the Navy Depart- 
ment, which met in the office of the Under Secretary of State and dis- 
cussed matters pertaining to all three departments, largely attache 
details, equipment for South American and Latin-American coun- 
tries, sometimes Chinese matters, and it developed during the period 
after I become Chief of Staff and before the outbreak of the war for 
us into many larger considerations ; but in the early stages it was en- 
gaged mostly in minor details regarding requests of Ambassadors 
and the desires of the State Department that affected the Army and 
Navy, particularly as to materiel and equipment to Latin- American 
countries. Eventually the larger matters were discussed. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think you told us that you currently saw these 
decoded intercepts of the Jap diplomatic messages. 



1100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you also see these decoded intercepts of Jap 
messages relating to military installations and ship [2907] 
movements ? 

General Marshall. I would assume I would, yes, the same as the 
diplomatic. 

IVIr. Mitchell. I think the record shows, I think General Miles said 
that at a certain date about that time, in the summer or early fall of 
1941, you ordered not only the G-2 evaluations of those messages 
but the raw material or original copies of dispatches should be shown 
to you. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JNIiTCHELL. Do you remember that at that time? 

General Marshall. I have a recollection of that. 

Mr. Mitchell. He said it was commencing August 5, 1941. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir 

Mr. Mitchell. How did they come to you? Were copies delivered 
and kept in your files? 

General Marshall. I beg pardon, sir ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Were copies delivered and kept in your files? 

General Marshall. At first they came in somewhat of a loose-leaf 
arrangement and they were all returned and I stopped that and re- 
quired that they be put in a locked pouch because I found in the various 
offices there was inevitable carelessness and also I felt inevitably the 
fact that we were doing this would leak out. 

[2908] I had been told when I became Chief of Staff that my 
predecessor, General Craig, was very guarded in the matter, primarily 
because he thought it was illegal and that, therefore, if we were to 
continue we would have to be exceedingly careful. That factor, of 
course, more or less vanished from consideration and was replaced 
entirely by the urgent necessity, from our point of view, of guarding 
the secret. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I understood that last 
statement of General Marshall. You mentioned the fact that your 
predecessor. General Craig, considered the practice, some practice, 
as being illegal ? 

General Marshall. The intercepting of these messages. 

Mr. Keefe. The intercepting of these foreign messages? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. As being illegal ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; contrary to the Espionage Act, I 
believe. 

Mr. Keefe. I wanted to be sure that I understood you. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you happen to know at that time of the pro- 
vision in the Federal Communications Act which forbids the inter- 
ception of communications? 

General Marshall. What is that? 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know anything about it then? 

[2909] General Marshall. I think that is the act I should have 
referred to. "\Ylien I said the Espionage Act I should have said the 
Federal Communications Act. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1101 

Mr. Mitchell. And that the Supreme Court held before December 
1941 some time that that applied to Government Intelligence or police 
authorities as well as to private persons? 

General Marshall. I think I kiiew that, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were you aware of the fact that at Hawaii, for 
instance, there wasn't any legal way up to December 7, when the attack 
occurred, of obtaining copies of the Jap messages that the Japs sent 
from Hawaii to Tokyo or that Tokyo sent back to their spies in Hawaii 
that came over commercial cables? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I was aware of that, particularly 
because, as I recall, Mr. Stimson was very much concerned in his desire 
to obtain that information. 

Mr. Mitchell. But afterwards you were concerned with the ques- 
tion of security ? 

General Marshall. When you say "afterwards," I am not referring 
to December 7. I am referring to about a year back before that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Prior to that day. 

General Marshall. Prior to that day. 

[■2910] Mr. Mitchell. I mean after the remark had first been 
made to you about the matter. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And the fear of war became apparent. 

General Marshall. The minute the danger of war to America be- 
came apparent our intense concern was the secrecy of the source 
because its value was quite evident. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was there any regulation in the War Department 
that you established or knew about that forbade the people in the 
War Department, such as G-2 and War Plans Division, from sending 
of Hawaii not the text of any intercepted messages, nor a paraphrase 
of it, nor the fact that they had decoded it, but the substance of the 
information that they had derived by the intercept? 

General Marshall. I am unaware of any regulation on that sub- 
ject. As a matter of fact practically everything concerning magic 
was oral rather than written, in my recollection. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know that G-2 was not sending out the gist 
of those intercepted messages in all cases i 

General Marshall. Was not sending out the gist? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not sending out the gist. General Miles testified 
that he never, of course, sent a copy of a message, [2911] of an 
intercepted Jap decoded message to Hawaii and he would not send a 
paraphrase of it and he did not want to let them know at Hawaii that 
he was cracking the code and he went further, I understand, and I 
think said that the information derived in that way could not in a 
covered-up way be passed on to Hawaii. Was that your understand- 
ing of tlie practice I 

General Marshall. I do not know as I got that understanding but 
I know that the G-2 of the War Department, whoever he was, General 
Miles, General Strong. General McCabe or Colonel McCabe, General 
Lee and later General Bissell, always were emphatic in their safe- 
guarding of the source and not advertising anything that was done, 
to hazard the source. 

The extent to which they might transmit the information was one 
that I am not familiar with, just what they did, because there was a 



1102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

continual passage of data from the G-2 of the War Department in 
the performance of his mission to the G-2's of the various overseas 
divisions and as the security factor was always ever present in the 
mind of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the Army, that thought 
that he would be reckless had never occurred to me. His fear was that 
I would be reckless. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember of ever seeing these intercepted 
Jap messages relating to dividing Pearl Harbor into area A, B, C, D, 

and E and locating the 

[2912] General Marshal:.. I do not recall the message. I know 
the one you are referring to. 

Mr. Mitchell. You have examined the book? 
General Marshall. Yes, sir. I saw it in the book. 
Mr. Mitchell. And you have no recollection of ever seeing it? 
General Marshall. I have no recollection of that. 
Mr. JSIitchell. Are you familiar with the decoded Jap message of 
November 19, translated November 28, which appears in the book of 
diplomatic intercepts at page 154, which set up an emergency system 
of conununication between the Japs and their foreign representatives 
by the use of certain words and weather broadcasts? 

General Marshall. I remember seeing this winds message at the 
time it came through. This is the winds message, I believe. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the message that established the code, the 
one on page 154. It is in Japanese there. 

General Marshall. Oh, I see. I do not remember exactly that. 
I am familiar with that specific winds message which would utilize 
this code, I believe, would it not? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there are two. There is this message which 
came in on the 19th of November and was translated on November 
28th, it says here, in which the Japs said to [2913] their Wash- 
ington diplomatic representatives : 

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. 

General Marshall. I think I can say now specifically I did see it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember then that after that message was 

received that any attempt was made to alert monitoring stations to 

listen in to the Japanese weather broadcasts to see whether what we 

call an implementing message was later sent out ? 

General Marshall. I do not know whether I knew just what it 
was then but I know now what instructions were given by G-2, so 
whether I knew it then or not I am not prepared to say. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever see or know of any second message, 
an implementing message by which the Japs in the weather broad- 
cast said the ''East wind — rain" or "North wind — cloudy," indicating 
war with the United States ? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of such a message or such 
data, rather. 

Mr. Mitchell. How ? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of such data. 
Mr. Mitchell. The FCC, the Federal Communications Commis- 
sion monitoring station which had been alerted to listen. \291Jf] 
for this implementing weather broadcast report shows that on De- 
cember 7, after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did intercept an imple- 
menting message weather broadcast which contained not the expres- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1103 

sion "East wind — rain," which meant trouble with the United States, 
but "West wind — clear," which meant trouble with Great Britain. 
That was after the Japanese attack. Did you ever hear or know of 
that? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I do not know anythiui^ about that. 

Mr. Mitchell. What were your usual office hours during the first 
week in December 1941 ? 

General Marshall. Well, at that period of short days and cold it 
was my custom to arrive at the War Department about 7 : 30 and to 
leave the Department somewhere between 4 : 30 and 5 and then ride 
in the evening from 7 to 9. On Sunday, which brings into question 
December 7, it was my habit to have breakfast about 8 and then ride 
after that and then go to the War Department. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then go to the War Department ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember this diplomatic message from 
Tokyo to their Ambassadors here, what we call for short the 14-parl 
message and the 1 p. m. message ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

[291S] Mr. Mitchell. Will you state in your own way just 
when you first knew about that, and under what circumstances ? 

General Marshall. I first ^vas aware of this message when I reached 
the 

The Chairman. I suggest. General, it is now practically 4 o'clock. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, it is 4 o'clock. 

The Chairman. Unless the General wishes to go on, the committee 
might wait until tomorrow. 

General Marshall. What is your pleasure ? 

The Chairman. We have been adjourning at 4 o'clock. We will 
stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow. 

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m. an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., 
Friday, December 7, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1105 



[2916] PEARL HAEBOE ATTACK 



FRIDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washmgton, D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a, m., 
in the caucus room (room 318) , Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Kepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[£917] The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. 
You may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEOKGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed) 

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, yesterday in connection with 
Exhibit 13, which is the Martin report on air defense, you mentioned 
that you had instituted an inquiry that resulted in that report and you 
were going to produce the memorandum. Have you the memorandum 
here with you this morning? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I have it here. Do you wish me to 
read it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. If you will, please. 

General Marshall. This is dated July 17, 1941 [reading] : 

COBRECTED MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S. AlR FORCES 

The Chief of Staff desires that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii 
to include: 

"a. Provision for tlie increase of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii to bring 
the actual lieavy bombardment strength (personnel and planes) of the Hawaiian 
Department up to one group. 

"b. Any further increases to be limited to pursuit, light and medium bombard- 
ment and observation types, [2918] in order to reduce the concentration 
of air power in Hawaii by holding any additional heavy bombardment aviation 
required from Hawaiian defense in readiness on the mainland for rapid reinforce- 
ment of the Hawaiian garrison as required. 

c. Outlying fields to be organized at operating strength by rotation of person- 
nel and organizations from parent airdromes. 

This study will be made in collaboration with the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, who is being furnished a copy of this directive. 

(Signed) Orlando Ward 

Colonel, General Staff, 
Secretary, General Staff. 



1106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell, This memorandum, General, speaks of one group of 

heavy bombers. What does a group mean in the Air Corps ? 

General Marshall. I think at that time a group consisted of about 
3 squadrons of either 9 or 12 planes each. The organization changed 
quite frequently. I am sorry I cannot give you an accurate count on 
that but the Air Corps officers who will follow me can. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, I want to refer to some testimony you gave 

l^OW] The Vice Chairman. Does counsel intend to offer this as 
an exhibit ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was read into the transcript and I did not 
think I would waste another number on it. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Mr. MirgHELL. I want to inquire about a matter you testified to 
yesterday in connection with the so-called "winds" implementing mes- 
sage. 

In reading over the transcript I am not sure that it is as clear as it 
should be and I want to be sure it is clear. In the first place, I want to 
call your attention again to the message in Japanese code that we inter- 
cepted and translated appearing on page 154: of Exhibit 1, which is the 
intercepted diplomatic messages. 

At the left hand bottom of the page it is dated November 19, 1941, 
translated November 28, 1941 and it reads this way : 

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. 

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the 
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added 
in the middle of the daily Japanese langauge short wave news broadcast. 

[2920] (1) In case of Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO 

KAZEAME", which translated, the record shows, means "East wind — rain." 

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI", which translated, 
according to the record, means "North wind — cloudv." 

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE", which translated 
means "West wind — clear." 

The dispatch continues : 

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast 
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all 
code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. 

Forward as urgent intelligence. 

Now, I spoke of that as the message which set up the code system. 
You understood that, did you? And on the next page, at the top of 
page 155, there is a second message from Tokyo to Washington inter- 
cepted on November 19, 1941, translated November 26, 1941, the Jap 
number on which is just the succeeding number to the previous mes- 
saye. That sets up a slightly different system of giving out this news. 
It says : 

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the fol- 
lowing at the beginning and end [2921] of our general intelligence broad- 
casts : 

"(1) If it is Japan-U. S. Relations, 'HIGASHI'"; that is the first word, you 
will notice, in the number 1 in the previous messages and I understand that means 
"East", just the word "East" ; no "East wind-rain" ; no "wind" about it. 

"(2) Japan-Russia relations, 'KITA'." That is the first word or part of the 
first word in the second paragraph in the preceding message. That means 
"North." 

"(3) Japan-British-relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.) : 'NISHI'." 
That is the first word in the third item in the previous message and means "West." 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1107 

Now, those are what we call the initial messages which were received 
on the dates shown and in my questions I used the word "implement- 
ing"' message which I intended to describe as any subsequent messages 
in which the Japs were using this code, in which the Japs using this 
code had sent out these warnings. 

Now, I notice when I was inquiring on page 2912 of the transcript 
A^esterday — my assistants have called my attention to the fact that one 
of my questions was not clear. 

I called your attention to the first message this way : 

"Are you familiar with the decoded Jap message of [2922] November 
19th, translated November 2Sth, which appears in the book of diplomatic inter- 
cepts at paiie 154, which set up an emergency system of communication between 
the Japs and their foreign I'epresentatives by the use of certain words and weather 
broadcasts? 

"General Marshaix. I remember seeing this winds message at the time it came 
through. This is the winds message, I believe." 

Did you understand I was referring to the one at the bottom of 
page 154? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell (reading from transcript of testimony) : 

Mr. IMiTCHELL. That is the message that established the code, the one on page 
154. It is in Japanese there. 

"General Marshall. Oh, I see. I do not remember exactly that. I am familiar 
with the specific winds message which would utilize this code, would it not? 

"Mr. MiTCHEXL. Well, there are two. This is the message which came in on 
the 19th of November and was translated on November 28th, it says here, in 
which the Japs said to their Washington diplomatic representatives : 

" 'Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency'." 

And then without my having completed my question and [2923] shown 
what the other one was you said : "I think I can say now specifically I did see it." 

Now, when I said "two" in that question I was referring to the one 
on the bottom of page 154 and the second one on the top of page 155. 

General Marshall. Are you asking me now specihcally clid I see 
both of these messages? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, having that statement I would like to know if 
you remember knowing about these two messages of November 19th 
which set up these code systems ? The first one had the "winds" word 
in it and the second one did not. 

General Marshall. I have no distinct recollection of the break-down 
between the two messages. 

Mr. Mitchell. I see. 

General Marshall. But I am quite certain I saw them both. 

]Mr. MiTCHELi.. Now, I think maybe we have been clear on this on 
the next page, page 2914, but I will ask you again : 

Prior to December 7, 1941, did you ever see or hear of any later 
message in which the Japs in using this winds code sent out word that 
there was "East wind — rain," which meant trouble with the United 
States ? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of either see- [292Jf\ 
ing or hearing of such a message. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, when we closed last evening I had just asked 
you a question. I will repeat it now : 

"Do you remember this diplomatic message from Tokyo to their Ambassadors 
here, what we call for short the 14 part message and the 1 P. M. message?" 



1108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Your answer was, "Yes, sir." 

"Will you state in your own way just when you first knew about that and 
under what circumstances?" 

And you got as far as saying: "I first was aware of this message 
when I reached the" — and then we adjourned. 

Will you give us now the answer? 

General Marshaix. When I reached the office on the morning of 
Sunday, December the 7th. 

On that particular morning I presumably had my breakfast at about 
eight, and following the routine that I had carried out on previous 
Sundays, I went riding at some time thereafter. 

I think in one of the previous statements I made in this investiga- 
tion of Pearl Harbor incidents that I said I probably rode at 8 : 30. 
Discussions with the orderlies and also evidence that I had seen of 
other individuals leads me purely by induction and not by definite 
memory to think that I must have ridden later; just what time I do 
not know; but between [392S] 8 o'clock and the time I went 
to the War Department I ate my breakfast, I probably looked at the 
Sunday papers and I went for a ride. 

Now, as to the probable duration of such a ride I can only say that 
there were very limited places to which one might ride unless you 
crossed from the Arlington side of the river up over Memorial Bridge 
and the park system on the Washington side, which I did not do but 
once, I think, in the previous 6 yeai-s. My rides took me almost in- 
variably down to the site of the present Pentagon Building, which is 
the Government experimental farm. 

On a few occasions I crossed the approaches to the Memorial Bridge, 
not the bridge itself, and rode along the Potomac about two-thirds of 
the way down to where the present National Airport is, but no farther. 
The average length of my rides was about, the time period of my rides 
is about 50 minutes because I rode at a pretty lively gait, at a trot 
and a canter and at a full run down on the experimental farm where 
the Pentagon now is and returned to the house, so I would say that the 
high probability is that the ride was an hour or less, generally or 
certainly not longer. 

My recollection beyond that is that while I was taking a shower, 
either as I went into the shower or while I was actually taking a 
shower, word came to me that Colonel Bratton [2926] had 
something important and wished to come out to Fort Myer. I sent 
word that I was coming to the War Department, so I finished my 
shower, dressed and left for the War Department. 

My average time of taking a shower and dressing would be about 
10 minutes, possibly less. As to what time I arrived at the War 
Department is a matter of conjecture ; I have no recollection. 

[2927] On my arrival there Colonel Bratton handed me these 
intercepts which included the 14 sections of the Japanese message, 
and I started reading them through. You recall it is a rather lengthy 
document and of such a nature that there were portions of it that I 
read twice. 

Wlien I reached the end of the document the next sheet was the 
1 o'clock message of December 7. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the message that directed the Ambassadors 
to deliver this thing at 1:00 p. m. Sunday to the American Gov- 
ernment ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1109 

General Marshall. Yes, sir, that message. That, of course, was 
indicative to me, and all the others who came into the room, of some 
very definite action at 1 : 00 o'clock, because that 1 : 00 o'clock was 
Sunday and was in Washington and involved the Secretary of State, 
all of which were rather unusual put together, 

I think that I immediately called Admiral Stark on tlie phone, 
and found he had seen the message, and I proposed a message to our 
various commanders in the Pacific region, the Philippines, Hawaii, 
the Caribbean, that is the Panama Canal, and the west coast, which 
included Alaska. . Admiral Stark felt that we might confuse them, 
because we had given them an alert and now we were adding some- 
thing more to it. 

I hung up the phone, which was the White House phone, [2928'\ 
and in longhand wrote out the message. My recollection was that 
he called me back. I am told now that the White House telephone 
records show that I called him back. 'I had no recollection of reading 
the message to him. I thought, on the contrary, he called me just as 
I finished the message, saving the last sentence. 

However, one way or the other, there was a call or conversation 
between Stark and myself, the effect of which was he wished me to 
add to the message specifically "Show this to your Naval officers," 
which I did in longhand. 

I then directed Colonel Bratton to take it immediately to the mes- 
age center and start it. There was a proposal then that we have it 
typed. The decision was there was no time for typing, and Colonel 
Bratton left with the message. 

On his return I questioned him as to the length of time involved 
and I could not make out whether or not he was talking about the 
time of encoding as well as the time of dispatching and the time of 
receipt, so I sent him back accompanied by Colonel Bundy, the 
officer in charge of the immediate details of all Pacific affairs. 

They came back and gave me the estimates of the time of deliveries 
in these various parts of the world. My recollection is that I sent 
at least Colonel Bundy back again, and I thought Colonel Bratton 
with him. I believe [2929] others state that there was no 
third trip. There were certainly two — my own recollection is there 
were three. However that may be, that was the procedure on the dis- 
jDatching of the message. 

Do you wish me to go ahead ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

General Marshall. The next information I had was the notifica- 
tion of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor. Of my own recollection 
I do not recall whether I was at the War Department or at the house. 
I am told on one side by the Secretary of the General Staff at that 
time, the Actmg Secretary at that time. General Dean, that I had 
returned to the house. I am told, on the other hand by my orderly 
that I was at the War Department. I do not know where I was. 
Ax-^^S^^-^'' ^^^^^^^^y thereafter, if not immediately then, I was at the 
VVar Department, because it was a very quick drive, and on Sunday 
there was no traffic. It was a matter of about 7 minutes from my 
house to the Munitions building. 

The information then came in in fuller detail, and telephone com- 
munication was established and I talked to General Short's Chief of 



1110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Staff, Colonel Phillips. You could hear the explosions at the time. 
He was endeavoring to tell me what was actually happenmg. 

[2930] My questioning, as I recall, was with relation to a re- 
port that had come from somewhere— and there were many reports 
of course at that time, rumors and authentic, confusion — that a Japa- 
nese landing was being attempted, as I recall, below Barber Point, 
and my recollection is my inquiry of Colonel Phillips was to the facts 
in regard to that. . 

I talked to Colonel Phillips because, as I recall, at that time Gen- 
eral Short had gone to his command post and therefore was not 
able to talk to me directly. 

The procedure on the dispatch of the messages did not come to my 
attention in detail until I was before the Eoberts Board. The fact 
that the one message had been sent by the Western Union to San 
Francisco on a direct line, relayed by the RCA and presumably tele- 
typed, which was not done in Hawaii, I did not know about that. 

Admiral Stark tells me, and I am quite certain he is right — I do 
not recall it but he is undoubtedly right — that he asked me at the 
time of our second conversation that morning, or he said that they 
had rapid means of communication and if I wished to use it, and 
I told him no. That must be a fact — I do not recall — that must be 
a fact. 

That, I think, covers the main details. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now do you remember your movements on the 
evening of December 6, as to where you were? 

[2931] General Marshall. I can only account for them by sort 
of circumstantial evidence. The only definite thing I have is that I 
had no dinner engagement. I found our engagement book, or Mrs. 
Marshall's engagement book, and between the 1st of November and 
7th of December I had one dinner engagement, that was the 2d of 
December. 

Also they checked on the post movie. It was about our only re- 
course for relaxation, and I had never seen the picture. So I was not 
there. 

We were not calling. We were leading a rather monastic life. 
There was also in that record the affairs of the day for her, which 
involved, I think, an old-clothes sale, I think, all day long, to raise 
money for one of these industries they had down there, so the proba- 
bility is she was tired and we were home. 

[2932] Mr. Mitchell. You are sure you were not at the White 
House that evening ? 

General Marshall, No, sir ; not at all. 

Mr. Mitchell. There is a statement in the Army Board report that 
the warning message that you got out on the morning of the 7th you 
telephoned to the Philippines. Is that your recollection ? 

General Marshall. No, sir; I talked to Colonel Phillips, as I ex- 
plained here, after the attack was going on, because we could hear 
the explosions at the time. 

Mr. Mitchell. You did not telephone any such message yourself? 

General Marshall. I did not telephone anywhere. 

Mr. Mitchell. After you drafted this warning message to the 
outposts that you were prepared to send as the result of having seen 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE HH 

this 1 p. m. message, is it your recollection that you called Admiral 
Stark first before he called you ? Originally, I mean. 

General Marshall. I am quite certain of that. I called him first. 

Mr. Mitchell. What did you say to him ? 

General Marshall. As nearly as I can recall, I asked him if he 
had seen the message. He stated that he had, and I proposed that 
we send a message apropos of this to the [2933~\ various com- 
manders concerned, and he replied as I have outlined, he feared that 
that would tend to confuse them, that we had given them an alert 
and now we were putting something else into the picture. 

I then went ahead and wrote the message, and I don't think I said 
to him in concluding that first conversation whether or not I was 
going to do it, but I did write it out inmiediately in longhand. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then your recollection is he called you '( 

General Marshall. My recollection is he called me, but the records 
of the White House telephone exchange show I called him. 

Mr. Mitchell. And what was the subject of the second conversation ? 

General Marshall. I had thought that he called me to say he 
wanted this shown to the naval officer. It would seem from the 
record at the White House that I called him and maybe read the 
message. In any event he did ask me, and I am specific about that, 
he did ask me to put into the message that it be shown to the naval 
officer. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you exhibit 58 before you ? 

General Marshall. No. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will have to show it to you, General. 

This is a record of telephone calls on December 7 by \293Jf\ 
outside parties through using the White House exchange. 

It says, and I will show it to 3^ou — the record says "11 : 40 A" which 
means "A. M.," I suppose. 

General Marshall eld Ad'm Stark — O. K. 

11 : 30 A— Gen. Marshall eld Ad'm Stark— O. K. 

In that particular instance, according to the White House records, 
these hours are reversed. The 11 : 40 A is ahead of 11 : 30, which does 
not seem to be the practice, and we are not sure just what it means. 

Will you look at it and see if it means anything to you? That is 
exactly what the record shows there, that the time 11 : 40 precedes the 
entry of the 11 : 30 message. 

General Marshall. I would not know what the significance of 
that is. 

Mr. Mitchell. You would not know anything about it ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. It does this, though. It gives the 
time one way or another of the completion of the message following 
the reading of the 14-point thing and the preparation of this other 
message. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then at least you did read the message and were in 
the act of preparing a warning by 11 : 30 or 11 : 40? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; 11:40 would be quite evidently the 
completion of it, because I had it all written [29S5] except 
the last sentence. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will offer now, as Exhibit 61, a photostat which 
reads as follows : "December 7, 1941." It is typed. 

79716— 46— pt. 3 10 



1112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

MEMORANDUM FOB THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (Through Secretary, 

General Staff) 

Subject : Far East Situation 

The Seeertary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram 
be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East ; Com- 
manding General, Carribean Defense Command ; Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department ; Commanding General, Fourth Army ; 

And the message is this : 

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what 
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code 
machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we 
do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this 
communication. 

Maeshaix. 

It has the signature of General Gerow on it. Has the committee 
a copy ? 

[29S6] The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. And the committee will note that underneath it 
is a record : 

"Radios as follows dispatched 11 : 52 AM, 12-7-41 by Code Room, WDMC." 

General Marshall. War Department Message Center. 

Mr. Mitchell. And another was dispatched 12 : 05 to Manila ; an- 
other one to Hawaii at 12 : IT ; the one to the Caribbean Command is 
blurred. It looks like 12 : 00 o'clock, and the one to the Fourth Army 
at San Francisco at 12 : 11. 

The Vice Ciiairmax. That is Exhibit 61? 

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 61. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 61.") 

[2M7] Mr. Mitchell. Did you give any instructions to the 
Comunications Center as to the means of transmitting this message 
to Hawaii ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. Their business was to dispatch it in 
the most efficient and rapid manner possible. This photostat of this 
document of General Gerow's should be read in the light that it was 
written after the event. The message was sent from a longhand 
pencil copy on an ordinary ruled sheet of paper — which, incidentally, 
was before the Roberts board. 

Mr. Mitchell. The original message was in your hand-writing and 
you gave directions that it should not be typed ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. It was carried by hand by Colonel 
Bratton and checked on the second trip by Colonel Bratton and 
Colonel Bundy, and then I thought there also should be a third trip 
by Colonel Bundy, but there was a difference of opinion on that. 

Mr. Mitchell. In the message center it was necessary to take your 
handwritten draft and encode it ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; encode it first. 

Mr. Mitchell. And then put it on the way ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was there any report made to you at that time that 
there was any difficulty in reaching Hawaii on [£9S8] the tele- 
phone ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I mean before the attack? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1113 

General Marshall. No, sir. I did not ask the question. 

Mr. Mitchell. You didn't ask the question as to means of trans- 
portation ? 

General Marshall. I didn't ask the question about the telephone. 

Mr. Mitchell. What did they estimate to you would be the re- 
quired time for delivery to Fort Shafter of the Hawaiian message? 

General Marshall. I don't recollect, sir. I have a faint recollec- 
tion of being told that it would take 8 minutes to get it through, but I 
think you will have positive testimony on that. 

Mr. Mitchell. You sent the message to all the commands without 
any special selection of Pearl Harbor? 

General Marshall. Exactly. I sent each commander involved in 
the Pacific situation. The Western Defense Command, which is the 
Fourtli Army, the Caribbean Command, the Philippine Command, and 
the Hawaiian Command. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you make any inquiry of the communications 
people or your subordinates as to the prospective time of delivery of 
that message to Hawaii? 

[2939] General Marshall. That was the reason I sent Colonel 
Bratton back with Colonel Bundy, to give me a clear picture of what 
the time involved was, because when I first questioned Colonel Bundy 
I couldn't tell whether he was including the time necessary to en- 
cipher the message, and so I sent him back to determine that for me. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, what report did he make to you, do you re- 
member, about that ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall the minutes. I think it is shown 
in one of the documents. I couldn't tell you offliand. I think they 
are prepared to give you that, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did anybody in your office, when you were reading 
the 14-part messageand the 1 p. m. supplement, on the morning of the 
Tth, make any mention of the fact that 1 p. m. in Washington would 
be about 7: 30 a. m. in Honolulu? 

General Marshall. There was no mention of the 1 p. m. message 
until I came across it at the end of the pile. I am quite clear about 
that, because I was A-ery much taken back by the time I had spent on 
the preceding lengthy message in trying to understand its significance, 
and then arriving at this, to me, very critical one of 1 p. m. 

Mr. ISIiTCHELL. You thought you ought to have been shown the 1 
p. m. part first ? 

General Marshall. I don't know about that. I am just [2940] 
talking about my own reaction. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, was any discussion had when you saw the 1 
p. m. message? Any discussion about the corresponding time of day 
in Honolulu or the Philippines? 

General Marshall. I don't recall that. I don't recall that at all. 
The whole thing was, it was a significant message, and what would 
we tell these commanders, and I went ahead and wrote it out myself. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did a^ou talk to the President on the morning of 
the 7th before the attack? 

General Marshall. Not to my recollection. I think I had an ap- 
pointment, I think the records show it, and that is my only source for 
speaking now, that I had had a previous appointment for 3 o'clock 



1114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that afternoon. I had no recollection of that until I was shown the 
record. I know I went to the White House that afternoon. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have your staff organized at that time so 
that if an especially significant or important intercept was made of 
a Jap message, was there anyone on duty who had authority, if they 
were unable to reach you, to send a warning message out ? 

General Marshall. No, sir, I don't think there was a set-up for that 
special purpose. We had always had an arrangement there whereby 
the officer on the receiving end, at the [294^1] central point in 
the War Department, knew where the principal people were, where to 
reach them. In my own case, for example, during that period and 
for, about a year thereafter, I always maintained an orderly at the 
house at the telephone. If I left the house to go to a moving picture, 
which was about the only place I went, he was there and knew where 
to reach me. These various sections of the AVar Department Staff, 
notably the G-2 section, were all working pretty much overtime. 
General Gerow's section, I know, was working at that rate practically 
all the time. Too much so, as a matter of fact. 

Mr. Mitchell. If they had not been able to reach you on the morn- 
ing of the 7th, or at any time when an important message came in, 
was there anybody but yourself that had authority to send a warning 
message to the outlying post? 

General Marshall. Yes. The authority was vested, for instance, 
in the Deputy Chief of Staff. Or even the head of War Plans Divi- 
sion. There is no dispute about that, I do not think, because the ac- 
tions always had been on a very decentralized basis. We selected the 
men and we trusted them. That does not go down the line, of course. 

I was asked on one of the investigations if Colonel Bratton would 
have had authority to send such a message. I would think that would 
be asking a great deal of him, to do that. I don't think that would 
apply in this case. He would [£94^] certainly not be respon- 
sible for sending such a message. 

]Mr. Mitchell. Was General Miles high enough up in the list to 
have authority to send out a warning message to G-2? 

General Marshall. General Miles had responsibility for dispensing 
information. He could not issue a command message. This goes as a 
command message. 

The same information, of course, might have been sent as just in- 
formation of what was happening. 

Mr. Mitchell. The thing that made this a command message 

General INIarshall. Was the positive direction. 

Mr. Mitchell. A direction to be on the alert accordingly? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. He would only have authority to 
send the facts. As to any deductions he might make, he couldn't tell 
them what to do, 

Mr. Mitchell. But the War Plans Division would have operational 
authority to send a message that involved action? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was the Deputy Chief of Staff the only other one 
that had authority to send a message without reaching you ? 

General Marshall. I think that would be the accurate way of stat- 
ing it, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1115 

Mr. Mitchell. I liave, of course, been speakinjr of the [2943] 
military oflicers. The Secretary of War, if he had information, for 
instance, he wouldn't have had to ask your permission. He would 
have directed an order. 

Secretary Stimson, if this think had come to him, and he had felt 
a warning ought to be sent out, he would have had authority to send 
it out? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

JMr. IVIitchell. Did you have any talk on the morning of the 7th 
with Secretary Stimson before the news of the attack came in? 

General Marshall. 1 don't recall it. He was at the State Depart- 
ment I knew, but I can't recall that I saw him before lunch. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know at the time that a meeting was being 
held at the State Department? 

General Marshall. I think I did, but I am not certain. You see, 
my time, when I reached the Department, was completely taken up 
m reading this lengthy message and trying to digest it, and nobody 
could talk to me while I was reading it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any meeting with the President, or an 
appointment with him, on the 6th of December? The White House 
records say; 10 a. m.. Justice William O. Douglas 11:15, Director 
Harold Smith. Those are under the head of President appointments. 
Nobody else for the 6th 

[■■^944] General Marshall. I have no recollection of any contact 
with him. 

Mr. Mitchell. When one of these Jap intercepts was translated 
there was a system of delivering copies of the translation to you, was 
there not ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was that done at your office ? 

General Marshall. My office desk. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was it the practice to send copies of those intercepts 
out to 3''our quarters, your home ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall that we ever did that. That 
would have been strongly opposed by the G-2 people. I don't recall 
ever having received any at my home. 

Mr. Mii'CHELL. You stated that the first time you saw this 14-part 
message and the 1 p. m. message was when you arrived at your office 
on the morning of December 7 ; is that correct ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Had you learned prior to that time of it, prior to 
the time you actually saw a copy, did you learn that any such dispatch 
had been received, had it been told or telephoned you ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember whether you had been told 
[S94S] or telephoned or informed in any way on the evening of 
the 6th, late in the evening, that any arrangement had been made for 
a meeting between Secretary Stimson and Mr. Hull on the next morn- 
ing? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I have no such recollection. 

[2946] Mr. Mitchell. General, I want to go back a little bit 
over the question of the estimates as to the possibilities of the success 



1116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of a Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, and the estimates as to 
the possibility of whether an attack might be made by the Japs. 

The record here shows that the question of a possible air attack 
on Pearl Harbor had been carefully considered. There is the Martin- 
Bellinger report, and the Martin report, and others. 

Those reports show that an assured, complete defense that would 
practicall}' guarantee the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor could 
only be accomplished if you had a long-range reconnaissance which 
caught the enemy carriers at sea at a distance of 800 or a thousand 
miles the evening before, followed up by a bombing attack on them 
to destroy the carriers before the planes had left. 

The conclusion in all those reports was that the probable selection 
by the enemy of the hour would be to reach a distance at a point some 
thousand miles or so, or 600 miles, the night before and then run in the 
dark, and discharge their planes early the next morning. 

I think the reports make it clear that the quantity of patrol planes 
needed to make a daily reconnaissance out that distance in all direc- 
tions was something more than [£947] double the number of 
patrol planes they actually had, and bombers available for a striking 
force were quite few. 

Now, on the basis of those reports and the available materiel on 
December 7, isn't it fair to say, fii*st, that the best that could be done 
with the available patrol forces was what you might call a sector 
long-distance reconnaissance each afternoon, choosing one sector one 
day and another sector another. 

Isn't that the conclusion you draw? 

General Marshall. That is, I would say, roughly the case. They 
had to, certainly, modify the procedure according to the means avail- 
able, which, however, is a common situation with any commander. 

Mr. Mitchell. That necessarily involved some element of luck. 
If you selected one sector for a long-distance reconnaissance one day 
and another for another day, you took some chance of missing the 
Japs. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. You have to accept that. 

Mr. Mitchell. So, with the available materiel, there would neces- 
sarily be considerable risk of their not being able to run such a 
reconnaissance as would locate the Jap carriers; is that the way you 
judge these reports^ 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, that meant that there was no definite 
[2948] assurance that they could strike the carriers and destroy 
the attack before it got launched? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. The alternative to that, if they couldn't reach them, 
was to hit the Japs in the morning, put our fighters out with radar 
detection, or some other reconnaissance, spot the Jap attack coming 
in or just leaving the carrier, and try to destroy theii^ planes and 
break up their attack ; that is the alternative, is it not ? 

General Marshall, Yes, sir. It would be the alternative in one 
sense, but also your dispositions might be changed to meet that situa- 
tion. Your degree of alert arrangements might be altered accordingly. 
The dispositions. Naval, as well as Army, might have been modified 
to meet that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1117 

Of course, what the modifications would be, I don't know, but cer- 
tainly you make various adjustments to meet a critical weakness in 
order to lessen the possibility of damage. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, all of my questions are based on the assump- 
tion that there was a complete alert, that everything was ready that 
could be ready. Of course, if you are not, that presents a different 
problem, but I am assuming in [2949] my questions that they 
are completely on the alert in the light of everything they had to face. 

Now, the Japs had 6 carriers in this attacking force and their rec- 
ords show around 360 planes. The record isn't quite clear as to 
whether they sent all of them in, or whether they may have kept some 
as a screen. But the number of planes that we had available in 
service to resist their attack seems to be less than a third of the Japs'. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; assuming on the Japanese side that 
they knew where our carriers were which also had some planes, and 
which also necessitated their holding certain planes on their Japanese 
carrier force. 

Mr. Mitchell. I naturally assumed that because the daily ship 
reports which were intercepted kept reporting whether the carriers 
were in and out. 

General Marshall. And, as I recall, the carriers were out. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Now, with the available materiel at Hawaii, there wasn't sufficient 
in the way of air forces, bombers, and so forth to insure that the Jap- 
anese air force could not get in to the fleet, was there? Wasn't there 
a risk that some of the planes would get through and that damage 
would be done? 

General Marshall. There was always that hazard. 

[29S0] Mr. Mitchell. It was a question then, under the con- 
ditions, of whether if they had been completely on the alert, the air 
forces we had would have been able to break up the Japanese attack 
in such a way as to minimize or mitigate the damage? 

General Marshall. It was a question of the deployment, the status, 
alertness, the various arrangements made with the means available. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, would it seem that under the circum- 
stances, if it had been definitely expected that an air attack would be 
made, would you have felt, considering what I have just said, knowing 
or believing that an attack was going to be made, that the risk ought 
to be taken of keeping the fleet in the port. Have you any estimate 
of that? 

General Marshall. You are getting, Mr. Mitchell, into a very 
technical naval question, which I do not think I am competent to 
answer, because how you might otherwise have disposed those vessels 
is distinctly a naval problem involving considerations of which, as 
a land man, I do not have the information to speak, and therefore 
I am not prepared to answer that. I will merely say that we created 
what we thought was a fair defensive set-up for our islands which 
was quite unusual for our degree of unpreparedness at [2951'] 
that time and that everybody there was aware, as indicated by the 
communications of the hazard of an air attack or a submarine attack. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then I think it comes down probably to what 
you said yesterday, that considering what was to be done, the question 
of the hazards of an air attack and the lack of complete assurance that 



1118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

it could be wholly defeated, was tempered with a question of judgment 
as to whether or not an attack ought to be expected at all in sizing up 
the situation ; the two things blend, do they not ? 

General Marshall. I don't know as I quite understand your ques- 
tion, but I would say this as to the problem of the attack not being ex- 
pected at all, the question of whether or not there is an attack depends 
on what you do yourself, to a great extent, on which the enemy makes 
his estimate, and you always have to suppose that he will do the thing 
that is most embarrassing to you. 

Perfection of defense is seldom ever achieved. Even in our most 
carefully laid-out operation, in which we took about 2^2 years to 
prepare for the landing in Normandy, we were short of LST's, 
and there was a bitter battle over getting them from the Pacific and. 
the Mediterranean. 

I presume had that failed, there would have been an investigation 
as to why we went into Normandy until we had [£9S2] the full 
number of LTS's necessary for the operation. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. You stated in your testimony before the Army 
Board, I think you used thisphrase. I think "we" did not expect the 
attack at Pearl Harbor. Wlien you said "we," were you speaking 
generally of the high officers in the War Department ? 

General Marshall. That was a rather careless expression. I will 
make that "I." 

Mr. MiTCHELi.. And when you say the enemy would judge whether 
he would attack on whether he knew you were going to be ready, did 
you, in that conclusion take into account the fact that the Japs knew 
we weren't alert? 

General Marshall. I didn't take that info consideration because I 
thought we were on the alert. 

Mr. Mitchell. Your estimate that you didn't expect it was based 
on the theory that what you had was ready and if ready, the Japs 
probably knew it was ready ? 

General Marshall. It is a little bit like, in my mind, the present 
discussion as to the postwar organization of our Army. If we are 
ready, the other man will not involve us. 

Mr. Keefe. I would like to have that last answer read. I didn't 
quite get the purport of it. 

(The answer referred to was read by the reporter.) 

[£95S] Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, it appears here from 
the record that commencing with Admiral Stark's letter to Admiral 
Richardson of November 22, 1940, directing him when he got back 
to Hawaii to start in motion facilities for air defense against an air 
attack, from that time, the Bloch report, the Knox and Stimson letter, 
and all those plans, and the Martin-Bellinger report, and right up to 
the end of August, at least everybody that had anything to do with the 
subject, both in the War Department and the officers at Hawaii, seemed 
to be worried over the possibility of an air attack; people out there 
were reporting that they were vulnerable and were demanding new 
materiel and you were doing your level best to shoot materiel out there 
to help them prepare, and the thing was batted back and forth right 
up to that time, everybody seemed to be on his toes about an air attack, 
and the possibility of it. 

Have you anything you could say that would help this committee 
by way of explanation that after all that stir, when it came to the last 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1119 

critical days, the people at Hawaii, certainly the people in the War 
Department had gotten into a frame of mind where at least some of 
them, I don't say all, where they feared, or dreaded — thought — the 
danger of an air attack had faded away? To a layman that is the 
[2963-A'] thing that is interesting, and if there is anything you 
want to say on that, we would like to have it. 

General IVIarshall. Possibly I can explain it in this way: 

In the first place, taking the latter part of your question — your 
statement — the fear of an air attack, as far as the War Department 
was concerned, had not faded away. The point was this. A new 
commander for the Fleet had been appointed. A new commander 
for the Air Forces in Hawaii had been appointed. They had brought 
up various things they wished to have done in order to insure capa- 
bility of carrying out their missions. We were then in a state of 
woeful inadequacy of all such material. Also, combined with that 
fact, what little we had, a material proportion had to be used or we 
couldn't develop an Army or air force. We couldn't prepare the 
crews for the new planes which were soon to appear. 

Therefore, through the late winter, at least beginning in February, 
and running up into the summer, we did our utmost one way or 
another to provide the things that the Navy thought were needed 
and the Army commander in Hawaii thought were needed. We did 
our utmost to provide the material that was needed. We had gone 
to the point where we thought they were reasonably prepared in 
meeting the [£964] requirements they had stated. 

The last one, of course, was this Martin-Bellinger report, which we 
never did come up to, up until the end of the war. 

We then, as quantity production came in, turned for the first time 
to try to send something to General MacArthur. The indications, the 
• positive indications, by observation, by reconnaissance, by magic, were 
definitely a Japanese evil intention south of the China Sea. We had 
that, as I say, by reconnaissance. We had it by many sources. By 
magic. 

General MacArthur had little or nothing. If we could make the 
Philippines then reasonably defensible, particularly with heavy bomb- 
ers in which the Air Corps at that time had great faith, in their action 
against hostile shipping, we felt that we could block that Japanese 
advance and block their entry into the war by their fear of what 
would happen if they couldn't take the Philippines, and we could 
maintain heavy bombers on that island. So from the latter part of 
August, having given Hawaii all we could afford to give them up to 
that time, and there having been elaborate arrangements made, modi- 
fications, readjustments one way or another, we turned and tried to 
do something for General MacArthur, and most of that went through 
the Hawaiian Islands, incidentally, by Navy or by air. So our struggle 
from that [2955'] time on was to give the Philippines an ade- 
quate defensive set-up. Theretofore they had little or nothing. 

\2956'\ I might put in the record here now the fact that on at 
least two occasions and possibly three the President, a long time back, 
in 1940, and Admiral Stark, in the presence of the President and to me 
personally, had expressed the hope that we could do something for the 
Philippines and in each case I had given them the reply that we could 
not; that it would be the seed corn. 



1120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We first had the defense of the continental United States. Hawaii 
was a vital factor in the defense of the United States; the Panama 
Canal was a vital factor, a great bottleneck in connection with the 
defense of the United States, To create the necessary forces we had 
to have experienced people, we had to have materiel, we had to create 
those forces not so much to arm them as to permit them to prepare 
themsejves. 

Therefore, anything we sent to the Philippines that could have 
had any possible effect on the situation out there would practically 
deny us the ability to create an Army, to create a defense out there 
that was in any degree effectual. 

Now, as I have said, quantity production was making its first 
appearance really in about August 1941 and, as I have said, we turned 
from the meeting of the demands in Hawaii and not fulfilling the 
Martin-Bellinger request for 180 B-l7's of which in all we possessed 
all over the world 148 [2957] at that particular time. We 
turned to our endeavor to set up a sufficient force in the Philippine 
Islands to guard the islands to be a threat to any Japanese movement 
through the China Sea and to possibly avert a war in the Pacific. 

We had equipped, so far as we thought it possible to equip and 
instructed, so far as we thought it was necessary to instruct, the gar- 
rison in the Hawaiian Islands. We were now engaged in trying to do 
for General MacArthur that what he so urgently required. 

I think that is a reasonable explanation of why from August on we 
were working in the Far East rather than a continuation of discus- 
sions of one kind and another and of materiel items to the Hawaiian 
garrison. Have I made that fairly plain, sir? 

Mr. MrrcHELL. It appears that some B-17's were flown from the 
Pacific coast to Hawaii leaving December 6 and that arrived at Pearl 
Harbor during the Jap attack. What do you know about that? 

General Marshall. We had succeeded in getting 35 Flying Fort- 
resses to the Philippines, incidentally, sending them via Wake Island 
and then Port Moresby or Rabaul or Port Darwin or Balikpapan 
in Borneo, north of the Philippines. 

Those had been made available by reason of the additional funds 
that were appropriated by Congi^ess to expedite produc- [2958] 
tion, which always costs a great deal more money. 

The result of that was that the following deliveries, which we had 
assumed would immediately come after those 35 from the plants, 
were delayed several weeks, I think about 3 weeks. There was a 
gap, in other words, in the delivery of the B-17's. 

Not only that, but>after we got the crews into the delivered ships we 
then found that the adverse winds at an unexpected period between 
Hawaii and California prevented the flight. 

I might add that the flight of the 35 was the first time that a B-17, 
in other words, a land-based plane, had attempted a crossing from 24 
to 27 hundred miles. It became a common thing later on with wider 
cruising radius. 

So these ships were held on the west coast, the B-17's. General 
Arnold can give you practical testimony regarding this. From my 
point of view and memory, I sent him out personally to the west 
coast to see if they were doing everything possible, first to get these 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1121 

planes completed with the extra tanks and the things that it required, 
and next to take off for the flight. 

Naturally, the young men, the squadron leaders, could not be told 
all the various factors in the case except that we wanted them to 
leave as quickly as possible. 

[2059] So General Arnold made the trip personnally. My recol- 
lection is he called me up on the 'phone shortly after he had arrived 
out there and he said, "These damn fellows don't realize how serious 
this thing is," and I told him, "Well," I said, "you are there and they 
are your people. You start them out." And he drove the harder to 
make an early departure. 

His criticism, of course, must be moderated to the point that they 
were doing their best and it was a very dangerous flight. The lim- 
itation on the quantity of gasoline you could carry was very decided 
and it gave them a; small factor of safety, so it was not one to be 
stepped into lightly unless a great emergency was in existence. The 
question was how thoroughly the great emergency was realized by 
the senior officers directing the men. 

Actually, under his urging and presumably under a moderation 
of the winds, the advei-se winds, the flight of the first squadron took 
off and arrived in the middle of the Japanese attack. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you say the first flight was the one that got 
there during the Jap attack? 

General Marshall. My understanding is that they arrived in the 
air over Hawaii while the Japanese were bombing Pearl Harbor. 

[2960] Mr. Mitchell. The record shows that those planes were 
unarmed ; that is, they were not provided with ammunition. 

General Marshall. I think they did not have any ammunition. 
That was explained, I think, by the fact these pilots were trying to 
get every gallon of gas they could in the plane and they did not an- 
ticipate fighting this plane on that long hop from California to 
Hawaii. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know anything about their actual equip- 
ment at the time they left the west coast with regard to arms or 
anything like that? 

General Marshall. I do not know that. General Arnold can 
probably tell you that specifically. My recollection is that they had 
their arms but they were covered with cosmoline to protect them 
against the salt air and that they did not carry ammunition. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will ask you to consider the suggestion about 
unity of command in Hawaii. There has been a memorandum intro- 
duced here, General Gerow's, dated November 17, 1941, reporting to 
you about the efforts of the Army and Navy in joint conference to 
reach some agreement in respect to unified command at various posts, 
including Hawaii. 

Will you tell us what you know about that? There was also offered 
in evidence with that a letter you wrote on the 20th. Is that attached 
to that file? 

[2961] General Marshall. Yes, sir. There is missing from this 
my endorsement on General Gerow's paper, though. My recollection 
is that I wrote a specific endorsement to General Gerow on his paper; 
on his proposal. If you haven't got it here I will obtain it for the 
committee. 



1122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. I wish you could get it from the War Department. 
Will you please tell us what you kuow about the situation dealt with 
in that report and your letter of the 20th ? 

General Marshall. We had been endeavoring for a long time to 
reach a more efficient command basis where the Army and the Navy 
were both in the same area. It presented, of course, certain very 
definite complications along the coast because you had the close-in 
defense, the coast defense guns, you had, we will say, the fighter 
planes which operated fairly close in and you had naval reconnais- 
sance planes which go tremendous distances out to sea and may be- 
come involved with the fleet or naval task forces in a sense remote 
from the coastal defense itself, so it presented a complication in work- 
ing out a system which would enable control without producing con- 
fusion. 

Admiral Stark and I — I am certain for myself and I am quite 
certain from his point of view — were endeavoring all the time to find 
a basis of unity in control of these matters. 

[^962] As has always been the case, you could do more at the 
top than you could down through the line because there a hundred 
complications would come up and differences of view, very decided. 

I had considered a long time before this of a proposal to the Navy 
that they take unity of command in Alaska and the Aleutians because 
I thought that if there was an actual landing attempt up there by an 
enemy that the matter was predominantly naval. For various rea- 
sons it was not accepted. I do not know, I do not recall at the mo- 
ment, I do not know that I knew at the time exactly why. I thought 
possibly — I may be utterly wrong — that they had felt that that would 
be taken as the basis for carrying the thing further on. 

We thought it was very important that we have unity of command 
in the Panama Canal on the part of the Army, where its interests 
are so predominant, we felt, though the Canal was for the service of 
the Navy. 

There was no question in my mind but what Hawaii was a pre- 
dominant naval factor. The question was how you worked this out. 

I have said this before ; I will repeat it again. It is a very simple 
thing to have unity of command if you give it to the other man but 
that also applied in all of our dealings with the British and among 
ourselves and always will [^96S] continue to be so. 

So we made every effort to bring this to a head and as I think I 
stated in my letter to General Emmons when it was finally determined, 
I covered a good many of the reasons. I will read the particular para- 
graph. This is the letter of December 20 to General Emmons, then 
m Army command in Hawaii, an air officer who had been the com- 
mander of the GHQ air force and for that reason I had sent him out 
there. 

Unity of command had just been ordered and it was to be a naval 
command in that region. The same occurred in Panama. It was 
to be an Army command in that region. (Reading :) 

For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following 
circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of 
the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion 
as to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a 
year to secure unity of command in various critical regions had been unavailing. 
AH sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1123 

coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives, and similar matters 
had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I 
must say at the same time [2964 \ that some of the Army stafE brought 
up somewhat similar objections to Naval control. Both Stark and I were strug- 
gling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed, 
at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two 
decisions I have just referred to — 

That is Hawaii and Panama — 

have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I 
feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments. 
Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our 
relations with Allies. 

I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate 
the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to 
work with Nimitz in complete understanding. 

Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought 
to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. These days 
are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency. 

[2965] Now I will add this further item in connection with that. 
After Pearl Harbor and preceding this letter I brought General 
Eisenhower in and he worked on the details, as I recall, and drew up 
what I might designate a bill of particulars or exceptions in Panama 
to meet various naval objections, things that we would guarantee on 
the Army side we would not do, we would not do this, we would not 
do that, with these reservations in favor of a naval situation. It was 
quite a long list. I know he worked most of the night on it, and I 
worked with him part of the time. 

When we turned to the Hawaiian side we put in no Army proviso, 
and bringing them in that way the net result was, as I recall, there 
were no provisos on either side, and we accomplished unity on that 
basis. 

It might be interesting to the committee, although it is not pertinent 
to this hearing, that we ran into exactly the same situation in determin- 
ing unity of command in the western Pacific with Wavel. We had to 
write a great many provisos and restrictions in the document in order 
to get a general acceptance of the proposition. Later on those were 
almost forgotten. The minute we had unity the solutions became 
evident and resolved themselves right within the command. But the 
start was always the same, and in that case also General Eisenhower 
helped me with the details of [2966] provisos in order to get 
the acceptance by the other party to the proposition. 

Mr. Mitchell. Has unity of command at Hawaii been maintained 
up to the present time ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I say the present time — I do not 
know what has happened in the last 10 days. 

Mr. Mitchell. Without asking you any questions about the unity 
of command, complete unity of command generally in the Army and 
Navy Departments, limiting it to the question of posts like Hawaii, 
or Panama, for instance, do you want to express any views as to the 
wisdom of maintaining such unity of command in peacetime as com- 
pared with war ? 

General Marshall, I think it is an imperative necessity. 

Mr. Mitchell. During this period, from what you learned about 
the operations of the intelligence branches of the Navy and Army, and 
what not, and the question of uncertainty or difficulty in exchanges 
and assurance of having all branches informed of all information, have 



1124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

you any views to express about unity of consolidation or centraliza- 
tion of the Military and Naval Intelligence? 

General Marshall. I think it is very necessary. 

Mr. Mitchell. I may have some more questions of the General but 
not until after lunch anyway, and if the committee want to inquire 
they can start in. 

[2967] It is 10 minutes of 12. 

The Chairman. It is 10 minutes to 12, and while some members of 
the committee might properly inquire of General Marshall in that 10 
minutes, suppose we hold 10 minutes later this afternoon and make up 
for that lost time ? 

Therefore we will recess until 2 o'clock. 

(Wliereupon, at 11 : 50 o'clock a. m., the committee recessed until 2 
o'clock p. m. of the same day.) 

[2968] AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 P. M. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Counsel may 
proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed) 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, before proceeding further with Gen- 
eral Marshall there is one point on which I would like the instructions 
of the committee. 

In September IDU General Marshall wrote some letters to Mr. 
Dewey during the Presidential campaign. Without going into details 
I will say that I think that these letters are material to this inquiry 
and the incident ought to be gone into and the letters put in evidence 
but, unfortunately, in those letters there is a sentence or two, a few 
words, which disclose technical cryptoanalytical methods which we 
had adopted to break the Japanese code and the question arises 
whether those words should be deleted or whether the whole letter 
should go in. 

I have here copies of the letters that are complete. I also have 
here copies of the letters in which those statements of our technical 
methods of cracking the Japanese codes are deleted. 

The deletion, in my judgment, does not change the tenor of the 
letters or their continuity and for the purposes of [2969] this 
case I should think that the deletions have nothing to do with what 
you are interested in. 

My own feeling is that in the interests of national security the 
deletions should be made but I do not think all the members of the 
committee have yet seen these letters. 

I am bringing that question up now so that I can have the instruc- 
tions of the committee as to whether we should offer in evidence the 
complete letters or those copies which have that cryptoanalytic in- 
formation deleted. I can supply the committee with copies if anyone 
has not seen them. 

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to make a statement in that 
connection which he thinks ought to be made on behalf of the com- 
mittee and in justice to General Marshall and to the counsel for the 
committee. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1125 

In September 1944, during the Presidential campaign, it is the 
understanding of the Chair that General Marshall received informa- 
tion that the question of cracking the Japanese codes might become 
involved in the campaign; whereupon he wrote a letter or two letters 
to Governor Dewey who was a candidate for President. 

In the letter or letters General Marshall referred to the cracking 
of certain codes which was then current. That is, they were in prog- 
ress then in September 1944. 

General Marshall felt that in view of the fact that this [2970] 
information was confidential and was not related necessarily to the 
Pearl Harbor situation but dealt with a situation that was current in 
1944 and may be even current now in 1945, that there was a sentence 
and a phrase or two in that letter to Governor Dewey that might well 
be deleted so far as this record is concerned. 

The committee met this morning in executive session to discuss 
that question and it transpired that there was a division within the 
ranks of the committee as to whether these parts that General Mar- 
shall felt that so far as he was personally concerned, due to relations 
existing between our Government and one of our allies, might well be 
omitted from the transcript. 

I think the committee recognized the fact that unless they could 
unanimously agree to the deletion and even though they unanimously 
agreed to the deletion, that it would be difficult to maintain that situ- 
ation in view of the avenues by which information is obtained, that 
notwithstanding General Marshall's feeling about it that so far as 
he was personally concerned that this information was given in 
confidence and notwithstanding the view of the counsel that it should 
be maintained in confidence, the committee was unable to agree that 
it should be and in effect decided that the letter should be made a part 
of the record and that it should be made a [2971] part of the 
record without deletion and that the committee accepts the responsi- 
bility of whatever consequences may ensue in regard to our relations 
with any other country among our allies for the publication of the 
full letter and its inclusion here in the record. 

I think that it is fair to General Marshall and to counsel and to the 
committee to make that statement and, therefore, it is the viewpoint 
of the committee as a whole that the whole letter should be placed in 
the record at this time and made public. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson, the Senator from Michigan. 

Senator Ferguson. I think the record should also show that I was 
unable to bring my thought to the conclusion that I should attend the 
executive session where there was a witness who wanted to give state- 
ments or testimony to the committee as a committee in executive 
session. Therefore, I am not familiar with the contents of this letter. 

I felt that because of the statements of the Chairman previously on 
the floor and my own stand that all meetings should be piiblic meetings 
and that all evidence should be produced in the public and for that 
reason I am not familiar with the contents of this letter. 

[2972] The Chairman. The Chair might also state 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Illinois. 

The Chair will also state that the Senator from Illinois also took 
the same position and excused himself from the executive session. 



1126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The object of the executive session was to discuss the very question 
involved here because it was thought it could be more freely discussed 
in executive session than here in an open session, as to whether the 
entire letter should go into the record or as to whether there should 
be eliminated the sentence or two to which I have referred and to 
which General Marshall called our attention. 

Now, the Senator from Illinois may amplify that statement in any 
way that he may see fit, 

[2973] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, the position taken by 
the Senator from Michigan is not the same position that the Senator 
from Illinois takes. The Senator from Michigan absented himself 
from the committee meeting and refused to participate in executive 
session and hear General Marshall's statement upon this question. 

The Senator from Illinois also absented himself from the executive 
session. I know nothing about the contents of the letter. The Senator 
from Illinois was not willing for one member of the committee to 
absent himself from the meeting without himself going out with the 
General. 

Mr. Mtjrpht. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Congressman from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, in my opinion it 
was a question whether or not the rules of this committee, or the feel- 
ings of any individual on this committee should come before the 
security of the Nation. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Senator from Maine. 

Senator Brewster. I think in order to complete the record, it ought 
to appear that the members of the committee who remained excused 
General Marshall at the same time that we excused the Senator from 
Michigan, or the Senator from Illinois, so no information of any char- 
acter was received [2974] from General Marshall aside from 
that given in the letter, with the underlining of the passages which he 
previously stated he thought perhaps might be left out. 

The Chairman. That statement is correct. The committee excused 
General Marshall simultaneously with the excusing of the two Sena- 
tors, who had excused themselves. The Chairman might suggest if 
we had excused anybody else we might not have had a quorum present. 

The upshot of the whole thing is the entire letter will be read into 
the record and made public. T might say that the committee accepts 
responsibility for that procedure. 

I might also say it was the viewpoint of the Chairman that notwith- 
standing any possible embarrassment that might accrue between our 
Government and an allied nation over the publication of confidential 
information contained in General Marshall's letter, that in the long 
run, it would be less embarrassing to publish the whole letter than 
to be required later to explain why we left any of it out, and for that 
reason the Chair felt, and now feels that the entire letter should be 
made part of the record, and made public. 

Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark. 

Mr. Clark. I, of course, accept my part of the responsibility to 
which the Chairman has just referred, but I [2975] regret 
exceedingly that some sensible and perfectly simple plan could not 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1127 

have been adopted, as I think it could, to the satisfaction of everybody 
who is reasonable about it, rather than to put us up against exposing 
a matter here that is wholly irrelevant to Pearl Harbor, tliat may 
have consequences that we cannot foresee. 

Under the circumstances, while I accept my part of the responsi- 
bility, I regi-et the circumstances that make it necessary. 

Mr. MxTRPHY. Mr. Chairman, I might add one more sentence. 

While I feel it is the responsibility of this committee at the present 
time, the occasion with which we were confronted this morning, was 
occasioned by two people other than people who are in this room, and 
one of whom will be before this committee later, at which time I wish 
to question him about the circumstances that brought about this morn- 
ing's meeting. 

The Chairman. We will cross that bridge when we reach it. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to make it clear that my only reason this 
morning, as I stated, was not that General Marshall was a witness — 
I have the highest respect for [2976] General Marshall— but it 
is the fact that I was unwilling to take any testimony in executive ses- 
sion, no matter what it was about, or who was the witness. 

I sat on the sofa outside with General Marshall. We were very 
friendly, and we discussed a portion of Pearl Harbor, and things re- 
lating to it. It was not the question that General Marshall was the 
witness, it was merely that all meetings, in my opinion, should be open 
meetings, no matter what is to be discussed with the witness. They 
should be here and be sworn as witnesses. We should get our testi- 
mony from the witnesses in sworn statements, in an open hearing. 

The Chairman. Of course, it is obvious that probably from time 
to time there will have to be executive sessions of the committee to 
determine with respect to testimony brought out in the open hearing. 

The Chair might volunteer this suggestion. In view of this situa- 
tion, it is his opinion that the result would have been the same in this 
particular instance if the entire committee had remained present and 
if General Marshall had been permitted to remain in it too, that the 
result would have been the same as we now face, and therefore the 
Chair is ready to suggest to the counsel that he proceed along the line 
of the committee's suggestion to inquire about [£9771 . this cor- 
respondence that he mentioned. 

Mr. Mitchell. The only thing I have left to say is there are two 
members of the committee now in the position of never having seen 
the letter or the proposed deletions, ancl their judgment has not been 
asked as to whether the deletions should be made or not. 

The Chairman. I think, gentlemen, it is the consensus of opinion, 
and the Chair is going to take that responsibilit}' — if the committee 
decides otherwise, we will abide by the decision, but in view of the dis- 
cussion, it is the view of the Chair that the committee decided these 
letters should be made a part of the record without deletion. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, did you have some correspond- 
ence with the Honorable Thomas E. Dewey in September 1944 ? 

General Marshall. I did, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I understand you wrote him two letters. 

General Marshall. I did, sir, and I have the letters here. 

79716 — 46— pt. 3 11 



1128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you read the two letters, first the one of the 
25th of September, and then the one of the 27th of September ? 

These are complete coj^ies, are they ? 

[2978] General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

On the 25th of September I addressed the following letter to Gov- 
ernor Dewey, who at tliat time was traveling in Oklahoma. 

[2979] Senator Lucas. "Will you read the top two words, Gen- 
eral Marshall? 

General Marshall. "Top Secret. For Mr. Dewey's Eyes Only." 

Mr. IvEEFE. Mr. Chairman, in order that we may understand this 
letter at the beginning, and before General Marshall starts reading, he 
is referring to the fact that he addressed the letter to Governor Dewey 
on the 25th of September, and another on the 27th. 

I would like to have the record show, Mr. Mitchell, at the start as 
to whether or not this letter was sent through the mail or by courier, 
or delivered in some other way? 

Mr. IVIiTCHELL. I will cover all that, Mr. Congressman, as to just how 
the letters were delivered and all the rest. I just want to get the 
letters in first. 

Mr. Keefe. All right, sir. 

]\Ir. Mitchell. We will go right to that. Please read, General, 
the first letter of September 25th ; every word on it. 

General Marshall. The heading at the top of the paper is "Top 
Secret." To the left in capitals "FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES 
ONLY." It is dated the 25 September 1944. 

My Dear Goveknor : 

I am writing you without the knowledge of any [2980] other person 
except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma 
in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor. 

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel com- 
pelled to ask you whether to accept it on the basis of your not communicating its 
contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any further 
and returning the letter to the bearer. 

I should have preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method 
that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff 
of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. 
Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, to be delivered by hand to 
you by Colonel Carter Clarke who has charge of the most secret documents of the 
War and Navy Departments. 

In brief, the military dilemma resulting from Congressional political battles of 
the presidential campaign is this : 

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of 
the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our [2981] 
cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were 
using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding 
machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we pos- 
sessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in 
turn was furnished the State Department — rather than as is jwpularly supposed, 
the State Department providing us with the information — but which unfor- 
tunately made no reference whatever to intentions towards Hawaii until the 
last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the follow- 
ing day, December Sth. 

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this 
business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as 
well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's inten- 
tions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin report- 
ing his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. 
These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events. 

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped 
out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1129 

[2982] battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and there- 
fore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were 
able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway 
when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of 
place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and 
also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed 
troops on Attu and Kiska. 

Operations in the Pacitic are largely guided by the information we obtain of 
Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations 
and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, 
we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy 
losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our sub- 
marine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and 
routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper 
points. 

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping 
in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known move- 
ments of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his 
destructive attacks. 

[2983] You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic conse- 
quences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the 
enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vftal sources of information we now 
possess. 

The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all ref- 
erence to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared 
incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important 
today because our sources have been greatly elaborated. 

As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people 
(the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy 
offices" in Portugal. As a result the entire military attach^ Japanese code all 
over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have 
not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source 
of information, particularly regarding the European situation. 

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest 
to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and 
the American public would probably not draw any such [298^ ] conclusion. 

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the 
Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly 
obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory 
and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current 
operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war. 

I am presenting this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope 
that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are 
now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent 
action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before 
certain dates has compelled me to bring back the Corps commander, General 
Gerow. whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are 
counter-attacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter com- 
pared to the loss of our code information. 

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my secret file subject to 
your reference should you so desire. 
Faithfully yours, 

(Sgd.) G. C. Makshaix. 

[£985] The second letter is dated the 27th of September, 1944, 
and is headed "Top Secret", and "FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES 
ONLY". 

My Dear Govebnok: Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you of yesterday, Sep- 
tember 26th, has reported the result of his delivery of my letter dated September 
25th. As I understand him you (a) were unwilling to commit yourself to any 
agreement regarding "not communicating its contents to any other person" in 
view of the fact that you felt you already knew certain of the things probably 
referred to in the letter, as suggested to you by seeing the word "cryptograph" 
and (b) you could not feel that such a letter as this to a presidential candidate 
could have been addressed to you by an officer in my position without the knowl- 
edge of the President. 



1130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

As to (a) above I am quite willing to have you read vv^hat comes hereafter 
with the understanding that you are bound not to communicate to any other 
person any portions on which you do not now liave or later receive factual knowl- 
edge from some other source than myself. As to (b) above you have my word 
that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intimation whatso- 
ever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or 
sending of such a [2986] communication was being considered. I assure 
you that the only persons who saw or know of the existence of either this letter 
or my letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key officers 
responsible for security of military communications, and my secretary who typed 
these letters. I am trying my best to make plain to you that this letter is being 
addressed to you solely on my initiative. Admiral King having been consulted 
only after the letter was drafted, and I am persisting in the matter because the 
military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary to 
protect the interests of our armed forces. 

I should have much preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise 
a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the 
Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this par- 
ticular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, with 
which Admiral King concurs, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Clarke, 
who, incidentally, has charge of the most secret documents of the War and 
Navy Departments. 

Mr. Chairman, the remainder of the letter is a repetition of what 
J read in the first letter. Do you want me to read it ? 

[2987] The Chairman. No. I suppose it will be published in 
full as it is without the necessity of reading it. It is exactly the same ? 

General Marshall. It is exactly the same. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will have it copied straight through in the trans- 
cript. 

The Chairman. These two letters will be printed in full as they 
appear in the transcript at this point. 

(The letters referred to follow.) 

[2987A] 

[Copy] 

TOP SECKET 

For Mr. Dewey's eyes only. 

25 September 19Pf 

jMy dhi\r go\'eknor : I am writing you without the knowledge of any other person 
except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma 
in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor. 

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel 
compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not communicating 
its contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any 
further and returning the letter to the bearer. 

I should have preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a 
method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the 
Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this par- 
ticular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, to be de- 
livered by hand to you by Colonel Carter Clarke who has charge of the most 
secret documents of the War and Navy Departments. 

In brief, the military dilemma resulting from Congressional political battles 
of the presidential campaign is this : 

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts 
of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our crypto- 
graph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for 
encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was 
built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possess a wealth of 
information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished 
the State Department — rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Depart- 
ment providing us with the information — but which unfortunately made no refer- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1131 

ence whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before December 
7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th. 

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this 
business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes. German as 
well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions 
in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's message from Berlin reporting his 
interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are 
still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events. 

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out 
almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle 
of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships 
were in the right place [2{)S7B] at the right time. Further, we were able 
to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when 
otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. 
We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also 
of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops 
on Attu and Kiska. 

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of 
Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various gan-isons, the rations 
and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, 
we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy 
losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine 
action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of 
their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points. 

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in 
Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements 
of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive 
attacks. 

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the 
present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German 
or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess. 

The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all refer- 
ence to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared 
incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important 
today because our sources have been greatly elaborated. 

As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people 
(the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy 
offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all 
over the world was changed, and thoiigh this occurred over a year ago, we have 
not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source 
of information, particularly regarding the European situation. 

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest 
to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and 
the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion. 

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the 
Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly 
obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute [2987C] greatly 
to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the 
conduct of current operations and in looking toward the early termination of 
the war. 

I am representing this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope 
that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are 
now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent 
action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before 
certain dates has compelled me to bring back the Corps commander. General 
Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are 
counterattacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter com- 
pared to the loss of our code information. 

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my secret file subject to 
your reference should you so desire. 

Faithfully yours, 

(Sgd) G. C. Makshaix. 



1132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Copy] 

[2987 D] Top Secbet 

For Mr. Dewey's eyes only. 

27 September 19U. 

My Dear Govebnok : Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you of yesterday, Sep- 
tember 26th, has reported the result of his delivery of my letter dated September 
25th. As I understand him you (a) were unwilling to commit yourself to any 
agreement regarding "not communicating its contents to any other person" in 
view of the fact that you felt you already knew certain of the things probably 
referred to in the letter, as suggested to you by seeing the word "cryptograph," 
and (b) you could not feel that such a letter as this to a presidential candidate 
could have been addressed to you by an officer in my position without the 
knowledge of the President. 

As to (a) above I am quite willing to have you read what comes hereafter 
with the understanding that you are bound not to communicate to any other 
person any portions on which you do not now have or later receive factual 
knowledge from some other source than myself. As to (b) above you have my 
word that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intimation 
whatsoever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation 
or sending of such a communication was being considered. I assure you that 
the only persons who saw or know of the existence of either this letter or my 
letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key officers re- 
sponsible for security of military communications, and my secretary who typed 
these letters. I am trying my best to make plain to you that this letter is being 
addressed to you solely on my initiative. Admiral King having been consulted 
only after the letter was drafted, and I am persisting in the matter* because 
the military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary 
to protect the interests of our armed forces. 

I should have much preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise 
a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the 
Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this par- 
ticular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, with 
which Admiral King concurs, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Clarke, 
who, incidentally, has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy 
Departments. 

In brief, the military dilemma is this : 

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts 
of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our crypto- 
graph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for 
encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine 
was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a 
wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turned was 
furnished the State Department — rather than as Is popularly supposed, the State 
[2987E'\ Department providing us with the information — but which unfortu- 
nately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last 
message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following 
day, December 8th. 

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this 
business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well 
as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in 
Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his 
interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These 
are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events. 

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped 
out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the 
battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few 
ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to con- 
centrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when other- 
wise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We 
had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of 
the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on 
Attu and Kiska. 

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of 
Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations 
and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast ifflportance. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1133 

we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy 
losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine 
action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of 
their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points. 

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in 
Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements 
of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive 
attacks. 

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if 
the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, 
German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we possess. 

The Roberts' report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all 
reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily 
appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even 
more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated. 

[2987F] As another example of the delicacy of the situation, some of 
Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the 
Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache 
Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a 
year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost 
this invaluable source of infonnation, particularly regarding the European 
situation. 

A further most serious embarrassment is the fact that the British government 
is involved concerning its most secret sources of information, regarding which 
only the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and a very limited number of other 
officials have knowledge. 

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest 
to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and 
the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion. 

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the 
Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly 
obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory 
and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of curent 
operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war. 

I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way 
clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present 
political campaign. 

Please return this letter by bearei*. I will hold it in my most secret file 
subject to your reference should you so desire. 
Faithfully yours, 

(Sgd) G. C. Maeshaix. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, what means did you take in pre- 
senting your first letter of September 25 to Governor Dewey? 

General Marshall. It was sent by the hand of Colonel Clarke who 
flew out to some point in Oklahoma and he boarded Governor Dewey's 
train at some point in Oklahoma and saw Governor Dewey personally. 

Mr. Mitchell. Wlien Colonel Clarke came back did he bring back 
with him your letter of September 25 ? 

General Marshall. He brought back the letter with the statement 
that Governor Dewey felt he could not accept the proviso of the first 
paragraph, which I will read again in order to make it clear : 

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel 
compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not communi- 
[2988] eating its contents to any other person and returning this letter or 
not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer. 

[2989] Mr. Mitchell. Did Colonel Clarke report that Mr. 
Dewey had stopped there and read no other part of the letter? 

General IVIarshall. He read no further, according to Colonel 
Clarke. 

Senator Brewster. I wonder if you are clear that the letter of the 
27th, the remainder, is the same. It seems to me there is a paragraph 



1134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

missing between the reference to Mr, Donovan, and the reference to 
Mr. Harness on the third page. That paragraph is left out. 

Mr. Murphy. It is shifted over on the other page. It is in a dif- 
ferent place in the second letter. 

The Vice Chairman. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that General Mar- 
shall read the rest of the letter. 

The Chairman. If there is any question about it, suppose you begin 
where you left off in the second letter, and read the rest of it. 

Mr. Keefe. It is all in there, only it is on the third page. 

The Chairman. The Chair thinks it is in there, but it is in a different 
place in the second letter. 

General Marshall. I will continue reading. 

Senator Brewster. I think it is important in connection with any 
copies that have been given out that we be clear [2990] for 
the information of everybody as to whether or not the paragraph 
which appears in the second letter appears in the first. I don't see 
where it is in the first. 

Mr. Mitchell. What paragraph do you refer to. Senator ? 

Senator Brewster. With reference to the British — "a further most 
serious embarrassment." 

Senator Lucas. The second paragraph on page 3 of the September 
27 letter. 

Mr. Mitchell. Go ahead, General, and read the letter of the 27th 
completely so there won't be any mistake about it. 

General Marshall. Shall I go back to the beginning? 

Mr. Mitchell. How far did you read? 

General Marshall. I read to the words "in brief, the military 
dilemma is this." 

Mr. Mitchell, Continue then with the letter of the 27th commenc- 
ing with the words "in brief, the military dilemma is this." 

General Marshall (reading) : 

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our inter- 
cepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our 
cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese [2991] 
were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a correspond- 
ing machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we 
possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in 
turn was furnished the State Department — rather than as is popularly supposed, 
the State Department providing us with the information — but which unfortu- 
nately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last 
message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following 
day, December 8th. 

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this 
business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well 
as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions 
in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his 
interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These 
are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events. 

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out 
almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle 
of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships 
were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate 
our limited forces to meet their [2992] naval advance on Midway when 
otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. 
We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also 
of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops 
on Attn and Kiska. 

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the infiormation we obtain 
of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1135 

rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast 
importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. 
The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our 
submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates 
and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the 
proper points. 

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping 
in Manila Bay and elsewhere were larj^ely based in timing on the known move- 
ments of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his 
destructive attacks. 

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the 
present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German 
or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we possess. 

[2993] The Roberts' report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from 
it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily 
appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more 
important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated. 

As another example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people 
(the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy 
ofl5ces in Portugal. As a result the entire military attach^ Japanese code all over 
the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not 
yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source 
of information, particularly regarding the European situation. 

A further most serious embarrassment is the fact that the British government 
is involved concerning its most secret sources of information, regarding which 
only the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and a very limited number of other 
oflBcials have knowledge. 

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest 
to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and 
the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion. 

[299 Jf] The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations 
In the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we 
secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the 
victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct 
of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war. 

I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way clear 
to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present 
political campaign. 

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my most secret file subject 
to your reference should you so desire. 
Faithfully yours, 

(Sgd.) G. C. Marshau.. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, I think I asked you if Colonel Clarke brought 
the earlier letter of September 26' back to you. 

General Marshall. He did. I discussed the matter with him, Gov- 
ernor Dewey's comments, and also with General Bissell, head of the 
Army Intelligence. I came to the conclusion that the matter was so 
important that we must make it a matter of record,* and T sent Colonel 
Clarke — incidentally, in civilian clothes — to Albany. He there secured 
[£995] an audience with Governor Dewey, and he telephoned me, 
as I recall, from Governor Dewey's office that the Governor was unwill- 
ing to read the letter until he had at least one adviser similarly aware 
of the circumstances I was bringing to his, the Governor's, attention, 
and also that he felt he must keep the letter in his file, because he did 
not know what might happen to me, and he would have no record 
whatsoever of the occurrence. 

Governor Dewey, as I recall, then came on the phone, I having told 
Colonel Clarke that I was ready to make those agreements. The 

^ See General Marshall's correction of this sentence, p. 1165, infra. 



1136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Governor spoke to me personally about a Mr. Bell, who was, I think, 
the State Bank Examiner 

Mr. Mitchell. Superintendent of Banks. 

General Marshall. Something of that sort, who was thoroughly 
to be trusted, and he, the Governor would see that it was locked up 
in his most secret file case, whatever that might be. 

He also said that he must keep the letters to have with his records. 

I then agreed to that, and on that basis the letter was left in his 
hands. There was no discussion between us as to what his decision 
might be. As a matter of fact, I do not think he read the letter be- 
3'ond the first paragraph at the time of this conversation. 

[2996] Colonel Clarke returned to Washington and reported 
to me that the Governor had read the letter, had discussed it with Mr. 
Bell in the presence of Colonel Clarke,^ and I do not recall that he 
gave us any assurances. All I know is that there seemed to be no 
further reference to the matter in the campaign. 

Do you wish me to go on ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Go ahead. General. 

General Marshall. Do you wish me to go into any further con- 
versations with Governor Dewey? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

General Marshall. After the election and the defeat of Governor 
Dewey, I thought it was due him that he should know more the basis 
of this letter, so I had General Bissell proceed to Albany, gain an 
audience with the Governor, and General Bissell took with him a 
number of copies of magic showing at that time the movements of 
the various Japanese convoys, and of the Japanese naval craft on 
which we were basing our operations, so that the Governor could 
gather some idea of just how important the matter was. As far as 
1 know, he was greatly interested. It was more or less in appreciation 
of the action he had apparently taken. 

[2997] I saw Governor Dewey for the first time in connection 
with this incident at the funeral, I think, of Mr. Roosevelt. At the 
end of the funera? services we were thrown together there and I asked 
him to come to the War Department M'ith me. He did and we showed 
him the situation out in the Pacific. Showed him also the current 
magic, giving the Japanese movements at that time, and made as plain 
as we could to him just what the importance of these matters were. 

His attitude was very friendly and very gracious. 

At a later time — no, I am wrong. 

When General Bissell returned from Albany, having gone up in 
effect to see Governor Dewey and to show him these copies of magic 
as to the current operations in the Pacific, the Governor told him and 
he. General Bissell, told me orally on his return that he, the Governor, 
understood there was going to be a further discussion in the near 
future in the Congress regarding Pearl Harbor and he. Governor 
Dewey, inquired of General Bissell to me as to whether I desired him 
to intervene to the extent that he might be able to suppress such 
debates. 

General Bissell was telling me this on his return to Washington. 
He suggested that I telephone Governor Dewey but I thought it was 

1 See p. 1165, infra, for General MarshaU's correction of this sentence. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1137 

better that General Bissell should have the conversation, and I told 
him what to say. He called up. [^.955J This is all hearsay. 

Mr. Mitchell. Tell us what you told him to say. 

General Marshall. I told him to tell Governor Dewey that I had 
already embarrassed him with requests which had affected his personal 
actions and that I would not make any further request of him. I told 
General Bissell that Governor Dewey would probably say that didn't 
matter, that he would be interested in the conduct of the campaign, 
the successful conclusion of the war, and if he said that to again repeat 
that I had anticipated that response and that I still had no request to 
make of him. 

That is exactly the way it took place. General Bissell told him 
what I had said. He replied that that was not the point, it wasn't a 
question of personal embarrassment, it was a question of the progress 
of the war. 

General Bissell told him that I had anticipated some such reply 
and I still had no request to make. 

And I will add that, so far as I know, certainly not in the immediate 
future after that, there was no debate on the question in Congress. 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice in these letters there is a reference to the 
fact that at some time prior to September 1944 as a result of the OSS 
getting into the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal, the military 
attache Japanese codes [2999^ all over the world were 
changed. Was that just one of the Japanese codes? 

General Marshall. That was one of their codes, which we had 
broken down. 

Mr. Mitchell. You continued to decode up to the time this letter 
to Mr. Dewey was written, the diplomatic codes that we have had 
here in evidence? 

General Marshall. We continued right through that time, and, 
I might add, it played a very important part, the decoding of these 
messages, deciphering of these messages, played a very important 
part after the termination of the Japanese struggle in connection 
with our movement of troops info Japan and particularly into Korea, 
because we had the communications of the Japanese officers and we 
knew whether we had to go in with a regiment or an Army corps. 

We went into Korea with — that was General MacArthur's action 
but I think this is approximately correct, on September 3 with, I 
believe — only a regiment, when the original plan was September 23 
with a whole Army corps, because we had the communications of the 
Japanese commander in Korea appealing to his own government to 
expedite the movement of the American troops into Korea, which 
meant to us we need not anticipate any violent reaction from the Jap- 
anese. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was about what date in 1945 ? 

[3000} General Marshall. That was after VJ-day. That was 
some days in August and possibly early September. 

Mr. Mitchell. With the exception of this change 

General Marshall. Also I might add that in the final phase of the 
war we obtained information regarding the campaign in Manchuria 
which was helpful to the occupation of the Allied troops. 



1138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. With the exception of this military attache code 
which you lost the ability to decode, prior to 1944 had you, since Pearl 
Harbor, lost the ability to crack these other Japanese codes i 

General Marshall. They lost some of them from time to time due 
to the regular changes. Then it would take a while to bring it down 
to date. But on that attache code the whole code went out. Almost 
all codes have frequent changes, some daily. 

Mr. Mitchell. There is a sentence in your letter of tlie 27th of 
September, at the bottom of page 1, which reads : 

Therefore we possessed a wealth of information regarding tlieir moves in the 
Pacific which in turn was furnished the State Department — rather than as 
popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information — 
but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii 
until [dOUl] the last message before December 7th which did not reach 
our hands until the following day, December 8th. 

Now, I would like for you to look in the intercept book, Mr. Haima- 
ford, and find the messages you marked, and 

General Marshall. I can tell you the character. The only mes- 
sage I had in mind was where they were talking abotit lights in the 
windows. That was the first one that came to my attention regarding 
the Pearl Harbor affair. 

Mr. Mitchell. That pointed at Pearl Harbor? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. Of course, at this time there had not 
been the exhaustive search of all of these various records. 

(A document was handed to General Marshall by Mr. Hannaford.) 

General Marshall. It is a lengthy message from Honolulu to Tokyo. 

3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo. 

The Vice Chairman. What is the page in the book? 

General Marshall. Page 22. 

Mr. Mitchell. That message we are showing you, about the lights 
in the windows, appears not to have been translated until December 
11, and your letter refers to a message that didn't come into your 
hands until the 8th. 

General Marshall. Mr. Chairman, the point was, I didn't [S002] 
^o back and check on these dates and translations, but was speaking 
from memory three or four years afterwards in dictating this letter to 
Mr. Dewey. It may have been that it didn't get to me until the 11th. 
I was not looking at any record. I was talking three years later. But 
it was a message that came to my attention after the event and this was 
the one I was talking about. 

Mr. Mitchell. At page 27 of the book you are looking at there ia 
a message that was sent from Honolulu to Tokyo, December 6, and was 
translated December 8. That is the message which says : 

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take 
advantage for a surprise attack against these places. 

Genei-al Marshall. The one I am referring to is this lengthy one. 

Mr. Mitchell. You don't identify the one I have read? 

General Marshall. I don't have a recollection of that. I have a 
definite recollection of this elaborate message here on page 22 though 
I didn't read it at the time, I didn't have it available, I have never seen 
it from that day until now. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. In your letter of the 27th you refer to the last mes- 
sage before December 7 "which did not reach our [3003] hands 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1139 

until the following day, December 8." As I understand it you were 
not referring to this 14-part and 1 p. m. message ? 

General Marshall. No, sir 5 I am referrmg to this message, as 
nearly as my recollection permits, and am quite clear this was the one, 
beginning at page 22, dated the 3d of December, 1941, from Honolulu 
to Tokyo; and I repeat I have never seen the message from the time 
I looked at it until today and I was dictating a letter offhand in a very 
few minutes to Governor Dewey. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. Will you tell the committee what occasioned your 
writing Mr. Dewey at all ? 

General ]\Iarshall. It was reported to me by the Chief of Army 
Intelligence that these various comments were being made on the floor 
of Congress referring to Pearl Harbor, and the comments being made 
at frequent intervals in the campaign speeches of the various members 
of the parties were leading inevitably to the conclusion, the Chief of 
Army Intelligence, General Bissell thought, that other Governments 
would decide that we had a method of breaking their code, and the 
matter was growing more pointed as the campaign was becoming 
more violent, and some action ought to be taken in a hurry or we were 
going to lose our tremendous source of information in the Far East. 

[SOO4] The recommendation made to me by General Bissell — 
and you can call him as a witness — was to go to the President for some 
assistance in the matter. I didn't think that would do. I thought it 
over overnight. The next morning I dictated this letter of September 
25 and sent for General Bissell, read the letter to him, and asked him 
his view on this procedure. He thought that was all right. 

I then sent him, as I recall, with the letter personally to Admiral 
King to let Admiral King see it and get his reaction. His reaction was 
to concur. Then the discussion was how to get the letter into Gov- 
ernor Dewey's hands without attracting attention to procedure. I 
have described the method we took. 

In explanation of that procedure of addressing the letter to Gov- 
ernor Dewey, I felt, and Admiral King concurred, that it was abso- 
lutely necessary that Governor Dewey feel that no one other than 
ourselves, that is, that the President, the Secretary of War, and other 
officials of the War Department or the Navy Department, had no 
knowledge whatever of this action, and its success would depend en- 
tirely on Governor Dewey feeling that that was the case. 

Therefore, we followed a purely nonpolitical procedure entirely in 
the interest of the conduct of the operation. That is the way, I under- 
stand, Governor Dewey accepted the approach. I never told the Presi- 
dent, I think he died with- [S005] out knowing anything about 
this, I am quite certain he did, and I have no recollection after the 
event of ever telling the Secretary of War. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think I have finished, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. General Marshall, I have two or three questions 
I would like to ask. 

Going back into the spring and summer of 1941, 1 think you stated 
on yesterday that not only j^ou but other officers of the War Depart- 
ment and also officers of the Navy Department, insofar as you felt it 
proper to do so, were urging that everything be done to postpone any 
clash that might result in armed hostilities between the United States 
and Japan? 



1140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. That is the case. 

The Chairman. Were you present during any of the discussions in 
the latter part of 1940 or any part of 1941 with reference to the location 
of the Fleet in the Hawaiian region ? 

General Marshall. I was present at some discussions with refer- 
ence to the fleet changing its base from Long Beach and San Diego to 
Hawaii and with regard to portions of the fleet being drawn into the 
Atlantic. 

[3006] The Chairman. Wliat was the general understanding, 
what was your understanding of the general opinion of those responsi- 
ble in the various branches of the Government, that is, the President, 
the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy, with respect to the 
maintenance of that fleet. Pacific fleet, as it finally came to be called, 
in the region of Hawaii? 

General Marshall. I don't recall, as I said before in my testimony, 
the pros and cons of the argument regarding the fleet at Hawaii. I 
heard it — I am sorry to tell you that I don't remember. I think I 
had a very definite view in the matter. I know I had a very definite 
view in relation to the reinforcement of the naval forces in the Atlan- 
tic, and I am rather foggy about that. 

So much happened after that, and it was a naval issue, that I have 
lost the thread of the discussions. I know that I was intensely inter- 
ested in the development of the fleet train, as it was then called, and 1 
recall specifically taking it up in a liaison meeting in an effort to 
assist Admiral Stark in getting the necessary craft which would have 
to be drawn from commercial use, particularly Latin America, at that 
time. 

I am sorry I can't give you any definite reactions regarding the move- 
ment of the fleet from the west coast out [3007] to Hawaii, or 
regarding the reinforcement of the Atlantic portion of our Navy from 
ships in the Pacific, though I sat in on a good many of the discussions. 

The Chairman. Do you recall what your own view was during the 
progress of the Japanese encroachments from Japan down to the 
south in the direction of Indochina, Thailand, and the Kra Peninsula, 
as to whether that encroachment e-ndangered the security of our in- 
terests in the Philippine Islands, and other regions of the Southwest 
Pacific. 

General Marshall. My view was that it clearly did endanger our 
interests, endanger the security of the Phillipines, if, the Japanese 
moved in force into the south of the Philippines, southern Indochina, 
Borneo, Thailand. 

The Chairman. And your view was, as I understand it, that while 
attempting to postpone any actual clash, while attempting to play for 
time, as we might say, in the relationship between Japan and the 
United States, such efforts might be, would be taken, or should be taken 
as would in some measure convince Japan that it was hazardous for 
her to proceed further south ? 

General Marshall. That was the effort that we were making in 
connection with the reinforcement of the Phillipines, which begin in 
a material way in August 1941 for the [3008] purpose of so 
strengthening the Philippines that the Japanese would think it unsafe 
to proceed further south. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1141 

The Chairman. Did I understand you to say that, taking the 
Panama Canal, the Caribbean area, into consideration, and the Pacific 
Coast of the United States into consideration, and the Hawaiian Is- 
hmds and the Philippine Islands into consideration, in view of the 
limited material we had for distribution to all of those points, that 
Hawaii was better taken care of in the way of materiel than any of 
these other points that I have mentioned ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. At that time, I think, to which you 
referred, virtually nothing had been done about the Philippines, and 
Panama had been about halfway developed up to the standard we 
thought necessary. 

The Chairman. So that you began to make some intensification of 
effort to give General MacArthur in the Philippines something of the 
materiel and supplies which he had been for quite a time requesting ? 
General Marshall. Yes, sir. There were two factors. 
One is, we had reached in the delivery of materiel or troops, or both, 
to Panama and to Hawaii to the degree where we thought they were 
reasonably safe, and, quantity production just coming in, we started 
to build up the Philippine Island defenses. 

[3009] The Chairman. Was it in pursuance of that policy that 
these unarmed airplanes had left the west coast on the 6th of December 
for the Philippines ? Were dispatched ? 

General Marshall. That is correct. That was the first squadron 
reinforcement of 45 flying fortresses, to be added to the 35 which had 
already reached the Philippines in early September. 

The Chairman. They left from some point in California ? 
General Marshall. They left Hamilton Field, right near San 
Francisco. 

The Chairman. Destined for the Philippines, but with a view of 
stopping in Hawaii to refuel. 

General Marshall. Refuel and have the engines gone over and 
give the pilots a rest. 

The Chairman. I presume it is safe to say that it was obvious 
to those planes, inasmuch as they were unarmed, they did not expect 
to run into a war in Hawaii on their way to the Philippines. 

General Marshall. No, sir. That was a natural reaction on their 
part. 

The Chairman. Now, this morning, I believe you said, or yesterday, 
that when General MacArthur's dispatch to you of November 28, which 
was in reply to yours to him of the 27th, and General Short's dispatch 
of the same date were handed to you, you did not recall whether they 
were attached [3010] together by a clip or not, as they now 
appear. 

General Marshall. I don't think I said I did not know whether 
they were attached together, or not. I do not know. All I do know is 
that I initialed the first upper copy, and apparently they came in in 
that form. 

The Chairman. Did I understand you to say you did or did not 
remember whether you saw General Short's reply ? 

General Marshall. I do not remember whether or not I saw General 
Short's reply, but the presumption must be that I did. In any event 
that was my opportunity to intervene which I did not do. 



1142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Now, you sent on the 27th almost identical mes- 
sages to Panama, Hawaii, the Philippines, and the Pacific Coast of 
the United States. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. There was apparently one difference, I think. In 
your message to General MacArthur in the Philippines you did not 
caution him with reference to alarming the civil population, which you 
did include in your message to the Hawaiian Islands. Do you recall 
that? 

General Marshall. There is that difference between the two mes- 
sages. The reason, quite evidently, is that Hawaii had quite a mixed 
population, including 130,000 Japanese, which is quite a different 
situation from that in [3011] the Philippines, and the position 
of vital installations which related to the city proper presented a 
condition in Hawaii considerably different from that in the Philip- 
pines. 

Clark Field is to the north of Manila, and Corregidor at the entrance 
of the bay, 35 miles from Manila. And, may I add, a very definite 
reason in connection with that was to try not to upset the procedure 
that Mr. Hull was following in an effort to stall action in the Pacific. 

The Chairman. In your conversations with the War Department 
and the Navy Departriient, and the President, with reference to obtain- 
ing time, as much time as was possible in order to prepare better before 
there might possibly be any clash of arms between Japan and the 
United States, do you recall what the President's attitude was toward 
that approach to the subject in conversations you had? 

General Marshall. As far as I can recall, it was identical with ours, 
and Mr. Hull's. "Ours" meaning Admiral Stark and myself; the 
Secretary of War, Colonel Knox. 

The Chairman. In your message to these various areas on the 27th 
of November, after calling attention to the fact that the negotiations 
with Japan appeared to be on the verge of termination, to all practical 
purposes, and so forth, you gave them what apparently amounted to 
instructions [30121 with respect to reconnaissance, and the 
taking of all other steps necessary in their judgment to meet an attack 
or to meet the situation as it might develop in view of that situation. 
That instruction, or that directive, was present in all these dispatches 
from you to Panama, Hawaii, the west coast, and the Philippines ? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

The Chairman. Now, you received a reply from General Mac- 
Arthur on the 28th, the next day after you sent it, in which he stated : 

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio 624 air reconnaissance has 
been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy. Ground security 
measures have been taken within the limitations imposed by present state of 
development of this theatre of operations. Everything is in readiness for the 
conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison and cordial relations exist 
between Army and Navy. 

Do you regard that reply of General MacArthur as responsive to 
your message to him of the day before ? 
General Marshall. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1143 

[30JS] The Chairman. On the same day on which you sent these 
various messages, General Miles as Chief of G-2 sent this message to 
Hawaii : 

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may en- 
sue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and 
Chief of Staff only. Signed "Miles". 

You received from General Short on the 28th of November, the day 
following your message, this message : 

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy — there 
is some word there which I do not understand — "four seven two twenty seventh." 

Did you say in your testimony yesterday that you remembered 
whether, you saw that reply from General Short ? 

General IVIarsiiall. I said I could not remember whether or not I 
saw it but the presumption must be that I did see it. 

The Chairman. Well, whether you saw it or not, looking at it now 
as it is and comparing it with your message to him of the day before, 
do you now regard it as having been an adequate response to the in- 
structions that you gave him ? 

General Marshall. In the light of all the events, Senator, it is quite 
evident it was not adequate. 

The Chairman. In view of the fact that General Miles wired him 
tage and in view of the fact that his message to you mentioned only 
on the same day, the 27th, to look out for some [^014] sabo- 
sabotage, would it have been possible for him to have confused Gen- 
eral Miles' message with yours and replied to General Miles but sent 
it to you ? 

General Marshall. I understand that you have the exact records 
here< 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Marshall. Or, rather, I am told that the records show that 
the dispatch of General Short's, his message was dispatched prior to 
the receipt of General Miles' message. I did not know that, of course, 
nor did I know of General Miles' message. 

The Chairman. Then if General Short's reply was sent before he 
received General Miles' dispatch, obviously it could not have been 
intended as a reply to General Miles. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. That would be a matter of record, I 
presume. The point here, I think. Senator, is this : that the fact that 
General Miles sent that message — because it was not known to me I 
presume it may have been known in the Operations Section, I do not 
know, but the G-2 was charged with the dissemination of information. 

The Chairman. The Operations Section, that was the section that 
was originally called the War Plans? 

General Marshall. War Plans. 

[S015] The Chairman. War Plans Division. 

General Marshall. War Plans Division. I am sorry. I misnamed 
it before. The War Plans Division. 

The Chairman. That was the section or division of which General 
Gerow was the head ? 



79716 — 46— pt. 3 12 



1144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall, He was the head. Whether or not he saw that 
I do not know, but, you see, G-2 was charged with the dissemination 
of information but not permitted to issue directives, and that was a 
report on the dissemination. 

The Chairman. Was there any rule existing in the General Staff 
or in the War Department that required messages received in reply 
to messages like that which you sent on the 27th should be called to 
your personal attention ? 

General Marshall. No specific rule. I was supposed to be given 
the opportunity to see the important messages. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Marshall. I do not know just what the situation was at 
that time but at least since they sometimes came in a thousand or more 
a day and the important ones are brought to my attention; and, of 
course, specifically anyone that would be as important as this, because 
the directive went out over my name, presumably from my office. 

The Chairman. Well, was there anything in General Short's reply 
referring to sabotage, being seen by an officer [3016] in the 
Operations or in the G-2 division, would have identified it as a reply 
to your message to him which did not mention sabotage but which did 
specifically mention reconnaissance and "all other measures that you 
deem necessary to be taken under the circumstances?" 

General Marshall. I do not know quite whether I understand your 
question, but in the message there from General Short I think is a 
word that you said you do not understand, "REURAD", "referring to 
your radio", which gave the number and which identified the message 
that was sent to him. 

The Chairisian. And that answer gave the number of the message? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

The Chairman. From the reply it would seem that was a reply to 
your message? 

General Marshall. Yes. That says directly that is what it is. 

The Chairman. Yes. Now, let me ask you this further question 
in regard to j'^our view in reference to the facilities, men and equip- 
ment in the Hawaiian Islands with respect to the aljility of those in 
charge of that operation, charged with the responsibility to have met 
the attack or have retarded it or have minimized its effects, if what 
Mas there in men and material had been reasonably alert and reason- 
ably [3017] active and reasonably ready to meet any such 
possible attack, what was your conclusion about that — not that every 
gun had to be in its place and every man had to be in his cockpit, but 
if under ordinary circumstances, in view of the information which 
had been sent to them and particularly on the 27th, and the general 
attitude of alertness that it seems had been invoked, what was your 
conclusion, that they could have retarded or minimized the effect of 
the attack or they could have defeated it altogether? I would like to 
get you to draw the distinction on it. 

General Marshall. My conclusion is, and I might say was, that 
the utilization of all the means at hand, means and men, and the 
deployment of the materiel and the ships, and so forth, to the best 
advantage under the terms of the alert, that the attack could have 
been seriously interfered with, its damaging effect greatly limited; 
and I do not know whether the carriers could have been brought into 



1 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1145 

a position to operate or not, I am unfamiliar with that, but they were 
great potentials out in that region at that time. 

The Chairman. The testimony of Admiral Inglis and Colonel 
Thielen shows, I think, that on the 6th day of December there was 
no reconnaissance whatever in Pearl Harbor or on the Island of Oahu. 
There was on that day some type of reconnaissance from the carrier 
Enterprise which was some two [^3018^ hundred miles west 
of Oahu. 

Have you received any information, or have you any information 
that would offer an explanation as to why there was no reconnaissance 
of any kind on the 6tn day of December, the day before this attack ? 

General Marshall. No, I have not. Senator, and I should explain 
that I haven't discussed this with anyone. I haven't discussed it with 
General Short or Admiral Kimmel. I haven't discussed it with my 
own people. I might say that I haven't discussed it with General 
Gerow. I haven't seen General Gerow since October 1944. The event 
occurred and my interest and my obligation brought me to the activi- 
ties necessary to meet the situation which developed and which con- 
tinued on, of course, as you know from one serious state to another. 

I would also add that in my own mind I never could grasp what 
had happened between the period when so much was said about air 
attack, the necessity for anti-aircraft, the necessity for planes, for 
reconnaissance, the necessity for attack planes for defense and the 
other requirements which anticipated very definitely and affirmatively 
an air attack, I could never understand why suddenly it became ap- 
parently a side issue. I do not know just what the reason was. I have 
never inquired of the individuals concerning it. 

The CHAiRMAisr. Following your directive, or order, or in- 
\301.9'] structions of the 27th of November, did you receive any 
further information that seemed to you to make it necessary to re- 
iterate those warnings 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I did not. 

The Chairman (continuing) : Until you received the message on 
the 7th with reference to the 14-part dispatch and the 1 o'clock dis- 
patch ? 

General Marshall. After I saw the alert message of November 27, 
which was brought to my attention on the morning of November 28, 
I recall nothing coming in from the Hawaiian Department or any 
other matter which required an additional dispatch. 

It is very important that you do not confuse a command direction. 
Better completely cancel it and issue a new one, because the amend- 
ments are dangerous things in relation to military operations. Once 
die commander is alerted, the question then was when did you reduce 
the alert. Of course, the G-2 functions of the War Department as 
well as out in the commands were to furnish material as it developed, 
but the command direction stood unless you dared to amend it, or 
what would be a better procedure, completely cancel it and issue a 
new directive. 

The Chairman. Reference has been made all through this ex- 
amination to Rainbow Nos. 1, 2, 3. 4, and 5. 

[SOW] General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Rainbow No. 5 seeming to be the ultimate plan. 
Did that mean that Rainbow No. 1 was cancelled or modified or 



1146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

completely changed when a new Rainbow plan was promulgated, or 
was it a modification or change? 

General Marshall. Senator, I will not try to answer that without 
actually looking at the papers and I would have to get the records 
of the War Plans Division. The presumption would be absolute that 
if a new plan was issued the other is cancelled by a certain date. 

The Chairman. Well, probably General Gerow can explain that 
in greater detail. 

General Marshall. He can tell you that direct. 

The Chairman. I think that is all. Congressman Cooper? 

The Vice Chairman. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire 
briefly. 

When, did you state. General, you were appointed Chief of Staff ? 

General Marshall. I was appointed Acting Chief of Staff on July 
1, 1939, and on the formal occurrence of the vacancy in the position 
of Chief of Staff by the retirement of General Craig on the 1st of 
September 1939 I then was nominated and confirmed as Chief of 
Staff. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you had been Assistant Chief 
[S021] of Staff while General Craig was Chief of Staff, had you? 

General Marshall. I came to Washington on the 6th of July 1938 
and became the head of the War Plans Division. In October 1938, I 
think about the middle of the month, I became Deputy Chief of Staff; 
therefore, the immediate assistant to General Craig. 

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to state something the 
other day about General Craig taking the position that the inter- 
ception of these Japanese messages was illegal. Is that correct? 

General Marshall. That was his view of the matter. 

The Vice Chairman. That was his view of the matter? 

General Marshall. He considered that that was forbidden by the 
terms of the Federal Communications Act. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. But the practice continued right on 
of intercepting all the Japanese messages that could be intercepted? 

General Marshall. With such secrecy as could be enforced. 

The Vice Chairman. Sir ? 

General Marshall. With such secrecy as could be enforced. 

The Vice Chairman. My interest was challenged, General, while 
General Miles was before us with respect to these intercepted mes- 
sages, especially with respect to the period of time that elapsed be- 
tween the time the messages were sent — and [S022~\ of course, 
I assume they were intercepted at the time they were sent — and the 
time they were decoded and translated. 

Had that attracted your attention at any time ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall that that attracted my specific 
attention because I was aware of the fact that they were short-handed 
and it was very difficult to obtain people that we could trust and that 
had the necessary qualities. 

I looked up several days ago what the status of that was and, as I 
recall, on December 7, 1941, there were some 44 officers and about 180 
men, women, civilians and soldiers, in Washington in the Army en- 
gaged in this work and some 150 out in the field at what they call the 
monitoring stations, that is, merely intercepting the material. 

Now, I compared that to see what the change was with the situation 
at the end of the war and there were in Washington some 666 officers 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1147 

and a total of 10,000 individuals here in Washington at this work. The 
British had 30,000. The Navy of ours here I think had 6,000. 

Now, that had to be built up, of course. You had to have the right 
people, with the qualifications; you had to have them all examined 
by the FBI. It was a very slow procedure ; and, of course, also at that 
time we had a shortage of personnel in all of our activities, and I recall 
at an earlier [30^3] date they had a small group down at Fort 
Washington — I think, which is near Mount Vernon just on that side 
of the river, at least I think that is where it was ; if it was not there it 
was across the river — and some 26 men, I believe; and one man was 
picked up or checked up endeavoring to sell this information up in 
Boston, I think, and we had the FBI nab him. 

It was very difficult to get trustworthy "personnel at that particular 
time in the state of general disregard of security matters and of inter- 
est and of an appreciation of the importance of what was going on in 
the United States with relation to the possibility of war. So I thought, 
if I might add, I thought that what they were doing was very unusual 
that they were able to turn out the critical messages in the manner 
that they did. 

Now, there was always a backlog of messages which did take a long 
time to reduce. There was always the hazard — I presume that General 
Miles is the best witness — of some particular message being overlooked. 
There was always, as far as I was concerned, the possibility that the 
messages that might seem to me with very sober consideration as most 
important for me to see, that I might not see them all and there was 
always the possibility that in going through this mass of information, 
of which this was only incidental to my desk every day, that I might 
not absorb the true significance [3024] of each matter. 

The Vice Chairman. I just noticed, while General Miles was before 
us here, that, as shown in exhibit 2, messages received from November 
28, that were translated after December 7, 1941, the time varies all the 
way from 2 days to about 28 days, do they ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I saw that record. 

The Vice Chairman. And you say that during that time we had a 
hundred and some odd people engaged in this work? 

General Marshall. We had, I recall rather accurately, we had 44 
officers here in Washington at work at it and I think some 180 soldiers 
and civilians, but the exact numbers can be easily obtained for you by 
General Miles or others. 

The Vice Chairman. And later you say that number 

General Marshall. Increased to 10,000 on the Army side. 

The Vice Chairman. 10,000. And the British had 30,000? 

General Marshall. Yes, and our Navy I think — I am not the witness 
for them — had about 6,000. The growth of that was comparable to the 
growth of the Army. It was changing every month. 

The Vice Chair^ian. Well, I was just wondering at the time I 
examined those how this information could be very valuable to you, 
with the great responsibility that you had resting on you, if it came 
to you a week or two weeks or [SO^S] three weeks after the 
message was intercepted. 

General Marshall. Well, that is natural, sir, but I was rather im- 
pressed with the fact that under the conditions under which they were 
then operating, which were pretty much unavoidable, they were able 
to pull out the most critical messages almost immediately. 



1148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Then another question if I may, General. 
Were you kept fully advised as to diplomatic developments all through 
the latter part of November and on up to the first part of December? 

General Marshall. I, of course, did not know all of the matters, 
but I would say that I was kept very fully advised ; and so far as Mr. 
Hull personally is concerned, I remember hearing him say with con- 
siderable emphasis in those last day apropos of his discussions with 
the Japariese envoys, "These fellows mean to fight and you will have 
to watch out." 

The Vice Chairman, You heard him say that? 

General JVIarsiiall. I heard liim say that and I have a very distinct 
recollection of it. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, he stated before the committee that he 
considered, to use his words, "Japan was hell bent on conquest and 
aggression." 

Did you entertain that view, that they were determined on conquest 
and aggression? 

[3026] General Marshall. My appreciation of the situation, as 
nearly as I can recall it — I am trying to avoid the back sight things — 
was that they were going to profit in every conceivable way by the 
opportunities presented on the destruction of Russia by the German 
Army and the fact that the German submarines had England by the 
throat, as it were, in the Atlantic, which widely aflfected the absolutely 
necessary reinforcement of England by materiel from the United 
States. 

What I could not quite decide in my own mind, because of the 
peculiar way in which the war had been conducted in the entry into 
Austria and the entry into the Sudeten lands and later Czechoslovakia, 
in the movement into China which would have started a state of war, 
in the occupation of Indochina, in the beginning of the infiltration 
into Thailand, I could not be quite certain in my mind how far they 
were going by that method before breaking out into an overt act. 

I was certain if given the opportunity, that is, security against 
Russian attack at their backs, that they would take as much as they 
could get for nothing and probably would fight for more if their 
position was a favorable one for it, which the occupation of Thailand 
would have been. Once they had their air fields, their gasoline, their 
bombs, and their maintenance established in Thailand, the Malay 
Peninsula, meaning Smgapore, the Kra Isthmus, they were virtually 
at their [3027] mercy because Great Britain had very little 
they could send out there, very little in planes they could possibly 
afford to that theater. They were completely committed to the des- 
perate battle that was going on in the European theater. 

The Vice Chairman. Then did you consider war with Japan as 
inevitable ? 

General Marshall. It appeared to me that it would be inevitable 
if the Russian Army fell, if the Russian Army fell and my own con- 
clusion before the end of the war, 2 years before the end of the war, 
w^as that the Japanese thought that Russia was going to be destroyed 
in December of 1941 with the capture of Moscow and they became 
committed in the Pacific thinking they were safe from any Russian 
involvement later in Manchuria. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, about when did you reach the conclusion 
then that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable? 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1149 

General Marshall. Well, that absolute conclusion would hinge 
somewhat on what happened to Russia, and Japan launched its overt 
act against us before the decision of the moment in the Russian 
campaign. 

The anticipation was, if you go back, that Hitler's forces would 
attack Moscow before the middle of December, that was the announce- 
ment at that time. Instead of that they [3028] collapsed due 
to a terrific cold spell and there began the turning of the struggle in 
Russia which meant that the Japanese need not expect with a cer- 
tainty that they would not eventually have a strong Russia at their 
back door, but they had committed themselves to the war, I think, on 
the assumption that the collapse of Russia was going to take place in 
the next 2 weeks. It did not take place. Had they not attacked on 
December 7, had they waited, for example, until January 1, there is 
a possibility that they would not have launched the attack, I do not 
know, because it appeared quite a definite possibility that Russia jnight 
get to her feet, which she did. 

I hope I haven't confused you. 

The Vice Chairman. No, that is all right, I am glad to have that. 

Well, where did you think the first Japanese attack on the United 
States would occur? 

General Marshall. I thought it would occur in the Philippines. 
I thought the first Japanese attack was going to be directly south 
towards Singapore, that that would be the main campaign, and the 
Pliilippines, of course, would become involved in it. Just when they 
would strike and their method of striking with landing forces rather 
than just air, I did not know, but the air strike might occur very early, 
[3029] which it did. 

I assumed that Guam would fall almost immediately and I assumed 
that Wake would fall almost immediately. 

[3030] The Vice Chairman. Did you think the first Japanese 
attack would be at Pearl Harbor ? 

General ^Iarshall. I did not anticipate that. I thought they 
would not hazard that. That, of course, was a raiding attack, to 
strike a crippling blow, which did not involve any landing, or any 
possible landing. 

Their campaign was headed south through the China Sea. It was 
to cover their flank with that stroke. Those same carriers appeared 
quite quickly in the China Sea operations. 

The Vice Chairman. I do not want to detain you too long. General, 
because I know other members of the committee want to ask you ques- 
tions, but I have one or two questions, if I may, about what occurred 
immediately before the attack. 

I understood you to state that you were out of Washington on 
November 27. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I was down in North Carolina. 

The Vice Chairman. Reviewing maneuvers in North Carolina ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I went down on the afternoon of 
the 26th, following a Joint Board meeting on the morning of the 26th. 

The Vice Chairman. And the message about which you have been 
examined here at some length, which was sent over your name on 
November 27 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and 
the other commanders mentioned — that message [3031] of No- 
vember 27, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 



1150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was brought to your attention early the next morning, the 28th, when 
you returned ? 

General Marshall. I saw it about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 
28th. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you consider that message an adequate 
warning to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ? 

General Marshall. I did, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Was there ever any doubt in your mind at 
any time 

General Marshall. There was not. 

The Vice Chairman. That that was adequate warning? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

The Vice CiiAHiMAN. And it was your opinion at that time that 
there were sufficient forces and sufficient material in Hawaii to defend 
that fortress? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I believe General Short, in command of the 
Hawaiian Department at that time, was a lieutenant general, wasn't 
he? 

General Marshall. He was lieutenant general by virtue of that 
appointment. 

The Vice Chairman. Was he one of the senior officers of the United 
States Army? 

[SOS£] General Marshall. Yes, sir; he was one of the two 
corps commanders at that time, who had actually had something re- 
sembling an Army Corps to command, and had had the benefit of 
training and maneuvers with the corps that they commanded. 

The Vice Chairman. Back at that time we did not have many 
officers with the rank of lieutenant general, did we? 

General Marshall. We had none except those who were assigned 
to their territorial Arm}'^ commands, of which there were four in the 
United States, one in Hawaii, and one in the Caribbean. 

As long as they held the post, they held the rank. When they left 
the post, they lost the rank. He proceeded to Hawaii as major general 
and became lieutenant general on his arrival there. 

The Vice Chairman. By reason of the fact that he took command of 
that post ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Several questions have been asked you about 
these messages received on the 28th from General MacArthur and 
General Short. I believe you stated you presumed that you saw 
the message from General Short at the same time that you saw the 
message from General MacArthur. 

General Marshall. Yes, I think that must be presumed. 

{3033'] The Vice Chairman. But your attention was not at- 
tracted by the message from General Short, as to whether it was 
responsive to the message of November 27. 

General Marshall. I said I had no recollection of it. 

The Vice Chairman. I notice in the message of November 27, these 
three words "Report measures taken." 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated, in response to a question 
by the chairman, that certainly in view of subsequent events, you 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1151 

recognized that the message from General Short was not an adequate 
response to the message of November 27. 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. But you do not recall that that was checked 
on any further, or any further messages sent? 

General Marshall. I am quite certain there was no further mes- 
sage sent. I might say here, Mr. Congressman, that the people work- 
ing with him had sent an alert direction which all in the War De- 
partment then and now, I think, thought was a sufficient directive, 
and the comment out there, as lar as we knew, from all our com- 
munications, had been insistent on measures to meet an air attack and 
submarine attack. 

The thought of merely expecting an alert direction for [3034-] 
sabotage was not in anybody's mind at all, which undoubtedly, in 
my opinion, may account for the fact that that word did not register, 
and when they spoke of liaison with the Navy that did register as to 
the assumption that the reconnaissance was on. That is merely a 
conjecture. 

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to state in reply to a ques- 
tion of the chairman that the reply from General Short was not 
considered as a reply to the message from General Miles, G-2 of the 
General Staff of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian 
Department. 

General Marshall. I testified to that purely because that message 
there says ''Re so-and-so," which is the alert message. 

The Vice Chairman. That is true. The message from General 
Short states, "Re your radio 472," and the message of November 27 
bears the number 472. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. So that was regarded as a reply to your 
message ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I believe that is all. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Senator George. 

Senator George. General Marshall, I would like to ask you just 
one or two questions. 

[3035] What proportion of the fleet in the Pacific, the entire 
Pacific area, was concentrated at Pearl Harbor? It is a naval ques- 
tion, I know, but I thought perhaps you would be able to answer it. 

General Marshall. I could not answer that in detail. I happen to 
know that there were no carriers at Pearl Harbor. Two were at sea, 
one of them proceeding towards or in the vicinity of Midway and the 
other one returning to Pearl Harbor, and a third carrier was, I believe, 
at San Diego. Other than that I could not give you the data. 

Senator George. But the main strength of the Pacific Fleet was at 
Pearl Harbor? 

General Marshall. I believe that is correct, sir; but of course I am 
a poor witness on that. 

Senator George. General, reference has been frequently made to a 
message, one of the intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu 
dated September 24, 1941, actually translated, according to the nota- 
tion at the foot of the message, on October 9, 1941, in which specific 



1 152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

inquiry is made about the waters in Pearl Harbor, and the suggestion 
of a rough division of the waters into five subareas, and specific inquiry 
made regarding the fleet. 

Presumably that message might have had for its inspiration a sub- 
marine or other attack other than air, but is it not [3036] rather 
strongly suggestive that an air strike must have been contemplated 
by Japan ? 

General Marshall. In the light of what happened that is quite 
evident, Senator. But I may say as to that, we were getting messages 
making very specific inquiries about naval vessels of ours all over the 
Pacific, and to that extent it dispersed the attention. 

However, it is inescapable, looking at this message and knowing 
what happened, that it must have had a direct relation to the planning 
of the attack. 

Senator George. General Marshall, Secretary Hull in his testimony 
before the conunittee, specifically directed attention to his appearance 
before the War Council on November 25, 1941, which he described as 
consisting of the President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, 
Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, and further described 
it as a sort of clearing house for all the information and views which 
were under current discussion by the State Department and any other 
Departments of the Government. 

I merely wish to inquire if your recollection accords with this state- 
ment of Secretary Hull (reading) : 

At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese 
military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined 
and desperate. They were likely to break [3037] out anywhere at any 
time at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their 
plan. I felt virtually the last stage had been reached, and that the safeguarding 
of our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. 

Does your recollection accord with that statement ? 

General Marshall. I do not remember all those details, sir, but I got 
the general impression from Mr. Hull of his telling me "These fellows 
mean to fight and we should get ready."' 

Senator George. And immediately after that you approved the 
message of November 27, although it was actually sent on the day 
when you arrived from Washington? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; it was discussed on the morning of 
the 26th in the Joint Board by Admiral Stark and myself and the 
Deputy Chief of Staff and his opposite in the Navy, and General 
Gerow and his opposite in the Navy. 

Senator George. General Marshall, of course the Fleet in the 
Pacific, or so much of our Navy as was in the Pacific and based at 
Pearl Harbor in November and December 1941 and sometime prior 
to that was of course a long distance from the southward movement 
of the Japanese forces. Isn't it almost compelling that we must 
have kept constantly in mind that Japan would make an air strike 
at the main naval forces [3038] in the Pacific as long as they 
were sitting out on their flank? 

General Marshall. I would not put it quite that way, sir. They 
certainly would if they thought they had the opportunity. They 
would have to be on their guard against that Fleet. Of course they 
would know presumably the extent to which the Fleet was prepared 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1153 

to go to sea for operations a long way from its base. The Japanese 
would know conclusively we had no means in Manila Bay to shelter 
the Fleet. We had virtuallj^ no antiaircraft at all. There were no 
guns at Cavite. 

The submarines and small groups of ships of the Asiatic Fleet 
could offer not even one gun of antiaircraft fire in the Cavite naval 
region. Therefore the Fleet would have to be based at Hawaii, 
though it might operate a couple of thousand miles west of Hawaii, 
which is a very difficult procedure. 

The Japanese of course would know that. They would know that 
if our Fleet moved out into the far Pacific it would be in a very 
tenuous position where any unfavorable action could result very seri- 
ously because of the distance of the Fleet from its base. 

All of those were considerations in relation to what Japan would 
probably do. Given the opportunity to strike a crippling blow at the 
Fleet, it is useless to say she would [3039] probably do it, 
because she did do it. 

Senator George. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark I believe is absent. 

Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. General Marshall 

The Chairman. Before you begin, Senator, may I ask General 
Marshall, for the benefit of the committee and to determine about its 
sittings a little later today and tomorrow, in an effort to conclude 
with you, what are your plans, as far as you have made them, to leave 
for China? 

General Marshall. All I can do, sir, is have a plane in readiness 
as soon as you release me. 

The Chairman. So your plans are to go forward at once as soon 
as we are completed ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Would it be agreeable for the committee to sit 
a little longer today, in view of General Marshall's situation? Of 
course, we contemplate tomorrow anyway. 

Senator Brewster. What is your question? 

The Chairman. Would it be agreeable for the committee to sit 
a little later than 4 o'clock today to accommodate General Marshall, 
in the hope we might conclude with him tomorrow? 

Senator George. Mr. Chairman, we ought to go on a reason - 
[3040] able length of time. 

Senator Brewster. I suggest 4 : 30. 

The Chairman. Well, we will go at least until 4 : 30. 

Go ahead, Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. General Marshall, I should like again to direct your 
attention to exhibit 32, dealing with the message you sent General 
Short on November 27, 1941. I will ask you if the same message with 
the same identical langage was not sent to the Commanding General 
of the Western Defense Command, San Francisco, Calif? 

General Marshall. The message is not identical. 

Senator Lucas. Will you point out the diflPerence between the two, 
sir? 

General Marshall. As I get it here in reading it, in the latter part 
of the message it states, "A separate message is being sent to G-2, 9th 



1154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Corps Area, re subversive activities in United States. Should hos- 
tilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in RainBow 5." 

That is a repetition of the message to Hawaii. 

Calling attention to the "G-2 of the 9th Corps Area re subversive 
activities" was not included in the message to General Short. 

Senator Lucas. For all alerting purposes, as far as the* commands 
are concerned, they are the same? 

[304.1] General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I think this has already been put 
in the record a time or two, but I should like to have the record show 
at this point General Short's reply and General DeWitt's reply to 
those two respective messages. 

The Chairman. That will be printed in the record again at this 
point. 

(The messages referred to follow:) 

NOVEMBEB 28, 1941. 
Priority 557 AM 

From Fort Shafter TH Secret 

To Chief of Staff 
No. 959 November 27th 

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy 
Reurad four seven two twenty seventh 

Shobt. 



Secret 

Received : November 28, 1941. 11 : 18 PM 
From HQ WDC Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., 
To General George C. Marshall 

November 28th. 
Report following measures taken as per your radio Nov twenty seven : Your 
radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC, Second Air Force, Fourth 
[3042] Air Force, Ninth CAD. Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps 
Area and Commandants Eleventh Twelfth and FifteeAth Naval Districts. All 
harbor entrance control posts continuously manner. One gun battery each har- 
bor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other sub- 
versive activities intensified. Six infy battalions and necessary motor trans- 
portation alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NCA to carry out his 
missions under rainbow five. Constant contact being maintained with corps 
area and naval district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector 
and subsector plans rainbow five practically completed and necessary reconnais- 
sance being made to carry out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies 
furnished CG SF P of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA 
for internment aliens at Angel Island. Paren in connection this report see my 
radio to CG GHQ Nov twenty fifth which recommended that WPL five two be 
extended to include Pacific coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps 
taken by me in preparation therefor. As air forces as well as other Army forces 
will be involved in the execution of WLP five two or the preparatory stage of 
rainbow five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to [3043] direct 
operations of air forces in defense of the PCF or that instructions be issued 
specifying air action and that I be furnished a copy of such directive. Should 
hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in rain- 
bow five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammuni- 
tion and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available with- 
out delay. 

DeWitt, Commanding. 

Senator Lucas. I should like to call your attention also to page 13 
of Exhibit 32 which purports to be a message sent out by the Adjutant 
General Adams, I believe, to the Hawaiian Department on November 
28, and directing your attention to the last two lines, the following 
words (reading) : "Telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1155 

does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instruc- 
tions." 

In the previous part of that message tliey have been talking about 
sabotage, subversive activities. Would you -care to explain to the 
committee what that last portion of that message means, if anything^ 

General Marshall. I am merely hazarding an opinion. I was not 
aware of the wording of this message at the time [3044] it was 
sent, or the fact that it was actually sent. 

Senator Lucas. What, in your opinion, did Adams mean ? 

General Marshall. My opinion is he was trying to make certain 
that this message in no way affects the terms of the command message. 

Senator Lucas. That is the way I construe it. 

General Marshall. That is undoubtedly what was the intention. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, after Adams talks about subversive 
activities and he concludes with that statement, which says, "Nothing 
shall affect your responsibility under existing instructions" you under- 
stand that the existing instructions would mean the previous instruc- 
tions that had been sent out by you in your message of November 27 ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; that was a definite alert message and 
they signed my name to it instead of the Adjutant General's, to make 
it quite clearly a command message. 

This message also, as I believe the witnesses will testify, if they 
haven't already done so, resulted from the Air Corps activities that 
concerned all over the world and the Chief of the G-2 section became 
involved in it, and it ended up with a message not with the signature 
from G-2 but by the Adjutant General's signature. 

Senator Lucas. Then on the following page, page 14 in [304S] 
this same exhibit, there is a further message to General Short, and that 
message is signed by both Arnold and Adams, which continues to deal 
with sabotage and subversive activities. 

Now is there any higher or more important message that can be 
sent to any command than that sent by the Chief of Staff ? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; unless the Secretary of War personally 
signed it or the President. 

Senator Lucas. General Marshall, you were adviser, under the 
Army rules and regidations, to the Secretary of War as well as the 
President of the United States upon military matters? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. During your tenure as Chief of Staff it goes without 
saying that you had many conversations with both of these gentle- 
men 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. On the conduct of affairs of this Nation. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Did the President of the United States have any 
information about the Japanese situation that the Secretary of War 
or the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval 
Operations did not have? 

General Marshall. Did not have? 

[3046] Senator Lucas. Did not have. 

General Marshall. So far as I know, he did not — meaning the 
President did not. 



1156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. That is right. In other words, the Secretary of 
War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval 
Operations were in close contact with the President of the United 
States and the Secretary of State ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. There were incidents such as this — 
I only remember this one : On the return from Argentina the message 
actually sent by the President to the Japanese Government did not 
come to my knowledge until several days later at a meeting in the 
State Department, in Mr, Sumner Welles' office, when I was informed 
of the message. So there was a period there of several days that 1 
did not know of that message. 

I am not citing that as an abnormal thing at all, but just as an 
incident. 

Senator Lucas. The usual course was in the other direction? 

General Marshall. The normal course was in the other direction. 

Senator Lucas. After you saw the message that was sent by Mr. 
Welles, did you approve it later on ? 

General Marshall. I do not know whether I could express 
[304-7] myself in terms of approval or disapproval. I listened 
to the message and I do not recall my specific reactions. 

Senator Lucas. Did the President of the United States, in your 
opinion, have a right to assume that tlie commands at Hawaii and in 
the Pacific, California, and Philippines, were properly alerted on the 
morning of December 7 ^ 

Geneial Marshall. I think he had every right to assume that. 

[SOJfS] Senator Lucas. One question with respect to the letter 
that has been introduced, or two letters that have been introduced in 
evidence, that were written by you to Governor Dewey. 

Now, what specific information came to you that Governor Dewey 
knew that we had cracked the Japanese code ? 

General JSIarshall. I do not know at the moment that I knew at 
that time that he specifically had information that we cracked the 
Japanese code. I know that he made a statement of that character, 
as I recall, to Colonel Clarke. 

Senator Lucas. What was that last? 

General Marshall. I know tha: he made a statement of that char- 
acter to Colonel Clarke, as I recall, in his interview with him, but 
there have been other references to the matter here in Washington by 
various people, and I think one speech on the floor of the House that 
clearly indicated such a condition of affairs. 

Senator Lucas. Did you believe that he was the proper man to give 
this information so as to be able to stop the flow of this sort of 
information ? 

General Marshall. I thought he was the only man with whom I 
could deal. 

Senator Lucas. It was testified to here by General Miles [30Jf9] 
that this code secret was known only by a very limited few, and I was 
just wondering how this information got to Governor Dewey, that he 
knew you were actually cracking the code. 

General Marshall. I would qualify General Miles' statement by 
saying it had come to my ears several times that there were various 
whisperings in Washington, in the gatherings in the hotels and other- 
wise, dinners, that such things were happening. Specifically, there 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1157 

was very dangerous whisperino; regarding the killing of the head of 
the Japanese Navy, Admiral Yamamoto, who was shot down by a 
group of Army aviators headed by one Major Lamphier, on the basis 
of the data we obtained on our intercepts which specified exactly the 
trip that Yamamoto was going to take. 

Senator Lucas. That was the fellow who said he was going to write 
the peace in the White House ? 

General Marshall. I haven't the record here, but I believe you are 
correct. The point there was that the aviators had to be told exactly 
where to go and what to expect. That, of course, meant to them we 
must have a means of knowing whether their first discussions came 
back in the form of mere rumors, but whatever happened, it was so 
distorted, or so elaborated that it reached Washington [3050] 
and finally I was called up by a responsible citizen and informed of 
general statements on the subject based on that particular incident. 
Other similar things had occurred, so it was well known to me that 
there had been ver}^ careless talk here in Washington. 

I might explain now, that I sought the services of the FBI a num- 
ber of times to check particular Army officers in Washington, in an 
effort to make an example of somebody. 

I might also, for the record, state that Mr. Hoover was very un- 
willing to do this, because he did not want the FBI investigating 
Governmental agencies for fear it would be regarded as a Gestapo, 
so he was always very hesitant about accommodating me, and yet, 
I felt it was imperative that I have his services. I almost caught 
the man once or twice, but some little thing intervened, and I was not 
able to do it. 

I might say apropos of that, that the Russians were fearful of tell- 
ing us anything, because they felt a leak was inevitable, and it reached 
the point where I was very much afraid that we would be embarrassed 
with them most seriously because of some leak affecting their cam- 
paign. Therefore, I instructed our officers on the mission in Moscow 
never to ask when an operation was going to be carried out, or when, 
or where, because I did not want to be responsible [3051] for 
the possible leaks of that information, and I so informed the Russians. 

Senator Lucas. Well, your only thought in drafting this letter at 
that particular time was for the sole purpose of winning this war at 
the earliest possible time and the saving of American lives? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. This would be, of course, a guess upon your part, 
but without the cracking of the Japanese code in the way that we did, 
without the knowledge that came to us of their ship movements, and 
their convoys, would you care to hazard a guess as to how much longer 
it would have taken us to defeat the Japs ? 

General Marshall. I wouldn't want to involve myself in that esti- 
mate except to say that it could be operated in two waj's. One, it 
would have made the operation much more difficult to stage, and also 
would have made it necessary, probably, at the time for us not to 
undertake certain things because we did not know enough about the 
Japanese dispositions, capabilities, and intentions. With positive 
knowledge, we were then free in our operations. 

I tried to give you an illustration in relation to going into Korea 
where we could not obtain the shipping sufficient for the number of 



1158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

troops first thought necessary [3052] to a landing in Korea, 
which was September 23. However, when we picked up the mes- 
sages from the Japanese commander, who was earnestly hoping that 
American troops would arrive at the earliest possible date, they sent 
in a small command with perfect assurance that it would not be 
complicated by Japanese resistance. 

The same considerations permitted our moving into Japan with 
a little driblet of people at the very start. We had the same infor- 
mation regarding the Japanese forces in China. 

To go back into the active operations in the war, -we found out 
what they were aiming to do, and what they had to do it with, 
and that left us free to make moves that we otherwise would not 
have attempted. 

I might say that, of course, we always had to be very careful to 
check, because you never could tell at what moment that would 
boomerang. It would be the inevitable procedure of the other gov- 
ernment, if they knew their business, and they suddenly discovered 
we had cracked their code and were picking up their information, 
to endeavor to capitalize on that, to lead us into a ruinous situation. 

For example, the information which we received which led up to 
the appropriate disposition of the fleet and the accumulation of 
aircraft to fight the Battle of Midway, [3053] where our 
means were very limited, where, I believe, we only had the equivalent 
of one carrier and a half, and where we knew from magic that 
the Japanese were coming in with, T believe, five carriers, our relief 
was profound when planes of ours located the Japanese columns 
of ships moving to the east of Wake, because it meant the confirma- 
tion of what was in magic. 

I might say, though it hasn't any importance to this hearing, that 
we were very much disturbed because one Japanese unit gave Mid- 
wnj as its post office address, and that seem-ed a little bit too thick, 
so when the ships actually appeared it was a great relief, because 
if we had been deceived, and our limited number of vessels were 
there, and the Japanese approached at some other point, they would 
have met no opposition whatsoever. And those vessels that went 
to Midway had to virtually race from the Coral Sea to arrive in the 
Midway district in time. 

I believe one carrier had been damaged at Midway — they made 
hurried repairs, superficial repairs, and rushed her up into Midway. 
Admiral Halsey's ships had to steam at top speed in order to reach 
the Battle of Midway in time. I think he got there the first day 
or maybe on the day of the battle. 

All of that was based on magic. 

[3054-] Senator Lucas. General Marshall, no doubt you are 
familiar with the Army board's report. 

General Marshall. I haven't read it, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You haven't read it ? 

General Marshall. I have had a hard enough time reading these 
other papers. 

Senator Lucas. You have something to look forward to. 

General Marshall. I have been told the general characterization. 
That is all I know. 

Senator Lucas. Are you acquainted with Gen. George Grunert ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1159 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I have known him for years. 

Senator Lucas. What position did he hold when war broke out ? 

General IMarshall. When the war broke out ? 

Senator Lucas. December 7, 1941. 

General Marshall. He was in command of the Philippines. When 
the war broke out? 

Senator Lucas. December 7, 1941, yes. •.■.(=•>■( .11;^;. 

General Marshall. I think he was conmianding an Army Corps 
back here in the United States. 

Senator Lucas. Do you remember what happened to him after that ? 

General Marshall. I believe he was given command of [3066] 
the corps area in Chicago. 

I am not quite certain of that. I know that he became, I think, the 
head of personnel of the Army Service Forces under General Somer- 
vell and finally he was given the Eastern Defense Command with 
headquarters at Governors Island. 

[3056 \ Senator Lucas. He did not serve overseas in the war? 

(General Marshall. He was overseas up until the summer of 1941. 

Senator Lucas. Who is Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell ? 

General Marshall. He is the officer of the National Guard from 
North Carolina who commanded the Thirtieth Division. 

Senator Lucas. Is he retired now? 

General Marshall. Until recently he was on duty on some board 
here in Washington, I think. 

Senator George. North Carolina or Georgia, General? 

General Marshall. Well, Senator George, if you say Georgia, I will 
say Georgia. It was the Thirtieth Division though, was it not ? 

Senator George. Originally he may have been from North Carolina 
but he has been in Georgia for quite a long time. 

Senator Lucas. Did jfie command the Thirtieth Division overseas? 

General Marshall. No, sir. In this country. 

Senator Lucas. General Frank? 

General Marshall. General Frank is an Air Corps officer. 

Senator Lucas. General Marshall, in this Army report, in the con- 
clusions, they laid responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster to a lot 
of folks. 

General Marshall. General Handy, the Deputy Chief of Staff, told 
me orally what they had referred to in regard to him. 

[3057] Senator Lucas. After talking about Mr. Hull and its 
conclusion they then turn to the Chief of the Army, General George 
Marshall and in this report they say : 

He failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following 
particulars : 

(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully 
advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an 
increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he 
had an abundance and Short had little. 

Would you care to expand on that statement, General? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I think I will rest on the evidence that 
I believe has been submitted here. 

Senator Lucas. I presume that is true with all of these statements 
that they have made? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 3 13 



1160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. General Marshall, there has been a great deal of talk 
throughout the country about the similarity between what happened 
at Pearl Harbor and what happened at Port Arthur back some years 
ago when there was an attack on Russia. I am not a student of mili- 
tary history but from what I liave read there seems to be quite a 
difference. 

[3058] Are you familiar with the history of the attack on Port 
Arthur? 

General Marshall. I remember, as I recall the incident, it seemed 
that certain statements of the Japanese Government were delivered 
in St. Petersburg. There was a night attack made by destroyers, I 
believe, on Port Arthur. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I think from what I have read there is a little 
difference, and I wanted to put it in the record so that we might have 
what I have discovered in connection with that for this inquiry. 

Mr. Keepe. Are you going to be a witness ? 

Mr. Murphy. I am now reading from the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board report, page 1058, and I am quoting Admiral Pye as follows 
[reading] : 

There are quite a few people who seem to feel that the situation in Honolulu 
was quite similar to that which existed at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese 
War, at Port Arthur. I would just like to point out that there were several 
differences in the situations. 

In the first place, even at Port Arthur, the Japanese had broken off diplomatic 
relations with the Russians, on February 6, two days before the attack at Port 
Arthur, and, in the letter breaking off those diplomatic relations, they informed 
the Russion Government that they [3059] reserved the right to take such 
independent action as they might deem necessary, or words to that effect. In 
other words, adequate notice was given, both of the fact that the negotiations 
were at an end, and that the Japanese Government intended to take independent 
action. 

The second great difference was, that the Japanese, in order to obtain their 
objective, had to land in Korea, or in the vicinity of Port Arthur. The only 
forces which could oppose these landings effectively were the Russian ships 
in Port Arthur and at Chinnampo. 

So much for that. 

Now, then, there has been reference made, General Marshall, to 
your trip to the South for maneuvers and I would like to have you 
for the record, so that we might have the facts on that, refer to your 
report covering the period from July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943. 

As I understand it, you reported at page 2 as follows [reading] : 

During the summer of 1941, large battle rehearsals continued which included 
maneuvers in August, September, and November of some 900,000 troops. 

And I inquire now whether your visit to the South in the month of 
November was to attend one of those three maneuvers? 

General Marshall. That was its purpose. I might add — 
[S060] I do not know as it is at all pertinent to the investigation — 
that the maneuvers presented my best opportunity to determine com- 
mand ability and I had to arrive there at the time of the maneuver 
because the whole thing was very carefully programmed in relation 
to other movements in other parts of the country and transportation 
and so on. 

On this particular trip the good roads in North Carolina offered 
facilities for covering the country, which made it a much more difficult 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1161 

proposition than in some of the other points that they were having 
maneuvers and I would see less and the prospects were I would see 
more. 

As a result of that particular trip I made several decisions. One 
was for the relief of three or four officers, two, I have in mind par- 
ticularly, from command and assignment to other duties and the other 
was the decision to advance General Patton to corps command. 

Mr. Murphy. Thank you. 

I now would like to read, Mr. Chairman, from page 3 of the same 
report as follows [reading] : 

Since 1935 the Hawaiian Islands, having been given first priority, had been 
provided with more complete troop garrisons and munitions than any other 
overseas garrison. It now became imperative that the defenses of the Panama 
Canal and Alaska be given immediate prior- l[3061] Also, the uncer- 
tainty of the European situation involving the peril of the British Isles and 
the British Fleet made it urgently necessary for us to secure the defenses of the 
Western Hemisphere by establishing air bases and defensive garrisons through- 
out the Caribbean and in Newfoundland. With our limited means the situation 
developed into a problem of priorities in attempting to meet these requirements, 
and it was not until February 1941 that additional aircraft, antiaircraft, and 
other items of modern equipment could be shipped to the Hawaiian Islands. A 
little later the first shipments of modern aircraft were made to the Philippines 
and the Philippine Scout organization was doubled in strength, drawing the 
necessary personnel from the trained cadres of the new Philippine Army. The 
fighter planes secured for these purposes were largely obtained by stripping the 
limited number of squadrons then in training in the United States. 

In July 1941 the development of quantity production made it possible for the 
first time to assign modern materiel in sizable lots to the Philippines. On 
August 28 the first flights of Flying Fortresses were started across the Pacific 
via Midway and Wake Islands and thence south through Rabaul, Port Moresby, 
or Port Darwin, and [3062] north to the Philippines. By the first week 
in November some 35 Fortresses had completed this trip. A gap in airplane 
deliveries from the factory combined with adverse winds between San Francisco 
and Hawaii prevented the ferrying of an additional 48 Fortresses prior to the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. 

At that point. General Marshall, I recall your testimony relative to 
the difficulties of the ships leaving the west coast in the direction of 
Hawaii and their problem of having sufficient gas. 

Are you prepared to testify, or should we ask General Arnold, 
whether or not having made the long distance from the west coast to 
Hawaii the very ships themselves, I mean the planes, would have 
sufficient gas in order to engage in any kind of combat ? 

General Marshall. I think under the conditions under which they 
operated then they would not, but General Arnold is the appropriate 
witness. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I would also like to ask whether or not 
you received this telegram, General Marshall — and then I will go 
on — whether or not on August 30 you received a telegram from Gen- 
eral MacArthur reading as follows: 

I wish to express my personal appreciation for the splendid support that you 
and the entire War Department [3063] have given me along every line 
since the formation of this command. Witli such backing the development of a 
completely adequate defense force will be rapid. 

General INIarshall. That is an excerpt from a message to me. 

]Mr. Murphy. From General MacArthur. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Would you give the date of that message ? 



1162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. August 30. 

Senator Brewster. Nineteen — 

Mr, Murphy. 1941. Page 4 of General Marshall's report. 

In questioning you, General Marshall, counsel asked you whether or 
not you had any information of a Jap implementing message up to 
December T. I would like to make it a little bit clearer .and ask you 
whether or not you had any knowledge of the existance of any Jap 
implementing message to the winds code up to the time of the attack 
on Pearl Harbor? 

General Marshall. I did not. 

Mr. Murphy. You also testified that you had an orderly at your 
home at Fort Myer whose purpose it was to get phone messages and 
the like. Did you have that orderly on duty before December 7? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir, I had him — I speak of him [3064] 
as one person, it was one of three or four — for about a year before that 
and continued it about a j^ear after that and as the War Department 
became more fully organized I had an arrangement whereby all calls 
were diverted to the office of the Secretary of the General Staff. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, do you have any information of any 
attempt to locate you at your home by telephone or messenger on the 
evening of December 6 or the morning of December 7 prior to the call 
which you received while you were taking your shower? 

General Marshall. I am unaware of any such message to contact 
me. 

Mr. Murphy. Then, as I understand it, from the time you received 
that call to the time you actually got to our office was a period of 
some 20 minutes ? 

General Marshall. I believe I said it generally took me about 10 
minutes to bathe and dress. I can only make an assumption in the 
matter but I think I proceeded directly to the office. 

Mr. Murphy. General Marshall, did you at any time ever hear, 
up to this very day, of any American having any information, specific 
information that an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941 ? 

General Marshall. What do you mean by "specific in- [3065] 
formation" ? 

Mr. MuPvPHY. Well, there is talk 

General Marshall. I might intervene to say we had pretty much 
everything attacked. 

Mr. Murphy. Knowledge to the effect that the Japanese were 
actually going to make an attack. 

General Marshall. I am unaware of such. 

Mr. Murphy. Have you any personal knowledge. General, of how 
much information General MacArthur might have had from Jap 
intercepts, which knowledge was not available to General Short? 

General Marshall. I do not know that. I have learned that Ad- 
.niiral Hart had facilities which Admiral Kimmel, I think, did not 
have. 

Mr. Murphy. And the Admiral Hart who had the facilities and who 
was then the commander of the Naval forces at Manila is presently a 
United States Senator from Connecticut, isn't he ? 

General Marshall. That is the same man. 

Mr. Murphy. And in Washington. Well, you wouldn't know 
whether he was in Washington or not, I mean today. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1163 



Now, then, General 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, would the reporter read the last 
remark ? 

[S066] Mr. MuKPHY. I said he would not know whether Admiral 
Hart was in Washington or not. 

The Chairman. Well, if it is of any value, this information, I can 
tell you he is here today. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, it may or may not become pertinent at a later 
stage of this inquiry. 

General, in giving your opinion as to the ability of the force at 
Hawaii to meet the Japanese attack, did you take into consideration 
only the Army forces out there or did you also include all the forces 
the Navy had there, including their PBY's? 

General Marshall. I was including the naval potential also. 

Mr. Murphy. Had you any warning. General, or any reason to ex- 
pect on the night of December 6 or on the early morning of December 
7 that there was any special urgency requiring you to be at the War 
Department earlier than the hour you did arrive there on the morning 
of December 7 ? 

General Marshall. I had no such conception or information. 

Mr. Murphy. Did 3'Ou at any time prior to December 7 ever have 
anyone tell you that the jfleet, the United States Fleet in the Pacific 
ocean, was not able to take care of itself in the event of an attack? 

[S067] General Marshall. I do not think I ever did, sir. I had 
heard a discussion by Admiral Richardson as to the requirements that 
the fleet had to have to be built up before taking out to sea and be prop- 
erly supplied. 

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock 
tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 35 p. m., December 7, 1945, an adjournment was 
taken until 10 a. m., Saturday, December 8, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1165 



[S0€8-\ PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK 



SATURDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., 
in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator 
Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present : Senatoi-s Barkley (chairman) , George, Lucas, and Ferguson 
and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman). Chirk, Murphy, Gear- 
hart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[3069'] The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. 
The Chairman is detained for a feAv moments. We will continue. 
Does counsel have anything to present at this time before General 
Marshall resumes his testimony ? 
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MAESHALL (Resumed) 

The Vice Chairman. General Marshall, do you have anything that 
you want to bring to the attention of the coimnittee before you resume 
your testimony ? 

General Marshall. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to present two 
items in the record regarding my testimony yesterday which are 
incorrect statements as recorded. Is that permissible? 

The Vice Chairman. You may proceed. 

General Marshall. On page 2994, the next to the last sentence 
reads : "I came to the conclusion that the matter was so important that 
we must make it a matter of record, and I sent Colonel Clarke", and 
so forth. 

I was referring to the discussion I had preliminarily to sending a 
second letter to Governor Dewey. The first five words on line 24, "it 
a matter of record" should have read "another eifort", so the sentence 
would read : "I came to [3070] the conclusion that the matter 
was so important that we must make another effort, and I sent Colonel 
Clarke". 

The Vice Chairman. That correction will be made. 

General Marshall. Two pages further on, 2996, line 4, the sen- 
tence reads : "Colonel Clarke returned to Washington and reported to 
me that the Governor had read the letter, had discussed it with Mr. 

Bell in the presence of Colonel Clarke ." That is not a correct 

statement. 



1166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Line 4 should read, "with Mr. Bell but not in the presence of 
Colonel Clarke". 

The Vice Chairman. That correction will be made, General. Is 
there anything further, sir ? 

General Marshall. Nothing further. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee has heard with profound sor- 
row that Senator Brewster's father passed away last night. Neces- 
sarily the Senator is absent this morning. The committee extends 
him its deepest sympathy in this time of bereavement. 

Senator Brewster would next be entitled to recognition, and of 
course being unable to be present the Chair recognizes Congressman 
Gearhart of California, who will now inquire. 

Mr. Gearhart. General Marshall, I regret the necessity of your 
being delayed in leaving for the Orient, and I regret especially that 
I must share a part of the blame for detaining you here, and for that 
reason I will make my cross-examination [30711 very, very 
short. 

First I would like to inquire, what was the over-all desire of the 
Army and Navy during the months of October and November and 
first part of December in reference to delaying or accelerating the 
commencement of war with any nation ? 

General Marshall. It was our great desire, speaking specifically 
for the Army, but I am certain with naval agreement, the agreement 
of Admiral Stark, to delay in every way the possibility of our being 
involved in war. 

Mr. Gearhart. The reason for that was that we were improving 
our defensive and striking capacity very rapidly under our prepared- 
ness program of the moment ? 

General Marshall. That, of course, was a prime factor, Mr. Con- 
gressman, but it goes a little further than that. Naturally it was our 
hope that we could avoid a war, but also, as a purely military proposi- 
tion, it would be highly undesirable, if involved in war, that it should 
be on two fronts in widely separated parts of the world, and more 
specifically, that it should develop in the Pacific, where we knew the 
British had very little available means to resist aggressive action by 
the Japanese. 

The British situation, or that of the British Empire, was so seri- 
ous as to deficiency in men and materiel, particularly in planes at 
that time, and in naval shipping, which [3072] was engaged 
ih the effort to keep the Atlantic lanes open for convoys from this 
country, carrying lend-lease supplies which were vital to the success- 
ful defense they were then laboring under, that if they became in- 
volved in war in the Pacific they were almost bound to weaken them- 
selves in the Atlantic, meaning in Great Britain, at a time when the 
Germans were exceedingly strong. 

So a war on two fronts was to be avoided, if it was at all possible 
to do so. War was to be avoided by us in our own view, if we could 
manage it, and every effort was to be made to gain us time in case 
war became inevitable. 

Mr. Gearhart. And it was your belief, Admiral Stark concurring, 
that if the war with Japan could be delayed long enough, that our 
might and power would grow so great that Japan probably would be 
dissuaded from attacking us ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1167 

General Marshall. I have a very distinct recollection of my own 
reactions at the time. I thought if we once had accumulated approxi- 
mately 100 4-engine bombers in the Philippines the Japanese could 
not dare to attempt to move to the south of the Philippines, or to 
make a naval attack on the Philippines, that is, to support a landing: 
I had great confidence in the potential threat involved in a large con- 
centration of heavy bombers. 

I might add that at that time no such concentration had \S073] 
ever been made before in the history of war, I think, and although 
now we think in terms of thousands, at that time 100 was a very large 
figure. 

So we were making every conceivable effort to present in the Philip- 
pines to the Japanese a concentration of air power that they would 
not dare hazard active operations to the south in the China Sea or 
directly against the Philippine Islands themselves. 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark shared those views with you, did 
he not ? 

General Marshall. That was my understanding, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. You and he took advantage of every opportunity 
to call the necessity for delayed action to the attention of the President 
and the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, did you not? 

General Marshall. And the Secretary of State. Admiral Stark, 
as I believe I testified earlier in my appearance here, which, of course, 
he can give you authentic evidence on, desired in the discussions with 
Mr. Hull that, or stated, I believe, that February 1st was the essential 
(late for the Navy in order that they might be able to make the com- 
pletion of the Fleet's requirements. I hazarded in early September, 
as I recall, that if we obtained the ships and delivery of planes, that we 
might or should be ready by December 5 to an extent [3074-] 
that would probably deter the Japanese from making an attack. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, during the month of November 
large convoys, men and materiel were moving towards the Philippines 
and you had plans for still larger convoys to be moving in that direction 
for the month of December ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Of 1941. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, convoys were leaving San Fran- 
f'isco as the bombs began to fall in Hawaii; is that not true? 

General Marshall. I did not hear the question. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, convoys were moving out of 
San Francisco at the time the bombs began to fall ? 

General Marshall. I think that is correct ; I also know that a large 
slow convoy had been headed south toward Torres Strait and was 
somewhere between Samoa and Hawaii at the time of the outbreak 
of war. 

Mr. Gearhart. In line with your and Admiral Stark's desire to gain 
time, you jointly prepared a statement which you sent to the Presi- 
dent on November 5 ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And the gist of that document was an appeal to the 
President to use his good offices and the good offices [S075] of 



1168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

our Government to prevent an outbreak of war with Japan for the 
timebein^? 

(jeneral Marshall. I think that in general is a correct statement. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you or Admiral Stark, in your presence and 
hearing, protest at any time to Secretary Hull the sending of his mes- 
sage, the handing of his message of November 26 to the Japanese 
Envoys ? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of such protest. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you know in advance of the handing of that 
message to the Japanese that Mr. Hull was contemplating the prepara- 
tion of such a document ? 

General Marshall. I think I knew he was contemplating the prep- 
aration of such a document. I did not know the time and actual 
date of the document. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you, in any words, written or oral, urge him 
not to take that step? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of such action. 

Mr. Gearhart. When did you first hear that he had handed such 
a note as the one which bears the date of November 26 to the Japanese 
Envoys ? 

General Marshall. I have not a clear recollection regarding that. 
I imagine it was on November 27, or 28th for me, because I was absent 
on the 27th. 

\S076] Mr. Gearhart. You were a member of the so-called War 
Cabinet of the President ? 

General Marshall. I don't believe I could be considered a member 
of the Cabinet, but I sat in at the meetings of that group on most 
occasions. 

Mr. Gearhart. Wasn't there an organization informally known as 
the President's War Cabinet consisting of the President, the Secretary 
of War, the Secretary of Navy, the Secretary of State and the two 
Joint Chiefs of Staff? 

General Marshall. That group met in that form on several occa- 
sions. What I mean is that the military, I don't believe, would be 
considered part of the Cabinet, though we were a part of the meeting. 

Mr. Gearhart. I will ask you if Secretary Hull, prior to the 26th 
day of November and prior to his handing the note to the Japanese, 
informed you and the other members of that so-called War Cabinet of 
his intention to hand a document at that time to the Japanese ? 

General Marshall. May I have the first part of the question ? 

[the question was read by the reporter] : 

General Marshall. He made, Mr. Hull, that is, made several gen- 
eral statements in regard to whether or not further diplomatic efforts 
would be practical, but the actual action [S077] that he took at 
that time I do not recall he stated in my presence. 

Mr. Gearhart. You do not know whether he read the message to 
you prior to its delivery to the Japanese Envoys ? 

General Marshall. I do not think he did. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did he read it to you, or was a copy placed in your 
hands, immediately after he delivered it to the Japanese ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1169 

Mr. Gr^vRHAKT. But nevertheless you and Admiral Stark on Novem- 
ber 27, the very next day, addressed a memorandum to the President 
in which you ugain urged upon the President, as the most essential 
tiling, the necessity ol' gaining time. 

General Marshall. Ves, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was that joint message from the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to the President inspired by the action of the Secretary of State 
in handing the message of November 26 to the Japanese? 

(jeneral Marshall. I have not a clear recollection on that, Mr. 
Gearhart. I couldn't tell you, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right. 

General Marshall. 1 certainly haven't an affirmative reaction of 
Avhat the Secretary of State said he was going to do that caused us 
to take that particular action. We [^078\ took it, but pos- 
sibly Admiral Stark can remember more clearly than I can. 1 do 
not recall all the circumstances of it. 

INIr. Gearhart. I will read you, for the purpose of refreshing your 
memory a paragraph from the pamphlet entitled "Peace and War, 
U. S. Foreign Policy, 1931-41," ^ the paragraph which appears on 
page 138 : 

On November 28 at a meeting of high oflBicials of this Government, Secretary 
Hull emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan. 
He stated that there was no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan, 
that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new 
acts of conquest by force, and that the matter of safeguarding our national 
security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. 

Are you familiar with that? 

General Marshall. My recollection is roughly that, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then, the Secretary on the 25th told you and the 
other members composing this so-called war cabinet that there was 
no chance of obtaining an agreement, and that the matter was in the 
hands of the Army and Navy at that time? 

General Marshall. I think that is correct. 

Mr. Gearhart. Isn't that the reason why you and Admiral Stark 
immediately devoted your attention to preparing the [S<//9\ 
memorandum of November 27 for the President? 

General Marshall. That may be, sir. I don't recall exactly the 
conditions under which we wrote that memorandum. 

Mr. Gearhart. Going on and reading further in the same 
paragraph : 

The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense 
should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of sur- 
prise a central point in their strategy, and also might attack at various points 
simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and coordination. 

Do you remember his speaking to you to that effect ? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of such detail. I tes- 
tified yesterday to a very distinct recollection of Mr. Hull saying at 
one of those meetings, one of the last, "These fellows mean to fight; 
you will have to be prepared." 

Mr. Gearhart. And to refresh your memory in -respect to your 
having read this pamphlet at some time, or having had conversations 

• Exhibit No. 27. 



1170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in December or November of 1941, let me read one further paragraph 
from this pamphlet I have in my hands, the succeeding paragraph 
to that which I just read : 

On November 29, 1941, Secretary Hull conferred with the British Ambassador. 
The Secretary said that "the diplomatic [3080] pai-t of our relations with 
Japan were virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the 
Army and the Navy." 

Have you any comjnent to make upon that statement of the Secretary 
of State? 

General Marshall. I have not, Mr. Gearhart. Incidentally I have 
never read that pamphlet you are reading from. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was it ever called to your attention by anyone who 
had heard that the Secretary had made that statement ? 

General Marshall. I don't recall anyone bringing it to my atten- 
tion. I have a vague recollection of it, which I probably obtained 
from the newspapers. 

Mr, Gearhart. Quoting further from the same page : 

He said further that it would be "a serious mistake for our country and other 
countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without 
including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly, and with every possible 
element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain 
positions and posts before tlie peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would 
have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this 
would be on the tlieory that the Japanese recognized that their course of unlimited 
conquest now renewed all along [3081] the line probably is a desperate 
gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risks." 

Do you remember having heard that from any one of the Secretary 
having so expressed himself to the British Ambassador? 

General Marshall, No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. But you did feel from that which he had to say, 
that war was imminent and you felt also in harmony with the Chief 
of Naval Operations that everything should be done to delay the com- 
mencement of hostilities? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. My understanding from 
the Secretary of State was that the situation was most critical, using 
the word "most" in its accurate meaning, that these "fellows" meaning 
the Japanese, intended to fight, and that we must be prepared. That 
is a pretty complete estimate of the situation. 

Mr. Gearhart. In your memorandum to the President of November 
27, 1941, written just after you had heard of the President's message 
which he had handed the Japanese envoys in Washington, you com- 
menced by using these words : 

If the current negotiations end without agi'eement Japan may attack : the 
Burma Road ; Tliailand ; Malaya ; the Netherlands East Indies ; the Philippines ; 
the Russian Maritime Provinces. 

[8082] There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the 
Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent Japa- 
nese troop movements all seem tohave been southward. 

As a matter of fact. General, wasn't it your opinion, and wasn't it 
the opinion of Admiral Stark and all of the high-ranking naval and 
military officers- with whom you were in conversation, that the Japa- 
nese attack was going to come to the Far East and that there was no 
thought of it coming at Hawaii ? 

General Marshall. Our thought at the time — my thought specifi- 
cally — was that the Japanese were engaged in a campaign southward 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1171 

from the Cliina Sea, that that would be their operation. I assumed 
that Guam would be captured. I assumed that Wake Island would 
be taken, though there was a little less probability there than there 
was as regards Guam, because while the fleet was still in full being, 
the American Fleet, Wake, I would assume, would be a more difficult 
task for the Japanese. 

We had in mind the possibility of an effort on the Panama Canal. 
We had in mind the possibility of an effort to strike a blow at our air 
plants in Seattle, at our air plants in San Diego, and we had in mind 
the possibility of a blow in the Central Pacific, in the Hawaiian 
district. 

[3083] We thought the latter was the most improbable. 

Mr. Gearhart. What was the latter? 

General Marshall. The attack against the Hawaiian Islands. 

Mr. Gearhart. You thought that was improbable ? 

General Marshall. I said the most improbable. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, in the opinion of the people 
with whom you were in daily conversation, both naval and military, 
Pearl Harbor was considered impregnable, was it not? 

General Marshall. Do you mean by that, Mr. Gearhart, it was 
impracticable as a naval base, or impracticable as a Japanese objec- 
tive? 

Mr. Gearhart. Why did we build it? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

General Marshall. Did you say impracticable? 

Mr. Gearhart. Impregnable. 

General Marshall. I didn't understand. 

Mr. Gearhart. We built it as a defense against possible trouble 
with Japan; isn't that right? 

General Marshall. Yes. I thought you used the word "impracti- 
cable." We thought it was impregnable against a Japanese landing 
expedition. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, you were so convinced 
[3084] of that you wrote in 1940 in your aide memoire the follow- 
ing words : 

The Island of Oahn, due to its fortification, it garrison, and its physical 
characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world. 

General Marshall. I didn't write that. It was prepared for me. 
At the time I think it was a correct statement. 

Also in the memorandum the implication is: when we get all the 
various arrangements there. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, referring to your warning message which was 
sent in slightly different forms to Manila, Hawaii, Panama, and other 
places, that warning message required the addressees to report to you, 
didn't it? 

General Marshall. Required 

Mr. Gearhart. The addressees to report to you? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. What they had done in response to your directions? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. General Short reported that he had taken steps in 
accordance with your part of your directions against sabotage, in his 
message of November 28? 



1172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

[S085] Mr. Gearhart. You received that report, did you not? 

General Marshall. I testified in regard to that, sir. The pre- 
sumption is I did. The War Department received it and the pre- 
sumption is that I read it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you remember whether or not you received 
such a message of that kind ? 

General Marshall. I do not remember, as I testified, and I did 
not initial the report. 

Mr. Gearhart. Wliat did you say ? 

General Marshall. I do not remember, as I testified, and I did not 
initial the report. 

Mr. Gearhart. You heard, or were you present in this room when 
General Grerow testified and accepted full responsibility for not hav- 
ing acted on the inadequacy, as he called it, of this report? 

General Marshall. I was not present in the room and I admire 
very much his attitude. 

Mr. Gearhart. I, too, thought it was very generous, but prior to 
November 28 you had issued a directive to General Gerow and to 
General Miles, did you not, directing them to send you not only the 
reports on the messages that they received but to send you the mate- 
rial itself, had you not? 

General Marshall. The message reads : 

[3080] Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical 
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might 
come back and offer to continue. .Japanese future action unpredictable but 
hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be 
avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This 
policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of 
action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you 
are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem 
necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to 
alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hos- 
tilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as 
they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information 
fo minimum essential officers. 

[Signed] Marshall. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is correct, but that is not an answer to the 
question, though, that I propounded to you, General. 

My question was, did you not, prior to November 28, issue a di- 
rective to General Gerow and General Miles 

ir^^7] General Marshall. General Gerow? 

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). Where you accepted their evaluations 
on the messages they intercepted but also to send the material along 
as well? 

General Marshall. Oh, I misunderstood you, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from California 
yield? 

General Marshall. That was, I believe, in the month of August, 
Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. You understand the question, don't you ? 

General Marshall. I think so. In the month of August are you re- 
ferring to ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, in the month of August, that they send the 
messages and their evaluations, if any, along with them ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1173 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Geakiiart. Your reason lor making that directive to the two 
generals was because you wanted to see yourself what w^as being inter- 
cepted and what messages were being received ? 

General Marshall. 1 hat, quite evidently, was my reason. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, can you give any reason now why you did not 
take exception yourself to the message of General Short's of Novem- 
ber 28? 

l^OSS] General Marshall. I can only say, sir, that that was my 
opportunity to intervene and have a further check made and I did not 
take it. Just why I do not know. 

Mr. Gearhart. You expected immediate attention to be given to 
your message of November 27 by the various addressess to whom you 
sent it, didn't you ? 

General Marshall, Yes, sir. That was a command direction for 
alert against a state of war. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Did you expect General Short to take im- 
mediate action? 

General Marshall. I did, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then will you explain how he could have taken im- 
mediate action and ordered a No. 3 alert instantly without creating 
alarm among the people and disclosing the intention of the United 
States? 

General Marshall. I think he could have, sir. We had done such 
things before out there. We had done it the previous summer. There 
are a good many ways to get at that. 

The reconnaissance, for example by air over water — that was a 
naval directive responsibility — could not in any way have alarmed 
the population. The other matters in regard to planes and, presum- 
ably, ships, it seems to me, would have not alarmed the population. 

The issue where the people came most closely in contact [3089] 
with the military mj^ht be as a change of attitude related to sabotage 
because that required the posting of a great many detachments in order 
to avoid action being taken. 

I would like to say, in regard to this right now, it was necessary, we 
felt, specifically necessary, to include that particular direction regard- 
ing the public, both as to Hawaii and as to the west coast, because it was 
the strong desire of, I will say, the War Cabinet, certainly of the Army 
and Navy officials and I am quite certain of the President of the United 
States, that the Japanese be given no opportunity whatever to claim 
that we had taken some overt act which forced a state of war upon 
them. 

The feeling was — I am now speaking as Chief of Staff only, from 
the point of view I could obtain as Chief of Staff — the feeling was at 
that time that if the Japanese could have created a situation, however 
unjustified, however illogical, in which they could have led at least 
a portion of the people to believe that our overt action had forced them 
into an act of war and we would have had a divided country, which 
would have been a terrible tragedy in a war situation. 

Therefore, each move we made had to be taken carefully into account 
to avoid the possibility that the Japanese would instantly make a claim 
that we had forced the issue, that we had really made the overt act 
and they were forced to fight [3090] us. 

Mr. Gearhart. In reply to that I entirely agi-ee with you. 



1174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. May I finish my statement, sir ? 

Mr. Gearhaet. I entirely agree with you. 

The Chairman. Let the General finish his answer. 

General Mahshall. At that time there was a very — I believe this 
is correct — divided opinion in this country and of course, the people 
generally could not know all the inside facts which we had obtained 
from one source or another about the very aggressive acts that the 
Japanese were carrying out in the Fart East. 

So we labored in this state of peace, in this state of normalcy ; and, 
as for example, in Hawaii, in this state of not being able to check them 
up, for instance, through the phone service and things of that sort, 
in this state of having to allow them to send any information they 
wished back to their own country, we labored constantly under the 
obligation that we must have no act committed by one of our oflficers 
that would permit the Japanese to chiim that we had started the war, 
and, therefore, would to that extent for the time being at least have 
left us with a divided people on a tragic issue. 

Therefore, it was necessary to omit, that those messages [S091] 
to the west coast and the message to the Hawaiian Islands must have 
a proviso in them of that character. 

Mr. Gearhart. I agree with you entirely, General. That was a 
tremendously important consideration and to further emphasize the 
arguments that you have made, the Constitution of the United States 
provides that war shall be declared only by the Congress of the United 
States. If you took any other steps it would have been in violation 
of the Constitution which all of us have taken an oath to uphold. I 
am just as firm in my agreement with you as 1 possibly could be on that 
necessity that you speak of. 

What I am talking about now is whether or not the message of Gen- 
eral Short's was in line with what should have been done under the 
circumstances and because of the very reasons that you have cited. 
"We must not alarm the people or give the Japanese the opportunity to 
say that we started the war." 

General Marshall. I gathered the impression from your question, 
sir, that you thought or were implying that the message was impracti- 
cal of execution. 

Mr. Gearhart. No — oh, yes, that may be touched upon, too. I may 
be touching upon that, too, for the reasons you have outlined so well. 

Now, if General Short had placed the Army on a No. 
3 [3092] alert immediately upon receiving your message, that 
would have required him to fill the air with airplanes, it would have 
required every soldier on the island to put on a steel helmet and side 
arms, would it not, and appear on the streets in full war regalia? 

General MarsHx\ll. Not necessarily appear on the streets in full 
war regalia and not necessarily fill the air with planes because deep 
reconnaissance takes off from the field and goes out over the water. It 
might be circling over the city, it might be on a training maneuver of 
any kind. It is not flying all the time ; and the pursuit and interceptor 
planes clid not need to take the air ; quite the contrary. They needed 
to be armed and equipped and the pilots ready. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, that is exactly what happened when they had 
a No. 3 alert, isn't it? 

General Marshall. I don't know what moment they went on the No. 
3 alert and I would also like to say, Mr. Gearhart, that I had never 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1175 

seen his various alert messages and they did not arrive here in this 
country until January. 

Mr. Gearhakt. Wouldn't the No. 3 alert require the men to take up 
battle positions immediately on the island? 

General Marsil^ll. It %Yould, yes, sir. I presume that was a No. 
3 alert. I have not got the details here before me. General Short 
can testify about that. 

[309S] Mr. Gearhart. That would have required trucks with 
men with helmets and rifles to ride out to the battle positions from the 
barracks in which they were then living? 

General ISIarshall. Presumably so, yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhakt. In other words, the sudden ordering of a No. 3 alert 
would have created a tremendous condition on the island that would 
have alarmed the civilian population on the island. 

General ]\Iarshall. It seems to me that a No. 3 alert, whatever its 
exact details were, could have been carried out with certain modifica- 
tions to attain the general result desired. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 

The Chairman. Will the gentleman yield to his colleague? 

Mr. Gearhart, Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. A No, 2 alert would have been a defense against air 
attacks and surface and submarine attacks. They did not need a No, 
3. A No, 2 would have made it. 

Mr, Gearhart, Either 2 or 3. 

General Marshall. I was not referring to 1, 2, or 3. That was the 
function of the commanding general in the Hawaiian Department, 

Mr. Gearhart, Yes, Now, when we have maneuvers over there, 
and we have had them for 30 or 40 years, the [S094] public 
mind was always prepared for the event, was it not, by prior an- 
nouncements and by notices, so that they would not become alarmed 
at the display of military power ? 

General Marshall. I am not the best witness on that. General 
Herron and possibly General Short himself can testify as to that, and 
other commanders. 

Mr, Gearhart, Well, I 

General Marshall, You are asking me, sir, for the details of the 
condition of a command by the individual responsible for that com- 
mand ? 

Mr, Gearhart. Yes. 

General Marshall. There were commands all over the Pacific, there 
were commands in this country and there were commands in the 
Caribbean, 

Mr, Gearhart. Yes. 

General Marshall, I was not familiar with the detailed execution 
of their plans any more than I was familiar with General MacArthur's 
plans, I had given certain general directives and as general officers 
in a responsible position in the outpost he was carrying the duties 
out, 

I testified, for example, the other day to an incident illustrative of 
that, that we only learned through magic his procedure of unloading at 
night and taking other measures to keep the Japanese in the dark as to 
what was going on, 

[3095] It is impractical and there are no means in Washington 
to know all the details of the execution of commands by a higher 

79716—46 — pt. 3 14 



1176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

officer who is given the responsibility of carrying out a defense for 
air or certain operations. 

Mr. Gearhart. At the present time you do not remember that you 
had or voiced any objections or criticism to General Short's report? 

General Marshall. I know specifically I did not. 

Mr. Gearhart. The evidence shows that the 13 parts and the pilot 
message were received and decoded on December 6, 1941. All this be- 
came available on Saturday night. The President, the Secretary of 
War, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Navy had it, 
your subordinates Miles and Bratton had it. 

How do you explain the fact that none of it was given to your 
attention on Saturday, December 6, 1941 ? 

General Marshall. As I recall — of course, the message itself will 
show — the first 13 parts were not of the nature of a vital threat as 
the 14th part. That was a message of direct importance to the Sec- 
retary of State and of related importance, of course, to the Secretary of 
War and the Secretary of the Navy who had been collaborating with 
him in his relationship in the dealings with Japan. The fact of the 
matter was it was not brought to my attention. 

[3096] Mr. Gearhart. Do you now feel that General Short was 
not entitled to have information of that character to guide him in 
setting up the degree of alert that it was essential to have done? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir, that was my view. He was issued a 
command and directed to do something. Now, if the directive was so 
written that he could not understand it, that is a matter for judgment. 
Once you issue an order, amendments or, you might say, codicils are 
very dangerous business when it is an operational order. In most in- 
stances it is far better to cancel the entire order and start anew. The 
transmission of information from the G-2, for example, of the War 
Department to G-2, for example, under General Short is another mat- 
ter. That is informational and that is not directional. 

Mr. Gearhart. Whenever a higher command, say the command in 
Washington, is in receipt of information of great importance to a com- 
mander in the field, it is the obligation of the command having that 
information either to transmit the information or issue directives in 
the light of that information, is that not correct? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was that always done by G-2 and by your War 
Plans Division? 

General ^Iarshall. Are you referring to this incident or [3097] 
the whole course of the war ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I am talking about this thick volume of Japanese 
intercepted messages which throw so much light upon the Japanese 
attitude toward this country of ours. 

The Vice CnAHiMAN. Exhibit 2. 

General Marshall. I presume that in searching through that you 
will locate messages the sense of which might well have been com- 
municated to General Short. However, the analyses of these messages, 
particularly as relates to the higher diplomatic operations of the Gov- 
ernment, would properly be made here in Washington. It is the only 
place where all the information was available. 

The problem was to keep the commander in the clear, as it were, as 
to what his action should be and not to confuse it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1177 

I recounted in my testimony, I believe, yesterday and doubted for 
the moment as to whether the 1 o'clock message of December 7 should 
be sent out, though it was quickly decided that it was essential that it 
should go as quickly as possible. 

There was another message, for example — no, that does not per- 
tain. 

The point, I think, that should be made clear, if possible, is that 
you must avoid confusing the commander with a [3098] mass 
of data. 

For example, in this particular case, following General Short's 
assumption of command, as this record shows, there were a series of 
letters directly between General Short and myself. Those letters 
gave me the most definite impression of an extreme sensibility to air 
and submarine attack. They did not give me an impression of a 
similar sensitivity to sabotage matters. 

Now, following that experience I practically never wrote another 
letter to any commander in the field and confined it purely to the 
operational directives. I did not w^rite to General Eisenhower, I did 
not write to General MacArthur, and I did not write to the other 
commanders virtually at all during the course of the war. I confined 
myself entirely to the dry directive as to what they were to do. 

In this case I gathered the impression from a series of letters which 
you have in the record, and the directive w^as issued having that im- 
pression, of an essential and understood policy and then the reaction 
developed, as you have been referring to here, wherein the attention 
went to sabotage and so on from an air and submarine attack. 

Mr. Gearhart. Quite a number of the messages which you caused 
to be sent and which were sent by subordinates of yours and by Ad- 
miral Stark and subordinates of his emphasize [3099] the pos- 
sibilities of hostilities in Indochina, the Philippines, the Kra Penin- 
sula, Thailand, even Guam, but in no message that you sent did you 
call especial atention to the fact that Hawaii might be threatened. 

General Marshall. Because at that time the opinion which we had 
most definitely in our own minds from the data available — in our own 
minds from the data available — was the Japanese threat south through 
the China Sea. We had it by magic. We had it by the actual recon- 
naissance of convoys, we had it by reports from other officials in Indo- 
china and elsewhere, of very positive action which actually did con- 
firm the main, the principal Japanese campaign. 

Mr. Gearhart. What effect do you think it had upon the minds of 
Admiral Kimmel and General Short as these several messages went 
over their desks warning of impending war, true, but always center- 
ing attention upon the Kra Peninsula, the Philippines, Indochina, 
Borneo, what effect do you think it had on the minds of these two gen- 
tlemen warning them as to war and then always directing their atten- 
tion to another side of the world? Do you think that there was any 
belief that Washington thought that Hawaii might be attacked ? 

General Marshall. I cannot say, sir. They were both long experi- 
enced in the military considerations. They were men of mature 
judgments and they were men of high rank and [3100] _ they 
were in a position of great responsibility. They knew, certainly, why 
Hawaii was set up in the military way as it was. They knew the 
capacity of an enemy to do certain things under certain circumstances. 
We did not have to tell them that. 



1178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, going to your letter which you wrote and had 
delivered to Governor Dewey, on page 2990 of the transcript, Volume 
18, you testified as follows 

General Marshall. 90 ? 

Mr. Gearhart. 90, yes. Line 21. 

General Marshall. 90 ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, 90. 

General Marshall. What line, please ? 

Mr. Gearhardt. Line 22 [reading] : 

The most vital evidence iu the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts 
of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our crypto- 
graph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using 
for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine 
was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a 
wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was 
furnished the State Department — rather than as is popularly supposed, the 
[3101^ State Department providing us with the information — but which 
unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until 
the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the 
following day, December 8th. 

Is that an entirely correct statement ? 

General Marshall. As to December 8 it was not. It was Decem- 
ber 11, apparently, when I saw the messages, I had reference to there. 
As to the others, after all the files were dug out and the various mes- 
sages were checked I think it would be proper to say that that was 
not entirely accurate as to that. 

As to my information at the time I dictated this letter — and under- 
stand me, Mr. Gearhart, this was dictated in about ten minutes time 
while I was in the business of conducting the war from the Army 
side — that was my recollection of an event four years previously with- 
out any records of any kind in front of me, so that at that time I 
thought it was the day after instead of 3 days later that this message 
was shown to me at my desk. I was unaware of that particular mes- 
sage at any other time. 

There were one or two other messages brought to my attention here 
recently which I was unaware of up to the time they were brought to 
my attention. 

[3102] I would like to say that there is an immense mass of data 
involved in this and there were an immense number of things going 
on at this particular time, and at the time of the dictation of this letter 
we were in the throes of the war. I dictated it, as I say, in about 10 
minutes. I had no records before me at the time ; it would take quite 
a while to assemble them. 

I think this is reasonably accurate according to my understanding 
of the facts at the time I dictated the letter. 

Mr. Gearhart. You realized that you were assuming a tremendous 
obligation to convey a true and completely accurate pi*cture of the 
situation to Governor Dewey when you were assuming to, or when 
you were asking him to do what was probably very hard for him to 
consent to do ; is that not correct? 

General Marshall. That is correct. I was thoroughly aware of 
that but I had been in that predicament almost every month through 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1179 

the war and I just did what seemed to me right and that is the best I 
could do. 

Mr. Gearhaet. But now you admit that the statement you made was 
grossly inadequate in respect to having received no intercept of Jap- 
anese messages which pointed directly to Hawaii ? 

General Marshall. I wouldn't say this is grossly inaccurate. I 
should say the statement as made here is in- [3103] accurate, 
but only in the matter of three days. It would have no bearing, in 
general, on the main issue. I made this for the protection of the con- 
duct of our operations by our troops. I did not make it with any 
regard whatever to a Congressional investigation. 

Mr. Gearhart. In order that the record may be complete, I will ask 
you a rather long question now to which I would like to have your very 
careful attention. I intend to read from page 12 of exhibit 2, a mes- 
sage from Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24th, intercepted and 
decoded on October 9, 1941. "Secretly Secret." [Beading from Ex- 
hibit No. 2 :] 

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along 
the following lines insofar as possible : 

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. 
(We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.) 

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. 

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This 
area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.) 
Area C. East Loch. 
Area D. Middle Loch. 
[310/;] Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes. 

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you 
report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tried up at wharves, buoys 
and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like 
to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along 
side the same wharf.) 

From Honolulu to Tokvo dated 29 September 1941, decoded October 
19,1941. [Reading:] 

Honolulu to Tokyo #178. 

Re your #083* 

(Strictly secret) 

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels : 

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message to 
Washington #48**) : KS. 

2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier) : KT. 

3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV. 

4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG, (East and west sides will be differentiated 
by A and B respectively. 

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco. 

\3105'\ There are some markings on it. 
I have another message from Tokyo to- 



Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I should think there ought to be the 
complete message read. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, in the low^er left hand corner is an asterisk. 

Mr. Murphy. And up above "083" and there is a note at the bottom 
it is not available. 

Mr. Gearhart, "jSTot available" asterisk "available" and then 
"dated 21 August." Lower down : "JD-1 : 5730 23312." Over in the 
righthand corner, "(D) Trans, 10-10-41 (X)." 



1180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Another message from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu (Kiyoji) 15 No- 
vember 1941 (reading) : 

#111 

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make 
your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although 
you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy. 

In the lower right hand corner: "(Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S." 
In the lower left hand corner : "JD-1 : 6991 25644." 

Another message from Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo, November 18, 
1941, decoded December 6, 1941, reading as follows: 

#222. 

[S106] 1. The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 15th were as I 
told you in my #219a on that day. 
Area A" — A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port. 
Area C<= — 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor. 

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, 
or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, 
one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks KS. 4 merchant vessels were 
at anchor in Area D**. 

3. At 10 : 00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed 
entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows : In a single file at a distance 
of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl 
Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, 
to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 
degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers 
entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side. 

Relayed to . 

a. — Available, dated November 14. Code under study, 
b — Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. 

[3/07] c— East Loch, 
d — Middle Loch. 

In the lower left-hand corner : "Army 25817." In the lower right- 
hand corner : "Trans. 12/6/41 (2) ." 

Another message from Tokyo (Togo) November 18, 1941, to Hono- 
lulu (reading) : 

#113. 

Please report on the following areas as to vessels, anchored therein : Area 
"N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay — "Manila Bay" is circled by a pen and up to one 
side "Honolulu" is written — and the Areas Adjacent thereto. 

(Make your investigation with great secrecy.) 

Lower left-hand corner : "a — Probably means Mamala Bay." What 
is Mamala Bay? Is that in the Hawaiian Islands? 

General M.\rshai-l. I think it is, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Lower right-hand corner: "Trans. 12/5/41 (S)." 
Lower left-hand corner : "Army 25773." 

Another message from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu dated November 
20, 1941. 

#111 Strictly Secret. 

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet — bases in the neighborhood of 
the Hawaiian military reservation. 

[3108] Lower left-hand corner : "Army 25694 JD 7029." Lower 
right-hand corner: "Trans. 12-4-41 (S)." 

One more, from Tokyo to Honolulu, 29 November 1941 (reading) : 
ing): 

#122. 

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future 
will you also report even when there are no movements. 



i 



PROCEEDINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 1181 

In the lower left-hand corner : "JD-1 : 7086 25823." In the lower 
right-hand corner "(Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)." 

Then appear other messages which were translated after the sixth 
day. 

So that it is quite apparent from the reading of those messages 
that were received, decoded, and placed on your desk, read or not 
read, tliat many messages directing the attention of our military and 
naval authorities to Hawaii had been received, is that not correct? 

General Marshall. You stated, Mr. Gearhart, as I understand you, 
that it was quite evident that all those messages were placed on my 
desk. I have no recollection of that. I have a very definite recollec- 
tion that the message on page 22 of the same exhibit was the one 
which I had in mind when I was writing to Governor Dewey. It was 
from Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo and bore the December 4th date 
and it is that Navy [ol09] message which was referred to in 
my testimony yesterday. I had a definite recollection of that par- 
ticular message, and I have also a very definite recollection it came to 
my attention after the event and it shows here it was translated on the 
11th of December. 

The messages which you have just read I had no recollection of 
whatever at the time. In fact, I first read them in the 2 days when 1 
was getting ready for this hearing here. 

[3110] The Chairman. Are you through, Congressman? 

Mr, Gearhart. General, in conclusion, I direct your attention to the 
report of the Army board. I haven't the official publication, but I have 
here the publication of the United States News of September 1, 1945. 
On page 56 of that particular printing, paragraph 2, "The Chief of 
Staff of the Army, Gen. George C. Marshall, failed in his relations 
with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars: 

(a) To keep the Comiuanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully 
advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an 
increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had 
an abundance and Short had little. 

Wliat have you to say to that ? 

General Marshall. Very much what I have said previously in 
answer to your question, sir, that we had given General Short a direc- 
tive to do something which was an alert against the possibility or prob- 
ability of war. He was a responsible commander; he had a definite 
task; he had indicated the various concerns he had in regard to that 
task; they were clear in our minds, and this mass of data which poured 
in here would normally, I think, merely impose an additional burden 
on him to undertake the analysis of it, which was [3111] going 
on at the same time back here. 

He had a direction to do something ; he had a direction to do some- 
thing, a command direction for an alert. Now, the question of how 
much additional information should go to him is a matter of judgment. 
As a command direction, I think only the December 7 message of 
1 p. m. applied. 

As to the information which would be passed to his G-2 from the 
G-2 of the War Department, there -is a question of judgment as to 
how much of that would be desirable. 

I would say offhand that the messages you just read to me would 
have been helpful to General Short, but particularly more so to 
Admiral Kimmel. 



1182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Reading further from the report : 

(b) To send additional instructions to tlie Commanding General of the Hawai- 
ian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the 
import of General Short's reply of November 27, which indicated clearly that 
General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 
27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war. 

What have you to say to that ? 

General Marshall. I have nothing to add to what I have ah-eady 
said to you, Mr. Gearhart. 
Mr, Gearhart. Reading further from the report : 

[3112] (c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6 and the 
early morning of December 7, the critical information indicating an almost im- 
mediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this. 

Wliat have you to say to that ? 

General Marshall, I have nothing to add to what I have already 
said in regard to that, except possibly this, that the first 13 sections 
of that message I do not believe had any specific bearing one way or 
the other on General Short's situation and responsibility with regard 
to the alert command direction that he had already received. 

Mr. Gearhart. Reading further : 

(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Com- 
mand between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the immediate threat 
of war. 

What have you to say to that ? 

General Marshall. I have only this to say, sir, that we had no 
intimation that that command was not ready, and I think we had 
every reason to believe that it was ready. With the rapidity of in- 
vestigations that later became possible, or inspections that later be- 
came possible through the ease of air flight, some might have gone 
out there, but at that time it was not as simple a matter as it became 
later, 

[SllS] Incidentally, Mr, Gearhart, I went out to the Hawaiian 
Department myself at an earlier date while General Herron was in 
command, and I think I know the Chief of Staff who did go out there 
prior to the war, and I spent about a week going through every phase 
of their preparations against attack from the air and against attack 
from the ground. 

I did not go into the details of the Naval concerns in Pearl Harbor 
itself. 

I did go out, though, specifically to make certain that on the arrival 
of the fleet, in a maneuver which was to take place by, I believe, sub- 
marine action largely and a few destroyers on the Hawaiian side, and 
the fleet coming from the west coast on the fleet side, to make certain 
that our heavy bombers were involved in the program regarding 
which I was, sir, at some doubt, and that was arranged, and that was 
carried out in that operation, to make it a joint affair for the better 
cooperation and organization of the Hawaiian defense. 

So I was aware of the plans that were in effect at the time General 
Herron — who was General Short's predecessor — was in command, by 
actual personal investigation. 

I was aware shortly prior to that, while I was head of the War 
Plans Division in the summer and early fall of 1938, of the actual war 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1183 

plans regarding Hawaii. I was only aware [31i4^ thereafter, 
with General Short's assumption of command, as indicated by the 
letters General Short himself sent me and by the discussions that 
came up, brought up by the Air Corps in relation to General Short's 
arrangements with the Navy, as to the control of the reconnaissance 
over water, and I had no reason to believe that that command was 
anything other than highly efficient and alert. 

That is my view of it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Thank you, General. That is all. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator, before we begin, may I call attention to what I think was 
an inadvertent mistake made by Congressman Gearhart in one of his 
questions when he assumed that the 13 parts of the 14-part message 
and pilot message were all received here on the 6th of December. I 
refer to page 248 of this pamphlet containing these Pearl Harbor de- 
coded messages,^ and you will find that the pilot message was trans- 
lated in Washington on the 7th of December instead of the 6th. 

Mr. Gearhart. I may have been mistaken, but I was under the im- 
pression that there was a message that came on the 6th which carried 
information to the effect that there would be a directive at 1 : 00 o'clock, 
as it turned out, on the following day. 

Mr. Gesell. That is at page 238, No. 901. 

[olio] Senator Ferguson. I show you Exhibit 41, which shows 
that the pilot message was decoded, translated and typed at the Army 
SIS the 6th of December. 

The Chairman. I am confused with the message on page 248, 
which reads as follows : 

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if 
possible to the Secretary of State) our i*eply to the United States at 1: 00 p. m. 
on the 7th, your time. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the eventual message. 

The Chairman. All right. That correction will be made. 

Go ahead, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. General, in order that we may clear up some 
points and in order that we may ascertain what was known in the 
field, the various fields, and what was known here in Washington, 
that we may, as a committee, ascertain why our forces at Hawaii 
were surprised, I want to ask you some questions. 

I would like to have you refer to Exhibit 42, on page 2 of that 
exhibit. I will ask you whether or not you were the Commanding 
General of the Field Forces? 

General Marshall. I was, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did that include Hawaii? 

General Marshall. That did, sir. 

[3116] Senator Ferguson. You were directly over General 
Short then, as I understand it. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the purpose of the Field Force in Hawaii 
was to defend Hawaii, defend the island where Pearl Harbor was, 
and the fleet, if the fleet was in? 

1 Exhibit No. 1. 



1184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now the second part of that exhibit indicates 
that if you were absent, then your Deputy Chief of Staff was in 
charge, is that correct? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, What is meant by you being absent? 

General Marshall. I imagine the best interpretation I can give 
you on that is "would be available," was I available or not. I say 
definitely if I am not in Washington I am absent, there is no question 
whatever about that. 

Senator Ferguson. There isn't any question of availability? 

General Marshall. I would think so, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, would you say you were avail- 
able on the morning of the 7th when you were horseback riding? 

General Marshall. In one sense, yes; in another sense, no. They 
could. not speak to me until they located me. 

Senator Ferguson. Correct. So under this directive your 
[3117] Deputy Chief of Staff would be able to act ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct, is it not? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I must say there, though, Senator, 
in fairness to him, that if he knew I was on an hour's absence he 
would have quite a problem to decide whether he would take action 
then or wait until the expiration of the hour. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to get it right there. How far were 
you at any particular time on that morning from your residence? 

General Marshall. I would say the present site of the Pentagon. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me? 

General Marshall. I would say the present site of the Pentagon. 
That was the most distant point of the horsebi'.ck trail I took. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not be over 3 miles then from your 
residence at any time? 

General Marshall, Approximately that. 

Senator Fercuson. So you would have felt that the Deputy Chief of 
Staff could have, if he desired, located you because you were within 
3 miles of your residence? 

Genei-al Marshall. I presume so ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did anyone know your custom of riding 
[3118] as to where you rode? 

General Marshall. At the stables they knew. I do not know as 
Genei-al Bryden, my deputy, knew specifically where I rode. I never 
rode with him, I do not think. The variations from that were limited 
to following the trail along the Potomac down toward the present 
National Airport, but that was the only variation. 

Senator Ferguson. You had regular places to ride? 

General Marshall. W^ell, you are very much limited, you have to 
ride there unless you cross the river. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you. General, you have stated 
here that Hawaii was alerted, that the Philippines was alerted. 

General Marshall. Correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. V/as Washington alerted? Was your office 
alerted ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1185 

General Marshall. We had an officer on duty at night in the Sec- 
retary to the General Staff's office who received any important mes- 
sages and routed them to the proper person. I am quite cei'tain Gen- 
eral Gerow will be able to testify he had a similar officer in the War 
Plans Division to receive any important messages that might come in. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I want to get to this: Your office was 
alerted and you had a man there all night that [S1J9] could 
have acted, is that correct? 

General Marshall. You used .the expression "alerted," sir. That 
had been the state of affairs for quite some time. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, as we go along, if I use a word 
that is not correct in Army parlance, will -you correct me? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I meant by that we had been doing 
that all along, just as I had been keeping the telephone open at 10 
o'clock in the house. 

Senator Ferguson. Would not this be true that on Sunday morning 
your office was alerted, or on the alert, the same as Hawaii, and th^'tt 
the Deputy Chief of Staff would be in a position to act? 

General IMarshall. I presume so ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now was G-2 alerted? 

General Marshall. You will have to ask General Miles that. I do 
not know the details. I do know specifically about the War Plans 
Division ; because I had so much business with it I am aware of it. 

[31W] Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, he was a deputy 
under you ? 

General Marshall. He was Assistant Chief of Staff. A deputy 
operates directly under me. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. 

General Marshall. These others function up to him, or sometimes 
directly to me. 

Senator Ferguson. He is classed as 

General Marshall. He handles the mass of ordinary business and 
acts for me in my absence. 

Senator Ferguson. Would he get his alert from you? 

General Marshall. He would have if I had given him a specific 
alert. He was responsible with the Secretary of the General Staff. 
The arrangements were such in that section of the War Department 
that there was a continuity throughout the night. 

Senator FErousoN. Here is what I w^ant to get at, if I can, by 
questions, to find out the facts. All I am trying to ascertain is, what 
are the facts. 

On the 27th, when the message was sent to Hawaii, was G-2, War 
Plans, and your office alerted so that they knew that war was imminent ? 
As I understand it, Hawaii was notified that war was inuninent. 
Now, were these respective officers oMa-2, G-1 — War Plans was what? 
G-1? 

[3121'] General Marshall. Well, it hasn't any number, sir. War 
Plans is the designation. 

Senator Ferguson. Was G-2, War Plans, and the Chief of Staff 
organization alerted at the same time? 

Genera] Marshall, They were all aware of the critical situation and 
of the issuance of a directive alerting the overseas theaters in the 
Pacific, 



1186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senater Ferguson. Then, how do you account for the fact, if they 
were alerted, that the 13 parts of the'^14-part message— and we under- 
stand each other on that — 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson (continuing) — and the pilot message were not 
delivered to the Chief of Staff? Who would be the man that was 
authorized to act on it, on the evening of tlie 6th as the Navy had done 
with their 13-part message? Have you ever looked into it? Have 
you ever looked into that question to ascertain why that was not 
done? 

General Marshall. I did not look into it at all, until here about 
two days ago, or three days ago, at the time General Miles was testify- 
ing. That was my first opportunity to go into these records. The 
question of the delivery to me of the first 13 parts of that messagCj I 
think is a matter of judgment. The final, and fourteenth part is quite 
different, and that I believe did not become [3122] available 
until the next morning. 

I want to get myself straight, Senator. You spoke of a pilot 
message. 

Senator Ferguson. The pilot message was merely that they would 
give a time of delivery, not the 1 o'clock message. 

General Marshall. I understand, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 238 of exhibit 1. 

General Marshall. Yes; I understand it now. 

Senator Ferguson. I wish, General, that you would always insist on 
completing your answers. I am sometimes a little fast with the next 
question. 

General Marshall. I understand it entirely now. 

Senator Ferguson. General, who was in charge, or who is charged 
with operations in peacetime? 

General Marshall. There is a section, or there was a section of the 
General Staff, called the Operations Section, and that was the section 
from which maneuvers were directed, from which the simulated war 
training was operated. However, that was not the section of the Gen- 
eral Staff which dealt with actual war measures. Those were dealt 
with in the War Plans Division, which is now called the Operations 
Division, and is virtually the GHQ. 

Senator Ferguson. I have in mind in peacetime. 

[3123] General Marshall. I am speaking of peacetime, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when would you say your regulations were 
peacetime, and when did they go over to wartime, so the committee can 
interpret this Exhibit 42 ? 

General Marshall. In one sense, they did not go over; they 
remained in their status quo. What I was trying to explain to the 
preliminary questions was we had a section of the staff called Opera- 
tions. That deals, however, with peacetime training operations, 
maneuvers, things of that sort, and organization, but the war measures 
were handled in the War Plans Division. 

The war plans were in the War Plans Division. 

The action of the Chief of Staff in relation to those plans would 
be prepared, presumably, unless he did it himself directly in the War 
Plans Division, and not at all in the Operations Section. That is a 
misnomer, so far as the war situation is concerned. So it is the War 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1187 

Plans Division which is. now the OPD, the operations of the General 
Staff. 

Senator Ferguson. So that we may be able, when we read these 
various papers, to know when we were in peace and when we were in 
war, would you say, the dividing line, the line of demarcation, was the 
attack, or bombing of Pearl Harbor ? 

[3124] General Marshall. That was the definite subdivision 
dividing the line between a known status of peace and a known status 
of war, but so far as the operations of the General Staff are concerned, 
the war measures, the war plans, the war advice to the Chief of Staff 
came directly from the War Plans Division. 

[31£o] Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, we were 
acting on a war basis. 

General Marshall. In relation to those matters; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And when did we go on that basis? 

General Marshall. When you use the expression "war basis" there, 
you have me a little bit in difficulty, because always the War Plans 
iDivision was concerned with war plans, with discussions of the prob- 
ability of war as to those plans, and the preparation of any instruc- 
tions to be issued by the Chief of Staff regarding our war plans. 
They are not operations, of course, in the sense of actual movements, 
and deployments until you actually engage in war. 

But the directions concerning the matter would be generated as 
a rule in the War Plans Division, unless the Chief of Staff did that 
himself. 

So from that point of view there was no change in the General 
Staff between the peacetime operation and the wartime operation, 
so far as the responsibility and the method of doing business was 
concerned, between the War Plans Division and the Chief of Staff. 

Senator Ferguson. General, on page 9 of Exhibit 42, under "b," 
I wish you would locate the directive, or the duty that would make 
General Gerow responsible for the reply of Short, where he stated — • 
that is in Short's reply to [312G'\ your message of the 27th — 
that he had alerted against sabotage, and liaison with the Navy. 
Now will you point out where AVPD, the War Plans Division, was 
made responsible, in this exhibit, just which one of these made Gerow 
responsible for action on the Short message? 

General Marshall. Before answering that. Senator, I would like 
to say this : It was General Gerow's section in which the details of 
those matters would be concerned and would be carried out, but the 
responsibility was mine as well as General Gerow's. 

Now as to this particular paragraph of this section — I will just 
refer to page 9 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; and anything else that you want. 

General Marshall. I was trying to get the section number. It 
would be to a large extent under, 1 think, subparagraph b (3), "The 
initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the movement 
of troops to execute the initial deployment to be the duty of the 
Operations and Training Division)." 

Also part of it comes under (2), "Estimate of forces required and 
times at which they may be neded under the various possible condi- 
tions nessitating the use of troops in the national defense." 

It does not specifically mention the exact point you are bringing 
up. 



1188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[3127] Senator Ferguson. That is what T was getting at. There 
is nothing in the directive here that specifically covers Gerow's re- 
sponsibility on the Short reply? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir, in this. 

Senator Ferguson. And under the section, as I understand it, as 
I say it, it was pait of your responsibility. You mean the Com- 
manding General of the Field was over Short, and therefore you had 
a right to command him? 

General MarsiL'VLL. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. That is in Army parlance? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Gerow have any right to issue orders to 
Short on a command basis? 

(reneral Marshall. Certainly, normallv. no. 

Senator Ferguson. In peacetime. T change my question and add, 
l)efore you answer, in peacetime did he have any right to issue a com- 
mand to Short? 

General Marshall. It would have required quite an assumption of 
authority on his part to do that without some confirmation from a 
senior officer. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, that province was in you as a 
senior officer, or in the case of your absence, it was in your deputy? 

Genei'al Marshall. That is correct. As to mere matters [Sl^S] 
of detail, of course, we communicated back and forth. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did Gerow have authority to order Rain- 
bow 5, or any other War Plan into effect ? 

General Marshall. He did not, sir. He would have had to assume 
it. 

Senator Ferguson. Who had authority to order a war plan, talking 
about Rainbow, or any other order, into effect ? 

General Marshall. The President, the Secretary of War, and my- 
self, and in my absence, the deputy. 

Senator Ferguson. General, I would like to go into how the Gen- 
eral Sv'atf is made up. 

You went in sometime in 1930, is that correct ? 

General Marshall. I joined the War Department General Staff on 
July 6, 1938, as head of War Plans Division. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. In October of 1938 I was relieved from that job 
and appointed Deputy Cliief of Staff of the General Staff. I held 
that office until I became Chief of Staff on the first of July, 1939. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, do I understand, the first of July, 1939, 
you became the Chief of Staff, and at that time was General Miles 
inG-2? 

\3129] General Marshall. No, sir, he was not. 

Senator Ferguson. Was General Gerow in War Plans? 

General Marshall. He was in War Plans but he was not the Chief 
of Section. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was the Chief of Section? 

General Marshall. General George V. Strong. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he a brigadier general ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. He was a brigadier general. Colonel 
E. R. Warner McCabe was the G-2 of the War Department General 
Staff at that time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1189 

Senator Ferguson. Who was at Hawaii? General Herron? 

General Marshall. General Herron, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, does the Chiefof Staff have the right to 
select his own G-2, his War Plans officer, his deputy? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that done in this particular case? Did 
you select them? « 

General Marshall. I found Colonel McCabe as G-2 when I be- 
came Chief of Staff; and I continued him as such until sometime — 
until he was relieved by General Miles. I found General Strong as 
a brigadier general in the War Plans Division when I joined it as 
Chief of War Plans Division. 

When I left the Division to become Deputy Chief of [SISO] 
Staff", he automatically became head of War Plans Division. 

When I became Chief of Staff — my first direct appointment was 
the Deputy Chief of Staff, who had previously been the G-1 Per- 
sonnel Officer — that was General Gasser. 

From time to time I replaced people for various reasons as their 
tours expired, or as they retired, and General McCabe, Colonel McCabe 
rather, now General McCabe, was replaced by General Miles, and 
General Strong was replaced by General Gerow. I think. 

General Gerow was replaced by General Eisenhower. General 
Miles w\as replaced by General Lee, shortly thereafter by General 
Strong. But those were my appointments. 

Senator Ferguson. General Miles has told us that he was Acting 
Assistant for the Chief of Staff in G-2. 

General Marshall. That, I think. Senator, was merely a techni- 
cality, because under the law we couldn't detail him directly on the 
General Staff. 

Senator Ferguson. Why were you not able to put him on the Gen- 
eral Staff? 

General Marshall. Well, I can't think of it right offliand but it was 
merely a technicality. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it one of the qualifications that he didn't 
have, the term of office ? 

General Marshall. Something of that sort. I think it [3131] 
pertained to how much duty he had had in Washington; something 
of that sort. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that also true of General Gerow? 

General Marshall. I don't think it was, sir; but my memory is 
not clear on that. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there any more important deputy during 
this increasing tension that we were having, than your G-2? 

General Marshall. Well, I should say that it lay between the G-2 
and the head of the War Plans Division. 

Senator Ferguson. So the combination of those two, they were, 
in your scheme of things, they were very important? 

General Marshall. Very important, indeed. 

Senator Ferguson. And were you at all times satisfied with the 
work in G-2 ? 

General Marshall. As far as I was aware of the details of the 
work, I was satisfied. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you also satisfied with the work in War 
Plans? 



1190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. I was. 

Senator Ferguson. So that np until the Tth day of December, you 
were entirely satisfied as to the heads of these two offices? 
[3132] General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, prior to the 27th, or let's say between the 
SiYth of November 1941, and the 7th day of December 1941, that is, the 
period between the warning message and tiie attack, was there any- 
one in the War Department that made a staff survey of the incoming 
messages, talking about the magic, to see whether the alerts were being 
carried out in relation to the magic? 

General Marshall. What were those dates. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. The 27th of November and the 7th of December 
1941. That is between the war warning message and the attack. 

General Marshall. But when was this period that I was to re- 
ply to? 

Senator Ferguson. That is the period. Did you make any survey 
during that period, when you had alerted these men, to see whether 
or not you were getting them at the moment they were being trans- 
lated? 

General Marshall. Not that I am aware of. 

Senator Ferguson. Could you tell us, General, if there was any 
reason why General Miles left G-2? 

General Marshall. I don't — he was relieved, I believe, in February. 
That is my recollection of the thing. I made several changes in the 
Chief of Staff. These [3133] people had been working very 
hard. We were reorganizing the whole War Department, and Gen- 
eral Gerow was given an opportunity with troops and General Miles 
an opportunity of territorial command. I think that is about the 
condition. 

Senator Ferguson. It was then in no way connected with the opera- 
tion in his office ? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. In relation to any of the messages, delivery of 
them, or not? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. It had nothing to do with that? 

General Marshall. Nothing to do with that ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would the same apply to General Gerow? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that the record may be clear on that. 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

As to General Gerow, my difficulty with him was that he con- 
scientiously overworked and stayed at the office late at night, and he 
was, I thought, exhausting himself, and that the thing couldn't go on. 
Therefore, I gave him what everybody in the War Department wanted, 
a troop command, I think the Twenty-ninth Division. I had brought 
General Eisenhower in [3134] a few days after December 7 
and given him more or less direct responsibility over all Pacific affairs. 

General Gerow not only had the affairs of the war as it pertained 
to the Atlantic, and, of course, the responsibility of General Eisen- 
hower in the Pacific, but he also went through a very gruelling experi- 
ence at the time the British Chiefs of Staff came here in the latter part 
of December. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMFITEE 1191 

So, he was pretty well exhausted, and I therefore gave him a troop 
command as both an opportunity and as a rest. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, there was no one specifically 
designated to see that the magic was translated and put into your 
hands, and that the alerts were properly carried out? 

General JNIarshall. You use the expression "specifically desig- 
nated." 

There was an organizational arrangement that had been in exist- 
ence. For example, you speak of the reply from the theater command- 
ers to the alert. That would be rather directly in the subsection of 
the War Plans Division, which had immediate charge of all details 
with reference to the Pacific. That section was headed by Colonel 
Bundy, who later lost his life when I tried to rush him out to Hawaii 
shortly after the attack. 

[31S5] Then the main, the drafting work, the checking work, the 
filing work, the reference work would be carried out as a matter of 
procedure in that section for General Gerow. Then General Gerow 
would either bring it or send it to me as Chief of Staff. 

Just as in G-2, my recollection of the status was that Colonel Brat- 
ton was in immediate charge of all magic affairs and was responsible, 
of course, to General Miles. General Miles was responsible for the 
bringing of these things to my attention, but in many instances Colonel 
Bratton, or at least, in instances, Colonel Bratton brought them in 
himself. 

But the system and procedure started in the section under Colonel 
Bratton, just as the Pacific affairs started in the section of War Plans 
Division under Colonel Bundj^ 

Senator Ferguson. Then it is true that General Miles should have 
had access to all intelligences, State Department, Army, Navy, and all 
intelligence ? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. He was the receipt source 
and the diffusion source of all intelligence matters in relation to the 
enemy. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he also the evaluator of such intelligence? 

General Marshall. He was responsible for the evaluation which 
\vould be done by a group in his section. 

[3136] Senator Ferguson. Now, was that, the evaluation of 
these various instruments, all sources, ever taken awaj^ from General 
Miles in G-2? 

General Marshall. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that jonr office, you as 
Chief of Staff, depended on General Miles' estimate of the intelligence ? 

General Marshall. You use the word "depend." He submitted 
his views, probably which in turn had been submitted to him by the 
section which did the laborious analysis, and with which he might or 
might not agree, or might or might not modify, and that estimate 
came to me at such times as he thought it was proper that I should 
be brought up to date or in response to my definite request, and I 
accepted it or modified it in my own mind, but I had the benefit of 
that advice. 

Senator Ferguson. Before they went out would you approve them ? 

General Marshall. In some cases they were sent to the President. 
There I either approved it and sent it to the President or expressed 

79716 — 46— pt. S 15 



1192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

myself so it was clear, I tliink, that I was submitting it as a view. 
Whether I expressed concurrence or not I couldn't recall in each 
instance. 

Senator FerotTsgn. Were there any evaluations, first, [3137] 
between the 1st of November and the 27th of November ? 

General Marshall, I will have to look at the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at that and check. 

General Marshall. The record shows that on November 1 there 
was an evaluation to the Chief of Staff from General Miles on the 
subject of a possible Japanese drive into Yunnan. 

Senator Ferguson. You made a report to the President about the 
5th of November on the same subject. 

General Marshall. I made a report. 

On November 2 there was a G-2 estimate on the Far Eastern situ- 
ation addressed to the Chief of Staff — no, that was addressed to the 
War Plans Division. Whether or not I got a copy doesn't show. 

On November 13 there was an estimate, signed'^ by General Miles, 
in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, again on the subject of a 
possible Japanese drive into Yunnan. That estimate was distributed 
to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, Under 
Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary 
of War, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, the Chief of Staff, Co- 
ordinator of Information, Chief of the Army Air Forces, Mr. Lauchlin 
Currie, who was the President's representative regarding Chinese 
matters, Division of Defense Aid Reports, Director of Naval Intelli- 
gence, the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, that was [SISS] 
General Gerov/, GHQ, that would be General McNair, Chief of Air 
Corps — that would be, I think. General Arnold. 

Senator Ferguson. General Arnold at that time? 

General IVIarshall. I don't know whether it was General Arnold 
or not. 

And General Embick. 

Senator Ferguson, At least that one would be approved by you. 

Do you tliink any were delivered to the President without your 
approval ? 

General Marshall. I would assum.e that I would — well, certainly 
would have struck out anything that I thought was entirely wrong 
in it. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore if it went through it had your appro- 
val insofar as you struck it out ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Any others. General? 

General Marshall. One dated November 26, on the subject of 
Japanese naval task force. A memorandum for the Chief of Staff. 
Its distribution shows the : Secretary of War, Assistant Chief of Staff, 
WPD — ^that is General Gerow— I. B, file, the Far East Section, and 
the Record Section. That refers to his own. General Miles' depart- 
ment. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you approve — before it would [3139] 
go to the Secretary of War, it would come over your desk ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. Normally I would give him the bene- 
fit of what I thought and if I thought it was important I would have 
spoken to the Secretary or written him a note. 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1193 

Here is one on November 27, a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 
on the subject of recent developments in the Far East. 

The Chairman. Might I ask the committee if it is willing to sit a 
little later today, say 12 : 30, before recessing? 

Senator Ferguson. I have no objection. 

Tlie Chairman. General, do you have any objection? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

The Chairman. "We will proceed to 12: 30 then. 

General Marshall. That estimate, in a memorandum for the Chief 
of Staff, on the recent developments in the Far East, dated November 
27, was delivered to the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of 
War, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Chief of Army Air 
Forces, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, Director of Naval Intelligence, 
and GHQ, which is General McNair. 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't been reading that these went to 
the Director of Naval Intelligence except in this last one. Do you 
recall whether any went to the Navy? 

General Marshall. I do not presume they did unless it [5140] 
shows in this. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, were there any between — is that all up to 
that date into November? 

General Marshall. No, one more. November 29, memorandum 
for the Chief of Staff, on the subject Brief Periodic Estimate of the 
Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. The message of November 1 went to the Office of 
Naval Intelligence, and the message of November 13 did, I believe. 

Senator Ferguson. We would be glad to have that correction on the 
record. 

General Marshall. This memorandum covers operations and the 
situation throughout the world with the various estimates of proba- 
bilities or possibilities. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall whether any of these reports indi- 
cated an air attack on Hawaii or any kind of an attack on Hawaii ? 

General Marshall. Just at the moment I do not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that all between those dates? 

General Marshall. That is all, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, were there any, to your knowledge, called 
to your attention between the 1st of December and the [Sl-^l^ 

7th of December ? 

General Marshall, There was one on December 6, estimate of the 
Japanese strength in Indochina. 

Senator Ferguson. Do vou know when that one reachel you, item 
29? 

General Marshall. I presume on December 6. I don't know. I 
suppose the records of my office in the War Department show that. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, that one would have no evidence in it 
whatever of any idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor? 

General Marshall. It is devoted entirely to Indochina. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. Then there is another on the 6th of December, 
estimate of Japanase air and ground forces in Indochina, Thailand, 



1194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and Formosa. That was distributed also to the Secretary of War, 
the Assistant Chief of Staff, General Gerow. 

Senator Ferguson. General, would you say that you had any 
knowledge over and above those estimates, as far as intelligence was 
concerned ? 

General Marshall. I think I would say that they reflected the 
general state of information which I had. Whether or not I had 
picked up any additional points of view from my own personal read- 
ing of magic I couldn't say. I think in general \31Ji2'\ that 
is the summation of the information I had at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any case where you ever took 
up with General Miles magic as to your interpretation of it, that you 
thought that he may interpret it any other way ? 

General Marshall. I don't recall any, sir. I have had a gi-eat 
many discussions regarding magic along that line, but when they 
were and what they were I don't recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you give to General Miles the intel- 
ligence, for instance, that you obtained through the Secretary of War, 
that he may have obtained from the Secretary of State at the War 
Cabinet? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How did General Miles get the information of 
the War Cabinet? 

General Marshall. That would be presumably only through my 
giving him the information myself, other than his liaison through his 
officers with the Department of State, but I don't think that liaison 
would give him information of that particular character, so he would 
be more or less dependent, I think, on my personally telling him what 
I personally had received from Mr. Stimson, or I had gathered by 
my presence at the conferences. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, take the conference that Secretary Hull 
talked about, where he was at a Cabinet meeting and he [<?i>^] 
called it to the attention of all of the imminence of war and Secretary 
Knox went out and made a speech, Secretary Welles made a speech, 
but he says here he didn't make it in relation to that Cabinet meeting, 
would that kind of an intelligence, that kind of information, go to 
General Miles, specifically? 

General IMarshall. There was not a specific routing for that pro- 
cedure. It would depend, I think, on m}^ telling him personally. We 
had a great many meetings at that time. We had discussions before 
the Joint Board at which, I think. General Miles was present, and a 
great many in my office. But there was no direct routing routine 
that would have carried that message from the discussion at the 
White House to General Miles personally. 

Senator Ferguson. Well now, if you eliminate that kind of a mat- 
ter from these evaluations, what do we have from these evaluations, 
if we don't take all of the details from the Secretary of State's office, 
which was a great source of intelligence, how would we get anything 
from these evaluations? 

General Marshall. I think, though General Miles can testify di- 
rectly, I think General Miles had daily contact, through a liaison 
agreement, with the State Department, they have now and I assume 
they did then, but even that, Senator, I do not think would give them 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1195 

the product of our meetings, [3U4] personal meetings with 
the President, such as you just referred to. 

Senator Ferguson. How often did this War Cabinet meet. From 
the 15th of November to the 1st of December, how often would they 
meet? I mean, to your knowledge. Was it frequent or not? 

General Marshall. Well, the actual meetings with the President 
of the entire group were not frequent in the sense that the meetings 
between the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. 
Hull were frequent and almost daily, and the attendance of Admiral 
Stark and I or one other, were. 

Senator Ferguson. How often would you say you saw the Presi- 
dent between the 15th of November and the 1st of December? 

General Marshall. I think the record will show that, but 

Mr. Geseix. They are shown on the exhibit. 

General Marshall. Can I see that, please? Will you give me the 
dates again? 

Senator Ferguson. The 15th of November to the 1st of December, 

General Marshall. I saw the President on the 15th of November, 
on the 25th of November, on the 28th of November, on the 7th of 
December. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you have no recollection, this sheet does 
not show any conferences between you and the President [3H5^ 
from the 28th to the 7th, 28th of November to the 7th of December? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the conference you had with the Presi- 
dent after the attack, at 7 o'clock? 

General Marshall. That was after the attack. I think the date 
for that conference was set before the attack. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did not see him until after the attack? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, General, about when the first 
matter of the breaking of the Japanese code, Avhich was called magic, 
was called to your attention ? 

General Marshall. Do you mean, Senator, my first knowledge that 
there was such a thing as magic? 

Senator Ferguson. Well, yes ; let's have that date first, about when. 

General Marshall. I don't think I was aware of it at all until I 
became Chief of Staff. 

Senator Ferguson. And about the time you became Chief of Staff 
you had this called to your attention, that we were able to get our 
intelligence from a certain source? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that was under G-2, that was their 
[3H6] job? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, as tension grew, were you ever consulted 
or did you confer with anyone in G-2 about the speed on this intelli- 
gence, that it was valuable, there wasn't anything more valuable to 
the Government than that particular source as far as intelligence was 
concerned ? 

General MariShall. My recollection is — I will go back a ways, 
if I may. 

[314^1 When it first came to my attention, as I recall it, G-2, 
then Colonel McCabe, not only explained to me that my predecessor 



1196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

thought it was illegal, but he was always concerned about the main- 
tenance of secrecy and possible carelessness in the handling of the 
papers. 

Of course, at that time there was a great deal of purely diplomatic 
information and no military information as I recall, at that time. 

As the situation changed, of course, the military factor became 
more predominant at least in our minds, and our concern was, as to 
secrecy, most definitely that of protecting the source. 

There were conversations with Colonel McCabe that I recall over 
the difficulty of securing the proper people to do the work, and also, 
I think, with General Miles as to the increasing difficulty and our fear 
that we were going to lose that source through the, you might say, the 
subversive action of at least one individual concerned with the work. 

We were then discussing, as I recall it, the difficulty of securing 
people with the proper talents and qualities, and integrity, and also 
where we could house them so that they could work effectively and at 
the same time not be unduly conspicuous. 

[314s] We continued to have frequent conversations regarding 
the handling of magic, particularly as to its security, and I recall that 
I intervened myself very directly and required that it be locked in a 
pouch and delivered by ])Ouch, the pouch unlocked, and it be read by 
the recipient and put back in the pouch. 

I have no definite recollection of discussing with General Miles their 
inability to keep abreast of these translations and decipherings. I do 
recall faintly conversations concerned with the mass of material which 
presumably had very little import, but which had to be culled away 
from the general lot, so that the important things came to us. 

I might say that I have no definite recollection of pressing General 
Miles to expedite the deciphering and the distribution of magic. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the fact, as shown by our record here, that 
this was received and then it would take as high as 20 days to trans- 
late, was that called to your attention during the time that you were 
getting these messages ? 

General Marshall. Not to my recollection. 

I saw, in the main, these messages that I knew, like those of the 
fateful days of December 7 and 8, were handled at a very high speed, 
it seemed to me, knowing the diffi- [3149] culties involved. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, it was not due to a 
lack of appropriation that you didn't get these messages fast — or was 
it due to that ? 

General Marshall. I would say. Senator, taking a long back sight, 
that it was the general combination of things relating to the entire 
Army, in the building up that we were going through at that time 
from very small groups to much larger groups. 

This, you might say, is a little bit comparable to radar. We could 
collect men and engineers for a regiment in a comparatively short 
time as compared for such a complicated business such as radar. 
That took a long time, and there was a necessity for high selectivity. 

That was very much the case in everything concerned with magic, 
and also we had the difficulty, at that time, of people not being in a 
frame of mind such as is common to almost the entire public in time 
of war, so that you could use then, control them, and get services out 
of them on quite a very much simpler basis than you could at that time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1197 

There were a great many factors like that involved. I would not 
say it was lack of appropriations. 

Senator Ferguson. General, did you know when the first magic 
was distributed to England? 

[3150] General Marshall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When that was taken up with England? 

General Marshall. I do not know when that occurred, sir. Gen- 
eral Miles would have to give you that. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not it was prior to 
any meeting on the ABC or the ABCD arrangement ? 

General Marshall. I don't recall that, sir. I would have to go 
to the records to get it. 

Senator P'erguson. You have no personal knowledge? 

General Marshall. No; I have no personal knowledge of that; 
no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on whose authority could that be done if 
it wasn't called to j'our attention, about that arrangement? 

General Marshall. Well, I would say that the actual exchange of 
such information as that prior to a state of war in which Great Britain 
was an ally would have, I think, undoubtedly been brought to my 
attention, probablj^ that of the Secretary of War, but certainly, I 
think, to my attention. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you any recollection of this being called 
to your attention, this matter of giving to the British this magic, or 
this means of getting the magic ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. It is very hard for me to [3151] 
put my finger on the point when this took place, when this inter- 
change was a matter of business every day. I don't recall that. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true at first there was a grave question 
about whether or not it would be given to the British, whether or not 
we wouldn't keep it and get the information ourselves? 

General Marshall. That would be a consideration, but I believe, 
Senator, what we were more concerned about was obtaining from the 
British the information they had, which was much more extensive 
than ours. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any arrangement between the 
British and America in relation to them giving us other intelligence 
that they didn't get through magic? 

General Marshall. Yes.^ sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And was that distributed to us? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did they also use magic to get intelligence 
and give us what they got out of magic ? 

General Marshall. I wouldn't attempt to answer that. I pre- 
sume they did. 

Senator Ferguson. That is your assumption ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When the intelligence was coming to [SIS^] 
you, it was an over-all intelligence as far as you were concerned? 

General Marshall. It was an over-all intelligence, presumably, as 
far as I was concerned, but I wish to make this comment, that for 
quite a long time we only received the British estimates. We did not 
receive the direct intelligence on which the evaluation was made, as 
the basis for the estimates. 



1198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It was a long period before they gave us the direct material, because 
they were very fearful of our letting them get out of the basis of 
secrecy. 

Finally, and I think we were well into the war, a long ways into the 
war, before they were willing to take the hazard of giving us the direct 
information, which involved, of coui-se, a knowledge of how they 
acquired it. 

13153] Senator Ferguson. So at first we received the estimates. 
Now I will ask counsel, do we have the estimates of the British ? We 
have here given to us the estimates of our Intelligence Department, 
but do we have the British ? 

General Marshall. They were not formal estimates, I think, as a 
rule, of the type that I have been reading here from General Miles. 

Senator Ferguson. No ; they were memoranda. 

General Marshall. But they were evaluations of those things that 
they were getting. 

Senator FEROutiON. Do we have. General Mitchell, the evaluations? 

General Marshall. I am quite certain that would not be in your 
records, sir, because we have been trying to keep that quiet as much 
as we could. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, then, General Marshall, do I understand 
we are not getting every bit, that certain things are being kept quiet 
that Ave are not getting? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I do not mean that at all. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you explain your answer? I must 
have misunderstood you. 

General Marshall, My last answer was that we did not wish to 
disclose the fact that the British had a capacity and a method of 
obtaining information which I referred to in that [SIS^] let- 
ter of Governor Dewey's which has now become public, not that they 
did not give us information. 

Senator Ferguson. What I am wanting to know is 

General Marshall. And now, as I understand it, your question is 
addressed to the fact whether there is some of that information that 
bears on this question? 

Senator Ferguson. On Pearl Harbor. 

General Marshall. I know of none such. I know of one 

Senator Ferguson. How can the committee tell? 

General Marshall. I know of one message, as I recall, that came 
through the State Department, I believe, on the afternoon, I think, 
of December G, but I think that is in the record and that is a British 
estimate specifically regarding the movement of Japanese ships in 
the Gulf of Si am. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now^ do you know. General, that 
Admiralty was given direct information by Intelligence. Do you 
know that to be a fact or not? 

General Marshall. I knew that they were receiving information, 
just as we were receiving a certain amount and that a part was coming 
directly from the Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did your department, G-2, get the Ad- 
miralty information? 

General Marshall. You will have to ask General Miles that. I 
could not testify anything about that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMrriEE 1199 

[31SS] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, General, wouldn't it be 
important when this intelligence came across your desk to know its 
source ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that called to your attention, that we were 
getting this intelligence from Admiralty ? 

General Marshall. I have no distinct recollection of that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have there been any instructions to G-2 that 
we were not to get all the files in relation to everything on Pearl 
Harbor ? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; none whatever. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I do not quite understand that previous 
answer that that probably would not be given to us. 

General Marshall. Well, I must have misled you. I was referring 
specifically to a method, a technique, rather than a record. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, it would be an evaluation. If it was an 
evaluation, it would be in writing? 

General Marshall. Well, Senator, if there is such it is certainly 
now before your group. I do not know just what the details of that 
are. I know that there are no instructions in the War Department to 
hold out any information from you gentlemen; quite the contrary. 

[S1S6] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that prior to August 
15)41 Admiral Kimmel was getting certain diplomatic information? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I was not aware of that that I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not at the time Ad- 
miral Kimmel was getting information prior to August or sometime 
in August that General Short was not getting that information? 

Greneral Marshall. I was not aware of that fact, that what Ad- 
miral Kimmel got was not being made available to General Short. I 
am aware of what General Short was receiving. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did you know of any rule or regu- 
lation that prohibited or delayed or stopped this intelligence going 
to Admiral Kimmel after some time in August ? 

General Marshall. I am not aware of the circumstances of that, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any reason, anything that hap- 
pened in August that would stop that ? 

General Marshall. I am not aware of that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You are not aware of anything that would 
stop that? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first get the information 
[31571 that General MacArthur in the Philippines was getting 
this magic? 

General Marshall. I could not answer that, sir. I know now 
what he was getting and the circumstances under which he was re- 
ceiving it, and I am not able to cast my mind back to that time to 
know exactly what I knew then as to the degree of it. 

In these headquarters, in some of them they had a basis — there 
was this which confuses the question in my own mind ; I knew that 
in the Pacific from sources in Hawaii and in the Philippines and 
presumably, maybe, at the minor stations in Puget Sound, possibly 



1200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR A'n^ACK 

in Alaska and at other places, we had quite largely, the Navy had 
groups who were engaged in intercepting Japanese radio messages, 
but that was done largely for the purpose of locating ship move- 
ments, or locating headquarters from which you might deduce what 
the actual ship movement was. 

Now, that was going on throughout the Pacific. That was the 
naval means of following as closely as they could Japanese shipping, 
possibly their submarines, certainly their larger naval craft. 

There, then, is a confusion in one's mind as to how much of what 
you knew was that and what you might have known that was the 
elaboration of the deciphering of these messages which [3158] 
constituted the basis of magic. 

The messages on which the magic is based were collected through- 
out the Pacific. I should imagine, though I am not the best witness 
on this, that the largest portion of the collection occurred in the Phil- 
ippines because of its proximity to Japan and its ease of interception, 
but it sometimes occurred, as in the instance I believed the record 
will show on the fateful message which gave the hour 1 p. m., Decem- 
ber 7, it was intercepted in the Puget Sound region rather than out 
in the Philippines or out in Hawaii. 

So in my mind, in trying to reconstruct my knowledge of the data, 
coming to that period just prior to December 7, there is a confusion 
as to how much I knew that pertained to these radio intercepts that 
located the movement of vessels, how much that I knew of arrange- 
ments to intercept the Japanese messages rather than to decipher them 
and how much I knew regarding the actual deciphering which I know 
about now. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; but did you know in 1941, in the summer 
of 1941, that General MacArthur had the means of obtaining the magic 
as far as the State Department and various other agencies are con- 
cerned, the so-called purple matter? 

General Marshall. I do not know as I knew it then, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That he was able to get it direct [3159] 
by means of cryptoanalysis in the Philippines? 

General Marshall. I know that now, sir. I do not know to what 
degr.ee I knew it then. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, can you place yourself back in 1941 to 
know now whether or not you knew it then ? I am trying to find out 
what you knew here in Washington of what he knew there ? 

General Marshall. Yes. I am unable to say that, sir. I rather 
think I know now what the naval arrangement was in the Philippines 
as to deciphering through what they called the purple machine of 
magic, at that source, but I do not know how much I knew about that 
then. 

Senator Ferguson. But that would be an important matter and 
would be called to your attention in 1941, would it not? 

General Marshall. If it were known by General Miles, and I am 
not positive whether or not he knew it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I do not want to pass on the evidence of 
General Miles. 

General Marshall. I am telling you 

Senator Ferguson. As to whether or not he knew that General 
MacArthur had this means. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1201 

General Marshall. Well, my reference to General Miles- 



Senator Ferguson. But I would like to have you, or if someone can 
for you, to get General Miles' testimony on that [3160] point 
and show it to you, rather than have me pass on it. 

General Marshall. Well, I have not read it, sir. I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. It is 12 : 30, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chair]Man. It is 12 : 30, and the committee will recess until 
2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12: 30 o'clock, a recess was taken until 2 o clock of 
the same day.) 
[31 6 J] afternoon session — 2 p. m. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Senator Ferguson will proceed. 

TESTIMONY OP GEN. GEORGE C. MAESHAIL (Kesumed) 

Senator Ferguson. At this place. General, I would like to offer 
the statutory duties of the Chief of Staff into the record. I wonder 
whether you can read them into the record and answer questions as 
to what you understand to be the statutory duties ? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator, for the purpose of the record, give 
the source ? 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator, in order to have the record correct, 
give the source ? 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look on the back of that? This is the 
United States Code. 

Mr. Murphy. The volume, pa^e, and section ? 

General Marshall. United States Code, 1940 edition, page 491, 
paragraph 33. Do you wish me to read this into the record, Senator 
Ferguson ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall (reading) : 

The Chief of Staff shall preside over the War Department General Staff 
and, under the direction of [S162] the President, or of the Secretary 
of War under the direction of the President, shall cause to be made, by the 
War Department General Staff, the necessary plans for recruiting, organizing, 
supplying equipment, mobilizing, training, and demobilizing the Army of the 
United States, and for the use of the military forces for national defense. He 
shall transmit to the Secrtary of War the plans and recommendations prepared 
for that purpose by the War Department General Staff and advise him in 
regard thereto ; upon the approval of such plans or recommendations by the 
Secretary of War, he shall act as the agent of the Secretary of War in carry- 
ing the same into effect. 

Do you wish me to read the various references in parentheses? 
Senator Ferguson. Yes; you might as well. 

General Marshall (reading) : 

(June 3, 1916, ch. 134, par. 5, 39 Stat. 167; June 4, 1920, ch. 227, subch. I, 
par. 5, 41 Stat. 764.) 

Paragraph 83-a. Further duties of Chief of Staff. 

Subject to the provisions of sections 82 and 1193 of this title, the Chief of 
Staff, under the direction of the President, or of the Secretary of War, under 
the direction of the President, shall have supervision of all troops of the line 
and of the Inspector General's, Judge Advocate General's, Medical, and Ordnance 
Departments of the Quartermaster Corps, 13167] of the Corps of En- 



1202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

gineers, and of the Signal Corps, and, in all matters pertaining to the com- 
mand, discipline, or administration of the existing military establishment, of 
the Adjutant General's Department, and he shall perform such other military 
duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President. 

Those are the two paragraphs I see here on this page 491. 

Senator Ferguson. You were familiar with the statutory duties 
of the Chief of Staff? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

[3164] Senator Ferguson, You heard the testimony of General 
Gerow that he took full responsibility for the action to be taken, and 
not taken, on General Short's reply to the message of the 27th of 
November ? 

General Marshall. I read that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you agree that it was his full responsibility? 

General Marshall. I would not say that was his full responsibility. 
It was his direct responsibility for each department of the General 
Staff, of which his was one. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you, by virtue of your office, share that 
responsibility ? 

General Marshau.. I think I do, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It is the responsibility of the Chief of Staff 
when he asks for a reply, and the reply takes a certain form, if any 
further direction is necessary, it is his responsibility to give that 
direction ? 

General Marshall. That would be his responsibility, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The Chief of Staff? 

General Marshall. The Chief of Staff, that is myself. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I understand. And that is the kind of a 
message that General Short's reply was? 

General Marshali.. Yes, sir. 

[3165] Senator Ferguson. I would just like to ask a few ques- 
tions, gomg back, on the giving to the British of the breaking of the 
code. That was a very important matter, was it not, General? 

General Marshall. Very important. 

Senator Ferguson. To share our secrets with another country? 

General Marshall. Very important, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Particularly so when we are at peace? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now would General Miles have authority, in 
his position, to perform that act? 

General Marshall. No, sir, not of his own initiative. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, can you tell us who did it in this case? As 
I understand it, the record now shows that it was done sometime in 
January of 1941. 

General Marshall. I presume that he did it after consultation 
with me. 

Senator Ferguson. No one else would be in authority to perform 
such an act? 

General Marshall. The Secretary of War would be the only other 
pei-son. 

Senator Ferguson. You know of no act that the Secretary of War 
took with relation to this code with Britain? 

[3166'] General Marshall. No, sir ; none whatever. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITrEE 1203 

Senator Ferguson. Could I ask now from counsel whether or not 
we have the so-called evaluation of the British ? Does the committee 
have those instruments ? 

Mr. Mitchell. What do you mean by "evaluations"? 

Senator Ferguson. What the General has described as evaluations. 

Mr. Mitchell. We examined them. They are under that arrange- 
ment, as you know, of nothing received from a foreign country can be 
divulged without clearing it with that country first. 

We looked over those documents, and we did not ourselves see any- 
thing pertinent in them, and therefore, we have not, up to date, asked 
the British Government to clear them. So they are there, and I think 
they are open to inspection even though they have not been cleared. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there any question about their being open to 
the committee's inspection? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not at all. Nobody has ever asked for them. We 
have seen thousands of documents that did not seem pertinent to us. 
We have not dumped material of that kind on you unless you asked 
for it. 

[3167] Senator Ferguson. I want the record to show what we 
have and what we do not have. 

Do you know, General, whether or not you consulted with anyone 
in relation to this exchange of information between the British and 
America ? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of that now, sir. I have 
a very definite recollection of frequent conversations with General 
Strong, who succeeded or who followed General Miles. I have no 
recollection of such conversations with General Miles. Those con- 
versations that I happen to recollect were after we were once engaged 
in war. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not, General, the Japs 
ever knew that we were breaking their codes? 

General Marshall. I do not Know one way or the other. I assume 
that they did not, or the procedure would have changed almost in- 
stantly. 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would refer to exhibit 2, page 122. 

General Marshall. Is that at the top or the bottom of the page ? 

The Vice Chairman. You have the wrong book. General. 

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 2. It is the yellow backed book. Now 
I refer you to the second from the last sentence in paragraph 3. 

[3168] General Marshall. How does that start, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. 

There are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. TRerefore, 
we wish to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any 
telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple. 

Do you know whether we had any other information than that par- 
ticular intercept, which was the 23rd of June, 1941 ? Were there any 
other intercepts that indicated that they knew we were iDreaking their 
code? 

General Marshall. I have a vague recollection of another one, but 
I think it was after we were engaged in the war. 

Senator Ferguson. Nothing before the war? 

General Marshall. Not to mj knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. You indicated yesterday. General, that certain 
information was kept from the Koberts commission. I believe you 



1204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

indicated, as I remember the testimony, there were certain parts 
taken out of the Roberts report. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. The intention that I wanted to con- 
vey to Governor Dewey was that the Roberts commission had the 
magic available to them but it had to be withdrawn out of their 
records in the report which was released to the public. 

Senator Ferguson. Now who changed the Roberts report? 
[S169] Who altered it to take those things out? 

General Marshall. I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get your knowledge that there 
was a change in the Roberts report before it was issued to the public? 

General Marshall. I could not tell you that, sir. Undoubtedly 
there were conversations in regard to the delicacy of the exposure of 
that material, but I do not recall the details of its control, because that 
would be one thing that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the 
Navy, presumably, and probably even the President, would become 
involved in. 

The board, as I recall, was under the direction of the President. 

[3170] Senator Ferguson. Did you have anything to do with 
the personnel of that board, the Roberts boai'd, or the Roberts com- 
mission ? 

General Marshall. My recollection of the matter is that the Secre- 
tary of War consulted with me as to what his recommendation might 
be as to the Army members of the board, and I had just brought Gen- 
eral McNarney back to this country in connection with the proposed 
reorganization of the War Department, and as he was an air man, 
and a very able individual, I suggested to the Secretary of War that 
General McNarney might be a very appropriate Army member. 

As to the other Army member, that was General McCoy. 

Senator Ferguson. He was retired, General, was he not? 

General Marshall. He was retired and an old acquaintance of the 
Secretary of War, and, as I recall, Mr. Stimson brought up his name 
as the man he thought would fit the job, and I concurred. 

Senator FFROTrsoN. Now, when did General McNarney leave the 
War Plans Division? 

General Marshall. He never was in the War Plans. Oh, he was 
in the War Plans Division possibly a while back; I do not recall when, 
but I can find that in the records ; but at the time he appeared on the 
Roberts board he had been in England almost a year in connection 
with the Air [31711 Corps. 

Senator Ferguson. Was not he in War Plans sometime the first week 
in December, about the time some of these things occurred ? 

General Marshall. No, sir; he was not even on duty in the War 
Department then. As far as my recollection goes, I had just brought 
him back from a year in England for the purpose of being on the board 
for the reorganization of the War Department that I was just com- 
pleting. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not he was familiar 
with the whole magic set-up ? 

General Marshall. I could not answer that, sir. The probability 
is that he did not know it. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the War Plans know about the magic? 

General Marshall. The head of War Plans did know about that. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he ever deputy of the War Plans? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1205 

General Marshall. I will have to check it. I do not recall that 
he was. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the President was advised 
about deleting or taking parts out of the Roberts report? 

General Marshall. No, sir. All I know about the Roberts 
[3172] commission and its operation and arrangement is the Sec- 
retary of War asking my advice as to what Army officer to put on the 
board, and I suggested General McNarney, who had just returned 
from England, and he mentioned General McCoy, retired, and I 
thought that was a good selection. 

Other than that, I knew nothing whatever about the board except 
as I appeared as a witness before it. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield if 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. As I understand, there was nothing kept out of the 
Roberts report; that it was all delivered to the public. There was 
something kept out about the magic, but it was not kept from the 
members of the board, and it is now delivered to the Senators. 

Senator Ferguson. General, did I understand you correctly that 
certain parts were deleted from the Roberts report ? 

General Marshall. The Roberts report on Pearl Harbor, reading 
from my letter to Governor Dewey 

had to have withdrawu from it all reference to this highly secret matter, there- 
fore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. 

I am referring to the public release of the board. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I have in mind. 

General Marshall. That is it. 

Senator Ferguson. Before that report was issued there [3173] 
were certain things taken out of it? 

General Marshall. Before that report was made public there were 
certain things withdrawn. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was not made public until sometime in 
January 1942, isn't that right? 

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. That is a matter of 
record. 

Senator Ferguson. We are clear on that, that certain parts were 
taken out before it was made public ? 

General Marshall. That is correct. I am quite certain, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you had that information in September 
of 1944, because you wrote the letter at that time. 

General Marshall. Oh, yes ; sir. 

\317i] Senator Ferguson. Might I ask counsel now if there is 
in existence or whether counsel for the committee has that full report? 

Mr. Mitchell. We have had it for about 3 months. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you furnish the part taken out according 
to the General's statement? 

Mr. Mitchell. There never was anything taken out, if you mean 
extracted or hidden, or am^thing. 

Senator Ferguson. Have I indicated that anything was hidden out 
of that report ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I should think your questions were directed to that 
but if I am mistaken- 

Senator Ferguson. You certainly are mistaken. 



] 206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Let counsel finish his answer to the Senator's ques- 
tion. 

Mr. Mitchell. As I understand it now, there is no part of the 
Roberts report that isn't available. I don't think any question has 
been raised about that. 

Senator Ferguson. Could counsel get the Roberts report before the 
deletions ? The general has indicated in his letter that to his knowl- 
edge there were certain things taken out. 

The Chairman. Senator, may I ask you this, when you say "taken 
out" 

Senator Ferguson. I am quoting the General. 

[S17S] The Chairjman. Let's see what really happened. It 
might mean one thing to say certain things in a report were taken 
out, that is, they were eliminated altogether. It might mean another 
thing to say certain parts of a report were not published, but that it 
went to tlie President as originally drafted. 

Senator Ferguson. May we havt from the witness what his under- 
standing was? 

General Marshall. My understanding was, and I am speaking on 
hearsay, because I had no control over the matter, that the complete 
report went to the President but that the portions that referred to 
magic were withdrawn from the portion of the report which was 
released to the public. 

Senator Ferguson. Have I misquoted you, General ? 

General Marshall. There has been so much conversation I am 
a little confused, but the complete report, as I understand it — and I 
am not an authority on that — went to the President, and the portions 
that were considered top secret, which were magic, were pulled out of 
that before a general release to the public. That is my understanding, 
but I am not the best authority on that. That is my understanding and 
it was on that that this part of the letter was based. 

Senaor Ferguson. From whom did you get your information? 

General Marshall. I don't recall. I presume from the Secretary 
of the War on G-2. That would probably be where I would [3176] 
get it. Either one or the other. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you got the Roberts report before you? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I have not. 

Senator "Ferguson. Would counsel give the General the Roberts 
report ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, you have spoken of the "report." That 
term has sometimes been used as applied to the findings, opinion, and 
sometimes the transcript. 

Now, as far as the report is concerned it always has been complete. 
The fact is that the transcript shows that at certain stages of the 
proceedings they took some evidence about this secret stuff that they 
never transcribed and we don't know, of course, what it was. Maybe 
that is what you are referring to. 

Senator Ferguson. My knowledge on this subject has come solely 
from the General, now the witness. 

Mr. Mitchell. We have had the Roberts transcript, copies of it, 
for months, and it has been handed around ; every now and then you 
find that transcript shows that they stopped taking evidence on the 
record and took some evidence off of the record. I think we have 
had a request to find out what the evidence off the record was and we 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1207 

have never found it because there isn't any such record, as far ,as 

1 can ascertain. 

[S177] Senator Ferguson. I will read from the bottom of page 

2 of the letter produced by you yesterday, General : 

The Roberts report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all ref- 
erence to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appears 
incomplete. 

Now, have you and I been talking about the report, is that what 
we are talking about ? 

General Marshall. I was dictating in regard to the report as I 
understood its make-up. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Marshall. I would like to add that I have never read 
the report. I made this statement from my general understanding 
of the matter with the approval of the then G-2 of the War Depart- 
ment. I knew that secret matter had been testified to because I testi- 
fied to a portion of it myself. I knew that that was not released to 
the public. 

Senator Ferguson. General, do you have the report before you ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would someone give him the report ? 

Mr. Murphy. Here it is [handing the report to the witness]. 

General Marshall. I have it. 

Senator Ferguson. On page 8, reading from the report, [3178] 
down in the last paragraph : 

The Navy Department sent three messages to the Commander in Chief of the 
Pacific Fleet, the first on December 3, stating that it was believed certain Japanese 
Consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents. 

Wouldn't that indicate that we were breaking the code because that 
information came through magic and as shown by the testimony of the 
Navy Board that was the purple code ? 

General Marshall. "Stating that it was believed"? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. Well, it depends, it seems to me, on the deduc- 
tion you make regarding this statement "it was believed certain Japa- 
nese Consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret 
documents." 

Senator Ferguson. ( Reading : ) 

The second one, the 2d of December 1941, instructed addressee to destroy 
confidential documents, 

and so on. 

That has nothing to do wdth it. 
On page 9 (reading) : 

About noon eastern standard time, 8 :30 American Honolulu time\ December 7, 
an additional warning message — 

that is before the attack — 

indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States 
and Japan was dispatched to the Chief of Staff after conferences with the Chief 
of [5/79] Naval Operations for the information of the responsible Army 
and Navy Commanders. Every effort was made to have the message as brief as 
possible but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery 
of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack. 

* See p. 12.35, Infra, for correction by General Marshall. 
70716 — 46— pt. 3 16 



1208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Didn't that clearly show, General, that we had intercepted the 14- 
part and the pilot message prior to the time of its delivery ? 

General Marshall. That might be, Senator. I think that is a 
matter of opinion. Evidently this was worded very carefully in order 
to convey an essential fact for the information of those reading the 
report and at the same time not to disclose the source of the informa- 
tion. That would be my estimate. 

Senator Ferguson. You had never read the report, you say ? 

(xeneral Marshall. No, sir ; I had not. 

Senator FERGUSoisr. Now then, General — were you going to say 
something else? 

General Marshall. I might say I anticipated going through all of 
these documents later this month but I was not given the opportunity. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

The Chairman. Will the Senator from Michigan yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[S180] The Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Do we have the report, the original report given by 
the Roberts Board to the President of the United States ? 

Mr. Mitchell. We have never had the original. We have got a 
photostat copy of the transcript and we have got one mimeographed 

Mr. Murphy. Is it a complete report so far as your investigation 
reveals ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is presumably the transcript of everything that 
they transcribed. I tried to point out that the transcript, not the 
findings, does show that there was some evidence taken off the record, 
and they never did have it transcribed. 

Mr. Murphy. Is it a complete copy, of what was given to the 
President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I so understand. I always so miderstood. But I 
will have to check again to make certain. 

Senator Ferguson. Will counsel, because of this testimony, get the 
original that was delivered to the President, with the signatures? 

Mr. IMitchell. We will get it if we can lay our hands on it. I 
suppose it is in existence.^ 

Senator Ferguson. You would expect that it would; it [SlSlI 
is an important document. 

Mr. Mitchell. It might be in the Archives Building. We will 
make an effort to see if we can get anything back farther than the 
copies furnished us 3 months ago by the War Department. 

Senator Ferguson. General, you stated yesterday that there was 
some question of the secrecy of the magic, that you tried to get the 
FBI to do some work for you? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. What I think I said, and what I 
intended to convey was, that there had been frequent rumors, and in 
. one case direct reports to me, of gossip here in Washington regarding 
the fact that we had intercepted Japanese codes. Of course, there 
were always other statements and conversations which were of a 
highly dangerous nature so far as security was concerned. I sent 
requests orally through G-2, orally to Mr. Hoover, to assist the War 
Department in trying to check this matter by the usual methods that 
they would follow, as related to Army officers. 

* See correspondence In Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2493-2495. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1209 

I was told in each case Mr. Hoover was very reluctant to engage 
his personnel in investigating any Government agency for the rea- 
son that he did not wish to be put in the position of running a sort 
of Gestapo. I don't know as he used the word "Gestapo." However, 
my recollection is — but the G-2 officials can corroborate this or give 
other testimony — the [3182] FBI did assist us in checking 
conversations going around Washington in the various hotels, din- 
ners, and so forth, in an effort to find out how serious this matter 
was, and particularly for the purpose of my making an example of 
somebody which would discourage further indiscretions by Army 
officers. 

We received no conclusive case. I think we had one that we finally 
could not try under some legal technicality which would have pre- 
vented a conviction. That is my recollection of that phase of the 
matter which I referred to yesterday. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that an Army officer ? 
General Marshall. These were all Army officers. 
Senator Ferguson. You had reason to believe that there was a leak 
in the Army on this magic ? 

General Marshall. I didn't know whether it was in the Army or 
not, but it was apparently in official Washington. 
The Chairman. In what? 
General Marshall. Official Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. General, do I understand that you had some 
evidence on one particular officer and there was something wrong with 
the jurisdiction? 

General Marshall. There was some complication in regard to the 
probability of conviction. I don't know, Senator, as that related 
specifically to magic. I don't know whether [3183] that oc- 
curred a year after this or a year before this. Presumably it would 
be at this time or at a later time rather than a year before. I am just 
giving you my recollection of my efforts to stop this indiscreet talk. 
Senator Ferguson. Did the FBI give you full cooperation? 
General Marshall. So far as I know. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you going to make another answer? 
General Marshall. I was, but I have forgotten it. 
Senator Ferguson. You had full cooperation from the FBI? 
General Marshall. So far as I know. I merely wanted to make 
plain their reluctance and the reason. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any evidence on anyone that you 
thought was sufficient to convict them of this crime of giving this 
secret out during war? 

General Marshall. No case where we thought we had the basis of 
a conviction. We had rumors, we had conversations reported to me 
that it was common knowledge of this, or common knowledge of that, 
particularly in relation to affairs shortly after the first, I think after 
the first creation of the Pearl Harbor Investigating Board, not the 
Roberts Board, but the later. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you place whether or not this matter that 
you took to Mr. Hoover and the FBI was prior to Pearl Harbor or 
subsequent? 

[318^] General MARfjHALL. I think it was subsequent, though 
there may have been somo prior. I can't remember, Senator; I am 



1210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sorry. There were several times that I asked G-2 to go to Mr, Hoover 
to help lis. We were always in a state of trying to run down some 
leak out of the War Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any department to take care of 
that kind of a matter yourself ? 

General Marshall. G-2 had a number of people engaged in that. 

Senator Ferguson. They had not only espionage but counter-espio- 
nage? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; specifically that. I thought, however, 
that in all probability the FBI was l)etter equipped for the purpose. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was really in charge of magic? 

General Marshall. In charge of what? 

Senator Ferguson. Magic. Who was designated by you to be in 
charge of this magic? 

General Marshall. Up to and including this time I had never 
changed the original set-up, the reception, deciphering and transla- 
tion, which, so far as the Army portion was concerned, was carried 
out by a section of the Sijrnal Corps under General Mauborgne. The 
material was then })assed on to the G-2 of the Army and the circu- 
lation of it occurred {Sins'] Thereafter under his direction. 

Senator Ferguson. Did G-2 have any instructions from you to 
furnish intercepted information to the Hawaiian Department during 
November and early December 1941? 

General Marshall. I recall giving no such specific instructions. 

[31861 Senator Ferguson. Were you aware that information 
and enemy intelligence was being withheld from G-2 in Hawaii? 

General Marshall. I was not aware of that, sir. If you mean it 
was being withheld from G-2 in Hawaii 

Senator Ferguson. Just not being given to them. 

General Marshall (continuing). By the Naval opposite, I was 
unaware of that. If it was being withheld from G-2 in Hawaii by the 
G-2 in the War Department, if you mean that, I don't think "with- 
held" would be quite the word we would use. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat would we use ? 

General Marshall. It was a question of what portions should be 
given to G-2 in Hawaii. I was not aware that they were withholding 
from him information which was considered vital to the proper per- 
formance of duty by General Short. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was responsible for the amount of in- 
telligence from G-2 that went to Hawaii. 

General Marshall. The G-2 of the War Department, General 
Miles. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you give him any instructions on it what- 
ever? 

General Marshall. No specific instructions that I recall. 

[3187] Senator Ferguson. Did you have instructions from any 
one, for instance, the Secretary of War ? 

General INIarshall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of State, did you confer with him 
on what ought to go and what should not go? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you would say that whatever instructions 
G-2 had. General Miles, was given to him by you and by no one else ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1211 

Senator Ferguson. Under your authority as chief of staff? 

General IMarsiiall. He was operating under my authority. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever conferred with Secretary of War 
Stimson on the information that was comincr to you throu^li magic? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; with great frequency. I often called 
his attention to portions of it where I thought he might not have had 
time to read the entire folder. There was quite a mass of this mate- 
rial. It was a question of how much time you had for the purpose, 
and how quickly you could read. I recall taking my copies to him on 
several occasions in order to be certain that he saw them. 

[S1S8] Senator Ferguson. Do you remember making an affi- 
davit before General Clausen? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel have that? 

Mr. Murphy. You mean Colonel Clausen. 

Senator Forguson. Colonel Clausen. 

The part I would like to have you check is your affidavit of the 
28th of August 1945, before Colonel Clausen, where you stated that 
''prior to the 7th of December" 

General Marshall, Which page is that ? 

Senator Ferguson. I have taken that out of the affidavit, the part 
leading : 

Concerning intercepts of the cliaracter mentioned, it was my understanding 
in the period preceding the 7tli of Decemher 1941, that the Commanding General 
<if the Hawaiian Department was aware of and was receiving some of this in- 
formation from facilities available in his command. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that your understanding? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; but there is a confusion there in con- 
nection with what I was explaining this morning. They were receiv- 
ing information as to intercepts, as to the locations of Japanese ves- 
sels at sea and their movements and the headquarters that were con- 
cerned in this. 

[3189] The actual translation, that is, the deciphering, trans- 
lation, and transmission of the magic, as such, clearly was not intended 
to be applied in this. 

Senator Ferguson. So you would correct that now to interpret it 
so as to make it indicate that you were not inferring that General 
Short was getting this other kind of magic ? 

General Marshall. I said some of this information. I tried to 
explain what some of that was. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he was getting any of 
the diplomatic magic ? 

General Marshall. I do not think he was, except to the extent, I 
recall, that we broke into magic in July 1941, meaning that we took 
the information from magic which came as diplomatic information. 
The Japanese instructions regarding shipping as to the Panama 
Canal. Just as we again moved into the diplomatic channels of magic 
on December 7 regarding the 1 p. m. message and sent that direct. 
Those are the two occasions that I think the record shows, and that I 
can recall between the first of July 1941, and December 7, 1941, that 
the magic material was directly referred to in so many words in mes- 
sages to General Short. 



1212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Did we put through some kind of an order re- 
stricting the amount of Japanese shipping that could [31901 
go through the Panama Canal? 

General Marshall. We stopped it all but the message I am refer- 
ring to, from the War Department to General Short, recited the 
Japanese instructions taken from magic regarding the movement of 
shipping into the Panama Canal durmg the period of some days in 
the middle of July. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever notify General Short that you 
found it impossible or that you were not furnishing him all available 
G-2 data for reasons of securitv? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I have no recollection of that. 

Senator Ferguson. So then he could not have any knowledge as to 
whether or not he was getting all that G-2 had or had not? 

General Marshall. Presumably so. Here is the message I was 
referring to. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it? 

General Marshall. It is dated Washington, D. C, July 8, 1941. 
It is only the later portion I refer to, but I will read it all (reading 
from Exhibit No. 32:) 

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. 

Nine two four seven AGMC for your information deduction from information 
from numerous sources is that Japanese Government has determined upon its 
future policy which is [319 J] supported by all principal Japanese political 
and military groups Period This policy is at present one of watchful waiting 
involving probable aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and 
when Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes 
evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia Period 
Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure 
and development of naval army and air bases in Indochina although an advance 
against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out Period Neutrality 
pact with Russia may be abrogated Period. They have ordered all Jap vessels 
in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August Period Move- 
ment of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant 
vessels are being requisitioned. 

Signed "Adams," who was the Adjutant General. 

I was referring specifically to the last sentence which is taken almost 
entirely from magic, other portions were in magic, but — that came 
to us in various ways — but the last sentence was from magic direct. 

[3192] Senator Ferguson. When you sent the message on the 
7th, General, that is, the noon on the 7th, did you consider the question 
of security? 

General Marshall. Do you mean, Senator, in relation to the form 
of the message ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; both the form and the means of sending it. 

General Marshall. I only knew that it would be encoded, which is 
done very rapidly on a type machine and automatically. My only 
recollection regarding the security aspect — and it is difficult for me 
to state this with any assurance that I am being accurate because I 
am confused in back sights — was we must be sufficiently secure to 
prevent some claim of overt act on our part and, therefore, the tele- 
phone was ruled out. 

Now, I am not at all certain that that did rule out the telephone. 
That might have been an afterthought after the event ; I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to talk to you about that for a moment. 

General Marshall. But I assume that this message — in fact, I had 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1213 

seen that this message to which you just referred was going to be 
enciphered in secure code and decoded in that manner. 

[3193] Senator Ferguson. Well, you felt rather sure at that 
particular moment that you were sending this message that something 
would happen somewhere at 1 o'clock, or prior to 1 o'clock? 

General Marshall, Something of some serious nature was going 
to be synchronized with that 1 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well, then, you were thinking about the 
question of security and as to whether or not you would use the tele- 
phone. Now, how could the use of that telephone to Hawaii have 
been an overt act of war by xVmerica against Japan in alerting Hawaii ? 

General Marshall. I think, Senator, that the Japanese would have 
grasped at most any straw to bring to such portions of our public 
that doubted our integrity of action that we were committing an act 
that forced action on their part. 

I say again I am not at all clear as to what my reasons were regard- 
ing the telephone because 4 years later it is very difficult for me to 
tell what went on in my mind at the time. I will say this, though : 
It was in my mind regarding the use of transocean telephone. 

Mr. Roosevelt, the President, had been in the frequent habit of 
talking to the Prime Minister by telephone. He also used to talk 
to Mr. Bullitt when he was Ambassador in [<?-?54] Paris and 
my recollection is that that was intercepted by the Germans. 

I had a test made of induction from telephone conversations on 
the Atlantic cable from Gardner's Island. I found that that could 
be picked up by induction. I talked to the President not once but 
several times. I also later, after we were in the war, talked with 
the Prime Minister in an endeavor to have them be more careful in 
the use of the scrambler. I believe it is understood what that is. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. Because in our terminology that is private and 
not secret. A casual person listening in would not know what we 
were talking about. The person intent and with the facilities foi- 
breaking through in your communications can do it. It was long 
after we were in the war before we were able to install a Scrambler 
system, which is now in vogue and which is quite elaborate, that was 
felt to be secret. Therefore, whether or not our overseas communi- 
cation, overseas telephone communication, was secure or not was a 
question. I might go 

Senator Ferguson. Will you explain for our benefit now what a 
scrambler is? 

General Marshall. A scrambler is a machine which takes your 
conversation and mixes it up into something that sounds [319-5] 
like Chinese ; that is the nearest I can give you. 

Senator Ferguson. Almost like static, isn't it? 

General Marshall. Well, no ; it is not a roar so much as it is just 
a hash of sounds and if you press a certain button it comes to you in 
understandable English. Now, a person 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you unscramble it. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; you unscramble it, anyone at the 
other end if he has the machine and presses the button. 

Senator Ferguson. All along the line it is scrambled and in that 
machine it is unscrambled ? 



1214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. Until it ^ets to the other end of the line. 

Now, I might illustrate a little further our telephone reactions be- 
cause I undertook to try one officer for the use of the telephone from 
Panama, which we found all taken down here and that was furnished 
to me in writing by a naval intercept, where they were checking on 
the time and indiscretions of that nature. 

I called this commander to get him up here, the officer going to 
Panama and the commander going the other way and then- 1 found 
myself in the same difficulty with the commander in his conversation 
from Hawaii and then we hung up on him. 

[3196] I had several conversations with the western defense 
commander and I hung up the phone because of the indiscretions in 
the excitement and argument that were being made over the phone. 
We were always in danger of that and we were quite aware of it, 
because the telephone is a very easy instrument to tap and the radio 
telephone, I believe, is even easier, but I want to repeat again that I 
have no clear recollection whatsoever as to my own reactions as to 
why I did not attempt to telephone at this time, but I have one con- 
clusion that I think is quite accurate, that I certainly would have 
called up General MacArthur first. 

Senator Ferguson. You had a scramble telephone to Hawaii and 
the Philippines at that time? 

General Marshall. I don't know about the Philippines but I know 
we had it in to Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever talked to General Short on the 
scramble telephone? 

General Marshall. I do not recall, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a line to General MacArthur? 

General Marshall. We had a means of telephone communication 
but I do not recall whether or not we had a scrambler. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to General MacArthur the first 7 
days of December 1941 ? 

[3197] General Marshall. No, sir; and I do not recall I ever 
did talk to him on the telephone. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall that you ever talked to him? 

General Marshall. Then or since. 

Senator Ferguson. On the telephone? 

General Marshall. On the telephone. 

Senator Ferguson. You mentioned about acquiring balloons and 
they were to be ready for Pearl Harbor in June. 

Oeneral Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us why they were not ready ? 

General Marshall. We had not been able to procure them up to that 
time. I don't know just what the intricacies were in the procedure 
in getting to the Congress through the Bureau of the Bud,get with the 
President's approval to arrange the necessary appropriations. I think 
that the records of the War Department can be produced before the 
committee to show when the War Department itself first represented 
to the Bureau of the Budget the desire for funds for the purpose of 
barrage balloons. 

Senator Ferguson. Would these things, such as the barrage balloons, 
be taken up at these council meetings? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1215 

[3198] Senator Ferguson. Were minutes made of the council 
meetings ? 

General Marshall. Do you mean those of Mr. Hull and the sec- 
retaries ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I mean of the people who attended the 
War Council meetings? 

General Marshall. I think the record shows in his office who were 
there, but there were no formal minutes that I recall ever seeing. 

Senator Ferguson. Who were the people authorized to attend the 
council meetings ? 

General IVIarsiiall. I do not know, Senator, as to whether you could 
express it as authorized. I think it was those asked to sit in. Now, 
what the arrangement was between Secretary Hull, Mr. Stimson, and 
Colonel Knox I do not know and I am not the best witness. My dim 
recollection is and I believe possibly is in Mr. Stimson's testimony 
there, that he suggested the meetings, but that would be a matter of 
record. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, we have some council meetings here look- 
ing like minutes in the Army. 

General Marshall. Well, that is the Army. 

Senator Ferguson. That is a different council? 

General JNIarshall. That is a different council ; yes, sir. [3199] 
I think that is a formal one for which there is a solid basis of 
regulation. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you keep on holding these council 
meetings in the Army, as far as these council meetings are concerned, 
until December 7 ? 

General Marshall. We are still holding general council meetings. 

Senator Ferguson. You are still holding them ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And so far as you know there are minutes kept 
of those meetings ? 

General Marshall. Yes ; they are published in a regular book now 
and I think they were in that form then. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

IMr. Murphy. I think for the purpose of the record and just to call 
it to all the committee's attention, there is an important entry on page 
C7 of the United States News on barrage balloons saying : 

Barrage balloons and smoke were also considered as means of defense but 
were rejected, the barrage balloons because they would interfere with the activity 
of U. S. aircraft, and the smoke because the strength of the prevailing winds 
would render it ineffective. 

[3200] Senator Ferguson. Did you reject it, General? 

General Marshall. No, sir. That, I believe, took place out there. 
I might say, Senator, we had that trouble all the time. I flew out to 
the west coast personally in regard to that immediately, shortly after 
the Pearl Harbor affair and took General Doolittle with me just as he 
returned, to check that, in order to straighten out the barrage balloon 
problem at San Diego, which was about the only fairly effective defense 
of that great B-24 plant there. 

At that time there was naval objection by the local naval officers to 
having any barrage balloons any place because of its interference with 



1216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the seaplanes coming in for landings and I went there personally on 
a Sunday morning to the plant, got the naval officers and finally reached 
an agreement which permitted it in a modified way, which permitted 
us in a modified way to put up barrage balloons immediately. 

There was always a question as to where you could use smoke to 
advantage or where the smoke might be to your disadvantage and, 
of course, part of that depended upon the efficiency of the smoke 
machines. 

Senator Febguson. Did you know about the decision not to use 
barrage balloons at Pearl Harbor? 

General Marshall. I presume I did, sir. I do not recall, though. 

[3201] Senator Ferguson. You do not recall it now? 

General Marshall. I presume I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say, General, now that they could 
have used torpedoes on these ships if we had had barrage balloons? 

General Marshall. I could not answer that, sir. I would be inter- 
ested to find out if they did use them afterwards, after they had plenty 
of balloons and plenty of time to consider it and I do not know now 
whether or not they did. My recollection is I never saw them there. 

Senator Ferguson. You mentioned the other day about the building 
of the radar in the Park Service. Do you know how long it took the 
Park Service to allow you to put these permanent radar stations up? 

General Marshall. My recollection, without referring to the record, 
is that we finally got the general approval about May 15. 

Senator Ferguson. Were they completed at the time? 

General Marshall. My understanding is that for the fixed stations 
they were not completed. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not your inability to 
get from the Park Service the right to build them delayed you in the 
production of those stations? 

General Marshall. No, sir. I am not the best witness [SSO^I 
on that but I am told it had something to do with transportation and 
materiel and something to do with the engineering officer in that dis- 
trict and so far as I know had no relation to the Park Service, though 
I am not the best witness on that. 

Senator Ferguson. But you have received some knowledge that you 
had that delay? 

General Marshall. I think there was a delay to the point that the 
fixed stations were not working at all on December 7, or were not work- 
able on December 7. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know anything about the Colonel 
Wyman case? 

General Marshall. Well, that is what I had reference to when I 
said that I did not think it was the Park Service. I was not clear 
on the details of that case. They did not come to my attention until 
long afterwards and then only the name and the fact that it was at 
issue. 

Senator Ferguson. So that really all you know about the Wyman 
case is the name "Wj'man." You have no knowledge of the facts? 

General Marshall. I have no detailed knowledge of the facts. 

Senator Ferguson. You have no knowledge of the facts ? 

General Marshall. T have no knowledge of the facts; no, 
[3203] sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1217 

Senator Ferguson. In relation to exhibit 13, that is the Martin- 
Bellinger report 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson (continuing). Yon are familiar with that now? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think it is the Martin report. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; they call it the Martin report. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 13. 

General Marshall. I know what you are referring to. 

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with that? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In fact you requested it ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why nothing was done in rela- 
tion to it ? 

General Marshall. I do not know — you say that nothing was.done 
in relation to it, Senator. It was a question when the materiel would 
be available in which to carry out the desires expressed in the rec- 
ommendations of that report. 

I believe I stated in my testimony yesterday in relation to the 
principal proposal of the Board, which was for 180 [3W4-] 
four-engine bombers, that at that time the Army possessed all over 
the world, including the continental United States, about 148, of 
which I think some sixty odd were here for training of personnel, 
some were in Panama, 35 were in the Philippines, 12 were in Hawaii. 
It was a question, of course, in the first place of the availability of 
materiel. 

Now, in the memorandum which I directed the secretary of the 
general staff to issue or, rather, not in the memorandum but part 
of the thought behind the memorandum was we were not only trying 
to resurvey with the later information available what appeared to 
be the full requirements for the proper defense of Hawaii, partic- 
ularly in case the Fleet was not present there, to what extent we 
could manage the affair by holding certain planes on the west coast 
until an emergency seemed to develop, and the reason for that was 
we in some way had to train the people for the new bombers com- 
ing out; and unless we had these bombers for our use we could not 
develop the crews to handle the new product. 

I had discussed with General Arnold the sending of men out to 
Hawaii to train out there and the question there was the over-use 
of the bombers they had and the interference in the air with the 
general activities of the Army and the Navy by training flights to 
that extent, so we were trying to double in brass as it were; have 
certain bombers ear- [3205] marked for Hawaii but avail- 
able for day to day training on the west coast and that was part of 
the thought behind the memorandum I had issued which brought 
about the Martin report. 

Senator Ferguson. At the time of Pearl Harbor you knew that 
the Army did not have long-distance reconnaissance ? 

General Marshall. I knew they only had 12 B-17's. I did not 
know just what the Navy had in their PBY's. 



1218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know what the arrangement was 
between the Army and the Navy as to who could or could not have 
long-range reconnaissance ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir.; I was aware of that, as I believe I 
explained before, for the reason that the Air Corps officials in Wash- 
ington brought to me an opposition to the arrangement General Short 
had made and I thought General Short's arrangement was a wise one 
under the circumstances and therefore did not accept the local War 
Department Air Corps officials' protest as sound. 

Senator Ferguson. Had any of your reports with their predictions 
ever taken up the question of attack through the vacant sea as it has 
been described here to us? That is the part north of Hawaii. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I understand what the vacant sea is. 
I suppose I am quite certain that I read the [3206] . discussions 
that involved that in going through the plans in the War Plans Divi- 
sion when I was the head of that division and when it was my particu- 
lar function to read in detail all the plans, which are very voluminous 
papers, of course^ and also to participate in the discussions regarding 
the continual revisions of those plans. 

Senator Ferguson. General, do you know what started the confer- 
ences on the ABCD agreement — or, first, the ABC agreement ? 

General Marshall. My recollection on the thing was entirely hazy 
but Admiral Stark told me over the telephone, I believe, a few days 
ago when I questioned him in regard to it — and he, of course, is the 
proper witness to answer this — that he had initiated the proposal 
after bringing it to me and I had concurred with him, and he arranged 
through Admiral Ghormley in London for the procedure. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I will yield. 

Senator Lucas. Do I understand from counsel that there was an 
ABCD agreement that was concurred in by this country? 

Mr. Mitchell. The staff speaks of it as an agreement but it was a 
report by naval and military officers of both countries making -certain 
recommendations. They had an agreement to report on that; that 
is what you mean. 

\3207\ General Marshall. The Army members and Navy mem- 
bers concurred in the report with the British representatives and the 
Secretary of War and I believe the Secretary of the Navy also favor- 
ably expressed themselves on it, and the President, I think, never 
expressed himself one way or the other, not to me at least, and not 
in writing. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, in the object — if you will just refer. Gen- 
eral, to the report marked "American-Dutch-British Conversations, 
Singapore, in April, 1941"? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And refer to the "Object," on page 7. I read: 

Our most important interests in the Far East are : 

(a) The security of sea communications and 

(b) The security of Singapore. 

An important subsidiary interest is the security of Luzon in the Philippine 
Islands since, so long as submarine and air forces can be operated from Luzon, 
expeditions to threaten Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies from the East 
are out-flanked. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. What is the question, sir? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1219 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why Hawaii is not in [3208] 
eluded in that ? 

General Marshall. This is a Far East survey, sir; not a Central 
Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. Then we will not find the Hawaiian Islands 
in any way connected with this ABCD agreement? 

General Marshall. I do not think so, sir. Of course, that was a 
naval base en route to the Far East, but this conference at Singapore 
related to Far Eastern conditions. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, General, you were talking there about 
the Philippines being on the flank if they were going south. 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't F'earl Harbor also be on their flank ? 

General Marshall. Not in that sense, sir. Pearl Harbor is a good 
many thousand miles from the China Sea and the movement of the 
Japanese would be south through the China Sea. Pearl Harbor, of 
course, is about .2,400 miles west of the coast of California. It domi- 
nates the Central Pacific. It does not dominate the China Sea. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with what Mr. Churchill said 
on the 27th of January 1942 in relation to Pearl Harbor being on the 
flank? 

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. 

[S209] Senator Ferguson. You do not recall such a statement. 
You would not consider, then, that the base and the ships that we had 
would be considered by a military authority as being on the flank of 
a movement south into Malay, Singapore, and the Netherlands East 
Indies? 

General Marshall. I think not in the sense that we ordinarily use 
"the flank." San Diego is on the flank in that sense as well as Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Japan ever knew of this 
ABCD arrangement? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. You say that Admiral Stark — you talked to him 
recently. Do you know whether he called that conference ? 

General Marshall. My understanding of what Admiral Stark told 
me was the proposition was brought up by Admiral Ghormley who 
was on duty in London and he. Admiral Stark, thought it was a wise 
procedure and discussed it with me and I concurred and the arrange- 
ments were then made by Admiral Stark, I believe, through Admiral 
Ghormley. Admiral Stark, of course, is the authoritative witness in 
the matter. 

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 45 indicates that you had approved the 
plan. Is that correct? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

[3210] Senator Ferguson. And you presented it to the 
President ? 

General Marshall. I presented it, as I recall, to the Secretary of 
War and Admiral Stark to the Secretary of the Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, the Secretary of War approved it also, 
did he not ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of the Navy approved it and 
Admiral Stark approved it ? 



1220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall, I think that is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Fergusox. Yes ; I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. To get the record straight, you said, "You approved 
the plan" without specifying which one. There are three plans. 

Mr. Mitchell. This memo I think relates to British conversations, 
not to the Singapore. I couldn't tell until I read it. 

Senator Ferguson. I will strike out the exhibit. You did approve 
the various plans ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; that is my recollection, but the record 
will show, I think. 

Senator Ferguson. The one with China and with the [3211'] 
Netherlands East Indies. 

General Marshall. I don't know which one you are referring to. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

The Chah^man. Let General Marshall conclude his answer. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. I don't know just what one you are referring to 
when you say with China. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield at that point? 

The Chairman. Will ih^ Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. The testimony is that the Chief of Staff approved 
the original ABC-1 and ABC-2, I believe. He also approved the 
Canadian but did not approve the Singapore. 

Senator Ferguson. Would 3'ou let the General see the Singapore, 
the memo on whether or not he approv^ed it ? I do not think the memo 
applies to Singapore; but I will ask you now, did you ever approve? 

Mr. Mitchell. When you say "memo" you mean that memorandum 
by General Gerow to General Marshall, that he has in his hand? I 
would like to know. 

Senator Ferguson. It is dated June 2, 1941, to the President at the 
White House, "Dear Mr. President," signed {3212^ by Henry 
L. Stimson, Secretary of War and Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy. 

Attached to it is a letter, June the 9th by W. P. Scobey, and attached 
to that is one of August 20, 1941, and to that is one of August 29, 
1941, signed "O. K," That is the part on Canada. "O. K., F. D. K." 
Signed, "AV. P. Scobey." 

General Marshall. You haven't any memorandum here in regard 
to the Singapore? 

Mr. Gesell. No. 

General Marshall. I will have to get some data on that. I do not 
recall just the details. 

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel have any data that he can give to 
the general ? 

Mr. Murphy. You have the testimony of General Gerow on that. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow says he never approved it. The 
document he has in his hand involves ABC-1 and 2 and not the British 
at all and also involves the Canadian. The record memo shows that 
ABC-1 and 2 — that Eainbow 5, I think it was, was put up to the 
President and he refused to approve them because ABC-1 and 2 had 
not been approved by the parties that were involved in it and the 
Canadian was the only one that was approved, as I understand it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1221 

[3213] Mr. MuRriiY. The President approved the Canadian one. 
He did not approve the ABC-1 and 2 and neither Admiral Stark or 
the Chief of Staff approved the Pecific one. 

Senator Ferguson. General, do jou have any knowledge as to 
whether or not you did or did not approve the one made at Singapore? 

General Marshall. I will have to go into my record, sir, and re- 
fresh my mind. 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't any present knowledge about that ? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I haven't. 

Senator Ferguson. This letter of June 9th said the President had 
familiarized liimself with the two papers but since the report of the 
United States-British Staff Conversations, ABC-1, had not been ap- 
proved by the British Government he would not approve the report 
at this time, neither would he now give approval to the Joint Army 
and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow 5 which is based upon the report 
of ABC-1. However, in case of war the papers would be returned 
to the President for his approval. 

Do you know whether or not Britain ever approved this ABC-1 ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any information in the 
[3214^ War Department as to whether or not thev ever approved 
ABC-1? 

General Marshall. I do not recall that. I imagine General Gerow 
can speak authoritatively from the records. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the President ever 
approved ABC-1 ? 

General Marshall. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Did ABC-1 ever go into effect? 

General Marshall. In generol effect it did because it involved the 
policy of the main fight in the Atlantic and the defensive principle in 
the Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. How did it go into effect if not approved ? Was 
it approved in part and not approved in part? 

General Marshall. I do not recall. Senator, just what the pro- 
ceeding was. Once we got into the war we all had a common under- 
standing of the almost imperative necessity of being on the defensive 
in the Pacific until we got control of the situation in the Atlantic. 

We had a formal meeting of tlie British and American Chiefs (^f 
Staff and with the President and with the Prime Minister which be- 
gan shortly after Christmas or, in other words, shortly after Pearl 
Harbor in December 1941, where general agreements for the combined 
cooperation in the conduct of the war were arrived at. There was no 
overt action in the way of carrying out a joint plan between Decem- 
ber 7 and [3215] that of the date of the British- American 
meetings that I can recall. 

Senator Ferguson. General, this plan depended upon an attack, 
did it not ? 

General Marshall. You mean ABC-1 ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes: in the Pacific. 

General Marshall. Well, it meant that we were not going to launch 
a war in the Pacific but that in the event we became involved in a war 
in the Pacific we would be on the defensive. 

Mr, Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 



1222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson". Yes ; I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. On page 9 of General Marshall's report is the follow- 
ing (reading) : 

On December 23, 1941, Winston Churcbill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, 
accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Washington to confer 
with the President and the American Chiefs of Staff. Out of the series of discus- 
sions which then followed resulted an agreement, not only regarding the immedi- 
ate strategy for our combined conduct of the war, but also for the organization of 
a method for the strategical command and control of British and American mili- 
tary resources. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that, Congressman ? 

Mr. Murphy. December 23, 1941. Page 9, report of General 
[S216] Marshall covering the period July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1943. 

Senator Ferguson. General, does that refresh vour memory that 
nothing was done prior to that about approving it^ 

General Marshall. I think that is the case, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it come into effect in the Atlantic ? 

General JNIarshall. It went into effect in the Atlantic to the extent 
that we utilized what we then had in the Atlantic to carry out what 
amounted to the same plan as outlined here in ABC-1. There was no 
transfer at that time of ships, as I recall, from the Pacific to the At- 
lantic and I do not know if there were any transferred during that 
period from the Atlantic to the Pacific, though there may have been. 

We did not make any general operational moves except some naval 
moves by the vessels there in the vicinity of Hawaii, based on Pearl 
Harbor and those of Admiral Hart's contingent of the Asiatic Fleet 
in the Philippines. We were operating there for a few days just under 
the rules of stern necessity. We met then with the British and reached 
a formal agreement in regard to the conduct of the war. 

Senator Ferguson. General, that 

General Marshall. May I go a little further ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. This plan presented to us a basis for [<?^i7] 
joint operations, for territories that one or the other would consider 
himself responsible, so that at the very beginning we had a fair under- 
standing of what we had best do rather than the necessity of engaging 
in prolonged conversations such as were required to reach this report 
after we once became involved and engaged in the war. 

Senator Ferguson. General, did it take an attack to put the plan 
into effect? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What is your definition of an attack that would 
put it into effect? 

General Marshall. Well, Pearl Harbor was an attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; no doubt about that. 

General Marshall. There was no other at that particular time, 
though a few hours later there was an attack on the Philippines. 

Senator Ferguson. I am going to read you a definition of an attack. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. (Reading) : 

Modern warfare has injected a new definition for that word "attack." There 
was a time when we could afford to say that we would not fight unless attacked 
and then wait until the physical attack came upon us before start- [S218'\ 
ing to shoot. Modern techniques of warfare have changed all that. An attack 
today is a very different thing. An attack today begins as soon as any base has 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1223 

been occupied from which our security is threatened. That base may be thou- 
sands of miles away from our shores. The American Government must of ne- 
cessity decide at which point any threat of attack against this hemisphere has 
begun and to make their stand when that point has been reached. 

The Chaikman. May the Chair ask the Senator what he is reading 
from? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I first want to ask the General whether 
or not he agrees with that definition of "attack" ? 

General Marshall. I do not find myself in any particular disagree- 
ment with it but it is a considerable discussion of a certain definition. 

Senator Ferguson. I cannot hear you. 

General Marshall. I say I do not find myself in specific disagree- 
ment with any part of that, but it is a considerable generalization. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, would you say that that kind of an at- 
tack, defined in that paragraph that I read you, was such as to put 
into effect these various phms or any of them? 

General Marshall. Well, if 

[3219] Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. 

The Chairman. Let the General answer his question. 

General ]\Iarshall. If you are referring. Senator, to some key par- 
agraph in the agreement, in the American-British-Dutch conversa- 
tions at Singapore — or is it ABC-1 you are talking about ? 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about 

General Marshall. ABC-1 ? 

Senator Ferguson (continuing) : ABC-1, I will first talk about 
that. 

General Marshall. ABC-1 To put that plan into actual effect I 
would say that that definition would not apply because there would 
be plenty of time for the Government itself to take care of considera- 
tion of whether or not it would commit itself on that basis. When you 
have an overt, close-striking operation which you must respond to 
instantly, then you have the sort of attack that compels an instant re- 
sponse with or without plans. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the ABC-1 apply to the Pacific? 

General Marshall. Senator, I must apologize for looking at these 
things. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I want you to look at them. 

General Marshall. I haven't read them for 4 years. 

{32W] Senator Ferguson. I want to get the record clear on it. 

General Marshall. And it takes me some time to catch up with it. 

Senator Ferguson. What exhibit have you now. General? Will 
counsel put in the record what he has ? 

General Marshall. I have Exhibit 49. 

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 49 ? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that is the one you say that the definition 
that I read would not put it into effect? 

General Marshall. That would be my opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, take the other plan. Exhibit 50. 
That is the American-Dutch-British. 

General Marshall. What I am trying to do, Senator, before I 
answer any of your questions — j'^ou talk about a paragraph in this plan 
that is automatic in the event of an attack by an enemy. 

79716 — 4G— pt. 3 17 



1224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. May I, Mr. Chairman, direct the witness' attention 
to the bottom of the second page? 

Purposes of the Staff Conference : 

To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States 
and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and 
the Powers allied with her, should the United States be com- [3221] pelled 
to resort to war. 

• General Marshall. Where are you reading from, please? 

Mr. Murphy. Page 2 of Exhibit 50, General. 

General Marshall. Of Exhibit 50? Well, I have got Exhibit 49 
here. That has to do with the American-Diitch-British conversations. 

Mr. Murphy. The same one that you call 49 1 am calling 50, General. 
I don't know just which. I have mine marked "50." 

Mr. Gesell. It is 49. 

Mr. Murphy. Page 2 of 49. 

General Marshall. Now, where were j^ou reading from, please, 
Mr. Murphy? 

Mr. Murphy. At the bottom of the page, the purposes of the 
conference. 

The Vice Chairman. What page? 

Mr. Murphy. Second page, under paragraph 3, the purposes of 
the conference. 

General Marshall. I have got some other paper. 

Mr. Murphy. Paragraph No. 3, "Purposes of the Staff Conference." 

General Marshall (reading) : 

Purposes of the Staff Conference. 

The purposes of the Staff Conference, as set out [3222] in the instruc- 
tions to the two representative bodies, were as follows : 

(a) To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United 
States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany 
and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort 
to war. 

(b) To coordinate, on broad lines, plans for the employment of the forces of 
the Associated Powers. 

(c) To reach agreements concerning the methods and nature of Military 
Cooperation between the two nations, including the allocation of the principal 
areas of responsibilit.y, the major lines of the Military strategy to be pursued by 
both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and 
the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme 
Military control, and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic or tactical 
joint operations. 

4. The Staff Conference,. interpreting the foregoing instructions in the light of 
the respective national positions of the two powers, has reached agreements, 
as set forth in this and annexed documents, concerning Military Cooperation 
between the United States and the British Commonwealth and its present Allies 
should [3223] the United States associate itself with them in war against 
Germany and her Allies. The agreements herewith submitted are subject to 
confirmation by : 

(a) The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy; the Chief of Staff, 
United States Army ; the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the 
United Kingdom. 

(b) The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in 
the United Kingdom. 

The Chiefs of Staff will request His Majesty's Government in the United King- 
dom to endeavor to obtain, where necessary, the concurrence of His Majesty's 
Governments in the Dominions, the Government of India, and the Governments 
of Allied Powers to the relevant provisions of the agreements herein recorded. 
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff will similarly request the 
United States Government to endeavor to obtain, where necessary, the concur- 
rence of the Governments of such other American Powers as may enter the war 
as associates of the United States. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1225 

The High Command of the United States and United Kingdom will collaborate 
continuously in the formulation and execution of strategical policies and plans 
which shall govern the conduct of the war. They and their [322/j] respec- 
tive commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will similarly collaborate in 
the planning and execution of such operations as may be undertaken jointly by 
United States and British forces. This arrangement will apply also to such plans 
and operations as may be undertaken separately, the extent of collaboration 
required in each particular plan or operation being agreed mutually when the 
general policy has been decided. 

The term "Associated Powers" used herein is to be taken as meaning the 
United States and British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the 
As.sociates and Allies of either Power. 

The Staff Conference assumes that when the United States becomes involved 
in war with Germany, it will at the same time engage in war with Italy. In 
these circumstances, the possibility of a state of war arising between Japan and 
an Association of the United States, the British Commonwealth and its Allies, 
including the Netherlands East Indies, must be taken into account. 

The Conference assumes that the United States will continue to furnish ma- 
terial aid to the United Kingdom, but, for the use of itself and its other asso- 
ciates, will retain material in such quantities as to provide for security and 
best to effectuate United States-British [,S225] joint plans for defeating 
Germany and her Allies. It is recognized that the amount and nature of the 
material aid which the United States affords the British Commonwealth will 
influence the size and character of the Military forces which will be available 
to the United States for use in the war. 

The broad strategic objective (object) of the Associated Powers will be the 
defeat of Germany and her Allies. 

The principles of United States and British national strategic defense policies 
of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are: 

(a) United States. 

The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western 
Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such dis- 
positions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European 
or Asiatic political or Military Power. 

(b) British Commonwealth. 

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. 
Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must miantain dis- 
positions which, in all eventualities will provide for [S226] the ultimate 
.security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British 
strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will insure 
the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of 
its war effort. 

(c) Sea Communications. 

The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential 
to the continuance of their war effort. 

The strategic concept includes the following as the principal ofEensive policies 
against the Axis Powers : 

(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and 
all other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplo- 
matic and financial measures. 

(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supplemented 
by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute 
to that power. 

(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis. 

(d) The employment of the air, land and naval forces of the Associated 
Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis Military 
[S227] strength. 

(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom. Associates 
of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in resistance to 
the Axis Powers. 

(f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against 
Germany. 

(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive. 

(13) Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will likewise 
be governed by the following: 

(a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the 
Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The prin- 



1226 CONGRESSIONAL in\'t:stigation pearl harbor attack 

cipal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations 
of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner 
as to facilitate that eifort. 

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, 
the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the 
protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of the 
United States efforts being [3228] concentrated in the Northwestern Ap- 
proaches to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval 
effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance. 

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied 
Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to prevent the spread 
of Axis control in North Africa. 

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis 
Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their 
forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention. If Japan 
does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The 
United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far 
East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner 
best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of 
the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The 
United States 

Senator Ferguson. General, may I interrupt just a moment? Are 
you answering Congressman Murphy's question now ? 

General Marshall. I am trying to find the exact terms of 
this agreement to refresh my own memory and read it 
clear \3220'] through to the end. I was reading it out loud. 
I can read it to myself if you prefer. 

Mr. Murphy. I have no question. 

General Marshall. I might say, Senator, there are thousands of 
pages of these and I have had 3 days in which to absorb them. 

Senator Ferguson. I think you and I both have had to do that. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make this clear ? I was trying 
to help the General in finding the answer to the question. 

Senator Lucas. What was the question ? 

Mr. Murphy. The Senator asked what was involved in the ABC ? 

General Marshall. No, Mr. Murphy, I understood the Senator to 
say when was the plan to be put into effect and I was trying to see 
if it was stipulated that when an attack came this would be automatic. 

Senator Ferguson. General, I refer you to Exhibit 16. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield. 

Mr. KiEFE. I realize the help that my colleague from Pennsylvania 
has been in this proceeding but in this particular [32301 ^^- 
stance his effort to help seems to have muddied the waters to the extent 
that there isn't anybody that knows what we are talking about and I 
would like to see if we can get an answer to a question or have a question 
submitted so that we can follow the proceedings. And I don't wonder 
that the General is disturbed because I confess as one member of the 
committee I have difficulty in Iniowing what is going on or what we 
are talking about and I would like to have this thing down to some 
basis so that one member can ask the questions and let the witness give 
the answers without these constant interjections which have the result 
of muddying the waters rather than clarifying them. 

[3231] The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan will proceed. 

Senator Ferguson, We will pass that question then. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1227 

The Chairman. The Chair would like to suggest, in response to the 
remarks of the Congressman from Wisconsin, that we had an under- 
standing that counsel would be permitted to inquire of the witnesses 
without interruption, and that the members of the committee in their 
turn would be permitted to inquire of the witnesses without interrup- 
tion and, except where it is necessary in order that a member of the 
committee understands an answer, does not get a word accurately, it 
would seem, in the interest of order, that that course be pursued. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I interject at this point? General 
Marshall has indicated from the start that he is perfectly able to take 
care of himself as a witness before this committee and to understand 
the questions that are asked without prompting from any other member 
of this committee. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I hope the gentleman will take that 
remark out of the record. I am not attempting to prompt anybody. 
I am seeking the truth here. I think the record will show I have been 
helpful to the Senator from ISIichigan in getting a clarification here. 

I think the remarks of the gentleman from Wisconsin is letting off 
steam and nothing else. 

[3232] The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan will pro- 
ceed. 

Senator Ferguson. I want the record to show I have not objected to 
any interruptions, because it is my interest to get the facts. The 
Chairman has well the right to invoke the rule. It was invoked the 
first day before I got two words out. 

The Chairman. I do not recall that. If that is true, the record will 
show it, but the Chair does not happen to remember it. The Chair 
offers these observations in order to try to discourage unnecessary 
interruptions of one member of the committee by another during the 
examination of the witnesses. 

Senator Ferguson. General, if you will now refer to Exhibit 50, 
I want to call certain things to your attention. 

On page 13, the top of the page, it states : 

It is agreed that any of the following actions by Japan would create a position 
in which our failure to take active military counteraction would place us at such 
military disadvantage, should Japan subsequently attack, that we should then 
advise our respective Governments to authorize such action : 

Then follow specifications (a), (b), (c), (d),and (e). 
General Marshall. Yes, sir ; I follow that. 
Senator Ferguson. In (b) it states: 

The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of [S2S3] Thailand 
to the west of 100° East or to the south of 10° North. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. We have a map before us, if you will just look 
at it, which indicates that line, and it ends up by saying : 

The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands. 

Do you see the line outlined on the map? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that. 

Senator Ferguson. And you used a very similar description in your 
letter — it is not a letter, it is a memorandum for the President by you 
and Admiral Stark, on November 5. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; I recall that. 



1228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. You recall that? 

General Marshall. I recall that. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 18 of that same exhibit, if you 
will refer to it, it says, "Japan's most probable course of action will 
be to," and then you have (a) and (b), and I will ask you whether or 
not anything is indicated in there in relation to an attack on Hawaii, 
or is it left out because Hawaii is not in this plan at all ? 

General Marshall (reading) : 

It is estimated that Japan's most probable course of action will be to : 

[3234] (a) contain the Asiatic Fleet in Manila Bay with the object of 

destroying it by air and torpedo attacks and failing in this, to 

(b) locate the Fleet at the earliest possible moment and endeavor to at least 

draw it by air, submarine or surface vessel attacks. 

The question, as I understand it, is whether there is an omission of 
any reference to Hawaii. 

feenator Ferguson. Yes ; was the reason that it was not covered by 
this plan because it was thought that that was the probable course of 
Japan? 

General Marshall. I think, Senator, it is my recollection of the dis- 
cussions that were going on in Singapore at the time that the problem 
of the attack on Hawaii was not what they were considering, it was 
the security of Singapore, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies, 
generally extending over north of New Guinea to the Admiralty 
Islands. 

Senator Ferguson. Then this plan did not anticipate an attack on 
America ? 

General Marshall. This plan was to meet a probable, as we under- 
stood it, Japanese operation to the south of the China Sea. 

[32S6] Senator Ferguson. Well, were you familiar with the 
fact that Mr. Churchill made the statement sometime before the war 
started, as far as America was concerned December 7, that in case 
Japan attacked America they would be in with us in 1 or 2 hours, or 
whatever the time was ? 

General Marshall. I have a recollection of some such statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Could that have been in reply to this plan then? 

General Marshall. I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Were they to come in if Hawaii alone were to be 
attacked ? 

General Marshall. I co"uld not answer that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or was it a one-sided plan? 

General Marshall. I do not think it was one-sided. 

Senator Ferguson. I just want to know what your opinion is on it. 

General Marshall. It says "A direct act of war by Japanese armed 
forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the 
associated powers." That is a very general statement, and can cover 
Hawaii also. "It is not possible to define accurately what would con- 
stitute 'a direct act of war.' It is possible for a minor incident to oc- 
cur which, although technically an act of war, could be [S236] 
resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized that the decision as to 
whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government 
concerned." 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out whether this plan went 
into effect prior to December 7. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1229 

General Marshall. I am quite certain it did not go into effect, 
because it never was implemented, sir. 

Senator Fergusojst. On page 25, it says, at the bottom of the page — 
will you read that (b), the last paragraph? 

General Marshall (reading) : 

The operating of Chinese guerilla forces armed, equipped, and directed by the 
associated Powers. Steps have already been taken by the British Government 
to organize such operations. It is recommended that the United States Govern- 
ment organize similar guerilla forces. * 

Senator Ferguson. Did we ever organize those, to put this plan into 
effect? 

General Marshall. So far as I know, prior to December 7, 1941, 
we did not, as far as I can recollect. 

The one action, aside from sending supplies into China, that I do 
have a very definite recollection of is equipping the air force, the 
Plying Tigers. 

Senator Ferguson. The Volunteer Air Corps? 

General Marshall. Yes ; because I took the action to get [3237] 
them the planes personally. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the Volunteer Air Corps? 

General Marshall. The Volunteer Air Corps was a force of air- 
men, combat planes, P-40's, I believe, furnished by the United 
States, and operated by volunteer officers from the United States, I 
think, of the Army and Navy, and there may have been even' civilians 
in it. I am not quite certain. 

Some of tliem were reserve officers, and they were relieved from 
active duty, and released so that they might go into the employ of the 
Chinese Government. 

The planes were obtained — is there any interest in that? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

General ISIarshall. The planes were obtained on the basis of an 
English contract for planes, I think, with the Curtiss Co., and when 
that contract had been fulfilled, it was possible for the plant to turn 
out a certain number of planes during the next few months, if they 
immediately started, within 10 days, using tlie parts that were then 
available; otherwise their assembly lines would change. 

Under the contract arrangement we had, which controlled the 
Curtiss Co.'s operations with the British, our Government, meaning 
the War Department in general, and Air Corps people in particular, 
could control the question [3^37] of whether or not those 

planes should be manufactured beyond the contract terms. 

The problem was to obtain planes immediately for the Chinese. 

The planes which would have been fabricated out of this available 
extra material of course would not have been completed for 3 or 4 
months. 

We could kill that, so far as the British getting the benefit of those 
additional planes, or, as I used it, we could, on a trade basis, require 
them to make immediate delivery of completed planes that were 
going to them, to the Chinese, and we later would allow them to take 
these additional planes that were manufactured from the accumulated 
materiel. 

[3239] I saw Mr. Sumner Welles and he took up the adjustment 
with the British, and they submitted to that condition, and we got 50 



1230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in January or February, and 50 more in February or March. They 
were all for the Flying Tigers; they were sent out to the Far East. 
The men that were recruited by the Chinese and we released where 
they happened to be reserve officers, also, proceeded to the Far East. 

My next recollection of the matter is while we had obtained the 
planes on that basis by a twist of the British contract, we now found 
ourselves in the predicament of having to provide the guns and ammu- 
nition, which we did not have available, and we had a hard time arm- 
ing the planes. 

That was the one definite force that I recall, prior to December 7, 
1941, we organized to the extent that I have just described. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, was that an activating of this 
Exhibit 50 plan? 

General Marshall. I do not think it was that. It came actually 
out of a visit here of T. V. Soong with the head of the Chinese Air. 
I took them out to my house for lunch and they made an impressive 
picture of the circumstances and the great good such action would do, 
and I immediately undertook the obtaining of that materiel. That 
was without regard to this plan, and what I was referring to here is 
the [3240] continuation of that. 

Senator Ferguson. What I was trying to find out was whether this 
was an activating of this particular plan. 

General Marshall. I do not think it was, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In your memo, exhibit 16, you refer to the same 
line which I rend to you before. 

Mr. Gesell. I think that is exhibit 17, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. No ; 16 is the one I have reference to. You see 
at the top of page 4, "The basic military policies and strategy agreed 
to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound." 

Now I assume you are referring to Exhibit 50, are you not. General? 

General Marshall. What page was that you were reading from? 

Senator Ferguson. Page 4. It is the fourth page of this document. 
They are not numbered. The top of the page, "Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions." 

General Marshall. I see it. "The basic military policies and strat- 
egy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain 
sound." Now the question? 

Senator Ferguson. I wanted to know whether that referred to 
exhibit 50. 

[3241] General Marshall. That was my understanding, sir. 
However, the use of the word "agreed" is not intended to imply that 
our Government was committed to it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Senator, the British- American Staff conver- 
sations are ABC-1 and 2. I was afraid you are getting a confusion 
on the record. Exhibit 50 is the American-Dutch-British. That is 
a memo with reference to what ? 

General Marshall. It is the estimate concerning the Far Eastern 
situation. 

The Chakman. That is a different document, isn't it? 

Senator Ferguson. Does not that include the Dutch and Singapore ? 
Does not that include Exhibit 50, which you were looking at? 

General Marshall. I think it does, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1231 

Senator Ferguson. You think it does. Now in order that there be 
no misunderstanding about this definition of an attack that I read — 
do you recall what I had read to you? 

(reneral Marshall,. Yes, sir ; I do. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that kind of an attack as described in 
the definition that I read to you activate or bring into effect Exhibit 
50, that is the one on the Far East? 

General Marshall. I will say, in the first place, that no attack would 
have brought into effect this exhibit 50, because 

[32Jf2'] Senator Ferguson (interposing). Well, was it contem- 
plated 

The Chairman. Just a moment. Let him complete his answer. 

General Marshall. It was contemplated that our Government ap- 
prove the procedure. Now your exact definition, I am not quite cer- 
tain about that. But the point I am making now is we, meaning Ad- 
miral Stark and myself, as Chief of Staff, and meaning the Secre- 
tary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, would not be in a position 
and were not in a position to bring the terms of this argument, so far 
as they pertained to the United States, into effect, by reason of the 
document without the formal approval of the Government. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

[^323J^\ General, I want to refer now to Exhibit 40, a dispatch 
between Admiral Hart and Admiral Stark. Do you have it before 
you? 

General Marshall. I have that before me. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you just read the message part? It is 
only one sentence. 

General Marshall. "Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain 
armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no 
corresponding instructions from you." 

That is a question ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. From the Commander in Chief in the Far East 
to Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, have you any such knowledge as that? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That was entirely foreign and not in your mind 
at all, that we had any such ararngements ? 

General Marshall. In my mind was the clear understanding that 
this was a planning arrangement which had not been approved, was 
not to be considered as an approved document until the Government 
so ordered. 

Mr. Mitchell. May I ask what the date of that letter is? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Will you give the date? It [3£44] 
has been in the record. 

General Marshall. It is December 1941. I do not see the day of 
the month. 

Mr. Gesell. After the war started. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, wait. 

General Marshall. There is no day of the month on it. 

Senator Ferguson. Is counsel testifying here or tlie witness? 



1232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. I was speaking to Mr. Mitchell. I would be glad to 
advise the committee of the information I gave to Mr. Mitchell. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask what the stenographer got. 

(The record was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson. Do you see anything on that exhibit to show that 
that was shown to Admiral Hart or Admiral Stark after the war 
started? 

General Marshall. I see merely the month, December, and the year, 
1941. There may be the day of the month on here, but I do not spot it. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that reference on it give you when it was ? 

General Marshall. I presume it would. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at it? Do you know the Navy 
code there ? 

\_32Ji.5'\ General Marshall. I do not know what it is. The way it 
reads, it is the 645th day of December, but that does not make sense 
to me. 

The Chairman. Is there anybody here who understands what date 
that is? 

Senator Ferguson. The first and second numerals of the serial 
designate the date of the month, the third and fourth numerals, the 
hour of the daj^, and the fifth and sixth, the minutes of the hour. 

General Marshall. This would be the 7th day of December 1941, 
according to that. 

Senator Ferguson. 1941? 

General Marshall. The 7th day of December. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and what hour ? 

General Marshall. The sixth hour, and 45 minutes. 

Senator Ferguson. I will read the cracking of the code here : 

The third and fourth numerals the hour of the day, a*Dd the 5th and 6th the 
minutes of the hour. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Just a moment. Let the Senator finish. 

Mr. Murphy. I want to make a protest before he does. 

The Chapman. The Chairman will not recognize the member at 
this time, until the Senator from Michigan finishes. 

\32J^6^ Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. No, not at this time. I want to overrule the 
Chair. 

The Chairman. The Chair is not overruled. The Chair has sus- 
tained the Senator from Michigan. 

Senator Ferguson. I was trying to give the General a way to in- 
terpret that langauge. Now I will read it again. 

I am reading from a letter of the Navy Department, Office of the 
Secretary, Washington, the 6th of December 1945, and signed by 
John Ford Baecher, Lieutenant Commander, USNR. 

The time element involved in the above-mentioned dispatches is computed in 
the following manner: The first and second numerals of the serial designate 
the day of the month, the third and fourth numerals the hour of the day, the 
fifth and sixth the minutes of the hour. 

Now, will you give us the date of the month ? 
General Marshall. The 7th day of December. 
Senator Ferguson. The third and fourth numerals, the hour of the 
day? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1233 

General Marshall. That is the sixth hour of the day, and that 
would be 6 a. m. 

Senator Ferguson, That would be 6 a. m. The fifth and sixth, min- 
utes of the hour? 

[S£4'^] General Marshall. That would be December 7, at 6 : 45 
a. m., 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I will read you the next 

All dispatches are dated Greenwich time. 

General IVIarshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What does that mean ? 

General Marshall. It means just that; it is the Greenwich time. 
You will have to relate this over to the similar time in the Far East. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to try to get it in Washington time. 

General Marshall. I could not tell you just what that is. You 
want it in Washington time ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. I think Greenwich time is about 6 hours dif- 
ference from Washington time, approximately. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, reading further. 

As an example, dispatch #070645 means that the dispatch originates in the 
Philippines area on the 7th day of the month (and as shown on the face of the 
dispatch in the month of December, 1941) at 6:45 a. m. Greenwich time. 

Now, they are talking about Philippine time, are they not ? I mean 
the day ? Is that Greenwich time ? I will give you the letter. General, 
and see if you can figure it [324S] out. 

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose I read it into the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, he had better look at it. I would like to 
have you figure out what time it w^as in Washington, and what day 
of the month. 

General Marshall. What time it was where ? 

Senator Ferguson. In Washington, when that was sent. 

General Marshall. This memo states : 

"Eastern Standard time is five hours earlier than Greenwich time, therefore 
the dispatch originated on December 7, at 1 : 45 a. m. Eastern Standard time. The 
Philippine area is about eight hours ahead of Greenwich time, therefore the 
dispatch originated on December 7, 2 : 45 p. m. Philippine area time." 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, with the time here in Washington 
that was 1 : 45 in the morning, was it not, on the 7th ? That would be 
an hour and 45 minutes after midnight on the morning of the 7th? 

General Marshall. That would be it. 

Senator Ferguson. Had the attack taken place at that time? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; the attack did not take place, 1 believe, 
imtil 1 o'clock in the middle of the day, Washington time. 

Senator Ferguson. In the middle of the day. 

[3249] The Chairman. May the Chair ask at this moment, it 
is practically 4 o'clock — whether the committee desires to sit longer 
today? I frankly, was hoping we might conclude with General Mar- 
shall today on account of his matters but whether we can is not within 
my control. 

Would the committee feel justified in sitting longer if there is a 
chance to conclude with General Marshall or not ? 



1234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. There isn't a chance, unless the committee is 
willing to sit well into the evening. 

The Chairman. The Chair would not want to compel the Senator 
from Michigan to tell how long it will take. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not know. 

The Chairman. In view of the fact we cannot conclude with Gen- 
eral Marshall, what is the wish of the committee as to recessing now ? 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire something of 
General Marshall. I understand he stated yesterday his plane was 
waiting, ready to take him to his duties in China. 

General Marshal. It will have to continue to wait. I am to be at 
your disposal until you have finished. 

The Chairman. Under those circumstances, the committee will re- 
cess until 10 o'clock Monday morning. 

(Whereupon, the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Monday, De- 
cember 10, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMFl^EE 1235 



[3250-] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



monday, decembeb 10, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10: 00 a. m., 
in the Caucus Koom (room 318), Senate Oflace Building, Senator 
Alben TV. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Fergu- 
son and Eepresentatives (Jooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, 
Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[3251^ The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Senator Ferguson, you v^ere examining General Marshall. 

TESTIMONY OP GEN. GEOEGE C. MARSHALL (Eesumed) 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a correction 
in the record. 

On page 3178 I read from the Koberts Keport. It is in the record 
on page 3178, the last paragraph. The record reads : "8 : 30 American 
Honolulu time." The record I read from, being the Roberts report, 
says : "6 : 30 A. M. Honolulu time." 

The word "American" is not in there. So there will be two changes. 
The figure "8 : 30" is changed to "6 : 30" and strike out "American." ^ 

The Chairman. The correction will be made. 

Senator Ferguson. General Marshall, about the 12th or 13th of 
August, 1941, you attended the Atlantic Conference meeting, did you 
not? 

General Marshall. Wliat sort of meeting, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. The Atlantic Conference. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I was present, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How long before you went to that meeting had 
you known there was to be a meeting ? 

[3252'] General Marshall. I do not recall. Senator, but purely 
as a guess I would say maybe a week; I don't recall at all. Maybe 
some circumstances will come up that will jar my memory, but I don't 
recall now at all. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see any agenda before you went to the 
meeting? 

1 See p. 1207, supra. 



1236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall, I know specifically there was no agenda for the 
Chiefs of Staff. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conferences with the British 
Chiefs of Staff or military authorities, in relation to the Far East? 

General Marshall. I don't recall a specific conference with the three 
British Chiefs of Staff regarding the Far East. 

Might I explain my recollection of what occurred ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. Admiral Stark, General Arnold, and myself 
met with the British Chief of Staff, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the 
Acting Head of the Air Corps — Air Marshal Portal was not present — 
and Field Marshal Sir John Dill, then Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff. 

Our discussions were quite general, somewhat in the nature of get- 
ting acquainted and of our learning from them of the course of the 
war from their point of view, and of [3253] their informing 
us in general statements of their urgent necessities. 

We proceeded thereafter most of the time on the basis of pei-sonal 
conversations between the respective opposite Chiefs of Staff. In my 
case, that would be Field Marshal Sir John Dill. 

My recollection of mj' conversations with the Field Marshal were 
that he explained on his own initiative, or on my questioning, what 
their situation was all over the world, their approaches to the various 
phases of the campaigns that had then taken place, and particularly 
the situation in the Middle East. 

My recollection is that he and I had not a great deal to say about 
materiel, because in the category of materiel for the ground forces 
we had already done for them about as much as it was possible for us 
to do for some time. 

My understanding of the conversations between General Arnold 
and the First Sea Lord, on which General Arnold is the best witness — 
I should say with the air representative — he had a great deal of dis- 
cussion regarding aircraft that the British needed. And I believe 
somewhat the same was the nature of the conversations between Ad- 
miral Stark and the First Sea Lord in regard to naval requirements. 

However, I did not sit in on those details. 

[3254] At another meeting with the three Chiefs of Staff 

Senator Ferguson. General, I was only interested in the Far East 
situation. I didn't care to cover the other. 

General IVL^rshall. I will confine myself to that by saying, Senator, 
that we only had a general discussion of the situation all over the 
world, and I do not remember specifically the Far Eastern part. So 
far as our discussions with them, I took the lead in pressing them all 
the time to unify their procedure and to save us from the confusion 
that was then existent here in Washington regarding their necessities 
as to materiel. 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to going there or at the meeting, did you 
know what this country's, America's, attitude, our attitude, was in 
relation to Japan going any further on her aggressive steps, aggres- 
sion steps in the Far East ? 

General Marshall. My recollection of my understanding of that 
phase of the matter at that time was that our policy was in every 
way that seemed possible and suitable to discourage any outbreak in 
the Pacific. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1237 

Senator Ferguson. On page 14 of exhibit 1, I wonder whether 
this was ever called to your attention. It was on the 7th of August, 
1941, translated the 8th of August — no, translated the 15th of 
August. So you would be at the meeting [3265^ at that time, 
would you not? 

General Marshall. I believe so, sir. 

[3256] Senator Ferguson. What I wanted to call to your at- 
tention was the second paragraph on that page. It is a message from 
Washington Japan intercepted : 

When Japan occupied French Indochina 

General Marshall. Senator, may I interrupt. What page are you 
on, please? 

Senator Ferguson. I am on page 14. 

General Marshall. I have it now. 

Senator Ferguson. The second paragraph [reading from exhibit 
No. 1] : 

When Japan occupied French Indochina, the United States retaliated with 
the "freezing" order and the export embargo ; a joint warning by Hull and 
Eden was issued with regard to any ambitions in the direction of Thailand. 

Did you know that? 

General Marshall. I presume that I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know tliat there was a conversation be- 
tween the President and Mr. Churchill in relation to parallel action 
by the United States as far as Japan was concerned in case of 
aggression ? 

General Marshall. I presume that I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you return at the same time as the Presi- 
dent? 

General Marshall. Only part of the way, sir. I left the Augusta, 
which was the cruiser on which we were traveling [32S7] at 
sea, somewhere southeast, I believe, of Nova Scotia, took a seaplane 
and flew in to the Naval Base near Newport, and there transferi-ed 
to a plane to Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. You came back to the United States 2 

General Marshall. I came back directly to the United States. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you learned before you came back to the 
United States that there had been a conversation between the Presi- 
dent and Mr. Churchill in relation to parallel action ? Was that dis- 
cussed with you at the conference ? 

General Marshall. That was not discussed with me at the con- 
ference. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when you returned to the United 
States ? The President — I relate the day he returned for the record — 
the 17th. That was on a Sunday morning. 

Do you know when you returned? 

General Marshall. Do I know when the President returned ? 

Senator Ferguson. No; when you returned to the United States? 

General Marshall. I returned quite a few days ahead of him, so I 
must have been here then. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you learn that on the I7th of August the 
President — that is on a Sunday morning — the President called the 
Japanese Ambassador to the White House [3258] and de- 



1238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

livered to him a statement, an oral statement? In the oral statement 
this language was used : 

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Gov- 
ernment of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in 
pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of 
force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be 
compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary 
toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and 
American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United 
States. 

That is the end of the paragraph and the end of the statement. 

General Marshall. Your question is 

Senator Ferguson. Whether you knew that, when you learned of it. 

General Marshall. My recollection is, and I believe the records of 
liaison meetings show, that at least the sense of that message, if not 
the actual message, was read in my presence in the office of the Under 
Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, about 2 days later, which I 
believe was the 19th. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the first knowledge you had that such 
action was taken or was to be taken ? 

[3259] General Marshall. Yes, sir ; as far as I can recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know that England — did you ever 
learn that England had taken a similar step ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that on August 24, 4 days prior 
to the Jap answer to that message, which was the 28th, that the Prime 
Minister made a statement to the effect that in case America went to 
war with Japan that they, the British, would be in in a short time — 
2 or 3 hours? 

General Marshall. I don't recall that. sir. 

[3260] Senator Ferguson. What was the discussion you had 
with the Under Secretary in relation to the paragraph that I just read, 
the one that you read at the 

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. I have not seen the 
minutes or the record of the meeting. I had a vague recollection of 
knowing something about that message at some time and I was told 
that it was in the record of the minutes of the liaison meeting. I 
believe it is a naval record of a Captain Schuirmann that Mr. Welles 
either told us of the message or actually read the message to us, so 
that I am not a very good witness on that. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you interpret what was said at that 
meeting by Mr. Welles? What obligation did it place on you as the 
head of the Army, if any? How did you interpret it as Chief of 
Staff? 

General Marshall. My interpretation now — I would have to guess 
at what it was then — was that the situation was growing more difficult 
and the implications here were largely, I believe, economic ; but I do 
not recall exactly what my reactions were at the time. I knew this 
throughout the procedure then, as far as I understood the matter of 
the diplomatic interchanges, that they were endeavoring to find some 
way to avoid a rupture in the Pacific without the complete sacrifice of 
American policies. 

[3261] Senator Ferguson. Did you take that as being from that 
time on the American policy so that you would have to, if necessary, 
implement it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1239 

General Marshall. I would assume that I would, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did that in any way change the American policy 
as far as you were concerned, that is, as far as your knowledge? 

General Marshall. I would assume that it did not. 1 have no 
recollection of any state of change in my mind at the time. Our 
procedure was more or less uniform throughout. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did that indicate that the tension was at 
least growing and that w^e had certain commitments and that it may 
be necessary for you to prepare for those commitments? 

General Matshall. I presume so, sir. Certainly the tension was 
growing all the time, and particularly in the months of September, 
October, and November. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. What is the Senator talking about when he talks 
about commitments ? I would like to know that. 

Senator Ferguson. Does the General understand my question? 

General Marshall. I could not hear. Senator. 

[S£^] Senator Lucas. I would like to know to what the Senator 
is referring, what the Senator is inquiring about when he talks about 
our commitments. I would like to know myself what the Senator 
is talking about. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will ask the General, does he understand 
my question ? 

General Marshall. Well, I was not making any fine interpretation 
of the word "commitment," Senator. I was talking about our mili- 
tary obligations. 

Senator Ferguson. We were talking about this particular para- 
graph, were we not. General ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you understood my questions to relate to 
that paragraph ? 

General Marshall. I thought I did. 

Senator Ferguson. And the fact that the Japanese had received it 
from the President on Sunday morning ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know. General, whether or not 
that information of the delivery of this message was sent to General 
Short or General MacArthur ? 

General Marshall. I have no — there was a message sent to General 
Short and to General MacArthur sometime, as I recall, during August 
that referred to the Japanese attitude. {3263'] I do not know 
offhand whether or not this message was sent. My recollection would 
be that it was not. 

Senator Ferguson. Your recollection would be that it was not sent? 

General Marshall. But the record wall show that, of course, Sen- 
ator. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well I have no record that it was and I 
wondered if you have any knowledge that it had been sent. 

Had you any information of a proposed meeting between Konoye 
and the President of the United States? 

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir, now. On that you will 
have to refresh my memory. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 3 18 



1240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. You never prepared any data or had prepared 
any data anticipating such a meeting? 

General Marshall. I do not recall it, sir. It may be but I do not 
recall it at the moment. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you any information that any meeting 
like that may be held in Juneau, Alaska? Would that refresh your 
memory ? 1 am only asking you that to refresh your memory. 

General Marshall. Well, I am sorry but it does not right now. 
May I say, Senator, this mass of papers and all I haven't seen for 4 
years, whatever part I did see, 

[3264] Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that. 

General Marshall. And it is very hard for me to recall what I actu- 
ally had known. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is why at times T ask a question 
thinking it may refresh your memory on it. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In the intercepts there is considerable informa- 
tion about such a meeting and in the memos from Ambassador Grew 
to the State Department and to the Secretary of State there is con- 
siderable in the early part of October prior to the fall of the cabinet. 
I think the indication is at least that theAmbassador thought the 
cabinet would fall, and advised them that it would fall unless such 
a meeting liad taken place. Did you have any information? 

General Marshall. If it was in magic I presume I did, sir, but 
just what Mr. Grew's messages were I do not recall whether I know 
anything about them or not. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't know whether you had any infor- 
mation 

General Marshall. Everything of that kind I got through oral 
statements from ]\Ir. Stimson who was attending these meetings fre- 
quently, more frequently than I was in the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, there is considerable magic [326S] 
on that question of the Konoye meeting. 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall it now? 

General Marshall. I have a hazy recollection now of the fact that 
there was quite a bit. 

Senator Ferguson. But you do not know of any particular data 
that 3'ou may have obtained for that meeting? 

General Marshall. I do not recall it now, sir. They may be able 
to show me a memorandum signed by me, but I do not recall it now. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I haven't got any memorandum or I 
would have given it to j'ou first. I was just seeking information as 
to what you may have. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. We have a memorandum in the record. Senator, if I 
may be helpful. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, certainly. 

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 33. item 17, dated October 2. 1941, has the 
memorandum to the Chief of Staff from General Miles' deputy. Colonel 
Kroner, which discussed that problem. The memorandum was also 
distributed to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
War, and the Under Secretary, and other officials. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1241 

Senator Fkrgusox. What part of Ihat iiieiiiorandum, Mr. [3266] 
Gesell? 

Mr. Geskll. Well. I think town id the middle there is a discussion 
of a meetinjT of leaders and the Army position is stated by G-2. 

Senator Fkk(;itson. That thcv will prepare data for it? 

Mr. Gesell. No, that they were discussinfj the meeting. Item 8 
at the bottom there starts and discusses the meeting; and ^oes over onto 
tlip next pajre, 

Senatoi" Fehouson. Yes. I am familiar with that. I)nt I wondered 
whether any data had been prejjared. 

Mr. Gesell. Oh, I don't know about that. 

Senator Ferousox. That is what I had in mind. 

General, do you know whether you advised such a meetino; oi- 
advised acainst such a meetinji'^ Were you consulted, in other words? 

General ^Marshall. I have no recollection of that. 

Senator Ferguson. General, had you desifjnated anyone to negotiate 
or at least confer in liaison about it between the State Department and 
your headquarters of the Chief of Staff? 

General Marshall. I think we had two mediums of that sort. One 
through the G-2 section of the General Staff and one i)robably through 
the War Plans Divisicm of the General Staff. However. General Miles 
and General Gerow^ can give you an authoritative statement regarding 
that. 

[3267'] Senator Ferguson. But you had not designated any par- 
ticular individual? 

General Marshail. No, sir; I don't think I ever have. I know 
that during the greater course of the war I had officers that would see 
Mr. Hull sometimes almost every day but I do not recall that I ever 
designated any particular individual unless it was General Hull on 
one occasion. 

Senator Fergxtson. During all of this time of all this negotiation 
did you understand that the Fleet was at Pearl Harbor, the main 
part of the Fleet ? 

General Marshall. I knew all the time where the Fleet was based. 
Its sailings in and out, though, I was not familiar with. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General INIarshall. But I would know absolutely when the Fleet 
left the West Coast, when it arrived out in HaAvaii and so long as it 
was based in Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted any in the year 1940 or con- 
ferred with in relation to the Fleet going and basing at Pearl Har- 
bor? 

General Marshall. I am quite certain that I was involved in the 
discussions regarding that movement. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what your opinion was on sending 
it there I 

[3268] General Marsil^ll. I am sorry. Senator, I do not recall 
just exactly what my point of view was. t haA^e a clear recollection, 
.still dubious, as to what my own thoughts Avere regarding quite a 
discussion as to the reinforcement of the Atlantic Fleet from a por- 
tion of the Pacific Fleet and at that time the U. S. Fleet was in the 
Los Angeles-San Dieiro recion. There was a verv considerable dis- 
cussion on it for (luite a while over that phase of the matter and it 



1242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was the problem of the maintenance of our convoys across the At- 
lantic to Great Britain, which Great Britain was vitally dependent 
upon ; and the security in the Pacific and the numbers and questions 
of the disposition of the vessels of the Fleet was a very important 
matter. 

Senator Ferguson. General, you would be vitally interested in the 
moving of the Fleet to Pearl Harbor because that being in Pearl 
Harbor, based in Pearl Harbor, it became one of your tasks to pro- 
tect it while it was at anchorage in Pearl Harbor, isn't that true? 

General Marshall. That is correct. Senator. I had a very vital 
interest, the Army had a very vital interest, in the Fleet at Pearl 
Harbor because the obligation to protect Pearl Harbor was an Army 
obligation. 

Senator Ferguson. And did j^ou have any idea as to its effect on the 
diplomatic negotiations? Were you consulted on [3269] that? 

Genera] Marshall. Well, my recollection is that was one of the 
considerations involved. Now, just whether they asked me person- 
ally or not I do not know, but I assume that I was personally in- 
volved in the discussions and, therefore, must have expressed an 
oi:)inion. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know what that opinion was? 

General Marshall. I cannot recall right now, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I see in a memorandum dated the 25th of Feb- 
ruary 1941, a conference in the office of the Chief of Staff, the Chief 
of Staff being present. It is exhibit 55. I will not have to read 
who was present there. This language is used [reading] : 

They are in the situation where they must jsniard against a surprise or trick 
attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and 
they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a pos- 
sibility or even a probability but they must guard against everything. 

That is down about a third of the way down. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Does that refresh your memory as to what 
was going on at the time? 

[3270] General Marshall. Only to the extent that we were hav- 
ing these discussions regarding the fleet and this is a direct state- 
ment by me at that time, which is quite evidently what I thought at 
that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when, or did you give any opinion 
as to when the fleet was actually prepared for war ? 

General M^vrshall. No, sir, I could not say I had any data on that. 
I know I have quite a clear recollection that I was very much con- 
cerned regarding their obtaining the additional vessels that I believe at 
that time were characterized as the fleet train. In other words, the 
fleet itself was very much limited in action unless it had a large 
supply force to keep it going, not only in oil, gas, but in munitions 
and in food and in all the other requirements of ships traveling at 
sea in long voyages. 

We greatly lacked, the fleet, I believe, greatly lacked such an equip- 
ment and I became personally interested in that and I recall discuss- 
ing it at the liaison meeting and I believe the record will show, though 
I have not checked it, that a recommendation was made by the liaison 
group through the medium of Mr. Sumner Welles regarding the im- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1243 

mediate establishment of an adequate fleet train. Now, the record 
will show that. That is my dim recollection at the time. 

[3£71] Senator Ferguson. General Marshall, when you sent the 
war warning:, that would necessitate the fleet preparing for war, 
would it not? 

General Marshall. The war M^arning would put the fleet on the 
alerted action. It was presumed at that time, at least I should say it 
was presumed at that time that the fleet, so far as was possible, was 
in a state of preparation for war but its actual alert for battle condi- 
tions was the purpose of the alert message. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, wouldn't it be necessary for the fleet to 
go into Harbor 

General Marshall. Senator, you are asking me 

Senator Ferguson (continuing). — to prepare for war? I am just 
bringing that out, to see what your information was as to the 

General Marshall. I am going to ask you to please ask a Naval au- 
thority on that because I am just guessing — I don't expect the Navy 
men to tell you much about tanks — but I do not want to commit my- 
self. 

Senator Ferguson. General, the reason I asked that question was, as 
I understand it, you had charge of the protection of the fleet. 

General Marshali.. The Army was responsible for the defenses of 
Hawaii, or the Island of Oahu in particular, [3272] which in- 
chided Pearl Harbor, and the coordination of all the air and de- 
fensible fires in that particular vicinity in the event of aggressive 
Japanese action. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, that would include the actual protection 
of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; specifically that. 

Senator Ferguson, And, therefore, if it was necessary to take the 
Fleet into anchorage to have it prepared for war on the war warning 
you would have to protect it while it was in there, that is, your Army? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you been consulted by anyone — well, by 
the Secretary of War or the President, about whether or not we were 
prepared for a war with Japan? That is, whether your Army was 
prepared ? 

General INIarshall. I had had a number of discussions with the 
Secretary of War regarding that consideration and I believe I testified 
earlier that, along with the Secretary of War, I had notified the 
Secretary of State at some time in September that I thought that by 
December 5th that we would be in such a situation as to deter Japanese 
action. I was referring, of course, specifically to the Philippine 
Islands because we thought we had done all we could at that time to 
make additional pi-ovisions for the defense of Oahu. 

[3273] Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether you prepared 
any memorandums outside of the one. Exhibit 16 and Exhibit 17 — 
they are the joint memorandum of November the 5th and November 
the 27th — as to our preparedness ? 

General Marshall. I will have to go to the record, sir. I do not 
recall offhand. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, would you have the records checked on 
this?^ 



See Mr. GeseH's statement in Hearings, Part 5, p. 2074, 



1244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The only two that I have seem to bear those 
dates. 

Now, I wish you would take Exhibit 16 and on the second page I 
ask you whether you were consulted in relation to the second para- 
graph on that page : 

The question that the Chief of Naval Operaticuis and the Chief of Staff have 
taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in 
undertaking offensive military oioerations with U. S. forces against Japan, to 
prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider tliat such opera- 
tions, however well-disguised, would lead to war. 

Was that question put to you? 

General ^Marshall. 1 don't know whether that specific question was 
put to me but I do know that Admiral Stark and [o274] I, 
myself, were called on either by oral direction or otherwi.se to express 
ourselves regarding the appeal of the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 
for protection against what he thought were the inevitable offensive 
intention of the Japanese north towards Kunming, which would 
cut the Burma Road and this exj)ressi()n. as I recall and as I think 
itself will show, stated our views in that matter. 

Senator Ferguson. Then the next sentence : 

At the present time the United States Fleet in tlie Pacific is interior to the 
Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the 
Western Pacific. 

•General Marshall. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson, (reading) : 

In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing 
all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. 

Do you remember discussing that with Admiral Stark ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I don't remem])er the exact discus- 
sion but I know that must be almost what we discussed. I couldn't 
help but have discussed it. And, incidentally, I referred to that a 
little while ago in stating that our problem was the respective 
strengths of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. 

[^^7o] Senator Ferguson. On top of page 3, at the top of the 
page it says, "The only existing," and then they say at the bottom of 
the page, after the w'ord "existing," they say in the footnote "two 
preceding words struck out, and handwritten word 'current' sub- 
stituted." 

So it would read : 

The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct 
defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of 
the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. 

General Marshall, Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you mean by the "current plans for 
war"? Were you at that time anticipating war was inevitable? 

General Marshall. The date of this memorandum is November 5, 
1941, and the threat of war was very evident. 

Senator Ferguson. You were being consulted at that time as the 
highest ranking military authority on that question ? 

General Marshall. Undoubtedly, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1245 

Scnntoi' Fer(usox. And at that time you nnticipated — on the same 
pa^e — that "The U. S. Army Air Forces in the Philij^pines will have 
reached the i)rojected strength by February or March, 1942"? 

General Maijsiiai.l. Yes, sir. 

Senator Fkrguson. And then it states down further : 

\327()] By this time, additional Britisli navnl and nir reinforcemonts to 
Singapore will liave arrived. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you of the opinion at that time that if 
there was a war it w^ould involve not only Britain with Singapore 
but the United States with the Philippines? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. There was not any question in your mind about 
(hat. that if war came to one of the countries, war was coming to 
both countries? 

General Marshall. That was my impression at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. And isn't it true that one of the things, at least, 
that Japan was claiming, their claim -was they were trying to get oil 
and various things, which naturally would come from the south, 
isn't that true ? 

General Marshall. Yes. sir, and I think she was also getting oil 
from California. 

Senator Ferguson. As late as 

General ]\1arshall. I do not remember the date, but she had been 
receiving things from California. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think they w^ere getting it as late as 

General Marshall. I do not think that, sir, but that is easily 
determined. 

\3277] Mr. Keefe. As late as wdiat ? 

General Marshall. November 5. 

Senator Ferguson. November 5, 1 am referring to, 1941. 

General Marshall. Let me interpolate again. I am not saying 
they were getting it on November 5, but there were discussions at the 
time regarding it. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it now. we start out on the 
premise here, at least as of the 5th day of November 1941, that if there 
was a war coming as far as Britain was concerned in the Far East in 
relation to Singapore or anything else, that America would be involved 
in tliat war? 

General Marshall. That was my estimate at the time, because of 
the situation in the Philippines, our obligations there. 

[3-^78] Senator Ferguson. That w^as your opinion at the time. 

I did want to take up with you page 4, if you will just turn to page 4 : 

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the 
following conclusions : 

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States- 
British Staff conversations remain sound. 

General Marshall, Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as of that time there would not be any 
doubt in your mind that if the Japs intended to move across the line 
tliat had been designated, that would mean a war with Great Britain, 
and therefore we would be involved in it? 



1246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. I cannot answer that categorically, Senator, 
because of this : Admiral Stark and I had recommended that if the 
Japanese did move east of 100 east longitude, or south of 10 degrees 
north, that that be regarded as an offensive act. or something of that 
nature. 

Whether or not the Government would accept that is another 
matter. 

Senator Ferguson. I am just getting what your reaction was. 

General INIarsiiall. I would answer that question, I think 
[S£79] this way : 

In my own opinion, the moment the Japanese moved into the Gulf 
of Siam, that was a definite offensive act which would result in a 
catastrophe for us in the Philippines, and for the British in Singa- 
pore, unless we definitely resisted it. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were of the opinion at that time that 
military strategy was that if they went in there it would affect Singa- 
pore, it would affect (he Philippines, and it would naturally affect 
our interests. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And therefore crossing the so-called line would 
mean war, not only with the United States, but with Britain? 

General Marshall. I think that is the statement that I was en- 
deavoring to give. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, when the message came in from Am- 
bassador Winant on the Gth, that they were across this line 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That meant war, did it not? 

General Marshall. That meant war, if the two Governments 
decided to make it war. 

Senator Ferguson. But as far as you were concerned, [32S0] 
as the military man, the Chief of Staff, in your opinion that meant 
war ? 

General Marshall. In my opinion that meant unless we definitely 
resisted that, we would be in a catastrophic situation soon thereafter. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were of the opinion that at that time 
it meant war? 

General Marshall. I was of the opinion at that time that the 
Governments would be forced to accept a condition of hostilities, but 
whether the Governments would do it or not, is another matter. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand that. 

General Marspiall. For example, I recall that somewhere near that 
time, I believe, the British Commander in Singapore wished to move 
troops north into the Kra Peninsula, which is the narrow neck of the 
Malay Peninsula, leading down to Singapore, to a place called Singara, 
and that was not, as I recall, accepted by the British Government. 
That was a defensive measure that he proposed. Why it was not 
accepted, I do not know. 

It may have been because they thought he did not have sufficient 
men, or it may have been because they thought that would be seized 
by the Japanese as a definite war act by the British. I recall some- 
thing of that kind happen- [3281'\ ing at that time, and I also 
recall my own thoughts in regard to it at that time. 

Admiral Stark can speak for himself, but I think he concurred, 
with me, that the definition of the latitude and longitude that has 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1247 

been referred to covering a movement that would turn the southern 
point there of Thailand, or Siam, and bring the Japanese into the 
Gulf of Siam, that meant they were on the back door of Singapore, 
and could have, in our opinion, only a direct hostile motive. It was 
still possible for them, of course, to have turned north and then east, 
and establish themselves by shipping on the west coast of Thailand. 
That was still a possibility. 

However, that threat by air would have been a very complete one 
over the whole Malay Peninsula. 

Those were my thoughts at that time; that is my understanding 
of the records. My own recollection is that our Governments — 
meaning the United States Government and the Government of Great 
Britain — neither one notified the Japanese that a movement south and 
east of the point determined would be considered in effect a hostile 
act. 

Senator Ferguson. General, what I am trying to get is the think- 
ing of the Chief of Staff, and his staff, the military authorities here, 
as to what they had in" mind, and their knowledge and their infor- 
mation. 

[328B] Now, on the 5th of November, when you wrote this mes- 
sage, you had certain things in mind, and that line was one of the 
things that you had in mind, was it not? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Because at (b) you say, down on page 4: 

War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building 
up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks, or directly 
threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great impor- 
tance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more 
of the following contingencies : 

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or 
mandated territory of the United States 

Now, there would not be any doubt as to that, that in case of any 
direct act of Japanese forces against the territory or mandated terri- 
tory of the United States, it would mean war with the United States; 
isn't that true? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it goes further and it says, "The British 
Commonwealth or the Netherlands East Indies"; in other words, at 
that time you had in mind that in case there was an attack, a direct 
act- of war against the British \_3283'] Commonwealth or the 
Netherlands iEast Indies, that, as far as you were concerned, it would 
mean war with the United States, that is, as far as you preparing for 
war was concerned and alerting ? 

General Marshall. You use the expression. Senator Ferguson, that 
it would mean war with the United States. 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about literally. 

General Marshall. Our statement was that military action against 
Japan should be undertaken only in one of the following contingencies, 
and you just read one of the contingencies. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Then, on the next page : 

The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand, to the west of 100 degrees 
east, or South of 10 degrees north, or into Port^uguese Timor, New Caledonia 
or the Loyalty Islands. ' 



1248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That is the line indicated on the map. 
(general Marshall. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that. 
Senator Fekgusox. You are familiar with that? 
General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I refer you to P^xhibit 37, page 39, and I 
will ask you to read that. 
General Marshall. This is headed "Top secret." 

2 December, 1941. 

[328^] From: OPNAV 
Action : CINCAF 
Into : 
012356 

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within 
two days if possible after receipt this dispatch. Charter three small vessels 
to form a "defensive information patrol." Minimum requirements to establish 
identity as U. S. men-of-war are conunand by a naval officer and to mount a 
small gun and one machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed 
with minimum naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and 
report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam. 
Vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel ( ff tlu,' In''ochina 
coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and one vessel off Pointe de 
Camau. Use of Isabel authorized by President as one of the three but not 
other naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At 
same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly 
performed at sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or 
submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures. 

That is the end of the message. 

[3285] Senator Ferguson. Now. General, I will ask you whether 
or not you ever knew that message existed ? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You have no recollection of any such message, 
is that right? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And the reading of it does not refresh your 
memory in any way ? 

General Marshall. It does not. 

Senator Ferguson. Now you have the map before you. Would 
you locate where those three vessels would be, and tell us how far 
ihey would be from the Philippines? 

General ISLvrshall. The first vessel between Hainan and Hue? 

Senator Ferguson. Between Hainan and Hue. Hue is on the 
China coast across the island of Hainan. Do you see that Hainan? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you see Hue just across? 

General Marshall. Hue is what I am hunting for. 

Senator Ferguson. A little south. 

General Marshall. Oh, yes, I see it now. That covers the strait 
between Hainan and North Central French Indochina, which would 
be the Japanese cour.se for vessels sailing out of \3'^S6] Haip- 
hong, coming down the coast all the way from Hongkong. As to the 
distance from the Philippines, I would have to guess at that. I should 
say it was about three or four hundred miles. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon? 

General Marshall. Three or four hundred miles. 

Senator Ferguson. Three or four hundred miles ? 

General Marshall. Yes. Now the next point 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1249 

Senator Ferguson. I ^yould just like to ask you a few questions 
about that. That would be for information? 

General Marshall. Presumably so. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you attempting to get information of 
ships going south to Singapore? Would not that be the purpose 
of such a vessel being placed there ? 

General Marshall. Ships going south anywhere in the China Sea. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; ships going anywhere south in the China 
Sea. They may go around the point, they may go around to the 
Kra Peninsula? 

General Marshall. They may be going around the point, they 
may be going to Borneo, they may be going to New Guinea. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not say we were looking for ships 
going to the Philippines at that point, would you ? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; unless an expedition against the Phil- 
ippines, by some strange quirk, would be based on [3287] the 
coast of Indochina, or near Haiphong. Of course an expedition 
against the southern Philippines might be quite far south. Pre- 
sumably an expedition against the Philippines would be based more 
north, in Formosa. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. Now take the next ships. 

General Marshall. Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques. I am 
familiar with those two places. 

Senator Ferguson. You are? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is down around 

General ]\Iarshall. Well, that is on the southeastern coast of 
French Indochina and I should imagine the distance from Manila, 
rather, is probably some 600 miles. I am merely guessing. 

Senator Ferguson. Where would the ships be going there ? Where 
would the lookout look for ships there? 

General Marshall. The normal assumption is they would be headed 
for the southern tip of Indochina or the Gulf of Siam, or Borneo. 

[S288] Senator Ferguson. Now, the next one is right at the 
Pointe, Pointe de Camau, and that is right at the most southerly 
point of the Peninsula. Do you see it there ? 

General Marshall. Yes ; I see it. 

Senator Ferguson. Where would that be a lookout for ? 

General Marshall. That would be a lookout specifically for the 
Gulf of Siam, I should say, and Malay Peninsula. 

Senator Ferguson. That would cover ships going to the Kra Penin- 
sula, would it not? 

General Marshall, Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. General, would you be of the opinion that this 
was a lookout to see whether or not there was going to be a move- 
ment across the line that had been designated? 

General Marshall. I would not say it was necessarily that, spe- 
cifically. 

Senator Ferguson. "\Aniat would be the purpose of this information 
to be obtained? 

General Marshall. A general knowledge of what the Japanese 
were doing in' the China Sea. 

Senator Ferguson. And also the Gulf of Siam ? 



1250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTA.CK 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; the China Sea and south into Malay- 
sia. In the light of the various documents and discussions at that 
time, the most critical move was that [3289] which might 
go into the Gulf of Siam, and the southern one of these posts would 
very definitely relate to that. That was somewhat beyond our normal 
air capability of reconnaissance, although we did send some, I be- 
lieve, in the general direction toward Camranh Bay at one period for 
three days. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, do you know why that action 
was not reported to you? Would not that be very material to your 
thinking ? 

General Marshall. Well, that would be material to my thinking, 
yes, sir; but on the other hand, I did not have brought to my attention 
every detail of Navy reconnaissance. 

Senator Ferguson. The next states: 

Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At sanie time inform 
me as to wliat reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea 
by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your 
opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures. 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. This M-as for information of CINCAF, which 
would be Admiral Hart, would it not? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you, prior to the 7th, get any information 
on his report as to what reconnaissance was [S290] being car- 
ried out, as far as the Army was concerned? 

General Marshall. I do not recall, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not have any recollection on that ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, 3'ou have given, at the end of your mem- 
orandum — it is on page 5 of Exhibit 16 — you specifically make certain 
recommendations there. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "That the dispatch of United States Armed 
Forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved." 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, that does not concern the voluntary 
air corps. 

General Marshall. No, sir, because that was under China's pay, 
and control. 

Senator Ferguson. That was under the Chinese and not our move- 
ment, as you interpreted the other day. 

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, 
Great Britain and our own forces. 

That was your recommendation, was it not? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether we were furnishing 
[3291] and supplies to Borneo or any of the other islands? Did 
not your first report indicate that we were ? 

General Marshall. In that report I gave a specific example of fur- 
nishing ammunition to the Chinese Government which had been re- 
served for Iceland. I think it involved 7,000 rounds", and we gave 
them 40,000 of those, or maybe it was 3,000, one or the other. That 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1251 

was to be sent by General MacArtlmr from Manila, and we would 
replace them by shipment at the same time from San Francisco. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that under Lend-Lease? 

General Marshall. I assume it was, sir. I was getting it out, and 
the details were being taken care of by someone else. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not know what it was under? 

General Marshall. I think it was under Lend-Lease, but my action 
was to get them started. 

Senator Ferguson. Your report of 1941, your first report indicates 
bombs were also furnished. 

General Marshall. I do not believe that is quite what it was, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you explain it? 

General Marshall. It was necessary, we felt, to have the ability 
to land, and gas, and arm the B-17's to the south of the Philippines, 
for two reasons : One was in case [3292'] \v% had to fly them in 
from Hawaii by that front, and the other one was that when you are 
operating strategical bombing planes of that type, their capacity is 
greatly increased for carrying bombs, and in range if they have some 
place they can shuttle to, and shuttle back from. 

Therefore, we directed General MacArthur to take up with the 
governments concerned the proposition of preparing strips that would 
accommodate the B-l7's and that he. General MacArthur, stock those 
strips with gasoline and bombs. 

Senator Ferguson. That was just anticipating, wasn't it, that if 
we got into any war. we would be using these other bases, and we would 
be using the ABCD plan, the Singapore plan? 

General Marshall. To that extent, yes, sir. The same thing is 
really covered in the ABC-1 and 2 plans. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. The point here was that the B-l7's would be 
greatly restricted in what they did from the Philippines if they had 
no landing points other than in the Philippine Islands, and therefore, 
it was essential, in my opinion — and I think I personally directed this 
myself — that is my recollection — that these arrangements be made 
at Rabaul, Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Balikpapan [3293] 
Borneo and Singapore. 

Senator Fekguson. Do you know when that material was furnished 
to those places? 

General Marshall. The records show, and I know this, the de- 
liveries were made and efforts to develop the strips were under way 
at Rabaul, at Port Moresby and Port Darwin before the outbreak of 
the war. My recollection is, and the records will undoubtedly show, 
that the shij) with the gasoline and bombs for Balikpapan, for Borneo 
and for Singapore, was just about to sail at the outbreak of the war. 

Senator Ferguson. Going back just a moment to page 39 of exhibit 
37, if those lookout ships, those men-of-war, saw convoys of Jap troops 
moving, for instance, in the Gulf of Siam across to Kra 

General Marshall. What page, please? 

Senator Ferguson. On page 39 of Exhibit 37. 

General Marshall. I have it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. If you won Id have known that Saturday 
morning, the 6th, that ships were moving across the Gulf of Siam, to 



1252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the Kra Peninsula, would that chano;e your thinkinir, as far as the 
alert of the Army was concerned, that is, as to what the Army should 
be doing'? 

General Marshall. No, sir; I do not think it w^ould. 

[S£94'] Senator Ferguson. You had done then everything up to 
that point, and that would not have changed your mind at all ? 

General Marshall. I do not think it would have, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not think it would have f 

General Marshall. It is more a confirmation than anything else. 

Senator Ferguson. A confirmation. Your next is, of course, the 
aid to the voluntary corps, and you explained that. 

The next sentence is "that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." 

Had there been any ultimatum, or why did you and Admiral Stark 
put that terse sentence there, that no ultimatum be delivered to 
Japan ? 

General Marshall. I would assume that there had been some such 
discussion. I do not recall now. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whom the discussion was with? 

General Marshali,. ]\Iy assumption would be that a discussion 
w^ould be with Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Colonel Knox, and probably 
Admiral Stark and myself present. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the President confer with you on that 
point of whether an ultimatum was to be delivered ? 

[329S] General ]\Iarshall. I do not recall that, sir. I might 
say here that Admiral Stark and myself were always on the side of 
trying to gain as much time as we possibly could, while I assume, 
and I am certain that Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Colonel Knox, and 
presumably the President only had the consideration of the great 
policies for which this Government stood, that were involved, as 
well as the military status in the way of potential power. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether you had any further 
discussions wnth Mr. Knox, Mr. Stimson, or anyone else after that 
in relation to an ultimatum? That is very strong language, "that 
no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." 

General Marshall. I do not recall that specifically. 

The only recollection I can go on now is these continued discus- 
sions as to what measures might be taken while upholding the dig- 
nity of the United States and at the same time fend off hostile action 
m the Pacific. Now as to the question of ultimatum or not, I do not 
recall that, although we made specific statements in regard to it, 
and it must have been a discussion of that specific nature. 

[3296] Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that at least 
you had been consulted as to whether or not an ultimatum should be 
given ? 

General Marshall. I think that is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you had given a direct recommendation 
that no ultimatum should be given ? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The next is the joint board Washington meet- 
ing. "Secret minutes of meeting, November 3, 1941." 

Major General William Bryden was there, the Deputy Chief of Staff, 
and Major General Arnold was there. Do you recall getting informa- 
tion at that meeting? It was immediately prior to your memo of 
the 5th. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1253 

General Marshall. Allow mo to look at it. 

Senator Fekgusox. I think you were there. 

General Marshall. Yes; I was present at the meeting, as it shows 
(here. I am looking at the minutes to see whether I can get any 
reminder. 

On the bottom of pn^e 2 I find this heading: "Action of the United 
States in the Far East m support of China." 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have you read that and get what 
your reaction was as of the time that it was given in your presence 
on the 3d. 

[3297] General Marshall (reading) : 

At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirraann gave a statement of 
the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, Novem- 
ber 1, at which a discussion was held on the r'ar Eastern situation. Captain 
Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang 
Kai-Siiek and General ]Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against 
making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States 
urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out 
tiiat on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea 
with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it 
would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese 
aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was 
no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, 
and he desired to know if the military authorities would l)e prepared to support 
further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the 
State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that 
the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be 
warned against movement into Siberia. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to ask you some questions about 
that. Does that refresh your memory about that being [3298] 
brought up, about the note of the I7th ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there any discussion as to whether or not 
that wnis an ultimatum or not an ultimatum? 

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What is your opinion as to it? 

General Marshall. I would say, in reading this and thinking while 
I was reading aloud, that the desire for the ultimatum was coming 
from China particularly, by General Magruder. 

Senator Ferguson. Going up and reading the sentence, "He pointed 
out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meet- 
ing at sea w-ith Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum 
to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take 
action in case of further Japanese aggression." 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Apparently that was Schuinnann's opinion, and 
he said he was speaking at the reciuest of Admiral Stark. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now was that your opinion ? 

General Marshall. All I can think of at this particular moment, 
sir, in regard to that is we were probably discussing [3Q99] 
largely economic exactions or restrictions in order to influence Japan. 

Senator Fergison. What I am asking now, General, is, was it your 
opinion that we had issued an ultimatum on the I7th to Japan? That 
is just what Schuirmann says, and I will read it again. 

General Marshall. I am familiar with that, sir. 



1254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General ISIarshall. What I am not familiar with is the terms of the 
President's message. I do not know what I knew about it at that 
time. 

Senator Ferguson. I cannot hear you. 

General Marshall. What I am not familiar with was the terms of 
the President's message to the Japanese Government. 

Senator Ferguson. I will read it to you. 

General Marshall. What I do not know that I knew at the time 
was the exact expressions in that message. Your question is, did I 
think that was an ultimatum ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. I cannot answer that. I do not recall whether 
I knew exactly what he had said or not. I presume probably I had 
heard the message, but I have no accurate memory of what I thought 
at that minute. I received this information, and I think the record 
will have to speak for [3300] itself. 

Senator Ferguson. In your recollection on what was being said by 
Schuirmann, Captain Schuirmann. did you or did you not consider 
that the message of the ITth was an ultimatum ? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of that, sir. 

Senator Fergl'SOn. Now the minutes further state : 

He further stated — that is Schuirmann — that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that 
there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them 
up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to sup- 
port further warnings by the State Department. 

"VVliat was your answer to that? 

General Marshall. I do not recall what my answer to that was, 
other than the joint memorandum of Admiral Stark and myself. 

Senator Ferguson. And that ended by saying 

General Marshall. That no ultimatum be issued. 

Senator Ferguson. That no ultimatum be issued, be delivered to 
Japan. Would you say then that you had advised against further 
warnings by the State Department? 

General IVIarshall. I would say that at that particular time our 
advice was that no ultimatum be issued. Now what you mean by 
"further warnings" is open to considerable interpretation. 

[3301] Senator Ferguson. I just have the language of the joint 
board. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out what happened at that 
meeting. Here is what Mr. Hull wanted to know : "Mr. Hull was of 
the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to 
Japan if we cannot back them up." Were we in a position at that 
time, in your opinion, to back up additional warnings? 

General Marshall. That meeting was on what date? 

Senator Ferguson. On the 3d day of November 1941. 

General Marshall. We were not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you express yourself at that time, when this 
question was brought up, along the same line ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall, sir. The expressions of my 
views must be those of the memorandum, which followed shortly 
thereafter. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1255 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate at least that you did not 
want an ultimatum to go to Japan. 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I next refer to paragraph a, if you want to read 
the next sentence. You better look at it, so if there is anything you 
want to bring out you may do so. 

General Marshall. You mean the preceding paragraph ? 

[3302'] Senator Ferguson. I mean the following paragraph. 

General Marshall. What I was going to read was this in relation 
to the question of what was generating the ultimatum idea in our 
minds. 

Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from 
Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder — 

our War Department Joint Staff representative in Chungking — 

urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China 
through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to 
support more fully opposition to Japan. 

That, to my mind, was what had precipitated this discussion. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. 

General INIarshall. That is the urging of our representative there 
as well as the generalissimo that we take more positive measures in 
our communications with Japan. Do you want me to read that ? 

Senator Ferguson. I do not want to pass over anything that you 
want to use as an explanation. You did, General, did you not, go 
further than the mere Chiang Kai-Shek matter? Because warnings 
to Japan were a different matter from what he was asking. He was 
asking for military aid, was he not ? He wanted military intervention, 
did he not? 

[3303] General Marshall. He was asking for military aid and 
he was asking us to take a stronger stand in our warnings to Japan. 
He uses the words "to warn Japan against making an attack on China 
through Yunnan." 

[3304-] Senator Ferguson. Then the additional warnings were 
general warnings; is that correct, and you discussed those? 

General Marshall. Just what clo you mean by that? 

Senator Ferguson. I am referring to the statement : 

Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional 
warnings to Japan if we can't back them up. 

General Marshall. Well, my conception of this matter that I have 
at this time, is that Mr. Hull's discussion was based on this urging of 
the Generalissimo and of General Magruder and he felt for us to say 
anything further, unless we were fully prepared to back it up, got us 
nowhere. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were of the opinion at that time, that 
we were in no position to back up any other warnings? 

General Marshall. That was my assumption at the time, because 
of the slow movement of equipment and materiel and personnel to 
General MacArthur. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, under a it states : 

The decision on the Far Eastern situation made several months ago, Is to 
make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to 
engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U. S.-British 
Staff conversations report ABS-1. 
79716 — 46 — pt. 3 19 



1256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[3305] Would you say that was a fair statement? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. Of the conditions there at that time? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Down at the bottom of page 3 : 

f. Assuming that the Fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilitits 
are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless, 
the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present. 

Was the moving of the fleet from Pearl Harbor considered at that 
time? 

General Marshall. My recollection is, and Admiral Stark un- 
doubtedly can give you much more direct testimony, that the British 
were very desirous of the United States Government basing a con- 
siderable number of naval vessels on Singapore, and we were very 
much opposed to any such procedure. 

Their point of view, if I may estimate, was that they had very little 
to build up their Far Eastern forces, because they were completely 
employed in trying to protect the western approaches of the North 
Atlantic, and the movement of the vessels down around the southern 
end of Africa to get to the Middle East. 

They, therefore, were in dire circumstances as to the [3306] 
availability of shipping, naval shipping specifically. Therefore, if 
we would station part of our fleet in the Singapore region, necessi- 
tating the base at Singapore, that would greatly strengthen the naval 
situation in the Far East, without a critical reduction in the British 
power of controlling the western approaches of the North Atlantic, 
and guarding the numerous convoys taking the long route around 
the southern tip of Africa to get to the Middle East and Far East. 

That was the discussion that I have a fairly clear recollection of at 
that time ; our opposition to such a move, or the British desire of such 
a move. 

[3307] Senator Ferguson. Was it your duty to defend the fleet 
in Manila Bay? 

General ISIarshall. Yes, sir ; within the means at our disposal, which 
were almost nonexistent. 

Senator Ferguson. Whatever we had, but that was your province, as 
Chief of Staff? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The next paragraph, will you read it? 

General Marshall (reading) : 

g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the fleet due to the lack of adequate 
antiaircraft protection for the anchorage. 

Senator Ferguson. Before you read the next paragraph, that was 
considered and you would be the man responsible for the antiaircraft 
there? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It was because you could not get it that it was 
not there ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you considered that at the time? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, read the next paragraph. 

General Marshall (reading) : 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1257 

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of [:i308] launcliing an 
attack in five directions ; viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, 
Thailand and against Mala.va. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more 
of these five operations, United States' action should be: In case of Japanese 
attack against either the Piiilippines or liritish and Dutch positions the United 
States should resist the attack. In tiie case of Japanese attack against Siberia, 
Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. 
The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the 
Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the 
Philippines, particulaiiy as to the increase in submarines and Army forces 
i)ecomes available. 

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the Fleet strength 
at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval 
units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the 
present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further 
the State Department conferences, Captain Schuirn)ann stated that the State 
Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take 
immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this coiuiection, 
he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Depart- 
ment was under the [3S09] impression that Japan could be defeated in 
military action in a few weeks. 

Senator Feeguson. Now, I want to ask you some questions about 
the two paragraphs. 

There were two parts as far as we were concerned. In the first 
paragraph it states : 

In the case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and 
Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. 

That is what you gave us before, that war with one meant war with 
the other. An attack on one meant an attack on the other. 

But not in this case : 

In case of a Japanese attack against Siberia. 

In that case a different set of facts existed; isn't that correct? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. There you said we should not declare war. 
Then, we should not declare war if they went into Thailand. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did vou consider all parts of Thailand or just 
east of 100° east? 

General Marshall. I couldn't tell you at this time, sir. 

[3310] Senator Ferguson. "* * * or China through Yun- 
nan." That is exactly what the generalissimo was asking you about. 
You said in those three cases we should not declare war. 

General Marshall. Might I interrupt. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. You are saying "you." This isn't my estimate. 
This is a naval estimate. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will withdraw the "you." 

Was it discussed there that the United States in the one case would 
declare war or would consider it as an act of war and in the other should 
not declare war and did you agree with that discussion ? 

General Marshall. I don't recall the terms of discussion, sir. I 
have stated before that my own feeling was that if the Japanese ap- 
peared in the Gulf of Siam that war was inevitable and we would be 
in a very critictd situation if we didn't immediately take some action 
to try to control it. 

Senator Ferguson. This memorandum went to the President, did it 
not, General? 



1258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. This I thought we were reading was the minutes 
of a meeting. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but it is attached, and was delivered to us. 
attached as a memo for the President. 

General Marshall. My understanding of this we were [3311] 
reading from were the minutes of a joint board meeting of discussions 
which occurred in the Office of the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the minutes were 
attached to the memo that went to the President ? They were attached 
when handed to us. 

General Marshall. That is the memorandum of Admiral Stark and 
myself to the President ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

General Marshall. Attached to those minutes? I will have to 
check up. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you check up and let us have that infor- 
mation ? 

General Marshall. This should show it, the actual memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you not desire to give to the President 
the information upon which your opinion was based, and part of it is 
stated in this memorandum, is it not, the joint board minutes ? 

General Marshall. I have got the wrong paper here. 

This record copy does not show that that was communicated to the 
President. 

I might say that the purpose of the memorandum such as Admiral 
Stark and I signed jointly here was to give the [3312] Presi- 
dent, in readily readable form, our views. There are many factors 
that go into our reaching those views. If we recited all those in each 
instance, and this particular item you refer to may have gone to the 
President, I do not know that it did, we would merely lengthen the 
document he would have to read. 

All I can say now is that the record handed me of the joint com- 
munication from Admiral Stark and myself shows no indication that 
the minutes of the meeting of the joint board of that date were sent 
to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any discussion with Admiral In- 
gersoll or anyone at that meeting on the 3d in relation to the State 
Department's impression "that Japan could be defeated in military 
action in a few weeks?" 

General Marshall. It states on page 4, at the bottom of the page, 
the last paragraph, preceding a discussion of the situation by Admiral 
IngersoU : 

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far Bast would be 
naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to the 
fact that the Navy v^'as now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his informa- 
tion that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be 
taken under the present situation. The information which he had received 
indicated that the [3313] Japanese authorities might be expected to decide 
upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis 
of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the 
danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the 
Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force 
remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards 
the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the 
middle of December the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive 
strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations; 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1259 

I would say that that generally is probably the sense of what I said 
at the meeting. 
Senator Ferguson. Now — 

The information which he harl received indicated that the Japanese authori- 
ties might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. 

What information had you and what did you anticipate would 
happen? 

General Maksiiall. I don't recall, sir. I would have to go back 
through all the information given me from G-2 to find out what that 
was. I am not conscious now of the specific thing. 

\3SlJf.'] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that on that date or 
shortly after they gave a deadline date of the 25th of November? 

General Marshall. I recall most distinctly that they gave a dead- 
line date of the 25th, which they later changed to the 29th. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Did you have intelligence information on the 5th that action was 
to be taken in relation to this deadline date of the 25th ? 

General Marshall. I would have to check up. I don't recall, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you check on that and let us have your 
best information. That would be material to this questioning. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you also spoke again, and I wish you would 
read what you said. "General Marshall emphasized." I want to 
get your opinion there. 

Just a moment, before you read that I will ask you a question in 
relation to the other paragraph. 

Did we move along as fast as you had anticipated so that by the 
middle of December the Army Force in the Philippines would have 
impressive strength or did we fail to get the men there ? 

\^3315'\ General Marshall. We were delayed materially in get- 
ting them in, but part of that delay was known at that particular time, 
I think, in November. The length of the delay on the west coast in 
flying the planes out we were not aware of at that time. 

I think I was probably aware of the delay of the delivery of planes, 
referring to the Flying Fortresses, from the factory. I was aware 
of delay in obtaining certain shipping. I was not aware until some 
time later, as a matter of fact, I think after December 7, of the delay 
in arranging convoys from Hawaii to the Philippines. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you advise the State Department on those 
items of delay? 

General Marshall. I assume that I mentioned these facts in the 
presence of Mr. Hull because they were very pertinent to our situation. 

Senator Ferguson. The next may refresh your memory. You 
spoke, apparently. "General Marshall emphasized the point." Do you 
want to read that? 

General Marshall. What page? 

Senator Ferguson. Page 5. 

General Marshall. Does it begin witli the words "emphasized the 
point"? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I thought you might want to look 

[3S16] at what you had said. 

General Marshall. I thought I had just read what I had said. 

Senator Ferguson. But down in the next paragraph you had some- 
thing to say. 



1260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall (reading) : 

General Marshall emphasized the point that Japan coukl hardly take the risk 
of military operations with a powerful air and submarine force directly on the 
flank of their supply lines, and that when United States power is sufficiently 
developed in the Philippines, we would then have something to back up our 
statements. Until powerful United States forces had been built up in tlie Far 
East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It ap- 
peared that the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions 
which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a 
relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions. 

Senator Ferguson. Whose language, General, is this : 

Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would 
take some very clever diplomacy to save Ihe situation? 

General Marshall. That is not a direct quotation of my language. 
That is the officer's notes of the meeting, the sense of my expression. 

Senator Ferguson. That was the sense of your expression? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

[3317] Senator Ferguson. You were of the opinion at that 
time that that was true ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And so expressed yourself. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I notice that it doesn't say whether — was the 
State Department present at that meeting? 

General Marshall. No. 

Senator Ferguson. They would not be present ? 

General Marshall. Tlie}^ would not ordinarily be present. 

Senator Ferguson. Would they get this information ? 

General Marshall. Not necessarily. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I notice (reading) : 

War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a mem- 
orandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed policy 
in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following 
lines: * * * 

Now, did that only cover the Yunnan situation, the China situation, 
or the whole Far East ? 

General ]\[.\rshall. I will have to glance through this to see. May 
1 read wJiat tlie items were? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall (reading) : 

The memorandum would take the following lines : 

[3318] Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan. 

Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan. 

Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support 
of Chiang Kai-Shek. 

Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long 
as possible. 

Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several 
months. 

Point out the effect and cost a U. S.- Japanese war in the Far East would have 
on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U. S. 

Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U. S. 
to engage in a Far p:astern offensive operation without the transfer of major por- 
tion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 

On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines' Army Air Forces, General 
Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1261 

were investijiatinsj reports that the Dutch East Indies w(>re capable of supplying' 
all United States and British requirements. 

Do you wish nie to go ahead ? 

Senator Ferguson. No. 

So it was to be a general menioranckim covering tlie Far East? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

[JJIO I Senator Fkrguson. Rather than just the particular move- 

ments in China? 

General MarshalI/. Yes, sir; evidently brought to a head by the 
generalissimo and General Magruder's appeals. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, notwithstanding what happened at this 
meeting, do I understand that things did grow more tense and you, 
as Chief of Staff, knew it from that date on ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you account for wlw it grew more tense ? 

General Marshall. M}?^ recollection on that would be that the con- 
tinued Japanese movements south in the direction of Malaysia, Indo- 
nesia, the general tone of their connnunications, the tone of the reports 
that appeared in magic, a large number of details of that nature, which 
taken all together, gave a very serious and forbidding aspect to the 
situation. 

Senator Ferguson. General, I want to take you to the November 
27, 19-11, memorandum for the President, subject Far Eastern Situa- 
tion, because it relates to the same question. It starts out by saying : 

If the current negotiations end witliout agreement, Japan may attack. 

That would indicate that, going from the 5th to the 27th, [3320] 
that you saw a different situation, would it not ; that it was more tense ? 

General Marshall. Well, as I just said, I thought it continued to 
grow tense. 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that you had expressed it 
t here in writing — had you not ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, in the first memo, I notice that the Ha- 
waiian Conunand, or the HaAvaiian Islands are not mentioned. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Sanator Ferguson. How do you account for that ? 

General Marshall. AVe were di.scussing here offensive operations. 

Senator Ferguson. You stated "in five directions" and you didn't 
state any direct moving on Pearl Harbor or the Hawaiian Islands. 

General Marshall. We were discussing general operations, a com- 
bination of naval and land aggressive moves, which would maintain 
themselves in the business of penetrating still further. The attack on 
Pearl Harbor was a slash, but not a ])roposed invasion at all. Simi- 
larly, we anticipated as I told you, Guam would be in trouble, and 
[)robably Wake Island. What we foresaw and what actually happened 
was [3321] a general offensive move south of the China Sea 
into Malaysia, Indonesia, and the New Guinea region, and possibly 
Australia. 

The scope at Pearl Harbor was to lessen the possibility of our action 
against such a general movement. The direction of the campaign was 
as discussed by G-2 to the effect that tlie Japanese would not attack 
in Manchuria, but would strike south. 



1262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That is what they actually did. 

Senator Ferguson. General, there you mentioned one thing, that 
this attack on Pearl Harbor was an attack to avoid our fleet. In effect, 
that is what I took from what you said. 
General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Avoid our fleet being used against their move- 
ment ? 

General Marshall To the south. 

Senator Ferguson. To the south, which you were anticipating there ? 
General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did the General Staff first anticipate that 
such a move may be made ? 

General Marshall. That is, the move to the south? 
Senator Ferguson. No, to take our fleet off, so as to allow them to 
go to the south. 

[3322] General Marshall. I don't know that the General Staff 
specifically at any moment, figured out a time when they would strike 
at the fleet. We did feel that if we put any of our vessels out at 
Singapore, aside from the difficulties of maintenance, that they would 
be under the hazard of Japanese air in that vicinity. 

We had assumed that in Pearl Harbor we had a reasonably secure 
base for the fleet. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the occasion for writing the memo- 
randum on the 27th ? 

General Marshall. I believe the record will probably show that 
there was a meeting on it with the President just preceding that. Does 
the record show that? 

Mr. Gesell. On the 24th, I think. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether this memorandum was 
written after the message to General Short dated the 27th or before? 
General Marshall. I would assume the record from War Plans 
Division will show, regarding which General Gerow will testify. It 
probably was written before because it takes a great deal of care in 
preparing such a memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know^ whether or not this November 27 
memorandum for the President was a confirmation of an oral state- 
ment that you had given the President? 

[3323] General Marshall. There is another memorandum from 
General Gerow to me dated November 27 which may answer the ques- 
tion, if you will give a minute. 

In a memorandum to me on November 27, with the stamped nota- 
tion November 28, when it was noted by the Chief of Staff and noted 
bj'' the Deputy Chief of Staff, regarding the Far Eastern situation, 
this appears in the second paragraph, following a number of items 
relating to the alert messages — possibly I had better read the whole 
memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you some questions in relation to 
that. 

You believe then that the one of November 27 was brought about 
by the memorandum signed by General Gerow ? 

General Marshall. No. He is stating what happened here, and I 
am getting my hint from what he states. 
Senator Ferguson. All right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1263 

General Marshall (reading) : 

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9 : 30 a. m., November 27, 1941. 
General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning 
messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave 
him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy nies.sage sent November 24. 

I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint 
Board meeting. He told me had telephoned [3S2I,] both Mr. Hull and 
the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been termi- 
nated with the barest pos.sibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning 
message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and 
l)repare an appropriate cablegram. 

2. Later in the morning I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, 
Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and 
Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for Gen- 
eral MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved; (copy attached). The Secre- 
taries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark 
directed be prepared for the President. 

[3325] I am not reading from the memo now. That was the 
memorandum you questioned me with regard to, Senator [reading J : 

The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be 
construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen 
the conversations. He was reas.sured on that point. It was agreed that the 
memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch. 

Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. 
He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy 
attacheil). 

That is the memorandum of November 27 signed by Admiral Stark 
and myself. Just when I signed it I do not recall because I was not 
here on the 27th. 

Senator Ferguson. General, do I understand that this refreshes 
your memory so that exhibit 17, which is the memorandum for the 
President, dated November the 27th, is the same memorandum that is 
mentioned in the second paragraph of the letter that you have just 
read ? 

General Marshall, I think that is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to ask you some questions on that 
particular letter. On November the 27th, apparently, this memo- 
randum was prepared, No. 17, was it not, because [3326] it is 
dated that day? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. The presumption is it was probably 
prepared on the 26th. 

Senator Ferguson. On the 26th? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Apparently you had not seen that, your letter 
that you read from, until the 28th. It says : 

November 28th : Noted : Chief of Staff. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is when you would see it? 

General Marshall. Presumably that is when I signed it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not that was prepared 
by someone else for you ? 

General Marshall. It was drafted, I am quite certain, in the War 
Plans Division following the discussions at the meeting of the Joint 
Army and Navy Board on the morning of November 26. As I left at 
about 1 o'clock, left Wasliington and did not return until the late 



1264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

evening of the 27th, so the assumption would be, and General Gerow 
can give you direct testimony, that following our discussions, meaning 
mine and Admiral Stark's and the other officers, the Deputy Chief's 
of Staff, the Chief of the Air Corps, General Gerow, and other officers 
and their opposites on the Na^'y side, following those discussions Gen- 
eral Gerow undertook the preparation of [3327] this memo- 
randum and also at the same time he was preparing the drafts of the 
alert messages, all of those, presumably that afternoon and night of 
November 26 and maybe on the early morning of the 27th. As I 
was not in Washington on the 27th my assumption would be that I 
signed this message, this memorandum on the morning of the 28th. 

Senator Ferguson. So certain things were taken up when you re- 
turned and on the morning of the 28th these matters were taken up 
with you : 

First, the Secretary of War at 9 : 30 on the 27th — that is the previous 
day — had called General Gerow. "He sent for me" — meaning he sent 
for Gerow. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Xow, why wouhl lie send for General Gerow 
and not send for General Bryden? Had you left word as to who 
would have authority to act while you were away? 

General Marshall. No, sir. That Avould be a matter of routine. 
When I am absent the Deputy Chief of Staff acts. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, had you known there was to be a memo- 
randum prepared before you left ? 

General Marshall. My assumption would be that I knew that such 
a memorandum was to be prepared just as I had discussed the prepara- 
tion of the alert messages before mv departure. 

[3328] Senator Ferguson. Well, it says here that "The Secre- 
tary" — that is the Secretary of War — "wanted to know what warning 
messages had been sent to General MacArthur. 

General Marhall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "And what were proposed." 

General INIarhall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, there is no mention there about sending 
any to General Short? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But the Secretary of War was questioning Gen- 
eral Gerow, and your Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, as to 
what messages were sent to MacArthur. 

General Marhall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Fergltson. That would indicate that at that particular mo- 
ment he did not know what had been sent to General MacArthur ? 

General Marshall. That would be correct, sir. Nothing had been 
sent, I do not think. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes [reading] : 

I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Na\y message sent November 24. 

Now, let us get that message. It is in Exhibit 37, page 32. Now, 
wouldn't that indicate. General, that the message 

[3329] General Marshall. Just a moment, please, Senator. 
Mr. Gesell. It is the same one. 
General Marshall. It is the same one? 
Mr. Gesell. It is the same message. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1265 

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't that indicate that at that particular 
time when they were conferring tliat the message of the 27th had not 
been sent yet, because he said : 

I f;ave liiiii a copy of the Joint Army and Navy niessajxt' sent November the 24th. 

General Mariiall. Yes, sir. 

.Senator Fergusox. Wouldn't that indicate that? 

General Mariiall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or he would have also presented the other mes- 
sage. 

General Mariiall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, let us read this message. We find first that 
the action and '"'action'- there indicates who is to act on it; "informa- 
tion" means that it is at least for their information but not necessarily 
action by them, so it is the Chief of Naval Operations [I't'^dingj : 
"ACTION CINCAF"; that is Admiral Stark? 

Mr. Gesell. Hart. 

Senator Ferguson. That is Admiral Hart, is it not? That is Ad- 
miral Hart, yes. 

[3oo0] General Marshall. I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. That is Admiral Hart for action ? 

General Marshall. I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. "CINCPAC"; that is Admiral Kimmel for 
action ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "COMll.' Where is 11? 

General Marshall. I don't know, sir. Those are the various naval 
districts, 11, 12, 13, 15. I presume the naval district in the Philip- 
pines, the one in Hawaii, the one on the west coast, and the one in 
Alaska. 

Senator Ferguson. General, Hawaii is not in there. 

General Marshall. Well, I 

Senator Ferguson. Hawaii is 14. How do you account for- 



The Chairman. Let the general answer. He did not finish his 
answer. 

General Marshall. I was endeavoring to say what 11, 12, 13, 
and 15 meant. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Marshall. I mentioned Hawaii, and you say 14 is Hawaii? 

Senator Ferguson. I am so informed. I find that out from the 
record. 

[3331] General Marshall. Probably you are right, sir. I have 
not got it memorized. 

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, would you help us on fourteen ? Is that 
Hawaii ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The Fourteenth Naval District is on Oahu, the 
Hawaiian Islands. 

Senator Ferguson. Not the Navy. I am talking about the Arni3\ 

Mr. Mitchell. These are all Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, these are all Navy? 

General Marshall. These are all Navy; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Fourteen is on Hawaii? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 



1266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. The "action" is Commander in Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet. 

Senator Ferguson. Later we get a notice from the Army to the Navy. 
Now, will you read the message ? 

General Marshall (reading) : 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This 
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their 
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggi'essive 
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possi- 
bility. Chief [S332\ of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests 
action addressees to inform senior Army officers their area. Utmost secrecy 
necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate 
Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, this "CINCPAC," that would be 
Admiral Kimmel? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate there that the Chief of 
Staff has seen this dispatch? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be you? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Concurs and requests action addresses to inform senior army ofticers their areas 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, that would indicate that Ad- 
miral Kimmel should have notified General Short of this message? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And Admiral Hart should have notified General 
MacArthur of the message? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

\3333'\ Senator Ferguson. That means that it is action for all 
parties ? 

General Marshall. Within their spheres. 

Senator Ferguson. Within the limitation of action as outlined ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would you know why information was 
6ent to "SPENAVO," meaning the British? 

General Marshall. Does "SPENAVO" mean the British or mean 
our representatives over there ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The naval attache, isn't it, in London ? 

Mr. Gesell. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. Our naval attache in London. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that what it means ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I so understand. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. What does "CINCLANT" mean, do 
fou know? 

General Marshall. I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. General Mitchell, have you information on that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I guess it was the connnander in chief of the Atlantic 
Fleet, but I am not sure. Is that right ? 

General Marshall. That is probably right. 

Senator Ferguson. It sounds like that now when you get [S334] 
the words and the letters lined up with it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1267 

So that would indicate now, reading that message, that a joint mes- 
sage had been sent to the Asiatic P'leet, to the Pacific Fleet, to notify 
the Army tops of those two places, which would mean the Philippines 
and Hawaii and tliat would indicate this was written before the 
twenty-seventh note, would it not ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for the fact that they 
are talking about General MacArtimr and what was proposed and 
no mention is made about General Short? 

General Marshall. My reaction to that would be this, that they 
felt an attack on the Philippines was a very certain proposition and 
an attack on Guam was probably a certainty. They do not mention 
Wake, they do not mention Hawaii, they do not mention the Aleutions 
and they clo not mention the West Coast of the United States. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, going back to the message 
that we read on page 32, Exhibit 87, the one that you had seen. Why 
was that message sent on the 24th ? 

General Marshall. Will you identify that for me again, please? 

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 32. 

Mr. Mitchell. The message appears in two books, General. You 
liave the Army book; and the same message ap [3S35] pears in 
tlie Navy. The Senator is giving you the Navy page. It is the same 
one you were looking at. 

General Marshall. That is the same message you were referring to ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. What was the question, please. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. I want to know what was the occasion for send- 
ing the message on the 24th? What happened? Why was there a 
message sent [reading :] 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This 
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their 
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive 
movement in any direction including — then he specifies two particular places, 

then he specifies two particular places, Philippines or Guam — 

is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests 
action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas. 

Now, what was there that caused you to alert the Army and Navy 
in the Philippines and not Hawaii, if we consider that an alert? 

General Marshall. I will have to go back and refresh my memory 
from the records. I do not recall the meetings that [3336] had 
occurred on that day or the preceding day. I haven't the data right 
here. 

Senator Fp:rguson. Well, now, General, up to this particular time, 
on November 24, do you know of any alerts given to either the Philip- 
pines or Hawaii? 

General Marshall. Not since the preceding summer. 

Senator Ferguson. Not since 1940, when the alert was given to 
General Herron? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So is this an alert? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I would consider it such. 

Senator Ferguson. This is considered an alert ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 



1268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Fergusox. Now, will you tell us what happened immedi- 
ately preceding, or any time preceding, that caused you to alert the 
Far East, including Hawaii? 

General Marshall. Well, I assume, Senator, that some information 
came in about that time and there may have been some meetings about 
that time and I do not recall that at this time. I will liave to check it. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ;^sk the Senator to jneld? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. This is not done for the pui-pose of inter- [33-]7] 
rupting, but I want to help. 

Senator Ferguson. I want all the help I can get. 

Mr. Murphy. The deadline on page 100 was the 25th, that was the 
last day the Japanese would wait, and there is a message on page 99. 

Senator Ferguson. I am going to put those in later. 

Mr. Murphy. There is a message on page 90. That might be the 
answer. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will try to refresh the General's memory. 

Was it because there had been a deadline set that you alerted 
these two places ? 

General Marshall. I could not say. sir. I will have to check that 
up. 

Senator Ferguson. Could vou check it ovov the noon hour. Gen- 
eral? 

General Marshall. I will try to do that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, we will develop next [reading J : 

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cable- 
gram. 

No [reading further] : 

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philipinnes. I told 
him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram. 

[3S38] Was there ever an appropriate cablegram prepared to 
send a message, as wanted by the President, to the Philippines? If 
so, what is the message? 

General INIarshall. If the reference is to tlie message to the High 
Commissioner of the Philippines, there was one sent on the 26th of 
November, 1941, by the Navy, Admiral Stark's initials and name and 
])resumably the signature is on it, for the High Commissioner of 
the Philippines reading as follows 

Senator Ferguson. Before you read it. Were you familiar with 
the instrument sent on the 26th of November, being Exhibit 45, 
from the President to the High Commissioner? Did vou know about 
that? 

General M.vrshall. I do not recall, sir, because I think that was 
sent — it may have been discussed at the meeting of the Joint Board 
that morning but it was sent after my depaiture. 

Senator Ferguson. I am just wondering about that sentence, how 
that sentence could refer to the High Commissioner's message which 
was sent on the 26th and this meeting has not taken place until 
the 2Tth : 

I told hiin I would consult Admiral Stai'k and prepare an appropriate cable- 
gram. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1269 

Would 3'ou say that Admiral Stark had anything to do with the — 
yes, he did. It says : 

From OPNAV, H. R. [3339 \ Stark, November 26, 1941. 

That appears at the top. 

Now, to go ahead a little further with this : 

I told him I \V(Mil«i (■(•iisult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cable- 
gram. 

We know that on the twenty-sixth the message had gone from the 
President to the High Commissioner. How could that be the same 
paper ? 

Mr. Gesell. Do you have it? 

General Marshall. I have it. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you anyone in your office that could aid 
you to make it clear, to sit here with you and to aid you on some of 
these things you are being asked ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; I will get somebody. 

Mr. Mitchell. We can handle it, Senator, if we know specifically. 
We can give the General the right documents if we know the par- 
ticular message you are referring to specifically. 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out. 

INIr. Mitchell. Are you referring to the warning sent to Mac- 
Arthur on the 27th? 

Senator Ferguson. No; I am trying to find this message, 

Mr. Mitchell. What message? 

Senator Ferguson. This memorandum dated November the 
[3340] 27th from Gerow to the Chief of Staff, at the end of the 
first paragraph, two sentences : 

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I— — 
meaning, I take it, Gerow — 
told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cal)]egram. 

Mr. Gesell. That must be the 27th. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the warning message of the 27th. 

Mr. Gesell. That is the warning message of the 27th. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. I am trying to get it from the Gen- 
eral, what he knows about it. 

General Marshall. This message 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give me where it is ? 

General Marshall. It is on page D of Exhibit ;J2. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. A telegraphic message between the War Depart- 
ment and Hawaii. It reads as follows : 

PRIORITY NOVEMBER 27, 1!)41. 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST 

MANILA, P. I. 

.\(»,i:<)tiation8 with .lapan appeal- to lie terminated to all praetieal purposes with 
only barest possibilities that Japanese Govei-nnient might come back and offer 
io \33AlA continue. .laitanese future action unpredictable but hostile 
action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot, be avoided 
the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy 
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that 
might jeopardize the succe.ssful defense of the Pliilippines. Prior to hostile 
Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures 



1270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

as you deem necessary. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you 
will carry out the tasks assigned in revised Rainbow Five which was delivered 
to you by General Brereton. Chief of Naval Operations concurs and request 
you notify Hart. 

(Signed) Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then, General, that you 
never saw that message before it went out? 

General Marshall, That is correct, sir. I was engaged in the dis- 
cussions regarding the preparation of it, I think, on the morning of the 
26th before my departure. 

The Chairman, It is now 12 o'clock and the committee will recess 
until 2, 

(Whereupon, at 12 noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same 
day.) 

[3S42] AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 P. M, 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. The 
Chairman was detained for a moment or two. 

Does counsel have anything at this time before General Marshall 
resumes his testimony ? 

Mr. Mitchell, No, 

The Vice Chairman, Do you have anything before you resume 
your testimony. General ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson will continue his inquiry. 

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed) 

Senator Ferguson. General, if you will take the letter now before 
you, of November 27, from General Gerow to you, I want to ask you 
some questions about that letter. 

I notice in the letter, as I asked this morning, Gerow speaking : 

I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. 

The next sentence : 

I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board 
meeting. 

[3343'] I will ask counsel, do we have a copy of that draft 
message ? 

Mr. Mitchell. We have never been able to locate it. 

Senator Ferguson. The answer is. General, they say they have 
never been able to locate it. 

General Marshall. It would presumably be in the files of the War 
Plans Division or the present Operations Division. General Gerow 
will have to testify in regard to that. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel, have we ever had the joint 
board meeting, and that may tell us what was in the message. 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. We have the minutes right here, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Do we have those ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. They have been distributed ? 

Mr. Gesell. They don't make any reference to this, so they weren't 
distributed. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1271 

(The paper referred to was handed to Senator Ferguson.) 

Senator Ferguson. General, do you have the paper before you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; that is the only copy. 

Senator Ferguson. I mean the letter I am speaking of. Would 
you show him the letter dated November 27 from General [S344] 
Gerow. 

General Marshall. I had it here this morning, Senator, but it 
seems to have disappeared. 

Now, I have it. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint 
Board meeting. 

Do you know when that meeting was held ? 

General Marshall. My recollection is that that meeting was held 
on the night of November 26, just prior to my departure from Wash- 
ington. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time you left here on the 
26th? 

General Marshall. I do not remember now, sir. I can obtain that 
data. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what message was he speaking about 
there, "a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board 
meeting." What kind of a message was that? 

General Marshall. My recollection of the matter is that at that 
Joint Board meeting we discussed the question of an alert message 
and that that is to w^hat General Gerow is referring. 

He should be able to state positively what it is he is talking about, 
because he committed himself in writing on the subject. 

[334^5] Senator Ferguson. Normally, in peacetime, General 
Gerow would not have charge of this, would he ? 

General Marshall. What do you mean by "have charge"? 

Senator Ferguson. Charge of such a message of action. 

General Marshall. He would have charge of the preparation of 
such a message. 

Senator Ferguson. In peacetime? 

General Marshall. In peacetime. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the Operations Division ? 

General Marshall. The Operations Division of the General Staff, 
which I tried to explain the other day, labors in peacetime under a 
misnomer, and it does today also, I think. It is the division charged 
with the organizational factors in the Army and with matters that 
pertain to maneuvers, training operations in this country. But it 
had no direct connection whatsoever with matters of war and the 
overseas theaters. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you assign any of this work to your deputy ? 

General Marshall. Not specifically, sir. My deputy, General 
Bryden, attended the meetings of the joint board. He was a member 
of that by virtue of the fact that he was a deputy. He was kept con- 
versant with the various sessions. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he have access to magic ? 

1334-6] General Marshall. I don't know whether he received 
delivery of magic or not. That will have to be answered by General 

79716—46 — pt. 3 20 



1272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Bryden himself. I know magic was discussed in the joint board 
meetings. 

Senator Ferguson. How could General Bryden operate in your ab- 
sence if he didn't have access to magic ? 

General Marshall. General Bryden sat in the discussions of what 
should be done, or why it should be done, or what should not be done 
in the meetings of the joint board. He was, therefore, aware of those 
sessions. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, going on in this message : 

Mr. Hull stated 

I don't want to leave out the next word 

Do you know why, if we have the minutes here of this meeting here, 
that no mention is made of this message? 

General Marshall. I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It was an important matter? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. A very important matter. 

[^3347^ Senator Ferguson. Prior to that, on the 24th, an alert 
had gone out as an amendment, this joint alert ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So to discuss an amendment to that alert was 
a very important matter. 

General Marshall. Very important. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't know why that would be left out of 
the minutes? 

General Marshall. I don't know, sir, unless the Secretary didn't 
get it in. He takes longhand notes himself of what is going on. 'Why 
it should be omitted, if it was, I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. An important matter like this, do you know 
how the minutes were ever approved later? 

General Marshall. The minutes were approved at the next meet- 
ing of the Board, presumably. Whether or not these particular min- 
utes were approved or not the record will show. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that the minutes are complete ? 
Was that your understanding as you were operating along? 

General Marshall. If you are referring to this particular set of 
minutes, and in the light of General Gerow's statement, and assuming 
that he states what he was referring to was the preparation of an 
alert message, I would say that those particular minutes were not 
complete. 

[SSJfS'] Senator Ferguson. Was there anything done that was 
kept off the record of the minutes ? 

General Marshall. Not to my recollection, sir. I know of no rea- 
son why our minutes should have kept things off the record unless 
it was a definite reference to magic. 

Senator Ferguson. If there was a reference to magic, that may 
account for it not being in the minutes of the Joint Board ? 

General Marshall. That might account for it, but I don't see why 
you couldn't refer to an alert message without necessarily commenting 
on magic. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not it could have been 
because magic was responsible for the alert that you were antici- 
pating? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1273 

General Marshall. I don't know that. 
Senator Ferguson. That that would be loft out? 
General Marshall. I don't know that. 
Senator Ferguson. Reading on from the letter: 

He told nie he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. 

That is speaking about the Secretary of War? 
General Marshall. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest 
possibility of resumption. 

[3S49] General Marshall. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Tlie President wanted a warning message sent to the Philii)piiies. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cable- 
gram. 

Now, is it that sentence, about an appropriate cablegram, the mes- 
sage that went to MacArthur on the 27th ? 

General Marshall. I would assume it did. General Gerow is the 
l)est witness on that. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be in effect an amendment or supple- 
ment to the one of the 24th, because this reads : 

I gave him a copy of the joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; I am aware of that. 

Senator Ferguson. You indicated before that it was always dan- 
gerous — I don't think you used the word '"dangerous" 

General Marshall. 'I think I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you? To send a supplement or amendment 
to a message. 

General ^Marshall. I think I also said it was better to send an en- 
tirely new message. 

Senator Fi:rguson. Do you know why this amendment was made, tlie 
one of the 27th, to the message of the 24th? 

[-3-S-50] General Marshall. The only answer 1 could give was 
that the other was a naval message to be communicated to the Armv 
opposite. This message that General Gerow is referring to is a direct 
Army message, which in its directions to General Short, ])articularly 
in. Hawaii, had some special reference to which the Navy was not 
directly concerned. 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't thev also alert Admiral Kimmel on the 
27th? 

General Marshall. By the action of General Short in apprising his 
naval opposite of the contents of the alert. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the only reason why you know why 
there was a new alert sent on the 27th? 

General Marshall. Is what the oidy reason? 

Senator Ferguson. The only reason why you felt it liad been sent 
originally to the Navy, therefore this one on the 27th was going to the 
Army on the 27th ? 



1274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. No, sir. I think that the events following a 
meeting with the President dictated a detailed alert to the Army 
officials. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, later in the morning, going on, the sec- 
ond paragraph 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, may I have the record show that you are 
referring to Exhibit 45, dated November 27, the memorandum to the 
Chief of Staff by General Gerow; so the [S^Sl] record will 
show. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that an exhibit? 

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 45. You spoke about a letter. 

Senator Ferguson. So from now on it will be referred to as Exhibit 
45. 

Later on in the morning — that is on the 27th, and this is Gerow speaking — "I 
attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral 
Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. 
Sayre were discussed. 

Now, I have the long letter as Exhibit 45. What is that? 

Mr. Hannaford. It isn't an exhibit. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the Sayre message. 

The Vice Chairman. If you will permit, Senator, that was read 
into the record and it wasn't made an exhibit. 

Senator Ferg.uson, All right. 

Now, speaking about the memorandum from the President to the 
High Commissioner, that is the message that they talk about there 
and Mr. Sayre was discussed ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when is the first, General, that you knew 
that the message, the memorandum from the President to the Higl) 
Commissioner of the Philippines, was discussed? 

General Marshall. So far as I can tell at the present [3S52] 
time, Senator, I first learned of that on the morning of November 
28th. 

Senator Ferguson. When you saw General Gerow? 

General Marshall. Well, I don't know whether that would be 
entirely correct, to say when I saw General Gerow. These documents, 
I think, were brought to my attention as soon as I arrived at the office 
and I undoubtedly talked to General Gerow then or later regarding 
them. 

Senator Ferguson. Take the message, the one of Sayre's and we 
will go over that for a moment. It says : 

A copy of dispatches will be delivered to you by Admiral Hart, which, with 
my approval, the CSO and the SOS addressed to the Senior Army and Navy com- 
manders in the Philippines. 

What are they speaking about there, General? What dispatches 
would be delivered to the High Commissioner ? 
It says : 

Copy of dispatches will be delivered to you by Admiral Hart, which, with my 
approval, the CSO and SOS— 

that is the Chief of Staff, isn't it? 
General Marshall. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Addressed to the Senior Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1275 

General Marshall. I assume that is the alert, Army alert message 
to General MacArthur. 

[3353] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, this is on the 26th. Is the 
President anticipating that a new alert message is going to be sent 
to General MacArthur? 

General Marshall. When I announced that I thought this was the 
27th. I see that it is the 26th. 

Senator Ferguson. This is the 26th. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Does this anticipate a new message to General 
MacArthur, because the Exhibit 45 says up there. 

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. 

General Marshall. Well, reading this paragraph again that you 
have just read to me and looking at the message of November 24, it 
is possible, though the date is 2 days earlier than the President's mes- 
sage, that he is referring to that particular message. 

Senator Ferguson. But doesn't it indicate in the Exhibit 45 that the 
President did not know about the message of the 24th, because it says 
this : 

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines? 

General Marshall. General Gerow will have to explain that, or the 
Secretary of War, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What is your explanation of it ? Do you know 
about it ? 

[3354] General Marshall. I don't know about it ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then going on in that letter : 

In addition, you are advised that the Japanese are strongly reinforcing their 
garrison, 

and so forth. Now, getting down to the fifth paragraph from the 
end : 

I desire 



that is the President 

that after further informing yourself as to the situation and the general outline 
of naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General 
MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the President of 
the Phihppine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I am relying upon 
the full cooperation of his government and his people. Please impress upon him 
the desirability of avoiding a public pronouncement or action since that might 
make the situation more difficult. 

Now, that indicated that the President personally was asking the 
High Commissioner to confer with Admiral Hart and General Mac- 
Arthur, is that correct? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And to get the picture from them and then to 
confer with the High Commissioner ? 

General Marsilall. Then confer with 

Senator Ferguson. With the President ? 

General Marshall. With the President. 

[3355] Senator Ferguson. Of the Philippines ? 

General Marshall. Of the Philippines. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, when you came back on the 28th 
you were familiar with that message ? 



1276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was its significance to you ? How did it 
stand in this picture ? 

General Marshall. About all I can say at the present time, Senator, 
is that it was part and parcel of the general action of the War and 
the Navy Departments in regard to the situation in the Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was carrying out what the President felt 
should go to the High Commissioner and to the President of the 
Philippines ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir, in particular, because the communi- 
cations with the High Commissioner would be a matter on the Presi- 
dential level, and not on the War Department level. 

Senator Ferguson. But he was to confer with the War Department 
and the Navy Department through Hart and MacArthur? 

General Marshall. He was to confer, as I understood it, with those 
two officials out there. 

Senator Ferguson. So that took them into the picture as well as the 
State Department ? 

[3356] General Marshall. Yes, sir. You see the background 
of this, as I read it at the moment, is that General MacArthur was 
endeavoring to bring into the best possible state of organization for 
mobilization and preparation for possible hostilities a Philippine 
army. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you think that this would convey to 
Admiral Hart and General MacArthur that the matter was serious 
when the President was personally having the High Commissioner 
take this up with them ? 

General Marshall. I would say it did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I didn't get you. 

General Marshall. I would say it did. 

Senator Ferguson. It did. Now, take the next sentence : 

"The Secretaries were informed" — that means of War and the 
Navy — "of the proposed memorandum you" — meaning the Chief of 
Staff — "and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President." 

Now, I refer you to exhibit 17 and ask whether or not that is the 
instrument that was referred to in that sentence? 

General Marshall. Is this the sentence, "The Secretaries were in- 
formed of the proposed memorandum" ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. That, I think, is the instrument re- [3367] 
ferred to. 

Senator Ferguson. That is exhibit 17. Now, General, I will ask 
you this : Have you been over that recently or would you rather read 
it before I start to ask you questions about it? 

General Marshall. No, I think you might start with your ques- 
tions, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, it starts out (reading) : 

If the current negotiations end witliout agreement, Japan may attack : the 
Burma Road ; Thailand ; Malaya ; the Netherlands East Indies ; the Philippines ; 
the Russian Maritime Provinces. 

Hawaii is not mentioned. Do you know why? 
General Marshall. Because we did not anticipate a general attack 
on Hawaii. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1277 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, are we talking only about general 
attacks here? 

General IMarsiiall. We are talking about, as I used the expression 
this morning I think, general operations. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand then that an attack 
such as was made on Pearl Harl3or was not being considered as part 
of an attack if current negotiations were to end without agreement? 

General Marshall. I think from my point of view, Sen- [SSSS] 
ator, I can probably explain it best this way : We had made our major 
commitment of troops and materiel to Hawaii to make it as safe 
against attack as we possibly could. We thought we had prepared 
that garrison so that its defensive strength was such that there was 
little likelihood that the Japanese would undertake the hazardous 
operation of attacking it. 

We tliought at the same time that there was every indication of a 
general campaign b}^ the Japanese south through the China Sea, as 
I referred to it before, and which actually was the case. We thought 
that the Japanese would not go into Manchuria under the circum- 
stances because it would be too hazardous for them under the condi- 
tions and so far as we were concerned would not be a direct threat 
against the United States or a serious threat against the British. 

We felt that Hawaii, as I have just said, was organized, equipped 
and prepared for a reasonable defense against an attack. I am 
using the word "attack" there in the meaning of any overt act of 
destruction or enemy aggression. I am not meaning it in the terms 
of a general operation, which was the nature of the Japanese move- 
ments we anticipated and which actually did occur down through 
the China Sea. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand that we must read 
tliis word "attack" here to have a qualified meaning, one of general 
(.'peration and not the ordinary attack? [3359] Is that what 
we must understand ? 

General Marshall. I would say yes, sir, because we anticipated 
the possibility of attack almost anywhere, in the Aleutians, on the 
West Coast, as I stated the other day, in Hawaii possibly, Guam, 
Wake, any of those islands, but that was not the Japanese campaign 
as we foresaw it. It did not mean. Senator, that if we kept on with 
our Hawaii we could remove that garrison from there because there 
was no danger there. The fact that it had a garrison, the fact that 
it had the equipment to use, would be the best guarantee against 
attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand then that we may 
use the word "may" there as "probable," where as Hawaii, West 
Coast, and so forth, were in a "possible" category ? 

General Marshall. That would be it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You say that would be the 

General Marshall. I think that is a reasonable interpretation. 

Senator Ferguson. You say that would be a reasonable interpre- 
tation to do that, that the word "may" is "probable," whereas these 
were outside of the probable and in the possible? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I mean specifically that we did not 
mention Alaska and the Aleutians and yet we had a [3360] 
hazard there of air bases being established there for the threat of the 



1278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

northwest portion of the United States, but the fact that we did not 
lind Japanese coming in there did not mean that there was not that 
possibility. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you have any discussions with 
the President that would allow him to interpret this as we now have 
interpreted it, that that meant general, over-all attack? 

General Marshall. I think that would be the impression that we 
had given the President. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the impression you gave him, so that 
he would have this language and he would understand what you 
were talking about ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. As I recall at the time, there was a 
general unanimity as to what the Japanese principal intentions were. 

Senator Ferguson. Now. the next that I want to call your atten- 
tion to is the first large paragraph there : 

Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Roard, Thailand, or 
the Philippines cannot now be forecast. 

Just what was the purpose of this memorandum and when did you 
have a meeting with the President and discuss it with him that you 
were following up by this memorandum ? 

[3361] Well, first, I will strike out the question as double bar- 
reled. 

When was the meeting with the President that you discussed this 
memorandum, that you were going to give the memorandum along 
this line and that he would understand the language above meant 
attack? 

General Marshall. There was a meeting with the President at 
12: 15 p. m. on November 25 at which the Secretary of State, Secre- 
tary of War, Secretary of the Navy, General Marshall, and Admiral 
Stark attended. 

Senator Ferguson. November the 25th at noon ? 

General Marshall. 12 : 15 p. m. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long that meeting lasted ? 

General Marshall. No ; I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why it was called ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall at the moment, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And this was one of the things that was an 
outgrowth, that you were to write him a memorandum on certain 
problems, and the problems are discussed in the memorandum? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I am thinking while you were asking 

the question. I think it probably had to do [SSO^] I 

think it was undoubtedly brought about by the information that we 
had received in the preceding 24 hours through magic and otherwise. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that information was ? 

General Marshall. I will have to get the records. 

Senator Gerguson. What I am trying to get on the record. General 
Marshall, is the detail of that so that this record may be complete. 
There are many things mentioned in these instruments and unless 
we can interpret the instruments in the light of what was going on 
we are not going to have the complete history of what was known 
in Washington, and that is the reason for this detailed examination. 

Do you know what that information was that caused the meeting 
at the White House on the 25th? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1279 

General Maksiiall. I think I could probably obtain what it was 
if I could see Mr. Stimson's testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. I am going to help you if I can. 

General Marshall. Because he has a diary, which assists the mem- 
ory 4 years back. 

Senator Ferguson. I will take you to the testimony of Mr. Stimson 
on November 25, 1941, and see whether this will refresh your memory, 
and so that you may have a copy o fit, General, as we go along, it is 
page 4050, 35 ; that is, [S363] "Secret 35, Tuesday, September 
26, 1944." Turning to the diary of the 25th I will read the sentence 
before (reading) : "On November 24, 1941, I had a talk with General 
Olmsted" — this is the Secretary of War speaking, is it not? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : * 

I had a talk with General Olmsted, whom I recently promoted to be the chief 
signal officer. 

Did the Secretary of War do the promoting? 

General Marshall. He signed the letters of nomination to the Pres- 
ident. 

Senator Ferguson. I don't know what that had to do with the situ- 
ation. Did it have anything to do with it? 

General Marshall. I don't think it did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now : 

That was important on the subject that I will tell you later of. 

Were you having trouble with the signal officer that you were going 
to get a new one ? 

General Marshall. General Maughborne's term was about to ex- 
pire. I think it had expired, and we were bringing in General Olmsted 
as his successor. 

[3364] Senator Ferguson. There is no definite term, is there. 
General ? 

General Marshall. Four-year details. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that definite ? 

General Marshall. Definite, and the man returns to his grade of 
colonel if he remains on the active list, from major general. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

in answer to a later question ; the use of the air warning service, which, as you 
know, was a radar operation. 

Now I will talk about November 25, 1941, and before I start I would 
like to ask what is the date, counsel, of the mimeographed copy of the 
Winant message, received here at 10 : 40 on the morning of December 
6, 1941? Someone told me it was November instead of December, so 
that we should, maybe, correct this testimony. Do you know what the 
mimeographed copy shows ? 

Mr. Gesell. I think there is a misprint on the mimeographed copy 
but the exhibit in evidence is a photostat and shows December 7. 

Senator Ferguson. So that the record may be accurate, the Winant 
message in relation to the movement of ships is on the 6th of December 
1941, and not the 6th of November. 

Now, on November 25, 1941, he is talking, General, about what is 
in his diary and he says : 

This is a long one — 



1280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

And then from the diary — 

"At 9 : 30 Kuox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed 
us the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the 
Japanese today or tomon'ow." 

I am not readmg from the record. I will ask yon a question. Was 
that the so-called modus vivendi ? 

General Marshall. I think it was, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that I may get your knowledge on the record 
as to what Colonel Stimson is talking about, the Secretary of War 
(reading) : 

"It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I 
don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was 
so drastic." 

Now, he is talking about the modus vivendi, is he not? 
General Marshall. I think so, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Then we had a long talk over the general situation there, which I remember. 
"We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Depart- 
ment — 

He is reading from his [3366] dairy— 

and I got hold of Marshall. Then at twelve o'clock I went to the White House 
where we were until nearly half past one." 

Now, the "we" in that sentence includes you, does it not, General? 

General Marshall. Yes ; I am following you. I can check that here. 
Are you able to follow me? 

Senator Fegruson. Yes. Will you check that and see whether or 
not the "we" there included you for that hour and a half — nearly half 
past one — almost an hour and a half? 

General Marshall, It does include me. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Marshall. It includes the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral 
Stark, and the Secretary of State. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, an hour and a half. (Reading:) 

That's an hour and a half. 

"At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the 
President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event 
that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as — perhaps next Monday." 

Do you know what day of the week that was that you were at the 
White House, that the President had brought up the attack as being 
perhaps next Monday ? 

[3367] General Marshall. I think Monday was the 

Senator Ferguson. It would be December 1, wouldn't it? The 7th 
was on a Stmday. 

Senator Lucx^s. It was not the 7th. 

Senator Ferguson. No ; it was not. It would be November 25 that 
the meeting was. 

Senator Lucas wants to know whetlier it was the 7th of December. 
It couldn't be, could it, if it as next Monday and he was speaking 
on the 25th? 

General Marshall. No, sir. If you will just wait a second, we will 
get the date. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Marshall. This one thing, I think, is a fact. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1281 

Mr. Gesell. I figure it to be Thursday. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, we have got a calendar now. 

General Marshall. I have a calendar here of the month of Novem- 
ber. The meeting that the Secretary of War is talking about was on 
November 25 ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marsiiau.. November 25, 1941, was a Tuesday. 

Senator Ferguson. Was on a Tuesday ; yes. 

General Marshall. Monday was November 24. 

[S36S] Senator Ferguson. Then it would be by the next Monday. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "Perhaps next Monday," he said, "for the Japs 
are notorious" — what date was Monday? The 1st? 

General Marshall. November 30. 

Mr. Gesell. The 30th is Sunday, isn't it? Monday is the 1st. 

Senator Ferguson. Monday would be the 1st, would it not? 

General Marsh aix. That is correct; December 1. 

Senator Ferguson. Reading on, "for the Japs are notorious for 
making an attack without warning. The question was what we 
should do." 

This is the President talking, as I understand it. Is that correct? 

General Marshall. I assume that "we" refers to the President's 
statement. That is not quite clear from this. 

Senator Ferguson. Does that refresh your memory. General, as to 
what took place in that meeting of November 25 at the Wliite House? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And would you say that was accurate as to what 
took place? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection to the contrary; 
[3-369] I will put it that way, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Reading on : 

"When I got back to the Department, I found news from G-2 that 
i( Japanese expedition had started." 

This is all out of his diary. Do you know what that news was ? 

General Marshall. Out of his diary, I see here, "five divisions had 
come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai, and there they 
had embarked on ships, 30, 40, or 50 ships, and had been sighted south 
of Formosa." 

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel have that particular information 
of G-2? 

Mr. (Resell. Yes. That is item 24 of Exhibit 33, I believe. 

Senator Ferguson. General, would you look at that and identify it? 

General Marshall. This is a memorandum for the Chief of Staffs 
dated November 25, 1941, and signed by Sherman Miles, Brigadier 
General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Shall I read it? 

The Chairman. That is a part of an exhibit. 

Senator Ferguson. It is part of an exhibit. I just want to get it 
identified in relation to this testimony. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I identify the document. 
[S370] Senator Ferguson. Would you say. General, that that 
was the information that they are speaking about here in G-2? See 
whether you can find anything there about the five divisions. 

General Marshall. That is what I am looking for. I do not find 
a direct reference to five divisions. 



1282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Could there be another message? Do you find 
any place there anything about Shantung or Shanghai or Shansi ? 

General Marshall, He does not use the expression "five divisions," 
he refers to the number of transports and their character of loading. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you find anything in there about the 30, 40, 
or 50 ships in the G-2 message ? 

General Marshall. No ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, could it be that there is another message 
tliat we do not have? 

General Marshall. I do not know, sir. That may be. 

Senator Ferguson. That could be a very important message, because 
it may indicate they are going to cross this line that we had talked 
about this morning? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So it would be an important message, would it 
not. Genera] ? 

[3371] General Marshall. It would, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. This one only shows in the back "Distribution : 
Secretary of War, War Plans Division GHQ." 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; and of course the recipient, the Chief 
of Staff. 

Senator Ferguson. Could the reason we did not get all these in 
this book be that it was an Admiralty message, from the British Ad- 
miralty to the Navy, going to G-2 ? 

General Marshall. I do not know about that, sir. I think General 
Miles could testify undoubtedly in regard to it, and possible Genera] 
Gerow. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel to see whether they can locate 
another message that may be the one I am talking about. 

Mr. MiTCHELT.. Those in exhibit 33 are not messages at all. They 
are estimates. 

Senator Ferguson. This does not appear to be an estimate. 

Mr. Mitchell. Wliat are you referring to ? 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about this : 

"When I got back to the Department. I found news from G-2 that 
a Japanese expedition had started." 

This is the Secretary of War speaking. 

Five divisions had come down from Shantung, Shansi to Shanghai, and there 
they had embarked on ships, 30, 40, or .50 ships, and had been sighted south of 
I'ormosa. I at [3372] once called up Hull and told him about it, and sent 

copies to him and to the President of the message. 

Now he is speaking about a message and not an estimate. 
Would not you say that is correct, General ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It would not be an estimate. He is speaking 
about a message. 

General Marshall. There is a message of some sort somewhere. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, he goes on, "of this message that 
I am speaking of from G-2 that is the end of the note on November 
25." 

Now, would you say, General, that that refreshes your memory, 
that you were at the White House with the President and the two 
Secretaries, and it was at that time that you were to prepare a memo- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1283 

randiim, and that memorandum is exhibit 17, which is dated Novem- 
ber 27, 1941 ? 

General Marshall, I would think that is the probability, sir, and I 
would think also as the result of that conference, we probably became 
involved in the discussion at the meeting of the Joint Board on No- 
vember 26, on that morning, following this meeting with the Presi- 
dent. 

Senator Ferguson. Then we could go on on the 26th to see whether 
there was anything that happened there that [3373] would be 
put in this message ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, we will talk about Secretary Stimson 

I ask counsel if he will try to locate that message there. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. The message of November 25 refers to Naval intel- 
ligence. It was based upon that. That is at the top of the sheet 
there. 

Senator Ferguson. It says "From G-2." That is the only thing. 

Mr. Murphy. It says : 

The following are extracts from cables received in the office of Naval Intel- 
ligence together with G-2 comment thereon. 

Senator Ferguson. Does that explain it to you. General? He is 
talking about an estimate, and you and I, as I understood you, are 
talking about a message. 

General Marshall. The Secretary of War is referring to a mes- 
sage here, I think. We have been discussing what was the basis of 
the preparations of the estimate. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now let us go on to Secretary Stimson's 
diary of the 26th. 

[557^] The following day, November 26 — quoting from his diary — Hull 
told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind 
not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day. 

Now, he would be talking there about the modus vivendi that you 
were discussing on the 25th at the White House ? 

General Marshall. That would be my assumption, sir. 

[3375] Senator Ferguson. Going further, "That means yester- 
day," the way the Colonel puts it, which would mean on the 25th, the 
day we talked about. Now, quoting from the diary — 

to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and to tell them that he had 
no other proposition at all. A few minutes later I talked to the President over 
the telephone and I asked him whether he had received the paper which I had 
sent him over last night, about the Japanese having started a new expedition 
from Shanghai down toward Indochina. 

Now that refers back to that G-2 message, does it not? 

General Marshall. I think it does, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "He told me," that is the President speaking, 
"that he had not yet seen it. I told him that it was a fact that had 
come to me through G-2, and I at once got another copy of the paper 
which I had sent him last night and sent it over to him by special 
messenger. That was on the 26th." 

Now that would indicate that on the 26th he had sent to the Presi- 
dent this G-2 message, isn't that correct? 



1284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; the same one that he had sent the 
previous afternoon or evening. 

Senator Ferguson. Now does that refresh your memory as to what 
took phice on the morning of the 26th before you went to one of the 
Carolinas? 

[3376] General Marshall. It refreshes my memory to the ex- 
tent that I connected up the meetinor of the Joint Board on the morn- 
mg of the 26th and the probable basis of the discussion that took place 
there which led, as I understand it and as I believe, to the drafting by 
General Gerow of the necessary alert messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I show you the minutes again of the morn- 
ing of the 26th and see whether or not — you have a copy of it there, I 
believe. 

General Marshall. Xo. 

Senator Ferguson. Take this one. 

(The document was handed to General Marshall.) 

Senator Ferguson. See whether or not you find anything about 
that in the minutes of the meeting. 

Do you want to identify that as an exhibit and give it an exhibit 
number, so we will know what we are talking about on the record? 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you like to have it marked as an exhibit? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will call it Exhibit 62, and it is the Minutes of 
the Joint Board Meeting of November 26th. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 62.") 

[3377] General Marshall. ^Minutes of the Meeting of Novem- 
ber 26, 1941, of the Joint Board, Washington. There is no mention in 
the minutes of the meeting of November 26 of the Joint Board of the 
instructions to General Gerow for the preparation of a draft of an 
alert message. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you account for that being left out, if it 
was taken up? 

General Marshall. No, sir; I cannot. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, is it a fair statement then that 
as early as the 25th, and on the 26th, from the G-2 message that was 
mentioned on page 4051 of the record and being mentioned in Secre- 
tary Stimson's diary, that there was a possibility of a movement that 
would take the Japs across the line that had been designated in your 
previous testimony? 

General Marshall. Towards the Gulf of Siam? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir, there w^as. 

Senator Ferguson. This would be evidence that as early as this 
date there was a movement on that would cross those lines? 

General Marshall. That might cross those lines. 

Senator Ferguson. That might cross those lines. 

[3378] Now, reading from the testimony of Colonel Stimson: 

November 27. As you kuow, this was a very important day. 

Do you know why he described in his language as being a very im- 
portant day? 

General Marshall. I presume it was because of the dispatch of the 
alert messages. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1285 

Senator Ferguson. Then quoting from his diary: 

Novembor 27, 1041. News is mining in of a concentration and movement 
south by the Japanese of a large exixMlitionai'v force leaving south from Shang- 
hai, evidently headed toward Indochina, witli a i)ossibility of g<iing to the Phil- 
ippine.s or to Burma, or the Burma lload. or the Dutch East Indies, but prob- 
ably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position from which 
tliey can attack Singapore when the moment arrives. 

Was that a fair estimate? 

General Marshall. I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. Of what was coming in ? 

General Marshall. I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next sentence : 

The first thing in tlie morning I called up Hull to find out what is the finale. 

General Marshall. He corrects that later. 
[■3S7'9] Senator Ferguson, (reading): 

what is the finale, I put it here but I meant it was liis final decision. 

He explains what he meant hy the 'finale"; isn't that correct? 

General Marshaix. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You would take it from that that the Seci-etary 
of War liad gotten from the Secretary of State his final decision? 

General Marshall. Not quite that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what does it say? 

General Marshall. You used the past tense. He says he called up 
to find out what it was. He may say later, I don't know, that he did 
find out. 

Senator Ferguson. It says, "I put it here, but I meant it was his 
final decision," quoting from his diary, "what liis final decision had 
been with the Japanese, whether he had handed them the new pro- 
posal which we passed on 2 or 3 days ago, or whether, as he suggested 
yesterda}', he had broken the whole matter off." 

Now, the "2 or 3 days ago" was the modus vivendi, wasn't it? 

General Marshall. That was my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever gone over with the Secretary of 
War, the Secretary of the Navy, the President, [3380] or ahy- 
bodj' else this modus vivendi ? 

General Marshall. My recollection in regard to that is it was first 
brought to the attention of the War Department, in General Gerow's 
presence, at a meeting in Mr. Hull's ofHce where General Gerow and 
Admiral Stark were present, and were called upon to express an 
opinion. 

As I recall — and this is purely hearsay — they stated it appeared to 
be all right, but they wished time to think it over. 

Then they each prepared a statement in which the general proposi- 
tions of the modus vivendi were stated by them, not to involve any 
objectionable military conditions, except that General Gerow said — 
I do not believe he wrote it — that the reference in Admiral Stark's 
memorandum which would imply that we would do nothing to further 
build up the defenses of the Philippines was not an acceptable proposi- 
tion, from the Army ]Doint of view. 

Now. my next recollection is — and it is rather vague— that this same 
document was at least a partial basis of the discussion with the Presi- 
dent at the meeting on November 25. 



1286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then that you had ap- 
proved this memorandum that General Gerow drew up in relation to 
the modus vivendi? 

[SS81] General Marshall. I had not expressed a formal ap- 
proval of it, but I concurred with him in what he wrote, with the con- 
dition that he expressed orally to Admiral Stark, that the naval reply 
should not imply that we would be barred from the further develop- 
ment of the defenses in the Philippine Islands. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, if you had the right to further 
fortify or, let us say, implement the Army in the Philippines, the modus 
vivendi as drawn was perfectly all right to you ? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir; it was perfectly all right 
to me. 

[3382] Senator Ferguson. Now, quoting agam from the diary 
(reading from the diary) : 

He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I wash my 
hands of and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy." 

That is the end of his quote from his diary, 

I will ask you. General Marshall, when that information came to 
your knowledge, the first time ? 

General Marshall. You mean by "that information" Mr. Hull's 
statement, "I wash my hands of and it is now in the hands of you and 
Knox, the Army and Navy"? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

General Marshall. I would assume that that information came to 
me for the first time on the morning of November 28, on my return to 
Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. On the morning of November 28. Do you know 
who gave it to you ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to Secretary Stimson ? 

General Marshall. I assume that I did. 

Senator Ferguson. And you assume then that you got it from him 1 

General Marshall. I assume he told me. He kept me pretty wel] 
informed of everything that was going on. 

Senator P'erguson. Now, General, where did that place [3383] 
the Army, that information ? What did it mean to you ? 

General Marshall. It meant to me, certainly now, and I presume 
then 

Senator Ferguson. I think it is only fair to try to consider it his- 
tory, if you might consider it history, in the past rather than in the 
future, now. 

General Marshall. That is what I am trying to do, Mr. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I would like you to be able to do. 

General Marshall. I assume it conveyed to me at that time the 
necessity for a general alert in the Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. That would, on the morning of the twenty- 
eighth, make you feel that a general alert in the Pacific was required ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. And on the morning of the twenty- 
eighth I was informed, by seeing the documents, that a general alert 
had been given. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, did you leave town the evening 
of the twenty-eighth again ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1287 

General Marshall. I do not think I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you go twice to the maneuvers ? 

General Marshall. I will have to check that. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you have that checked to see [33841 
whether you left on the night of the twenty-eighth? 

General Marshall. I will. 

Senator Ferguson. Going to the next question, No. 30, on page 
4053, so that we will get the continuity (reading) : 

Mr. Secretary, I do not like to disturb you but I have become a little con- 
fused on dates about this telephone call. Was that on the 26th? 

Mr. Stimson. That was on the 27th. 

General Russexl. Twenty-seventh, the day after the 26th. 

Mr. Stimson. Was the day he told me he was in doubt whether he would go 
on with it? 

General Russell. Yes. 

Mr. Stimson. Or whether he would break it off, and on the morning of the 
27th by telephone he told me that he had decided to t»reak it off. 

That makes the record very clear that the conversation between 
Secretary Stimson and the Secretary of State was on the morning of 
the 27th. 

Would not you say that is clear now, from that? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And is that your understanding? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. To refresh your memory, General, on whether 
or not you left town on the night, or the afternoon [33851 of 
the twenty-eighth, the same testimony, taken August 7, 1944, before 
the Pearl Harbor Board, question No. 50: 

General Russeix. Do you recall giving instructions for the preparation of that 
message, or participate in its preparation? 

General Marshall. I was away on the 27th. I left here on the afternoon of 
the 26th. I went down to maneuvers in North Carolina and did not return 
until the night of the 27th. Incidentally, I think I left immediately after that on 
the 28th and went back again, and I have a rather distinct recollection of com- 
paring the effects of this statement. 

Does that in any way refresh your memory? 

General Marshall. No, sir. I wnll have to try to check up and find 
out. Incidentally, when 1 appeared in that hearing I only had about 
45 minutes to prepare myself, so I did not have my data. 

Senator Ferguson. Then taking question No. 33 : 

Mr. Stimson. Or whether he would break it off; and on the morning of the 
27th, by telephone, he told me that he decided to break it off. 

Quoting from his diary : 

"I then called up the President and talked with him about it. General 
Arnold came in 

"This is to my office. 

[33S6] "General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of 
two of our biggest planes out from San Francisco and across the Mandated Islands 
to Manila. There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in the Mandated 
Islands, and these planes can fly high over them and beyond the reach of their 
pursuit planes, and take photographs." 

Now I ask you to turn to page No. 6 of Exhibit 32. 
General Marshall. You wish me to read this ? 
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I want you to read that message into the 
record, and then I will talk to you about it. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 3 21 



1288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall [reading] : 

November 26, 1941 

RCA 831 US GOVT 

Washington DC Nov 26 1941 1149P 

Commanding General 

Hawaiian Department Ft Shatter TH 

Four six five twenty-sixth 

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission stop 
It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photograph Truk Island in the Caro- 
line group, Jaluit in the Marshall group stop Visual reconnaissance should be 
made simultaneously stop Information desired as to the number and location of 
naval vessels including submarines comma airfields conmia aircraft comma guns 
comma barracks and camps stop [3.^87] Pilots should be warned Islands 
strongly fortified and manned stop Photography and reconnaissance must be 
accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the 
vicinity stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed 
stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for 
self preservation stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer 
with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice stop If 
distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B 
dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then 
Philippines by usual route photographing ponape while enroute Moresby stop 
Advise Pilots best time of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit stop Upon 
arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to 
General INIacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the 
Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department stop Insure that 
both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon 
departure from Honolulu 

Adams 

Senator Fergusox. Now, General, is that the message they are 
talking about here in the diary ? 

General Marshall. I presume that is the message, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Tliat was sent out on the 26th of [3S88] 
November 1941? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator P'ergusox. When is the first that you knew such a message 
had been sent out? 

General Marshall. I could not say as to that, sir. I was familiar 
with what they were going to do, and the directions were being given 
about it. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you knew before you left on the 
26th that such a mission was contemplated and going to be advised? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I had authorized the procedure. 

Senator Ferguson. You had authorized the procedure. Now was 
that discussed at the meeting of the 25th at the White House ? 

General Marshall. I do not recall, sir. It probably was mentioned. 

Senator Ferguson. Probably mentioned. Well, it was a very im- 
portant mission, was it not. General? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; it was important. Or, rather, I would 
sav it was a rather delicate mission, because that was taking us directly 
over the Japanese islands and we had to consider whether or not they 
would grasp at that as a hostile threat. 

[S389] Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I want to ask you 
in relation to the use of the telephone as an overt act to Hawaii, com- 
pared to this action, as to how you would compare it. 

General Marshall. I would say the use of a telephone depended on 
what was being said on the telephone. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, to alert the Hawaiians, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1289 

General Marshall. That is a matter of judj^nieiit, Senator. 

Senator Fkrguson. I just want your explanation of it. 

General Marshall. I will go into this first, the question of the air 
flight. General Arnold discussed that with the Secretary of War, 
because we regarded it as a very delicate proposition. We could not 
figure any other way how to obtain this information. We thought it 
was very important that we should know. We thought it possible that 
by flying at a high altitude we might get by with the thing without 
more than a Japanese objection to our coming into their mandated 
area. However, we had to accept the possibility that they would 
seize upon this as an overt act. 

As to the tele|:)h()ne message, I feel if they knew exactly what we 
were doing, which they would have ascertained from the telephone 
message, that there were two factors involved : One was the explana- 
tion of why we took that action, which was the receipt of a magic 
message, the only way we could [3390] obtain that, and the 
(;ther was the fact we were alerting the garrisons which they could 
construe as a hostile act. 

Now there was brought to my attention in that connection an item 
of my testimony on page 3109, lines 8 and 9 — no, I am wrong. I will 
strike that all out. It does not apply to this. 

That is the best answer I can give you, Senator. I will say this, 
though, in conclusion, that my comments about the telephone, where I 
explained my own state of mind in general regarding the serious aspect 
of the telephone, should not be read in the light of assuming that that 
was definitely why I did not telephone, because just exactly why I did 
not telephone I do not undertake to explain right now, because I 
am too involved in back sights to try to determine definitely what 
was going on in my head at that particular moment. 

There was the question of time involved. The only thing I can 
say, I am quite certain I am right, is had I telephoned I would have 
telephoned to the Philippines first. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, w^ould alerting our own Army on the 
Philippines, from a military standpoint, be an overt act against any 
country? 

General Marshall, I would not consider it as such. 

Senator Ferguson. Would, from an Army viewpoint, the flying of 
these planes over this Japanese territory, the [3391] mandated 
islands, would that be an overt act ? I am asking you first as to whether 
the question 

General Marshall. Yes, I understand you are asking me. Senator. 
It would certainly be assumed as an indiscreet act, because the flight 
of our planes over any foreign territory was always supposed to be 
by previous arrangement, and particularly that would apply to mili- 
tary, to combat planes. Therefore, we were doing something quite 
definitely that the Japanese might seize upon as an overt act. They 
themselves had been doing it, but that is not the point. 

[3392] Senator Ferguson. General, the last few words of the 
message indicate that you felt it might be considered an overt act, 
because we would need guns and ammunition to protect ourselves. 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 



1290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator FERGUsoisr, We were assuming that Japan would treat it as 
an overt act and that our military authorities felt we should arm our 
men in these planes, because it says "airplanes are fully equipped with 
guns and ammunition on departure from Honolulu." 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Who is Adams? 

General Marshall. Adams is the Adjutant General of the Army. 

Senator Ferguson. This was a matter of action ? 

General Marshall. A matter of action? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes» it was a message for action, was it not? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; it is a direction to do something. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; direction, and Adams had that authority, 

[3393'] General Marshall. Yes, sir. However, I wish to in- 
tervene here a moment. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I wish you would. 

General Marshall. You used the expression that we are assuming 
that that was an overt act. AVe were taking the chance of that. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you guarded against it if they had been 
attacked. 

General Marshall. We did not leave our crews in a helpless posi- 
tion. The question was whether they should chance it. We would 
never be able to find anything in regard to the mandated islands, 
and it had now become imperative, in our view, to learn something 
of what the state of affairs in the mandated islands was, particularly 
as it related to the Japanese fleet. 

I was asked questions as to whether I was aware of the fact that 
we had lost track of where certain Japanese vessels were. On No- 
vember 20, at the meeting of the Joint Board in Washington, there 
is this paragraph in the minutes in relation to this matter 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would read that. 

General Marshall (reading) : 

The Board next engaged in a discussion of the Pacific situation. The Navy 
had information that Japanese airplanes had been making reconnaissance and 
photo- [339 Jt] graphic liights over the United States islands in the 
western Pacific. It was felt that in view of recent developments indicating re- 
inforcements and activity in the construction of defense installations in the 
Marshall and Caroline Islands, efforts should be made on the part of the 
United States to photograph the more important of these islands. 

General Arnold announced that two planes were already en route from Day- 
ton to the Philippines with photographic equipment and with instructions to 
photograph Truk, Jaluit and other important Japanese islands as required. 
With reference to this mission, Admiral Turner announced that the Com- 
mander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, had proposed that the United 
States, the British, and the Dutch undertake to photograph all of the islands 
in the Far East, and Western Pacific, but since the Army was engaged in the 
stated photographic mission, the Navy would like the planes to obtain certain 
specific information. General Arnold proposed that the Army would assist the 
Navy in obtaining desired data if the Navy would furnish to him, without 
delay, a memorandum of exactly what was desired, so that instructions could 
be given to the pilots engaged on the two photographic missions. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the end of the quote ? 

[3395] General Marshall. That is the end of the quote. 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that prior to the 26th 
these ships were already on their way in this mission ? 

General Marshall. Those ships were equipped and on their way 
to the Philippines. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1291 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. MuKPiiY. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. I was wondering if it is not a fact that the record 
shows the flight was never undertaken? 

Senator Ferguson. I was going to ask the General that in the next 
question. 

You say they were on the way to the Philippines? 

General Marshall. They were on their way to the Philippines 
with photographic equipment. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, was this message to alert them to carry 
on that mission, the one I read here? 

General Marshall. This message was to instruct them to make 
this photographic mission en route to the Philippines. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. They were to stop and confer with Ad- 
miral Kimmel? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And then go on to Truk and make the [3396'] 
various photographs ? 

General Marshall. On their way to the Philippines. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Now, do you know when it was decided actually to do this photo- 
graphing? What day? 

General Marshall. I do not know whether the records will show 
that. I do not remember it, and I do not know whether the records 
will show that. I know I discussed it with General Arnold, and also 
required it to be taken up with the Secretary of War, because of the 
dangers of involvements . 

Senator Ferguson. And did you take it up with anybody else? 

General Marshall. I think it came originally from the Navy to the 
Army in connection with these references here of Admiral Hart. 

Senator Ferguson. You mentioned in your minutes some message 
of Admiral Hart. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I have not had the opportunity to see those min- 
utes before. I would ask counsel, do we have that message ? 

General Marshall. It states here : 

With reference to this mission, Admiral Turner announced [3397] that 
the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, had proposed that the 
United States, the British, and the Dutch undertake to photograph all of the 
islands in the Far East and Western Pacific, but since the Army was engaged 
in the stated photographic mission, the Navy would like the planes to obtain 
certain specific information. General Arnold proposed that the Army would 
assist the Navy in obtaining desired data if the Navy would furnish to him, 
without delay, a memorandum of exactly what was desired so that instruc- 
tions could be given to the pilots engaged on the two photographic missions. 

Senator Ferguson. General, do you know whether it was ever car- 
ried out? 

General Marshall. I believe, sir, the planes never got away from 
Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. You say they never got away from Hawaii. You 
mean that they could not get away ? 

General Marshall. I believe they became involved in the attack. 
However, that is a matter that somebody else can give better testimony 
on. 



1292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I understand. 

General, might I suggest here that you attempt to get the Hart pro- 
posalmentioned in the minutes? 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you like to get the wire from Hart [3398] 
if there is one? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Asking that this reconnaissance photographing be 
made ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will try to get it. 

Senator Lucas. Is Admiral Hart on the list as a witness, Senator 
Hart? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't think he has been, up to date. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, going on, General, page 4054, and reading 
from the diary — he says first : 

This is all the 27th. 

Now, reading from the diary : 

"Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General 
Gerow." 

This is a throw-in : He was the Chief of the War Plans Division at 
that time, corresponding to the present Chief of Operations. 
Now, quoting from the diary : 

"Marshall is down at the maneuvers today." 

That was the maneuvers in North Carolina. 

"A draft memorandum"- 

These ni'xt three lines are not fi'oni my own memorandum, but from what 
appears from another paper : 

\3399] "A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark 
to the President was examined, and the question of the need for further time 
was discussed." 

Now, General, does that sentence refer to Exhibit 17? 

General Marshall. I think it does, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that before you left, this 
instrument dated November 27, 1941, had been prepared? 

General Marshall. It may have been, sir, but I don't think that 
is the necessary deduction because I had not yet signed it, apparently. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, it had been drafted. 

General Marshall. Whether or not we had discussed it and directed 
the drafting, or whether I had seen the draft and directed the changes 
I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. This would indicate on the morning of the 27th 
at this meeting, wherever the meeting was, that Secretary Stimson 
put in the diary that he had before him, 

A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the Presi- 
dent was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed — 

indicating that that was the instrument that they were examining. 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Going back to Exhibit 45 — I am [3400] 
sorry to keep switching 

General Marshall. I just lost the paper. 

I have it now. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral 
Stark directed be prepared for the President. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1293 

That is the same message, is it not ? 
General Marshall. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Now, the next : 

The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be 
construed as a reconmiendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen 
the conversations. 

What is meant by that sentence ? 

General Marshall. Well, I will have to merely read it here and 
then attempt to construe it, but I am not the best witness. 

The Secretary of War and General Gerow, it seems to me, would be. 
If you want me to read the sentence and then make a guess of what I 
think they mean, I will do that. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it ever discussed with you as to what was 
its meaning? 

General Marshall. I do not recall discussing the memorandum with 
the Secretary of War. 

[3401] Senator Ferguson. Had you any conversation with any- 
one in relation to that "he request Japan to reopen the conversations"? 

General Marshall. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what is the explanation of that sentence 
in that memorandum, Exhibit 45? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I am going to object to that ques- 
tion. The gentleman has said definitely that it would be his own 
interpretation, that he wasn't the best witness. Why have the General 
give an interpretation that might be in contradiction with the wit- 
nesses who know ? 

The Chairman. The Chair recalls that the General said that his 
answer would be only a guess, and that the Secretary of War and 
General Gerow would be the best witnesses. 

Whether the General's guess would be in conflict with the testi- 
mony, the positive testimony of the Secretary of War and General 
Gerow, the Chair can't say. As between a guess on the part of the 
General and the positive testimony on the part of the Secretary of 
War and General Gerow, the Chair would assume that the guess 
would go out of the window if there was any conflict. 

Senator Ferguson. What is your answer. General? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know — and I ask 
for information — how long are we going to take with [3402] 
guesses in the course of this proceeding with a witness who tells you 
directly that he can't answer the question and it would be only a guess 
and that he is not the best witness. How long are we to continue with 
this type of delay? 

The Chairman. The Chair can't answer that question. Of course, 
in any legal proceeding, in a court, the Chair imagines that a court 
would instruct the jury to disregard a guess if there was positive 
testimony on the point, but this is not, strictly speaking, a court pro- 
cedure, and the Chair can't answer the question propounded by the 
Senator from Illinois. But it would seem advisable, in order to get 
at the facts, that the committee devote as little time as possible to 
guesses, and as much time as possible to positive evidence on the part 
of those who can testify. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I put upon the record my 
version on that matter, and reason for asking the question? 



1294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Here is a case where a memorandum was to be prepared by this 
witness, by General Marshall. It was to make sure that certain 
things would not get into that memorandum. A man who was superior 
in command, to a certain extent, the Secretary of War, was sending 
a message to the Chief of Staff that certain things would not go into 
the memorandum [3^03] to the President. 

Now, I want to question this witness as to what he understood by 
that, because he had to have an understanding, and it can't be a guess, 
as to what was meant by it, so that it could not get into this official 
record that was going to the President, and it was to be over his signa- 
ture. 

The Chairman. The witness is the best judge as to whether his 
answer to any question is a guess. 

General Marshall. I will attempt to answer the question. 

The Chairman. The Chairman is certain General Marshall will 
answer the question to the best of his ability. 

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that. 

General Marshall. In the preparation of 

Senator Ferguson. General, if your answer is going to be a guess, I 
don't want it. 

General Marshall. I will go up to the point where. I introduced the 
guess and let you decide whether you want it or not. 

The preparation of the memorandum from Admiral Stark and 
myself, as the senior members of the Joint Board, that was not to be 
the opinion of the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of tlie Navy; 
that was to be the opinion of the [3404-] Joint Board, presum- 
ably, as represented by its senior members for the Navy and the Army, 
Admiral Stark and General Marshall. 

Of course, as a matter of fact, in my own mind, if I determined that 
the Secretary of War, with his vast experience in diplomatic affairs of 
the world, as well as the War Department, with two terms as Secre- 
tary, felt that a certain phase of the thing was highly inadvisable, I 
would be very much influenced by that view on his part. 

The Chairman. Very much what? 

General Marshall. I would be very much influenced by that view 
on his part. Nevertheless, the memorandum had to be Admiral 
Stark's and mine, representing a Joint Board of which the Secretaries 
of War and Navy were not members. The reports were sent through 
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the President. 
They could approve them, disapprove them, or comment on them. 

[3405] Now, as to just what was meant by this statement of Gen- 
eral Gerow's, as to the Secretary of War, I can only guess at what was 
in the mind of the Secretary of War. 

Senator Ferguson. I will put another question. 

Up to that point in your answer it is not a guess ? 

General Marshall. That is a fact. 

Senator Ferguson. The next question is : What conversation did you 
have with General Gerow about that sentence ? 

General Marshall. I don't recall that I had any conference with 
General Gerow regarding that sentence. He is giving me here, dated 
November 27, which undoubtedly — it shows I noted it on the 28th, 
and probably the first business of the day, along with the alert mes- 
sages — the statement of what had happened in the discussion with the 
Secretary of War. He had reached an understanding with the Secre- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1295 

tary of War without the exchange of the memorundum. I doubt if I 
even spoke to the Secretary of War regarding it, and I doubt if I 
discussed it with General Gerow. The Secretary of War had appar- 
ently been assured that the memorandum, so far as it was written, 
didn't do violence to his own ideas, and I was prepared to -sign it the 
way it stood. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether you had signed the 
instrument prior to that discussion with Gerow ? 

General Marshall. I do not know, sir. It is dated [34^6] 
November 28, and I couldn't have signed it on the 27th because I was 
not here, unless they brought it to me late at night, and I am quite 
certain they did not do that. 

Senator Ferguson. So probably at the time that you had the memo- 
randum, Exhibit 45, you had before you Exhibit 17 unsigned and you 
didn't sign it until after you had your conversation with Gerow 
about the instrument? 

General Marshall. Presumably so. I may not have even had any 
conversation with Gerow if I had Exhibit 45 before me at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have a conversation with Secre- 
tary Stimson about that particular point? 

General Marshall. Not to my recollection. I had many conversa- 
tions with the Secretary of War. 

Senator Ferguson. No, I mean on that particular point, about re- 
opening the conversations. 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of a conversation with 
the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, regarding that specific point. I 
do have a recollection of frequent discussions with Mr, Stimson about 
the proceedings of the diplomatic interchange with relation to how 
far they should go. 

Senator Ferguson. The next sentence [reading] : 

It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before 
dispatch. 

[3407] General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, was that so that it would make sure it 
covered that particular point and any other point ? 

General Marshall. I am a little confused about that particular 
statement, except that he may, Gerow may have, assured the Secretary 
of War that that memorandum would go to him en route to the Presi- 
dent, because the proceedings of the Joint Board were, I thought, 
invari-ably sent through the Secretary of War and the Secretary of 
Navy to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Take the third paragraph : 

Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. 

What message are they talking about there ? 

General Marshall. I presume he is referring to the alert message. 

Senator Ferguson. The alert message? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson [reading] : 

* * * and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He sug- 
gested some minor changes in the memorandum. 

That would be Exhibit 17. 

General Marshall. I presume so, yes, sir. 



1296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. "He suggested some minor changes in the 
memorandum. These were made (copy attached)." 

[S4O8] What were the changes in this memorandum made by 
tlie Secretary of War? 

General 'Marshall. I do not know, sir. General Gerow will have 
to give you that. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel, do we have the original so 
that we can find out here? It says "copy attached." Was any copy 
attached to Exhibit 45? 

Mr. Mitchell. The memorandum that was attached is already in 
evidence. 

Senator Ferguson. That is Exhibit 17? 

Mr. Mitchell. As part of Exhibit 17. That doesn't show any alter- 
ations. It is a fair copy. 

Senator Ferguson. Has there been any attempt to get the original 
to show what chanws were made? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not at all. I have never known any reason to ask 
for it. 

Senatoi- Ferguson. General, have you any idea what changes were 
made? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And 

General Marshall. I presume if that shows in the record, it will 
be shown on one of the duaft copies in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. As a rule are they kept? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

[3409] Senator Ferguson. Now, reading from the diary, that 
is, from the testimony on page 4054 : 

That appears in tlio inenioranduin which is already in evidence, by General 
Geiow, to General Marshall, the niemoranduni of November 27. 

General Russell. The joint statement is in evidence, not where the Secretary 
suggested, but General Marshall put it in evidence. We are acquainted with the 
joint statement. 

Now, going down to his diary : 

36. Mr. Stimson. Because it governed the — it helped — exi)lains the next jjen- 
tence. Now I begin with my own record : 

Quoting from the diary : 

"I said that I was glad to have time, but I did not want it at the cost of humility 
on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing, which would show a 
weakness on our part." 

And I go on : 

Quoting from his diary : 

"But the main question at this meeting" — The meeting of Knox, Stark, Gerow 
and myself. 

" — was over the message that we shall send to MacArthur." 

Now, at that time, were you talking about a message to anyone else 
but MacArthur ? 

General Marshall. At that time meaning this meeting [S4^10~\ 
that he is referring to ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. I don't know, sir. I wasn't present. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1297 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you take it from the diary tliat that is 
the only one they were talking about. Next he explains the alert to 
the others. I will read it : 

''We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert ;" — 

What is a quasi-alert? 

General Marshall. That is a legal term that you gentlemen will 
have to interpret. 

Senator Ferguson. Well 

General Marshall. He says, '' 'or the first signal for an alert.' " 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and now he says — I am reading from liis 
diary : 

"We have arlready sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert; and 
ntw, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, L suggested 
and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely, that he" — 

Then he says : 

That was the recipient. 

" — should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation 
was." 

[3411] What are they talking about there? 

General Marshall. It would appear from reading his testimony 
he is talking at this moment about an alert to General MacArtliur. 

Senator Ferguson. You had already given him the •24th alert. 

General Marshall. That is what he was generally referring to as 
a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert. 

Senator Ferguson. In your opinion, as Chief of Staff ^ was that an 
all-out alert ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn that Secretary Stim- 
son had talked with the President as indicated in that paragraph from 
his diary? 

General Marshall. I don't know, sir. I assume that I may have 
been told by the Secretary or by General Gerow on the morning of 
the 28th on my return to Washington. I don't believe General Gerow 
tells me that in this memorandum. It must be just a presumption on 
my part that the Secretary or General Gerow or both of them spoke 
of it to me. I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you recall now ever getting that infoi-- 
mation ? 

General Marshall. I do not, sir, 

[S4J2] Senator Ferguson. That would be at least an amend- 
ment to the alert of the 24th, would it not? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson (reading on) : 

Now, to understand what I was talking about, an earlier alert, I am not 
sure which one I meant, but we had sent a message which would meet with the 
description, on November 24tli, a joint Army and Navy message, but we had 
also sent warnings back as far as .July 7, July 25, October 16, and October 20, 
which contained warnings to the members of the — comamnders of the outposts 
as to the situation that was going on with Japan. 

Do you recall those messages, those different alerts that he is talk- 
ing about — or were they alerts ? 



1298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. I don't think they were alerts. They were in- 
formation bearing on the increasing and critical situation. Just what 
they were on the specific dates I am not prepared at the moment to 
testify. 

Senator Ferguson. Then he goes back and says : 

Now I go back to my narrative : 

"So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him." 

General Marshall. He says : 

That is, I was talking about MacArthur especially, but [3413] we were 
sending the messages to four people, not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, 
and Alaska. 

Senator Ferguson. But that last part was not in the dairy. 

General Marshall. That is not in the diary. 

Senator Ferguson. The diary only referred to the one to Mac- 
Arthur ; is that correct ? 

General Marshall. So far. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the next page will you read what he 
says. 

General Marshall (reading) : 

"So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from 
Marshall very carefully, finally got it into shape, and with the help of a telephone 
talk I had with Hull I got the exact statement from him of what the situation 
was." 

Senator Ferguson. Talking about this message that would be signed 
from you to MacArthur ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. On the 27th? 

General Marshali^. That is my assumption. 

Senator Ferguson. Being alert, and the one that had been dis- 
cussed with the President, up on the top of page 4054 ; is that correct ? 

Page 4055 : 

"* * * on talking with the President this morning . [3414] over the 
telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we sliould send the final 
alert, namely — " 

General Marshall. I presume that is what it is. 
[34IS] Senator Ferguson. All right. 
Now, will you read on from the testimony prepared. 
General Marshall. This is not the diary (reading) : 

That is the situation between him and the Japanese envoys. 

Now, let me have the message, that message which I have been referring to here. 

The thing I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correct- 
ness and accuracy what the situation was between the two Governments, and 
this part I got from Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right. You 
see that mesage opens with these sentences : 

"Negotiations with .lapan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with 
only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and 
offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible 
at any moment." 

Senator Ferguson. Now, just a moment there. The message to 
MacArthur opened with those particular sentences that you read, with 
the two messages alike. Take the one to MacArthur and the one to 
General Short. That language is used in both, is it not ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1299 

Senator Ferguson. That part of the message. 
[34I6] General Marshall. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you read on ? 
General MxVrsiiall (reading) : 

The thing I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correct- 
ness and accuracy what the situation was between the two Governments 

I read that. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall (reading) : 

That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had 
been a decision which I had heard from the President as I have just read, and I 
had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department and 
tlie envoys from Mr. Hull ; and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in my mind, as I 
quote my talk with the President was to send a final alert, namely, that the man 
should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation 
was here. 

That was why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a decision 
from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what 
I, of course, normally do ; to see that the mesage, as sent, was framed in accordance 
with the facts. 

Senator Ferguson. Before you go further, General, does [^4^7] 
that indicate to you that there had been a mesage drawn up that had 
different language in it? 

General Marshall. I think that is the case, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the language' was in the 
original message ? 

General Marshall. I don't know that. General Gerow would have 
that, undoubtedly. 

[^4^5] Senator Ferguson. But that would indicate that the 
first paragraph, at least the first part, was changed to meet the Secre- 
tary of War's conversation with the Secretary of State. 

General Marshall. My understanding was it was modified by the 
Secretary of War to be in accord with his conversation with Mr. Hull. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when was that first called to your atten- 
tion? 

General Marshall. Unless it is called to my attention in this memo- 
randum of General Gerow's to me dated November 27, which I read 
for the first time on the morning of the 28th, I do not know that it was 
ever called to my attention. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, with the message that was being 
drafted by the Secretary of War, the change being made, you know 
that he was going from the Secretai^- of State and his conversation 
with the President, as he says at the top : 

That was why I was in here. While Marshall was away I had had a decision 
from the President on that subject and I regarded it as my business to do what I, 
of course, normally do, to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance 
with the facts. 

That is, the facts as considered by those two men and by myself. 

[34-19] Now, what my question is is this : Who could change the 
language of such a message or who could supplement it? 

General Marshall. The President, the Secretary of War, and my- 
self. The proposals could be made by the head of the AVar Plans 
Division. They might be commented upon and changes proposed by 
the Deputy Chief of Staff. They might in relation to the references 



1300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to the enemy's status be commented on and different proposals made 
by G-2 of the Army, but in principle I would say that the only people 
that could directly change the message would be the President, the 
Secretary of War, or myself. 

Senator Ferguson. And that would be true because of the language 
there, as I quote, from the President "that we should send the final 
alert, namely, that he" — that was the recipient — "should be on the 
qui vive for any attack and telling him how the situation was." 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The others could advise, but the only three that 
could change were the ones that you have mentioned'? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or supplement it. 

General Marshall. Of course, you must understand that the origi- 
nal proposal would come in in written form, in the [34^0'] 
usual circumstances, from the War Plans Division where it might even 
he prepared by some captain. However, the responsibility for the 
message in going forward would be General Gerow's, and then beyond 
them it would be mine ; and if I am not present, the Secretary of War's. 

Senator Ferguson. Now. read on, will you please, General? 

General Marshall (reading). 

I speak thore in the words of the message to MacArthur. but there were four 
inessajies sent out that are m evidence, and you will see the message to Hawaii 
carries the aimotation on the back of it. which is very extraordinary, "Shown 
to the Secretary of War," and after they liad drafted it. And we were covering 
the situation in the four great outposts of the Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that was not in the diary, that last part? 
It does not show. 

General Marshall. That is a statement ^vithout regard, apparently, 
i o the diary. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. It goes on with a question : 

General Grunert. Has the Secretary finished regarding that message? 

Mr. Stimson. No. I have been regarding that message, [3^21] yes. I 
am just going over to the next, to the following day. 

General Grunert. I would like to ask whether you saw the rest of that message 
and whether you prepared the rest of the message or approved what was in that 
message. 

Mr. Stimson. Oh, yes; this message that I have just read a portion of to you, 
I went over very carefully the whole message. 

General Grunert. Yes. 

Mr. Stimson. Because the part that I read you was merely the part which 
I have consulted Mr. Hull about. 

General Grunert. Yes. 

Mr. Stimson. Because the part that I read you was merely the part which 
I have consulted Mr. Hull about. 

General Grunert. We have that message in evidence. 

Mr. Stimson. Yes. 

General Grunert. And lots of testimony about it. 

Mr. Stimson. Yes. 

General Grunert. All I wanted to know was whether you were actually 
acquainted with the rest of the contents of that message. 

Mr. Stimson. I was. 

General Grunert. Yes. 

[3422] Mr. STI^[S0N. And I saw it after it was finally drawn, as was shown 
by the memorandum there. 

General Russeix. Mr. Secretary, before you go away from that message, which 
we have consideerd and are considering rather seriously: When General Gerow 
came to your office that morning did he have a rough draft of that message? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1301 

Mr. Stimson. I can't remember that, sir. 

General Russku.. In his testimony before the Roberts Commission he stated, 
relative to tin- first sentence of the message, that initially the tirst sentence was 
to the effect tliat negotiations liad terminated ; that confirming your report now, 
you called tlie Secretary of State, who suggested this other language; to all 
intents and purposes it had been terminated, with only a slight possibility of 
their being resumed. 

This is General Russell's statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Right there is where I want to ask you. Do you 
recall, or do 3'ou know, or do you have knowledge that the original 
draft of the message to General Short and General MacArthur was, 
as the sentence indicates, ''that initially the tirst sentence was to the 
etl'ect that negotiations had terminated" '{ 

General Marshall. I do not recall that I was aware \3Jf23^ 
of what the original proposal was othei- than what the form of the 
final message was. It may be that the record will show that I saw 
both drafts. I do not recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at Exhibit 87, page 36 ? That is 
the message by the Navy to CINCAF, CINCPAC, where they use the 
language: 

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan 
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased. 

That is page 36, Exhibit 37. Do you have that exhibit, General? 

Mr. Mitchell. Page 36 it is, of Exhibit 37. 

General Marshall. It is page 36? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, page 36 : "Have ceased." It is the third 
line down. 

General Marshall. 1 must have some wrong paper here. Where is 
that? 

Senator Ferguson. Page 36. 

Mr. Gesell. The war warning message. 

Senator Ferguson, The war warning message : 

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. 

Exhibit 37, page 36. 

Mr. Gesell, Here it is. 

General Marshall. What is the question, please. Sen- [<^4^-^] 
ator ? 

Senator Ferguson. I wanted to know whether or not the one from 
Navy on the same day as the one that went out from the Army did not 
use the language that the negotiations had ceased, just like it was 
stated in the testimony that you have just read here. I will read it 
again: 

In his testimony before the Roberts Commission he stated, relative to the 
first sentence of the message, that initially, the first sentence was to the effect 
that negotiations had terminated. 

Then it was changed to the language used by Secretary Stimson : 

Negotiations with .Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with 
only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and 
offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, and so forth. 

Now, take the Navy message that went out on the same day as an 
alert. There they say that they have ceased. 

Would that explain that the two messages were to go out alike as 
far as the termination of the negotiations and that because of the con- 



1302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

versation with Secretary Hull by Secretary Stimson there was a change 
in the one that went to the Army ? 

General Marshall. That would be my assumption of what 
[3425] had happened, that the original messages had been pre- 
pared in conjunction with the Navy, General Gerow and. Admiral 
Turner, and that certain phraseology had been used. The Army 
message, though, through the intervention of Mr. Stimson had been 
changed following his conversation with Mr. Hull. The Navy mes- 
sage 1 am assuming probably had already been dispatched. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield '( 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. There is an explanation by General Gerow on exactly 
that at page 2690 of the record. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Do you want to put it in now '^ 

Mr. Murphy. No. It is already in on page 2690. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, General, reading those two alerts can you comment on — as 
a military man and as Chief of Staff — whichis the stronger of those 
two messages as an alert as far as the ceasing of the negotiations, 
those two sentences ? 

General Marshall. The Navy message reads : 

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan 
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an 
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. 

[3426] Senator Ferguson. Now, up to that part," "negotiation." 

Senator Lucas. I insist, Mr. Chairman, if you are going to construe 
a document or compare two documents that the witness ought to 
have a right to look at all parts of it. You cannot take one para- 
graph or one sentence of a document in construing it. 

The Vice Chairman. That is correct. The General had just read 
the pertinent part of the Navy message and I assume he was in the 
act of reading the comparable part of the Army message. I think 
that is what Senator Ferguson was after, wasn't it? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. What I am trying to do is to get the two 
messages in the first sentence as they relate to termination of negotia- 
tions, and I have some other questions about the whole message. 

General Marshall. The message sent by the Army on November 
27 states : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes 
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come 
back and offer to continue. 

Then it goes on to say : 

Japanese future action unpredictable. 

The naval message, of course, is in stronger terms in- [34^7] 
dicative of the termination of negotiations. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, which is the stronger there — 
the Navy ? 

General Marshall. I just attempted to state that, sir, that the 
naval message terms are the stronger, indicative of the termination 
of diplomatic relations — negotiations rather than relations. 

Senator Lucas. Why don't you let the witness answer? Why 
should you cut him off in the middle of an answer ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1303 

Senator F'erguson. Have you been cut off, General ? 

Senator Lucas. You just put words in his mouth that are before 
you, Senator, when he was trying to answer a simple question. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to make any explanation, General ? 

General Marshall. No, sir ; I have nothing to say. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, let us take the two messages, as has been 
suggested. 

Senator Lucas. He is the Chief of Staff, he is a General and he 
ought to have the utmost respect shown him. 

General Marshall. I have them both here, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Take the next sentence : 

An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next fevp days. The num- 
ber and equipment of Japanese [3428] troops and the organization of 
naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philip- 
pines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. 

Now, General, that is a sentence which indicates an expedition, a 
specific expedition against one of three places, is that not correct ? 

General Marshall. That is correct.^sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the possibility of a fourth ? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, let us take the one to the Army, let us take 
the language in the one to the Army. 

General Marshall. "Japanese action." 

Senator Ferguson. "Future action unpredictable." 

General Marshall. "Japanese future action unpredictable." 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it ? 

General Marshall (continuing) : 

But hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot comma repeat 
cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first 
overt act. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, we will just read down to what is 
predicted before we get to the overt sentence. Now, in that one is 
there any specific expedition set forth ? 

General Marshall. There is not, sir. 

[34^9] Senator Ferguson. Now, which is the most specific mes- 
sage as far as that sentence is concerned ? 

General Marshall. The naval message. 

Senator Ferguson. The Navy message because it outlines three 
specific movements and a possibility of a fourth, and the Army mes- 
sage is only unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. 

General Marshall. Correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So you would say the Navy message was more 
specific there. Do you know why the two messages differed in rela- 
tion to that sentence ? 

General Marshall. I could not say, sir. I imagine it was the possi- 
ble views of the individuals drafting them either as to where the 
Japanese were going to strike or as to the desirability of indicating a 
particular place as against the desirability of indicating a general 
alert for any place. 

Senator Ferguson. So one is a specific alert, the one of the Navy, 
and the one of the Army is general. 

General Marshall, No; they are both alerts in one message, in- 
cluding indications of where it is thought the Japanese action might 
be. 

79716 — i6— pt. 3 22 



1304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Marshall. The degree of alert is not the point. 
Senator Ferguson. Take the next sentence in the Navy [34^0]^ 
message, will you read it, after the "Borneo"? 
General Marshall. Yes [reading] : 

Execute an appropriate defensive development preparatory to carrying out 
the tasks assigned in WPL46X Inform District and Army autliorities. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, shouldn't the "X" after the "46" be 
a period ? 

General Marshall. I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. That is a period ? 

General Marshall, Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. So that is a sentence. Now, that is a specific 
order, is it not ? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. (Reading:) 

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out 
the tasks assigned in WPL46. 

All right. Now let us take the next sentence in the Army one. 
Would you read it? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir [reading] : 

If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that 
Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be con- 
strued as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. 
Prior to hostile Japanese action 13431] you are directed to undertake 
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, let us stop at that part. Is that as 
specific, is that as strong in the alert as the one in the Navy where he 
is to take and "execute an appropriate defensive development prepara- 
tory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46" ? 

General Marshall. Possibly as strong except that it has a proviso 
regarding the overt act. 

Senator Ferguson. It has a proviso in it. Let us take the next 
sentence : 

Inform district and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by 
War Department. Spenavo Inform British. Continental districts Guam Samoa 
directed take appropriate measures against sabotage. 

Now, the "report measures taken" is not in the Navy at all. They 
are ordered to do certain things, are they not, and you ask in the Army 
one over your signature that you are to be advised as to what measures 
were taken. The other one says : "Take appropriate measures against 
sabotage," is the last part. 

Now, which is the stronger of those two, where you ask for "report 
measures taken" and the other one is a direct order? 

[34^2] General Marshall. I do not know that I would say 
either one was stronger than the other. It is a different approach to 
the same problem. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you had close coordination between the 
Army and Navy with these two branches working where they had to 
work out in the field, would you have had the difference in these mes- 
sages ? They were sent on the same day. 

General Marshall. I will have to reflect a little bit on that. 

Senator Ferguson. I beg pardon ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1305 

General Marshall. I will have to reflect a little bit on that. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Marshaix. I think that if the two agencies were side by 
side there is less probability of a conflict in messages. We were in the 
same string of buildings at that time, the Munitions Buildings, so we 
were not very remote one from the other, but they were separate agen- 
cies, of course, with long traditions each of its own. I think if it had 
been a single group there, naturally, would have been a less possibility 
of the contradictory messages. I do not imply that these two messages 
are contradictory. That is my answer, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, General, that is your explana- [S43S] 
tion as to how, or as to why the exhibits are not the same. 

General Marshall. I did not state that as an explanation, sir. I 
was giving you a view as to the possibility of what might have been if 
there had been a different arrangement of the two sections, the Opera- 
tions section of the Navy and the War Plans Division, which is the 
operations section of tlie Army. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, General, here is what I have in mind. 
They were to inform the Arni}^, and the Army getting its own mes- 
sages and informing the Navy. At the field the messages were to go 
one to the other. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it not possible or probable that because of 
the difference in the language, one designating that it had ceased 
and the other one that it had terminated for all practical purposes 
with only the barest possibility, the one being for three specific ex- 
peditions and a possible fourth, the other being general in its nature, 
one calling for a report back, the other one directing that a specific 
plan be put into effect, that the men who received th^m in the field 
would be confused as to the meaning, and that when the report came 
back as to what action was taken that it then became the duty of those 
in Washington to catch that there was confusion and to straighten 
it out as of the 28th? 

[^SlfSJf] General Marshall. That might be, Senator, but I don't 
see how it could create that much of a confusion. 

The Chairman. Four o'clock having arrived, the committee 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn may I say just 
one word ? 

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois. 

Senator Lucas. There was an almanac — not an almanac, but a cal- 
endar, a small calendar that was used and I was just wondering 
whether or not that should not be marked as an exhibit. I would like 
to have it because we will be referring to that calendar probably 40 
or 50 times between now and the time this committee meeting is over. 
Who has that calendar ? 

The Chairman. The committee will be in order. We have not re- 
cessed. 

If anybody can identify that calendar and mark it as exhibit num- 
ber anything. 

Mr. MiTCHEi>L. The court will take judicial notice of it and you 
will have other copies. 

The Chairman. Would it be possible to ascertain from what al- 
manac that sheet of the calendar was taken ? 



1306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. I would like to know whether it is an original 

document, too. . • i ^ xi i. 4. u 

[S4^5] The Chapman. Maybe we can straighten that out by 
10 o'clock tomorrow and the committee will stand in recess until 

that time. , .^ .^.. t x 

(Whereupon, at 4:03 p. m., December 10, 1945, an adjournment 
was taken until 10 o'clock a. m., Tuesday, December 11, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1307 



[3436] PEAKL HAEBOR ATTACK 



TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

Or the Pearl Habor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Eoom (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkle}'^ (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Fergu- 
son, and Kepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, 
Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule ]M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

\SJi37'\ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. Does counsel have anything at this point ? 
Mr. Mitchell. Just a little, Mr. Chairman. 

A memorandum from Colonel Duncombe, our chief liaison officer 
in the War Department, dated today contains this statement: 

At Record 3343 and 3408 request was made for drafts of the 27 November 1941 
Marshall warning message and the 27 November 1941 memorandum from General 
Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President. Careful search of War Depart- 
ment files has disclosed no drafts of either of those documents. 

By that he means preliminary drafts. 

You will be advised if further search discloses any such drafts. 

Paragraph 2 : 

At Record 3311 question was raised as to whether the minutes of the Joint 
Board meeting of 3 November 1941 were attached to the memorandum for the 
President from Admiral Stark and General Marshall dated 5 November 1941. 
The War Department files indicate that the Joint Board minutes were not at- 
tached to the memorandum to the President. 

Then another request was made with reference to the message of 
December 3, 1911, sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the com- 
mander in Chief of the Asiatic Force, the Pacific Force, and the com- 
manders of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth [^.^5] Naval Dis- 
tricts which reads as follows : 

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in- 
structions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts 
at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy 
most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confiden- 
tial and secret documents. 

Request was made that we find out the source of that highly reliable 
information. 



1308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I have been informed that the highly reliable information referred 
to the contents of intercei^ted Jap diplomatic messages contained in 
exhibit 1, which show those instructions to their various ambassadors. 

The Vice Chairman. Is that all, counsel ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, 

The Vice Chairmax. General, do you have anything you want to 
offer at this time before you resume your testimony ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will continue 
to inquire. 

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed) 

Senator Ferguson. General, will you refer to page 1 of Exhibit 52'^ 
Will you read that message ? 

[S^SQ'] General Ma