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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BBFOBB THB
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOB ATTACK
CONGBESS OF THE UNITED STATES^
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS *-^_7^7
FEBST SESSION
,92
FUBSUANT TO / /7^
S. Con. Res. 27 ^^^^
(79th Congress) f^ > *J^
A CJONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 4
DECEMBER 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1946
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
ffS^Cp^i^^ BEFORE THE
^ JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS '^J)l^y
FIRST SESSIONS ^y
PURSUANT TO A JT"
S. Con. Res. 27 /j^(^
(79th Congress) r>/ y /
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN'
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 4
DECEMBER 14, 15, 17, IS, 19, 20, AND 21, 1945
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 194G
,9?.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Miclii- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, Oeneral Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate Oeneral Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
Hearings
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
Nov,
. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
Nov,
. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945,
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
Dec.
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
Dec.
14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
Dec.
31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946,
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
Jan.
15, 16, 17, IS, 19, and 21, 1946.
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
Jan.
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
Jan.
30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
Feb.
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
Feb.
15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Apr.
9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No. Exliibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
IV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5269-5291
3814-3826
3450-3519
""5089-5122
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149 t
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
'"471-510"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
I 1 tH I I I ( I I I I I I I I I I I I I I T^* CO 1
iicDiiiiiiiiifititiiiiOiOl
11: ; ; : 1 : ; ; ! : : : ! 1 : 1 ; 1 rd. !
(^11 1 ; i : 1 1 : 1 : ; I ! i 1 ! i 1 ! "^ !
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 1 1 1 1 1 !! 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1(N
. 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i-T
1 1 ; i I ; I 1 1 I 1 i 1 1 I 1 1 i ; ; 1 I I ;
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
""660-688"
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3105-3120"
2479-2491"
4022-4027"
148-186
2567-2580"
3972-3988
2492-2515
1575-1643"
3726-3749"
1186-1220
1413-1442'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
""391-398"
"'115-134'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. IS, 1941,
toJan. 23, 1942)
Pages
203-209
1127-1138
1033-1038
1719-1721"
1219-1224"
""886-951"
1382-1399
""377-389"
1224-1229
"'314-320"
a
1
Allen, Brooke E., Maj
Allen, Riley H
Anderson, Edward B., Maj
Anderson, Ray
Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm
Anstey, Alice
Arnold, H. H., Gen
Asher, N. F., Ens
Ball, N. F., Ens_._
BaUard, Emma Jane
Barber, Bruce G
Bartlett, George Francis
Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr
Beardall, John R., Rear Adm
Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens
Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm
Benny, Chris J
Benson, Henry P
Berquist, Kenneth P., Col
Berry, Frank M., S 1/c
Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen
Bicknell. George W., Col
Bissell, John T., Col
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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VI
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to iVIay 31,
194G
Pages
5080-5089
'"3826-3838
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
Mav 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
163-181
"418-423"
"451-464'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
'8'7'-B"
205
'B223~224"
B6.5-66
B229-231
49-51
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
3 i 1 ; i i ; ; ; i ; ; i ; ; ; ; M ;! I
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
495-510
Joint
Committee
Exiiibit No.
145
(Array Pearl
Ilarbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
4125-4151
1695-1732
2745-2785
4186-4196
3196^3201'
1928-1965
3642-3643
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
"179-184"
"105-114"
96-105
74-85
"368^378"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dee. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
11 1 _ III, iiii 1 iiii
coo 1 ■'X lOCOOO 1 1 iC0^05 1 1 1 iC^ lOO 1 1 1 ICO
OC^ 1 it^ lOCcCOS 1 1 I'^t^O 1 1 1 ICO lO 1 1 1 IIO
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11-HI,— r^ lllT-H IIII 1 |||,,_>
S
Craige, Nclvin L., Lt. Col
Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)
Croslcy, Paul C, Comdr
Curloy, J. .1. (Ch/CM) J
Curts, M. E., Capt., USN
Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN
Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen
Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm
Dawson Harry L
Deane, John R., Maj. Gen
DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm
Dickens, June D., Sgt
Dillingham, Walter F._
Dillon, James P
Dillon, John H., Maj
Dingeman Ray F,., Col
Doncgan, William Col
Doud, Harold,' Col
Duiilop, Robert H., Col
Dunning, Mary J
Dusenbury, Carlisle Clyde, Col
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN
Earle, Frederick M., W/0
Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN
INDEX OF WITNESSES
VII
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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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INDEX OF WITNESSES
IX
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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
OiiiiliOiCOiliiiiiiii i_- ,-0 1 1
OiiliiiOCO iiSl^Oil
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lOi Tf< iiii2"*'»Oil
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
541-553
182-292
'140^142'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1915)
iiiCOiiilMiiiiiiiiiii<lD!N (Ni
iiiOiii— iiiiiiiiiiiiQOlM 0(
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= 1 t- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 C5 1
0,111 iiiOiiiiiiiiiii-* 1
111 1 1 1 —1 1 1 1 1 1 (M 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 —1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II
^1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
904^918
028-643
"734-746'
"852-885'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2665-2695'
3028-3067
1161-1185'
2787-2802'
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374'
2-54'
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1913
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
214^225
363-367
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
II 1 1 111 1 1 1 1 III 1 ..
iiOir-^iC^iOiiiiOiiii-^iiiiC I(M|0>
1 110 It- IC0O5 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 lO iiOOOiO
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ii-^iiOi COiiit-iiii>-OiiiC3 iCO
11—11^1 OiiKNiiii iiit^ 1
1
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landreth, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, William S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN
Leahy, William D., Adm
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, Jr
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA
Lorence, Walter E., Col
Lumsden, George, Maj
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN .
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George "W-, Lt. Comdr
MacArthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, Morrill W., Col
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
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XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION TEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1915)
Pages
"387-388'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
14S
(Clau.sen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
45-46
"179-181'
232
76^77'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ I i i i i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
i is i i i ill is^^fs'^^'s i i^ i i§§
2 11^ 111 III Vr^i?<='^^ • '^ ' '^^
Si.IlI III III l**^"^-—!—-*— -(Ill III— J
1 i if: 111 III ^^^i^X 1 li 1 i^J.
II III III '•^ "-' O ^ ^^ 1 1 1 1 o
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1160,'
1240-1252
3636^3640
237.5-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2923-2933
3885-3915
1968^1988'
1035-1070
778-789
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
111 III III 1 1 ia> 1 1 1 1
III III III 1 1 ICD 1 1 1 1
°0 1 1 1 III III 1 1 1 I— 1 1 1 1 1
111 1 1 : iti 1 1 1 1
Q, 1 1 1 III III 1 1 ITt< 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
1 iKJ^t^-* 1 1 «c> 1 ,-j-,_-oo 1 1 ICO-* 1 1 1 1
1 iC:t»<35 1 1 IC 'SiS*^ ' ' '0000 1 1 1 1
s 1 ;^7:2 ! ; 2 \^^^ ! ! lC:°f 1 I l 1
^ 1 :^iJ^ 1 : i ig^ ! ! icifS 1 1 1 1
1 l?^^S \ \ -^ ]^^ \ 1 l^'^ 1 1 1 1
o
a
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Col
Pierson, MUlard, Col
Pine, WiUard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
PoweU, BoUing R., Jr., Maj
Powell, C. A., Col
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
Prather, Lou ise
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, William S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
xm
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XIV COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15. 1945,
to May 31,
1948
'n Illl IgoS 1 :^ ! igf^'jfg^ ! low 1 1 I
.17 1 1 1 1 177 1 1^ 1 :^?3loS7 1 ;^^ i 1 i
Jig i i i i ::i§ i ii i :§^s§g \'M\\\
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
4-9
'335-375'
411-413
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
."'69'
195-197
203-204
185'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarko
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1045)
1 1 1 1 i(N 1 1 1 1 Ic^ 1 1 111 III
t \ \ III ! 1 1 I I 11 III III
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
lO llllilN ^llll ^-^-0 III III
it^ 1 1 1 1 it^ 00 1 1 1 iSi^ZS-^ 111 111
Si(N IlliiiCOiiiiS^^aO III III
^ lO 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 1 1 J, J, "*
fti i(N 1 1 1 1 ic^ j^ 1 1 1 I'^Sr- 1
ic<j iiiiiici^iiiix^t^
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 ^ III 111
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
0 ^"lO icOii II iiO-^iQili
lO-^-<lfiGOllll IIIIII ll~-C5 III
jjCDiO'J<iCliii iiOO III
S.CO IrrCO Illl Ir^TJI III
-o 1 c6 1 1 1 1 ; ! Ill
a,.,^r^.-i 1 lo 1 1 1 1 IIIIII icit-. Ill
'*<(N— I'Oiii ICOCO.III
CO-Tfii'M iiiii IIOO III
M -S< 1 CO 1 1 1 1 IIIIII 1 -^ tH III
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
32-65"
323-334
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
"'37-169,'
1617-1647
452-455
1738^1742
'1186-1196"
1805-1808
B
Short, Arthur T
Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen
Shortt, Creed, Pvt
Sisson, George A
Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN_.
Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen
Smith, William W., Rear Adm
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN
Smoot, Perry M., Col
Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr
Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen
Staff, W. F, CH/CM
Stark, Harold R., Adm
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR
Stilphen, Benjamin L
Stimson, Henry L
Stone, John F
Street, George
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XV
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PhoQ
XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1915,
to May 31,
1940
Pages
"""1723-1911
'""3"2"3"3'-3"2'5"9",
3303-3354
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
""389^410'
376^386
541-553
597-602
442-450
Joint
Conmiittee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
1 1 1 1 1 1 Ici i 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1
00 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17 i 1 1 1 17 1 1 1 1 1 1 I
a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 O- 1 1 1 1 1 li^
CI, 1 1 1 1 1 1 lOO 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 O^ 1
2 1 1 1 1 o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
O 1 1 1 1 1 1 T-l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
^ ! ; ; : 1 ; 1 ; : 1 ici 1 : 1 : : ; i i :
1 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1
'O
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2722-2744
3120-3124
1989^2007"
2456-2478
134.5^1381"
910-931
3663-3665
3677-3683"
3750-3773
3357-3586"
2580a-2596
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
""279-288"
379^382
Joint
Comiiiittee
Exliihit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. IH, 1941,
toJan. 23, 1942)
Pages
1311-1329
496-499
1830-1842
1334-1340
""247-259"
1.525-1538
1083-1705
Witness
ells, B. IE, Maj. Gen
-St, Melbourne H., Lt. Col
laling, William J., Lt. Col
lite, William R., Brig. Gen
chLser, Rea B
Ike, We.slie T
Ikinson, T. S., Rear Adm ,
lloughby, C. A., Maj. Gen
Isoii, Durward S., Maj. Gen
Ison, Erie M., Col
mer, Benjamin R., Col
thers, Ihomas, Rear Adm
Dng, Ahoon H
jodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR
jodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), XJSN-
3olley, Ralph E
right, Wesley A., Comdr
vman, Theodore, Jr., Col
rk, Yee Kam
charias, Ellis M., Capt., USN
cca, Emil Lawrence
?:?:i$p££5:^CScScS:sS:sScS:cS^pS {g^^pS^^t^ N 1
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1585
Uyo\ ' PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee of the Investigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington.^ D. G.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson
and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart arid Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
{4196~\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr, Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, before General Gerow's examina-
tion continues I have a statement to present to the committee about the
situation of the legal staff, if I may do it.
The Chairman. Yes ; the chair will recognize counsel for that pur-
pose.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, the point we have reached in the
hearings makes it evident that a complete replacement of the com-
mittee's legal staff is necessary.
The committee began its hearings No^ember 15 and has been sitting
regularly for a month, including all Saturdays but one. During that
period only 8 witnesses have been completely examined and we esti-
mate that as the field of inquiry by committee members has widened
out and new witnesses have been added to the list, there remain at
least 60 witnesses to be examined. Many of these witnesses are quite
as crucial as those Avho have testified. At the rate of progress during
the past month, it seems certain that several more months of hearings
will be required.
When I undertook to serve the committee as chief counsel, I believed
that my services would not be needed beyond early January. This re-
sulted from several factors :
I had and still have a definite conviction that the real piu'pose of
this committee was to prCvSent facts which [4 ^•9'/] would per-
mit a final answer to this basic question : Who was responsible for the
failure of our forces at Hawaii to be on the alert and for the admitted
failure to use to the best advantage such defense facilities as were avail-
able at Pearl Harbor?
The joint resolution of the Congress under which tlie committee is
acting requires a final report of the committee to be made not later
than January 3, 1946. I assumed that time limit meant what it said.
^ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of
testimony.
79716— 46— pt. 4 2
1586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I had every reason to feel that the essential facts bearing on this
basic question could be presented thoroughly within the time set.
There had already been six inquiries into this question. As a result
we had as a starting point the testiinony of most of the principal par-
ticipants and a substantial amount of documentary material previously
assembled. At the beginning of my employment, as I then informed
the committee, I undertook with my staff to spend approximately 6
weeks in the preparation of evidence and I stated to the committee
that commencing on or about November 15 we would be in a position
to present in an organized and orderly fashion the evidence which
we had assembled.
I have never had the idea, nor do I have it today, that counsel should
be the sole judge as to what evidence should be presented to the com-
mittee or what avenues of inquiry the committee should follow. I
thought that there are cer- [^7P<§] tain essential facts, as to
which there could be no doubt as to pertinence or relevance, which
counsel should present at the outset in order to lay out the basic ground-
work. I thought and so stated to the committee that at the conclusion
of this presentation, which we had every reason to feel could be com-
pleted well within the time limit set, the committee would then be in a
position to appraise the case as a whole and determine what additional
evidence was required or whether any other witnesses should be called.
Since the start of the hearing it has become increasingly apparent
that some members of the committee have a different view than that
entertained by counsel, either as to the scope of the inquiry or as to
what is pertinent evidence. This has been reflected in extensive ex-
amination by some members of the committee far beyond what the
legal staff anticipated.
This unexpected development during the last month has made it
clear to me and all of my staff that it is not possible to complete the
hearings within anything approximating the time I originally antici-
pated, and. accordingly. 1 am certain of my own inability, and that of
my staff, to see the job through to the end. All of my staff accepted
their places on my expectation and assurances that they would not be
held for any considerable time after January 1st. My own obliga-
tions and responsibilities put me in the same [410.9] position.
This outcome is a source of deep concern and regret to me and to
the other members of my staff. I did not want the place as counsel,
but under the circumstances I felt I could not refuse it. I had hoped
to perform a useful public service in aiding to present publicly all the
pertinent facts which would permit the committee, the Congress, and
the public to answer the questions in their minds. Our entii"e staff
has worked days, nights, and Sundays for 2 months and a half. We
have produced, or prepared for introduction, much pertinent evidence
that has never been produced at any previous inquiry about Pearl
Harbor. We are all depressed that because of the course of the pro-
ceedings we have not been able to ])resent it.
It is necessary for me to ask the committee to arrange for other
counsel to carry on. If that is done with reasonable promptness there
should be no serious break in the hearings. We have already done a
large part of the work in digging out and organizing basic material
and documents, and arranging for the witnesses.
I want to make it clear that there has been no restriction placed
upon counsel by any member of the committee or by any agency
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINt COMMITTEE 1587
of the Government as far as presenting pertinent evidence i% con-
cerned. We have had access to all pertinent records and have received
complete cooperation from [4^00] all Government depart-
ments concerned. I feel sure that this same condition will continue.
We will make every effort to aid the new counsel in preparing for
their work and, during that process, we can, if the committee desires,
continue, for the rest of December and for a short time in January,
presenting evidence to the committee so that the new legal staff can
pick up the case and carry on.
[4301] The Chairman. The Chair would like to state, in con-
nection with that statement of our chief counsel, that in his opinion
the development as outlined there is, as far as this committee is con-
cerned and the Congress, the country I think, tragic.
I would like to say for the record that when this committee was
appointed — I will go back of that, when the reports that were re-
leased of the War Inquiry Board and Navy Board of Inquiry, I
think in August, there was a general feeling, in which I shared and so
stated on the floor of the Senate, that the confusion growing out of
the various investigations and reports was such that, in my judgment,
it required a congressional investigation. I felt that it was a responsi-
bility of the majority party in Congress to make that investigation
and accept the responsibility and whatever the consequences might
be, and believing that I introduced the resolution under which we have
been acting since the 6th of September, I tliink, or since its adoption
by the House.
One of the first tasks to be performed was the selection of counsel.
That was not an easy task. We had a number of applications for ap-
pointment of chief counsel by able lawyers. I think the committe^e
felt we would have to draft somebody, some outstanding man whose
character and whose record for ability, integrity, and experience in
legal matters, and \_4202'] especially in the Governmental set-
ups, would insure a thorough and nonpartisan examination into this
question.
The first name suggested, or that occurred to me and to other mem-
bers of the committee, and I think generally, was Hon. William D.
Mitchell, who had been Solicitor General 4 years in the Coolidge Ad-
ministration, and had been Attorney General for 4 years in the Hoover
Administration.
I called Mr. Mitchell over the telephone in New York and told liim
that I had been authorized to consult him as to the availability of his
services, and he said that he had a busy law practice and he was not
seeking any additional assignments, but if the committee felt that
he was the man desired to conduct this investigation from a legal
standpoint, he would accept.
I asked him to come down to Washington to sit with the commit-
tee and discuss it, vrhich he did. He was unanimously selected, and
the press generally, and the country, reacted most favorably to that
selection, and I think botli Houses of Congress did also.
The committee authorized him to select his own staff, because if he
were to be responsible for the conduct of the investigation from the
standpoint of the counsel, obviously it was necessary for him to select
men with whom he could work and in whom he had confidence, and so
he set about to [4^03] make the selection of his assistants. No
1588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
injunction or suggestion was made to him, as far as I know, certainly
not in the committee, and if anybody individually made any such
suggestion 1 am not aware of it, that there should be any politics or
any partisanship in the selection of counsel.
The chairman of this committee does not know now and has never
inquired whether any member of this legal staff were Democrats or
Republicans.
Mr. Mitchell came down and began to organize his staff and to look
into the mass of records involved in this investigation. It was a
herculean task, involving the State, War and Navy Departments, and
other agencies of the Government, and. as Mr. Mitchell has said, they
liave worked day and night and Sundays in making available to the
committee everything that appeared to be pertinent to the inquiry
without restriction and immediately.
I, as chairman of the committee, asked all the departments, from
the President on down, to make available to the counsel every bit of
pertinent record or testimony that might bear upon this investigation.
The chairman of the committee has been, of course, as chairman, in
touch with counsel. It was necessary to confer with him day by day
over details that it was unnecessary and impossible for the commit-
tee to do as a whole. That is one [4^04-] of the functions of
the chairman. The chairman is able to say, without reservation, that
Mr. Mitchell, and his entire staff, have devoted themselves conscien-
tiously, without sparing themselves in any way, in undertaking to
develop the evidence tliat the connnittee niiglit want or might feel
that it needed in order to make an investigation available to the public
and held in public, so that the people themselves would know every
word of testimony produced here and make up their own minds about
the responsibility of anybody in the Government for the disaster at
Pearl Harbor, regardless of the opinion of any member of the com-
mittee, or of the committee as a whole.
The chairman feels like saying to Mr. Mitchell, and to his entire
staff, that in his experience as a legislator covering 33 years, and a
longer experience in public life and in the practice of law, he does not
recall a more diligent, earnest, painstaking, unselfish effort made by a
lawyer or group of lawyers to perform their services as a public duty.
When Mr. Mitchell was asked to come down here he insisted that
he did not want to consider any question of compensation, that what
he did would be a matter of public duty.
One or two members of his staff have insisted likewise, that they were
not interested in any compensation that the committee or Congress
might pay them. They have sacrificed their time and income in order
to serve this committee and, [4^05] as they felt, serve the
country and do a constructive job in presenting this case, in present-
ing the evidence and in digging it out, which the committee could not
do as a committee.
Late yesterday afternoon Mr. Mitchell called me, as chairman of this
committee, into the office where he and his staff had been engaged in
work and advised me that they would be compelled, under the cir-
cumstances, to take the step which they have now taken, I attempted
to dissuade them from that decision and asked them to consider it
overnight, in the hope that they might reach a different conclusion.
They have not reached a different conclusion.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1589
Now it is a tra<>edy that we are to lose the services of these gentlemen.
To select new counsel at this time, or within the next week or two,
involves a difHculty the result and solution of which I cannot now
foresee. I do not know to what extent any lawyer, or any group of
lawyers, who are engaged in their own practice, who have a rep-
utation and standing as lawyers and as citizens that would justify
their selection by tliis comnuttee, would be available.
The chairman does not know whether it would be possible at all
under the circumstances to substitute counsel who would be in a posi-
tion to undertake the onerous task which would devolve upon such
comisel, notwithstanding the groundw^ork which has been laid by the
counsel and his assistants.
[4:^06] The Chair expresses his profound regret that the situ-
ation, as it has developed up to now, has required the action taken by
General Mitchell and his assistant counsel. I cannot make any predic-
tion. I have no idea who might be willing to take over the job. I
have no idea how much longer these hearings will last.
When I introduced the resolution and fixed the 3d of January as
die date for making the report I honestly believed that we could,
within 4 months from that date, bring about the development of this
evidence publicly and make our report on the 3d day of January.
On account of the mass of detailed information and documents that
had to be gone into by the counsel, it took some time to arrange all
that and to get it available, and there was a little more delay in the
beginning of the hearings than I, at the time of the introduction of
the resolution, anticipated.
[4^07^ On the whole, I think that was a timesaver in this re-
spect ; that it gathered and selected and made available the informa-
tion from the standpoint of the presentation of the case, and that
that delay which was necessary as it turned out did not in any way
cause any undue postponement of the beginning of the hearing.
It is obvious now to all of us that the hearings cannot be concluded
and the report made by the 3d of January, and that an extension of
time must be requested of the Senate and House. How much more
time will be required, the Chair would not even prophesy.
We have had, as General Mitchell has said, 10 witnesses up to now,
only 8 of whom have been concluded, as far as the examination is
concerned, with 2 more still on the stand and unconcluded, and at
the rate of progress made in the examination of these w^itnesses, it
would be difficult to prophesy how many months it would require
to conclude this testimony.
The chairman wishes to say that he not only did not seek appoint-
ment to this committee, notwithstanding the fact that he introduced
the resolution, he did not seek appointment to this committee, but
protested against his appointment and argued with the President of
the Senate for days, seeking to persuade him not to appoint the
[4208'] chairman as a member of the committee.
As majority leader of the Senate I had all that any ordinary human
being could be expected to do, and I realized that in order to give
this position the service and to do the justice to which it was entitled,
I would have to abandon my duties temporarily as Majority Leader,
and almost as a Senator.
I must, in my own mind, decide whether I have any further duty
in regard to this investigation, and w'hether, if I have any duty, it
1590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
outweighs my duty on the floor of the Senate in the capacity in which
I have been chosen by that body, and in which I served for more than
8 years.
I must say in good conscience, and say it publicly, and I think the
committee is entitled to have me say that during the next few days
I will weigh my relative objections as a member of this committee
alongside of my obligations as a member of the Senate and as Ma-
jority Leader, and if I conclude in my own mind that I must make the
decision that my duties in the Senate over the next 3 or 4 or 6 months,
whatever the time may be outweigh my duties as a member of this
committee I shall thereupon surrender my chairmanship of this corn-
committee and resign as a member of the committee.
If I conclude in my own mind — and I must again say [4^09]
I must reach the decision myself — that I can render any additional
service as a member of this committee over a period of months, and
that that service and that obligation may outweigh my obligation on
the floor of the Senate, I shall decide accordingly. But I feel that,
in view of the whole situation as we all understand it here, I must
within the next few days reach a conclusion as to what my course
will be.
Wliatever my course will be, I want chief counsel and all his assist-
ants to know that I have appreciated their contribution to this devel-
opment in this public hearing, and to the evaluation of the testimony,
and the service which all of us have assumed they would and that they
have rendered.
I have never in so brief a time been associated with men in the
legal profession or in legislation for whom I have a more profound
respect and in whom I have greater confidence, and I want them to
know that as far as I am concerned, and I think I speak for the
committee in that respect.
That is all I feel like saying. I cannot but feel depressed, immeas-
urably depressed over this development and I don't think I need say
anything more at the moment.
Senator George. Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted to [4^10']
make a very brief statement?
The Chairman. Senator George.
Senator George. I think the Chairman of the committee knows, and
I know the President of the Senate well understands, I have remained
on the committee because I felt we were fortunate in securing the
assistance and aid of General jNIitchell.
I have been perfectly willing fr )ni the outset to allow General
Mitchell and his staff, in whom I have complete confidence, to organize
and lay out this inquiry. I have believed that there was not but
one way to ascertain the truth and answer the question, which, under
the Senate resolution we were called upon to consider, and that was
to get a complete view of the pertinent, relevant, and material facts
that could be developed only through the conscientious work and
skill of counsel.
Of course, I recognize the right of all members of the connnittee
to cross-examine witnesses at any length, but I have wondered whether
or not we were confusing the issue rather than arriving at any answer
in which the public could have any confidence. I still feel that way
about it.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1591
I deeply regret (xeiiei-al Mitchell's decision and the decision of the
other members of his staff. I appreciate [4211] the facts
stated by (Tcneral Mitchell to this committee this morning, and I
think it is only fair to say that all members of the committee under-
stood that General Mitchell hoped to conclude the inquiry by or
very soon after the turn of the year, as he has alj-eady stated to us.
1 merely wish to say that I deejily legret the decision which General
Mitchell and his staff have been forced to make in the circumstances,
in view of the now clearly indicated length of this inquiry, and I
know that their separation from service here with this committee
is a loss to the committer, to the Congress as a whole, and I think
to the country.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I say just a word?
The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I desire to concur in what the able
Senator from Georgia, and the able Senator from Kentucky have
said with respect to this announcement of General Mitchell this
morning. It is a source of deep regret to me that General Mitchell
and his staff feel it necessary to leave this extremely important
national assignment, and I say without fear of contradiction that it
is a great loss to the American people, in view of the magnificent job
that they have done up to date.
I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that General Mitchell [4^12]
and his staflf will continue through this month, and that these hearings
ma}^ continue from day to day just as we have planned them.
It may be that by January 3, we will have a better opportunity to
assess the time necessary to conclude the hearings. Of course, in the
meantime we can be arranging for counsel to take over should the con-
tingency arise that it will be necessary to extend this hearing.
I want to say in conclusion, as one member of the committee, I had
never met any of these gentlemen before beginning my service with the
committee.
I had frequently read and heard about General Mitchell. The first
time I ever met him or saw him was when he appeared before our
committee for the first time. I was deeply impressed with his frank,
opening statement. I concurred in wdiat he wanted to do. That was
to bring in every shred of evidence that they could possibly find that
would throw any light upon this Pearl Harbor clisaster. Counsel
selected to aid him in this cause have been more than diligent in the
preparation of this case.
I again reiterate that it is a tremendous loss to this committee and to
the country that these fine men feel it necessary to remove themselves
from their assigimient.
The Chairman. The Chairman would like to say that [^^IS]
General Mitchell and his staff have assured him that they will continue
until the committee takes its recess for the Christmas holidays. It
has been my thought that we would recess for the Christmas holidays
probably Saturda3% the 22nd, but it may be more convenient for some
members to recess the 2lst. Under the circumstances, it doesn't make
much difference, apparently. So that we will have the services of
General IMitchell ancl his staff until such time as the committee recesses
for the holidays, and in the meantime we may be able to assess the
situation more accurately.
1592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Cooper.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to detain tlie
committee longer than to concur with the Chairman, the Senator from
Georgia and the Senator from Illinois in the remarks they have made.
It had not been my privilege to know General Mitchell or any of
the members of his staff prior to the time they Avere selected for work
with this committee.
I have been most favorably impressed by all of them. I think they
have done an outstanding job, and have rendered an outstanding pub-
lic service. As a member of the committee I regret exceedingly that
the situation has developed so H2H~] that they feel they must
not continue longer than the end of this month in the excellent service
that they have reiidered the committee.
It is a matter of very great regret that the situation could not have
developed so that we could have gone on with this investigation as was
originally planned, outlined, and understood, and under the able guid-
ance of General Mitchell and his staff.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. I want to state on the record that in my judgment,
Mr. Mitchell has held positions of great honor in this country; he has
an outstanding reputation as a lawyer ; he and his staff have been able,
conscientious, sincere, thorough, and have thus far made a clear pres-
entation of the facts in this inquiry.
I regret that it has been necessary for him and his staff, in view of
tlie developments, to come to the conclusion they have.
[4^16] The Chairman. General Gerow, I believe, is now here
and ready to proceed. I have forgotten who was examining.
The Vice Chairman. Counsel was examining.
The Chairman. Yes.
TESTIMONY OF IT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW (Resumed)
Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, I understand you have in mind ask-
ing for some corrections in the transcript of your testimony?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you like to present them now ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
In reviewing my testimony given before this committee on 5 De-
cember 194.5, I have found several statements made by me Avhich for
purposes of the record should be clarified :
(a) On page 2643, lines 24 and 25, and page 2644, lines 2 and 3, com-
mittee coimsel stated as follows :
Go to the third itfiu in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow
No. n : please look at that and sive us the date of that and briefly just what the
scope of that plan is, or was?
The bound folder which was handed me contained two documents,
i. e., Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 and a
revision thereof dated November 19, 1941. I apparently read from
the revision rather than the original [4^16] document. Since
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1593
the War Depaitineiit Operations Plan, Eainbow No. 5 was based on
the orio-inal joint phui and not on the revision thereof and since it is
therefore my belief that I should have identified and quoted from the
orio:inal plan, my statement as it appears on page 2643, lines 24 and
25, and page 2644, lines 2 and -1. should have been as follows:
There are two plans in this folder : Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan —
Rainbow No. 5 and a revision lliereof. Tlie original plan was approved by the
Secretai-y of the Navy on 28 May 1941 and by the Secretary of War on 2 June
1^1. It was never approved by tlie I'resident. Tlie revision of the plan was
approved by the Joint l?o;n-(l on 1') November 1041.
I can best descril>e tliis plan by quoting the general assumptions as stated in
the original Rainbow No. "> plan.
" 'Section III. General Assumptions. That the Associated Powers, comprising
initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Nether-
lands East Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the
"Free French" are at war against the Axis Powers, comprising either :
" 'a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or
" 'b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.
" 'That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in [^217] accord
with ABC-1 and ABC-22.
" 'Tiiat even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility
of their intervention must be taken into account.
" 'That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be
able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical
materials, from sources in that general region.
" 'That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive
elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct
attack ; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will
be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.' "
Again :
(b) On page 2646, lines 11, 12, and 13 in commenting on the fact
that the War Department Operations Plan which you handed me bore
no date, I stated:
I know it was sent to Hawaii in August, 1941, and the receipt was received
back from the War Department on September 3, 1941.
This would have been more accurately stated as follows:
This plan was approved by the Chief of Staff and sent to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department in August, 1941. [^SiS] The records of
the War Department show that a receipt for this document, dated 3 September
1941, from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was received in the
War Department on 15 September 1941.
Again :
(c) On i^age 2646, lines 14, 15, and 16, the committee counsel stated
as follows:
The next item here is extracts from Hawaiian Defense Projects, Revision 1940.
Will you look at that and tell me the scope and nature of that document and
the date.
My answer to that should have been as follows :
Yes, sir. This document was prepared in Hawaii. It is a local plan or rather
defense project based on Joint Army and Navy War Plan (Orange) 1938.
Again:
(d) On page 2647, lines 14 to 17, the committee Chairman stated :
May I ask of the General : You say this was in 1940, and based on that previous
item which you have just discussed which seems to have been approved in
August, 1941. Is not there some divergence as to dates?
1594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I see that my answer to that question was not quite clear. It would
have been better answered as follows :
This defense project was not based on War Department Ui219] Opera-
tions Plan — Rainbow No. 5 approved in August, 1941. This document is a com-
pilation of approved projects for personnel, armament, materiel and funds. It
was compiled by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as of December
1, 1940.
This document was referred to the War Department where the separate proj-
ects contained therein were reviewed to determine that they were in accordance
with approved War Department directives. When new separate projects, sub-
mitted by tlie Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, were approved by
the War Department the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was noti-
fied by letter or radio that these projects were then included in the next com-
pilation of this document.
The 1940 edition of the Hawaiian Defense Project is based on tlie Army mission
as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan Orange 1938, which is substantially
the same as that contained in War Department Operations Plan — Rainbow
#5, August 1941.
Again :
(e) On page 2647, line 25, and page 2G48, line 2. committee counsel
asked the following question :
The next item is joint coastal defense plan, Hawaii. What is that?
My answer would have been more clearly stated as follows :
[4220] This is a joint plan that was prepared by the local Commanders in
Hawaii, Army and Navy. It is based on the joint Army and Navy Basic War
Plans and the Army and Navy plans furnished by the War and Navy Departments.
(f) On page 2650, lines 23 and 24, committee counsel in questioning
me regarding the "5 November, 1941 Standing Operating Procedure,
Hawaiian Department," asked :
Did you .see that document before December 6, 1941?
to which I replied :
I don't recall ever having seen it before December 7. I think the records of
the War Department show it came in later in 1942.
I have since had the War Department records checked and find that
that document was received in the War Department on March 7, 1942.
The purpose of most of those corrections, sir. is to correct the dates,
that I did not liave with me at the time, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow. I want to direct your attention to
the events of December 6 and 7. 1941, and particularly in relation to
this so-called 14-part message that Avas intercepted, the message from
the Japanese Government to their Ambassadors in Washington, of
which 13 parts were translated before midnight and the 14th part
and the 1 p. m. part on the morninsf of the 7th.
[4^21] You have that in mind, have you?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell us, if you remember, what your move-
ments were on the afternoon and the evening of December 6. Have
you any recollection of that ?
General Geroav. No, sir ; I have no clear recollection of where I was
on the afternoon of the 6th.
Mr. Mitchell. I am more interested in the evening of the 6th, after
the dinner hour. Do you remember that?
General Gerow. No, sir; I do not recall. I believe though, sir, that
I was at home.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1595
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, if this 13th part of this message had
been translated, decoded and translated, by the Signal Corps, Signal
Intelligence Service, it was their custom to deliver the decoded mes-
sage, or exhibit the decoded message, to you in your office, was that
the practice ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; that was the practice.
Mr. Mitchell. In case of your absence from the office, for instance,
on the evening of the 6th, was there anybody there in War Plans
Division whose function it was to receive the copy of the decoded
message or make any effort to reach you ?
General Gerow. No, sir ; there was no one actually in the office. The
procedure, sir, was to designate what we [4^232] call a duty
officer for each day. The responsibilit}^ of that duty officer was to
remain — he could go home- — but he remained at his telephone so he
could be reached at any time by the Adjutant General or the Office
of the Chief of Staff. He could get in toucli with me and inform me
of any important messages that might be intended for me, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. If the Signal Intelligence Service people translated
a message of that type on the evening of the 6th, what would be the
practice that they would follow in endeavoring to have copies of it
delivered to the War Plans Division or to you or to a duty officer, how
does that work ?
General Geroav. I think, sir, if they had an important message to
deliver to me that Colonel Bratton, who usually delivered those mes-
sages, would have teleplioned me at my home, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, the message would go from the
Signal Corps, Signal Intelligence Service, to G-2, would it, and then
to you, or would it come direct to your office?
General Gerow. It was delivered to my office bv a representative of
G-2.
Mr. Mitchell. G-2. So that in order to reach you personally a
decoded copy of such a message would pass first through G-2 and then
to your office or your duty officer?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; that would be the procedure, sir.
[4£23'\ Mr. Mitchell. So that on the evening of the 6th if G-2
wanted to ])lace a copy of such message in your hands, their arrange-
ment would have been that they would have to call your duty officer,
locate you through him?
General Gerow. No, sir. My telephone number was on record in
the War Department and I believe the representative of G-2 would
have called me directly rather than calling the duty officer.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you on the night of the 6th receive any copy or
learn of any such message as the 13-part message?
General Gerow, To the best of my knowledge and belief I did not,
sir.
Mr. Mitchell. There was a pilot message which came in earlier and
which was an announcement by the Japs to their Ambassadors to look
o'lt for the long message which was to follow. It is found on page
238 of exhibit 1.
Will you look at it and see whether you ever on the 6th were informed
of the receipt of that message, or if you have any recollection about it?
General Gerow. I do not recall having received that message, sir.
Mv MrrcHELL. What is your recollection about going to your office
or to the War Department on the morning of Sunday, December 7,
1596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1941? Do you remember your movements on that [-^^4]
morning ?
General Geeow. I remember, sir, that I went to the office that morn-
ing. I believe I arrived there shortly before 10 o'clock. There was
some unfinished business that I had to take care of with some of my
senior officers and we met there on Sunday morning and were there.
I think, prior to 10 o'clock, sir.
[.f'?,^.5l Mr. Mitchell. Did you see or learn of this fourteenth
])art and 1 p. m. decoded series of messages on the morning of the 7th
at any time?
General Gerow. The first time I saw them, sir, was in the office of
the Chief of Staff about 11 : 30, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you state what occurred there?
General Gerow. May I refresh my memory? I submitted a memo-
randum on that shortly after the event.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you produce that memorandum? It is in evi-
dence as exhibit 39, and it has already been read to the committee, but
will you please look at it?
General Gerow. Sliall I read it, sir?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I think it would be well to do so. and bring
out the contents again.
General Geuow. It would be much more accurate than my memory,
sir, at the present time.
This is a memorandum for record, dated December 15. 1941 :
On Sunday, December 7, 1941. about 11 : 30 a. m., e. s. t., General Marshall
called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. Gen-
eral Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been
directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941.
He felt that the Japanese Govern- [4226] ment instructions to deliver
the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The penciled
draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East ;
CG, Caribbean Defense Command ; CG, Hawaiian Department ; and CG Fourth
Army was read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present.
Colonel Bratton was directed to take the penciled draft of the message to the
Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means.
Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes, and informed General INLarshall that
the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach
destinations in about 30 minutes. The penciled draft was typed later during
the day and formally made of record.
Signed, "L. T. Gerow. Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief
of Staff."
Mr. INIi tchell. Do you remember anything more about that incident
than is stated in your memorandum?
General Gerow. No, sir; I cannot recall anything that is not stated
in this memorandum, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Before you went to General Marshall's office at his
request, had you heard from anyone of the receipt :iiid decoding of
that message?
General Gerow. I had not, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Had you seen or talked witli C\)lonel [42£7]
Bratton about it?
General Gerow. To tlie best of my know ledge and belief I had not,
sir.
Mr, Mitchell. Had General Miles had any conversations with you
about it before vou went to General Marshall's office?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1597
General Gerow. 1 do not recall having seen General Miles that
morning until I saw him in the office of the Chief of Staft' at 11 : 30, sir.-
Mr. Mitchell. Referring back to the period from November 27 on,
after the so-called alert messages were sent out to the commanders of
the overseas stations, do you recall that after that warning of the 27th,
which you sent over General Marshall's signature to the commander
at Hawaii, and to others, any discussion took place that you partici-
pated in, or knew about as to sending any additional warnings?
.General Gerow. No, sir. I do not recall any discussions on that
point.
Mr. Mitchell. 1 think, if the committee please, that that is all I
have at the present from General Gerow. I suggest the committee
inquire from him.
The Vice Chairman. General Gerow, you were head of War Plans
Division at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, [42£8] as
you have testified ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. You participated in the drafting of the mes-
sage of November 27 to the commanding general of the Hawaiian
department, and the other commanders to whom that message was
sent?
General Gerow. I did, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Did you regard that message to the command-
ing general of the Hawaiian department as adequate and sufficient as
an alert message ?
General Gerow. I did, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Senator George.
Senator George. I have no questions at this time.
The Vice Chairman. Mr, Clark.
Mr. Clark. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that someone else will ask
every question that I could possibly think of, so 1 defer any
questioning.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas. ^
Senator Lucas. I have no questions.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire.
Mr. Murphy. General Gerow, there has been some testimony in
the several hearings, by Colonel Bratton, about some attempt to get in
touch with someone in your office, as I [4229] recall it,^ to
deliver the 13-part message. Have you made any inquiry as to
whether or not any attempt was made to deliver that by actually
making contact with someone on your staff on the night of December
6,1941?
General Gerow. I have made no such inquiry, sir. I think if any
of my officei's had been contacted on that impoi'tant message, they
would have informed me, sir.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you did not. as you presently recollect
have any notice wdiatsoever of the 13-part message until you arrived
in General Marshall's office on the morning of the 7th ?
General Gerow. That is the first time I recall having seen that
message.
jMr. Murphy. There has been some testimony in the previous hear-
ings about a pouch that was delivered on the night of the 6th. There
has been some doubt as to what actual papers were in that pouch.
1598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Avlielhor it was the 13-part message or the so-called pilot message, and
' other papers of the aftei'noon of the 6th. Do you know whether you
ever received the pilot message prior to your going to General Mar-
shall's office?
General Gerow. I do not recall having seen this message, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Do you know what the pilot message as [4'2'30]
I'eferi'ed to here, is?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mv. Murphy. Now, then, do you recall having been in General
Marshall's office when Colonel Bratton was sent to the Signal Corps
end of the War Department to inquire as to how long it would take
to dispatch the message of December 7 to the Pacific theaters?
General Geeoav. Yes, sir; I was in his office at the time and I recall
that, sir.
Mr. Murphy. After Colonel Bratton was sent, or directed by Gen-
eral Marshall to make that inquiry, do you recall his returning to
General Marshall's office ?
General Geroav. I can recall that he came back and reported that
it would take about 30 minutes.
Mr. Murphy. Was that to send it to all of the Pacific theaters, the
Panama Canal, the IJawaiian Department, the Philippine Depart-
ment, and possibly Alaska ?
General Gerow. I don't recall that that question came up at the
time, sir.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the message had been directed to be sent
to the several Pacific theaters?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, after the message of the 27th was sent,
you said tlie other day that it was your impression [4^S1]
when the Short reply arrived that it was in answer to the other mes-
sages sent as to sabotage, rather than in answer to the command for
an alert from General Marshall. At that time the gentleman from
Wisconsin suggested that you be asked about the fact that it was
signed "Marshall," that is, the message going out. And the answer
was directed to "Marshall." Do you recall that?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. ISIuRPHY. Of course, the Short message did say that it was in
reply to 472. You would not know then what 472 was; is that right?
General Gerow. I would not know at that time; no, sir, because
that is a number put on to the message by the Signal Corps, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, the war plans, in effect at Hawaii between
General Short and Admiral Kimmel, called for cooperation and
liaison in regard to reconnaissance, and in regard to the use of the
equipment there in the event of an emergency, did it not?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. It was the standing rule over the yeai-s for the War
Department at Hawaii, and the Navy Department to have liaison,
was it not?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
[4£S2] Mr. Murphy. So that when General Short sent the mes-
sage in reply to General Marshall's message of the 27th, and said
"Liaison with Navy," did you think that General Short would send a
message in answer to a war direction or an alert message that would
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1599
merely say they had been doing what they had been doing over the
years, having ordinary liaison with the Navy? Do you understand
my question ?
General Gerow. I don't quite understand it, sir.
Mr. MuKPTiY. Well, for years, and always, as I understand it, there
was supposed to be liaison at any outlying theater between the Army
and the Navy. That is a fact, is it not ?
Gr^neral Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the message of the 27th was a war alert,
as I understand it, and then the reply of General Short was to the
effect, "Liaison with the Navy."
Would you, as head of the War Plans Division, expect that a lieu-
tenant general at Hawaii would take the time to send a telegram
merely saying to General Marshall that he was maintaining the same
liaison with the Navy that he had been over the months prior to receiv-
ing an alert message?
General Gekow. No, sir. I think in that case, that [42S3]
that phrase would have a different meaning.
Mr. Murphy. Would it not be fair to assume that in view of the
message of General Marshall, that the reply of General Short, ""Liai-
son with the Navy," meant that there had been an actual conference
with the Navy, a discussion of plans to meet the war warning message
from the Navy and the war warning message from General Marshall,
and that the necessary steps had been taken to put into effect the
plan which they had already prepared to have proper liaison, proper
cooperation, and an all-out alert, or the necessary alert to meet the
impending clanger ?
General Gerow. The message was susceptible of the interpretation
that you have outlined, sir.
[4^34] Mr. Murphy. At any rate Colonel Bundy saw the mes-
sage, did he not ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr, Murphy. And Colonel Bundy was the man on your staff whose
duty it was to follow up on messages of that kind and to see whether
or not they were responsive to the Marshall message of the 27th;
is that right ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Then, as I understand it, Colonel Bundy unfortu-
nately met his death on the way to Hawaii immediately after Pearl
Harbor?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. v
Mr. Murphy. Did Colonel Bundy leave any kind of a memorandum
in the War Department files which would explain his reaction to
the General Short telegram of the 28th ?
General Gerow. I have had the records searched very carefully
and I can find no such record and I don't recall of my own knowledge
having talked to Colonel Bundy about that after December 7.
Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions.
The Chairman. Senator Brewster is still absent. Therefore Con-
gressman Gearhart may inquire.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I just clarify the record on one
point?
1600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[4^35] Will you give Colonel Bundy's initials, will you furnish
them?i
General Gerow. Yes, sir. I know his first initial was "C," but I don't
know what his middle initial was.
Mr. Murphy. There has been reference by General Marshall to a
Mr. Bundy who was an assistant, as I understand it, a civilian assistant
to Secretary of War Stimson.
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Was he a separate and distinctly different person
from the Colonel Bundy in the War Plans Division i
General Gerow. Yes, sir. Mr. Bundy in the Secretary's office was a
civilian. Colonel Bundy was an officer of the Re^rular Army. His
first name was Charles. I don't recall his middle initial.
Mr. Murphy. If there had been liaison with the Navy in accordance
with the war plan already drafted and ready for execution at Hawaii,
in your judgment would we have had the same result on December
7 which we actually had?
General Gerow. No, sir. I think if the means on hand had been
properly alerted and properly used that the damage that the Japs
did at Pearl Harbor would have been considerably less.
Mr. INIuRPHY. Admiral Kimmel had a message commencing with
the words, "This is a war warning." General Short had [4^36]
a message putting him on warning that hostilities might commence at
any moment. If there had been a conference between Admiral Kim-
mel and General Short and a discussion of the plans necessary to meet
that situation and a putting into effect the kind of plan they already
had, you say there would have been a different resuk on December 7 i
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I believe the damage would not have been
so great.
Mr. Murphy. That is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart is now recognized.
Mr. Gearhart, General Gerow, you have been present in the hearing
room during the examination of General Marshall, have you not i
General Gerow. Only one afternoon, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Were you here when I, on two different occasions,
referred to the seven intercepted Japanese messages, messages which
either asked for information or supplied information with reference
to ship movements in the Hawaian area?
General Gerow. I don't believe, sir, I was present when you asked
tliose questions. May I see the messages, sir?
Mr. Gesell. You are/ referring to the ones in exhibit 2, are you?
The Chairman. May the Chair ask the photographers not to inter-
fere with the examination of the witness.
[4^o7] Mr. Gearhart. I am referring to the intercepted mes
sages which appear on pages 12, 13, 14, and 15, seven messages in all.
General Gerow. Yes, sir. I have those; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, those messages, each one of them, refer
specifically, do thej" not, to the Hawaiian area?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. They are from Tokyo to Honolulu and Honolulu
to Tokyo. Now, the first of these messages divides the Hawaiian area,
the island with the name of Oahu, they divide this island into seven
areas for purposes of subsequent exchanges of intelligence between
Honolulu and Tokyo, do they not ?
' Col. Charles W. Bundy.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMAtEE 1601
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Then the other messages either called for reports
of ship movements in that area, or render reports on ship movements
in that area, do they not?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
INIr. Gearhart. And there is one of the messages which reveals a
little impatience on the part of Tokyo in respect to the information
they were getting, asking for reports not only when ship movements
occur but when they do not occur, is that not correct?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
[4^SS] Mr. Gearhart. Now, in your opinion, after reviewing
those seven messages will you not say that they reveal an inordinate
interest in our Navy's operations in the Hawaiian area on the part
of the Japanese?
General Gerow. They certainly indicate interest in those movements,
yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, none of those messages were called to the
attention of General Short or Admiral Kimmel so far as you know?
General Gerow. No, sir ; not so far as I know.
Mr. GEAiRHART. AVliy were they not called to their attention? -
General Gerow. I believe, sir, that G-2 can testify to that better
than I can, sir. They are not messages on v^^hich the War Plans Di-
vision would normally be called upon to direct special operations.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, the War Plans Division of which you were
the head makes plans for warfare and for defense, doesn't it?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Then aren't j^ou charged Avith an interest in plans
I have described that are being made
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart (continuing). By a nation that might be [4239]
an enemy of ours?
General Gerow. I had a very decided interest in it, yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, do not these seven messages react on yoiir
mind as possible evidence of war plans that were being perfected by
Japan ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; they do so react but at the moment, sir,
these messages were brought to me in a locked despatch case. I cannot
recall now whether they all came together or not. I cannot recall
whether I saw all of them or not. They were taken out of the despatch
case and read by me and handed back to the officer. I did not attempt
to evaluate the magic messages that came to me, sir. If there were any
that struck me at the moment that they were especially important I
would usually contact G-2 and discuss those particular messages
with him.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, if it is not your precise' duty to read the in-
tercepts that ai-e brought to you and very material, to read, to under-
stand, to evaluate and to recommend action, what was your function
in reading them ? Why were they submitted to you ?
General Gerow. They were submitted to me, sir, as a matter of
information, to keep me informed as to the general situation. As I
stated before, if there had been a message [4^40] in the in-
tercepts that conveyed to me the idea that Japan was probably going
to attack any place in the globe I would consider that it required
action on our part, sir, and to draft a warning message and take it
79716 — 46 — i)t. 4 3
1602 CONGRESSIOI#AL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
up to tlie Chief of Stuff. I did not so interpret those messages at
that time, sir, as I now recall.
Mr. Gearhart. You knew that relations with Japan were very
rapidly deteriorating, did you not?
General Gerow. 1 did, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. You were being advised of that by other Army and
Navy high responsible officers, weren't you, from time to time?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And even though you knew our relations with Japan
were rapidly deteriorating, knowing also that, I believe, the American
Navy was, ship for ship, very much inferior to the Japanese Navy in
the Pacific, the fact that Japan was asking for definite information
concerning our Navy over and over again and dividing the Island of
Oahu into areas diet not impress you as important information?
General Gerow. I do not recall, sir, having seen these particular
messages. I presume that I did, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. It was your duty not only to see them but to read
them, to understand them, to evaluate them and [4^-4-?] rec-
ommend action upon them, wasn't it?
General Gerow. No, sir; it was not my duty to evaluate all the
magic tliat came to my office, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. It ceased to be jowr duty to evaluate them in
August of 1941, did it not?
General Gerow\ I did not understand the question, sir.
Ml'. Geakhart. It was your duty to evaluate them, prepare action
upon them with recommendations to the Chief of Staff prior to August
of 1941, was it?
General Gekow. No, sir.
]\Ir. Gearhart. Didn't you receive a directive from General Marshall
in August of 1941 to thereafter not merely evahiate and send your
recommendations in but to send the original material itself to his
desk, is that not correct?
General GEROw^ No, sir; I had no such directive.
Mr. Gearhart. That was not issued to you?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Mr. Geauhart. Did General Miles ever tell you that he had such
a messajje or dii-ective from General Marsliall affectine: his
department?
General Gerow. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Mr. Gearhakt. Well, did you not as a matter of practice evaluate
interce])ts (hat came to you and to send those intercepts to General
Marshall?
[If2.!t,2\ General Gei:ow. No, sir; I had nothing to do with the
distribution of inteivepts. sir. He received the same intercepts I did,
sir.
Mr. Geariiakt. Well, when you read an intercept that struck you
as important and calling for action, didn't you take that intercept be-
fore you returned it to the courier and discuss it with General
Marshall?
General Gerow. No, sir. If I thought that an intei'cept required
action I would prepare a draft of a message, sir, for General Marshall's
signature and take it up and suggest that he send it. I did not take
the intercepts up to him. sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1603
Mr. Gearhart. You did not take it because you knew General
Marshall had the same intercepts which you read as he was on the
list of persons to wlioni the intercei)ts were to be delivered, is that
correct ?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhakt. Now, I will ask you as a military expert, asking
you for the moment to put yourself in the position of Admiral Kimmel
;md General Short, I will ask you if you think that the tragic hap-
pening of December 7, 1941, Avould have occurred just as it did if
Admiral Kimmel and General Short had been warned of those seven
messages to which I have just called your attention?
[4^4^] General Gerow, Sir, I do not believe I can put myself in
the position of the connnanders in Hawaii. There was so much back-
ground, so many things happening. The mental attitude of those
commanders, I cannot translate now, sir, in an expression of opinion.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, if you were the commander of either the Army
or the Navy over there and you received seven definite intercepts called
to your attention that the Japanese have divided the area into seven
areas and were calling impatiently for reports upon the ship disposi-
tions there, do you think that in the face of the message of November
27, in the face of other circular ( ircular messages that were being sent
around the world, one of which was delivered in Haw^aii, do you think
that eight of our battleships should be lined up like sitting ducks in-
side of that harbor, with voids open, with ammunition boxed, in a
condition in which they could fight very, very inefficiently if they were
called upon to fight at all, do you think that would be the situation in
the face of those messages being before the eyes and upon the desks
and in the minds of those commanders ?
General Gerow. Again, sir, I do not believe that I can state what I
would have done under those circumstances without having been in
command over there, sir, at the time.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, in justice to them don't you [4344]
think now as you look back that they should have had that informa-
tion then?
General Gerow. I think when the War Department took the re-
sponsibility of sending the message of November 27 and stated that
hostile action was possible at any moment, that these messages would
not have added anything to the strength of the directive that was
contained in the November 27 message.
Mr. Gearhart. Did any of those messages, those circular letters
that were sent around, contain any information as to where hostile
action was expected ^
General Gerow. I did not understand the "circular letter," sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, these messages are circular, aren't they, in
nature ? They are sent to Hawaii, they are sent to Panama, they are
sent to San Francisco, they are sent to San Diego, they are sent to all
of the commandants in all of the naval districts. Now, did any of
them say w^here the war was expected to break out ?
General Gerow. No, sir. The one of November 27, as I recall, dis-
tinctly stated that Japanese action was unpredictable but hostile
action
Mr. Gearhart. There were other messages circulated around that
an attack was expected in the Philippines, in the [4^4-5] Kra
1604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Peninsula, in Indochina and possibly at Gnam and Borneo, menacing
Singapore. That was what was contained in the messages that were
being circulated by the Chief of Staff, is that not correct?
General Gerow. I should like to look over those messages, sir, to
see specifically what they stated.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ?
Mr. Gearhart. Do you know of the memorandum that General
Marshall and Admiral Stark sent to the President on the 27th ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. They discussed that very subject?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Named those very places that I have picked out?
General Gerow. Some of them, yes, sir, I recall.
Mr. Gearhart. And in that message there is not even the slightest
suggestion or intimation that any trouble is expected in the Hawaiian
area.
General Gerow. No, sir. I think the reason for that was that that
memorandum was directed specifically to the Far Eastern area, to a
special area, not to the whole area of the Pacific.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, as a matter of fact all you big [4M6\
ranking Army and Navy officers considered Hawaii as an impregnable
fortress, did you not?
General Gerow. No, sir. No- fortress is impregnable, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, you have seen the characterization of Pearl
Harbor that was made by General Herron, didn't you, in his some-
thing from memory ? It is a French word.
Mr. Murphy. Aid de memoir.
Mr. Gearhart. I have got to apply to my learned friend Murphy
for my French.
You have the document in hand, don't you ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Read the first paragraph.
General Gerow [reading] :
The Island of Oahu, due to its fortifi'^atious, its garrison and its physical
characteristics is believed to be tiie strongest fortress in the world.
Mr. Gearhart. And j^ou know that General Herron when he was
commander of the Hawaiian area issued a similar statement to the
press that was given wide circulation everywhere, don't you?
General Gerow. I do not recall that message.
Mr. Gearhart. Have you got the volume of that book on Hawaii ?
The Chairman. Which book is it ?
[4^4'n Mr. Gearhart. The young lady sitting there has it.
Senator Fp:rguson. Which is it?
Mr. Gearhakt. It is a novel.
The Chairman. A novel ?
Mr, Gearhart. Well, I don't know. It was a book about Hawaii
and it had a large circulation. However, I will pass it.
I will ask you do you know of any message of any kind that was
ever sent to General Short or Admiral Kimmel in which they were
told that Hawaii itself would probably be attacked?
General Gerow. I do not recall such a message.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, how do you acc( unt for the fact that there
is a warnino; in that warnin<r notice of November 27 which was not
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1605
contained in the one sent to the Philippine Islands, an affirmative
direction not to do anything which would alarm the people or reveal
intent? Why was that specially put in the Hawaiian and the San
Francisco versions and left out of the one sent to Manila ?
General Gerow. Well, the conditions in Hawaii and in the Philip-
pines were quite different at that time. In Hawaii we had a big
Japanese population. We felt that the installations there were very
close to the population; that if the civilian population happened to
be alarmed there would prob- [WS] ably be headlines in the
press. Those headlines would be quickly transmitted to Japan and
would probably precipitate the very thing we were trying to avoid.
Mr. Gearhart. And everything you have said, every reason that
you have given is equally true of the Philippines, isn't it ?
General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not believe so, sir. The Philippines
did not have the large Japanese population. The Philippines at that
time had been more or less, I will not say alerted but we were or-
ganizing and training a Philippine army at that time and there was
a great deal of military activity going on in the Philippines that was
not going on in Hawaii, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, as a matter of fact you do not want to stand
on the assertion that there wasn't a large Japanese population in the
Philippine Islands prior to December 7, 1941 ? As a matter of fact,
the island was full of Japanese and most of them were Japanese
agents, were they not?
General Gerow. I do not know that.
Mr. Gearhart. They had probably more observers in percentage
to the population of the Philippines than they had in all the rest of
the world put together, is that not correct?
General Gerow. I do not know, sir.
[4249] Mr. Gearhart. And if they only had one Japanese spy
there an alert in the Philippines would cause the same alarm to be
reported to Japanese headquarters in Tokyo as if there were 50,000
there, wouldn't it ?
General Gerow\ I do not know, sir, how the Japanese would have
reacted to it.
I should like to invite the attention, sir, in that message to which
you have just referred, however, that it contains this statement : "That
this policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of
action that might jeopardize your defense."
Mr. Gearhart. That is correct, but after a message which from
beginning to end warns specifically against doing certain things that
was put in the message for the purpose of conveying the idea to the
commanders in Hawaii, wasn't it?
General Gerow\ Which sentence now are you referring to, sir ?
Mr. Gearhart. Directing them to avoid the doing of anything
which miglit create alarm among the people or reveal intent.
General Gerow. Sir, I do not understand your question.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, when you put a specific direction in a
letter not to do certain things and then say you can do something else
if you have to, you are going to expect [^^,5(9] the recipient
of that notice to try to avoid doing the things which you say you do
not want done, is that not correct?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
1606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Geakiiart. Now, you would ex])ect the commanders in Hawaii
to avoid the doing:; of anythinji; which would alarm the people or
reveal an intent to them, wouldn t you '?
General Gerow. Yes, sir, so long as it did not jeopardize his
defense.
Mr. Gearhart. I have the book which I designated a novel to the
inquiry of the chairman.
The Chairman. Did it end all right ?
Mr. Gearhart. The volume is entitled, "Hawaii — Restless Ram-
part," and the book was written by Joseph Barber. Jr. I will read
you from page 213.
Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield ?
Mr. Gearhart. What did you say ?
The Chairman. Will you yi^ld to the Senator from Illinois?
Senator Lucas. Who did you say wrote this book?
Mr. Gearhart. Joseph Barber, Jr. I don't know anything about
him, about who he is. It is a book which has had quite a large sale,
it is a popular edition, but what I am going to read there is in quota-
tion marks so that it will not [4251] rest on the responsibility
of Mr. Barber but, rather, on the responsibility of General Herron.
This is the author's introduction. (Reading:)
Prior to the maneuvers, however, Major General (now Lieutenant General)
Charles D. Herron, commanding the Hawaiian Department, issued this statement,
intended to reassure nervous residents : "Oahu will never be exposed to a blitz-
krieg attack. This is why : We are more than 2,000 miles away fi-om land which-
ever way you look, which is a long way for an enemy force to steam, and besides
it would have to smash through our navy.
"But we plan for the worst possible situation, which means we assume that the
navy might be too busy elsewhere to help us.
"So we have developed a potent air defense. Our reconnaissance bombers are
going farther and farther to sea. Our air bases here could be reinforced overnight
from California bases. The potency of this striking power which would engage
an enemy long before he sighted Oahu means that to land on Oahu the enemy must
first win mastery of the air aliove it.
"Assuming that happened, enemy transports tlien would have to anchor off-
shore, making' them fine targets for our coastal artillery. High speed, mobile
forces can [^252] be rushed within an hour to any point on Oahu. They
pack devastating power.
"As international tensions increase in the Pacific, the war of nerves comes
closer to Hawaii. So we double our vigilance, our intensive training. We don't
let up until the future is perfectly safe."
The 1040 war problem assumed that Hawaii was tlireatened with a sudden
thrust by an invading enemy. The enemy fleet had a well-balanced force, with
adequate aviation and highly trained personnel. In addition, its merchant ma-
rine was capable of transporting an extremely large army for initial overseas
operations.
The "war situation" at this point was outlined by headquarters as follows:
"It is assumed that an outside enemy has succeeded, by stealth, in landing from
boats and dropping by parachutes numerous well-armed nationals at night on the
island of Oahu."
Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?
Mr. Gearhart. I would rather wait and yield at the c(mclusion
of this quotation.
Mr. Clark. I was wondering when it was going to conclude. That
is what is troubling me.
Mr. Gearhart, Don't you find it interesting? Every- [4^63]
body else does.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1607
Mr. Gkariiart. You are not very helpful, Mr. ('hirk.
The Chairman. That is not a matter ujjou which the conunittee
has to pass.
Mr. Gearhart. I will proceed [reading] :
"The enemies have mixed with the population as stran.aiers, but are be-
lieved to be secretly assembling at various points on tbe island with the in-
tentions, it is feared, of disrupting both civil and military life by destroying
or contaminating water supplies, food, communications, electric power, and
other necessities, and democratic institutions with the object of liqaidating the
present population to eventually make room for their own people.
"These activities are believed to be in preparation for reducing our strength
and our military resistance against a hostile landing force assumed to be
■approaching the island.
"All civil police, national guard, other civil organizations, and the entire civil
population, in accordance with a proclamation that it is assumed was issued
by the governor, are closely working with the military to apprehend the in-
vaders and to protect our ifamlies, homes, and institutions from destruction."
[4^54'] The Chairman. Would the Congressman let the Chair-
man, ask him: What does this book show as to where this statement
was made, whether it was a newspaper interview or an official state-
ment? What does it say about that?
Mr. Gearhart. That was the document, as I understand, that was
issued by General Herron, just prior to the alert of 1940.
The Chairman. I suppose the General can testify about it, if he
did it.
Mr. Gearhart. That clearly evidences, does it not, that the high-
est ranking army officers in the Hawaiijan Islands had the same
opinion in 1940 that General Marshall had, that he reflected in his
paper? You had just read the first paragraph of it. Is that not
correct ?
General Gerow. I think everyone of us in the War Department felt
that Oahu was our best prepared outpost.
Mr. Gearhart. Aiid they both, in these two great statements,
issued to the people, stated that they considered it in eflfect an
impregnable fortress ?
General Gerow. The two statments, sir?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes, in each of them.
General Gerow. I did not understand that this Aide Memoire
Mr. Gearhart. I will read the first paragraph again.
[4-^55] General Gerow. I did not understand, sir, that that
was a public statement to the people, sir. I think that is a paper
that I understood he took to the White House with him, or some-
where else, on which he would talk.
Mr. Gearhart. Then it is still more important, isn't it? It is a
paper circulated for the eyes of military experts only?
General Gerow. I am not so sure, sir, that this paper was ever
circulated. I do not know what General Marshall's testimony was,
as. to why it was prepared.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, you admit, do you not, that it represents
General Marshall's viewpoint at that time? He would not put his
signature to something he did not believe, for the purpose of deceiv-
ing anyone, would he?
General Gerow. No, sir ; but he did not sign this paper.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, he admitted that he wrote it.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? That is not so.
1608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. Would that make any difference, that he did not
sign it ?
Mr, Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Will the gentleman yield to his colleague?
Mr. Gearhart. I yield.
INIr. Murphy. General Marshall said he was called to [4^S6]
the White House, he was going over there immediately, and someone
in the Department prepared that memorandum. He did not prepare
it, and did not sign it.
Mr. Gearhart. He read it and presented it, with all of the influence
and high position behind it of the Chief of Staff of the Armies of
the United States. If he did not believe it. he would not have pre-
sented it, would he, in your opinion ?
General Gerow. General Marshall will have to testify to that, sir.
I do not know whether he used this paper or not.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, the testimony will speak for itself.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Will the Congressman yield to Senator Fergulon ?
Senator Ferguson. Will the Congressman yield?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Senator FV.rguson. We would like to find out from counsel where
this paper was obtained.
Mr. Gesell. The paper was obtained, as we stated when we intro-
duced it, from the files of President Roosevelt.
Mr. Gearhart. So it was left with President RoosevoH. the Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the ITnited f j~-5?']
States, by the Chief of Staff of the Army of the United States. That
is correct, isn't it?
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, hoAv could this g-^- tlemnn knoAv
anything of that kind ? I do not understand that.
The Chairman. If the witness does not know it, he may sav so.
General Gerow. I am a bit confused.
Mr. Gearhart. I have more interrn])tions than anybody else has
had on my line of questions up to now.
The Chairman. If the Congressman does not want to yield, he cer-
tainly does not have to.
Mr. Gearhart. I would like to proceed a little more orderly and
with greater continuity of thought, if I am not constantly interrupted.
I am developing a condition of mind that was existing in the high
ranking military of the United States as an explanation plainly of
why no specific warnings were sent to Hawaii.
You admit that no specific warnings were sent to Hawaii during
this long period, during which our relations with Japan were de-
teriorating, don't you ?
General Gerow. No specific warnings were sent to Hawaii, spe-
cifically designating'- that Hawaii was the place that the Japanese
Avere going to attack; no, sir.
Mr. Gearhvrt. Whenever a specific place was discussed, \4^^-58]
it was alwavs an attack on the Kra Peninsula, the Pliilippines, Siam,
possibly Guam, and possibly Borneo: is that correct, •that permeated
all of the military literature to the commanders of the United States?
General Gerow. I believe it was a belief at that time, sir. that the
Japanese would make their main effort in that area, and I believe the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1609
belief was boi-iie out by subsequent events tliat tlie.v did, that their
attack on Hawaii was in the nature of a diversionary attack, and put
on our flank to lay us back on our heels so tliey could <>i:o ahead with
their main effort.
Mr. Gkarhart. I will ask you, General Gerow. if vou had thou<;ht
durine: those days prior to December 7, 1941. that there was a pos-
sibility of attackinof Hawaii, and if that were the p;e!\eral opinion
of the hio:h rankino; military and naval people with whom you were
in daily association, would you not have interpreted those seven
messages, those seven intercepted Japanese messag'es, were important,
would you not have attached to tliem greater significance than you did?
General Gerow. I think we all realized, sir, that there was a pos-
sibility of an attack on Hawaii.
Mr. Gearhart. Then why did not you send co])ies of those inter-
cepts to the two commanders that were charged with the | ,f ?a'?]
defense of those islands?
General Gerow. Sir, I cannot answer that question. As I say, these
messages came to me maybe one at a time, or maybe in a group of 15
or 20, and I had no opportunity to sit down and analyze them. They
came in along with other messages from Panama and the Philippines,
and many of the messages from Panama were quite significant. They
indicated an intense interest in where our air forces were, where the
fields were, which would be the very thing that an enemy would want
to do, information that he w^ould want in case he intended to attack
Panama, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Did yon send any special warning messages to
Panama when you saw the Japs were making definite inquiries with
reference to the defenses there ?
General Gerow. I do not know whether G-2 sent any informational
messages to Panama with regard to those particular intercepts or not,
sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Will you not say, as the head of War Plans that the
commanders of Panama were entitled to that information in the event
that any such information had reached Washington authorities?
General Gerow. Sir, that is a question of opinion, as to how much
information you give commanders in the field.
[4-2601 Mr. Gearhart. Isn't it the rule that when high author-
ity in Washington obtains information that is important to any
particular commander in the field, that Washington should transmit
that information, or if reasons of security did not permit it, that they
shall issue directives in the light of that information ?
General Gerow. If the intercept is one that the War Department
feels is important that the commander have, I think it should send it
to him. The War Department, in the case of the November 27 mes-
sage, interpreted all of the facts it had before it, and decided that the
Japanese were going to take some action, hostile action, and assumed
responsibility for telling the commander that there was a great pos-
sibility of an attack.
[4^61] Mr. Gearhart. Again directing your attention to the
somewhat protracted or extended statement of General Herron that
I just read, that statement manifestly was issued to allay any fear
that might be aroused because of the alert of 1940 by the activities of
the Army and Navy, was it not?
1610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Gerow. Sir, I do not know whether the statement was
made prior to or after that alert. I was not present in Washington
at the time the alert was put on, sir.
Mr. Ge^\riiart. Now it would be necessary, if you were going to
take steps not to alarm the people, to issue a warning well in advance
of the event, is that not correct ?
General Gerow. No, sir, that would not be necessary.
Mr. Gearhart. Do you think that it would have been possible to
have alerted Hawaii, both its Naval activities and its Army activities,
to a No. 3 Army alert and No. 1 Naval Operations alert, overnight
without alarming the people ?
General Gerow. A lot would depend on how the commander did it.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, the order that he was to alert his island was
put up instantly upon the receipt of the November 27 notice, wasn't
it? If he was to do anything at all under that order it was to do it
right then?
General Gerow. That is correct, sii-.
Mr. Gearhart. And because you could not do it right now
.[^^fW] without alarming the people and revealing the intent
General Short reached the right decision which he reported on the
28th day of November, did he not ?
General Gerow. That is your conclusion, sir.
Mr. Mtjrpht. Will the gentleman yield ?
Mr. Gearhart. I am not drawing any conclusion at all, I am asking
you questions. I want your conclusions; mine are unimportant.
General Gerow. May I have the question, sir?
Mr. MuRPHT. Will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. The member asked not to be interrupted and
the Chair feels like protecting him in that request. Go ahead.
General Gerow. May I have the question again?
Mr. Gearhart. Will you read the question, Mr. Reporter?
(The question was read by the reporter.)
General Gerow. No, sir; I do not think he reached the right con-
clusion.
Mr. Gearhart. In order to reach the conclusion that you have just
reached you have to delete then from the November 27 message the
positive directive not to alarm the pople and not to reveal the intent?
General Gerow. I believe thnt is correct, sir. He was told he was
authorized to take any course of action he might [4^6S] neces-
sarilv have to take to prevent jeopardizing his defense.
Mr. Gearhart. The record speaks for itself. Now yesterday the
gentleman from Pennsylvania opened the report of General Hap
Arnold and read to us that the Air Forces in the Philippines had
been alerted prior to December 7, 1941. Were you here when he read
that from his report?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Has the gentleman from Pennsylvania that report?
Mr. Murphy. Do you have that report from General Arnold?
Senator Litcas. I do not know where it is.
Mr. Gearhart. Assuming that General Arnold's report does con-
tain that information, can a^ou give us any information about the
alerting of the Air Force in the Philippines?
General Gerow. At what period of time?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1611
Mr. Gearhart. Just prior to December 7, 1941.
General Gerow. May I refer to the message from General Mac-
Arthur, sir ?
Mr. Gearhart, Yes.
General Gerow. This is a message from General MacArthur to
General Marshall, dated November 28 :
Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnais-
sance has beeu extended and intensified in conjunction witli tlie navy stop
ground security measures [Ji2GJf] have been talien stop within the limita-
tions imposed by present state of development of this this theatre of operations
everything is in i-eadiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop intimate
liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between army and navy.
( Signed ) MacArthur.
Mr. Gearhart. Does that report indicate to your mind an all-out
air alert ?
General Gerow. He states, "Reconnaissance has been extended and
intensified." I do not know just what he was doing prior to the
extending of it.
Mr. Gearhart. Were you in the conference that they had with
General Arnold just about the time the November 27 warning mes-
sages were sent out, a conference in which General Arnold said that
he had information that there was sabotage going on at certain air
stations and he wanted a special warning sent to all of his outlying
commands ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I was present at one conference on a
sabotage message of that kind, I think on the 28th of November, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. General Arnold wanted to send a special message
over his own signature to his commands, did he not ?
General Gerow. I do not recall that conference, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Was not that one of the main things [4^65]
discussed ?
General Gerow. I do not remember, sir, whether that was discussed
at that particular conference or not. I remember General Arnold's
insistence, or at least the insistence of his G-2, General Scanlon, that
warning messages go to all the air stations.
Mr. Gearhart. And wasn't it finally decided in that conference
that General Arnold should not send it out over his signature, but
that it would go out over General Marshall's signature, with a
special reference in the notice to the air services ?
General Gerow. I do not recall such a decision, sir.
]Mr. Gearhart. Well, you have no special information to convey
to the committee now as to why the Air Command in the Philippines
went on an all-out alert in the Philippine Islands ?
General Gerow. The only information I have, sir, as to why they
went on the alert is because they received this message from General
Marshall directing the alert which was sent out on the 27th of
November.
Mr. Gearhart. Have you any information as to what the Air
Command did in Hawaii, after receipt in Hawaii of the warning
message of November 27, 1941?
General Gerow. No, sir; I have no such information. [4^66]
Mr. Gearhart. And if the Air Command in Hawaii went on an
all-out alert on December 1 and remained on it until December 6, you
know of no special reason from Washington for their having done it,
1612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
other than the information that was contained in the warning mes-
sage of November 27 ?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. I believe that is all.
The Chairman. Twelve o'clock having arrived, the committee will
recess to 2 o'clock p. m.
(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2
o'clock p. m. of the same day.)
[4^67] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 : 00 P. M.
TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW (Resumed)
The Chairman, The committee will come to order.
I believe that Congressman Gearhart had concluded his examina-
tion of General Gerow and Senator Ferguson will now be recognized.
Senator Ferguson. General Gerow, you were in what is known as
the War Plans Section. Now, at the time was that the operational
section ?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I am talking about prior to the 7th of December.
General Gerow. No, sir. The G-3 section was normally known as
the operational section, but the section that I was in was known as the
War Plans Division, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now. we had an exhibit here that gave your
duties.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Could I have a copy of that ? Does counsel have
it? Do you have your copy?
Mr. Mitcheij.. It is the War Department order of the General
Staff setup.
General Gerow. I think I have it.
Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 42.
General Gerow. I think I have a copy of the Army regu- \ 4^681
lations here that cover that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I have it; it is Exhibit 42.
Your duties are in paragraph 12 ?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir. ^
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you give me the specific section in
that, during peacetime, that would have you function in writing
messages ?
General Gerow. I think the first paragraph, sir, paragraph "a"
would cover that. I shall read it.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read it?
General Gerow (reading) :
The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of tlie War
Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for use in
the theater of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the
naval forces, in the national defense.
Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't that only the formulation of tlie
plans, the actual drafting of the plans, the war plans?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1613
General Gekow. It includes that, sir, but it also states :
is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department Gi'neral Staff
which relate to the formulation of plans.
The Avritin^ of an oi)erational order, the ()})erational orders such
as was written on November the 2Tth I think, sir, [4:?0f)\ would
be included in that wording;.
Senator Ferguson. Prior to that had you ever taken any part in
the Avriting of messages'^
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The writing of alerts?
General Gerow. Some of the warning messages that were sent, sir,
I participated in their preparation.
Senator Ferguson. Did you participate m the one on the 24th, the
joint one?
General Gerow. May I refer to that, sir? Either myself, sir, or
some of my officers in War Plans Division I believe did participate in
this apparently joint message. We worked with the Navy in the
preparation of that message.
Senator Ferguson. You knew General Bryden?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. He was Deputy Chief of Staff?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Under this he was to act, was he not, when the
Chief of Staff was absent ?
General Gerow. I believe it so states.
Senator Ferguson (reading).
The Deputy Chief of Staff,
on page 2 —
will assist the Chief of Staff and will act for him in the War Department in his
absence.
Would you say that you had been specifically designated [42701
to act for the Chief of Staff during his absence in the sending of the
message of the 27th ?
General Gerow. No, sir; I had not been specifically designated but
as the staff officer concerned with the preparation of plans and the
issuance of operational orders in connection therewith I believe,
sir, I would have assumed that responsibility if necessary in General
Marshall's absence.
Senator Ferguson. Did General Bryden, who was the duly author-
ized officer to act in the absence of the General, did he act in relation
to that message?
General Gerow. I believe he did, sir. If I recall correctly, the mes-
sage was taken in to him and he O. iK.'d it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, can you show us on the original message
thai we have here, his O. K. ?
General Gerow. I will try to find it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you try to find that?
General Gerow. I have, sir, here is a photostatic copy of the message
of November the 27th. It shows on the bottom, sir, "Noted : Deputy
Chief of Staff," with the initial "B".
Senator Ferguson. That was for Bryden?
General Gerow. I think it must have been for Bryden ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did he go into this with you and help
draft it, or did he just approve it after it A\as drafted?
1614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[4^71] General Gerow. As I recall, sir, he went in with me to
the office of the Secretary of War on my first visit in the Secretary
of War's office on the morning of the 27th. I clo not believe that he
was in there at the second conference and I do not believe, sir, that
he actually participated in the drafting of the message.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever attend the Army Staff College?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson, How long a time did you spend in the college?
General Gerow. I spent the usual 9 months as a student, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was there any course or any information as to
how to draft plans taken up b}^ you — or I mean messages ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir ; but that was normally taught at the Com-
manding General Staff School at Leavenworth. I thought you had
reference, sir, to the War College.
Senator Ferguson. Where was that taught ^
General Gerow. That was taught at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., sir,
and also at the infantry school.
Senator Ferguson. And did you take that course?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
[4^7'd] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, tell me the elements, the
things to be clone in the writing of a message as far as the War De-
partment or Army was concerned ?
General Gerow. We had a system of writing what we called the
tive paragraph operational order. The first paragraph contained
information of the enemy and information regarding your own forces.
The second paragraph contained a general mission.
Senator Ferguson. Wait until I get this first one. First was what
information ? The first was all the information that you had about
the enemy ?
General Gerow. It contained enemy information and information
about our own troops.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Gerow. Paragraph 2 contained a general statement of the
mission, to attack or defend.
Senator Ferguson. The mission, yes.
General Gerow. The third paragraph was broken down into a
number of subparagraphs and gave specific missions and the major
units involved.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Gerow. Paragraph 4 — I have been awa,y from that school
so long I cannot remember definitely paragraph 4. Paragraph 5 I
think prescribed the command post and I believe [4^73] per-
tained to communications. I liave forgotten now definitely what
paragraph 4 included, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You wouldn't say that tiie first paragraph was
your mission ?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That the proper way to draft an order was to
put the mission in the first paragra])h ?
General Gerow. No, sir. Your first paragraph would contain
enemy information and the information regarding your own troops.
Senator Ferguson. And that the second one was to give full in-
formation as to the enemy, its strength, its capacity and its intentions ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1615
General Gerow. I am afraid I did not make myself clear, Senator,
In the first paragraph it contains the enemy information and in-
formation of our own troops. That is oi-dinarily broken down into
two paragraphs, paragraph A and paragraph B.
Paragraph A contains the information concerning the enemy. Para-
graph B contains the information concerning our own troops that
are pertinent to that particular order.
Senator Ferguson. Well, should that information, whether it is
one or two, should tlie information be full as to the enemy, that is, as
to its strength, its intention, and its [4^74] capacity ?
General Gerow. No, sir; that is normally included in an entirely
separate document which is known as an estimate of the situation,
Mdiich is prepared sometimes by G-2, and sometimes by G-3.
There are two types of estimates: One is a G-2, which arrives at
some conclusions as to what the enemy is going to do. There is a sec-
ond type of estimate of the situation which covers not only what
the enemy's capabilities are and his probable intentions but also in-
cludes your own capabilities and the plans that are open to you and
from that you decide what the enemy, you think the enemy is going to
do and decide what you shall do to counter that action.
Senator Ferguson. Now, have you got with you any booklet or
paper or information that would tell us what should be in an order
and how it should be written, or could you get that for us?
General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I will be glad to get that for you, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When I take up the message of the 27th I will
refer further to that and you may have it by that time.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have any aide here w^ith you that could
go and get it for you ?
General Gerow. I think so, sir.
[4^275] Senator Ferguson. Normally in peacetime is the War
Plans concerned with the diplomatic messages of the United States?
General Gerow. We are interested in them, yes, sir. Anything that
might possibly affect military operations we are interested in, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And how do they come to you ? How does that
information come to your Department?
General Geroav. It comes through various sources, sir. As far as
the War Plans Division is concerned, I would get information from the
Chief of Staff, very occasionally from the Secretary of War, and also
from the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, and from some of my officers
who had contacted their opposite members in the State Department,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. Who was your opposite in the State Department
that you would get your inf oi-mation from ?
General Gerow. That depended on the type of information you were
after, sir. If it happened to be the far eastern situation you would go
to the Far Eastern Division. If it was Latin American, you would go
to the Latin American section, and if it was European, you w^ould go
to the European section.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first get the messages that were
delivered by the President on the I7th of August, 1941 ?
[4276] General Gerow. I do not recall, sir, that I ever had copies
of those messages, sir.
1616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. I will describe tlieni as they were described in
1943 by l*eace and War, on page 129. It may refresh your memory :
During the August 1941 conference between President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill of Great Britain the situation in the Far East was discussed,
and it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel
action in warning Japan against lu'w moves of aj;gression. It was agreed also
that the United States should continue its con\ersations with the Japanese
Government and by such means offer Japan a reasonable and just alternative
to the course upon which that country was embarked.
Does that i"ef resh yonr memory ?
General Gerow. I do not remember, sir, seeing that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I will read the part of the message
that gave that, or that gave, as far as America was concerned, its
parallel action.
On the bottom of page 556, volume II, Foreign Relations, this was
handed to the Jap Ambassador, among others :
Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the
Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes anjH further
steps in pursuance of a policy [^277] or program of military domination
by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the
United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it
may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests
of the United States and American Nationals and toward insuring the safety
and security of the United States.
Now does that refresh your memory as to whether or not you ever
saw that or heard of it?
General Gerow. I do not recall having seen it, sir. I believe if the
Chief of Staff had known about it he would have informed me, sir,
that such a declaration had been made.
Senator Ferguson. Now was that of concern to the War Plans
Department ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir ; it would have been of concern to the War
Plans Division.
Senator Ferguson. In fact it was vital information to the War
Plans Department, was it not ?
(xeneral (terow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now Iioav do you account for never having
heard of that ?
General (xerow. Sir, I cannot testify at this late date that I never
heard of it, sir. I do not believe that I ever actually saw the docu-
ment. I believe if the Chief of Staff knew about it, sir, that he did
inform me of such a declaration.
[4278~] Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know of that before
you heard of it here in this caucus room?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When did you hear about it?
General Gerow. Since I have been back here, sir, in A^'ashington,
to appear before this committee, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. So since you have been back and after
the Tth of December, you heard about it ?
General Gerow. I cannot recall, sir, whether I heard it before oi-
not, sir. I definitely remember since I have been here this time to
appear before the committee, of reading that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. AVas that kind of information of value to you.
and if so, did you act upon it?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1617
General Gerow. It was of value, yes, sir. My instructions to act
upon it would probably have come, sir, from the Chief of Staff.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have any information or orders
upon which you did act upon that information, and if so what action
did you take ?
General Gerow. Sir, I cannot recall at this time, my conversations
with the Chief of Staff, if I had such conversations on that subject,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember receiving word at [4270]
all that came from Ambassador Winant on the morning of the 6th,
about the movement of troops, that went into the State Depart-
ment at 10:40 on the 6th of December 1941?
General Gerow. May I see that message, sir, to refresh my memory ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
(The document was handed to General Gerow.)
General Gerow. I do not believe, sir, that I ever saw that message.
Senator Ferguson. Now, if you had known what I read to you
here, what I read from these two books, and you would have seen
that message, what would that message have meant to you ?
General Gerow. It would have only meant to me, sir, reading this
message now that certain troop movements were being made by the
Japanese, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would it have meant anything more than that?
General Gerow. Not that I know of now, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Where is that troop movement to, according to
that message ?
General Gerow. That states "sailing slowly westward toward Kra."
Senator Ferguson. How many hours distant ?
[^.^SOI General Gerow. Fourteen hours distant in time.
Senator Ferguson. Where would they have struck?
General Gerow. The Kra Peninsula, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That 14 hours distant, they would have struck
in 14 hours, would they not ?
General Gerow\ In 14 hours, yes, sir; if they had continued on
that course to Kra.
Senator Ferguson. Now, would that mean anything in relation to
this parallel action that we had taken about any further aggressive
movement ? Here is what the message said :
The Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan,
that if the Japanese Government talies any further steps in pursuance of a
policy or program of military domination or force or threat of force of neighbor-
ing counti-ies, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take
immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary towards safe-
guarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American
nationals toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.
Would that not have been a violation of this order, or of this rule ?
General Gerow. I do not believe, taking this message [4£S'1'\
by itself, it says enough to definitely state what the Japs were plan-
ning to do, sir, from my interpretation of the message.
Senator Ferguson. So, if you had received that, it w^ould not
have meant a thing to you^
General Gerow. Well, I would like to plot this on a map, sir, and
see. There were, in those staff conversations in the Singapore
Senator Ferguson. I have got a map here.
79716 — 46 — pt. 4 4
1618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Gerow. I think I have got a copy of that same one,
Senator.
Senator Ferguson. You have got a copy of it ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. This map has no scale on it, Senator,
so it is rather difficult for me to say exactly where they would be
in 14 hours, but it would indicate
Senator Ferguson. It would indicate that they were 14 hours
from Kra?
General Gerow. Yes, but as to where that would place them on
the map, I do not know where their position would be actually on
this map. It would indicate, sir, that they were proceeding to go
south of the line 10° north, sir.
Senator Ferguson. They would go south of 10° north, and they
would also be east of 100° east, [4^82] wouldn't they?
General Gerow. They would be east of 100° east, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familar with the fact that on
the 2d of December, the President made a directive in that the
President directed three men-of-war to be established in the Pacific.
Were you familiar with that?
General Gerow. Not at the time, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear of that?
General Gerow. Not until I heard it brought out before this com-
mittee, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I have tried to mark on my map with
ink there where these ships would be, or the area. It may help you
some, because the name are small and hard to see. The first one
is between Hainan and Hue. Do you see that one ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And the next one is between Camranh Bay
and Cape St. Jacques; and the next one is off Ponte de Camau. Do
you see those three?
General Gerow. I have those located, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you think those three men-of-war,
would be out in a position so they could execute and [4^83]
see whether or not the Japs were violating what I read to you from
the message of the l7th of August — not the message, but the note?
General Gerow. You refer now, sir, to this Admiralty note?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir, and the note from the President. Will
you let him see page 39 of exhibit 37 ?
(The document was handed to General Gerow.)
Senator Ferguson. Have you looked at it?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, would they not be in a position to execute,
to see whether or not there were violations of the note of the I7th of
August 1941?
General Gerow. I would say tlie one, sir, around Camranh Bay and
Cape St. Jacques, and the one on Pointe de Camau, yes, sir, they would
be in a position.
Senator Ferguson. They would be ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, would not it be material to you, being in
the War Plans Division where you were going to give, and it was your
duty, as you say, to give orders of action to our troops, if you were
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1619
going to put the position of the enemy Avhich you said a message should
contain, would not it be essential to have the information [4^84-]
in the note of the 17th and also the message of the President to the
Asiatic Fleet? Would not it be essential for you to have them?
General Gerow. It Avould be helpful to me to have them.
Senator Ferguson. Not only helpful ; it would be essential, would it
not?
General Gerow. Only in the failure of G-2 to keep me posted, sir,
as to any information.
Senator Ferguson. Were you posted as to that information?
General Gerow\ I was not, sir.
KSenator Ferguson. How could you have acted on the 6th of Decem-
ber 1941, then, without that information?
General Gerow. With regard to these ships?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, with regard to these ships.
General Gerow. Or with regard to the movements ?
Senator Ferguson. The movement of the troops, movement of those
ships ; how could you give orders if you did not have the information ?
General Gerow. Well, it depended, sir, on whom I wanted to give
orders to. There was nothing that the Army could do to stop that
movement south. That was a naval matter and only ships or aircraft
posted down there could do anything about that, sir.
[4^86] Senator Ferguson. Did it indicate to you, or would it
have indicated to you that such a movement meant war with the
United States?
General Gerow. Not unless our Government decided to go to war,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. What about if they struck the first overt act?
Would not it be necessary that you give an order to defend yourself ?
General Gerow. Well, sir, if the Japs had attacked some of our
positions, then they would automatically defend themselves under
the existing war plans, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did not I understand you to say, sir, the reason
they struck at Hawaii was that that was our strongest fortification
and it was on their flank ?
General Gerow. I stated, sir, that it was on our flank.
Senator Ferguson. On whose flank ?
General Gerow. On the flank of the Japanese, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Gerow. On the advance to the south.
Senator Ferguson. But if they struck and it meant war, because
of this message and our stand, and let us say that it was a correct
stand, was not it then the duty of your department to know those
things so that you could give orders, so that we could have a defense
to any action they may take [4^86'] on their flank?
General Gerow. Sir, I believe we would have known very quickly
had the Japanese attacked any of our positions.
Senator Ferguson. They did on tht Tth, so what is the use of know-
ing afterward. That is why we are here today, because in Washington
they did not know and did not anticipate. Isn't that true ?
General Gerow. No, sir. I think when we sent that message of
November 27 out we distinctly stated that we anticipated hostile action
against each of our possessions that bordered on the Pacific. We did
1620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not loiow which one. The Japanese action was unpredictable, and I
saw no information that indicated to me at any time at which partic-
ular place they woud attack.
Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand this, that no matter what
information you received after the 27th you would not have sent it
to the theater in Hawaii ?
General Gebow. No, sir. Senator ; I do not think I stated that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, isn't that a fair answer ?
General Gerow. No, sir. I would like to elaborate a bit on that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Can we get a recess long enough for me to vote ?
[4287] The Vice Chairman. If you desire it, Senator. We will
naturally conform to your wishes.
Senator Ferguson. I would like, if we could take that long.
Mr. Murphy. Why not let Mr. Keefe take it up and then have you
continue later ?
Senator Ferguson. It will only take me 5 minutes, and then we
will not have to break the continuity here.
The Vice Chairman. Without objection, we will take a recess
Mr. Clark. I do not object. Senator, but I am calling attention to
the fact that the House Members do not get an opportunity to vote.
I am not objecting
Senator Ferguson. I will continue.
General Gerow. Shall I proceed. Senator?
Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to finish my statement.
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Clark. I was going on to say if we are going to be here a good
long while I thought we would have to have a definite policy in that
respect.
Senator Ferguson. That is perfectly all right.
Mr. Murphy. May I state for the record that there is a resolution
that was adopted by both Houses excusing the members [4^88]
of the Pearl Harbor committee from voting during the sessions of the
committee.
Senator Ferguson. Has the interruption taken you from the question
that I have given ?
General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not think so, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
General Gerow. This is an operational message. It contains certain
sentences in it that I would like to read :
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.
Prior to hostile .Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance
and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried
out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Should hostilities
occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow 5.
Those are all directives. There was nothing that occurred, sub-
sequent to the sending of that message, no information that I received,
that would have influenced me to change the actions directed in that
message.
[4^891 Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, as a matter
of fact really no information came to you between that date on the
27th and at 11 : 25 when you walked into General Marshall's office on
the day of the 7th at noon. You had not had the pilot message, you
had not had the destruction of the codes message, you had not had
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1621
the 14-part, or the 13th part of the message, you had not had the
destruction of the Japanese code messages, you did not have the
message coming from Winant, you did not have the President's direc-
tive to CINCAF which was the Asiatic Fleet ; isn't that correct ?
General Gerow. The information that came in with regard to
magic between the 27th and the 6th and that was distributed by G-2
I did see and that contained certain information.
Senator Ferguson. I will ask you what information you received
out of magic between the 27th and the 6th and the 7th ?
General Gerow. Sir, I would have to check the documents showing
the messages that were received during that time, and I may be able
to identify that I saw some of them. I must presume I saw all of
these messages that were distributed by G-2, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Let's take the Winant message. You didn't see
that?
General Gerow. No, sir.
[4^90] Senator Ferguson. The President's message to CINCAF
to put out the three men of war, you didn't see that ?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The President's message to the High Commis-
sioner, did you see that one?
General Gerow. I believe I saw that one, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When ?
General Gerow. I am reasonably certain, sir, that I saw it on the
morning of the 27th. I think my memorandum to the Chief of
Staff states that I saw that.
Senator Ferguson. That was on the 26th, so you saw it on the
27th?
General Gerow. I saw it on the 27th.
Senator Ferguson. You didn't see the pilot message?
General Gerow. I don't recall having seen it.
Senator Ferguson. You didn't see the 1 o'clock message, that is,
giving the day of delivery, and the destruction of the last code ?
General Gerow. That is the 1 o'clock message that indicated they
were going to deliver something at 1 o'clock. No, sir; I didn't see
that until 11 : 30 on the morning of the 7th.
Senator Ferguson. You didn't see any part of the 13-part
message ?
[4^91] General Gerow. Not to the best of my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Until you went in there.
General Gerow. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Then you heard, read, or saw the whole message,
you saw it laying on General Marshall's desk ?
General Gerow. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for that information
not being given to you as a general in War Plans who had the duty to
act on it ?
General Gerow. Sir, I cannot recall whether General Marshall dis-
cussed any of those messages with me or not. If he was informed of
them I believe he would have. I don't know what his testimony was
with respect to them. I cannot account for why they were not de-
livered to me, sir.
Senator Ferguson. General Gerow, on the 15th you drew up a state-
ment, did you — didn't you have a statement here, exhibit 39 ?
1622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Drawn up on the 15th of December.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that that
doesn't consider any facts except what took place really in the gen-
eral's office at 11 : 25, and didn't consider anything that happened on
the day of the 6th or up until that time ?
[4-292] General Gerow. I don't recall the instructions that re-
quired me to prepare this memorandum. I rather imagine that the
Chief of Staff was not clear in his own mind as to what happened
during that period in his office and asked those present to give him our
views as to what had happened, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was the crucial thing what happened in his
office or was it what happened prior? You were only in there a half
hour, were you not, between 11 : 25 and when tEe message went out,
at the latest, 12:17?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was that the crucial part of this occasion, that
short period ?
General Gerow. I think that was a very crucial period, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was it as crucial as Saturday and early Sunday
morning ?
General Gerow. Sir, I am not certain how you use "crucial." It
was vital, the distribution of magic on the 6th was of vital importance,
if that is the point, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of a more serious time in the his-
tory of this Nation than between early morning on the 6th and 1
o'clock on the 7th ? Have you ever heard, in history, of a more crucial
period than that ?
General Gerow. Well, sir, I don't know whether I can [^^PS]
compare that period with some of the other cracial highlights in our
history and say whether one was more crucial than the other.
I think such things that happened at Gettysburg, I think certain
things that happened at Valley Forge, certainly certain things that
happened in Germany in the last war, and certain things that hap-
pened in the Pacific, probably would be just as crucial in the history
of this Nation.
[If29Ji\ Senator Ferguson. Now, General Gerow, as I under-
stand it you prepared a memorandum, and it would be for history's
sake, and out of that entire period you took 52 minutes and that was
the period between 11 : 25 and 12 : 17.
Now, you have no recollection, as I understand it
Mr. Murphy. I think that the witness should be allowed to answer.
This man is a general who fought in France, on the beaches of Nor-
mandy, and he ought to be shown every courtesy. He ought to be
given an opportunity to answer.
Senator Ferguson. I haven't finished the question.
Will you read it ?
(The question referred to, as recorded above, was read by the
reporter.)
Senator Ferguson (continuing). Of what took place in the other
part of the period from Saturday morning. Can you tell us anything
as to the other part of the period from Saturday morning up until
11:25?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1623
General Gerow. Senator, I think I stated before, this memorandum
was prepared, I believe, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, to cover
the period that we were assembled in his office. He did not direct me,
as I recall, to prepare a statement covering the period of the days of
the 6th and the 7th. I did not prepare such a memorandum, so, con-
sequently, my memory is not as clear as to what [4^96] hap-
pened on the 6th as it is as to what happened that particular morning
in General Marshall's office. I do not recall anything eventful, as far
as I am personally concerned that occurred to me on December 6.
Senator Ferguson. And on the 7th?
General Gerow. On the morning of the 7th, no, sir, until I was called
to General Marshall's office, and after that the news of the Pearl
Harbor attack came in and other things happened.
Senator Ferguson. General, do you know, or did you know, Major
Clausen ?
General Gerow. I met Major Clausen when I appeared before the
Army Pearl Harbor board, and I saw him later on, sir, in Europe.
Senator Ferguson. He was making an investigation, was he not?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. He approached me with a letter, as I
recall, signed by the Secretary of War, directing him to make an
investigation concerning certain matters in connection with Pearl
Harbor, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you give your full testimony before the
Pearl Harbor board ?
General Gerow. I tried to answer all the questions they asked me,
sir. I don't believe that the magic phase [4296] came into it.
And after I appeared before the Pearl Harbor committee, I under-
stand that a number of other witnesses appeared and made certain
statements regarding deliveries of certain papers to me, and I had
no opportunity to answer those statements.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any instructions when you went to
the Army Pearl Harbor board not to bring magic in ?
General Gerow. I am under the impression that I did receive some
such instructions, because in giving my testimony after reading it, I
find I hesitated in the middle of a statement, and I said that I might be
disclosing something of ultra secrecy and I said I did not want to
state that without the approval of the War Department.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know who you got that instruction from ?
General Gerow. I cannot recall definitely at this time sir.
Senator Ferguson. Who would have authority to give it to you ?
General Gerow. Any of the officers in the War Department would
have the authority to pass it on to me as an order from the Chief of
Staff, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It would have to be an order of the [4^97]
Chief of Staff or his deputy because — you were a Deputy Chief of
Staff?
General Gerow. No, sir; I was not. When I appeared before the
Board I was not. I came back from Europe to appear before that
board.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
General Gerow. I had no status in the War Department at that
time.
Senator Ferguson. You were not in the Chief of Staff at that time ?
General Gerow. No, sir ; I was not on duty there.
1624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I just want to have the record correct.
Who would have authority to give you that order ?
General Gerow. I should say the Secretary of War, the Chief of
Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, or any officer designated by the Chief
of Staff to transmit such an order to me.
Senator Ferguson. Can you recall it at all now ?
General Gerow. I am very uncertain in my mind, sir. I think, and
this, Senator, is — I cannot testify to this, my memory is not clear on
it — I believe it was either Colonel Clarke or General Noyes, and I
am not positive as to which one or whether it was either one.
[^298] Senator Ferguson. Both of those gentlemen would be
in a position to have given you that message; as I understand it, you
carried it out and didn't give secret magic before the Pearl Harbor
board ?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When Lieutenant Colonel Clausen came to you
did he ask you to make certain statements to contradict other wit-
nesses ?
General Gerow. I submitted an affidavit, sir, and I think that affi-
davit is of record. I believe I have a copy with me. I would prefer
to answer from that, if I may.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Let's take your affidavit then.
General Gerow. Yes, sir. I have a copy of it. Do you wish me to
read it ?
Senator Ferguson. No, I will ask you some questions about it —
unless you want to read it first.
General Gerow. I think that gives the whole story, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Suppose you read it into the record and that
will save time.
Mr. Murphy. May I have a copy of the Clausen report. Do you
have it, Counsel ? May I have it, Mr. Greaves, please.
(The document referred to was handed to Mr. Murphy.)
The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, General.
[42991 General Gerow (reading) :
Affidavit of Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow.
Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow, presently Commanding General, 15th Ai'my,
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceed-
ings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes
and says :
During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, as Chief,
War Plans Division, War Department, I received and reviewed at Washington,
D. C, some of the highly secret intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages
which had been decrypted and translated, then known as "Magic." These
were delivered in the "raw" (unevaluated form) to me or to my Executive Officer
by representatives of G-2, War Department. Copies were not retained by me.
Those which I received were returned the same day to representatives of G-2.
No receipts were given by or requested of me. When these messages were
handed me, no evaluations were made of them by G-2, other than occasional
comments by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I placed the highest degree of reliance
on this form of intelligence.
Colonel Clausen has shown me the file of some intercepts of this type, desig-
nated Top Secret Exhibit "B." I recall the general substance of some of these
messages and presume that they were all presented to me on the approximate
dates 1^300] of the translations. I specifically recall the two numbered
23570 and 23859. I knew that the intercepts in the exhibit mentioned, which
pertain to reports to Tokyo on ship movements in Pearl Harbor, were going also
to and coming from the Navy Department. Since these related especially to
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1625
the Navy, I assumed that the Navy vras fully cognizant, and would interpret
this information in connection with Navy studies and estimates, and in coor-
dination with other information available to the Navy and not given to me.
My recollection is that there were reports similar in nature which had also
been intercepted and disseminated, which showed that Japanese consuls at
ports such as Manila and Seattle were giving Tokio information as to ship
movements at these places.
Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been
testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect :
(1) On 4 December 1941, Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's
attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese consuls to destroy their
codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokio, and then asked
General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. General
Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent. Following this, Colonel Bratton
conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent on [J/SOl] 5
December 1941 a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Com-
mander Rochefort, USN, concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."
(2) On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, informed General
Gerow that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal breach
of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked that the Com-
manding General Hawaiian Department, be notified. General Gerow replied
that he thought plenty of notification had been sent.
(3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered
to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843.
My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows :
(i) I do not recall the incident. In this connection I wish to state that if a
representative of G-2 thought my action inadequate he could quite properly
report the facts to his superior. General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, who had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a matter of such
importance. The proper and usual manner was to confer and if the matter still
remained unsettled, to present the problem to the Chief of Staff. I believe the
Chief of Staff was [Jf302] then available for that purpose.
(2) I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken.
It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer
and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of
"Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave mo-
ment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of
Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To
the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notifica-
tion from any soui'ce of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code."
If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall
the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me
of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information
which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written
evidence availaljle in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact,
which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time,
especially since so many major events have intervened.
(3) I did not receive or see any parts of the [4303] message men-
tioned until the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with
the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6
December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders
and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes
was always open to me.
In the months immediately before 7 December 1941, I did not receive any
written or oral estimates from G-2, properly vouched for, which pointed to
Pearl Harbor specifically as the attack target at the opening of hostilities with
Japan or the other axis powers. During this period, however, I did on
several occasions receive estimates from G-2, some of which were not borne out
by subsequent events, and which were to the effect that hostilities with one
or more of the Axis powers would open with attacks on almost any of many
strategic points of United States or British territory in the Pacific areas. My-
self and the members of my staff were constantly concerned with global prob-
lems and considerations, involving possibilities of hostile land, sea and air
action against the United States by the Axis powers.
1626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I wish to state that in my opinion the War Department had sent ample
warnings to the overseas commanders, including General Short, to alert their
respective commands for war. General Short did not send at any time any
notice to the War [^SOJ/] Department which would indicate that he was
not fully prepared for an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means
available to him. The War Department had given him estimates and basic war
plans which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as
primary threats in the event of war with Japan. These pre-battle and battle
plans and estimates with which I was very much concerned, were prepared,
reduced to writing and given to General Short and other officers involved after
a great deal of mature consideration by the best military brains available to
us for that purpose. They represented the concensus of the belief and expert
military opinions of the War and Navy Departments and the Hawaiian Depart-
ment. Since I was aware of this and knew that General Short similarly was
fully cognizant thereof, I assumed that these fundamental concepts of primary
threats from a surprise attack by Japan would govern General Short in his
thinking and preparations in light of the warnings of imminent war. No
notice ever reached me that he would disregard these estimates, or that he
would omit preparations against an outside threat. General Short at no time
informed the War Department that he was not in full agreement with War
Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu. If he was not in
accord with these estimates and plans, then it would have been quite reasonable
to assume that he would have informed the War Department, in accordance
with established military practice. [4305] I assumed also that General
Short's liaison with the Navy was such that he received all information of use
to him and available to the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It was inadvisable for
the War and Navy Departments to send identical or nearly identical messages
to the respective commanders at Hawaii, for fear of compromising our codes.
Hence, it was understood that information sent by either Department which
would be of use to the other service would be exchanged between the two
commanders at Hawaii.
So far as General Short is concerned, the message to him on 27 November
3941, signed "Marshall", should be considered in the light of all the Army and
Navy messages which were sent to Hawaii before and after that date, as well
as with whatever other information was available to him. It was my under-
standing that G-2, War Department, in carrying out his normal responsibilities,
was transmitting periodically to the overseas commanders, information, reports
and estimates bearing on the current situation. For this purpose, G-2 had avail-
able all the intercepts mentioned, as well as many others which are not included
in Top Secret Exhibit "B."
Concerning the "Magic" messages, it was necessary to guard most carefully
against compromising the source of this extremely valuable intelligence. Only
a very few persons knew the details. For example, I did not know fully how it
was obtained. Under this necessity, therefore, it was not [^306] the policy
of the War Department to send these messages to overseas connuanders. The
wisdom of this policy has been proved by our recent victories. If more detailed
information, or if the actual intercepts, had been sent to Hawaii, then the same
procedure would have been followed with respect to the other overseas com-
manders, some of whom were at places of greater vulnerability than Hawaii.
This would have led to great danger of compromise. The spreading of this
highly secret information at that time into so many hands might have lost us
tor the present war the source of this form of the best evidence of the enemy's
intentions. This loss would have been a great disaster, resulting in prolongation
of the war, increased bloodshed, uncertainty and expense, and possible defeats.
(Signed) L. T. Gerow,
Lieut. Gen. U. S. Army.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June, 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
(Signed) Henry C. Clausen,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
at Cannes, France
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1627
[4^07] Senator Ferguson. Now, General, do you know what —
put it this way: Did Major Clausen at this time, or Lieutenant Col-
onel— was he Lieutenant Colonel?
General Gerow. Lieutenant Colonel.
Senator Ferguson. Colonel Clausen, at that time, did he ask you
these questions so that you would write out this 3-page affidavit?
How did you know at that time what you wanted to put in the affi-
davit— what he wanted?
General Gerow. He visited me first at my headquarters at Bad
Nauheim. We had a short conversation at that time and he told me
what the scope of his investigation was going to be. He left, and, as
T recall, went up to interview other officers on this Pearl Harbor affair.
I then left, I think the day after he was at my headquarters, and went
to the Riviera, for the first leave I had had in four years. He followed
me down there and came out to my house and questioned me in a very
full and very formal w^ay.
I drafted notes. I had no typist or stenographer. He took them to
his hotel and typed it and brought it back, the substance of what I
told him, and I didn't agree with some of the things he had written,
and so I scratched them out and rewrote them myself, and he finally
typed them.
Does that cover your question, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
[4^308] Now, what did he tell you he was trying to prove; did
he tell you he was trying to prove something?
General Gerow. No, sir. He merely came to me and presented
this letter from the Secretary of War authorizing him to make this
investigation and he stated, as I recall now, that testimony had been
submitted before the Pearl Harbor Board after my testimony and
he was trying to clear up that testimony, to see whether the state-
ments made concerning certain acts that I was involved in were
correct, what my testimony would be in answer to it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, first :
Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been
testimonj' before the Pearl Harbor Board to the following effect: * * *
Did he tell you that it was testimony that had been sworn to?
General Gerow. He has it here "on what is stated to have been
testimony."
Senator Ferguson. Was there some doubt about this being testi-
mony ?
General Gerow. Well, there wasn't in my mind, sir. I interpreted
the statement he made to me that it was testimony given before the
Pearl Harbor Board.
Senator Ferguson. Apparently he told you Bratton had [4309]
testified to this :
On 4 December 1941 Colonel Bratton of Gr-2 called General Gerow's atten-
tion to an intercept indicating action by Japanese Consuls to destroy their
codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokyo, and then asked
General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders.
Up to there it would indicate that Bratton wanted to send more
warnings to the overseas commanders. The warning then in effect
was that of the 27th, was it not? This is on the 4th of December.
1628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Gerow. Yes, sir. The operational message was sent on
November 27, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That would be the one he was talking about.
He asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders.
You would be the man he would come to, would you not? You
have told us you were the authorized officer outside of the Chief of
Staff to send this.
General Gerow. That is right. If it was an operational message.
If it was an informational message it would be sent out by G-2.
Senator Ferguson. Now, that kind of a message, to send more
warnings to the overseas commanders, that would be [4^10^
operational, would it not ?
General Gerow. Not, sir, if you take it in connection with the sen-
tence above, "called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indi-
cating action by Japanese Consuls to destroy their codes and papers
in accordance with instructions from Tokyo." That would only bear
out what the Operational message already said.
Senator Ferguson. What did the destruction of codes mean to
you?
General Gerow. It means that the people destroying were antici-
pating war, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And then you didn't disturb or want to dis-
turb, if you got that information you didn't want to disturb your
warning of the 27th ; is that correct ?
General Gerow. No, sir; I don't think the statement in the Op-
erational message, the instructions to the commander out there, needed
any changing because of the fact that the Japanese were destroying
their codes. We had already stated, the War Department had taken
the position that war was imminent, hostilities might occur at any
moment. The mere fact that they had destroyed their codes wouldn't
change it.
Senator Ferguson. Then the fact that you had received information
about the destruction of the Japanese codes subsequent to the 27th
wouldn't cause you, would not have [4311] caused you to act?
General Gerow. Would not have caused me to send another Opera-
tional action message, no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then
General Gerow. I would like to elaborate, if I may. I think my
response to that one should also be read.
Senator Ferguson. I want you to answer fully. I don't want you
to feel that you are not given an opportunity to answer fully.
General Gerow. I would like to, since part of that paragraph 1 has
been brought into the picture, I think the answer should be given at
the same time.
I do not recall the incident.
Senator Ferguson. That is what you said, "I do not recall the in-
cident," but I am trying to ask you questions to see whether or not it
would be your duty if you did get the information to act.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
[4^12] Senator Ferguson. That is what I am trying to say.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1629
Senator Ferguson. And, as you remember now, if you had received
that information knowing that the warning of the 27th went out, that
you would not have thought that the information about breaking the
codes would not have led you to give them more warning. Now go
ahead and make any further explanation that you want.
Mr. Mitchell. He did not say that. He said it would not require
an operational order. He said it two or three times. This man had
operational orders to give and G-2 had warnings to give and I think
there ought to be a distinction made between an operational order and
information in every question that is asked him.
Senator Feeguson. Now, on the statement by counsel does that help
refresh your memory ? Has he enlightened you ?
General Gerow. Will you ask your question again, sir, and I will
reply to it again, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Here is the language in the affidavit : "And then
asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas
commanders."
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, we are talking about warning of action,
that is, a directive of action not such as G-2 would [4313] send
but such as you would send.
Now, to get this straight, the warning on the 27th was a message
that you could send but not G-2, isn't that correct ?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
General Gerow. And I would only send it in the name of General
Marshall if he would approve it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct. Now, you answered my ques-
tion when I asked you that, that you did not think that the destruc-
tion of codes would have caused you to send any further message of
action or warning.
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I said that destruction of codes was
not — the information was not of such a nature that would have
caused me to change the operational instructions, the directives that
were contained in the message of November the 27th.
Senator Ferguson. I understand.
General Gerow. And, sir, the use of that word "warnings" in here
I think is a bit confusing. If Colonel Bratton did what he said that
he did he was merely telling me that he wanted me to send a message
to Hawaii to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes.
Now, that is apparently what the paragraph means, sir, and that was
a message that was purely informational that could have been sent by
G-2 [431.f] and not by me, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, if he had in mind the other
kind of a message, "General Gerow to send more warnings to the over-
seas commanders," not information, warnings — and we have been
talking here with the other officers that the message of the 27th was
a warning, the one of the 24th was even called a war warning right
in it.
General Gerow. That is right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, if he had in mind that kind of a message,
"General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent." Now, you are
1630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
still of the opinion that that would be a correct answer to Bratton,
are you not, if you were of the opinion then that sufficient had been
sent?
General Gerow. I was of the opinion that a very positive and clear-
cut directive had been sent to the Commanding General of the Hawai-
ian Department for definite action and that the fact that the Japanese
were destroying their code did not indicate to me that I should change
that directive that was still in effect on December the 7th.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; all right. Now, on the 5th of December,
the next thing : "Colonel Otis E. Sadtler, S. C."— what does the ''S. C."
mean after that?
General Gerow. Signal Corps.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
Informed General Gei'ow [4-315] that the Japanese wind code had been
implemented to signal breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain
and asked that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department be notified.
General Gerow replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent.
Now, at that time, General, taking as of December the 5th, did you
know that Batavia, Netherlands East Indies, had notified General
Miles by a message that there was a wind code, not an activating of
a wind code, but a wind code which it interpreted as a war decision
would be sent by weather broadcast? Did you know that?
General Gerow. I would like to see that message, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would counsel show him the Batavian message ?
Mr. Gesell. You have got it, Senator. It is in volume 5 of the
Navy.
Senator Ferguson. Volume 5 of the Navy.
Mr. Gesell. It is the one you had yesterday.
Senator Ferguson. That is the original.
Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Senator Lucas. May I ask counsel whether or not the Clausen
report has been introduced in evidence as yet ?
Mr. Gesell. No ; it has not been introduced in evidence [4^^^]
as vet.
Senator Lucas. How many reports are there, may I ask. Clausen
reports ? Just one ?
Mr. Gesell. Well, the Clausen report is a series of affidavits pri-
marily.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you mean how many copies?
Senator Lucas. Yes ; how many copies.
Mr. MrrcHELL. We have 2 copies.
Mr. Gesell. There are 2 copies available to us.
Senator Lucas. When could the Senator from Illinois get ahold
of the Clausen report ?
Mr. Gesell. I will be glad to let you have our copy tonight.
Senator Lucas. No; I am not going to take the copy aAvay from
counsel because he needs it. I am asking about the other one. "VMio
has it now ?
Mr. Mitchell. I am not clear whether it is Senator Brewster or
who it is.
Mr. Gesell. Congressman Murphy I think has the other. Both
of them are out of our hands now.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1631
Senator Ferguson. I will undertake, Senator, to give you Senator
Brewster's copy.
Senator Lucas. I will be delighted to have it.
Senator Ferguson. All right, sir.
\_Jf317'\ Senator Lucas. Overnight, at least.
Senator Ferguson. I do not find it. Does counsel recall the page?
I have it now. It is on page 726, so the record will show.
Mr. MrrciiELL. Of volume 5.
Senator Ferguson. All right, General.
General Gerow, I think, Senator, when you asked me the question
you read what Colonel Sadtler was reported to have said.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Gerow. And I would like to go back to my answer on that
for the purpose of the record and state that I have no such recollection
and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken.
In answer to your question, sir, I have never seen this message.
Senator Ferguson. You had never seen the Batavia message?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Which indicated it would not be a message on
breaking up relations ; it would be a war decision message. You see
that language in there ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. I do not recall ever seeing that message.
[JfSlS'] Senator Ferguson. And that is quite an important mes-
sage, is it not, and you would recall it now ?
General Gerow. I think I would ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it you say that you do not
remember that incident. It could have happened but you do not
remember.
General Gerow. It could have happened, sir, but I do not recall it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I am trying to get what your mental atti-
tude would have been at that time.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. If Sadtler had come to you telling you this,
were you of the opinion that they had sufficient information, and,
therefore, you would not have sent it ?
General Gerow. I think that is a little different message, Senator.
If I had been sure that the Japs had announced that war with the
United States was going to occur at a certain time, I would have
most certainly written a message as quickly as possible and sent it
on my own responsibility if General Marshall had not been there.
That would have been an operational message.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, an operational message.
General Gerow. And warning them that a certain thing would hap-
pen at a certain time.
[4^J9] Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, as I understand it,
if 3^ou had seen the Batavia message and knew it was activating, then
you would have felt that it was your duty to send a new action message
to Hawaii?
General Gerow. Not necessarily a new action message, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, what would it be ?
General Gerow. One quite similar to the one General Marshall sent
on the morning of December the 7th. There was something that rather
1632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fixed a date as immediate, that something was going to happen. If
they had said, "We have definitely decided to go to war with tlie United
States," I think we most certainly — that is, if I may correct that, that
if Japan had decided and had stated that she was going to go to war
with the United States definitely on a certain day — would inform our
commanders all over the world to that effect.
Senator Ferguson. Now, the next one :
On the night of the 6th of December 1941 Colonel Bratton or another delivered
to General Gerow thirteen parts of the fourteen part Japanese intercept 25843.
That is the 13 parts of the so-called l4-part message. Now, did he
give you that information on the 6th, that is, on Saturday ?
General Gekow. I do not recall, sir, that he did. I have seen testi-
mony somewhere that he stated that it was given [4^20] to my
executive officer, Colonel Gailey, and I haven't talked to Colonel Gailey,
sir, and I do not know what his answer would be.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have an executive officer by the name
of Colonel Gately or Gailey ?
General Gerow. Gailey; yes, sir. I had such an executive officer,
C. K. Gailey, a colonel.
Senator Ferguson. Now, at that time on Saturday was your office,
the War Plans, alerted to war?
General Gerow. That depends. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. To expect war that day ?
General Gerow. It just depends. Senator, on what you mean by the
term "alerted." I was, and most of my officers were, working down
there quite late every night and practically all day Sunday and on
holidays. As I stated, I believe, this morning, we had an arrange-
ment whereby a duty officer was designated each day for a 24-hour
period. That duty officer after the office was closed up was permitted
to go to his home. He remained within calling distance of a telephone
during his entire period of duty, except when he was at the office. He
knew where to reach me, sir, and the Adjutant General and the Secre-
tary of the General Staff knew where to reach him. sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, would your records show — should [4S£1]
they show what officers were on duty after 6 o'clock Saturday night
in your department 'i
General Gerow. Senator, I have had a search made in the War
Department to try to find that duty roster, sir, and I have been unable
to locate it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. There was one at that time, there was a roster?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you have made a search and you have been
unable to locate it ?
General Gerow. I have asked the Operations Division, w^hich took
over and superseded the War Plans Division, to make a search of their
records and to search the Adjutant General's records and they have
been unable, sir, to find the record or the roster for that period, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you are unable to tell us who was on duty
that night?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I regret to say I am, sir. I think that I
was down at the office myself until G or 7 or 8 o'clock. Of course, that
was a very busy time and we had a lot of unfinished business. As a
matter of fact, we went down the next morning, a number of us. Sun-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1633
day morning, in order to clean up some of this business that had ac-
cumulated and we could do it better on Sunday morning because
[4S22] you did not have a lot of people bothering you.
Senator Ferguson. But you were not going down Sunday — or you
were not down Saturday night, I mean your force, because your office
was closed. All right.
General Gerow. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you say here :
I do not recall the incident.
You were replying back to one. And then you said that —
General Sherman Miles, Assistant of G-2, had direct access to me and to the
Chief of Staff in a matter of such importance.
You meant there that if it was only information he could have given
it alone, but if he wanted to get any action message then he would have
to come to you or General Marshall ?
General Gerow. Yes. If he wanted to give out information he
could send it without consulting me. He normally did consult me,
however, but he had no authority, sir, to direct operations without
consulting me, sir. If he felt that operations should be conducted, he
was absolutely free to come to me and suggest that such a message
be sent and if we did not agree I think the custom would have been for
General Miles and myself both to go to the Chief of Staff and express
our differing views and have him make the decision.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to go to paragraph 3 on the next
page [reading] :
[4323] I did not receive or see any part of the message mentioned until the
morning of the 7th of December 1941 when a conference was held with the Chief
of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of the 6th
Now, I assume there that you are talking about the 13 parts that
were in.
General Gerow. I think probably I was covering the whole message,
sir, at that time because
Senator Ferguson. You do not say that in your affidavit do you ?
General Gerow. No, sir; but I did not have these messages in front
of me at that time, sir, to show when they came into the War Depart-
ment and the time they were translated.
Senator Ferguson. But he must have told you that 13 were in
because you say, "If I had received parts of the message on the 6th
of December 1941." Now, here is what you say in your affidavit that
you would have done :
I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the
Chief of Staff.
In other words, you thought that the 13 parts of the message, plus
the pilot message, which I understand you did not see
General Gerow. No, sir.
[iS^^-l Senator Ferguson (continuing) . Would have been suffi-
cient for you to immediately have realerted or to at least have alerted
the commanders across the sea ?
General Gerow. I think possibly. Senator, there may not have been
a meeting of minds with regard to that particular sentence between
myself and Colonel Clausen. I did not have those messages with me,
I did not recall all their contents. As a matter of fact, as I have testi-
79716 — 46 — pt. 4 5
1634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fied, I saw them first on the morning in the office of the Chief of Staff
at 11 : 30 and I think I read it very casually that morning, sir, and
had not seen them since. I did not see them when I testified before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Senator Ferguson. Are you through ?
General Gerow, I am sure what I meant in that was if they necessi-
tated operational orders to the commanders overseas I would have
sent such orders.
Senator Ferguson. Well, that is not what it says, is it ?
General Gerow. No, sir ; and I say now I feel that there must not
have been a meeting of minds because I would not have acted on an
order that was unimportant, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand that you feel that
up until the night of the 6th, which includes the 13 parts, that they
were not important ?
General Gerow. No, sir.
[4^'25] Senator Ferguson. The Winant message, the pilot
message, the breaking of the codes message and the 13-part message,
the various other messages that were in here that I reviewed with
General Marshall the other day, that they were not of such importance
that you would have given an alert ?
General Gerow. No, sir ; I did not mean, sir, to convey that answer.
The sentence reads : "If I had received parts of the message." I might
have received maybe the first part of 14 parts and there may not have
been anything in that one part of that message that would have caused
me to send an operational message. Do I make myself clear, Senator ?
Senator Ferguson. Did you read the 13 parts of that message?
Have you ever read it ?
General Gerow. I read it, sir, I think on the morning or the after-
noon of December the 7th, sir, rather casually. That was something
which happened, that was in the past. We were trying to see that
nothing like that happened in the future.
Senator Ferguson. Then as far as you were concerned, General,
you really never read those 13 parts or heard it read prior to the 7th,
the time of the attack on the 7th?
General Gerow. No, sir; I saw it first at 11:30 in the Chief of
Staff's office.
Senator Ferguson. But you did not read it and he did [4^26]
not read it aloud ?
General Gerow. No, sir; I do not believe that he did, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore you hadn't any knowledge of it, I
mean what was in it?
General Gerow. Well, sir, the Chief of Staff told me in general
what was in it when I went in there, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, had he already read it when you got in
there ?
General Gerow. I think he did, sir. He had the papers on his desk
in front of him.
Senator Ferguson. General, how did you get to the General's
office? Did you drive there or were you in the same building?
General Gerow. No, sir ; we were in the same building, on the same
floor just a very short distance away.
Senator Ferguson, Did you go there by a telephone call ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1635
General Gerow. As I recall, sir, the Chief of Staff had a buzzer
oil his desk, a telephone buzzer and he buzzed that and said, "Come
up to my office at once."
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, how long had you been in your
office prior to the buzz from the Chief of Staff to come to his office ?
General Gerow. To the best of my recollection and belief I arrived
in my office some time before 10 o'clock, sir.
[4327] Senator Ferguson. Well, have you any nearer idea?
9:30?
General Gerow. No, sir ; I cannot testify as to the exact time.
Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you would be an hour
and twenty-some minutes in your office.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Prior to going to General Marshall's office.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And during that period you had no idea that
there was a pilot message, that there was an Admiralty message about
the movement of ships, the Winant message, the 13-part message, the
14th part, or the 1 o'clock delivery, and the destruction of the code.
You were in your office an hour and twenty-one minutes, and that
never came to your attention ?
General Gerow. I do not believe, sir, it was ever brought to my
office.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I asked you.
General Gerow. Sir ?
Senator Ferguson. That is what I asked you.
General Gerow. No, sir. I do not recall ever seeing that message
until I went to General Marshall's office at 11 : 30.
[4328] Mr. MncHELL. He is talking about several messages,
not only the 13 parts or 14th part, but the one from Winant.
General Gerow. I think I testified I did not
Mr. Mitchell. Your answer only relates to one of them?
General Gerow. I do not recall, as I think I stated before, having
seen the Winant message at all, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I say. You never saw it at all.
General Gerow. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You did not see the pilot message prior to being
with General Marshall in his office on the morning of the 7th?
General Gerow. To the best of my recollection I believe I did not,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. You had not seen the 13th part of the message,
or the 14th part, is that right?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You had not seen the 1 o'clock delivery message
and the destruction of their code machine, had you, prior to 11 : 25 ?
General Gekow. The destruction of the code machine, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. It is in the 1 o'clock delivery message.
Would you just let him see that message?
(The document was handed to General Gerow.)
[4S29] Mr. Mitchell. What is the message you asked him
about ?
Senator Ferguson. It is the 1 o'clock delivery message. Is not
there in that same message a provision about destroying the code?
1636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. No; it is a separate message. That is on the other
page, right across from it.
Senator Ferguson. It is across on the other page, the one as to the
destruction of the code.
General Gerow. That is the one, sir, No. 910, that you refer to, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Wait until I get my copy.
General Gerow. Page 249, sir.
Senator Ferg.uson. On page 218, the one at the top. General, first.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. "Will the Ambassador please submit to the
United States Government, if possible to the Secretary of State, our
reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on the 7th your time." That
would be on Sunday at 1 o'clock, would it not?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. As I recall now, sir, I did not see that
message until I went into the office of General Marshall.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I understand. Now, on page
[4^30] 249, at the top of the page :
After deciphering part 14 of my 902, also my 907, 908 and 909, please destroy
at once the remaining deciphering machine and all machine codes. Dispose in
like manner also secret documents.
General Gerow. I do not recall having seen that message until I
went into the office of the Chief of Staff at 11 : 30 on December 7, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I understand. And you do not recall anyone
calling you at your home to give you any of those messages or infor-
mation on those messages ?
General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not recall any telephone calls, sir, with
regard to that.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Colonel Gailey was in
your office on Sunday morning ?
General Gerow. I do not recall, sir, specifically that he was there,
Senator. I remember the names of several other officers who were
there at the time.
Senator Ferguson. Now, was there any officer other than you below
General Marshall that could have acted on Saturday, or Sunday up
until the time you saw General Marshall in his office, on this informa-
tion and given another alert to Hawaii? Did you understand my
question?
General Gerow. No, sir; I am not quite clear, sir,
[43S1] Senator Ferguson. Were you the only officer with au-
thority to act under General Marshall — I think he was the Chief of
Staff
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you the only officer that had authority to
act, to give a further alert or action message similar — I say "similar"
only because it would have an effect — as the one of the 27th, an action
message? Were you the only one under General Marshall capable
of doing that ?
General Gerow. Senator, I had no specific authority to act for Gen-
eral Marshall; I would have assumed that authority if I thought the
situation demanded it.
Senator Ferguson. But, as I understand it then you did not have
that authority, but you now say that you would have assumed it; is
that correct ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1637
General Geeow. That is correct, sir. I had no specific authority to
act in General Marshall's name. I had authority to si<^ papers with
his name, sir, but in a matter of that kind, I would have, if the situa-
tion warranted, I would have assumed the responsibility for sending
the message.
Senator Ferguson. Now, suppose, General, that you had known at
10 o'clock in your oflfice all that you knew [4S3^] at 12 o'clock
after being in General Marshall's office would you have sent a message
to Short?
General Geroav. I would have certainly drafted such a message, and
if I could have gotten in touch quickly with General Marshall, I would
have put the question up to him. If I could not have gotten in touch
with him, sir, I would have probably gotten in touch with the Secre-
tary of War and told him what I was doing, and gotten the message
on the line as quickly as possible, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore, you figure that that information was
such that it should have had action on it?
General Gergw. You mean the document that I saw at 11 : 30 in the
Chief of Staff's office the next morning?
Senator Fei?guson. That is right.
General Gerow. Yes, sir ; they did warrant action.
Senator Ferguson. Now, down at the bottom of the page in your
affidavit, "General Short," — so we are talking about the same thing.
General Short did not send at any time any notice to the "War Department
which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack of the kind
that occurred with the means available to him.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I want you to look at Exhibit 32, page
10, and ask you when you made that affidavit with [4333']
Clausen, whether you are familiar with the message on page 10?
General Gerow. The message on page 10 ?
Senator Ferguson. Page 10 of Exhibit 32.
General Gerow. May I read that message to see if we have the
same one ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Gerow (reading) :
Japanese negotiations have come to a practical stalemate.
Senator Ferguson. That is wrong.
General Gerow. That is the one on page 10, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It is on page 12. The question is when you
made the affidavit in Paris — no, in Cannes, France, the 20th of June,
1915, were you familiar with the message on page 12 of Exhibit 32,
reading :
"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy
REURAD four seven two twenty-seventh," and signed "Short."
General Gerow. I did not have the message in front of me. sir, at
the time I testified. I did know about it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How could you make that affidavit, the Clausen
affidavit and put that sentence in it, and have in mind at the same
time Short's reply?
{Ji33Ji\ General Gerow. Well, sir, I think the reply from the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is subject to sev-
1638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
eral interpretations, sir. I think the phrase "liaison with the Navy"
could be interpreted to mean that he was taking steps to conduct recon-
naissance, and carry out other defensive measures.
Senator Ferguson. Is there any reason why you would misinterpret
the first part, "Report Department alerted"? That was in reply to
the 27th, wasn't it ? Let me get the language of the one of the 27th.
Report measures taken.
Then his message came in on the 28th :
Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period.
That is the end of the sentence ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, could that be misconstrued?
General Gerow. It could be construed that he was taking steps to
prevent sabotage and also these other things. The entire message
could be construed that way.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first see the message on page 12?
General Gerow. I think I saw it first, sir, on the morning of the
28th of November, 1941. I have testified, I believe, sir, to that effect.
[4335] Senator Ferguson. And the interpretation that you now
get from it is to the effect that that sentence "Eeport Department
alerted to prevent sabotage" meant to you that he was alerted to the
other, and he was also alerted to sabotage?
General Gerow. Senator, I did not testify to that, sir, on my pre-
vious testimony.
Senator Ferguson. I am asking you now.
General Gerow. I say now, that the message could be interpreted
to mean that he was alerted to prevent sabotage and that he was also
prepared to conduct reconnaissance and other defensive missions.
Senator Ferguson. It could be ?
General Gerow. It could be.
Senator Ferguson. How did you interpret it on the 28th when you
got it?
General Gerow. Well, sir
Senator Ferguson. You acted on it ?
General Gerow. No, sir ; that is the trouble. I did not act on it.
Senator Ferguson. Even filing it away is acting on it, or passing
it off is acting on it.
General Gerow. I testified. Senator, at considerable length to my
part in the affair. I will repeat the testi- [4336] niony, if
necessary.
Senator Ferguson. I want you to answer my question first.
General Gerow. Will you repeat the question, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. What interpretation, what evaluation did you
give it on the 28th ?
General Gerow, I stated, sir, that I testified before the Roberts
board to the effect that when that message passed over my desk, I
thought it was an answer to the G-2 message sent out by General Miles.
Consequently if I did have that thought on the morning of the 28th
when the message passed over my desk — and I cannot recall now what
my thoughts were at that time, but if I did have that thought, then
there was no occasion for me to make any interpretation of the rest
of the message, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1639
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you want to say that that was your
thought, to the best of your knowledge now ?
General Gerow. Senator, 1 would like my testimony to stand, sir,
as I have stated it, that I testified before the Roberts Commission,
or Committee, that when that message passed over my desk I assumed
it to be an answer to the G-2 message sent by General Miles, and the
reason for that assumption was that the G-2 message was discussed
greatly at length the evening before.
[4337] Senator Ferguson. I want to get down to what you said
in the affidavit:
General Short did not send at any notice to the War Department which would
indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack at the time it occurred
with the means available to him.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I ask you again, did you have in mind this
reply to Short's on page 12 when you made that affidavit?
General Gerow. I told you, sir, that I did not have that message in
front of me. I did know, and was familiar with the message, sir,
and I did have it in mind at the time I made that affidavit, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not think that at least that message
would indicate that he was not fully alerted ?
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I submit the witness has answered
that question at least a half dozen times in the examination. I just
cannot understand the repetition of these questions over and over
again. I may be wrong, and I certainly am not attempting to fore-
close any member of the committee from asking any questions, but
I cannot for the life of me understand the repetitious questions. I
may be wrong.
[4-338] The Chairman. The Chair would suggest that the mem-
bers of the committee avoid repetition as much as possible, in order to
expedite the hearing, but we will let General Gerow answer this ques-
tion once more.
Senator Lucas. I do not object, but I should like to ask this
question :
Should I be permitted, and every member of this committee be
permitted to go through the same kind of examination and ask the
same type and character of questions over and over again ?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I did not yield.
The Chairman. Let the Chair answer that question, or that inter-
rogatory, which he thinks is a proper one. This is not a court proce-
dure in which the presiding judge, or the presiding officer, has any
control over the inquiries made by members of the committee.
The Chair does not understand that he can, arbitrarily, or without
arbitrary action, control the interrogatories propounded by members
of the committee. Even though they repeat over and over again, the
Chair, however, cannot control that. If any member of the commit-
tee desires to ask the same question or a similar question over and
over again, the Chair does not know how he can control that process
of inquiry by any member of the committee. But the [4339]
Chair would like to caution the members, as far as possible, that
there be no repetition of the same question, in view of similar answers
that may have been given by the witness in any case.
So the Senator will proceed.
1640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, this affidavit was not covered,
as I recall it, by the General, in his testimony. These questions
are new. They were not covered. This sentence that I was reading
and trying to get an answer to had not been covered.
I want to know how it is possible to have that sentence in the
affidavit, having in mind page 12. Now, do you understand my
question ?
The Chairman. The Chair does not recall whether General Gerow
was asked about that matter when he was on the stand before.
Senator Ferguson. Did you cover that before. General?
The Chairman. The Chair may say also
Senator Ferguson. Pardon me.
The Chairman. The Chair might also as far as the Chair is
concerned, as a member of the committee, he understands the Gen-
eral's answer, and if other members do not, then they can pursue
that matter, I suppose, until they do understand it.
[4^4^] General Gerow. My only desire sir, is to explain all
I know about the Pearl Harbor affair to the committee. I am
willing to answer any questions freely.
Senator Ferguson. That is all I am trying to find out, is what
you do know.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, General, can you answer the question?
I wish you would look at that sentence. I want to know how it is
possible to write that sentence in an affidavit and at the same time
have in mind General Short's reply on page 12 of exhibit 32.
General Gerow. Well, Senator, as I stated before, this affidavit
was made, as I believe, in June 1945. That was when this affidavit
was made. This message was received on November 28, 1941. A lot
had happened between 1941 and 1945. I stated that I had not
attempted to interpret this message when it passed over my desk
on the morning on November 28, because of the incorrect assumption
1 had made that it was a reply to the sabotabe message sent by
General Miles.
If you ask me now, sir, to interpret whether this message could
be interpreted as meaning that General Short did not send at any
time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that
he was not fully prepared for an [4^4^] attack of the kind
which occurred with the means available to him, I think I can state
now, sir, that this message could be interpreted as meaning that the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had prepared for an
attack of the kind that was actually made.
Senator Ferguson. That is your answer to the question?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It is now 4 o'clock.
It is obvious we cannot finish with General Gerow, so we will
recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 10
o'clock a. m., of the following day, Saturday, December 15, 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1641
Wm PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a, m.,
in the Caucus Koom (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator
Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, and Ferguson, and
Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart,
and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
\_Jf3If3'\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, if we may do so, there are one or two
matters that have come up that may be of aid to the committee in
connection with the further examination of General Gerow, and if
we could intervene for a moment, with Senator Ferguson's permis-
sion.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.
The Chairman. All right, go ahead.
Mr. Gesell. The first has to do with Exhibit 21, the Winant dis-
patch of December 6 concerning the movement of Japanese vessels
towards the Kra Peninsula. We wish to call the committee's atten-
tion to two additional messages on that subject.
The first is a message dated December 6, 1941, from the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, signed by R. E. Schuirmann — a
memorandum for the State Department, dated December 6, 1941.
This memorandum reads as follows :
Following report has been received from the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic
Fleet dated December 6 :
"British Commander in Chief China reports a 25-ship convoy escorted by 6
cruisers and 10 destroyers in latitude 08-00 North longitude 106-00 East at
0316 Greenwich time today. A convoy of 10 ships with 2 cruisers and 10
destroyers were in latitude 07-40 North longitude 106-20 East 2 hours Vt^W
later. All on course West. Three additional ships in latitude 07-51 North
longitude 105-00 East at 0442 course 310°. This indicates all forces will make
for Kohtron in latitude 10-01 North longitude 104 East.
"Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Admiral Hart's scouting force has sighted 30
ships and 1 large cruiser anchored in Camranh Bay."
There is also attached to this memorandum wliich I have just read
the text of the message from the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic forces
dated December 6, 1941, addressed to the Cliief of Naval Operations,
1642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
which forms the basis of the Schuirmann note to the State Department.
This is dated December 6, 1941, and contains the same information and
shows on its face that the dispatch was also sent for the information
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Com. 16 and
Com. 14. The time group on the dispatch indicates that it was sent
December 6th Greenwich time, at 12 : 55 p. m.j which would be 7 : 55
a. m. Eastern Standard time, or 2 : 55 p. m. Philippine time.
I would like to have these two documents designated Exhibit 66.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 66.")
Mr. Gesell. Now the question also arose I believe in [4^4^]
connection with the examination of General Miles, but it is pertinent
perhaps to the examination of General Gerow as well, at page 4190
of the transcript, as to whether the so-called' parallel action messages
which were delivered to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941
by President Roosevelt were contained in magic.
We have obtained the magic messages which show that the texts
of those notes were in magic, as well as the message from Tokyo
to Washington dated August 17, 1941, transmitting the messages,
and I think that should be marked as an exhibit. I suggest that the
next exhibit number be Exhil)it 67.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 67.")
[4S46] Senator Ferguson. Could I just see them?
Mr. Gesell. Certainly.
(Exhibits Nos. 66 and 67 were handed to Senator Ferguson.)
Mr. Gesell. We have not reproduced the latter because it is the
text of notes which are already in volume 2 of Foreign Eelations.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire from counsel whether or not we
have all of the intercepts now between the 16th and the 28th of August
1941, in relation to this instrument both ways?
Mr. Gesell. I cannot answer that question. We will inquire and
see. I thought the question in the transcript was for the texts of these
specific messages.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat I would like to have now in relation to
these is all of the messages in relation to them both ways. This is
the one transmitted
Mr. Gesell. Between what dates. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Between the 16th of August and 29th.^ The
28th is when the reply came in.
Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel whether or
not we will receive the material which I requested of General Mar-
shall, namely the reasons for the 1940 alert?
[434'^] Mr. Gesell. No, Congressman Keefe, we have not
received that information. We understand it is expected either later
today or Monday.
Mr. 'Keefe. Have you received the action report on the log of the
U. S. S. {Enterprise which I asked for some time ago?
Mr. Gesell. The situation with respect to the ship logs is as follows,
according to my understanding: A large number of ship logs were
requested by the different members of the committee at different times.
* Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 124.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1643
The Navy Department has set aside a large room, and filled it with
these various logs that had been requested. It is a rather difficult
matter to reproduce them all, and the Navy has suggested that those
logs will be there for the inspection of anyone authorized by the com-
mittee to examine them. We wrote a letter in that connection for
Senator Brewster, who had asked for quite a number. We have gotten
the log of the Boise^ which the committee had expressed a special
interest in, and we were going to make a report on that, and some of
the other requests later on today.
Mr. Keefe. I was especially interested in the log of the Enterprise.
Mr. Gesell. I am sure that will be in the room along [4H^]
with the other material.
Mr. Keefe. If I am permitted to go down to this room and see it,
in company with somebody, if the committee would authorize me to, I
will be glad to go down there and look at it.
Mr. Gesell. We will try to get the Enterprise log for you, Mr.
Congressman. I am sure it can be made available. I think so many
logs were requested, however, that unless there is a special interest in
a particular log, it might be more convenient to leave them in this
room, which has been especially supplied with them.
The Vice Chaikman. I recall a special interest has been indicated
in the Enterprise and Boise.
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. I was wondering if those two could be
brought up here, and if any special ones are needed, they can be ex-
amined in the room.
Mr, Murphy. If any members of the committee are going to look
at the logs, I want to see them, too. I want to know what they are
looking at.
Mr, Gesell. They are being used by the Navy, also. We will get
the Enterprise and the Boise logs.
Mr. Keefe. Does that also include the action report ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes ; we will get that also.
[4349] Mr. Keefe. Now, I also ask for the series of memoranda
written by Hornbeck. I have been furnished with Avhat purport to
be two. I understand there are quite a series.
Mr. Gesell. We were advised this morning, Congressman Keefe,
that the Navy had just located the file of the Hornbeck memoranda,
and we expect to be able to meet your request completely, and more,
by next week. I think I reported to the committee earlier that the
Navy had not been able to find the memoranda, but they reported
this morning that they at last were located. We will have them re-
produced and make them available to the members of the committee.
The Chairman. Is that all ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
The Chairman. Proceed with the examination of the General.
TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONAED TOWNSEND GEEOW (Eesumed)
Senator Fergtjson. General Gerow, you heard read this message
from Commander Schuirmann to the Secretary of State, a memoran-
dum for the State Department, December 6, 1941, based upon the
message from Admiral Hart to the Chief of Naval Operations.
1644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Had you ever heard of that before ? Had that been called to your
attention ?
General Gerow. I do not recall now, sir, if the Navy [4S50']
sent a copy over to the War Department, as they usually do, and if
they had sent some document of that nature I would have seen it, or
one of my subordinates in the War Plans Division would have seen it.
Mr. Gesell. I should have stated the Navy record indicated that
the Navy message was sent to the War Department. The War Depart-
ment, however, has been unable to locate the message as yet, and is still
searching for it.
General Gerow. I do not know. Senator, whether it would have come
directly to War Plans or to G-2, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would that come to G-2 or would it come to you,
your department ?
General Gerow. I do not know, sir, how that message was sent.
It may come directly to War Plans Division, or it may go to G-2 first,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. That was very important information if it came
in on the morning of the 6th ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that now?
General Gerow. I do not recall that particular message, no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that information around the 6th ?
General Gerow. I have a hazy recollection. Senator, of [43^11
a number of troop movements being made by the Japs around the
Camranh Bay area, but I do not remember the details of where I
received that information, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You stated yesterday that there was some infor-
mation put in the original affidavit by Colonel Clausen that you re-
fused to sign and had him take it out and prepare a new affidavit ; do
you recall that?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, what was the information that he put in
that you had him strike out ?
General Gerow. I don't recall that it was information, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What was it?
General Gerow. He misunderstood, I think, some of the statements.
There was no stenographer there and he tried to take it down in long-
hand and he misunderstood, I believe, some of the statements that I
made.
Senator Ferguson. You don't recall what that information was ?
General Gerow. I cannot recall now ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you get the regulations, over the evening, as
to the drafting of messages ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. I have searched two or three regulations
and in that connection, sir, I would like to state [4362] that —
T believe you asked me about what they taught at our schools with
regard to certain operational messages and my reply was directed to
the 5-paragraph order which is normally an order issued to, you
might say, subordinate units, such as a division.
The type of order that may be issued to a theater commander in one
of the larger units does not necessarily follow that detailed form.
It may be included in a letter of instructions. It may be a telegram
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1645
sent out by the Chief of Staff. It may be very brief or it may be very
long, depending on the person that 'is writing it and the desire or
instruction he wishes to convey.
Senator Ferguson. Does the rule itself, in the book, give an excep-
tion when it goes to a theater commander ?
General Gerow. I would like to read the Field Service Regulations
regarding larger units.
Senator Ferguson. What are you reading from ?
General Gerow. I am reading
Senator Ferguson. War Department Staff OflScers Field Manual?
General Gerow. No, sir. That is a book that pertains primarily
to the details of these subordinate orders rather than to the orders
issued to the large units. I shall be very glad to have you look at this
or I will read the paragraph.
[4^53] Senator Ferguson. Suppose you read the paragraph.
General Gerow. This document is entitled "Field Manual 100-15,
War Department, Field Service Regulations," dated June 29, 1942.
On page 6, paragraph 15 reads :
The mission of tlie theater commander may be prescribed in an approved war
plan or it may be stated in a letter of instructions or other orders from the
President or the War Department. The mission assigned will usually be general
in character and leave great discretion to the theater commander. Ordinarily,
he is consulted prior to the promulgation of the plans. He may be called upon
to prepare such plans.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you claim that your order of the 27th
followed that?
General Gerow. I don't believe, sir, that it was necessary that it
should follow that manual.
Senator F erguson. As I understand it, you don't claim it did follow
that manual ?
General Gerow. No, sir, I didn't make that statement. I would
have to analyze the message to see whether it followed it exactly or not.
Senator Ferguson. Are there any other memoranda in that book?
General Gerow. Yes, sir, the book
[4354-1 Senator Ferguson. I mean in relation to the order.
General Gerow. That is the pertinent paragraph, I believe, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with the Staff Officers' Field
Manual? For instance, on page 31, "Command Responsibility":
a. The commander alone is responsible to his superior for all that his unit
does or fails to do. He cannot shift this responsibility to his staff or to subordi-
nate commanders.
Then under "Liaison" :
Liaison is the connection between units or other elements, established by a
representative — usually an oflBcer — of one unit who visits or remains with another
unit. Its purpose is to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal
contact.
General Gerow. May I have a reference to the page you are reading
from, sir?
Senator Ferguson. I didn't know you had the same book.
General Gerow. I think I have the same book, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Page 31, paragraph 47.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
1646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Now, when General Short used in his message
the word "liaison," with the Navy, wouldn't that be what he meant in
Army language ?
General Gerow. No, sir, I don't think so, sir. The [4^55'\
liaison referred to is when a commander, such as an Army commander,
sends an officer from his staff down to a corps commander's head-
quarters. That officer is his particular representative there at the
moment. He keeps him advised of the operations of that corps. He
reports back periodically to his higher commander.
This liaison with the Navy, as it is used in, I think in Hawaii, was
meant the close association between the two commanders themselves,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, what is this definition that I read, where
is the definition that you are giving ?
General Gerow. May I read the paragraph again, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, read it aloud.
General Gerow (reading) :
Liaison is the connection between units or other elements, established by a
representative — usually an officer — of one unit who visits or remains with another
unit. Its purpose is to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal
contact.
Now, as I understand General Short's relations to Admiral Kimmel,
he did not visit at headquarters and remain with that headquarters,
but he was in constant touch with that particular command head-
quarters and exchanged views, they exchanged views between them-
selves.
[4^56] Senator Ferguson. Does this liaison definition apply
only in the Army itself? Have you any definition in any of the
books that would show what liaison with another branch, the Navy,
would mean ?
General Gerow. There may be a definition in some field manual,
I don't recall, but it would be customary, and it was customary in
my operations, when operating with the Navy, I would send one of
my staff officers to the admiral commanding the fleet operating with
me. He was my personal representative with that Navy commander,
and he reported back to me the information he thought I should
have.
Senator Ferguson. I am trying to get what the manuals or regula-
tions show. Will you look at page 30, at the bottom of the page,
under paragraph 46, "Reports."
General Gerow. Subparagraph b.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Gerow. Do you wish me to read that ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Gerow (reading) :
The merit of a report is not measured by its length. A concise presentation
of important points usually is all that is required.
Senator Ferguson. Would General Short's reply comply with that
regulation ?
[4357] General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 39, number 63, will you read
that?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1647
General Gerow. What is the number of the paragraph ?
Senator Ferguson. Number 63, page 39.
General Gerow. (reading) :
Supervision of Execution. The responsibilities of the commander and his
staff do not end with the issue of the necessary orders. They must insure
receipt of the orders by the proper commanders, make certain they are under-
stood, and enforce their effective execution.
Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't there a special provision in there that
when the message of the 27th was sent — it says they must "insure,"
that would be the General Staff, "receipt of the orders," that is the
first thing, "by the proper commanders, make certain they are under-
stood"— so when they report back isn't the burden on the one giving
the order to ascertain if the order was understood by the one that
it was sent to ?
Isn't that what that provision says ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir, that is what it states.
Senator Ferguson. Then :
* * ♦ and enforce their effective execution.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
[4S58] Senator Ferguson. That is a clear understanding.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, would the man in the field then be able
to rely upon that, that having sent back his order, that it was under-
stood here in Washington, because the burden was, under the rule, on
the people in Washington to know what was being done there, how
it was understood ; isn't that the way the order reads ?
General Gerow. Senator, may I have that question again?
Senator Ferguson. I will reframe it. Strike the last question.
Under this rule, where the burden is on the one who sends the order
to make certain that it is understood, wouldn't the field officer. General
Short, have a right to rely upon the fact, having sent what he had,
that the interpretation was proper, having sent the order ?
General Gerow. I think that is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct, isn't it ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Not having heard anything for the number of
days between the 28th and the 7th, he would have a right to rely upon
that fact, that they had understood his order, and that he had properly
interpreted the order of the 27tli ?
[43591 General Gerow. I think that is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. You mean understood his report.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Let's go to page
General Gerow. But, of course — I haven't studied these books — ^but
I think you will find in some of these pamphlets that the commander
on the ground that is responsible, if there is any doubt in his mind
as to what the commander wants him to do, it is perfectly proper for
him to come back to that commander and ask for a clarification of
those instructions. If he is in doubt as to whether the action he has
taken is proper he is perfectly within his rights to come back and re-
quest confirmation on his action.
1648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. I am going to ask you, General, when we get
through with the ones that I have, if you look over this and find some-
thing else that you want to bring to our attention, you may do so.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. On page 49, under paragraph 71, I wish you
would read "a", and "b", under that.
General Gerow. "a" and ''b" under paragraph 71 ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, on page 49.
eGneral Gerow [reading] :
Technique of Orders, a. Purpose. The purpose of a [4360] unifoi-in
technique throughout the service in the preparation of orders is to promote clarity
and to prevent misunderstanding. The points of technique discussed iu the
following subparagraphs have been found helpful.
b. Amount of Detail. Orders should be concise. Those giving missions for
subordinate units should prescribe only such details or methods of execution as
are necessary to insure that the actions of the subordinate unit concerned will
conform to the plan of operation for the force as a whole. In many cases, brevity
is governed by the state of training of the troops for whom the order is intended ;
for a newly organized or poorly trained unit, the orders of necessity must be more
detailed than for the well-trained organization.
Senator Ferguson. Was that in effect at the time, on the 7th?
General Gerow. I will have to check up to see what date this docu-
ment is, sir.
Senator Ferguson. August 19, mine is dated.
General Gerow. Yes, sir. It shows the date of August 19, 1940.
Senator Ferguson. It would be in effect?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 51, number i on that page, "Af-
firmative." Will you read that?
14361] General Gerow. (reading): Paragraph i:
Affirmative. In the interests of simplicity and clarity, the affirmative form
of expression should be used. Such an order as "The trains will not accompany
the regiment" is defective because the gist of the order depends upon the single
word "not." A ttetter form is "The trains will remain at Leavenworth." No
doubt arises in the latter case.
Senator Ferguson. Now, down under "k", I think you might read
it all.
General Gerow. (reading) :
k. Avoidance of Highly Technical Language. The military profession like all
other professions has developed a technical vocabulary. This vocabulary is con-
venient and aids in the clear and rapid transference of ideas between military
persons. The use of this vocabulary in texts and instructions is natural. In
combat orders it is essential that there be no opportunity for misunderstanding
by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used. With par-
tially trained troops and staffs the use of technical military language may afford
opportunities for such misunderstandings. Therefore the use in combat orders
of technical expressions should be avoided if there is any danger of misunderstand-
ing. In such cases, words of common understanding should be substituted, even at
the sacrifice of brevity.
[4^362] Senator Ferguson. Were you here when General Mar-
shall spoke about the meaning of the first overt act ?
General Gerow. No, sir; I was not present at the hearing, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say that that was an expression
that could be easily interpreted ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1649
Senator Ferguson. Now, when you only gave the message to — the
message of the 27th, it is on page 7 of exhibit 32 — to "minimum
essential officers" — who would you say should have gotten that infor-
mation about the first overt act?
General Gekow. I would have given it to every officer that I
thought should have that information in order to carry out his
mission. I may have given that information to some second lieutenant
if I thought it was necessary. That is left to the commander's dis-
cretion, as to the people that he should disseminate that information
to.
Senator Ferguson. It says :
In combat orders it is essential tliat there be no opportunity for misunder-
staudinj? by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
General Ferguson. Now, have you got FM-100-5, May 22, 1941,
Field Service Eegulations, War Department, Operations?
[4363'\ General Gerow. No, sir ; I failed to bring that document
with me, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I am going to pass it to you and ask you
to read: On page 30, number 149; on page 31, 149 and 150; on
page 31, 154; on page 32, 156; and the first two sentences of 157.
I will indicate them for you.
General Gerow. Yes, sir. I didn't get all those numbers.
Senator Ferguson. They are marked.
(The pamphlet referred to was handed to General Gerow.)
[4^J64\ General Gerow. Paragraph 156.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Gerow (reading) :
As a I'ule it is desirable to keep contemplated operations secret as long as
possible and to confine knowledge thereof to a few staff officers and senior
commanders. However, upon entry into action noi unit should be in doubt
as to what the commander wants it to do. Whenever knowledge of his inten-
tions is necessary to insure the cooperation of tlie units engaged, a commander
does not hesitate to disclose them to all concerned. Ignorance of his inten-
tions may often lead to inactivity on the part of subordinates.
Paragraph 157. (Reading:)
It is impossible to prescribe detailed forms of orders to fit every tactical
situation. To attempt to do so would result in a rigid form and a routine style
of expression which would not be in accord with the tactical requirements
sented by the diverse situations that arise in war. To the extent practicable,
however, it has been found efficient and convenient to classify combat orders
accorrling to their purpose and scope and, for some of these, to adopt a
standard sequence of composition. This makes for ease of understanding,
the [/f365] avoidance of omissions, and ready reference. Moreover, ex-
perience has shown that an order which can be misunderstood will be misunder-
stood and that, to obviate this danger, it is necessary to follow certain rules
relating to the designations of boundaries, details of time and place, military
terminology, abbreviations, designations of units, and the like. For details
relating to these matters, see FM 101-5.
Did you have something-
Senator Ferguson. I gave you a sheet there with the page numbers
on it. Then I drew a line down to the paragraph.
General Gerow. Oh, yes.
Senator Ff.rguson. Can you make it out?
79716 — 46 — i)t. 4 6
1650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Gerow. I am trying to find it now. Paragraph 149 on
page 30. [Reading:]
The authority to issue orders is an inherent function of command. Orders are
normally issued to next subordinate commanders. Bypassing the normal chan-
nels of command is resorted to only in urgent situations ; in such cases both the
commander issuing and the commander receiving the order should notify inter-
mediate commanders of its purport as soon as possible.
kSenator Ferguson. Is that on page 31 ?
General Gerow. That is page 30, sir.
[4366] Senator Ferguson. Page 30?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. I am reading now paragraph 150 on page
30, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
General Gerow. (reading) :
Orders may be either complete or fragmentary.
The order is complete when it coves all essential aspects and phases of the
operation. Complete orders include missions to all subordinate units charged with
the execution of tactical operations in carrying out the commander's plan.
Fragmentary orders are used when speed in delivery and execution is impera-
tive. Fragmentary orders are issued successively as the situation develops and
decisions are made, and consist of separate instructions to one or more subordinate
units prescribing the part each is to play in the operation or in the separate phases
thereof. This procedure will be usual in divisions and smaller units. Frag-
mentary orders may be either oral or written. They are concise but not at the
expense of clarity and omission of essential information. Instructions issued
in fragmentary orders may be repeated in a complete field order or in an annex
if considered desirable.
[4-367] Senator Ferguson. Now page 31, paragraph 154.
General Gerow (reading) :
Orders must be clear and explicit and as brief as is consistent with clarity;
short sentences are easily understood. Clarity is more important than tech-
nique. The more urgent the situation, the greater the need for conciseness in
the order. Any statement of reasons for measui*es adopted should be limited
to what is necessary to obtain intelligent cooperation from subordinates. De-
tailed instructions for a variety of contingencies, or prescriptions that are a
matter of training, do not inspire confidence and have no place in an order.
Trivial and meaningless expressions divide responsibility and lead to the adop-
tion of half measures by subordinates. Exaggerated and bombastic phrases
invite ridicule and weaken the force of an order. Expressions such as "attack
vigorously," if used in orders, are not only verbose and meaningless, but tend
to weaken the force of subsequent orders in which such expressions do not
appear.
[4368] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Army Board
classified or described the order of November 27 from General Mar-
shall to General Short, on page 7 of Exhibit 32, as a "do-don't" order?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I know they classified it as such, but I do
not know the reasons therefor.
Senator Ferguson. But under the instructions that you have just
read would you classify it as a "do-don 't" order?
General Gerow. No, sir; I would not, sir. I do not think we find
\n this message any definite don'ts. May I-
Senator Ferguson. Well, what about the
Mr. Murphy. May the witness finish his answer?
The Vice Chairman. Let the General finish his answer. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. Go ahead, General.
^ PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1651
General Gerow. The first sentence I would like to read with refer-
ence to that is as follows (reading from page 7 of Exhibit 32) :
If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit
the first overt act.
That is a desire.
This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course
of action that might jeopardize your defense.
That sentence gives him the right to do anything that he [4369']
considers necessary in his discretion to safeguard the Island of Oahu
and carry out his mission.
There is another sentence, sir, which I would also like to read, if I
may, sir:
You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you
deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not,
to alarm civil population or disclose intent.
Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't that a do-don't, do something at first
but don't do the other? Don't you think they were correct when they
described it that way ?
General Gerow. The message does not state, sir, that "you "will
definitely not alarm the civil population."
Senator Ferguson. Under the first one that you read you have got
this word "unpredictable." That is not a very definite term, is it?
General Gerow. I did not read that sentence. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. No. I want you to read it.
General Gerow. All right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I will read it and pick out the word that I want
and ask you about the word.
General Gerow. All right, sir.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated.
[4S70] You helped to draft this order, did you not. General ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Where did you get the word "appear" from?
You had already sent a message on the 24th, the joint message that
they were broken off.
General Gerow. What date is that message you refer, to, sir?
Senator Ferguson. I think it is the 24th.
Mr. Mitchell. Page 5 of Exhibit 32.
General Gerow. Page 5 ?
Senator Ferguson. That does not use the language I had in mind.
It was another message. "Chances of favorable outcome" is the lan-
guage of that.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggnssive
movement * * *.
Do you know whether or not this language of "appear"
General Gerow. I did not understand you.
1652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK ,
Senator Ferguson (continuing). Was used because the Secretary of
War had talked with the Secretary of State ?
[4^371] General Gerow. Yes, sir. I think I testified previously,
as I recall my testimony, I was called to the office of the Secretary of
War about 9 : 30 on the morning of November the 27th. I went up
there for a second conference with him later on in the morning. Dur-
ing that conference it is my recollection now that the Secretary of
War talked to the Secretary of State on the telephone with regard
to the question as to whether or not negotiations with Japan had ac-
tually terminated. As a result of that conversation the Secretary of
War directed that the sentence as written in this message cover the
statement as to the status of negotiations with Japan at that time,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then it was in your first draft of this message
that you had a definite term that they were broken off?
General Gerow. I cannot recall exactly that message, sir, but it is
my impression now that I took a message in, sir, which stated "nego-
tiations are terminated."
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Instead of doing it — or instead of being
in the joint message — it was in your original message?
General Gerow. I believe it was, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
General Gerow. I have tried to find a copy of that [Ji372']
message, sir, and I cannot locate it and I am relying now on memory 4
years old.
Senator Ferguson. That is a long time.
General Gerow. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Then the next words are, "barest possibilities."
That is pretty indefinite, isn't it ?
General Gerow. Well, sir, I would not say it was pretty indefinite.
I think it means exactly what it says, that there is the barest pos-
sibility of it being resumed. It is perfectly clear to me, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then the words "Japanese Government might
come back,"
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And then this "unpredictable, but hostile ac-
tion possible."
General Gerow. But, sir, "Japanese future action unpredictable
but hostile action possible at any moment."
Just what that action would be and where it would be was not
clear to any of us at that time, sir, but we felt that hostile action was
possible at any moment and particularly against our possessions in the
Pacific.
Senator Ferguson. Wlien did you first think or come to the con-
clusion that hostile action would" be directed against Hawaii?
[4373] General Gerow. Senator, I participated in the prepara-
tion of this message and I state in that message, sir, or it is stated
in the Chief of Staff's message, that "Japanese future action is un-
predictable but hostile action possible at any moment."
I do not think I ever came to the conclusion, sir, that the Japs
were going to attack Hawaii and no other place. I felt that they
would attack any one of our possessions bordering on the Pacific.
That was a possibility, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1653
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever have a mental conclusion,
then, prior to actual notice of the attack that Japan would attack
Hawaii ? Did you ever think that they would attack Hawaii ? Was
that within your thoughts ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I considered it as one of the possibilities
in the event war occurred with Japan. •
Senator Ferguson. Now, "possibility" is a very weak expression,
isn't it, in the possibilities ?
General Gerow. No, sir; I do not think it is weak under the cir-
cumstances, Senator. There were several possibilities there.
Senator Ferguson. You did not even say it was a probability. You
say it was only a possibility.
General Gerow\ Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is that what I understand ?
[4r?/'4] General Gerow. It was a possibility that they might
attack any one of our possessions in the Pacific.
Senator Ferguson. But it did not get the dignity of a probability
in your opinion ?
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
General Gerow. Well, I think. Senator, I would say it was probable
that they might attack any one of our four major areas bordering on
the Pacific, sir.
Senator Ferguson. General, one of your duties, as I understand
you, was to send out messages for action, keeping the field informed.
General Gerow. No, sir; Senator. I think I stated, sir; that my
responsibility was to prepare messages and submit them to the Chief
of Staff and the Secretary of War for their approval. In any emer-
gency, if the Chief of Staff was not there, I would assume the re-
sponsibility for sending them and accept the consequences if I made
a mistake.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, one of your duties, then, was
to prepare messages and submit them to the Chief of Staff?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And those messages would be what is known as
action messages, not information but action?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
[4^75] Senator Ferguson. Therefore, it would be necessary
for you to determine the time when such a message ought to go ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Isn't that correct?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you at any time make up your mind
that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor so that you could
have determined to prepare a message?
General Gerow. Senator, I think I testified here before, sir, that I
never made up my mind that Hawaii was the only place that the Japs
might attack. My thinking was that we had certain possessions in
the Pacific ; that if war with Japan occurred that Japan might attack
any one or all of those possessions.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I am not including the words "or others."
I want to know just about Hawaii, that, Pearl Harbor.
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I concluded that an attack on Pearl
Harbor, among others, was possible or probable.
1654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Now, can you answer it without "and others" '^
General Gerow. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I want to know just whether or not
General Gerow. No, sir ; I cannot.
[4S76] Senator Ferguson. All right.
General Gerow. I tried to be as positive as I can on it.
^r. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
General Gerow. I tried to picture my thoughts at the time, which
was that Japan might attack any one of our possession in the Pacific,
I did not pick out any one of them and give it first priority.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. The next question is
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. No, not at this time.
The Chairman. All right, proceed.
Senator Ferguson. The next question is, General Bryden, did he
confer with you on any of these messages ?
General Gerow. General Bryden accompanied me when I went in
to the office of the Secretary of War on the morning of November the
27th. Later on the messages that had been prepared were presented
to him for his approval and I think he initialed them, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Where is General Bryden now ? Is he in Wash-
ington ?
General Gerow. I believe he is retired, sir. I do not know where he
is living.
Senator Ferguson. Did you help to prepare the memo to [4'?77]
the President of the 5th of November? I think it is exhibit 16.
General Gerow. As I recall now, sir; the War Plans Division of
the Army and the War Plans Division of the Navy cooperated in the
preparation of that message, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you personally help to prepare it? ,
General Gerow. The original drafts were perhaps prepared by the
committees that worked under my supervision and these were then
presented to me for my approval or change.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there was an ABCD, the
basic military policies on strategy agreed to in the United States-
British staff conversations, did you know about that ?
General Gerow. You are referring now, sir, to the ADB Singapore
conference?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I knew about that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And did you know that there was a certain
line fixed as indicated on pages 4 and 5 (reading from Exhibit 16).
Until such time as .Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose secu-
rity to tlie United States is of very great importance. Military action against
Japan should be undertaken only in one or more [^378] of the following
contingencies.
General Gerow. May I ask, Senator, where you are reading from,
sir?
Senator Ferguson. On the bottom of page 4.
General Gerow. And the paragraph?
Senator Ferguson, (b)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1655
General Gerow. Paragraph (b). May T take a moment to read
that?
Senator Ferguson, Yes, I want you to take a moment.
General Gerow. May I have the question again, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to know v,hether you were familiar
with the terms of that agreement. It says :
Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of
the following contingencies,
not in that agreement, but under those contingencies. Were you
familiar with that?
General Gerow. I was familiar, yes, sir; with the staff conversa-
tions in Singapore and the recommendations of the members who
participated in that conference, as to what they considered should be
done in the event the Japanese did certain things, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were they in effect on the 5th of November
1941?
[4-379] General Gerow. In effect, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Gerow. They could not be put into
Senator Ferguson. So far as you knew.
General Gerow. They could not be put into effect without the
approval of our respective governments. They were purely staff con-
versations between military personnel.
Senator Ferguson. All right. As far as you knew, then, they were
not in effect, is that correct ?
General Gerow. They had never been approved by our Government,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted to find out.
General Gerow. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That is what you knew.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you at the meeting — in the minutes of the
meeting of November 3, 1941, that were attached to that? I do not
see your name on it.
General Gerow. I do not know what the document is, what meeting
you refer to, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you show him the first page ?
General Gerow, What date is that, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. This is on November 3, 1941.
General Gerow, Yes, sir; my name is on the list as be- [43801
ing present, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is it ? Oh, yes, it is, "Acting Chief of Staff, War
Plans Division,"
General Gerow, Yes, sir. I think you stated, Senator, that this
document was attached to the memorandum that went to the President.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you straighten it out?
General Gerow, As far as I know it was not attached, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You know it was not ?
General Gerow, Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. On the bottom of page 2, then, did you hear
Captain Schuirmann give that statement to the board meeting?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
1656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Now, at that time he pointed out that on August
17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr.
Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it
would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of
further Japanese aggression. You heard that ?
General Gerow. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you understand it ?
[4SS1] General Gerow. Yes, sir; I think I did.
Senator Ferguson. Did you agree with it?
General Gerow. I was not asked to agree with it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Pardon?
General Gerow. I was not asked to agree with it.
Senator Ferguson. I ask you now did you agree to it?
General Gerow. I cannot recall now that I agreed to it at the time
or made any statement regarding it.
Senator Ferguson. Was it a fact or not a fact ?
General Gerow. I cannot testify as to whether it was a fact or not
a fact. Captain Schuirmann is, as I understand, presenting his views
as to what happened at a State Department meeting at which I was
not present.
Senator Ferguson. No, I am asking you whether or not you were
of the same opinion at that time ?
Mr. MuKPHY. Mr. Chairman, I submit that question is not a fair
question.
General Gerow. I do not quite understand
Mr. Murphy. I would like to state my reasons for it.
General Gerow. I cannot quite understand the question, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I will put it this way: Were you of the opinion
that when the President returned from a meeting at sea with Mr.
Churchill the President had issued an ulti- \43S2'] matum to
Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action
in case of further Japanese aggression? Now, I have read what
Schuirmann said.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you of that opinion ?
General Gerow. I have no first-hand knowledge, sir, if the President
issued such a statement, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you did not even know at that
time that the President had issued such a statement?
General Gerow. No. sir.
Senator Ferguson. Or any statement?
General Gf.how. No. sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
General Gerow. I do not say that. I stated I had no first-hand
knowledge that came to my memory that the President had issued it.
I had seen, I believe, information concerning it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, what was your mental reaction on what
you had seen? "Wliat conclusion did you draw? Schuirmann tells us
here what he drew. What did you draw ?
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering. Will the
Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. I decline to yield.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1657
[p83] The Chairman. I think there is a parliamentary question
here and the Chair onglit to hear it.
Senator Lucas. Well, I withdraw it.
The Chairman. All right. Go ahead, if you please.
General Gerow. Will you repeat that question again, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. Will you read the question, please?
Senator Lucas. You are trying to trap a great General in these
inconsistencies.
(Whereupon the question was read by the reporter as follows:
"Well, what was your mental reaction on what you had seen ? What
conclusion did you draw? Schuirmann tells us here what he drew.
What did you draw?")
Senator Ferguson. Do j'Ou understand my question?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; but a conclusion as to what, sir — as to
whether the President had issued an ultimatum or as to whether we
should go to war in case of further aggression ?
Senator Ferguson. Whether or not he had issued an ultimatum.
General Gerow. Well, I have stated. Senator, that to my own
knowledge, to my own personal knowledge, I do not know that he
issued an ultimatum.
[iSS^] Senator Ferguson. All right, that is all I wanted to
know. Now, the next question : On the 27th — that is Exhibit 17 — did
you help to prepare that?
General Gerow. I believe this document was prepared, sir, by the
War Plans Division of the Army and the War Plans Division of the
Navy working together.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with it ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversations in relation to
the modus vivendi ?
General Gerow. As I recall, sir, I attended a conference in the
State Department on November the 21st in which a paper setting out
tentative proposals to Japan were discussed. I do not know whether
that was known as a modus vivendi or what name the State Depart-
ment gave it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether when the State Depart-
ment had decided to send their message, which changea iiis meaninj;"
of the message to try to get Jap consent, whether you remember that
term "modus vivendi" in it ?
General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not recall definitely where I received
that information or if I did. If the Chief of Staff had it he probably
informed me of that fact, sir, but I cannot recall at this time just
when he did or if he did.
['4'385] Senator Ferguson. You do not have that in mind?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know upon whose orders the words were
put in the message of the 27th about the first overt act? Did you
have any knowledge of that?
General Gerow. I think I received instructions from General Mar-
shall to include a statement of that sort in the message.
Senator Ferguson. Did he advise you where he had received any-
thing about it ?
1658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Gerow. I do not recall definitely at this time, no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You do not recall?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Senator Fekciuson. Now, will you take Exhibit 45 ? That is a letter
or memorandum to General Marshall on the 27th, your memorandum.
General (tergw. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You say there that : "The Secretary of War sent
for me at 9 : 30" on that morning and "he wanted to know" — the Secre-
tary wanted to know — "what warning messages have been sent to
General MacArthur and what were proposed."
Do you remember that conversation?
14^386] General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was there at that time anything said about
sending one to General Short ?
General Gerow. Not at that particular time. I think later on in
my second conference with the Secretary of War that sending mes-
sages to all of our overseas possessions in the Pacific were discussed.
Senator Ferguson. Well, isn't this a memo of your conversation,
with the Secretary of War?
General Gerow. Yes, sir ; and may I go on to paragraph 2 ? There
is a statement in paragraph 2 which reads : "The various messages to
the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed."
Senator Ferguson. You recall those? ,
General Gerow. I wrote this, sir, on the day that it happened. I
think this is more accurate than my memory, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And does that refresh your memory, though, as
to whether or not any message to General Short was discussed, the
fact that a warning message for General MacArthur — no : "The various
messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre were
discussed."
General Gerow. Yes, that indicated to me that they were discussed.
Senator Ferguson. It indicates definitely that there 14387'\
was something said about sending one to General Short.
Genera] Gerow. To all of our Pacific commanders.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I will come down to the language: "The
Secretary of War" — in the same exhibit — "wanted to be sure that the
memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the
President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations."
Do you remember that,?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Where didyou get that language? Did the Sec-
retary of War actually tell you that?
General Gerow. I imagine he did, sir, because I wrote it.
Senator Ferguson. You wrote it right in here?
General Gerow. I wrote it on the 27th and that is the only place I
could have gotten it was to have the_ Secretary tell me, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did vou discuss it with the Secretary of War
as to why that was in there?
General Gerow. No, sir; I do not recall any such discussion. I
might have, sin
Senator Ferguson. Do vou know what your conversation with Gen-
eral Marshall on that point was?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1659
General Gerow. I do not believe I had a conversation with General
Marshall on that. This memorandum went in to him [J/.-iSS] on
the evening of the 27th and I believe that he read it when he returned
to the oHice on the morning of the 28th. I can not recall whether he
sent for me on that morning and discussed it with me or not. I was in
and out of his office daily, sometimes once, sometimes four or five times
during the day, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You prepared the statement on the 27th for
General Marshall or did someone else prepare it?
General Gerow. Which statement now are you referring to?
Senator Ferguson. The one of November 27. It is Exhibit 17. Is
that the instrument that they were talking about that was not to con-
tain a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen
the conversations?
General Gerow. I think I stated, sir, that this document was pre-
Earecl by the War Plans Division of the Army and the War Plans
'ivision of the Navy working together, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you check it for that item, do you
know, as to whether or not it did contain or did not contain any request
to Japan?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You checked it for that?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
General Gerow. And I think the statement in my memo- [4389]
randum is to the effect that I reassured the Secretary on that point,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. You reassured him later?
General Gerow. That is in the memorandum, sir. There is a
sentence which I would like to re^id from that memorandum.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
General Gerow. That said: "He" — meaning the Secretary — "was
reassured on that point."
Senator Ferguson. You reassured him?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
.Senator Ferguson. After you had checked the memorandum?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. I had the memorandum with me, sir,
I believe, at the time.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there were Jap scouting
planes over the Philippines, over Clark Field and the other fields,
prior to the time of the attack at Pearl Harbor? Did you get any
word on that?
General Gerow. I have a very hazy recollection of hearing some-
one state that the Japanese had sent planes over some of our areas.
I cannot recall definitely, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you of the opinion that if a proper
alerted condition existed at Pearl Harbor that the Japanese should
have been defeated in their attack ?
[4390] General Gerow. I think our losses out there, sir, would
have been much less had the command been completely alerted.
Senator Ferguson. That is the only answer you want to make?
General Gerow. I cannot quite interpret what you mean, sir, by
"defeated." There are all degrees of defeat, sir.
1660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Well, how much of a defeat, or what qualifica-
tion?
General Gerow. Well, they would have lost some planes. They
may have lost some carriers, they may have lost some of their other
major vessels.
Senator Ferguson. Did you hear what General Marshall had said
on that same question ?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Or similar question?
General Gerow. Sir?
Senator Ferguson. A question along that same line?
General Gerow. No, sir. I was not here when he testified, only
one afternoon, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You never came to any conclusion as to what
would have happened there if we had been properly alerted?
General Gerow. You say I never came to any conclusion ?
Senator Ferguson. I say, have you ?
[4-'^91] General Gerow. Yes, sir. I just stated if we had been
properly alerted that our losses there would probably have been much
less.
Senator Ferguson. What about their losses ?
General Gerow. Their losses would have been much greater, the
Japanese losses.
Senator Ferguson. But you would not want to classify it as to
whether or not they would be defeated in that encounter or not ?
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I submit that question has been
answered twice in the last five minutes.
General Gerow. Well, sir, I
The Chairman. The Chair sustains the point of order.
Senator Ferguson. Do you claim. General, that you have answered
that question ?
Mr. Murphy. All right, go ahead.
General Gerow. I think I answered it, Senator. I will be very glad,
sir, to have the question repeated and attempt to answer it again, sir.
Senator Ferguson. No, I just want to know whether or not you feel
that you did answer it ?
General Gerow. I thought I did, sir, but if I did not make myself
clear I would Hke to have the opportunity of making myself clear, sir.
[4S92] Senator Ferguson. It was not clear to me. General, or
I would not be asking the question again.
General Gerow. All right. I am here, sir, to clear up any points
that I can. I have no desire to be vague on anything that I am cer-
tain of.
Senator Ferguson. I realize that. It has been a long time since
this happened.
General Gerow. Yes. sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that is tlie reason I have asked you the
number of questions that I have, to let you have time to think about
them and to see whether or not we could get what was known at that
time.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And what was not known, that is all.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1661
General Gerow. If I can clarify anything, Senator, if you will ask
me the question I will do my best to, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. No, that is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe?
Mr. Keefe. General Gerow, I shall not detain you very long.
General Gerow. Thank you, sir. I am very grateful.
Mr. Keefe. I think you are a great officer, that is all I can say.
General Gerow. Thank you again, sir.
[4S9o] Mr. Keefe, There are just one or two things that I am
not clear on.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You testified before the Army board under oath?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you told them what you knew about this whole
situation ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Then Major Clausen came over to France some time in
1945, as I recall, where you were stationed ?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And talked to you about the testimony you had given
before the Army Board ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Is that right ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And I presume before the affidavit that you signed
finally was drawn, you had considerable discussions with Major
Clausen about your testimony?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And the testimony of others that had testified before that
Board?
General Gerow. Primarily directed toward two or three 14'^94]
people. I think Colonel Bratton's testimony and Colonel Sadtler's
testimony.
I don't think we went into the details of the others, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And I presume you had a considerable talk with Colonel
Clausen before an affidavit was finally drawn ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. He made some longhand notes, did he, and then went
some place and prepared an affidavit?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe, And asked you to sign it ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. He took down the penciled notes. I gave
him my testimony rather formally. He made the notes and I had
no office facilities there, I was living in a sort of villa place and I had
no typist or anything, so he took the notes of the testimony, sir, and
typed them himself.
Mr, Keefe. And then when he brought the typed affidavit back you
read it over?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe, You found some things in it that you did not think you
had stated, or that he had misunderstood ?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
1662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. And you decided that you would draw your own
[4J05] affidavit?
General Gerow. Yes. I went over it fully, sir, and revised it
and cut out thin<Ts and added things.
Mv. Keefe. Did you draw the new affidavit yourself or did Colonel
Clausen re-draft it under your instructions?
General Geijow. No, sir. I sat there and took the draft that he
liad there and went through it and changed it and scratched things
cait and put in in pencil the things that I thought should go in
there as presenting the facts.
Mr. Keefe. And then it was re-drawn?
General Gerow. It was re-typed.
Mr. Keefe. And you signed it?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
INI r. Keefe. And he swore you to it?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
ISIr. Keefe. Did you know the purpose for which he was asking
you to make this affidavit? Did he disclose that to you?
General Gerow. I think he stated sir, that after I had made my
testimony there was other testimony which I did not have an oppor-
tunity to reply to and that involved me and that he was trying to
get my testimony on those particular points, particularly, as I say,
iliat had reference to Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler's testi-
mony.
[4^00] Mr. Keefe. Did he call your attention to the testimony
that Colonel Bratton had given before the Army board?
General Gerow. Yes, sir, I think he gave it to me in a brief sum-
mary form. I do not believe, sir, that he had a transcript of the
testimony. I do not believe I have ever seen that, sir.
INIr. Keefe. Did he tell you also what Sadtler testified to before the
Army Board?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. •
Mr, Keefe. And did he indicate that theii^ testimony was in
conllict with the testimony that you had given before the Board?
General Gerow. No, sir, he did not indicate that. As I recall now,
i*- was testimony that had come out subsequently that was not in
conflict, as 1 now understand, with anything I had stated but I did
not cover magic.
Mr. Keefe. I see.
Genertd Gekow. In my first statement before the Army board,
or in my only statement before the Army board, because I never
iiad an opportunity to appear before it again.
Mr. Keefe. Now, when you were in before the Army board, or
after you testified, were you furnished a copy of the transcript of
your testimony and given an opportunity to correct it?
[4S!^7\ General Gerow. 1 es, sir; 1 was furnished a transcript
and 1 read it o\er and turned it in to the board, sir.
Mv. Keefe. And whatever corrections you had to make in your
testimony that you gave before the Army board were made before
it was finally accepted by the board?
General Gerow. I imagine they were, sir. I never saw a copy of
that board's i-eport until I came back here for this committee hear-
ing, sir. I was never furnished a copy and I never saw it until I
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1663
Mr. Keefe. Pardon me, but in your testimony before the Army
board, of course, you made no reference whatever to magic?
General Gekow. No, sir. In my testimony, I think I stated yes-
terday, that I began to get on magic and I realized that I should not
talk about it and I stopped myself and they allowed me to para-
phrase. That is the only time we got into it at all, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, one other thing I would like to get clear in my
mind. I will admit some confusion still exists in the face of all you
said about his message of the 27tli.
General Gekow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. General Marshall testified that he left at 1 o'clock on
the 26th and went down to the maneuvers.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Iveefe. And did you not come back until the evening of the
[4-308] 27th?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Isn't that correct, he was not here on the afternoon
of the 26th nor all day of the 27th ?
Ganeral Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. I^EFE. Now, any conversations that you had with Geiieral
Marshall in respect to this message of the 27th, therefore, must have
been had before 1 o'clock on the 26th ?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That is true?
General Geroav. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And any instructions that General Marshall had given
you as to the language in the proposed alert message to go to the
Pacific outposts must have been had on the morning of the 26th ?
General Gerow. Either on the 25th or the 26th, the morning of
the 26th.
Mr. Keefe. The 25th or the 26th?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
[4399] Mr. Keefe. So when it came to actually drafting the
message, when was it actually drafted, the first drafting, the after-
noon of the 26th or morning of the 27th, or when ?
General Gerow. Sir, I tried to remember exactly what happened
on that morning. I notice in my memorandum here it stated — I
state here, sir, "I then showed him a copy of the draft message
discussed at the Joint Board meeting."
This is a memorandum of November 27, sir,"* that I sent in to tlie
chief of staff. I think, in making that statement, I was trying to
fix in General Marshall's mind he place that he had discussed this
message with me. I did not intend to state positively that that
message was actually discussed formally at the Joint Board meeting.
I have a very hazy recollection, sir, that General Marshall was in a
hurry to get away, that the Joint Board meeting had been quite a
long one, that he had told me earlier on the morning of the 26th
about the message prepared for him, and perhaps to finish up this
memorandum that was to go to the President.
I had, I believe. Colonel Bundy and one or two of my best officers
working on it. I think when the Joint Board meeting was over, had
been formally concluded. General Marshall turned to me and said
1664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
with respect to this message and memorandum, we went from the
Joint Board room into my office, which was quite close there, and
Colonel Bundy came to the door [4400] of the Joint Board
room with this message, and General Marshall scanned it very quickly
and either told me it was all right, or all wrong, or to do something
else with it.
I walked down the hall, as I recall now, and he was in quite a con-
siderable hurry, and I believe he read either the memorandum or the
message as I walked down the hall with him to his office and finished
it before he got there. That was on the morning of the 26th, sir,
before he left at 1 o'clock.
Mr. Keefe. In that conversation, as he walked down the hall, did
he suggest some changes in the message?
General Gerow. I cannot recall that, sir.
Mr. Kj:ErE. Did the original draft of the message contain the
provision as to Japan committing the first overt act ?
General Gerow. I have tried to find that message, Mr. Congress-
man. I cannot locate it, and I cannot say positively that it did. I
believe that General Marshall had told me to prepare that message
and I think he probably told me about including the overt act at the
same time, and that I had prepared with those instructions in that
first draft of the message, which I cannot locate, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now on the afternoon of the 26th was it discussed
with anybody else, or was it redrafted ?
General Gerow. Not to mj^ recollection. I imagine I sat down
with Colonel Bundy and these other officers and between [4401]
us we worked out the message, sir.
Mr. Keefe. It was dated the 27th, the next day?
General Gerow. The next morning, yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. It was sent on the 27th ?
(xeneral Gerow. It was sent on the 27th, yes, sir.
Mr. Keet-e. When you sat down with Colonel Bundy, or any of these
other people, did you have the Navy message before you as to what
they proposed to send ?
General Gerow. I tried to remember that, sir. From my memory
I cannot definitely say I did, but Admiral Turner, whom I haven't had
a chance to talk to, can state whether we did or not. I just cannot say
when the Navy message was prepared.
I regret I cannot remember more than that, sir, but I just simply
cannot.
Mr. Keefe. General Gerow, may I say to you, sir, for anybody that
has been through the service that you have and rendered the magnifi-
cent service that you have during the war, I, for one, can well ap-
preciate that there are a lot of these details that you cannot remember.
I thank you, sir.
[4402] The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask one ques-
tion. In regard to your statement a while ago. General, that it is your
opinion that if the forces had been alerted in Hawaii, or at Pearl
Harbor, that the degree of success by the Japanese would have been
lessened. That is the effect of what you have stated ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You could not, of course, tell what Japanese ship or
plane might have been destroyed, if our forces had been alerted, nor
what ship or plane we might have saved.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1665
General Gerow. No, sir.
The Chairman. But taking the whole situation into consideration,
your opinion is that if that had happened, if that had been the status
of affairs, the degree of Japanese success against our materiel, our
forces and men, would have been considerably less; is that correct?
General Gerow. Yes, sir, that is correct, sir.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. General Gerow, as the head of the War Plans Di-
vision, I take it you were familiar with the plans for the defense of
the Philippine Islands.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
[44OS] Senator Lucas. Do you know at what time the Japs
struck the Philippine Islands ?
General Gerow. I should think it was probably 10 or 12 hours after
they struck Hawaii. I state that because I telephoned to the Phil-
ippines shortly after the attack on Hawaii, and the Philippines had
not been attacked at that time, sir.
Senator Lucas. To whom did you talk in the Philippines?
General Gekow. I talked to General MacArthur, sir.
Senator Lucas. Do you recall what time it was on Sunday, Decem-
ber 7, that you talked to General MacArthur ?
General Gerow. No, sir. I think probably the telephone log will
show that, sir. It was in the afternoon, sir, and I recall the conversa-
tion quite distinctly, sir.
Senator Lucas. Just briefly, what did you tell General MacArthur.
General Gerow. I told General MacArthur, sir, that Hawaii had
been attacked by the Japs, and he asked me what damage had been
done, and told him, sir, that the telephone was not secret, and I could
not divulge that information to him, and I asked him if anything had
happened out in his area, and he said "no," but there were a group of
planes approaching the Philippines at that time that had not been
identified, and he was sending up his planes [4404-1 to meet
them. Then he asked me to convey to General Marshall the statement
that they were on the alert out there, and ready to meet any emer-
gency. That is in substance the conversation as I now recall it, sir.
Senator Lucas. Plow many air fields did they have in the Phil-
ippines, do you recall?
General Geroav. Sir, I remember Clark Field, and Nichols Field,
and I think there was one at a place called Eba. I do not remember
how many more they had, sir.
Senator Lucas. Can you give to the committee the number of air-
planes that were in the Philippines at that time?
General Gerow. I do not have those figures with me, sir. The
War Department, I am sure, will be very glad to give that to you, sir.
Senator Lucas. Will you get that for us ? ^
General Gerow. I will see that they are given to the committee.
Senator Lucas. Do you recall getting any information from the
Philippines as to what happened to our bombers on Clark Field the
following day, after the war started?
General Gerow. I do not know, sir, whether we ever received an
operations report from the Philippines or not, with regard to that,
sir. I cannot recall at this time.
* See footnote on following page.
79716 — 46 — pt. 4 7
1666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[4405] Senator Lucas. Will you look for that also for me and
see whether or not any report was made from the Philippines with
respect to the number of bombers that were lost on Clark Field the
following day, after the Japs struck, or that afternoon? ^
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. General Gerow, a lot of information has come to
this committee during this hearing about the messages that were
intercepted and decoded and translated. You are, of course, familiar
with all that.
You were one of the high officers in the military branch of the Gov-
ernment who saw these magic messages from day to day?
General Gekow. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. General Marshall testified that it was through magic
that we really won the Battle of Midway, and the Coral Sea, and he
also testified it was magic that caused the damage to Yamamoto, I
believe.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Those are just a few examples that he gave to ug
of what magic had done in the way of security and information to
this nation.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. You are familiar with all of those, [4406]
of course.
General Gerow. I was not in Washington at that time. I left, you
see, in February of 1942. I have heard that statement made, sir.
Senator Lucas. Now, I take it that you agree that the keeping of
magic secret was a high and top military secret all through that war.
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I think it was vital that we preserve that
secrecy, sir.
Senator Lucas. There were only a few men in Washington that
knew anything about magic at that time, isn't that true?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. For the sake of the record, can you give to this
committee now, the number of officers in Washington w^ho knew the
secret of magic, who knew of the breaking of this Japanese code?
General Gerow. No, sir. I think I can speak only for the War De-
partment, sir, at the time I was here, and G-2 will know better than I
know whom they delivered them to, but my recollection is they were
given to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief
of Staff G-2, and Assistant Chief of Staff", War Plans Division, and I
got })ermission at some time during 1941 from General Marshall
[440/] to show it to my No. 1 assistant, Colonel Bundy, so in the
event that anything happened to me there would be continuity in the
War Department in the War Plans Division, sir.
Senator Lucas. Was Colonel Bundy the only officer in the War
Plans Division outside of yourself wdio knew the secret of magic?
General Gerow. He was the only one, sir, to whom magic was shown.
Now, some of the others may have guessed that we were doing some-
thing of the kind, sir, but I do not know that fact.
Senator Lucas. He was the only officer that possessed actual knowl-
edge of it ?
General Gerow. Who actually saw the magic ; yes, sir.
^ See information furnished by the War Department, Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2073-2074.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1667
Senator Lucas. Now, General Gerow, there was quite a little specu-
lation in the autumn of 1944 about a leak in magic from somewhere.
Do you recall at that time — Oh, you were not here at that time?
General Gerow. No, sir ; I was overseas in 1944, sir.
Senator Lucas. Well, what would have been the military course that
would have been pursued against an individual who knew the secret
of magic, had that individual given that secrecy to the public — what
would have been the course pursued by the military under those cir-
cumstances ?
[H08] General Gerow. I think he would have been court mar-
tialed, sir, and if the evidence was sufficient, if they found him guilty,
he would probably — I do not know what the penalty would have
been — dismissal or confinement.
Senator Lucas. Here is one of the top secrets that involved our
national defense and our security. Just assuming now that one of
these officers would have given me, for instance, that top secret, and
it would have become thereafter a matter of public property, every-
body would have known it, do you care to hazard a guess as to the
penalty that might have been attached to the officer that had given
away tlie highest top military secret in the Nation ?
General Gerow. AVell, sir, of course I do not know what the officers
of a court would decide. I can give you my own personal opinion, sir.
Senator Lucas. That is what I want, sir. I would like to ask you,
before you give your personal opinion, one more question. Can you
give to the committee, from your knowledge of military life, wliat the
officer would have been charged with in the first instance had he given
away a top secret of that character? Maybe that is a legal question.
[iiOO] General Gerow. There are quite a lot of articles of
war that we operate under, and there are general articles, such as
conduct prejudicial to the good order and interest of the United
States.
If he deliberately gave it away, he might be tried for treason.
There are probably any number of articles of war under which he
could be tried, sir. There would be no question about an article of
war that would fit it, sir.
Senator Lucas. You started to answer another question, that was
as to what was your opinion.
General Gerow. Well, sir, if the evidence showed that that officer
had deliberately given out that information, with full knowledge of
what it meant and its effect, I, as a member of the court, would have
voted the death penalt}^, sir.
Senator Lucas. I think that is all.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one question.
The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. General Gerow, in the message of the 27th, there
is the language, "Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile
action possible at any moment."
As I understand you, when you sent that to the Pacific theaters,
you wanted to put all of the Pacific theaters on [44^0] the
alert, because the action of the Japanese was unpredictable. That is
correct, isn't it?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
1668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. As far as General Short at Hawaii was concerned,
when he got that message, he did not have to concern himself with
other matters but only with the defense of Hawaii ?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. Does counsel have any further questions?
Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, I would like to clear up one thing,
and that has to do with the responsibilities and powers of the Com-
mander in the field.
The record shows here that in W-ashington, on the basis of all of
the accumulated information they had, the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations,
and in part, the President, along with officers like yourself, had evalu-
ated the information they had, and their conclusion was that war
might come at any moment, that action was unpredictable, but hostile
action in any direction might be expected. That was the conclusion.
Then, they put that evaluation in the form of a dispatch to a field
commander. Now, there has been a great deal of [44^-? J in-
quiry as to whether this and that bit of information was or was not
sent out to the commanders in Hawaii to make their own evaluation,
and the inference I get from it is the commanders in the field were
in a position and were entitled, when they got an evaluation like that
from Washington by their superiors, before they accepted it and
acted on it, they had a right to demand that the original source of
material which had been acted on here, should be given to them,
so that they could form their own judgment as to whether the people
in Washington knew what they were doing.
Now, is that a permissible practice in the Army ?
General Gerow. No, sir. The commanders did not have that right
to demand the information on which the Chief of Staff based a de-
cision. I think if the officer insisted on demanding that information,
he would have probably been relieved from that command.
Mr. Mitchell. At the time this warning message was sent on No-
vember 27, 1941, did you have any Army posts in areas other than
the F'acific ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; we had garrisons on some of our Atlantic
bases, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What were they?
General Gerow. I think we had troops in Iceland at [44^^]
the time. We had some, probably, on Bermuda, and some on the
other Caribbean Islands. I do not remember the exact bases we had
in the Atlantic at that time.
Mr. Mitchell. When you formed the judgment about the im-
minence of war with Japan, did you send warning messages to Ice-
land and these other posts in tlie Atlantic that you mentioned?
General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not believe such messages were sent.
Our thinking was about Japan at the time and we did not anticipate
that Japan would operate in the Atlantic Ocean right away, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you did come to the conclusion that Iceland
was not a possibility for an attack ?
General Gerow. Not for an attack by Japan.
Mr. Mitchell. That is what I mean.
General Gerow. No, sir ; that was not a possibility.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1669
Mr. Mitchell. Then do I understand you to say, in sendinp; the
message, your state of mind was to send a warning to any post that
was Avithin the possibility of an attack from Japan?
General Gerow. That was the purpose, sir, to send warning mes-
sages to those areas that Japan would be in a position to attack.
Mr. Mitchell. Suppose you had been convinced at that [44^3]
time that there was not a shade of possibility of any Japanese attack
on Panama, or call it the Pacific coast command, at Seattle, or wherever
it was, if you had been in that state of mind and felt there was no
possible chance of anything being done on the Pacific coast, to the
bases there, would you have sent them a warning message?
General Gerow. I do not believe, sir, I could quite get in that frame
of mind.
Mr. Mitchell. I know it was something you did not do, but I am
trying to get your distinction, your state of mind as to your judg-'
ment at the time, as to whether there was a chance or a possibility
of an attack, and you told me you did not think there was, in
Iceland.
General Gerow. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I am asking you if — that is not the case, of course —
but if you had supposed that the Pacific coast was totally out of
reach of Japan, that it was a waste of time to put them on the alert,
would you have sent them a message ?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Then, the gist of it is, as I understand it, that you
picked out the spots that you thought Japan might reach?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
[44-^^] Mr. Mitchell. Now, I notice that the alert that you
sent to Hawaii was in identical terms with the one you sent to the
commander of the Pacific coast.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Not a word of difference. The Pacific coast was
2,000 miles or more further away from Japan than Hawaii ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Then I notice that your message to MacArthur, who
was right under the main islands of Japan, differs in no respect from
the one you sent to Hawaii, except in one or two immaterial respects,
about disturbing the population.
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You did not make any distinction in the nature of
your warning to any one of them ; did you ?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Mr. Mitcheix.. That was deliberate on your part ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir, because we did not know which one of
them would be attacked.
Mr. Mitchell. There has been something said here and you have
been asked about impregnable fortresses, and whether Pearl Harbor
was the greatest fortress in the world.
In forming your judgment as to whether a fortress was [44^^]
supposed to iDe immune to attack, or completely capable of defense,
or impregnable, whatever you want to call it, is that judgment formed
on the assumption that the fortress will be attacked when she is
asleep, and her command is not alert?
1670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Gerow. No, sir ; it could still be alerted and would not be
impregnable, I do not believe, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You haven't got my question. What I meant was,
in judging whether a fortress is safe from attack, do you assume,
in judging her safety, that her garrison is going to be prepared and
ready, alerted to meet an attack that comes to it?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Is any fort impregnable, or safe from attack, how-
ever powerful it is, if the garrison is asleep at the switch?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I think Fort Ticonderoga in the American Revolu-
tion was considered the next largest or strongest fortress in the
country.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. She was captured in the nighttime by a crowd of
ragged militiamen without firing a shot.
General GER'nv. Yes, sir.
[441G] Mr. Mitchell. The commander, as I remember it, was
caught in bed. Is that an illustration of a case where an impregnable
fortress is captured because the garrison is not prepared?
General Gerow. I think that is a very good illustration, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I think he even had his trousers in his hands.
The Chairman. Was he about to put them on, or take them off?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Mitchell. Now, on this question of judgment as to the likeli-
hood of an attack on Pearl Harbor, you have been asked a good deal
about tliat, as to wiiether your judgment was that it was possible
or likely, and so forth.
Now, there was great risk to the Japs in that expedition. It had
considerable hazards, did it not?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And the hazards had to be measured against the
importance of the objective?
General Gerow. TJiat is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I assume in measuring the hazards and chances of
success, the fact that the Japs knew our state of alertness, or lack of
it, would be an important factor, [44^7] would it not?
General Gerow. Yes, sir ; that would greatly lessen the hazard.
Mr. Mitchell. It is a matter of record here that the Japs knew
from day to day everything we were doing and not doing in Pearl
Harbor and that information was transmitted from day to day by
their spies in Honolulu to the Government in Japan, so if we had
been on the alert on November 27 to the 7th of December, the Japs
would have known it, would they not ?
General Gerow. I belive they Avould have known.it, sir.
IM^S] Mr. Mitchell. And although it was an impregnable
fortress, if we were not on the alert in that period and the Japs knew
that, it would be a great factor in their decision as to whether the
attack was worth while?
General Gerow. I think that is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You knew here in Washington — I think the record
fairly shows — that they did have a spy system, that these reports
were going out almost daily from their spies. You Avere intercepting
them, you knew that the Japs had every means open to the public
to communicate with their Government, so you were aware here,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1671
at least, that the Japs knew everything that was going on in Hawaii?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. The next question is whether you had a clear idea
as to whether we were alterted out there. The people on the ground
had this advantage over you, did they not, that they knew whether
they were alerted or not ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. It never occurred to me that they were
not on the alert, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. The commander in the field, under those circum-
stances, at that place, had at least this advantage over the Washing-
ton end, that is, they knew the same things you did, but that the Japs
knew everything they were doing and not doing — both ends knew
that?
[44^9] General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell, The people in Hawaii were in a better position to
know the extent of their preparations, to know whether or not the
Japs knew that they were not taking any steps against an air attack.
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. So the judgment of the people here, and it seems
rather clear that there is a great deal of evidence here, that at least
officers in Washington did not expect an attack, their judgment was
necessarily formed with a less and certainly a hazier picture of
whether there w^as a different alert necessary out there than the local
commanders had?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, there has been a good deal of discussion about
the order in your command of November 27 to Hawaii and other
points as to an overt act. It may be irrelevant because nobody was
ever called upon to make a decision as to what an overt act was
until the Japs appeared over Pearl Harbor and commenced to drop
bombs. But as a matter of discussion of the sufficiency of the order,
when it says we want the Japs to commit the first overt act but do
not let this induce you to fail to take measures or jeopardize your
defense, let me ask you, if the Jap carrier fleet had been spotted at
sea the night of the 6th or the morning of [44^0] the 7th
driving toward Honolulu with six carriers in the fleet, and the ques-
tion had arisen whether that was an overt act under your message
or whether it would jeopardize the defense to wait until they got
to Pearl Harbor and commenced to drop bombs, what was your idea
about that?
General Gerow. I think the commander would have attacked that
Japanese force and I think he should have done so, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. If he had seen the Jap carriers 300 miles at sea and
had done nothing but sail around in the air until they commenced
to drop bombs, what would have happened to him under this order ?
General Gerow. It would have jeopardized his defense to permit
that outfit to approach any closer.
Mr. Mitchell. That would amount to a disobeyance of the ordet,
would it not?
General Gerow. Yes, sir ; or a failure to obey the order.
Mr. Mitchell. You draw a distinction there ?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. Direct disobedience of an order is some-
thing that is intentional. Failure to obey may be due to any number
of causes, error of judgment, or absence, or something else.
1672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell,. I have' just one more question. It is submitted by
counsel, Captain Ford, for General Short. I am asked to put this
question to you :
[44^1] How should General Short have worded his reply on the
27tli of November 1941, his reply to your message of the 27th, to
make clear to you and to your staff that his alert was to prevent
sabotage only?
General Gerow;. Well, I think, sir, if the message had read simply
"alerted against sabotage only," it would have been perfectly clear.
Mr. Mitchell. I notice that in these war plans, exhibit 44, the
operational order of November 5 which you have testified did not
arrive in the War Department
General Gerow. May I get the page of that, sir ?
Mr. Mitchell. It is tab 9.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. General Short on November 5 put into effect an
operational order out there which had these three alerts. No. 1
alert was this :
This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the
Islands with no threat from without.
Now, you never say that in fact until after the 1st of Janipary
1942, you testified?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. But you did see this preliminary draft he had
sent in the previous year, did you not ?
General Gerow. I don't recall having seen that preliminary
[44^2] draft either.
Mr. Mitchell. That had substantially the same alert, the alert is a
defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands
with no particular threat from without, the way that read that
was alert No. 3, according to his then system. This later became
alert No. 1.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, if General Short had this on file in the
War Department on November 27, this operational order of November
5, so that you could have known what alert No. 1 was, and he reported
alerted against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands with
no threat from without, that would have made it clear to you what
he was doing?
General Gerow. Yes, it would have made it quite clear.
Mr. Mitchell. And if he hadn't this on file, as he didn't, and
couldn't use the specific reference to alert No. 1, which would have
meant nothing to you at that time, if he had used the same ex-
pression in his report that he did in phrasing his alert, defense
against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands with no
threat from without, that would have been clear?
Generf^l Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Take the message as he put it, if he had said alerted
against sabotage and left out the words ''liaison [44^^] with
the Navy," do 3^ou think that would liave made you aAvare of his being
alerted for sabotage only? It is asking a good deal of you, but it
would certainly be likely.
General Gerow. Yes, sir, it would be likely. I didn't have to
make the decision, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1673
Mr. Mitchell. I know you (li(ln''t. It's, and's, ami hut's aren't
worth much.
I think that is alL
The Chairman. General, is there any further information within
your knowledoe which is pertinent to this inquiry which you have
that you could submit to the committee that has not been drawn out
by the interrogation of you as a witness?
General Gerow. No, sir, I have nothing.
The Chairman. Well, the committee thanks you, General, for your
forthright cooperation in trying to develop the facts in this inquiry.
You have demeaned yourself before this committee in a manner be-
fiitting 3^our record in the Army. You have the grateful appreciation
of this committee for your services in that connection.
Thank you very much.
General Gerow. Thank you, sir, and I wish to thank the committee.
The Chairman. You may be excused.
(The witness was excused.)
[44^4'\ The Chairman. The Chair understands counsel have
some documents that they wish at this time to put in which have been,
received in response to request of various members of the committee.
Mr. Gesell, Yes, Mr. Chairman. If the committee will indulge us
for a few minutes past 12 o'clock I think we can put into the record
with some dispatch the material in response to certain requests and
that would permit us to avoid any session this afternoon.
The Chairman. The Chair might announce that Admiral Wilkinson
is the next witness, but he will not be before us until 10 o'clock on
Monday.
Mr. Gesell. The first item that we wish to present has to do with
the United States ship Boise.
The committee will recall that Congressman Gearhart at pages
274 and 560 of the record asked for the log of the Boise and indicated
that he had Imowledge or information to the effect that the cruiser
had sighted the Japanese task force on its way to attack Pearl Harbor.
I have here in my hand a photostatic copy of the entries in the log
of the United States ship Boise for the period November 25, 1941 to
December 7, 1941, inclusive.
^ This log shows that on two occasion during that period the Boise
sighted a strange ship. The first occasion was on [44^-5'\ No-
vember 27 and I will read into the record the brief entry concerning
that. On November 27, 1941, during the 18 to 20 watch, according to
an entry of F. G. Dierman, lieutenant ( jg) , United States Navy, there
was the following that occured :
Steaming as before. 1840 sighted darkened ship, bearing 240° T. estimated
range 16,000 yards. Went to general quarters. 1845 set material condition afirm.
1851 challenged ship. Received no reply. 1852 changed speed to 20 knots. 1854
changed speed to 14 knots.
[44^6] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. May I inquire what time of day that was ?
Mr. Gesell. 18 to 20. That would be between 6 and 8 p. m., I take it,
and 1840 was when they sighted the ship. That would be 6 : 40 p. m.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire whether the log shows where the
Boise was at that time ?
1674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr, Gesell. I am coming to that, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Pardon me.
Mr, Gesell. I wanted to develop this so that the committee has all
of the information.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. On the 28th of November 1941, there is an entry by
D. S. Edwards, lieutenant. United States Navy, in the 16 to 20 watch,
that is Friday, November 28, 1941 :
Steaming as before, on various courses at various speeds. * * * 1733
darkened siiip. 1743 sigtited ship bearing 325 t. hull down. Changed course
to 260 degrees t, changed speed to 15 knots. Manned battle stations. 1750 cut
in boilers No. 3 and No. 4 on main steam sine. 1752 [-'t427] set condition
affirm. On various courses at various speeds keeping between ship sighted at
1743 and convoy. Ship appeared to be H. I. J. N. S. "ATAGO" type, steaming
darkened at 14 knots on various courses toward convoy. ISOO ship turned to
course about 090 degrees t. 1804 on various courses closing convoy. 1S35 unset
condition affirm.
Now, from the information presented by Admiral English, it ap-
pears that there were no cruisers of the Atago type in the Japanese
striking force.
The Navy has plotted on the basis of the log, the positions of the
U. ^. S. Boise at the various times mentioned in the log.
With respect to the entries on November 27, 1941, the Boise at 1840
was at latitude 16°46'0.5" N., longitude 153°55' E. 1851 on Novem-
ber 27, 1941, latitude 16°45'0.5'' N., longitude 153°52'0.5'' E
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Does counsel kiiow where that would be on the
map?
Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir, I am coming to that, if I may present this,
please, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Pardon me.
[44^5] Mr. Gesell. (continuing) On November 27, 1941 at
1927, it was latitude 16°43' N., longitude 143°44'0.5" E. 1743 28
November 1941, latitude 14°56'0.5'' N., longitude 148°48' E., 1920, 28
November 1941, latitude 14°49' N., longitude 148°26' E.
We asked the Navy to state in simple terms what that meant in
terms of the position of the Boise in relation to the Japanese force,
and were advised as follows :
The position of the U. S. S. Boise with relation to the track of the Japanese
striking force on the 27th and 28tb of November, 1941, from the best informa-
tion available appears, that the U. S. S. Boise on those dates was not less than
1,400 miles from the Japanese striking force.
Now, in this connection the committee has also asked to have the
log of the S. S. A me.rican Leader
Senator Lucas. Before you proceed, the S. S. American Leader
was in the convoy with the Boise?
Mr. Gesell. The Navy reports as follows with respect to the ATner-
ican Leader:
With further reference to your request dated 17 November 1945 for the log of
S. S. American Leader, the S. S. American [}//29] Leader was one of the
ships in the convoy which the U. S. S. Boise escorted to the Philippines November 7,
1941.
The log of the S. S. American Leader is not immediately available to the
Navy Department since this ship was in the U. S. Maritime Service.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1675
[J/.JfSO'] I think, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, to conclude this matter
on the Boise we should ask to have the log for the periods indicated
designated as an exhibit. It would be Exhibit 68.
We also would like to accompany it, as part of the same exhibit,
a map on which the plot of the Japanese task force appears and the
position of the Boise on the dates when it sighted the darkened ships
also appears.
The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement about the
Boise and the American Leader?
Mr. Geseli.. That concludes the matter on the Boise.
The Vice Chairman. Exhibit 68 will be received.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 68")
The Vice Chairman. Are there any questions about the Boise and
American Leader?
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one question.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas.) Does the plot show just about how far the Boise
was from the Hawaiian Islands when this first ship was sighted?
Mr. Geseij:., It was near Guam. It appears on the map just where
it was.
Senator Lucas. I see.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairmati
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
[4^5i] Senator Ferguson. Does counsel know where this con-
voy had been picked up by the Boise? That is not shown on the log.
Mr. Gesell. I don't think on these days, but I believe that was cov-
ered by the testimony of Admiral Inglis. My recollection is it was
a convoy proceeding to the Philippines. Where it started I don't
know.
Senator Ferguson. You don't know whether it was from Hawaii or
not. What I am trying to find out is whether or not the commanders
at Hawaii knew they were convoying.
Mr. Gesell. I guess there is no question about that. My recol-
lection is that Admiral Inglis said this convoy did start in the
Hawaiian area, but I am not certain of that.
The Vice Chairman. You are referring to a United States convoy ?
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
The Vice Chairman. Did you start to say something, General
Mitchell?
Mr. Mitchell. No.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry ?
The Vice Chairman. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Do the records with respect to the Boise show the action
orders or the action report of what orders they were sailing under?
I notice that that says that the ship was cleared for action and battle
stations manned, and {H32^ so on. Does it disclose what the
orders were to this ship escorting this convoy to the Philippines on
the 27th of November ?
Mr. Gesell. No, sir. The request was based upon a statement by
Congressman Gearhart that he had information that the Boise had
sighted the Japanese task force. We were attempting to answer that
question. It appears now that the Boise was 1400 miles from the
task force. So I guess it didn't sight it.
Now, if the Congressman wants information as to the orders under
which the convoy was proceeding, where it started from and where it
1676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was o'oing, that would be a separate request and we would have to
get that information separately.
Mr. Keefe. Could you get that information ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir. We will ask the Navy Department for it.
Mr. IMuRPHY. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MuRPTiY. At the time the request was made for the log of the
Boise, in order to be prepared to discuss the matter in the event that
it were j^ertinent, I requested that we have present the commanding
officer of the Boise. I now cancel that request in view of the informa-
tion supplied.
The Vice Chairman. Are there any other questions about the Boise?
[44-^3] All right, you may proceed, Mr. Gesell.
Mr. Gesell.- A request was made to show the dates of arrival of
the vessels that were in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack on
the 7th of December 1941.
I have in my hand a schedule showing the arrival of all the vessels,
the dates they came in, and I think the most appropriate means of
handling this would be to ask the reporter to spread this two-page
schedule on the daily transcript.
The Vice Chairman. That may be done. Do you desire to read it?
Mr. Gesell. I don't see any need of that. It shows they came in
at different times.
The Vice Chairman. Is there any request that it be read? If not,
it will be spread in full in the record at this point.
(The schedule above referred to follows:)
Arrivals of vessels in port {Pearl Harbor) just prior to 7 December 1941
Battleships :
Pennsylvania --
Arizonn
Oklahoma
Nevada
California
West Virginia^
Maryland
Tennessee
[4434] Heavy Cr
San Francisco^
New Orleans
Light Cruisers :
Honolulu
Detroit
Raleiyh
Phoenix
Helena
St. Louis
Destroyers :
Patterson
Helm
Blue
Bagley
Jarvis
Mugford
Ramsay
Orydock
1941.
5 Dec. 1941.
Do.
Do.
28 Nov. 1941.
Do.
Do.
Do.
uisers :
Prior to 1
1941, exact
not Ijnown.
Do.
28 Nov. 1941.
o Dec. 1941.
28 Nov. 1941.
28 Nov. 1941.
28 Nov. 1941.
28 Nov. 1941.
5 Dec. 1941.
Do.
Do.
4 Dec. 1941.
Do.
Do.
Do.
1, Dec.
Dec.
tme
D .^s t r oy er s — con .
Breesr 4 Dec. 1941.
Conyngliam Do.
Phelps Prior 1 Dec. 1941.
Far ra gut Do.
Monoghan Do.
Alwin Do.
Hull Do.
{4'tm
Dewey Do.
Warden Do.
McDonongh Do.
Tucker Do.
Cmnmings Do.
Zane 6 Dec. 1941.
Selfridge Do.
Reid Prior 1 Dec. 1941.
Case Do.
Montgomerii 4 Dec. 1941,
Henley 5 Dec. 1941.
(r(lllll)le^
Ralph Talbot.
Dale
Wasmuth
Trever
Auxiliaries :
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
\(»xho 6 Dec. 1941.
Ramapo 5 Dec. 1941.
Curtiss Do.
Note. — Tenders remained in harbor to carry out repair schedules.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1677
[44^6] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman, Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. In connection with that, I understand that in the two
documents we have been furnished of the Navy story that there is a
discussion as to how the fleet got into Pearl Harbor and how the
ships got there, and the periodic orders from time to time covering
matters of that nature.
Mr. Gesell. This is in response only to the request as to the dates
when they entered the Harbor.
The Vice Chairman. Are there any other questions on that point?
If not, you may proceed, Mr. Gesell.
Mr. Gesell. We have been asked also to furnish information con-
cerning the condition of watertight integrity of the major vessels
that were in the Harbor.^ Under date of December 11, we received
from the Navy a table showing scheduled inspection of ships at Pearl
Harbor during October, November, and December, and I am going
to ask that that schedule be inserted in the record.
It will be noted from the table that it does not contain all the ships
which were in Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December. The explanation
for that is that ships which are not shown on this schedule, the Navy
advises, were not scheduled for inspection during the period October-
December, [44J7] 1941.
The Vice Chairman. That will be admitted, and spread on the
record.
Mr. Gesell. I think that should be made an exhibit, and perhaps
the reporter can arrange to have photostats accompany the transcript
for the information of the members of the committee. That will be
Exhibit 69.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 69" and follows
herewith.)
1 See also Hearings, Part 11, p. 5347 et seq., for correspondence concerning this subject.
1678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1679
[44S9] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. In that connection, I would like to inquire whether or
not the exhibit in question shows if voids were open on the ships?
The gentleman from California had referred to the voids apparently
being open on all the ships. Does the exhibit show whether they were
or were not ?
Mr. Mitchell. I think the exhibit is not complete enough to satisfy
counsel and I called upon the Navy — and Mr. Gesell didn't know that —
to supplement this, to give direct information as to each vessel, and if
they didn't have it on an inspection record to have officers from the
vessels who were on them to give testimony.
We have called for, really, additional material on that.
Mr. Murphy. I see.
Mr. Gesell. This document goes solely to the limited question as to
whether or not there was some major inspection of all vessels scheduled
for that week end. It does not describe the condition of the various
vessels which were subject to inspection.
The Vice Chairman. You may proceed.
Mr. Gesell. Now, a request was also made by one of the [^^4^]
members of the committee for a report of the recall of United States
merchant ships on the west coast, after the attack on Pearl Harbor.^
The Navy has submitted the order issued recalling the merchant
vessels after the Pearl Harbor attack, the names of the ships, the
dates they sailed, and the dates they returned. I suggest that that
information be spread upon the record.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
Senator Ferguson. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Michigan.
Senator Ferguson. Are you going to furnish each member of the
committe with copies of these exhibits?
Mr. Gesell. In saying "spread" on the record. Senator Ferguson, it
was my thought that in that fashion it would come to all members
of the committee.
The Vice Chairman. That brings it to us in the daily blue covered
copy of the transcript.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct.
Mr. Gesell. This is a memorandum from the Navy to us, and we
thought if it were copied into the transcript that would be enough. We
can get the actual record.
Senator Ferguson. No. Does that report show whether those ships
were in convoy or not?
[444^] Mr. Gesell. It doesn't relate to the question of convoy.
It relates to when merchant ships were recalled.
Senator Ferguson. It doesn't designate when they were in convoy ?
Mr. (tesell. No ; it does not.
1 Hearings, Part 1, p. 78.
1680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The memorandum and accompanying copy of dispatch follow:)
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Seceetaey,
Washington, 13 December 1945.
Memorandum
To : Mr. William D. Mitchell
1. In regard to your request for report of the recall of U. S. Merchant ships to
the West Coast after the attack on Pearl Harbor, we have the following table:
Name of ship
Sailed from—
Date
Date returned
USAT Tasker U. Bliss
San Francisco
do
6 Dec
10 Dec.
Coast Miller
...do
8 Dec.
Etolin _
do
5Dec
10 Dee.
Henry D. Whiton
Balboa, C. Z.
do-.
Sand 17 Dec
7 and 16 Dec
5 Dec
(7).
J. A. Moffett
(?).
PaulM.Gresrg
San Francisco
do
10 Dec.
President Garfield
6 Dec
8 Dec.
President Johnson
... do
do
9 Dec.
Portland, Oreg
Balboa, C. Z
-..-do
Sand 17 Dec
(?).
West Portal .
(?).
2. These ships apparently put back in compliance with the attached dispatch
instructions issued by CinCPac on 7 December 1941. No evidence has been
found that other ships in addition to those listed put back to West Coast ports
after the Pearl Harbor attack.
(Signed) John Foed Baechee,
Lieut. Comdr. USNR.
Naval Message
Navy Department
Phone Extension Number Addressees
Message
Precedence
From Radio Honolulu
Released by . ..
n
_o
o
<
o
Radio SanFran
Radio Washn
Urgent
Priority Routine
Date 7 December 1941
Deferred
For Coderoom
c
9
a
Priority Routine
Decoded by .. .. -. .
Deferred
1444^^ Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
072202 0538
Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred
precedence.
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:
Date Time GCT
Text
War exists between United' States and Japan XX Proceed closest U. S. or
friendly port immediately.
Distribution :
380 . (*) .ACTION
10A11 . (*) . 38S . (*) . 38W (*) OPDC (*) FILE . .
(•) Initials illegible.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1681
TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See
article 76 (4) Nav Res.
[4444-] Mr. Gesell. Congressman Keefe requested various Ex-
ecutive Orders establishing defensive sea areas around Pearl Harbor,
and other areas. We have the text of these orders and suggest that
they be spread upon the record.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
(The Executive orders referred to follow :)
General Order No. 118 Navy Department,
Washington, D. C, June H, 1939.
Establishing a Defensive Sea Area in and About Peabl Habbob, Hawaii
1. The following Executive Order is quoted :
Executive Obdee
establishing a defensive sea area in and about PEABL harbor, HAWAII
By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of
section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C, title 18, Sec. 96), the area
of water in Pearl Harbor, Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, lying between
extreme high-water mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel to
said harbor, within an area bounded by the extreme high-water mark, a line
bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the Puuloa Naval Reserva-
tion, a line bearing south true from Ahua Point Lighthouse, and a line bearing
west true from a point three nautical miles due south true from Ahua Point Light-
house, is hereby established as a [W5] defensive sea area for purposes
of national defense.
At no time shall any person (other than persons on public vessels of the
United States) enter the defensive sea area above defined, nor shall any vessels
or other craft (other than public vessels of the United States) be navigated
within said defensive sea area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.
Any person violating the provisions of this order shall be subject to the pen-
alties provided by law.
FEANKUif D. Roosevelt.
The White House,
May 26, 19S9.
William D. Leahy,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.
General Order No. 144 Navy Department,
Washington, D. C, March 29, 1941.
Establishing Kodiak Island and Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea Abeas and
SuBic Bay Naval Aiespace Resevation
1. The following Executive orders are quoted :
Executive Order
establishing kodiak island naval DEFEFSI\TD BB1&. ABEA ALASKA
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the
Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C, title 18, sec. 96), the territorial waters
between extreme high-water [4446] mark and the three-mile marine
boundary adjacent to the easeern portion of Kodiak Island, Alaska, in and about
Women's Bay to the westward within a line bearing true north and south tan-
gent to the eastern extremity of High Island, are hereby set apart and reserved
79716 — 46 — pt. 4 8
1682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
as a naval defensive sea area for purposes of the national defense, such area to
to known as "Kodiak Island Naval Defensive Sea Area."
At no time shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the
United States, he navigated into Kodiak Island Naval Defensive Sea Area,
unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be enforced by the Secretary
of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the
United States and of the Territory of Alaska; and the Secretary of the Navy
is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out such provisions.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this order shall be subject to
the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C,
title 18, sec. 96).
This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.
Fkanklin D. Roosevelt.
The White House,
March 22, 1941.
[4447] Executive Order
establishing subic bay naval defensive sea area and subic bay naval airspace
reservation, philippine islands
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the
Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C, title IS, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air
Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 568, 570; U. S. C, title 49, sec. 174),
the territorial waters within Subic Bay, Philippine Islands, between extreme
high-water mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel within a
line bearing true southwest extending three nautical miles from Panibatujan
Point, a line bearing true southwest extending three nautical miles from Sanpaloc
Point, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the above two bearing lines,
are hereby set apart and reserved as a naval defensive sea area -for jjui-poses of
the national defense, such area to be known as "Subic Ray Naval Defensive Sea
Area"; and the airspace over the snid territorial waters and over the Subic Bay
Naval Reservation, Olongapo, Philippine Islands, is hereby set apart and reserved
as a naval airspace reservation to be known as "Subic Bay Naval Airspace
Reservation."
At no time shall any ves.sel or other craft, other than public vessels of the
United States, be navigated into Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area, unless
author^z 'd by the Secretary of the Navy.
[>{^.^8] At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the
United States, be navigated into Subic Bay Naval Airspace Reservation, unless
authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.
The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary
of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local Inw enforcement officers of the
United Sfates ; and the Secretary of the Navy i.<; hereby authorized to prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such i)n)visi()ns.
Any per.son violating any of tlie provisions of this order relating to Subic Bay
Naval Defensive Sea Area shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44
of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, .'^ec. 06), and any person
violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Subic Ray Naval Airspace
lieserv'tion shnll be subject to the penalties prescribed by The Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 97.3).
This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.
Fr^vnki.in D. Roose\-ei-t.
The White House.
March 22, 1941.
(No. 8718)
( F. R. Doc. 41-2165 ; Filed, March 24, 1941 ; 1 : 14 p. m.)
/ James ForreStal.
Acting Secretary of the Navy.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1683
[4'i'i9] General Order No. 14G Navy Department,
Washington, D. C, April 1,.10J,1.
Naval Deff:nsive Sea Areas and Airspace Reservations
1. The President, on February 14, 1941, signed ExecuKve Orders Nos. ^80,
8681, 8683, and 86S4. They are quoted :
Executive Order
Establishing Naval DefensiA'e Sea Areas Around and Naval Airspace lleser-
vations Over the Islands of Kiska and Unalaska, Alaska.
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the
Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C. title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air
Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C. title 49, sec. 174),
the territorial waters between tlie extreme high-water marks and the three-mile
marine boundaries surrounding the islands of Kiska and Unalaska, are hei'eby
establislied and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national
defense, such areas to be known, respectively, as "Kiska Island Naval Defensive
Sea Area", and ''Unalaska Island Naval Defensive Area" ; and the airspaces
over the said territorial waters and islands are hereby set apart and reserved"
as naval airspace reservations for purposes of national defense, such reservations'
to be known, respectively, as "Kiska Island Naval Airspace Reservation", and
'Unalaska Island Naval Airspace Reservation.'
At no time shall any person, other than persons on public [^^-50] ves-
sels of the United States, enter either of the naval defensive sea areas herein set
apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels
of the United States, be navigated into either of said areas, unless authorized by
the Secretary of the Navy.
At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States,
be navigated into either of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and
reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.
The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary
of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the
United States and of the Territory of Alaska ; and the Secretary of the Navy is
hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out
such provisions.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-
named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided hy
section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C. title 18, sec. 96), and any
person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named
naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed bv the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973). '
This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
{IfJiSl] The White House,
February IJt, 1941..
(No. 8680)
(F. R. Doc. 41-1136 ; Filed, February 15, 1941 ; 11 : 50 a. m.)
Executive Order
Establishing Kan^ohe Bay Navax Defenslve Sea Area and Kaneohe Bay-
Naval Airspace Reservation, Hawaii
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of
the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C title 18, sec. 96). and section 4 of the
Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U- S. C, title 49, sec.
174), the territorial waters within Kaneohe Bay between extreme high-water
mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel within a line bearing
northeast true extending four nautical miles from Kapoho Point, and a line joining
the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines, are hereliy estab-
lished and reserved as a naval defensive sea area for purposes of national defense,
such area to be known as "Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area" ; and the air-
space over the said territorial waters is hereby set apart and reserved as a navali
1684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
airspace reservation for purposes of national defense, such reservation to be known
as "Kaneohe Bay Naval Airspace [4452] Reservation."
At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United
States, enter Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area, nor shall any vessel
or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into
said area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.
At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States,
be navigated into Kaneohe Bay Naral Airspace Reservation, unless authorized
by the Secretary of the Navy.
The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Sec-
retary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement oflScers
of the United States and of the Territory of Hawaii ; and the Secretary of
the Navy is hereby authorized to presecribe such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out such provisions.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Kaneohe
Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area shall be subject to the penalties provided by
.section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C, title 18, sec. 96), and any
person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Kaneohe Bay
Naval Airspace Reservation shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).
This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.
U45S]
Fbanklin D. Roosevixt
The White House,
Fel)ruary 14, 1941-
(No. 8681)
(F. R. Doc. 41-1137 ; Filed, February 15, 1941 ; 11 : 50 a. ni.)
ExEctrnvE Order
ESTABLISHING NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS AROUND AND NAVAL AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS
OVER THE ISLANDS OF PALMYRA, .TOHNSTON, MIDWAT. WAKE. AND KINGMAN REET,
PACIFIC OCEAN
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the
Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C. title 18, sec. 96). and section 4 of the Air
Commerce Act approved May 20. 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C. title 49, sec. 174),
the territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and the three-mile
marine boundaries surrounding the islands of Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake,
and Kingman Reef, in the Pacific Ocean, are hereby established and reserved as
naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such areas to be
known, respectively, as "Palmyra Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," "Johnston
Island Naval Defensive Sea Area." "Midway Island Naval Defensive Sea Area,"
"Wake Island Naval Defensive Sea Area." and "Kingman Reef Naval Defensive
Sea [4454] Area"; and the airspaces over the said territorial waters
and islands are hereby set apart and re.served as naval airspace reservations for
purposes of national defense, such reservations to be known, repectively. as
"Palmyra Island Naval Airspace Reservation," ".Johnston Island Naval Airspace
Reservation." "Midwav Island Naval Airspnce Reservation," "Wake Island Naval
Airspace Reservation." and "Kingman Reef Naval Airspace Reservation."
At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the
United States, enter any of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and
reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the
United States, be navigated into any of said areas, unless authorized by the
Secretary of the Navy.
At no time .shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States,
be navigated into any of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and
reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.
The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary
of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement oflBcers of the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1685
United States and of the Territory of Hawaii ; and the Secretary of the Navy
is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out such provisions.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this order [4455] relating
to the above-named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties
provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C, title 18,
sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating
to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).
This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.
Franklin D. Roose:velt
The White House,
February I4, 1941.
(No. 8682)
(F. R. Doc. 41-1139; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:51 a. m.)
Executive Order
establishing naval defensive sea areas around and naval airspace reserva-
tions over the islands of eose, tutuila, and guam, pacific ocean
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of
the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C, title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of
the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C, title 49, sec.
174), the territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and the
three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of 14456] Rose,
Tutuila, and Guam, in the Pacific Ocean, are hereby established and reserved
as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such areas to be
known, respectively, as "Rose Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," "Tutuila Island
Naval Defensive Sea Area," and "Guam Island Naval Defensive Sea Area" ;
and the airspaces over the said territorial waters and islands are hereby set
apart and reserved as naval airspace reservations for purposes of national
defense, such reservations to be known, respectively, as "Rose Island Naval
Airspace Reservation," "Tutuila Island Naval Airspace Reservation," and "Guam
Island Naval Airspace Reservation."
At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the
United States, enter any of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and
reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the
United States, be navigated into any of said areas, unless authorized by the
Secretary of the Navy.
At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the) United States,
be navisrated into any of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and
reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.
The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary
of the Navy, vrith the cooperation of the local law enforcement oflBcers of the
United States ; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe
[445^] such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-
named naval defensive .sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by
section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C, title 18, sec. 96), and any
person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named
naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (.52 Stat. 973).
This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
February I4, 1941.
(No. 8683)
(F. R. Doc. 41-1140 : Filed, February 15. 1941 : 11 : 51 a. m.)
1686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Genekal Order 1 Navy Department,
No. 153 / Washington, D. C, September 8, 19^t.
Establishing Manila Bat Defensive Sea Area
1. The President, on August 16, 1941, signed Executive Order No. 8S53, quoted
below :
Executive Order
establishing MANILA BAY DEFENSIVE SEA AREA, [-i-}58] PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is
hereby ordered as follovps :
Tlie following-described area is hereby established and reserved, for purposes
of national defense, as a naval defensive sea area, to be known as "Manila Bay
Defensive Sea Area" :
All territorial waters of Manila Bay, Philippine Islands, and its approaches
and tributaries from the contour line of extreme high water as shown on the
latest U. S. C. and G. S. charts, to :
A line running southwest true from Luzon Point, in approximate position.
Latitude 14°27'40" North, Longitude 120°23'13" East to the seaward limit of
territorial waters, thence southeasterly along the seaward limit of territorial
waters, to the parallel of Latitude M'lO'lS" North, thence east along that
parallel of Latitude to meet the shore at Hamilo Point in approximate Latitude
14°10'15" North, Longitude 120°34'24" East.
A vessel not proceeding under United States Naval or other United States
authorized supervision, shall not enter or navigate the waters of Manila Bay
Defensive Sea Area except during daylight, when good visibility conditions
prevail, and then only after specific permission has been obtained. Advance
arrangements for entry into or navigation through or within the Manila Bay
Defensive Sea Area must be made, preferably by [4^59] application at
a United States Naval District Headquarters in advance of sailing, or by radio
or visual communication on approaching the seaward limits of the area. If
radio telegraphy is used, the call "NQO"' shall be made on a frequency of 500 kcs.
and. permission to enter the port shall be requested. The name of the vessel,
purpose of entry, and name of the master must be given in the request. If visual
communications are used, the procedure shall be essentially the same.
A vessel entering or navigating the waters of Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area
does so at its own risk.
Even though permission has been obtained, it is incumbent upon a vessel
entering the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area to obey any further instructions
received from the United States Navy, or other United States authority.
A vessel may expect supervision of its movements within the Manila Bay
Defensive Sea Area, either through surface craft or aircraft. Such controlling
surface craft and aircraft will be identified by a prominent display of the Union
Jack.
These regulations are subject to amplification by the local United States Naval
authority as necessary to meet local circumstances and conditions.
When a United States Maritime Control Area is established adjacent to or
abutting upon the above-established defensive sea ai'ea, it shall be assumed
that pei'mission to enter, and [-i'/'jO] other instructions issued by proper
authority, shall apply to any one continuous passage through or within both areas.
Any master of a vessel or other person within the Manila Bay Defensive Sea
Area who shall disregard these regulations, or shall fail to obey an order of
United States Naval authority to stop or heave to, or shall perform any act
threatening the efficiency of mine (»r other defenses or the safety of navigation, or
shall take any action inimical to the interests of the United States, may be
detained therein by force of arms and shall be liable to attack by United States
armed forces, and liable to prosecution as provided for in section 44 of the
Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C, title 18, sec. 90).
All United States Government authorities shall place at the disposal of the
Naval authorities their facilities for aiding in the enforcement of these regula-
tions.
The Secretary of the Navy will be charged with the publication and enforce-
ment of these regulations.
Frankijn D. Roosevbxt
The White House,
August 16, 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1687
(No. 8853)
(F. R. Doc. 41-6114; Filed, August 18, 1941; 2:31 p. m.)
FOBRESTAL,
The Acting Secretary of War.
[44^i] Mr. Gesell. Senator Lucas made a request for detailed
information concerning the different types of planes which the Navy
had at Pearl Harbor on January 6, 1940, and on February 1, 1941,
the period when Admiral Richardson was in command, and infor-
mation as to the extent and nature of the reconnaissance conducted
by those planes during that period.^
This has been furnished in a memorandum to Mr. Mitchell dated
December 13, 1945, to which is attached a detailed breakdown of
the number of planes present, the sectors covered by the reconnais-
sance, and is responsive to that request.
I again suggest that the memorandum and the attached schedules
be spread upon the daily transcript.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
(The memorandum referred to follows:)
Depaktment of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, IS December 1945.
MEMORANDUM:
To : Mr. William D. Mitchell.
1. In response to the questions asked on the record by Senator Lucas, I am
forwarding as you requested the necessary information in compliance therewith,
2. Exhibits A and B outline in detail the information \.H62'\ concerning
the number of Naval planes, and their types, attached to the Pacific Fleet when
Admiral Richardson assumed command on 6 January 1940 and when he was
relieved of command on 1 February 1941.
3. The number of Naval planes attached to the Pacific Fleet during the period
6 January 1940 and 1 February 1941 that were capable of running a long distance
reconnaissance over the sea are indicated on Exhibits A and B as "VPB" planes
of "Patwing 2 (Pearl Harbor)" or a total of 67 on 1 January 1940 and 63 on 1
February 1941. It is also possible that some "VJ" planes were capable of .such
use in case of necessity and in fact such planes were so used on 7 December 1941
after the attack.
4. The number of Naval planes that were assigned and performed daily recon-
naissance duty, in pursuance of the order issued by Admiral Richardson on
approximately 17 June 1940, is indicated in the attachments to the "Search
Plan", (Exhibit E).
5. The exact sectors and distances from Oahu covered in the reconnaissance
ordered by Admiral Richardson are also indicated in detail on the "Search
Plan" (Exhibit E).
(S) John Ford Baecher,
John Foed Baecher,
Lt. Comdr., NSNR.
Ends: (HW) Exhibits A, B, and E.
> Hearings, Part 1, p. 66.
1688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[U63]
Enclosure (A)
Naval aircraft assigned to the V. S. Fleet (Pacific) on J January 1940
Type
Num-
ber
Sub-
total
Total
BATTLE FORCE
VOS
vs
vso
VF
VSB
VB
VTB
VJ
VN
VB
VSO
VPB
VJ
VJR
VN
VR
VTB
VSO
VSO
VSB
VSO
VSO
VPB
VSO
VPB
VJ
VPB
10
8
112
95
175
47
96
13
3
BASE FORCE
559
1
2
8
32
14
5
1
3
55t
CRUISER SCOUTING FORCE .
66
78
66
SUBMARINE FORCE..
78
2
78
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE:
COMAIRSCOUTFOR ... I. .. ..
2
1
2
2
3
PATWING 1 (San Diego)
3
1
34
35
PATWING 2 (Pearl Harbor)
35
2
67
1
70
PATWING 4 (Seattle)
70
24
24
24
Enclosure (A)
132
132
837
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1689
umi
Enclosure (B)
Naval aircraft assigned to the Pacific Fleet 1 February 1941
Type
Num-
ber
Sub-
total
Total
BATTLE FORCE
VS
VSO
VF
VSB
VB
VTB
VJ
VN
VSO
VJ
VJR
VB
VSO
VSO
VSO
VN
VSO
VPB
VSO
VPB
VJ
VPB
VPB
4
137
88
142
40
90
11
5
BASE FORCE .
517
17
30
12
1
517
CRUISER SCOUTING FORCE .
60
60
60
SUBMARINE FORCE -
60
2
60
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE:
COMAIRSCOUTFOR ' . . .
2
2
1
3
1
34
35
4
63
1
3
PATWING 1 (San Diego).
3
PATWINO 2 (Pearl Harbor)
35
68
PATWING 4 (Seattle)
68
19
19
7
PATWING 6 (Alameda)
19
7
7
132
""132
771
1690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Enclosure (E)
SEARCH PLAN
Seciirlty Patrol from Barbers Pt .
(as of 30 June 19^0)
360°
Barbers
Point
20 ttlle Visibility
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1691
[U66]
Fleet security patrol from Barbers Point, Oahu
Plane "A"
Course T.
Distance to Lat.N.
Long. W.
345° .
75
226
37
123
1(23) ?
37
226
75
22-31
26-15
26-12
24-14
26-01
25-47
22-31
21-18
58-27
000 . . -
58-27
265H - -
59-08
175
58-55
336—
59-52
248-. . .
60-30
150-
58-27
165 -
58-07
Plane "B'
315° .
75
226
38
123
123
37
226
75
22-n
25-21
25-04
23-23
24-35
24-04
22-11
21-18
59-0.
330 _..
61-0'
232..
61-3t
144... -
60-21
306
62-l(
218 - .- - -
62-3(
120
59-o:
135-...
58-0"
Plane "C"
Plane "D"
PLANE "F'
285°
75
226
37
123
123
37
226
75
21-37
23-29
22-55
22-05
22-16
21-38
21-37
21-18
59-23
2WA . - . .
62-57
202
63-10
115-.
61-10
277
63-22
187 . .
63-27
90}^
59-23
105...
58-07
255H
75
226
37
123
123
37
226
75
20-58
20-58
20-19
20-32
19-41
19-03
20-58
21-lS
59-23
270 ..
63-23
172
63-18
084-..
61-07
246
63-07
157
62-52
060
59-23
074H ---
38-07
lUS7[ PLANE "E"
224°
75
226
37
123
123
37
226
75
20-25
18-30
18-91
19-13
17-32
17-09
20 -'25
21-18
59-02
239 . .
62-27
142J'^ .
62-^4
054
60-12
215 .. , ..
61-33
127
61-01
030
59-02
044
58-07
194H
2091^
113-..
024}^
185- -
0973^2
000...
015--.
75
20-05
226
16-50
37
16-35
123
18-27
123
16-25
37
16-20
226
20-05
75
21-18
Total distance for each plane 922 miles.
{_.U(^8^ Mr. Gesell, Congressman Gearhart made a request for
a copy of the order fixing the time of operation of the radar stations
in tlie period immediately before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
1692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pursuant to that request the Army eommunicatcHljvilh the Com-
mandiiw General in Hawaii and a search was made ot the tiles there
to fi ouV if here was any written record estabhshmg those times
A ne^ai^e report has confe back stating that an exhaustive search
of the files does not disclose the publication of official orders of any
kind in connection with the time schedule for training or the opera-
ao 1 of he radar stations on Oahu during the period m question.
Th^t answer suggests that those orders were orally established and
of con se we wfll have the responsible officers who wei-e not only in
conimaiid bTit particularly concerned with radar before the committee
'ind thev can ffive the information at that time. ,
The Vice Chairman. Do you want to put anything m the record on
^^lli- Gesell. I think there is no need of simply documenting this neg-
ative fact We will have to get the information by witnesses.
The Vice Chairman. All right. You may proceed.
Mr Ges^ We have a substantial number of requests relating to
the Department o^^ before the con^ittee this mormi^
two mimeo^^raphed documents. These are submitted by counsel. The
fiTsts dated November 25, 1941, and represents the p.^^tch Govern-
ment's views on the matter of the type of reply which should be
ffiven to the Japanese. • ^^^,.a
^ This is offered for the purpose of completing tl^e i^co d
I micrht say that we had requested it earlier. We ^^ele unab e to
subm "it to the committee because we were awaiting the approval of
the Dutch Go ernment for its release, which has now been obtained
I would hke to have the text of that document as -^11 as the text
of the other document, the document of November 2< ^^^^^^^^^g
ino- Secretarv Hull's negotiations, discussions with the iNetiieiianas
Sfnister on Ihat, date, concerning the threatened Japanese invasion
of French Indochina, spread upon the record.
Thp Vtce Chairman. It will be so ordered.
Sector LccAS. May I ask one question of eounsel on that point?
The Vice Chaibman. Senator Lucas. ii „f tv,a
Senator LtJCAS. Does the record contain at this point now all ol he
so cXd tentative proposals by the various governments on this
"Tlr! gLu.. Yes, I think we have now had released all of the docu-
ments which we requested be released.
Um Senator Lucas. Tliat was my understanding.
The documents referred to above, dated November 25, 1941 and
November 27, 1941, respectively, follow herewith:)
WASHINGTON, 25th November 19U-
■SXfp.%l.ro?M,"Ku.^,™ ;S?.>rwere kind enough to oommunloate
to me last Saturday.
Believe me, my dear Mr. Secretary,
Yours sincerely, ^^^ ^ Loudon
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE X693
Memorandum
As it seems impossible to discuss at present a final and ceneral -jCTPPmpnf a^
is necessary tliat for tlie reasons expressed by the Secretafv nf int? T l ' .J
be endeavored to arrive at a limited^nd temporary Sement ' ' '^^"'^
..lorl'^''' "^ '^''^ ^;i'' "'^'^ '^^^'^'•^ *h^ occupation ot- Indochina bv Janan no
sanctions were applied against the iatter, it seems reasonahlp fw i^^io
gradually withdraws from Indochir.a proponiSely sanetlois may be Hf tS
SpU: Sa?;S^l1h^^5S-S^.- - ^.erl^r kdiefSS.?^
But even in that event, according to the opinion of the Netherland., Cnvprr,
niw?fi,w-!f '1''°t' CJ^^^^n^ient will be glad to follow the same policy concerning
oil deliveries to Japan as applied by the United States Tf trLcTTfy.^^ -^
that the license system will remain in operation ^°^^ '^'^^''"^ "^^^"^
1. If it is the intention of Japan to militarily withdraw fmm nhj^o v-i,
are no objections ; if Japan is not wi Lg t^do so Then t^e nLhfVn^^ ^""'^
to give assistance to China, should be rest rved ^^ ^'^ continue
2. It should be proposed that North East Asia (Russia) be atso includeri in «m
oblir^™'l„n/°"" ^ "' ""^ •'''P''"'^'^ ■"•"'X'^'" •="« ''<^« aosweredTilhe above
abrrobse'rvati'ons '^' '''^"°''" ^^'P°'^^^ ^^^'^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^aU with in the
lea"srror^t^^dgcSor^tfl^L;rwV?u^ll^t^^^^^^ ^Vf at
especially now that we have been so fuHv informprt hv m ^^7^ ^''^ of State
been given the opportunity to inform him'o'ourToInf of' We^"' "°^^ "^ ^^^^
As far as the possible reduction of economic nressnrP on tT;.^,. -.
consultations with Governor General SfaXnwlh!.? i P"^" '^ concerned,
will be necessary in view of the fact th«7^ro1f -^ l"""^- Economic Warfare
were originally lestin^d'or'jfpan'arVn^w bSn^^^^^^^^^^ ?he Un't'j .T'f '^
In general it will not be possible to go furthir than thp fin«i^ 1^^ ^\''^^^^
the Batavia Conference as pronosed hefnrp tho M.fi7 V , ^^^ proposals of
sions had been broken ol Xeover as a resi^^^n^^^^ '^^''"'-
Durchn<5ps r//7/i Vi,^ luuieuver as a lesult of Russian and American
purcnases, [U'4i the amounts of tin and rubber offerPd in fh« «^oi
posals are no more available. ^uuuer omerea m the final pro-
NovEMBER 25th, 1941.
'■■^-^'^^^ Depaetment of State
jfemorandum of conversation
Subject: Threatened Japanese Invasion of French In?o;:Wna?rir''" ''' ""'
Par„c,pants: Sec^retar. of State Hul, .n/?h1 '^eX'rZdT^Min.ster, Dr. A.
Copies to:
1694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Saigon and other localities in the French Indochina area indicating that tens
of thousands of Japanese troops with equipment, vessels, transports, et cetera,
were proceeding to that area from the north. He examined the cables care-
fully and appeared much disturbed about the Japanese troop movements. The
Minister stated that this presented a very serious situation.
The Minister wanted to make clear that he had supported me unequivocally
in connection with the proposed modus vivendi arrangement which I abandoned
on Tuesday evening, November twenty-fifth, or practically abandoned when the
Chinese had exploded without knowing half the true facts or waiting to ascer-
tain them. I said that I had determined early Wednesday morning, November
twenty- [-^^76] sixth, to present to the Japanese later in the day the
document containing a proposed draft of an agreement which set forth all of
the. basic principles for which this Government stands and has stood for, for
many years, especially including the maintenance of the territorial integrity
of China. I reminded the Minister that the central point in our plan was the
continuance of the conversations with Japan looking toward the working out
of a general agreement for a complete peaceful settlement in the Pacific area
and that the so-called modus vivendi was really a part and parcel of these
conversations and their objectives, intended to facilitate and keep them alive
and that, of course, there was nothing that in any way could be construed as
a departure from the basic principles which were intended to go into the general
peace agreement. The Minister said he understood the situation.
C H
S CH:MA
- {If..!f77^ The Vice Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Gesell.
Mr. Gesell. At page 1265 Senator Ferguson requested the notes
made by Mr. Welles regarding conferences with President Roosevelt
in connection with the Atlantic Conference, discussions concerning a
parallel declaration to Japan.
The State Department advises that to date it has not found any
such notes. The State Department has, however, found a draft dated
August 16, 1941, which appears to be a revision of a draft dated
August 15, 1941. The committee will recall that the August 15 draft
was part of .Exhibit 22 and was submitted by us in the presentation.
The State Department now has a draft dated August 16, which we
are glad to furnish for the record. It has to be photostated and is not
yet here.
Senator Ferguson. Could you make that Exhibit 22-A so it will be
with Exhibit 22?
Mr. Gesell. We will make it 22-A. ^
Thut draft, which is a day later than August 15, I understand
already shows the watering down of the crucial paragraph at the end.
[Ji47S~\ Mr. Gesell. We have also obtained a message dated
August 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Chur-
chill advising Prime Minister Churchill of the statement made to the
Japs on August 17, 1941. I would like to read that into the record.
This is dated August 18, 1941 (reading) :
Amembassy,
London (England).
Triple Priority.
Secret from the President for Churchill
Quote. With reference to our discussions in regard to the situation in the Far
Bast, upon my return to Washington I learned tliat the Japanese Ambassador
had on-August 16 approached the Secretary of State with a request for a resump-
tion of the informal conversations which the Ambassjulor and tlie Secretary of
State had been holding directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a
» See Hearings, Tart 5, p. 2065.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1695
basis for negotiations in regard to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and
that the Secretary of State had in reply confined himself to repeating what he
had previously said in regard to the developments in Japan's course of conquest
which had led to the cessation of those conversations.
On August 17 I sent for the Japanese Ambassador, and the Secretary of State
and I received him. I made to him a statement covering the position of this Gov-
ernment with [4479] respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in
the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed state-
ment such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less
vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed.
The Ambassador renewed the request made by him to the Secretary of Stale
in regard to the resumption of convei'sations. I replied by reviewing the
Japanese Government's action in actively pursuing a course of conquest and in
inspiring the Japanese press to attack this Government. I dwelt on the prin-
ciples of peaceful, lawful and just international relations which this Govern-
ment has emphasized and I suggested that if the Japanese Government is pre-
pared to readjust its position and embark upon a peaceful program this
Government would be prepared to resume the exploratory conversations and
that before undertaking the resumption of those conversations we felt that
it would be helpful to have a clear ^statement of the Japaese Government's
attitude and plans.
The Japanese Ambassador said that he would communicate what I had told
him to his Government.
Roosevelt.
I would like to have this marked as Exhibit 70.
The Vice Ch.mkman. It will be so ordered.
[M^O] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No.
70.")
Mr. Gesell. At page 127 of the transcript a request was made by
Senator Ferguson for any record that Great Britain took parallel
action in accordance with the Atlantic Conference agreement. That
request was also made at page 1804 of the transcript.
No record of any such action has been found by the State Depart-
ment in its files. However, on August 25, 1941, the State Department
telegraphed to Ambassador Grew for his information an extract from
Prime Minister Churchill's radio address on August 24, 1941. We
have that telegram as No. 535 to Tokyo and I would like to read it
into the record since it does indicate information, perhaps, of a kind
that Senator Ferguson was inquiring about as to whether it is avail-
able.
The Vice Chairman. Proceed.
Mr. Gesell. It is dated August 25, 1941. It is addressed to the
Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, via Shanghai, China, and Naval Radio, and
it reads as follows [reading] :
There follows for your information extract from the Associated Press text
from London of Prime Minister Churchill's radio address of August 24.
This is the quote, I take it, from the press :
But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented [P/Sl] and deva-
stated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, r,eek-
ing to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as
if it w^re a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the
500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about
that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carn;ige, ruin and cor-
ruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now they stretch a grasping hand
into the southern seas of China. They snatch Indochina fntm the wretched
Vichy French. They menace by their movements Siam, menace Sintiapore, the
Britisli link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine Islands under the
protection of the United States.
1696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It is certain that tliis has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a
peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience
to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost
reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations-
will succeed. But this I must say : That if these hopes should fail we shall,
of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.
I would like to have that telegram marked as Exhibit 71.
The Chairman. So ordered,
[44^2] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No.
71.")
The Vice Chairman. Now, that is a quotation from Mr. Churchill's
speech in London ?
Mr. Gesell. Right, sent by Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. May I just inquire as to where counsel obtained
exhibits 70 and 71, whether they were both in the State Department
files?
Mr. Gesell. Yes; we obtained them from the State Department
files.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I mean, the State Department
files.
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Proceed.
Mr. Gesell. At transcript page 1285 there is a request by Senator
Ferguson for any messages to Ambassador Grew regarding alleged
parallel action taken by him in Japan on August 12, 1941, with Sir
Robert Craigie relating Thailand.
We would like to point out that at page 1649-1652 of the transcript
Ambassador Grew testified that he took no such parallel action.^
We have some documents from the files of the Department [-^4<5<^]
of State which bear on this subject and I will designate them all as
the next exhibit and describe them. That will be Exhibit 72,
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 72.")
Mr, Gesell, The first is a telegram. No, 452, from the State Depart-
ment to Ambassador Grew, reporting statements made by Sumner
Welles to the Japanese Ambassador August 1, 1941, and requested
Grew to report these statements to the Japanese Foreign Minister.
Second, telegram No. 1153, from Ambassador Grew to the State
Department, reporting that he has taken action in accordance with the
instructions.
And, third, a State Department radio bulletin pf August 6, 1941,
reporting a press conference of Secretary Hull on that date at which
Secretary Hull commented on Thailand.
We believe this whole document would in the normal course of the
State Department procedure have been sent to Ambassador Grew.
Perhaps all three of these documents should be spread on the record
so that the committee will have it for their information.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman, Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson, Do I understand that the last one, [44'^4]
there is no knowledge that it was sent to the Ambassador?
1 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 488-489, 627-629,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1697
Mr. Gesell. Well, it is a Department radio bulletin, which we
understand were sent generally to all ot our ambassadors and repre-
sentatives and, therefore, the presumption is very strong that it went
to Ambassador Grew.
Senator Ferguson. That is wdiat I want to know.
Mr. Gesell. Yes. He had the facilities to receive it and he was
one of the logical people to be looking for it.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
(The documents comprising Exhibit 72 follow herewith:)
mS5] Telegram sent
Department of State
Washington, August 1, 2941. Noon
AmEmbassy,
Tokyo (Japan) PRIOKITY
CONFIDENTIAL TO THE AMBASSADOR
Reference my 793 94 451 August 1, 11 a, m.
One. After the Japanese Ambassador had delivered his Government's mes-
sage in regard to the bombing incident at Chungking and I had expressed
appreciation, I took occasion to say to the Ambassador that we have heard from
authoritative sources that the Japanese are bringing or are about to bring
pressure on the Government of Thailand similar to that which they have
recently exerted against the French Government and the Indochina author-
ities ; that we, of course, regard such reports with very serious apprehension ;
end that, speaking under instructions from the President, I wished to state
that the proposal which the President made recently in relation to Japan's
contemplated procedure in and regarding Indochina would also extend to
and cover any such contemplated procedure in and regarding Thailand.
I requested that the Ambassador immediately inform his Government of this.
The Ambassador replied that he would do so.
Two. The President and I desire that you at the earliest possible moment
inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the above.
Acting (Signed) Welles
14486] Telegram received
Tokyo.
From : EJ
Dated August 2, 1941
Rec'd 7 : 47 a. m.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to
anyone. (SC)
[Stamped :] Secretary of State, Aug. 5, 1941. Noted
The Secketary of State,
Washington.
Rush
1153, August 2. 3 p. m. (Section One)
Confidential for the Acting Secretary.
Department's 452, August 1, noon.
One. In the absence from the Foreign Office today of the Foreign Minister,
who is leaving tonight to worship at the Ise Shrines, counselor called this
afternoon on the Acting Vice Minister and communicated to him the substance
of the first paragraph of the Department's telegram under reference, at the
same time conveying my request that the information be transmitted promptly
to the Minister. Mr. Yamamoto replied that a report along precisely similar
lines had already been received from Ambassador Nomura, but that lie would
immediately inform the Minister of the information received through us.
79716 — 46— pt. 4-
1698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ipjjg [Telegram received]
[4//S7] From: Dated August 2, 1941
Rec' d 7 : 48 a. m.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to
anyone. (SC)
Secretary of State,
Washington.
Rush.
1153, August 2, 3 p. m. ( Section Two) .
Two. In reply to my request for an interview with the Foreign Minister on
Monday afternoon after his return from Ise, Mr. Yamamoto said that he would
of course arrange for the interview if I desired to communicate further views
or information with regard to the American Government's proposition, but
that if the purpose of the interview were to receive some indication of the
Japanese Government's considered views with regard to the proposition he be-
lieved that the interview might be usefully deferred for a few days. He said
that the proposition was being carefully studied by the Japanese Government
with every desire to find a solution. He added that a telegram in the sense of
the preceding sentence had already been sent to Ambassador Nomura.
(Signed) Grew.
HPD
[4488] Department of State,
Division of Current Information.
Radio Bulletin No. 186 August 6, W',1.
Note. This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in
no v/ay an expression of official opinion.
state department
Press Conference. Questioned again today whetlier any credence could be
placed in reports of a possible meeting between the President and Prime Min-
ister Churchill, the Secretary said that he had nothing more to say than he had
said yesterday morning.
A correspondent asked whether the Secretary could say what Mr. Duff-Cooper's
mission to the United States was about. The Secretary replied that as far as
he knew Mr. Duff-Cooper had not as yet landed. He added that be had heard
a report, which he could not vouch for, that during the next few days Mr. Duff-
Cooper might pass through this country on his way to the Far East. Asked if
he expected to see him, the Secretary said that if he came by and proposed to
call, he supposed he would see him as he did other important and prominent
people who come to this country.
A correspondent mentioned that there were increasing indications that Japan
was making demands on Thailand and he referred to Mr. Eden's speech in the
House of Commons to the effect that anything that threatened the security and
integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Britain, and he wondered
whether the [-'i^/89] Secretary would care to say anything on the situation
in regard to our own policy. The Secretary said that he thought that we had
many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the part of certain
countries, and that it included the Pacific area. He said that we liad made
very clear our concern and our interest in respect to steps carrying out that sort
of policy. He pointed out that Mr. Welles just a few days ago had occasion
to give the correspondents a statement on that general question as it related
to the Pacific area.
Asked if he could say whether this Government had had occasion to express
any views to the Govenmient of Thailand concerning the present crisis out
there, Mr. Hull said he could not go into details now bpcause it was not at a
stage wliere he could be very definite. A correspondent pointed out that certain
steps followed the occupation by Japan of Indorhina and he inquired whether
it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follow the occupation or
attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. Thf Secretary replied that it
was fair to have increasing concern about a movement that would include the
step to which the correspondent referred.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1699
Asked if the correspondents could int'ci- that this Gov<M-iinieiit has increasing
concern about events over there, the Secretary said tliat that was what he was
trying to say. He added that anything that JMr. Welles l>ad said regarding
the Pacific area and Indochina would have especial application to Tliailand
and the present situation. ■
[4^/90] A correspondent mentioned that the Japanese had also madd some
demands upon the Ecuadorans, ancl he asked whetlier we were going to do any-
thing about that. The Secretary said that we had notlung on that subject
except what appeared in the newspapers. He added that he had not heard from
Ecuador nor from our representatives.
A correspondent asked whether there had been some indications that Thailand
had been ottered what amounted to a protectorate over Malaya as well as
Indochina, so that the Japanese would have a protectorate similar to that of
the British Commonwealth of Nations over Canada, of which Canada is a
part. The Secretary said that he had not been advised on that subject. He
mentioned the multiplicity of rumors and reports coming from that area lately
and said that we were observing all of these as closely as possible.
A correspondent, with reference to an article in a Netherlands Indies paper
that there was no ciuestion tiiat the United States was behind the Netherlands
Indies but the question was how far behind, asked whether we had any indica-
tions of a weakening of their attitude towards Japan out there. The Secretary
said that he had nothing new on that .subject.
To a question of whether the United States had had any change in relations
with Finland, the Secretary said thnt there had been nothing especially new
on that recently.
Asked whether he had any report or definite assurance from [-'hi91]
Vichy on Admiral Leahy's conversations, the Secretary said that he had not
yet heard from him.
A correspondent asked whether there was any development on the question
of evacuating Americans out of Japan. The Secretary said that there was
nothing especially new. He said that we had not had any communications yet
from any of the persons who were refugees if we might call them that or
fi'om our consuls. He added that at the same time we are giving every
attention to the whole problem.
A correspondent mentioned that there was a private group, including several
Republican leaders, who issued an appeal last night to Congress (see below)
to put a stop to the step-by-step projection of the United States toward an
undeclared war and he asked for the Secretary's comment on that. Mr. Hull
said that he would repeat his statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
in the House of Representatives in January in support of the Lend-Lease Bill
in which he sought to state the issues confronting us in the international
situation.
Paraguay. The Department of State today made public a translation of a
letter dated July 28 to the Acting Secretary of State from the Minister oif
Paraguay expressing the appreciation of the President of Paraguay and Sonora
de Morinigo for the courtesies shown in the United States to Senora de Morinigo
and their son. The letter said that the general health of the child has improved
notably and that the difficulties have begun to give way with the ['{492]
treatment applied. (See Radio Bulletin No. 172 of July 21.)
Chile. Senorita Magdalena Petit, distinguished authoress and musician from
Chile, will arrive in New York on August 11 on an invitation extended by the
Department of State to visit the United States.
Max W. Thornhurg. The Department has announced the appointment of Max
W. Thornburg as a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, to act
as consultant to the State Department on international petroleum matters.
Mr. Thornburg has been assigned to the Office of the Adviser on International
Economic Affairs.
CONGRESS
Defense Seizure. The House yesterday voted 241 to 136 to adopt the Property
Requisitioning Bill. The House added three amendments to the measure as
passed by the Senate, thus necessitating its going to conference to iron out the
differences. (See Radio Bulletin No. 373 of July 22.)
Highway Defense Program. The Senate todav over-rode by 57 to 19 the Presi-
dent's veto of the $320,000,000 highway defen.se bill.
The measure will now go to the House for consideration. (See Radio Bulletin
No. 185 of July 5. )
1700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DEFENSE
Naval Bases. The Navy Department will establish six additional section bases
for refueling and minor repairs for small ships at Key West, Fla. ; Mobile, Ala. ;
Corpus Christi, Tex. ; [4'i93~[ Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico ; Monterey,
Calif. ; and Neah Bay, Wash., as soon as funds are available. The Department
said that additional section bases would also be established in Alaska.
Airplne Deliveries. The OPM reported that its Director General Knudsen,
Rear Admiral John H. Towers, and Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal
would leave tomorrow on a three-day tour to inspect East Coast Airplane fac-
tories with a view to possible speeding up of deliveries to the Army, Navy
and the British. '
Naval and Aircraft Equipment. Federal Loan Administrator Jones announced
that the Defense Plant Corp.. at the request of the Navy Department, had
authorized a lease agreement with Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., N. Y. C, to
construct and equip a plant at Baltimore, Md., costing $3,100,000, to be used for
naval equipment production.
The Defen.se Plant Corporation also authorized a lease agreement with Bell
Aircraft Corporation, Buffalo, to construct and equip a plant at Niagara Falls
Airport.
[W4] Mr. Gesell. At transcript pages 1300, 1305, and 1316 a
request was made by Senator Ferguson for messages transmitted by
Sumner "Welles to Lord Halifax referred to in Ambassador Winant's
telegram dated December 6, 1941.
We cannot find any further record and call attention to the testi-
mony of Secretary Welles at transcript pages 1337 and 1338 where he
gave his explanation of what he thought that information was.^ We
are unable to find any further record.
At transcript page 1399 a request by Congressman Keefe for drafts
prior to October 17, 1941, of messages to Emperor Hirohito: There
are two State Department drafts of October 16, 1941, prior to the
receipt of what is referred to as a draft from the T\^ite House, and
one State Department draft of October 16, apparently following the
receipt of the White House draft. We are not clear. Those drafts
we have marked as Exhibit 73 and if the Congressman wishes we can
have them spread upon the record.
The so-called White House draft which came between these two
drafts has not yet been found. Further search is being conducted
for the "White House draft.
The "\^iCE Chairman. The exhibit will be received.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 73.")
[4495] Draft Telegram
October 16, 1941.
(Draft No. 2)
His Imperial Majesty Hirohito,
Emperor of Japan.
I have just been informed that the Cabinet of Prince Konoye has tendered its
resignation. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions have been carried
on during the past few weeks between high officials of the Government of the
United States and high officials of the Government of Japan directed toward
working out a basis in principle for a meeting between the Premier of Japan
and myself which we both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and
preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages I
received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were very gratifying. Un-
fortunately, the concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese
Government seemed to present a narrower concept tlian I had anticipated. The
Secretary of State therefore on October 2 suggested to the Japanese Ambassador
here that we return to the original concepts and endeavor through re-examination
1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 508.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1701
* of those concepts to evolve general lines of action which would be clear mani-
festations of the high purposes we have in mind and thus might be expected to
establish a durable [4^9G] and fundamental peace in the Pacific area.
The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government
of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the
results hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of your Government
have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest to Your Imperial Majesty that
there be a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself and the Chairman
of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of China, General Chiang
Kai-shek. I believe that such a meeting, to be held as soon as arrangements
therefor can~be completed, furnishes in present circumstances the best hope of
maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area.
I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek in regard to this, but I
shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.
FE : MMH : HES
(Handwritten note: Tentative draft which was discarded upon receipt of a
draft from the White House.)
Draft Telegram
October 16, 1941.
His Imperial Majesty Hirohito,
Emperor of Japan.
I have just been informed through news reports that [^-^97] the Cabinet
of Prince Konoye has tendered its resignation to you. As Your Imperial Majesty
is aware, discussions have been carried on during the past few weeks between
liigh officials of the Government of the United States and high officials of the
Government of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle for a
meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself which we had both hoped
would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the
Pacific area. The original messages I received from the Premier of Japan on
this subject were very gratifying. Unfortunately, it seems to me that the con-
crete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese Government seemed to
present a more narrow concept than I had anticipated (than that conveyed by
the Premier's message). The Secretary of State therefore on October 2 suggested
to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to the original concept and
endeavor through reexamination of that concept to evolve general lines of
action which would be clear manifestations (of the lofty concepts) of our
original concepts and thus might be expected to establish a durable and funda-
mental peace in the Pacific area.
The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government
of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the
results [-i-'fdS] hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of
your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest that Your Im-
perial Majesty signify approval of a meeting between the Premier of .Japan and
myself and the Premier of China. I believe that such a meeting to be held as
soon as arrangements therefore can be completed furnishes in present circum-
stances the best hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area.
I have not as yet consulted General Chiank Kai-shek, the Premier of China, in
regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you
of a favorable reply.
FE :MMH : HES
, October 16, 1941.
Draft of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan —
superseded by a later draft dated October 17, 1941.
This draft was not used.
Department of State,
Adviser on Political Rklations,
Octoler 16, Wlft.
Mr. Secretary:
Mr. Hamilton does not recommend taking the proposed [4-'/5.9] action.
Mr. Ballantine feels that it is premature to come to any decision on the matter. I
feel strongly that this proposed message in the form in which it stands should not
at this time be sent.
1702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A redraft is submitted here attached. The important paragraphs are, of
course, the last two. We all feel that great care should be exercised to avoid
making any too broad commitment or any too emphatic threat. I myself feel
that we should avoid anything that implies countenancing of the Japanese oper-
ations in China.
PA/H : SKH : BGT
Proposed Message From the President to the Emperor of Japan
Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your
Imperial Majesty. I feel I should again address Your Imperial Majesty because
of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency in the process of formation. As
Your Imperial Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between
representatives of our two governments for many months for the purpose of
keeping armed conflict from any extension in the Pacific area. That has been
our great purpose as I think it has equally been the real purpose of Your Imperial
Majesty.
I personally would have been happy even to travel [Jf500] thousands of
miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic accords
could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been
assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached. The first related to the
integrity of China and the second related to an assurance that neither Japan
or the United States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.
If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering
armed attacks against Russia or against France or Great Britain or the Dutch
or independent territory in the South, the obvious result would, of necessity, be
an extension of the Atlantic and European and Near East theatres of war to
the whole of the Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve Ameiican
interests.
The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to see
peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of the seas and
trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to preserve peace
in the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume normal commercial relations,
with the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our
own defense and that of all of the Americas against possible aggression from
abroad.
If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the United
States, in accordance with her policy ['i-^"!] of peace, would be very seri-
ously concerned.
Mr. Gesell. At pages 1419 and 1420 of the transcript a question was
raised by Congressman Keefe as to the time when President Roosevelt's
message of December 6, 1941, to Emperor Hirohito was released to the
press.^
The State Department has advised us as follows : That at 7 : 40 p. m.,
December 6. correspondents were informed orally at the State Depart-
ment that the President had sent a personal message direct to Emperor
Hirohito of Japan. It is my understanding
Mr. Keefe. Was that, do t understand you, at 7 : 40 p. m. ?
Mr. Gesell. At 7 : 40 p. m., Decem})er G.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. It is my understanding that the text of the message was
not released at that time.
We have a release of the State De])artmont dated December 7, 19tl,
for the press — or rather from the White House, but it comes from the
State Dei^artment files — releasing the text of the message to the Em-
peror. We haven't yet been able to ascertain whether this release was
handed to the press before the Pearl Harbor attack or after and we
are continuing on that matter, but it looks as though the text of the
message was released on December 7.
1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 538.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1703
At page 1410 of the transcript a question by Congressman Kecfe
was raised as to the issuance by the State Department [4S02\
of official notices advising American nationals to leave the Orient/
Now there are quite a number of those warnings, as the Congress-
man himself indicated.
The major warnings to Tokyo are three :
No. 381, to Tokyo, dated October 6, 1940 ;
No. 100 to Tokyo, dated February 11, 1941 ; and
No. 765 to Tokyo, dated November 19, 1941.
We feel that these, particularly because they refer to prior orders
and because they show they also went to other embassies in the Pacific
area, will give the Congressman the information he wants and per-
ha])s the three of them should be designated as the next exhibit, No. 74
The Vice Cii.\irmax. They will be received and made an exhibit.
Mr. Gesell. I do not suppose you want those in the record, do you,
Congressman, or do you ?
Mr. Keefe. Can the}^ be put into the record some way ?
Mr. Gesell. All right, we will have them copied into the transcript.
The Vice Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 74" and
follow herewith :)
[4503] Telegram Sent
AC October 0, 1940—2 p. m.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to
anyone. (Br)
Amembassy,
Tokyo (Japan) via ^hayxghai (China).
Info: Amembassy, Chungking (China)
Amembassy, Peiping (China)
American Consul, Hong Kong
381.
The continuance of an abnormal situation in the Far East which has in wide-
spread areas disturbed and interfered with the legitimate commercial, cultui'al,*
and philanthropic activities of American citizens and which has adversely af-
fected conditions of order and general living conditions has impelled the Depai't-
ment to the conclusion that the time has come for it to adopt with reference to
China (including Manchuria), to Japan (including Kwantung Leased Territory,
Korea, and Formosa), to Hong Kong, and to French Indochina an attitude to-
ward passport control and withdrawal of American citizens therefrom similar
to that which has been adopted for some time toward these questions with ref-
erence to disturbed areas of Europe. The Department accordingly desires that
its diplomatic and consular officers in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in
French [/f505] Indochina quietly repeat quietly infoi'm American citizens
in their respective districts of the substance of the preceding sentence and suggest
withdrawals insofar as is practicable from the areas in question to the United
States. This applies especially in regard to women and children and to men
whose continued presence in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French
Indochina is not repeat not considered urgently or essentially needed. There
should be pointed out to American citizens the advisability of their taking ad-
vantage of transportation facilities while such facilities are available, as it
goes without saying that no one can guarantee that such facilities will remain
available indefinitely.
In order that this instruction be not repeat not misconstrued in any quarter, it
is desired that effort be made to avoid publicity in regard thereto and that
endeavor i^e made to preclude the reading into it of sensational implications.
The Department would appreciate receiving fj'om you and from Peiping, Shang-
hai, Hong Kong, Saigon, and other interested offices an estimate of the number of
Americans who will be inclined to heed these suggestions. Tokyo should instruct
consuls in Japanese territory and Peiping should instruct those in China.
1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 534.
1704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Depai'tment will expect shortly to issue further [^506] instructions
embodying various administrative considerations.
Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, and Hong Kong.
Hong Kong repeat to Saigon.
Hull
S
FE : GA : HES FE PA/H
Telegram Sent
Department of State,
Washington, February 11, Idlfl — 7 p. m.
This cable vpas sent in confidential Code. It should be carefully paraphrased
before being communicated to anyone. (Br)
Amembassy,
Toyko {Japan).
100
URGENT.
Department's 381, October 6, 2 p. m., withdrawal of American citizens.
It is desired that the Embassy at once instruct American consulates in Japanese
territory to renew, immediately and quietly and with effort to avoid any sensa-
tional publicity, to American citizens, especially to women and children and to
men whose continued presence in Japan is not highly essential, this Government's
suggestions that they withdraw to the United States. In so doing, the [4507]
Embassy and the consulates are to understand and should explain to American
inquirers that this Govei'nment is making no repeat no assumption that a situation
of acute physical danger to American nationals is imminent, but that this Govern-
ment, in the light of obvious trends in the Far Eastern situation, desires to reduce
the risks to which American nationals and their interests are exposed by virtue
of uncertainties and, through the process of withdrawal of unessential personnel,
to improve its position in relation to problems which may at any time be presented
of affording maximum appropriate protection to those persons who are not in
position to withdraw, those interests which cannot be abandoned, and those prin-
ciples and those rights to which it is the duty of the American Government to give
all appropriate support at all times. This instruction and the advice to be given
under it is not repeat not meant to be alarmist, but is a further and necessary
precautionary measure. We do not repeat not wish to impose unnecessary hard-
ships upon any American nationals, but we ask that those whom you address shall
realize that there are real risks, that we wish to reduce these risks, and that this
advice is being given in the interest both of the safety and convenience of the
American nationals addressed and in the interest of national security.
The Department is sending similar instructions [^508] to Peiping, Hong
Kong, and Indochina.
The Department does not repeat not contemplate sending a special vessel or
special vessels to assist in the withdrawal and American nationals who make
inquiry in this particular connection should be advised to take advantage of such
transportation facilities as may be currently available.
(Hull)
PA/H : SKH : ZMK/HNS FE PA/H
Telegram Sent
Department of State "Br"
Naval Radio,
Washington, November 19, 1941 — 'S p. m.
Amembassy,
Tokyo (Japan) via Shanghai (China).
Info: Amembassy, Chungking (China).
Amembassy, Peiping (China).
American Consul, Hong Kong.
Reference Department's 100, February 11, 7 p. m. and previous telegrams in re-
gard to withdrawal of American citizens.
The Department desires that the American diplo- [4509] matic and
consular officers concenied call to the attention of American citisens in the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1705
Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and
French Indochina the advice previously given in regard to withdrawal and in so
doing emphasize that the shipping problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that
because of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance that it will be possible
to retain in the Pacific even the present facilities.
Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Hong Kong.
Tokyo please repeat to all consular offices in the Japanese Empire and to Dairen.
Peiping please repeat to all consular offices in .Japanese-occupied areas of China,
and in Manchuria. Hong Kong please repeat to Saigon and Hanoi.
(Hull)
FE : WAA : NHS/MHP FE PA/H SD A-L S
[4510] Mr. Gesell. On transcript page 1436 a question was
raised by Senator Ferguson as to whether the State Department has a
record of a statement by Senator Pepper on November 24, 1941, which
he made in Boston in a speech. The answer from the State Depart-
ment is that there is no record of any such statement found in the
State Department files.
On transcript page 1437 a question was asked by Senator Ferguson
as to whether the declaration suggested by Prime Minister Churchill
in the message to President Roosevelt on November 30, 1941, was ever
made. You will recall that was a message from Prime Minister
Churchill in which he asked for a warning to be made by the United
State and referred to his appreciation of President Roosevelt's con-
stitutional difficulties. The answer is that no record was found by
the State Department in its file that any warning or declaration was
ever issued to Japan pursuant to that suggestion. We would like to
call attention to volume 2 of the Foreign Relations papers which is
in evidence here, to page 771, an inquiry by President Roosevelt which
was handed by Sumner Welles to the Japanese Ambassadors, as to
their intentions with respect to going into Indochina.
Now, here is a question raised by myself at page 1499 of the trans-
cript, as to whether the Japanese Government gave [4511]
any publicity to their proposal of November 20, 1941, which has been
referred to as the Japanese ultimatum. The answer was that no answer
was found by the State Department in its files that the Japanese ever
gave publicity to their note. The further information is furnished
that the Japanese proposal was published in the United States on
December 15, 1941, as annex 11 to House Document No. 458 of the
Seventy-seventh Congress, first session, which was President Roose-
velt's message to Congress of December 15, 1941.
At page 1505 of the transcript a question by Senator Barkley as to
when Ambassador Grew received word of the delivery of the United
States note of November 26. I believe that question was also raised
by Senator Ferguson at transcript 1820 and 1821. We have here a
series of dispatches to Ambassador Grew from the Department of
State, Numbers 783, 784 and 787; the first is dated 8 p. m., November
26, 1941 ; the second dated 9 p. m., November 26, 1941 ; and the third
.dated November 27, 1941. These dispatches show that Ambassador
Grew was immediately advised that a proposal had been received
and subsequently the actual text of the note was sent there, a summary
of it, at 9 p. m. I think all three of those documents should be spread
upon the record and designated Exhibit No. 75.
[4S12] The Vice Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 75" and
follow herewith.)
1706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[■iSlS]
[Telegram sent]
Department of State "8C"
NO distribution
Washington, November 26, 19^1, 8 p. m.
AmEmbassy, Tokyo, 783 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the
Counselor only
I called in the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in the afternoon of
November 26 and gave them two documents — an oral statement and draft outline
of a proposed basis for a broad agreement covering the entire Pacific area.
A summary of these documents follows in a subsequent telegram.
(Hull.)
FE : MWS : M JF . FE
mm
[Telegram sent]
Department of State "SC"
no DIS.TRIBUTI0N
This cable was sent in confidential code. It should be carefully paraphrased
before being communicated to anyone. (SC)
Washington, November 26, WJfl, 9 p. m.
AmEmbassy, Tokyo. 784 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and Counselor
only
The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at my request November 26.
I handed the Japanese Ambassador an oral statement substantially as follows :
It is believed that some progress has been made in reference to the general
principles which we have been discussing for the past several months in informal
and exploratory conversations in an effort to reach a settlement of problems of
the entire Pacific area. Included among those principles are the principles of
reliance upon international coox)eration and conciliation to improve world condi-
tions through peaceful ways and means and to prevent and solve controversies,
inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty, no interference in internal
[IfSlS] affairs of other nations and the principle of equality. Mention is made
of the proposals of the Japanese Government received on November 20 and recent
statements of the Japanese Ambassador that his Government desires to continue
these conversations and that a modus vivendi would be helpful toward creating
a propitious atmosphere.
This Government most earnestly desires to further the promotion and main-
tenance of peace in the Pacific area and to provide full opportunity to continue
discussions with the Japanese Government looking to the working out of a
broad program of peace. In the opinion of this Government the Jajianese pro-
posals of November 20 in some ways conflict with the fimdaniental principles to
which each Government has committeed itself and would not hp likely to furtlier
our ultimate ob.1ectives. It is suggested that further efforts toward resolving
divergences of views on the practical application of those principles be made.
There is therefore offered the Japanese Government a draft plan as one prac-
tical manifestation of the sort of program this Government has in mind to be
worked out during further discussions. The hope is expressed that there thus
may be expidited progress toward a meeting of minds.
The draft proposal for a broad-gage settlement was substantially as follows :
[//5/6] "The first section contained a draft mutual declaration in which
there was embodied an afl^rmation by both Governments that their national
xwlicies have as their objectives extensive and enduring peace throughout the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1707
Pacific area, that both Governments' are without territorial designs, that both
have no intention to threaten other nations or to use aggressively military force
and that accordingly they will give active support and practical application to
certain fundamental principles." (There are then listed the four principles
which are mentioned above in the oral statement.)
Both Governments agree practically to apply actively support five economic
principles in a program to eliminate'and to prevent recurrent political instability,
economic collapse and to provide a basis for peace. Those principles call for (a)
the establishment of international tinancial institutions and arrangements de-
signed to aid essential enterprises and continuous development of all nations and
to utilize processes of trade to permit payments consonant with the welfare of
all nations; (&) nondiscrimination in commercial relations between nations; (c)
nondiscriminatory access to raw materials; (d) abolition of expressions of ex-
treme nationalism such as excessive trade restrictions and promotion of inter-
national economic cooperation; (c) full protection of consuming countries' and
populations' interests as regards the operation of international commodity agree-
ments.
[45i7] The second section of the draft proposal calls for ten steps to be
taken :
1. Both Governments to exert their influence t^ewaf^ bring about other gov-
ernments' adherence to and practical application of the basic political and
economic principles set forth.
2. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression
pact among Thailand, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Japan, the
Soviet Union and United States.
3. Both Governments to agree that no agreement already concluded by either
with any third power or powers will be interpreted so as to conflict with this
agreement's fundamental purpose — establishment and preservation of peace in
the entire Pacific.
4. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of an agreement among the Neth-
erland. Thai, American, British, Chinese, and Japanese Governments calling
for pledges on the part of each Government to respect Indochina's territorial
integrity and should a threat to that integrity develop to embark upon im-
mediate consulation with regard to that threat; i« eyde? that moaaurco fteees-
oary ft«d a-dvisobte meed -wtrt* ^' eat *»fty fee ^ftteeft? such agreement to pro-
vide also that each eigttflrtof fy)- signatory would not repeat not accept or seek
preferential economic or commercial treatment in Indochina and each [43i8]
signatory would exert its influence toward obtaining for all signatories equality of
treatment in those matters.
5. Japan to withdraw from China and Indochina all police, air, naval, and
miltary forces.
6. Both Governments to give up all extraterritjjrial rights in China and rights
and interests in and with regard to concessions, international settlements and
rights under the Boxer Protocol ; both Governments to seek to obtain from
other governments, including the British, an agreement to give up all similar
rights in China.
7. Both Governments to undertake negotiations toward conclusion of an
American-Japanese trade agreement on the basis of mutual reductions of
tariffs, including an American undertaking to bind raw silk on the free list,
and of reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment.
8. Roth Governments to remove their freezing restrictions on each other's
funds.
9. Both Governments to agree upon a dollar yen rate stabilization plan, each
allocating one-half of the funds adequate for that purpose.
10. Both Governments not repeat not to support^economically, politically,
militarily — any government or regime in China except the National Government
located temporarily at Chungking.
An account of the conversation will be sent you in a [J/SIO] later
telegram.
Huix.
FE : MWS : MBW FE
1708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U520]
[Telegram sentl
Department of State "SC"
no distribution
Washington, 'November 27, Idifl, 7 p. m.
AmEmbassy Tokyo (Japan). 787 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and
the Counselor only.
Reference Department's 784, November 26, 9 p. m.
After reading the documents summarized in the Department's telegram under
reference Mr. Kurusu asked whether those documents represented the reply of
this Government to the Japanese proposals. The Secretary said that just as
Japan had to deal with a domestic political situativon this Government also had
its internal political problems and that the suggestion contained in the docu-
ments he had given the Ambassador represented all that we could do at this
time in the light of the Japanese proposals. The Secretary went on to mention
that the proposal he had just given the Japanese would make possible certain
international financial arrangements which were not actually outlined in the
documents.
Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the arrange-
ment suggested in the documents which he had just [452i] received. He
mentioned Japan's bitter expei-ience with international organizations as the
basis for his objection tjo the proposed multilateral nonaggression pacts. He
added that China had received the wrong impression from the Washington
treaties , and had used them advantageously to flaunt Japan's rights. He said
that if this proposal represented the ideas of the American Government he
did not see the possibility of any agreement and added that he did not see how
the Japanese Government could consider the proposal that Japan withdraw all
military, naval, air and police forces from China and withdraw all support
from regimes or governments in China except that of Chiang Kai-shek.
The Secretary inquired whether we could not work out these questions.
Mr. Kurusu suggested that as his Government would be likely to throw up
its hands at our proposal and as the document was marked tentative and with-
out commitment, it might be the wiser course further to discuss it informally
before sending it to the Japanese Government.
The Secretary suggested the Japanese might want carefully to study the docu-
ments before further discussion. The Secretary said that with the public having
lost its persepective it was necessary to present a complete picture of our posi-
tion. He mentioned the actite public feeling on the oil question and reminded
the Japanese of the great injury being [li522'\ done to us by Japan's
immobilizing large forces of democratic countries in territories near Indochina
and indicated that should Japan pour troops into Indochina the American people
would have misgivings as to the possible menace in countries south and west of
Indochina and to our direct interests.
Mr. Kurusu offered specious and unconvincing -arguments on Japan's difficulty
in renouncing support of Wang Ching-wei and observed that the standing of
the Nanking regime was a matter of opinion.
The Japanese clearly indicated their disappointment over our response to their
proposal and their feeling that we had reached an end. They asked whether we
were not interested in a modus vivendi, whether any other arrangement was not
possible and whether they could see the President.
The Secretary replied that we had explored the question of a modus vicendi
and, in response to a further inquiry as to whether our inability to consider a
modus vicendi was because of the attitude of other powers, he added that he had
done his best. He said that the President would undoubtedly be glad to see the
Japanese (an appointment for such a meeting has been arranged for Novem-
ber 27).
FE : MWS : HNS/HE S FE PA/H HULL
{Jf,523'] Mr. Gesfll. At pa;2;e 1510 of the trail sci-int a request
was made by Conp;ressman Miirphv for a copy of tlio official Gorinaii
report on discussions between Adolf Hitler and tlio Japanese Foreign
Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on April 4. 1041. as inti'odnced at the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1709
Nuernberg trial on November 23, 1945.^ We have the complete text,
which we will simply keep in our files, and the full translation of the
document relating to this subject, which was introduced in the Nuern-
berg trial, I suggest be spread on the record at this point.
Perhaps we should also desimate that as Exhibit 76.
The Vice Chairman. So ordered.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 76," and fol-
lows herewith)
Translation of Document 1S81-PS, Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel
Notes Fueh 20/41
Notes regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER and the Japanese
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister
and of the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin on the 4th of April 1941.
[4524] Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those
endeavours for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal
CASAPARI.
Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the POPE, that the United
States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe
and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President
were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy.
Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact,
that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China he
tried to convince the Pope, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China
herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and
in the entire Far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with
Bolshevism.
The FUEHRER interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bol-
shevism.
MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, and the FUEHRER should in-
struct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-minded as possible
the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German
help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by mak-
ing available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest
technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid
a war with the United States. [4525] In case that the country should
decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared
for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would
side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United
States couldl be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at
the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst
situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that
such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form
of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea.
For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the
greatest value to Japan. It was a 'question how such a war would best) be
conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details
such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.
To sum up. Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the
proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those
developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by
the Japanese.
The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a con-
fiict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances
for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's
contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that [4526]
this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against
tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but
also against America. Germany has made her preparations so, that no American
could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America
with her U-boats and her Luftwafl'e, and due to her superior experience, which
would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior,
and that qnite nnnrt from the fact, that the German soldiers naturally ranks
high above the American.
* Hearings, Part 2, p. 573.
1710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany
on lier part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved
with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would
first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to
eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the
otlier country suhsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore
Germany wold sU-ike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict
between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies
in their joined iiction, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be
beaten individually.
Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the
necessary instructions, in order that the proper Ui527] German authorities
would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inven-
tions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare
Immediately for a conflict with the United States.
As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that
he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the
United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at
present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later.
His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike
at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America?
Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she
gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many
who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in
those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated,
that, if Japan continued to walk along per present path, one day she would
have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circum-
stances than at present.
The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka,
brciuse he himself was hi similar situations (the clearning of the Rhineland,
declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that
he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an [-i528\
anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full
of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now
was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening
of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Pi'ovidence favored those who
will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.
Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had
recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that
America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided
that Japan gave free passage to the consignments rubber and tin to America to
their place of destination. However. America would war against Japan the
moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the
destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss
its efi'ect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines
which many had received.
The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean
a'\vthing but that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British
World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with
Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would
be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.
[//,T2.of The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans pre-
cisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of Eng-
land in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to
what extent, she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.
Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer
an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he
also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity
as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a
single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich
Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage
In political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake,
before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend
something about his intentions. It .seems that the latter had spread the.se things
and thus brouglit about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1711
oppose eiRTj^etically. thou5;h as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these
circumstaiK-es he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the
questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to tiie Emperor. He would
have to study exactly and carefully in tlie first place the development in Jaiwin
so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his
proper plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then [Ji530]
the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would
otherwise be spoiled by talk.
Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that
he is lacking- in inlluence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities.
However, sliould he succeed, it would pi-ove that he had great influence in Japan.
He himself felt confident that he would succeed.
On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the
Premier and the Rl^nisters for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been
discussed ; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.
Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter
of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might
leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.
The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured
of German reticence.
Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately
could not say the same of Japan.
The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal narting
words.
Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.
Signed: Schmidt.
Certificate of Translation of Document No. 1881-PS
[4531]
4 April 1941.
I, Ehnst M. Cohn, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly con-
versant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true
and correct translation of Document 1881-PS.
Ernst Cohn,
Pfc.
[4SS2] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. At that point, the papers in this country this week
contained a notation to the effect that an entry was made in the trial
at Nuernberg of a conversation between Von Ribbentrop and the
Japanese representative, asking them in February 1941 to have a sur-
prise attack on tlie United States. I will get the specific reference
Mr. Gesell. I am famaliar with that. We have asked for those
documents.^ •
Mr. Murphy. All right.
Mr Gesell. I might say to the committee we have also been work-
ing this process in reverse and making available to Justice Jackson
and Mr. Keenan the intercepted Jap messages, which have proved to
be ot great interest to them, and we think they will be of value in
both ot those trials.
On transcript pages 1537, 1586, and 1908 questions were raised bv
Senator Brewster as to whether Ambassador Grew was consulted
when the fleet was based at Pearl Harbor in 1940. No record c^n be
found by the Stafe Department, in its files, that such was the case,
in other words, there is no documentary evidence found that he was
consulted one way or the other, which appears to confirm his own
testimony concerning it.
1 Siibspouently admitted to the record a.s Exhibit No. 165.
1712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[4^33] At transcript pages 1544 and 1586 are questions by
Senator Brewster as to whether Ambassador Grew ever expressed an
opinion regarding the effect of basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor. The
answer is again the same, that there is no record which can be fomid
in the Statfe Department files, except the statement on page 69 of
volume II of Foreign Relations, that the presence of the fleet at Pearl
Harbor did not constitute a threat to Japan.^
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think that has already been
read into the record.
Mr. Gesell. That has already been read so we will not pursue that
further.
At transcript 1641, a request by Senator Ferguson for Ambassador
Grew's so-called green light telegram dated September 12, 1940, to
the State Department.
We simply want to note that that was offered as Exhibit 26 and
read into the record by Mr. Grew at pages 1668 to 1679 of the tran-
script.^
[4^34] At transcript 1652, a request by Senator Ferguson for
information received by Ambassador Grew from the State Depart-
ment in August 1941, as to the United States attitude regarding the
independence of Thailand. That is covered by the previous discus-
sion of the Thailand documents at transcript page 1285.
At transcript 1669, a request by Senator Ferguson for telegram No.
300 from Peiping to the State Department referred to in Ambassa-
dor Grew's so-called green light telegram. We have this, and I will
not bother to read it. It is a rather lengthy document. We will offer
it as the next exhibit. No. 77, and have it spread on the transcript.
The Vice Chairman. So ordered.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 77" and fol-
lows herewith:)
[4535] Telegram Received
MG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any-
one. (BR)
From : Peiping via N. R.
Dated : August 31, 1940.
Rec'd 9 :35 p. m. ^
Secretary of State,
Washington.
300, August 31, 3 p. m.
Mr. A. T. Steel, Far Eastern correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, re-
turned last week from home leave in the United States spending some days in
Japan and Manchuria before coming here. As Mr. Steel is an experienced and
able observer the Embassy asked him to prepare a statement of his impressions
and a summary thereof is respectfully submitted below as of interest to the
Department.
(Begin summary) Returning to Japan and Manchuria after an absence of
four months I noticed many striking changes. Japan is moving toward totali-
tarianism at a faster pace than at any time since the commencement of the China
hostilities. The Yonai Government which was a neatly balanced arrangement of
pro-Anglo-American and pro-Nazi influences has been followed by a regime
based on the expectation and hope of an early German victory over Great Britain.
(End of Section One) Smyth.
1 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 586 and 603.
* Ibid., p. 634 et seq.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1713
[4536] Telegram Received
MG
This telegram uiust be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any-
one. (BR)
From : Pciping via N. R.
Dated : August 31, 1940.
Rec'd 11 :o9 p. m.
Secretary of Statk.
Washington.
300, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section Two)
This ♦ has made no secret of its intentions to profit in every possible way from
that victory, if it comes. Four months ago Japanese agricultural interests, busi-
nessmen and liberals were still acting as a brake against precipitate acts of
aggression and opportunism, but these elements have been momentarily sub-
merged under the current wave of pro- Axis enthusiasm. Japan has gone frankly
and starkly "realistic".
Germans in Tokyo, and they are numerous, are nevertheless not entirely satis-
fied with the pace at which Japan is turning toward the Axis, rapid though it
seems to outsiders. German newspaper men with whom I have talked complain
that the Japanese seem prone to delay decision until they are quite certain of
ultimate German success. They claim that German diplomats have pointed out
to the Japanese that the quicker they make some kind of a deal, the more generous
the Germans will be Vi5Sl] in the final reckoning.
I was not able to learn whether the Germans want the Japanese as active allies
in the European conflict or whether they are simply seeking some kind of a diplo-
matic alignment which would give the Japanese a free but independent hand
against the British in the Far East.
(End Section Two)
Smyth.
* Apparent omission.
EMB
[Telegram received]
MG
This telegram nnist be closely paraphrased before being communicated to
anyone. (BR)
From : Peiping via N. R.
Dated August 31, 1940.
Rec'd 1 : 45 a. m. Sep. 1.
Secketaby of State.
Washington.
300, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section Three)
In any case German newspaper men told me that the most important factors in
any possible arrangement between Germany and Japan would be: (one) defii-
nite assurances concerning the future German stake in the China market
which Germany regards as of great importance; (two) some satisfactory solu-
tion of the East Indies and other South Sea problems in which Germany has a
deep interest especially economically; and (three) utilization \_J^5S8] of
the Japanese as a means of keeping the United States constantly worried and
preoccupied with Pacific problems so that Germany would have a freer hand
in Europe.
Very few of the Germans with whom I have talked are pro-Japanese at heart
and some are doubtful of the extent to wliich the Japanese could help them.
Most of them however, recognize that at worst the Japanese would have a
certain nuisance value and Germany would therefore like to make allies of
them. The Germans foresee of course that Japan's exclusionist policy in the
Orient will be applied to all white people including themselves in the long run
[End Section Three)
EMB
Smyth
79716 — 46 — pt. 4 10
1714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[Telegram received]
MN
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to
anyone. (BR)
From : Peiping via N. R.
Dated August 31, 1940.
Rec'd 5 : 30 a. m. Sept. 1.
Seceetaey of State,
Washington.
300, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section Four.)
I believe that a considerable part of the Japanese army including War
Minister Tojo is in favor of a closer [4539] alignment with Germany.
They are being stalled off for the moment by other pro- Axis but cautious elements
in the Government who wish to be sure that they are on the winning side. The
reasons why Japan is hesitant to plunge boldly forward on her policy of south-
ward expansion are in order of importance: (one) she wants to be sure which
way the war in Europe will go; (two) she wants to be sure that the United
States has no intention of taking up arms against her; (three) she wants to
be sure of at least a temporary respite along the Soviet Manchurian frontier
which is the Achilles Heel of the Japanese Empire; and (four) failure to wind
up the China incident.
Meanwhile as Japan struggles to make up her mind she may be expected to
continue the nibbling policy she has pursued ever since the Manchurian out-
break. She has learned from experience that aggression by easy stages is the
easier way. She has discovered that many little bites add up to the same
thing as one big one and that the victims seem to make much less noise
about it.
(End of Section Four)
Smyth
EMB
[45 40] [Telegram received]
MG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any-
one. (BR)
From : Peiping via N. R.
Dated August 31, 1940.
Rec'd 5 : 50 a. m. Sept. 1
Seceetaey of State,
Washington.
300, August 31, 3 p. m. ( Section five)
In view of Japan's extremely diflBcult position I believe that she is in no posi-
tion at the present time to wage a successful war alone against the United States
or Russian although with allies her position would be of course changed. I feel
sure, however, that the majority in Japan are extremely desirous of avoiding a con-
flict with the United States. I might add that on my recent visit to the United
States I was struck with the number of people who mistakenly believe that any
strong show of strength by the United States would automatically plunge the
United States into war. The trouble is that the Japanese know we feel this way
and are making the most of it by flourishing the war scare in our faces. Actually I
believe the Japanese have no intention of fighting us except as a last resort ; in the
face of this attitude I believe that firmness is the soundest and safest American
Naval policy. The risks involved much less than is commonly supposed in the
United States. Of [4541] course if Great Britain is defeated then we can
expect the Japanese to become more belligerent.
(End section five)
Smyth
EMB
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1715
MG [Telegram received]
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any-
one. (BR)
From : Peiping via N. R.
Dated August 31, l'J40.
Rec'd 5 :45 a. m. Sept. 1
Secretary of State,
Washington.
300, August 31. 3 p. m. (Section Six)
The Japanese appear to be so confident of a German victory and are so hopeful
that such a victory would permit them to realize their ambitions in Asia that it
appears quite useless for the United States at the present time to suggest any
halfway measures of appeasement or friendship. In fact the reception that
has been accorded such ideas recently by the Japanese press shows that the
tendency is to interpret them as signs of fear and weakness. No form of appease-
ment short of American recognition of the Japanese created new order in the
Far East would satisfy the Japanese at this time. It is obviously^ pointless to
attempt to reason with the Japanese until [4542] the course of events
in Europe becomes clear. If Great Britain holds out against Germany contrary
to present Japanese expectations Japan will then have to reconsider her whole
policy for Japan today is a nation whose policy is dictated solely to expediency.
(End Summary)
(End of message).
Sent to Department. Repeated to Chungking, Shanghai. Code text by air mail
to Tokyo.
Smyth
EMB
\_45If3'] Mr. Gesell. At transcript pages 1750 and 1751, a request
by Senator Ferguson for any information sent by the State Depart-
ment to Ambassador Grew regarding parallel action with Britain in
August 1941. This information was handed to Senator Ferguson at
page 1883 of the transcript. At transcript 1752, a request by Senator
Ferguson for any information received by Ambassador Grew from
the State Department regarding the American Volunteer Group. No
record has been found in the State Department files that any such
information was ever received from Ambassador Grew, or sent to
him.
At transcript 1781, a request by Senator Ferguson for any answer
Ambassador Grew may have received from the State Department
in reply to Grew's telegram on page 143 of volume II of Foreign
Relations. No record of any reply found by the State Department in
its files.
Now, the committee understands that this is only a partial report
on some of the requests. We have held this group up so that General
Marshall could finish his testimony. We did not want to interrupt
at that time.
We are just making this interim report, and we will do the best we
can in any remaining time on any other [45441 requests pend-
ing, so the transcript will tie togetner.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. I understand counsel has gone through the tran-
script and got all these requests, and he is now just taking up a part
of these requests, and he will reply sometime later on any others.
Mr. Gesell. We are replying to the ones we have ready, and as the
other ones come in we will take care of them, yes, sir.
1716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. These only apply to the transcript, so the tran-
script will be tied together, to see what happens to a request ?
Mr. Gesell. That is right.
We felt we should not have a number of loose ends in the transcript
on the various questions.
There is one further request that has just been brought to my
attention.
Senator Ferguson, on page 2510 of the transcript,^ requested any
Japanese intercepts between the numbers 836 at page 178 of Exhibit
1, and 841 at page 185 of Exhibit 1.
We have the reply of the War Department giving the additional
intercepts that fall in those numbers to the extent that they are avail-
able, and I would like to ask [4^-^] that the memorandum
from the War Department, and the intercepts be spread upon the
record, and with the permission of the committee we will strike from
the intercepts the code information, which we have been striking in
the past.
The Vice Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter refererd to follows:)
10 Decembee 1945.
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.
At p. 2510 of the transcript Senator Ferguson requested the four Japanese
messages from Tokyo to Washington between No. 836 (p. 178 of Exhibit 1) and
No. 841 (p. 185 of Exhibit 1).
- Copies of Nos. 837 and 838 are inclosed herewith.
No. 840 was not intercepted.
The records of Signal Intelligence Service indicate that No. 839, dated 26
November 1941, was not decoded until about 13 December 1941. When it was
decoded, the following summary of the message was prepared :
"Representations made to American Embassy here. Your instructions follow.
Evacuation from Panama according to #322 from Panama. Please negotiate
for assistance from Canal Officials as well as for supplies, water, fuel, oil, and
wharf facilities at Balboa. Negotiate for granting of funds to return to Japan
as quiclily [4546] as possible. Transmit to each office concerned. Sent
to U. S. and Panama."
SECRET
From: Panama (Akiyama).
To: Havana.
November 26, 1941.
Circular #34. Message from Tokyo to Washington #837.
Re my message #819".
The schedule for the Tatsuta Maru, as given in my #838 ^ is to leave Balboa
on the 26th arriving in Yokohama January 15th. On the basis of conditions at
the time, it may stop at Los Angele^ again on the way home, but try to have the
passengers from the United States board it on the outward trip. As far as
possible, have all those who wish to sail from South America also come on the
Tatsuta.
Transmit this message and my caption telegram to all offices in the United
States, as well as Canada, Vancouver and Panama. From Panama send it to
all Central and South American ministers and
•■■ See S. I. S. #26217.
^ See S. I. S. #26216.
Army 26218 (Japanese) Trans. 12/13/41 (BR).
1 Honrings, Part 2, p. 952.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1717
usm
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To : Washington.
November 26, 1941.
#838
Tatsuta Maru Schedule:
Yokohama December 2.
Los Angeles arrive December 14. Leave December 16.
Balboa arrive December 24.
Army 26216 (Japanese) Trans. 12/13/41 (S).
The Vice Chairman. Anything further from counsel?
Mr. Gesell. That is all we have today, Mr. Congressman.
The Vice Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until
10 o'clock Monday morning, at which time Admiral Wilkinson will
appear as a witness.
(Whereupon, at 12 : 40 o'clock p. m., December 16, 1945, the commit-
tee recessed until 10 o'clock a. m., Monday, December 17, 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1719
[4^48] PEARL HARBOE ATTACK
MONDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. G.
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the Caucus Koom (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster
and Ferguson, Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
[4649^ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in
order.
The Chairman was called to the White House this morning and
is detained for a few moments. We will proceed.
Will counsel announce the first witness.
Mr. Gesell. Admiral Wilkinson.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster.
Senator Brewster. I would like to make a brief statement about a
matter that came up during my absence in connection with my assist-
ant here, Mr. Greaves.
1 am sorry I had to be absent, and am very sorry there was any-
thing which seemed disturbing to the committee. It was not a matter
about which there need be any mystery.
Some weeks ago, at what I thought was a full press conference —
certainly a dozen or 15 were in my office — I stated that I had secured
Mr. Greaves as my assistant and thought it would be very necessary,
as far as I was concerned, to have an assistant of this character.
I was sorry that the committee hadn't found it practicable to allow
the minority some assistance, but thought that under the circumstances
I would do the best I could.
I secured Mr. Greaves. I want to make it clear that he has not had
for many months any connection whatsoever with [4SS0] the
Republican National Committee. I think he is a very competent man.
In connection with the episode concerned with Senator Lucas, I
have here a memorandum from Mr. Greaves which I would like to
put in the record. Mr. Greaves is my assistant and is being paid by
me.
1720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. Being paid by you, did you say, Senator?
Senator Brewster. Yes, sir ; being paid by me.
I have this memorandum which I would like to put in the record,
in justice to everybody concerned. It is signed by Percy L. Greaves,
Jr.:
Regarding the recent unpleasantry during youj absence (pp. 3605-3608),
I should like to say that there never was any intention on my part to insult
or reflect on any Members of the United States Senate by thought, word, or
action. I have great respect for Members of both Houses of Congress. I an^
sure that the Senator from Illinois misconstrued an unconscious and which I
thought was a silent smile that went unnoticed by anyone else.
I am a registered Republican, but as you know I receive no compensation
from Republican Party sources and had not for many months before I entered
your service. My activities with you have not been of a partisan or a political
nature.
[4551] I sincerely hope that my conduct has not caused you any em-
barrassment and that my services meet with your satisfaction.
I want to add my personal word, that if there had been any ground
for any feeling, I very much regret it.
I thought the position of Mr. Greaves had been very clear through-
out. He has been here as my assistant. I hope he may continue.
I certainly do not want him, or myself to do anything which would
in any way impair the proper conduct of this very important investi-
gation.
The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement >?
Senator Brewster. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, at the proper time, in executive
committee meeting I propose again to raise this question. I am not
going to take the valuable time of the committee now to argue this
question here this morning.
Not only do I propose in executive session to find out more about
Mr. Greaves than has beeii told by the Senator from Maine, but
there are two other gentlemen that I propose to find out something
about also, who have sat here constantly at these hearings, and have.
according to my [4S52'\ best information, given considerable
information to members of this committee.
I think this committee is entitled to know who every individual
is, what his background is, what his motives and purposes are, how
much he is being paid, and by whom.
If I had two or three people working for me, I would have told
the committee all of these things long before this.
This is all that I care to say at this time.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster.
Senator Brewster. In connection with that comment, if the usual
consideration accorded by other committees, particularly by some of
the standing committees of the Senate, and the committee which more
than any other has established a record for investigation in the past
4 years, if the practice prevailing in those committees has been
followed, I am sure the occasion for the comment of the Senator
from Illinois would not have occurred.
Under the circumstances, other steps have been necessary.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1721
If there is to be an investigation, as he suggests, there may also be
an investigation of the associations and connections of those more
actively identified with the committee, but I am sure we will be
embarking on something that will carry us a rather long way.
[4^53] Senator Lucas. Yes.
Senator Brewster. There are a good many things that have oc-
curred which have not impressed the minority. They are matters
of record. If we are going to start on that we will make a complete
job of it.
Senator Ltjoas. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.
Senator Lucas. One more word. There is no precedent from any
special committee such as the Senator from Maine suggests. There
is precedent on standing committees and those committees are pre-
sumed to be composed of Republicans and Democrats who look after
partisan matters and look after the principles on which the parties
operate.
This was presumed to be a nonpartisan investigation.
Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield ?
Senator Lucas. Just a moment.
This was presumed to be a nonpartisan investigation and there is
no precedent, according to my informants, where a special committee
of this kind has had any minority representation, and that is especi-
ally true in view of the fact that everyone in the first instance agreed
that General Mitchell should act as counsel here in this case for us all.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman
Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield ?
[^SS^] Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. I hope we can proceed soon, Senator.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
I will be a little more specific in the comment which I made. Aside
from the standing committees I did have reference to the special
committee investigating the defense establishment which has been
functioning throughout the past 4 years and which I thought had
accumulated considerable reputation, and which has always had
minority assistants as members of its staff.
And, I might add, that it is a very significant, and I think of a very
nonpartisan character, in the whole 4 years of its history it has never
had a minority report of any character or a divided report, and it
never had any such difficulties as tliis cornmittee has faced. That
is what has reinforced my impression that if well-established prac-
tices of the Truman Committee had been followed much of the dif-
ficulty here would have been avoided. I say that in all kindliness.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, we have an admiral of the Navy
waiting, have had for 10 minutes, while we have been discussing
Mr. Greaves. I hope that we can proceed.
[4^6S] The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe, did you want recogni-
tion?
Mr. Keefe. I was going to make the same suggestion that Mr.
Murphy has made, but in view of the statement of the Senator from
Illinois as to the purposes of his investigation, I simply wanted to say
1722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that I was very much impressed with the long newspaper account in the
newspapers yesterday where the Senator from Illinois proposed to
investigate the Dewey incident to its ultimate conclusion.
I wonder if that is prompted by a nonpartisan attitude. I wonder
whether we are investigating Pearl Harbor or Mr. Dewey. Are we
going to go off on a lot of other matters ?
The Vice Chairman. I hope that we don't get into a discussion
of every newspaper article.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. The Dewey letters were placed in the record here
by General Marshall and they were thought to be pertinent and ma-
terial to this investigation by counsel, at least certain portions of
them were thought to be material and pertinent, and the thing that
I want to find out in connection with Mr. Dewey, and the only thing
I want to find out, if it can be found out, is who gave him this top
secret, if it was given to him, and I think the country and this
committee is entitled to know.
[4^56] Mr. Keefe, What has that to do with Pearl Harbor?
Senator Lucas. It has plenty to do with Pearl Harbor, if somebody
is giving away top secrets that are the highest ever considered by
this Nation; much more than about 90 percent of the questions
that have been asked by the Congressman from Wisconsin have to
do with Pearl Harbor.
The Vice Chairman. Obviously that would not be a proper matter
to go into at this time. The Chair hopes that we may proceed with
the witness before us.
Anyone else?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman —
The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Michigan.
Senator Ferguson. I just want to place on the record the com-
ment that my silence does not mean that I agree with what has
been said here by Senator Lucas this morning ; and I think it would
be of interest to go into the past employment of each of the em-
Eloyees of the committee and their present salary on the committee ;
ut that we may proceed with Pearl Harbor I am not going into
that this morning.
The Vice Chairman. Of course, the Chair feels constrained to
make this statement in connection with the remarks of the Senator
from Michigan. Every employee of this committee, so far as the
Chair knows, was selected by unanimous action of the committee.
[4S57] Senator Brfwster. Mr. Chairman, I am sure you do
not mean to put that in the record as a fact. The facts are that
Senator Barkley and the Congressman now presiding and myself
were members of a subcommittee which did have certain alleged
powers, but aside from Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell, the selection
of the other two members of the counsellor staff was not known even
to me as a member of the subcommittee.
I do not mean to be intimating a challenge of their capacity but
I never knew anything directly regarding their terms of employment,
their salary and, as a matter of fact, I know even little at the
present time.
The Vice Chairman. Well, I think the statement I made is accurate
and correct and certainly in no executive session of this committee has
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1723
any member of the committee raised any question or intimated any
objection to any member of the staff. I am confident that statement
is absohitely and technically accurate.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, it was conceded that there was a
subcommittee named consisting of Senator Barkley, Congressman
Cooper and the Senator from Maine, and the Senator from Maine
had the responsibility as one member of that committee with regard
to hiring our staff.
I hope we will go on with Pearl Harbor now. There is an Admiral
waiting.
The Vice Chairman. Of course, it was the purpose of [4558]
the committee to try to conduct a non-partisan, non-political in-
vestigation and all employes of the committee are employes of the
whole committee and, as far as the Chair is advised and knows, every
employe of the committee has endeavored to fully cooperate with
every member of the committee.
It is my privilege to be a member of several joint committees. I
am a member of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation.
There is no minority or majority employes. The staff is for the whole
Joint Committee.
I am a member of the Joint Committee of the Reduction of non-
essential Federal expenditures headed by Senator Byrd. So far as I
know there has never been any minority or majority employes. They
are employes of the Joint Committee.
I am a member of the committee on Post- War Economic Policy and
Planning of the House and there has never been any minority or
majority employes. All employes serve the full committee.
Now, Admiral, will you please be sworn ?
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON,
UNITED STATES NAVY ^
Mr. Gesell. At the outset I think perhaps we can direct attention to
the principal exhibits which will be covered in Admiral Wilkinson's
testimony.
The first, of course, is Exhibit 37, which is already [4559] in
evidence, the basic exhibit of Navy dispatches.
I would like to call attention to two matters in connection with that
exhibit at this time. When the exhibit was prepared, for reasons of
security as to which the committee is fully informed the word "purple"
was eliminated from two dispatches. In view of developments since
that date the word "purple" no longer has any security significance and
for that reason we would like to amend the dispatches merely to put
that word in at the appropriate place. It first appears at page 12 of
the exhibit.
The Vice Chairman. This is exhibit number what ?
Mr. Gesell. 37, basic Navy dispatches. At page 12, the first line of
the dispatch should read, "Tokyo to Vichy No. 295." Insert "purple"
before "of 19th." So the word "purple" will appear in that dispatch.
More important, perhaps, from the point of view of the hearing is the
insertion of the word "purple" in two places on the dispatch which
appears at page 41. That is the dispatch of December 2nd from
OPNAV to CINCAF and others concerning code destruction. The
' See p. 2485, Infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Admiral
Wilkinson.
1724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
word "purple" should appear after the word "destroy" in the second
line and again after the word "destroy" in the fourth line.
Also at paoje 10 the first word of the dispatch should be "purple."
[4^60] We would like to introduce other exhibits at this time
which have been in the hands of the committee now for several weeks.
The first, as Exliibit Ts, a folder designated "Dispatches on Kra
Peninsula alert."
As Exhibit 79, a folder designated, "Dispatches on Dutch alert."
As Exhibit 80, a series of photostated documents designated "Fort-
nightly Summaries on Current National Situations."
And as Exhibit 81, a folder containing various special estimates made
by the Office of Naval Intelligence on the Far Eastern situation in
the period preceding Pearl Harbor attack, commencing with a special
estimate dated February 15, 1941, and going up to December 6, 1941.
I might say these latter two exhibits, 80 and 81, comprise data com-
parable to that contained in the basic exhibit of estimates which was
introduced in connection witli General Miles' testimony as Exhibit 33.
Senator Brewster. Do I understand whether we have been given
copies of these yet?
Mr. Gesell. Yes, I think several weeks ago, Senator.
The Vice Chairman. The exhibits will be admitted as indicated by
counsel.
14S61] (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos.
78, 79, 80 and 81", respectively)
Mr. Gesell. Admiral, will you please state your name, your rank
and present duty for the record, please, sir ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Theodore Stark Wilkinson, Vice-Admiral U.
S. Navy, recently commander of the Third Amphibious Force of the
Pacific Fleet and now awaiting the pleasure of the committee, sub-
sequently to join the Navy Department for duty.
Mr. Gesell. During what period of time were you Chief of the ONI *
Admiral Wilkinson. From October the 15th, 1941, until, as I recall,
July the 20th, 1942. I will, of course, however, be glad to speak of
anything within my knowledge of events before October 15th.
Mr. Gesell. What had been your duty immediately prior to your
connection with ONI ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I had been commanding officer of the battle-
ship Mississippi for some 9 months and before that a year and a half
Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral Andrews, commander of the scouting
force and of the Hawaiian detachment.
Mr. Gesell. How long have you been in the Navy, Admiral?
145^'3] Admiral Wilkinson. Forty years and a half.
Mr. Gesell. During that time you have had duty at Hawaii, have
you not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Intermittently. My last and only tour of
some length was with Admiral Andrews for about a year and a half in
Hawaii and then subsequently on the Mississippi for 6 months addi-
tional.
Mr. Gesell. Well, now, that would leave you at Hawaii during what
period of time?
Admiral Wilkinson. From October 1939 until May 1941.
Mr. Gesell. Were you stationed at Hawaii your whole time from
October 1939 on, or did you go out there when the fleet went (Mit there?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1725
Admiral Wilkinson. I was with the so-called Hawaiian detach-
ment, which was a force of vessels, and my duties were entirely at sea.
We operated off Hawaii and from time to time went in port. At no
time was I on shore duty there, nor have been.
Mr. Gesell. Prior to joining the ONI on October 15, 1941 had you
had any experience in the field of naval intelligence?
Admiral Wilkinson. None other than attendance at two inter*
national conferences for limitation of armaments in 1933 and 1934.
[4S63] Mr. Gesell. Had you ever had any experience in the
Navy's field of activities comparable to what the Army calls their War
Plans Division?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. At sea, as Chief of Staff to Admiral
Andrews and again as gunnery officer and assistant officer to Admiral
Willard some 10 years before, but not on shore.
Mr. Gesell. The precise title which you held in ONI was Director of
Naval Intelligence, is that correct?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gessell. Do I understand that that was in the nature of a
position comparable to that occupied by General Miles of the Army ?
That is to say, that you were a member of the immediate staff of tlie
Chief of Naval Operations?
Admiral Wilkinson. Comparable but not entirely similar in that
the Chief of Naval Operations had under him not a general staff but an
office composed of a number of divisions. His responsibilities were
somewhat different from the Chief of Staff of the Army and the
responsibilities of his several divisions were quite different from those
of the General Staff of the Army.
Mr. Gesell. But the immediate advisers to the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations would be the various directors of the principal divisions?
[4S64] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Now, can you indicate for us what the other principal
divisions of the Navy organization are in addition to the Office of
Naval Intelligence?
Admiral Wilkinson. The Chief of Operations was by law charged
with the operations of the fleet and the preparation and readiness of
plans for use in w«,r. By regulations he was charged with the coor-
dination of efforts of all bureaus of the Department to maintain and
make ready the fleet. He had to assist him in these duties several
divisions, as you asked : The War Plans Division, the Central Divi-
sion, the Communications Division, Ship Movements, Fleet Mainte-
nance, Fleet Training, Naval Intelligence, and possibly one or two
others.
Mr. Gesell. Can you tell us who were during the period immedi-
ately preceeding Pearl Harbor responsible as directors of those respec-
tive divisions?
Admiral Wilkinson. War Plans, Rear Admiral Turner; Central
Division, Captain Schuirman; Communications, Rear Admiral
Noyes; Ship Movements, Rear Admiral Brainard ; Fleet Maintenance,
I believe Rear Admiral Farber; Fleet Training I forget at the mo-
ment; and Naval Intelligence myself.
Mr. Gesell. Well, now, will you give us some idea of what the re-
sponsibilities and functions and organization of [4S6\5] Naval
Intelligence were?
1726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. Naval Intelligence had three principal
branches, the administrative, Domestic Intelligence, and Foreign
Intelligence.
The Administrative carried out its routine duties with regard to
personnel, and procurement and assignment of duty of personnel,
finances, mail, the issue and forwarding of all reports, reproduction,
printing, and general files, a normal administrative office.
The Domestic division carried on the investigation of espionage
and conspiratorial organizations and individuals, looked after coastal
intelligence along the coast of the United States with respect to in-
formation that could be picked up from boats and otherwise, plant
inspections to make sure that the plants in which the Navy was in-
volved were safe both from a mechanical viewpoint as to fire and
other hazards and safe from a security viewpoint as to national se-
crets; that is the plants, I am speaking of, in which confidential ,work
was going on. This Domestic branch also investigated candidates
for confidential Navy Department employment and candidates for
employment with the Naval Intelligence Service itself. It organized
and conducted, in general, schools for officers and men to be assigned
to intelligence. Its principal duties were those I first mentioned,
the investigation of [4^66] espionage and conspiratorial or
subversive organizations and individuals. They conducted a survey
of the country in connection with FBI and Military Intelligence and
marked down such suspects as were known by the contacts, by the
large number of contacts we had. It was this work that enabled us
to run in, as you might say, to get taken into custody immediately
after the war, some 8,000 suspects of various Axis nations and I think
in large part contributed to the fact that at no time during the last
war was there any serious sabotage in this country.
The Foreign Intelligence comprised a number of geographic sec-
tions, such as the British Empire, the Far East, Western Europe, Cen-
tral Europe, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Near East, American
Republics, and then certain other sections such as foreign trade in
merchant vessels, statistics in connection with foreign navies and
matters of trade and two sections known as Special Intelligence and
Strategic Information.
The duties of the office as a hole and of the foreign branch in par-
ticular and of each geographic section was to collect, evaluate and
forward to interested agencies intelligence received from abroad or
picked up from newspapers or otherwise with relation to the several
foreign countries under each geographic section. The evaluation
would consist of considering the source, considering the reliability of
the information which we had obtained and its consistency with other
proven information that we had.
[4^67] In addition to those main sections there was a small
section of Records and Library, Historical Section, and one of Cen-
sorship, which was held in the nucleus, ready to go into action when the
national censorship was declared. That, of course, could not be de-
clared before the war situation and there was no censorship in the
United States prior to that time. That was the main office.
Mr. Gesell. Before you leave the main office, was there also a
branch known as Fleet Intelligence?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1727
Admiral Wilkinson. No. Upon the institution of Admiral King's
Commander in Chief Office, he set up a Fleet Intelligence which was
directly under his office and was related to the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, but at the time that we were operating before Admiral King
came in — in I believe January or February of 1942 — there was no
specific office of Fleet Intelligence, as I recall.
Mr. Gesell. Did the Office of Naval Intelligence do the work with
respect to keeping track of the movements of the Japanese and other
potential enemy nation vessels?
Admiral Wilkinson. Very definitely.
Mr. Gesell. Where was that work done in this organizational
scheme ?
Admiral Wilkinson. In each of the foreign sections.
Mr. Gesell. In other words, the Far Eastern branch of [4-568]
the Foreign Intelligence Section would keep track of the movements
of the Japanese vessels?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. May I continue with the field ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir.
Admiral Wilkinson. That was the office. The personnel at the
time of December 1 were 230 officers and 175 enlisted men and 300
civilians in the main office, including the branches I have spoken of,
and the school which took a number. In the naval districts there were
about 1,000. I have the figures for November 15 and December 15,
and I am interpolating between the two. There were about 135 agents
who were civilian employees of considerable detective and analytical
skill; 900 enlisted men and 100 civilians. These were the naval dis-
tricts throughout the . country and in Hawaii, Panama, and. the
Philippines.
In the foreign posts there were 133 officers and 200 enlisted men,
and no civilians. In the foreign posts there were naval attaches and
naval observers throughout the world. The naval attaches were at
the capitals, and naval observers, a naval equivalent of a consul, at
a number of ports. We were obtaining our information in large part
from these naval attaches in the foreign nations, from the naval at-
taches and observers in these ports, and in part from the State De-
partment [4S69] officials and in part radio intercepts which
we received from the Radio Communications Office.
Mr. Gesell. Going back to your organization for a moment more,
there was an assistant director of the division, was there not?
Admiral Wilkinson. There was an assistant director who at the
time was awaiting relief, as the Director of the Domestic Branch. He
was doubling at the time and subsequently became relieved, and be-
came full-time assistant director.
Mr. Gesell. What was his name?
Admiral Wilkinson. That was Captain, now Eear Admiral How-
ard Kingman.
Mr. Gesell. Who was in charge of the Foreign Intelligence
Branch ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Capt. W. A. Heard.
Mr. Gesell. Who was specifically responsible for the Far Eastern
section of that branch?
Admiral Wilkinson. Commander, now Captain McCollum.
1728 CONGRESSIONAL 'INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[4570] Mr. Gesell. Admiral, I have in. my hand a three-sheet
mimeographed document entitled "Intelligence Division (OP 16).
Duties:"
Does that document correctly summarize the duties of the Intel-
ligence Division as it was set up and operating immediately prior to
Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes. You will note on page 2,
subparagraph (c), they speak of duties of the public relations branch.
That had been a part of the Office of Naval Intelligence, but in the
middle of the year 1941, 1 believe, it was detached and placed directly
under the Secretary's office, and in consequence that entire subpara-
graph was no longer effective.
Mr. Gesell. Does that document correctly state the duties of the
Foreign Intelligence Branch?
Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes. In item (a) (2), thereof,
''Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable,"
the definition of "evaluation" which has been advanced in connection
with General Miles' testimony is somewhat in conflict with that in
the Navy in that in G-2 evaluation of information included the de-
termination of the probable or prospective intentions of the enemy.
That, however, was not one of the duties of the Office of Naval
Intelligence.
[4^71] Mr. Gesell. I want to return to that in a moment.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. I would like to offer this three-page statement of the
duties of the Intelligeiice Division as the next exhibit, Exhibit 82.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 82.")
Mr. Gesell. I ask you. Admiral, to read the duties of the Foreign
Intelligence Branch.
Admiral Wilkinson (reading) :
The Foreign Intelligence Branch will :
(1) Secure all classes of pertinent information concerning foreign countries,
especially that affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention
to the strength, disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces.
(2) Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable.
(3) Direct the activities of U. S. Naval Attaches.
(4) Maintain liaison with naval missions.
Naval missions were special bodies sent to various countries on
their request in order to train their navy.
[4572] (5) Maintain liaison with foreign naval attaches accredited to the
United States.
(6) Maintain liaison with other Government departments for the exch:mce of
foreign information.
Mr. Gesell. Now, under item (a) (1), it is clear that one of the
duties of the ONI was to secure or collect information concerning the
disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces, was it not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. We were to secure everything we
could which was factual, and which would be of value in determining
those intentions.
Mr. Gesell. Now, is it also clear that under item (2) ONI had the
responsibility of disseminating such information to all concerned?
Admiral Wilkinson. You will note that term "as advisable," which
means as may have been directed from time to time. There were
directions which we had received in that connection.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1729
Mr. Geselxi. I want to be sure I understaiul you. I understand you
to testify on that point thus far, as follows, that it was the respon-
sibility of ONI to assemble the information as to the disposition and
probable intentions of foreign naval forces.
Admiral Wilkinson. Entirely.
[4.673] Mr. Gesell. That the responsibility of evaluating sucli
information was not the responsibility of ONI.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. With respect to its accuracy, very
definitely. With respect to the determination of probable intentions
of itself, it was not.
Mr. Gesell. In other words, ONI simply indicated, when it had
collected the information, whether it considered it reliable or not,
and! if so, what degree of reliability it attached to the information.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and to the best of our guess we would
advise the Office of Chief of Naval Operations what we thought it
meant.
Mr. Gesell. But you did not have, as one of your functions, the
responsibility of determining what the probable intentions of the
foreign naval forces would be ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. I was advised by my predecessor that
he had been told by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant
Chief, and Director of War Plans, that the Office of Naval Intelligence
would not prepare the estimate or probable intentions of the enemy,
as had been done in the War Department, but that War Plans would
assume that duty.
I have subsequently consulted Admiral Ingersoll on that same sub-
ject, and I stated that I felt we had considerable [4S74] talent
in the office that might be prepared to do that, but that I understood
this from my predecessor, and Admiral Ingersoll confirmed it.
Mr. Gesell. These duties that I have just introduced as Exhibit 82,
were established by the order of the Chief of Naval Operations on
October 23, 1940, were they not?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe so.
Mr. Gesell. Do you know of any formal written amendment of
those duties. Admiral?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. For instance, I know of no amend-
ment that removed the Public Relations Branch from that office, but
perhaps that has been overlooked in the general corrections.
^ Mr. Gesell. So that by word of mouth, and discussion, the responsi-
bilities of ONI under this general statement of its duties were quali-
fied and amended ; is that correct ?
Admirajl Wilkinson. I would not say amended. I would say,
qualified, because there is nothing in the specific text that would
require us to disseminate the probable intentions of the enemy, as I
read it.
Mr. Gesell. Are we clear thus far, that it was your duty to assemble
the information ; it was your duty to determine its degree of reliability ;
and it was the duty of someone else to determine what the probable
intentions of [^575] the enemy would be?
Admiral Wilkinson. That was my understanding, except, of course,
I was willing and anxious that the efforts and abilities of our office
should contribute our view of the enemy intention to the Office of
Naval Operations.
79716— 46— pt. 4 11
1730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. I am talking, you understand, though. Admiral, as to
your duties, as to your responsibilities.
Admiral Wilkinson. Quite right.
Mr. Gesell. It was not your responsibility or duty to determine the
probable intentions of the enemy ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not so understand, and I have the in-
formation, as I said, from my predecessor, my discussion with Admiral
IngersoU, the Assistant Chief of Operations, and just this morning
from Admiral Kirk, also my predecessor.
Mr. Gesell. You recall a conversation with Admiral Kirk to that
effect?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. I understand he talked about the matter with Admiral
IngersoU and he also advised you.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Did you ever discuss the matter. with Admiral Stark?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
[4^76] Mr. Gesell. Now^, wnth respect to the responsibility for
dissemination, I understood you to testify that your responsibility for
dissemination was qualified by the words "as advisable," and that you
had orders instructing you as to what type of information should be
disseminated. Is that correct?
Admiral Wilkinson.^ I said that the text of the regulations which
you introduced read "Evaluate the information collected and dissemi-
nate as advisable."
I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate
and spread abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles
had termed static information, such as the defenses of the country,
its economics, the diplomatic relations, the characters and activities
and previous careers of its military and naval men, the location of its
fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other than the
enemy probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself
might give rise or might require action by our fleet, or by our naval
forces.
In the latter case before dissemination I would consult higher
authority, either the Assistant Cliief, the Chief of Nfival 0]ierations,
or my colleague, Chief of War Plans, in order that this information
which I sent out would not be in conflict with his understanding of
the naval situa- [4^77] tion, and the operations for which he
was responsible.
Mr. Gesell. In other words, you had the responsibility to dissemi-
nate, but where you reached a situation which led you to feel that
the information disseminated might approach the area of a directive,
or an order to take some specific action to the recipient, then you felt
you were required to consult War Plans, or the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions?
Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly.
[4578] Mr. Gesell. I have just been handed, at the opening of
this hearing. Admiral Wilkinson, a memorandum which I wanted
to read to you and ask you if you are familiar with this memorandum
or have ever seen it. It is:
• See HearinKS, Part 11, p. 5.'^61 et seq. for material in connection with the te-'tlmony
of Admiral Wilkinson, now deceased, included in the record at the request of Mrs. Wilkinson.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1731
Confidential Memorandum, December 12, 1940.
From the Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Director, Naval Intelligence Division.
Subject : Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations,
Enclosure: (A) Distribution List.
1. In view of present world conditions, the Chief of Naval Operations believes
that there is a need for keeping responsible Fleet and Force Commanders, and
important Navy Department executive agencies, in closer touch with important
aspects of the situation which may affect decisions on the nature and direction
of initial war operations of the Naval Forces. It is, therefore, requested, that
the Director of Naval Intelligence prepare fortnightly for limited distribution
a contidential and condensed summary of the current situation under headings as
follows :
A. The diplomatic situation.
Japanese, German, Italian, French, Russian, Latin American.
B. The Japanese military situation.
[^57.9] C. The Japanese naval situation.
D. The Chinese military situation.
E. The German military, naval, and air situations.
F. The Italian naval and air situations.
2. Under each general heading a condensed and broad view of the situation
should be summarized, with paragraphs following in necessary detail to give
recent diplomatic, military, or naval trends.
3. It is desired that no information be included pertaining to the United States,
British or Dutch military or naval disposition and strengths; nor should refer-
ence be made to United States war plans or secret diplomatic conversations.
Signed, "H. R. Stark."
The distribution list shows substantial distribution both in the field
and within the Navy Department, including the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
Do you remember having seen that memorandum of December 12,
1940?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not see it until this morning, but I was
fully aware of its terms as conveyed to me, and I was issuing, or my
office was issuing such a fortnightly bulletin throughout my tenure of
office.
As you will note, the operations of the anti-Axis nations [4680]
were not to be included in it, and when Russia came into the war that
was also added to the list of operations we should not discuss, and
also our own operations were not included.
The distribution was materially expanded. The original sheet there
shows distribution of something less than 20, I believe. Eventually,
at the time of the first of December, that distribution list was up
around 120, going to all flag officers, or the commands of all flag
officers in the field, in the naval districts and in the Office of Naval
Intelligence.
Mr. Gesell. Now we have introduced some of these fortnightly
summaries, the ones immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, and they
are contained in Exhibit 80.
What I am particularly concerned with now, Admiral, is the in-
struction from Admiral Stark that these fortnightly summaries should
not contain information concerning secret diplomatic conversations.
Did you understand that you were, under orders from Admiral
Stark, not authorized to send to the field information concerning
secret diplomatic conversations?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, because of the general security attached
to the code-breaking activities.
1732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mv. Gesell. Do you know whether the recipients of these fort-
nightly summaries had ever been apprised or advised that you were
not going to submit to them information concerning [4^81]
secret diplomatic conversations?
Admiral Wilkjnson. I do not know. Of course in each bulletin
there was a diplomatic section, and everything that could be obtained
outside of the secret material was in there, and possibly some re-
flection, in guarded terms, on the secret material and its bearing in
the diplomatic sections of this bulletin.
Mr. Gesell. That is just what concerns me. You have a diplomatic
section in your fortnightly summary and you have instructions limit-
ing the nature of the information you can place in that section.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell, Just what is secret diplomatic information or what
are secret diplomatic conversations? What did you understand that
to exclude.
Admiral Wilkinson, As I say, I had not seen the text of that
bulletin, but I found it a going concern and my general instructions
were I was not to put anything in there, anything derived from what
was known as "ultra" or "magic.'' We thought the general trend
of the diplomatic conversations which might be indicated in magic
as being adverse would be so indicated in the bulletin, but speciric
quotations, or specific facts known only to the diplomatic magic were
not to be placed in there.
[4S82] Mr. Gesell. In other words, it referred to conversations
ut least in which our Government was participating, did it not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Information which we might obtain from our
naval attaches or other sources, so long as it was not the product of
code-breaking activity. We got a great deal of information from
State Department dispatches which we were privileged to examine,
and we got quit€ a little from our attaches and naval observers from
abroad.
Mr. Gesell. Your functions with respect to the dissemination of in-
formation, which w^e have been discussing here, remained the same
under the various war plans, did they not? That is, the Naval In-
telligence had, under the different war plans, the similar responsibility
of collecting and disseminating information, if advisable?
Admiral Wilkinson. I should say so, I do not recall any mention
of Naval Intelligence specifically in any of the war plans.
Mr. Gesell, I notice in War JPlan 46, and in War Plan 52, in each
instance a chapter and section under the Assignment of Tasks, which
specifies that the Office of Naval Intelligence, either alone or in co-
operation with the other participating governments, would secure and
disseminate as advisable whatever information was necessary in carry-
ing out the plan.
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that specifically. [4S8rl\
but I take it as a routine entry,
Mr. Gesell, I want to turn to a discussion of Japanese intercepts
with you at this point. Admiral, and see if we can get a clear under-
standing of what the functions of O. N, I. were in respect of the
Japanese intercepts.
Who, or what department in the Navy, was responsible for inter-
cepting the Japanese messages?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1733
Admiral Whkinson. The Division of Naval Communications ar-
rano;ed for interception and for decryption.
Mr. Gesell. Now the Division of Naval Communications you staled
-was under Admiral Noyes, did you not ?
Admiral Wh-kinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. That was not a division which went through your chain
of command ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, it was a parallel division in our opera-
tions.
Mr. Gesell. Did that division also have the responsibility for de-
coding and translating messages?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, except we furnished them, as best we
could, translators whom we had scoured the country for, and in find-
ing an inadequate number we had actually started, on the first of
October, two schools for Japanese translators, one in California and
one in Harvard.
Mr. Gesell. But the responsibility for interception, re- [4'584.]
sponsibility for decoding and responsibility for translation all rested
in the Division of Communications?
Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly intercepting and certainly decod-
ing. I am not quite clear in my mind about translation. I think the
translation was done under that same central office by translators
who were assigned to that duty and who had been found by us and
in part were paid by us but were told to report to that office.
Mr. Gesell. You understand I am again talking now in terms of
chain of command
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Rather than whether or not you had cooperated by
lielping them through the loan of personnel, and so forth.
Admiral Wilkinson. I think the translation itself was in that
chain of command, but of course the cooperation between Admiral
Noyes and myself and our officers was, I think, quite complete, and
certainly very friendly.
Mr. Gesell. Did you then receive the message for the first time, any
particular message, after it had been intercepted, decoded and trans-
lated and was in an English text form ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Now who in the Navy received the intercepted Japa-
nese messages during the period that you were director of [.^586]
O. N. E. preceding Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. In the finished form that you just mentioned {
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. They were sent according to their applica-
tion to the foreign section to which attributable. Speaking specifi-
cally of the Far Eastern matters which we are now concerned with,
they went to the Far Eastern section, Captain McCollum.
Mr. Gesell. Now was it his responsibility to distribute them to
certain officers in the Navy Department?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, it was his responsibility only to arrange
for such distribution, but it was my over-all responsibility to see
that it was done, and we had Commander, now Captain Kramer, who
was charged with the distribution.
[4586] Mr. Gesell. With the physical distribution?
Admiral Wilkinson. The physical distribution.
1734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. Now who, in the Navy Department, was on the dis-
tribution list?
Admiral Wilkinson. The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Director of War
Plans, and myself.
Mr. Gesell. Can you give us the names of those officers at that
time?
Admiral Wilkinson. Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, Rear Ad-
miral Ingersoll, Rear Admiral Turner, and myself.
Mr. Gesell. Did Admiral Noyes, the Chief of the Division which
was intercepting, decoding, and translating them, get them?
Admiral Wilkinson. He got them before they came to me, or to
my secretary. •
Mr. Gesell. Then he was on the list, was he not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. He was not on the formal distribution list,
but he passed on them before they were sent to me.
Mr. Gesell. In other words, he passed on them as part of his ad-
ministrative responsibilities?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. He may or may not have actually seen
each one. He may have delegated that [4^S7] authority at
times when he was not in his office, but in general he sighted them
all, I believe.
Mr. Gesell. Did the Navy make any distribution outside of the
Navy Department of the texts of these intercepted messages?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, to the White House.
Mr. Gesell. To any place else?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge. Some months before
it had gone to the State Department intermittently with the Army,
but more recently the Navy took the White House direct and the
Army took the State Department direct.
Mr. Gesell. Now, as I understand it, the interception and trans-
lation and decoding of these messages was worked out between the
Army and Navy, so if the Navy intercepted and translated and de-
coded, it gave a copy to the Army, and if the Army intercepted and
translated and decoded, it gave a copy to the Navy?
Admiral Wilkinson. Both services were supposed to have a full
file of the intercepts made by either or both together.
Mr. Gesell. Did you personally see all of the messages intercepted ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. A number of them were excluded in the
Office of Communications from further transmission, [4588] if
they were purely trivial, such as ordering a dozen pair of trousers,
or something of that sort, for instance, but those which were of any
importance were sent to the Naval Intelligence, and were then placed
in a book, and I saw all of those.
I might not have read those to which my attention was not called,
because sometimes they were very bulky, but they were available there
for me to see.
Mr. Gesell. Did anyone in the Office of Naval Intelligence make
any selection from that complete file of the messages which were
to be sent to the other officers on the distribution list ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Captain Kramer, who was primarily in our
chain of command, but had additional duties with Communications,
usually I believe saw them all, even those of the trivial nature which
he excluded.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1735
Those which were then placed in the book and brought to us, he
usually marked them as more important, with clips or otherwise.
That marking was checked afterwards by Captain McCullom and
myself, and we both scanned through the book.
Mr. Gesell. By the time it had gotten to you, the book had on
it, by a clip or other designation, some means of calling particular
attention to the more important messages ?
[4SS9] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Furthermore, when matters
were particularly interesting, or the messages were particularly inter-
esting. Captain Kramer would point out to the recipient by his finger,
or by turning to the page, particularly what he thought they would
be interested in.
Mr. Gesell. I gather you used a system of a book rather than a
locked pouch, such as they had in the Army, is that correct?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Will you explain just how that was done ? Was there
one book which contained these messages which went to the various
people on the list, or did each receive a list of the messages that he
should examine?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure which went to the White House.
I am sure they had a separate copy which went to the naval aide,
and he used that, and prepared his own brief of that for the President,
but as to the addressees in the Navy Department, it was all in the
same book.
Mr. Gesell. And when that book had been distributed around
through the various Navy Department recipients, it went back to the
officers who originally initiated and prepared the book, did it not?
[4590] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, except one copy, I believe,
was retained in the geographical section concerned, and in this case
it was the Far Eastern section. In fact, the book would have in there
matters concerning the German or whatever foreign intercept was
broken down, and proved to be interesting.
Upon its return those appertaining to those other geographic sec-
tions would be taken out and filed in their respective sections, and the
Far Eastern intercepts filed in the Far Eastern section.
Mr. Gesell. But you, or Admiral Stark, or Admiral Ingersoll, and
the other recipients did not have any means of keeping your own files
of those intercepts ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. You examined the book and returned it ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. What opportunity was given to those officers to study
and appraise, and read over more than once, if you will, the various
messages in the book?
Admiral Wilkinson. They might hold the book as long as they
wished, or send for it to come back again, but in the interest of security,
we did not like to send out individual copies for retention.
Mr. Gesell. Under your system, if one of the officers [4S91]
chose to hold the book he delayed the other officers from receiving this
important information?
Admiral Wilkinson. They did, but the bearer of the book was wait-
ing outside and might remind them to return it.
1736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. So as a matter of general practice, I take it, the book
went rapidly to the officers permitted to read it, who then leafed
through the pages, reading matters of particular interest?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would not say so. I know Captain Kramer
often said he was busy pretty nearly all day long carrying the book
around at times. So they took time to read the messages, they did
not scan them too hastily.
[4S9^] Mr. Gesell. Are you familiar with Exhibit 1 and Ex-
hibit 2 in this proceeding, the diplomatic and military Japanese
intercepts?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Can you tell us whether or not you personally saw all
of the messages contained in those two exhibits?
Admiral Wilkinson. I naturally cannot, of my own recollection,
speak for all of them and of course those sent just before October 15
I had on opportunity to see, but I should say roughly that presumably
I did see them all.
Mr. Gesell. All translated subsequent to the 15th of October?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. I was going to ask you whether you made any effort
to examine any intercepts which were in the file for the period prior
to your becoming Director of Naval Intelligence ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not, except as occasion to refer to them
might come up, in which case I would ask Captain Kramer to please
give me the references.
Mr. Gesell. Of course, as the evidence here shows, the situation
was becoming quite tense by October 15, 1941, when you took over the
job, and I was wondering what means were taken to acquaint you
with what had been taking place?
[4S9o] Admiral Wilkinson. I spent several hours, perhaps a
whole day, in the Far Eastern section before I took over the office,
getting the picture from their point of view, and talking to the officers
tJiere, and Captain McCullom particularly, and then Admiral Kirk
as well told me something of it. So I was informed by word of mouth
rather than the examination of many documents.
Mr. Gesell. Well, when you became Director of Naval Intelligence
did you give instructions to send the texts of these messages, or the
i-'ist of the messages to the various commanders in the field?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge. I carried out the ex-
isting system, and I know there was every emphasis on the importance
of security because of the value of this method of intelligence.
Mr. Gesell. What do you mean by the "existing system" ? In this
Exhibit 37, which the committee has before it, there are a substantial
number of dispatches sent to Hawaii prior to October 15. 1941, which
are directly based upon magic, and in tact some of the dispatches actu-
ally quote the text of the intercepted message verbatim, and as I think
we pointed out in the beginning this morning, some of them refer even
to the purple code. I have in mind particularly the messages on pages
4 to 12 whicli were sent out almost [4->^4] in the month of July
1941 to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Forces, and to the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific forces.
Now what do you mean by "practice" ? It looks as though there had
been a practice of sending out these messages to the theaters con-
cerned.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1737
Admiral Wilicinson. I was told, and understood, that such messages
were not to be sent. I believe, although I am not at all sure, that the
messages you speak of as examples were in July and none subsequent
until we come to that critical message with respect to burning the codes.
Mr. Gesell. I think that is a fair statement, Admiral, that most of
them were in July, until the code burning messages which you sent out
in the very last days.
Admiral Wilkinson. I think it is a question, too, of the overlapping
responsibilities of Naval Intelligence and Communications. If I may
dwell on that a moment, the Navy had established in Pearl Harbor and
in Corregidor subunits for the collection of radio information and for
the breaking of such codes as, with the limited personnel and limited
facilities they had, they might be able to do.
In connection with the work back and forth between those agencies
and the Washington Office of Communications there were certain mes-
sages sometimes interchanged with relation [4^95] to codes,
and I believe, although this again is information that was told me, that
these messages of July were more or less of that nature. They had a
trick name known as "Jonab." I think that those were more a discus-
sion of that, in a way, and then again they were messages or informa-
tion of what they had learned from the codes.
Mr. Gesell. You say that you were told not to send such messages
to the field. Who told you that?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall the specific informant. I
think it was my predecessor. It may have been Captain McCullom.
Mr. Gesell. Either Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Either Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom.
Mr. Gesell. Now I have been talking about the actual texts of the
intercepted messages.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. What was the situation with respect to sending out a
gist or summary of the intercepted messages ?
Admiral Wilkinson. There was always the danger that the action
that we took might have come from no other source than code-breaking,
and in consequence — if I might diverge a little, in the South Pacific we
received one time, when Admiral Halsey was in Australia and I was
his deputy commander, we received a message from Admiral
[4^96] Nimitz that Admiral Yamamoto would be coming down to
Buin and would be following a very definite schedule, and in Admiral
Halsey's stead I arranged for an interception. Of course that story is
now well-known. There being 2 days to spare, I sent word back to
Admiral Nimitz that we were doing this, but I invited attention to the
fact that this would give suspicion that we had broken the code and we
knew what the schedule was. In this instance Admiral Nimitz sent
down his best wishes and said, "Go to it," that he would take a chance
on the inferences to be drawn from that. That is an example of acting
upon a code-breaking activity even without repeating the text of the
message.
Mr. Gesell. Well, then, from what you have said so far, you were
concerned about the question of security, which we have discussed
in the hearings. My question was, however, first, whether or not
you were under any instructions which in any way limited your send-
ing out to the commanders in the field gists or summaries of the
messages ; not why you didn't do it.
1738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. No, I don't recall any specific instructions
to that effect.
Mr. Gesell, When you took over you didn't get from Admiral
Kirk or Captain McCullom, or from the Chief of Naval [4^97]
Operations, or anybody else, instructions that you were not to sum-
marize this information from the intercepts and send it to the
theater commanders?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall any specific instructions except
the general preservation of security.
Mr. Gesell. You came to the conclusion, I gather, that you would
not do so for reasons of security ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I either cam© to that conclusion myself or
found that that was the practice in other divisions of operation.
Mr. Gesell. You see, I am anxious to know which it was. Was
it because you found there were some orders in effect and you com-
plied with them, or because you yourself made the decision, for the
reasons you have indicated, not to do it?
Admiral Wilkinson. Well, I think it was, as I think I earlier
said, an existing practice, and that I continued it in the interest of
security. I do not know that I had any specific instructions. I
would have acted similarly with or without instructions.
Mr. Gesell. Did you know these messages had gone out in July,
for example?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. Did you ever discuss this matter with any other ofii-
cers. Admiral Stark or the chiefs of other divisions [4^98']
concerned, as to whether you should or should not send out sum-
maries or gists of intercepted messages?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, I don't recall specifically any instances.
Mr. Gesell. You don't recall any discussion of that matter with
anyone ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Not with respect to my own send-
ing out. I may have had, and I think I did have from time to time,
discussions as to information we had, as to whether that information
should be further sent out. I remember a discussion on the first of
December with respect to the evident Japanese moves in the South
China Sea. I do not believe, however, that that was concerned
largely with code breaking activities.
Mr. Gesell. I am limiting my questions now to the sending out
of information obtained from the intercepted messages.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell, I understand you to say that you don't recall any dis-
cussions with any officers concerning whether or not summaries or
gists of the messages should be sent out ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not so recall, no.
Mr. Gesell. Had you ever heard that any particular commander
in the field, at Hawaii or any other place, had requested such informa-
tion be sent him ?
[4599] Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I now know, but I did
not know then.
Mr. Gesell. What do you mean you now know ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think I have seen a transcript of a letter
from the commanding chief, Pacific Fleet, requesting that he be kept
advised of diplomatic activities.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1739
Mr. Gesell. You are referring to Admiral Kimmel's request to
Admiral Stark that he be advised concerning diplomatic matters ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I did not know of it then and only
recently in connection with this hearing have I seen it.
Mr. Gesell. You recall no discussion concerning that letter with
anyone 'i
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Do you recall ever having discussed the matter with
Admiral Kirk at the time you took over your duties ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I am not sure he was aware of it.
Mr. Gesell. I have in my hand, Admiral, a memorandum by Ad-
miral Kirk dated March 11, 1941, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval
Operations, written on the stationary of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, referring to Admiral Kimmel's [4600'] letter, which
contains this paragraph, paragraph 4:
The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of
this division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately informed
concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements
within the United States.
I want to show you that memorandum and ask you if you have ever
seen it?
Admiral Wilkinson. Very recently I have seen it, but I think that
is a general statement of the duties of the Naval Intelligence and it
does not refer specifically to the inquiry which you asked me, which
was diplomatic activities, as I recall.
[4601] Mr. Gesell. So far as you were aware, you had no
specific responsibilities toward Admiral Kimmel or any or any other
commander in the field to apprise him or them of diplomatic material
obtained from interceped Japanese messages?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, and my understanding was that the ma-
terial from intercepted messages would in general be kept highly
secret.
Mr. Gesell. Well now, whose responsibility was it in the Navy
Department to advise Admiral Kimmel or other commanders of infor-
mation which came from the intercepted messages?
Admiral Wilkinson. If it was purely a question of diplomatic
activities, I am not sure that there was any responsibility to so
advise him.
Mr. Gesell. On the part of anyone, you mean ?
Admiral Wilkinson. On the part of anyone. When it came to
the question of enemy intentions, derived from diplomatic activities,
I would say that it was that of the Office of War Plans, but I do not '
know whose responsibility it was to keep him advised of diplomatic
negotiations of themselves.
Mr. Gesell. I understand you to say that as far as sending out
such information as a matter of information, to Admiral Kimmell
and others, you recall no discussion of [4602] it, you recall no
instructions concerning it, and you recall no requests from him
concerning it?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know of the requests. I don't re-
call as to the discussion. I do know that in our foreign fortnightly
summary that we had a section on diplomatic activities, and we en-
deavored to place in there everything that we could without com-
prortiising the intercepted messages, and to that exten it was the
1740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the responsibility of my office to place in there everything with regard
to diplomatic activities.
" With regard to the intercepted messages, there was a conflict of
security versus the dissemination and I would say that there was no
responsibility to furnish the intercepted messages unless they were
directly related, or from them could be derived intentions of the
enemy with respect to activities prejudicial to our fleet.
Mr. Gesell. In other words, if the intercepted messages reached the
point that it was apparent that some directive or order was necessary,
then there was a responsibility, and you say that responsibility, in
your opinion, rested in the War Plans Division under Admiral
Turner ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It was my responsibility to call his attention
to it, but his responsibility to send it out because of the directive
phase of it as you mention.
[4603] I am not attempting to say I had no interest, but I
didn't have the authority to do it.
Mr. Gesell. Did you ever have any discussions with the Army con-
cerning their practice in sending out summaries or gists of those
intercepted messages ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I was in very close touch with General Miles,
and had frequent conferences and meetings with him informally in
his office and mine ; we had weekly meetings with the FBI, Mr. Hoover,
and General Miles and myself, on the Presidentially inspired com-
mittee set up by the President, we talked over secret matters of this
sort, and both General Miles and I, I believe, were very anxious td
guard the code-breaking activities to the greatest degree.
I do not recall specifically any conversation with him specifically on
the question of sending out messages, except that we, from time to time
discussed the matters that had turned up in magic.
Mr. Gesell. You mean as to what the information meant, but not
what should be done with it ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Well, now, I would like to take up with you the ques-
tion of what the commanders in the field may have known concerning
the interception of those messages.
[4'604] Let's take first of all Admiral Hart at Manila.
General Miles testified, and I believe there has been some other
reference to it, perhaps in your testimony, that there were certain
facilities at some point in the Philippines, under naval command and
direction, which permitted the interception, translation, and the de-
coding of those Japanese messages ; is that correct ?
Admiral Wilkinson. There were two radio intelligence stations,
one at Pearl Harbor and one at Corregidor. They were primarily
set up to intercept all of the information they could get and to study
out from the ship calls that were used by the Japanese, and the types
of messages and the frequency of the traffic, and so on, to figure out
what they could from those rather than the code breaking proper.
It became desirable, however, that Admiral Hart — it apparently
became desirable — I am speaking from hearsay — that Admiral Hart
be able to do his own breaking down without the necessity of referring
back to Washington and so on, and his section was enlarged somewhat
and some of the facilities, which I would prefer not to describe, with
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1741
relation to code breaking, were sent to him. So that he had out there
facilities for breaking some codes, including, I believe, the diplomatic
code.
[4G05] Mr. Gesell. If I may interrupt
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr, Gesell. That meant that Admiral Hart had at Corregidor
facilities for intercepting, translating, and decoding messages of the
type which appear in exhibit 1, and exliibit 2 here?
Admiral Wlkinson. I would say partial facilities. I don't think he
was as well equipped as we were here.
Mr. Gesell. You mean he wasn't as well equipped in terms of man-
power ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and experienced manpower.
Mr. Gesell. Experienced manpower, or, I suppose, the ability to
intercept as many messages, because he hadn't so many intercepting-
stations under his control, fewer of these stations?
Admiral Wilkinson. He had a very limited number.
Mr. Gesell. But he was in a position to translate and decode any
messages which he himself intercepted ; is that correct?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. In many codes, he couldn't touch them,
but in the so-called purple code he was to a degree enabled to translate.
In fact, there were many codes we never got into ourselves here in
Washington.
Mr. Gesell. But the purple code was the code in which [4606]
many of these messages which we have in exhibits 1 and 2 were sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think practically all of exhibit 1 and some
few in exhibit 2. I am not certain.
Mr. Gesell. Was he in a position to decode messages sent in other
codes of the type contained in exhibit 2 ?
Admiral Wilkinson, I am not sure. Again, I have been speaking
entirely from hearsay and would prefer that the specific degree of
his ability be answered by a communications officer.
Mr. Gesell. You were about to discuss the situation at Hawaii?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. I am sorry I interrupted.
Admiral Wilkinson. Similarly in May of 1941, an agency of the
same type was set up in Hawaii. Captain Rochefort, then Com-
mander, was sent out, and half a dozen former language students who
had recently been evacuated from Japan because of the growing crisis
were sent to join him, and he head perhaps 20 or 30 enlisted men.
They were working mainly on the radio intelligence proper. That
is, the calls and the traffic analysis that I have just described.
Mr. Gesell. Ship locations?
[4607] Admiral Wilkinson. Ship locations, and so on. And
he did not have the facilities for the purple code, nor originally
facilities for any code. Later he was asked by the department to
specialize on one or two codes, and what success he had, I am not sure.
Mr, Gesell, He was in a position at Hawaii to intercept but he was
not in a position to decode and hence to translate messages that were
sent in the purple code ?
Admiral Wilkinson, Correct, There was a certain amount of inter-
change between Corregidor, Hawaii, and Washington, particularly on
ship movements. In fact Corregidor become our control and authority
1742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
on ship movements, but there was not much, as I understand, and I
again defer to the Communications witness, there was not much
transfer through Hawaii of the purple code messages translated in
Washington and at Manila.
Mr. Gesell. Well, as far as you were aware, they had not then
facilities at Hawaii for intercepting, translating, and decoding those
messages there through which Admiral Kimmel or any other officer
could have gotten the information ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. Were summaries prepared in the Navy Department of
the intercepted messages, daily summaries of [Ji,608'] [that]
kind?
Admiral Wilkinson. In the morning, I forget whether it was 9 or
9 : 30, the Secretary of the Navy had a conference at which the Director
of Naval Intelligence would discuss the news from all over the world,
chiejfly, of course, the naval activity, the progress of the war. At
that time special items in connection with it which might have been dug
out of a code word were sometimes mentioned. But in view of the
size of that conference, there were about 20 officers in it, the references
to the intercepted messages were rather few and far between.
Mr. Baecher has just invited my attention to this
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, while we are waiting, I might direct
counsel's attention to the fact that on page 31 of the volume 1, of the
Naval Narrative, there is a difference between that and the admiral's
testimony.
Senator Ferguson. I can't hear the Congressman.
Mr. Murphy. I might direct counsel's attention that on page 31 of
the Naval Narrative, there is a difference. It may be that it could
be cleared up now and we would save time later.
[4009'\ Mr. Gesell. I don't even have a copy of that narrative.
Admiral Wilkinson. Here you are.
(Document handed to counsel.)
Admiral Wilkinson. My attention has been invited to a summary
as of the 10th of October listing the number of approximately 12
dispatches which are briefed, but I don't recall ever having made any
of those in my time or seeing them, and I am not sure who made this
particular one. I did have, initially, a little summary, daily sum-
mary of the Japanese situation, which contained information as to
what activities were apparent as to Japan, from all sources, includ-
ing intercepts, and I thought that was continued through Pearl
Harbor Day, but I have since been informed that it was discontinued
on the 24th of October, 9 days after I came in. I don't recall why it
was discontinued. In fact, my recollection was that I had con-
tinued it.
Mr. Gesell. We had been addressing our inquiries to those sum-
maries and the dailj' analysis to the Navy Department, Admiral, par-
ticularly from the point of view of seeing whether either the daily
summary or the daily situation reports, as they were sometimes called,
were continued after you became Director of Naval Intelligence, and
we could find none beyond October 24.
Admiral Wilkinson. The 24th is what I have been informed.
[4^10] I don't recall having stopped them or why they were
stopped. In fact, my recollection, when I was at sea and somebody
asked about it, was that we had continued to use them.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1743
Mr. Gesell. Is it your present information that those summaries
were not used beyond October ?
Admiral Wilkinson, Yes, sir, and Captain McCullom so advises
me, as well as the information you have.
Mr. Gesell. Those summaries did contain information from Jap-
anese intercepts, as I understand it.
Admiral Wilkinson. Not in the form of quoting the intercept, I
don't think, but just mentioning the fact that the negotiations are
continuing, and that some objection, apparently, was made by Tokyo
to some terms, or something of that sort.
Mr. Gesell, Were those daily summaries prior to October sent out
to the field at all, to the theater commanders?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe not. They were purely for internal
consumption. Very small. Only two or three paragraphs a day.
Mr. Gesell. Do you feel that the information that was available
to Commander Eochefort and others concerned with Naval Intelli-
gence at Hawaii was sufficient for them to know at least in a general
way that we were in a position not only to intercept but to translate
and decode these Japanese 14^11] messages in the purple and
other high codes?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say so, particularly as Captain Roche-
fort was an expert in that line, and was familiar with the latest de-
velopments up to the time that he left in May. Then also we had
three intelligence agencies out there — we had two. Captain Roche-
fort, who belonged to the Communications Division of operations, and
was assigned to duty witl:| the 14th Naval District, but was available
to the Commander in Chief, and we had directly under Naval Intel-
ligence the District Intelligence Officer at Honolulu, and he was given
information at times with respect to individuals that might have ap-
peared in codes intercepted in South America, or even in these codes
here, but it was carefully guarded at the time.
Mr. Gesell. Was either the District Intelligence" Officer or Com-
mander Rochefort under any restriction or inhibition which would
have prevented them from advising Admiral Kimmel that these
messages in these high codes were in fact being decoded and trans-
lated in Washington ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't think so. They were in close con-
tact with his Intelligence Officer, which was the third agency I spoke
of. Captain Layton, who was Intelligence Officer on his staff. He
was in full contact continually with Captain Rochefort and fre-
quently, I believe, with Captain Mayfield of the District Intelligence
Office,
[4(^1^] Mr. Gesell, Did Captain Layton himself have the in-
formation that we were decoding and translating these messages?
Admiral Wilkinson, I don't know, I think probably he did,
Mr. Gesell, What precisely was the relationship that existed be-
tween the Office of Naval Intelligence here in Washington and these
various Naval Intelligence agencies in Hawaii? Could you describe
the organization to us so we understand?
[4613] Admiral Wilkinson, The Navy Department does not
deal in general with any subordinate forces in the fleet or a unit.
In other words, there was no relation between the fleet intelligence
officer and the Office of Naval Intelligence. The matters went direct
1744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet and were handled there or
he could handle it with his intelligence officer or his gunnery officer
or whoever he saw fit, but we did not have the direct chain between
fleet and office that was existent in the Arm}' between the head of
G-2 and the G-2 of the division. So much for the fleet.
Mr. Gesell. That means that ONI communicated directly with
the commander of the fleet on all intelligence matters?
Adimiral Wilkinson. Either with our division of communications
or in more important matters either directly with Admiral Stark
or Admiral Ingersoll, his assistant.
Mr. Gesell. And always directly to the commander of the fleet?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. With respect to all of the other
agencies the intelligence officer 'was under the command of the
<.listrict officer, Admiral Bloch. Administratively he checked in with
us, or we would send him such information as we had and such
lequests that we might have to make, but we had [4^1 -f] no
authority to order him to do anything and he was directly on the
staff of the commandant of the district.
The same thing I would say would apply to Captain Rochefort
except that his administrative parent in Washington was not our-
selves, ONI, but rather the Communications Division, but he like-
wise was on the staff of Admiral Bloch and primarily his officer
and under his command and only related to communications, as
Mayfield was to use for matters of administration, finance, general
technique; technical matters largely.
Mr. Gesell. But matters of intelligence and information of im-
portance to Admiral Bloch in his command, that went in through
fither Mayfield or Eochefort through to Admiral Bloch himself?
Admiral Wilkinson. Most any
Mr, Gesell. I say from you or from Admiral Stark. I am talking
about nonadministrative matters.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I was just thinking. The District
Intelligence Officer, as you recall, was a member of the Domestic
Intelligence side, which had to do with suspects and there was an
unending chain of information being exchanged about Jim Smith
or Hashihaha Tadikama or whatever you like. That sort of in-
formation, that intelligence went directly from the District Intel-
ligence Officer to our domestic branch. [4^1S] For any major
matters we would be likely to communicate direct to the fleet rather
than to the district fellow, because the district fellow's activities
were on the domestic side and not on the foreign side. He had
nothing to do with Japan as a nation or with the Japanese Fleet.
Mr. Gesell. So that means, in effect, to wind it all up, that all
communications concerning diplomatic matters or major Japanese
developments would be communicated to Hawaii directly through
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Now, you referred a moment ago to this question of
the translation of the intercepted messages. I understood you to
testify that you made available certain of the personnel and may
have paid part of their salaries, to assist in the translation.
You were aware, were you not, that there was a very substantial
delay, sometimes as much as 28 days, sometimes quite a bit less than
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1745
that, between the date of interception and the date of translation of
these Japanese messages?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall the specific delays but I knew
that for various reasons there were at times delays of some periods.
Those reasons might,' of course, be [46J6] transmission times,
they might be due to the necessity of breaking a new code, they might
be the difficulties in breaking the cipher. I am not too familiar with
the mechanics, but I think most of us understand that you have to
have certain material, a certain amount of material in the code before
you can begin to break it. Now, if somebody sends in a ten-word
message, that might lay aside for some time before a longer message
and two or three others would come in to give you enough material
to attack it, but — coming back to your question — ^yes, I was aware
that there were delays.
Mr. Gesell. Precisely. Looking at these messages, just as any of
us from day to day, you can see that the translation date was fre-
quently later than the date the message was sent.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I just wanted to mention what I did
because I think General Miles has emphasized the delays in trans-
lation and transmission of the intercept to the head office, but he has
not mentioned the mechanical delays which were inherent there even
if there had been as much personnel as we would have liked. There
wasn't much we could do about it. Both Admiral Noyes and I were
concerned about it because I think we were trying to pick up all the
Japanese- and English-speaking people we could find in the country.
Mr. Gesell. That is what I wanted to get at. Conscious [1^617']
as you must have been, of some of these delays, some of which might
have been of a nature which you could cure by manpower and steps of
that nature, what did you do to encourage or speed up translation,
if anything?
Admiral Wilkinson. Admiral Noyes and I were both concerned
about it. His primary difficulty was in getting people actually to work
on the mechanics of it, and I endeavored to assist him by procuring
translators, and we found, I think, some half a dozen translators
that we could produce and we scoured the country for more and finally
started a school to make more, because there were none in the country
that either could or would take the job with us.
Then, also, we endeavored to expedite and speed our investigations
of the personnel that Admiral Noyes wanted to have employed be-
cause, obviously, we could not go blind and have somebody in there
without knowledge of who he was because the whole thing might be
blown sky-high, so we investigated all the applicants for the code-
breaking work and part of my efforts, as you asked, was to expedite
those investigations. That was done through the domestic branch.
Mr. Gesell. Now, there is one question that was asked of the Army
side in that connection and perhaps we ought to have the correspond-
ing Navy figure if we can. How many people, if you know, were
actually engaged at this time in the [4^i<§] business of inter-
cepting and translating and decoding these messages and messages
of a similar type ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I have no real knowledge about that. I know
it grew into very large numbers and I would say offliand at that time
it was somewhere between three and five hundred, but I would defer
to I he testimony of the communicator.
Ti'TlC — 4ti — I't. 4 12
1746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. Well, perhaps before you leave the stand you can get
some check made and get that figure for us, Admiral.
Admiral Wilkinson. Surely.
Mr. Gesell. I am sure, also, I did not ask you one other question
concerning the transmission of these intercepted messages or their
text to the theaters. I have been discussing with you Hawaii. Did
you send information concerning the intercepted messages to Ad-
miral Hart, or to any other commander overseas, which was more de-
tailed in any respect than the information you sent Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge. There may have
been some interchange between the communication officers in attempt-
ing to straighten out their respective translations of certain inter-
cepts, but there was nothing from my office.
Mr. Gesell. You did not undertake, for example, to supply Ad-
miral Hart with the text of intercepted messages which he had not
himself intercepted but which you had picked {4619^ up here
through your facilities in Washington ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not from my office. That might have been
done in the communications office in an endeavor to straighten out
their code work.
Mr. Gesell. Would you know whether or not that was done? Do
you have any information on that ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not.
Mr. Gesell. Admiral, we have had a great deal of discussion here
concerning some of these messages which are contained in exhibit 2.
They are the so-called military installations and ship movement inter-
cepts. I first want to get straight concerning the message that ap-
pears at page 12, which sometimes has been referred to here as the
bombing plot message, or something of that sort.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Now, that was sent prior to your becoming Director
of Naval Intelligence, since it is dated September 24, 1941 and it was
translated October 9, 1941. I understood you to testify that you
assumed your post on October 15, 1941.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. But I gather that you had been at least around the
Division a bit beforehand before you formally took over the job to
find out what it was all about?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
[4j6BO] Mr Gesell. I want to ask you when this message first
came to your attention ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall whether it came to my atten-
tion before or on my taking over, or when a later message may have
come in referring back to it, but I was aware of it at some time during
the fall.
Mr. Gesell. You were aware of it prior to the attack?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. And were you similarly aware of various messages
which other witnesses have had called specifically to their attention,
I think sometimes when you have been sitting here in the room, you
might say implementing this message, i. e., giving reports of ships
broken down by areas and asking for later detailed reports or asking
for reports when ships were not moving, were not making any move-
ments and other messages of that concern ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1747
Admiral Wilkinson. I was aware of most but not all of them.
I couldn't say positively all.
Mr. Gesell. What evaluation did you give to those messages at
the time as far as their tending to indicate in any way the possibility
of an attack on Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Wilkinson. The Japanese for many years had the repu-
tation, and the facts bore out that reputation, of being meticulous
seekers for every scrap of information, whether by [4621]
photography or by written report or otherwise.
We had recently, as reported to me, apprehended two and I think
three Japanese naval officers on the west coast making investigations
of Seattle, Bremerton, Long Beach, and San Diego. In the reports
that we had gotten from them there had been indications of move-
ments and locations of ships ; in the papers that they had there were
instructions for them to find out the movements and locations of
ships except in Hawaii and the Philippines, the inference being that
these fellows that were planted in America, these naval officers,
were not to be responsible for movements in Hawaii and the Philip-
pines because there were agencies finding that information there.
My general impression of adding all this reputation and this fact
and these data together was that these dispatches were part of the
general information system established by the Japanese. We knew
also that certain information had been sought in Panama and again
in Manila. I did not, I regret now, of course attribute to them the
bombing target significance which now appears.
Mr. Gesell. These officers of the Japanese Navy who were appre-
hended on the west coast you said were getting information concern-
ing the movement and location of ships ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
[4j62£] Mr. Gesell. Do you mean to tell us that those officers
had instructions to break down the harbors at Seattle and other points
on the coast by areas and to designate the location of ships iii those
areas with particular reference to which were at wharves and which
were tied to buoys ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No ; because there are no wharves, as I recall,
in San Pedro except for one or two used by naval vessels, at San Diego,
and Bremerton to a limited extent. I do recall, or have been informed,
that one of the reports of Lieutenant Commander Kacarda with ref-
erence to Bremerton specified what ships were at anchor and which
ships were alongside of a dock.
Mr. Gesell. Could we see that report ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I will endeavor to find it.
Mr. Gesell. Generally, those fellows were simply getting ship
movement reports, weren't they, what ships came into the harbor and
which ones went out and what their destination was and whether or
not they were moving in convoy and the type of general ship move-
ment information that is spread throughout this exhibit 2 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes, but the location of the ship,
whether it was alongside of a dock or elsewhere, did give an inference
of work going on aboard her which would be of value to the question
of when she might be moved, what [^Jp623'] her state of readiness
was and the inference that we drew from this was that they wanted
1748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to know everything they could not only about the movement of the
ships and those that were present and, therefore, accounted for and
not a threat to them in some other waters, but also with reference to
those that were present where they were located with reference to
state of repair. For instance, the ships that were particularly in
Pearl Harbor might be in repair and not ready to go to sea, whereas
those at anchor in the stream would be ready, or would be so on short
notice. Those at double-banked piers might not be, particularly the
inside one might take some time to go out.
Mr. Gesell. Well, you recognize, don't you, that that is not the
type of information that this message was designed to get. Looking
at the message now in the cold light of the hearing room it is apparent
that they were trying tO' spot the vessels there so as to determine their
state of repair or readiness for battle at sea.
Admiral Wilkinson. It would seem so now since the locations
might be of value not only as a bombing target but also for submarine
attack or midget submarine attack.
Mr. Gesell. In an attack made from either above or under the water.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. And it is quite apparent that this message L^^^-^]
was not designed to get information concerning the likelihood of cer-
tain vessels departing from the harbor or the state of their repair or
ordinary ship movement information. It is just what we have been
calling it, is it not, Admiral?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. A bombing plot message.
Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes. There are other things of
conceivable technical matters and interest. The ships that are in
various harbors at the time might be an indication of what the capac-
ity of this section of the harbor was with respect to taking a large
fleet in, but those are technical interpretations which are hardly ger-
mane to the purposes as we now see it.
Mr. Geseli>. Well, they are not the technical interpretations that
you gave the message at the time either, are they ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know that we did.
Mr. Gesell. Do you recall discussing this message with anyone
in the Navy Department at the time prior to the attack on Pearl
Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; I think I mentioned to one or more
officers that the Japs seemed quite curious as to the lay-out in Pearl
Harbor and at the time I thought that that was an evidence of their
nicety of intelligence.
[-^(J'25] Mr. Gesell. Now, who do vou recall discussing that
with?
Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McCoUum particularly, possibly
with Admiral IngersoU or Admiral Turner. I cannot say specifically
who.
The Chairman. It is now 12 o'clock and the committee will recess
until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon a recess was taken until 2 o'clock
p. m. of the same day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1749
[4626] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 V. M.
The Chairman. Counsel will proceed.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON
(Resumed)
Mr. (iESELr>. Just as we were recessing, Admiral Wilkinson, you said
you had talked to Admiral Turner, you thought, and to Captain
McCullom, concerning this plat dispatch of September 24 we have
been discussing. Do you recall your conversation with them?
Admiral Wilkinson. Only, as I think I said, that I mentioned it
showed as an illustration of the nicety of detail of intelligence the
Japanese were capable of seeking and getting.
Mr. Gesell. What did they say to you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall
Mr. Gessell. Did they agree with you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall an agreement of that sort. Of
course, it must be remembered that all during this year, 1941, there was
some exchange of letters to and from Pearl Harbor and Hawaii on
both the Army and Navy side emphasizing the fact that the first
priority of risk or hazard to Pearl Harbor was a bombing attack,
next an air torpedo attack and third a submarine attack. This infor-
mation they were getting there, while substantiating that fear, was
being obtained, in some degree at least, everywhere that we [4627]
knew of — Panama, the West Coast, Manila.
Mr. Gesell. You are in agreement with General Miles that there
is not another message like this one that appears in this document
or which was intercepted prior to Pearl Harbor, is there ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection. I explained that the
other harbors were, perhaps, smaller and need not have so much of a
differentiation.
Mr. Gesell. When you pointed this out to Admiral Turner and
Captain McCullom as an example of the nicety of Japanese espionage,
you don't recall what they said ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall except, perhaps, to agree with
me. I am not even sure in recollection that I pointed it out to Admiral
Turner.
Mr. Gesell. What evaluation did you place upon the document?
Did you tliink it had some significance that required your bringing
it to their attention ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not particularly.
Mr. Gesell. Did you recommend that it be sent to the field ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. Was there a discussion of whether it should or should
not be sent to the field ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.
[4628] Mr. Gesell. So that your testimony amounts to, if I
understand it, a statement that you somewhat casually pointed this
out and said this was an example of the nicety of their espionage?
Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly.
Mr. Gesell. I would like to discuss with you now. Admiral, for
a few moments some of the alert or warning messages which were
sent by the Navy Department, at the first at page 18 of Exhibit o7, the
basic dispatch, dated October 16, 1941.
1750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. What page?
Mr. Gesell. Page 18.
I will read it :
The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a
new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic aind anti-Ameri-
can. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under
a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States.
In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility.
Since the United States and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present
desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two
powers. In view of these possibilities you wjll take due precautions including
such preparatory deployments [4629] as will not disclose strategic in-
tentions nor constitute provxocative actions against Japan. Second and third
adees inform appropriate Army and Naval district authorities. Acknowledge.
That is addressed to the Commander in Chief in the Atlantic and
the Pacific and the Asiatic Fleet. That appears to have been sent
the day after you took over as Director of Intelligence.
Were you. consulted concerning it?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. Purely an operational matter.
Mr. Gesell. You do not recall having participated in any discus-
sions concerning it ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Did you have knowledge that it was sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not until after it was sent.
Mr. Gesell. How soon after?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall. Perhaps the next day.
Mr. Gesell. Was it the practice for messages, when you were not
in on their drafting and transmission, for them to be sent to you
afterwards for your information?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not as a frequent practice. Occasionally,
yes. Occasionally I would hear of them in conversation and look
them up.
Mr. Gesell. If they weren't sent to you, how would you [4030^
be in a position to know whether the information you had been ob-
taining as Director of Naval Intelligence was being properly evalu-
ated?
Admiral Wilkinson. I had confidence in the officers comprising
the War Plans Divisions. But there was no back check in their con-
sultation with me to see if I thought it was properly evaluated.
Mr. Gesell. That confidence, I can see, might give you a degree of
personal assurance, but it didn't give you any information, did it,
as to precisely what evaluation was being made. Without having
that information, how could you properly conduct your office?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know that it affected the conduct of
my office, because I would give the information that we collected, and
frequently advised on what my own inferences were from it, but
what action was taken as a result, I do not think was necessarily in-
volved in the conduct of my office.
Mr. Gesell. I understand your testimony to be that you recom-
mended evaluations from time to time in transmitting this infor-
mation to War Plans and to the Chief of Naval Operations?
Admiral Wilkinson. In discussion, yes. Sometimes in writing,
but seldom.
Mr. Gesell. But they didn't inform you of what action they took?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not as a matter of routine, no.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1751
Mr. Gesell. You might find it out from talking to somebody, and
then you would look it up ?
Admiral Wilkinson. They might tell me, as a matter of interest,
but I was not an information addressee, as it [4^32] were.
It was not a matter of established routine.
Mr. Gesell. How did you know what information to send out to
the theater commanders if you didn't know what evaluation had
been placed upon the information you. had already transmitted?
Admiral Wilkinson. The information I sent to the theater com-
manders was of a static nature. There was a fortnightly summary,
of which you speak, which was partly action, partly static. There
were in the course of the year 1941, for instance, some 62 or 70
so-called Far Eastern serials, two- and three-page discussions of
specific items, which might range from a new type of torpedo to
Japanese aircraft production, things of that matter.
We also supplied to the fleet a so-called Japanese monograph,
O. N. I. 49, a full description of all the information we had been
able to obtain concerning Japan.
Mr. Gesell. My question was whether it would not have aided
you in pointing up the information to know what evaluation was
being placed on the information you were sending.
Admiral Wilkinson. I am mentioning the types of information
I sent which, of itself, was not the type that was involved with the
evaluation of the current situation. As I have earlier mentioned, the
matters concerning operations [4633] I did not send to the
fleet except on reference to the Operations Office or War Plans of
themselves.
The Chairman. Will counsel suspend for a moment?
I am compelled to leave because since last Saturday I have been
suffering with a very high temperature, and with what looks like
a severe case of the flu, and I am out against the advice of the
doctor, and am compelled to leave now and do what he told me to do.
I had intended to have an executive session this afternoon, but
that is impossible. Therefore, I ask to be excused for the rest of
the day. I hope to be back tomorrow.
Mr. Gesell. We are sorry you are ill, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Vice Chairman will preside.
Mr. Gesell. The next warning message which I wish to inquire
concerning is that appearing at page 32, the message of November 24,
1941, addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic, Pacific and
certain other districts, 11, 12, 13, and 15, reading as follows:
CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN
VERY DOUBTFUL. THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS OF THEIR NAVAL AND
MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT A SURPRISE AG-
GRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON
U634] PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY. CHIEF OF STAFF
HAS SEEN THIS DISPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION. AD-
DRESSES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UT-
MOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN AL-
READY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION. GUAM
WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY.
Did you have anything to do with the sending of that message?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
The Vice Chairman. What pagfe is that ?
1752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. Page 32. Did you know it was sent at the time?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not until after it was sent.
[4SS5] Mr. Gesell. How long after did you know about it?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure ; a day or two.
Mr. Geseli-. You were not consulted concerning this, concerning
its wording or whether or not it should be sent ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. The next message of a warning nature appears on page
36 and is the message of November 27, 1941. It is the message sent
at the same time as the Army warning message of that date, from the
Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific
and Asiatic Fleets, reading as follows :
This despatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased on an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra
Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46. Inform District and
Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Spenavo
inform British. Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate
measures [^656] against sabotage.
Were you consulted in connection with the sending of that message ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. When did you first know it had been sent ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think two days later, perhaps three. I
might explain, of course, that these were highly secret messages and
the Chief of Naval Operations was anxious to confine the knowledge
of them to the minimum and since I was not directly concerned in
them, once I had prof erred the information upon which they were
based, that he thought that neither he nor his instructions carried the
necessity of advising me about it. I do not feel, in other words, that I
was neglected by not being consulted because I liad proferred the
giving of the information and I am sure that it was well used.
Mr. Gesell. And when you say you learned of these messages you
meant that you learned it informally by hearing of them rather than
hearing of them in a direct way as a matter of office organization ?
Admiral Wilkinson. As I recall them.
Mr. Gesell. Is that your testimony with respect to the message on
page 38 transmitting the Army warning message of November 27 and
containing instructions concerning overt [4^37] acts?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. That takes us up to November 27, Admiral. Now,
from the period from November 27, 1941 to December 7, 1941 the only
other messages of a warning nature that one finds here directed to
Hawaii were the messages concerning the destruction of codes. Did
you have anything to do with those messages ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, we initiated those after a conference with
the Chief of Naval Operations.
Mr, Gesell. You are referring to the messages that appear at 40
and 41 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Forty particularly. Forty-one I believe was
initiated by the communications officer.
Mr. Gesell. You initiated the message on page 40 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1753
Mr. Gesell. Will you read that, please, sir?
Admiral Wilkinson (reading) :
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in-
structions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at
Hong Kong Singapore Batavia Manila Washington and London to destroy most
of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential
and secret documents.
[4638] Mr. Gesell. That was addressed to the Commander in
Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleet, to Com 14 and to Com 16 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. You say you initiated that dispatch. Will you tell
us
Admiral Wilkinson. That is, to my recollection. Let me check one
moment, sir. Yes, I believe that to be the case.
Mr. Gesell. Well, will you stat« for the committee, please, what
the circumstances were as you recall them under which that message
was sent ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think Captain McCollum advised me that
intelligence had been received through the magic source as to this and
I think there had been other confirmatory evidences by reports by
cable as to signs of burning. I am not sure of that last. I know
there were such reports but whether they occurred before this dispatch
was sent or not I do not know, but the primary basis I think was the
magic. Captain McCollum recommended its being sent and I agreed,
of course, and after consultation with either the Chief or the Assist-
ant Chief of Operations it was so sent.
Mr. Gesell. Did you approve the dispatch then ? I mean did you
draft the plan then?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe Captain McCollum drafted
[4639] it.
Mr. Gesell. And then after it was drafted you approved it or
initialed it before it went out I
Admiral Wilkinson. I think I probably presented that in person
to Admiral Ingersoll. I may have actually released it. The record
may show.
Mr. Gesell. I have here what purports to be a photostatic copy of
the original message, which shows it was released by you and an
initial which appears to be Admiral Ingersoll's initials after your
name.
Admiral Wilkinson. That would seem to bear out my statement.
Mr. Gesell. You have seen that photostatic copy of the dispatch,
have you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. I want to show it to you and call your attention to
the following words which appear on the dispatch as stricken follow-
ing the words at the end of the message, "Secret document" :
From foregoing infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia.
Do you recall that ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not but if it occurs in the original dis-
patch it was doubtless so drafted by Captain [4^40] McCol-
lum and approved by me. Whether I struck it out or whether
Admiral Ingersoll struck it out, I cannot recall.
1754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. You cannot recall which of you struck it out?
Admiral Wilkinson. I have no recollection which.
Mr. Gesell. I would like to have this dispatch marked as an
exhibit. It will be Exhibit 83, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 83.")
Admiral Wilkinson. I may state that we had every inference and
evidence for the preceding two weeks that Orange was contemplating
action in southeast Asia and did in fact so act.
Mr. Gesell. Well, will you state to us at this time, Admiral, what
was the considered conclusion and evaluation reached by you and
your staff in the Office of Naval Intelligence, prior to the receipt of
the one o'clock message, as to where and when the Japanese would
attack?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think our conclusion was that every evi-
dence indicated an attack in the South China Sea on either Siam or
the Kra Peninsula. Those evidences were almost indisputable. There
were possibilities of attack elsewhere ranging, in fact, from Panama
on the Pacific Coast [4^4^] to Hawaii, Guam, Wake and the
Philippines. The nearer each of these objectives was to Japan, to our
mind the greater the probability of their attack. As it happened we
all know that they attacked all of those on the far side of the Pacific
Coast, Hawaii, Wake, Guam and the Philippines.
Mr. Gesell. Well, did you have any information, written or oral,
prior to the actual attack which specified Hawaii as a point of attack ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not the slightest.
Mr. Gesell. You say there were indications that they might attack
Hawaii and other points in the Pacific. What were those indications ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't think I said "indications." I said
possibilities.
Mr. Gesell. I beg your pardon.
Admiral Wilkinson. That was within the range of practicability
that they should so attack.
Mr. Gesell. Well, my question was directed as to what information
and evidence you had on that point. Did you have any evidence or
information to show that Hawaii was a possible point of attack or a
probable point of attack?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not that it was a probable point. There was
every possibility that it was a possible point of attack in that the
Japanese Navy's steaming radius and their [464^] capabilities,
as the Intelligence people say, and I am learning to say, and their
probable capabilities indicated that they could come there. It was
possible. So in fact was Seattle possible.
Mr. Gesell. Well, now, I would like to review with you for a
moment some of the information you had of a naval nature to see
whether we can get, perhaps, a more specific understanding of what
you had before you.
You knew, did you not, for example, on the 25th of September that
the combined home fleet of the Japanese had undergone extensive
personnel changes and that that personnel reorganization, which was
not normal for that time of year, was interpreted by your people to
mean that preparations were being made for an emergency ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1755
Mr. Gesell, You also knew, did you not, on the 1st of November that
the Japanese Navy, according to statements made by its own* people,
was ready for any immediate eventuality; that mobilization plans
had been carried out, including not only changes in commands but
increase in ship crews to full war complement?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; the ships had been docked as well.
Mr. Keefe. Right there may I ask what was the date of [4^4^}
the first statement?
Mr. Murphy. September 25.
Senator Ferguson. A little louder, please.
Mr. Murphy. September 25, that was the first and the second one
was November 1.
Mr. Gesell. September 25 was the first. The second I have given
as November 1.
Mr. Keefe. All right. I wanted to get those dates in mind.
Mr. Gesell. Now, on November 15
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I could not hear the first part of
the Congressman's remark.
The Vice Chairman. He just wanted a repetition of those dates.
One was September 25 and the other one was November 1.
Senator Ferguson. Thank you. That is 1941 ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes ; I am talking about 1941.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Mr. Gesell. You knew on November 15 that the Japanese had requi-
sitioned an increasing number of merchant ships and armed those
ships, many of them, with antiaircraft guns, did you not?
Admiral Wilkinson. I have full knowledge and recollection of these
various events that you are speaking of. I [4-644] cannot from
my own recollection check those particular dates.
Mr. Gesell. This is coming from those exhibits that we have put in
this morning.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Those were dates that we registered
that those happened on the preceding 2 weeks because this was a fort-
nightly review.
Mr. Gesell. You knew on or about December 1, similarly, that
Japanese ships had been recalled for quick docking and repair, did you
not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. You also knew, and this is specifically on December 1,
that on that date the Japanese had changed all of the service calls
for their forces afloat at 0000 on December 1, did you not?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know that I knew specifically it was
a change of service calls. I knew that there had been a change in
certain of their codes which resulted in difficulty in our radio intelli-
gence analysis at that time.
Mr. Gesell. On that date?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Well, I have here a file of ship location reports and on
page 30-d of that file — and this comes as an intelligence report from
your office, it states :
All orange service radio calls for units afloat were [4^45] changed at
0000, 1 December 1941.
Does that refresh your recollection on that point ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
1756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. It is a fact, is it not, that the Japanese had changed
their service calls previously on the 1st of November ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe so.
Mr. Gesell. And by changing them again so formally within a
period of 30 days that was further indication that an emergency situa-
tion had arisen ?
Admiral Wilkinson. There was every indication from many of
those and many others that there was an emergency situation arising.
Mr. Gesell. Now, when did you first learn that the ship location and
direction finding people in the Office of Naval Intelligence had lost
track of the Japanese carriers ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall particularly. I know that
our ship locations were often incomplete. I know it began to be appar-
ent toward the end of November that there were a large number
of ships that we could not locate specifically for both battleships and
carriers.
Mr. Gesell. Well, it was specifically notable, was it not, that the car-
riers could not be located and you knew that at the time ?
[4^4^] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Now, you were also aware, were you not, that shipping
had been routed to the south through Torres Straits ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe I was aware. It was not of my ini-
tiation but I believe I was aware of it.
Mr. Gesell. You were aware of the dispatches that directed all
shipping to proceed through Torres Straits ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I presume so. I do not recall that specifically.
Mr. Gesell. And you were familiar, were you not, with the general
term that I think General Miles referred to here, of there being a
vacant sea to the north and west of Hawaii?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Through which there would be no shipping ?
Senator Bre^vster. Will you answer that?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. While you were at Hawaii I presume you had, engaged
in war games and other maneuvers in which you had anticipated and
prepared against an air attack launched against that point from an
attacking force coming from the north?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall the maneuvers of an air attack
specifically, but I know that we had a large fleet maneuver there in
which there were carriers on both sides and the endeavor of the defend-
ing fleet was to inter- [4^47] cept the attacking fleet before
it would have got the air attack launched.
Mr. Gesell. You knew as a naval expeit that the Japanese Navy
had the striking power and the strength and the fleet to approach
Hawaii and execute an attack, did you not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. If not protected, yes, or, for that matter, any
point in the Pacific, including the Canal.
Mr. Gesell. Well, now, would the factors which I have just — per-
haps we should call them facts — which I have just reviewed with you,
did it ever occur to you prior to the 6th of December that it would be
appropriate and advisable to send some specific direction to Pearl Har-
bor warning against a surprise air attack?
Admiral Wif.kinson. It never occurred to me, first, because from
uiy service out there and from these letters that had been interchanged
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1757
throughout the year it was my belief that Hawaii knew the possibility
of an air attack. Second, it did not occur to me because it was not
within my province to conclude or derive the enemy functions although
naturally I was interested in such matters. And, third, it was my
own belief that an approaching force would be detected before it could
get into attack range.
Mr. Gesell. Well, did you have any information as to whether or not
the Army and Navy at Hawaii were in fact con- [4^4^] ducting
long-range reconnaissance ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not. They had done so while I had been
there at intervals.
Mr. Gesell. But you had no information in the months or weeks
immediately preceding Pearl Harbor as to whether, in fact, the com-
manders there were or were not taking action w^hich would permit
them to pick up the Japanese fleet before it attacked ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I had not.
Mr. Gesell. You Avere fully aware, were you not, as an Intelligence
officer that Japan had men and facilities at Hawaii which permitted
them to know the state of our garrisons and preparations there and the
steps we were taking ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. All the anchorages at Pearl Harbor and
Honolulu port and other anchorages in Hawaii were readily susceptible
of observation by any elements of the large Japanese population ; our
communications going out of Honolulu were not censored ; and there
were other possibilities of espionage and that had been recognized by
the three Intelligence agencies there, the agents of the FBI, the Mili-
tary Intelligence, and our own.
1464-9] Mr. Gesell. Had there been any discussion of the fact
that the fleet, stationed at Hawaii, on the flank of a Japanese movement
to the south, constituted a threat unless, by some device or means, the
Japanese could knock it out of action temporarily ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No discussion like that to which I was a party.
Mr. Gesell. Were you aware of that consideration as a naval
expert ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and furthermore, I would anticipate
that any Navy anvious to strike a blow or to win a war would naturally
be in search of the enemy's navy, irrespective of the stategic con-
siderations of being on the flank.
Mr. Gesell. You have said that your division considered it a possi-
bility, I believe that Pearl Harbor, among other points, might be
attacked.
Admiral Wilkinson. Sure.
Mr. Gesell. Did you, yourself, personally expect that the Japanese
would attack Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. I thought that the Japanese would pro-
ceed to the southward, would carry out their campaign, and I felt,
insofar as my own guess was concerned, which was not a very good
one, obviously, that they would [46S0] not make a direct
attack on the Anglo-Saxon nations, but they would attempt to see,
as they had already for so many years, how far they could go with
infiltration methods without precipitating a full-scale war.
Every evidence indicated their movement was down toward those
areas. The question of whether the Philippines would be attacked
or not, in my own case, I was not certain about it.
1758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner, I know, was not confident it would be attacked.
I thought myself, possibly for political reasons, they would avoid the
Philippines. I did not think they would attack Hawaii, because I
thought, in so attacking, they would expose themselves to great danger
to whatever force they brought there, and, furthermore, they would
be precipitating a war with the United States, which theretofore they
had given every indication of attempting to avoid.
Mr. Gesell. Admiral, in the period from November 27 to the time
of the attack, do you recall discusing with anyone the advisability of
sending any additional warnings to the theater commanders in the
Pacific?
Admiral WiLKiNSoisr. On December 1, Captain McCollum prepared
a suggested memorandum for me with regard to the situation in the
Far East.
[4651'] Mr. Gesell. May I interrupt there? Is that the memo-
randum dated December 1, captioned "Memorandum for the Director,"
signed by McCollum, which appears toward the front of Exhibt 81, a'
memorandum of approximately five pages long, with a covering memo-
randum to you as Director?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; except that the particular memorandum
is only two and one-half pages long. You are confusing the following
memorandum with it.
Mr. Gesell. It goes from page 24 to page 27, does it not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; 24 is the covering page.
[465£] Mr. Gesell. Right. That is the memorandum you were
referring to?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. On receipt of that I went with Captain
McCollum to Admiral Stark's office, to discuss it with him, and he
called in — if they were not already tliere — Admiral IngersoU and
Admiral Turner, and I think I read the memorandum, or Captain
McCollum did.
Mr. Gesell. Out loud, do you mean?
Admiral Wilkinson. Out loud. There was some discussion about
the indications there, and a general agreement that there was a very
definite advance by Japan into the South China Sea areas, and that the
extent of that advance was not as yet apparent, as to the geographic
extent, but the numerical extent of the advance was apparent as a very
strong movement.
Mr. Gesell. You say that Captain McCollum brought this memo-
randum to you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Do you recall what your conversation was with him at
that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. Only that I thought it was very interesting
and important, and that Admiral Stark and his people should see it.
Mr. Gesell. Did Captain McCollum give any indication in the
memorandum as to what should be done?
[If653] Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.
Mr. Gesell. It was you who initiated the proposal of a conversation
with Admiral Stark?
Admiral Wilkinson. It was Captain McCollum who said that
Admiral Stark should see it.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1759
Mr. Gesell. Did you think that the memorandum required some
additional warning message to be sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. Did you have any views one way or the other when you
went to see Admiral Stark as to whether a warning message should
be sent ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No warning message had been sent and this
was information as to the movement of the fleet in the South China
Sea. There was no indication on the face of this evidence that an
attack was to be made upon Hawaii, or, for that matter, upon the
Philippines.
Mr. Gesell. Captain McCollum concluded, did he not. in his cover-
ing memorandum, an eventual control or occupation of Thailand, fol-
lowed almost immediately by an attack against the British posses-
sions, possibly Burma and Singapore?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. That was his estimate of what the information in the
memorandum pointed to?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and it was subsequently proved.
[4GM] Mr. Gesell. You concurred in his recommendation?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and it was subsequently borne out.
Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion by you, in the presence of
Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, and Ingersoll, as to the desirability
or appropriateness of sending any further warning message?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall any.
Mr. Gesell. Your discussion with those gentlemen, then, had some-
thing to do with the contents of the memorandum ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. This was not the type of memorandum which was sent
to the field, was it?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, except a large part of it, if not all, was
embodied in the fortnightly summary of that day.
Mr. Gesell. That summary appears in Exhibit 80, does it not?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure. On page 9 of that memoran-
dum, or page 12, as it has been surcharged in ink later on, you will
find the discussion on the Japanese military situation and naval situa-
tion, which is very similar, although it does not exist over the whole
2 months, as this particular memorandum does.
Mr. Gesell. I gather from what you have testified that there was no
discussion of Hawaii at this time between you [4655] and Cap-
tain McCollum, or between you and Adriral Stark and his associates.
Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.
Mr. Gesell. Do you recall any other instance where you recom-
mended, in the period from November 27 to December 7, that a message
be sent or discussed the possibility of sending a message?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall specifically. Captain Mc-
Collum has since told me, and it has aided my recollection vaguely, that
he brought a message in to me, that I was concerned about it, in connec-
tion with the so-called winds message, and after the discussion with me
he took it, by my direction, to Admiral Turner and Admiral Turner
showed him the warning message which had gone out and asked him if
1760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
he did not think that had covered the situation, and Captain McCollum
said it did, I believe.
I have no clear recollection on that.
Mr. Gesell. I want to ask you, Admiral Wilkinson, whether you
have any recollection of it yourself ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot say I have.
Mr. Gesell. You are simply repeating then what Captain McCollum
told you?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. You yourself have no recollection of that [4^56}
incident ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot say I do.
Mr. Gesell. You of course saw the code setting up the winds mes-
sage, did you not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Did you at any time ever see or hear any message which
implemented that code?
Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is I did after the actual attack,
Mr. Gesell. After the actual attack?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr, Gesell. You are referring there to the message that was inter-
cepted by the Federal Communications Commission stating about war
tvith Great Britain ?
Admiral Wilkinson, No, I do not recall specifically which message
it was, but I understood after the attack, within 24 hours or perhaps
36, that there was a message that was intercepted and translated.
You will recall — it is my recollection, at least — in the winds message
it was not a question of war, it was a question of strained relations, in
the interpretation of it.
Mr. Gesell. Do you have any recollection at all of having heard of
or seen any message prior to the attack that implemented that code in
any respect?
14^57] Admiral Wilkinson. No; and we were very keenly on
the lookout for it, and I do not believe, to the best of my knowledge,
there was such a message before.
[4SSS] Mr. Gesell. Was your department or division the one
responsible for picking up that message, or was that a function of
communications ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It was a function of communications and such
outside agencies, outside the Navy, as they had maybe talked with,
the F. C. C. and others.
Mr. Gesell. The Office of Naval Intelligence was not the office con-
cerned with the interception or any implementation that might have
been seen ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. We were very much interested in the
receipt of such a message if it were sent, and I know of no such
implementing message having been sent.
Mr. Gesell, I next want to turn to or to check up with you the
question of the events of December 6, and December 7,
Testimony before the committee appears to establish that on De-
cember 6 there was available, sometime during the day, a so-called
pilot message, in which the Japanese advised from Tokyo that a
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1761
reply in 14 parts, to be delivered at a time later specified, was to
come in.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. It also appears that 13 parts of that message were
intercepted, decoded, and translated on the 6th.
[4^69] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Were you at your office on December 6?
Admiral Wilkinson. I was out in my office, I think, until late
before dinner, and before I left the office I saw the pilot message, and
that night at home I saw the other.
Mr. Gesell. Did you see any message other than the pilot message
before you left the office ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I did not, none of the 13 parts.
Mr. Gesell. That is what I refer to.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Under what circumstances did you see the pilot
message ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think it was brought to me in the normal
course of events in connection with the magic book.
Mr, Gesell. Did you have any discussion with anyone concerning
it, after you saw it?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, except I said, "We will be on the lookout
for the message." I think I told Captain Kramer, "We will be on
the lookout for the message when it comes through."
Mr. Gesell. What kind of set-up did you have in your [4660']
office at the time that you could keep in touch immediately with de-
velopments when important messages such as this were coming in?
Admiral Wilkinson. We had normally a 24-hour watch in the
domestic branch, and in the foreign branch. Within the last few days
of the crisis developing, I had set up a 24-hour watch in the Far
Eastern Section alone. I think the day before, when it appeared that
the Japanese advance in the China Sea was becoming more and more
critical, I had set up, I believe, a watch of the senior officers of the
Department, the heads of the branches, and the Assistant Director,
to be in the Department.
Captain Kramer was on call, and I myself was on call. As it hap-
pened in this particular instance. Captain Kramer received the 13-
part about 9 o'clock.
Mr. Gesell. I want to come that in a moment.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. You say you had a 24-hour watch set up in the Far
Eastern Section ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Do you mean you had someone in the Navy Depart-
ment on duty 24 hours a day ?
Admiral Wilninson. No one person, but in rotation, yes.
[4-661] Mr. Gesell. Representing the specific interests of the
Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch?
Admiral Wilkinson. Precisely. There were three officers in there,
and they stood watch there in rotation.
Mr. Gesell. Would you mind indicating who these officers were
who stood that watch ?
79716—46 — pt. 4 13
1762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McCuUom, Colonel Boone, and Lieu-
tenant Commander Watts.
Mr. Gesell. They were the three officers standing that watch during
the specific time we are talking about?
Admiral Wilkinson. There were three. There may have been two
or three more. As I recall, there was Lieutenant Siebold. I cannot
remember whether he was on the watch or not.
Mr. Gesell. You had no discussion with anyone other than Cap-
tain Kramer concerning the pilot message before you left your office?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not particularly.
Mr. Gesell. What do you mean "not particularly" ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. I think 1 told him we would
be on the lookout for the other. I may have told the watch officer in
the Far Eastern Section to be sure it did not get away from us when
it cume.
I may have told, and probably did tell. Captain Kramer [4662]
to be sure they saw it in the front office.
Mr. Gesell. That is what I was getting at.
Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot say that I recall specifically that I
did, but I feel sure I did.
Mr. Gesell. You don't recall about having given instructions to
Admiral Stark or other key officers?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not at this long range.
Mr. Gesell. What time did you leave your office on the evening
of the 6th ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I have no specific recollection. I would say
about 6 o'clock.
Mr. Gesell. You were at home and had a dinner party at your
house that night, did you not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. A small dinner with General Miles, Captain
Beardall, and two French officers, whom, in my duties as Director of
Litelligence, and taking care of the attaches, I had asked in.
Mr. Gesell. Now, at what time during that evening, did you learn
that the 13 ])arts came in ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say roughly 9 o'clock. Commander,
or Captain, Kramer called me up and said he was going to take this
en the rounds and would come out to me later. I told him to go ahead.
Mr. Gesell. Did he discuss with you what deliveries [4663]
he was going to make and to whom he was going to deliver the 13
parts ?
Admiral Wilkinson. He was going to make the normal rounds. I
will not say "normal" because it was after office hours, but in view of
the importance of it, he was going to leave a copy at the White House,
to see the Secretary of the Navy — to see Secretary Knox, and Admiral
Stark, and Admiral Turner. He subsequently told me he was un-
able to reach Admiral Turner and Admiral Stark by telephone be-
cause they were out.
Mr. Gesell. Did Captain Kramer at that time discuss with you on
the telephone the contents of the message?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesetx. How did he refer to it, if you recall?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think he said, 'The message we were wait-
ing for has come in in part." He obviously could not speak of it on
the telephone in detail. It would have been a gross breach of security.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1763
Mr. Gesell. Did he subsequently come to your home?
Admiral Wilkinson. He did.
Mr. Gesell. What happened at that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. He brought the message in, and General Miles
and I read it over with him, and I think Captain, or Admiral, Beardall
read it likewise.
[4664] Mr. Gesell. Now, what time was that?
Admiral Wilkinson. About 11 o'clock.
Mr. Gesell. You had other guests at your home, Admiral Wilkin-
son. Did y^'i withdraw to another room to read it ?
Admiral Wilkinson. We did.
Mr. Gesell. Did you have all 13 parts ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. You did not have the 14th part, or the 1 o'clock
message ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. Now you went to another room with General Miles
and Admiral Beardall and Captain Kramer, and read through the
message ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Then what happened?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure of my own recollection. Cap-
tain Kramer tells me I went to the phone and called up, apparently.
Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner. I asked Kramer whom he had
shown it to, and he said he left a copy at the White House, and had
shown it in person to Secretary Knox, who had gone over it, made
some telephone calls, and told him to bring it back to the Secretary
of State the next morning.
[4665] While Kramer was there, or perhaps after he left — again
my recollection is stimulated by him, but it is not very clear — he
said I made some telephone calls. I may have attempted to raise
Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner again, on the basis of his in-
formation that they were not there. However, both General Miles
and myself, and to some extent Captain Kramer, felt that this was a
diplomatic message; it was a message that indicated, or that re-
sembled the diplomatic white papers, of which we had often seen
examples, that it was a justification of the Japanese position.
The strain was largely in the 14th part which we discussed the
next morning.
Mr. Gesell. You are discussing what was said at that time, are
you, or are you telling what you thought?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am discussing what was said between Gen-
eral Miles and myself, as I recall.
Mr. Gesell. In the presence of Captain Kramer?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think so.
Mr. Gesell. Did Captain Kramer tell you at that time that he had
been unable to reach Admiral Stark or Admiral Turner
Admiral Wii-kinson. I believe he did. I do not recall now, but
he informs me he did, and I accept his statement.
[4666] Mr. Gesell. I am very anxious. Admiral, not only to
get the full story, but I am very anxious to get your own recollection
of what happened.
Admiral Wilkinson. I would like to have it myself, sir, but it, is
not complete.
1764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. When you cannot recollect something I wish you would
just say so, and then give us your best judgment, if you want to, as
to what you think happened, or from what somebody told you.
Admiral Wilkinson. That is what I just said, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Right. Did Captain Kramer give yooi any information
as to what had occurred at Secretary Knox's home?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; he said the Secretary 'had withdrawn
with him and had gone over it with him carefully, and had then made
some telephone calls and had directed him to bring the message to
the State Department the next morning, from which Kramer inferred
that he had called the Secretary of State, and possibly someone else.
Mr. Gesell. Did he say to you that Secretary Knox had called the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of War?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it independently.
Mr. Gesell, He told you that he was instructed to deliver the
message to the State Department the next morning?
[4-667 \ Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; and his assumption was that
the Secretary's telephone calls may have been to those people. He
did not hear them specifically.
Mr. Gesell. Did he tell you to whom he had delivered the message
at the Wliite House?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. Obviously it was not to
Captain Beardall, who was at my house.
Mr. Gesell. Did Captain Beardall read the message that evening?
Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is he did.
Mr. Gesell. You stated that General Miles and Captain or Admiral
Beardall discussed the message and referred to it as more or less a
white paper.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Or a diplomatic communication.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; a justification for the Japanese position.
Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion of this sentence, which
appears as the last sentence in paragraph 5, which is the first para-
graph of the thirteenth part, appearing at page 244 of Exhibit 1 :
Therefore, viewed in its entirety, tlie Japanese Government regrets that it
cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I do not recall any specific [4668]
instruction on that one paragraph, or I do not recall any discussion
of that one paragraph. I believe there had been exchanges in almost
the same words in the past, however, when a proposal was being made
and turned down and then brought up again.
Mr. Gesell. That sentence would indicate that negotiations were
going to be broken off, would it not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. If taken out of its text, yes.
Mr. Gesell. You did not think negotiations were going to be broken
off in the first 13 parts of this message?
Admiral Wilkinson. I was not sure they would be, and I did not
think diplomatic relations would be broken. It is one thing to break
off current negotiations and another thing to break off diplomatic rela-
tions.* The same negotiations, I believe, had been broken off earlier
and then resumed.
Mr. Gesell. So I gather the impression that you and the others
arrived at at your home that evening was that negotiations were going
to be broken off?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1765
Admiral Wilkinson. No, not necessarily. That this was a re-
joinder on the part of Japan that the last message we sent to them
was not acceptable, which, in fact, we had not expected it to be.
Mr, Gesell. Now you said you believed on the basis of what Captain
Kramer has told you that you tried to reach [4669] Admiral
Stark and Admiral Turner by telephone. Is that correct?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; that would be my natural reaction, when
he told me had not been able earlier to reach them, that I called them
then.
Mr. Gesell. Did you do that, Admiral ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. I do not know, except that I
would have that natural reaction.
Mr. Gesell. I take it you are quite clear, however, in your recollec-
tion that you did not talk to either of those gentlemen on the phone
that night, is that correct ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall having talked to them, no.
Mr. Gesell. What time did you go to your office the next morning ?
Admiral Wilkinson. At about 8 : 30. Between 8 : 30 and 9.
Mr. Gesell. Had you received any additional information, by tele-
phone or otherwise, during the night ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. It was Sunday morning, but I came
down reasonably early in order to be on hand when the 14th part was
received.
Mr. Gesell. You had no telephone call concerning it?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. You do not recall whether anyone told you [4670]
to come down ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, I came down anyway.
Mr. Gesell. You were on call, I understood you to say, in case
anyone wanted to reach you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Ever since I had taken the job.
Mr. Gesell. What happened when you got to your office that
morning ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I sent for Captain McCollum, who had him-
self relieved the last man on the night watch shortly before 8 o'clock,
and he came in and we talked over this matter, and my recollection
is after he came in the fourteenth part was brought up to us.
Mr. Gesell. To you and McCollum ?
Admiral Wilkinson. To me and McCollum. It may be he came
in with it, I am not sure, or that shortly after he arrived the fourteenth
part came in.
Mr. Gesell. About what time was that ?
Admiral Wilkinson. About 9 o'clock.
Mr. Gesell. At that same time was there brought to your desk
the 1 o'clock message ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. Was there any other message brought to you at that
time except the fourteenth part ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not believe so. If so, it was [4671]
of relatively minor importance and I do not recall it.
Mr. Gesell. So at 9 o'clock on the morning of December 7 you
had the fourteenth part in your hand, and do I understand the only
other person in your office at that time was Captain McCollum ?
1766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe so. There were other people in the
office; yes; but not in my room. I mean the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence has a number of people in it.
Mr. Gesell. I mean the office in the sense of it being in your room.
Admiral Wilkinson. My room ; yes.
Mr. Gesell. After having read the fourteenth part your mind was
clear as to the breaking off of negotiations, was it not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Well, it was not only clear about that, which
was the last clause in the last paragraph, "it cannot but consider
that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotia-
tions," but what was more striking to me was the language in which
this last part was couched :
Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the estab-
lishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially
to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China
at war.
[4672] In other words, they were iSghting words, so to speak, and
I was more impressed by that language than by the breaking off of
negotiations, which of itself might be only temporary. Those would
be hard words to eat. The breaking off of negotiations could be
resumed.
Mr. Gesell. They were really doing this in a big way, so you thought
it was very serious?
Admiral Wilkinson. I tliought it was very serious.
Mr. Gesell. What did you do ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I talked to McCollum and we went to see
Admiral Stark.
Mr. Gesell. Where was Admiral Stark when you saw him?
Admiral Wilkinson. He was in his office. I think we arrived there
about 9 : 15.
Mr. Gesell. You think you arrived there at 9 : 15 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection.
Mr. Gesell. Using "his office" in the sense of "room" ?
Admiral Wilkinson. His room.
Mr. Gesell. Who else was in his room with him at that time ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. Ultimately Admiral Inger-
soll and Admiral Turner were there, but at that moment I do not recall
who was there besides himself.
Mr. Gesell. Did you show Admiral Stark the 14th part?
[4673] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. That would be about 9 : 15 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Somewhere around there, to the best of my
recollection.
Mr. Gesell. What discussions did you have with him concerning
the fourteenth part at that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think I pointed out to him the seriousness
of that language that I just mentioned, and I believe that I advised that
the Fleet should be notified, not with any question of an attack on
Hawaii in mind, but with the question of imminence of hostilities in
the South China Sea. My recollection is that Admiral Stark at that
time attempted to call General Marshall on the phone.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1767
Mr. Gesell. Well, now, did Admiral Stark have in front of him
the 13 parts?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure whether he had them there or
whether I brought them all down to him. Either as the result of my
coming in or of the earlier receipt, he did have the fourteenth part,
I am sure.
[4674] Mr. Gesell. So by 9 : 15 or 9 : 30, you are quite clear that
Admiral Stark had read the 14-part message?
Admiral Wilkinson. To my recollection.
Mr. Gesell. In its entirety ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Now, when you discussed with him the sending of thjs
message to the fleet, do I understand correctly that you still did not
have the 1 o'clock message?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. You say that you believe Admiral Stark tried to call
General Marshall at that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is that he did, to consult with
him about a message of warning.
Mr. Gesell. The telephone calls made from the outside through the
White House switchboard on those dates, as set forth in exhibit 58,
show that Secretary Knox called Admiral Stark at 10 : 44 a. m. Do
you remember that call ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. They show no calls by Admiral Stark to General Mar-
shall until 12:10.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr, Gesell. They show but two calls by General Marshall to Ad-
miral Stark, one at 11 : 30 and one at 11 : 40.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
[4675] Mr. Gesell. Do you believe that sometime around
9:30-—
Admiral Wilkinson. It is my impression that Admiral Stark either
called General Marshall, or told me he would talk with General Mar-
shall on the subject, and I had thought he actually tried to make the
call while I was there.
Mr. Gesell. You think he picked up the phone and tried to make
the call?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think so.
Mr. Gesell. Do you remember his talking to General Marshall?
Admiral Wilkinson. No ; I am quite sure he did not.
Mr. Gesell. When did the 1 o'clock message turn up ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say roughly about 10 : 30 or 10 : 40.
Mr. Gesell. There had been no decision up to 10 : 30 or 10 : 40 to
send any message to the fleet ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. I had not been in there all
the time.
Mr. Gesell. I want you to straighten me out on that. When did
you leave the office?
Admiral Wilkinson. I suppose after Admiral Stark had [4^76]
read the message.
Mr. Gesell. And you had made your recommendation to him?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
1768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. When did you go back to his office ?
Admiral Wilkinson. An hour later.
Mr. Gesell. And what was the occasion of your going back to his
office?
Admiral Wilkinson. I may have gone back — I am not sure — I
may have gone back to give him the 1 o'clock message, or I may have
gone back to receive any further information.
Mr. Gesell. The best you can now recall is you went back?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. When, to the best of your recollection, was it that you
received the 1 o'clock message ?
, Admiral Wilkinson. About that time, 10 : 30 or 10 : 40. Of course,
these intervals of time are just relative. I had no intention of checking
the clock at each moment. It was well after the fourteenth part, in
other words.
Mr. Gesell. You think it was an hour later ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Or an hour and 15 minutes later?
[4>677] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, nearly two hours later from
the time I first saw the fourteenth part.
Mr. Gesell. You had seen that at 8 : 30 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Between 8 : 30 and 9 : 00, yes.
[4^78] Mr. Gesell. You are aware that there is quite a conflict
of testimony, are you not. Admiral Wilkinson, as to when the 1 o'clock
message was delivered to Admiral Stark ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I did not know there was a conflict in
when it was delivered to Admiral Stark. I knew there was a conflict
as to when it was received in the Department.
Mr. Gesell. Your recollection as to when it was delivered to Ad-
miral Stark is that it was about 10 : 30 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Or 10 : 40, yes.
Mr. Gesell. Either you brought it there or you arrived at the time
it got there?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection.
Mr. Gesell. At that same time was there available the message
concerning the destruction of codes, which appears in exhibit 1 at
page 249, the first message at the top of the page, which gave the
instructions to destroy the remaining cipher machine, the machine
codes, immediately after deciphering the fourteenth part?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not believe so. I do not recall its being
available at that time.
Mr, Gesell. What discussions took place in Admiral Stark's office
when you arrived there about 10 : 30 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not remember a discussion [^6791
particularly. I think it was noted that this was the presentation
period that we were looking for. It was 1 : 00 o'clock on that day. It
was a little sooner than we had expected, because the pilot message said
it would be several days, perhaps. That 1 : 00 o'clock in Washington
represented varying times throughout the Pacific and the Philippines.
I do not recall, as I have stated, that any special mention was made
that it was daylight, or shortly after daylight, in Hawaii.
Mr. Gesell. You knew that it was, did you not ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1769
Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, yes. It was about two hours after actual
daylight. I think you will get the first daylight about 5 : 30 there this
time of the year.
Mr. Gesell. It was 7 : 30?
Admiral Wilkinson. It was 7 : 30 actual time, about two hours after
daylight.
Mr. Gesell. Do you remember the various times that were discussed
throughout the testimony ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think some mention was made, as often
occurs among naval officers who are familiar with geographic time
figures.
Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion had as to the fact that the
Japanese had been directed to present, on a Sunday, to the Secretary of
State, at 1 : 00 o'clock, this [4-6S0] message ? That was unusual
as to time and unusual as to the day, was it not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I do not recall any discussion except
that it was sooner than we had expected from the pilot.'
Mr. Gesell. Who else was in Admiral Stark's office at that time ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe Admiral IngersoU, Admiral Turner,
and I believe Captain McCollum.
Mr. Gesell. Anybody else?
Admiral Wilkinson. There may have been. I do not recall.
Mr. Gesell. And what happened after that ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I have no recollection. I think I left the-
office.
Mr. Gesell. When do you think you left the office ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Within 10 or 15 minutes.
Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion of sending any warning
message to the various outposts in the Pacific ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it at the moment.
Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion of the fact that the Secretary
of State, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of War were meeting at
the State Department at that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.
Mr. Gesell. Do you recall any conversations that [4681]
Admiral Stark or anyone else in the room had by telephone with any
of those Cabinet officers at that meeting ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. Or any calls that they received from those Cabinet
officers ?
Admiral Wilkinson.. I do not recall.
[46S2] Mr. Gesell. Or whether there was any call from the
Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Stark ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that specifically.
Mr. Gesell. Were there any telephone conversations had either way
between Admiral Stark and anyone else in the office and the White
House, President Roosevelt, or anyone else there ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. There were several of us in
the room. Admiral Stark may have picked up the phone and talked
with someone. At any rate, I do not recall it now.
Mr. Gesell. When you left the office you had no indication that any
warning message of any kind was going to be sent; is that correct?
1770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, except that in my earlier discussion with
Admiral Stark, I had the definite impression that after discussion
with General Marshall, he was going to advise the fleet that the crisis
was about to break. That was my impression. Just what caused that,
I cannot tell you, except, as I say, I thought I recalled our mentioning
it, that he picked upon the phone to call General Marshall, or at least
he told me he was going to call General Marshall.
Mr. Gesell. When you saw him the second time, and [4^83]
he had the 1 o'clock message, he had much more specific information
than when you saw him the first time, as to when things were going to
happen, did he not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. He had the specific information about when
the message was to be delivered. He had no indication that anything
else was going to happen. It would be inference.
Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion that it was likely that the
Japanese would time some action with the delivery of that note ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall any. It would be possible that
they would strike before or after, and at the very moment of delivery
it was not too significant. It really looked as though they wanted the
thing delivered as soon as they could. They sent it over the wire one
day and the next day said, "Turn it over at 1 o'clock."
Mr. Gesell. I understand your testimony to be : when you left, after
you had been there the second time, you had no specific statement from
Admiral Stark that he was going to send a message to the fleet.
Admiral AVilkinson. I recall an impression. Whether that im-
pression was born in a specific statement, or born because of the atmos-
phere of the room, or recommendations of other officers, I do not know.
I just have an impression [4(^S4] he was going to consult with
General Marshall, and advise the fleet, not that an attack was coming
on Hawaii, but that something was about to break in the Japanese
situation, and that the fleet should be prepared to steam, or whatever
would be brought out by the action which, in fact, did result.
[468S] Mr. Gesell. There Avas no drafting of any message at
that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; not in my sight.
Mr. Gesell. On the second occasion was there any mention made
of Hawaii?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, except that it might have been men-
tioned, and J am not sure that it was, that 1 o'clock here was 7:30
there, or something of that sort.
Mr. Gesell. What was your reference to the fleet being prepared
to steam ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Well, what I meant was that if there was
an indication that something was going to break it would be the
natural desire of the Chief of Operations to advise the fleet it was
about to break so that if there was any immediate departure from
port necessary to fend off an attack, to start for some distant position,
either to defend it or to intercept some attacking force — at any rate,
he should beforwarned so that he could complete any last-needed
stores in order to have the fleet immediately ready instead of generally
ready.
Mr. Gesell. Now, it is your recollection that you did not have at
that time the message telling the Japanese to destroy their codes upon
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1771
the completion of the translation of the fourteenth part ? When did
you get that message ?
[46S6] Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall. I imagine I got
it subsequently because it brings no recollection to me; and, ob-
viously, after the attack became known we wouldn't be interested in
the destruction of the machine.
Mr. Gesell. When did you next go back to the office of Admiral
Stark ?^
Admiral Wilkinson. I think I was at my office until some time
past noon, went to lunch at home, and while at lunch got a telephone
call and hurried back.
Mr. Gesell. After you left, that second occasion you were there,
you had no further conversations with him by telephone or otherwise ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not until after the attack.
Admiral Gesell. You had no information then that a message was
being sent by the Army or what the terms of it were ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gesell. The officers were to be advised.
Admiral Wilkinson. Never heard of it for hours if not days.
Mr. Gesell. During this period that we have been talking about,
the last month or 6 weeks or 2 months before the attack, Admiral,
did you have any means in the Office of Naval Intelligence of keeping
posted on diplomatic developments?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. There were several channels by
[4687] which we had contact with the State Department. I, my-
self, rarely, if ever, was called to the State Department for a con-
ference, but the Director of the Central Division, Captain Schuir-
mann, was the Chief of Naval Operations' direct representative with
the State Department and he advised me usually of what transpired
on the occasions that he was called in conference.
Mr. Gesell. He was not attached to your office ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, he was on the same level, as the head of
the Central Division.
Also we had a lieutenant commander, Delaney Hunter, of the Naval
Reserve, who was our liaison officer on the lower level, so to speak,
and he went over to the State Department daily and searched through
the dispatches there, and was shown dispatches from all parts of the
world, and made copies of a number of them and extracts of them
which because of code security could not be copied direct, and brought
those back and gave me every day a list of State Department dis-
patches which were of interest to us.
Those dispatches, that little paper, usually a dozen pages, was cir-
culated daily within the office of Naval Intelligence and within the
office of the Chief of Operations.
Mr. Gesell. Those were diplomatic dispatches?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
[4688] Mr. Gesell. Well, now, did you have any means of
knowing what was taking place in the discussions between Secretary
Hull and President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassadors?
Admiral Wilkinson. Well, in the first place, I saw the incoming
magic, and usually I saw the outgoing magic, wherein the Ambassador
was telling Tokyo what he had been doing. If something, on the
other hand, was sent from the State Department to Mr. Grew to pre-
1772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sent over there. I would not see it unless I was told it by Captain
Schuirmann.
Mr, Gesell. Or your man went over and read the dispatches ?
Admiral Wilkinson, He read only the incoming dispatches. I
don't think he read the outgoing dispatches.
Mr. Gesell. So you knew what Ambassador Grew was reporting?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; in general, yes.
Mr. Gesell. You also knew in a general way what progress was
being made and what recommendations were being made in the nego-
tiations with the Japanese Ambassadors here ?
Admiral Wilkinson, Yes.
Mr. Gesell. By the way, did you know that Ambassador Grew in
February, 1941 had said that he picked up a rumor that there was a
likelihood of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor ?
Senator Brewster. Wasn't it January?
Mr. Gesell. I see the press nodding their heads, so I am sure you
are riglit, Senator.
[46S&] Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure whether I knew that
at that time or not. I have heard it since, of course.
Mr. Gesell. Of course, that was
Admiral Wilkinson. It w^as in line with the fears, the apprehen-
sions of the whole Island, that the primary thing was an air attack.
Mr. Gesell. Of course, that was a message prior to your becoming
Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted with respect to the placing of
embargoes and freezing orders on the Japanese?
Admiral Wilkinson. I was not consulted and I don't think Admiral
Kirk was.
Mr. Gesell. Did you have anything to do. Admiral, with the joint
memoranda which General Marshall and Admiral Stark presented to
the President, of November 5 and November 27 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No; I wasn't aware of their existence until
quite recently.
Mr. Gesell. Did you receive information from Admiral Stark and
Captain Schuirmann, and others who were dealing with the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, as to
what was taking place at the War Council meetings and at meetings
in Secretary Hull's office ?
[4690] Admiral Wilkinson. Occasionally from Captain Schuir-
mann. Not as a matter of routine.
Mr. Gesell. There was no regular way of your being briefed on
what was taking place in those, you might call, policy conferences?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. You see, that links up with that other
question, whether I was consulted on the warning messages and so
on. Our office was an incoming and receiving office of information
from abroad and from the domestic areas. We were not concerned
with the outgoing directives for the Fleet nor in fact told of the
movements and operations of our own forces. When we got into the
war I arranged for the setting up of a war room and thereupon we
did to a large degree get the movements of our forces laid out so that
we might have a better understanding and interpretation of the infor-
mation from abroad.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1773
But prior to getting into the war we did not know the United States
side of an argument that was going on.
Mr, Gesell. I asked you whether you had anything to do with the
joint memorandum to the President of November 5.
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. There is attached to that document some supporting
papers, it is exhibit 16 here, a memorandum dated November 1 from
Captain Boone of the Far Eastern Section. Have [iOQl] you
ever seen that dispatch ? I will show it to j^ou.
AdmiraHViLKiNSON. I am sure I did.
Mr. Gesell. That would suggest that perhaps you had some con-
tact with that joint memorandum of the 5th.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, only that this is part of the information
that they had at hand.
Mr. Gesell. In other words, that w^ould be written to estimate the
specific situation but without regard to the basic matters being dis-
cussed in the memorandum ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. This was some of the data upon
which they based their decision.
Mr. Gesell. Did you have any detailed knowledge of the Singa-
pore staff conferences and other conferences which had been taking
place between the Americans, the British and the Dutch?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, only that they had been held.
Mr. Gesell. Did you know that the Army — rather, did you know
that a reconnaissance had been ordered by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, an air reconnaissance, for the purpose of picking up movements
around the Kra Peninsula?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I think I was aware of that.
Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted in connection with the ordering of
that reconnaissance?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
[4-692] Mr. Gesell. Did you see the various reports that came
in, as are included in Exhibit 78 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think so.
Mr. Gesell. But you had nothing to do with the decision to make
the reconnaissance?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. That was a recomiaissance to confirm the
evidences which we were getting of a movement south and to deter-
mine the precise locations of the Japanese ships and the degree and
intensity of the movement. It confirmed the reports which we had
received from our various coastal observers.
Mr. Gesell. Did you see a disj^atch of December 2 sent by the Chief
of Naval Operations to Admiral Hart expressing the President's de-
sire to set up a so-called defensive information patrol by stationing
three vessels in that area for reconnaissance purposes?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall having seen it.
Mr. Gesell. Do you know whether or not any such patrol was ever
in fact established.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, I don't know.
Mr. Gesell. Do you ever recall seeing the dispatch from Admiral
Hart to the Chief of Naval Operations dated December 6 concerning
the movement of Japanese vessels toward the Kra Peninsula, which
is part of Exhibit 66, which I now [4003] show vou ?
1774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I think I saw that. I note that it has
been signed for in my office. Although it does not bear my initials,
I presume it was called to my attention.
[4-694-] Mr. Gesell. Do you recall a discussion of that piece of
information on the 6th with anyone ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall the discussion. It had been
sent to War Plans and Chief of Operations. So it seems no discussion
was necessary. It was an indication that the movement was progress-
ing as anticipated.
Mr. Gesell. You don't recall having any discussion with anyone
concerning it ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. Do you recall having any discussion with anyone con-
cerning the dispatches contained in exhibit 79 relating to the so-called
Dutch alert?
Admiral Wilkinson. I recall some of them. I can't say specifically
which.
Mr. Gesell. What is your recollection of the incident covered by
those dispatches ?
Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection of both the dispatches and
of the contact with tlie Dutch naval attache at the time was that the
Dutch were seriously worried about the implied threat to the Dutch
East Indies possessions by the Japanese movement down through the
South China Sea, and that these dispatches had to do with such con-
cern of theirs. It was more confirmatory evidence of the movement
which eventually took place.
[4695] Mr. Gesell. That refers to the belief of the Dutch that
there were fleet dispositions by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands.
I gather from the dispatches that it was not the view of the Office of
Naval Intelligence that the forces there were as strong as the Dutch
had believed?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe that was the case, although we had
some indications that the Marshall Islands further to the westward
Palaus, that there was a force building up there, and the Pearl Harbor
unit and the Corregidor unit were both watching for such radio intel-
ligence indications as they could get as to the location of the Japanese
ships, and there was a difference between them.
Corregidor, which we believed to be slightly more accurate, felt that
there was no pronounced indications of a strong task force in the
Marshalls, while the Pearl Harbor unit felt there was, but we didn't
believe that there was a large force in the Palaus, as I recall.
Mr. Gesell. Did you ever receive any information from the Dutch,
British, or any other friendly nation, which indicated that the Japanese
were moving toward Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. That there was likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
[4^96] Mr. Gesell. Did you know that the Naval Intelligence
officer at Pearl Harbor had discontinued the tapping of a certain tele-
phone of the Japanese consul on the 2d of December ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. I think we were getting information in
the last part of that period prior to the attack by such methods, but I
didn't know whether it was the district intelligence officer, or the FBI
that was getting that.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1775
Mr. Gesell. Did you have any information of the discontinuance of
the tapping of the phones by the Naval Intelligence officer ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.
Mr. Gesell. Did you ever receive, prior to the attack, any knowl-
edge of the so-called Mori telephone tap ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure what that is. If that is the one
about the flowers
Mr. Gesell. I will show it to you.
Admiral Wilkinson. About poinsettias
Mr. Gesell. Yes. You did not know of that in the Office of Naval
Intelligence prior to the attack ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. I think perhaps if the committee please, we .might
designate that conversation Exhibit 84, because [4^97] there
will be other questions concerning it with other witnesses, and I will
introduce it at this time.
The Vice Chairman. Exhibit 84?
Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 84,")
Mr. Gesell. One final question, which has to do with these messages
involving code burning ; I neglected to ask you whether you had had
any conversations with General Miles concerning the sending of those
messages, particularly the message to Hawaii ?
Admiral Wii-kinson. I don't recall any. I think it very probable
I did.
Mr. Gesell. He stated, at page 2103, that he had conversations with
you concerning that.
Admiral Wilkinson. No doubt we did.
Mr. Gesell. Do you recall ever having discussed with him the ques-
tion of that message sent in such terms that it would also go to the
Army as well as the Navy ?
Admiral Wh^kinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, I think that is all the questions we have
at this time.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral, I would like to ask you [4698]
a few questions, if I may please, sir.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. You were Chief of the Office of Naval Intel-
ligence on December 7, 1941 ?
Admiral Wilkiijson. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Did you say you became Chief of ONI —
when was it ?
Admiral Wilkinson. October 15.
The Vice Chairman. October 15, 1941 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And you continued how long ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Until July 20, 1942.
The Vice Chairman. Did you ever think an attack would be made
on Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. That was possible, but improbable.
The Vice Chairman. How is that ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was possible, but improbable.
1776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. Did you ever at any time prior to December
7, 1941, reach tlie conclusion that an attack on Pearl Harbor was
jn-obable ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
The Vice Chairman. Did you ever think such an attack would be
made ?
[4-699] Admiral Wilkinson. I had been out there, Mr. Chair-
man, for nearly 2 years, up until the spring of 1941.
The entire time I was there, I thought it was possible that if any
war arose, or should any war be in progress, that an attack on Pearl
Harbor was possible ; but neither then nor on my — after my departure
in May of 1941 — nor when I was in Naval Intelligence, did I think it
v.as probable. I always thought it was possible. Almost anything is
l)ossible in war, given the tools that can reach the objective.
The Japanese had those tools.
The Vice Chairman. But on up until December 1941, you did not
think such an attack would be made ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not think it was probable.
The Vice Chairman. Even though you had examined and were fa-
miliar with the 14-part message, the so-called pilot message, or the 1
o'clock message, you still did not think an attack on Pearl Harbor was
probable ?
Admiral Wilkinson. All of those indicated, Mr. Chairman, that
Japan was breaking off the negotiations for the adjustment of affairs
in the Pacific.
On the evidences indicated, that she was expanding down through
tlie South China Sea, going into Indochina, Siam, possibly the Kra
Peninsula, on the basis of the phj'sical [4700] evidences before
us and on the basis of the breaking off of the negotiations — and those
negotiations, you will remember, were designed to stop the infiltration
or the movement of the Japs into Indochina and into those southern
areas — on the basis of that, I figured that they were going to stop the
negotiations and go on with their nefarious designs down there.
None of those messages gave me any cause to guess — and it would
have been a guess only, and I am sorry I didn't guess it — but none
of them gave me any suspicion or cause to guess that an attack would
be made on Pearl Harbor any more than on any other United States
objective. In fact, I did not think an attack would be made on any
United States objective, but I though that the Japanese would pursue
a course of successive movements, infiltration, trying the patience and
temper of the Anglo-Saxon nations without actually urging them
into war.
The Vice Chairman. Did you, during that time. Admiral, think
that an attack on any other point of the United States positions was
more probable than the attack on Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I though that as one went westward of Pearl
Harbor, the probabilities increased. In other words, the Philippines
was the most probable, Guam the next, [4701] Wake the next,
Midway the last, the last before Hawaii.
I did not think an attack on any of those was probable because I
did not think there was a probability of an attack on any United States
possession to thrust us, invite us, as it were, into war.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1777
I, perhaps, gave the Japanese credit for less boldness and more
political canniness
The Vice Chairman. Or common sense ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Than tliey possessed.
The Vice Cfiairman. Or common sense?
Admiral Wilkinson. Or common sense, to my mind, yes, sir.
In other words, I thought an attack on any United States possession
was not probable but that the degree of probability increased, rather
decreased, as you went from the Philippines eastward.
The Vice Chairman. You were familiar and, of course, kept posted
with the progress of the negotiations that were then being carried on
by our State Department with the Japanese representatives?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
\4.'^03] The Vice Chairman. And still, in view of all of that,
and the situation that appeared to be developing, more tense, on reach-
ing a critical stage, you still did not think that war between the
United States and Japan was probable?
Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was probable but not inevitable,
and I thought that — in my ill advised opinion — that it would come
by easy stages, and that the Japs would try our patience as far as
they could to avoid getting into war. They had been successful in
Manchuria, China, and Indochina. I had heard of this imaginary
line of 100° east longitude and 10° north latitude and I had some
doubt as to whether we would be able, in the light of the temper of
the country, to back that conclusion up.
As I understand it, the conclusion was, there was actually no promise
that we would go to war, but that we would think it was a serious'
matter if they crossed that line. I had some doubt whether the coun-
try would be seriously concerned as to matters in that part of the
world, and I thought the Japanese were going to push their luck in
that part of the world as far as they could.
[^fOS] The Vice Chairman, Admiral, did you ever at any time
prior to December 7, 1941, reach the conclusion that war between Japan
and the United States was inevitable?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I thought that war was becoming
increasingly probable, but from all the angles that I saw it from, I
did not think it was inevitable.
The Vice Chairman. Now, as I understood you to say, you did not
know that the warning message of November 27, 1941, was sent to the
commander of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander of the Pacific
Fleet for some days after it was sent.
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure whether it was hours or days.
I think about 2 days.
The Vice Chairman. It was about 2 days after the sending of that
message before you found out that it had been sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think so, sir.
The Vice Chairman. I understood you to state that it was not a
part of the responsibility of the position that you held to be familiar
with messages going from the Chief of Naval Operations to the com-
manders of the fleets ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, unless I had had some share in the
initiation of them, myself, when, of course. I would want to know
whether they had been sent or not.
79716 — 46— pt. 4 14
1778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. Am I correct in my understanding that
[j^7^^] you also state that it was not a part of your responsibility
to even keep up with the various locations of the fleets of the United
States throughout the world ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. That was another Office of Opera-
tions, the so-called Ship Movements office, that had care of that, that
took care of that, and we were privileged to inspect their records and
their boards but we had no record of that of our own and we were not
kept informed of it. Our activities were one-sided in that we were
responsible for the information on the foreign navies and the foreign
elements but not for our own.
The Vice Chairman. That is what caused me to wonder how you
could operate intelligently as the word "intelligence" would imply
witliout knowing where our Fleet units were ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It did cause some difficulties at times and ulti-
mately, as I explained, after the war started I got at the information
and was able to keep our own boards posted with where our own forces
were.
The Vice Chairman. But I believe you had stated that it was a part
of your responsibility to keep informed as to the location and move-
ments of potential enemy fleets ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Or the fleets of other countries of the world?
[4.704 A] Admiral Wilkinson. Not only of potential enemies but
of all countries, yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. The fleets of all other countries ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And you state, I believe, that at various times
you were not prepared to give information as to the location of various
units of the fleets of some of the other countries of the world?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. There were many ways in which
we could detect them. First, of course, by actually sighting, whether
by our own merchant ships or whether by our naval attaches or naval
ODservers or consuls at the various points.
Then, second, we could detect them by radio bearings. If we got
so-called radio direction finders it would indicate that this radio
message was coming from such and such a spot or if we could obtain
by the call that the ship was using and the message she was sending,
whether we could translate it or not, we could identifj^ the call, then
we knew that ship was there and perhaps we would add up some other
ships that we knew were usually in company with it, but when the
actual sightings failed us and when the radio direction finders failed
us and wnen radio indications were no longer of avail, as when a ship
went into complete radio silence and they even [4.7'05'\ stopped
sending messages to her, why, then she disappeared into the void and
we might not pick her up for some little time, that ship or a number of
them with her.
The Vice Chairman. You say there was a part of the Japanese
fleet that was lost, or not accounted for, for some period of time?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, for some 3 weeks prior to the attack.
The Vice Chairman. For some 3 weeks?
Admiral Wilkinson. Several battleships and several carriers.
The Vice Chairman. How is that ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Several battleships and several carriers were
lost for some 3 weeks prior to the attack.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1779
The Vice Chairman. Did you receive any information or gain any
intelligence from any source about the Japanese task force leaving
Japan on about, I believe, November 25th, which was the task force
that finally resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Our only indication was that she was
not in other waters, that they were in home waters either close to Japan
or somewhere in the sea off Japan where we had no means of detecting
them. We did not know that they had actually sailed from Japan.
When we knew that [4706] they were not down to the south
from all we could pick up, they were either based on or leaving Japaii
proper.
The Vice Chairman. As the situation appeared to grow more crit-
ical did you increase your efforts to locate or ascertain the location of
the units of the Japanese fleet ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. The Corregidor station, the Pearl
Harbor station and ourselves were all anxious to get all the informa-
tion we could. The commander in chief of the fleet in Pearl Harbor
was aware that they were unlocated and he was trying to find them
but there were simply no evidences except the negative evidence that
nothing could be learned.
We have had similar experiences, of course, in this last war. Ad-
miral Halsey's fleet has popped up frequently in a very annoying posi-
tion for the Japanese when they had not been able to locate him.
The Vice Chairman. I thank you. Senator George would be next
but he is not able to be present at the moment. Mr. Clark. Mr. Clark
of North Carolina will inquire.
Admiral Wilkinson. How do you do, sir.
Mr. Clark. Admiral, there are just two or three questions in my
mind that I would like to have your opinions on. I hope you will not
consider this in the nature of cross-examination and I appreciate the
difficulty of forming questions [4707] and probable replies
after the event without being influenced by the event itself.
I want to go back prior to December the 7th and look at the things
that are in my mind from that angle, sir, and I want to ask your opin-
ion as to the strength of our military establishment in Hawaii prior
to December the 7th, from the standpoint of an attacking force,
whether it would be possible to take it, what would be the size of that
undertaking and the likelihood of its success, including landing and
taking the island ?
Admiral Wilkinson. To land and take it I would say it would take
a very large force, a force probably larger than the Japanese could
muster, of shipping and troops, in view, particularly, of the shipping
and troops that they were using in the South China Sea.
Mr. Clark. Well, now, with the expansion going on to the south
as it was and did, would there be any slight likelihood of such an
attack on the Hawaiian Islands by the Japanese ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Very slight, if at all, because of the known
limitations of the Japanese shipping to carry the expeditionary force
that would be necessary to land and take the island.
Mr. Clark. Yes. Now, aside from that kind of an attack.
[4708] how would the Hawaiian area be vulnerable?
Admiral Wilkinson. How would it be vulnerable?
Mr. Clark. Yes.
1780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. It would be vulnerable, of course, to a hit-
and-run raid, which is precisely what it got. The Japanese were very
fortunate, I think, that they were able to get in and out without de-
tection.
Mr. Clark. But what they did does demonstrate that that kind of
a raid was possible.
Admiral Wilkinson. Was possible and without warning, and even
with warning our carrier task forces have made the same raids on
the Philippines and on Japan throughout this war.
Mr. Clark. I assume that is why our forces had from time to
time gone through what you call war games, in which a surprise attack
by air was practiced ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I presume so, sir, yes.
Mr. Clark. Now, what about subversive activities ?
Admiral Wilkinson. What, sir ?
Mr. Clark. It would be vulnerable also from the standpoint of sub-
versive activities?
Admiral Wilkinson. We had always been apprehensive about that
because of the large Japanese population. As it happened, that popu-
lation was in the main very friendly and to the best of my knowledge
there was no large-scale sabotage at all.
[4.709] Mr. Clark. Now, did you know of the telegram or radio-
gram, whatever it was, that General Miles in G-2 sent warning against
subversive activities?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure that I did. I think I probably
did, sir.
Mr. Clark. Did the Navy send any similar communications?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, because it was the Army's responsibility
to control the civilian population.
Mr. Clark. I beg your pardon ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, because it was the Army's responsibility
to control the civilian population.
Mr. Clark. I think it was General Marshall who first suggested
here that the Hawaiian Islands and our military establishment there
was on the Hank of this Japanese movement to the south. What would
be the importance of that militarily ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Simply this, sir, that if your life line to an
objective is longer in time or in distance from your home bases than
the enemy is distant from that life line at any point, then you may
be subjected to attack and to a severance of that life line.
Mr. Clark. Yes. Now, if our establishment in Hawaii had not
been attacked and we had remained in the full control of the whole
establishment, naval and air and army, would that [^/^O] have
constituted a serious threat to Japanese movement south?
Admiral Wilkinson. No doubt they would have been much con-
cerned. I do not know whether our forces advancing from that line
would have had to pass through the danger of air attack from the
mandated islands, the Japanese islands, and it may have been that the
damage we would receive from those islands might have beaten off
the attack we might have been in the process of making, in other words,
defeated the threat, but I can well understand the Japanese might
be apprehensive about it.
Mr. Clark. You do not understand the Japanese would be appre-
hensive about an attack by our entire Hawaiian establishment in this
long movement they were making south ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1781
Admiral Wilkinson. I should think they would, yes.
Mr. Clark. Well, wouldn't that be of very great concern to them
as a military matter ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I should think so.
Mr. Clark. Now, did the Hawaiian Islands in that respect occupy
a position any different from the Philippines or the Canal Zone?
Admiral Wilkinson. Only as the geographic distances are involved.
They were much less important, much less threatening than the
Philippines.
Mr. Clark. I beg your pardon?
[4'^IJ] Admiral Wilkinson. They were much less threatening
to the Japanese than the Philippines. They were more threatening
to the Japs than the Panama Canal military establishment. The
Panama Canal was a means of uniting the oceans, of course, but the
greatest military and naval threat, I think, to the southern advance,
to the southern extension of the Japanese, was the Philippines.
Next after that, because the intervening bases of Guam and Wake were
inconsequential, and Midway, next after that was Hawaii.
• Mr. Clark. Well, now, am I to understand — and my own ignorance
of military matters is perfectly complete, sir, so you will have to
excuse me if I appear not to understand
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not profess to know too much, sir.
Mr. Clark. But do I understand from the military viewpoint
the threat of the Hawaiian establishment to this Japanese movement
south was not serious ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think if the Hawaiian establishment had not
been largely depleted that the Japanese would in normal military pre-
cautions have had to feel their way to the southward much less rapidly
than they did advance. I think they could still have advanced into
Indochina and the Kra Peninsula. I assume that they could have gone
much more rapidly into Java and into Borneo. It is a question of
whether [471£] they could have gone into the Philippines and
maintained themselves there. It would doubtless have brought on a
fleet battle and our forces, had they^ advanced across the Pacific, would
have been subjected to attacks by air from the Japanese air bases on
the islands and they would have been doubtless subjected to attack
by the Japanese Fleet. What the outcome of that would have been
I do not know. Our navy was much smallet then than it was ulti-
mately, and, in fact, at that time it was smaller than the Japanese Fleet
in the Pacific.
Mr. Clark. Well, I am sorry to consume so much time. What is
rolling over in my mind is whether Hawaii as it stood before the attack
constituted such a threat to the Japanese movement south that an
attack or some effort to remove that threat might reasonably have been
anticipated on our side of the fence ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I see what you mean, sir, and I think that it
is a very sound presumption. Against it, perhaps, are the two facts:
First, it would require extreme boldness, which they did actually show,
because of the risk involved ; and, second, it would be a presumption
that the Japanese were prepared to attack the United States in a spot
which would be certain to plunge them immediately into the war.
[4713] If, as I was mentioning to the chairman, they had deter-
mined to feel their way to the southward, to gain as much ground as
possible without antagonizing and bringing on their heads the Anglo-
1782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Saxon nations, they would not, of course, have been tempted to dispose
of this threat because the threat would not have been operating against
them.
Mr. Clark. An attack in force with an attempt to take the islands
being pretty inconsistent with their rapid extension south, and they
having been warned specifically in Hawaii, our people, against sub-
versive activities, a surprise air attack was the only thing, the only
possibility left open, was it not?
Admiral Wilkinson. With respect to Hawaii, yes, sir, and sub-
marines.
Mr. Clark. I am talking about with respect to Hawaii.
Admiral Wilkinson. And submarine attack.
Mr. Clark. Yes. Now, did you or anybody in all of the discussions
that you ever heard of this whole situation, ever suggest the likelihood
or the probability of a surprise air attack on the Hawaiian Islands and
that there should be a specific warning against that, just as there was
against subversive activities?
Admiral Wilkinson, For the entire year, sir, there had been dis-
cussion in various correspondence and plans laid out \_Ii7HY
about air attack and I think that was in the mind of everyone there,
the very possibility of a surprise air attack.
Mr. Clark. Will you pardon me, sir? I am thoroughly familiar
with some correspondence which General Marshall, and perhaps oth-
ers, had back a good many months prior to that and the message from
the Ambassador to Japan which has been referred to.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. What I had in mind in asking you that question was
the two or three weeks preceding Pearl Harbor and particularly from
the 27th of November to the 7th of December.
Admiral Wilkinson. May I have the concluding part of the ques-
tion before this interpolation ?
Mr. Clark. I do not mind just asking the question again, sir. If
you will allow me, I will repeat the question.
Admiral Wilkinson. I wish you would, sir. I was a little confused.
Mr. Clark. As to whether or not, it being pretty generally conceded
that Hawaii was right impregnable against an all-out assault for the
purpose of taking the islands, and the command at Hawaii having been
specifically warned against subversive activities, did anyone in the
Navy or the Army or any other person in military life to whom you
talked between H715] the 27th of November and the 7th of
December ever suggest specifically the possibility of an air attack and
specific warning against that?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think not, sir. The subversive warning, you
will recall, was to the Army only and there was a general war warning
sent to the Fleet as a whole, but I heard no specific mention as you
suggest.
Mr. Clark. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. It is now 4 o'clock and. Admiral Wilkinson,
I will ask you to please return at 10 o'clock in the morning and Senator
Lucas will be recognized.
The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock in the morning.
(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., December 17, 1045, an adjournment was
taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, December 18, 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1783
W16-] PEAKL HAEBOR ATTACK
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1945
Congress of thb United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
or the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. C.
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m.,
in the Caucus Eoom (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator
Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Fer-
gison, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
earhart, and Keefe.
Also present: William D, Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
[^/i7] The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in
order. Does counsel have anything at this time ?
Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, one or two small matters.
From time to time we wish to place in the record evidence that has
come along that has been gotten in response to requests. We have
three highly significant documents here which I would simply like
to have spread on the record. They relate to the meeting at Argentia.
The State Department has delivered to us three memoranda pre-
pared by Mr. Sumner Welles covering his conversations with the
President and Prime Minister Churchill at sea on August 10 and
August 11. These relate to the so-called parallel action matter and
I, simply, without taking the time of the committee to read these
memoranda, would like to suggest that they be spread upon the record.
They were made available to us yesterday. We had them immedi-
ately mimeographed and in view of their importance I wish to place
them in the record immediately.
The Vice Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered. Each
member of the committee has been furnished a copy ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes. And they may, I think for convenience, fol-
lowing the suggestion of Senator Ferguson made the other day, be
designated 22-B, so that they will run along with Exhibit 22 which
contains the other documents relating to this subject.
{^^718'\ The Vice Chairman. These will be designated exhibit
22-B, is that correct?
Senator Brewster. There are several of them. Shouldn't they be
B,C,D, and so forth?
Mr. Gesell. Very well. We'll designate the one of August 10,
22-B, the one covering the morning conference of August 22-C
and the one covering the afternoon conference of August 11, 22-D.
The Vice Chairman. Very well.
1784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The documents referred to were marked Exhibits Nos. 22-B, 22-C
and 22-D, and follow:)
[^7i5] Depaetment of State
MEMORANDUM OF CXJNVERSATION
Date : Sunday, August 10, 1941 At Sea.
Subject : British-American Cooperation.
Participants :
Sir Alexander Cadogan.
The Under Secretary of State.
Copies to :
I accompanied the President this morning to attend the religious services and
the lunch which the Prime Minister was giving for the President on the PRINCE
OF WALES. Sir Alexander Cadogan told me before lunch that in accordance
with the conversation which was had between the President, the Prime Minister,
Sir Alexander and myself at the President's dinner last night he had made two
tentative drafts covering proposed parallel and simultaneous declarations by the
United States and British Governments relating to Japanese policy in the Pacific
and of a proposed joint declaration to be made by the President and the Prime
Minister when their present meeting was terminated. The two drafts read as
follows :
"Draft of Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government.
14720] "Declaration by the United States Government that :
"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would
produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled
to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the United
States and Japan.
"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japarl in conse-
quence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would
have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power."
"Declaration by His Majesty's Government that:
"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would
produce a situation in which His Majesty's Government would be compelled to
take counter measures even though these might lead to war between Great
Britain and Japan.
"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in conse-
quence of such counter measures or of their support of them. His Majesty's
Government would give all possible aid to such Power."
"Declaration by the Netherlands Government :
[4721] "1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific
would produce a situation in which Her Majesty's Government would be com-
pelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the
Netherlands and Japan.
"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in conse-
quence of such counter measures or of their support of them, Her Majesty's
Government would give all possible aid to such Power."
Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether
they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.
The draft of the proposed joint declaration reads as follows :
"The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister,
Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom,
being met together to resolve and concert the means of providing for the safety
of their respective countries in face of Nazi and German aggression and of the
dangers to all peoples arising therefrom, deem it right to make known certain
principles which they both accept for guidance in the framing of [4722]
their policy and on which they base their hopes for a better future for tlie world.
"First, their counjtries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other ;
"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with
the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned ;
"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government
under which they will live; they are only concerned to defend the rights of
freedom of speech and of thought without which such choosing must be illusory;
"Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1785
essential produce not only within their territorial jurisdiction but between the
nations of the world.
"Fifth, they seek a peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi
tyranny but by effective international organization will afford to all States and
peoples the means of dwelling in security within their own bounds and of
traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or need of getting
burdensome armaments."
As I was leaving the ship to accompany the Presi- [4723] dent back
to his flagship, Mr. Churchill said to me that he had likewise given the President
copies of these documents. He impressed upon me his belief that some declara-
tion of the kind he had drafted with respect to Japan was in his opinion in the
highest degree important, and that he did not think that there was much hope
left unless the United States made such a clear-cut declaration of preventing
Japan from expanding further to the south, in which event the prevention of
war between Great Britain and Japan appeared to be hopeless. He said in the
most emphatic manner that if war did break out between Great Brit,ain and
Japan, Japan immediately would be in a position through the use of her large
number of cruisers to seize or to desti'oy all of the British merchant shipping
in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, and to cut the lifelines between the British
Dominions and the British Isles imless the United States herself entered the
war. He pled with me that a declaration of this character participated in by
the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions, the Netherlands and possibly
the Soviet Union would definitely restrain Japan. If this were. not done, the
blow to the British Government might be almost decisive.
Sumner Welles.
U SW. GAM
['i724] Department OF State
MEMOEANDUM of CONVB3SSATION
Date : Mondat, August 11, 1941. At Sea.
Subject : British-American Cooperation.
Participants :
The President.
The British Prime Minister.
Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.
The Honorably Harry Hopkins.
The Under Secretary of State.
Copies to :
The President received Mr. Churchill this morning on the Augusta at
11 :00 a. m. There were present at the meeting Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry
Hopkins and myself.
The conference commenced with the subject of Portugal. The President
read to Mr. Churchill the letter addressed to the former by the Prime Minister
of Portugal. It was agreed by both that the contents of the letter were highly
satisfactory and made possible without any diflSculty the carrying out of arrange-
ments for the occupation of the Azores as a means of assurance that the islands
would not be occupied by Germany.
[Handwritten note:! Card for Atlantic Charter.
[4725] Mr. Churchill stated that a highly secret operation had been decided
Tipon by the British Government, namely, the occupation of the Canary Islands
during the days immediately after the September full moon. This date, as Mr.
Churchill remembered it, would be about the 15th of September. The British
Government were undertaking this operation with full knowledge that the islands
hnd been recently heavily fortified and that a very large number of German oflS-
cers were engaged there in the training and preparation of the Spanish troops.
It was undertaken with the further realization that this step would almost inev-
itably involve a Spanish attack either in conjunction with or upon the instigation
of German military forces and that such attack would render untenable by the
British Navy the harbor of Gibraltar. The ^^ritish Government, however, had
decided upon the step in view of its belief that the situation in Spain from the
1786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
British standpoint was going from bad to worse and that Hitler almost inevitably
would undertake the occupation of Spain and Portugal with the subsequent pene-
tration of North Africa if any collapse took place on the part of the Russian Army
or even if a winter stalemate resulted. In that event Mr. Churchill stated Gibral-
tar would be isolated anyway and the occupation by Great Britain of the Canary
Islands was of the utmost [^726] importance in guarding a southern
Atlantic convoy route into the British Isles.
In view of this operation, the British Government would not be in a position
conveniently to carry out the commitment they had made to the Portuguese Gov-
ernment to assist in the defense of the Azores.
In view of the contents of Dr. Salazar's letter to the President, it was therefore
agreed that the British Government immediately upon the return of Mr. Churchill
to London would notify Dr. Salazar that the British GoTernment could not con-
veniently undertake to assist in the defense of the Azores and would further
inform Dr. Salazar that they therefore desired him to request the United States
for such assistance. It was agreed on the part of the President that immediately
upon the receipt of such notification from Dr. Salazar the United States would
send the necessary forces of occupation to the Azores and that the Brazilian Gov-
ernment would be simultaneously requested to send at least a token force to take
part in the expedition.
The President stated to Mr. Churchill that in view of our present military situ-
ation if the United States undertook to occupy the Azores it would not be in a
position in the near future at least to undertake the protection of the Cape Verde
Islands. Mr. Churchill [4727] stated that the British Government would
be in a position to occupy the Cape Verde Islands with the understanding that it
would later turn over the protection of those islands to the United States at such
time as the United States was in a position to take those measures. Mr. Churchill
further stated that during the time that the United States was landing the neces-
sary forces in the Azores, the British Navy would maintain a large force between
the Azores and the mainland of Portugal in order to render impossible the send-
ing of any German expeditionary forces should Portugal at that time be already
occupied by Germany.
II
The Prime Minister then said that he desired to discuss the situation in the
Far East. He had with him a copy of a draft memorandum, of which he had
already given the President a copy and which suggested that the United States,
British and Dutch Governments simultaneously warn Japan that further military
expansion by .Japan in the South Pacific would lead to the taking of counter
measures by the countries named even though such counter measures might
result in hostilities between them and Japan, and, second, provided tliat the
United States declare to Japan that should Great Britain go to the assistance
of the Netherlands East Indies as a result [4728] of aggression against the
latter on the part of Japan the President would request from the Congress of
the United States authority to assist the British and Dutch Governments in their
defense against Japanese aggression.
The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statement handed
to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6.
The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the implica-
tion was that .Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that she would move
no further provided the United States would abandon their economic and financial
sanctions and take no further military or naval defensive measures and further
agree to concessions to Japan, including the opportunity for Japan to strangle
the Chinese Government, all of which were particularly unacceptable.
The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, that he
felt very strongly that every effort should be made to prevent the outbreak of war
with Japan. He stated that what he intended to do was to request Secretary Hull
by radio to inform the Japanese Ambassador that the President would return to
Washington next Saturday or Sunday and desired to see tlie Ambassador immedi-
ately upon his return. The President stated that in that interview he would
inform [4729] the Japanese Ambassador that provided the Japanese
Government would give the commitment contained in the first paragraph of the
proposal of the Japanese Government of August 6, namely, tliat the Japanese
Government "will not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific
areas, except French Indochina, and that the Japanese troops now stationed
in French Indochina will be withdrawn", specifically and not contingently, the
United States Government, while making it clear that the other conditions
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1787
set forth by the Japanese Government were in general unacceptable, the United
States would, nevertheless, in a friendly spirit seek to explore the possibilities
inherent in the various proposals made by Japan for the reaching of a friendly
understanding between the two Governments. The President would further state
that should Japan refuse to consid«;r this procedure and undertake further steps
in the nature of military expansions, the President desired the Japanese Govern-
ment to know that in such event in his belief various steps would have to be taken
by the United States notwithstanding the President's realization that the taking
of such furtlier measures might result in war between the United S"tates and
Japan.
Mr. Churchill immediately declared that the procedure suggested appeared to
him to cover the situation U7S0] very well. He said it had in it an
element of "face-saving" for the Japanese and yet at the same time would con-
stitute a flat United States warning to Japan of the consequences involved in a
continuation by Japan of her present course.
There was then discussed the desirability of informing Russia of the steps
which would be taken as above set forth and of possibly including in the warn-
ing to Japan a statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan
against the Soviet Union.
I stated that in my .judgment the real issue which was involved was the con-
tinuation by Japan of its present policy of conquest by force in the entire Pacific
region and regardless whether such policy was directed against China, against
the Soviet Union or against the British Dominions or British colonies, or the
colonies of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific area. I said it seemed to
me that the statement which the President intended to make to the Japanese
Government might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy
rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the Southwestern Pacific
area.
The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this and it was decided that the
step to be taken by the President would be taken in that sense.
14731] The question then arose as to the desirability of the President's mak-
ing reference in his proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador to British
policy in the southern Pacific region and specifically with regard to Thailand.
The iPresident said that he thought it would be advantageous for him to be in a
position at that time to state that he had been informed by the British Govern-
ment that Great Britain had no aggressive intentions whatever upon Thailand.
Mr. Churchill said that in this he heartily concurred.
I asked whether it would not be lietter for the President to be in a position to
state not only that Great Britain had no intentions of an aggressive character
with regard to Thailand, but also that the British Government had informed the
United States Government that it supported wholeheartedly the President's pro-
posal for the neutralization of Indochina and of Thailand.
Mr. Churchill stated that he agreed that it would be well to make an all-
inclusive statement of that character with respect to British policy, that he
trusted that the President would, therefore, inform the Japanese Ambassador
that he had consulted the British Government, and that the British Government
was in complete accord with the neutralization proposal, and that it had like-
wise informed the President that it would in no event [4732] undertake
any initiative in the occupation of Thailand.
It was agreed that Sir Alexander Cadogan, after further consultation with
Mr. Churchill, would give me in writing a statement which the British Gov-
ernment was prepared to make with regard to this issue.
The President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any further
move of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in war could be
held off for at least thirty days. Mr. Churchill felt that if negotiations or con-
versations actually took place between the United States and Japan on the
basis which had been formulated, there was a reasonable chance that Japanese
policy might be modified and that a war in the Pacific might be averted.
Ill
Mr. Churchill then said that he desired to bring up for discussion the proposed
joint declaration by the President and himself.
The President said that he believed the best solution of this problem was
for an identic statement to be made in London and in the United States, probably
on Thursday, August 14, to the effect that the Prime Minister and the President
had met at sea, accompanied by the various members of their respective staffs ;
1788 CONGRESSIONAL, INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that these members of the two Governments had discussed the [4733]
question of aid under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act to nations resisting ag-
gression, and that these military and naval conversations had in no way in-
volved any future commitments between the two Governments, except as author-
ized under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act ; that the Prime Minister and the
President had between them discussed certain principles relating to a better
future for the world and had agreed upon a joint declaration which would then
be quoted verbatim.
Mr. Churchill dissented very strongly from the form in which the President
had desired to make it clear that no future commitments had been entered
into. The President stated that that jwrtion of the proposed statement was of
extreme importance from his standpoint inasmuch as a statement of that char-
acter would make it impossible for extreme isolationist leaders in the United
States to allege that every kind of secret agreement had been entered into during
the course of these conversations.
Mr. Churchill said that he understood that side of the question, but that he
believed that any categorical statement of that character would prove deeply
discouraging to the populations of the occupied countries and would have a very
serious effect upon their morale. He likewise made it clear that a similar
effect would [4'^34] be created by British public opinion. He asked if the
statement could not be worded in such a way as to make it positive rather than
negative, namely, that the members of the staffs of the Prime Minister and of
the President had solely discussed questions relative to the furnishing of aid
to the countries resisting aggression under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act.
The President replied that he believed that the statement could be drawn up
in that way and that if he then were queried in the United States he need
merely reply that nothing had been discussed or agreed upon other than that
which had already been indicated in his public statement.
I then gave the President, Mr. Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan copies of a
redraft which I had made this morning of the proposed joint declaration before
Mr. Churchill had arrived and had had an opportunity of going over it with the
President, and the latter had approved it. Mr. Churchill then commenced to
read it. He suggested that there be inserted in the text of the third point before
the word "self-government" the words "sovereign rights and". This was agreed
npon.
Mr. Churchill then read the fourth point which read as follows : "Fourth, they
will endeavor to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without dis-
crimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to [4755] the raw
materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."
He immediately inquired whether this was meant to apply to the terms of the
Ottawa agreements. I replied that, of course, it did. since the policy which the
United States Government had been pursuing for the better part of nine years
had been addressed primarily towards the removal of all of those artificial
restrictions and controls upon international trade which had created such tragic
havoc to world economy during the past generation. I said I understood fully
the immediate difflculties which this occasioned him, but I pointed out that the
phraseology was "they will endeavor to further" and that this naturally did not
imply a formal and immediate contractual obligation on the part of his Govern-
ment. The President stated that he believed the point was of very great im-
portance as a measure of assurance to the German and Italian peoples that the
British and the United States Governments desired to offer them, after the war,
fair and equal opportunity of an economic character.
The Prime Minister said that, of course, he was without any power himself to
agree upon this point. He set forth in considerable detail the position of the
United Kingdom vis-^-vis the Dominions and emphasized \/i7SG] his in-
ability, without the agreement of the Dominions, to enter into the proposed
declaration insofar as this point was concerned. He said that insofar ns he
himself was concerned the issue was one with which his own personal life history
was connected. He referred to the days at the outset of the century when Joseph
Chamberlain first brought up the proy)Osnl for Emiiire preferences and the pre-
dominant part which this issue had played in the political history of Groat Britain
during the past forty years. He said that he felt that the proposal as now phrased
would have the enthusiastic support of all the liberals everywhere. He said that
he himself was heartily in accord with the proposal and that he himself had always
been, as was well known, emphatically opposed to the Ottawa agreements. He
said, however, that it would be at least a week before he could hope to obtain by
telegraph the opinion of the Dominions with regard to this question.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1789
Harry Hopkins then suggested that Sir Alexander Cadogan and I be requested
to draft new phraseology which would take care of these diflSculties and prevent
the delay of which Mr. Churchill spoke. He said it was inconceivable that the
issuance of the joint declaration should be held up by a matter of this kind.
I said that in my own judgment further modification [7/737] of that
article would destroy completely any value in that portion of the proposed
declaration. I said that it was not a question of phraseology, that it was a
question of a vital principle which was involved. I said that if the British
and the United States Governments could not ag;ree to do everything within
their power to further, after the termination of the present war, a restoration
of free and liberal trade policies, they might as well throw in the sponge and
realize that one of the greatest factors in creating the present tragic situation
in the world was going to be permitted to continue unchecked in the post-war
world. I said that the trade policies of the British Empire during the latter
portion of the nineteenth century had, I felt, contributed enormously to the sane
and prosperous condition of the .world at that time, and that, of course, ' I
realized that the tariff policies pursued by the United States and many other
countries during that period had played an important part in the creation of
the evils which had sprung up after the last war. I said, however, that it seemed
to be imperative that we try to agree now upon the policy of constructive
sanity in world economics as a fundamental factor in the creation of a new
and better world and that except through an agreement upon such a policy by
our two governments there would be no hin4rance whatever to a continuation
later [|73S] to the present German practices of utilizing their trade
and financial policies in order to achieve political ends.
Mr. Churchill agreed very emphatically to this policy. He and Sir Alexander
Cadogan both agreed that it was not a question of phraseology, but that they
were up against a material obstacle which Mr. Churchill had already indicated.
The Dominions would have to be consulted. It might well be that an agreement
could not be had from the Dominions and that consequently the proposed joint
declaration could only be issued some time after news of the meeting between
the President and the Prime Minister had been given out. Mr. Churchill sug-
gested that the inclusion before the phrase "they will endeavor to further" of
the phrase which would read "with due regard for our present obligations"
might ease the situation.
The President suggested, and Mr. Churchill agreed, that the latter would try
and draft some phraseology which would make that situation easier, and it was
arranged that I would call later in the afternoon upon the Prime Minister
and Sir Alexander Cadogan to go over with them such redraft as they might
have in mind.
Mr. Churchill was in entire accord with points five and six.
He then read point seven and after discussion at the [4739] meeting
of this point it was agreed that the phrase "to use force" be replaced by the
word "aggression" in the second sentence of the seventh point.
Mr. Churchill said that, of course, he was heartily and enthusiastically in
favor of this point seven, which had been initiated by the President. He in-
quired, however, whether the President would not agree to support some kind
of "effective international organization" as suggested by the Prime Minister
in his original draft of the proposed joint declaration.
The President replied that he did not feel that he could agree to this because
of the suspicions and opposition that such a statement on his part would create
in the United States. He said that he himself would not be in favor of the creation
of a new Assembly of the League of Nations, at least until after a period of time
had transpired and during which an international police force composed of the
United States and Great Britain had had an opportunity of functioning. Mr.
Churchill said that he did not feel that he would be candid if he did not express
the President his feeling that point seven would create a great deal of opposi-
tion from the extreme internationalists. The President replied that he realized
that, but that he felt that the time had come to be realistic and that [//740]
in his judgment the main factor in the seventh point was complete realism. Mr.
Churchill then remarked that of course he was wholeheartedly in favor of it and
shared the President's view.
T!he meeting then broke up and I arranged with the President that I would
drop by to see him after my conference later in the afternoon with the Prime
Minister. The latter stated that he would not be able to leave until at least
5: 00 p. m., tomorrow, August 12 and that as he felt it of importance to reach a
■complete meeting of minds with the President upon all of the issues involved,
1790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that he would be willing to spend an additional twenty-four hours should that
be necessary.
SuMNEB Weixs.
U SW, GAM
Depaetmb:nt of State
memorandum of conversation
Date: Monday, August 11, I94I. At Sea.
Subject : British-American Cooperation.
Participants :
Sir Alexander Cadogan.
The Under Secretary.
Copies to :
[47 4 n I went by arrangement to see Sir Alexander Cadogan on the PRINCE
OF WALES this afternoon. He gave me to read memoranda which he had
already completed on the conference between the Prime Minister and the Presi-
dent this morning and, with a few changes which I indicated, they appeared to
be a correct presentation of the discussion and of the agreements reached.
With regard to the draft of the joint declaration. Sir Alexander told me that
the Prime Minister had already radioed to London the text of the proposed joint
declaration incorporating therein modifications of points four and seven. Sir
Alexander gave me the revised text to read. Inasmuch as the Prime Minister's
draft of point four was far broader and more satisfactory than the minimum
which the President had instructed me, after our conference of the morning,
to accept, I raised no objection thereto, and with regard to the proposed change
in point seven I stated that while it was completely satisfactory to me and
entirely in accord with my own way of thinking I had no idea what the President's
decision might be. I said that I would have to submit it to him.
Sir Alexander stated that the l-*rime Minister felt very strongly — perhaps
exaggeratedly — the opposition which would be created on the part of a certain
pro-League-of- [47^2] Nations group in England to the contents of point
seven declaring for the disarmament of nations which undertook aggression out-
side of their frontiers. He went on to say that while he believed there would
not be the amount of opposition which the Prime Minister anticipated he never-
theless thought that it would be a tragic thing to concentrate solely upon the
transition period after the war was ended when some kind of joint police power
would have to be exercised by the British and by the United States Governments
and omit any reference to the need of the creation of some effective and prac-
ticable international organization which would function after the transition
period was concluded. I said that as I had already indicated while I was in
full agreement with his own views the matter would have to be determined by
the President.
We discussed the desirability of informing the Chinese Government of the
steps which the United States Government in the person of the President was
taking with regard to Japan. I said that while I felt very definitely that every
effort should be made to keep China closely informed of what was being done
in her interests by Great Britain and by the United States I wondered whether
telling China of what the President intended to state to the .Lapanese Govern-
ment at this f-^7-^'^] particular moment would not mean that the Govern-
ment at Chungking for its own interests would make public the information so
received. If publicity resulted, I stated I feared that the extreme militaristic
element in Tokio and that portion of the Tokio press which was controlled by
Germany would immediately take advantage of the situation so created to inflame
sentiment in Japan to such an extent as to make any possibility remote, as It
might anyhow be, of achieving any satisfactory result through negotiation
with Jnpan. Sir Alexander said he was entirely in accord and would be gov-
erned by those views. He said, of course. I realized how terribly persistent
the Chinese were and that the present Ambassador in London. Dr. Wellington
Koo, would undoubtedly press him dny in and day out to know what had trans-
spired at the meeting between the Prime Mini?^ter and the President with regard
to China. He said that he felt that the best solution was for him merely to
say in general terms that the two governments had agreed that every step
should be taken that was practicable at this time for China and its defense
and avoid going into any details.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1791
I subsequently went to see the President. The President said that he was
entirely in accord with the redraft of point four which was better than he
had [^f^H] thought Mr. Churchill would be willing to concede. He
also accepted without question the amendment made by Mr. Churchill to point
seven and the President said that it seemed to him entirely desirable since
the amendment made it clear that once the war was over a transition period
would have to take plnce and that the permanent international organization
would only be set up after that experimental period had passed. He had jotted
down certain minor changes in the text of the proposed joint declaration, most of
which were merely verbal changes for the purpose of clarification.
I said I felt it necessary for me to ask him whether he did not believe that a
very considerable opposition on the part of extreme isolationists in the United
States would result from that portion of point seven which declares in
the judgment of the United States that it is essential that aggressor nations be
disarmed. I said that if a great Power like the United States publicly declares
that something is essential, the inference is that the Power is going to do some-
thing itself about it. I said it appeared to me more than likely that the isola-
tionisits will insist that this public statement by the President meant that the
United States would go to war in order to disarm not only Germany but even
possibly Japan and theoretically, at [-^7^5] least, even the Soviet Union
if that country should later once more embark upon aggression on its neighbors.
The President replied that the whole intent of point seven, as he saw it,
was to make clear what the objective would be if the war was won and that
be believed people in the United States would take that point of view. He
further said he felt the realism inherent in article seven was one which would
be apparent to the enormous majority of the American people and that they
would enthusiastically support the need, for the disarmament of aggressor
nations.
I said I also had been surprised and somewhat discouraged by a remark that
the President had casually made in our morning's conference — if I had under-
stood him correctly — which was that nothing could be more futile than the recon-
stitution of a body such as the Assembly of the League of Nations. I said to the
President that it seemed to me that if he conceived of the need for a transition
period upim the termination of the war during which period Great Britain and
the United States would undertake the policing of the world, it seemed to me
that it would be enormously desirable for the smaller Powers to have available
to them an Assembly in which they would all be represented and in which they
could make their complaints known and join in l-i'^^fG] recommendations
as to the policy to be pursued by the major Powers who were doing the police
Avork. I said it seemed to me that an organization of that kind would be the
most effective safety valve that could be devised.
The President said that he agreed fully with what I said and that all that he
had intended by the remark he made this morning was to make clear his belief
that a transition period was necessary and that during that transition period no
organizations such as the Council or the Assembly of the League could undertake
the powers and pi-erogatives with which they had been entrusted during the
existence of the League of Nations.
I further said that while from the practical standpoint I was in agreement
that the United States and Great Britain were the only Powers which could or
would exercise the police trusteeship and that it seemed to me that it would be
impossible if such a trusteeship were set up to exclude therefrom the other
American republics or for that matter the countries at present occupied such as
Norway, the Netherlands, and even Belgium. The President said that he felt
that a solution for this ditficulty could probably be found through the ostensible
joining with Great Britain and the United States of those Powers, but it would
have to be recognized that it would be ostensible since none of [-'/6^7] the
nations mentioned would have the practical means of taking any effective or, at
least, considerable part in the task involved.
I said that it seemed to me that now that the text of the joint declaration had
been agreed upon, since I assumed from what Mr. Churchill had told me that
the British Government would support his recommendations with regard thereto,
all that was left to do in the way of drafting was the preparation of the brief
statement which would be issued simultaneously in London and at Washington
announcing that the President and the Prime Minister had met, referring to the
discussions under the Lease-Lend Act and the inclusion at the termination thereof
of the text of the joint declaration. I said that Mr. Churchill had told me that
1792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
he had cabled his Gov^ernment that he was not leaving Argentia until Wednesday
afternoon and said it seemed to me that everything could be definitely agreed
upon and cleared up by 1 : 00 p. m. tomorrow, and I could see no practical reason
for waiting another twenty-four hours. The President agreed and said that he
would try and get a decision reached in that sense when he saw Mr. Churchill
this evening.
SUMNEE WEIXES.
U SW . GAM
[4-74-S] Mr. Gesell. Also, we would like to have just to make the
I'ecord complete, designated Exhibit 8-A, three additional reports re-
ceived from General MacArthur concerning the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. These simply supplement the information already
available but we want to furnish to the committee everytliing w^e have
received. Perhaps, following Senator Brewster's suggestion, these
should be designated 8-A, 8-B, and 8-C.
The Vice Citajrmaist. That is, the 4 December 1945, exhibit S-A;
20 November 15)45, 8-B; and 12 November 1945, 8-C, is that correct'^
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. That is, the 4 December 1945, Exhibit 8-A;
8-B, and 8-C.")
Mr. Gesell. Now, my attention was also called to the fact that w^hile
in the questioning of Admiral Wilkinson, reference was made to the
letters from Admiral Kimmel concerning the transmission of infor-
mation, that I failed to read into the record Admiral Kinnnel's re-
quest for information and the replies that he received, and with the
committee's permission, I would like to get those into the record now.
Some time ago the committee was handed this correspondence
between Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark and we do not feel it
should be offered at this time, since it relates to [4749] the
testimony of those officers when they appear, but I wdll simply read
the pertinent portions relating to this matter of information.
The first is a postscript appearing to a letter of February 18, 1941,
addressed to Admiral Stark by Admiral Kimmel which reads as
follows :
P. S. We receive through radio and othor intelligence rather re.liuble reports
on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite iuformatiou
on the important Japanese trade routes. Can you send us the latest informa-
tion you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic.
I have receaitly been told by an oflicer fresli from Washington that ONI con-
siders it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with
information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Oiwrations considers
the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of
ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt
as to whose responsibility it is to keep tlie Conuuander-in-Cliief fully informed
with pertinent reports on subjects that sliould be of interest to the F.eet, will
you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no mislnderstanding.'
To that letter there is a reply of Admiral Stark's [4'^SO]
dated March 22, 1941, and I will read the jjortion relatiitg to the
postscript I have just read from Admiral Kimmel's letter. [Reading :]
With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and
responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINcUS, Kirk informs
me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately in-
formed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal ele-
ments within the United States. He further says that information concern-
ing the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly
to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more freipiently.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1793
or sent by despatch. As you know, ONI-49 contains a section devoted to Jap-
anese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and
the volume of shipping which moved over each route.
There is then a further memorandum or letter of Admiral Kimmel
dated May 26, 1941, which it is my understanding he delivered to
Admiral Stark with respect to information. That memorandum under
paragraph VII reads as follows :
The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He
is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing
situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change l^'^Sl]
of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is
unable "to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even
sure of what force will he available to him and has little voice in matters radi-
cally affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of infor-
mation is distui'bing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly
contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of
action, so necessary to the conduct of military oi^erations.
It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international
picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge
of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of
timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptilile to marked
improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives,
even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Command-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to con-
form to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific
situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet
must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this train-
ing by [4752] strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending even-
tualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Depart-
ment itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with
regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it
even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by
broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.
It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be inmiediately informed of all important developments
as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.
I am sorry for that long interruption.
The Vice Chairman. That is alright. Does that complete counsel's
request ?
Mr, Gesell. Yes.
[4-7S3] The Vice Chairman. Just as a matter of information, I
notice in addition to the six documents which have already been ad-
mitted for the record under the exhibit numbers given there, is a one-
sheet statement here, "War Plans Division (OP-12)."' Is that to be
included now, or just for the information of the committee?
Mr. Gesell. No, sir; that is in anticipation of the questioning of
Admiral Turner. It relates to the functions of the War Plans Divi-
sion. We can insert it now, but we thought perhaps the members of
the committee wished to see it, for possible use in the examination of
Admiral Wilkinson.
The Vice Chairman. Is that all, Counsel ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON
(Resumed)
The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have any statements that you
desire to make regarding your testimony ?
79716—46 — pt. 4 15
1794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. There are one or two questions, Mr. Chairman,
that were asked me yesterday to which I have, at least, partial infor-
mation.
One was the number of personnel engaged in the radio intelligence
work, including the decrypting, in the fall of 1941. I inquired about
that. Althou^ the best witnesses, of course, are the communications
authorities, the information [4'^54] they gave me was that the
total radio establishment was 700, including about 80 officers. That
embraced the entire world, as far as our radio intelligence activities
were concerned. Of this total nearly two-thirds were engaged in
direction finding or intercept work, or training for that work, and the
remainder, some over one-third of the 700, and including most of the
officers, was engaged in the crypt analysis and translation, which was
the primary question.
The second question was to locate, if practicable, the incident which
I spoke of wherein Lieutenant Commander Okada, the Japanese naval
officer, engaged in espionage on the west coast, and had reported the
precise location of the ships in the Bremerton Navy Yard. That in-
formation I have not found. It is not in the local file, apparently.
We have sent a dispatch to the west coast to find the documents that
were seized there, and I have an intelligence report from Los Angeles
to Tokyo, an intercepted, decrypted, and translated code message,
speaking of the movements of several ships, and included in tliere, that
a 55-destroyer squadron was moved from San Daigo to presumably San
Pedro. The translation is inadequate on the 25 and 2 vessels which
were tied up at the Bethlehem and Los Angeles shipyards and repair
work was begun.
Then there are further notes as to the movement and prospective
movements of other ships.
[4.755] In checking my testimony with respect to the distribu-
tion of the intercepts in the locked pouches, and in the bags, I find
I was in error in my recollection in that the locked pouch was left for
the Chief of Naval Operations and separately for the Secretary of
the Nav}', and a sealed pouch was left at the AVhite House.
I said I thought there was a separate copy there, and one for the
War Plans officer. The copy that came to the Far Eastern Section
and myself was a folder, and I had erroneously thought that was the
same copy that went elsewhere. There were separate copies.
The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas from Illinois will inquire.
Senator Lucas, Admiral Wilkinson, on yesterday you gave to the
conunittee certain information about the location of the various fleets
of potential enemies throughout the world during the month of Novem-
ber and the first week of December, and you advised the committee
that there were many ways in which the Navy could detect these fleets;
first by actual sight by our own merchant shijDs, and second by our own
attaches, or the consuls at the various ])orts.
[4750] Now, let me ask you, insofar as information coming
from the Far East is concerned, from whom did you receive such
information as to the location of the Jap ships during the months
of November and December, 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1795
Admiral Wilkinson. We had reports from the State Department,
the consuls, we had reports from our naval attache in Tokyo, and I
do not know whether he was able to detect anything at that particular
period.
We had several very pertinent reports from our assistant naval
attache at Shanghai, and our observers in the Chinese ports, one or two,
and they also got further reports.
Senator Lucas. Now, are you familiar with the memorandum en-
titled "Japanese Fleet Locations" from November 4 up to December 1,
inclusive'^
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. I should like to have you. Admiral, look at this
document. The document is dated December 1, 1941. I would like
to have you tell the committee what the letters "Op-16-F-2" mean
at the top there?
Admiral Wilkinson. Operation 16 is the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, and F-2 is the Far Eastern Section. That is the office that
originated the paper. Captain McCullom's office.
Senator Lucas. That memorandum purports to advise [4757^
Naval Intelligence in Washington as to the Japanese Fleet locations
as of December 1, 1941 ; is that correct ?
Admiral Wilkinson. To the best of the knowledge that we could
deduct and infer, and actually have from our various stations, they
were not only the sightings, but also radio intelligence analyses, the
traffic analyses of ship calls, and so on, conducted primarily at Hono-
lulu and Corregidor, and adjusted between the two.
On November 24, we had sent out a message saying we would not
expect many more sightings in the open seas because of the ocean
traffic falling off, and in consequence w« would be more and more
reliant on the radio intelligence, and would Com 14, which was
Honolulu, and Com 16, which was Corregidor, please make complete
analyses of everything that came, and Com 16 would be the record
coordinator, because they had more intercepts and larger scouting
work.
Senator Lucas. This is the last account received from the Far
East in answer to that query?
Admiral Wilkinson. It is the result of what they had had, and
what we could pick from our other reports as well, although we had
instructed our naval attaches and observers to send reports also to
the commander in chief, Asiatic, and commander in chief, Pearl
Harbor, so those fellows, in addition to ours, had the benefit of the
naval attaches [4738] and observers report. All three officers
had the same sources.
Senator Lucas. In answer to the query you also received from
Hawaii their best judgment as to the Japanese Fleet location at that
particular time?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; and all three officers were aware
even before the printing of the data which went into the preparation
of this paper.
Senator Lucas. I presume you have made an examination of both
of these reports, one received from the Far East and one received
from Hawaii at that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not quite understand you.
1796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Lucas. I presume you have examined, I presume you
did examine at the time, the memorandum that came from the Far
East as well as the memorandum that came from Hawaii, with respect
to the fleet locations of the Japs?
Admiral Wilkinson. I understand, sir. There was not a specific
memorandum as such. There were a series of messages indicating
factual data, and tliey were compiled in the Far Eastern Section.
I myself did not examine the memorandum coming it.
Senator Lucas. Who did examine it?
Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McCollum's section, and I think
Lieutenant Commander Watts.
[4759'] Senator Lucas. Were they under your direct super-
vision ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. It was the duty of those two officers to examine these
memoranda as they came in, and give to you their evaluation, or their
best judgment, as to what they meant?
Admiral Wilkinson. To prepare this paper which we have before
us, which was not only for me, but after I approved it, was for the
benefit of all officers who received it.
Senator Lucas. It is my understanding that the report that came
from the Hawaiian-Department indicated definitely that they had lost
the fleet completely as of December 1, 1941, that is the fleet that finally
struck the Hawaiian Islands, they reported that they knew nothing
about that fleet from their own intelligence work that they were doing
at that time : is that correct?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it specifically, but I think it is
not quite correct, because all of us had lost it.
[4760] Senator Lucas.- That is the point I wanted to make, in-
sofar as the memorandum from the Far East is concerned. You will
notice on the first page it states definitely that the battleship Hiyei was
located near Sasebo, and the battleship Kit'ishima was located near
Kure.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Then on the next page, insofar as the carrier fleet
is concerned, you find that the Akagi was located near Kyushu, and
the Kaga near Kyushu, the Sori/u near Kure, the Hiryu near Kure, the
Ryu'jo near Kure, the Zuiknku near Kure and the Shogagu near Kure.
It is my understanding that those two battleships and those vessels in
the carrier fleet that I have just mentioned, were in the Pacific force
that attacked Hawaii on December 7, 1941.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. I am just wondering whether or not that was ever
called to your attention as being in direct conflict with the report that
was made from Hawaii ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It is obviously an error. That was the last
indication we had gotten on those ships. We had reported in other
papers, as I recall, and certainly in conversations to the recipients of
this memorandum that some battleshi))s and a number of carriers were
unlocated and were believed to be in home waters. Home waters, of
course, is an [4761] indefinite term, signifying waters near the^
Japanese coast.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1797
Senator Lucas. Now how would the Intelligence Officer of the Far
Eastern Division locate, for instance, the battleship Hiyei as being near
Sasebo ? How would he get that information ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Possibly from radio direction finding on a ship
which was sending out a radio message and which was identified, cor-
rectly or wrongly, as that particular battleship ; possibly from the fact
that the radio station at Sasebo was issuing messages apparently di-
rected to that ship and hence she would be in the vicinity of Sasebo to
receive those messages.
I am not sure of the other features of radio intelligence, because
that is outside my scope, but that is my general naval knowledge as to
how one would detect it.
Senator Lucas. Obviously, though, the battleship we are talking
about was not near Sasebo at that time.
Admiral Wilkinson. Quite right, sir.
Senator Lucas. And the point occurred to me as to how an intelli-
gence officer could be mistaken about two battleships and a number
of carriers in the carrier fleet.
Admiral Wilkinson. They had not been located recently, sir. The
statement should have been more correctly made, "Unlocat^d" instead
of which the statement was apparently [4-762] made as of the
last location in which they had been found and where, pending evi-
dence to the contrary, they were still presumed to be.
Senator Lucas. Which report did the Navy follow, if you remember,
with respect to the Japanese Fleet being lost ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not quite understand, sir.
Senator Lucas. Which report did the Naval Intelligence in Wash-
ington follow with respect to these ships being lost or being located ?
One report says they were located and another report says they were
lost.
Admiral Wilkinson. We followed the report that we were not at
the moment able to locate them, sir.
Senator Lucas. In other words, you did not give any consideration
to the Far Eastern report then ?
Admiral Wilkinson. We should have checked it and corrected it,
but we checked that by our knowledge of unlocated ships. The two
are obviously in conflict.
Senator Lucas. Obviously if these two battleships and this great
group of ships in the carrier fleet were near Kure on December 1, it
would be rather difficult for them to get to Hawaii by December 7.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. I was just wondering whether that was not taken
into consideration by those here in the Naval Intelligence [4763]
Department, insofar as we assumed there was a failure of a proper
warning at the time in Hawaii.
Admiral Wilkinson. There might have been, sir ; but I do not think
so, because the recipients of this material who, you will note, on the
last page were the Chief of Naval Operations OP-12, which was the
War Plans, OP-38-W, which was the so-called War Room where the
tracks of ships were maintained, and all of them were aware that cer-
tain ships had not been located. So that this report erroneously enter-
ing the last location where they had been found rather than their
present location I do not think was deceptive to the Navy Department,
1798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
nor did it go out as such anywhere excepting those officers that I men-
tioned, as shown on page 4.
It is true, of course, that this data from which this was compiled
was also available at Manila and at Pearl Harbor, and the wrong
inferences might have been drawn there as to the location of these
ships, even though this paper itself did not go there, but I think that
all hands were aware that certain ships had not been located, because
we have had statements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer that he
knew that they were not located, and I believe the same thing is true
in Manila.
Senator Lucas. Do I understand from your last statement that the
memorandum of Japanese fleet locations that came [4'^64.] from
the Far East was also available to the Hawaiian Department on De-
cember 1, 1941 ?
Admiral WiLKiNSOisr. No, sir. This memorandum was furnished
only to those recipients that are listed on page 4, the Chief of Naval
Operations, Director of Naval Intelligence, Chief of War Plans Divi-
sion, the Chief of the office where the tracking of the fleet was carried
on, and the head of the Foreign Branch of the Office of Naval Intel-
ligence. The data, however, from which this was compiled was avail-
able in both Manila and in Pearl Harbor. It was possible that errone-
ous deductions might have been made from it, but I do not believe
such to be the case, since we have evidence indicating that it was known
that those ships were unlocated at both those stations.
[4'^65] Senator Lucas. Well, the Hawaiian Department def-
initely informed the Intelligence Department here in Washington,
D. C, that they had completely lost the Japanese fleet at that particular
time and gave no report to your department such as was found in
the Far Eastern report of December 1, with respect to these particular
battleships and carriers, the ships in the carrier fleet that I have
pointed out?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, they made no such report. This is,
I think, erroneous. This is obviously erroneous. I think it was com-
piled from the last locations at which they had been sighted, and
they were by no means certain that they were still there, but that was
the last one they had.
Senator Lucas. Was the Japanese fleet ever lost for a period of three
weeks before, insofar as the Intelligence Department of the Navy was
concerned ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure that the entire Jap fleet had
been. I am not sure of any particular large force, but I know that
it was impossible to keep track of all the ships and all the forces in
any fleet continuously.
I think it probable that large elements were lost from time to time
and subsequently recovered in harmless positions. This time it was
in a harmful position when it was {4766^ found.
Senator Lucas. Do you remember ever losing track of a task force
of the size that struck Pearl Harbor at any time previous to Decem-
ber 1 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would not know of my own recollection, and
I do not recall having been so told.
Senator Lucas. Was there any reason why this task force should go
into hiding if it was going into the China Sea and was on its way to
Singapore, we will say, or the Australian section ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1799
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; every nation is always desirous of con-
cealing its full plans, and although it was obvious that some strength
was going down to the south China Sea, there would be good reasons to
hide the iact that their main strength was going there.
Again, they might have been proceeding into the Marshalls, for an
attack on New Guinea or on Borneo. They might have been working
down to the Marshalls for an attack toward Samoa. It would be
desirous of concealing the movements of its main strength forces
wherever they were.
Senator Lucas. The only real reason for the concealing of their
force was the United States battleships and the fleet at Pearl Harbor ;
isn't that true?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say no; no, sir. They [4767]
would not want the British at Singapore to know. They would not
want the American planes in the Philippines to be ready to attack in
case there should be a breach. I think they would not want to disclose
their plans no matter where they were.
Senator Lucas. Well, they had not been very secretive about their
movements up to the last three or four weeks before Pearl Harbor, had
they ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think they were usually pretty secretive, sir.
They would start out, as I recall, for maneuvers, and, just as we did,
go into radio silence, and they had sent a lot of amphibious vessels and
cargo vessels down to the south China Sea, which, since they were
loaded in China, could not be hidden, but the movement of their com-
batant vessels had been pretty carefully screened.
Senator Lucas. England did not have much of a fleet around Singa-
pore at that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, not much. She had several ships on the
way. I think it was the 5th or 6th of December that the Repulse and
the Prince of Wales, that was subsequently ill-fated, that they arrived
in Singapore, and, of course, they were on the way.
Senator Lucas. Admiral, passing from that subject
Mr. Gesell. Senator, may I interpose?
[4768] Senator Lucas. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. I have not offered these fleet location summaries as an
exhibit, and in view of your questioning I think perhaps we should
designate this entire folder as an exhibit, which would be exhibit 85,
so that it will be easier to follow the examination.
Senator Lucas. All right.
The Vice Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 85.")
Senator Lucas. Admiral, on yesterday you were discussing with
counsel and members of the committee the conversations that you had
on the morning of December 7, 1941, when you received the l-lth part
of the message, 13 of which were sent on December 6. You stated you
immediately went to Admiral Stark. You also stated that as you
construed the mesage :
* * * They were fighting words. I was more impressed by that language
than with the breaking off of negotiations which, of itself, might be only tempo-
rary. Those would be hard words to eat. The breaking off of negotiations
could be resumed.
There seems to be some conflict in the testimony, according to coun-
sel, as to when this message was delivered [4-769'] to Admiral
1800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Stark, but according to your testimony, to the best of your recollection,
it was somewhere around 9 : 15 to 9 : 30?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Now, did you tell Admiral Stark at the time, that
you believed that a proper construction of that message was more than
the breaking off of negotiations and that they were really fighting
words in your opinion ? Do you recall that ?
Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is that I told him that that
was a very strong final part to that message and that I thought that
they were going to press on in the direction of the advance which
they were then following in the South Sea and that something might
be expected in that or other directions, but I think particularly I said
that, and I thought the fleet should be advised of the latest develop-
ment in the nature of this strong language.
Senator Lucas. And what was his reply, if you recall?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think he agreed with me at the time, sir, and
my recollection is that I said he made an effort to reach General
Marshall, or said that he would make such an effort.
Senator Lucas. Did you have any further conversation with him,
with respect to sending a message to Hawaii, to [4-770] the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet there ?
Admiral Wilkinson. When I said the fleet, I meant the Pacific
Fleet. No further conversation.
Senator Lucas. No further conversation ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Lucas. But he did not send a message immediately after
that conversation ?
Admiral Wilkinson. So I understand. He did not while I was
there, the few minutes I was there.
Senator Lucas. He had the authority so to do, as Chief of Naval
Operations ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. If he had seen fit to do so ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. The message that was sent, as I recall, was around
11 :30 that morning?
Admiral Wilkinson. So I understand.
Senator Lucas. So there was at least an hour and a half difference
between the time the message could have been sent by Admiral Stark,
and the time that one was actually sent to the War Department ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Senator Lucas. Now, you have been to Hawaii, Admiral ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I have been where ?
[4771'\ Senator Lucas. I say, you have served in Hawaii with
the Fleet in the Pacific, as I understand it.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Do you know how many ships were in Pearl Harbor
on the morning of December 7th ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not of my own knowledge.
Senator Lucas. Well, from what you have read, and what you know
about the situation, do you know the number that were in there?
It is not so material.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1801
Admiral Wilkinson. I couldn't say. My recollection is about six
battleships, six cruisers, and a dozen destroyers, but there may have
been more.
Senator Lucas. I was wondering how many battleships and how
many destroyers could leave the harbor say in an hour and a half ?
Admiral Wilkinson. The usual time of sortie, as I recall, was 10
minutes for a major ship. In other words, one battleship or cruiser
per 10 minutes. They would be able to put out one destroyer in
between each of the larger ships. If they were pressed, they might be
able to get two destroyers between each of the larger ships, but it would
not be very desirable as there would be some danger of collision.
[4-772] Senator Lucas. They would be pressed on the morning
of December 7, if the message had gone ?
Admiral Wilkinson. They undoubtedly would have made every
effort, but if they tried to put too many ships out, they might have
had a collision with the result of the blocking of everyone which
would be another story.
Senator Lucas. Of course, any ship that got out of the harbor
would be better able to protect itself?
Admiral Wilkinson. It would have been able to maneuver to avoid
the bombs or the torpedoes and would have been probably able to man
the guns with the entire ship's company immediately, but little sooner,
in fact, than they did in port, because the call to general quarters that
all battle stations be manned was carried out immediately on every ship,
I understand.
Senator Lucas. I think that is correct, Admiral.
Now, Admiral, how long did you serve in the Navy Intelligence
after December 6, 1941 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. After December 6?
Senator Lucas. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. Seven months.
Senator Lucas. From there, where did you go, sir?
Admiral Wilkinson. I went to command of battleship division 2
in the Pacific for 5 months, and then to [4773] the South Pacific
as deputy commander of the South Pacific under Admiral Halsey. A
vacancy occurred some 6 months later in the Amphibious Forces of the
South Pacific, and I was made the amphibious commander of the
Third Amphibious Force, and remained such.
Senator Lucas. In what sea battles did you participate ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know that I participated in any sea
battles, as such.
I ran the amphibious campaign in the South Pacific for a year, and
then I was in command of the operations against Palau and Yap.
Yap was substituted for Leyte. I went in command of one of the two
amphibious forces at Leyte, and then again in command of one of the
two amphibfous forces at Lingayen and again at the landing on Luzon.
In the South Pacific campaign I had perhaps a dozen landings.
[4^774] Senator Lucas. Let me ask you. Admiral, as a matter of
curiosity, what class did you graduate from at Annapolis?
Admiral Wilkinson. 1909.
Senator Lucas. And what State are you from ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Louisiana.
Senator Lucas. That is all.
1802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Wilkinson, I have a few questions.
I notice from a study of the messages forwarded by the Navy and
received by the Navy, that apparently notice had come into Washing-
ton that the Japanese had ordered the various offices throughout the
world to destroy their code, but I see no notice whatever from Tokyo
to Hawaii to destroy the code there.
Do you know whether or not there was any such message ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I presume there was, sir. I don't recall the
message proper, but I know the Hawaiian consul burned his code I
think the day before the attack.
Mr. Murphy. There have been questions asked here of witnesses and
some witnesses have concluded that when word comes about destroying
a code that that is a very strong indication of war, and I notice in the
messages here word from Admiral Kimmel on December 6, 1941, that
the local consul [4-775] at Hawaii had commenced destroying
his code or was in the actual process of doing so.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. In Navy parlance, what is the significance of that,
from the standpoint of expectation of war or trouble ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Well, obviously any nation is desirous of pro-
tecting its code. Ordinarily, through international courtesy, diplo-
matic missions and consular missions are proof against search and
seizure, and any action of that sort would be a grave international
offense.
Now, if any country feared that relations would become so strained
with another that the other country would incur the risk of an inter-
national offense and would invade the diplomatic mission and seize the
codes it would be obviously best to burn them up first.
The significance, in other words, is that they thought relations were
going to be pretty tricky and sensitive, even though there might not
be actual war.
Mr. Murphy. I notice in Exhibit 37 at page 40 there is a message
from Washington to Pacific commanders in which the following is
contained :
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instruc-
tions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong,
Singapore [4776] Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy
most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential
and secret documents period
Now, Hawaii is not contained in that message, is it ? That is exhibit
37.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Apparently a separate dispatch was
sent to Hawaii, which we did not have at hand at that time,
Mr. Murphy. Then I notice on page 41 there is a message as
follows :
"Circular 2444 from Tokyo 1 December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore,
and Manila to destroy machine period Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo
period December second Washington also directed destroy all but one copy of
other systems and all secret documents period British Admiralty London today
reports Embassy London lias complied period"
Still no message to Hawaii.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, none apparently.
Mr. Murphy. Apparently.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1803
Then I notice on page 42 a discussion of some points throughout the
world from the United States to Tokyo, Bankok, Peiping, Shanghai,
telling our. agents there to destroy their machines and codes, but no
message to Hawaii.
[4777] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think, as I recall, I
initiated that message.
Mr. Murphy. I notice on page 43 a message to Peiping and Tientsin.
Admiral Wilkinson. Those were to the marine detachments there.
Mr. Murphy. No message to Hawaii.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Both of those last two were our
messages out to exposed positions to destroy their codes and obviously
Hawaii was not in danger of capture.
Mr. Murphy. You felt Hawaii was fairly safe at that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly not subject to capture.
Mr. Murphy. Right.
Now, then I notice
Admiral Wilkinson. Without sufficient notice to destroy the codes.
Mr. Murphy. Right.
I notice on page 44 notice being sent to Guam.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Guam was exposed and they were
told to destroy everything except what they needed urgently and be
ready to destroy that.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, going to page 46, down to page 46, there
is no intercept whatsoever obtained, apparently, by our forces, which
would indicate that the Japanese had told [4778] Hawaii to
destroy its code or ciphers ; isn't that right ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir,
Mr. Murphy. Then the message that we do get on December 6th
comes from Admiral Kimmel himself.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, it comes from Admiral Bloch. Informa-
tion derived from our district intelligence official and his contacts
through Japanese personnel, indicate that he was informed by under-
ground channels that the Consul was burning his stuff.
Mr. Murphy. In that case there would be no need of Washington
telling Hawaii because Washington is telling Hawaii about the
incident ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. '
Mr. Murphy. Now, in the Pearl Harbor story as contained in the
United States News of September 1, 1945 at page 34 I see a statement
under the heading of :
The Navy account of the Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor.
Sources of information are Japanese.
The statement is as follows :
The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at Tankan Bay was about
November 22nd and they awaited word to act before the force moved out on the
27-28 of November, 1941.
Where is Tankan Bay ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It is on one of the islands of the [4779]
southern Kuriles just north of Hokkaiddo.
Mr. Murphy. That is not connected with the Gulf of Tonkins, it is
an entirely separate place ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. The Gulf of Tonkin is in the South
China Sea.
1804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. In no way connected.
Mr. Murphy. Tankan Bay is up in the Kuriles ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; southern Kuriles.
Mr. Murphy. Are you familiar with the testimony of Admiral
Inglis ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Only roughly.
Mr. Murphy. Well, the place he testified the fleet left from was
the southern part of the Kuriles.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; southern Kuriles.
Mr. Gesell. Etorofu Jima.
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
Where would that be in connection with Tankan Bay?
Admiral Wilkinson. Tankan Bay is a bay on the Island of Etorofu
Jima. Jima means island.
Mr. Murphy. Would you have any special knowledge as to the
conflict which apparently existed between the Navy and the Army
officials at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7 as to whether or not there
was a Jap force in the Marshalls?
[4780] Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know that there was a con-
flict, sir. I know that from radio intelligence, which at the best is
analytical and scientific guessing, that the Pearl Harbor Kadio Intelli-
gence Center thought that there was a large force in the Marshalls
and the Corregidor unit could not confirm that. I understand later
that there was a force there of reasonable size.
[4781] Mr. Murphy. I think "conflict" is the wrong word.
There was some difference of opinion between the Naval Intelligence
and the Army, as I understand it, as to whether there was a force there
and as to the size of it.
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall a difference of op)inion between
the Army and the Navy, All I recall is a difference between the radio
intelligence center of the Navy at Corregidor and at Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Murphy. That may be.
Admiral Wilkinson. I know there was an airplane reconnaissance
ordered to go over the Marshalls to try to photograph the situation,
but I do not believe it was ever carried out.
Mr. Murphy. You say j^ou learned about the message of the 27th
from Washington to Pearl Harbor either hours or days afterward.
Did you ever see a reply from Admiral Kimmel to that message ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Was that unusual ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I wouldn't know, sir ; and if there had been a
reply there was no reason that I should assuredly have seen it.
Mr. Murphy. Was it usual naval practice in a case of [4782]
that kind ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not unless requested to report at once. Often,
in an important message, the word "acknowledge" is added. I forget
whether it was on that one or not. And that is simply an indication
that you have received and understand it.
Mr. Murphy. In the message of November 27 some of the language
is as follows :
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.
That would be the first part of it.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COmImITTEE 1805
Mr. Mtjrphy (reading) :
* * * an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.
The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval
task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against eitlier the Pliilippines,
Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive
deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPLr46X.
' Now, at this point, an appropriate defensive deployment, what
would that be in regard to the fleet generally ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Speaking purely as a naval officer and with-
out connection with this plan, it would be to make such disposition of
his air forces and his submarines and [47S^] his surface ves-
sels, as he would consider necessary in carrying out the tasks assigned
in War Plan 46. I do not recall whether that was the so-called Rain-
bow Plan or not. I suppose it was Rainbow-5.
Mr. Murphy. I think it was, but it would mean necessarily a change
in the status quo until you were prepared to meet that situation,
wouldn't it?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not familiar with the status quo. It
would require him at least to review his present situation and see
whether it was consistent with the war plans. He might find it was
consistent, or he might find that changes were necsesary.
Mr. Murphy. After that, I find the following :
Inform district and Army authorities.
Admiral Wilkinson. That is Admiral Bloch and General Short.
Mr. Murphy. That would mean that he discussed this message,
wouldn't it, with Admiral Bloch and General Short ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. If not discussed, at least informed
them of the message.
Mr. Murphy. Of the fact that he received it ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. "A similar warning is being sent by War Department.
SPENAVO inform British. Continental districts [4784-]
Guam Samoa directed take apropriate measures against sabotage."
Now, you say you know of no reply from either Admiral Block or
Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall any, no sir. As I say, there may
have been a reply which I never saw.
Mr. Murphy. Did you feel particularly concerned about sabotage
at Hawaii? Would you consider it one of the major problems out
there?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I thing so. We had a very large Jap
population, and we knew from our intelligence reports that there were
a number of very strongly partiotic Japanese there as well as the
general run of Japanese of whom we could not be certain.
Subsequently, a large majority of them were found to be very loyal,
and an excellent regiment came from there, as I understand. Our
suspect records showed from 300 to 500 Japanese that we regarded as
definitely dangerous, and 500 as potentially dangerous.
Then we knew that there were a number of consular agents in the
employ of the Japanese Government.
Mr. Murphy. Did you think that the situation at Hawaii was such
that the efforts of the authorities there should be concentrated on
sabotage to the neglect of [4785] avoiding the danger from air
attack and from submarine attack ?
1806 congressional'investigation pearl harbor attack
Admiral Wilkinson. My judgment would be that nothing should
be neglected, that sabotage should be guarded against, but should
not beguarded against as the sole objective, although it was the most
immediately probable one.
The potential forces were actually present for that.
Mr. Murphy. I have one last question, Admiral.
Did you ever, within a year prior to December 7, 1941, ever hear
anyone in the Navy say that the fleet was insecure at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. That the fleet was what ?
Mr. Murphy. That the fleet was insecure at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Wilkinson. I was there until May. I saw some of the
maneuvers.^ I myself was not convinced that the antiaircraft defenses
provided on the islands would stop a large raid. I was not con-
vinced that they would be adequate. I think there was always the
possibility in all of our minds that an attack could be made. I do
not know that we could say definitely the fleet was insecure, but that
a full and adequate protection, which would, of course, be difficult to
achieve to 100 percent was not available to the extent that we would
like, either in air [47861 craft to defend the place by counter-
attack against air or antiaircraft guns.
Mr. Murphy. Would the fleet have been more secure at Lahaina
Roads than it was in the harbor itself ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I would say less secure.
Mr. Murphy. If the fleet had been taken out of the harbor and
taken to Lahaina Roads, and we had the same experience in the
amount of damage that we had at Pearl Harbor, we would have had
more ships at the bottom of the ocean, wouldn't we?
Admiral Wilkinson. We would have had that and also we would
have the exposure to submarine attacks. Pearl Harbor was fairly
secure against submarines. Quite secure, in fact.
Mr. Murphy. We would have had the same danger from air attack
and less danger from submarine attack by being in the harbor as com-
pared to Lahaina Roads ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say so. The only advantage of
Lahaina Roads would be that the ships could get under way and
stand out together, whereas they had to do so separately in Pearl
Harbor.
On the other hand there would be more exposure to submarines and
less protection from antiaircraft guns.
Mr. MuPtPHY. Assuming that the Japanese had been able [^7^7]
to have the same number of carriers and other equipment, the same
number of planes, and that the Fleet were at Puget Sound or at San
Pedro, and the Japs succeeded in making a sneak attack, would the
fleet have been any more secure at either of those places than it was
at Pearl Harbor, assuming a sneak attack?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say rather less so. I don't think the
antiaircraft protection, assuming it was in action, was as complete
at either of those places.
Of course, the Japanese fleet would have further to go to get there,
and at Long Beach the ships would have moved out more readily.
Puget Sound, certainly, in Bremerton, they could not.
Mr. MuRPiiY. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster of Maine will inquire.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1807
Senator Brewster. Admiral, how long had Admiral Kirk been in
the Intelligence Division before you came in, do you recall ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Admiral Kirk?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. I think from March 1 to October 15, of 1941.
Senator Brewster. He was just there for practically [^75<S]
6 months ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Who was there before him ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Admiral Anderson had been there and left
about the first of January. Captain James, the former assistant di-
rector was acting director for 2 months.
Senator Brewster. How long was Admiral Anderson there ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think about 2 years.
Senator Brewster. Had there been any established tour of duty
in that position ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically. Usually officers on a shore
duty tour will remain in fixed positions from 2 to 3 years. Captain
Kirk went to sea before the expiration of his tour in order to obtain
an opportunity for a command which was open at the time, and I did
not remain similarly. It was wartime, and I had a very promising
job.
[4.789] Senator Brewster. You much preferred to get to sea?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think that is what most of us
would like to do.
Senator Brewster. Officers do not welcome shore duty ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Well, I think we are interested in them, but
we like to practice our profession at sea.
The Vice Chairman. Would you mind a word, there. Senator? I
believe while the Senator had to be away General Marshall testified
that everybody in the War Department wanted to get assigned to duty
with troops. So I imagine that applied to the Navy, too.
Senator Brewster. I can quite understand that.
Admiral, could you give your estimate of the importance of Naval
Intelligence as a function of the Navy ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think it is quite important, sir.
Senator Brewster. I think so, too. I think that all events have
demonstrated it. And what impresses one is the change here in this
most critical period in our history. Men remained for less than a year
and had had, as I understand it, no previous experience in this field.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Senator Brewster. Do you know whether any steps had been taken
to see that more trained personnel in the higher echelons were made
available in this field ?
^ [4790] Admiral Wilkinson. Usually, Senator, officers with con-
siderable previous experience in intelligence were placed there.
Senator Brewster. But that was not true.
Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot account for my having been ap-
pointed to it, although I was pleased at the appointment, despite the
fact that it took me from my battleship, because I considered it a re-
sponsible position, and felt complimented to be chosen for it.
But in general the officers who have been there have had duty abroad
and in intelligence work. Captain Kirk had been naval attache in
1808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
London, and Admiral Anderson in London and I think somewhere
else. And other officers in that position have normally had experi-
ence under that office before they became the head of it.
Senator Brewster. But you welcomed the release from those duties
yourself, as you have indicated, in your transfer back to your battle-
ship assignment.
Admiral Wilkinson. I was interested in both jobs, sir. I was
very much interested in the work but I wanted to have a command
at sea.
Senator Brewster. Do you know what became of Captain
Zacharias ?
Admiral Wilkinson. He is — I saw him in Washington a [4'^91'\
few days ago.
Senator Brewster. I mean at that time, where was he?
Admiral Wilkinson. He was in command of a cruiser, I think, in
the Pacific.
Senator Brewster. He had had rather extensive experience in ap-
praising Japanese psychology, did he not?
Admiral Wilkinson. I understand Admiral Kirk made every ef-
fort to get him back into Xaval Intelligence after Admiral King
came to Washington, and he was shortly so ordered.
Senator Brewster. Yes. Had he been at one time Chief of Naval
Intelligence ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Brewster. Never had been?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. He had been on duty in the office,
however.
Senator Brewster. He spent a great deal of time studying the
Japanese situation and was a Japanese language student of rather
extraordinary attainment?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure but I think he had been a lan-
guage student and became naval attache.
Senator Brewster. And he was used for the Japanese language
broadcasts as a result of his familiarity with the language?
Admiral Wilkinson. I understand quite effectively.
[479£] Senator Brewster. Now, in the situation at Honolulu
there was a great deal of construction work going on during 1940
to 1941, was there not, in the Pearl Harbor base?
Admiral Wilkinson. Quite a little, sir. The navy yard, building
of drydocks, and building of quarters.
Senator Brewster. So there were a good many thousands of civil-
ian employees in the Pearl Harbor base day by day, were there not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. And who was responsible for screening them
to determine as to their reliability ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure of the precise direct responsi-
bility. The commandant of the navy yard and his industrial manager
were interested. Our Naval Intelligence, the district of Capttiyin
Mayfield, in conjunction with the FBI, were very much interested.
And, I fancy, it was those two that were consulted or who checked
on the employment of civilian employees.
[4'^9S] Senator Brrwster. I would rather not have your fancy,
but I would rather have what you know as to who was responsible
and what steps were taken, if any.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1809
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. I do know that the FBI
and tlie District Intelligence officer were screening everyone out there.
Senator Brewster. But you do not know who was specifically re-
sponsible in the naval establishment or the FBI for that screening?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Brewster. I speak of this from personal experience in
visiting there in December 1940 when I was impressed and somewhat
amazed at the thousands of Orientals circulating there, particularly
in the Pearl Harbor naval base, at which time I asked the contractors
what they knew about these people and they said, "Nothing, except
that they were supposed to be American citizens."
It was obvious that unless they had a very considerable staff that
it would be difficult to know about this considerable number of people
who had complete access to all the Pearl Harbor facilities so far as
my observation was concerned. You were serving there during some
of that period ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I was serving there on ships. I was not de-
tached to shore. It is my recollection that no [4^54] em-
ployees of Japanese blood were out there in the latter days prior to the
attack, were allowed to be employed. I think, however, Chinese were.
Senator Brewster. Well, at what time, if you know, was the ban on
people of Japanese extraction imposed ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know.- I would recollect it was 6
months to a year prior to the attack.
Senator Brewster. Well, you were not there, were you, after May
of 1941?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Brewster. And would not know whether or not it was in
effect then ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think it was in effect before May.
Senator Brewster. Will you verify that in the records if possible ?
Admiral Wilkinson. If I can, sir.
Senator Brewster. And I would like also to have this information
about who was responsible for that screening.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Now, when did you first see the report of Gen-
eral Martin regarding the air defenses of Hawaii, and which I think
was concurred in by Admiral Bellinger, that was issued under date
of August 20, 1941?
Admiral Wilkinson. Very recently.
[4.795] Senator Brewster. You never saw that while you were
Chief of Naval Intelligence?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Brewster. Wasn't that rather unusual that it did not come
to your attention ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. As I said, the activities relating to
our own war plans and our own movements of forces and preparations
were not under my division and they were not brought to my atten-
tion. There was a good deal of insistence in the department upon the
value of security and the knowledge of war plans was closely held
and there was no necessity, it was felt, and I agreed, that my division
in a large number of people or in a small number should laiow, and I
was sometimes told in conversation, but there was no system set up
whereby any documents were sent to my office or even to myself.
79716 — 46— pt. 4 16
1810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. Well, in a correlation of naval intelligence as
to a possible attack wouldn't it be rather essential that there should be
pretty complete collaboration between your agency of Naval Intelli-
gence and the other preparations for defense ?
Admiral Wilkinsox. There would be a desirability that we should
know what they were doing or planning to do but the balance between
the possible loss of security by extending _ [^796] the knowledge
as against the necessity of our knowing, was inclined toward not telling
us.
You recall Admiral King's favorite maxim that "only those who
need to know," and while it would have been desirable, I cannot say
that it was necessary.
Senator Brewster. Well, the most valuable possession which we had
in the Pacific was the fleet, was it not ? You perhaps agree with that
as a naval officer.
Admiral Wilkinsois^. Yes, sir ; because it was not static.
Senator Brewster. Yes. Because the military establishments were
primarily for the purpose of defense of the fleet based in the port for
security. That is what we got Pearl Harbor for, as a naval defense.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. And the defense of Pearl Harbor, it has already
been pointed out, was in order to make it possible for the fleet effec-
tively to function in that vast ocean, was it not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say certainly 75 to 90 percent of its
purpose was that, but it was also, of course, a defensive feature for
our own territory. It belonged to us and we would naturally defend it.
Senator Brewster. You knew, in the latter part of November and
early December, as Chief of Naval Intelligence, that [4'^97'] you
had lost contact with important elements of the Japanese fleet?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. And yet you had no knowledge as to what steps
were being taken by your reconnaissance in the vicinity of this fleet,
of the American fleet, to see that these carriers might not be approach-
ing for a strike ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Well, doesn't that impress — it impresses, per-
haps I should say, a layman, as a lack of correlation that, here, you
as Navy Intelligence, knew you had lost some Jap carriers and yet
you had no knowledge as to whether other parts of our services, mili-
tary or naval, were taking necessary steps to see that our fleet was not
exposed to a sneak attack.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. We would have received the infor-
mation of any discoveries made by searches from any of our operating
forces but we were not told of the searches wliich of themselves were
made. In other words, we did not knoAv whether a search was being
made from Midway or Johnston or Hawaii, but we would have received
information of any discoveries that such searches had made.
Senator Brewster. And in your function to protect the security of
this fleet it was not within your function or scope [479S] to
recommend to anyone that it might be wise to carry out aerial recon-
naissance to protect the fleet ?
Admiral Wilkinson. My function was to utilize the material which
was received. I should have desired to have received more material
and I might well have been well advised to urge actual operations to
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1811
secure the information although, as a matter of fact, those operations
would not be within my province to order, but I might well have urged
their being made.
Senator Brewster. That is, you could have
Admiral Wilkinson. It was not my function, however, to do so but
I might well have done it.
Senator Breavster. Yes. You could have volunteered the sug-
gestion but it was not a part of your responsibility or function ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Do you know whether as a result of this experi-
ence any steps have been taken to change that system of functioning, as
to w^hether or not Naval Intelligence today would recognize that as
part of its responsibility ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not believe they have, sir. I do not know
that siDecifically, I do not know that.
Senator Brewster. Wouldn't Pearl Harbor argue rather persua-
sively that it might be a good idea and that when they [47991
lose track of an enemy fleet that it might be well to be sure that our fleet
was not going to be approached without warning so far as the aerial
reconnaissance might disclose?
Admiral Wilkinson. Surely, yes, sir ; but you see there is a distinc-
tion between the operations of the forces in the field, that is to say, the
fleets, and the operations of the officers in Washington. Now, the fleet
collects and is normally responsible for wdiat we term combat intelli-
gence ; that is to say, sending out a scouting line or sending out a recon-
naissance fleet of planes. They collect that information and that is
sent to Washington.
Senator Brewster. Let me interrupt you. Would that be true in
time of peace ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think that would be true in time of peace,
yes.
Senator Brewster. Thank you.
Admiral Wilkinson. And the fleet collects the combat information,
or in the absence of combat, the operational intelligence we might call
it, and the office at home would not prescribe to the fleet the precise
measures to be taken to get that. I think we have sent, not the intelli-
gence of itself, but operations on the recommendations of intelligence
have sent information out saying, "Please find out what you can about
such a thing," and, in fact, you will recall that operations [4800]
told Admiral Hart to please send the scouting fleets over the South
China Sea for several days to give us the information.
Now, that is the operational intelligence which is conducted by
the forces in the fleet and might be initiated by them or might be
initiated by the operational side rather than the intelligence side of
the department proper. In that particular instance of the force of
planes over the South China Sea, I do not believe I made such a
recommendation but I would have been prepared to join in it. I
think Admiral Turner probably initiated that.
Senator Brewster. Well, then, as I gather, that would be the
responsibility of someone higher up in correlating your reports as
to the missing fleet and the protection of our fleet, to see to it that
these operational surveys were carried out?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say so, yes, sir, except that I might
say, of course, at any time I was free to recommend.
1812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. Yes. Now, what about the submarine that it
has been alleged circulated in Pearl Harbor in the early morning
before the attack? What knowledge have you regarding that?
Admiral Wilkinson. None before the attack. I have the informa-
tion afterward.
[48OI] Senator Brewster. I am not asking you before. I am
asking you now. What is your information as to what happened
there?
Admiral Wilkinson. It is my understanding that submarine con-
tact was made several hours before the attack and that it was in the
restricted waters, and that two of our vessels attacked it, and believed
that from the absence of subsequent sound indications, believed that
they sank it.
Senator Brewster. When you speak of the restricted area, how
extensive was that?
Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, very limited ; I think 5 or not more than
10 miles, at least, off the entrance to Pearl Harbor.
Senator Brewster. I am asking more particularly about another
submarine beside the one that you speak of which you think was sunk
off the entrance to Pearl Harbor, about one that was supposed to have
circulated through Pearl Harbor and gone out, and an officer from
which submarine they captured near one of the points in Oahu.
Admiral Wilkinson. I have asked about that, sir, and I think
the best opinion now is that that map, that was supposed to indicate
that the submarine had been in and come out, was an indication of
the chart, of the track that it proposed to follow, and that there was
no definite confirmation [4^^] in any way that it ever had
been in. 1
Senator Brewster. Wliat became of that Jap officer?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not laiow, sir.
Senator Brewster. Did you ever examine him ?
Admiral Wilkinson. The chart ?
Senator Brewster. No, the Jap officer who was captured?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not examine him.
Senator Brewster. The Jap officer, as I understood you, that had
the chart.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not examine him.
Senator Brewster. Did anyone from Naval Intelligence?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think he was examined in Hawaii. I am
not sure.
Senator Brewster. Did you have a copy of the report on that?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. I think we did.
Senator Brewster. What did you base your opinion on that this
was not an actual chart of an operation ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, on recent discussion with Captain Mc-
Collum, who examined the chart carefully and who had been familiar
with the testimony of the officer, I believe.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Counsel, was there a request ever made for
a copy of the examination of that Japanese officer?
Mr. MuiiPiTY. I believe the record
148031 Mr. Gesell. None has been made.
Mr. Mitchell. None has been made that I remember.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1813
Mr. Murphy. I believe the record will show there was a question
asked as to whether or not he was available and Admiral Inglis said
he would look into it, into the whole matter.
Senator Brewster. Did you mention the examining data?
Mr. Murphy. I don't remember.
Senator Brewster. I think that would be most significant. I would
like to have it. I am not prepared to say at this time that we should
examine the Jap officer and have him testify, but I think the ex-
amination by the Army and Navy Intelligence would be very perti-
nent.
Mr. Murphy. I don't mean to say that there was a request for him
to testify. I asked if he was still alive or what happened to him and
I don't know whether I requested the report, but if it is available we
should have it.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. If you will permit me, I think the Admiral
stated that his opinion about it came from Captain McCollum, and
I believe Captain McCollum is listed as a witness. Is that right,
•counsel?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, hasn't counsel furnished us with
some information on this point? I have made a request and I think
they furnished us with information that was very [4^04-^
meager.
Mr. Mitchell. There have been so many discussions that my mem-
ory fails me. I have no recollection of that at this time.
Senator Ferguson. I think they reported to me that it was very
meager, they had no definite information. Isn't that right?
Mr. Gesell. I think that is correct. Senator. We will check it.
The Vice Chairman. And isn't it correct that Captain McCollum
is listed as a witness ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes ; it is.
The Vice Chairman. Well, if he gave the Admiral that informa-
tion he might be in a position to help us.
Admiral Wilkinson. I think he can tell you on what he based
his interpretation that he discussed with me.
Senator Brewster. Is that a matter in which there is complete
concurrence between the Army Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and
the FBI as far as you know ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir.
Senator Brewster. Do you know who captured this fellow? That
is, was it the Army, or the Navy, or the FBI?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. My recollection is he landed
at Bellows Field, and if that is the same one, he was [^5<95] cap-
tured there by the Army.
Senator Brewster. Did you have occasion to look into the communi-
cation from the destroyers who sank the submarine outside of Pearl
Harbor and communicated this to the shore, did you have occasion to
look intathat at all to know how long it took ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, I have seen a good many since, sub-
sequently, but I have no direct knowledge.
Senator Brewster. Did you have any contract with any of the
fishing fleets operating off of Pearl Harbor there through your Naval
Intelligence? Did you have operators in that field?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not understand, sir.
1814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. The fishing fleets operating off of Pearl Harbor
were very extensive.
Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, yes. Our District Intelligence officer
was very much — was very directly concerned in that fishing fleet
and we had laid down a number of restrictions which were carried
out by the local Coast Guard, but inspired by us, as to the removal of
all Japanese aliens from the boats, the registration of the boats, limit-
ing them to certain hours and certain areas and the removal of radio
apparatus. They were under thorough control and restriction for
some time prior to the attack.
Senator Brewster. Have you testified as to how many oper-
[4S0G] ators you had in Naval Intelligence in Hawaii ? Have you
given us those figures ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not, specifically. I can readily obtain
it. I gave the figures for the fleet as a whole.
Senator Brewster. Yes. Will you give us those that were in
Hawaii?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Senator Brewster. And did I make it clear, that I would like that
report of the examination of the Jap submarine officer, if there were
any examination, and if it is available.
Did I understand you to say. Admiral, that the Grew message
of January 1941, regarding a possible Jap attack on Pearl Harbor,
did not come to your attention prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it, sir.
Senator Brewster. That was not a matter of any discussion or con-
cern in the Intelligence Department during the period that you served
from October to December?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it. It might have been men-
tioned.
Senator Brewster. You spoke about the number of consular agents
in Hawaii -by the Japanese. There were a rather unusual number, were
there not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
14S07] Senator Brewster. Do j'^ou remember how many ?
Admiral Wilkinson. There had been quite a discussion about that.
There was, of course, a law in effect that all agents in the employ of
foreign nations should register and they had not been required to reg-
ister, and the commandant of the District and our Intelligence officer
were very anxious to get them under control, and there had been some
correspondence back and forth about it.
Senator Brewster. Do you remember how man}^ there were ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I would say in the order of about 50,
perhaps more.
Senator Brewster. Are you sure it was not 150?
Admiral Wilkinson. No ; I am not sure ; at least 50 of them.
Senator Brewster. I think counsel can inform you that it was more.
T think it ran up to an amazing number for so comparatively small
an area.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. We were trying to make them comply
with the law but there was some instruction put in about any rigid
steps conflicting with the efforts made to assure the loyalty of the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1815
remaining Japanese. On December the 6th we said we hoped to get
some decision in a month, I believe.
Senator Brewster. Did you have any reason to suspect, [48081
during the period between October and December 7, 1941 when you
were functioning as Director of Naval Intelligence, that the Japs sus-
pected that we were breaking any of their codes?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I do not know specifically in that period
but there had been a message which I recall somewhere around October,
I think, that the Germans had informed the Japs that there were indi-
cations that we were breaking some of their codes. Several messages
that were sent from Japan indicated that they wished their agents to
be particularly careful in their reports to protect their codes.
Senator Brewster. Have you located the messages which contained
those references to the German warning ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think I can find one, sir.
Senator Brewster. I would like to ask counsel whether they have
located those.
Mr. Gesell. No ; we have not, the ones I believe the Senator refers to.
Senator Brewster. What steps have you taken ?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I refresh Mr. Gesell's mem-
ory ? I had a request in for such information and I am sure that my
letter states definitely that there were no such codes — I mean no such
messages. Do you recall that, Mr. Gesell ?
Mr. Gesell. No: I do not.
[4809] Mr. Mitchell. I think there were one or two messages
such as the Admiral speaks of in Exhibit 1.
Mr. Murphy. And there is also a reference in Matsuoka's message to
Hitler that might lead to such an inference.
Mr. Gesetj.. I thought the Senator was referring to ones other than
in the exhibit.
Senator Ferguson. I am. The letter maybe might refresh you.
Senator Brewster. Well, I have a letter from Mr. Mitchell saying
that there was no evidence that the Japanese had any knowledge that
we were breaking their codes or suspected it, and that the evidence was
all to tlie contrary. Do you recall that letter, Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. That is based on a report from the department
of whom we made inquiry.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I did not know it, personally. I forwarded to you
their report.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. But I think there are one or two messages in exhibit
1 that makes the same report, that the Japs were at one time fearful
of certain ones of their codes being broken.
Senator Brewster. Well, I have one here, and it is [4810]
dated the 23d day of June 1941, from Tokyo to Mexico. It appears on
page 122 of the intercepts, concerning military installations, ship move-
ments, and so forth and it says :
Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their #62* from Panama to me,
mentioned the question of a trip, get in touch with them regarding date and time
of arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There are
also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to
exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any telegrams
exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.)
1816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, that, of course, is squarely in conflict with the report which
apparently the Navy Department gave you, is it not, indicating that
at least the Japanese suspected that we were breaking their code.
Mr. Mitchell. I assume the Navy kept right on cracking them, so
we can assume the Japs did not know that. I suppose that is why they
made that statement. Obviously that one message contains a suspicion
that we might be.
Senator Bkewster. Yes.
Mr. Mitchells But we kept right on breaking them, and I assume
that, if the Japs had known we had broken them they would have fixed
them up.
[4^11] Senator Brewster. I am asking for information.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you asked me if they were not in conflict?
Senator Brewster. Yes, and you agreed that it is. Now, the inter-
cepts run from July 1 to December 7 and I asked some time ago for the
earlier intercepts, after I was refused permission to examine the files,
as I was reliably informed that tliere were five cablegrams which made
very specific reference to this matter of which the admiral now speaks,
that the Germans had apparently discovered something of this kind
and communicated it to the Japanese in this interchange of messages
between Berlin and Tokyo regarding tliis and in this matter — I am
simply citing reports which the adniiral confirms now, or at least
intimates in his reference to the Germans, I say I am at least surprised
that the Navy would give you the information that there was nothing
to indicate this, if there are four or five messages of this character in
their files.
Mr. Mitchell. To be specific, do I understand you would like to
have any intercepts back to January 1, 1941 of tliis type that indicate
the suspicion, is that what you are interested in?
[4-SlB] Senator Brewster. Well, I certainly am, but I also call
attention to my letter of November 15, in which I acknowledge the
receipt of these intercepts from July 1, to December 8, and added I
would greatly appreciate if you would send me another copy of this
material, as well as a copy of all such intercepted messages between
January 1 and July 1, 1941.
To that, I, as far as I know, have received no reply. That was a
month ago.
I think you will remember, IMr. ISlitchell, 10 days ago, in executive
session, I spoke of this matter as a matter that I thought was of con-
siderable interest, in view of the very great emphasis which had been
placed on the complete ignorance of the Japanese of the fact that we
were breaking their code.
Mr. Mitchell. I understand what you are especially interested in
is tlie messages that have to do with the question of whether the Japs
suspected our cracking the code. It is so much easier to get results if
we know what we are after. I am just asking you the question, to get
an indication as to what you are really interested in.
Senator Brewster. I think my interest has been made manifest also
in a letter to you in which I asked specifically whether there was any-
thing to indicate the Japs had [4^^-^] either Icnowledge or
suspicion that we were breaking their codes, and your reply, based on
the Navy Department's information, was that there was nothing to
indicate either, and your reply was that all the evidence was to the
contrary.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1817
Mr. MiTCHKLL. That is exactly the report as it was given to us.
I never asked them what their evidence was, but I assumed it was
a fact because we kept on breaking the code, indicating that the Japs
were not aware of it. I will get from the Navy just what the basis
of that report is. ,^ I do not know.
Senator Brewster. You just heard Admiral Wilkinson testify that
he understood there were indications that Berlin had given the Japa-
nese a tip on this. I think it is unfortunate that the Navy should have
given you a report of this character, if what Admiral Wilkinson says
now is correct.
Mr. MoRrHY. That is two or three times that the statement is in
the record.
Senator Brewster. I can quite undea'stand the concern of the
gentleman over anything which seems in any way to be in conflict
here, but I think it is a rather important point, on which great
emphasis has been laid, and I would like to know whether or not
these messages exist. It is [4S14-] very significant to me that
the intercepts were given us back to July 1 when these messages
apparently occurred, in May and June. I have been trying for more
than a month to get them. I spoke to counsel about this in the execu-
tive session 10 days ago, and now I am advised that they would like
to know just what it is I am after.
Mr. Murphy. You are using that microphone rather loudly. This
is three times that that statement is in the record now.
The Vice Chairman. I think counsel understand. Senator. I am
sure they will continue to cooperate in every Avay possible.
Are there any other questions of Admiral Wilkinson?
Senator Brew^ster. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have further questions
of Admiral Wilkinson.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have a memo that I would like
to refer to the counsel, and might refresh their memory. It is dated
the I7th of November, and signed by Mr. Mitchell. It was received
by me November 17 at 3 p. m.
(The document referred to was handed to Mr. Mitchell.)
Mr. Mitchell. That is the same thing, I think, to which Senator
Brewster just referred.
Senator Brewster. You gave me the same answer ?
\ 481-5] Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Senator FercxUson. Has this been put in the record?
Mr. Mitchell. No,
Senator Ferguson. I will put this in the record. It is dated
November 17, 1945.
Memorandum to Senator Ferguson :
With reference to your letter of November 16th, requesting "all information
that any of the Services or the Government had that Japan knew tliat we had
broken their code"', tliere is no information or indication that Japan ever knew
it. All information would indicate the contrary.
Now, Mr. Chairman, that indicates that Mr. Mitchell signed it,
and the initials in the lower left-hand corner are "WDM/CBN."
That would indicate, Mr. Chairman, it was answered the day fol-
lowing the request for that information. I requested it on the 16th,
and the letter came on the I7th.
Mr. Mitchell. I have been sitting here wondering just wliat the
special significance and the importance in this inquiry is the question
1818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of whether prior to June 1941, or at any time, the Japs suspected that
we were cracking their code. I confess it would help me a bit to work
this thing out, if I knew just what bearing it has on the case.
I am probably dumb about it, but I do not quite grasp it. [4^816]
I have an idea that maybe that attitude may have had something to do
with the fact that maybe I did not follow up your request as diligently
as I otherwise would.
Senator Brewster. I should be very happy to give you what is in
my apparently simple mentality. The first thing which has interested
me a great deal on this particular episode, Mr. Mitchell, is if what
Admiral Wilkinson now says is correct, then the Navy has not been
giving you complete or accurate information when they tell you there
was nothing to indicate that the Japs knew or suspected that we were
breaking their codes.
That has been, as you know, a matter in which I had some concern
about your previous willingness to submit the data.
As i said to you and others, that was the first point of my interest
in this episode.
Mr. Mitchell. You made that request before the Admiral made
that statement. I am trying to get back to your point of view as to
the materiality of that in this hearing.
Senator Brewster. I am coming to that.
Mr. Mitchell. All right.
Senator Brewster. The second point, I had thought that one of the
very outstanding matters that had been [4^^'^] emphasized
here, and in fact you yourself examined General ISIarshall at great
length regarding this very matter in connection with the Dewey epi-
sode, that a great state secret existing here was magic, and that the
Japs had no knowledge or suspicion that we were breaking their codes,
and apparently very great importance has been attached to that
throughout this hearing.
If there is anything to indicate that is not so, we must all, to some
extent, revise our estimate of the situation in the light of that possi-
bility or probability. At least that is my observation in all this evi-
dence. I cannot otherwise reconcile the whole Dewey episode.
Now, if, back in May or June 1941, there were messages indicating
that the Japs suspected that this was happening, if it was of great im-
portance, I cannot understand why this has not been developed. I
cannot understand whj^ the Navy will tell you there was nothing to
indicate it. If it is not of any importance, why do not they just simply
give us the facts and the messages, and if it is of importance, and
there is any suggestion of concealment, that is something we must take
into account.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I might say, the gentleman from Maine
has been absent for some days. Yesterday we spent 20 minutes on
tirades in connection with the Republican [4818] National
Committee, and now we have spent 20 minutes in trying counsel, talk-
ing about the Dewey episode. I suggest that we talk about Pearl
Harbor; I suggest that we proceed to inquire as to what happened
at Pearl Harbor.
The Vice Chairman. I am sure the counsel understand the gentle-
man's request now, and I hope we can move along.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1819
Senator Brewster. I certainly will be most pleased to. I am not
at all surprised that the gentleman from Pennsylvania is considerably
concerned over the necessity of my replyins^ to the question of counsel.
I have been rather patient myself, and perhaps it is just as well, and
this will clarify it.
The Vice Chairjiatst. I think it does, Senator. I have heard every
witness wlio has testified, and my clear impression is that the remark
just made by Admiral Wilkinson is the first intimation that has come
out in the course of this hearing that the Japanese had ever suspected
that their code might have been broken. I know other witnesses have
been asked the question whether there was anything to indicate that
Japan had ever suspected that the code had been broken, and their
testimony was that there was nothing to indicate it, until just at this
moment when Admiral Wilkinson had made the remark in response
to the question, and I think that is the first intimation that has come
to the committee [4S19] that anybody thought Japan might
have had any knowledge that the code had been broken.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for that
observation, and I hope you agree with me that this does have a dis-
tinct relevance in establishing it.
The Vice Chairman. Of course, if the Senator wants information,
I am sure counsel will cooperate in every possible way to secure it, and
to give it to the Senator when it is secured.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I just say I do not think
we have wasted time this morning on this question as to whether or
not counsel is able to obtain for us immediately upon our request infor-
mation material to the matter that we have before us. I think as to
whether or not the services are obtaining the information for us is
very vital to this hearing. Now, if we have a request in on the 16th
day of November for certain material and that is material that is in
the files, and then the fact that we get a reply immediately on the I7th
of November, and we wait until the 18th clay of December and do not
have that information, that question is very vital to the thing that we
are trying. Are we getting the cooperation of the services or are we
merely here taking what the services desire to give us ?
[48'W] That is the question.
I raised it on the floor and I raise it again here.
That is very vital to this case. Are we getting what they want to
give us, when they want to give it to us, or are they going to give it to
us because it is material to this issue as we request it?
[4^21] Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose for a mo-
ment ?
The Vice Chairman. Does the Senator yield ?
Senator Brewster. Yes, I will yield.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster yields.
Mr. Keefe. About the request for information and the speed with
which it has returned, I have asked time and again for information
and some of those requests were propounded in the first 2 or 3 days of
this hearing.
In one instance it was promised to me in 2 days in respect to one
request, and to date I have only received one or two responses of any
kind to any request I have made.
1820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
You will recall that on the second or third day of these hearings I
asked Admiral Inglis in respect to the condition of the fleet, in respect
to her fighting ability, on the 7th day of December when it was in the
harbor. He told me that the California was practically hors de com-
bat because of an inspection and because of boxed ammunition. The
noon hour intervened, and when he came back he said they were investi-
gating it and he would report to me immediately, and to date I have
received no report on the ships, except what has come to me from let-
ters from men on the ships, and who know, who were in a position to
know, whether their fighting condition was reduced because of open
voids and the boxing of ammunition, and the type of inspection that
was carried [4822] on. That is one thing.
While we were quizzing the Admiral, Admiral Inglis in this room,
I made a request on Friday and the material was promised me for
Monday, and that request has not been complied with,
I can go on and read the list from my notes — I haven't got my notes
here — but I have made at least 25 requests and I am sure only 2 or 3
of which have been complied with. I wanted the information for the
purpose of interrogation of witnesses at the proper time.
I have been told that they have liaison committees in the State
Department, in the War Department and Navy Department who are
standing by all the time to get the information just as rapidly as it
is humanly possible to get it. Now one month goes by and although
you have made an important request there is no intimation from coun-
sel at all as to whether or not that request had been looked into.
We cannot help but wonder as to what is the cause of this great
delay. That has caused me great exasperation and I can only say we
have been receiving spoon-fed evidence. If we have the information
certainly we will be in a better position to conduct an intelligent cross-
examination.
That is all I want to say at this time.
Mr. Mitchell. May I be permitted to say something?
[4S2S] The Vice Chatrmax. Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. In regard to your lequest for the condition of the
ships on Pearl Harbor Day, when they were inspected and open and
all that sort of thing,. I think we have already brought in some data
on that. I thhik it was during your absence within the last few days.
The Vice Chairman. Last Saturday.
Mr. Geakiiart. I was sick in bed one day. The report came to the
committee when I was absent one day. I wonder why that was done.
The Vice Chairman. That was done on Saturday when, unfortu-
nately, the gentleman from California was unavoidably absent, and
we regret that. The counsel made a report to the committee, which
sat for about an hour longer than we had expected, for counsel to
make a report to the committee on various requests that had been
made during the hearing by the different members of the committee.
During the course of that report to the committee I recall that quite
a number of the things requested by the gentleman from California
were presented and included in the record. If the gentleman will
examine the record of last Saturday, the day on which he was unable
to be here, I think he will find at least responses to many of his re-
quests, and the counsel made the statement that the information that
[4834] was not being submitted at that time and that had been
requested would be submitted as quickly as it could be secured.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1821
The counsel gave us a rather exhaustive report along that line last
Saturday. I am sure that many of the requests made by the gentleman
from California were complied with in the course of that report.
Mr. Gearhart. May I inquire as to whether or not the chart I re-
quested showing the numerical readiness of the fleet in the Pacific,
that I asked of Admiral Inglis, was mentioned ?
Mr. Mitchell. There are so many of these that I cannot pick from
memory the generality. We have been engaged in the last week check-
ing up from the transcript to be sure that everything that was asked
for orally here in the past will be submitted.
Mr. Gearhart. I requested a chart showing the number of ships
that were in the Pacific on May 1 and the transfers from that fleet
to the Atlantic, and the augmentations from ship construction, and
then I also asked for that information for the Atlantic Ocean as well, in
chart form, and Admiral Inglis said he would have it 2 days later.
I have been told — information has come to me from reliable
sources — that that report has already been submitted to counsel. Can
counsel verify it?
[4825] Mr. Mitchell. I have no recollection of seeing it. I
will find out during the noon hour if it is in our files.
The Vice Chairman. I do recall, Mr. Gearhart, you made the re-
quest about the Boise. That was included in the record last Saturday,
and I am sure counsel will have the gentleman's request checked and
every effort will be made to comply with his request.
Senator Brewster. May I just ask that Admiral Wilkinson will
check on those cablegrams, the intercepts during the noon hour so
we can get this thing clarified ?
Admiral Wilkinson. My only recollection was a dispatch from
Berlin, I think to Tokyo, indicating that the Germans thought we
might be reading the Japanese codes and warning them about it.
Senator. Brewster. I understood there were five messages on this
subject between Tokyo and Washington. I would like to have a
complete file.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral, you understand the Senator's re-
quest ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. You will make every effort to comply with it ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record
[482'6] note that not one question was asked the witness in the
last half hour.
The Vice Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 2
o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of
the same day.)
[4827] afternoon session — 2 p. m.
TESTIMONY OP REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON
(Resumed)
The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. Senator
Brewster will resume his inquiry.
Senator Brewster. Admiral, were you able to secure those wires
during the recess ? I think they were radiograms.
1822 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. I have not been able to locate it to date. The
liaison oflicer for the Navy Department has made the specific inquiry
for that dispatch. I have talked to my predecessor, Admiral Kirk,
who says he recalls it as a message from the Japanese Ambassador
in Berlin to the home office in Tokyo, that the German Foreign
Minister Von Ribbentrop had advised him that there were indications
that the Americans were breaking Japanese codes.
I may state, of course, that there were a number of codes, some of
which are relatively simple and can be readily broken, others are
more complex, and the very reading of one code would not be any
assurance that others or the entire bulk of them were being broken.
The only indication would be with respect to such a message that
we were at least attacking their codes.
I do know that in the late fall, in the early fall and the late fall, we
had some worries about the Japanese finding [482S~\ that out
and the Japanese suspicions, although we did not believe from the
tenor of their dispatches that they were convinced at all that we were
breaking them, and those worries occasioned our tightening up of
security concerning intercepts and occasioned our being particularly
careful about broadening in any degree the text or even knowledge
obtained from the text of such messages.
Senator Brewster. When you say there are different codes, how
frequently are they changed ordinarily ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Again it is a matter for a communicator to
give expert knowledge, but there is in general, I understand, two types
of concealed message. One is a code and the other is a cipher appli-
cable to that code. The code is contained in a book and to change it
you have to issue another book. The cipher may be changed from
day to day and often is.
You must first break the cipher on any message before you can
tell what the concealed message is and then you must have the code
to know what the words which have now been derived, or the groups
which have now been derived, mean under that code.
Answering your question directly then, the ciphers were very fre-
quently changed, sometimes from day to day, and the codes would not
be changed so often, perhaps once a month or even a year or more.
[4820] Senator Brewster. How many are they likely to have
in use at any one time? How many would they be likely to have in
use at any one time, of codes as distinct from the ciphers?
Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, perhaps 10 or 12: A diplomatic code, a
naval attache's code, a military, a consular, some very secret codes for
each of those and some day to day codes.
Senator Brewster. And the interpretation of any one was de-
pendent either upon breaking it as you did or upon having the code
book to enable you to easily translate it ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. And the knowledge that we were at-
tacking a code would not be particularly significant as it is more or
less of an international practice. The knowledge that we had suc-
ceeded in breaking some of the simpler codes would not be particularly
significant. If they knew definitely we had broken their most secret
codes it would be a matter of great concern.
Senator Brewster. It is not considered that there is anything par-
ticularly reprehensible in this practice, is it? Isn't it a rather well-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1823
recognized practice in tlie international code of morality that tliat is
done by all o-overnments in the interest of their national security?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think so. I do not think that governments
are particularly desirous to admit it, but I think it has been done in
the past, sir.
[4^830] Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. Whether it is being continued today in all
countries I do not know.
Senator Brewster. Wasn't there a rather conspicuous case in our
own history during and after the last war about certain translations
that were made in time of peace ?
Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is not authentic at all but I
know that in the last war we did have a so-called Black Chamber.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. And that sometime after the last war I believe
the then Secretary of State decided that he would abolish it completely
and all such activities on our part were then discontinued for a time.
The Vice Chairman. If you will permit me, Senator, you and the
Senator were both referring to the last war. You are talking about
World War I?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, World War I. This one is too recent to
be known as the last war.
The Vice Chairman. Well, both of them are last wars now.
Senator Brewster. Was that discontinued at that time when Henry
L. Stimson was Secretary of State ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know.
[4.8SI] Senator Brewster. I think it was.
Now, have counsel been able to secure any further information about
these messages? Have they made any inquiries from the Navy De-
partment about it?
Mr. Mitchell. They are hard at work, and so is the Army.
Admiral Wilkinson. Mr. Chairmanj maj^ I suggest a change in the
stenographic record of yesterday at this point ?
The Vice Chairman. Yes, go ahead. That won't disturb you, will
it. Senator? ,
Senator Brewster. No.
The Vice Chairman. Go ahead. Admiral.
Admiral Wilkinson. On page 4575, referring to the responsibility
of the Office of Naval Intelligence regarding probable intentions of the
enemy, in the middle of the page, the record shows that my answer to
a question was :
I did not so understand, and I have the information, as I said, from my
predecessor, my discussion with Adn»iral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Opera-
tions, and just this morning from Admiral Kirk, also my predecessor.
That last phrase should read, "and just this morning I have received
a dispatch from Admiral James who was a predecessor in turn of my
predecessor. Admiral Kirk, to that effect."
[4832] The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your correc-
tion ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster.
Senator Brewster. In connection with the discussion of the answer-
ing of the questions, I believe, of Judge Clark, about the threat of
1824 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the American Navy on the flank of the Japanese operations, in replying
to that you pointed out on page 4712 of your testimony :
Our navy was much smaller then than it was ultimately, and, in fact, at that
time, it was smaller than the Japanese fleet in the Pacific.
How long had that condition prevailed so far as you know and on
what were the comparisons made?
Admiral Wilkinson. Sir, our navy was smaller than the Japanese
fleet in the Pacific. I meant, of course, our force in the Pacific itself.
Senator Brewster. Yes, I understand that.
Admiral Wilkinson. I think that had in general prevailed through-
out the year of 1941 and the disparity had been somewhat increased
by the necessity of sending ships to the Atlantic, one of which, in fact,
was my ship, the battleship Missis.^ippi, in May of 1941.
Senator Brewster. You brought that from Pearl Harbor to New
York, or thereabouts?
[4833] Admiral Wilkinson. From Pearl Harbor to the Atlan-
tic, and then I was operating on the Atlantic patrol until I came ashore
to the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Senator Brewster. Were there other battleships moved at that
time?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Senator Brewster. What were they?
Admiral Wilkinson. The Idaho and New Mexico, as I remember
it, one carrier and three or four cruisers and some eight destroyers.
Senator Brewster. And what was the relative rank of the two
navies before that transfer, approximately?
Admiral Wilkinson. Of the navies as a whole or of the forces in
the Pacific?
Senator Brewster. No ; the Pacific Fleet and the Japanese Fleet.
Admiral Wilkinson. I would prefer to refer to Admiral Inglis'
testimony on that subject. Mj^ impression is that there was a slight
disparity against the United States force.
Senator Brewster. Even before that time ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Even before that time.
[4S34]' Mr. Gesell. May I interpose, Senator?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Congressman Gearhart raised before the recess the ques-
tion of whether we had received a response to his request for a state-
ment showing the relative strength of naval combatant units of various
kinds in the Atlantic and Pacific on May 1, 1941, and December 7, 1941,
including a comparison between the strength of our Navy, and, I
believe, the Navies of Allied and potential enemy powers.
We have gotten that material. I handed a copy to Congressman
Gearhart, and we have one copy for every member of the committee.
I interpose with it now because it relates directly to your question.
Senator Brewster. Would you want to put that in the record now
so it may be available ?
Mr. Gearhart. I would like to have it included in the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Brewster. Will you offer it as an exhibit then ?
Mr. Geseli.. We will then offer this material as Exhibit 86, and
perhaps we better have it spread upon the transcript so it will be
available to every member of the committee.
The Vice Chairman. Yes. So ordered.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Senator Brewster. That will appear in the transcript
tomorrow morning.
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 86.")
(Exhibit 86 follows:)
Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, May 1, 1941
AXIS
1825
[4SSS]
Germany
Italy
Vichy
France
other
augmen-
tations
Total
Battleships
Aircraft carriers .
Heavy cruisers. .
Light cruisers...
Destroyers
Submarines
«6
i>6
4
4
1 15
'150
04
dll
f 77
e5
hi
4
ig
152
58
k'2
19
17
1
12
26
160
294
» Includes 2 over-age battleships, Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein.
b Includes damaged Duilio and Cavour, heavily damaged, resting on bottom.
« Includes damaged Bolzano.
d Includes 5 ineffective light cruisers.
• Includes 2 ineffective destroyers.
' Includes 8 ineffective submarines.
e Includes 4 damaged or incomplete battleships.
h Interned in Martinique.
' Includes 2 interned in Martinique.
1 Includes 4 damaged or incomplete destroyers.
^ Includes Yugoslavian Dalmacia and Dutch Gelderland.
' Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 1 Greek, and 5 Norwegian destroyers.
=> Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 6 Dutch submarines.
' Estimated.
[4856]
Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, May 1, 1941
ALLIED
United
Great
Free
other
States
Britain
France
augmen-
tations
6
3
5
•bl6
M3
>3
''3
kl
8
'30
i>l
"2
85
'191
' 12
mil
53
'65
J8
-15
Total
Battleships
Aircraft carriers
Heavy cruisers.
Light cruisers..
Destroyers
Submarines
25
10
22
41
299
141
• Includes 3 battle cruisers.
>> Includes 6 battleships damaged and under repair.
<• Includes 1 escort carrier.
d Includes 1 large carrier damaged and under repair.
• Includes 5 heavy cruisers damaged and under repair.
' Estimated, no accurate figures available at this time.
• Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.
^ Interned at Alexandria.
' Includes 4 incomplete and 3 interned at Alexandria.
i Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria.
k Includes Greek Georgios Averov.
' Includes Dutch Heemskerck and Sumatra.
=> Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.
» Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish, and 1 Yugoslavian submarine.
79716—46 — pt. 4-
-17
1826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[^837] Naval combatant strength, Pacific Ocean, as of May 1, 1941
AXIS
Japan
Vichy
France
Total
Battleships
Aircraft carriers
Heavy cruisers-
Light cruisers.-.
Destroyers
Submarines
10
7
18
17
100
68
10
7
18
18
100
70
ALLIES
United States
Great
Britain
Dutch
Pacific
Asiatic
9
3
12
9
67
27
1
1
•4
bl3
•>6
(-=)
1
2
13
28
3
7
15
Total
Battleships
Aircraft carriers
Heavy criiisers,
Light cruisers..
Destroyers
Submarines
• Includes 1 unit damaged and under repair.
b Estimated, no accurate figures available.
• Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate.
[4838] Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, Dec. 7, 1941
AXIS
Battleships.
Aircraft carriers.
Heavy cruisers..
Light cruisers...
Destroyers
Submarines
Germany
«5
4
'20
1 155
Italy
b6
04
<J12
•77
'67
Vichy
France
«5
tl
4
'9
i 53
60
Other
augmen-
tations
Total
16
1
12
27
159
291
• Includes 2 over-age battleships Schlesien and Schleswigholstein.
b Includes Cavour heavily damaged l)ut afloat.
« Includes damaged Bolzano and Gorizia.
d Includes damaged JJ'Aosta, Bande Nere, and Montecuccoli.
• Includes 34 damaged destroyers.
' Includes 20 damaged submarines.
e Includes 3 damaged or incomplete battleships.
b Interned at Martinique.
' Includes 2 interned at Martinique.
' Includes 7 damaged or incomplete.
k Includes Yugoslavian Dalmacia and Dutch Gelderland.
' Includes 1 Greek, 5 Norwegian, and 3 Yugoslavian destroyers.
™ Includes 6 Dutch, and 3 Yugoslavian submarines.
' Estimated.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
ALLIED
1827
United
States
Great
Britain
Free
France
Other
augmen-
tations
Total
Battleships
Aircraft carriers
Heavy cruisers.
Light cruisers-.
Destroyers
Submarines
«6
) 04
5
d8
92
58
•'12
' 12
'28
'225
'80
k3
13
'1
mil
"1
P2
111
'15
21
12
21
39
339
161
• Does not include North Carolina and Washington both on trials.
b Does not include Hornet on trials.
" Includes Long Island (escort carrier) .
d Juneau, Atlanta, San Diego and San Juan carried on Atlantic Fleet lists but were not completed or
commissioned and are not included.
• Includes 1 battle cruiser.
' Includes 1 damaged battleship under repair.
« Includes 2 escort carriers.
1" Includes 2 damaged aircraft carriers under repair.
' Includes 5 damaged heavy cruisers under repair.
1 Estimated. No accurate figures available.
k Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.
' Interned at Alexandria.
"i Includes 4 incomplete, 2 interned and 1 repairing.
" Includes 1 incomplete and' 1 interned at Alexandria.
" Includes Greek Georgios Averor.
p Includes Dutch Heemskerck and Sumatra.
0 Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.
' Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish, and 1 Yugoslavian submarine.
[4840]
Naval combatant strength, Pacific Ocean, as of Dec. 7, I94I
AXIS
Battleships
Aircraft carriers
Heavy cruisers..
Light cruisers-
Destroyers
Submarines
Japan
18
17
103
74
Vichy
France
Total
10
■9
18
18
103
75
ALLIES
United States
Great
Britain
Free
France
Dutch
Pacific
Asiatic
Total
Battleships
9
3
12
•10
be 54
d25
.(4
«1
4
hl7
13
Aircraft carriers -.
4
Heavy cruisers
1
1
13
28
17
Light cruisers
3
7
15
31
Destroyers . . . .. ..
1
88
68
Submarines
» Includes Boise which at that time was escorting in Asiatic waters.
•> Includes 4 destroyers assigned Fourteenth Naval District.
" Does not include destroyers assigned other west coast naval districts.
d Status of 2 submarines not clear.
0 Includes 1 battle cruiser.
' Includes 1 damaged battleship under repair.
« This aircraft carrier damaged and under repair.
h Estimated, no accurate figures available.
' Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate.
1828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[^^^i] Senator Brewster. I notice the date is May 1, 1941.
Was that before or after you were detached ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Immediately before. I left about 2 weeks
later.
Senator Brewster. About the middle of May?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Senator Brewster. So that as of May 1 it would show the three
battleships and the other units you mentioned in the Pacific Fleet ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It should so show.
Senator Brewster. There has been a good deal of discussion about
the information which was available to Admiral Kimmel. I think it
has appeared rather clearly that under the limitations under which
you were operating there was a substantial amount of material bear-
ing on the diplomatic communications which you did not communicate
to Admiral Kimmel.
Is that the way I understood your testimony ?
Admiral Wilkinson. There was a substantial amount of diplomatic
interchange of messages that was not sent verbatim, or even in gist of
themselves outside of Washington, either to Admiral Hart, Admiral
Kimmel, or to the Atlantic Fleet, for instance. The summary of those
with respect to the status of the diplomatic negotiations was, however,
contained in the fortnightly situation wherein it was stated what the
general [4-^4^1 progress of the negotiations was.
Senator Brewster. I think in Mr. Gesell's question yesterday,
which was gone into rather clearly, whether it was not proper to con-
vey that information, and there was a substantial amount of informa-
tion bearing on the situation which was not communicated to Admiral
Kimmel. I think perhaps you answered that "yes," and you agreed
it was a substantial amount but you kind of qualified it somewhat.
Admiral Wilkinson. There was certainly a substantial amount that
was not forwarded in detail.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. With respect to the summary, for instance, of -
the fortnightly summary of November 15, on the first page we find the
diplomatic situation, paragraph 1 :
(1) Japan.
The approaching crisis in United States-Japanese relations overshadowed all
developments in the Far East during the period.
Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, is flying to Washington
with compromise Japanese proposals. No one apparently expects his mission to
succeed, the Envoy himself reportedly expressing extreme pessimism. American
spokesmen, including Secretary Knox, have indicated that the United States will
not budge from* her position. Prime [4843] Minister Churchill warned
that if war breaks out between Japan and America, Britain will dechare war on
Japan "within the hour". The United States is preparing to withdraw the
Marine detachments from China. The Japanese press continued to rail at
Britain and the United States.
Now, on December 1, a similar first paragraph :
Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-
American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government
and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work
of building the Greater East Asia coprosperity sphere. The press also is criticis-
ing Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance
against Thailand.
Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a 5-year
extension of the anticomintern pact with Germany and other Axis nations on
November 25.
i
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1829
Those were the diplomatic advices that were furnished to Admiral
Kimmel, which are a brief summary of the status of negotiations.
Senator Brewster. You would recognize, would you not, Admiral,
that there are very substantial gaps in those summaries, necessarily;
perhaps, as compared to the information available here in Wash-
ington ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly. I mean the fact of the [^4-^]
dispatch of the 10-point note from us and the receipt of the Japanese
reply was not in it.
Senator Ferguson. There was the conspicuous incfdent of the
charting of the waters of Pearl Harbor, which was the dispatch of
September 24, translated on October 9, and which I believe they indi-
cated was not communicated to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor.
Is that your recollection ?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection.
Senator Brewsteii. With those things in mind. Admiral, I am some-
what puzzled by this statement in your report of December 19, 1941,
which was, of course, very near to the event, and I quote from that
report — I do not know whether this has been put in evidence as an
exhibit or not. It is a memorandum for the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions from xidmiral Wilkinson on December 19, 1941.
Do you know whether that is in evidence ?
Mr. Gesell. It is not. Senator. I think, if that is the memorandum
given to us, it summarizes a report or reports on his testimony before
the Roberts Board.
Senator Brewster. That is right.
Mr. Gesell. That is not in evidence.
Senator Brewster. The subject is the proceedings of the President's
Investigating Committee, December 19, 1941. 14^^45] This was
a rej^ort from Admiral Wilkinson, reporting his testimony before the
so-called Roberts Commission, to whom he stated on page 3, "The
Commander in Chief, Pacific, had as much information as we had, but
I myself could not expect that he and his staff Avould infer positively a
raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same
information."
That would not be a correct statement of the situation, would it,
Admiral ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think if you will read the preceding two
sentences, sir, it will make it clearer.
On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1st that the Japanese
were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed at Thailand, Burma and
the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had proved this to be true. We
had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indication
of a raid on Havpaii. The Commander in Chief Pacific had as much information
as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would infer posi-
tively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same
information.
Perhaps that is not correct in that the earlier dispatches had not
been relayed to him specifically.
Senator Brewster. Would not it be a matter of concern, and a mat-
ter of considerable interest or significance to the [484.6] entire
Fleet at Pearl Harbor, to know that the enemy were mapping the loca-
tion of the fleet day by day, by five sectors in Pearl Harbor? Would
not it mean more to the commander in Pearl Harbor than to anyone
here in Washington who was less immediately concerned ?
1830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly it would be of more immediate
application to him.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. He was well aware that the fleet was under
constant observation from the surrounding hills.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. And that the reports were being made as to
them. Whether the geographical designation of the areas by sectors
would mean more to him or not I cannot say. Probably it would, yes.
Senator Brewster. If you had been in command of that fleet you
would probably lie awake at night trying to figure out just what the
significance of that was, would you not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Might well have.
Senator Brew^ster. Now here in Washington you had reports from
all over, you had the whole world view, you had Manila, you had all
the other departments coming in here, and while you were naturally
concerned, you were not immediately responsible for the safety of that
fleet, so it might well take [4847~\ up less of your thought and
attention and consideration, I can well understand, than it would in
the hands of Admiral Kimmel. That is probably a fair statement, is
it not? ^
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. So that in the light of what we now know it cer-
tainly proved unfortunate that it did not prove practical to send in
some more information regarding the developments that were going
on? _
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. That again was a question of the
security of the code, of which we were becoming increasingly con-
cerned.
[4^4^] Senator Brewster. In future situations of this character
the lessons whicli we have learned from this will undoubtedly have
a substantial bearing on the conduct of our armed services, our intel-
ligence, and our entire arrangements, I assume.
Admiral Wilkinson. I hope so, sir. I hope we profit by all the
lessons of the war.
Senator Brewster. I think that is the only justification of this in-
vestigation, as a matter of fact.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. One other thing which I did not follow quite
through is. the matter of the fleet.
Speaking to you now as a naval officer of long experience, when
you spoke of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, the American Fleet as being
inferior to the Japanese, you meant in the relative strength of battle-
ships, destroyers, carriers, the entire component of the fleet?
Admiral Wilkinson. Including the Naval Air Force ; yes sir. That
is discounting any superiority of training and materiel, in which we
hoped we were a little better off.
Senator Brewster. Yes. Is it not also true that the power of the
fleet increased proportionately to its moving from its base? '
[4349] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Senator Brewster. As I remember Admiral Leahy, his testimony
before us in 1938, when we were considering expanding the Navy, he
estimated we would need a superiority of approximately 2 to 1 in
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1831
order to move into the Western Pacific, and take up the Japanese on
equal terms.
That involved communication lines and everything else.
Admiral Wilkinson. I think that is more than a fair statement,
and when we did finally move into the Western Pacific in this war,
we were more than 2 to 1.
Senator Brewster. So when you speak of the fleet as being inferior,
our fleet being inferior, you compared the values side by side, rather
than the fact that there was four or five thousand miles of water that
we had to cover.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; a direct comparison.
Senator Brewster. It is probably useless to contemplate, except as
it assists us in this lesson, but the price at Pearl Harbor was not only
the price we paid at Pearl Harbor that day, but all the way on from
Guadalcanal to Leyte, and even Okinawa, was it not, in the matter of
the depletion of our naval strength ?
Perhaps I should confine it now to Guadalcanal, where we went to
fight on a shoestring, to stop the Japs because we had to stop them
right then.
[4860] Admiral Wilkinson. I was thinking. Senator, that, of
course, we could not say what the course of the war might have been.
We might have gone out of Pearl Harbor with what we had in an
attempt to relieve the Philippines, which might well have been disas-
trous in view of the Japanese islands and air fields, and the challenge
we would have met from the Japanese Fleet.
The temporary losses at Pearl Harbor, and, of course, the actually
complete losses of two battleships, undoubtedly reduced for a time the
ratio and we had to wait until that ratio was restored and increased
before we could successfully conduct the campaign in the Western Pa-
cific. It is possible, if our losses had not been incurred in Pearl Har-
bor, other losses might have resulted subsequently, and that those
losse might have been more permanent, not readily restored.
I cannot say what it may have been in the course of the war.
Senator Brewster. Well, after this initial upset, we did demon-
strate a capacity to beat the Japanese on almost any terms from* then
on. We had no serious surprises, no serious upsets in our procedure,
from then on.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. The first campaign in the South Pa-
cific, in the vicinity of Guadalcanal, was [^SSl] pretty tough
fighting. Our losses were heavy, and so were the Japs' losses, we hope,
but thereafter we began to have disproportionate losses, comparing the
Jap losses with ours.
Senator Brewster. I think it is proper to speak of it now. It is my
understanding that in the Naval Afl^airs Committee I think Admiral
Stark, or Admiral King — Admiral King, I think, testified that we had
to go into Guadalcanal to stop it; we could not let the Japs g)o any
further, so it was a calculated risk that we felt obliged to take.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Not because we felt it was necessarily easy or
feasible, but it just had to be done with insufficient forces because of
the losses at Pearl Darbor.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Is that right ?
1832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. In part. The ships that were disabled at
Pearl Harbor, the older battleships, would have been strong units in
the South Pacific, but they would not have been particularly well
adapted to some of the fighting there which required faster vessels.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. Our greatest difficulty, as I recall, in the
earlier days of the war, was the lack of [4S5£] carriers, and,
of course, there were no carriers affected at Pearl Harbor.
Senator Brewster. The estimated losses — I recall getting this at
that time from Admiral Stark — the losses incident at Pearl Harbor,
it was estimated at that time had set us back a year. Did you hear
such estimates at that time ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I defer to his judgment. I made no such
estimate.
Senator Brewster. It would be true that if the fleet had remained
in being, with the augmentations in the ensuing 12 months, our prog-
ress both in the South Pacific and in West Pacific could have been
that much more rapid, because of the strength which we would have
had if we did not encounter these losses, don't you think so ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I should say so, unless we had undertaken
an expedition for the relief of the Philippines in the crisis that was
developing there before we were prepared for it, in which case, of
course, we might have had heavy losses there, and then been worse off
than we were to begin with.
Senator Brewster, I quite appreciate that. That is, if the Japs
had not sunk these ships at Pearl Harbor, public opinion might have
been for a relief expedition, although [4853] when I was at
Pearl Harbor in 1940, the standing joke between the Army and Navy
at that time was that the fellows in the Philippines were just out of
luck, that we were not going to relieve them. There seemed to be a
rather jovial aspect to it. The poor fellows were supposed to hold
out for 6 months when they knew the fleet, very well, was not coming,
because it did not have the strength to go into the western Pacific until
it had the 2 to 1 superiority to the Japs, which it did not have.
Did -you ever hear such discussions ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Not authoritatively, not in the sense
that they were definitely doomed, but that it was difficult to relieve
them.
Senator Brewster. I refer to the captains, not the top command. I
refer to the boys down the line who felt they were up against it.
I think that is all that I have.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire.
[4^04.] Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Wilkinson, during the course of
your examination by the gentleman from Pennsylvania you pointed out
certain advantages that the fleet had in the harbor at the time of the
surprise attack. One of them was that it was practically protected
from submarine attack. And, I think you also pointed out, that when
the ships were sunk tliey were sunk in shallow water and you were
able to later raise them.
You did not mean to imply that that was a good place to have the
fleet if we had been under any impression that an attack was to occur,
did you?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I think I was asked in fact whether,
as to the contrast between Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Roads, whether
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1833
the fact that the water was shallow in Pearl Harbor, and ships were
recovered, would not have made Lahaina a worse place to be, if a
similar attack with similar effects had taken place, and I think my
answer was "yes."
I did not, of myself, I believe, say I would prefer the ships stay in
Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, as they were lashed together in
pairs and in line, that very arrangement of things reduced their fight-
ing capacity, didn't it?
Admiral Wilkinson. It reduced their ability to get out and reduced
the arc of fire of the guns of the inner [48S5] ship.
Mr. Gearhart. Prevented all maneuverability?
Admiral Wilkinson. The single ship would be unmaneuverable
as long as it was tied up. The effect of tying them together was to
delay the exit from the harbor in case of necessity of the inner ship and
also it massed the guns, the inboard guns, the guns toward each other
of the two ships lying side by side.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
In event that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had received in-
formation that an attack was imminent, within the range of possibility,
those ships wouldn't have been in the harbor at all, would they ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Depending on the time of advance notice he
got.
Mr. Gearhart. If he had gotten advance notice he would have gotten
them out of the harbor as fast as he could?
Admiral Wilkinson. My impression is that he would. I can't speak
for his mind.
Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact they presented a very, very
enticing target to the Japanese in the position in which they were
moored, did they not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Very much so. That, of course, was a char-
acteristic of the limited mooring in the harbor for [4856^ deep-
draft vessels. There were not many places we could put them.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, you were a witness before the Hewitt
inquiry ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. That occurred in Washington sometime subsequent
to the 2d of May of 1945 and the month of August 1945, did it not?
Admiral Wilkinson. It occurred, I think, in June, early June 1945.
Mr. Gearhart. I will ask you if in that hearing, during the course
of that hearing, the following questions were not asked you and to
which you gave the following answers — question by Mr. Sonnett :
As to the dissemination of information, Admiral, outside of tlie Navy Depart-
ment and to the Pacific Fleet, do I take it then, that it was the responsibility
of the ONI to disseminate information on the Japanese situation to the Pacific
Fleet?
Answer by Vice Admiral Wilkinson :
That point was never fully determined. We issued the reports and the bi-weekly
summary of the situation but I was told that the deductions of future move-
ments were the function of the War Plans, rather than of Intelligence, and this
understanding was confirmed by the Assistant Chief of [4856a'] Opera-
tions, Admiral Ingersoll, when, at one time, I said that I thought it was our
responsibility. He told me at tha,t time that the Army system was for Intelligence
to prepare the analyses of the enemy's prospective movements, but in the Navy
system the War Plans did that.
1834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I told him then that I would prepare that anlysis myself, in my office, in order
that War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations might use it as they saw fit,
and in consequence, such analyses as I made weren't transmitted to the Fleet but
were given to the Chief of Operations and to the War Plans.
The same with respect to spot news of the enemy movements. My under-
standing at the time was, and still is, that I would report to the War Plans
and the Chief of Naval Operations the latest operational information deduced
from all sources and that they would forward to the Fleet such items as they
felt should be forwarded.
Mr. Sonnet. Would it be an accurate summary then. Admiral, to state that
information in the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning the
Japanese movements, for example, would be disseminated by ONI but the
evaluation of the Japanese plans or deductions to be drawn from these move-
ments would be the function of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations?
Answer by Vice Admiral Wilkinson :
[^857] The latter part of your question, yes. The first part, the day by day
information of Japanese movements would not, according to my then and present
understanding, be sent out by Intelligence, but rather by Operations after their
evaluation.
I will ask you if those questions were asked and if those answers con-
stituted the answers you gave to those questions at that time ?
Admiral Wilkixson. To my recollection, yes.
Mr. Geariiart. At the time you gave those answers in 19-15, in June
1945, did you recall or did you have in mind the provisions of Schedule
of Organizations, a schedule which bears the date of 23 October 1910,
a schedule which I understand was in effect in 1941?
Admiral Wilkinson. I had those in mind as modified by the instruc-
tions that had been turned over to me by my predecessor and that had
been confirmed by my conversation with Admiral Ingersoll to which
I testified, I believe, yesterday.
Mr. Geariiart. The document, Schedule of Organizations, is in the
nature of a regulational order, is it not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, your understanding is quite contrary to what
the schedule of Organizations required and [4858] recited;
is that not correct?
Admiral Wilkinson. The Schedule of Organizations was prepared
and issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. It was subject to change
by him orally or otherwise. It had been changed orally by him to
Admiral Kirk. It had been changed orally by Admiral Ingersoll, his
assistant, and speaking for him, to me.
I considered that the change had been made orally and did not re-
quire the textual change in writing.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, are you giving hearsay evidence in reference
to verbal changes by Admiral Stark, or are you reciting your own
information received from the lips of Admiral Stark?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am giving the hearsay information received
officially from my predecessor, and I am giving you information re-
ceived from Admiral Stark's first assistant, Admiral Ingersoll, who
spoke for him.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, regardless of that, the Schedule of Organiza-
tions provides that, in respect to both foreign and domestic intelli-
gence, that the ONI should "evaluate the information collected and
disseminate as advisable" ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
[4859] Mr. Gearhaet. All right.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1835
I find in the correspondence a letter dated February 18, 1941 from
Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, to which there is appended a
postscript, which I will read :
I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI con-
siders it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander in Chief with the
information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considei's it
responsible for furnishing the same type of information to that of ONI. I do
not know that we have missed anything but if there is any doubt as to whose
responsibility it is to keep the Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent
reports on subjects that should be of interest to the fleet, will you kindly fix that
responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?
I also find Admiral Stark's answer to Admiral Kimmel, dated
March 22, 1941, in which he says :
With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and
responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to the Commander in Chief
of the Pacific, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in
keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these
nations, and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that
[4860] information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant ships
is forwarded by air mail weekly to you, and that if you wish this information
can be issued more directly or sent by dispatch.
I also find a memorandmn for the Chief of Naval Operations, dated
March 11, 1941, signed A. G. Kirk, from the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, which is apparently the basis for Admiral Stark's answer to
the postscript of Admiral Kimmel's letter in which it is stated :
4. The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsi-
bility of this division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately
informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal
elements within the United States.
Now, with those letters in mind, I will ask you, first, the A. G. Kirk
that signed the memorandum of March 11, 1941, to the Chief of- Naval
Operations, was then Director of Naval Intelligence ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearh.\rt. That is the position you later held?
Admiral Wilkinson. I relieved him directly.
Mr. Gearhart. When you became Chief of Naval Operations, did
Admiral Kirk inform you of that correspondence between Admiral
Hart and Admiral Kimmel and of his memorandum 14S61'\
which was sent around ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically.
Mr. Gearhart. Wlien you talked with Admiral Ingersoll, the As-
sistant Chief of Naval Operations, as you testified in the Hewitt in-
quiry, and told Admiral Ingersoll in effect that you thought it was
your function to evaluate and disseminate the intelligence, did you
find and give him these precedents to support your position 2
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you every discuss the subject with your senior
subordinates in the office ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Frequently.
Mr. Gearhart. Some of them had been on duty much longer than
you had ; had they not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Did any of them recall to you the memorandum of
Admiral Kirk ?
1836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admircal Wilkinson. I do not recall tliat they did, and do not
believe they did, sir. I think it was generally understood that we
had the responsibility and I accepted it, of keeping the forces afloat,
including the commander in chief, Pacific, of all information, informed
of all information except that which through our instructions, was
specifically excepted, and if I may, I will road my answer [4^^362-31
of yesterday :
I said that the text of the regulations which you introduced read "evaluate the
information collected and disseminate as advisable."
I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread
abroad all types of basic Information, vphat General Miles had termed static infor-
mation, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diijlomatic relations,
the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and naval men,
the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other
than the enemy's probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself
might give rise or might require action by our fleet or by our naval forces.
In the latter case, before dissemination, I would consult higher authority, either
the Assistant Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations, or my colleague, Chief of War
Plans, in order that this information that I sent out would not be in conflict with
his understanding of the naval situation, and the operations for which he was
responsible.
That is the end of my answer, sir.
I will explain further that it would obviously be [4^64-'] un-
desirable for me to send out information which on its receipt would
cause the commander in chief to take such action as would be in conflict
with the action which was desired by the responsible officer in the
Department for War Plans.
Mr. Gearhart. And still Admiral Kirk issues a memorandum in
which he says that it is his responsibility, and we have also in the record
that Admiral Stark says it was the responsibility of ONI.
Admiral Wilkinson. I think that last sentence of Admiral Kirk's
is not aB all-embracing as you would have it be, if you would mind read-
ing it again, sir, the last part of Admiral Kirk's letter.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, Admiral Kirk says [reading] :
The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility
of this Division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately in-
formed concerning foreign nations, activitieiS of these nations, and disloyal ele-
ments within the United States.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. That is pretty definite, isn't it?
Let's pursue it a little further. It is an interesting subject.
Admiral Wilkinson. All right.
[4^65] Mr. Gearhart. I find among the correspondence a letter
from Admiral Kimmel, Chief of Naval Operations, dated 26 May,
1941, entitled "Survey of Conditions in tlie Pacific Fleet."
In this letter there appears under title VII, "Information :"
Information.
(a) The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He
is far removed from the seat of government in a complex and rapidly changing
situation. He is as a rule not informed as to the policy or change of policy
reflected in current events and naval movements, and as a result is unable to
evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of
what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically
affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information
is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly con-
travenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in some course of action so
necessary to the conduct of military operations.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1837
It is realized that on occasion the rapid development in the interniational
picture, both diplomatic and military, and perhaps even the lack of knowledge
of the Military authorities themselves, may militate against the 14866]
furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is suscep-
tible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knovpledge of current poli-
cies and objectives even thougli necessarily late at times, would enable the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient his pos-
sible course of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly ap-
plicable to the current Pacific situation where the necessity for intensive training
of a partially trained fleet must be carefully balanced against the debility of
this training by strategic disiwsitions or otherwise to meet impending
eventualities.
Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department
itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard
to the status of current outlying island developments, thus making it even
more necessary that the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet be guided by broad
policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.
It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principal that the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments
as they occur, and by the quickest secure means available.
Did you see this letter after you arrived and assumed [4S67]
the duties as Director of Naval Intelligence ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I am not sure that Admiral Kirk
saw it.
[4^68] Mr. Gearhart. I find that Admiral Stark testified before
the naval court of inquiry, and I quote his testimony :
You considered the letter. Exhibit 33, so good, did you not. Admiral Stark, that
you caused it to be reproduced and distributed in a restricted area upon its
receipt among important offices in the Navy Department?
Answer :
Yes. It was our general custom to do that and I mimeographed this, sent it
to all hands who were concerned, followed it up and, as I recall, assembled all
concerned for Admiral Kimmel to talk to himself in my office.
Did you see the mimeographed copy that Admiral Stark, according
to his testimony, had prepared and distributed to the Navy Depart-
ment ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Did Adtodral Stark mention this letter to you after
you assumed your duties ? * ■
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. I find that Admiral Stark testified further before
the naval court of inquiry in respect to this letter, and I quote :
Have you any comment on the last sentence in the last paragraph of 7?
Answer :
[4869] About being guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by
categorical instructions? I have just covered that. You mean the next para-
graph?
Yes.
Answer :
(Reading) "It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Com-
mander in Chief Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important develop-
ments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available." I was in
complete concurrence with him on that and that was one of my objectives, yes.
You agreed with Admiral Kimmel then that the Commander in Chief of the
Pacific Fleet should be, insofar as you were able, immediately informed of all
important developments as they occurred, and by the quickest secure means
available?
Yes.
1838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Did Admiral Stark tell you after you became Director of Naval
Intelligence that one of his objectives was that the commander in chief
Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments
as they occurred by the quickest secure means ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.
Mr. Gearhart. I find in the correspondence a letter from Admiral
Kimmel to Admiral Stark dated July 26, 1941— [4870] by
the way, when did you become Director ?
Admiral Wilkinson. October 15, 1941.
Mr. Gearhart. This is a quotation of Admiral Stark — pardon me,
it is a quotation from Admiral Kimmel's letter to Admiral Stark of
July 26, 1941 :
1. The importance of keeping the Commander in Chief advised of depart-
ment policies and decisions and the changes in policy and decisions to meet
the changes in the international situation.
Subparagraph (a) :
We have as yet received no official information as to the United States atti-
tude toward Russia's participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of
operation, if any, in the Pacilic between the United States and Russia, if and
when we become active participants. Pres-ient plans do not include Russia
and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communica-
tions systems, and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us
which may be fully explored * * *
(and so on.)
Then Admiral Kimmel asked a number of questions:.
Will England declare war on Japan.
The answer to 1 is in the affirmative — and so on.
He asked all the questions possible about the situation which might
develop in tlie Pacific.
[4871] Did you know anything about that long letter that he
wrote to Admiral Stark?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir. I think normally that
would be prepared in the Division of War Plans which has cogni-
zance of the plans you speak of, whether there w^as coordination
between Russia and America, and so on. Anything with regard to
our own participation or the participation of other nations in con-
junction with us.
Mr, Gearhart. Your answer is interesting in view of Admiral
Stark's answer to Admiral Kimmel, from which I will quote. His
letter was dated August 19, 1941. That is getting pretty close up
to your tenure, is it not? I will quote a portion:
I can readily understand your wish to be kept informed as to the department
policies and decisions and tlie changes thereto which must necessarily be made
to meet the changes in the international situation. This we are trying to do,
and if you do not get as much information as you think you should get the
answer probably is that the situation which is uppermost in your mind has just
not jelled sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative.
Evidently Admiral Stark though that that responsibility was ONI's,
didn't he?
^ Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I should say that a [4S72]
situation which has not jelled is a matter for iho. State Department, a
matter of international relations. As I heard you, and I may not have
understood it, that was a question of a fluid situation, an international
situation.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1839
Mr. Gearhart. Then I understand that you still believe that the
organizational order of ONI didn't mean what it said during your
tenure as Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It meant, as I interpreted it, and as it had
been amended to me verbally, and as I mentioned yesterday, there
was one whole paragraph with regard to the Division of Public Rela-
tions which viewed as it stood would give us authority and instructions
as to what to do with public relations, they had been completely lifted
out of my office, but the order of over a year's standing had not been
amended, but there was no order, and I don't know that one was
required to show textual changes in each order every time a directive
of any sort was issued in modification of it, whether that directive was
in text or orally.
Mr. Gearhart. Did Admiral Stark ever call you in and tell you
that you should disregard the scliedule of organizations in respect to
the evaluation of information collected and of disseminating it as was
deemed advisable?
Admiral Wilkinson. I never asked Admiral Stark that. [4^731
I had the word from my predecessor, and I confirmed it by instructions
from Admiral Stark's responsible assistant.
Mr. Gearhart. Did Admiral Kirk tell you to disregard his memo-
randum which he had issued just a short time before to the contrary
effect?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't consider the memorandum is to the
contrary effect, sir, if you speak of that letter w^iich you read to me,
because that is a broad and all-embracing program, and what he told
me was specific orders he had receive4 from Admiral Stark which he
stated had been received in the presence of Admiral IngersoU and
Admiral Turner.
Mr. Gearhart. Well now, to quote his memorandum again — there
is no use disregarding its import
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, except it is very broad.
Mr. Gearhart (reading) :
Naval Intelligence is fully aware it is the responsibility of this Division to
keep the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet adequately informed concerning
foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the
United States.
Did Admiral Kirk ever tell you to disregard that memorandum ?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is a very broad statement. There were
limitations and modifications to it such as I mentioned. Admiral Kirk
never told me of the memorandum itself [4^74] and, as I men-
tioned, I never saw the memorandum, but I do recognize that in the
broad sense, that is the responsibility of the office, as it may have
been amended by instructions received from higher authority, which
I mentioned, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Then I will ask you. Admiral Wilkinson, why
didn't you transmit the information that was contained in the inter-
cepts to Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet,
when the information pointed directly to Hawaii ?
Admiral Wilkinson. The information contained in those inter-
cepts pointed to many sources.
Mr. Gearhart. I am not talking about the ones that pointed to
Panama or the ones that pointed to any other place, but the ones that
1840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
pointed directly to Hawaii. Was not it your duty to transmit the in-
formation contained in intercepts that reached your desk which did
point directly to Hawaii and did evidence an inordinate interest by
the Japanese Intelligence. We did not send this to the Commander
Admiral Wilkinson. We did not, perhaps erroneously, recognize
that that was an inordinate interest in Hawaii. We had found in-
quires and reports of similar investigations in many ports. We con-
sidered that those were part, as I have said, of the degree of nicety of
the Japanese Intelligence. We did not send this to the Commander-
in Chief, partly in [4-S751 error, perhaps, we didn't recognize
it pointed specifically to an attack on Hawaii, and partly also because
we were very jealoiis at that time of the security of the code and the
fact that we were breaking the code, as Senator Brewster has men-
tioned they were already suspicious that we were attacking the code,
and we continued to discourage that suspicion.
[4S76] Mr. Gearhart. There were some intercepts which
reached your desk which indicated on the part of the Japanese an
inordinate interest in conditions existing in Panama?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you inform the Commanding General and the
Commanding Admiral at Panama?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Of those messages?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, they were of a special concern to the com-
manders at Panama ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Why did you not give them that specific informa-
tion which pointed their way ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It was well known that a great deal of espion-
age activity was going on throughout all of our coastal areas, and our
island possessions. That information as to those espionage activ-
ities was known and sent by the Office of Naval Intelligence to the
district intelligence officers located in those various ports. That in-
formation which they received, plus that which we collected on the
spot, was conveyed to the local commander in every instance. The
commnnder in chief of Hawaii, the naval commander in Panama, the
commander in chief of Manila, [4S77] were all aware that
their forces were under constant espionage. They were so aware
because of the activities of the intelligence agencies, and our own
representatives there.
These messages that you speak of, whicli pointed to the desire for
information in those various ports, were of themselves but confirma-
tory of the espionage activities which were already known and which
were constantly being kept before the commanders.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, the situation still remains that you had in-
formation, very much definite information, which jon did not transmit
to the commanders in the field, that were in command in the areas, that
the information you had related to.
Admiral Wilkinson. That information was little more than what
they had through their own intelligence agencies, Mr. Congressman.
They were aware that they were the subject of constant espionage,
that the result of that espionage was being transmitted back to Japan.
We knew that photographs were being taken of the fleet in Hawaii.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 1841
In fact, we endeavored to secure a law to prevent the taking of photo-
graphs and were unsuccessful, and the commanders of the fleet were
aware of that, all of that.
The specific inquiry as to the division of Pearl Harbor [487S]
into several areas and the location of ships in those areas was another
refinement on tliat intelligence, a refinement which we perhaps should
have recognized as indicating a possible attack.
It would also be indicated similarl3^ elsewhere, but the fact that a
comprehensive espionage was being carried on was, I think, known
through the district intelligence ofiicers to the naval commanders in
all of these ports, and I know that the time I was in Hawaii, that we
were cognizant of that fact, and we were helpless to stop it.
We could not censor the mails. We could not censor the dispatches.
We could not prevent the taking of photographs. We could not arrest
Japanese suspects. There was nothing we could do to stop it, and all
hands knew that espionage was going on all along, and reports were
going back to Japan.
Mr. Gearhart. My dear sir, don't you think that you were assum-
ing a tremendous responsibility in deciding in your mind what Ad-
miral Kimmel knew, and what the Admiral in command at Panama
knew ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I think that from the reports that we
had sent to our district intelligence officers and those returned by them,
we knew they were acquainted with the espionage. But these particu-
lar messages, indicating [4879] as it has been said, a bombing
plan, were not sent out in view of the attempts at security of the code
breaking apparatus, code breaking process that we were then main-
taining.
Mr. Gearhaet. In view of the fact that Admiral Kimmel was writ-
ing to Admiral Stark for information, begging for information almost
monthly or weekly, don't you think he was entitled to know that a
Japanese intercept had disclosed that the Japanese had divided Oahu
into five areas, and that the Japanese were demanding, and their con-
federates on that island were reporting day by day, on the movements
of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor — don't you think that that was
information Admiral Kimmel was entitled to have?
Admiral Wilkinson. With the exception of a division of Pearl
Harbor into these areas, I think Admiral Kimmel was aware that some
such process of survey, espionage, and reports was under way; I think
he was aware of that by virtue of his contacts with the district intelli-
gence officer.
Mr. Gearhart. But the point remains you had definite information
to the effect that I have just described, and you thought you were ful-
filling your full responsibility when you left Admiral Kimmel to guess
that they were exercising espionage over his command ?
[4880] Admiral Wilkinson. I did not leave him to guess. Our
district intelligence officer and his fleet intelligence officer was aware
of the espionage. The only thing he was not aware of was the message
dividing the harbor into five parts, which might have been for con-
venience in locating it on a map, and which probably was. as we now
appreciate, information convenient in establishing an attack.
70716—46 — pt. 4 18
1842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. Yes ; and that would indicate to any man that they
were dividing that harbor into parts for the purpose of making more
convenient a possible attack?
Admiral Wilkinson. Very possible.
Mr. Gearhart. Wouldn't that have been mighty important informa-
tion for Admiral Kimmel to have ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It would have been useful. He had been
writing himself of the dangers of an air attack. He had been drawing
up plans for protection against an air attack. He was convinced that
there was a possibility and a threat of an air attack. It would have
been a confirmation of his suspicions.
Mr. Gearkart. And being a confirmation of his suspicions, he prob-
ably would have acted, would he not, in the light of that confirmation ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure. The message that arrived
was translated on October 9. If he had had the [4^81] mes-
sage on October 10, what action he would have taken, I don't know.
He couldn't keep the fleet at sea for 2 or 8 months.
Mr. Gearhart. He didn't have to bring them all in at one time,
did he?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, he didn't. Ordinarily he had them
operating in three sections, as I recall, of which two were at sea at
one time.
Mr. Gearhart. Two, less three battleships.
Admiral Wilkinson. Well, that was a particular incident, as you
recall, in that period, but the normal schedule called for their operat-
ing in three sections, of dividing the battleships, I believe, among
two, if not three, and having them at sea, only one in port at any time.
[4S82] Mr. Gearhart. Now, that information of the division
of Hawaii into five areas, supported by six other intercepts, each one
reporting in respect to those areas and with respect to the set-up in
the harbor, taken all together probably wouM have a very decided
effect upon the mind of the commander in Hawaii, the commander
charged with the defense of the fleet and of our military and naval
establishments there, would it not?
Admiral Wilkinson. I should think so. What effect it would have
I do not know, sir, in view of the relatively protracted length of time
that was affected, nearly 2 months, whether he would have kept the
fleet at sea continually or would have pursued a rotational plan he
had in effect.
Mr. Gearhart. If Admiral Kimmel had been informed by fur-
nishing him either copies of the intercepts or the substance thereof,
that the Japanese were constantly calling for further information
with respect to ship movements, that would probably have had an
effect upon the commander of the island, would it not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; further information with respect
to the ship movements might well have been desirable for him to know,
but I do not think it would have affected the status of the fleet if he
had known of these things.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, vou are giving us an expression of [4S8S]
your thoughts now, aren't you ?
Admiral Wilkin«;on. Yes, sir; that is what you asked _me.
Mr. Gearhart. Have you a right to nssume that Admiral Kimmel
would have thought the same way you do now, or then?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not at all, except as a naval officer, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1843
Mr. GEARriART. As commanding officer he had a r\<i,ht to make those
decisions and make whatever conchisions he pleased from the informa-
tion that yon should have supplied him with, is that not correct?
Admiral Wilkinson. He had a right to make any conclusion which
he pleased. I am not quite, as yet, in agr-eement with the fact I should
have supplied it to him.
Mr. Geakhart. And by withholding from him that information
ou withheld from him the right to decide what importance should
e attached to those messages, you denied to him the right to evaluate
those messages in that way, didn't you, and you denied him the right to
act in the light of what information those messages conveyed, didn't
you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I denied — in the first place, I am not con-
vinced that it was I who was withholding them. In the second place,
whoever withheld them was not denying him these facilities, but not
furnishing him the opportunity to work upon them.
[^(954] Mr. Gkariiart. Yes; now, I have been referring specifi-
cally to the messages which appear
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield at
this point because I wanted to complete what I had which bears on
this particular point you are discussing, which you just concluded.
Are you through with that phase of it?
Mr. Geariiart. I was just going to conclude that phase of it by
calling attention to him that I am referring to the messages that
appear on pages 12, 13, 14, and 15 of exhibit 2 in this proceeding.
Now do you want me to yield ?
Senator Brew\ster. If you will, at that point.
I did not perhaps make it clear. Admiral, as to the purport of my
questioning on your testimony before the Roberts Commission which
bears, I think, very directly on this point that Mr. Gearhart has been
stressing, and I think that in justice to you it ought to be clear.
As I understand now, I did not realize that your testimony was
not taken down before the Roberts Commission; that you appeared
before them and testified off the record.
Admiral Wilkinson. My testimony was not intentionally off the
record, but it was not recorded and reduced except as a summary of
the statement, I believe.
Senator Brewster. Yes; so that this record which you made im-
mediately thereafter for Admiral Stark was the only \488S]
record, apparently, of your testimony?
Admiral Wilkinson. Apparently and which, of course, was my
recollection after the fact.
Senator Brewster. Now, the Roberts Commission, after the pre-
liminaries on the first page, apparently thought it was important —
they apparently did attach great importance to this question of
information that Admiral Kimmel had received, because at the bottom
of the first page you state [reading] :
They then asked me what informntion and communications had been sent
during the months preceding the attack.
And you turned in a full page there of information you furnished
and then you say at the bottom of page 2 :
Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had assured ourselves that all
of this information had either passed through the CINCS Asiatig and Pacifle
Fleets or, if not, had been furnished them from the Department.
1844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Then came the next paragraph which I have quoted.
The Commander in Chief Pacific had as much information as we had.
I think you have now agreed in both the colloquies with Congress-
man Gearhart and myself th-at that was not strictly accurate, that
they did not have all of the information which you had here, either
in connection with this particular inter- [J/.S86'\ cept and some
of those that followed it and also as to the broader diplomatic phases
of it, which might be more arguable, but, at any rate, was information
which you had which he did not have.
Now, the point which I was bringing out was this, that the Roberts
committee, which made the reports bearing on the responsibility of
Admiral Kimmel, apparently did that on the basis of your stateitient
that Kimmel had all of the "information which we had" ; that is, the
Department here had. If that is not so it would be possible that
their conclusions might have been very different as to the responsibility
of Admiral Kimmel and any others concerned, if they had had a
more accurate picture of what had been furnished to Kimmel ; would
that not be so ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, and thank you for the suggestion. I
had not appreciated that when I was answering Mr. Gearhart, and in
the middle of page you will find, just above that, this statement
[reading] :
We had, on the first of December, drafted a summary of information available
to us at that time, reciting the details of the concentration of Japanese land
forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa, and the several naval preparations,
including:
(a) Reorganization of Japanese Fleets;
14887] (b) Readying for war of Japanese ships by docking, etc. ;
(c) Additional naval aircraft to the Mandated Island area;
(d) Establishment of patrol between Marshalls and Gilberts;
(e) The activity of the combined Air Force (patrol planes and tenders) in South
China and the Mandates ;
(f) The taking over of many merchant vesels by the Japanese Navy and the
equipment of several antiaircraft ships ;
(g) The radio intelligence with respect to the two task groups under the
Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet — Group One operating in the South China area,
and Group Two in the Mandated Islands area. (I stated, however, that nothing
in this item made us forecast a movement as far east of the Mandated area as
Hawaii — whereupon Mr. Roberts asked the distance from Hawaii to the Mandates,
and I told him the easternmost — Jaluit — was about 2,300 miles, and the remainder
extended to the westward about 2,700 miles. Actually the figures are 2,100 and
2,400. )
Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had [4888] assured our-
selves that all of this information —
this information I just mentioned —
had either passed through the CINCS Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had
been furnished them from the Department. In addition, on December 3rd we had
ascertained that Japanese diplomatic and consular agencies had been ordered to
burn all their confidential codes and papers immediately, and we had relayed this
information to CINCS Asiatic and Pacific and to the Commandants of the 14th and
16th Naval Districts, and had also directed our representatives in the Far East
(attaches and observers) to burn their codes and papers.
On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1st that the Japanese
were contemplating an early attack, primarily dii'ected at Thailand, Burma and
the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had pi'oved this to be true.
We had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indica-
tion of a raid on Hawaii. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific had as much informa-
tion as we had.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1845
I think in speaking of that and bringing it back, I might well have
been — I think I was, in fact, referring to the fact that he had as much
information as we had on all of that subject I have just read.
[4SS9] Senator Bkewstek. Certainly the statement is somewhat
broader than that. I think it is. We can now see here that it is
perhaps unfortunate that you did not have a complete transcript of
your evidence because it might do you more justice than this somewhat
sweeping summary by yourself would when you perhaps might not
have been thinking of all that was involved.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Obviously this was prepared by me
for the private and personal information for Admiral Stark, which
1 had made, telling him \^hat I and other officers had told the Roberts
Commission.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. That was entirely dependent on my recol-
lection, it had nothing to do with the transcript. I thought notes
had been taken. In fact, I thought there was a recorder or stenog-
rapher present and I was later to have a record of that but I under-
stand hone were taken, I understand none appeared in the record
except a two-paragraph statement.
Senator Brewster. This does have the value of. having been made
contemporaneously.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. This was made
Admiral Wilkinson. It is my recollection immediately after the
event.
[4S90] Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. But I know, for instance, I did not tell them
about magic, I did not let them know — I did not tell them about all
the diplomatic messages.
Senator Brewster. So that magic, you say, was freely discussed,
as you say later on in the memorandum. You mention that on the
next page.
Admiral Wilkinson. My hearing was very brief. They were in-
terested in the actual movements of forces and I did not go at any
length into the discussion of the diplomatic magic.
Senator Brewster. On page 4 at the bottom you say :
The meeting was discussing the Magic freely but stated they would be most
careful that no mention of it would be made.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. So that was apparently one of the topics that
was gone into to a material extent.
Admiral Wilkinson. I think the discussion I had with them as to
the "magic" was simply as to the 14-part message.
Mr. Gesell. Senator, would it be helpful to put the entire text of
the memorandum in the record? We have read different portions, at
different times, and to show the relationship of the excerpts wouldn't
it be a good idea to put it all in ?
[48911 Senator Brew^ster. I think it would be helpful to put
it all in.
The Vice Chairman. You want it included at this point in the
record ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes. I think it would be a ffood idea.
1846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. It is so ordered.
Mr. Gksell. If it is so ordeied I think it would be helpful.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
(The meniornndum above referred to is in words and figures as
follows, to- wit:)
Op-16 Copy No. 5 of 5.
Secret
December 19, 1941
S-E-C-K-E-T
]Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: I'roceediiigs of President's Investigating Committee, 1000 to 1200,
December 10, 1941.
On notiticafion from Admiral Reeves, received at 0915, I reported to Justice
Roberts' Comniisision at ten o'clock in the Munitions Building. General Miles
was also there, accompanied by the chief of his Fav Eastern Division, Colonel
R. S. Bratton ; Commander McCollum accompanied me. The Commission stated
they wish(>d tlie Army and Navy Intellisienco to [.}<Sy2] cooperate in
their answers; that they would hear General Miles first but might ask me any
questions that might arise during his discussion.
General Miles was then (]uestioned, and in the main his testimony was not
interrupted by any side questions to me; so that despite the statement of joint
questioning the actual effect "was complete testimony by General Miles, followed
by mine. In fact, General Miles was excused, because of preparations for de-
partui'e from the city this afternoon on an inspection trip, immediately after
his testimony, although Colonel Bratton remained.
They asked General Miles mainly what reports and instructions his office and
the conunand in Hawaii had e\chat)ged for a period of approximately one
month prior to the actual attack. He menti(niod conmiunications regarding
possibilities of sabotage and described at some length the events in General
Marshall's office, including the sending of the subsequently delayed dispatch
to General Short on the moi-ning of Sunday. December 7th. He mentioned his
evperience in service in the Islands and said that in the past the concern of
G-2 of the Army had been rather in sabotage than in a military raid. He said
his studieis as war plans officer there had, however, envisaged the possibility of
a raid and that he had reached the conclusion that a successful raid was possible
against a garri- {//l^OS] son which had not been warned, but was not
possible against a garrison which had been warned.
They then asked me what information and connnunications had been sent dur-
ing the months preceding the attack. I said that, for an understanding of the
picture, I would like to de.«!cribe our avenues of intelligence, and then mentioned
the Naval Attaches we had maintained in the Far East, and the seventeen addi-
tional observers and consular shipping advisers we had established in the past
year. These informants reported matters which they ascertained either by
their own observ:ition or by contacts which they might make. We had in the
past had secret agents in Japan but we had none recently since those we had had
had not survived. Aso n source of information was the ra<lio net and the inter-
cepted dispatches, utilizing the facilities of the 14th and lOth Naval Districts.
Information dispatches were received by us and the forces in the field kept in-
formed, and the Chief of Naval Operations had testified as to actual warning dis-
patches wliich he had sent in the peiMod immediately prior to the attack. As to the
actual intenhange of messages with reference to intelligence, in general the
sources reported their information to us via the Connnandei--in-Chief of the Asiatic
and in forwarding it the Commander-in-Chief Pacific was usually advised. We
had, on the fli-st of Drember. drafted a summary of information liSO-i]
available to us at that time, reciting the details of the concentration of Japanese
land forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa, and the several naval prepara-
tions, including:
(a) Reorganization of Japanese Fleets;
(h) Readying for war of Japanese ships by docking, etc.;
(c) Additional naval aircraft to the Mandated Island area;
(d) Establishment of patrol between Marshalls and Gilberts;
(e) The activity of the combined Air Force (patrol planes and tenders) In
South China and the Mandates;
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1847
(f ) The taking over of nmny merchant vessels by the Japanese Navy and the
equipment of several anti-aircraft ships;
(g) The radio intelligence with respect to the two task groups vuider the
Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet — Group One operating in the South China area,
and Group Two in the Mandated Islamls area. (I stated, however, that nothing
in this item made us forecast a movement as far east of the Mandated area as
Hawaii — whereupon Mr. Roberts sked tlie distance from Hawaii to the Mandates,
and I told him the easternmost — JaUiit — was about 2,SM miles, and the re-
mainder extended to the west- [^8i)5] ward about 2,7U0 miles. Actually
the figures are 2,100 and 2,400.)
Withotit mentioning particular dispatches, we had assured ourselves
that all of this information had either passed through the CINCS
Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had been furnished them from the
Department. In addition, on December 3 we had ascertained that
Japanese diplomatic and consular agencies had been ordered to burn
all their conlidential codes and papers immediately, and we had re-
layed this information to CINCS Asiatic and Pacihc and to the Com-
mandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts, and had also directed
our rei^resentatives in the Far East (attaches and observers) to burn
their codes and papers.
On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1 that
the Japanese were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed
at Thailand, Burma, and the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent devel-
opments had proved this to be true. We had not been able to obtain
intelligence or to develop by inference any indication of a raid on
Hawaii. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific had as much information
as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would
infer positively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to
do from the same information. I believed the raid had been aside
from the main effort, and to my belief the Japanese striking force
[4896] had retired to the westward immediately afterwards. We
had no conclusive evidence of any Japanese surface vessels operating
thereafter to the eastward of Hawaii, ajthough it was probable that
some submarines had come into the eastern Pacific and possibly Avere
still there.
The Commission asked as to the control of fishing boats in the vicin-
ity of Hawaii. I said that I knew that even before I left there in May
there had been measures to effectuate control of these boats — first, by
denying noncitizens the right to own and use them ; and second, by
either removing or, in some way I thought, controlling their radio.
These efforts were made principally by the Coast Guard as their proper
province, although guided by the advice of the Commandant's office.
Such measures as have been taken since the Coast Guard was incor-
porated into the Navy would, of course, be more directly under his
command.
Under the Delimitation Agreement, regarding the special investiga-
tory services, the actual investigations of all civilian population in
Hawaii were in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but I
knew the military and naval counterintelligence services were closely
allied with the FBI, and that I felt sure that with the fishing boats
Captain Mayfield and Naval Intelligence gave actual assistance where
possible. Mr. Roberts said that they would find out more of [4897]
that exact situation when they got out there.
They asked what arrangements we had in the Intelligence branch of the Navy
Department as to information during Saturday night (December 6). I said
1848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that responsible oflBcers were on telephone call, but that in addition there was an
oflBcer watch in our Foreign Branch, in our Administrative Branch, in our Domes-
tic Intelligence Branch, and that, beginning on Friday night I had set a watch
over the week-end in the Far Eastern section itself. I said that Commander
McCollum had relieved Lt. Comdr. Watts at 0800 Sunday, that I had arrived at
the office at about 0900, and that only then had the last part of the Magic (the
meeting was discussing the Magic freely but stated they would be most careful
that no mention of it would be made) arrived containing the final instructions
to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington to break off negotiations, whereas
the previous parts which had been available to us the preceding night had been
more argumentative in sense and rather of the type of a "White Paper" designed
subsequently for publication.
Sometime after 0900 Sunday the information came that the presentation of
the complete message, which was to be withheld until a later dispatch announc-
ing the hour, was not directed to be made at 1300, Washington time. I said I
understood by hearsay that the actual call requesting the appoint- [4898^
ment was not made until 1300 and that the appointment was granted for 1345 —
but that the State Department was, of course, aware of these times.
I said that we had reported this information to you, and that while we were
discussing it you had talked over the phone with General Marshall, and that
I understood you and General Marshall had mentioned (to the Commission) your
conversation and the dispatch he sent.
The Commission asked about the RADAR installations on the ships and in
Hawaii. I understood that the Army had RADAR on shore, and I knew we
had it installed on a few ships. However, it only works on a direct line such
as the eye does, and in consequence, the RADAR on the ships so fitted which were
in Pearl Harbor could not be effective because of the interposition of the moun-
tains and the hills and the land in general. Some of the ships which were out
of port were equipped with RADAR but, as far as I knew, they had not picked
up anything on them — again because of the limitations of the device — the curva-
ture of the earth limiting its range.
With regard to the general question of the readiness of the Intelligence Service,
I said that on the recommendation of my predecessor. Captain Kirk, as early
as last April the Chief of Naval Operations had sent out a disptach that, because
of past experience with reference to the Axis beginning activities [^899] on
Saturdays or Sundays or on national holidays, the personnel of the naval intel-
ligence service should be particularly careful on those days. Again in March the
Chief of Naval Operations had directed an advanced state of readiness of the
District Intelligence organization,. had directed the placing of coastal information
sections in active status in May, the further expansion of District Intelligence
organizations in May ; and a complete state of readiness had been directed in .July.
After my testimony Lieutenant-General C. D. Herron, who relinquished com-
mand in early February in Hawii, testified mainly about his preparations and his
general practice as to alert stations. He said that last winter he had had
them in the field for six weeks on the alert, but had subsequently modified that
in some degree although he had maintained guns at their field stations. He said
his primary plan was to use anti-aircraft for the defense of Pearl Harbor, to use
fighting planes to control the air, and to have infantry support covering landing
beaches. He said that he considered the most dangerous time to be dawn,
particularly because of the possibility of approach during the night of enemy
vessels, whether aircraft carriei-s or an actual raiding expedition.
Tlie Commission asked if he considered Sunday morning the most lax time
in the defenses, and consequently the most ad- [4900} vantageons time
for an attack. He said that with regard to the reserves. Yes, because they were
more likely to be on leave or other privileges, but with regnrd to the actual
stations in the field he considered that they should be as efficient and as fully
manned on Sundays as on any other morning. He personally made many dawn
inspections on Sundays to check on and insure their readiness.
T. S. Wilkinson.
Copies
No.
1-
-CNO
No.
2-
-ACNO
No.
3-
-Op-12
No.
4-
-Op-lG-F-2
No.
5— Op-16.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1849
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, did you ever give any attention or con-
sideration to the possibility of transmitting the substance or the copies
of those intercepts that I have directed your attention to ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. As I have stated, my responsibility
was limited to sending out, or included what was a limitation, the
sending out of all information except that respecting enemy com-
munications and that which might require or involve operational plans
and movements. This message Avas [4^01] of that character.
I am not convinced that I would have been authorized or permitted to
send that out, or whether I should have given it or suggested to an-
other agency that it should send it out, but in any respect, answering
your question, I did not consider sending it out because I did not
evaluate it, as I had not, as an indication of the detailed intelligence
they desired.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, did you consider Hawaii to be beyond possi-
bility of attack ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you think it was beyond probability of attack ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. Is that the reason wdiy you did not adequately evalu-
ate those messages concerning ship movements
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart (continuing). In and around Hawaii ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; it had nothing to do with the possi-
bility versus the probability of them.
. Mr. Gearhart. Did you refrain from transmitting copies of inter-
cepts for any particular reason ?
Admiral Wilkinson. If I considered sending them, which I doubt,
I would have refrained from sending copies of them because of danger
to tlie code, the code-breaking activities.
[4902] Mr. Gearhart. What was the practice of your division ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not to send copies outside the Navy Depart-
ment and to limit those very carefully.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you ever send any copies of intercepts ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge and only at the last
moment did I send the gist of such an intercept, when we said that the
diplomatic agencies have been told to burn their codes.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, by transmitting that information any Japa-
nese who cracked our code would know that we had cracked theirs,
wouldn't they ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not only that, but if any widespread conver-
sation or discussion had come to the ears of any Japanese agents, they
would have known we had cracked it. I think our code was fairly
secure. What we were attempting to avoid was the spread of knowl-
edge that we were engaged in code breaking and had succeeded in
breaking their code.
I think I recall that General Marshall testified that he had heard
rumors that that knowledge was beginning to leak out.
Mr. Gearhart. You were present when General Marshall wrote out
the message on the 7th of December, the one that arrived in Hawaii
too late ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
[4^03] Mr. Gearhart. You were not among those in that group ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
1850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. Well, in that message he tells them that "Tomorrow
the Japanese are going to deliver an ultimatum to the State Depart-
ment" and also that they were going to deliver it at 1 o'clock. He did
not hesitate to tell what he had learned through reading the intercepts,
did he?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; nor did we in sending out the message
about breaking the codes.
Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, your office had been sending out
the substance of intercepts all during the year of 1941 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe not, sir. I think those messages you
spoke of were sent out by the communications office.
Mr. Gearhart. What does "OPNAV" stand for?
_ Admiral Wilkinson. OPNAV ? That is Chief of Naval Opera-
tions office as a whole. Is there any number, small number on it after-
ward, Op-13, Op-20, something like that ?
Mr. Gearhart. "OPNAV" is the way this reads.
Admiral Wilkinson. That is general operations of the Navy ; yes.
Mr. Gearhart. That means the Chief of Naval Operations?
Admiral Wilkinson. Or someone in his office. The actual
[4^04] office number if it is prepared in a subordinate office would
be indicated by a number such as OP-20o which would be Communi-
cations, or Op-16, which would be Intelligence.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, you have looked through these messages that
have been sent them by OPNAV, have you not, during the year of
1941?
Admiral Wilkinson. I have seen this book. I am not sure that I
recall which were sent out by OPNAV and which were otherwise
indicated.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, here is one that was sent out on the 7th day
of July 1941 to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and for
the information of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. This
reads :
Tokyo to Washington 1 July 329:
Japan directs eight Marus on east coast United States rush cargo handling
and proceed Colon pass through Canal to Pacific between 16 and 22 July on fol-
lowing schedule: 16th Tokai ; 17th —
and so forth, naming a lot of dates.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. You hnve that before you, do you?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. Page 6 of Exhibit 37.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
[4905'] Mr. Gearhart. That is transmittal of information that
was received from intercepts, is it not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. Turn over to page 7 and you will find another
message.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. That is a transmittal by OPNAV or whatever you
call it of information received from intercepts, isn't it?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Likewise the next, on page 8?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1851
Mr. Gearhart. And page 9?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Page 10?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Those were all sent out by the Com-
munications Office and all sent out in July. I am informed that that
practice was discontinued after July. In any event, it was not under
the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Mr. Gearhart. That was sent out because someone who then had
the say-so believed that it was necessary to advise American com-
manders in the field of information that was received in intercepts?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. There was a balance between the
information going out and the security of the code- [4906]
breaking processes.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Admiral Wiliunson. As we have heard a few moments ago, sir,
there were rumors of the suspicions as to code breaking and during the
summer and fall every attempt was made to tighten up the security.
This practice was apparently discontinued and we were constantly
being warned by all hands to be careful about how the code breaking
was threatened, the knowledge of code breaking was possible of
suspicion.
Mr. Gearhart. All right. Now in a lot of those messages that I
called your attention to, the ones relating to ship movements and in-
quiries concerning ship movements, did they take on any greater im-
portance in your mind when the Navy translated this message from
Tokyo to Washington, November 5, 1941, translated on November 5,
1941:
Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange-
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoid-
able one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the
Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great
determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
[4907] This information is to be liept strictly to yourself only.
Now, when you read that message of a deadline being fixed by Japan
for the doing of something, didn't the previous Japanese ship-move-
ment intercepts take on a new and a more important aspect in your
estimation ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would not say that it did, sir. That was in
the character of prospective diplomatic negotiations that they were
anxious to reach a conclusion on. Our war plans people were fully
cognizant of it. They were aware of the diplomatic negotiations and,
in fact, on October 16 they had sent out a warning message, on Novem-
ber 24 they sent another and on November 27 still another. These
messages were in a class affecting the operations of the fleet, which 1
did not feel was in my province to relay.
Mr. Gearhart. When you read the intercept from Tokyo to Hong
Kong dated November 14, 1941, translated November 26, 1941, in which
the following is said :
Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the
Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this,
the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it
pertains to China, is :
a. We will completely destroy British and American [^908] power in
China.
1852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and
interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.
c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even
though they might have connections with the new Chinese government should it
become necessary.
When yoit read that warlike intercept didn't the interest in our
ship movements in Hawaii take on an added importance in your
estimation?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say the interest in our ship move-
ments everywhere did. The interest of the enemy espionage in the
movement of our ships and the information they dispatched in con-
junction with the messages hitherto were all matters considered by
the question of how the fleet would operate and what it would do
and were measures under the jurisdiction of the War Plans Section.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, in the light of these last two intercepts that
I have called your attention to, intercepts having to do with a dead
line and Japan's martial intentions, after you read them and you
say the shipping movement intercepts took on a more important
aspect and a greater importance, did you at that time give anv con-
siderations to whether or not you should transmit to Admiral Kimmel
the substance of the ship- [4:909] movement intercepts or send
him copies thereof?
Admiral Wilkinson. Wliether we informed him of the fact that
these detailed inquiries as to the locations in Pearl Harbor had come
in in addition to the regular — I mean aside from the regular espionage
that was going on, is that your question ?
Mr. Gearhart. I want the question answered.
Admiral Wilkinson. He knew there was a regular espionage.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, as you have testified that the ship-movement
intercepts took on greater importance in your mind in the light of
the dead-line message I have read you, did you at that time give some
consideration to the proposition that you should send Admiral Kim-
mel the substance of the ship-movement intercepts, or copies thereof?
Admiral Wilkinson. May I ask you, sir, if you meant, should I
tell him than in addition to the regular espionage with which he and
we were familiar, that there were special messages inquiring as to
special information desired from the spies?
Mr. Gearhart, That is right.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I did not.
Mr. Gearhart. In other words, did you give any consideration to
the question as to whether or not you should give to Admiral Kimmel
the information that you had?
[JfDW] Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. Gearhart. All right. Then wlien you encountered this inter-
cept, directing your attention to page 165 of Exhibit No. 1 in this
proceeding from Tokyo to Washington, November 22, 1941. [Read-
ing:]
To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our
fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the
solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we
wanted to settle Japanese-American i-elations by the 25th, but if within the
next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans;
if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you — '
twenty ninth) ; if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an under-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1853
Standing with Great Britain and the Netlierlands ; and in sliort if everything
can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean
it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things' are
automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful considera-
tion and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the
infoiiuation of you two Ambassadors alone.
[4911] Now when you read this intercepted message that the
Japanese had fixed a positively imaUerable deadline of November 29
at which things are automatically going to happen, after you i:ead
that did it not occur to you, Admiral Wilkinson, that you should give
to Admiral Kimmel the information that you had?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. If that was information of the
character that would influence the operations of the Fleet, whether
to move in or out of port, I am not sure that it was within the responsi-
bility or the authority of my office to send that. If, however, it was
within that authority and responsibility, I did not consider sending
it to him.
Mr. Gearhart. You were charged with evaluating all information
that came to you, domestic and foreign. You were charged with the
responsibility of disseminating that information. You had the infor-
mation. Did you go and talk to Admiral Stark about it, or to any
other higher officer than yourself?
Admiral Wilkinson. I was charged with evaluating the informa-
tion, but I had been ordered not to develop the enemy intentions. I
was charged with the dissemination of this information "as desir-
able." I had been restricted as to the dissemination of information
of this character. I should perhaps have talked to Admiral Stark,
or to Admiral Turner, [4-912] about it. I did not. The infor-
mation, however, was available to all hands, including myself.
Mr. Gearhart. So much for that. Now I want to ask you some
more questions about a few intercepts which were not translated until
after the 7th.
I notice, by making a rough count of Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No.
2, that on December 6, 36 or 37 Japanese intercepts were decoded.
Without counting them carefully, I notice in these two exhibits that
very, very few were decoded on the 5th and very few on the preceding
day.
How do you account for the fact that on the 6th day of December
our decoders were decoding like lightning and on previous days they
decoded very, very few in comparison ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not account for it, sir. That was being
done by the War Department Signal Intelligence Service and by the
Navy Communications Service. It is possible that the completion of
the transcripts were in part done on the 5th and finished on the 6th.
It is possible that the key to the code was obtained on the 5th and
applied on the 6th, but I haven't any information as to why.
Mr. Gearhart. Do you not consider it regrettable that a message
containing this phrase remained undecoded until the 8th of December,
a message which was received on December 6, 1941, from Honolulu
to Tokyo, "I imagine that in all [4^13] probability there is
considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack
against these places," referring to Pearl Harbor? That appears on
page 27 of Exhibit No. 2.
1854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. You ask me if it was not unfortunate that it
was not decoded before?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. sir.
Mr. Gearhart. It was tragic that that was not decoded before?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. How do you account for the fact that was not
decoded, when the decoders were decoding very rapidly and decoding
messages in great number on that day, the 6th ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not account for it, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. How do you account for them picking out the 13-
part message to decode on the 6th and ignore this surprise attack
message that arrived on the same day?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not account for it. It is possible it came
in another code which they could not so readily translate; it is possible
that they were primed to get that 14-part message because the pilot
message had come before it and they were on the lookout for it and
wanted to [4^H] tackle it first.
Mr. Gearhart. Was there any special organization of decoders on
the 6th day of December 1941 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir. It was not under my
kn'>wledge of cognizance. That was in the communications office.
Mr. Gearhart. Have you heard anyone account for the tremendous
output of decoding that occurred on that day?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Has it been subject to conversational discussion?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I think I heard Captain Kramer
remark that there was a heavy demand for translators that day, but
that was, of course, after the decoding work had been done.
Mr. Gearhart. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson, from Michigan, will
inquire.
Senator Ferguson. Did you. Admiral, have any conversation with
Admiral Kirk about why he had been replaced in a few months?
Admiral Wilkinson. I feel quite sure I did, sir. I know he was
not replaced. He went to sea at his own request, in order to take
advantage of an opportunity for command.
[4015] Senator Ferguson. Whom would he have to make a
request to?
Admiral Wilkinson. The Chief of Naval Operations, I presume,
would release him, and the Bureau of Personnel would give him the
orders as to his duty.
Senator Ferguson. Had you requested the assignment in there?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. It was a surprise to me. I was in
command of a battleship at the time.
Senator Ferguson. You were called from the fleet then?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. To come into Intelligence?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you briefed on any subject when you came
in?
Admiral Wilkinson. I spent some little time going through the
Office of Naval Intelligence, spending a few hours in each section and
division in order to see what subject they handled and how they han-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1855
died them. I had intermittent converScations with Admiral Kirk
and finally a fairly complete turn-over personally from him orally.
I was not briefed by any officer outside of Admiral Kirk and his sub-
ordinate divisions.
Senator Ferguson. Were you briefed by Admiral Kirk?
Admiral Wilkinson. In the sense of the usual turn-over,
[WW] yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you briefed on the diplomatic messages
up to that day ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically. I was in the Far Eastern
Division and discussed the general tenor of them; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now who in the Far Eastern Division did you
discuss the general tenor with?
Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McCollum.
Senator Ferguson. Captain McCollum?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, the head of the Division. He was a
continuing source of knowledge in there, had been in there some little
time, and would subsequently find me there as well, and he told me
the status up to the moment.
Senator Ferguson. You think you came there the 15th of October?
Admiral Wilkinson. I took over the duties on the 15th of October.
This period of briefing I* spoke of, I had gone through the various
offices, that took perhaps 2 weeks.
Senator Ferguson. B'^fore that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. Before the 15th of October.
Senator Ferguson. So you really came into the Department about
the 1st of October?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I spent a time in the [4917]
individual offices seeing what they did. I had a fairly complete and
informative turn-over.
Senator Ferguson. You mean when you say that the mechanical
end of the of'ce you were looking over for 2 weeks?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Not the mechanical, I mean each one
of the sections, I mean the Domestic Branch, the Foreign Branch,
or the Geographic Section, or the methods of counterespionage, sus-
pection, and so on, in each one of the several offices, of which there
were perhaps 20, I spent a few hours.
Senator Ferguson. That would be the administrative end then,
thft ' a;t --P =t?
Admiral Wilkinson. The operating end entirely. Not purely ad-
ministrativp. the operating end of the office; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. At that time you knew, on the 16th, that there
was a chanp-p of Cabinet in Japan?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do vou recall that?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did the Intelligence Branch figure in any way
that that was a changing point in our negotiations?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and I think we so reported it [4^^<§]
in our fortnightly situation, or fortnightly summaries, as our general
understanding of the picture. The Far Eastern Section had con-
siderable information on the make-up of the new Cabinet, that is on
the military and naval members of it. We were all cognizant of the
1856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fact that this made a more military tenor in the Japanese Govern-
ment than had existed before.
[49J9] Senator Ferguson. From a diplomatic viewpoint, when
ypu went in, effective on the 15th of October, where did we stand in
relation to the negotiations with Japan, as far as you are concerned;
what was the diplomatic situation as of that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is that the negotiations, which
had been begun the preceding spring, interrupted in the summer, had
been resiimed, were now being carried on with Admiral Nomura, the
Japanese Ambassador, as the senior Japanese representative, Mr.
Kurusu, had yet to arrive.
Senator Ferguson. At that time, were you familiar with what had
taken place about the I7th of August 1941 in relation to our diplo-
matic situation?
Admiral Wilkinson. With relation to the Argentina Conference,
you mean, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, only by newspaper accounts.
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell me what the newspaper ac-
counts were at that time, on that question? Tell me what yoii got
from the newspapers.
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not think I gof very much more than the
"four freedoms," and I think there was a communique there, I forget
it now.
[4-920] Senator Ferguson. Pardon me?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think there was a communique issued, but
T forget it now, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You say you learned about the "four freedoms"
from the newspapers?
Admiral Wilkinson. To my recollection ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is that all you knew about that conference?
Admiral Wilkinson. I knew our naval and military staffs had
attended, and I knew, in all probability, they had discussed measures
of supply of England. The lease-lend, I am not sure whether it was
in effect at that moment, but it soon was, and I knew they had probably
discussed that and discussed the safety of the xltlantic lanes. I knew
nothing of any discussions whatsoever regarding the Far East.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn about the discussions
that had taken place there with relation to the Far East?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know that I ever learned, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you were going to make a summary or
appraisal of the intelligence that was coming throaigh, isn't that
correct ?
[4921] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever learned about the parallel action
of the two countries ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Only recently.
Senator Ferguson. Just recently?
Admiral Wilkinson. As I think I have explained, Senator, our in-
terest, responsibilities, and authority were confined to the action of
foreign countries, and particularly prospective enemies. Matters on
arrangement within our own country and diplomatic, military, and
naval plans or arrangements or understandings for cooperation were
not given to us.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1857
Senator Ferguson. Then the question, us I understand it, as far as
Intelligence was concerned, of what our diplomatic negotiations were,
did not concern you ; you did not use that in any way to evaluate what
the enemy might be going to do?
Admiral Wilkinson. As I could learn and find out matters of that
degree, yes, of course, they would be reflected in our interest. There
was no machinery set up that I w\ns definitely informed of. I learned
a good deal through the translation of these intercepts as to what
proposals our State Department had made to Japan which otherwise
1 would not have known through the machinery [4-922] exist-
ing.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall getting the Winant message in
relation to the movement of ships on the 6th of December 1941 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it specifically, sir, but if I did
see it, and I presume I did because it came through the information
channels, it was confirmatory of the evidences that we had already had
of this advance through the South China Sea.
Senator Ferguson. Had you received Admiralty messages on the
same point?
Admiral Wilkinson. I had been informed of them, yes, sir, and I
think I had seen them.
Senator Ferguson. What did those two messages mean to you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. They meant an attack was coming in the South
China Sea area.
Senator Ferguson. It meant an attack was coming on the south?
I did not get that?
Admiral Wilkinson. The South China Sea area, if we are speak-
ing of the same message. You are sj^eaking of the Winant message
regarding the movement of ships?
, Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. That is the attack which [4923']
we had foreseen.
Senator Ferguson. What did that mean to the United States ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I have my doubts, sir. It might mean we
would come into the war in support of Siam, if that country were
attacked, or Singapore, if that were attacked ; it might mean we would
not come into the war.
Senator Ferguson. Why would we possibly come in if Singapore was
attacked, in your opinion, as of that time?
Admiral Wn.KiNSON. Only because of two things : First because of
our possible relations with England, as had been evidenced by the
arrangements for the transfer of food and ammunition to England,
the lend-lease, ocean convoys; the second thing, because that was an
encroachment, a further advance of Japan, and the policy of our
country apparently was directed toward preventing the aggressive
moves of Japan extending beyond certain limits.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Now, I want to get what information you had in relation to the
United States policy as far as Japan was concerned, if they moved
beyond certain limits, as you now say in your last answer.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
[4924] Senator Ferguson. What was your information along
that line ?
79716 — 46 — pt. 4 — - I'J
1858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. I had the information — I cannot say whether
I saw the document, or was told about it — that an advance of the
Japanese forces to the westward of the one hundredth meridian or the
southward of the tenth parallel of latitude would be a matter of grave
concern to both England and America.
Whether that policy, as so indicated, of our State Department would
be translated by the Congress and people into not only grave concern,
but a resistance by war, I did not know.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you say someone showed it to you, or some-
one told you about it. Is that true ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure which, sir, whether I had heard
of it, or I had seen some message to that effect.
Senator Ferguson. Can you recall what kind of message you may
have seen along that same line?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I think I have seen some exhibit to
that effect now. It may be that that I have seen it.
If the counsel will show me, I can perhaps speak of it.
Senator Ferguson. I want to try and take you back [^^5]
as of the date, rather than what you saw here or heard at the hearing.
Admiral Wilkinson. What I am speaking of now, is what I have
seen which embodied those same parallels, those same geographical
limits.
As to the time I knew of the geographical limits, I cannot remember
whetlier I knew of them by someone telling me, or whether I knew
of them by seeing a paper. You ask me what paper I saw. I saw,
if I saw a paper, it was probably this paper you speak of now. I think
more probably I was stold that by Captain Schuirmann, who was the
Director of the Central Division and liaison officer with the State
Department.
The Vice Chairman. It is now 4 o'clock. You will require some
further time, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until
10 o'clock tomorrow morning. You will return then please, Admiral.
(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., the
following day, Wednesday, December 19, 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1859
[Wm PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK
wednesday, december 19, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF THE Pearl Hareor Attack,
Washington, D. G.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and
Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Ilannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
[4-927] The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order.
Does counsel have anything at this time?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Yesterday we had up an inqury made of counsel by Senator Fergu-
son, I think, under date of November 16, in which he said, "Please
obtain for me all information that any of the services or the Govern-
ment had that Japan knew we had broken their code."
There was a response from me immediately on the I7th, which said :
With reference to your letter of November 16 requesting "all information that
any of the services or the Government had that Japan knew we had broken
their code," there is no indication that Japan ever knew it. All information would
indicate the contrary.
Now, yesterday I made the mistake, without checking up on the
fact, of saying or thinking that I had submitted that request to the
Navy or the Army, and they had reported and it was on the basis of
their report that I made that statement, and as the result of that there
were some imputations made on the good faith of the Army and Navy
in not producing what we asked for.
I want to say that imputation is not justified because I now find
I never did ask for that material, and that this [4928] answer
that I made was made based on my own impression of what they were
asking, and what the evidence was at that time. I am quite willing
to be open to criticism for not having followed it up, although at
that time we were pretty busy just getting started, and possibly I
might be forgiven for that.
The Vice Chairman. I am sure we all recognize that.
Mr. Mitchell. At any rate, we had the inquiry made. Bear in
mind that this inquiry, as I interpret it, I am quit:e sure referred to
what the Japs knew about our breaking the code prior to Pearl Harbor.
1860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I was not thinking of any information about that in 1944 when
Marshall wrote his letter, because we had not asked that they produce
any of these intercepts at that day, so I was referring to what the
conditions were prior to Pearl Harbor, and I also feel quite sure,
although the request is not limited to that
Senator Ferguson. That is all I was referring to, Mr. Mitchell.
There is no misunderstanding about that.
Mr. Mitchell. There is no misunderstanding about that.
I also want to say at that time this was in the singular, and I was
thinking of the diplomatic code, the magic or the purple stuff, so I
wrote and told him I did not know of anj'^ evidence of that kind. I
should have asked [4.9^5] the Departments for it, but I am
glad to make it clear or to get straightened out on it.
Senator Brewster. I think I had some correspondence also. Did
you check that ?
Mr. Mitchell. Our file clerk was not able to get in from Virginia
this morning. She has been ill for a week. She went away yester-
day. We will have to let that go, a little.
The Vice Chairman. We will take judicial knowledge of the weather
conditions today. All of us had a hard time getting here.
Mr. Mitchell. There is a communication from you, I am quite
certain.
Senator Brewster. Yes, along the same line.
Mr. Mitchell. I have not heard from the Navy this morning on
this, but the Army comes in, having worked hard on this subject with a
number of intercepts during the months of April and May 1941. inter-
cepts of Jap messages between Berlin and Tokj'o, Tokyo and Wash-
ington is one of them, two, three, four of them. They all indicate a
suspicion on the part of Japan that we were cracking one or more of
their codes.
Senator Brewster. Can we have those read into the record?
[4930] Mr. Mitchell. I will be glad to read them. It is not
always clear what code they are talking about. Ther^ are a number
of them. The first one is from Tokyo to Berlin.
The Vice Chairman. Pardon me a minute. Senator Brewster and
Senator Ferguson had requested some information about whether
Japan had suspected or knew we were breaking their code, and had
requested some information from counsel, and counsel is giving a
report on that now.^
The Chairman. I see.
Mr. Mitchell. At the request of counsel, a search was made with
reference to the intercepts prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. We have
not made any attempt to find out what they suspected later on. It
was Marshall's letter. They say they were still cracking. I suppose
that is all I know about that.
This message is as follows :
From: Tokyo (Konoe)
To : Berlin
April 16, 1941
Purple
#329 Secret.
Ke your #407 "
We suspect that the several codes P, 80= and [4^31] OITE^ are
being cryptanalyzed by foreign powers and today we have none too many code
books to spare. Therefore, when it is necessary to send a message, and at
1 See also hearings, Part 5, p. 2069 et seq. for additional messages indicating suspicion
or knowledge by the Japanese that their codes were being broken.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1861
the same time insure its secrecy, please dispatcli them by machine or by TSU "
code. In case revelation of the contents are made to foreign powers, take care
to paraphrase them from beginning to end. I want you to use OITE ** for
messages of relatively slight importance.
Relay to Italy and Turkey.
" — S. I. S. #16312 — Berlin tells Tokyo that intelligence wires emanating from Japanese
oflaces in the Near East and Egypt to offices in Germany and Italy should be appropriately
paraphrased before transmitting their contents to the Germans and Italians in order to
avoid giving them clues in decoding Japanese codes. Berlin recommends use of certain
codes in this connection.
'' — An auxiliary code.
« — P-1.
"1 — PA-K2.
® — J series codes (J18-K7 now under study).
ARMY 16407 Trans 4/19/41 (5)
The next dispatch is from Berlin to Tokyo, May 3, 1941, marked
"Purple No. 482".
From: Berlin (Oshima)
To: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
3 May 1941
(Purple-CA)
#482
STAAMAA STAHMER called on me this day (evening?) and stating that this
request was to be kept strictly secret, he said that Germany maintains a fairly
reliable intelligence organization abroad (or — "in the U. S."?), and according to
information obtained from the above mentioned organization it is quite (or —
"fairly"?) reliably established that the U. S. government is reading Ambassador
Nomura's code messages, and then asked that drastic steps should be taken
regarding this matter.
There are at least two circumstances substantiating the above (suspicion).
One circumstance is that Germany is reading our code messages * * *. Re-
garding this, during my previous residency here, they were known to have a
large scale cryplanalytic organization —
(unfinished — last two-thirds not available)
JD-1 2369 (M-A) Navy trans. 6 May 19411
[49SS^ Senator BrewstW. Mr. Counsel, you spoke of two cir-
cumstances. Did they give two ?
Mr. Mitchell. No. It is a garbled message and there are some
dashes after the words "two circumstances," so we don't know what
it was ; and then the message breaks off entirely. They didn't seem
to get it all.
The next one is from Tokyo to Berlin, May 5, 1941 :
From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
To: Berlin (Oshima)
5 May 1941
(Purple-CA)
#370
Please express our appreciation to S^AMMAA STAHMER for the informa-
tion in question and ask him if it is not possible to give us the authority for the
statement that it has been fairly reliably established that the U. S. government
is reading our code messages, so that we might take appropriate action.
Reply requested.
JD-1: 2368 (M*A) Navy trans. 6 May 1941
The next one is from Tokyo to Washington, May 5, 1941, No. 192:
From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister).
To: Washington (Koshi).
U934] 5 May, 1941
(Purple)
#192
According to a fairly reliable source of information it appears almost certain
that the United States government is reading your code messages.
Please let me know whether you have any suspicion of the above.
.TD-1: 2346 (A) Navy Trans. 5-51-41 (S-TT)
1862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The next is from Washington to Tokyo, May 5, 1941, No. 267 :
From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin).
5 May, 1941
(Purple)
#267
(Most guarded secrecy).
( Foreign Office secret ) .
Re your #192*.
For our part, the most stringent precautions are taken by all custodians of
codes and ciphers, as well as of other documents.
On this particular matter I have nothing in mind, but pending investigation
please wire back any concrete instances or details which may turn up.
*JD-1: 2346 (M) Navy Trans. 5-6-41 (7)
JD-1: 2367
[4935] The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 7, 1941 :
From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
To: Washington (Nomura)
7 May 1941
(Purple— CA)
#198 Regarding your #267 :*
This matter was told very confidentially to Ambassador Oshima** by the
Germans as having been reported to them by a fairly reliable intelligence me-
dium ; but to our inquiry they are said to have refused to divulge the basis on
which they deemed it to be practically certain.
JD-1 :2367 Nomura requests further details of the basis for the report that
his code msgs are being read by the U. S. government.
**General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin.
JD*-1:2388 (F) Navy trans. 7 May 1941 (S-TT)
The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 7, 1941, No. 1015 :
From : Tokyo.
To: Washington, Bangkok, Rome.
7 May, 1941
(Purple)
#1015 (Circular)
Immediately upon receipt of this message, [4936] use 1941 regulations
for A and B code machines until further notice.
16974
JD-1: 2372 (A) Navy Trans. 5-7-41 (S-TT)
I think that refers expressly to the machine type.
The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 8, 1941, no number :
From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
May 8, 1941
Purple (CA)
No number.
From Vice Chief OHASI to IMinister WAKASUGI.
I want you to leave the custody of the government code in the hands of IGUCHI.
No matter how long the communications are or how hurriedly the code must be
used, there should be no occasion to call upon the services of telegraphic clerks.
Please impress upon all of your secretaries that this is a special regulation.
In view of the importance of the details of our recent exchange of wires, please
(burn?) them immediately.
ARMY 2446 Trans. 5/9/41 (S)
Then there is one from Washington to Tokyo, May 9, 1941, unnum-
bered :
[4937] From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
9 May 1941
(Purple-CA)
Unnumbered
To the Vice Minister*, from Wakasugi.**
I respectfully acknowledge receipt of your telegram.***
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1863
Because of various duties at this office it requires a long time for a secretary
alone to handle long messages and the increased volume of traffice in connection
with this matter.****
(My message :j^272***** required 6 men woi-king for 6 hours.)
With the opening of negotiations, the volume of telegraphic traffic is bound to
increase tremendously. As time is at a premium in handling these communica-
tions, you can well appreciate the inadvisability of having only the secretary han-
dle this work. Furthermore, it goes without saying that the increased traffic
will interfere greatly with other duties of this office.
However, fortunately, our communication clerks have been constantly reminded
of the necessity of maintaining security, and they have faithfully adhered to this
policy in their work.
[4938] Although I appreciate the intent of your telegram *** from the
standpoint of security, I, nevertheless request your authorization to enlist the
aid of Horiuchi, Hori, and Kazuwara to handle communication duties under
strict supervision.
Also please authorize me to have Kawabata of Chicago come here temporarily
to assist us in our communication work. (Bring all codes and do his work in this
office),
*Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ohashi.
**Japanese Minister to Washington, under Ambassador Nomura.
***S^e JD-1: 2446, unnumbered, dated 8 May (Purple-CA), in which Tokyo
issues Washington special regulations for custody of the Chief of Mission private
code (CA).
**** Japanese-American negotiations, being conducted in great secrecy.
JD-1: 2494 (A-M) Navy Trans. 12 May 1941 (7)
The next one is from Washington to Tokyo, May 20, 1941, No. 327 :
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
May 20, 1941
Purple (CA)
No. 327.
INTELLIGENCE :
Though I do not know which ones I have [4939] discovered the United
States is reading some of our codes.
As for how I got the intelligence, I will inform you by courier or another
safe way.
ARMY Trans. 5/21/41 (7)"
The next is from Tokyo to all Japanese merchant vessels :
From : Tokyo.
To : All Japanese Merchant Vessels.
30 May 1941
(NL)
No. 1
The Navy "S" code was seized from one of our merchant ships in a certain
foreign port, together with other secret documents in custory of the captain.
The use of the Navy "S" code shall be discontinued except when absolutely nec-
essary for training purposes.
And, as previously instructed, when there is a possibility that official inspec-
tion may be made, all secret documents should be promptly burned.
JN-1 : 69 (C) Navy Trans. 5-31-41 (M)
That is the last one. The Army reports that they are continuing
their search and the Navy reports that it has found some messages
which are now being photostated. Whether they are the same or
others I do not know yet.
The Vice Chairman. Is that all, Mr. Counsel?
[W40] Mr. Mitchell. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Very well.
1864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. THEODORE STARK WILKINSON
(Resumed)
The Vice Chairman, Admiral, do you have any statement you want
to make before you resume your testimony ?
Admiral Wilkinson. With regard to some of the inquiries made of
me yesterday to bring information when available :
Counsel has just read the dispatches which I was requested to look
up, the second one of which referred particularly to the one I spoke
of where Berlin had advised Tokyo that they had information as
to breaking the codes.
With respect to the personnel in the district intelligence office in
Honolulu at Pearl Harbor time, the nearest date for which we have
figures is December 16, at which time there were 41 officers, 60 enlisted
men, and 3 civilian agents in that office.
Inquiries are being made as to the surveillance, screening, and gen-
eral security of the civilian laborers and workmen in the Pearl Harbor
Navy Yard, as requested by Senator Brewster. I have not the answer
on that at present.
Thes Vice Chairman. Is that all ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
[494^] Senator Ferguson. Yesterday, Admiral Wilkinson, I
was asking you about the knowledge that was given to you at the time
you went in in relation to diplomatic negotiations with Japan and
also the military and naval knowledge, because you went into the
department on the 15th of October.
Now, can you recall that you were briefed on the military situation
as far as our forces were concerned, and their forces, so that you would
be able to take the knowledge that you were getting and analyze it,
so it would be of value to those that you were to give it to ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I had general information of our own forces
from my previous work at sea and I had a professional interest in
where they were acquired before I took over and afterward from the
ship movements office and from the War Plans as to the disposition of
our forces. I was not formally briefed nor formally informed as to
it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. A^Hien Admiral Ingersoll talked to you- — as I
understand it, he did talk to you — he told you that your duties would
be varied from those that were in writing?
Admiral Wilkinson. I asked him to confirm that specific point only,
sir, that I mentioned.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did he give you any reasons why
there was to be a change?
Admiral Wilkinson, No, sir. He said that was a naval [4^4^]
practice as opposed to the Army practice, that the Army practice
was that the so-called G-2 office, which was not only the Military
Intelligence Division but also an Assistant Chief of Staif, that that
otrice was charged with preparing the enemy side of the Estimate of
the Situation, so-called, which is to say, what can the enemy do, what
will he do, and what are his possibilities, that that was assigned to
the Army G-2, but that that was not a part of the duties or within the
scope of the activities of the Naval Intelligence, that that estimate of
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1865
the situation, both the enemy side and our own side was prepared in
War Plaiis.
That was the only point I asked him about, sir, and that was how
he explained it.
[4^4^] Senator Ferguson. And he explained it in that way ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You asked him because the instructions in the
manual were direct that you had other duties than what you were
then performing?
Admiral Wilkinson," No, sir; I don't think the instructions in the
manual conflicted directly. They said I should get all the facts and
information bearing on the enemy's intentions. They did not tell me
to estimate them, and the instructions in the manual said, "Disseminate
information as desirable," and "desirable" would be such instructions,
or otherwise, as I might receive.
I thought, in other words, that his word to me was consistent with
the manual.
Senator Ferguson. And it made a direct limitation ?
Admiral Wilkinson. A direct limitation and an order from an
officer, a responsible officer in the chain of command.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know or did you hear after you came in
that there had been a change in the sending of messages to Admiral
Kimmel in August of that year?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall that I did, sir. I was informed
as to the present status and continued that. I don't know that I was
informed of a prior status [4d4-4] which had been changed.
Senator Ferguson. You just had the present status?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I didn't go into the history of it.
[494^] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Admiral Hart had
his own means on the Philippines of getting his information in the
CINCAP?
Admiral Wilkinson. I knew that both Admiral Hart and Ad-
miral Kimmel had agencies wherein they could get the radio intelli-
gence with regard to the movement of the enemy ships. I knew both
of them had agencies which had some facilities, however slight, for
attacking codes. I do not know that I knew that Admiral Hart was
able actually to solve the purple code.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that Admiral Hart did have
means of getting diplomatic messages?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that I did ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that Admiral Kimmel did not have any
such means at all ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I do not recall that I did.
Senator Ferguson. You do not recall that you knew that?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. I knew that they both had certain facil-
ities but the extent of them I did not know.
Senator Ferguson. Did Ambassador Grew's messages come to you?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
[4946] Sentor Ferguson. Then you did not know
Admiral Wilkinson. My error, sir. The messages he sent to the
State Department during my tenure of office, my liaison officer over
1866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
there picked those up, but not the — I thought for the moment you were
speaking of the first message of January.
Senator Ferguson. No.
Admiral Wilkinson. The more recent messages did, yes.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with his message on the third
where he said that the Japanese might strike with dramatic suddenness ?
Admiral Wilkinson. The message of what date, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. November the 3d.
Admiral Wilkinson. I think I probably saw it, sir. I think I did
see it because my liaison officer obtained these messages from the State
Department.
Senator Ferguson. Did that change your thinking at that time as to
whether or not war was near or not near?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes and no, sir. It crecked so closely with
the movements that they were making into the South China Sea,
which were already beginning then and were intensified later, that it
probably directed my attention there rather than the possibility of
their making a sudden strike against the United States at some other
place.
[4-94'^] Senator Ferguson. Now, when you were before the Rob-
erts committee was there a stenographer present ?
Admiral Wilkinson, My recollection is there was, sir.
Senator Ferguson, There was?
Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is there was, yes, sir; and I
had expected to see it and, in fact, when I came here I looked for that
record and found there was no record, only a summary.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he took stenographic notes
of what you said ?
Admiral Wilkinson, I thought so.
Senator Ferguson, You thought so at the time?
Admiral Wilkinson, Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you do not know why, then, they were not
transcribed ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson, You never heard?
Admiral Wilkinson, I never heard.
Senator Ferguson. This paper
Admiral Wilkinson. I found a precis but not a brief, not a
transcription.
Senator Ferguson, You did not prepare this paper then that you
brought in yesterday?
Admiral Wilkinson. I prepared that as a memorandum to
[4'94S] Admiral Stark after the event of what my testimony had
been according to my recollection, but it was in no sense a stenographic
record of my testimony. It was just for Admiral Stark's informa-
tion of what they had nsked me and what I had said.
Senator Ferguson, Did the Roberts committee draw up an instru-
ment similar to this?
Admiral Wilkinson, Not to my knowledge. That was my memo-
randum to Admiral Stark, It was entirely within the office and had
no connection with the Commission, Now, the Commission may have
made, and I thought they did, an actual transcript by a stenographer,
but when their report came in it was only what they called a precis of
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1867
testimony of those witnesses they heard before they left Washington
to go to Pearl Harbor, among them myself, and the precis with respect
to my testimony was about two paragraphs long as I recall.
Senator Ferguson. Has the comisel got that copy of those two para-
graphs ?
Mr. Mitchell. I think Senator Brewster has that. I would not be
able to check it without looking at our files.
Mr. MuuPHY, Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. MuRi'HY. I think in the Roberts' report itself you will find a
discussion of the procedure they followed. They \.PJ4^\ did
not take notes, apparently, in this country on that part of their hear-
ings and later on they went on into a stenographic record, but there is
the discussion you want in the report itself.
Senator t erguson. I just wanted to clear this up this morning as to
what took place in that hearing.
Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection was that they had a confi-
dential secretary or ship's clerk or someone present taking notes but
it may be that he was only taking an abstract rather than taking
stenographic notes.
Senator Ferguson. I am going to try and take you back to the morn-
ing of the 6th.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. About a certain meeting with Admiral Turner
and there was also a meeting with, as I understand it, McCollum and
Bratton. Do you recall that meeting?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I have seen some mention of it. I do
not recall it. I saw McCollum constantly and occasionally Bratton;
not so often Bratton.
Senator Ferguson. Well, on page 998 of the Navy Top Secret Ad-
miral Turner talks about the meeting ; at least it relates to the instru-
ment that was drawn.
Do you remember a long document, some 500 words, being drawn up ?
Admiral Wilkinson. By whom, sir? ^
Senator Ferguson. By McCollum.
Admiral Wilkinson. Not as of that date. I remember a December
the 1st memorandum.
Senator Ferguson. Let me read this. I will change it. It was not
on the morning of the 6th as I see here. There is another meeting
that I had in mind on that.
Question No. 48 on page 998 [reading] :
There is evidence before this court that Commander McCollum in the Office
of the Director of Naval Intelligence prepared a summary of information on
the Japanese-United States i*elatioiiship over a period some time preceding the
third or fourth of December 1941 which was for the information of the Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Did you have any knowledge of the preparation
of such a dispatch?
Answer. Yes. We had discussed the advisability of making such a summary
and I had personally discussed with Commander McCollum the details of the
various points and the detail of the relationship and their negotiations and so on.
We had spent a great deal of time talking the thing over. Then Commander
McCollum, I will say we found ourselves in very close agreement, prepared the
dispatch, I have forgotten its terms, and brought 14^51] it to me to
check over it, which I did, and found myself in general agreement with it and
made suggestions on a few comparatively minor changes. Now, I do not re-
member just what happened with the dispatch.
1868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Question. Can you recall what happened to the dispatch? Was it ever trans-
mitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet?
Answer. I do not know. We do not know at this time.
Question. To your knowledge did it ever reach the Chief of Naval Operations?
Answer. I do not know. I think I initialed it and gave it back to McCollum
so that the dispatch could be presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by
the OfBce of Naval Intelligence with my own concurrence. That is my memory
of it. It was presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Director of
Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson.
Admiral Wilkinson. Is that Colonel Bratton's testimony or whose,
sir?
Senator Ferguson. That is Admiral Turner's testimony in the Top
Secret of the Navy. I read the direct quote. Have you got it ?
Mr. Gesell. No ; that is our only copy.
14^62] Senator Ferguson. Have you seen it ?
Mr. Gesell. I haven't checked that testimony. You are quite right,
it is in the Top Secret but I did not recall at this time that that was the
testimony.
Senator Ferguson. Extracted testimony of Vice Admiral R. K.
Turner, U. S. Navy, pages 994 to 1008, inclusive.
Admiral Wilkinson. And that is reported as of December 6th, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, he has not given the date there but
he has got in the dates over a period some time preceding the third or
fourth of December.
Admiral Wilkinson. Preceding the third or fourth ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, over a period some time preceding the third
or fourth of December, which was for the information of the Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall that message?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that as of the morning of the
6th, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, any other time ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Or the messages there preceding the third or
the fourth. At one time in that interval between the first and the
sevent]^ Captain McCollum came to me with a message and I went to
see Admiral Turner with him. Now, more [4053] recently we
have discussed that to endeavor to clear our mutual recollections and
the latest recollection which resulted from that discussion that I recall
is that Captain McCollum took the message to Admiral Turner and
Admiral Turner referred back to the war warning message and dis-
cussed with McCollum whether that of itself was not sufficient or
whether it was necessary to send any further message, and the result,
as I now recall, as I say, of their discussion through this mutual recol-
lection and mutual endeavor to clear our memories, was that Turner
and McCollum agreed that it was not necessary to send further infor-
mation of that sort because it had been covered by the war warning
message, but I would like very much, of course, to have Admiral
Turner testify to that as well and he, I believe, will be a witness
shortly, but I do not believe that there was any such message actually
sent. The message may have been in our thought, the message may
have been one that we were contemplating with respect to the winds
message when there was a false interpretation but that was proved to be
false before anything was sent out.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1869
Senator Ferguson. Now, whether or not the message was sent — let
us pass that for the moment
Admiral AVilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson (continuing) : You recall the dis- [4^54]
cussion of getting further information to Kimmel. That is what they
are talking about in this, are they not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you lemember that ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I remember McCollum discussing with me
whether there was anything further that should be sent out on the
basis of the information which we had discussed up to the date of
the 1st of December with regard to the South China Sea incidents.
Senator Ferguson. Well, it would certainly be after the 27th?
Admiral Wilkinson. It was after the 27th.
Senator Ferguson, So it was information received after the 27th
that you had discussed with McCollum ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you discussed as to whether or not that
should be sent to the CINCPAC ?
Admiral Wilkinson. To the fleet as a wliole.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; to the fleet as a whole.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Which would go to the Commander in Chief.
Admiral Wilkinson. And as I recall that discussion it was factual
evidence that we had of the further movements in [4^55] the
South China Sea.
Senator Ferguson. Now, can you give us, as near as you can, the
substance of what this message was that you now recall was taken
up with Admiral Turner, that you say was not sent ?
Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is very hazy but I think it
was information with respect to the further developments that had
actually been discovered in the South China Sea which were brought
up to date by the 1st of December memorandum which is in evidence
and which may have occurred in the 2 or 3 days since the 1st of Decem-
ber memorandum and the time we were discussing that message. It
wasn't anything to do with a threatened attack on Hawaii because
we had no intimation of that whatsoever.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to Admiral Turner as to
whether or not he thought of an attack upon Hawaii ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But at least you had no thought of an attack
upon Hawaii ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that continued on until after the attack ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall a meeting with any-
14^S6] one, particularly with Colonel Bratton, on Saturday morn-
ing about further information to be sent to the Army or the Navy at
Hawaii ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You have no recollection at all of that ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. As I say. Captain McCollum was in
my office frequently all the time I was on duty there and as the rela-
tions became strained and the movements of the Japanese forces to the
1870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
south were more and more apparent, he was in my office I would say
three and four times a day, sometimes, but rarely. Colonel Bratton
would be with him and I recall from time to time in that way seeing
Colonel Bratton but I do not recall specifically seeing him on the
morning of the 6th. I do recall seeing Captain McCollum several
times that morning. It may well be he brought Colonel Bratton in
with him.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any conversation with officers in
the Army and/or the Navy in relation to trying to get more informa-
tion to Hawaii? Would that refresh your memory, whether it was
with Bratton specifically on a specific date or just a general conversa-
tion with him, or information from him or any of the other officers?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, not specifically, except [4^571
the 1st of December in Admiral Stark's office we were discussing the
general movements of the Japanese, the preparation of this message I
just mentioned. The information as to the movements of the Japanese
Fleet was being picked up and in fact more or less originated in Pearl
Harbor and in Corregidor and was known to both of them. Except for
information of an attack on Pearl Harbor, which I did not have, there
was nothing particularly for me to send to the fleet.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the message of — if you
will take Exhibit 37, page 32. Counsel, could you give the Admiral
Exhibit 37 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I qualify my last reports, of course, Senator,
with respect to the sending of the code messages. I did confer with
Admiral Ingersoll about that — first with Captain McCollum and then
with Admiral Ingersoll and sent the code message.
Senator Ferguson. Now, on the code message, were you familiar
with the message being sent to Tokyo to destroy our code ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I originated, in fact, a message to Tokyo and
several other naval attaches' offices to destroy our codes, yes, sir. I
think it was Tokyo as well.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the one that went to
Tokyo?
[4958] Admiral Wilkinson. As I recall, it was the same one that
went to the other agencies. I was familiar with that and, in fact,
originated it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, can you tell us just what caused you to
send that message to destroy the code?
Admiral Wilkinson. Because the Japanese had issued instructions
to their offices to destroy codes, and we feared that if they anticipated
that conditions would be such that their offices would be raided, that
certainly they themselves would not hesitate to raid our offices, war or
no war, and we did not want to be in a position to have our codes seized
by a raid.
Senator Ferguson. Did you believe that war was imminent?
Admiral Wilkinson. Imminent but not inevitable.
Senator Ferguson. Now, the message on page 32, November 24; do
you have thnt before you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted at all about the sending of
that message or its wording?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1871
Senator Ferguson. Then your only knowledge came after it had
been sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And would you say how long after it [4^59']
had been sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say a day or two, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And then did you get any instructions on it as
to its meaning or effect or why it was sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, except I was familiar with the negotia-
tions in process by reason of the broken codes so that I knew the obvious
reason for it ; similarly with the message of the 2Tth.
Senator Ferguson. Were you in any way informed that that mes-
sage was to take care of a surprise attack? For instance, I will read
you question 40 on page 996 of Admiral Turner's testimony before the
top secret. It may refresh your iriemory.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I understand that reference now.
I did not understand before what you were reading from.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
This dispatch, exhibit 15, states "a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction is indicated."
And that Exhibit 15 is this same message that I am reading to you.
Admiral Wilkinson. Except the text of the message reads, "is a
possibility."
Senator Ferguson. Yes. [Keading :]
This language is omitted from the dispatch of the [4-960] 27th of No-
vember, three days later, wherein there is set out certain Japanese objectives in
the Far East. Was this omission from the dispatch of November 27th done
intentionally?
This is the answer of Admiral Turner :
I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two dispatches.
In the one of the 24th it says "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction
is indicated." Now, that "in any direction" could be by naval force, air force,
amphibious force or anything else. In this other dispatch we said, "an amphib-
ious expedition is en route."
That is the one of the 27th. I am inserting that in my own language.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Now, to quote further :
It was moving down the China Sea. Now, those two are quite different. They
do not cover the same kind of a subject and they were intended not to cover it.
That was information. We knew that the Japanese were on the move in the
China Sea. That was a fact. Now, the other was deduction as covering gener-
ally not only the movement of an amphibious force but the movement of any force.
[4901] Now, does that refresh your memory?
Admiral Wilkinson. As to what, sir?
Senator Ferguson. As to these two messages, what you were told
told about.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, I am familiar with both of the
messages.
Senator Ferguson. Was that your understanding of the messages
that I just read you, what Admiral Turner said about them?
Admiral Wilkinson. Why, I do not -know that I developed any
particular understanding. My understanding of the first message was
a statement that the negotiations were breaking down and that any-
1872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
thing might happen anywhere. My understanding of the second mes-
sage was, so far as I was interested in it — I was not directly affected
by it, the second message — that it was a war warning sent to both the
Asiatic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet stating, "Look out; negotiations
have ceased ; an aggressive movement by Japan is expected and here is
what has been indicated : We know they are going to do tliat."
My understanding was, certainly, that that would not be the only
thing that might have happened, such as Admiral Turner has said,
but that was certainly the one thing that was very evident and, of
course, did occur.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have any knowledge that
[4^62] there was a movement that would cause an amphibious
landing?
Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, yes. I think the basic information under
the conditions that existed had been prepared and received in various
detail by my office and furnished to him. Ther6 were ships and trans-
ports and landing boats and men-of-war streaming down the South
China Sea.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat was the earliest you remember coming to
the conclusion that there would be an amphibious landing?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say certainly by December 1.
Senator Ferguson. Now. where would this amphibious landing in
your opinion be made, would you say ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know, of course. There was a pos-
sibility tliey might be getting around to make an advance base in
Indochina, they might be going down to go into Thailand — Siam at
that time — and from then to expand their influence into that free
country, or they might be making a direct assault on the British terri-
tories in the Malay Peninsula.
It integrated with my conception, as I have said earlier, that I felt
that they might well be feeling tlieir way southward and by the infil-
tration method to gain all the ground and solidify their position as far
as they could before they made any definite act which would antagonize
the British into [4d6S] the war, including certain nations, just
as they had done for some years past. If they followed that course
they would limit their activities to Indochina and perhaps Siam* If
they wanted to make a direct attack, they would go, as in fact they did
go, into the Malay Peninsula.
Senator Ferguson. Well, if they went into the ^lalay Peninsula
how would that involve us in Avar from the Imowledge you had ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I know that if there was an attack on British
possessions. I knew it would involve England in war. I knew that the
relations between England and the United States were close, the actual
details I did not know, but I knew that Ave would be concerned and I
thought it probable that the Congress Avould be sufficiently concerned
to consider Avhetlier it was a cause of Avar. As far as I kncAv there Avere
no binding commitments. I did knoAv that there had been the geo-
graphical lines set up, the passage of Avhich aa'ouM be a cause for con-
cern on the part of this country and that the ISIalay Peninsula Avas
beyond those lines.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall the three men-of-Avar memoran-
dum here ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I recall it noAv. I did not see it at that time.
Senator Ferguson. You did not see it prior to the 7th ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1873
[4964] Admiral Wilkinson. I am quite sure I did not. It was
quite new to me.
Senator Fercjuson. Pardon me ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It was quite new to me when I saw it here. I
am quite sure I did not see it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not you ever got
any information from those three men-of-war or any one of them ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't think so, sir. I don't think it ever got
out of the station. I do know with the aerial patrol that was so. That
was established and we got information from it but I doubt if the
men-of-war were ever stationed.
Senator Fer(;uson. Were you getting information from the aerial
patrol at the Philippines ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, via the commander in chief of the
Asiatic.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you get any from the aerial patrol at
Hawaii ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you using the aerial patrol at the Philip-
pines as a source of information ?
Admiral Wilkinson, I was not using it. I was looking for it.
[4^65] Senator Ferguson. Well, that is what I mean.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; I did not order it.
Senator Ferguson. It was being used by your office ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know when Singapore actually went
on alert?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You did not know that it had gone on alert
on the 6th, their 6th ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It would be on our 5th.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I may have seen the dispatches but
at what precise moment I did I do not know, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the purple code
was used for that wind message or was that a minor code that was
used on that wind message ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Setting it up?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. To set it up was a code. To implement it
was in the middle of a weather broadcast as I remember. There is
no code that set it up. It might be evident on the face of the dispatch.
I w^ould not ordinarily know particularly what code any message
came in because they came to me after translation.
[4966^ Senator Ferguson. And the name on the code as a rule
was not on the translation ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly.
Senator Ferguson. When would you say your office was alerted
to war, for real war ?
Admiral Wilkinson. My office was alerted to the Far Eastern
crisis about 10 days or 2 weeks before the 7th of December and my
office was not alerted to war as war until it actually occurred, but we
were in a crisis condition and standing watches and 24-hour servince
and responsible officers on call outside of their own office hours.
79716 — 46— pt. 4 20
1874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. How much effort did you put in Saturday eve-
ning trying to reach Admiral Stark after they delivered those 13
parts to you at your office, or at the moment ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think I called him up, sir, and failed to
get him. I don't think I put much more effort into it because I thought
at the time, and I was in agreement with the people I had been dis-
cussing it with. Captain McCollum, General Miles and Captain Beard-
all, that it was a diplomatic paper, a justification of the position of
Japan, a so-called w^iite paper such as governments frequently issue
in connection with negotiations which they are conducting. I did
not consider it a military paper and it was not until the fourteenth
[4^67] part came in that I considered it was a final paper. We had
sent dispatches of almost that same character, I think, indicating
that propositions made by the Japanese were not satisfactory to us
and this was one being made by them that our propositions w^ere not
satisfactory to them.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you knew about the message of the
26 th having been sent ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you knew that we had considered their
message of the 20th of November as an ultimatum?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not know that because one
does not reply to an ultimatum. I would have considered their message
of the 20th, and I do consider it, as a step in the negotiations and
ours of the 26th as a further step, although I did not think that they
would accept ours of the 26th.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, why did you want to reach Admiral
Stark then that evening if this was only an ordinary white paper
diplomatic message?
Admiral Wilkinson. Just to tell him that we had it. He had seen
the pilot message. To tell him that we had it and as far as we read it
there was nothing particularly alarming in those parts and I would
show it to him in the morning.
Senator Ferguson. That pilot message said that they were
[4968] to get another message as to when it was to be delivered.
Was that very significant to you, the placing of a zero time for
delivery ?
Admiral Wilkinson. The pilot message said two things, sir. It
said, ''We are going to give you an answer and it is going to be in 14
parts. We will tell you when to deliver that note." The second thing
was, "You are going to receive it and you are to dress it up in good
language and we will tell you when to deliver it." The fact that there
was a certain time for the delivery was not significant to me. Per-
haps it should have been. I was not familiar with diplomatic hm-
guage, that the time of presentation is characteristic of an ultimatum
rather than an ordinary note, which would not ordinarily be presented
at some certain time. I did not appreciate it if that is the case. In
other words, the time element, the fact that they were to deliver it ;'t
a certain time, it didn't mean any more to me than as being a time with
respect to negotiations and here they said to them to "dress it up and
then we will tell you when to present it."
Senator Ferguson. Would you say that was because of or caused
by your lack of knowledge of diplomatic procedure ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1875
Admiral Wilkinson. Or my general lack of intelligence or appre-
ciation, sir, I don't know which. I certainly did not appreciate it.
[4901^] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, Admiral Beardall was
at your office that night ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. He was the President's military aide?
Admiral Wilkinson. Naval aide.
Senator Ferguson. Pardon me ; naval aide.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And had been familiar with the magic?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So you could properly discuss and freely discuss
with Admiral Beardall and General Miles, who was also familiar
with magic this question ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, and my recollection is we all agreed
that it was a diplomatic justification of their position.
Senator Ferguson. Normally Admiral Beardall would have been
the man to receive it for the President, would he not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And Kramer, who had delivered it to you, he
delivered it at the White House?
Admiral Wilkinson. He saw that as he was at the Wliite House —
he delivered it at the White House.
Senator Ferguson. He advised you of it?
Admiral Wilkinson. It was not necessary for Beardall to [4^701
take it there.
Senator Ferguson. You were advised of that fact?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he had any discussion
with Kramer about it?
Admiral Wilkinson. Whether Beardall had?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. No. Kramer was there with all three of us.
I don't remember any particular discussion between those two. Kra-
mer was there during our talk and sat in there with us.
Senator Ferguson. Did he advise you of his conversation with the
Secretary of the Navy?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. At least that the Secretary of the Navy was
going to have a meeting with the Secretary of State and War on the
following morning at ten?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir ; for two reasons : First, because they
were to discuss this diplomatic message; and, second, on the pre-
sumption that the fourteenth part would be available by then, as in
fact it was. In fact, I thought that message was primarily of concern
to the State Department rather than the Navy and the Army.
Senator Ferguson. And did you put on any special effort [4'^71]
to decode the fourteenth message which you were intercepting, which
would have been the one o'clock message?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not myself because that was under
Communications but I knew from Kramer that Communications was
on the lookout for it.
1876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson, Well, you knew that America was not bluffing
in this negotiation?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. We were going to adhere to our
principles.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. But I also knew that we were making an
effort to delay the break-off of the negotiations and any actual conflict
until we got our positions in the Philippines sufficiently garrisoned.
Senator Ferguson. From the intelligence did you think that the
Japanese were bluffing or not, from the intelligence that came through
your hands?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not think they were bluffing
but I did not think they would strike America. I thought, as I have
said, that they would confine their efforts to working to the south
and possibly appreciating that we did not want to precipitate anything
in the temper of our country, that they would try to consolidate their
position and gain all they could before they did have to risk a
[4^7£] war.
Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that you believed prior
to the 7th because of the movement of the troops and the intelligence
you had that there was going to be war with Britain but you did not
believe that there was going to be war with the United States? Is
that a fair summary ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believed there would be war with Britain
if the Japs went into the Malay Peninsula. I was not sure they would
go there. If there was in that case a war with Britain, I thought
there was a possibility that the United States would come into the
war but I did not think there would be any certainty of it. I did not
think that the Japs would attack the United States direct.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Saturday morning a message came from
Admiralty that they were going across the Gulf of Siam, 14 hours,
I think, was the message, from the Kra Peninsula, and the message
from our Ambassador Winant to the same effect, which came in at
10 : 40 Saturday morning. Do I understand that j^ou did or did not
get that information ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I got it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When did you get it ?
Admiral Wilkinson. And my recollection, without checking it, is
that that course that they were on was a westerly course, which would
be a clear possibility of attacking Siam, [4973] which was one
of the alternatives I spoke of. I would like to see that dispatch to
check that course.
Senator Ferguson. Could you show it to him, both the Winant and
the Admiralty message?
While he is looking for it, did you get that Saturday, Admiral,
on the 6th ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think so, sir. ,
Senator Ferguson. So when you got the 13
Admiral Wilkinson. That is just long range, I am not certain, but
I think I did.
Here is one message, sir, again from Cadogan.
"Admiralty conference on information just forwarded, Cadogan attending.
They were uncertain as to whether destination of parties" — which is the Japa-
nese force — "is Kra or Bangkolt."
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1877
Bangkok, of course, was Thailand and Kra was the Malay Peninsula.
The message they referred to was the 3 a. m. this morning and "the
parties seen off Cambodia Point sailing slowly westward toward Kra
14 hours distant in time."
In that same dispatch from the Admiralty — or from Mr. Winant,
I find that :
British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand
fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before
[4974] British have opportunity to guarantee support.
In other words, the British also were in doubt as to whether the
attack were to be made on Thai or the Kra Peninsula or not.
[4975] Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you did
not even come to the conclusion Saturday that they would attack in
such a way that Britain would come into the war ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not come to the firm conclusion, no, sir.
I thought they might be working their way to Siam, rather than
challenge England immediately. I thought it probable, and almost
certain, that Britain would shortly be drawn into the war, but in
support of Siam rather than as against a direct attack on them.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, would Senator Ferguson yield
to a question ?
Senator Ferguson. I will yield to my colleague.
Senator Brewster. It is in connection with this: You reiterated
it is your firm opinion that they were likely to move south instead
of coming to Hawaii, to attack us. Whether or not the fact that the
United States Fleet m the Pacific even at Hawaii was inferior in
strength to the Japanese, would not be calculated to incline the Japa-
nese to the opinion that they could move south without any immediate
danger of serious interruption from the United States ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not quite understand you. I got the
fii^gt part.
Senator Brewster. Will the reporter read it?
[4976] (The question referred to, as recorded above, was read
by the reporter. )
Senator Brewster. Without any immediate danger of serious inter-
ruption from the United States, because of the fact that the fleet, as
presumably they knew, was not sent to the western Pacific or moving
to the Philippines and striking.
Admiral Wilkinson. They could move southward without immedi-
ate danger. There was a risk. The further they extended their lines
southward, the more possible a threat from Hawaii would be, because
they were more exposed to us. But they could, and did, move south
along the China Coast, and into Indochina, with comparative freedom.
Senator Brewster. I assume that probably was one factor in your
consideration of the situation, your knowledge of the relative strength
of the fleet.
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know that I went into the strategic
consideration, so much, sir. The very evident factors were the known
l^resence of the ships moving down there, and then there was, as a back-
ground, the knowledge that you have just stated, that the lines of com-
munication were short; they had air fields and harbors and bases on
Forrnosa which they could use in the protection of those lines, and it
was, in fact, a Japanese sea, and it would [4977'] be very diffi-
cult for us to interfere with it.
1878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. If the United States Pacific Fleet had been twice
as powerful as the Japanese Fleet, with adequate supply trains, to move
promptly to the Philippines, your estimate of the likelihood of the
Japanese moving south, rather than moving in our direction might have
been materially altered? Would that be a fair statement?
Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly they would have been more reluct-
ant to move in the open sea to the south. They might have moved along
the coast. Certainly they would have anticipated our fleet would come
into the Philippines and establish its base there and then it would be
in a position to cut the water transport, so they would have to work
overland.
Senator Brewster. And so they would have materially altered the
strategic concept on both sides if that situation had prevailed ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly.
Senator Brewster. You did, of course, take all of those factors into
account in forming your opinions as to the situation, I assume ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think I naturally would, sir, even without
formally estimating them. They would influence [4^78] me
by virtue of my familiarity with naval matters.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, that brings up the question about these
lost Japanese carriers. You were quite sure from the intelligence that
you received, that these six carriers that were lost could not have been
used in the movement south, because you had that covered and had the
information on that ; isn't that correct ?
Admiral Wilkinson. There could not have been any movement of
those carriers through the China Sea, or we would have detected it.
There might well have been a movement south into the Carolines, the
Palaus, Saipan, and Guam ; there might have been a movement into
the Marshalls, and in fact we had some information from the radio
intelligence at Pearl Harbor that they thought there was a force of
carriers and submarines into the Marshalls, which would have ac-
counted for them, although Corregidor did not believe it.
Senator Ferguson. Then we find this situation, that at least these
six lost carriers could not be used in the movement south in the China
Sea, and the Kra Peninsula ?
Admiral Wilkinson. They were not there at that time. They might
have been home getting ready to start there.
Senator Ferguson. If they were in the Carolines then there was
a possibility that they could attack Guam ?
[4^79] Admiral Wilkinson. If they were where, sir?
Senator Ferguson. If they were in the Carolines, they could have
attacked Guam?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator F'erguson. Then were we, from your evidence, anticipat-
ing an attack, an air attack from these six lost carriers at Guam?
Admiral Wilkinson. There was a possibility, if Japan was deter-
mined upon war, that they would attack anywhere, if Japan was
determined upon opening the war against us. The probabilities, we
felt, were most probable, the Philippines, next Guam, next Wake,
next Midway, and last Hawaii, because of the distance and the exten-
sion of the line, the increased risk of interception by our forces, and
the greater boldness required.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1879
Senator Ferguson, When the message was sent on the 27th, the
war warning message to tlie Navy, that was, as I understand it, because
of this movement to the south that you knew about ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think everything boiled into that. I did
not prepare the message or was not consulted in preparing it, but
my assumption would be not only the movement to the south, but
also the diplomatic messages and preparation of the fleet. We knew
the fleet was getting [4^)80] ready for almost anything.
Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 22 of Exhibit 2, there is a mes-
sage that I want to speak to you about. Do you have the book before
you?
Admiral Wilkinson. The yellow book, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. That is the one in relation to the lights
and want ads and radio.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When did that first come to your attention?
Admiral Wilkinson. Some 3 or 4 days after Pearl Harbor. I
note it was translated on the 11th. Whether this was intercepted
or not I do not know. It was, however, picked up in code form on
the 8th from the cable station in Hawaii, and turned over to the
Navy then. I am not sure whether it had been earlier intercepted
by an intercept station or not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know, or did you ever hear that it was
intercepted here at Fort Hunt in Virginia ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I would not know it, since that was
a matter of communications.
Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by a code being translated
in the rough, or a message being translated in the rough ?
■ \4981] Admiral Wilkinson. In the rough?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. I suppose it is the first draft before they went
over it and removed inconsistencies and dug out some of the things that
might have puzzled them the first time.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know Dorothy Edgers?
Admiral W lkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know she was a translator in the ONI,
the Naval Intelligence?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. If this message had been translated in the rough,
and put on Kramer's desk — was it Commander Kramer at that time,
or Captain Kramer?
Admiral Wilkinson. Commander then.
Senator Ferguson. Commander Kramer's desk on the afternoon of
the 6th, completed in the early afternoon of the 6th of December 1941,
and was brought to the attention of Captain Kramer, I would like
to ask why that would not be called to your attention, if your office
was alerted on that day? Was it because of this 14-part message?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would have every idea that it would be, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with the Hewitt [498^]
testimony, Admiral Hewitt's testimony?
Admiral Wilkinson. His personal testimony, or the testimony he
collected ?
Senator Ferguson. Pardon?
1880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. His personal testimony, or the testimony he
collected ?
Senator Ferguson, Not his testimony.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I am only familiar ^Yith my testimony.
I read none of the others.
Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with the Dorothy Edgers
testimony ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I did not know she had testified.
Senator Ferguson. How was that?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know she had testified.
Senator Ferguson. So, if this was translated in the rough and put
on Commander Kramer's desk, it should have reached you then on the
6th, even though it was in the rough ?
Admiral Wilkinson. If the translation was sufficiently intelligible,
yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you look at that message and see whether
you see any significance to it in relation to an attack on Pearl Harbor?
[4983] Admiral Wilkinson. I would say certainly it was an
indication to vessels lying off Pearl Harbor, presumably submarines,,
as to the movement of the ships within Pearl Harbor.
I would say probably, without hindsight now, that it would be a
substitute for more rapid means of communication', such as radio and
cable, if they had been broken, and that this was a last minute or last
resort, rather, method of communication where, if they had no other
means, they would hang a light in the indow, just as we were told
Paul Revere did, burning a light in the window to show that ships
had left, or by day they could have made some other signal.
[4^84] Senator Ferguson. Then this message, even though it
had been laid on your desk on the 6th, would not have meant any-
thing to you in relation to an attack, a warning of an attack on Pearl
Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. It would have indicated a further interest
in the movements in and out of Pearl Harbor, but it would not have
meant that an attack was imminent, no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you would not have seen, as the intelli-
gence officer, au}^ need, having that message, to send any more informa-
tion to Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. I doubt if I would, except to tell them that
the last resort signals were being arranged to take the place of the
radio and cable communications, which they had been having there-
tofore. You know the meaning of these signals is just an indication
of what the movements of ships were. It did not give any informa-
tion as to ships present, only ships that had left. It did not give
information as to the locations of ships other than whether they had
left or not.
Senator Ferguson. Could I ask counsel whether this has actually
been put in the record, this exhibit?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That particular one ?
Mr. Gesell. This whole book is Exhibit 2, 1 think.
[4<985] Senator Ferguson. It was not printed; it is just an
exhibit?
Mr. Gesell. I think that is all. It is not in the transcript.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1881
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. Is that all, Senator ?
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Admiral Wilkinson, I understand from your testimony,
or I want to ask you whether it is a fair assumption on my part from
your testimony that at no time during your service as Chief of Naval
Intelligence, from October 15 down to the 7th day of December 1941,
did you have any idea or form any conclusion yourself that the Japs
intended to attack Pear Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. It was your impression, from the intelligence that you
had, that they intended to continue their movement down into the
South China Sea, but your personal impression was that they would
not attack what you were pleased to call the Anglo-Saxon nations, is
that right?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is correct, sir. "Anglo-Saxon" is the
common term. I thought England and America were generally under-
stood by that term.
[4^86] Mr. Keefe, You meant England and America when you
used that term ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. That was purely a personal im-
pression, and of course was erroneous.
Mr. Keefe. It was jonr personal impression ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, personal impression, and obviously er-
roneous.
Mr. Keefe. And you came to that conclusion as the result of your
review of all the naval intelligence that came to your attention as the
Chief of Naval Intelligence ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, plus the history of the Japanese
opportunistic moves in China and Manchuria in the past few days, plus
their negotiations which they had endeavored to stay, that they were
going into China and they could not get out of China itself, there was
nothing to force an issue there.
Mr. Keefe. You of course were familiar with the entire world situa-
tion and the rapidly moving events that were taking place?
Admiral Wilkinson. Roughly, yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. During that period and that which had taken place
prior thereto?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So that your personal opinion was arrived at [4^87]
as the result of a survey of the entire situation ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. When you concluded that they would not attack Britain
and the United States ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr, Keefe. That is correct, is it not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now I assume that, as a naval officer of 40 years' stand-
ing, and having been to sea with the fleet for years, and having served
in Honolulu, or in Hawaii, as well as in the JFar East, that you thor-
oughly understood that Pearl Harbor was developed as a bastion for
defensive and offensive operations in the Pacific area ?
1882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Primarily as a base for the fleet, and
secondarily as a means for the protection of our territory in the
Hawaiian Islands.
Mr. Keefe. It was the cornerstone of our defenses, was it not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. In the Pacific ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. In the Pacific ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And for years maneuvers had been held and plans had
been drawn contemplating the possibility that Pearl Harbor might
be attacked?
[4^88] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And Japan was the enemy against whom we were pre-
paring all these years, was it not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you thoroughly understood that ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; in connection with those maneuvers,
there had, of course, been countermaneuvers by our fleet, wherein they
had obtained contacts, and so on, of Japanese movements.
Mr. Keefe. Did you agree with the general sentiment that appeared
to have been expressed by Mr. Hull and others who have testified
here, that the possibility of an attack on the Hawaiian area envisioned
fundamentally and primarily an air attack, secondly a submarine
attack, as being the most possible means of attack ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes sir ; and probably both.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. I thought perhaps a submarine attack was the
most probable, because submarines could get there unnoticed and
without risk.
Mr. Keefe. So in your thinking in the years before you became
Chief of Naval Intelligence you never ruled out the possibility of
attack on Pearl Harbor and Hawaii ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; while I was there, of course,
[4^89] we were concerned with that possibility and had maneu-
vers, as you say, to that effect.
Mr. Keefe. But you did not consider it probable, although it might
have been possible, in 1941 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, for a double reason. I thought, in the
first place, that the Japanese would be loath to encounter the hazard
of sending a sufficient force into such dangerous waters, and, in the
second place, I anticipated such a force would be detected before it
arrived at any threatening position.
Mr. Keefe. Now you were out there with the fleet in 1940, were
you not?
Admiral Wilkinson. 1939-41, yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Then you were there in 1940 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you were familiar with the operations of the fleet
in 1940?
Admiral Wilkinson. I was in them, in fact.
Mr. Keefe. And you were familiar with the liaison that existed
between the fleet and the Army in that period ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Do you recall that the Army was alerted at Pearl Har-
bor on the 17th of June 1940?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1883
Admiral Wilkinson. I remember it was that summer. I do
[4990] not remember the date particularly.
Mr. Keefe. You remember there was an all-out alert in June 1940?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; I was quite close to General Herron,
because I was the chief of staff of Admiral Andrews, who had been
his colleague, until the Fleet arrived there in the spring of 1940.
Mr. Keef*e. You are familiar with the fact that the Army was
alerted in Panama at that time, are you not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know Panama had been altered
at that time. I now know.
Mr. Keeee. Now do you know of any other time prior to that that
the island garrison at Oahu had ever been alerted ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know specifically, but I know that
drills and maneuvers were occurring quite frequently, and partial or
full alerts took place in connection with them, just as on a similar
occasion, I think, when the fleet came out in 1934, and I believe I came
there with the fleet, and the Army was alerted at that time as part
of the maneuvers.
[4991] Mr. Keefe. I mean other than mere maneuvers.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I do not know of my own knowledge
of any time that the Army was alerted against an enemy threat.
Mr. Keefe. Now, this alert in 1940, in June, was a real alert,
wasn't it.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So far as the Army was concerned ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. They were alerted against a possible trans-Pacific at-
tack by air?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That meant Japan, did it not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So that according to the developments of that particular
period, the growing tension and strains were such that the chief of
staff here in Washington, in consultation with his advisors, decided
that the Army ought to go on an all-out alert against possible attack,
as early as the 17th of June 1940 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; Japan was, of course, not preoccu-
pied with any other movements at that time.
Mr. Keefe. I did not ask you that, Admiral.
Admiral Wilkinson. It seemed to be a diplomatic situa- [4992']
tion that would favor her taking such a step.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman yield at
that point ?
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Senator Brewster. In connection with this alert matter, I call your
attention to your own report to the Chief of Naval Operations that
you put in the record yesterday, on the testimony of General Herron,
wherein you make the following statement :
After my testimony, Lieutenant General C. D. Herron, who relinquished com-
mand in early Fehruary in Hawaii, testified mainly about his preparations and
his general practice as to alert stations. He said that last winter —
1884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I assume that was the winter of 1941 —
he had had them in the field for six weeks on the alert, but had subsequently
modified that in some degree, although he had maintained guns at their field
stations.
Does that recall to you the matter of the alert during that period?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think it does, sir. Of course, it was not the
winter alert that Mr. Keefe was speaking of. It was the summer
alert. I might have misquoted it, or it might have been mistyped,
or General Herron himself might have misstated his recollection by
saying winter instead of surmner. I think that is the summer alert.
Senator Brewster. That is the summer alert ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. I call your attention to the fact that this was
given within a very few days after General Herron testified, so I think
your recollection would undoubtedly be accurate. This was on Decem-
ber 19, 1941, which must have been within 3 or 4 days of the events.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. As I say, it might have been that
I dictated it wrong, or the stenographer might have written it wrong,
and General Herron himself might have said it wrong. I left in
May, 1941, and I do not think that there was any alert in the winter
there of 1940-41, that I knew of, at least.
[4^94] Senator Brewster. Was General Herron's testimony
taken down, or was that off the record ?
Admiral Wilkinson. That was in the same status as mine. I think
it preceded me. General Herron was relieved, in fact, on the 7th of
February, I think, so that to have the 6-week alert in the winter, it
would have been very early in the winter.
Mr. Keefe. May I suggest that the evidence is already in in the form
of the order for the alert and all of the reports in reference to it, and
it is quite conclusively shown that the alert took place on the ITth of
June, 1941. We have all that proof here.
Senator Brewster. I am not questioning that. Wliat I am question-
ing is whether there was another alert during the winter as Admiral
Wilkinson reported General Herron as testifying. That is why I
thought it was pertinent in connection with your question.
Mr. Keefe. I may say I think I have gone into it quite carefully
and I think the evidence is quite conclusive there was not an all out
alert during that period, and he must liave been mistaken as to the
time, and that the actual alert took place in June 1940.
Admiral, you, as an officer with the Navy at that time, knew that
so far as the Army was concerned, in June, 1940, [4^05] they
considered the possibility of an air attack upon Hawaii to the extent
that an alert was ordered to prepare against it?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, we didn't know why it was ordered.
Mr. Keefe. You mean the Navy didn't know?
Admiral Wilkinson. I personally didn't know, and I don't think
Admiral Andrews knew, and I think that some of the evidence I
have seen indicates that Admiral Richardson was not informed and
had to ask the Department about it.
Mr. Keefe. I am not talking about the Navy side.
Admiral Wilkinson. I though you were. Excuse me.
Mr. Keefe. You did not know, and you did not know that the Navy
was even alerted so far as you were concerned, did you ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1885
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. The Navy was not alerted. "We
made a maneuver toward the southeastward for several days, but we
were not alerted for any defense of Panama.
Mr. Keefe. But your connections with General Herron were such
that you knew the Army was alerted ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I knew the Army was alerted, but I didn't
know why.
Mr. Keefe. You saw the operations order, did you not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. It might well have been . [4^96']
a maneuver alert.
Mr. Keefe. Did you know that it was a serious alert?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, I did not know.
Mr. Keefe. Then you didn't know whether it was a real alert or
a maneuver alert?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Keefe. Well, the evidence before us now is that it was a real
alert. And you so understand that?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do. sir.
Mr. Keefe. You saw the evidences of it out there, did you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Can you describe what took place under that alert so
far as the Army was concerned ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Such evidence as came to my notice was
that they manned the coast defense guns, moved their anti-aircraft
artillery to prepared positions, they had searchlight battery exercises.
In fact, I think I went to witness a searchlight battery exercise
wherein they flew a plane into the searchlight for test purposes, and
I recall I was interested in the working of the mechanical ears in con-
nection with it. They had, in other words, [4997] the defense
stations manned both against air and against landing expeditions.
Mr. Keefe. At that time did it impress you that in 1940, there must
have been some situation developed that indicated the possibility of
an attack on Oahu ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I thought it was an excellent
maneuver. I thought it was a practice maneuver, and well done.
Mr. Keefe. Wliat was that answer ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was a practice maneuver. I
thought it was an excellent maneuver, and well done.
Mr. Keefe. So that as far as the Navy was concerned and speaking
for yourself as an individual officer in the Navy, you just thought that
it was an excellent practice maneuver.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You didn't know that it was a real alert ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, Mr. Chairman, may I say to counsel, you will
recall that I asked General Marshall when he was on the stand for a
statement of the reasons for that alert of June 17, 1940, and upon a
number of occasions he referred to the fact that it would be taken
up with General Strong, who was Assistant Chief of Staff in the War
Plans [4£}98] Division at that time, and that General Strong
was preparing a statement of the reasons for the 1940 alert, and on the
18th of December, just yesterday, I was furnished with this statement
from General Strong, and I believe, Mr. Counsel, that it would be a
1886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
suitable and proper place, in view of the questions asked of the Ad-
miral, to offer it in evidence, so that it will be a part of the record.
Mr. Gesell. You have the only copy we have, so we will have to put
yours in.
Mr. Keefe. I shall turn it over to you.
And I would like to read this, if I may, Mr. Chairman, into the
record, without all the supporting affidavits, because to me it is rather
illuminating.
This is dated December 15, 1945 [reading] :
Memorandum for General Marshall :
Subject : Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940.
1. In connection with your testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investi-
gation of the Pearl Harb9r Attack, you were asked repeatedly for the reasons
which prompted you to aleVt the Panama and Hawaiian Departments on 17 June,
1940. As your Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division at that time, I was
responsible for advising the action you took, and I feel that it may complete the
[49'99] story (in case it is not self-evident to the committee from a review
of contemporaneous historical events) if I summarize the situation leading to the
alert which I recommended and you approved.
2. You will recall that Axis ascendancy in May and early June of 1940 gave us
cause for gravest concern. The British had evacuated Dunkirk by 4 June, and
on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for surrender terms. Germany had a
good chance of acquiring the French Fleet intact. Russia appeared to be cooper-
ating with the Axis; on 12 June she moved in on Lithuania; on 16 June she de-
manded a change of government in Esthonia and Latvia. On 10 June Russia
and Japan signed a treaty fixing the Manchukuo-Outer-Mongolia border, and the
inference was that these two had composed their differences with a view to nego-
tiating a neutrality pact. The Japanese Navy would then be free for any adven-
ture. Japanese land forces were concentrating in Hainan, Formosa, and Kyushu,
apparently for further aggressive action.
3. You may remember a conference held in your office at 0830 on 17 June 1940,
at which I was present, along with General Andrews and General Moore. We
believed at that time that German control of the French Fleet would create a
very serious situation in the South Atlantic [5000] Should Great Britain
fall, a hostile move toward South America was far from unlikely. Anticipating a
desperate need for troops in Brazil, and Uruguay, General Andrews and I recom-
mended at this meeting that the National Guard be ordered into Federal Service.
That was our frame of mind on 17 June 1940. At the conclusion of the conference,
you directed us to consider the questions which had been raised.
4. In looking to our own security I apprehended the most immediate threat
to be a raid or ma.ior sabotage effort which would effectively close the Panama
Canal. Evidence of sabotage plans existed ; certain specific evidence is men-
tioned below. In the event of a raid, a diversionary attack in the Hawaiian
area could not be ruled out, since a large part of our fleet was based on Pearl
Harbor. Accordingly on 17 June, 1940, I recommended placing these two depart-
ments on an alert status. The documents directly bearing on my decision do
not tell the story nearly so well as does a vivid recollection of Axis capabilities
and American weakness at that time when the collapse of France was imminent,
and the fall of Britain by no means impossible. However, I cite and summarize
below a few significant papers which reflect those times, and give some indica-
tion of what was in our minds during those late spring days of [5001]
1940.
Then follows, which I won't take the time to read, a series of mes-
sages from Ambassador Grew, two in number, as a matter of fact;
some information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese
crew of the Argentina Maru that the Jap ships were to be sabotaged
in the canal if they went through and sunk; some information taken
from a drunken German sailor out in Eureka, Calif.; and an unused
draft of a letter prepared, giving the commanding general of the
Panama Department, the reasons and the background for the alert.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1887
iS002] The Vice Chairman. Would you yield for a question ?
Ir. Keefe, Yes.
The Vice Chairman. I probably misunderstood you but in the
first part of your reading there I understood you to read that the
fall of "Bataan" was evident. Is that right?
Mr. Gearh.'.rt. Yes, I caught that too.
Mr. Keefe. The fall of Bataan? No. Petain.
The Vice Chairman. General Petain.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Maybe I mispronounced it.
The Vice Chairman. I understood you to read that as "the fall of
Bataan was evident."
jNIr. Keefe. No. "The British had evacuated Dunkirk by 4 June,
and on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for surrender terms."
The Vice Chairman. I thought if Bataan was about to fall then
that is something we want to learn about.
(The balance of the memorandum above read is as follows:)
a. State Department 793,94119/640, dated 25 May, 1940. Mr. Grew discusses
"a flurry of oflicial activity" in Tokyo. Although he sees no reason to attack
on the Netherlands Enst Indies he acknowledges that preparations for such an
attack "would presumably be guarded with utmost secrecy." (This, to our
minds, did not exclude, l)ut rather drew our attention to, the possibilities of
attack or raid? elsewhere.)
[5003] b. State Department 711. 94/1518, dated 3 June 1940. In surveying
the Japanese situation Mr. Grew states in diplomatic terms that "a complacent
view of tlie future would no longer be warranted." He cites the opinion of Jap-
anese militarists that their fleet had nothing to fear from the use of force and
expresses his own belief that Japan "may be tempted to resort to desperate
courses."
c. State Department 811 F. 812 PROTECTION/165, dated 10 June 1940. The
Navy furnishes information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese
crew of Argmtina Mum that all Japanese ships have orders to scuttle if in the
Panama Canal when the United States "declares mobilization."
d. War Department WPD 3730-18, undated. Information from a Navy source
describes how a German sailor, under influence of liquor, revealed to an American
petty officer on 1 May 1940, at Eureka, California, some specific and detailed plans
to blow up the Panama C 'nal if our entry into the war "became imminent".
e. War Department WPD 4326, undated. In an unused draft of a letter pre-
pared for your signature at your request, the Commanding General, Panama
Department, was informed that "the background of the instructions (for the alert
of 17 June) has doubtless been made clear from matters that have appeared in
the public press", and that "the Increasing [500ff] tension and uncertainty
in the world situation, as affecting Canal security, emphasized the necessity of a
continuous and vigilant alert basis for some time to come." (The letter remained
unsent on my recommendation, largely because I considered the reasons for the
alert to he obvious, as indeed they were.)
5. I can think of no more conclusive way to summarize the situation as of 17
June 1940 than to point out that the factors which guided my decision in recom-
menf^ing alerting these overseas bases were essentially those which made it neces-
sary for the President of the United States to issue his Confirmation of 27 June
IVAO (F. R. Doc. 40-2639), which extended the scope of the national emergency
proclaimed 8 September 1939 and gave additional and exceptional authority in
regard to safeguarding the Panama Canal."
(Signed) George V. Strong,
Major General, U. S. A. (Retired).
Mr. Keefe. I have called your attention to this communication, Ad-
miral Wilkinson, because it summarizes what was in the minds of the
Army and General Strong, who was Assistant Chief of Staff in the
War Plans Division at that time.
Based upon those facts, which involved world conditions, they
thought that the possibility of an air attack upon Hawaii [6005]
1888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was SO probable that they ordered an all-out alert on the iTth of June
1940.
Now, I ask you again, as Chief of Naval Intelligence, with all of the
subsequent information which was obtained by you as Chief of Naval
Intelligence, you, down to the 7th of December 1940, did not believe
that an attack
The Vice Chairman. 1941.
Mr. Keefe. 1941. You did not believe that an attack on the Ha-
waiian area was probable ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believed it was possible. I did not believe
it was probable. I don't think that one awaits for an attack to be
probable before an alert is ordered. An alert is ordered on a pos-
sibility of an attack.
You note that General Strong said that a diversionary attack on
Pearl Harbor could not be ruled out. That is a very slight phraseol-
ogy but even on such a slight possibility he ordered an alert.
Now, similarly, on November 27 both the Army and the Navy
ordered an alert at Pearl Harbor, again on the possibility of an at-
tack. I contended I was quite convinced there was a possibility of
an attack, yes, sir, but I did not believe that there was a probability.
I certainly agreed in the desirability of an alert. I agreed in the
desirability of full defense measures. But I did not believe from my
own [-5006] conclusions that there would be — that there was
a probability of an attack.
Mr. Keefe. I call your attention to the fact, in view that you have
quoted part of this communication, to the fact that
Admiral Wilkinson. As I understood it.
Mr. Keefe. Wliat Strong released was :
In the event of a raid, a diversionary attack in the Hawaiian area could not
be ruled out, since a large part of our Fleet was based on Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, I call your attention to the fact that as I recall
General Marshall's testimony, and that of other witnesses that have
testified here, it was their opinion that Japan would not go on with
its movement to the south and leave its flank exposed by the presence
of our fleet at Pearl Harbor.
Did you believe that in the summer and fall of 1911 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not believe that they would attack Pearl
Harbor up to the moment they did. I believed that their preoccupa-
tion in south China would engage them in a military way and I be-
lieved that their political progress would be headed toward, be directed
toward, making the gi'eatest advance, consolidating their positions
to the greatest degree, [5007] before they were involved in a
war with England and America.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I say that I have asked for the log
of the Enterprise and I have not had a chance to see it as yet, but I
might want to ask Admiral Wilkinson a couple of questions in refer-
ence to that, and also a couple of questions with reference to the Lex-
ington, and I understand it will be here at 2 o'clock.
Mr. Gesell. That is correct.
May I ask. Congressman Keefe, if it was your intention that all of
the papers relating to this alert from which _you read be spread upon
the record?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1889
Mr. Keefe. No ; just the letter itself from General Strong to General
Marshall.
The Vice Chairman. What you read into the record ?
Mr. Keefe. Well, the whole letter.
Mr. Gesell. There is part of the letter you didn't read so we will
spread it all on the record.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Mr. IVIuRPHY. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the rest of the docu-
ments be made an exhibit.
Mr. Gesell,. This document can be designated "Exhibit 87."
Mr. Keefe. May I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania that
the documents attached are referred to in the letter and that is the
reason I didn't suggest putting them in.
[5008] Senator Brewstee. Would that be too extensive to put in
the record?
Mr. Keefe. I don't think it is necessary to spread them on the record
because they have been condensed in General Stroiig's report and he
simply attaches the photostat copies of the originals.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 87.")
The Chairman. The Chair wishes to advise the members of the
committee that immediately upon the recessing of the committee at 4
o'clock the Chair wishes to have an executive session here for the
consideration of two or three matters that the committee should con-
sider.
Mr. Keefe. Where will that be, Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. Eight here. We will remain here after the recess
after the rest of the people leave. >
We will recess now until 2 o'clock. '
(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of
the same day.)
[5009] AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 : 00 P. M.
The Vice Chairman, The committee will please be in order.
Mr. Keefe from Wisconsin will resume his inquiry.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK
WILKINSON (Resumed)
Mr. Keefe. I have just one or two questions. Admiral.
Am I correct in my understanding that prior to your assumption
of your responsibilities as Chief of Naval Intelligence on the 15th of
October 1941, you had had no previous experience or tour of duty
in that particular field?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; only attendance at two sessions of
the conferences on the limitation of armaments.
Mr. Keefe. You had no previous experience in the field of intelli-
gence, had you, prior to that time ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically under the Office of Naval In-
telligence. As Chief of Staif," and again as fleet gunnery officer in a
l)receding tour of duty at sea I had been concerned with the intelligence
at sea, but I had not been under the Office of Naval Intelligence or in
it before.
79716— 46— pt. 4 21
1890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. You had been essentially a line officer at sea?
. Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe, Most of your experience has been in that connection?
[5010] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; such shore duties as I
had done were not connected with intelligence.
Mr. Keefe. When did you leave your duties as Chief of Naval
Intelligence ?
Admiral Wilkinson. The 20th of July 1942.
Mr. Keefe. So you had an experince in that office which lasted from
the 15th of October 1941 to the 15th of July, did you say?
Admiral Wilkinson. 20th of July.
Mr. Keefe. 20th of July 1942.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; a little over 9 months.
Mr. Keefe. And you went back to sea ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Went back to sea immediately, and I have
just returned therefrom.
Mr. Keefe. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, when you did begin as head of Naval In-
telligence, was there any change in the stait or the subordinates who
were under you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No general change, sir. There are always
recurring changes as one officer after another is relieved, but I brought
no one in with me and no one left.
[5011] Mr. Murphy. Substantially the same oiganization as
it existed under your predecessors remained under you, except there
was a new chief ; isn't that right ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly.
Mr. Murphy. When you did go there you brought to that office
a good many years' experience in the Navy — 36, wasn't it i
Admiral Wilkinson. Thirty-six ; yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Thirty-six years. Now I would like to direct your
attention, Admiral, to page 430 of the Narrative Statement of Evi-
dence at the Pearl Harbor Investigation, Volume 2, and I note there
the following — do you have a copy of it available for the Admiral ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. As a preliminary to that, Admiral Wilkinson, will
you state for the record the full name of Admiral Newton?
Admiral Wilkinson. Admiral John Henry Newton.
Mr. Murphy. I notice there the following:
Admiral Newton, as stated infra page 578, left Pearl Harbor on 5 December
1941 with a powerful task force including the aircraft carrier Lcxiiiyton, two
cruisers, U. S. S. Chicago and U. S. S. Portland, and five destroyers, on a mis-
sion to Midway Island where he was to fly off a squadron of airplanes. Even
up to and at the time of his sailing and thereafter he [50U\ remained
in ignorance of the existence of the war warning message of 27 Nnvember 1U41,
as well as the similar warning messages of 24 November and 16 October 1U41.
That states that it was taken from the Hart Inquiry at paires 316
and 318. h j' p ^,
Do you, Admiral, know of any reason in the world why Admiral
Kimmel would not have told Admiral Newton, who was going in the
direction of Japan, after he had received a war warning, of the fact
that such messages had been sent to him ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1891
Admiral Wilkinson. I know of no reason, sir, but of course I am
not a judge.
Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, if you were Admiral Newton and
you were going in the direction of Japan, you would certainly have
liked to have had that kind of information, would you not?
Admiial Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now one question. Admiral.
In Exhibit 8-A, which was introduced in evidence yesterday, and
which, for identification, is headed "General Headquarters Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers," and dated 4 December 1945 —
will you make that available to the witness, please?
Mr, Gesell. He has it.
Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to the page numbered
2, which is actually the third page in the exhibit, [SOIS] under
the heading "A," and preliminarily, as I understand it, this was a
statement as explained on page 1 :
Since the staff officer connected with the document reporting the above facts
has died and the various records have been burned, the forejj;oing is the conjecture
of Commander Tachibana Tome vpho worlved in the same department at that
time.
Now on page 2-
Admiral Wilkinson. And who I imagine, Mr. Congressman, is the
same gentleman we arrested on the west coast a few months before.
I am not sure, but I think so.
Mr. Murphy. You think he was the same?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think he was the same. He was in intelli-
gence work, and of the same name.
Mr. Murphy. Someone of the same name was arrested on the west
coast of the United States some months prior to Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, for espionage on the west coast. I
just know it was Commander Tachibana Tomo.
Mr. Murphy. I noticed the following :
American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December 1941) (American
time).
Tiie United States broadcasts of the number of battleships, cruisers, destroy-
ers, and others entering (or anchored) in Pearl Harbor was overheard.
[■''tOJ^] Admiral, so far as any messages that were sent from
the United States by the Navy are concerned, they would certainly be
in code, would they not, if they were sent to Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. Unquestionably, sir; I see no reason why they
would report on the number of battleships, cruisers, and so forth,
entering Pearl Harbor. Any message back from Pearl Harbor would
certaiulv be in code.
Mr. Murphy. So far as naval messages are concerned in and out
of Pearl Harbor, they would be in code, would they not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. On a subject such as this I should be almost
certain of it.
Mr. Murphy. Do you have any idea as to what, if any, kind of
broadcasts might be referred to there. Admiral Wilkinson?
Admiral Wh.kinson. Possibly some local news broadcast speaking
of a unit of the fleet coming in for the benefit of the local Hawaiian
population. I know there was no censorship going on there. I think
they had been requested not to comment on the ships, but there was
1892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
no formal censorship. Possibly some amateur radio people talking
together.
[601S] Mr. Murphy. But so far as you know, Admiral, was
there any official broadcast by the American Government, by the
United States Army or by the United States Navy that would con-
tain that kind of information at that particular time ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I suggest that we make an inquiry,
and if the committee so pleases, I will initiate it, of our district intel-
ligence officer out there to see if he knows anything about it.
Mr. Murphy. I would appreciate it if you would take the necessary
steps to put such action into motion.
The Chairman. Mr. Clark.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I have been provided with the original
log of the Enterprise, and I not having had a chance to see it before,
I may have a question of Admiral Wilkinson.
The Chairman. All right. In the meantime Congressman
Clark
Mr. Keefe. I have no questions otherwise until I get a chance to
go through this.
The Chairman. All right; Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark. Admiral Wilkinson, on yesterday Senator Lucas, I
think, inquired of you as to when you graduated from the Naval
Academy. I should like to ask you when you went on active sea duty
in this last war ?
[S016] Admiral Wilkinson. I think the 15th of August of 1942.
Mr. Clark. 1942 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. Would you state, please, for the record, briefly, your
services from then until the close of the war, and also state whether
you received any recognition of any kind in connection with your
services ?
Admiral Wilkinson. From the 15th of August until early Janu-
ary of the following year, 1943, I was commander of battleship divi-
sion 2, comprising three battleships, and operating in Hawaiian
waters, and in the west coast waters of the United States.
In early January I was detached and directed to proceed by air,
which, of course, I did, to Noumea to report to Admiral Halsey as his
deputy commander. I arrived there in late January and remained as
his deputy commander until the end of June, wlien I reported as un-
derstudy to Admiral Turner, in command of the amphibious forces
of the South Pacific.
I joined him in time to participate in the attack on New Georgia
and relieved him in the later stages of that campaign on the 15th of
July, 1943.
From then until the 15th of November of this year, 1945, I was in
command of the South Pacific Amphibious [5017] Force
which subsequently was entitled the Third Amphibious Force, and
remained in command of the Third Amphibious Force when it shifted
its operations from the South Pacific into the Western Pacific as a
whole.
During this time I was engaged in the South Pacific campaign
with the amphibious operations in connection witli the later stages
of the New Georgia campaign, with the seizure of Vella Lavella, the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1893
capture of the Treasury Islands, and the landing and capture of a
portion of Bougainville in November of 1943.
Then in 1944, with the seizure of Green Island and the capture
and occupation of Emirau Island in, respectively, February and
March.
In June the South Pacific campaign was over and I was transferred
to the Pacific as a whole and operated with Admiral Halsey's Third
Fleet in the capture of the two islands in the Palau Islands, Peleliu
and Angaur, in September, 1944, and in the capture and occupation
of the Ulithi atoll.
Immediately after that I was transferred to the Seventh Fleet
under Admiral Kincaid for duty with his fleet and General Mac-
Arthur's single command as a whole in the Philippine campaign.
I was in command of one of the two amphibious forces [5018]
which landed at Leyte on the 20th of October, and was present there,
although not actively commanding any combat forces, during the
sea battles for Leyte of October 20.
Again I was in command of one of the two amphibious forces which
landed at Luzon in Lingayen Gulf on January 9, and initiated the
campaign that resulted in the capture of the entire Philippines.
After leaving there, I was — I wasn't relieved of duty, but most
of my ships were then assigned to the Fifth Amphibious Force under
the command of Admiral Turner, who then proceeded with his force
to the capture of Iwo and Okinawa. I was not concerned in either
of those operations except for a visit I made to Okinawa, but was
engaged in the planning for subsequent operations under Admiral
Halsey.
During the development of the Okinawa campaign, these partic-
ular operations which we were planning for were abandoned, and I
then fell in with the general plan and began to work up the invasion
of Japan with Admiral Turner in command of all the amphibious
forces consisting of my own. Vice Admiral Hill's, and Vice Admiral
Barbey.
Upon the surrender of Japan my duties in the invasion were, of
course, automatically canceled, and I become an amphibious com-
mander to bring in the Eighth Army under General Eichelberger into
Japan from Tokyo, including Tokyo Bay and a short area to the
south of it, throughout northern Honshu, and Hokkaaido and all of
northern Japan, from that line I have spoken of to the southward of
Tokyo.
[S019'] I brought i« the first of the major installments of troops
on surrender day, the 2d of November, some 25,000 troops of the First
Calvary Division and the One hundred and twelth Calvary Regimental
Combat Team, and I supervised the arrival of other divisions in north-
ern Honshu and in Hokkaaido, and remained there in Yokohama in
general command of reinforcement and supply operations for the
Eighth Army until I left there on the 8th of November.
That, I think, sir, is the narrative.
As to any awards, I have been honored by the Distinguished Service.
Medal of the Navy for the capture of Bougainville, by a second Dis-
tinguished Service Medal for the Palau campaign, and by a third for
the Philippines campaign.
1894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Clark. Admiral, this committee, as you understand, is sitting
on this inquiry, the ultimate purpose of which is the finding of the
facts in regard to the Pearl Harbor incident. Do you know of any
other fact or circumstance relating to that or bearing upon it that
you have not related that might be helpful to this committee in that
connection ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Clark. That is all.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions ?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman
[5020] The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I have now before me the memoran-
dum on your testimony before the Roberts committee.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you got it?
Admiral TTilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Referring to the bottom of page 12, "Statement
by Captain T. S. Wilkinson, United States Navy, Director, Naval
Intelligence Division."
Admiral Wilkinson. I beg your pardon. I haven't the Roberts
commission report itself.
Senator Ferguson. Will you just look at the testimony.
(Paper handed to Admiral Wilkinson.)
Senator Ferguson. The other part is in the record and I wanted to
have you read this in. It is a very short memo.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What you gave to Admiral Stark is already in
the record.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. This is headed "Precis of
Testimony".
The Chairman. For the record, define that word.
Admiral Wilkinson. It is headed "Precis", — p-r-e-c-i-s.
The Chairman. What does that mean ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It means a brief, I think, or summary.
[6021'\ The Chairman. That is not our language?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe it is a French word meaning brief.
The Chairman. In other words it means a brief or resume?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. A summary of whatever it is dealing with ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right.
Admiral Wilkinson. The heading is "Precis of Testimony Given
Before the President's Investigating Commission." Statements by
A.dmiral Stark and several others.
Turning to the part that Senator Ferguson has spoken of:
Statement by Captain T. S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, Director, Naval Intelli-
gence Division.
In replies to questions, the witness described naval avenues of intelligence,
including naval attaches and additional naval observers and consular shipping
advisers who had been maintained in the Far East. Frequent reports were
received from these officers. The witness mentioned other methods through which
the Navy received secret information. Frequent exchange of dispatches had
occurred between the Intelligence organization in Washington and in the field.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1895
In general, the sources reported their information to Washington, at the same
time informing the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and the [5022]
Pacific Fleets. Care was taken here to see that these two officers were kept
fully advised as to deA'elopments.
From the evidence avaihable the Navy had concluded in November that the
Japanese were contemplating an early attack. Tlie witness considered that both
Commanders in Chief had available to them the same information on which this
conclusion was drawn here. Nevertheless, warning dispatches had been sent out.
The witness gave information concerning the control of fishing boats in the
vicinity of Hawaii, and described the delimitation of the spheres of activity
of the naval and military intelligence services and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
[5023] In April, 1941, the Chie of Naval Operations sent out a dispatch in-
dicating from past experience that the Axis could be expected to initiate new
activities on Saturdays, Sundays, and national holidays. Steps were taken in
March 1941, placing the Naval District intelligence organizations in an advanced
state of readiness ; coastal information sections were placed in an active status
last May. District intelligence organizations were further extended in that
month, and a complete state of readiness of the intelligence organizations was
directed last July.
S3nator Feeguson. Now, Admiral, were those the only questions
that you had gone into before the Roberts Commission?
Admiral Wilkinson. I should say so, sir. It was a brief hearing,
a half-hour only, as I remember.
Senator Ferguson. That is the only time you testified?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that there was
a Presidential commission to find all of the facts and that is the only
question they went into with you ? Was there anything said why they
were limiting your scope ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know, except that they were in a hurry
to get out to Hawaii, I think, and you will note that this is a summary
of the statements of Admiral Stark, [S024-] Admiral Turner
and myself, and I think on the same day they questioned me, they
also had General Herron and General Miles.
Senator Ferguson. When they got back they didn't go into it any
further, they didn't call you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Didn't call me at all, sir.
Senator Ffrguson. You were here in the Intelligence Branch?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, reading that, I think it is the second or
third paragraph, about the knowledge that the Pacific Fleet and the
Asiatic Fleet had, do you want to let that stand as your testimony, that
(hey had the same amount as you had here in Washington, or to that
effect ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think it is too broad a statement, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It is too broad a statement?
Admiral Wilkinson. They had the same information by reason of
their radio intelligence centers which they had there as to the move-
ments of the Japanese vessels, and the position and location of the
Japanese fl^et ; they had the same information as to those factors that
we had. They did not have the same information as to the diplomatic
negotiations, no, sir, nor as to some of the code messages.
[502-5] Senator Ferguson. And some of the other messages?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So you would say that ought to be corrected ?
1896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson. It should if it is to be narrowed down and
my own statement, my own draft of memorandum for Admiral Stark,
mentioned a number of points about the movement of ships, and I
said they had that information.
Senator Ferguson. Now, on the Sundays and Saturdays, that is in
the last paragraph, I wish you would clear up what they had asked
you about that.
Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, that, I think, is in one of our exhibits,
Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Was that your own or were you just telling
what General Herron had said ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I was telling what my office had done. It
was Admiral Kirk's action on the preceding April. Let me have the
exhibit.
Senator Ferguson. I notice they questioned both you and General
Herron on that same subject.
Admiral Wilkinson. That dispatch is shown on page 1 of exhibit
37 counsel tells me.
Senator Ferguson. Page 1 of 37.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
[5026] Senator Ferguson. Will you just read that?
Admiral Wilkinson (reading) —
1 April 1941
From : Chief of Operations
but I know this dispatch was initiated by Admiral Kirk.
To: Commandants of all Naval Districts —
which would, of course, include Manila and Hawaii.
NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa.
Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because
of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activi-
ties in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays
of the coTuitry concerned they should take steps on such days to see that proper
watches and precautions are in effect.
Senator Ferguson. And had that been called to your attention
when you came in ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And then you had that in mind while you were
in the office ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That would be true because of a relaxation on
that day ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think the British and America,
both countries, paid a good deal of attention [S0£7] to Satur-
days and Sundays.
Senator Ferguson. The same would be true of civilians; the same
thing would be true of civilians?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. If you were going to send a message on Sunday
or Saturday, would you say that you would be more apt to get better
attention from the civilian services or the Army and Navy?
Admiral Wilkinson. Purely as a matter of personal attention, I
would say from the Army and Navy because we maintained a regular
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1897
24-hoiir watch. We don't relax established routines on communications
on those days.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say then that any Army or Navy
establishment that had been alerted, should be alerted on Saturdays
and Sundays even more so than on other days, owing to what you
stated in your report, or what was stated in this report?
Admiral Wilkinson. This dispatch, sir, was not as broad as perhaps
would have been desirable for it to be. It was initiated by Admiral
Kirk and sent out as applicable to the service over which he had
authority, which is to say the Intelligence Service. This was not
warning all the communications services, was not warning all the
combat field. It was only applicable to Intelligence Service of itself,
which was Admiral Kirk's service and consequently my service.
[5028] Senator Ferguson. In other words, you were specially
alerting the intelligence services— they were — on Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And I notice that when you gave your resume as
to what you heard before the Commission you gave the^this is already
in the record but I want to call it to your attention — the Commission
asked if he considered Sunday morning the most lax time in the de-
fenses and, consequently, the most advantageous time for an attack.
He said that —
with regards to the reserves, yes, because they were more likely to be on leave
or other privileges, but with regards to the actual stations in the field he con-
sidered that they should be as efficient and as fully manned on Sunday as on any
other morning.
Admiral Wilkinson. I think I was quoting General Herron there,
was I not, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. All right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, he personally made many dawn inspec-
tions on Sunday to check on and insure their readiness.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I had seen him on his return from
at least one of those.
[S029] Senator Ferguson. Now, he was a general in the Army.
What would you say about that in relation to the Navy at Hawaii ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would not like to express an opinion on
that. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you had been there Saturdays and Sun-
days and holidays ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, what is your opinion ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Well, I think stations which were required
to be manned would be manned very definitely just as much on Sun-
day morning or Saturday afternoon as on any other weekday or any
other day. There were established watches on all the ships and those
watches were maintained regularly regardless of the calendar day
or the day of the week or the holiday.
The ships were placed on certain conditions of readiness, of which
I think you are already aware. Condition 1 was all battle stations
manned; condition 2. half the batteries manned; and condition 3 was
a somewhat smaller element of the battery.
1898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Condition 3, as I recall, was the standard condition in which we
would be when in port. That would require a certain number of
guns manned, and I believe from what I have [50301 heard
that that was the case on Sunday morning, that all the ships were
manned in that condition.
Senator Ferguson. That is. No. 3 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say they would be equally manned
on Sunday morning or Tuesday morning or Monday afternoon, in
that same rotation I mean, that they would be just as carefully
manned then as at any other time.
Senator Ferguson. So, then, you don't think it made any dif-
ference ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It did make this difference: that in the nor-
mal work on the ships they would be having a drill for all hands
and all officers in the forenoon, say, of Thursday or Friday and they
would be having inspections on Saturday. All officers and all men
would be required back aboard.
Now, on a Sunday morning, as a matter of a holiday there would
not be these drills and inspections and some officers might be allowed
to return late ; some few others — I think there was a limitation to
those who might stay away — some few others might be allowed to stay
away all day Sunday, so there would be that slight difference in that
instead of probably being aboard for the work of the day some few
might have been excused because there was no work of that day.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.
[5031] The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Wilkinson, despite the schedule of organ-
izations which is dated October 23, 1940, which requires the Office of
Naval Intelligence in both Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Intelli-
fence to evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advis-
able; despite Admiral Stark's reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of the
22d of March 1941 which reads as follows :
With reference to your postscript on tlie subject of Japanese trade routes and
responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINCUS, Kirk informs
me that ONI is. fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately
informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal
elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning
the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to
you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent
by despatch ;
and despite Admiral Kirk's memorandum of March 11, 1941, his
memorandum reading :
4. The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility
of this Division to keep the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet adequately
[5032] informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and
disloyal elements within the United States.
you testified in June of 1945 before Admiral Hewitt's special investiga-
tion on the order of the Secretary of the Navy in response to Mr.
Sonnet's questions that I will read :
Would it be an accurate summary then, Admiral, to state that information in
the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning Japanese move-
ments, for example, would be disseminated by ONI but the evaluation of Japanese
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1899
plans or deductions to be drawn from these movements would be the function of
War Plans or Chief Naval Operations?
Your answer being :
The latter part of your question "Yes." The first part, the day by day information
of Japanese movements would not according to my then and present understand-
ing be sent out by Intelligence but, rather, by Operations after their evaluation.
My statement to this point is correct, is it not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhakt. Now, I believe that in the closing portion of my
examination of you the other day you explained the discrepancies be-
tween the schedule of organizations of 23 October 1940 and your
conception of your duties by pointing out that you had received
verbal orders from someone which [5033] changed your re-
sponsibility?
Admiral Wir kinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. I forgot to inquire then as to who gave you those
verbal orders?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think I stated that I was officially informed
by my predecessor as part of my relieving him that he had been
orally directed by Admiral Stark to that effect in the presence
of Admiral IngersoU and Admiral Turner as well, and that I myself
had received verbal instructions from Admiral IngersoU and the
authoritative assistant to Admiral IngersoU.
Mr. Gearhart. Has that schedule of organization order ever been
changed ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not knoAv, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. So far as you know it is still in effect?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir. I know that frequently
papers of that sort are drawn up and modified from time to time
and there is no machinery, perhaps, in existence to make sure that
each particular modification, such as I said with respect to removing
the public relations department from the Office of Naval Intelligence,
that there is no machinery set up to keep up these instructions in
writing to date.
Mr. Gearhart. As long as you were the Director in the [5034^
Division of Naval Intelligence you never received from any source
a written order changing the schedule of organization to which I
have just referred?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I did not feel it was necessary.
Mr. Gearhart. Who was it that issued the written order "Schedule
of Organizations"?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure when Admiral Stark assumed
office. It was either he or his predecessor, whoever was Chief of
Naval Operations.
Mr. Gearhart. Could it have been
Mr. Gesell. I can answer that question for you, Congressman
Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. I would appreciate it if you would.
Mr. Geseix. Because I have the original memorandum. It was
approved by H. R. Stark, October 23, 1940.
Mr. Gearhart. October 23, 1940?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
1900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. And did Admiral Stark tell you personally that
lie had changed that order?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. I was satisfied to receive that informa-
tion from my official predecessor and to receive it from his authori-
tative assistant.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, drawing upon your experience as a [5035]
naval officer, if Admiral Stark desired to change that order he would
do it himself, naturally, by another and succeeding written order,
wouldn't he?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not think so, sir. I think he would tell
the man that had charge of it to act otherwise than as was laid out
under written order. I do not think Admiral Stark attached perhaps
very great importance to the existence of this series of long documents
outlining for their guidance the duties of the respective divisions. I
think he felt free to add to them or change them orally from time to
time as he saw fit.
Mr. Gearhart. Both Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Kirk were of
lesser rank than that of Admiral Stark, were they not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact. Admiral Stark was their com-
manding officer, wasn't he?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and mine as well.
Mr. Gearhart. And yours as well.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. It was not then possible for either Admiral Inger-
soll or Admiral Kirk to have issued an order contravening an order
of a higher ranking officer in writing, was it ?
[5036'] Admiral Wilkinson. For Admiral Kirk, no, sir. For
Admiral Ingersoll, yes, if he were acting in his stead.
Mr. Gearhart. But he could only do that while acting in the name
of Admiral Stark?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. When people or other officers, associates of yours,
come to you and tell you that written orders that are plain on their
face in respect to import and meaning — tell you that verbal orders have
been issued setting them to one side, do you not at once feel that you are
on inquiry that you should make inquiries at the source as to whether
or not that has ben done ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not necessarily, sir. If I were relieving an
officer of rank and responsibility in command of a ship and there were
general orders extant and he said that he had received certain particu-
lar orders in variance to those orders, I would acept his statement un-
less I felt there was something distinctly wrong with them, which I
did not in this case.
Mr. Gearhart. And despite the fact that you had before you a writ-
ten order for your guidance, despite the fact that you had been advised
orally that you were not supposed to do the evaluating and not sup-
posed to do the disseminating, you did continue as long as you were the
head of the ONI to [5037] evaluate and to disseminate didn't
you?
Admiral Wilkinson. I had the orders which were applicable ex-
cept as they were modified. They had been modified in a brief, in a
limited way. I continued to evaluate and by "evaluation" 1 mean
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1901
determining the accuracy, the authenticity, and the consistency of
information, I do not mean by that the deduction of enemy inten-
tions. I continued to evahiate all information in that sense and for
my OAvn satisfaction I attempted to figure out what the enemy inten-
tions were but I did not spread that out because I was ordered not to.
I continued to disseminate in every respect, including a number of
papers and articles and publications which I have mentioned, but I
did not disseminate information which would immediately affect the
operations of the fleet until I had consulted with the War Plans De-
partment about it, because those were the limitations that I felt had
been placed upon me.
Mr. Gearhart. Insofar as the receipt of these intercepts, you dis-
seminated them through the agency of your courier. Captain Kramer,
did you not ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Within the limited distribution that was
turned ov'er to me to be carried out.
Mr. Gearhart. And he delivered them in most instances [6038]
to the White House, to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the
Navy, and the Secretary of State and to the two Chiefs of Staff?
Admiral Wilkinson. They were delivered to those officers, sir. He
did not deliver them himself to them, to all of those you mentioned.
He delivered them to the Secretary of the Navy, to the White House,
and to the Chief of Naval Operations, but not to the Secretary of
War, the Secretary of State, or the Chief of Staff. That was an Army
distribution on that side.
Mr. Gearhart. The Army took care of the Army side?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; and to the Secretary of State.
Mr. Gearhart. That is all.
Mr. Keeee. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question ?
Mr. Gearhart. First I would like to make a request, if you will
yield the floor.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. First I would like to make a request of counsel.
Counsel will recall that I called to the attention of the committee
that I had received letters from enlisted men who were serving at
Hickam Field, who had reported to me that on the 1st day of December
1941 a formal all-out air alert was ordered, an all-out alert was in-
voked which required all [6039'] battle stations to be manned,
all men to be in full battle regalia, the mounting of machine guns
and the mounting of antiaircraft guns, and I asked you at that time
to furnish me with the copies of the orders establishing that alert
and the copies of the orders calling off that alert on the afternoon of
Saturday, December 6.
Since that time I have received letters from far separated parts
of the United States, from other enlisted men advising me that the
alert was not confined to Hickam Field but that there was a general
all-out alert at other bases in the island. Is there a Wright Field?
Mr. Keefe. Wheeler Field.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes, it is Wheeler Field, which is the combat airfield,
or was at that time, in the islands ; that an all-out air alert was called
on or about December 1 requiring the same activities at Wlieeler Field
that I have desci-ibed at Hickam Field, and that that air alert was
called off by an order of the afternoon of December 6, 1941, the sus-
1902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
pension of the all-out alert, which required the taking down of the
machine guns and the antiaircraft guns and the packing of them away
in grease and the return of ammunition to the arsenals; and I would
like to have copies of the orders establishing the alert at Wheeler and
a copy of the orders calling off that alert at the same base, together
with any [504.0] similar orders that were issued at about the
same times, creating an air alert upon other bases in the islands and
also any orders, if there be. any, calling off the alert at those other
bases.
Mr. Gesell. We will ask the Army to broaden their request. I
might report, Congressman, that at the time you made that inquiry,
that initial request, it was necessary for the War Department to direct
the inquiry to Hawaii where those orders are if there are any, and
they have not yet received a reply from Hawaii.
Mr. Geakhart. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. We are already at work on that subject.
Mr. Gearhart. I appreciate that. And there is one other thing.
If these field orders at Wheeler and Hickam were purely field orders,
I would like to have that fact certified. If those orders were inspired
from higher authority, I would like to know the history of their
issuance.^
The Chairman. Mr. Keefe, do you want to ask a further question?
Mr. Keefe. Admiral Wilkinson, I have before me now the original
log of the aircraft carrier Enterprise and the photostatic copy of the
log of the aircraft carrier Lexington.
The log of the Enterprise dates from Monday, November [504.1]
24, 1941, to December 15, 1941, and the photostatic copy of the Lexing-
ton log is for the period December 5, 1941, to December 8, 1941.
Now, purely for information in order to be able to evaluate and
understand the language appearing in these logs I ask you as an expert
on naval affairs, a log such as that whicli I liave does not show the
action or battle action report, does it, normally ?
Admiral TFilkinson. I think it would noimally, not a full report
but it would state whether the ship was engaged or when she had
sighted the enemy and what had happened at once. There would be
a separate action report in fjreater detail.
Mr. Keefe. There would be a separate action report ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, I find language in this log which I
have some difficulty, due to my inexperience in dealing with those
matters, to understand.
For instance, on the 30th of November at 12:45 appears the
language: "Sounded flight quarters." What does that mean?
Admiral Wilkinson. That on a bugle they sounded call to flight
quarters, which is to say "stand by the planes, we are ready to launch
planes" or "get ready to launch planes" [504^] or perhaps "get
ready to recover planes." That is to stand by for flight operations of
planes, in other words.
Mr. Keefe. That would mean the planes were either going to take
off or land, would it not?
Admiral Wii kinson. Yes, sir. Calling the men to their stations
in connection with that operation, that was the purpose.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, I find this : On December 1, 1941, as near as
I can make out, the Enterprise at this time was proceeding westward.
» See information submitted by the War Department, Hearings. Tart 5, p. 2490 et seq.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1903
It left Honolulu a few days before. It was carrying planes to Midway
or to Wake, counsel, do you recall? I think they were going to Mid-
way and perhaps the Lexington was going to Wake at this time. Well,
all it says
'Admiral Wilkinson. Excuse me one minute. Senator Ferguson,
do you remember what page that was on, that reference to Admiral
Newton ?
Mr. Murphy. 430.
Admiral Wilkinson. 430? That would give us a clue.
Mr. lOsEFE. There appears information of this character, Admiral,
as of December 1.
Admiral Wilkinson. You are speaking now of the Lexington or
the Enterprise?
Mr. Keefe. I am speaking now of the Enterprise.
[■504-3} Admiral Wilkinson. She had been with Admiral
Halsey.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. Because the Lexington was with Admiral
Newton.
Mr. Keefe. With Admiral Newton?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. There appears this :
17''6 darkened ship: out in the de-Gaussing gear for half hour test. 1746,
secured the de-Gaussing girdle. •
What does that mean?
Admiral Wilkinson. "Darkened ship" means turn out all lights so
the ship cannot be seen after dark. It is usually done at sunset so
that there will be ample time to check, probably, before the actual
dark sets in and lights could be seen.
Mr. Keefe. Is that a normal operation ?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is a normal operation when cruising
at sea and at any times — certainly at any times of danger or crisis and
often just for maneuvers.
In the degaussing process that you mentioned, magnetic mines were
used to some extent early in this war and the answer to it was found
to be putting a magnetic girdle or belt around a ship and when you
were in mineable waters, that is to say, where you were not too deep
for mines to be em- [5044] ployed, the ship would normally
cut in the current on this degaussing girdle so that that w^ould counter-
act the magnetism of the ship and defeat the magnetic mines which
otherwise would be affected by the magnetism of the ship.
Mr. Keefe. I understand that. So that, then, the order to darken
ship was either a precautionary measure, to be indulged in by the
commander of the ship in the event they were in waters where there
m'ght lurk some danger, is that it?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think we were doing it regularly for some
time because of the possibility of an attack from Japanese subma-
rines and, of course, if we were showing lights it would be an open
invitation to discovery.
Mr. Keefe. That is just exactly what I thought.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. That you would darken a ship because you had knowl-
edge or thought, at least, there might be an attack by Japanese sub-
1904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
marines and this ship going out there is preparing itself against that
particular attack by darkening the ship ?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think they had been doing that for some
time, sir, in fact.
Mr. Keefe. For some particular time prior to December 1 ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; the darkening of ships at night.
[504S] Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, then, it says :
Set condition of readiness 3, ship control and fire control.
What does "set condition No. 3" mean?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. 3 is to characterize a condition wherein
a certain number of guns are manned but a certain number of others
are not manned, so that the crews in rotation can get some rest;
roughly about one-third of the guns.
Mr. Keefe. That means they are manning the guns ?
"Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; or the guns were manned at all
times against a surprise submarine attack when at sea.
Mr. Keefe. Is that the highest condition of readiness?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. The highest condition is all hands
at the battle stations, which is condition 1. Condition 2 is about
half the battery and condition 3 is from one-third to one-fourth,
depending upon the ship.
Mr. Keefe. So that I am to understand that when the log says,
"Set condition of readiness No. 3, ship control and fire control," that
that means that at least a part of the guns of that ship were manned
and ready for action ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And what does "ship control" mean and "fire control,"
what does that mean?
Admiral Wilkinson. Fire control is to say — fire control [5046]
has to do with the guns. Ship control has to do with the readiness
to counteract any damage incurred to the ship and that would mean
that they should have certain damage-control parties on at the time,
nucleus damage controls. Of course, if all hands were at the battle
stations they would have full damage control. This would be smaller
and fewer damage-control stations but enough to take action in the
event of a surprise attack.
Mr. Keefe. I do not want to appear so naive as my questions might
appear, Admiral, but I want this for the purpose of the record.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Well, I admit they are very tech-
nical terms as well.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. All of these things that you have described are
conditions of alerting this vessel to prepare it for any possible surprise
attack that might be made upon it ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kfjefe. Isn't that true ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So that so far as i\\Q Enterprif^e is concerned, in accord-
ance with the log, this ship as it was proceeding out toward Midway,
at least in these days for which the record appears in this log, the
commanding officer of that ship was preparing against the possibility
of a surprise attack?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1905
[504.7] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; and doubtless on orders
from Admiral Halsey, the commander of that detachment, who had
probably had similar practices in all other ships of that detachment.
Mr. Keefe. Now, I find also that planes were constantly being
launched into the air for patrol. That would be for the same purpose,
wouldn't it?
Admiral Wilkinson. To ascertain if there were any submarines in
the path of the ship ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. And then I find as they steamed on that Decem-
ber 3, 1941, appears for the first time this language :
1015 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 11.
What does that mean ? What was that plan No. 11 ?
Admiral AVilkinson. One of several plans. In order to have a
variety of plans available so that no enemy could determine that we
had one single method of zigzagging, we would have a number of
plans wherein at different intervals of time we would make different
changes of course. Plan No. 11 was just one of those plans. Which
one that was I do not know.
Mr. Keefe. Well, in any event if the ship on December 3, 1941,
adopted plan No. 11 and commenced zigzagging, it would be quite
safe to assume that that action was prompted by the fact that they
were in waters where they expected the possibility of submarine attack,
isn't that true?
[5048] Admiral Wilkinson. It might, of course — that is very
true. It might, of course, have been for a drill that morning as well
but it might well be — if it were a drill only it would be indicated by
an entry afterward that they ceased zigzagging an hour or two
later.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, I am glad you said that because right in the
next entry, 1216, appears this:
Changed course to 314 degrees T. and commenced zigzagging in accordance
with plan No. 2.
Would that indicate that it was a drill or a maneuver ?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. That would indicate they intended
to do it all day.
Mr. Keefe. I beg 3^our pardon ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It would indicate they intended to do it all
day. They have to stop every ship to change courses and then all
ships would resume together and then they would begin zigzagging
apparently on another plan.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, the next entry contains this language :
1748 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2.
What is plan No. 2? Just another one of these zigzag plans?
Admiral Wilkinson. Just another one. I think we had about 20
at that time.
[5049] Mr. Keefe. That is a different type of zigzag?
Admiral Wilkinson. Slightly different.
Mr. Keefe. Then I find on December 4 the same language, "Zig-
zagging."
Admiral Wilkinson. The ship's course was west of the Hawaiian
Islands and we had had reports of strange submarines being sighted,
79716 — 46— pt. 4 22
1906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I think, in the past few months and the ship was taking no chiinces,
obviously.
Mr. Keefe. Then all of this language that all ships in the task force
are steaming darkened, maintaining condition of readiness No. 3, in
ship control, fire control, ships zigzagging according to plan No. 11
or plan No. 2 or some other plan, indicated that so far as Admiral
Halsey was concerned in going west from Honolulu in this period be-
tween, I think, November 26, when he left Honolulu, and the time
when he got out to Midway, he was taking the precaution that would
normally be taken by the commander of a task force and the com-
mander of this aircraft carrier Enterprise against a possibility of sub-
marine attack, isn't that true ?
Admiral Wilkinson. It certainly appears so, sir, and I believe he
is to be here and he can further testify directly, but I would certainly
say yes.
Mr. I^EFE. And if they manned the antiaircraft guns and were
in readiness at their stations at the antiaircraft gims \5050'\ you
would consider that that was a precaution and a safety measure against
the possibility of a sudden air attack, wouldn't j^ou ?
Admiral Wilkinson. What time was that entry about condition 3,
sir? If it was at night he might be standing off a night submarine
attack, but the guns could be used, of course, against both submarines
and airplanes, the antiaircraft guns. Some other guns cannot be
used against airplanes.
Mr. Keefe. In your opinion, Admiral, as an expert of 40 years in
the Navy, with these entries appearing in this log and also similar
entries in the log of the Lexington, and I shall not burden the record
with putting them all in at tliis time, it would appear that so far as
the commanders of those two task forces were concerned, Admiral
Halsey on the one hand and Admiral Newton on the other, that in
carrying out the task assigned to them, which was to deliver planes
to Midway and Wake and return, they were doing it under the princi-
ple that they might be attacked by Japan either by submarine or by
air attack? Isn't that a fair conclusion for me to draw ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think that the situation was cer-
tainly strained and they were not neglecting any precautions. They
may not have been expecting it but they were taking precautions
against surprise.
[S051] Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, you say they may not have been
expecting it?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; but they were taking precautions
against surprise.
Mr. Keefe. Do you think they miglit have had the same idea
which you have expressed so frequently here, that you did not think
there was any probability of any such attack being made?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. If I was in a similar situation I
would not have expected a probable attack but I certainly would have
done the same thing with regard to my ships.
Mr. KJEEFE. You would be ready for it if it came?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would.
Mr. Keefe. Is that right?
Admiral Wilkinson. And I believe I would have done what they
did.
Mr. Keefe. All right. Thank you, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1907
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in order to clear the record in con-
nection with the questions that have been asked, I would like to read
from page 578
The Chairman. Is that a question?
Mr. Murphy. It is an official record and answers the questions of
the gentleman from Wisconsin.
[5052] Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I state that the gentle-
man from Pennsylvania is repeatedly referring to a book that has
not been offered here, entitled, "Narrative Statement of Evidence of
Pearl Harbor Investigations,'' which I have a copy of, but which I
do not understand has been offered in evidence, is not part of the
record in this case and I understand it has a sort of nebulous char-
acter from what I have been able to hear about it, and until such
time as the full character and background of that instrument has been
produced and it appears as part of the record in this case I do not
intend to be interrupted, nor do I want to be interrupted by reading
from something that is not in the record and may or may not state
the facts as they may ultimately develop.
So I do not accept anything that appears in this statement as
being of verity nor do I think it will assist me in clarifying anything
that I may think in regard to it until it is properly identified.
The Chairman. I think the Chair explained the other day when
these documents were furnished that they were prepared by the Navy
Department at the request of the Committee on Naval Affairs, pos-
sibly before this hearing, started, I am not certain about that, but
that upon the completion of this narrative story they turned them
over to the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs and he
turned them over to me for [5053] distribution to the mem-
bers of the committee, for the information of the committee.
I do not think they were made part of the record or filed as ex-
hibits, but for whatever they might be worth in giving the committee
and to the individual members a running story of this Pearl Harbor
situation. They are not yet officially parts of the record as the Chair
understands it and were not offered for that purpose; that is, not at
that time. They might be so made, but have not as y^t been made
part of the record or filed as exhibits.
Mr, Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I did not mean to interrupt the
gentleman. I understood he had concluded.
I want to read from a part of the Hart report, made by Admiral
Hart, now Senator Hart, and reported on page 578 of volume 2,
precisely along the line of the questions put to the witness and if the
questions are pertinent, this is certainly pertinent.
The Chairman. The Chair has inquired whether this was a fur-
ther inquiry of Admiral Wilkinson? If the committee are through
with the Admiral, unless there are some further questions from him,
we might excuse him.
Mr. Murphy. Let me just say this, Mr. Chairman: I was about to
read into the record the explanation by Admiral Newton as to why
he zigzagged, in answer to the question of [5054] the gentle-
man from Wisconsin. It is at page 578 of the record and there are
further references at 430 and 578 and 562 of volume 2, for those who
are interested.
The Chair. All right. Are there any further questions of Admiral
Wilkinson ?
1908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. I had one or two I wanted to ask him.
The Chairman. Senator Brewster.
Senator Brewster. Admiral, on the general questions of your re-
sponsibilities and the preparedness to meet it at the time, what, if any,
opinion have you formed about the psychological effect of the repeated
warnings which had gone out over the course of the past 2 years, in
1940 and 1941? We have seen these warning messages and one of
those, at least, if not the two — we do not seem to be clear about the
second one — as to the state of mind of conmianders in evaluating these
warnings in view of the recognized inadequacy of the forces at their
command to carry on a continuing state of reconnaissance and alert-
ness ; that is, they did not have actual control ; as to whether or not
it had sort of the effect of hearing a cry of "wolf, wolf" from them
every 2 or 3 months or every month or so, with the result that they
did not take it as seriously as they would have taken it if they were
in the position that you were at Washington, where you knew this
time it meant business ?
[50S5] Certainly the state of tension in Washington and the
knowledge of the situation indicated that this was very different from
any of the preceding crises that had arisen.
What would be your comment as to the lessons which we all might
derive from that experience, looking to the future?
[50S6] Admiral Wii>kinson. I do not recall, sir, that there we're
very many alarms sent out there. Up to the time I left in May there
had not been an excessive number. We kne.w that Japan was restless
on the other side of the ocean, we knew that difficulties might ensue,
and from then on until the actual attack I do not know that very
many were sent. I think perhaps the Department refrained from
sending an excessive number for that very reason, that they did not
want to add up, to produce a wolf -wolf situation.
In answer to your question, I do not believe that there was an
allayment or subsidence, you might say, of apprehension because of
having received too many warnings.
Senator Brewster. You do not think that the alert they had sent
out in June of 1940, when they really put them on the alert — was
that about the date?
Admiral Wilkinson. That was the date, I understand.
Senator Brewster. And the earlier episode in keeping the fleet there
that Admiral Richardson testified about, his visits and his concern,
and then in the winter and spring, 1941, when certain indications were
given and the situation was very tense, you felt all of those were not
sufficient to in any sense put them to sleep ? '
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not think so, sir. The Navy, for in-
stance, was not disturbed or concerned in the summer [5057]
alert of 1940. The fleet remained out there in the eyes of most of
the officers, and it was an idea that it was a good operating ground,
good climate, and of course it had the supposed effect upon the
Japanese.
Senator Brewster. I think you are not familiar with the testimony
on that point. Admiral Richardson testified he was very much con-
cerned about that alert, and he came on to find out whether it was
simply an exercise. At first he was told it was an exercise and later
he was told it was really a war warning.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1909
Admiral Wilkinson. I thought you were speaking about the effect
on the fleet as a whole. Concerning the effect on the commanders, 1
could not say. Admiral Richnidson was concerned in that, but the
general effect on the fleet was little, if anything.
Senator Brewster. I am thinking ]iow in terms of the command
and what their appraisal would be of these warnings, I think that
is one of the questions which demands most consideration, concerning
the effect upon these men.
One other question. I think you testified about wanting certain
additional legislation to take care of espionage in Hawaii. Did you
speak about that yesterday?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I said, I think, that the Depart-
ment had asked for legislation to prohibit the [5058] photo-
graphing of a naval reservation at Pearl Harbor, and that that legis-
lation, I believe, was introduced by the Navy Department but was not
enacted. I mean it was requested by the Navy Department.
Senator Brewster. Question has also been raised about these some-
thing over 200 — I now have the figure before me — 200 consular agents
of the Japanese there. I quote now from the Roberts Eeport as it
seems to have pertinence :
In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents acting under
the Japanese Consul, who was stationed in Honolulu, territory of Hawaii. The
Naval District Intelligence Office raised a (Question with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and with the IntelliKeiu-e Officer of the Hawaiian Department of
the Army, whether these agents shoulil not be arrested for failing to register
as agents of a foreign principal as retiuired by statutes of the United States.
In conferences respecting this question, the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, objected to the arrest of any such persons at least until they had
been given notice and an opportunity to register, asserting that their arrest
would tend to thwart the effort which the Army had made to create friendly
sentiment toward the United States on the part of Japanese aliens resident
in Hawaii and American citizens of Japanese descent resident in Hawaii and
create unnecessary bad feeling. No action was [5059] taken against the
agents.
It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii was the
Japanese Consulate at Honolulu.
You were familiar with that, were you ?
Admiral Wilkinson. Very. We discussed it. General Miles, iMr,
Hoover and myself, in one or more of our weekly conferences and we
were all concerned about it, and the Department was endeavoring to
secure authority or action on that subject. But the Army, the War
Department, on the recommendation of the commanding general out
there, took the action, or requested the action that he had set, that it
would be delayed and they would be given an opportunity to register,
in order not to disturb the feeling of loyalty which they were trying
to build up among the Japanese.
Senator Brewster. That is as far as that phase of it was concerned,
but there was no need for additional legislation, was there ? You had
all the legal authority that was needed?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, indeed.
Senator Brewster. That is all.
_ Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in rela-
tion to the one Senator Brewster just asked?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
1910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. I want to read to you, Admiral from page 127
some questions and answers from the Army Pearl Harbor [6060'\
Board record. Your opposite in the Army was General Miles?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I want to read from his testimony :
General Grunert : Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side"
might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of satura-
tion tlmt they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting?
In other words, "crying wolf! wolf!" so that they became confused, or "fed up"?
General Miles. That could have been, sir.
General Gruneet. Do you think that the G-2 message — we call it "the G-2
message" of November 27 — and the sabotage message — we call that the "Arnold
message", of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General's signa-
ture— did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the command "down
below" as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of November
27?
. General Mixes. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of St^iff's message of November
27 was a war warning message, in my mind, all inclusive so far as different
forms of attack or dangers might be considered, and my message of the same
date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who
was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas department,
to that particular form of danger,
[5061] General Grunert. There was no report from the recipients required?
General Miles. There was no report required.
Were you familiar with those messages that went out to the Army?
Admiral Wilkinson. I was not familiar with the Army message. 1
think I knew General Miles' message as to sabotage, and I knew that
the Army had sent a parallel message to our war-warning message,
although T was not familiar with its language.
Senator Ferguson. Would you agree with General ]\Iiles there on
that one question, No. 135, asked by General Grunert:
Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side" might have considered
themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation that they did not
pay much attention to the information they were getting? In other words, "crying
wolf, wolf." so that they became confused, or "fed up"?
General Miles. That could have been, sir.
Admiral Wilkinson. I could not say as to the Army. sir. I do not
think that situation arose in the Navy. I think the Chief of Operations
Office was careful not to send too many for that reason.
The Chairman. In other words, taking the alert in the summer of
1940 and the other alerts along in the winter of [5062'] 1941,
even in the summer of 1941, up to the 27th of August, 1941, they did
not constitute a sufficient number of alerts as to create the "wolf"
sign in the minds of the commanders in the field, so that they would
abandon or disregard them as just one more repetition of something
which had already happened?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not in the Navy, sir. I do not think so, sir.
I cannot speak for the Army.
The Chairman. Anything further ?
Mr. Gesell. There are two small points that ought to be clarified,
Mr. Chairman. It will just take a second.
Admiral, I understand you to state the code designation did not
appear on the Japanese intercepted messages. That was an error. The
code designation did appear on the top under the name of the sender
and addressee.
Admiral Wilkinson. Speaking of what message ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1911
Mr. Gesell. Of the intercepted messaoes appearing' in exhibits 1
and 2 here, these diplomatic and other messages. They do not appear
on our copies of the exhibit because, as we advised the committee, we
had stricken them off.
Admiral Wilkinson. That is what I was referring to.
Mr. Gesell. That may have misled you?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Ml-. Gf.sell. I think the eA'idence is and the record ought [60631
to show that those code designations did appear.
Admiral Wilkinson. On the original draft, yes.
Mv. Gesell. Also I think we neglected to ask you whether or not
your December 1 summary was sent to Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. That is all.
The Chairman. The committee thanks you, Admiral, for your co-
operation in eliciting the facts in this inquiry. We appreciate your
forthright rej^lies to all questions asked.
Admiral Wilkinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
committee for the courtesy they have shown me.
The Chairman. Who is the next witness. Counsel?
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Turner.
The Chairman. You may be excused. Admiral Wilkinson.
Admiral Wilkinson. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Admiral Turner.
[6064.'] TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER,
UNITED STATES NAVY
Mr. Mitchell. Will you state your present rank. Admiral, and
station ?
Admiral Turner. My rank is Admiral. My name is Richmond
Kelly Turner.
[6066] Mr. Mitchell. You were Chief of the War Plans Sec-
tion in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations at one time, were
you not ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, from October 24, 1940, until June 13,
1942.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you state briefly what your service has been
since you left that post ?
Admiral Turner. I left Washington on June 13, 1942 ; proceeded
to the west coast; had 10 days' leave; went to the South Pacific by
air ; took command of the Amphibious Force, South Pacific, later the
Third Amphibious Force; landed troops at Guadalcanal on August
7, 1942, and then continued in command of the operations at Guadal-
canal for several months, taking troops and supplies back and forth.
In February of 1943, after Guadalcanal had been secured, we en-
gaged in the occupation of the Russells Islands as a preparatory
move for the capture of New Georgia.
On June 30 of 1943, we made the landings at Rendova, and othei'
parts of New Georgia Islands.
On June 15, I was relieved by Rear Admiral Wilkinson. I pro-
ceeded to the Central Pacific on August 24, 1943, assumed command
of the Fifth Amphibious Force, which was a new force.
We then engaged in the capture of the Gilbert Islands [6066]
in November, and in the Marshalls in February of 1944,
1912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In about the end of March I was promoted to Vice Admiral, and
about that same time was given command of the Amphibious Forces,
Pacific Fleet, which then comprised only the Fifth Amphibious Force.
In the late spring the Third i^mphibious Force was added to the
Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.
In June we began the capture of the Marianas Islands, and after
that I returned to Pearl Harbor and turned over all my ships to the
commanders of the Third and Seventh Amphibious Forces, which
were in the Southwest Pacific under Admiral Kincaid, who was under
General MacArthur's command.
In February of 1945, we made the capture of Iwo Jima, and the 1st
of April 1945 began the campaign against Okinawa, and I remained
at Okinawa for about 7 weeks and then went to Guam and the Philip-
pine^ to prepare for the Kyushu invasion.
At that time, the Seventh Amphibious Force was made available
for use in the invasion.
I was relieved as the Fifth Amphibious Force commander, which
I held in addition to the office of commander, Amphibious Forces,
Pacific Fleet, by Vice Admiral Hill, in May, and then on August 15,
the Seventh Amphibious Force was added to the [5067] Am-
phibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, as an administrative organization,
which then comprised the Third, Fifth and Seventh Amphibious
Forces.
I organized the movement of ships and troops into Japan for the
occupation, and on November 14 of this year, I was relieved and came
to shore duty. I was promoted to Admiral on May 14, of 1945.
My present duty, to which I have just been assigned, is the repre-
sentative of the Chief of Naval Operations on the military staff com-
mittee of the United Nations Organization.
Mr. Mitchell. When do you have to leave for that job?
Admiral Turner. About the 29th or 30th of this month.
Mr. Mitchell. If you are finished here ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you state, Admiral, what were the functions
of the War Plans Division, and War Plans Director in 1941 when you
were there?
Admiral Turner. May I quote from the pamphlet which I turned
in to the committee ?
Mr. Mitchell. I offer in the record at this time, and ask to have
it transcribed in the daily transcript, as Exhibit 8S, those sections in
the document heretofore described as "Organization of the Office of
Chief of Naval [5068] Operations, October 28, 1940," which
relates to the War Plans Division. The committee has already had
as exhibit 82 those sections that prescribed the duties of the Intelli-
gence Divisicm.
The Chairman. It will be ordered printed as part of the transcript.
That is Exhibit 88.
(The document referred to was nuirked "Exhibit 88.")
Admiral Turner (Reading) •
WAR PLANS DIVISION (OP 12)
12-1. DUTIES:
(a) Policies and Projects Section:
(1) Development of policies and projects in support of Mar jilans.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1913
(2) Collaltomtidii with the War Department in preparation of current plans
for joint action of the Army and Navy, and in the solution of current problems.
(3) Collaboration with other Government departments on policies and projects
affecting national defense.
(4) Study ~of subjects referre<l to the War Plans Dixision by the Chief of
Naval Oi>erations.
(;!) Action in advisory capacity in current [5069] administrative mat-
ters ref(>rred to the War Plans Division.
(b) Planfi Sect i 07) :
(1) Direction of war i)laniiing.
(2) Preparation of designated war plans.
(3) Review of Ojx'rating Plans and Principal Contributory Plans.
(4) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of Joint
Basic War I'lans.
(5) Collaboration with other Government departments on plans affecting
national defense.
12-2. The Director of the War Plans Division is a member of the Joint Board
(General Order No. 7).
12-3. The War Plans Division has membership on the following committees :
Joint Jioard.
Joint Plaiuiing Connnittee.
Joint Aeronautical Board.
Joint Air Advisory Committee.
Shore Station Development Board.
12-4. The War Plans Division is non-administrative.
(OP 12)
[6070] Also in addition to that, shortly after this order was
issued, we established section (c), which was the Pan American De-
fense Section.
That section had liaison with the military personnel of the other
American countries except Canada, and with other agencies of the
Government, and War Department, who were interested in the war-
making powers and plans of Pan America.
Also in addition to that, and at just about this time, the War Plans
Division had membership with two members in the Joint United
States-Canadian Defense Committee, which had been established by
the President, I think, in July of 1940.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, there is one phase of your work that
especially interests me, and that is to try and find the line of demar-
cation between the Office of Naval Intelligence, and Office of War
Plans, on the subject of evaluating intelligence information and
disseminating it to the field commanders.
Maybe I can approach the thing better by saying we have gone into
that subject with the Army, the General Staff, and the impression
we have is that General Gerow, head of War Plans, who was your
apparent opposite in the Army, War Department, did not issue and
was not called upon to issue messages or directions to field commanders
unless [5071] they involved some operations.
If it was a mere question of dissemination and evaluation of in-
formation about enemy affairs that did not require any operational
order or directive, then it was a G-2 function to do that.
Was the situation in the Navy precisely parallel to that, in the
Navy Department ?
Admiral Turner. So far as war plans were concerned, I think that
both the War Department and Navy Department War Plans Division
actually operated in exactly the same way. I have heard General
Gerow's testimony, and if you will recall, he said it was his business
to issue major evaluations of strategic situations. Those were not his
exact words.
1914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It was his business to keep the responsible commanders in the field
informed as to prospective operations.
Mr. Mitchell. Yon mean enemy operations or our operations?
Admiral Turner. Both. That was exactly the same as we had in
the War Plans Division. The only difference in practice that I know of
is that in the Army, the MID, the G-2, makes the enemy estimate of
the situation, which is an over-all estimate of capabilities and probable
actions, and keeps that current. In the Navy that is the function of
the War Plans Division, to make and keep current the estimate as to
the enemy, as well as to our own probable future actions.
[60721 I have heard the testimony here in regard to this sub-
ject and I will say now that there vras no change ever at any time
to my knowledge made in the duties of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence as set down in the pamphlet. There was an interpretation
made before, I think it was during the first part of Captain James'
tenure of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
I conceived it to be the duty of War Plans to be consulted on and
to have major advice on the general and major strategic situation of
the country and of all other countries.
About that time estimates as to probable actions by foreign powers
then at war or not at war started to go in from the Office of Naval
Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations not routed by me and
giving estimates as to what was going to happen. I was shown some
of these by the Chief of Naval Operations and I disagreed with them
very much.
So that I talked to Captain James and I later talked to then Cap-
tain Kirk on this subject and said that when they prepared any
evaluations as to strategic matters to send to the Chief of Naval
Operations I would like to have them consult me in advance or if not
convenient at least they should be routed by my office so that I could
make a comment on them because that was my function, to give
major strategic advice.
[S07S] We had in our Division officer? who were experienced
in matters of that character and more experienced than the officers
in the Office of Naval Intelligence, who, generally, were more junior,
and were trained rather for the collection and dissemination of in-
formation, rather than its application to a strategic situation.
Now, there apparently became a misunderstanding of that situa-
tion, through, probably, the use of the word "evaluation." There
are several kinds of evaluation of information. One is as to its
authenticity, its probability, its probable effect on the future in gen-
eral terms, the trends which it may indicate. That evaluation was
assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence and is perfectly properly
assigned.
If you will look at the letter — I don't know whether it has been
introduced in evidence or not — of December 12, 1040, from the Chief
of Naval Operations to the Director of Naval Intelligence, which was
prepared by myself, directing that the fortnightly bulletins with
fresh information be issued, you will find in there nothing that differs
in the slightest degree from the duties of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence as laid down in the rules.
Frequently they would put in their estimates as to what the mean-
ing of certain types of movements or certain actions by political or
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1915
military members of foreign governments mean. [507^] They
would put in that and it was perfectly proper.
My function was to give the major strategic over-all picture for
the use of my superiors and disseminate that. I had no responsibility
whatsoe37er for disseminating information as such and never did
at any time, although from time to time I would suggest that the
Office of Naval Intelligence should put out certain types of informa-
tion. But I never initiated anything of that sort. It was not within
my function.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, please refer now to this document marked
"Exhibit 88," covering the functions and duties of the War Plans
Division, and point out any provision in it which calls upon the War
Plans Division to get out these over-all strategic estimates of the
situation.
Which one is it that you say covers that?
Admiral Turner. Under the "Plans Section." "Direction of
War Planning."
Mr. Mitchell. "Direction of War Planning" ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct. The War Planning is a very
widespread and complicated matter. One of the important parts
of any plan, major operating plan, or a basic plan, is the strategic
estimate that goes along with it and forms a part of it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, these strategic estimates weren't
always related to the War Plans, were they? That is, [S07S]
you weren't limiting your strategic estimates to cases where "you
were developing a war plan. Didn't you make those regularly whether
your plans were settled or not ?
Admiral Turner. We kept running estimates. We made a basic
national policy estimate shortly after I came in the Division which
supplanted a long estimate that had been used in the preparation
of the Rainbow war plans and from time to time memoranda, let-
ters, and so forth, memoranda, were sent to the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, letters were sent to the Secretary and to the commanders in
chief, in development, and so on, of that plan.
Our basic plans were founded on those estimates. They were
part of it. You had to make the estimate in order to make the
plan.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, if you had your plans, basic plans
made, and then from day to day you were watching the situation
around the world and making estimates of the probable operations
and strategic intentions of possible enemy nations, you weren't doing
that with a view to changing the plan, were you ?
Admiral Turner. If necessary, to keep the plan alive. We tried
to have a realistic plan.
Mr. Mitchell. I am talking more about the question of getting
information out to the field commander. You wouldn't [5076]
have to send them to the. field commanders to use those estimates for
the basic information, your office. War Plans?
Admiral Turner. I sent no information to any field commander at
any time.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am anticipating a little bit, but we are getting
down to a specific case here, where on November 27, 1941, what was
called a war warning was sent out to the commander of the Pacific
1916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fleet at Hawaii which warned him that diplomatic relations had been
broken, or words to that effect, that a hostile attack might be expected
by the Japanese in any direction at any time, and so on.
' Now, was it your function to have any part in the drafting of this
kind of a document?
Admiral Turner. I drew that document up. That was my concep-
tion and the conception of the Chief of Naval Operations and Assistant
Chief, that that was exactly the type of thing the War Plans was re-
sponsible for preparing.
[5077] Mr. Mitchell. Well, didn't that include information
about— —
Admiral Turner. Only in connection with the change in the stra-
tegic situation.
Mr. Mitchell. Did that warning contain any kind of a directive
for action?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What was that?
Admiral Turner, That was putting into effect preparatory measures
for the Rainbow-5 War Plan which was then extant.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, we have in that message first a warning that
this is a war warning, second a statement of the information on the
diplomatic situation, negotiations with Japan have ceased, another
warning that a strategic estimate may be that an aggressive move by
Japan is expected within the next 3 days, and finally an order to do
something, to wit, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatoi^ to carrying out of the task assigned in WPL-46. There
was all sorts of things in there, wasn't there ?
Admiral Turner. That is a preparatory order with necessary parts
showing reasons for the officers addressed to get ready to execute
WPL-^6 from a defensive situation.
[5078] Mr. Mitchell. Well, was it because that message of that
date contained an order or directive to take appropriate defensive
action that you came into it ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. I would have come into it in sending out
an over-all picture of the strategic situation.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, turning to the part of this Naval regulation
which has been labeled " Exhibit 82," which deals with the Intelligence
Division, it says :
Secure all classes of pertinent infurnmtion concerning foreign countries, espe-
cially that affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention to the
strength, disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces, evaluate
the information collected, and disseminate it as advisable.
Now, will you explain to us just what you understand that required
of the Intelligence Division?
Didn't it require everything that you had in your message of the
27th except the order to take appropriate defensive deployment?
Admiral Turner. No, sir ; I think not. This says "Secure all classes
of pertinent information." It does not say to prepare a strategic esti-
mate of the situation, and to give a sti-ategic estimate to the forces in
the field. It [5079] says "from pertinent information of -all
foreign countries," and that comes in from time to time.
One of the usual ways of distributing such information was through
the fortnightly summary and to evaluate the matter with resjiect to
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1917
what effect that information has on lutuie intentions. Those are
minor matters. If at any time the Office of Naval Intelligence wanted
to send out a long estimate, as a matter of fact which they did in a
Russian section of the fortnightly bulletin late in 1941, why, that is
perfectly all right for them to do that, provided it goes by the War
Plans Division so that the Chief of Naval Operations can be ^iven
ultimate advice from the War Plans Division as to the strategic situa-
tion.
Mr. Mitchell. Then your idea, as I hope I understand it, is that
there were certain things the Intelligence Branch was supposed to do,
but that you felt that owing to your broader field of operation, and the
chance that your strategic estimates and theirs might conflict, you
brought 'about an arrangement by which the Intelligence estimates on
their way to the Chief of Naval Operations passed through your office,
so that you could make your comment and they wouldn't be confused;
is that it ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. But, there really was a duplication of [SS80}
function there in a way, was there not ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Let me ask you this question :
a. 1. says:
Intelligence Branch. Secure all classes of pertinent information with par-
ticular attention to the strength, disposition, and probable intention of foreign
naval forces.
Do you mean that they were to get the information that might bear
on the probable intentions, but not state what the intention was, is
that it?
Admiral Turner. No. sir. They could do exactly as that is there,
if it referred to a major situation, but an over-all picture, then it had
to go through War Plans.
Mr. Mitchell. Why wasn't there an over-lap then? I don't under-
stand. They could do it, but merely had to route it through you?
Why wouldn't there be both functions performed by both of these
divisions with a check-up through your Division?
Admiral Turner. The War Plans Division collected no informa-
tion Mdiatsoever. We had no agent. We were not an administrative
organization. We depended on the Office of Naval Intelligence and
through them on the Military Intelligence Department of the Army
for all of the information that we got with one or two exceptions.
[5081] For example, we got information as to diplomatic ac-
tivies through Captain Schuirmann of the Central Division. We
got information as to the future activities of the British, the United
Kingdom, through the British Admiralty delegation which was set
up here during the spring of 1941.
We got information as to Canadian activities, and plans directly
from the naval attache, or through the naval attache at Ottawa.
We got a great deal of information from the newspapers.
That all went into our thinking. But the collection of the in-
formation and its effect, general effect, of any particular kind of
information was up to ONI.
[S082] Mr. Mitchell. Was up to what?
1918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner. Office of Naval Intelligence. It was not their
function, and I see nothing in there to show it, to maintain a general
estimate of the situation. That was up to War Plans.
Mr. Mitchell, When it says in subdivision 2, after saying the In-
telligence Division is to collect information relating to the strength,
dispositon, and probable intention of the foreign naval forces, in
the next sentence when it says "evaluate the information collected,"
that is evaluate it, the information, as to the strength, disposition, and
probable intentions of foreign nations, and disseminate as advisable,
do you feel that that does not place upon them any share of the
responsibility or duty of making any evaluation available to Intelli-
gence and dissemination of it, which gives anybody in the field any
idea of the probable intentions of the possible enemy forces ?
Admiral Turner. If their evaluation affects the general situation or
affects our view as to the general situation then before they put it out
it was customary, and nearly always done, that it was cleared through
War Plans. If we objected, why, we would come to an agreement.
Now, they would send their information out weekly or periodically,
or something of tliat sort, and they would collect [508S] cer-
tain information, certain classes of information, and as to this class,
this one little pigeonhole that they would collect, why, they would
give their estimate of what the effect of that particular thing had on
the general situation.
Mr. Mitchell. We have arrived at the hour of adjournment. Do
you think you could confer with Admiral Wilkinson over the evening
and possibly prepare for the committee a very condensed and short
statement of the relative functions that you two would agi'ee on under
this order?
Admiral Turner. I can't give anything more, Mr. Counsel, than
we have here.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am pinning myself right down on some writ-
ten document and wondering what the words mean. A lawyer would
construe them to mean something. I haven't a clear idea. But if
you can't do that, all right.
The Chairman. Think it over. Admiral, and see if you can give
more specific answers to the questions. ,
We will suspend until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
The committee and counsel will remain for a brief session.
(Wliereupon, at 4 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until 10 a. m.,
Thursday, December 20, 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1919
[5081^-] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. G.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Fer-
guson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
\^5085^ The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)
Mr. Mitchell. The admiral has some minor corrections in the
transcript that he would like to suggest.
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Turner. On page 5067, line 5, the date "November 14"
should be "October 14."
On page 5080, line 12, the word "but" at the end of the line should
be changed to "that is," and the word "but" inserted previously in
the same line before the phrase beginning "if it."
Page 5065, the fourth line from the bottom, insert the word "and"
before the words "on August 24, 1943."
Page 5083, about the middle of the page, Admiral Wilkinson is
shown as being the witness and that should be changed to Admiral
Turner.
That is all.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Turner, I think my questions last night
about the respective duties of ONI and War Plans Division were
couched in general terms. Possibly if I make some, present some
specific examples of messages that were sent, we could get a more
definite idea of the relations between the two Divisions.
[5086'\ So I will call your attention first to the message of
November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and others, found on page 32 of Exhibit 37,
1920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Exhibit 37 is the basic exhibit of the Navy dispatches to and from
Honolulu.
That message says : •
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful period
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and move-
ments their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise
aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam
is a possibility period Chief of stafE has seen this dispatch concurs and re-
quests action addressees to inform senior armyi officers their areas period
Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation
or precipitate Japanese action period Guam will be informed separately period
Now, the record shows that the authorization for the sending of
that dispatch was signed by Admiral Ingersoll. Would that be a
dispatch that you had a part in preparing or the duty of getting
ready or having to do with ?
Admiral Ttjrner. Yes, sir. I prepared that dispatch and after
some changes by the Chief of Naval Operations and by the War
Plans Division of the War Department that was sent [S0S7]
in that form. It relates to the over-all picture of the situation vis-a-vis
Japan which might lead to war and thus invoke our war plans.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Well, that message did not contain any directive or
or order for action, did it ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. So that the AVar Plans Division had a broader
function in participating in the preparation and sending of messages
to the fleets involving directions as to operations ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. It had to do with the presentation of
advice as to the over-all picture of the international situation which
might result in war for the United States. And that was my con-
ception of the function of the War Plans Division. That is, to
advise the Chief of Naval Operations on matters of that character.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, j^our function was not to send dispatches
direct over your own signature but to take the matter up with the
Chief of Naval Operations, make your recommendations and sug-
gest a form of dispatch you ought to send; is that the way it worked?
Admiral Turner. That is correct. We practically never sent a
dispatch from War Plans without it having been released either by
thq Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief. [50S8]
I believe on only about one occasion did I release a dispatch and
that was after talking over the telephone to Admiral Ingersoll.
Mr. Mitchell. These dispatches from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to the fleets, none of them seem to bear any signature. That
is, we have a record of the oflicer who authorized the release or
sending of the message. In this particular case it was Admiral
Ingersoll, When these messages reached the addressees did they
bear the signature of the officer who had authorized them, or were
they generally messages from the Chief of Naval Operations?
Admiral Turner. Almost invariably the naval practice is to send
the dispatch from the official and not the person. We never mention
the name of the sender unless there is some special reason, such as
a somewhat personal dispatch from one person to another. That
differs from the War Department practice.
[5089] Mr. ]\Iitchell. The War Department record shows that
some of these dispatches to Honolulu were signed by Marshall, others
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1921
by the Adjutant General and some by General Miles, and so on. That
was not your custom in the Navy ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. Almost invariably we merely put it as
the official, originating from the official.
Mr. Mitchell. That is, when the various persons to whom these
naval dispatches were addressed — those in Exhibit 37 — received their
dispatches there were no person's signatures on them and they came
with the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, that was the
situation ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, let us pass on to the warning message of
November 27 on page 36 of Exhibit 37 ; that is the message that reads :
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning ;
and among other things it directed, that the commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet and the Asiatic Fleet execute an appropriate defensive
deployment.
There we have a warning, plus information, plus a directive. Now,
what part did you take in preparing that message ?
Admiral Turner. I prepared that message and submitted it in the
same manner as the other to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations,
the Chief of Naval Operations, and General [5090] Gerow of
the War Plans Division of the War Department. That message had
some changes made in it and this was the final draft as approved.
That was also released by Admiral Ingersoll, but Admiral Stark had
approved it himself.
Mr. Mitchell. There is another one on December 3, page 40 of
Exhibit 37, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders in
chief Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet, commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District at Honolulu and commandant of the Si^^enth Naval
District.
That message appears to have been — the sending of it appears to
have been authorized by Admiral Wilkinson, initialed by Ingersoll,
and that is the one that says that :
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent
instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at
Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and Ixjndon to destroy most
of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential
and secret documents.
Now, that was not an over-all picture, was it ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And it did not require any action, that is, any
directive for a movement of the fleet, did it ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; and it did not change the over-
[S0,91] all picture. That was initiated by 16-F-2 in Admiral
Wilkinson's division and was shown to me and was released — -initialed,
that is, by Admiral Ingersoll before sending. It was pure informa-
tion.
Mr. MrrcHELL. It was not the type of message that under the
arrangements between the War Plans Division and the ONI was your
function to prepare ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
79716 — 46 — pt. 4 23
1922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. It is one of the things that passed through your
hands so there wouldn't be any conflict, is that the idea ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, I call your attention next to the subject
where a message was not sent. Those were the messages that have
been referred to as target area messages in Pearl Harbor in exhibit
2, commencing on page 12 and extending up through page 14, a
series of Japanese intercepts, Japanese messages from Tokyo to
Honolulu and so on which were intercepted by our agencies and de-
coded and translated a considerable time before the Pearl Harbor
attack.
I am not asking you to express any opinion as to whether that in-
formation ought to have been sent at all, but I am just assuming
for the sake of argument that those messages were significant and
if properly evaluated Avould have- pointed [6092] to the fact
that the Japs were doing more than just getting ship movements;
they were getting up some kind of a bombing pattern for pin-pointed
dive bombing in Pearl Harbor.
Let us assume that for the sake of argument, and let us also as-
sume that if they had been evaluated in that "way, the information
should have been sent to Honolulu.
Now, whose business would it have been under the system between
ONI and the War Plans Division at that time to bring that message
and its evaluation to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations
and suggest a dispatch to the fleet at Honolulu? Whose function
would that have been ? Do I make myself clear there ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I conceive that to be the dutv and
function of the Office of Naval Intelligence. As a matter of fact, I
have no recollection of ever having seen that dispatch of the 24th of
September until I returned here recently and saw the dispatch in
this book. I would never have initiated a dispatch on that subject.
However, our relations with ONI and the other divisions were close,
and if I had seen that dispatch I surmise that I would have talked
it over or brought it specifically to the attention of Admiral Wilkin-
son. I do not know why I did not see that. I believe that I would
have remembered it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, do you not think that this message [60931
of the 24th of September on page 12 of this book did change the over-
all picture that we had up at that time, to wit, that there was no definite
information of any particular animosity toward Pearl Harbor and
this changed the picture — I assume it did — in that aspect, at least, does
it not ?
Admiral Turner. I think: it changed it sufficiently so that if I had
seen it I would have taken it up with Admiral Wilkinson or possibly
talked it over with Admiral Ingersoll, but I would not have initiated
any dispatch on that subject myself.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, as a matter of principle, what would have been
the difference between that dispatch and the dispatch about destroy-
ing codes of December 3, the destruction of the codes?
Admiral Turner. There is no difference in principle between the
two dispatches in my opinion.
Mr. Mitchell. While we are on the subject I will continue with
what I was doins on that.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1923
Now the diplomatic intercepts in exhibit 1 — there is a whole series
of them and I will try and sum up the situation there.
There was a dispatch intercepted from the Japs to their Ambassa-
dors here giving a proposal on November 20, 1941, to our Govern-
ment, which we received, the gist of which was that [f>094] the
Japs demanded that we cease our aid — in substance, cease our aid to
China, sto}) our embargoes, the freezing of assets and other economic
sanctions, furnish oil to Japan which she would be free to use against
China or anybody else, and the record also shows dispatches to their
Ambassadors here to the effect that they must by, originally, the 25th
of November, and finally on a deadline of November 29, obtain from
the United States an affirmative agreement agreeing to these things,
and that the British and the Dutch would have to sign also on the
dotted line ; and that if we did not affirmatively agree to her proposals,
the abandonment of China and the furnishing of war materials to
Japan, by that date, something was going to automatically happen.
And there was a further statement in some of those dispatches that
the Ambassadors here were not to allow us to prolong this thing or
put them off.
Now, if I have correctly stated the summary of that situation, and
I am assuming that it would have been desirable for any reason to
send that information to the commander of the fleet at Honolulu,
whose function would it have been to frame a message giving the story
of that situation and have it sent to the commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet?
Admiral Turner. Those dispatches considered by themselves were
informatory but all of them entered into the back? [SOOS]
ground from which was derived the reasons for sending the dispatches,
first of November 24 and then of November 27. In other words, the de-
tailed information, if it had been desirable to have acquainted the
commander in chief with those dispatches, would have been the func-
tion of Office of Naval Intelligence. The effect on the international
situation, which was very large, would have been treated by the War
Plans Division.
I would like to add that it was my belief at that time, and it was
Admiral Stark's belief, that all of these major diplomatic messages, at
least in the Pacific, were being decrypted by both Admiral Hart and
by Admiral Kimmel, and I did not know that Admiral Kimmel did
not hold the code for those dispatches until I was so informed at the
time of the Navy court of inquiry on Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, your answer to my specific question would be
that the situation exposed by those diplomatic intercepts I referred to
did have a broad effect on the strategic situation, and were a subject
which the War Plans Division had a responsibility for, and you sup-
plemented that with the statement here that all of the messages which
had been sent on November 24 and November 27, represented your
evaluation of that information, and was sufficient, as I understand?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
[5096] Mr. Mitchell. Now we are getting a little bit into the
question of having seen these and who delivered them, and so on, and
I have been trying to avoid that for the present and stick to our ques-
1924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tion of respective duties between the two divisions. I only have one
other question to ask along this line and that is this :
On the 6th and the 7th of December 1941, there came in this 14 parts
message and the 1 p. m. message, and I think the record shows now that
the 13 parts of the message were decoded on the evening of the 6th and
that the fourteenth part definitely breaking off negotiations and the
1 p. m. message which followed it, which set the delivery at 1 p. m.,
Sunday, came in on Sunday morning.
Now, information of that kind, coming in suddenly and properly
evaluated as General Marshall evaluated it, suggesting that there
might be a serious significance to the 1 p. m, delivery, whose business
was it in the Navy Department, in the Chief of Naval Operations
set-up, to get ahold of that message and see that the information about
it was dispatched immediately to the fleet at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Turner. I believe that was the duty of the Office of Naval
Intelligence. My recollection of the delivery of the 13 parts and of the
fourteenth part is not entirely clear, but if you wish I will tell you the
story of it.
[5097] Mr. Mitchell. No ; I will go into that shortly.
Admiral Turner. All right, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I just assumed that the message came in in that
way, and my question is whose responsibility was it to act on it by
giving the information to the fleet? Wliose responsibility was it to
bring it to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations, and see
that a message was sent promptly to Honolulu ?
Admiral Turner. I believe it was the duty of the Office of Naval
Intelligence. However, when I saw the 13 parts, which I believe
was about 11 : 30 on the night of December 6, I inquired from the
officer who showed it to me and brought it to my house as to who
had seen that dispatch, and he informed me that Admiral Wilkinson
and Admiral Ingersoll and Secretary Knox had all seen it before it
had been shown to me. I considered the dispatch very important,
but as long as those officers had seen it, I did not believe it was my
function to take any action.
The question of the 1 p. m. delivery, I saw that dispatch in Ad-
miral Stark's office about noon, recognized its very great importance,
and asked him if anything had been done about it. He told me that
General Marshall was sending a dispatch, and I did nothing further
about it because I considered that would cover the situation.
[5098] Mr. Mitchell. Well, in defining that message — those
messages — as something that the Office of Naval Intelligence and not
the War Plans Division had any respcmsibility for, where do you
draw the distinction between that type of message and the one about
these displomatic messages, and the dead line that Ave talked about,
which you do think came under the jurisdiction of the War Plans
Division, as affecting the overall situation or changing it in some
way. How do you draw a distinction between the two types in
assigning responsibility back and forth between the ONI and the
War Plans?
[5099] Admiral Turner. I did not consider that that message
and the fact that it appeared to be an ultimatum changed the over-all
situation in the least degree, because I was certain in my mind that
there was going to be war immediatel}' between the United States and
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1925
Japan, and this was merely confirmatory. The full orders, and what
I felt was the full picture of the situation had been ^iven to the fleet
commanders in the dispatch of November 27, and confirmed definitely
by the later dispatches regarding the destruction of the Japanese
codes and the Navy Department's orders for our people to destroy
codes in exposed positions.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, the question as to whose respon-
sibility it was would not have any connection with your judgment as
to whether or not that responsibility had been discharged. I am not
asking about that. Your judgment was that whosever responsibility
it was, it was sufficiently taken care of.
Don't you think. Admiral, that the relations between the ONI and
War Plans Division, as to the over-all picture and whose responsibility
it was, was in a very fuzzy condition at that time ?
Admiral- Turner. No, sir, I do not. I think the line among staff
officers — and that applies to all staff officers — can never be exactly
drawn for every particular [SlOO] and every detail. So long
as they have proper relationships with each other and keep each other
informed as to matters near the dividing line, which we did, I believe
that the instructions were adequate.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you not think that this interpretation of the In-
telligence Division rules that we have been told about, without any
formal change in the literal terms of the order, was something more
than a change in interpretation ? Don't you think it was really con-
trary to the expressed provisions of the orders prescribing the duties
of the Intelligence Division ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir ; I do not.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, I have a statement here, Mr. Chairman, pre-
sented by Admiral Wilkinson, which he has asked me to have put in
the record, and I will do that, and then I will ask the Admiral to
present any further ideas that he has on this picture.
Admiral Wilkinson presents this letter. He says :
In view of the apparent variance in tlie testimony of Admiral Turner and my
testimony with respect to the responsibility for the development of enemy in-
tentions, and the supplying to the stafE of information bearing upon and re-
lating to fleet operations. I respectfully suggest, if the committee pleases, the
enclosed papers be [5101] read into the record. These papers comprise
memoranda from my predecessoi". Vice Admiral Kirk, regarding his instructions
from Admiral Stark, and two dispatches containing inquiry on this subject from
me to Rear Admiral Janes, now in the Mediterranean, and his reply.
Very respectfully.
T. S. Wilkinson, Vice Admiral.
The first thing he presents is a memorandum from Vice Admiral
Kirk. I suppose Admiral Kirk can be called directly, but I think
there is no impropriety in reading this statement into the record.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell (reading) :
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C, 19 December 1945.
Memorandum for Vice Admiral Wilkinson :
1. Confirming my statement to you upon turning over the duties of Director
of Naval Intelligence in October 1941. the following represents the gist of the
oral decision of the Chief of Naval Operations as to the duties of the Office of
Naval Intelligence regarding interpreting and evaluating information concerning
intent of possible hostile [5102] nations.
1926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. On April 1941. following a discussion in the office of Rear Admiral Ingersoll,
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, with the Director of War Plans, Rear
Admiral Turner, and myself, the three of us entered the office of Admiral Stark,
Chief of Naval Operations, where the points at issue were reviewed.
3. It was maintained by me that the Office of Naval Intelligence was respon-
sible for interpreting possible enemy intentions after evaluating information
received from whatever source. Further, that the Office of Naval Intelligence
was comparable to G-2 in the War Department General Staff in these respects,
and should likewise prepare that section of the formal Estimate known as
"Enemy Intentions".
4. This position was contested by Rear Admiral Turner who maintained that
the War Plans Division should prepare such section of the Estimate, and should
interpret and evaluate all information concerning possible hostile nations from
whatever source received. Further, that the Office of Naval Intelligence was
solely a collection agency and a distributing agency, and was not charged with
sending out any information which would initiate any operations on the part
of tlie fleet, or fleets, anywhere.
5. Admiral Stark then approved the position taken by [5103] Rear
Admiral Turner.
6. I abided thereby and so advised my principal chiefs and subsequently your-
self.
A. G. KiKK,
Vice Admiral, U. 8. Navy.
Navy Depaetjient
CNO
Naval Message
From : COMNAVNAW
Date : 5 Dec. 45
TOR Code Room : 1050
Decoded by : Carroll
Typed by : Curtis
Routed by : Thompson
041134 NCR 3435.
From Admiral James
Refers CNO 031500. Believe information regarding written instructions in
error Init probably based on following facts. Director War Plans Admiral Turner
came to my office and requested that ONI make no estimate of prospective enemy
intentions for CNO but furnish information to War Plans who would make the
required estimates. Turner was informed that existing printed organization
instructions of CNO required Intelligence to make these estimates. McCullum
can verify and perhaps elaborate. No Avritten or other instructions [5104]
of which I have knowledge were issued.
Change action to 0P1)3 . . . Add : OP10 . . . 20-9C . . . (Per 2-9C 171432) BUPERS
. . . Act.
Navy Department
Naval Message.
From: DCNO.
Released by : L. E. Denfeld :
Date 3 Dec. 45. COMNAVNAW
TOR Code Room : 1632.
Typed by : Poindexter/Grusky.
Routed bv Thomsen
031500 NCR 7368
For Admiral James.
"Question arising Pearl Harl)or investigation regarding written instructions
given ONI early 1941 by CNO not to disseminate any estimates of enemy or
prospective enemy intentions. These instructions although recalled by officers
of ONI cannot be located. Do you remember incident and can you suggest
location of the order or memorandum. Would appreciate your recollection.
Request reply care Bupers. Wilkinson."
'ADD: 2019G . .(PER 20-9C 171432)
ADD BUPERS . . (PER BUPERS SVC NO 63)
OPIO . . . ORIG.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1927
[5105] Now, Admiral, did you have a summary of the situation
as you saw it, that you wanted to present?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; if I may be permitted to read this
memorandum.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; you may read that.
Admiral Turner. My principal point is that I did not consider the
oral instructions of the CNO, Chief of Navel Operations to the
Director of Naval Intelligence on this subject to be a change in
existing orders, but merelj?^ an interpretation of them.
The interpretation was that the War Plans Division was respon-
ible for advising the Chief of Naval Operations and preparing papers
for dissemination regarding the over-all international situation,
which might involve the United States in war, and thus bring the
war plans into effect.
It was, of course, essential that communications from the Chief of
Naval Operations to the fleets be consistent as regards predictions
as to the future involvement of the United States in war, and there-
fore that estimates which might be prepared by the Office of Naval
Intelligence should be cleared through the War Plans Division.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, will you please explain to us what
the system was in the Navy Department for delivery to you, or your
office by the agency in the Communications [5106] Division,
which I understand was charged with the matter of decoding and
translating these Jap messages, delivery to you of copies of those
messages ? How would that work in your case ?
Admiral Turner. The Communications Division delivered copies
to the Office of Naval Intelligence. When I first came to the War
Plans Divisidn, daily an officer of the Office of Naval Intelligence
brought a folder to me, and waited until I had read the various
dispatches. As these dispatches increased in number, sometime in
the spring, approximately, of 1941, the system was changed, and a
daily file of dispatches was delivered to me in a locked pouch.
I would then open that pouch and read the dispatches sometime
during the day, and on the following day that pouch would be
exchanged for another with that day's dispatches.
In this one folder were Japanese intercepts and intercepts from
other countries of all character.
It was customary for the Office of Naval Intelligence to put a paper
clip on the dispatches which they considered of importance, because
there were many dispatches circularized which had very minor impor-
tance. I would always read the ones with the paper clips, and usually
would glance through those without paper clips and read those which
a glance showed [5107] to be of interest.
Mr. Mitchell. In your absence from your office, or being out of
the citj'-, who would accept delivery of those documents and make the
examination?
Admiral Turner. The senior officer remaining in the War Plans
Division.
Mr. Mitchell. You said that you do not remember ever seeing those
intercepts on pages 12 to 15 of exhibit 2, what we call the target
planning division of Pearl Harbor into areas and location of vessels in
each section.
1928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner. I said I did not see the dispatch on page 12. I
saw many dispatches concerning the location of ships in Pearl Harbor,
and on the movement of the United States war vessels in and out of
other ports.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the one on page 12 says :
To divide the waters of the harbor up into areas A, B, C, D, and E, for the
purpose of describing the location of vessels.
On page 13 is another message from Honolulu to Washington that
sets up a code system for describing each one of these areas. Then
there is one on page 14, which was translated very late, it is true, trans-
lated December 6, which speaks of areas in the harbor there.
Do I understand you mean it was only the one on page [610S]
12 that you failed to see and that you did see the others ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; I do not remember these specific dis-
patches as to locations of ships. There were a good many of them.
I saw many of them. I definitely fail to remember the dispatch on
page 12.
Mr. Mitchell. Might not your failure to remember be due to the
fact that under the circumstances under which you examined it, it
did not make any definite impression on you as being important?
Would not that make you fail to remember ?
Is your recollection affirmative that you did not see it, or are you
just in a state pf mind that you cannot recollect whether you did or
not ? That is what I am after.
Admiral Turner. It is rather in between. I definitely do not re-
member seeing it. I think that if I had seen it I would have remem-
bered it, but that is pure surmise.
Mr. Mitchell. I see.
Do you remember having any discussion with Admiral Wilkinson
or any other officer, respecting any significance to be attached to this
message, and this series of messages about the division of Pearl Har-
bor into areas ?
Admiral Turner. I do not remember ever hearing that discussed.
Mr. Mitchell. Am I right in thinking that Admiral [5109]
Wilkinson has testified that according to his recollection he did notice
such a thing, and had some discussion with you about it. Do you re-
member his testimony to that effect ?
Admiral Turner. I did not hear that. But I have no recollection of
such conversation.
Mr. Mitchell. To cluuige tlie subject, Admiral, I want to go back
to this series of joint war plans: One, the American-Dutch-British
conversations at Singajjore; another, the British- American conversa-
tions, called ABC-1 and ABC-2, and the joint Canadian-United
States conversations on basic defense plan No. 2.
In order to malce it clear just what I am after. I will say what I am
interested in is to find out, if I can, from these documents or any other
evidence, whether or not anybody representing the United States,
from the President down, made any commitment, or promise, to the
British or the Dutch to join in a war against Ja]ian before Japan
attacked us, and without prior authority from the Congress. That is
what I want to know. I am not interested in the plans in any other
respect.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1929
[5110] Now yon had soinethin<:- to do witli all these plans, did
you not ^
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Let ns take np first the American-Dntcli-British con-
versations. I call your attention to a document dated December 12,
1940, signed by H. R. Stark, directed to the Commander in Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, "entitled "Instructions Concerning' the Preparation of
the U. S. Asiatic Fleet for War under War Plan Rainbow 3."
Would you look at that document?
Admiral Turner. What was the question?
Mr. MiTCKELL. Did you have anything to do with the preparation
of that document ?
Admiral Turner. I prepared it.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you read it into the record? It does contain
the instructions that were sent out to the United States representatives
who were planning to take part in that British-Dutch- American con-
versation at Singapore, is that not true ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Please read it into the record.
Admiral Turner (reading) :
Secret. OP-12-Dy
(SO A16 (R-3)
December 12. 1040.
[5111] From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. 8941.
Subject : Instructions Concerning the Preparation of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet for
War under War Plan "Rainbow 3."
1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet is informed that a plan de-
signed for governing naval operations in case of war with Japan, Germany, and
Italy, and entitled "RAINBOW 3" has been prepared. Two copies of this plan
are forwarded to you by special officer messenger. While it is not to be considered
as the policy of the United States Government to become involved in war under
this plan, such a war appears at this time to be a possible eventuality. You are
requested, therefore, to give a high priority to the preparation of your operating
plans, and also to the preparation of your vessels, aircraft, and personnel.
2. The ofl5cer messenger carrying this plan, Commander J. L. McCrea, U. S. N.,
is authorized to remain in the Manila area for about nine days. He is prepared
to present you the general views of tlie Chief of Naval Operations as to various
political and strategic matters which have influenced the preparation of "RAIN-
BOW 3." You are requested to make a study of the plan and to forward to
the Department via Commander McCrea recommendations and suggestions for
changes which may appear desirable to you at this time. It may be [5112]
stated, however, that it does not seem practicable, under the existing situation,
to effect material changes in the Assumptions of the plan.
8. One of the assumptions of the plan is that war would b(e fought with
the United States, the British, and the Dutch Colonial Authorities as Allies.
Staff conversations with the British, of a limited nature, have been undertaken
in London and Washington, but so far as concerns an allied operating plan and
command arrangements in the Far East, the only useful staff conversations
would appear those which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet might be able
to hold with the British and Dutch Supreme War Commanders in that region.
It is believed that you may be able to hold such conversations with the British.
There is a considerable doubt as to the extent of the conversations which may
become iwssible with the Dutch, owing to their fear of repercussions in .Japan.
4. You are, therefore, authorized to conduct staff conversations with the
British and Dutch Supreme Commanders, with the specific understanding that you
are in no way committing the United States Government to any particular politi-
cal or military decisions, and that the purpose of the staff conversations is
solely to facilitate joint operations should war eventuate under the approximate
conditions shown in the Assumptions of "Rainbow 3." It is requested that these
1930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL H ARBOR ATTACK
[5113] conversations be conducted in secret; in particular the most extreme
care should be taken not to permit the Japanese to become aware o^your attempt
to establish contact with the Dutch.
n. You will note that "RAINBOW 3" will require agreement between the Com-
manders-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and U. S. Fleet, concerning the routing and
protection en route of the Asiatic Fleet Reenforcement. It might be necessary
for the Reenforcement to join you via the south of Australia, but this will depend
upon the situation at the time.
6. Questions as to special personnel or material which should go forwai'd
to you via the Asiatic Fleet Reenforcement should be settled by direct arrange-
ments between you and the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. These arrange-
ments should include all questions concerning the cargoes of the two XAF and
two XAK which it is proposed to send you from the East Coast via the south of
Africa.
7. All matters concerning the logistic supply of your forces should be decided
by you, with the understanding that, so far as possible, only personnel and
technical materials would be supplied from the United States.
8. It is requested that you take advantage of the presence of Commander
McCrea to inform him as to your views concerning various pending matters, and
particularly those [511^/] which require the assistance of the Navy De-
partment in solving the problems which you foresee may arise in war. Specifi-
cally, the Chief of Naval Operations desires furtlier light on matters connected
with the following:
(a) Your recommendation concerning a further reenforcement of the Asiatic
Fleet during peace, due consideration being given to political reactions and to
the present capability of existing facilities to care for reenforcemonts.
(b) It is proposed to send you, probably, in February, four "Biid"' class
minesweepers fitted for both ordinary and magnetic sweeping, and fitted to lay
contact mines. Advise as to whether or not these minesweepers should be
sent.
(c) Are additional patrol seaplane squadrons desirable, and can they be
supported with present facilities?
(d) It is possible the next reenforcement after the 'Bird' minesweepers may
be four 1,2(M) ton destroyers converted to high speed minesweepers fitted for both
kinds of mineswoeping. Would these ships be desirable?
(e) In view of the fact that the Crete Moersk cannot be purchased or char-
tered, what is the present situation as regards the support of your submarines?
Can six more (or a total of 23) submarines be supported if a cargo ship with
spares and supplies is sent from the United States to the Asiatic to augment
the Canopiis?
[5115] (f) Advise concerning sending motor torpedo boats to the Philip-
pines.
(g) There are now in store in San Francisco portable facilities and equipment
for establishing advance bases for patrol seaplanes. These facilities are made
up in sets capable of supporting either two or four squadrons each. Would
you desire to have sent to you one or more sets of these facilities for either two
squadrons or four squadrons?
(li) Do you need increases in personnel and material? Under consideration
are renewing, or adding to, the machine tool and crane equipment of the Cavite
Navy Y'ard; adding to the facilities of the submarine base; and establishing an
airplane overhaul base with a capacity for overhauling two patrol squadrons
including engines. Under this heading, would the establishment of minor base
facilities for submarines and aircraft In Mariveles Bay in addition to those at
Corregidor and Cavite be advisable? Would the establishment of similar facili-
ties near Cebu or Uoilo or elsewhere be desirable?
(i) What is your present view with respect to increases in ammunition,
including bombs, mines, and torpedoes? What increase in stowage and upkeep
facilities for these Items are required?
(j) We desire your recommendations as to booms, nets, loops, etc. This is
in connection with your "front door" problems.
[5116] (k) Advise as to the location and adequacy of quantity of gasoline,
fuel oil, diesel and lubricating oil stowage.
9. The Chief of Naval Operations has under consideration a visit to Australia
by two liglit cruisers, one the cruiser now under your command, and the other
the cruiser carrying to INIanila the spares and personnel of the patrol squadron.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1931
It may be proposed that the Marhlehrad would return to the Asiatic Fleet after
this cruise, provided you consider that you still need her out there. On the
other hand, since the Marhlehcad might yxn-haps be more suitably employed in
war in either the Atlantic or the southeastern Pacific, it may be preferable to
withdraw her now from the Asiatic. Your advice on these matters is requested.
10. Information is also requested as to whelher or not (he Chief of Naval Opera-
tions should talve up with the Chief of ^taff, U. S. Army, any of the problems
affecting the closure of the "baclv door" referred to in one of your letters.
11. It is recognized that the above list is comprehensive and that you may be
unable at this time to furnish answers to the questions involved or to other
items you have in mind. If this should prove to be the case, you are requested
to forward them by air mail or dispatch as soon as practicable. If it seems
advisable, you should forward your recommendations by dispatch in order to save
the time involved in Commander McCrea's return to Washington.
H. R. Stark.
Copy to : Cincus.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Mitchell, that is from the Chief of Naval
Operations to whom?
Admiral Ttjrnkr. To the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
Admiral Hart.
Mr. Mitchell. And Admiral Hart it was, I think, that designated
the men wlio went to that conference.
Now, Admiral, you produced a file here from the files of the Navy
Department that has something to do with this Singapore business,
and I think in that you have a copy of the instructions which the
British gave their representatives at that Singapore conference, have
you not?
Admiral Turner. No, sir, not at that conference. I have instruc-
tions which were given for the conference which was held in Singapore
in April.
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, a later one ?
Admiral Turner. That is the paper in which the British give in-
structions to their conferees.
Mr. Mitchell. Now there was an earlier conference prior to April ?
Admiral Turner. I think, in answer to that question, the committee
might be interested in a brief resume of all of [5ii^] the con-
ferences that were held between the American authorities and the
British and the Dutch.
The first contact with the British in Singapore was made by our
naval attache. Commander Thomas, who was going to Thailand in
October, about the 23d.
The Vice Chahrman. What year?
Admiral Turner. October of 1940. That was merely exploratory.
On November 11, in response to a dispatch from the Chief of Naval
Operations, Captain Purnell, the chief of staff of Admiral Hart, went
to Singapore and had exploratory conversations with them, with in-
structions that no commitments were to be made. There were, no
written documents issued from those two preliminary conferences.
The next conference that was held — and it was in compliance
with the letter which has just been read — was from January 14 to
January 16, 1941, at Batavia, between the Commander in Chief of
the Dutch Forces and Captain Purnell. We have in this paper a dis-
patch summary of the result of those conversations, and I have in my
possession the minutes of that meeting, Avhich I believe the counsel
has not seen, which I just very recently got. It adds nothing
particularly.
1932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Then we received word that finally the British and Dutch were
going to get together in Singapore in the latter part of [6119]
February of 1941. Captain Purnell attended this British-Dutch con-
ference and was authorized to agree to tentative methods of command,
tentative methods and areas of operations, either jointly or sepa-
rately, and to exchange of communication facilities and intelligence,
but of course under the instructions that there would be no political
or definite military commitments.
Nothing very definite came out of that conference.
The next conference — and on which there is another letter direct-
ing that this conference be held, and a letter or a dispatch from the
British Chiefs of Staff concerning the conference — was held in Singa-
pore about the 19th of April, 1941, Out of that conference was
evolved the ADB paper which is here, and which the counsel has
just produced.
Mr. Mitchell. That is is exhibit 50.
Admiral Tubner. That paper contained a lot of objectionable fea-
tures, and the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff in the
Army, on July 3, 1941, in a letter to the British Joint Staff' Mission
here, rejected that paper in toto and requested that additional in-
structions be issued, so that we could get another agreement.
In brief, the objections were two : First, there were some political
implications in the paper which w^ere not acceptable to us, and one
of them was this deadline down in the South China Sea and Gulf of
Siam. The other objection [5119] was that the plan was not
very realistic and did not seem to advance in many respects the
possible cooperative effort between the different countries.
Mr. Mitchell. Excuse me for interrupting .you, but that document
that the Admiral just referred to, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief
of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff of the British rejecting this
Singapore proposal has already been introduced in evidence as
exhibit 65.
Go ahead. Admiral.
Admiral Turner. As a result of that rejection, and after consider-
able conversations between our representatives and the British
representatives here in Washington, the British Chiefs of Staff pro-
duced a paper which was a proposal for a draft of an agreeanent, and
which had the title "ADB-2." The date of that is August, 1941.
That paper was not entirely acceptable but was closer to our ideas.
Negotiations on the basis of that draft agreement were proceeding
rather slowly, until the arrival of Admiral Phillips, the new British
Far Eastern Commander in Singapore, in November. Admiral
Phillips and some staff officers went to Manila and had conferences
there with our authorities, chiefly Admiral Hart, and Admiral Hart
on the 6th of December, his date, which would have been the 5th
here, sent a dispatch to us concerning arrangements which he had
made with Admiral [5121] Phillips as to command, and so on,
in the war which then was coming, within a day or two.
That agreement, with some slight modifications and remarks, was
approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, it being only a naval
agreement, on the 7th of December, and the dispatch went out on
the 8th.
[5122] In none of these papers was there ever a political com-
mitment, or a definite military commitment. This was a plan of
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1933
action, or these were plans ol' action based on assumptions that should
the United States enter the war, then these papers would be efTective,
provided they were approved by the proper authorities.
None of ADB papers were ever presented to either the Secretary of
the Navy, or the Secretary of War, or to the President, although all
of those officers as well as the Secretary of State were aware that
these conversations were being held from time to time.
Mr. Mitchell. Have you in that file any instructions by the British
about this United States-British-Dutch conference and the powers of
their representatives 'i
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. If you find any clause there stating the limits of
their authority in these matters, will you please read it into the
record ?
Admiral Turner. This appears in a note from the British Military
Mission in Washington to the United States Chief of Staff, and trans-
mits a copy of the British instructions to the British representatives
at the forthcoming conference at Singapore.
Mr. Mitchell. What is the date of the note ?
\5123] Admiral Turner. The date of the note from the British
Military Mission is April 13, 1941.
Paragraph 7 of the enclosure, which is the British instructions, reads
as follows — I beg your pardon. To make it clear, I will read para-
graph 6 as well.
6. The conference will be in two parts : Part 1 to be British-United States-
Dutch staff conversations ; Part 2 to be British-Dutch staff conversations with
the United States representatives attending as observers, should this be desired.
7. In both cases, the following conditions will apply :
a. No political commitment is implied.
b. Any agreement is subject to ratification by the Government's concerned.
c. Conversations to be conducted in spirit of complete frankness.
Mr. Mitchell. We will offer in evidence at this time and have it
read into the daily transcrij^t, a report from the commander in chief
of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations dated Decem-
ber 7, 1941, which I understand is a dispatch report of the discussions
that took place at that earliest conference in Singapore.
Admiral Turner. That is 1941.
[5124] This is the final conference with Admiral Phillips.
Mr. Mitchell. The very last one ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I think that is one of the documents that Senator
Ferguson has asked us to produce.
The other is the reply dated December 7, 1941, released by Admiral
Stark and addressed to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet.
Shall I read those, or do you want them transcribed ?
[S12S] The Chairman. I think if they are not very long you
might read them.
Mr. Mitchell. No, they are not long. The report dated December
7, 1941, coming from the Asiatic commander states :
This is the first of five parts.
(1) We have met and discussed the problems with which we are faced In
the Far Eastern area.
(2) In the early stages of a war with Japan occurring at the present time,
the initiative must inevitably rest with the Japanese.
1934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) It is consequently not possible for us to draw up definite plans to be
carried out by all our forces at the outbreak of war, and the most we can do
is to decide upon the initial dispositions that appear to us best suited to meet
the probable Japanese actions. Plans for submarines and naval aircraft are
definite and ready.
(4) We are agreed that it is of great importance to prevent any Japanese
movement through the Malay barrier. Part two will follow.
Second part of 070327.
(5) We are agreed on the following initial dispositions :
(A) British battle fleet to be based upon Singapore and operate as required
from there as a striking force in [5126] connection with any Japanese
movement in the China Seas, Dutch East Indies and through the Malay barrier.
(B) Cruiser striking force to be based on East Borneo — "Surabaya — Darwin"
to act as a striking force in connection with air reconnaissance. This force
can provide cover, and when necessary, escort, for convoys within the Dutch
East Indies and Philippines area or for an occasional important convoy from
Australia to Singapore.
(C) The minimum cruiser force should be maintained in the Australia -New
Zealand area to deal with a moderate scale of raider attack or escort important
convoys.
(D) The minimum cruiser force to be maintained in the Indian Ocean to escort
important trade.
(6) The actual dispositions of forces to give effect to "5" are contained in
Appendix 1.
(Part Three.)
(7) We consider it very important that action in the Far East area should be
co-ordinated with the movements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and we hope we may
be informed of the time table vizualized for the movement of this Fleet to Truk
in accordance with plan "Rainbow V". The release of cruisers from Australia
and New Zealand is intimately connected with the movements of this Fleet.
(8) All operations of U. S. Army aircraft which touch the operation of any
naval forces to be co-ordinated [5127] through CINCAF.
(9) The setting up and use of a joint headquarters is found impracticable at
this time. %
(10) Strategic Control. Strategic control as between H. M. and U. S. Forces
for the present to remain under respective Commanders in Chief and their opera-
tion to be co-ordinated under the principle of mutual co-operation.
(11) Tactical Command. The policy in force in North Atlantic will be
followed.
(12) We consider that liaison officers .should now be exchanged between the
United States Asiatic and British Eastern Fleets, and are taking the necessary
action.
(13) We consider that if the above is agreed to in principle by Dutch, Australian
and New Zealand authorities in. consultation with British Commander in Chief
Eastern Fleet, next week, then all that remains to do in the way of conference
is the perfection of details by our respective staffs.
Signed Thos. C. Hart and Tom S. V. Phillips.
(Part Four) In addition to the items reported in the first three parts we are
also agreed as to the following :
-1- With the growth of our forces in the Far East, it will be important to be
in a position to undertake more offensive operations. Such operations are not
practicable from Singapore, and we consider that it is necessary to have, [5128]
in due course, a base further north from which to operate.
-2- Manila is the only suitable base available, and we consequently consider
that the necessary measures should be put in hand to enable Manila to be used
by the British Battle Fleet. The question of just what action is necessary for
this purpose will be discussed by our staffs.
-3- We consider that we should aim at having Manila available as a base by
the first of April 1942, if this can be done.
(Part 5)— Appendix 1— Singapore : Battleships: PRINCE OF WALES, RE-
PULSE, REVENGE, ROYAL SOVEREIGN ; Cruisers : MAURITIUS. ACHILLES,
TROMP, DE RUYTER, (AUSTRALIA?) (AND LATER HOBART?) Destroyers:
Ten British, 6 Dutch, 4 U. S. (See note.) SOURABAYA— DARWIN— EAST
BORNEO. HOUSTON, MARBLEHEAD, CORNAVALL, JAVA, 4 Destroyers
(U. S. see note). AUSTRALASIA. AUSTRALIA OR CANBERRA. PERTH,
LEANDER, THREE AMC. INDIAN OCEAN. EXETER, GLASGOW (20 Knots)
Two "E" Class, 3 "D" Class, four "C" Class, 5 AMC.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1935
Footnote: Hart's nnderstandins is that we build up destroyer force to
operate with the British battleships as they increase in number. At present, the
two destroyer divisions are deployed with his cruisers, one division being in full
readiness at Balik Papan to proceed to Singapore upon declaration of war.
(CINC Eastern Fleet requests above be forwarded First [5129] Sea Lord
as personal message from him.)
And the reply from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Hart,
dated December 7, 1941, reads : — r—
Senator Brewster, Is the time of that shown, the time of day ? Was
that before the attack or after, does it appear?
Admiral Turner. May I answer that?
Mr. Mitchell. Have you a copy of this ?
Admiral Turner. This was actually transmitted on the 7th about
8 : 00 p. m. It had been written, I believe, late on the 6th or early on
the 7th, and would have gone out a little earlier except for the attack
on Pearl Harbor.
Senator Brewster. It was prepared then entirely before the attack
and was not changed after that ?
Admiral Turner. I don't remember that it was changed. It might
have been slightly changed. It was still in the process of drafting at
the time of the attack.
Senator Brewster. Excuse me for interposing.
Mr. Mitchell. The original dispatch from the commander in chief,
Asiatic Fleet, bears date December 7, 1941. I will ask you what that
date is here and if the hour is noticeable there.
Senator Brewster. That would be the 6th here, wouldn't it. Ad-
miral?
Mr. Mitchell. We want to know when that message was received
in Washington, the original.
[5130] Admiral Turner. It doesn't show the time of receipt.
That was sent on noon of their 7th which would have been
Senator Brewster. That would be the 6th here, wouldn't it ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Are there any hieroglyphics on that photostat that
would help you state the hour it was received ?
Admiral Turner. That would be about 11 p. m. on the 6th, 11 p. m.
on the 6th. So we did not see that until the next day. I will modify
my other answer. I think that was entirely prepared after the attack
in the afternoon of the 7th because I know if it had come there at 11
o'clock at night nothing would have been done on it that night and I
think it came to my attention when I came down to the Department
the next morning.
So that I believe now that that was prepared in the forenoon of the
7th. Actually our time of 11 p. m., the time of transmission, time of
coding out there, time of transmission, decoding, of that long message,
it wouldn't have been available for less than 8 or 9 hours after the
date that it was started to be coded.
Mr. Mitchell. This reply to Admiral Hart reads as follows :
Tlie five parts of your dispatch beginning with 070327 approved with comment
as follows X Part one approved x [5131] Part two approved but CNO
invites attention to possibility that the major Japanese attack against Philippines
may come from the eastward and that a Japanese concentration may be estab-
lished in Halmahera or Mindanao approximately in accord with ideas expressed
in WPL44 x Part three approved para seven make arrangements direct x Para
1936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
eight approved by CNO and COS x Part four approved when practicable x
Regarding paras two and three inform me what additional personnel material
and minor forces you require for the projected fleet base in Manila or alternatively
in Mindanao x Footnote approved x Question of transfer to you of additional
destroyers cannot be decided at t'ns time xx Para 3315 WPL46 provisions are
■extended to include Army x You are authorized by SECNAV to time charter US
and foreign flag merchant vessels of your station as necessary to accomplish this
objective suggest possible use of British vessels formerly in service on China
Coast X Request prompt information as to loading of supply vessels from US
which will be sent you via Indian Ocean approximately in accord WPL44 tables xx
Inform Army British and Dutch xx Sent CINCAF for action and CINPAC and
SECNAVO for info.
Copy to : BAD
WPD, U. S. Army.
[S132] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, counsel at the beginning,
as I understood, said that was a reply of Admiral Hart.
Mr. ISIiTCHELL. Reply by Admiral Stark, I mean.
Senator Lucas. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I misspoke. It is a reply by Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to Admiral Hart, Asiatic Fleet.
Now, Admiral, you know also about the ABC conversations, British
conversations, 1 and 2. The record so far shows that those conversa-
tions never were finally approved.
Is that in accord w^ith your recollection? That is, before the war
started, anyway. I think there has been correspondence offered here
in connection with Rainbow 5, which the President refused to approve,
because it was based on the British-American conversations, and they
hadn't been approved.
What is your recollection about the conferences between the British
and United States staff officers here in Washington, called ABC-1
and 2?
Admiral Turner. It is in accord with the record except for one
curious thing, that the British Chiefs of Staff and the war cabinet
approved ABC-2, which was an appendix of ABC-1. I had been
under the impression that the British War Cabinet had approved both
but I can find no record of it and the man, then a clerk, now an officer,
who had care of all [■5133'] the papers in connection with that,
assured me that ABC-1 was never approved by a war cabinet, by the
British nor by the President.
Mr. Mitchell. The other joint war plan of that date was the
one arranged with the Canadians for the defense of areas in Canada,
Alaska, and tlie United States in case of an attack on this continent.
That is covered bv Exhibit 51. That document was approved, was
it not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. In all your dealings with these war plans, joint con-
versations, and so on, did it ever come to your attention that anybody
in the services of the United States, in the executive branch, military
or civil, had ever assumed to commit the United States to engage in
a war with Japan before we were attacked?
Admiral Turner. I know definitely that there never was any such
commitment. All instructions that we had from the President and
from the Secretary were that, and that was entirely in accord with
the views of all of the officers of the War and Navy Departments who
were directly concerned, that it was the province of Congress to de-
clare Mar, and that any agreements that we entered into were pro-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1937
visional, and to a large extent for the purpose of getting our ideas
together and for establishing the machinery for [6134] coop-
eration.
Mr. Mitchell. Turning attention next, Admiral, to Exhibit 44,
which is a document containing extracts from various of our war
plans, basic war plans. Army and Navy with special reference to the
defense of Pearl Harbor against an air attack, you have seen that
document, have you not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And you also are familiar with the various basic
documents that are listed in the 13 items in the contents ?
Admiral Turner. Not with all of them. I was familiar with No. 1
"Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Orange
(1938)."
No. 2, "Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan —
Rainbow No. 1."
No. 3, "Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan —
Rainbow No. 5."
No. 4, "Extracts from War Department Operations Plan — Rain-
bow No. 5."
No. 5, "Extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940."
No. 6, "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii."
No. 7, "Annex No. VII to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense [51351
Plan, Hawaii."
No. 8, "Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement) ."
I was not familiar with No. 9, "Five November 1941, Standing
Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department." I never saw it until
I saw this document.
Mr. Mi'rcHELL. You are giving now the list of the ones you were
familiar with prior to December 7, 1941, that had come to your at-
tention prior to that date ?
Admiral Turner. I beg your pardon. I thought that was what
you wanted.
Mr. Mitchell. That is what I do want.
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. No. 9 hadn't come to your attention ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. That would not come to me normally.
•I never saw No. 10, "Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security),
Hawaiian Department."
No. 11, "Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan" — I was familiar
with.
Familiar with 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41 (Re-
vised)— Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas."
And also No. 13, which was the Operations Plan No. 1^1.
[S1S6] Headquarters, Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval Dis-
trict.
Mr. Mitchell. The ones you have specified, you did know about
prior to December 7, 1941, are plans that you had directly to do with
in the War Plans Division ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. Either joint plans made here or out
there, or navy major plans, the basic plans, made here, and major
plans which were made out there. Never minor plans, which never
even came to the department.
79716— 46— pt. 4 24
1938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. MiTCiiFXL. Kecently, in preparation for testifying here, you
liaA'e examined the items on this list that you did not know about prior
to December 7 ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. Not too carefully.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, what I am leading up to, is this. I asked
General Gerow of the War Plans Division of the War Department
to sum up as briefly as he could from these various plans that are
listed here, a statement showing the respective responsibilities of the
Naval forces and the Army forces at Oahu and in Hawaii in connec-
tion with defense against an air raid, limited to that, and he did
prepare such a document and it was read into the record here, but I
woidd like to label it Exhibit 89, and have it attached as an exhibit.
The Chairman. That will be ordered.
[S1S7] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 89.")
Mr. Mitchell. In which he made a statement in summary fashion
as to the separate and joint responsibilities or respective responsibili-
ties of the Naval forces and the Army forces in connection with
defense against an air raid.
Did you examine that before General Gerow presented it here?
[513^] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, and I agreed with it as to
the over-all picture.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, getting back to the development of the plans
for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands against an air attack, the
record shows that on November 22, 1940 that a study of that situ-
ation was initiated in a letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Rich-
ardson in which he asked Richardson to make a study of the situa-
tion. Do you know about that letter, or did you know about it at
the time?
Admiral Turner. May I examine the letter?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. I think the first part of it is all that relates
to this matter.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I saw that letter before Admiral Stark
sent it to Admiral Richardson.
Mr. Mitchell, Did you have anything to do with the preparation
of it or the making of the suggestion ?
Admiral Turner. VeiT little; that was related to matters that had
been discussed between Admiral Richardson when he was here in
early October, I think, and Admiral Stark. It was before I arrived.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, the record shows that as a result of that
letter Admiral Richardson made a study. He went out himself and
examined the Army defenses and all that in connection with or in
conjunction with Admiral Bloch, who [5139^ was commaU"
dant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and it resulted in what is
known as the Bloch Report. Did the Bloch Report come to your
attention ? That is pai-t of Exhibit 9.
Admiral Turner. Mr. Counsel, there is a letter intervening, I be-
lieve, of date November 22, an official letter on this subject to the
commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, which
gives specific directions for preparing that report. Is that in evi-
dence?
Mr. Mitchell. That is in the file I just handed you, is it?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; I have a copy here.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1939
Mr. MiTCHFXL. Well, Admiral Stark's letter refers to the fact that
he previously asked Admiral Bloch for a report, but it was not quite
as complete as he wanted and so he asked Kichardson to pursue it.
That is in the letter of November 22. Do you remember that'^
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I have a copy of that here, if I may
refer to it?
Mr. Mitchell. Surely; what I am trying to find out. Admiral, is
how nuK'li you personally had to do with the preparation of all these
studies and plans for defense against an air attack at the Hawaiian
Islands that was generated by this request of Admiral Stark's for
an inquiry out there.
xA-dmiral Turner. Admiral Stark started the matter of a [6140}
better defense of the fleet at Hawaii before I arrived here on Oc-
tober 24 and he had some notes on the matter which he' turned over
to me with a directive to make the matter official, as he had talked
it over orally with Admiral Richardson.
As I recall, I drafted the letter of November 22, at least it was
drafted in the War Plans Division. I do not have a copy of that
here. That went out and then Admiral Stark decided that Admiral
Richardson should take a greater part in the reply to that and I
believe that was the occasion for his letter of the 28th, personal letter
to Admiral Richardson.
Mr. Mitchell. Is that the 28th or 22nd? That is what puzzles
me because th.e very first letter we found from Stark to Richardson*
raising tliis issue was the 22nd.
Admiral Turner. Yes, that is correct. Well, I am a little con-
fused on that other letter
Mr. Mitchell. Prior to that ?
Admiral Turner. No; I thought there was a letter between the
letter of about that same date to the commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, maybe there was.
Admiral Turner. I think so.
Mr. MrrciiELL. But it is enough for our present purposes to call
attention to that and my last question was [ol-^l] whether
you saw the Bloch Report in which he made a report about the
situation r-jgurdir^g an air attack, dated December 30, in evidence
here, and which bears an endorsement by Admiral Richardson of
January 7. I think I handed that to you, did I not ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I am familiar with it and as a result
of these letters here, the one of November 22 and November 28 I
started to get information from the War Department and such in-
formation as we had here in the Navy Department on that subject.
As soon as the letter came from Admiral Bloch wuth Admiral Rich-
ardson's endorsement, I immediately took that material, added some
of our own and drafted the letter of January 24th from the Secretary
of the Navy to the Secretary of War.
Mr. Mitchell. So that this letter, Exhibit 10, written by Knox to
Stimson, in which he labels the dangers at Pearl Harbor in their
order of importance and probability :
1. Air bombing attack.
2. Air torpedo plane attack.
3. Sabotage.
1940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. Submarine attack.
5. Mining.
6. Bombardment by gun fire.
You prepared that letter yourself ?
[514^] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And took it to the Secretary for transmission?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; it was approved by some of the other
divisions of operations, approved by Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral
Stark and then sent to the Secretary because it was an official communi-
cation of the greatest importance to the War Department and we
felt that it should be taken up in that manner rather than informally.
Mr. Mitchell. You drafted that letter partially on the basis of
the result of Bloch's Keport, inquiry and report?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it is obvious if you drafted it you were at that
time of the views expressed in this letter about the possibilities or
order of importance, and probability of these various kinds of at-
tacks, were you not ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; except I was of the opinion that the
word "probable" ought to have gone in there instead of "possibility"
as to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in advance of a declaration
of war. However, it was felt, and I was entirely agi'eeable, that
"possibility" was a perfectly good word.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you see the letter of Secretary Stimson that
came back in reply to the Knox letter that you [514^] drafted ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and we made sure that a copy of that
letter went to the Commander in Chief.
Mr. Mitchell. I am showing you a letter that came in from
Admiral Richardson from Pearl Harbor, dated January 25, 1941,
addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, which has to do with
this very problem of defense against an air attack, which is part of
Exhibit 9. Did you see that letter when it came in?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I judge from this that you had an active
part in what happened from that time on in connection with the
working out of any sort of plans for defense against air attack at
Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Turner. Not the working out of the detailed plans; the
providing of the material and the providing of the necessary units,
the improvement in the defenses and general directives as to indi-
vidual services and joint preparation and training for such an attack —
joint training in preparation for such an attack. There is a letter
of February 10 in reply to the letter of the Commander in Chief of
January 25 which I drafted in addition.
Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure that we have had that, have we?
[5144] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I sent it to the committee
some days ago.
Mr. Mitchell. Let me look at it.
Admiral Turner. And received the return of the originals.
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, well Admiral, you took some share in the
efforts to obtain the action by the War Department towards increasing
its antiaircraft guns and plane equipment ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1941
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, and also action by the Navy Department
on this question of the study on the subject of protective measures
in the waters of the harbor and in the entrance, but the actual prose-
cution of that project was in the hands of the Naval District's Division.
There were a number of letters writen to the War Department
requesting that they increase their antiaircraft defenses and increase
their air defenses and we recognized that the War Department had
little equipment and did not have many trained men and they were
most sympathetic and cooperative in attempting to supply material
and formations. We never had any refusals from the War Depart-
ment to provide defenses out there where, in our opinion, they could
have provided them.
Mr. Mitchell. You stated, I think, that you were familiar with
the Martin-Bellinger Keport, which is contained in [614^] ex-
hibit 44 and in which General Martin, commander of the air force
there, and Admiral Bellinger, commander of the air force of the
Fourteenth Naval District, made a joint report?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; that is an estimate which they used in
drawing up their operating plans, joint operating plans.
Mr. Mitchell. That is the report in which it says :
It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would
be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely
be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of
three hundred miles.
And then they said :
A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines
or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away
by the original thrust.
They said again :
Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable
undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier.
(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered
as a complete sur- [5146] prise in spite of any patrols we might be using
and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would
be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away
from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could
have all day to find and attack the 'carrier. A dusk attack would have the
advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be
located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The
disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching
the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might
not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we prob-
ably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would
be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of
the advantages of the above.
Which is speaking from the Japanese viewpoint.
After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages
but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more
hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success.
Now, that was a pretty wise report, was it not ?
[SI47] Admiral Turner. That was, indeed. We agreed thor-
oughly with it, approved it, and it was very comforting and gratify-
ing to see that officers in important commands out there had the same
view of the situation as was held in the War and Navy Departments.
1942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. Turning to another subject, did you know of the
diversion of merchant shipping from the northern ship lanes to the
Central Pacific area which occurred in October 1941 and later ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; that subject had been under discussion
for some little time between Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Brainard,
whose business it was, and myself, whose interest was in War Plans,
and we were prepared to execute that when conditions became tense
and we believed that war was imminent. That was initiated by Ad-
miral Ingersoll, who talked to me about it before it was sent out and I
was heartily in favor of it.
Mr. Mitchell. There was a large area up there that even normally
had a very slight amount of marine traffic in it, was there not?
Admiral Turner. There was very little marine traffic north of
Hawaii, except such as was going to Vladivostok and there wasn't
very much of that. By no means all, but a large proportion of the
maritime traffic that was going from the [-5^4^] United States
or from Panama to the Far East went via Hawaii and thence going
to Japan would go north to Midway, and going to China I think also
went north of Midway. The other that went to South China and
the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines went rather close to Guam.
The composite great circle course from Puget Sound or from San
Francisco, that goes south of the Aleutians to Japan or to China,
runs very close to Japan itself and approximately parallel to the
general trend of the land.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that was the traffic that von diverted, was
it?
i^dmiral Turner. We diverted that and also the traffic that went via
Honolulu. We sent that down via Torres Straits, so that the track
that the Japanese task force actually took would cross the composite
great circle course close to Japan and they would be clear of any traffic
that would be there in a very short time and that traffic that Avent on
that composite course went through the' normal operating areas where
the Japanese held their maneuvers.
Senator Brewster. Mr, Counsel, I wonder if we could have one of
the maps of tlie Pacific put up, which would enable us to understand
very much better tliis question of the routes, if that map were put up
on one of the standards.
Mr. Mitchell. I will have it set up. It is 12 [^JW] o'clock
now.
The Chairman. We have changed our schedule to 12 : 30.
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, we have?
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Turner. Those routes illustrate exactly' what I have just
said.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, on the map that has just been ]ilaced on
the easel, south of the Aleutians, going from our northern Pacific
coast, there are a number of lines drawn from the United States over
to the Japanese area. Are those lines representative of the ship lanes,
so-called, for that traffic?
Admiral Turner, Yes, sir. That is what is called the composite
great circle course.
Mr. Mitcheil. And that is the traffic that by these orders was di-
verted to a southerly course ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1943
Admiral Turner. It was that traffic and also all of the traffic that
went westward, that is, all of the merchant traffic tliat went westward
from Hawaii. Now, from Hawaii all traffic except naval traffic was
sent down around, too, in that direction ; some of it had to go via Suva
and the Fiji to get Avater — no, it didn't go that far south. It went
through the Solomons. Possibly I had better trace it.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
[6150] Admiral Turner. All of this traffic, this traffic
Senator Brewster. You will have to identify it a little more because
in the record that won't be clear.
Admiral Turner. I, beg your pardon. All of the composite great
circle routes from San Francisco and from Piiget Sound which went
to the Asiatic points, either to Japan or to China or even around to
the Philippines and Malasia, plus all of the traffic that went from
Hawaii to Japan, to China direct, to the Philippines, was diverted
south roundabout to go first east — the Puget Sound and San Francisco
ships were sent first to Hawaii and then all ships from Hawaii, mer-
chant ships, went approximately west of Howell and Baker Islands,
through the Solomons, then west of the Santa Cruz Islands, thence
south of New Guinea and through Torres Strait, which is between
Australia and New Guinea. We had Australian pilots to take them
through there.
"We for a time sent some of the naval traffic which had freight for
Guam and the Philippines, direct from Honolulu to Guam and thence
to the Philippines and that is tlie traffic that we started escorting at
about that time. Shortly before December 7 even that traffic, which
included naval freight and freight and passenger vessels, was also
sent south and around South New Guinea and thence up to the Phil-
ippines.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, there is an area on the map. Ad- [5161]
miral, that lies south of this ship lane, of those ship-lane lines from
Puget Sound through to Japan and north of the Hawaiian Islands,
that does not have any ship-lane lines drawn on that. Is that a part
of the ocean that was not generally used ?
Admiral Turner. Practically never do any ships go through that
part of the ocean.
Mr. Mitchell. Is that term "vacant sea" a recognized maritime
expression ?
Admiral Turner. I never heard that term before but I think it is a
good term.
Mr. Mitchell. So that after that diversion took place, according
to the map there, there was practically little or no traffic in the areas
followed by the Jap fleet wiiich attacked Pearl Harbor, as shown in
red on that map ?
Admiral Turner. There was very little traffic there in any case.
After the freezing of Japanese assets on July 26, within a short time
there was no Japanese shipping between the United States and Japan
and the American-flag shipping dropped off to practically nothing.
Because those lines are there, it does not show a stream of ships even
at any time. When shipping was going full blast even before the war
there were very few ships in through there and going between Honolulu
and Japan. I have gone that route and the chances [5152'] are
we didn't even see a ship there. That was much quicker than these
1944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
northern routes. It is very easy to miss a ship if you do not want to be
detected because there is only one ship along there every 2 or 3 days
and sometimes by shifting your course a few miles every few hours,
why, it is practically impossible for merchant shipping ever to detect
a naval task force that wants to be undetected.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Mitchell, could I ask the witness a question?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Senator Brewster. What happens to the Russian ships, going to
Vladivostok that were moving out of Seattle ? Was there any change
in those?
Admiral Turner. No, sir..
Senator Brewster. Those continued to move ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Those had been going from Japanese ports, had
they not?
Admiral Turner. No, they did not.
Senator Brewster. Did the Japanese have surveillance of those
ships ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, but they went through the Kurile Is-
lands. I think they had no patrol, the Japs had no patrol. They had
surveillance up there but they did not stop [5163] them and
they would normally have gone through that area up here during
the summer. Well, very few of them went into Vladivostok during
the winter.
Senator Britsvster. Now, could you give an approximate difference
in distance, for instance, going from Seattle and San Francisco to the
Philippines via the two alternate routes?
Admiral Turner. You mean via the maritime ports?
Senator Brewster. The great circle or the Hawaii-Torres Strait,
Admiral Turner. Oh, I would say roughly 4,000 miles farther.
Senator Brewster. So that this was a very important change when
you rerouted these ships?
Admiral Turner. It was extremely important and was taken only
because the shipping companies were very much opposed and we our-
selves because it meant a longer time to get our production and our
material in the Philippines, very much longer.
Senator Brewster. Thank you.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, I call your attention to a dispatch
dated July 25, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the com-
manders in chief of the Pacific and other fleets in the Pacific, found
on page 14 of Exhibit 37, that has to do with economic sanctions^
That is the dispatch that informed them that
[5154] At 1400 GCT July Twenty Sixth United States will impose economic
sanctions against Japan —
and describes them.
Did you have any part in the preparation of that dispatch?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I drafted it.
Mr. Mitchell. It says :
Do not anticipate immediate hostile acts by Japan through the use of military
means, but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appro-
priate precautionary measures against possible eventuality.
You realized at that time that the imposition of these sanctions
and embargoes produced very strained relations?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1945
xVdmiral Tukneu. I believed it would make war certain between
the United States and Japan.
Mr. Mitchell. When you come to examine the intercepted diplo-
matic dispatches which showed us Japan was fretting and deteriorat-
ing under these embargoes, and her demands and our refusal to remove
"those embargoes and to keep on furnishing her war materials, what
is your judgment as to the extent the embargo and our refusal to
stop aid to China and release those embargoes had on compelling
Japan to attack us?
Admiral Turner. I think it made sure the fall of the [51561
third Konoye Cabinet, which had begun in the middle of July, and
I think that it made sure the going in of the militaristic Cabinet.
It undermined the Konoye Cabinet which I believe was trying to
ieep from war with the United States, but not trying to keep out of
war with Britain and the Dutch.
Senator Brewster. Could I have the question and answer previous
to the last one read, please ?
(The question and answer referred to, as recorded above, was read
by the reporter.)
Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to another dispatch dated Oc-
tober 16, 1941, page 18 of Exhibit 37. Did you have any part in the
preparation of that? That is the one that refers to the resignation
'Of the Japanese Cabinet.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; I drafted that dispatch.
Mr. Mitchell. You say :
There is a strong possibility of hostilities since the United States and Britain
are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation.
To what did you refer in the words "desperate situation"? Were
you referring to her economic condition ?
Admiral Turner. Very largely to her economic condition, and to
"the fact that through our action, her trade had been cut off not only
with the United States, but with the British possessions and the Dutch
liad reduced their commitment to furnish oil, a certain amount of oil
annually, to something like one-third, or two-fifths of that. That
meant that since the United States and the Dutch possessions were the
sources of nearly all of the petroleum products that Japan was using,
in a comparatively short time her own large stocks maintained in the
JEmpire would be exhausted. She could not get cotton from India,
upon which she depended for a large part of her cotton industry, and
she also got rice from the Dutch and India.
It meant, of course, that her trade with the world was practically
■stopped and that was a very serious matter for an industrial nation.
In addition to that, of course, was her very large extension in China,
and the help that the United States and the British were giving to the
nationalist government in China.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that message almost amounted to an alert,
didn't it? It said the Japs may attack, and "you will take due pre-
cautions, including preparatory deployments" and so on.
Was it your judgment at the time that you wrote that dispatch on
the 16th of October, that the conditions you had spoken of might result
in war in a very short time?
[5157] Admiral Turner. No, sir; not a short time. That is
relatively. The new Cabinet would have to be formed. It took a cer-
1946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lain amount of time to do that, to make their prononncement, get the
approval of tlie Emperor, and to issue orders to deploy their forces, '
and to load their ships. So at that time, so far as the United States
and the British and Dutch were concerned, I did not believe that there
would be any possibility of war for at least a month.
It was somewhat different with respect to the Kussians, because there
they were close to .the Eussians. They already had an army in Man-
churia, deployed or not, we did not know.
They had a great part of the Navy in her home waters, so that action
against Russia could have been taken at an earlier date possibly.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, I notice in exhibit 38, dated October 18, 1941,
it appears that the War Department had their attention called to this
message of October 16, 1941, from the CNO to the Pacific Fleet and
felt, or maybe gave the impression that the hostilities were very im-
minent, and so the Army sent this dispatch to their commander out
there :
Calling the War Department estimate of the Japanese situation to your atten-
tion, tension between the United States and Japan remains strained, but no
rapid, no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.
I gather you are really not at all in disagreement with that view,
are you ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. I saw that dispatch before it went; 1
did not have any disagreement with it.
Mr. Mitchell. The Army dispatch I read is dated October 18, 1941.
The dispatch of November 24, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets and others, page 32 of Exhibit
37, we have already referred to this morning. That contains the
statement :
The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful —
and —
Surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines
and Guam is a possibility^
That is the dispatch that j'ou say you initiated and that Admiral
Ingei'soll authorized, is it?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. That was also cleared with Admiral
Stark and with General Gerow who cleared it with General Marshall.
I have an impression, not confirmed by the minutes of the Joint
Board, that that was discussed at a meeting of the Joint Board before
it went out.
May I say this in addition :
Before that went out it was cleared with Mr. Knox, and [5159]
I think with the President.
]\Ir. Mitchell. Coming down now to the war warning message of
November 27, 1941, appearing on page 36 of Exhibit 37, from the Chief
of Naval Operations to the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, what part did
you take in the preparation of that message? Will you state the
circumstances as you remember them ?
Admiral Turner. The dispatch of the 24th we did not consider re-
quired any immediate action, except to get ready plans for putting
into effect when we gave them another warning.
As a result of the Japanese intercept which had postponed the final
date to the 29tli, we felt it necessary to put this dispatch out, because
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1947
we could not tell whether the 20th was to be tlie day that the attack
was to take place, or whether it was to be the day when the expeditions
vvoidd start from their ports.
[5160'] So that this gave 2 days for deployments, proper de-
plgyments to be made, which was enough. I think that one of the
immediate reasons for that was our learning, or my learning on the
2()th from Captain Schuii-mann, who Avas the liaison officer with the
State Department, that Mv. Hull had decided, or felt, that negotia-
tions were of no further use and that the matter was in the hands
of the War and Navy Departments.
My recollection is— I am not too sure on this part— my recollection
is that Captain Schuirmann came back from the State Department
about 10 : 30 on the 26th and immediately told me. Admiral Stark,
and Admiral Ingersoll about this matter where the State Depart-
ment had decided not to send the modus vivendi, but he did not know
then that they were going to send the note of the 2r;th.
The scheduled meeting of the Joint Board was for 11 o'clock. That
was put off by Admiral Stark until, I think, 11 : 35, while I drafted
this, the original form of this dispatch. And I think, without making
any particular change, that that was taken up and discussed in the
Joint Board meeting that morning, which General Marshall attended.
There were some objections to the phraseology of the dispatch and
it was finally changed almost to this form, partly by the Army and
partly by Admiral Stark.
[5161'] Now, I believe that either that night or early in the fore-
noon of the 27th, I am not sure which, that dispatch was then cleared
with Mr. Knox and sent to the President and we got it back in the
afternoon from the White House.
Now, there is a possibility that it was telephoned to the President,
but I believe that Admiral Beardall took it to the President himself.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the Joint Board minutes, the minutes of the
Joint Board of November 2G, are in evidence, and we don't find any-
thing in them at all that mentioned any discusion whatever of any
warning messages going out either from the Army or the Navy,
Admiral Turner. That is correct, and that was rather customary.
It mentions a discussion of the Asiatic situation, or the Pacific situa-
tion. Dispatch of this character, while it might be discussed in tlie
Joint Board — this may be rather a fine point, but it is, I believe, cor-
I'ect — was not the function of the Joint Board to send. It was the
business of Admiral Stark and General Marshall. The Joint Board,
which is a constituted body, consisting of eight people, would give
their advice, but the action would be by those two officers.
So that customarily, when something of that sort came up that
required action, it was not put down in the Joint Board minutes,
because then it would look as if the Joint Board had decided to do
such and such, which would not be the case.
Mr. Mitchell. I see.
AVho was present with you and, I suppose. Admiral Stark, when the
terms of this message were finally agreed on, tlas message of Novem-
ber 27, can you remember who wa^in the conference?
Admiral Turner. I think after the Joint Board conference, the only
people that were then concerned with that after that were Admiral
Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and myself, possible Admiral Brainard.
1948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. On what day was it you met and agreed upon this
draft? Was it the 27th?
Admiral Turner. We discussed it several times on both the 26th
and the 27th, and this was what emerged. I will say that it had some
of the thoughts of the Army in it, because we wanted to always try, in
anything of this nature, to take exactly the same action. As we know,
that did not occur in this particular case.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is one of the things I wanted to mention
to you. The record shows that when the Army got up their dispatch.
Secretary Stimson telephoned Mr. [516-3] Hull about whether
negotiations were terminated or not, and Mr. Hull said they were ter-
minated to all practical purposes with only a bare possibility that the
Japanese Government might come back, and that was the way their
message read.
Your message doesn't contain that. It is a flat statement.
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days . . .
Now, when you drew this dispatch in this form and sent it, did you
know that the War Department dispatch had been toned down a little?
Admiral Turner. I knew it before the dispatch went but our idea
was to make this sharp and clear so there was no possibility of mis-
understanding.
We also took cognizance of the fact that in one of the magic mes-
sages, the Japanese had said even after the 29th to go on and make the
motions of continuing to discuss things from the diplomatic viewpoint.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you really then disagreed with the State De-
partment, Mr. Hull's evaluation, if I may use that word, of the state
of negotiations, did you ? A little bit, I mean ?
[516'.>i\ Admiral Turner. I felt that for the military personnel,
stating the matter, the situation in this way, was necessary and was
really factual, and realistic.
Mr. Mitchell. And it was better to give them a stiff jolt than to be
easy under the circumstances?
Senator Brewster. You say military personnel ?
Admiral Turner. T say for the military personnel this was a much
more realistic and direct message.
Senator Brewster. You mean military as distinct from naval?
Admiral Turner. No, no, sir. I beg your pardon. That was a
general term.
Senator Ferguson. Will you ask him if he was trying to differen-
tiate between civilian and military in that?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I think when you said "military" you used the
term in a broad sense to include Navy and Army and everything in the
armed services, did you not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It is now 12 : 30. The committee will recess until
2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, the committee recessed at 12 : 30 p. nL, to reconvene at
2 p. m. of the same day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1949
[6165] AFIERNOON SESSION, 2 P. M.
Mr. Clark. The committee will come to order. I will take responsi-
bility for calling the committee to order in the absence of the chairman
and vice chairman who, I think, were detained on the floor.
Counsel will proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, when we recessed we were engaged in mak-
ing some comparisons between the warning message of November 27
sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Pacific commander and
the warning message of the same date sent by the War Department to
the commanding general of the Army forces at Hawaii.
The first difference is this, your dispatch — withdraw that.
Before you finally settled on the form of joiiv dispatch I imagine
. you had some preliminary discussions with the Army officers who
were engaged on similar work as to the form the dispatch should take'^
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. They saw our dispatch and I am quite
sure before they drafted their final form of their dispatch.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, after you had had that con- [5166]
ference you separated, you went to the Secretary of the Navy with
yours, and they went to the Secretary of War with, theirs ; is that the
way you understand it?
Admiral Ti^kner. I left the draft of the dispatch with Admiral
Stark arid, as I understand it, he took that up with Mr. Knox, and I
think, sent it to the President by the aide, but he may have talked
to the President about it over the White House telephone.
Mr. Mitchell. You don't know whether the original draft of the
Army dispatch contained the Avords "This dispatch is to be considered
a war warning" ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; I do not. I first saw the Army dispatch
after it had been drafted when General Gerow came over with it to
clear it with Admiral Stark and they called me in and showed it to me.
Mr. Mitchell. That was after General Gerow had had it up with
Secretary Stimson?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Your dispatch suggests, or states :
'The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval
task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines,
Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.
The Army dispatch mentions no area in which the attack [5167]
may come. Do you notice that? The Army dispatch is on page 7
of Exhibit 32.
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Why did you put in a reference to the Philippines,
Thai, or Kra, or Beorneo?
Admiral Turner. We wanted to emphasize the fact that this was a
very important major effort, that there was an amphibious expedition
or expeditions en route. We knew that these ships had sailed in convoy
from Shanghai and, I believe, from Hainan, and that they had, some
■vessels had already arrived in the ports of Indochina.
1950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Also from the locations of Japanese naval vessels there was a definite
movement of a fair-sized force down through the China Sea even at
this date. There was no definite indication at that time of a movement
towards the Philippines. We could get very little information as to
intentions toward the Philippines. We expected the attack to come
from Formosa, which it did, but we couldn't get any information from
there.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the fleet at Hawaii wasn't tied down to the
Hawaiian Islands, was it?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. It had an interest in the campaign anywhere in the
Pacific?
Admiral Turner. Not outside of the provisions of Eainbow
[5168] 5 War Plan, and that did nqt permit them to go out into
the Asiatic without directions from the Chief of Naval Operations.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, coming to the next sentence in your message
it says :
Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL46.
What is meant by that ? In the first place, what is meant by "appro-
priate defensive deployment," and next, what was WPL46 ?
Admiral Turner. Before coming to the meat of the answer, I invite
attention to the fact that this dispatch has a multiple address. It goes
to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action and it goes
to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for action. It is as
if it were the Army practice, with two dispatches, one addressed to
each, but both in identical terms.
A "deployment" is a spreading out of forces. A naval deployment
means to spread out and make ready for hostilities. To get into the
best positions from which to execute the operating plans against the
enemy. The defensive deployment as applied to Hawaii, which is of
chief interest, was for the defense of Hawaii and of the west coast of
the United States, because one of the tasks of WPL46 is to defend the
territory and coastal zones, our own territory and coastal [5169']
zones, and to defend our shipping.
Instead of being in a concentrated place, or instead of being off in
some distant region holding exercises and drills, it meant that the
forces under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific
Fleet could take station for the most probable attack against them or
against the Hawaiian Islands, keeping in mind their responsibilities
for covering the United States and Panama.
The deployment in the vicinity of Hawaii, if wide enough, would
in itself constitute a formidable barrier against any attempt further
east, and we definitely did not expect an attack, that is, the Navy did
not, an attack on the west coast or in Panama, as is indicated by a
dispatch going out the same dav to iho. commandants of districts to
take precautions against subversive activities, but we did not tell them
to make any defensive deployment.
[5170] The deployment from Hawaii might have been made
in a number of different ways. Certainly I would expect that in
accordance with the plans that should have been drawn up, and they
were, that airplanes would have been sent to Midway, if not already
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1951
there, to Wake, to Johnston Island, to Palmyra, the reconnaissance
planes as well as defensive planes, and that a reconnaissance would
have been undertaken. The movement of those planes and forces to
those positions constituted part of the defensive deployment.
The battleships, of course, were of no use whatsoever against un-
damaged fast ships. Naturally, it was not to be expected that the
Japanese would bring over slow ships unless they were making their
full and complete effort against Hawaii, so that a proper deployment
for the battleships would have been in the best position to do what was
within their power, which was only to defend Hawaii against actual
landings. In other words, if they had been at sea and in a retired
position even, such that if actual landings were attempted on the
Hawaiian Islands and at such a distance that they could arrive prior
to or during the landings, they would have been most useful indeed
to have interfered with and defeated the landings.
Since, as has been pointed out previously, the danger zone, the dan-
ger position of Hawaii was to the north, because [5171] there
were no little outlying islands there from which observation could
have been made, since there was no possibility of detecting raiders
from the north except by airplanes and ships, an appropriate deploy-
ment would have been to have sent some fast ships, possibly with
small seaplanes, up to the north to assist and possibly to cover certain
sectors against approach, which the long range reconnaissance could
not have done. Of course, these ships would naturally have been in
considerable danger, but that was what they were there for, because
fighting ships are of no use unless they are in a dangerous position so
that they can engage the enemy and inflict loss on them.
Another part of a deployment, even where airplanes would not be
moved, would have been to put them on operating air fields scattered
throughout the islands so that they could be in a mutual supporting
position with respect to other fields and to cover a somewhat wider
arc.
Another part of the deployment would have been to have sent sub-
marines, as many as were available, out into a position from which
they could exercise either surveillance or could make attacks against
approaching vessels.
It is to be noted that there was no offensive action ordered for sub-
marines. The offensive action, of course, would have been to send
them into Japanese waters.
[517B] Mr. Mitchell. Well, can you identify for us WPL-46 ?
Admiral Turner. WPL-46 was the Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow
No. 5, derived from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow
No. 5, which in turn was derived from ABC-1 and 2, the American-
British conversations.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, is WPL-46 involved in any one of these 13
items on Exhibit 44, which lists various war plans?
Mr. Keefe. Is it the same as Rainbow No. 5 ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is what I am trying to find out.
Mr. Keefe. That is what I would like to get cleared up.
Admiral Turner. Yes. I said that WPL-46 is Navy Basic War
Plan, Rainbow No. 5, shown in No. 11, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. That is another name for Rainbow No. 5, is it?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. WPL-46 is a war-plans number.
1952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you are familiar with WPL-46 and Rainbow
5. Can you state in a very brief way what the defensive tasks as-
signed in that plan were?
Admiral Turner. May I see the tasks assigned to the Commander-
in-Chief from Rainbow 5 ? I do not think they are all in here.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you want the original Rainbow 5, do you^
the original document?
['5^/51 Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I haven't anything but a summary of certain items.
Senator Brewster. You remember that was a question we had when
it was up the other day, that that exhibit described the defensive ac-
tions but it did not show the affirmative actions of the fleet. I raised
that question at the time. I do not know whether we have ever had
the complete plan, have we ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr, Gesell. Not in evidence. We have it in the office.
Mr. Mitchell. We have it down in the office, all these plans.
Admiral Turner, I believe counsel has that plan, a copy of that
plan.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, while we are waiting for it to be brought up
I will go on with these questions about this warning message.
Now, there is nothing in this message about the Ja]:)anese taking^
performing, or committing the first overt act. The Army had that in
there "on direction of the President" and I understand that this mes-
sage of yours went over to the President. I am not sure whether it
was before or after it was sent.
[51741 Did you have any directions from the President to say
anything about Japan committing the first overt act?
Admiral Turner. No. sir. The situation was this: The question
was discussed as to whetlier we would issue an order that if Jap forces
came within a certain distance of Hawaii, whether or not we would
attack them. Naturall}", if strong forces were even within 500 or 600
miles of Hawaii their intention would be very apparent.
The decision as to when and where to consider that they had com-
mitted an attack or were about to commit an attack on us was felt to
be within the province of the commander in chief and that we should
avoid any details at all.
The Army was in a slightly clifFerent situation. We felt that the
Navy could not afford, if it were possible to prevent it, to let the attack
come in and be made without taking action, and I am quite sure that
if our deployed ships had encountered an enemy task force there would
have been no question whatsoever immediately as to the commission
of overt acts by the Japanese. It Avas not a situation capable of exact
definition.
Mr, Mitchell. Well, you knew when you drafted the order, I as-
sume, that that desire existed in the administration that Japan should
commit the first overt act however you define it ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and if ^they had brought a task
[5175] force within 500 miles of Hawaii, under the circumstances
that most assuredly would have been an overt act.
Mr. Mitchell. I notice here at the end of this dispatch you say:
Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1953.
Well, did you have an idea at that time that the only danger that
Guam and Samoa were under was a sabotage operation^
Admiral Turner. The category of defense of Guam was "E'', which,
meant that no resistance was to be offered ; that the only action they
would take would be the destruction of military facilities in our pos-
session.
We had no force there except a small number of marines and a small
number of naval personnel and the defense of Guam was entirely out
of the question. Therefore, in order to avoid too much difficulty for
the natives, why, the decision had been made previously that no defense
\Ahatsoever would be offered for Guam.
Samoa — I have forgotten their category of defense. I think it also
was "E". They had a couple of hundred native troops, I think they
had three or four emplaced G-incli guns, I am not sure as to that, and
there was no defense that Samoa could offer that was of any account
at all. Therefore, [5176] the only measures that they could
take effectively were against sabotage.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, on the 2Ttli of November, on page 37 of exhibit
37 there is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the com-
mandants of all the naval districts except the 14th at Hawaii and — the
16th was in the Philippines?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Which read:
Coinmanclants will take appropriate measures for security against subversive
activity and sabotage clue to critical status of orange negotiations and imminent
probability extension orange operation. Publicity to be avoided.
Why didn't you warn the commandant of the naval district in
Hawaii against sabotage?
Admiral Turner. Because the commandants of the naval districts
in Hawaii and in the Philippines were subordinate officers of the
two commanders-in-chief and it was the duty of the two commanders-
in-chief to issue the necessary instructions to those commandants.
Their existing orders in their war plants were all written out and that
M^as one of the tasks of those commandants but there were many other
tasks, too.
[-5177] You will note also that the commandant of the navy yard
in Washington and the Governors of Guam and Samoa were also in-
cluded as action addressees in that dispatch.
The reason we did not send a stronger dispatch to those districts
was that we did not expect there anything except possible sabotage
and we did not want to spread that other war warning throughout
all those districts because it would have been in the newspapers half
an hour after it got there, in most of the places probably.
Mr. Mitchell. I notice on November 28, page 38 of exhibit 37,
there is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations for action
of the commander-in-chief PNNCP. What is that?
Admiral Turner. Pacific northern naval coastal frontier and Pa-
cific southern naval coastal frontier.
Mr. Mitchell. That is on the mainland?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. For the information of the commander-in-chief of
the Pacific Fleet among others.
^Admiral Turner. And commander, Panama naval coastal frontier.
79716 — 40 — pt. 4 25
1954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. And Panama.
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. There you sent them a copy of the warning [5178]
dispatch that had just been sent out by the War Department to its
commander?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the purpose of that?
Admiral Turner. The purpose was to make sure that those com-
manders knew what the Army was doing in their districts.
The Chairman. Mr. Counsel, may I at this point make an observa-
tion ? The first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress is about to come
to a conclusion, probably tomorrow. There are important matters
of legislation and other matters over there on the floor of the Senate
that require my attention in connection with the winding up of this
session and I am compelled to go to the floor. I wanted the Admiral
to know that my absence is in no sense an indication of my lack of
interest in his testimony, but I cannot be in two places at a time and
I feel I must be on the floor, so that I am sure you will understand
and excuse me if I am not here during the balance of your testimony
today.
Admiral Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy in
making that statement.
[5179~\ Mr. Mitchell. Now, you had been sending what are
called joint messages. If you sent a message to the Xavy commander,
you might say there "Inform the Army commander," or vice versa.
That was a common practice, wasn't it ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have a special reason to fear that the com-
manders in Hawaii would not get the War Department message?
Was that why you adopted a rather unusual way of sending a copy
of the War Department message to your commander?
Admiral Turner. I did not know that the War Department had
sent that particular dispatch to the commander of the Western De-
fense Command, for example, as shown on page 8 of the pink book
(Exhibit 32). There is nothing in there that tells the Army com-
manders to disseminate this to tlie Navy commanders. On the con-
trary, it says:
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum number
of oflB 'ers.
So I felt it might easily be that the Army commanders would con-
strue that so that the Navy commanders would not know what they
were doing, and so, with the concairrence of the AVar Plans Division,
I sent this out. There was also the very minor matter after the end
of the quote concerning WPL-S^.
Mr. Mitchell. AVell, of course the War Department [5180]
message that you thus sent copy of to the commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor contained all of this material about
overt act. "Do not disturb the population," and "negotiations appear
to be terminated but maybe not quite," and various things that you
deliberately cut out, or did not pait in your warning message. That
is a fact, is it not?
Admiral Turner. It is a fact, and this dispatch was sent to the-
commander in chief, purely for information, so he would know what
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1955
the orders ATcre that were given to the Army. I presumed that Gen-
eral Short ah'eady had shown him that, but it was necessary that
Admiral Kimmel know that we were sendino- this information to the
frontier commanders, the three frontier connnanders, so he would
not have to send something himself.
Mr. MiTCHFXL. You would assume that he w^ould naturally obtain,
from General Short, the War Department message or the warning to
Short, and you would not be adding anything to the possible confusion
by sending him a copy direct ; is that the idea ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct. As I said, tlie chief reason was
so he would know what had been sent to these other officers, because
the commanders of the two coastal frontiers immediately WPL-46
came into effect went [5181] under the command of the com-
mander in chief. Pacific Fleet, so far as regards all matters connected
with cooperation with the fleet.
[SI 82] Mr. Mitchell. Now regarding WPL-46, w^e have it here
now. It is a voluminous decument, but can you briefly state to the
committee just what the operation in general called for, so we may
know what the preparatory deployment would be referred to in your
warning message?
Admiral Turner. The tasks assigned to the commander in chief,
Pacific Fleet are not very long in number. They are two pages.
Mr. Mitchell. Read them right into the record.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And you can comment on them as you go along, if
^ou like.
Mr. Murphy. Is that section 3212, Admiral ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. Section 3212, WPL^6 :
The U. S. Pacific Fleet is assigned the following tasks within the Pacific area :
That limits the area in which he can operate, because the Asiatic
area is another area.
Mr. Mitchell. How far out was that line of division ?
Admiral Turner. I will look it up in just a minute.
Mr. Mitchell. Go on with your analysis and we will get the other
later.
Admiral Turner. It is a little ways to the eastward of the Philip-
pines, about 500 miles, as I recall it, offhand. [618S] It included
in the Asiatic the Palau Islands, but Guam was included in the Pacific
area.
Task A: Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by-
diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and
capture of positions in the Marshalls and through raids on enemy sea communi-
cations and positions.
That meant that we would attempt to raid the lines of supply lead-
ing from Japan southward to the Malay Barrier both by submarines
and by surface ships, if we could, and also raid the positions in the
Marshalls in the hope of drawing enemy air and naval strength in that
direction and get them off the backs of the forces in the Far East.
Task B: Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Mar-
shall Island area and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk.
That was a purely preparatory task for the assembly of forces and
material. In another part of the plan is the direction that that will
1956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not be undertaken within 6 months, which is allotted for the assembly
of material and forces.
Task C : Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels-
trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.
That meant that we would capture or sink enemy vessels, [S184-}
merchant vessels or Government vessels, engaged in carrying troops
or material, and we would also do the same for neutral vessels. The
only neutral vessels that would be involved might have been some
South American-owned vessels which might attempt to carry goods
to Japan proper.
Task D : Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far
west as longitude 155° east.
The longitude is along the east coast, or just off the east coast of
Australia and includes New Zealand.
That was a long waj^s away. We did not expect much in the way
of Axis effort down there except possibly from raiders. We put that
in there so that the New Zealand and Australian Governments would
feel free to turn over their cruisers to the British commander in chief
at Singapore, so that they could operate there along the Malay Bar-
rier, instead of being kept useless down south.
[S186] We expected a very small diversion of our force to that
area.
Task E : Defend Samoa in category D.
That was a defense, which I could not remember. It was cate-
gory D which was to be prepared for rather heavy attacks, but do-
not expect immediate attempts at occupation.
Task F: Defend Guam in category F.
I think I referred previously to that category as "E" which was
in error. Category F is merely to blow up facilities, destroy stores
which might be useful to the enemy as we expected the place to be-
captured.
Task G : Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by es-
corting, covering and patroling as required by circuuistancos and by destroying
enemy raiding forces.
That was a matter of protecting our linos of vessels that were ^up-
plying our forces, and also to protect the British ships that were
going from the west coast to Australia an-d New Zealand.
We had a plan for joint escort where we would escort ships from
San Francisco down tAvo-thirds of the way, for example, to Australia,
and then their ships would pick them up, if necessary, and escort them
the rest of the way.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, might I ask the counsel
[S186] whether we have any comparable document? I have here
Exhibit 44, which purports to be a cop}^ of defense plans. It is appar-
ently identified as 1938.
I wonder if we have any comparable document ?
Mr. MiTciiELi.. The comparable document is Rainbow Five that
we are talking about. Is that right?
Admiral Turnj:r. Yes, sir, item 11. That refers only to matters-
connected with the defense of Hawaii, as I recall it.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 1957
Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 44, Senator, is extracts directly of portions of
:all these plans having to do with defenses of Hawaii against air at-
tack, so that the complete basic plan he is now reading is not in Ex-
hibit 44, only the air provisions tliat are based upon it. So there is no
comparable document that has been mimeographed that contains all
that this war plan does. There are a mass of them here, th^t are
identified as the items in the index of Exhibit 44, but we never had
them mimeographed. They can be made available to the commit-
tee, if you want them.
Mr. Murphy. May I suggest on page 103 of volume I the offensive
tasks are outlined. It may be of some help.
Senator Brewster. That is the document that we have not had pre-
sented in evidence ?
]\Ir. MirRniY. That is the document given to us by the [57<§7]
^aval Affairs Committee, Senator Walsh.
Senator Brewster. It has not been offered as an exhibit.
The Vice Chairman. Not as an exhibit, but each member was fur-
nished with a copy.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether the tes-
timony now going in is under the instrument of November 27, 1941,
page 46 of Exhibit 37, where the task is assigned to WPL-46?
Mr. Mitchell. That is another name for Rainbow No. 5. I have
established that a few minutes ago.
The Vice Chairman. That is right.
Senator FERciUsoN. But that WPL-46 is not in this Exhibit 44, ex-
cept as it relates to the air defense of Hawaii ; is that true ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right.
Admiral Turner. INIay I make an amendment to that ?
The only thing from WPL-46 that is in this exhibit that Senator
Brewster has, is assignment of tasks for the naval coastal frontier
forces as applied to the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. It is an
•extract from this full plan, part 3, chapter 2, section 3, and it is only a
part of section 3.
It merely shows this task "Defend the naval coastal [51881
frontier in category D." That is all it has got.
Senator Brewster. What I have purports to be extract from Joint
Army-Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, Section 7, tasks Pacific
area, Army tasks 33, 35, Navy tasks, under which there is F, G, H,
which letters do not at all correspond with what you have been reading.
F is to prepare, capture, establish, control, protect Caroline and
Marshall Islands.
"G" is to defend Midway, Johnston, Guam.
I could not reconcile that program under Rainbow No. 5.
Admiral Turner. You cannot reconcile it. Senator. They are from
two different documents. What you have there is from the Joint Army
and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Admiral Turner. What I am reading from is the Navy Basic War
Plan Rainbow No. 5, which is the Navy part of the joint plan.
Senator Ferguson. We have a further over-flow, we have 3233.
That is another section?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you have another section, as I understand
that you are reading.
1958 • CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIQATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. That 3233 only refers to [5189]
the task that was assigned by the Department to the commandant of
the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier, and is merely a defense plan, to
defend in category D.
Senator Ferguson. I see.
Admiral Turner. Now, in addition to that task assigned to Admiral
Bloch, since Admiral Bloch was a subordinate officer of Admiral Kim-
mel. Admiral Kimmel could, from his own tasks, and he did, assign
additional tasks to Admiral Bloch, but they are different documents.
I mean the first part that you read is the joint plan, and this is the
Navy plan.
The Vice Chairman. You may proceed. Admiral, from where you,
left off.
Admiral Turner. "Task H : Protect the territory of the Associated
Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the expansion of enemy military
power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions
and by supporting land and air forces in denying the use of land posi-
tions in that hemisphere."
That is the major defensive task of the Pacific Fleet.
Mr. Mitchell. And that would include Hawaii ?
Admiral Turner. That says "protect the territory of Associated
Powers," and we are defined as one of the associated powers.
[r5190] Mr. Mitchell. Then when you orderecl him to "Execute
an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL-46," did you mean the commander of the
Pacific Fleet should take preparatory deployment measures for all
those operations that you just read about, except those that were not to
start for 6 months?
Admiral Turner. It says "Execute an appropriate defensive de-
ployment."
Mr. Mitch'^j.l. Defensive?
Admiral Turner. Yes. That immediately fixes attention on task
H and task G, which is "protect the sea communications."
Mr, Mitchell. Does that include the associated territory ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, your warning message said nothing about
reporting measures taken, did it? You did not order him to report
what measures he had taken.
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. That was not the naval practice ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. I never had seen it done, unless some-
thing lias occurred to indicate that you suspect he is not carrying-
the thing out, and then action Avill be taken, but in a case of this kind
I have never seen a report on measures taken, I have never seen it.
Mr. Mitchell. You did not ask him to acknowledge your [5191]
message? Or was that a practice that would be expected to be fol-
lowed ? There is nothing said about acknowledge, is there ?
Admiral Turner. It is routine always to acknowledge an important
operating signal. This hasn't all of "the operating procedure on it.
I do not see the signal sign for "Acknowledge" here.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral
Admiral Turner. There are three more tasks.
Mr. Mitchell. I beg your pardon. I thought you had finished
them.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1959
Admiral Turner (reaclino;) :
Task I. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces.
That means to operate in such position that the weak naval coastal
frontier forces if encountered, or if attacked l^y superior forces, will be
driven off by the forces of tlie fleet.
Task J : Establish fleet control zones, defining their limit from time to time
as circumstances require.
That means that in the vicinity, the general area of where the fleet
is operatino;, a zone is established which is under the control of the
fleet and into which no vessel of any kind can come, except under rules
established by the fleet.
Task K : Route shipping of associated powers within the [51&2] fleet
control zones.
In other words, the routing generally in the open ocean was done-
by the commandant of the naval coastal frontiers, but within the fleet
control zone it was done by the commander in chief.
That is the end of the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet.
]Mr, Mitchell. Well, whether you got an acknowledgment of the re-
ceipt of this dispatch of November 27 or not, did you get a report from
Admiral Kimmel prior to December 7 as to what, if any, measures he
had taken under that?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any information prior to December 7
as to whether or not the commander of the fleet at Hawaii had taken
aii}^ action, or as to what it was?
Admiral Turner. We had none.
Mr. Mitchell. Had you any information as to what, if any, state
of alert he placed his forces in ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Had you any information prior to December 7 as
to what General Short had done in response to the message sent him
b}^ tlie War Department?
Admiral Turner. I saw the message, his reply. I remember very
distinctly seeing that reply about alert against sabotage [S19r3]
and liaison with the Navy. We had a regular exchange of messages of
that character between the Army and Navy War Plans, and I won-
dered at it. I thought, without referring to that dispatch, it men-
tioned the War Department dispatch, that it referred to the order
that had gone out regarding sabotage. I rather expected a later dis-
patch on the subject.
However, that was a matter within the entire province of the War
Department, and I did nothing about it.
Mr. Mitchell. How did it happen that you had copies of the re-
ports that these officers in the Army command had sent in in response
to the warning messages? Did you receive copies of General DeWitt's
report, and one from the Philippines, and the Pacific coast, and so on^
that the Army got from their commanders ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Was that a regular practice? You had seen mes-
sages of that kind?
Admiral Turner. General Gerow would send to me and I would send
to him, on personal initiative, dispatches which we thought we woulil
1960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be interested in. In addition to that, an officer from my Division
would go to tlie Army War Plans Division daily, look over their dis-
patches and get copies of any that he thouoht that we should see, and
the Army did a similar thing with the dispatches that came to my
Division.
[S194] Mr. Mitchell. Well, if in that way you got a copy of
'General Short's report and it attracted your attention because of its
brevity, and other things, as compared with other reports, what rea-
son was there that you could not call the attention of the Army author-
ities to it?
Admiral Turner. There was no reason whatsoever. I felt a little
hesitancy in doing it.
Mr, Mitchell. Would they feel offended?
Admiral Turner. It did not occur to me to call his attention to it.
I felt if anything was wrong it would be attended to. It was only
a passing matter, and it then passed out of mind.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the security of your fleet depended somewhat
on it, didn't it ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. So it was not purely an Army affair. If the com-
mand had been separate from any fleet command I can understand
it, but if the security of the Pacific Fleet were in danger, do not you
feel you should have called the Army's attention to what you might
have thought was an inadequate response to the warning?
Admiral Turner. I do not know that I went so far as to formulate
the idea that it was an inadequate response. I could have done so and
I would have done so if I had felt that [5195] the matter would
not be fully attended to.
Mr. Mitchell. One member of the committee wanted me to ask you
what the effect of this diversion of shipping would have been, from
the northern lanes down to the southern area, if measured in length of
voyages or additional mileage?
Admiral Turner. It probably would increase the time of passage,
•depending on the speed of the ships, from 9 to 15 days from, say,
San Francisco to Manila.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that was a very serious matter with the short-
age of shipping, was it not ?
Admiral Turner. Extremely serious.
Mr. Mitchell. A measure that would only have been resorted to
if you felt there was real danger to that shipping in the old lanes?
Admiral Turner. We were certain there was danger there, and we
felt we would rather put the extra time in than lose the ships.
Mr. Mitchell. You sent a message to Hawaii December 3, to the
commander there, the Navy commander, about code burning, which is
found on page 40 of Exhibit 37. That is a dispatch which read :
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in-
structions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at
Hongkong,
and to [SWO] different places, including Washington, D. C,
and London, to destroy most of their codes. That appears to be initi-
ated by Wilkinson and initialed by Ingersoll. Did you have anything
to do with that?
« Admiral Turner. No, sir. I saw it. I had a conversation with
Admiral Ingersoll on that subject. I do not know whether he brought
PROCEEDINGS Of JOINT COMMITTEE 1961
ic up or I did. Tliat was with respect to informin"^ our forces about
this code burning, because to me that was a definite indication of
immediate war. I entirely approved sending the dispatch, but I did
not initiate it.
Mr. Mitchell. There has been put in evidence here a document
in the nature of reports on Japanese Fleet locations which were avail-
able here in Washington, prepared here in Washington, and in one
part of that report it indicates the number of Japanese ships, troop
ships, and several carriers tliat were afterward in the expedition which
attacked Pearl Harbor, that had been located, so far as these informa-
tion sheets are concerned, in various Japanese ports.
Now would these reports have come to your attention at that time?
Admiral Turner. They did come to my attention. I saw that and
did not believe it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the record will show — we haven't got to that
evidence yet, but it was established, I think, at [51d7] prior
hearings that out in Hawaii, where they had prepared Japanese Fleet
location reports, that along about the latter part of November, the
28th or 29th, or the 1st of December, the officers there who were collat-
ing the information of this direction finder work found that they lost
track of three Japanese carriers, they did not know where they were,,
they had been silent for days, and the fact that those carriers had
been lost track of was brought to the attention of the commander in
Chief of the Pacific Fleet out there.
Did you know anything more about the failure to locate those car-
riers during that period than was available to you here? These re-
ports that seem to have been available here purport to locate the
carriers at certain Japanese ports because that is where they were
last known to be, and they left them there until they found they had
moved, but the reports out in Hawaii were a little different, they found
they lost track of them, and the fact that they had was noted.
Did you know that fact before December 7, that the carrier had.
been lost sight of ?
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. How Avould you know it ?
Admiral Turner. I think I saw the dispatch from the commander
in chief stating that fact, or else somebody told me that they had been
lost sight of. But there was another [S197-A'] very sig-
nificant
Mr. Mitchell. Just before you pass that, we have not seen any dis-
patch from Hawaii reporting to Washington that they had lost track
of a carrier. Is your recollection right on that ?
Admiral Turner. Maybe I am mistaken. I am not positive.
Mr. Mitchell. When you say somebody told you, are you sure they
told you before December 7 or you heard it afterward ? I am curious
to know how anybody here could have known it if their own ship
location reports here did not show it.
Admiral Turner. I was under the impression that they had received
that information from the commander in chief, but it is very vague,
I am not at all firm on that.
Mr. Mitchell. You mean you were under the impression, prior to
December 7, that we had lost track of those carriers ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I will tell you the reason, if you wish.
1962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. I wish you would, now that I have gone into the
subject. What was your reason for it?
Admiral Turner. A very significant thing occurred. I have for-
gotten the date. I think my recollection is around the 25th or 26th
of November. For about 3 weeks the traffic level of the Japanese
Fleet had been unusually high.
[SW8] Mr. Mitchell. You mean the radio traffic level, the
messages ?
Admiral Turner. The number of messages and length of messages
had been unusually high and had involved the entire Japanese Fleet
and their bases. Suddenly somewhere around the 25th or 26th of
November the traffic level dropped very markedly and the Japanese
changed their code, or their cipher, and changed their calls. They
certainly changed their calls, and I think it changed the cipher.
Well, that was extremely significant that very important operations
were contemplated, and it was probable that nearly the entire Japanese
Fleet had put to sea.
Well, that overweighed anything of this sort. I thought that be-
sides the ships that were headed down through the China Sea the
entire fleet had gone to sea. Well, now, where they were going to go is
a matter that could be easily determined. One large part of them
were bound to go down with the expeditionary forces in the South
China Sea. As a matter of fact I expected more, a stronger force to
go down there than actually went, a somewhat stronger force.
Now the rest of the fleet, including the battleships and carriers, could
go one of two places : They could either proceed down in the vicinity
of Eniwetok, of Kwajalein, or Palaus, or Truk to take up a covering
position against any [S199] attempt of our fleet to proceed to
the Far East — although such a proceeding was out of the question
unless we wanted to commit suicide — or the major portion of the force
could go to the eastward and attack Hawaii, either for a raiding or for
landing operations, which we did not expect in tlie least degree because
we analyzed they wanted the far eastern region and that they would
make their major amphibious effort and their shore effort in that
direction.
So that the possibility, the percentage chance of whether they would
come to Hawaii or go down and take up a covering position in the
Mandates, you could put that into anything you wished, depending on
the person doing it.
Roughly, I thought the chances, as I had no other definite means, T
thought the chances were about 50-50 that we would get a heavy raid
in Hawaii or that the Japanese Fleet that would not be used in the
China Sea would deploy in tlie ISIandates.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you had an impression then, when you heard
of the reports relating to the location of all these carriers and a couple
of battleships, you had it in mind that there was a 50-50 chance that
Hawaii would be attacked?
.Vdmiral Turner. Yes, sir; at least.
Mr, Mitchell. And you gained that impression around the 1st of
December in connection with these ship location reports?
[S300] iVdmiral Turner. No. Tliat had been the opinion all
along, expressed by tlie Navy Department, expressed in Hawaii, ex-
pressed by the "War Department, expressed by everybody else, that
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1963
there was a strong possibility that there would be an attack, a raid,
that is, against Hawaii. That was merely following along the line
the Navy officers and Army officers had been thinking about for 25
years or more. There was no change.
Mr. Mitchell. They had been thinking about it hard up to August
1, 1941, as all these plans against an air attack show, but we haven't
found any officer here yet. Admiral, that has testified that they had
any idea that the chances of a raid at Hawaii were any 50 percent.
Some of them thought it was a bare possibility. Some didn't expect
it. But they though it ought to be guarded against, and so on.
Did you stand alone in your rating of the possibility of an air raid?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. There were a good many naval officers in
the department that felt the same way about it.
Mr. Mitchell. Then at that stage of the game, or on November 27,
if the Navy felt that way about the chances of an air raid on the fleet
in Pearl Harbor, why didn't they send some further message that at
least mentioned the possibility of such a thing?
[S^Ol] Admiral Turner. That had been in correspondence right
along. The dispatch of November 27 fully covers it, in my opinion.
I think on the 5th, the afternoon of the 5th of December, after con-
vassing the situation with officers in my Division, I went into Admiral
Ingersoll's office and we talked for an hour as to what more the Navy
Department could do to warn the forces in the field, the fleets, what
ought to be done, should we send any more dispatches, or what. We
came, bothj to the conclusion that everything had been done cover-
ing the entire situation that ought to be done and we then proceeded
into Admiral Stark's office, discussed the same question with him for
15 minutes, and it was the unanimous decision that the orders that
we had sent out for Admiral Kimmel to take a defensive deployment
there were sufficient.
What was he going to take a defensive deployment against? Just
one thing. That is the meat of that dispatch. It is all in there.
Mr. Mitchell. You think that the defensive deployment referred
to is necessarily covered by that provision in the plan which calls for
participation in the defense of our territories in the Pacific against
Admiral Turner. Attack. /
Mr. Mitchell. Attack,
\r£02] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, here is a message that says :
This is a war warning.
That is good. It says that —
an aggressive move by Japan is expected witliin tlie next few days.
That is all right.
Number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task
forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai
or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.
Now, there you direct attention to the fact that your best judgment
is that the indications are that there will be an expedition against either
the Philippines, Thai, or Kr.a Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.
Now, we will say that within a few days after that you, or at that
time, you thought there was a 50-percent chance that that lost carrier
fleet might be headed for Hawaii.
1964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Do you think that this was an adequate warning? You were talk-
ing about the i^ossibility of Borneo. Why not say something about
the possibility of Hawaii ?
Admiral Turner. The major effort, the major war effort, was defi-
nitely, or was defined right there, and that was correct. Well, Ad-
miral Kimmel had nothing to do with that except as a later task to
attempt to keep as much of the Japanese Fleet in play in the Mar-
shalls as possible to give our resources out there a better chance. So
that the order [5203] to him, and I again invite your atten-
tion to the fact that this is directed to CINPAC, the order to him is
"Execute a defensive deployment."
Mr. Murphy. Mr, Chairman, I suggest that the admiral point out
on the map the area that the Pacific Fleet was supposed to cover. It
is covered at page 107 of volume 1 of this document. And none of
those items are m the Pacific Fleet area. It might be good for the
committee to understand at this point. It is page 107.
North of latitude 30" North and west of longitude 140° East.
(The witness went to the map.)
Admiral Turner. The longitude was 140° ?
Mr. Murphy. North of latitude 30°, north and west of longitude
140° east.
Admiral Turner. Yes. The Far East area runs across here [indi-
cating]. This was the responsibility of Admiral Hart [indicating]^
[5204-] Senator Brewster. Wliat was that ? 144 ?
Mr. Murphy. 140° east.
Admiral Turner. This is 140 [indicating] 30 is this right here
[indicating]. South of KYUSHU. Then all the way down here is-
the far-eastern area.
Mr. Murphy. That would cut right through Japan, would it not?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; that would cut over here [indicating].
Mr. Murphy. But the 140° line.
Admiral Turner. It wouldn't go any higher than 30 latitude.
Mr. Murphy. It is north of 30 and north and west of 140.
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Senator Brewster. South of the tip of the Japanese Islands?
Mr. Murphy. South. It would be north of the Equator and east
of longitude 140° east.
Mr. Mitchell. That line 140° east if projected down through the
Japanese Islands, where does it hit in the Dutch East Indies?
Admiral Turner. It didn't go north of
Mr. Mitchell. I said projected
[S20S] Admiral Turner. Down here [indicating].
Mr. Mitchell. Both ways, it goes up through Japan projected.
Admiral Turner. This is longitude 143 [indicating].
Of course this part [indicating^ has nothing to do with the definition
of the area.
Mr. Mitchell. I didn't say it did, but we are trying to get the gen-
eral location. As projected in each direction it passes through the Jap-
anese Islands. Where does it land? Down toward Australia, New
Guinea?
Admiral Turner. It strikes New Guinea about 1° west of the divid-
ing line between the Netherlands and British New Guinea.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1965
Mr. Mitchell. It was the area west of that, south of 30, that was
in the area that these tasks imposed by WPL--46 kiid the burden on
the fleet. That was the general area in which those tasks were to be
performed?
Admiral Turner. It was the area outside of that. This is the far-
eastern area.
Mr. Mitchell. It was the area east of that line and south of 30 ?
.Admiral Turner. North of 30.
Mr. Mitchell. That they were to operate in ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; north of 30 and east of 140 is [6206^
the Pacific area.
Mr. JMitchell. Does that cover the ground ?
Mr. Murphy. No. 2 would be —
north of the equator and east of longitude 140 east.
No. 3:
south of the equator, and east of longitude 180 to the South American Coast, and
longitude 74 degrees west.
The Vice Chairman. Let him locate one at a time.
Mr. Murphy. No. 2 :
North of the equator and east of longitude 140 east.
Admiral Turner. Here [indicating].
Mr. Murphy. No. 3 :
South of the Equator and east of longitude 180 to the South American coast, and
longitude 74 degrees west.
That wouldn't all be on that map.
Admiral Turner. Pretty nearly. Across this way [indicating] 180,
[indicating] and then over here to the Southeast Pacific area [indi-
cating] , which as I recall was along
Mr. Murphy. 74° west.
Admiral Turner. There is something wrong about that.
Mr. Murphy. 74 is not on the map, is it ?
Admiral Turner. There was a line that ran here
Mr. Murphy. 74 would be to the right.
\'5W7] Admiral Turner. Yes. I will have to see that book.
The Vice Chairman. Just a moment. While you are at that map,
Admiral — does it disturb you General Mitchell if I ask a question at
this point?
Mr. Mitchell. Not a bit.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral while you are at the map, please point
out the area coming within the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Turner. It was from the China Coast, latitude 30° north,
over eastward to longitude 140 east. Everything north of that within
the Pacific was under Admiral Kimmel. Then from the point 30 — 140
south to the Equator, everything east of that was under Admiral
Kimmel. Then the line went on along the Equator to 140°. Then
everything east of that, and I think that book is wrong — my recollec-
tion is to longitude 100, and that was in the Southeast Pacific area
under another command.
I know that for a fact. That was under the command of the South-
east Pacific, responsibility starting all the way south, came up along
100 west to about the Galapagos Islands, then over to the boundary
between Mexico and Guatemala.
1966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Everything west of the west coast of the United States, Canada^
and Alaska.
\S208] So that was the area under Kimmel's responsibility.
In addition to that he had a supporting task in a segment that
went down here [indicating],
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, your message suggested movements
of the Japanese in certain directions, either tire Philippines, Thai,
Kra Peninsula, or Borneo. Which one of those areas, if any, was the
area covered by Admiral Kimmel's responsibility?
Admiral Turner. None,
I beg your pardon, it doesn't say movements, it says "amphibious
expedition.'^
Mr. Mitchell. That is right, an amphibious expedition against
either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.
Now, one of the objectives were within this, Kimmel's area, at all,
were they ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
The purpose in that Avas to indicate to all the addressees the major
nature and the direction of the major war effort, of the Japanese.
Mr. Mitchell. I think maybe the committee would like to have
you take j^our seat agaiii.
Thank you. Admiral,
Well, now in these conversations you had with Admiral [5^09]
Stark and other people in the Navy after December 1, in which you
discussed at great length the advisability of sending some additional
warning to Admiral Kimmel, did they express the view in your
presence that there was a oO-percent chance, or anything like it, of
this lost carrier group attacking Hawaii?
Admiral Turner. I would like to correct what apparently was an
erroneous impression that I gave.
I wasn't thinking about any lost carrier group in particular. I
was thinking about the major portion of the J;ii)anese P'leet which we
had not detected going down through the China Sea.
Attention was not centered on any of the six. My attention was
not particularly centered oii six carriers to the exclusion of others.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then on that basis, what did these other offi-
cers say at this conference about the ])ossibility of a raid on H;iw:iii f
Admiral Turner. I can't remember any of the specific lines that
the conversation took. We discussed what we had done and looked
over the dispatches, looked over the charts, and just how much atten-
tion was paid to the question of a raid on Hawaii, how much of the
time on other matters, why, I can't remember, can't recall it.
[5^01] Mr. Mitchell. Did you express your opinion to them
at that time that these ship location reports that you had available
here in the Navy Department at Washington, sucli as you had, did
not, to your satisfaction locate the three carrier divisions?
Admiral Turner. No, 1 don't think I mentioned that particularly.
r think more than likely I mentioned the radio silence which was in
effect, and the. change of codes.
That would have been the natural thing.
Mr. Mitchell. Bearing in mind all these plans and estimates that
hitd been made over the months during 1941 about an air attack,,
all of them reached the conclusion that an air attack would be from
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1967
a carrier, some specified the direction and some hit witliin 450 miles
of where it came from, they all emphasized the carrier aspect.
Wonldn't you place special significance on the failure to locale three
divisions of carriers as indicating a possibility of a raid on Hawaii,
more than yon would the failure to locate some battleships and cruis-
ers? Wasn't there any special signifiance in that?
Admiral Turner. Well, I think we had failed to locate quite a lot
of the rest of the fleet as well. Carriers don't go out alone, and the
whole sum of all of the variables and all of the parts of the situation
pointed, as I say, to [5311] me, to one of two things, and I
believe we discussed the whole thing.
After reading these splendid plans that had been sent in by the
commander in chief, and by the Fourteenth Naval District, why, my
feeling was that these people knew their business. They knew what
to do about it, probably a lot more than I did, or the rest of here,
because they were the ones that were on the firing line.
Mr. JNIiTCHELL. Well, let's pass on to something else now.
I want to call your attention to the Japanese diplomatic intercepts
setting up what was known as the winds code particularly, circular
2353 on page 154 of Exhibit 1.
Admiral Turxer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. The bottom of the page. Among the Japanese
intercepts that were decoded, translated, and given to you, was that
among them?
Admiral Tu^jner. Yes, sir; I saw it at the time.
Mr. Mitc:iiell. Did you see the one on the top of page 155 under
the same date, establishing a more abbreviated system for the general
intelligence broadcasts?
Admiral Turner. That is vaguely familiar. I won't say specific
ally Avhether I saw it or not. I think X did.
Mr. Mitchell. The one on the bottom of page 154 is [5212]
the one that is known as the winds code because some" of the words
there refer to east wind, west wind, north wind.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
. JNIr. Mitchell, Do you know whether after the receipt of that
and translation of that message on page 154, the Navy took any steps
to put any monitoring stations on the alert to endeavor to receive that
message when it did come, if it did come ? Was that in your functions
at ail?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. Not in the least. It was Communica-
tions.
Mr. Mitchell. We have to go to them for the story ?
Admiral Turner. I understand it was done, but I know nothing
about the details.
Mr. Mitchell. You have no accurate and detailed information as
to what monitoring stations were available and whether they had
Japanese language representatives?
Admiral Turner. I know several places. I know they had them in
Guam, Samoa, Pearl, and Bainbridge Island.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you know whether they had Japanese language
men listening on those or whether each was equipped with a Japanese
language man, or would I have to go to Communications for that?'
1968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner. Well, that would depend on whether {52131
this Avas voice or key procedure. I believe that we did not at that
time, at least I had never heard of it. I believe we ourselves did not
monitor voice circuits, but depended on the FCC and other services.
That is what I was told.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, we will let that go because we will get the
accurate information from Communications.
Now, after this intercept of the 19th of November, translated No-
vember 28, was received, and you saw it, did you ever have given to
you, prior to December 7, any "execute message" using that code
which used the words, east wind rain, or west wind clear, or north
wind cloudy, meaning war with the United States, war with Britain,
and war with Russia ?
Did you ever have a message of that kind given you among the
information you received?
Do you understand my question?
Admiral Turner. I understand thoroughly. I would like to start
with what happened and then give you a direct answer.
Mr. Mitchell. All right, tell it your own way.
\^521Jf] Admiral Turner. On Friday afternoon, I think it
was
Mr. I^EFE. Wliat date was that?
Admiral Turner (continuing). Of December 5 Admiral Noyes
-called me on the telephone or the interphone, I do not know which,
and said "The weather message," or words to this effect, "The first
weather message has come in" and I said, "What did it say ?" And he
said, "North wind clear." And I said, "Well, there is something wrong
about that," and he said, "I think so, too," and he hung up.
I never saw a draft of that, I do not know from my own knowledge
where he got it from. I assumed until recently that it was an authentic
message. From what I can determine since coming back here it was
something entirely different, but it was never told to me. If it had
come in and had been authentic I am certain that I would have received
a copy of it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the phrase in English for "War with the
United States" which would have been used in such a message was
the phrase "East wind rain."
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever see that?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. The phrase in case there was war with [5215]
Russia was "north wind cloudy."
Admiral Turner. Well, maybe it was "cloudy" instead of "clear"
but it was "north wind," which was ridiculous.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, maybe this will refresh your recollection : In
the FCC report of their monitoring station, which will go in evi-
dence here and was offered in evidence in one of the other inquiries,
that FCC station record shows that they intercepted a weather broad-
cast from the Tokyo station transmitted at approximately 2200
<jrreenwich meridian time December 4, 1941 and the Japanese lan-
guage man at that monitoring station reported that he had heard
words to this effect :
Tokyo today north wind, slightly stronger; may become cloudy tonight;
itomorrow slightly cloudy and fine weather.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1969
Now, you will notice that that comes close to the phrase "North wind
cloudy," which meant war with Russia, but doesn't quite fit in with
the man that picked it up. Could that have been the message?
Admiral Turner. I think it is. It comes even closer to my recol-
lection, which is very distinct, "North wind clear." Now, he was
being rather guarded.
Mr. Mitchell. Maybe he is right about that because he said "North
wind and may become cloudy," which would indicate [6216'] at
the time it was clear, would it not ?
Now, there is another message that was intercepted by the FCC on
December Tth at approximately 2130 Greenwich meridian time — no,
I have got that wrong. This is another one, exhibit 3, intercepted
2130 Greenwich meridian time December 5, 1941 and this message
says :
Today north wind ; morning cloudy ; afternoon clear.
and still that was not quite "North wind cloudy." Was that the one?
Admiral Turner. It might have been that message ; I do not know.
He only called me once and that was, to the best of my recollection, in
the late afternoon of the 5th, which would have been about 22 or 23
hundred Greenwich time.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you are sure that was "North wind" and not
"East wind," though ?
Admiral Turner. I am sure it was "North wind" because I ques-
tioned it.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, here is a final report of the FCC station, a
message from Tokyo station transmitted by them between 0002 and
0035 Greenwich meridian time, December 8, 1941. That would be
December 7 here, would it not, Greenwich meridian time, December 8 ?
Admiral Turner. No; it is 5 hours earlier than that the same date.
[5217'} Mr. Mitchell. Five hours earlier?
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, here is the English translation :
This is in the middle of the news but today especially at this point we are
giving the weather forecast : West wind clear.
Now, that was the exact phrase set up in the winds code for war with
Great Britain and that came in after the attack at Pearl Harbor.
Did you ever see or hear of that ?
Aclmiral Turner. Yes, sir; I saw that. That is, I have a strong
recollection of having seen that.
Mr. Mitchell. There is some evidence here that Captain McCollum
sometime between the 1st of December and the 7th of December indi-
cated or showed a view that some further warning ought to be sent
to Pearl Harbor. Do you know anything about that?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and I was here yesterday when Senator
Ferguson read my testimony from the Navy court of inquiry, and I
was a little confused in that. I had nothing to refer to, I had not
received any warning of more than 2 or 3 days about the proceedings
and since that time in going over it myself and thinking about it I
arrived at what I believe is a correct statement on that subject.
From time to time Captain McCollum would come to me with
[5218] drafts of memoranda to the CNO concerning tlie situation
and we would discuss them, I think that he had such a memorandum
about the 1st of December but I do not believe that it was intended to
79716— 46— pt. 4 2C
1970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
go out as a dispatch but was merely for the information of the Chief of
Naval Operations. Now, I have not seen such a memorndum but I
have a recollection of that.
Now, about the 1st or 2d of December — and this is sure, I am com-
pletely sure of this, I remember it very distinctly — about the 1st or 2d
of December Commander McCollum came into my office and handed me
a proposed dispatch written on one sheet of paper and approximately
the ]enp;th of the dispatch of November 27 which he proposed that
the Chief of Naval Operations send out to the fleetg concerning the
immence of war. It covered the same ground approximately as the
CNO dispatches of the 24th and the 27th.
Now, I know that Admiral Wilkinson and some other officers in
ONI had seen those two dispatches and I asked McCollum if he had
seen them.
Mr. MiTCTTELL. You mean seen the officers or seen the dispatches ?
Admiral Turner. If he had seen the two dispatches of the 24th and
27th, and he said, "No." So I pulled the two dispatches out and handed
them to him and said, "Well, read these over and then see if you think
your dispatch ought to go."
[5219] He sat down and read them over and handed them back
to me and he said, "No," and tore up his proposed dispatch. It had the
same general ct)verage but was not as specific as these two messages.
Mr. Mitchell. Not as specific as those two that were sent?
Admiral Turner. Not quite, no, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Can you give us any more information from your
recollection as to what his proposed dispatch contained ?
Admiral Turner. I agreed with it entirely, he and I agreed on the
situation and he was afraid that a warning had not been sent out and
he had prepared himself a dispatch which he wanted to send out to the
commander in chief. I did not ask him not to send it but I just merely
said, "See if you think it ought to go after you read these dispatches"
and he read the two dispatches and he said, "No." He said, "That is
enough."
Mr. Mitchell. Now, turning now to the messages that were inter-
cepted between Janan and her ambassadors here in Washington on the
day of the Oth and 7th of December 1941, what are known as the pilot
message, the fourteen part message and the 1 p. m. message, when did
you first have called to your attention or see any part or all of those
messages ? You know what I am talking about ?
[5220'] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I think I testified that my
recollection is that some time just preceding the 7th, some night, and
I now believe it to have been the night of December 6, about 11:30
p. m. an officer came to my house, and I was in bed, and went down
and read a long dispatch in several parts. I believe that that was the
dispatch in question. I asked the officer to whom he had shown these
and he said, "Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, and Secretary
Knox" and I did nothing more about it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, when you say that was the dispatch in ques-
tion, my question was probably too broad.
Admiral Turner. The first 13 parts.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Admiral Turner. The first 13 parts, I believe.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1971
The Vice Chairman. What time did he say he saw it ?
Admiral Turner. 11 :30 p. m.
Mr. Mitchell. 11 :30 in tlie evenin<^ at his house.
Admiral Turner. About 11 :30 at night.
The Vice Chairman. OftheGth?
Admiral Turner. Of the 6th, yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. "VVliere had you been at about that time ?
Admiral Turner. I had been home.
Mr. ]\Iitchell. All evening ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. That is confirmed by a tele- [5221']
gram which I just received from my wife as to where we were that
night. She said we were home and that is my recollection.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, the next day what was the first hour
you say at which you saw the fourteenth part and the 1 p. m. ?
Admiral Turner. I do not recall seeing the 14th part until after
the attack. I did see the 1 p. m. part.
I had stayed at home Sunday morning and about 10 : 30, as I recall
it, Admiral Stark called up and said there was a dispatch from Admiral
Hart or a letter, rather, and he wanted me to come down to the office.
I went down to the office, arriving there some time, I believe, about
11 : 15, it may have been a little ahead of that, and it was quite urgent
that a letter be written to Admiral Hart and he gave me the necessary
information. I went to my office and started writing the reply and
iiad just about finished and looked over my disj^atches for the day and
Admiral Stark called me on the interphone and told me to come to his
office. That, as I recall, was about 12 or 12 : 15.
He then showed me the 1 o'clock message and I asked him if any
action had been taken on it and he said that he had called General
Marshall or General Marshall had called him and they had discussed
it and at first Admiral Stark had [5222] advised against send-
ing anything further because it might be confusing and then he said
about 3 or 4 minutes later he changed his mind and had called up
General Marshall and had told him that he thought the dispatch should
go and asked him, if he was going to send one, to inform the naval
authorities.
Mr. Mitchell. That dispatch he thought should go was one along
the lines that Marshall tried to get through?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Calling attention to the effect of the 1 p. m. delivery?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; exactly, because it was evidently an ulti-
matum with something very serious attached to it.
Mr. Mitchell. During the time that you were at home Sunday
morning did anybody call you from your office to see if anything
should be done about the fourteenth part or the 1 p. m. message ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; they did not call me at the house and
I had an officer on watch in the office and he did not report that any-
thing had been sent in there.
Mr. Mitchell. And as far as the first 13 parts were concerned you
satisfied yourself the night before that the Secretary of the Navy
knew about it and who else ?
[5223'] Admiral Turner. And Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral
Wilkinson. If it had been a change in the situation, why, I might
1972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
have called up Admiral IngersoU and recommended something going in
but it constituted no particular change; it was information of value
and I presumed that either Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Wilkinson
would do what they considered to be necessary in that case.
Mr. Mitchell. The pilot message had not been called to your atten-
tion on the afternoon of the 6th ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; I do not remember seeing that until
possibly as part of the 13 parts.
Mr. Mitchell. In the ordinary course of business the whole 14 parts
and the 1 p. m. would go to your office as soon as translated, would
they not ?
Admiral Turner. They would come to me.
Mr. Mitchell. They would come to you ?
Admiral Tltrner. They" were not delivered — well, they would go to
my office but they would not be delivered to anybody else except me.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you did not get to your office Sunday morning
until about 10:30?
Admiral Turner. Until about 11 : 15.
Mr. Mitchell. 11:15?
Admiral Turner. Yes.
\_522Jf\ Mr. Mitchell. Were these messages, the translations of
the fourteenth part and the 1 p. m., delivered to you then?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. I had seen them. I did not see the
fourteenth.
Mr. Mitchell. You had seen the 13 parts you told me.
Admiral Turner. I had seen the 13 parts; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. They were delivered to your house?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; and taken away.
Mr. Mitchell. But the fourteenth part and the 1 p. m. did not even
come to you ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir ; they did not.
Mr. Mitchell. As late as 11 : 30 Sunday?
Admiral Turner. They had not.
Mr. Mitchell. How do you account for that ?
Admiral Turner. I do not account for it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, did you receive delivery in a locked pouch
of the fourteenth part and the 1 p. m. any time on Sunday? '
Admiral Turner. I think they came in the locked pouch some time
during the afternoon. The only thing that I saw or have a recollection
of seeing was the 1 p. m. part, which was Admiral Stark's copy and
which he showed to me.
Mr. Mitchell. During this time after around November [522S']
27 to December 7, in all your discussions around the Navy with those
in authority was any consideration given to the question of whether
the fleet should be moved out of Pearl Harbor and sent to sea?
Admiral Turner. No; there was not that I recall. I assumed that
most or all of it would be at sea.
Mr. ]\Iitchell. Well, why did you assume that?
Admiral Turner. W^ll. that was the place for them under Admiral
Kimmel's operating plan for their deployment.
Mr. Mitchell. You mean tliat that was the place for them under
your dispatch of the '27th ordering tlie preparatory deployment?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1973
Admiral Turner. Ordering a defensive deployment, yes, sir, and
the commander's operating plan.
Mr. Mitchell. And you say that prior to the 7th of December you
did not know what, if any, state of alertness after the warning mes-
sages of the 27th had been established by either the Navy or the Army
command ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct, for that one dispatch, short dis-
patch from General Short.
Mr. Mitchell. The committee may inquire.
The Vice Chairman. It is now exactly 4 o'clock. We will recess
until 10 o'clock in the morning. You will be here then, please,
Admiral.
[52.?6] Admiral Turner. I will, yes, sir.
(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., Thursday,. December 20, 1945, a recess was
taken until 10 a. m., Friday, December 21, 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1975
[sm] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
or THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. 0.
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chariman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and
Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keef e.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
[<5;^^(5] The Chairman. The committee will come to order,
please. Counsel, I believe, desires to ask Admiral Turner again before
turning him over to the tender mercies of the committee.
TESTIMONY OP ADMIRAL EICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, two points were mentioned toward the end
of your testimony yesterday that I would like to inquire about.
One is a statement you made that neither you nor Admiral Stark had
any knowledge prior to December 7, 1941, as to what, if any, equipment
existed at Pearl Harbor, naval equipment, to decode or decrypt Japa-
nese messages. Had you no information at all about that?
Admiral Turner. I did not know the details at all of the decryption
methods or codes that were employed 4)y the Army and the Navy ex-
cept in a very general way. On three occasions, I think all three times
at Admiral Stark's initiative, I asked Admiral Noyes as to whether or
not Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart were receiving the same de-
crypted information that we were receiving here. I do not know that
I specified diplomatic intercepts.
On each occasion Admiral Noyes assured me that since these dis-
patches were being intercepted by botli Admiral Hart and Admiral
Kimmel, that those officers had the same information that we had.
[5229] Now, in the testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry
Admiral Noyes states that he knew that the particular codes that we
were using for the decryption of the diplomatic messages were not
in the possession of either Admiral Hart or Admiral Kimmel and in
his testimony he said that he could not understand how he could
have given me any such information.
1976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The only conclusion that I can arrive at is that I did not make
my question to Admiral Noyes clear and that he misunderstood what
I was trying to get at. It was true that Admiral Kimmel's organiza-
tion and Admiral Hart's were doing the traffic analysis and that they
had such codes and ciphers as were in the military's possession con-
cerning Japanese naval codes. We were not doing that type of work
here but only, as I understand it now, the diplomatic decryption. It
is possible that Admiral Noyes thought I was referring to that type
of decryption and not to the — I mean to the tactical type of decryp-
tion— and not the diplomatic.
However, as a result of those three conversations at three widely
separated times during 1941 1 believed and so informed Admiral Stark
that those officers were receiving the same information on all de-
crypted messages, at least concerning the Pacific, that we had here
in Washington. I now know that that belief is entirely in error as
regards diplomatic codes.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Noyes was in charge of what at that time?
Admiral Turner. He was in charge — he was the Director-^of Naval
Communications.
Mr. Mitchell. And if there was any one man in the Navy Depart-
ment tha.t knew what the set-up was about intercepting, decoding and
translating these Jap intercepts, he would be the man, would he not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And, of course, he knew or must have known when
you had any conversations with him just what the situation was?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And he would not have any object, of course, in
deceiving you about it ?
Admiral Turner. Not the least. He gave me at all times all in-
formation that I requested.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, here is a situation where according to the
set-up that you described and the responsibilities of the War Plans
Division it was your duty to keep these fleet commanders fully ad-
vised and report to them any over-all information that affected the
possibilities of war and, of course, it was not possible to discharge
that duty if you did \5331~\ not know what means thoy had of
obtaining information of their own. You could not do that unless
you knew precisely just what they had and what they needed from
you, isn't that so?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; that is not correct. It was not my duty
to inform the commanders in chief as to Intelligence, as to informa-
tion. It was my duty to inform them as to the major aspects of the
international situation that might lead to war with the United States
or might affect war with the United States. Sending the intercepts
or summaries of the intercepts or evaluating them as to authenticity
or probability was not War Plans province and we never under any
circumstances sent such information out.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, these so-called diplomatic intercepts, this
magic code stuff that you were getting here and seeing every day, did
bear directly on the over-all situation, did they not?
Admiral Turner. They affected very greatly our estimate as to
the over-all situation. I will modify that and say they affected them.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1977
They probably affected them in general terms about 15 percent, because
we were gathering information from many other sources and we knew
we were not intercepting all of the diplomatic dispatches.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, assuming the diplomatic intercepts only
affected your estimates to the extent of 15 [5232] percent, in
^'udging what you ought to communicate to the fleet commander it was
important for you to know whether they already had available that 15
percent through the intercepts and translating of the diplomatic
purple code?
Admiral Turner. Yes ; that is true.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Admiral Turner. Because they would understand — if they had at
least the more important parts of those intercepts — it would certainly
influence their understanding of any general estimate that we sent
out from tlie Department.
Mr. Mitchell. Precisely. Now, the situation was, though, as a
fact, whatever caused it,' that War Plans Division assumed then or
believed that at Honolulu the Navy had a system and equipment to
decode all that stuff when in truth and in fact it had not; that was
the actual situation, wasn't it ?
Admiral Turner. That was the actual situation and I thought and
Admiral Stark thought that we had taken due precautions to inform
ourselves on exactly that point, but there was apparently a misunder-
standing in the conversations. It was all done orally.
Mr. Mitchell. Another question I want to ask you about is with
reference to 3^our statement that you submitted this warning message
of the 27th and the previous one of November 24, submitted it or
transmitted it, to the President. Now, [S2S3] did you do that
personally ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. I left those messages with Admiral
Stark with the understanding that he would clear them with the
Secretary and if necessary with the President. I believe that he did
in the case of both of those dispatches, but I have no knowledge except
that Admiral Stark on one or both occasions informed me that either
one or both dispatches, and my memory is not clear on that, had been
approved by the President.
Mr. IVIiTCHELL. Before they were sent?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell, Or after?
Admiral Turner. Before they were sent.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, one of the things that the President was
very keen about here was having these warning messages tell the com-
manders not to commit the first overt act and he brought that to
Marshall's attention and they were careful to weave that into the War
Department warning. Here you have a dispatch of the same type sent
to the naval commanders and the President, if he saw it, apparently
did not say a word about any overt act or anything of that kind.
Admiral Turner. I have no recollection that the President told Ad-
miral Stark or Secretary Knox anything at all concerning any overt
act. The fact that the President ap- [SSS^] proved one or
both of those dispatches, and I know that he approved them in general
terms even if
1978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you knew it because somebody told you so,
isn't that about all the basis for your knowledge ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. My relations were in these
Mr. Mitchell. We are going to try to draw a distinction. Admiral,
between things that you were told and things that you know from your
own personal knowledge or activity.
Admiral Turner. I know from my own personal knowledge that I
was never informed that any such warning dispatches should by direc-
tion of the President contain any prohibition against any overt act.
Senator Brewster. Did he ever talk to the President about it?
Mr. Mitchell. I am trying to get that clear.
You never did talk to the President, did you, about these messages,
these warning messages ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You never took them personally to him ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. All you did was to leave them with Admiral Stark,
with the understanding, as you put it, that he would clear them with
the Secretary of the Navy and, if necessary, with anybody else, includ-
ing the President ?
Admiral Turner. With the Secretary of the Navy and the Presi-
dent.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you said before, "If necessary, with the Presi-
dent."
Now, was it your definite understanding that these messages could
not be sent until they had been submitted to President Roosevelt?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. The messages were sent when Admiral
Stark released them — gave directions to Admiral Ingersoll to release
them.
I know Admiral Stark believed, and I believed, that certainly the
President and the Secretary ought to be informed as to any definite
war warning and as to any message similar to the one of November
24, because they were extremely important.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I was not asking you whether you had any
instructions from the President about putting something in this mes-
sage to warn our commanders not to commit the first overt act, my
curiosity was aroused by the fact that the President had a good deal
of emphasis laid on that, and he insisted that it be put into the War
Department dispatch.
I was wondering how it could be that this warning message of the
Navy of November 27 went over to the President before it was sent, and
he examined it and approved it, and 3'^et the message as drawn does not
say one word above overt act. Would not you think, yourself, that if
it actually got to the Commander in Chief in that way, and he had been
so interested in the overt act business, he would then have made a simi-
lar suggestion to you or to the Navy ?
Admiral Turner. Well, INIr. Counsel, that would be a pure surmise
on my part. I know that I was never informed
Mr. Mitchell. I think you were right about that.
Admiral Turner. That the President required such a phrase to be
put in the Navy's messages, and so far as [5237] I am aware,
no evidence that the President directed the Navy to put anything about
overt acts, as has been introduced in this inquiry.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1979
Mr. Mitchell. When did you first see the Army warning message
that went to the commander of Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Turner. It was when General Gerow brought it to Ad-
miral Stark's office, I think on the afternoon of November 27.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that message had a provision in it about overt
acts.
Admiral Turjster. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell, It is from the Chief of Naval Operations to the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated November 28, and in it,
the statement is made that you undertake no ofTensive action until
Japan has committed an overt act — I am mistaken about that. I have
missed where the quotation started. The message of November 28,
from the Chief of Naval Operations to the counnandant PNNCP,
for information to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, quotes
the Army message which contains the statement that the United
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. Then after the
quotation is ended, the Savy message goes on and states —
WPL 52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in [523S'\
effect in that area except as now in force in Sontheast Pacitic snbarea and
Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has
committed an overt act.
That is not a copy of the Army message, that part. That is an order
from the commander in chief, or the Chief of Naval Operations.
I suppose you had something to do with preparing that message.
Have you found it ? It is on page 38 of exhibit 37.
Admiral Turner. That was sent to the commander in chief for
information, so that he would know what orders had been given by
the AYar Department to their subordinate commanders primarily on
shore, and so that the commander in chief would know what orders
we were giving to those two officers of the Pacific Northern and Pacific
Southern Naval Coastal Frontiers, as to what they should do, since
those two officers, as soon as war eventuated, would come under the
commander in chief for certain merits [sic^.
Now, the overt acts that could be committed by those officers were
possibly arrests
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Admiral, excuse me, but I am afraid I have
not made my question clear. I am trying to find out where you got
any directions or instructions to [6230] put into a Navy com-
mand order an explicit direction to undertake no offensive action
against Japan until Japan had committed an overt act. It is not
the Army dispatch I am quoting from, it is part of your dispatch of the
28th that follows after the quotation of the Army dispatch.
Who told you, or suggested that you give this caution against the
first overt act?
Admiral Turner. The commanders of those two naval coastal
frontiers
Mr. Mitchell. That is not my question.
Admiral Turner. I will answer it, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. All right, sir.
Admiral Turner. The commanders of those two naval coastal
frontiers were ashore in the United States. Alongside of them were
Armj commanders who had been given orders to commit no overt act,
and it seemed entirely suitable in that case that the orders to the naval
officers should be parallel to their associates in the Army.
1980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. Well, on that basis, why, then, in your November
27 warning message, in order to make it parallel with the Army order
to Pearl Harbor, did you not notify your commander in chief in
Hawaii not to commit the first overt act ?
Admiral Turner. The commander in chief in Hawaii was in a very
much more exposed position where hostilities were far more likely
to ensue than were the commanders of the naval coastal frontiers.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, I will ask you again if you will state to us
just who was it ? Was it the President, or if not he, who was it that
suggested or directed that this warning against committing the first
overt act be put in the message from the Chief of Naval Operations on
November 28, which I have just read ?
Admiral Turner. I drafted that dispatch and put those words in,
so that the actions of the commanders of the naval coastal frontiers
should be parallel with the actions of the Army commanders who
were their associates.
Mr. Mitchell. But you did not want them parallel at Hawaii?
Is that the way I undestand it; you wanted different orders there?
You wanted the Army to look out for the first overt act but the Navy
not?
Admiral Turner. The Navy dispatch of the 27th of November was
written first. It was cleared and we were agreed on it before any of
us ever saw the Army dispatch. I consider that the dispatch to the
commander-in-chief of November 27 was couched in the proper terms
to meet that particular situation, which was a very dangerous one,
with which they were faced.
[5241] Mr. Mitchell. When you saw the draft of the Army
dispatch of the 27th and the words that cautioned against overt acts
in it, did you inquire why that was there or who had suggested it?
Admiral Turner. We discussed — that is. Admiral Stark, General
Gerow and I, discussed — the Army dispatch for a few minutes. I
do not recall the nature of the discussion. I do recall feeling, as I
probably expressed, that the Army dispatch was not as strong as
the Navy's dispatch.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, I think you had one or two proposed
corrections of the transcript of your evidence that you wanted to
mention. Will you please do that now?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. On page 5130, the bottom of the page,
I would like to clarify my answer as to the time, the hour of prepara-
tion of Admiral Stark's reply to Admiral Hart's dispatch report of
December 7 concerning the report of the Hart-Phillips conversations.
From n study of the date and time books of the two dispatches and
a knowledge as to times of decoding and coding, and the times of trans-
mission, I believe that I received Admiral Hart's dispatch of his date,
December 7, about 11:30 a.m. on the morning of our December 7,
and that I prepared a reply to it late in the afternoon of the 7th,
after knowing about the attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor.
[-524^1 Pace 5152, the first sentence, change to read "Maritime
traffic between Hawaii and Japan ordinarily was much heavier than
maritime traffic on the northern great circle routes."
On the same page, line 5, change the word "every" to the words
"for a few."
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1981
Mr. Mitchell. Did you want to add something about the ship
location information ?
Admiral Tukner. I have a little more.
Mr. Mitchell. Excuse me.
Admiral Turner. Page 5152, the next to the last line, in two places
change the words "no patrol" to read "a patrol".
Page 5153, line 7, change "maritime ports" to read "maritime
routes". *
Page 5153, line 15, insert after the word "because" the words "of
necessity", and insert a period after "necessity".
Page 5153, lines 16 and 17, change the word "production" to
"troops".
That is all, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now did you want to add anything to your testi-
mony about the information available here as to the location of Jap-
anese vessels ?
Admiral Turner. It may be that I gave an incorrect impression as
to my impressions concerning the Japanese vessels that had been lost
sight of by our analysts during the first [5^4^] part of Decem-
ber. I knew that we had not definitely located a considerable number
of vessels of the Japanese Fleet. I did not identify them at all as
forming any particular task force, but knew that a number of vessels
of various classes had not been located.
I said yesterday, and was not too firm on it, that I believed I had
seen dispatches or information here in Washington showing that these
vessels had not been located, and that I did not agree with the deduc-
tions by tlie Office of Naval Intelligence that these vessels were neces-
sarily in home ports.
A good deal of information was sent to the Navy Department by
both the commandant of the Fourteenth and commandant of the Six-
teenth Naval Districts, giving analyses of their information as to the
location of Japanese naval vessels and the organization of fleets.
I have here two dispatches, one from each of those officers, dated
November 26, 1941, which go into considerable detail as to organiza-
tion and locations. They are not significant of the information that
I believe I saw about the 1st of December, but they are indicative of
the types of reports that were coming in every day or 2 or 3 days
concerning the Japanese Fleet. I think that there were other dis-
patches than these about the 1st or 2d of December which gave esti-
mates that certain vessels of the Japanese Fleet had not been located
for several days.
Mr. Mitchell. That last phrase "for several days" answers the
question I was just about to ask you on that. You say "had not been
located". Now our understanding from the old records in prior
inquiries on the situation at Oahu was that these carrier divisions had
been previously located up to about maybe the 25th or so of November,
and then had vanished into thin air, and they got no further trace of
them, there was absolutely radio silence as to all of them from that
time up to the 7th.
So tliat is a little bit different from the statement that they had not
been located. They had been once, and then they had been lost track
of for that period.
That is ,what you mean Ijy saying they had not been located?
1982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I think that is all.
[524s] Mr. Keefe. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, as a matter of
information, was there a lieutenant commander, or commander. Lay-
ton out at Hawaii, who was in charge of this matter of ship locations?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
^ Mr. Keefe. He is the man that was sending those reports into Wash-
iligton. Were you acquainted with him. Admiral?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I know him very well. He is at the
present time, or was. Admiral Nimitz's intelligence officer, and during
the time that I was out there, why, he was the adviser for Admiral
Nimitz.
Mr. Keefe. He was the intelligence officer for Admiral Kimmel,
wasn't he, at the time ?
Mr. Mitchell. The evidence will show later, Mr. Congressman,
that it was Layton who had charge of this ship location business; it
was he who reported to Admiral Kimmel, and it was he that noticed
and called attention to the fact that the carriers had disappeared.
Mr. Keefe. I merely wanted to identify him in my mind at this
time.
Admiral Turner. There is one small point about that, at the time
of the Pearl Harbor attack, the actual mechanical work of decryption
was under the commandant of the Fourteenth [S£4^] Naval
District
Mr. Keefe. That was Admiral Bloch?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and not directly a part of the staflF or-
ganization of the commander in chief?
Mr. Keefe. I see. All right.
The Chairman. The Chair at the moment has no questions to ask,
because I have missed most of Admiral Turner's testimony. There-
fore, he will waive his right.
Mr. Cooper.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral Turner, I desire to commend you
very higlily on the splendid record that you have made during the
fighting in this recent war with Japan, as I understand it from the
information you gave us. I understood you to indicate that you were
engaged in some of the greatest battles in the Pacific area. Is that
correct ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; the amphibious operations.
Thank you.
The Vice Chairman. I commend you very highly on that. Any
questions I might ask you about the period of time during which you
served as Chief of War Plans of the Navy would not in any way
reflect on this distinguished record which you have made during the
fighting period, but I do want to inquire briefly about some of these
matters that have developed during your testimony in connection
with the period of time [5^47] during which you served as
Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy. And I may say that my
impression is that much of the information you have p^iven us is
somewhat in conflict with other information we have received during
the hearing.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1983
Naturally, we want to try to reconcile all of these matters as much
as we can.
NoAv, how long have you been in the Navy, Admiral?
Admiral Turner. I entered the Navy as a midshipman of the Naval
Academy in June of 1904; graduated in 1908.
The Vice Chairman. From what State did you enter the Academy?
Admiral Turner. California.
The Vice Chairman. Now, during what period of time was it that
you served as Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy?
Admiral Turner. From October 24, 1940, to June 13, 1941—1942;
I beg your pardon.
The Vice Chairman. From 1940 in June
Admiral Turner. October, 1940.
The Vice Chairman. October 1940.
Admiral Turner. June 13, 1942.
The Vice Chairman. October 1940 to June 1942 ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
[624^] The Vice Chairman. What was your rank at that time ?
Admiral Turner. I came to War Plans as a captain. In January
I was appointed by the President as a rear admiral. That was for the
purpose of giving me rank for the ABC conversations. That was
not a rank that involved an increase of pay. It was what they call a
spot promotion.
In October, I believe, of 1941, 1 was promoted to the temporary rank
of rear admiral, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and in
December of 1941 I was made, given the permanent rank of rear
admiral.
The Vice Chairman. Well, during this period about which we are
inquiring here, you held the rank of rear admiral either temporary or
permanent?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, it was your duty and responsibility as
Chief of the War Plans Division, to make plans for war in case this
country became involved in war?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. And also to direct any operations that might
become necessary in connection with those plans?
Admiral Turner. To give the orders for the initiation of operations
and to give advice as to major changes or major aspects of the opera-
tions. Minor routine operations were taken care of by the Ship Move-
ments Division.
[524^] The Vice Chairinian. Well, most of my inquiries are for
the purpose of securing information.
Now, would it be fair to assume that from the standpoint of the real
effect of operations that the War Plans Division perhaps had the
highest responsibility for the advice given to the Chief of Naval
Operations ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. The Office of Naval Intelligence was largely
charged with the responsibility of disseminating information?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. But your Division, War Plans, was the re-
sponsible operations division ?
Admiral Turner. So far as regards the major aspects of war.
1984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. Now, you were kept fully advised and in-
formed as to the development of all diplomatic relations between this
country and Japan and other foreign countries, were you?
Admiral Turner. I was kept advised and I think had fully ade-
quate information. There were lots of details, of course, that I didn't
know.
The Vice Chairman. Well, did you reach the conclusion that war
with Japan was inevitable?
[6250] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. When did you reach that conclusion?
Admiral Turner. I thought that war with Japan was inevitable
for a number of years — for quite a number of years — before the war,
that at some time the Nations would clash in war.
I became convinced that war was certain under the conditions that
existed in 1941 during June and July of 1941, and that it was only
a question of a few months at most before we would be in war with
Japan.
The Vice Chairman. During June and July of 1941, you became
convinced that war, and you were certain that war between the United
States and Japan would occur?
Admiral Turner. Within the next few months.
The Vice Chairman. Within the next few months from June or
July of 1941 ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. You at that time held the position of Chief
of War Plans Division of the Navy?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Did you express those views to other respon-
sible and high ranking officers of the Navy Department?
Admiral Turner. I did, and also to officers of the [5261] War
Department.
The Vice Chairman. Did any of those other high ranking and
responsible officers of the War and Navy Departments agree with
you in that conclusion ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, there were quite a number in the Navy
Department that agreed. I am quite sure that Admiral Stark had
a strong opinion in that direction. I am sure that Admiral IngersoU
did. And other officers with whom I talked. They felt that the
situation was developing so that we would definitely.be at war within
a few months.
The Vice Chairman. Then you knew that Admiral Stark and
Admiral IngersoU, and perhaps other high ranking officers agreed
with you in the conclusion and the conviction that you had that war
was inevitable with Japan within a few months from June or July
1941?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I believed that.
The Vice Chairman. Do you know whether or not Admiral Wilk-
inson agreed with those views?
Admiral Turner. I knew then that Admiral AVilkinson did not
agree with them. On December fi he, much to my surprise, because
] had not fully realized his belief before that, he informed me that
he felt that I was mistaken, and I asked him, "Mistaken in what," and
he said, "Mistaken that Japan would attack the United States."
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1985
[525'2'\ The Vice Chairman. Well, did you have the conviction
that Japan would attack the United States'?
Admiral Tukner. I did.
The Vice Chairman. Knd that was your conviction, that you have
spoken of, that you reached that conclusion alono^ about June or July
of 1941, that it would be within a few months?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Did you ever think an attack would be made
on Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I did. I thought that that was a very
important part, a fundamental part of a war that we would have
with Japan. The Navy generally and the Army generally had thought
so for a longtime.
Under the circumstances that existed at the time of the outbreak
of war, as I testified yesterday, I felt that there was at least a 50-50
chance that w^e would get a severe attack on, that is, a severe raid, not a
landing attack — I did not expect that, because they could not do
important operations in the S3uth China Sea and also conduct an
amphibious operation against Hawaii simultaneously.
The Vice Chairman. The type of raid of which you speak was
what did occur on December 7, 1941, wasn't it?
[6263] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Xow, did you have any conviction in June
or July of 1941 that this type of raid would be made on Pearl Harbor
within a few months ?
Admiral Turner. I don't know that I thought a great deal about
it at that time, because we were interested in the general situation,
but it was part of our thoughts and part of our plans, I had written
the draft of the Secretary's letter of January 24, 1941, which I think
brought that matter to the fore, and so that throughout the whole time,
and throughout the whole time I was here, up to the time of the
war, here was a great effort being put forth by the Navy Department
and by the fleet, and by the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District, to prepare that position and the ships for just such an attack.
The Vice Chairman. And the effort was being made over a period
of many months?
Admiral TuitNER. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. To prepare Hawaii for just such an attack
as was made on December 7, 1941?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. Did you consider the fleet in Hawaii prepared
for that attack at the time it did come ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, within the limits of the material im-
provements program, I felt that the fleet was efficient and was ready
for war.
[6264-] The Vice Chairman. You felt confident that the Pacific
Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was ready for war on December 7, 1941 ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, and further that the district was ready
for war within the limits of the material that we had been able to
provide. We all had the utmost confidence in the command of the
fleet and the command ashore.
The Vice Chairman. Well, it is probably alwaj-s true, isn't it,
Admiral, that the commander in the field, whether it be the Navy
79716 — 46— pt. 4 27
1986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
or Army, always wants still more in the way of supplies and equip-
ment and forces, doesn't he?
Admiral Turner. Mr. Congressman, you never have enough, you
always want more and you want things to be better.
The Vice Chairman. I think General Marshall conveyed that very
clear impression to us and also the impression that he wouldn't be
worthy of his command and responsibility unless he did feel that
way about it.
Admiral Turner. I agTee with that, sir. I will say further — you
were speaking of the Navy
The Vice Cairman. Yes.
Admiral Turner. Further, I felt from all indications, all mj^ con-
tacts with the Army, that the Army headquarters here and the Army
in Hawaii had done everything that they could in the way of pre-
paring for- war. They were limited in a great many things [5^56^
but that was due to other conditions.
The Vice Chairman. I remember General Marshall testified that he
had stripped practically every other post in the United States of vital
aircraft and many other things in order to give it to the Hawaiian
Department and that, he gave us the impression that that was the best
prepared post in the Army of the United States in December 1941.
Would that probaably hold true also as to the Navy?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. If I may say, they had also put a good
deal of material, or were putting a good deal of material, in the Philip-
pines and, of course, just by so much was the availability of formations,
troops, reduced for Hawaii.
The Vice Chairman. As a senior officer of the United States Navy
of long experience and the Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy on
December 7, 1941, it was your conviction that the Pacific Fleet based
at Pearl Harbor was prepared for war?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, back for a moment to the question of
your views or convictions as to the imminence of war, please, Admiral.
You stated that during June or July of 1941 it was your conviction
that war with Japan was imminent within a few months. Then I
asked you, did you ever think an attack would be made [5256']
on Pearl Harbor. I understood you to indicate that your conviction
on that point was not quite as definite and certain as that war between
the United States and Japan was inevitable within a few months.
Could you help me a little further on that point?
Admiral Turner. I am sorr^^, I think that is the wrong impression.
I was concerned at this time with the over-all picture and not specifi-
cally concerned with parts of the picture. Inherent in war with Japan
was an attack on Hawaii and all through the entire time I felt that
that was a part of it.
The Vice Chairman. But in June or July, Admiral, you had the
conviction that war with Japan was inevitable within a few months?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And that Japan would attack the United
States?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Where did you think that first attack would
come
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1987
Admiral Turner. Well, I thought the major effort, the major part
of the attack, would certainly come, I mean, the permanent amphibious,
the conquest part, would certainly come in the Philippines and would
come either against the [6257] Malay Peninsula, Kra Isthmus,
or against Borneo, thence Java and thence westward to Singapore.
The Japanese were strong enough by that time to launch two major
efforts. I believed that they were pretty well convinced, by June or
July, that they could not detach the United States, although they
continued efforts to do so, from very definite military interest in the
Far East.
For example, if they had attempted to go down to the China Sea and
to have made a major effort against Malaysia without having a definite
assurance from the United States that the United States would not
intervene, they couldn't possibly have gone on down without the
capture of the Philippines, because it would leave on their flank an
extremely important position, which we could build up and later attack
them and cut them off from the south.
So that I believe the whole diplomatic effort during that time, the
summer and fall, was toward getting an arrangement with the United
States for us to keep out of war while they went after the British and
Dutch.
The Vice Chairman. Of course, as subsequently developed, they did
make their main effort along the line that you have indicated ; is that
correct ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Did you ever at any time think there
[52S8] would be a raid on Hawaii ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I thought there was always a strong
possibility and even a probability that a raid in Hawaii would pre-
cede any declaration of war and would be simultaneous with other
operations. I always thought that.
The Vice Chairman. And you thought then that probably the first
thrust or the first raid that Japan made, and even before the declara-
tion of war, would be at Hawaii?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; unless we could build up their strength
so great that the raid would almost certainly be disastrous in a large
way for Japan. We were engaged in building that strength up.
The Vice Chairman. You had that conviction then in June or July
of 1941, that such a raid or thrust at Hawaii would come within a few
months ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; unless we could be so superior in strength
that they would be afraid to take a chance.
The Vice Chairman. You have stated that the Pacific Fleet based at
Hawaii was prepared for war on December 7, 1941?
Admiral Turner. That was my conviction.
The Vice Chairman. And was it sufficient at that time to have de-
feated or greatly reduce the effect of the Japanese raid on Hawaii if
it had been fully alerted?
Admiral Turner. I believe so.
[6259] The Vice Chairman. And the raid made by Japan on
Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, could have been defeated or the effect
of that raid greatly reduced if proper measures had been taken by the
local commander?
Admiral Turner. I believe so. ,
1988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. Now, after seeing these various messages that
were intercepted from Japan along during the period immediately pre-
ceding December 7, 1941, for a few weeks before that, did your con-
viction become firmer and stronger that war with Japan was inevi-
table?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; and it was daily approaching the point
where it would occur.
The Vice Chairman. And that attack on Pearl Harbor was immi-
nent ?
Admiral Turner. Probable.
The Vice Chairman. Now, you say you drafted the war warning
message of November 27, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Did you consider that that message was ade-
quate and sufficient as a w^ar warning to him ?
Admiral Turner. I did, particularly with the addition of the infor-
mation that was sent later concerning the Japanese destruction of
codes.
The Vice Chairman. He was one of the highest ranking [62601
officers of the United States Navy at that time, wasn't he?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. He was a full Admiral, wasn't he ?
Admiral Turner. He was.
The Vice Chairman. Of long experience ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And regarded as among the best of the
senior naval officers in the Navy?
Admiral Turner. Indeed so. I personally had the utmost confi-
d'Cnce in him and respect for his ability, and I believe that that was
a generally shared opinion in the Navy.
The Vice Chairman. Ajid it is your conviction if he had carried
out the order drafted by you and sent to him on November 27, 1941,
that the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor could have been defeated
or the effects greatly reduced ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And that he had sufficient equipment, ma-
terial, and other things necessary at his disposal to have accomplished
that result?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, to have inflicted very serious damage
on the Japanese Fleet.
The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated yesterday that in your
opinion his fleet should not have been concentrated in Pearl Harbor
on that Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.
[5261] Admiral Turner. I did not say that in those words. I
said the business of the fleet out there was to be so deployed as best
to be able to carry out a defense of the region and to prepare to carry
out the other tasks of the war plan. If Pearl Harbor was the best
place for them to be to carry out those tasks, why — and it might be
a question of judgment on that — then Pearl Harbor was the best
place for those ships to be. If it was the best place, if the best place
was at sea, why, then, they should have been at sea.
Personally, I would have had them at sea, except those under repair.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1989
The Vice Chairman. You thought then that the ships and naval
forces there should have been at sea on that Sunday morning, Decem-
ber 7, 1941.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And you certainly do not think that they
should have been tied up two and two in the harbor ?
Admiral Turner. Well, two and two was the only way that you
could tie them up there, and, as a matter of fact, the antiaircraft fire,
development of fire, was nearly as good, not quite, when tied up in
that manner and, of course, in addition to that, and this actually
occurred on the attack, the inside ships got far less damaged than the
outside ships did; that is, the ones toward the water were the ones
worst [S26£] damaged.
The Vice Chairman. From a naval standpoint, could the fleet be
prepared to protect itself, or maneuver or move about so as to not
caltch the full force and effect of an air raid of that type, tied up
and standing still as if it had been out to sea ?
Admiral Turner. They could not maneuver, naturally. They did
have the advantage that the waters of the locks in Pearl Harbor are
very narrow. The torpedo runs were short and difficult. It was a
difficult attack to make by torpedoes.
They had, presumably, around them the antiaircraft guns of the
Army. And it was far easier to have a combat patrol of airplanes
overhead in a defensive position, than it would have been if the ships
had been several hundred miles away.
[5263] In that case, you see, it would have been necessary to have
given the fighter cover over the fleet from the carriers, and thus take
them away from any offensive missions which they might wish to
undertake.
So that from many aspects the defense of the battleships primarily
had advantages with them in Pearl Harbor over the conditions out-
side. On the other hand, being at sea offered other types of advantages.
The Vice Chairman. Well, you stated a moment ago that if you
had been in command there, you would have had your fleet at sea.
Admiral Turner. I believe so.
The Vice Chairman. Now, then, considering all of these various
elements to which you have referred, and considering it from a prac-
tical standpoint, it is your view that best over-all results could have
been accomplished if the fleet had been at sea ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
Just one or two questions, if I may, with respect to this message.
Well, was it solely within the discretion and jurisdiction of the com-
mander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kinmiel, as to whether
his ships were all in Pearl [526Jf\ Harbor, as they appeared on
December 7, 1941, or were out at sea?
Admiral Turner. It was within his province entirely.
The Vice Chairman. And he was the one that made that decision as
to just what he did with his fleet and how he handled it, and used it
rather than somebody here in Washington ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, the message of November 27, 1941, which
was drafted by you, and sent by the Chief of Naval Operations, is
1990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
addressed, and, as I understand, was sent to CINCAF. Is that the
commander of the Asiatic Fleet?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And CINPAC. Is that the commander of the
Pacific Fleet?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. This message was sent to these two com-
manders who were at that time Admiral Hart, in command of the
Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Kimmel, in command of the Pacific Fleet?
Admiral Turner. It was sent to them for action.
The Vice Chairman. Sent to them for action ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
[6265] The Vice Chairman. And the word "action" appears on
the message ?
Admiral Turner. It does.
The Vice Chairman. Now, then "INFO," does that mean
"information"?
Admiral Turner. It does.
The Vice Chairman. To CINCLANT. Who was that ?
Admiral Turner. Commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, Ad-
miral King.
The Vice Chairman. And SPENAVO. Who was that ?
Admiral Turner. That is the special naval observer in London, Ad-
miral Ghormley, who was there acting as the head of our naval mission
to the British Admiralty.
The Vice Chairman. Then this action message of November 27,
1941, was sent directly to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart for
action on their part, and was sent for information to the commander
of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral King, and the naval observer in London,
Admiral Ghormley ?
Admiral Ti^rxkr. Yes, sir; and Admiral Ghormley was directed
by the dispatch to inform the British Admiralty.
The Vice Chairman. But that was drawn by you and was sent by
Admiral Stark as an action message to Admiral Hart and Admiral
Kimmel ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct,
[S26'6] The Vice Chairman. Now, at my request, you have
kindly indicated to us yesterday on the map the areas coming within
the responsibility of Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel at the time
this message was sent.
Now, in this message the following occurs about the middle of the
message :
The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval
Task Forces indicates an amphibious expedition against eitlier the Philippines,
Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.
All of those points' were within the area coming under the responsi-
bility of Admiral Hart, were they not?
Admiral Tt^rner. That is correct.
The Vice Chatrjiant. None of them were within the area coming
under the responsibilit}' of Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Tui^ner. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. Then, Admiral, if you had the conviction
at the time this message was sent that at least a 50-50 chance existed
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1991
ffor a raid or a thrust at Pearl Harbor why did not, either in thlig
message or in some subsequent message, you convey some more infor-
mation to Admiral Kinnnel on that point ?
Admiral Titunkk. TIk; message tells Admiral Kinnnel to execute
an appropriate defensive deployment. That is [5267] per-
fectly specific and entirely clear an<l must be separated from the orders
to Admiral Hart that the Pacific Fleet was to execute a defensive de-
ployment. That is to take care of territory and take care of itself.
The Vice Chairman. My purpose is to try to secure information,
and I certainly haven't drafted as many naval orders as you have, and
I wanted to get your views on that.
Then, if I understand it correctly, the part of this message convey-
ing general information applied to both Admirals Hart and Kimmel?
Aihniral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And the part specifically pointing out these
places within the area coming under the responsibility of Admiral
Hart were primarily for his attention and only for information to
Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now^ then, following the words I liave read
from the message, ending with the word ''Borneo," these words next
appear :
Execute an appropriate defense deployment preparatory to carrying out the
taslvs assigned in WPL-46.
Tliat part of the message applied with equal force and effect to
both Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
[6268] The Vice Chairman. In your opinion, Admiral, did
Admiral Kimmel comply with that part of this order ?
Admiral Turner. He did not, in my opinion.
The Vice Chairman. If he had complied with that part of this
order do you think the disastrous effects suffered by the Pacific Fleet
at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, would not have occurred or
would have been materially reduced?
Admiral Turner. I think they would have been materially reduced
and I believe there would have been a good chance of indicting consid-
erable damage on the Japanese Fleet. We know from experience now
that an offensive raid by carriers against positions and against ships
is very difficult to stop and almost always can get in. With the
ships in Pearl Harbor, why, no matter what had been done I believe
a considerable portion of the attack might have gotten in but it
would have been broken up and been of considerably less effect.
We had land-based in Oahu at that time a total of 185 fighter
aircraft. The total fighter aircraft that the Japanese had, according
to my information, in their fleet was 112 and a portion of those and
a portion of their reconnaissance planes were maintained over their
carrier group for protection.
Now, if even a considerable portion of our fighters had been in the
air and been able to intercept — and that is not [5269] too
easy why, I believe that the Japanese attack would have been
very much less severe in its results and I believe then that we could
have, with our land-based bombers, done considerable damage to the
Japanese carriers.
1992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We know, however, from subsequent experience that high altitude
bombers have little chance of doing much damage to maneuvering
ships. Our principal possibility of damaging the carriers, as was
shown in the Midway Battle, is from the carrier planes that we
ourselves have.
The Vice Chairman. Did Admiral Kimmel ever reply to this mes-
sage of November 27, 1941 ?
Admiral Turner. He made no reply so far as I know.
The Vice Chairman. Did he ever acknowledge receipt of it ?
Admiral Turner. I do not know. That would not come to my
attention. Probably he did. We know that it was receipted for by
his communications organization. There is a difference between
acknowledge and receipt. When an operator finishes sending a dis-
patch the operator at the other end receipts for the dispatch.
The Vice Chairman. I can understand that.
Admiral Turner. But "acknowledge" means that it has gone to the
commander in chief and he has seen it.
The Vice Chairman. I can understand that, Admiral, but here was
an important action order drawn by you and issued by [S270']
the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander of the Pacific Fleet.
Now, did you ever receive any information that he got that message?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. Tlie standing orders at that time were
that whenever an operating disj)atch went to an officer he was required
to acknowledge. Now, that part of it would have come under Com-
munications people to check. I think there is no question but that he
did receive it.
Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield ?
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
Senator Lucas. May I ask counsel on that point whether or not the
record shows that the Admiral did reply?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Senator Lucas. That he did reply.
Mr. Mitchell. There is no question but what he got it. We have
not put in evidence the receipt for it. He actually got it, there is no
question about that.
The Vice Chairman. Do you have any record of any message from
him making acknowledgment?
Mr. Gesell, No.
Mr. Mitchell. We haven't got any of that information. We can
look at the communications record ; but there isn't any doubt but what
he received it.
The Vice Chair:\ian. I have never understood that there ['^>^71'\
was any question about Admiral Kimmel receiving it.
Mr. Mitchell. No, there is not.
The Vice Chairman. But the ])oint I had in mind in this question,
Admiral, was to check you a little bit, as well as Admiral Kimmel.
If you drew an important action order to go to the commander in chief
of the Pacific Fleet, I was just wondering why you did not have the
interest, or even the curiosity, to satisfy yourself as to whether he got
that directive order or not.
Admiral Tltrner. Mr. Congressman, I will agree that the word
"Acknowledge" should have been on the end of that message. It
would have been a proper thing to do.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1993
The Vice Ciiaikjmatst. You should have included that word "Ac-
knoAvledge" at the end of this message you drafted?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; I believe so.
The Vice Chairman. But even not having included that word "Ac-
knowledge" at the end of the message, didn't you have the interest, or
at least the curiosity, to satisfy yourself as to whether Admiral Kimmel
received it or not?
Admiral Turner. I knew that it had gotten into the Communica-
tions organization of Admiral Kimmel because our radio people never
quit until they get an "R" for it. Now, the chances of a dispatch like
that being lost in the Communications organization without getting to
Admiral Kimmel may be [5273] one in a million; I doubt if
they are that much.
The Vice Chairman. Well, I can understand that but what I was
trying to get at is whether you felt an interest in the matter sufficient
to want to satisfy yourself that Admiral Kimmel received it?
Admiral Turner. Oh, I w^as satisfied he had it, perfectly satisfied.
The Vice Chairman. Without ever inquiring or checking it or in-
dicating any further interest on your part, you were satisfied that he
got it?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. You did not have any information as to what
he had done, if anything, after receiving it, did you ?
Admiral Turner. None.
The Vice Chairman. Now, if he had complied with this message of
November 27, 1941, would his command have been properly alerted?
In other words, was this message of November 27 to him sufficient to
require the proper alert of his command?
Admiral Turner. I believe it was.
The Vice Chairman. And if he had complied with this message his
command would have been on the proper alert?
Admiral Turner. I believe so.
The Vice Chairman. Do you have any knowledge or any [527S]
information as to why Admiral Kimmel did not so alert his command?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. You have not received any information since
then that would indicate to you why he did not alert his command or
comply with this order as you had written it and had intended it?
Admiral Turner. I have never seen a report on the subject by
Admiral Kimmel. I have not read any of the testimony given be-
fore the various courts of inquiry from officers of the fleet or in
Hawaii. The only things that I have seen on it are matters that have
appeared in the newspapers and reading the report of the Naval Court
of Inquiry.
The Vice Chairjvian. Well, you continued as Chief of the War
Plans Division of the Navy Department from December 7, 1941, until
June of 1942, didn't you ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. If Admiral Kimmel had made any report or
conveyed any information to the Navy Department as to the reasons
for his action or lack of action on that it would have come to your
attention, wouldn't it?
Admiral Turner. I believe so.
The Vice Chairman. Any you never received any such information?
1994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[5^274] Admiral Turner. I have no recollection of receiving any
explanation at all. We received further dispatches as to action being
taken subsequently by Admiral Kimmel but I have no recollection
of an explanation.
I read, also, in addition to the other matters I mentioned, I read the
report of the Roberts Board.
The Vice Chairman. Well, was it customary in the Navy Depart-
ment when an exceedingly important order had been issued to a com-
mander of an important part of the fleet, or in this case the Pacific
Fleet itself, and that order was not complied with, was it the practice
of the Navy Department to call on him for some explanation?
Admiral Turner. The matter was taken out of the Navy Depart-
ment's hands as regards responsibility by the President's decision to
appoint the Roberts Commission and also it was taken out of the Chief
of Naval Operation's hands by Mr. Knox's personal investigation at
Hawaii.
The Vice Chairman. So that you do not consider that the Chief
of Naval Operations, or you as one of the chief divisions under him,
which was the Division of War Plans, had any further responsibility
to inquire into the reasons or the causes for his failure to comply with
your order?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. That was a matter — let me change that
Admiral Kimmel was relieved from his command be- [52751
fore he could possibly have submitted a formal report to the Depart-
ment and once it had been put into the inquiry stage, naturally none
of the naval officers would have expected him to make any statement
to the Department, but only to the various courts.
The Vice Chairman. Well, almost immediately after the attack on
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr.
Knox, flew out in person, didn't he?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And made an investigation?
Admiral Turner. He did.
The Vice Chairman. Now, if he found out anything; about the
reason for Admiral Kimmel's failure to comply with this order of
November 27 did you secure any such information from him after his
return, or anybody else coming from him ?
Admiral Turner. Mr. Knox made a report to the President. I do
not recall whether or not I ever saw that report, or not. Shortly after
Mr. Knox returned he made a very short oral statement to several
officers in his office. I was present amongst them.
The Vice Chairman. Well, did that short oral statement which
was made in your presence convey to you any information as to why
Admiral Kimmel had not carried out the order you had written which
had been sent to him by Admiral Stark?
{52761 Admiral Turner. No, sir; no reasons.
The Vice Chairman. Now, did you consider the Pacific Fleet as
safe at Pearl Harbor as an_v other i)race that it could have been based?
Admiral Turner. If I may, Mr. Congressman, before making a
specific answer to that, I would like to put some qualifications ahead
of it.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could not stop the com-
petition with the witness. I want to hear the witness. There is a ter-
rific noise coming from the left ; I do not mean at the table here.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1995
The Chairman. Well, the committee will be in order and also the
spectators.
Mr. Murphy. I do not mean the committee. I mean the spectators.
The Chairman. Well, all right, whoever is in disorder will now
resume order.
The Vice Chairman. Well, Admiral, I am sorry to have detained
3''0u this long, but just as briefly and specifically as you can answer the
question, why, that will be sufficient.
Admiral Turner. The reason for the fleet's being in Hawaii was not
for its own safety or its own security. The reason was for the security
of Hawaii and the security of the United States. Hawaii was, under
war conditions, a dangerous [6277] place. Any place where
fighting is going on is dangerous. The fleet would have been more
safe if it had been on the Pacific coast or if it had been in the Atlantic,
but it was out there for the purpose of engaging in a fight with the
Japanese and winning the fight.
So far as regards its own immediate safety, that is, the battleships,
which was of far less importance than of carrying out its tasks against
the enemy, there is great disagreement. There are two opinions as to
whether it was better in port or at sea. Since then we in the Navy
have maintained our ships in port many times against very severe air
attacks because we had things to do in port, at other times they have
been at sea, and under the conditions which existed at that time I,
myself, feel that local safety could have been obtained better if the
fleet had been at sea but, certainly, that opinion is subject to challenge.
The Vice Chairman. Well, considering the world condition as it
existed at that time did yoij think it was appropriate and best for the
fleet to be based at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Turner. I did.
The Vice Chairman. I thank you.
The Chairman. Inasmuch as I am compelled to go to the floor
I would like to ask one question, if it is agreeable, prompted by Con-
gressman Cooper's interrogation.
[5278] Admiral, you sent, or Admiral Stark sent, on the 27th of
November this command message to Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir .
The Chairman. In which you thought you were sufficiently specific,
in view of the possible danger, to notify him or any other officer in a
similar position that it was essential that all proper steps be taken to
protect not only the Navy, but protect whatever the Navy was out there
to protect, is that right?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And on the following day you wrote and Admiral
Stark sent an additional message in which you specified the Philip-
pines and the Kra Peninsula, I believe Thai and possibly Borneo, as
the more imminent objects of attack.
When you sent that message Admiral Hart had jurisdiction over
all those places you mentioned in that message of the 28th?
The Vice Chairman. The 27th.
The Chairman. I know the 27th, but I am talking now about the
message of the 28th, the next day. You mentioned all those points
over which Admiral Hart had jurisdiction and you did not mention
points over which Admiral Kimmel had jurisdiction.
1996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Did you ivive any thoii<!:ht, in view of the previoais mes- [6279']
sage of the 27th, did you give any thought to the possibility that
the emphasis that you phiced upon the Philippines and Borneo and
these other places -would justify any relaxation on the part of the
commander in the Hawaiian area whose area was not specifically men-
tioned in the telegram of the 28th ?
Admiral Turnek. No, sir; I did not. You see, that dispatch of the
28th, which transmitted the Army dispatch, was sent for action to
the shore-based Navy commanders on the west coast and only for in-
formation to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet so that he would
know of the (several orders we were giving his subordinates.
The Chairman. In view of the command nature and the imperative
nature of the message you sent on the 27th, regardless of the fact that
yoii mentioned other points that might appear to you and to Admiral
Stark as more imminently in danger, would that have justified a pru-
dent officer in relaxing his effort in that area though it was not men-
tioned specifically ?
Admiral Turner. AVe did not think so and reviewed that very sub-
ject, as I testified yesterday, on Friday afternoon.
The Chairman. Yes. Now, one other question. It is in evidence
here that on the 6th day of December ther-e was no reconnaissance of
any kind, either Army or Navy, at Pearl Harbor ; that the only recon-
naissance within that region any- [5280] where was from the
airplane carrier Enterprise, which was some 200 or more miles west
of Oahu.
Would you say that you regarded the failure of any reconnaissance
of any character on the 6th, the dav before the attack, whatever may
have happened betAveen the 28th or the 27th and the 6th, that the failure
to have any sort of reconnaissance at Pearl Harbor on the 6th of
December was a compliance or a violation of the command order you
had sent out on the 27th?
Admiral Turxi.r. It was a violation of it.
The Chairman. That is all I want to ask.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark of North Carolina will inquire at
this point.
Mr. Clark. Following up the question that was just touched upon
by the chairman, I have no disposition to be super-critical about this
message of the 27th. I call your attention to the fact that after re-
ferring to cessation of negotiations it says —
An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.
I am struck by the fact that is limited to the singular, and it con-
tinues—
The number and equipment of .lapanese troops and the organization of naval
task forces indicate? an amphibious exix^dition against
the four places you mentioned, all of which were in Admiral Hart's
district.
\S2S1] In fairness to Admiral Ivimmel. might he not have as-
sumed reasonably from that that the authorities in Washinj^ton were
expecting a movement only in the direction of the places indicated and
not in his naval district at all?
Admiral Turner. An answertothat, I believe, would be surmise, but
I invite attention to the fact that Admiral Kimmel was directed to
take an appropriate defensive deployment.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1997
Mr. Clark. I am not speaking of that at all. The thought in my
mind is whether he might have been justified in reading this mes-
sage and giving the words a simple meaning, that it was the opinion
of Admiral Stark who sent this message, or in whose name it was
sent, that (here would be an aggressive movement and in the direc-
tion of one of these four places mentioned in the message?
[5282] Admiral Turner. An aggressive movement. ^
Mr. Clark. One ?
Admiral Turner. One. An aggressive movement was intended to
include the over-all effort, military effort exerted by Japan. It was
that Japan as a whole was making a move. That was the intention
there.
Now with regard to the singular, in the next sentence, the opinion was
rather generally held here by officers that the amphibious movement,
amphibious expedition by Japan, only one at a time could be under-
taken in sufficient strength. I personally feel that the dispatch would
be improved by saying "The number and equipment of Japanese troops
and the organization of naval task forces indicates one or more amphib-
ious expeditions", but I think the singular in the first part there, as
indicating the whole picture, is all right.
Mr. Clark. I am only interested in the impression this might rea-
sonably have made upon Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. You refer here to only one amphibious expedition.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. And .you point out the direction that the circumstances
indicate it would take. Might that not easily have lulled him into
some sense of security as to his district [o283] insofar as the
opinion of Washingon was concerned ?
Admiral Turner. I do not know, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Clark. I believe you testified before this committee that if
Hawaii, or our establishment on Hawaii, had not been considerably
damaged — if our establishment there had not been quite severely dam-
aged— it would have cohstituted a serious threat to the Japanese flank
as this large movement to the south unfolded. I think you said that in
3^our testimony.
Aclmii'al Turner. No, sir ; I beg your pardon. That testimony was
given by another witness. I have not made any such statement.
Mr. CyLARK. I did not want to repeat if you did. What do you say
about that now ?
Admiral Turner. The threat to the flank would not have been par-
ticularly serious for some months. It would, under no circumstances,
have ati'ected the Japanese action in the South China Sea and against
Malaysia. AYe could not possibly move the fleet, as it w^as then con-
stituted or as it would ever be constituted, direct from Hawaii to the
Philippines and estal)lish a base and leave all of those Japanese islands
in between. We could not have supported the fleet. The only threat
to the Japanese flank would be operations against the islands in the
way of raids for some months, and that was alaout the only thing that
would be done, the idea being that [6284.] we would try to con-
tain the Japanese naval forces and air in the Mandates and take them
off the backs of our forces in the Far East.
1998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Clakk. I understood you, Admiral, to say that the only kind
of an attack that could be made on Hawaii would be by a surprise air
attack.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; and submarines.
Mr. Clark. And submarines, yes.
Admiral Turner. That is the only kind we anticipated.
Mr. Clark. Now you do agree that a surprise air attack of the char-
acter made bv the Japanese was a right risky thing for them, was it
not ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. Then why would they undertake that unless Hawaii was
a serious threat to their flank?
Admiral Turner. For two reasons. Hawaii was a serious threat
to their flank ultimately, not immediately. In other words, with the
fleet practically destroyed it meant that any action of ours against the
Mandates with the idea of making an advance across the Pacific must
be postponed possibly indefinitely, and that would give the Japanese
time to get themselves set in a better defensive situation, and it might
so discourage the United States — I think that is the second point —
that we would be willing to let things go and leave [o2S6] them
in possession of their spoils.
Mr, Clark. The only thing I am getting at, in my own thinking,
is whether the presence of our establishment on the Hawaiian Islands
along during the days from the 2Tth of November to the Tth of Decem-
ber constituted such a threat to what Japan had in mind doing, that
they would have been interested in taking a desperate chance on
removing that threat.
Admiral Turner, By all means, Mr. Congressman, from a long-
range point of view, not very much from within a few months, or
something like that.
But that was very definitely an ultimate threat against their posi-
tion, because it formed a base from which we could undertake later
strong operations.
Mr. Clark. Then, as I understand you, while you expected or
thought the chances of a raid on Hawaii were about 50 — 50 you would
not have expected it to come for some months ?
Admiral Turner. No, no ; I mean that was the time to do it right
then. It was unquestionably the time to do it, I am sorry I cannot
make myself plain, A raid on Hawaii, from the Japanese viewpoint,
if successful might have such tremendous effects as to insure their
success not only in conquering these positions but in holding them
indefinitely.
Mr. Clark. Well, now, to my mind that seems inconsistent with
your statement that Hawaii was not a serious threat to [5386^
their flank all the time.
Admiral Turner. It was not any particular immediate threat that
would prevent their major operations from being successful within a
few months. It was a definite threat against their ultimate success in
the war and holding their conquests.
In other w^ords, whatever happened there at Hawaii would have
very little effect on the operations for the capture of the Philippines and
Netherlands East Indies and Malaya.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1999
However, from Hawaii, with an intact fleet built up — as they knew
we could — we could, in the course of time, move across the Pacific, as
we did, and the;i threaten their position and relieve them of their
conquests.
For the immediate operations, unless we wanted to commit suicide,
why, we could not possibly interfere with their success.
Mr. Clark. Would you say the strategic importance of Hawaii in-
creased or diminished or remained static from the 27th of November to
the Tth of December, having in mind the movement of the Japanese
south ?
Admiral Turner. Well", it remained the same. It was a funda-
mental of our position in the Pacific — for any future offensive it was
fundamental that we should hold Hawaii. Probably I did not under-
stand the question.
[62S7] Mr. Clark. I do not think I made myself clear; I am
sorry. I really was thinking of the Japanese point of view when I
asked that question. From their point of view, with this rather
extensive movement unfolding to the south, did the strategic impor-
tance of the Hawaiian set-up to them increase ?
Admiral Turner. Oh, no ; it was the same, the same as it had always
been and the same as it continued.
Mr. Clark. I want to ask you about the diversion of this traffic that
you spoke of in your testimony. Was that known to Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. All of those dispatches were sent to him.
Mr. Clark. Did that or not enhance the opportunity for the Japa-
nese to make a successful surprise attack along the route they did take?
Admiral Turner. Not in my opinion. I think it made no difference
one way or the other. They could have easily avoided any of that
traffic. They could pass the trade routes at night darkened and they
could send airplanes out to let them maneuver clear, and in fact the
route through which they came was a normal operating area, they
operated out there for maneuvers and drill a good deal of the time.
Mr. Clark. You don't think the likelihood of the discovery [5288]
of that expedition would have been greater if traffic had still been
moving along normal channels ?
Admiral Turner. Not in the least.
Mr. Clark. Now may I ask you one more question about the message
that was sent by General Short in response to the message from the
Chief of Staff. I believe you said you saw that.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. It had in it I think the phrase "liaison with the Navy".
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
Mr. Clark. What did you make of that?
Admiral Turner. Well, I assumed that full arrangements were in
effect for the exchange of information and for the issuing of orders
by one service to the other in such situations as the one service worked
for the other.
For example, we had some fighters on shore and the Army was
charged with the fighter defense. I assumed that those communica-
tions were set up and functioning and that arrangements had been
made for full exchange of information and for putting in, or standing
by to put into, effect operating orders for both services with the knowl-
edge of the other.
2000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Clark. But the words in the preceding sentence of that message
indicated that tliey had become alerted only as [5289] to
sabotage.
Admiral Turner. That is correct as regards that message.
Mr. Clark. Now applying that same rule, would not you have under-
stood there was cooperation between the two forces as to sabotage
only?
Admiral Turner. That conclusion is, I believe, entirely justified.
It was not drawn at the time of the receipt of that message, although I
distinctly remember the message and thought it was rather queer.
Mr. Clark. I would like to ask you. Admiral, with the greatest
respect, what other conclusion could have been drawn from that
message ?
Admiral Turner. Well, another message had been sent by G-2 with
respect to special measures against sabotage, and while I do not recall
distinctly my thoughts about that dispatch, mj'^ thoughts at that time,
I think that I assumed that additional reports would come m as
regards the deployment of the troops.
[5290] Mr. Clark. Yes; but that does not really get to my
question.
Admiral Turner. Your question is what other conclusion could
have been drawn ?
^Ir. Clark. That is right.
Admiral Turner. I am telling you what conclusion I drew at the
time.
Mr. Clark. You concluded that other reports would come ?
Admiral Turner. Might come ; yes, sir.
]\Ir. Clark. But as to the meaning of the Short message, when you
read it — I am not talking about other reports, I am talking about that
particular message, as to its meaning — what other meaning could you
draw from it than that which I have just suggested?
Admiral Turner. I think I shoulcl have drawn the conclusion that
sabotage was the only one that was concerned in it, but I certainly did
not draw that conclusion, nor did any of the other officers that saw it
draw such a conclusion.
Mr. Clark. Well, I am inclined to agree with you on that, but that
still does not answer the question I am asking you.
Admiral Turner. I am not saying we were right.
[5291] Mr. Clark. Did that not raise even a suspicion in your
mind that your order of the 2Tth had not been complied with ?
Admiral Turner. I remember the dispatch very well, and I read it
over several times and thought it was a rather peculiar dispatch. It
certainly did not have any connotation, nor does it now, that the action
taken by the Navy was confined to sabotage, not the least, and I cannot
see how that conclusion can be drawn, because there were additional
orders issued to General Short with regard to sabotage, and knowing
the order about sabotage had been issued, I just drew the conclusion
that that was the message that related to sabotage.
INIr. Clark. That is all I have to ask, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire,
A.dmiral.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2001
Senator Lucas. Admiral Turner, I want to refer just briefly to this
message that was prepared by you and sent out on November 27.
The beginning of that message reads :
This dispatch is to be consitleretl a war warning.
Could there be any question about the interpretation of those words
by anyone who was in command of a fleet anywhere in the Pacific
or otherwise?
xVdmiral Turner. I do not see now, and I did not see [52921
then, that there was any possibility of misinterpreting that sentence.
Senator Lucas. Well, our main fleet was located at that particular
time in Hawaii, was it not?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. You also state :
Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out
the tasks assigned in WPL-46X.
Admiral Turner. "X" is a period, Senator.
Senator Lucas. WPL-46, then. I presume counsel will probably
ask you what WPL-46 is.
The Vice Chairman. He covered that.
Senator Lucas. You covered that thoroughly, so I will not go into
that.
Admiral Turner. That was covered yesterday.
Senator Lucas. Presumably Admiral Kimmel also knew what that
was, did he not?
Adiniral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Now, in addition to that warning sent out on
November 27, as a matter of precaution I take it, you also sent to
Admiral Kimmel, on November 28, a copy of the message that was
sent by General Marshall to General Short in Hawaii.
Admiral Turner. The primary reason for sending that [52931
dispatch was to inform the commanders of the Pacific northern and
Pacific southern naval coastal frontiers as to what orders had been
given to the commander of the Western Defense Command.
Since those two officers, the commanders of those two naval coastal
frontiers on the outbreak of war automatically came under Admiral
Kimmel's command for certain purposes, it was appropriate that we
should inform Admiral Kimmel what orders the department had
given to two of his future subordinates, and that is the sole purpose
of that dispatch.
Senator Lucas. That may be the sole purpose of the dispatch, but
certainly it also had a significant additional warning, it seems to me,
to Admiral Kimmel, in view of the type and kind of message that was
sent to General Short. He could not overlook tlie following day, it
seems to me, a message which meant really action. Am I correct in
that?
Admiral Turner. I do not believe that had any influence in draft-
ing that dispatch, because we were satisfied, as was the case, that Gen-
eral Short would show to Admiral Kimmel the dispatch which he had
received, and which was identical with that.
Senator Lucas. Assuming that he did do that, and I presume Gen-
eral Short did show the warning he received from [5294-] Gen-
eral JSIarshall to Admiral Kimmel, but nevertheless, here was an
additional warning to Admiral Kimmel that was sent from the Chief
79716 — 46— pt. 4 ^28
2002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of Naval Operations from Washington, D. C. There cannot be any
question about that even though it may have been, as you have stated,
insofar as the northern and southern spots were concerned.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I misunderstood you before.
I agree with that.
Senator Lucas. Now, on December 3, the Chief of Naval Operations
in Washington also sent to Admiral Kimmel this message :
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and ui'gent
instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at
Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, to destroy
most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confiden-
tial and secret documents.
Did you prepare that message?
Admiral Turner. No, sir, that was prepared by a subordinate of
Admiral Wilkinson's, but I knew about it, and we talked about it
ahead of time, and we all considered that that was an exceedingly
important piece of information to send to Admiral Kimmel and to
Admiral Hart, because the destruction of codes in that manner and in
those places [5295'\ in my mind and experience is a definite
and sure indication of war with the nations in whose capitals or other
places those codes are destroyed.
Senator Lucas. Am I correct in my understanding that that is about
the last thing a potential enemy does before war is started ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. It indicates war within 2 or 3 days.
Senator Lucas. I am only a layman, but I believe I can understand
that, and I could understand that if I were on tlie ground and knew
something about the burning of codes.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And especially in view of the message sent on
December 6, which is as follows :
In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying
Pacific slands —
He is talking about Hawaii there as well as the Philippines, and
others, is he not ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir ; not about Hawaii.
Senator Lucas. It went to the commander of the Pacific Fleet, did
it not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, but the "outlying Pacific islands," that was
a phrase, while not appearing to be specific in this dispatch, that we
used in correspondence and dispatches [5296] and indicated
Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake, and Guam.
Senator Lucas. It further says :
You may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential docu-
ments now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communi-
cation to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course
be maintained until the last moment.
Did you prepare that message in exhibit 37, page 45?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. That was prepared by the Office of
Naval Communications, but it was referred to me.
As I recall it. Admiral Noyes and I talked it over before it was sent.
We held on as long as we could, and then it was decided that that was
the last minute that was proper to send it. But we did not send that
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2003
direct to those outlying islands, because it is bad practice to. give
orders to subordinates.
Senator Lucas. I understand. But this message did go direct to
Admiral Kimmel, who was in charge of the Pacific Fleet?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Could I ask counsel whether or not the record shows
that Admiral Kimmel received all these [S297] messages?
Mr. Mitchell. It may be presumed he received all in this book.
There is no question about it, that I know of. We can get the com-
munications record, if you like. Everybody has assmned so, including
his own counsel.
Senator Lucas. Then on that same day, on page 46 of that same
exhibit, 3'^ou sent to the commanding officer of the Fourteentli Naval
District, a message as follows :
Believe local consul bas destroyed all but one system although presumably not
included in your eighteen double five of third.
Will you explain to the committee just exactly what that means?
Admiral Turner. That, Senator, is from the commander of the
Fourteenth Naval District to operations, and gives us information.
Now, it does not show information to the commander in chief, but cus-
tomarily since they go out through the same offices, why, as the dis-
patches are customarily delivered to the commander in chief,
undoubtedly they knew it.
Senator Lucas. All right. In other words, on the 6th of December,
this message came from Admiral Bloch, who was then commanding the
Fourteenth Naval District in Hawaii?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
[S298] Senator Lucas. He advised you that the local consul —
he means Japan there, does he not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. The local consul of Japan has destroyed all but one
system, although presumably not "included in your eighteen double
five of third."
Now, under the arrangement that was had there between the Army
and Navy, the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral
Bloch, had the duty to inform General Short, as well as Admiral
Kinmiel with respect to this important piece of information?
Admiral Turner. It was.
[S299] Senator Lucas. So the result of all these messages that
were sent from November 27 tip to December 6 and the message that
was received from Admiral Bloch on December 6 by the authorities
here in Washington indicated, from the 27th on, that a serious crisis
was existing between this country and Japan, and that war was
imminent, if not inevitable, between these two nations?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. Now, after all of these messages had gone forward
advertising Admiral Kimmel of the situation between these two na-
tions, as the Chief of Naval Operations here saw them, what he did
with the fleet upon these instructions was his own responsibility under
Navy orders ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. I want to ask you. Admiral Turner, a question
which probably is not pertinent or material, but inasmuch as a lot of
2004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
questions of that kind have gone into the record, I don't believe that
I am going to be stopped by the chairman if I ask this one question.
Assuming that Japan had not struck Hawaii, assuming they had
struck tlie Philippines, as it seems most Navy officers thought they
would if they did attack the United States, what war plans did you
have to aid the Philippines in the event that Japan struck them first
and made a landing [5300] there ?
Admiral Turner. It was the same war plan. Rainbow No. 5, WPL46.
That was a global plan and included orders to the Asiatic Fleet, the
Pacific Fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, all of the naval coastal frontiers
and the entire naval department and all of the services in the Navy
Department.
Senator Lucas. Assuming that Japan had not destroyed our fleet
in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, would it have been possible, in the
opinion of naval experts, to have given relief to General MacArthur
and his men before they w^ere captured at Bataan in the following
spring ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; it would be completely impossible.
Senator Lucas. I gleaned that from your statement a moment ago
with respect to the fleet being a threat on the flank of Japan and
I wanted to ask that question.
In other words, it has been stated many times — it hasn't been stated,
but it has been questioned — by many people as to why we did not give
relief to MacArthur and his forces in the Philippines after the Japa-
nese invaded in December 1941.
It is your studied opinion now that, even though we had not been
attacked in the Hawaiians by the Japanese, we still would not have
been able to deliver to our forces in the Philippines supplies and
support before they w^ere captured?
Admiral Turner. That is correct. It would have been [S301'\
completely impossible. That is, from that direction. Now, we made
an effort and got some supplies, small in amount, up from the south,
but that had nothing to do with the Pacific Fleet. I believe we sent
one or two submarines from the Pacific Fleet, but as far as any material
effect on the situation is concerned, why, the Pacific Fleet could not
have gone out and relieved the situation.
Senator Lucas. Well, it was my understanding that a certain
amount of relief did reach them, but it was only through submarines
landing there at night.
Admiral Turner. And a few little, small ships from the south.
Senator Lucas. But so far as taking out the fleet to convoy a group
of merchant ships with supplies and men, and so forth, it is your
opinion that that could not have been done before we were captured
there ?
Admiral Turner. It could not. The only way that could be done
was the approximate manner in which it was done. That is, step by
step, and that took 2 years.
Senator Lucas. You stated in the examination of Congressman
Cooper that, in your opinion, war had been more or less inevitable
with Japan for many years. Didn't you say years?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Wliat factors did you take into considera-
[S302] tion when you reached that conclusion years ago?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2005
Admiral Turner. The general national polic,y of Japan towards ex-
pansion in the Far East, starting with, actually, with their war with
China in 1893, and the continuation of that ; the growth of the militaris-
tic spirit, the increasing education of the Japanese people to be com-
pletely submissive to the military leaders; the increased mililary influ-
ence in the Government; their actions in China from the earliest
time, toward trying to get advantages of all kinds; their attempt to
hold on to Shantung after World War I; the Tanaka Memorial, so-
called — that may have been later, it may have been 1925 — which,
while he died, Mr. Tanaka was the epitome of Japanese aspirations
toward military conquest and world conquest; [SSOS] their
moving into China and refusal to make any arrangements, and grad-
ually thereafter the formation of those associations "to bring light
and happiness" to the Asiatic people.
Senator Lucas. In other words, it was the aggressive nature of the
Japanese to expand that caused you to believe that sooner or later
this country would be engaged in war with Japan.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and a definite crossing of our national
policy and the threat to the Philippines and our position in the Far
East Avhich such agtiressive tendencies had.
Senator Lucas. Was there anything during that period, upon the
part of any of the officials in the War, Navy or Executive branches
of the Government that caused you to reach that decision ?
Was there any action or any opinions expressed either in the War,
Navy or Executive branches of the Government that influenced your
opinion that sooner or later we might get into war with Japan?
Admiral Turner. Yes, and on the part of the American people.
The demand generally of the American people that we put an embargo
on Japan for some years, and the refusal of American officials to com-
pletely back down and let Japan [S304-] have their own way.
Of course that is not a criticism of them, naturally, but our adher-
ence to our policy right along in support of China, and in support of
the British and our refusal to just let the field, leave the field open,
to Japan, let them do what they pleased.
Of course, that had a very definite influence.
Senator Lucas. Li other words, we would have had to forget com-
pletely about our basic and fundamental policies that we had pursued
over a long period of years in this country, so far as our foreign policy
in the Pacific is concerned?
Admiral Turner. That is my opinion.
Senator Lucas. And we would have had to yield completely to Japan
if we wanted to stay out of war with them ?
Admiral Turner. I believe so.
[S30S] Senator Lucas. Now, do you know of anything in the
last 3 or 4 months before December 7, 1941 in the Navy, the War, the
diplomatic or any executive branch of the Government that tricked
Japan into this war?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; far from it. We wanted to hold them
off as long as we could and there was — I knew pretty well what people
in all branches of the Government were doing with respect to this
matter — and I think there was absolutely complete loyaltj^ on their
parts to the Constitution and to our constitutional methods of prose-
cuting foreign affairs and prosecuting war. There was never the
2006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sliglitest tendency to do anything but what I believe was honest and
sound.
Senator Lucas. That is all.
Mr. Clark. Mr. Murphy has some questions to ask at this time.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Turner, as I understand it, you were very
close personally to Admiral Stark prior to December 7, 1941.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr, Murphy. I find at one point that before the naval court of
inquiry you stated that your duties included being a sort of profes-
sional adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations in matters pertaining
to military operations and particularly [63061 with regard to
preparation for war, to future operations, and also in respect of rela-
tionships with the War and State Departments. Would that be an
accurate statement ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; not too much with the State Depart-
ment. I had some direct relations. It was mostly as an adviser on
questions that were of concern to the Chief of Naval Operations.
Mr. Murphy. Did you state before Admiral Hart that you consid.
ered yourself one of Admiral Stark's principal advisers and that you
were close personal friends as well as closely associated officially?
Admiral Turner. I did.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, as I understand it you felt that the possi-
bility of an attack on Hawaii was a 50-50 proposition.
Admiral Turner. Approximately.
Mr. Murphy. And you_also felt that that would be one of the start-
ing points of the war?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Were you in close contact with Admiral Hart in the
month of October 194l'?
Admiral Turner. Admiral Hart?
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark. I beg your pardon.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to the file of [5307'\
letters between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel and particu-
larly to a letter dated October 17, 1941.
Will you make that available, please? The letter I am referring
to is dated October 17, 1941, and at the top of the page it says, "Re-
ceived 23 October."
Admiral Turner. I have it.
Mr. Murphy. Do you have that letter?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I direct your attention, Admiral, to the second para-
graph, a letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel [reading] :
Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message
I sent you merely stated the "possibility." In fact, I tempered the message
handed to me considerably. Perliaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case,
after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at
least until something indicates the trend.
Would you say thfit that was Admiral Stark reflecting a 50-50
possibility of an attack on Hawaii and that war was certain on that
date?
Admiinl Turner. No, sir. I was very much astonished when I
first saw that because I had not and did not later detect any opinion
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2007
like that. Of course, witli regards to the 50-50 ISSOS] possi-
bility we referred to a time that was about 7 weeks later.
Mr. Murphy. Except that you said that
Admiral Turner. And I do not believe that Admiral Stark held
that opinion around the latter part of November.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you said yesterday before us that you felt that
war was certain in July.
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. And when do you think the 50-50 possibility arose?
Was that before when war was certain?
Admiral Turner. War was certain. I believed war was certain,
but in the event of war probably — well, right about the time of Pearl
Harbor — I felt that there was at least a 50-50 chance that they would
raid Hawaii.
Mr. Murphy. Now, what was there that occurred between July 26,
19-il, and December 7, 1941, to change the situation so that it became
a 50-50 proposition?
Admiral Turner. I am afraid I did not make myself clear. I was
satisfied in July that we would be at war with Japan certainly within
the next few months. I believed during the first part of December
that the probability of a raid on Hawaii was 50-50. There was no
change, Mr. Congressman. I do not know that I evaluated it in July
as regaids a raid. I was certain there was ging to be war.
[6309] Mr. Murphy. I understood you to say that something
hajDpened right before December 7 that made you come to the conclu-
sion that a raid on Hawaii was a 50-50 possibility or probability.
Admiral Turner. Nothing occurred to change any relative proba-
bility there at all. I said that I felt that there were two methods, two
strategic methods that the Japanese Fleet could pursue. One was to
go down and base their fleet in the mandates with the hope that our
fleet would go after them and they would be in a good position. The
other was to make a raid on Hawaii. There were two major methods
and without evaluating it too much, too greatly, I thought it was about
a 50-50 chance of the raid on Hawaii.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, as I understand it in July you felt that it
was certain that we would be at war with Japan in a few months and
yet in the month of August you made a report and a forecast that they
would attack Siberia, didn't you ?
Admiral Turner. That was a possibility there and was a new devel-
opment, and I believe that they had taken it in mind. You remember
the attack by Germany on Russia was, I think, the 24th of June and by
August Russia was in a — had suffered some severe defeats and there
were movements up to Manchuria of Japanese troops which started, I
think, along in the first [SSIO] j)art of August and continued
on into October.
Mr. Murphy. Do we have here, Admiral
Admiral Turner. Sir ?
Mr. IMuRPHY. Do we have here available your forecast of the Jap-
anese attack on Siberia in August ? Do we have that available ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, I have that. I think it is the dispatch of the
3d of July, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Murphy. Well, that would be a message from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the various outlying theaters, but wasn't there some fore-
2008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cast made by you to Admiral Stark at that time, a written report or
something, upon which this message was based ?
Mr. Clark. Mr. Murphy, it is 12 : 30 and I presume during the
lunclieon hour maybe you can get that straightened out.
Tlie committee will stand in recess until 2 p. m.
(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the
same day.)
[S3 11] AFTERNOON SESSION, 2 P. M.
TESTIMONY OP ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)
The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order.
Mr. Murphy will resume his examination.
Mr. Murphy. What was the status of the record at the time of ad-
journment, Mr. Reporter, please?
(The record was read by the reporter, as follows :
Mr. IMuBPHY. Do we have here available your forecast of the Japanese attack
on Siberia in August? Do we have that available?
Admiral Turner. Yes, I have that. I think it is the dispatch of the 3d of July,
Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Murphy. Well, that would be a message from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to the various outlying theaters, but wasn't there some forecast made by
you to Admiral Stark at that time, a written report or something, upon which
his message was based?)
Mr. Murphy. Do you understand the question now before you,
Admiral ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I ask for a moment.
So far as I recall there was no memorandum to the Chief of Naval
Operations covering the subject matter of the dispatch of July 3, 1941,
addressed for action to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet
and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and for information to
a number of addressees. I beg your pardon, I have the incorrect
reference. The dispatch I referred to is No. 031939.
Mr. Murphy. It is the dispatch of July 3, 1941, contained on page
4, Exhibit 37.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. So far as I recall there was no memo-
randum on that subject. It was discussed with various officers, in-
cluding War Department officers and officers in the Office of Naval
Intelligence.
Mr. Murphy. I understood your testimony to be that on July 26
war with Japan was certain, and that the probability of an attack on
Hawaii was 50-50. Did you have that in mind at the time of the
sending of this dispatch of July 3, 1941 ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, ultimately, within the next several
months. Also at that time, on July 3, owing to troop movements of
Japanese troops and through magic intercepts which shoAved the
Germans were urging the Ja]:)anese to join in against the Russians,
it looked like the first move might have been against Russia instead
of to the south, but I felt that that would be succeeded, if successful,
by war by the Japanese against the United States'; that in any war by
the Japanese against the United States, where they initiated ^it, that
there was a very good probability, on the order of 50-50 \S3lB]
that the first move would be accompanied by a raid against Hawaii.
That was
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2009
INIr. MuRPiiY. Adiuii'al, can you i)oiiit out to the committee any-
where, at any time, any single word in writing Avhere you said that,
anywhere, at any time, to anyone, where you made such a statement
in writing?
Admiral Turner. That is the 50-50?
JSIr. Murphy. Yes. I am talking now about before December 7.
Incidentally, I have never seen a Monday (quarterback of a football
game. What we want is what happened before December 7, 1941.
Now, is there anywhere, at any time, where you said to any person any-
thing like that in writing or to anyone in the Navy Department, any
paper tliat will show it by anyone in the Department ?
Admiral Turner. No, not anything on the 50-50, but I invite your
attention to the consideration of tlie Secretary of the Navy's letter of
January 24, to the Bellinger-Martin agreement, to the estimates that
were made by the Commander in Chief in his war plan and in his
estimate, to letters between the War and Navy Departments as to the
strong possibilities that war would be initiated with a raid, an air
raid on Hawaii.
Mr. Murphy. That was in the
Admiral Turner. On the 50-50, 1 was asked my opinion [6314-^
as to what I tliough the chances were, and I said I thought about 50-50.
I never put that in writing.
Mr. Murphy. The letter of the Secretary of War and the letter of
the Secretary of the Navy spoke about what would happen if there
was an attack on Hawaii, but where do you find in either of those
letters anytliing that would indicate that the war would start by an
attack on Hawaii?
Admiral Turner. I invite your attention to the wording in the first
pargaraph of the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary
of W^ar dated January 24. The last sentence says :
If war eventuates with Japan it is believed easily possible that hostilities
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the naval base at Pearl
Harbor.
That is, if a war under any circumstances occurred it would be in-
itiated by such an attack. That is the same thought that is in the
Martin-Bellinger agreement, it is the same thought that many, many
officers of the Navy Department and the War Department have had for
many years, that the war would probably start and be fought generally
in the Asiatic lands but it would be accompanied by an air raid and
an attack on Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Murphy. Now, will you point out anything in your [6315^
estimate of the situation of July 3, 1941, that would point anj^thing
like that out or indicate anything like that ? That was a current esti-
mate of the situation, wasn't it, July 3d?
Admiral Turner. That is correct. As I have mentioned before, this
was the major — it was speaking of the major principles — and inherent
in any eventual war with Japan was the belief in the possibility of an
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Murphy. Well, is there anything like that in your dispatch of
July 3, 1941? ^ .
Admiral Turner. That is not mentioned there.
Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention. Admiral, to page 108
of the Navy's Narrative Statement of Evidence in the Pearl Harbor
2010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Investigation, volume 1. Do you have a copy that the Admiral can
use?
Mr. Gesell. No ; we do not have a copy.
Mr. Murphy. Does anyone have a copy of volume 1 that he might
let the Admiral use?
Admii-al Turner. I have never seen that.
Mr. Hannaford. Here it is.
Mr. Murphy. I ^m referring, Admiral, to page 108, in which is set
forth section 1333 of WPL 46 and I will read section 1333 :
To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be
townrd
[5316] (a) Capture of Guam :
(b) Establishment of control over the Soiith China Sea, Philippine waters and
the waters between Borneo and New Guinea by the establishment of advanced
bases and by the destruction of United States and Allied air and naval forces in
these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon ;
(c) Capture of Northern Borneo;
(d) Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Carolines-Mariannas
area, by the use of fixed defenses and by the operation of air forces and light
naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet ;
(e) Reinforcement of the mandate islands by troops, aircraft and light naval
forces ;
(f) Possibly register like stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other out-
lying United States positions.
Now, I am wondering where in there there is anything that would
indicate that there was a 50-50 possibility of commencing the war by a
raid on Hawaii? That is the alternate plan.
[-5317] Admiral Turner. I said that my estimate was 50-50,
and that that estimate was shared by other officers. In "f", which you
last read, possibly raids on other outlying United States possessions.
Mr. Murphy. Is there anything in Rainbow 5, section 1333 that
agrees with your estimate of the situation?
Admiral Turner. That does.
Mr. Murphy. Where?
Admiral Turner. Possibly raids.
Mr. Murphy. "Raids or stronger attacks on AVake, Midway, and
other outlying possessions." You mean the 50-50 proposition would
be covered in general terms in section F in what Japan would have
to accomplish in her initial action, that the 50-50 proposition would be
covered in section F, in general terms ?
Admiral Turner. This is a Navy Department publication. The
WPL46 is a Navy Department publication. While War Plans pre-
pared it, those estimates also reflected the opinion of the War Depart-
ment, and that is the official publication. I have not said at any time
that either the War Department or the Navy Department thought
there would be a 50-50 chance of a raid on Hawaii, because I do not
believe they did.
INIr. Murphy. Your message. Admiral, of November 27 to Admiral
Kimmel tells him "Execute an aj^propriate defensive [-^5/5]
deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in AVPL46",
and when you go to WiPDlG, to section 1333, 1 do not see the name of
Hawaii mentioned.
Admiral Turner. Those are not the tasks. The tasks were read
yesterday, and the defensive task read yesterday was the task requir-
ing the defense of the Territory of the Associated Powers. This is
part of the estimate which is in the front part of WPL 46.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2011
Mr. MuRPiiY. It does say, however, Admiral, "to accomplish the
foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be outlined in
these paragraphs," doesn't it?
Admiral Tukneu. Yes, sir. Those are not the tasks.
Mr. MuKPiiY. Well, the tasks are in section ;'>212, are they not? The
tasks are on page 10;3, and I find on page 103 of volume 1 of the Narra-
tive Statement of Evidence in the Pearl Harbor Investigations para-
graphs A, B, G, H, and I of the Rainbow Plan, or WPL 4G, reading
as follows :
The U. S. Pacific Fleet is assigned the following tasks Pacific areas,
and then there is outlined "A" which pertains to the Malay Barrier.
Let me read it exactly :
Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy
strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of posi-
tions in the Marshalls and through raids on enemy sea communications and
{53} 9] positions.
B. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall
Island area and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk.
G. Protect the sea conununications of the Associated Powers by escorting,
covering and patrolling as required by circumstances and by destroying enemy
raiding forces.
H. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and
prevent the extension of any military power in the Western Hemisphere by
supporting land and air forces and denying the enemy the use of such positions
in that hemisphere.
And
I. Cover the operations of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.
That would cover Hawaii in H and I, would it not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. There are tasks omitted, of course.
Mr. Murphy. Yes. They are in the record as you read them yester-
day.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Do you see anything in section 3212 that would make
Hawaii a 50-50 proposition for a starting point in case of war?
[5320] Admiral Turner. There is no estimate in there as to a
60-50 chance. It orders him to protect the territory.
Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, I would like to direct your attention
to the memorandum that was given to the President of the United
States on November 5, 1941, by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval
Operations. Will you kindly look at that?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I see it.
Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention, if you please, to page 13 :
The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct
defensive war in cooperation with the British and Dutch for the defense of the
Philippines and British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being
reinforced.
I assume you are referring there only to the Far East as apart and
distinct from the Pacific?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, down below :
The potency of this threat will then have increased to a point where it might
well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the area south and
west of the Philippines.
2012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In that memorandum of the 5th of November there is a statement
from the Chief of S^ alf and Admiral Stark to the effect, as I read it,
that if we succeeded in building up our [oS31] forces as ex-
pected at that time, that we would deter Japan from going to war.
Is that right?
Admiral Turner. That is in there; yes, sir.
JNIr. Murphy. And yet you say we w^ere certain we were going to
war back in July.
Admiral Turner, That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Well, do you change your estimate now, in view of
the memorandum which was prepared by your department, I take it,
on the 5th of November 1941?
Admiral Turner. That was prepared in cooperation with the War
Department and represents the views held at that time by the War
Department and by the Navy Department.
Mr. Murphy. Well, what were your views as to the certainty of
war at the time this statement was issued ?
Admiral Turner. I believed it was certain.
Mr. Murphy. You did not believe then what was being told the
President as the true reflection of the true situation at that time?
Admiral Turner. I thought that the increase of forces in the Philip-
pines as then planned would be a deciding factor in deterring them.
Mr. Murphy. If it did deter them would war be certain? I mean
those statements are contradictory, I take it. You said war was cer-
tain back in July. On the 5th of November, [5322'] there is a
statement to the President by the leader of each force, the Navy and
Army, that we may avoid war by having the necessary forces there,
and deter the Japs from going to war, as I read it.
Admiral Turner. That is the statement by the Chief of Staff and
Chief of Naval Operations.
[SS23] Mr. Murphy. Did you agree with that ?
Admiral Turner. I did not agree that any plan of reinforcement
of the Philippines would be a deciding factor in deterring Japan
from making war.
Mr, Murphy. Now, did you ever express yourself in that manner
to Admiral Stark ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Is there anything in writing anywhere that will show
your attitude at that time as head of the War Plans Division.
Admiral Turner. No, I do not believe there is.
Mr. Murphy. In other words, at that time, 1 month preceding Pearl
Harbor, wdien the Navy and Army were giving the President an esti-
mate of the situation, it was at variance with the opinion of the Chief
of the War Plans Division of the Nav}^; is that right?
Admiral Turner, In that sentence ; yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, you have stated on the record that you
believed that war' was certain in July of 1941, and I take it that your
reason for stating that was because of these economic sanctions, or was
it because of the course of action which Japan had been pursuing
ever since 1931?
Admiial Turner. The course of action which Japan had [5324]
been pursuing, and the course of our diplomatic negotiations with
them, and recent statements by the Japanese, because the economic
sanctions were nofput on until the 26th of July, I think.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2013
_Mr. MuRriiY. The Army witnesses before us testified that they had
given an opinion to their superiors, and to the President in tlieir esti-
mates of the situation, in which they encouraged tlie placing of eco-
nomic sanctions. Was the Navy ever asked for its opinion and did
they express it?
Admiral Turner. It was asked for its opinion on several occasions.
Admiral Stark was asked for an opinion by either Secretary Hull or
Secretary Knox. I discussed the matter with him several times, and
each time expressed the view that the putting on of economic sanctions
would hasten the war with Japan and make it almost certain.
Mr. MuRPiiY. Well, assuming that we did not put economic sanctions
on, that we would have continued to give them scrap, we would have
continued to give them oil, they would have continued to build up
their war machine, do you believe if we had not put the sanctions on
them that would have resisted the onward advance of their military
forces ?
Admiral Turner. I did not say that I opposed putting on the eco-
nomic sanctions. I merely said — which I believed and which is borne
out to be correct — that putting the [5S£6] economic sanctions
on would hasten war, and I think it had a very decided influence in
hastening the war.
Mr. Murphy. You think then, if we had not put the economic sanc-
tions on, and Japan had built up its forces, that they would have been
law-abiding citizens?
Admiral Turner. I said hastening war. It would not have pre-
vented it at all. The only object that I could see in putting off the
war with Japan was so we could get our war potential higher. We
were improving at a rate considerably greater than the Japanese were
during the fall of 1941.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I take it while you say^you felt in time
that war with Japan was certain, you felt it was certain, did you not,
back in January when you prepared that letter for the Secretary of the
Navy ?
Admiral Turner. My statement, as I recall it, was not that it was
certain. I said I felt for many years that ultimately war was inevi-
table with Japan and I became convinced in about June and July that
war was imminent within the next few months.
Mr. Murphy. Did you feel that way in January, that we were going
to go to war with Japan, when you prepared that letter for the Secre-
ary of the Navy ?
Admiral Turner. I believed it would come at some time.
\6326^ At that particular time I felt it might be put off.
Mr. Murphy. How long?
Admiral Turner. No definite term. It might even be put off until
the end of the European war.
Mr. Murphy. Wliat was your opinion in April of 1941 ?
Admiral Turner. About the same, that it was certainly worth
working for, to put the war off, and it was greatly to our advantage,
assuming that we would be at war with Germany in the course of time,
that we should keep out of war with Japan, if possible until after we
had obtained success in the Atlantic.
Mr. Murphy. Did you make a statement, Admiral, on the I7th day
of April, to the effect, "I do not agree that Japan has decided to strike
even against Indochina"?
2014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.
Did you make that statement in writing;?
Admiral Turner. May I see what document that is from?
Mr. MuRPiiY. Referring to a note on the bottom of the paper headed
"Memorandum for the Director," dated April 17, 1941, reading entirely
as follows :
I do not agree that Japan has decided to strike, even against Indo-CInna. See
my memo of Feb. 5th. R. K. T.
That would be you, would it not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; that is my writing. The word "decided"
is underlined.
[S327] Mr. Murphy. That is right. What did you mean by that?
Admiral Turner. I meant exactly what it said. I did not agree
that Japan at that particular time had come to a definite decision to
send troops or to make war then against anybody, even against
Indochina, that is "decided" as regards any particular date or period.
It was not until June and July and subsequently that I came to the
conclusion that war then was imminent. At this time I still believed
it might be possible to put it off, to postpone it for some time.
Mr. Murphy. And yet you did prepare the letter for the Secre-
tary of the Navy in January ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. That does not say we were going to
have war, that it is immediate.
Mr. Murphy. Now, will you produce that memorandum of Feb-
ruary 5, to which you refer ? Do you have that, Admiral, or can you
get it?
Admiral Turner. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman, I do not know
what the reference is.
Mr. IVIuRPHY. Well, I was just wondering. You say there "See
my memo of February 5th," and I was wondering what that memo
would say.
Can you tell me where I could find it ?
[S-32S] Admiral Turner. I remember what it was. I have not
seen a copy of it since coming back here.
About the time of the starting of the ABC conversations the
British sent in a very urgent alarm to us saying that they had very
strong evidence that Japan was going to attack Singapoi-e about the
10th of February, and there was considerable excitement about it.
I wrote a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations in which
I pointed out that it was not possible for them to strike Singapore
on February 10, because they were not deployed for it ; they did not
have troops deployed to the south, and most of their Navy was in
Empire waters, and I discounted the report from the British, I said
that they would not strike at any time until they had deployed their
troops and had acquired bases in the south.
[53'39] Mr. Murphy. At any rate, I request the liaison officer
of the Navy to find the exact memorandum of February 5 of Admiral
Turner, so we might have it for the record.^
May I inquire of counsel if this letter of April 17, 1941, has been
offered as exhibit 81, but the particular letter and note of Admiral
Turner have not been spread in the record?
Mr. Gesell. That is right. The entire exhibit has been introduced.
J The Navy Department subsequently advised the poramittee that search of Its files
failed to disclose a copy of this memorandum. See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5133.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2015
Mr. Murphy. I ask that the memorandum of April 17, 1941, and
the note of Admiral Turner be spread in the record at this point.
The Vice Chairman. So ordered.
(The document referred to follows:)
In reply to No.
0P-1&-F-2
Navy Dkpaktmknt,
Office of tub Chief of Naval Operations
OmcE of Naval Intet.ligencb
Washington, April 11, 1941.
Memorandum fob the Dikector
Subject : British-Japanese Crisis.
1. On April 16, 1941, the Domei (Japanese) News Agency reported from
Bangkok that repeated attacks by British troops on Thai territory along the
Thailand-Malaya frontier caused the Thai Government to lodge a protest with
British authorities. Domei said the protest was announced by the Thai Foreign
[5S30] Ministry, and added that no further details regarding these attacks
were given.
2. For some months past the Japanese have been concentrating troops at
Formosa, Hainan Island and Kyushu. There has been a gradual shortening of
lines in Central China, and movement of troops from this area to Formosa and
Hainan Island. Tliere has been also a gradual reduction of Japanese troops
in North China, which were in some instances replaced by Manchukuo levees.
Within the last two weeks some S,OCO Japanese troops, 3,500 of whom had re-
ceived special instruction in jungle warfare, left Indo-China foi'nUnannounced
destinations. During about the sami> period, some 11,000 fresh troops from
Japan arrivrd in T'entral China, and 11,000 veterans left Central China for
Formosa. The Japanese Fleet is in home waters. A strong force is near the
Palau Islands. It is probable that in case of a drive on Singapore, a strong
flanking force would be maintained in the Palau Island area.
3. A report from the Naval Attache, Tokyo, states that there are persistent
rumors in Tokyo that Japan plans an early attack on Singapore. Although the
Japanese deny this, credence is lent the story by the above facts, and by the
severe blows suffered by Britain in the Balkans. Britain's merchant tonnage
is suffering so heavily that the question of American convoys is coming promi-
nently to the fore. [5331] Some move to keep the American Fleet in the
Pacitic and thus prevent the diversion of any American strength from the
Pacific to convoy duty in the Atlantic would seem logical for the Axis to make
at this time.
4. When to all this is added Japan's new position with regard to Russia,
whereby she apparently has a Russian guarantee of non-interference in case of a
southward drive, it may be that the Domei article is the beginning of a J'apanese
drive on Singapore. Newspaper attacks have often preceded Japanese military
attacks, and newspaper attacks invariably precede the military attacks of her
Axis partners.
/S/ A. H. McCollum.
A. H. McCOLLUM.
CC— OP-16-1
0P-16-F
[The following written in longhand:] The Japanese Fleets have been re-
organized, also. C. H. C.
I do not agree that Japan has decided to strike, even against Indo-China. See
my memo of Feb. 5th.
EKT.
[5332] Mr. MuRPiiT. Now, Admiral Turner, there has been some
testimony by General Miles to the effect that during 1941 there was
an attempt made by the Army and Navy to have the Joint Intelli-
gence Committee set up and there was testimony to the effect that
there was a preliminary meeting held but that no actual meeting was
2016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
held until after Pearl Harbor, and the reason given by General Miles
was that the Navy could not find oflice space.
Was that the real reason why that was not set up ?
Admiral Turner. I can give you the entire history on that, if you
will give me a moment or two.
Mr. Murphy. I wish you would.
[53S3] The Vice Chairman. You may proceed if you are ready,
Admiral.
Admiral Turner. Sometime in the late spring, I think it was about
June, there was a proposal made to set up a superintelligence organiza-
tion under the command of then Colonel Donovan, an organization
which developed later into the OSS.
The proposal, as I recall it, was that the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, and the Military Intelligence Department, would become inte-
grated into this new office under Colonel Donovan. That proposal
so far as relates to those two divisions was opposed b}^ both the War
and Navy Departments.
Then there was a proposal made that these two offices would absorb
Colonel Donovan's organization.
On the 16th of July 1941, the joint board considered a memorandum
from General Miles dated the 14th of July, the subject Coordination of
military and naval intelligence with the office of coordinator of infor-
mation.
That wa'the one that wanted to amalgamate them, and put them all
directly under the joint board.
And there was a memorandum on the subject also, dated the same
date, from the Director of Naval Intelligence.
Now, these papers were read to the board, but the [S3S4^
memorandum I had here, looked up recently, says they were not put
in the file. They were summarized in paragraph 1 of Joint Board
No. 329, serial 710, a copy of which I have.
Now, a part of the recommendation was that the Director of Naval
Intelligence, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, should become
members of the joint board and form an organization which would
report directly to the joint board. That was referred to the planning
committee, and the planning committee made a report to the joint
board dated 10 September 1941.
In that report the Planning Committee, by previous or interven-
ing action of the Joint Board, had stricken out the question of
bringing Colonel Donovan's organization and also the Joint Board
by an intervening action had decided that they did not want these
two officers on the Joint Board because it would make the Board
too large.
Mr. Murphy. Did you oppose it personally ?
Admiral Turner. Oppose making them members of the Joint
Board?
Mr. Murphy. Did you oppose making the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence a member of this board ?
Admiral Turner. That was, I believe, unanimous on the part of
the eight members.
[533S] Mr. Murphy. Didn't you express yourself personally on
the matter ?
Admiral Tuener. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2017
Mr. MuRPiiY. Why? Will you tell us what your opinion was and
why they shouldn't have this working arrangement, so that Navy
and Army Intelligence would report and be a part of the Joint Board,
with war certain, in your judgment, at that time?
Admiral Turner. I beg your pardon. I said that these two officers,
would become members of the Joint Board. That was opposed.
Mr. MuRPJiY. Why did you oppose it?
Admiral Turner. Because the Board would then be too large, and
it was agreed to unanimously that we didn't want any more members
of the Joint Board.
Mr. Murphy. Why? What harm would there be in having the
Army and Navy Intelligence there going over this situation with war,
in your opinion, certairt, so that you cbuld have the benefit of their
judgment and they have the benefit of your judgment, in order to
understand the coming of war, which, in your opinion, was certain ?
Admiral Turner. They didn't need to be members for us to have
their opinion.
Mr. Murphy. Your only objection was that by having [5336']
these two members additional on the Board it would make the Board
too large ?
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. You were opposed to the Office of Naval Intelligence
particularly being on the Board, weren't you ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Didn't you express yourself to that effect?
Admiral Turner. I don't recall saying particularly. I was opposed
as the other members were to either one being on the Board.
Mr. Murphy. What were the relations between you and Admiral
Wilkinson between the months of September and December of 1941 ?
Were they friendly ?
Admiral Turner. Very friendly.
Mr. Murphy. Are they still friendly ?
Admiral Turner. They are still friendly. They have always been
friendly.
Mr. Murphy. Well, then, when you talked about this decrypting
and decoding at Hawaii, and you talked to Admiral Noyes about it,
did you talk to Admiral Wilkinson about it?
Admiral Turner. I didn't talk to Admiral Wilkinson about de-
crypting because he had nothing to do with decrypting.
Mr. Murphy. You said yesterday that you understood that
[5337] Admiral Kimmel was getting all of this decrypted mate-
rial and the person who was in charge of Naval Intelligence and the
person in charge of distributing it to the various people in Washing-
ton, and certainly who knew considerable about it, was the Chief of
Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson. Don't you think he would
have known what they had in the outlying fields?
Admiral Turner. He had nothing to do with the codes and I
believe he testified he didn't know what the codes were.
That was exclusively within the Communications organization until
it was decrypted here and delivered to the Office of Naval Intelligence
and Military Intelligence.
[5338] Mr. Murphy. I don't mean the codes. I am talking-
about facilities. He testified before this committee that he knew all
79716 — 46— pt. 4 29
2018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
about it, told us what facilities they had there. He must have had
that information at that time.
Admiral Turner. Decoding facilities, Mr. Congressman?
Mr. MuRriiY. Yes, decoding and decrypting and translating fa-
cilities.
Admiral Turner. I misunderstood that.
Mr. MuRPMY. Here is a man, an Admiral at the time, the head of
one of the Departments in the Navy, the Office of Naval Intelligence,
and reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations on a very vital
matter, yet no consultation is had between the head of War Plans and
the head of Naval Intelligence on that very subject.
Can you explain that?
Admiral Turner. I have already explained it, and I will say again
that the Office of Naval Intelligence had nothing whatsoever to do
with the technique of decrypting and receiving and intercepting
magic messages. The Communications Office did all of that work
and after it had been decrypted and translated by either them or MID
they delivered the copies in English to the Office of Naval Intelligence
for further processing.
Mr. Murphy. And they in turn delivered it to you ; that [53391
is right, isn't it ?
Admiral Turner. Correct.
Mr. Murphy. During this time, from the time you felt that war was
certain, did you have staff meetings of Naval Intelligence, of War
Plans, of the Chief of Naval Operations, consultations and dis-
sions?
Admiral Turner. There was daily a meeting in the Secretary's
office of the heads of the Divisions of the Office of Naval Operations
in which the situation was presented by the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence and general discussion was held.
Mr. Murphy. In all those discussions wasn't there any time, in
this critical period, when there was some discussion of what kind
of material was available to Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Turner. The only times that there was any discussion,
that I know about, was when I, on my own initiative, took the matter
up to inform myself, because that was not within my province to do.
Mr, Murphy. Wasn't it within somebody's province at your staff
meetings to discuss what information was available to the Comman-
der in Chief of the Fleet who was about to be confronted with war,
wasn't that discussed generally back and forth and each one adding
their ideas?
Admiral Turner, Not with respect to the decryption of magic.
That was secret, and properly so.
[6340] Mr. Murphy. It wasn't secret to any man in the room,
because every man in the room was getting it regularly. The Chief
of Naval Operations, head of Naval Intelligence, and you, as head of
War Plans, each one of you had it each day and had had for months
before then.
Why wouldn't you be able to discuss how much of this material,
if any, was going to Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Turner, The Secretary's meetings were held and were
attended by about 25 or 30 officers and civilians. We had no regular
meetings of the heads of the Divisions.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2019
Mr. MuRTHY. You say you never
Admiral Tuknkk. In the oflice of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Mr. Murphy. You say that Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner
and Admiral Wilkinson did not sit down together from time to time
to discuss the progress of events coming up to a war which you felt
was certain, apart from civilians and apart from everyone else?
Admiral Turner. There were man}' occasions when we held con-
ferences, those three, with others that were interested, in the office
of the Chief of Naval Operations. There were many occasions when
I consulted Admiral Wilkinson in his office or he consulted me in
my office or we talked matters over with the Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations.
[5341] Mr. Murphy. Were there ever occasions when Admiral
Stark, Admiral Turner and Admiral Wilkinson were in the same
room discussing the progress of events in the Pacific, and just you
three? If not, why not?
Admiral Turner. I don't recall any particular occasions. I re-
member that there w^ere many times when \\e were called into Admiral
Stark's office and possibly others
Mr. Murphy. Wasn't
Admiral Turner. For discussing some particular aspect of the situa-
tion.
Mr. Murphy. Wasn't there ever a time that you can recall when
the Chief of Naval Operations arid the Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations and Admiral Turner and Admiral Wilkinson were to-
gether discussing the situation in the Pacific?
Admiral Turner. I recall no specific dates.
Mr. Murphy. But do you recall what occurred between September
and December 1941 at any time?
Admiral Turner. I recall no specific dates.
Mr. Murphy. Do you recall any specific meetings?
Admiral Turner'. Not about any specific subject. I know that — I am
quite sure — that during that time there were many occasions when
those officers, plus possibly others, were in Admiral Stark's office
discussing various matters with regard to the situation.
[5342] Mr. Murphy. Well, you asked Admiral Noyes about what
was available to Admiral Kimmel. Did you ask Admiral Wilkinson
what was available to him ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir ; because it was not within Admiral Wilk-
inson's provin9e to supply such material and the decryption and trans-
lation of that material was a matter of Communications, of which
Admiral Noyes had charge.
15343] Mr. Murphy. Did you ever discuss it in Admiral Wilk-
inson's presence ?
Admiral Turner. I don't remember that I did.
Mr. Murphy. Did you ever tell Admiral Stark that Admiral Kim-
mel was getting that information?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, on three occasions he requested me —
asked me^— if Admiral Kimmel was, and I said I would find out, and
I asked Admiral Noyes about it and so reported to Admiral Stark.
Mr. Murphy. You were asked three times about it, and not once
did you ask the Chief of Naval Intelligence what was available to
Admiral Kimmel ?
2020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner, Because he had nothing to do with that particu-
lar matter.
Mr. Murphy. Yet you were friendly ?
Admiral Turner. Entirely.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I come to the next proposition. If you
will go bach to the exhibit which is before you, Admiral, the mem-
orandum
Admiral Turner. I have not fully answered your previous question
concerning this.
Mr. Murphy. No, you did not. I want you to pursue that, yes.
Admiral Turner. Do you wish the rest of the story ?
[So44] Mr. Murphy. Yes.
Admiral Turner. After eliminating those questions about Colonel
Donovan's organization, and the questions about the membership on
the Joint Board, the Joint Planning Committee drafted a report in
which they were agreed, with one exception, and that exception was
that in accordance with previous practice, the Military Intelligence
Department wanted to prepare the enemy estimate of the situation.
I beg your pardon. The agreement was to form a joint intelligence
committee composed of four members from the Army — three members
from the Army — and three members from the Navy intelligence sys-
tems, and have additional civilian personnel and to have separate
office space, near the joint strategic committee, which had office space
in the Navy Department, War Plans Division,
The only point of disagreement was on the preparation of the enemy
estimate of the situation.
In accordance with custom, the War Department felt, that is, in
accordance wdth War Department custom, the War Department mem-
bers of the Joint Planning Committee desired to have the reports of
the Joint Intelligence Committee cover the entire estimate of the
strategic situation in their reports to the Joint Board.
The custom of the Navy had been, and always has been, [6S4'5Ji
that the planning body makes the entire estimate of the situation,
our own estimate, and the enemy's estimate. That still prevails. The
report was delayed possibly 2 weeks while settling that point.
Mr. Murphy. When was the first meeting of the Board?
Admiral Turner. The report
Mr. Murphy, The day after Pearl Harbor, wasn't it?
Admiral Turner. There are one or two minor matters.
Mr. Murphy. All right.
Admiral Turner. The report was sent to the Joint Board on the 10th
of September, 1941, was approved about a week after that — I haven't
the date right here, was approved by the Secretary of War on the 29th
of September, by the Secretary of the Navy on the 10th of October,
and general orders were issued, although that was put into effect im-
mediately, general orders were issued by both the War and Navy
Departments the latter part of November.
There was a very great difficulty about setting up this Joint Intelli-
gence Committee because of the lack of space. Everybody was very
badly crowded. And the committee, or the Director of Naval
Intelligence, took the matter up immediately with the Room Assign-
ments Officer in the Department, but it was not for some considerable
time.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2021
Mr. MuKPHY. They had a meeting, did they not, within [5346]
24 hours after war started ?
Admiral 'J'ukneu. They had some meetings before tliat.
Mr. Murphy. Are you familiar, or can you name the date? Gen-
eral Miles said they had one meeting to organize and then they never
functioned until the war was started.
Admiral Turner. The information that I have is somewhat dif-
ferent from the statement of General Miles. We have no record of any
meeting of the committee attended by General Miles and Admiral
Kirk, or Admiral Wilkinson, because they w^ere not members of the
committee.
There was on October 11, in memorandum No. 1, Record of Initial
Meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee.
Mr. Muiu'iiY. In other words, on October 11, you had a meeting of
the Joint Intelligence Committee from which was excluded the head
of Intelligence of the Army and the head of Intelligence of the Navy?
Admiral Turner. They were not members of the Board. The Joint
Intelligence Committee was not composed of those two officers. Those
two officers appointed their own people without any interference by
anybody else, and they did not appoint themselves as members of that
Joint Intelligence Committee.
They had a meeting, an informal meeting, on October 11, at which
organizational matters were discussed.
[5347] Mr. Murphy. Now, will you give me the date of another
meeting, between October 11 and December 8, 191:1, if there were any?
Admiral Turner. There was some informal action taken, I don't
know whether it was a formal meeting or not ; tliere was a recommen-
dation on October 29 by that committee concerning office space, and
final decision on the initial membership.
On November 6, it reports an action of the acting Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, General Miles appointing his members of the
committee.
Then on November 14, there is further correspondence relating to
the question of office space.
December 3 is the next one. A memorandum for the Joint Intelli-
gence Committee, subject "Agenda for first full meeting." It does not
give the proposed date of that. It gives the agenda.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate the meeting was held after the war
started ?
Admiral Turner. I take that back. On December 3, minutes of the
first formal meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the com-
mittee assembled in room 4548, Munitions Building, at 11 : 30 a. m.,
December 3.
Mr. Murphy. What was that?
[5348] Admiral Turner. The committee assembled in room
4548 Munitions Building at 11 :30 a. m., December 3.
Mr. Murphy. Who was present ?
Admiral Turner. Part-time members: Colonel Hayes A. Kroner,
G. S. C, Chief, Intelligence Branch, M. I. D. (for the Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2).
Captain W. A. Heard, U. S. N., Head, Foreign Branch, ONI (for
the Director of Naval Intelligence) .
The decision was t^at those heads would not devote their full time
to the committee, but only part time.
2022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Present as full-time members were :
Lieutenant Colonel Louis J. Fortier, G. S. C, from M. I. D.
Commander J. H. Foskett, U. S.^N., from ONI.
Lieutenant Commander W. T. Kenny, U. S. N., from ONI.
Major Ludwell L. Montague, Cavalry, from M. I. D.
It was noted that a third full-time Army member, Lieutenant Colonel Vincent
J. aieloy, G. S. C, designated by the Chief of the Army Air Forces had not yet
arrived in Washington for this duty.
Mr. Murphy. Will you state what business was transacted at that
meeting, if any?
Admiral Turner. Colonel Kroner was recognized as Chairman of
the committee, and Captain Heard as vice chairman.
Mr, IMuRPHY. Will you state, in substance, without [oS49^
burdening the record, if you can state in substance, what did occur.
Admiral Turner. It was decided to organize the committee into a
Secretariat and four geographical sections, and there was a decision
that this subdivision was for internal convenience only; the committee
would act as a unit; assignment of officers to those sections; discussion
of space assignments ; establishment of the Secretariat in the War De-
partment, pending acquisition of space in the Navy Department.
Mr. Murphy. You say they did have space then ?
Admiral Turner. Assignment of the Secretariat in a room in the
War Department until they had ample space.
There were several trial runs of a daily summary of military intel-
ligence, that matter was considered.
All formalities necessary to the establishment of vacancies for the
planned civilian personnel had been completed.
Mr. IMuRPHY, Well, at any rate, on December 8, they met and did
some business, didn't they ?
Admiral Turner, I have no record here — oh, yes. Here is a para-
graph :
The Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee was not fully activated until
9 December 1941 because, until that date, the Head Foreign Branch, ONI, vras
unable to obtain " [5350] agreement within the Navy Department as to the
office space to be provided. Except for this difficulty, the .Joint Army-Navy Intel-
ligence Committee might have been activated by 1 November 1941.
That is a statement by the former Secretary of the Joint Armv-Navy
Intelligence Committee, Colonel Ludwill Montague, dated 21 Novem-
ber 1945,
;Mr, Murphy, Now, Admiral, if you will come back with me for one
more question to the memorandum to the President of November 5,
1941, and referring to page 4 of that memorandum — do you have it?
Admiral Turner, I have it,
Mr. Murphy. Paragraph B, reading as follows :
War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building
up defensive forces in "^lie Far East until such time as Japan attacks or directly
threatens territory whose security to the United States is of very great impor-
tance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or
more of the following contingencies.
Did you also disagree with that portion of the memorandum to the
extent that you felt war could not be avoided and that it was certain?
Admiral Titrxer. I didn't agree with that at all.
[Sool] Mr. IMurphy: Now, then. I direct^ your attention to a
paper which was presented by you at the convening time at 2 o'clock.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2023
Congressman Cooper questioned yon this morning ns to whether or
not there had been received a report from Admiral Kimmel, and as
1 understand it that paper — which I think shoukl be marked as an
exhibit — is the rei)ort from Admiral Kimmel, immediately after
December 7, or on December 8, lOll ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I saw this at the time. I have not
read it today.
Mr, Murphy. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that that should be spread
on the record at this point.
The Vice Ciiairimax. Suppose we have the Admiral read it now.
Mr. MuRriiT. Will you read it please, Admiral ?
Admiral Turner. From CINCPAC, Action, to OPNAV, priority,
dated December 8, 1941, No. 080450 [reading] :
In spite of security measures which were in effect surprise attack by Japanese
bombing and torpedo planes damaged all battleships except Manjlaud. Damage
to Tennessee and Pennsylvania was moderate. Arizona a total wreck. West
Virginia resting on bottom. Still Burning Oklahoma capsized. Honolulu. Ilel-
ena, Raleigh damaged and unfit for sea. Vestal [-5352] damaged and
beached. Curtiss moderately damaged. Desti-oyers Shaic, Cassin, Dnicnes in
drydock complete wrecks. As result of attack army airplane losses severe.
There remain thirteen Baker Seventeen, nine Baker Eighteen, and about twenty
pursuit planes. Approximately ten patrol planes remain available. Oahu,
one patrol squudrou at Midway. Recommend all available army bombers be
sent to Oahu. Fire was opened promptly by all ships and number of enemy
aircraft were destroyed. One enemy submarine was sunk. Possibly two more.
Two carrier.s, seven heavy cruisers, three squadrons destroyers and all avail-
able planes search for c,nemy. Personnel behavior magnificient in face of
furious surprise attack. Personnel ca.sualties believed to be heavy in OJdahonia
and Arizona.
The Vice Cn.MmrAN. Was that report from Admiral Kimmel to
Admiral Stark?
Admiral Turner. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairiman. On December 8, 1941?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Turner, as I tmderstand your testimony, you^
felt that inasmuch as there had been a message sent out on November
27 to tJie effect that "this is a war warning" that Admiral Kimmel was
told to prepare a defensive deployment, you felt there should be no
more [5353] warnings, or additions sent to that, because that
was sufficient?
Admiral Turner. I would like to say that that dispatch, neither
that dispatch nor any other single dispatch concerning the military
situation, certainly back as far as the one of October 16, should be
considered alone.
Beginning October 16, that was the time of the fall of the Third
Kono.ye Cabinet, a series of dispatches relating to the war or the
pending war were sent. They included the one of the 24th. They
included several others that went out. They also included the matter
aboait the codes.
Looking at the matter as a whole, as Admiral Stark and Admiral
Ingersoll and I did on December 5, we felt that they were adequate
to give all necessary directions to the Commander in Chief of the
Pacific Fleet.
Mv. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to page 64 of the United
States News. Do you have a copy of that available ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
2024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. MuRPiiY. I read from that the following from the Navy Board
of Inquiry :
The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge
that an attack vpas to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans
were drawn with 15354] this as a premise.
Is that true ?
Admiral Turner. It is true that the plans Avere drawn with that
as a premise.
Mr. Murphy. Well, if that is so, and you sent your message of
the 27tli, wouldn't it be important if you could supplement your mes-
sage of the 2Tth with an additional memorandum which wo'uld narrow
the time limit and give some indication of the immediacy of the attack?
Admiral Turner. That was done with the dispatches concerning
the destruction of Japanese codes.
Mr. MuRPHT. The 1 o'clock message was also important?
Admiral Turner. Very.
Mr. Murphy. Why was there a reluctance in the Navy Department
to send word about that?
Admiral Turner. I don't think there was — oh, you mean Admiral
Stark's first decision not to send it and then his change. Why, he told
me that he had told General Marshall that he felt nothing further
was necessary.
Mr. Murphy. But if this is true, that they wanted to have it down
within narrow limits, the 1 o'clock message is in the Navy Depart-
ment several hours before General Marshall sees it, wdiy didn't someone
in the Navy Department send it to Admiral Kimmel?
[5oSS] Admiral Turner. I didn't know it was in the Navy
Department several hours. As I recall Admiral Wilkinson's testi-
mony, he showed it to Admiral Stark about 11 : 15. That is my recol-
lection.
Mr. Murphy. I don't think so.
Admiral Turner. The 1 o'clock message?
Mr. Murphy. The 1 o'clock message was translated and available
for distribution about 9 : 30. I don't want to misspeak. What is the
correct time ?
Mr. Gesell. My recollection of Admiral Wilkinson's testimony is
that at 9 : 30 he showed the 14th part and about 10 : 30 the 1 o'clock
message.
]\Ir. Murphy. But it was available for distribution long before that.
Mr. Gesell. As to 10 : 30 he is not clear as to whether he took the
1 o'clock message to Admiral Stark, or whether Admiral Stark had
it earlier. I believe that is his testimony.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, Admiral, you were the Head of War
Plans. You felt from July that war was certain, on the night of the
6th you have 13 parts and it is apparent that another part is coming,
or it is apparent that more is coming, yet you didn't arrive at your
office until about 11 : 30 that morning?
[SoSO] Admiral Turner. Eleven-fifteen.
Mr. Murphy. You would have been the person to prepare the addi-
tional message in order to give notice of the exact time to Admiral
Kimmel, wouldn't you ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. That message did not change the situa-
tion in the least degree. It was a matter of information as to the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2025
time, and it was not my business to send that dispatch out. I consider
that that was entirely the province of the oflice of Naval Intelligence,
to send out information.
It was no evaluation whatsoever. My oflice never sent out informa-
tion.
Mr. Murphy. Well
Admiral Turner. Except in connection with operations.
Mr. Murphy. Well, who was it that sent out about the codes?
Admiral Turner. That was sent out by Communications. One of
them was sent out by communications, one by Oflice of Naval Intelli-
gence. I have photostat copies of those here.
Mr. Murphy. Page 40 says "From OPNAV." Who would that be ?
Admiral TI'Rner." The photostatic copy says it originated by OP-16,
F-2, from OPNAV, released by TS. Wilkinson's [5367] sig-
nature isn't there.
Admiral IngersoU's initial is. And they get — OP IG, which is
Admiral Wilkinson, gets back the original.
Mr. Murphy. Would that have to go over your desk before it could
be sent ?
Admiral Turner. That has a note, it hasn't my initials, but it says
"OP-12 has seen."
Mr. Murphy. Didn't that have to go over your desk before it could
be sent ?
Admiral Turner. It did not have to, no, sir.
Mr. Murphy. What about the one on page 41 ?
Admiral Turner. The one on page 41 was released by J. R. Redman,,
who was the assistant to the Director of Naval Communications.
Mr. Murphy. Did that go over your desk ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; it did not. It was not necessary.
Mr. Murphy. Now, you say that the fourteen-part message would
not be your particular function to handle, and yet I see on page 64 :
The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that
an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were
drawn with this as a premise.
[5358] Would not that tend to indicate that the time was getting
short, the fact that they had severed relations and particularly in view
of the fourteenth part of the message ?
[6.369] Admiral Turner. Those plans referred to were local
plans drawn up in Hawaii with respect to the reconnaissance solely of
airplanes, not with resp'ect to anything else. The other plans which
were drawn by the Commander in Chief and by the Commander of the
Fourteenth Naval District did not have to have any such affair. In
addition to that, the security order, as I recall it, of the Commander
in Chief did have a certain air condition where additional reconnais-
sance was to be made without respect to the war plans.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you were familiar, were you not, with the Mar-
tin-Bellinger report ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And that was the report that would require — the
plans under that report would require time in order to figure out as
closely as possible when the attack would occur, isn't that right ?
Admiral Turner. I did not agree particularly with that. That was
unnecessary. Since that time and before that time, as a matter of
2026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fact, we have maintained reconnaissance with that types of planes for
months on end.
Mr. Murphy. It is a fact, sir, is it not, Admiral, that if you have so
many planes that you can use in the air and you might have to use
them, and you gave out a warning on October 16 and another warning
on November 24 and an- [5360] other warning of November
27, that it would have been of great assistance to the Admiral in control
of the Pacific to have something that would point to a certain time or
to an approaching time so that he could accelerate his reconnaissance
and do whatever he thought necessary under the circumstances, isn't
that so?
Admiral Tueis^er. There was only one war warning and that was
on the 27th of November. Of course, it would have been highly de-
sirable for the Commander in Chief to have known exactly when the
attack was coming and he certainly should have had at least a sum-
mary of the first thirteen parts and also the fourteenth part and have
known about the other matter. Remember that from my standpoint
I was under the impression that he was getting that.
ISIr. Murphy. At any rate, if there was anybody to send it out in
Washington it was not your department, is that right?
Admiral Turner. It was not my department. That was infor-
mation.
Mr. Murphy. All right. Now, Admiral, I direct your attention to
page 65 of the United States News, the report of the Naval Court of
Inquiry, column 2, and right at the end of Section 12 I read the fol-
lowing :
The attack of 7 December 1941, on Pearl Harbor [5S61] delivered under
the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take place
was unpredictable.
Do you agree with that?
Admiral Turner. I agree with the first sentence. In think the exact
date possibly was unpredictable, although after we got the 1 o'clock
message it looked like that day.
Mr. Murphy. Well, do you agi'ee that the attack was unpreventable
and rest on that statement? I understood you to say that while it was
not preventable, that is, to prevent it entirely, that if some things were
done it would have been considerably mitigated in its effect.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, that is correct, but I believe that I also
said that an attack of that nature is most difficult to stop entirely.
INIr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to page 67, section 15
[reading] :
The greatest damage to ships resulting from the attack of 7 December was that
inflicted bj' torpedoes launched from Japanese torpedo planes.
Whose function was it in Washington to keep Admiral Kimmel
informed as to the progress made with torpedo planes in the European
war?
Admiral Turner. The Office of Naval Intelligence would [6362]
provide him, and I tliink did, with such information, technical in-
formation as they could obtain with regard to the use of torpedoes.
A great deal was sent out on that. I think also the Bureau of Ord-
nance sent out Ordnance bulletins from time to time giving the latest
information they had on that.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2027
Mr. Murphy. Well, if the situation was sucli at Hawaii that they
were proceeding on the theory that torpedo planes would not be
particularly effective because of the shallowness of the water and
if they were going on that premise, would the War Plans have some-
thing to do with changing the situation so that they would be ready
for torpedo planes in shallow water ?
Admiral Turner. Nothing whatsoever. We had nothing to do with
material, except from an advisory viewpoint.
Mr. Murphy. I am talking about
Admiral Turner. That matter was under the Bureau of Ordnance.
Mr. Murphy. But I am not talking about the supplying of them.
I am talking about the effectiveness and the kind of a defense to have
to meet it. Wouldn't that be War Plans ? ^
Admiral Turner. Oh, yes. That was initiated by War Plans in a
letter of January 24, 1941 and in memoranda and consultations with
the Naval Districts Division which had all defenses, water defenses
and fixed defenses, under [Sods'] their cognizance which were
in the districts.
ISIr. Murphy. Well, you think then that War Plans did all it should
in order to apprise Admiral Kimmel as to the danger from that kind
of attack?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. This Naval Districts Division took the
matter up and there was correspondence with the Commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District concerning the use of nets and barriers and
also sending them information on two occasions regarding the prob-
able effectiveness of torpedoes in water of the depths in Pearl Harbor.
Mr. MuTRPHY. As I understand it. Admiral, the position of the ships
at Pearl Harbor on December 7 was as a result of an order of Admiral
Kimmel dated in September of 1941. AVas there ever any order out
of Washington by anybody in authority which changed the order of
September 1941 of Aclmiral Kimmel's?
Admiral Tukner. The order of September 21, if that is it, had three
conditions. It had an enclosure (b) which on the date of September
21 gave the conditions that would be effective until further orders. In
case of worse conditions expected it was the intention, which is evident
from reading the order, to change those conditions and put other con-
ditions into effect that would deal with the worse situation. That was
Admiral Kimmel's order.
[S364-] Mr. Murphy. Did anyone in Washington ever advise or
command, either one, Admiral Kimmel to change his order of Sep-
tember 1941 ?
Admiral Turner. No. Under the conditions that would exist up to
the time of sending out the dispatch of 27 November that situation
covered — the conditions prescribed by that order were entirely
adequate.
Mr. Murphy. But tlie defensive order in the message of the 27th
was stilj within the discretion of Admiral Kimmel as to what particu-
lar defensive deployment there should be, isn't that right?
Admiral Turner. Entirely; entirely so.
Mr. Murphy. Now, was there ever any order from anyone in Wash-
ington that necessitated having more ships in Pearl Harbor on Decem-
ber 7 than were the direct result of the orders of Admiral IGmmel
himself?
Admiral Turner. Not that I know of.
2028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. MuRPiiY. Now, there is one thing that concerns me a little bit,
Admiral. In your message of the 27th it states :
Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL 46.
As I understand it, WPL 46 itself would not come into effect until
there was an order from Washington to put it into effect, is that
right?
[536S] Admiral Turnj:r. That is correct, modified by the under-
stood condition of all military forces at all times, in all circumstances,
to defend themselves if attacked.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, under section 0211, under the heading,
"Execution of the entire plan," I see the following :
(a) Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV dispatch the naval establish-
ment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts
of war. "Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5."
(b) The date on the above dispatch will be M-day unless it has been other
wise designated.
Do I understand that in the event of an attack such as had occurred,
there would be no necessity whatever for the message from Washing-
ton to execute Rainbow 5 ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. We sent out such a dispatch very
shortly after we got the news of the attack but that did not affect the
prior defense matter.
Mr. Murphy. Now, there has been some discussion about whose par-
ticular duty it was to estimate enemy action and I find some conflict
in the record on that point. I would like to direct your attention to
the testimony of Captain Glover on page 11 of volume 1 of the Narra-
tive Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigation.
[■5366'] Captain Glover was assigned at that time, was he not,^
to War Plans Division?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I notice that he says on page 12, and I am now quot-
ing from testimony by Captain Glover before Admiral Hart in the
Hart hearings at page 174, under the heading (c) :
The continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice may be
given in regard to the composition and distribution of forces, operations, and other
matters in relation to the execution of the plan.
Do you find that? That is under subheading (c).
Admiral Turner. I see it, yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, as I understand it. Captain Glover's impression:
was that that was his job and his dut3^ Was that your impression?
Admiral Turner. Yes, that was his duty.
INIr. Murphy. Well, in other words, your Department had to make
continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice may be
given in regard to the composition and distribution of forces, opera-
tions, and other matters in relation to the execution of the plan?
Admiral Turner. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Well, did you give information from Novem-
[5367] ber 27 to December 7, 1941 as to the composition and dis-
tribution of forces? I assume that would be enemy forces, wouldn't
it?
Admiral Turner. No, that is in regard to the composition and dis-
tribution of our forces. That is what that means. I assume that is
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2029
what he means. Those are his words, the composition and distribu-
tion of our forces, boat operations and other matters in relation to
our execution of the plan.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I will p^o into that further in connection with
the testimony before Admiral Hart. My impression is, however, that
he is referring to enemy forces.
Now, then, I see on page 12 under subhead 4 Captain Glover states,
and this was before Admiral Hart, page 176 :
Referring again to the order of August 21, 1941, signed by the head of the Plans
Section, War Plans Division, one paragraph of this order designated Commander
Ansel, in collaboration with Captain Wright, to draft daily and submit to the
Director (Admiral Turner) a short strategic summary of the international
military and political situation. Commander Ansel, in preparing these sum-
maries, had made available to him dispatches of Military Intelligence Division,
Naval Intelligence Division, the State Department, and the press.
And I am wondering if we have available those dailj^ estimates
[53681 which would cover your feeling that it was a 50-50 propo-
sition and that war was certain ; I mean if there was anything like that.
Admiral Turner. I do not know. Tho^e were Commander Ansel's
estimates. I do not know whether they were saved or not. They
were drawn up and circulated within the division. I do not know
who else had copies. There might still be copies in the War Division
files.
Mr. Murphy. Well, at a time of crisis like this daily estimates of
that kind would be highly important papers to keep, would they not ?
Admiral Turner. I have no doubt they were kept ; they were filed,
I think, probably ; I am not sure, I wouldn't say.
Mr. Murphy. Well, counsel, will you make those papers available,
or try to make those papers available? ^
Now, you have said that Captain McCollum came to you with a
proposed message which he felt should be sent out to the forces in
the Pacific and you said that the language of Captain McCollum's
report was substantially in the same hmguage as the one that had
gone out and you said that you did not find any particular — you said,
"No, I did not ask him not to send it."
If Captain McCollum's message was in substantially the same lan-
guage as the one that you had sent on the 27th wouldn't [SS69]
he be infringing on your department and wouldn't you tell him not to
send it if it was in effect an operational order?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. In the first place, in my testimony I said
that it covered the same ground but the language was not considered
as firm and specific as the language in the dispatches of November 24
and 27! By no means would I have told him not to send it. As I
have testified before, when the Office Of Naval Intelligence wanted to
send out material even if it included strategic estimates and they cleared
the matter with me and I felt it ought to go out, I would certainly
approve sending it out. The decision not to send it was made entirely
by Captain McCollum.
Mr. Murphy. Now, as I understand it, on Sunday morning, De-
cember the 7th, despite the fact that the 14 parts of the message
were in and despite the fact that the 1 o'clock message was in, you
received no word at your office and no word at your home that they
were available?
* Copies of the estimates were subsequently furnished to Representative Murphy. See
Hearings, Part 10, pp. 5133-5134.
2030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner. I did not. As I recall it, I saw the pouch with
them in during the middle of the afternoon. The first I saw of the
1 o'clock message was, as I recall it, when I went to Admiral Stark's
ofiice the second time about 12 o'clock. He did not show it to me when
I got into his office the first time at 11 : 15, 1 am quite sure.
Mr. MuKPHY. Wouldn't that 1 o'clock message be im- [5370']
portant to you in connection with this paragraph, page 64 again of the
United States News :
The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that
an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were
drawn with this premise.
That would be important, that 1 o'clock message, wouldn't it?
Admiral Turner. That 1 o'clock message would have been exceed-
ingly important and when I saw it I asked Admiral Stark wdiat had
been done about it and he said that General Marshall was sending a dis-
patch out to tlie Army and was telling the Navy what had happened.
Mr. Murphy. Did you inquire in j^our Department as head of War
Plans from those in the several departments as to why that had not been
delivered to you before the time that it was ?
Admiral Turner. No, I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Well, it was important and it would have been a big
help in Hawaii, would it not ?
Admiral Turner. It would not have been delivered to me much in
advance — or it would not have been delivered to me in advance of the
time Admiral Stark got it. It was customary for them to start with
him and then go to Admiral Inger- [SS?!] soil. I was in my
office from about 11 : 15 until 12 or possibly 12 : 15 and so far as I can
recall no dispatch came in my office during that time.
Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, then, the Navy had a 1 o'clock
deadline, they had seven copies of the message and even with the 1
o'clock deadline the Navy went step by step over the same routine as
they would day after day before that instead of making it available to
eacii one of you as quickly as possible, is that right ?
Admiral Turner. I did not see the dispatch until it was shown to
me by Admiral Stark.
Mr. Murphy. Now, I understood you to say that you spent an hour
with Admiral Ingersoll discussing messages, discussing the message of
the 27th of November and you spent 15 minutes with Admiral Stark
discussing the message and you also say that it was the duty of the
Naval Intelligence to send out any additional information. Did you
discuss the message with Admiral Wilkinson and whether or not some-
thing in addition should be sent out?
Admiral Turner. My statement was that we discussed the whole
situation, reviewed all the messages relating directly to it and can-
vassed to see whether or not we should send anything else out to the
Commander in Chief that would help them in the present situation.
[5372'] Mr. Murphy. Did you. Admiral, have Admiral Wilkin-
son present at any of those discussions ?
Admiral Turner. I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Why?
Admiral Turner. I went to talk to my superior and he did not send
for Admiral Wilkinson.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2031
Mr. Murphy. Well, was Admiral Wilkinson consulted by anybody
that you know on the sufficiency of the message of November 27 ?
Admiral Turner. Not by me,
Mr. JMuRriiY. Do you have any reason that you can give the com-
mittee why Admiral Wilkinson, the head of Naval Intelligence, was
not called into those discussions if it was his duty to send out the infor-
mation, if any was available?
Admiral Turner. This was a matter which related to the major
strategic situation. I do not know why he was not consulted during
the two days that was under discussion. I do not know why I did
not consult him. It was initiated with a discussion between — well, at
different times the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief,
Captain Schuirmann and myself.
Mr. Murphy. My last question is this : Did you at any time during
the week of December preceding Pearl Harbor have a meeting at which
time you and Admiral Wilkinson discussed \_SS7S\ the situa-
tion in the Pacific?
Admiral Turner. I saw Admiral Wilkinson several times and dis-
cussed the situation in the Pacific with him. As I testified, he told
me on December 6 that he considered my report and that Japan was
not going to attack the United States.
Mr. Murphy. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.
[SS74] The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster of Maine will
inquire, Admiral.
Senator Brew^ster. Admiral, in connection with the point about
overt act, I was interested in your commentary about that. I found
in the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, headed by Admiral
Murphy and Admiral Andrews, this statement, on which I would like
your comment, at the bottom of page 64, referring to Admiral Kimmel :
Therefore, he had issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified
submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters were to be depth-charged and sunk.
In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and ran the risk of
committing an overt act against Japan, but did so feeling that it is best to follow
the rule "shoot first and explain afterwards."
That seemed to me to be somewhat in conflict with your idea that
he was not ordered not to do such a thing. What is correct on that ?
Admiral Turner. He was never — pardon me. Let me consult the
dispatch of November 24.
Senator Bre waster. Yes.
Admiral Turner. He was never ordered, so far as I know, not to
commit an overt act, and I am glad this point came up because that
may be the key to the reason he was not. The [S37S] fleet
was operating around in that area and for IG or 17 months we had
been operating under an order very similar to that one of the 21st of
September. That was the second revision. The first had been issued
about June of 1940 by Admiral Richardson, and we were taking the
precautions — with the purpose of taking precautions — against some
irresponsible Japanese in a submarine around our areas.
Now at a number of times during that 16 months they thought they
had detected submarines and investigated, but could not find them.
So that a few days before Pearl Harbor, why, this order was issued,
and the Chief of Naval Operations was informed, and I knew it.
2032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Bkewster. Now, Admiral, if you will confine yourself right
to it, that is a statement of the Naval Board, that in so doing he ex-
ceeded his orders from higher authority.
As I understand you, you do not agree that that statement is correct.
Admiral Turner. There were no orders from higher authority
whatsoever to Admiral Kimmel not to commit an overt act.
Senator Brewster. And you know of no basis for that statement
of the Court?
Admiral Turner. Other than a possible confusion with the Army
dispatch.
Senator Brewster. All right. Now on the matter of the [5376]
estimate in Washington, on page 72, the first column,
It is quite clear from the evidence that the i-esponsible officials of the Navy
Department had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to
mean that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian
area, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Philippines, and British
and Dutch possessions in the Far East.
Now I had not supposed there was any question that you were a
responsible official at that time in the Navy Department. You would
come under that category, would you ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I was Staff Officer to the Chief of
Naval Operations.
Senator Brewster. You would not agree with that statement.
That was the statement of the Judge Advocate General T. L. Gatch.
Admiral Turner. I do not agree with that.
Senator Brewster. Now they go on, and I quote again :
Those witnesses who, on 7 December 1941, held positions in the Navy Depart-
ment which qualified them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing opinion
there just prior to the attack, are all In substantial accord that the Chief of
Naval Operations and his assistants had not deduced or inferred that an attack
in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the consensus in
the Navy Department was that [5iJ77] any attack would probably come
in the Far East, and the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was given
ft comparatively low probability rating.
As I understand it, you would not agree with that.
Admiral Turner. No. There were a good many officers who felt
that the attack was coming, and that there was a good possibility that
Pearl Harbor would be involved. However, there were a great many
officers here in the Department that did not think so, did not even
think there was going to be war.
Senator Brewster. Could you name any of the responsible officers
who agreed with you at that time in your estimate ?
Admiral Turner. I cannot remember any of the senior officers that
made a definite statement that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked.
There were not too many of them that had the information that was
held by the Chief of Naval Operations.
I believe that Admiral Stark thought there was a good possibility,
and I believe that Admiral Ingersoll did. I think that Admiral
Towers was of the opinion that an attack on Pearl Harbor was a good
possibility.
Senator Brewster. I think that covers it, Admiral.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2033
Senator Brewster. He goes on witli the further statement, and I
quote again :
[5.378] Those witnesses who stated that the information available to the
Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference aiid deduction, that an attack
on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who were not on duty in the Navy
Department at that time, or occupied subordinate positions.
That, too, you would not think was a warranted statement?
Admiral Turner. No, it was not Avarranted, Senator, as far as I was
concerned, and these otlier officers. There were subordinate officers
that considered the attack was probable.
Senator Brewster. Now I quote this opinion of an Army officer, a
General at the time, and I ask your comment on it. He is referring to
these various intercepts, and he says this:
The sequence of messages referred to, had tliey been known to a competent
intelligence officer, with battle order and tactical background, beginning with
November 14, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion, that Pearl
Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25 or Novem-
ber 29 as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was involved,
for some sort of naval seaborne sortie.
Wliat would be your comment on that expression of opinion?
Admiral Turker. I l)elieve if those dispatches had been adequately
analyzed that his conclusion is correct.
[SS79] Senator Brewster. Now, about the matter of the defense
of the island. I understand you to say with the facilities there they
could have done a much better job than they did. I guess that is about
the way you put it.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. What would you saj' as to the contention which
I find running tlirough these reports, that while it was quite correct
that they had enougli facilities there to have possibly detected this ap-
proach of carriers, if they knew within narrow limits of time it was
coming, that they had a warning as far back as October 24, they had
an alert there, the Army had, a year earlier, there were a good many
communications along this line, there were several warnings that they
did not have the air reconnaissance facilities to maintain at all con-
tinuous control day by day?
They had the primary responsibility of having the fleet ready to
function ?
I call your attention to what Admiral Kimmel said in his letter
to Admiral Stark on page 69, which perhaps puts it as well as it can
be put, on this point, although it is referred to several times, where
Admiral Kimmel is seeking much fuJler information about what is
going on, and he said he needed this information in order to estimate,
and he said.
This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific \5.iS0] situation
where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained fleet must be
carefully balnnced against the desirability of interruption of this ti'aining by
strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities.
As I understand, in commenting on that, very serious weiglit was
attached to that position of Admiral Kimmel, in view of this warning,
and t1\e question of whether or not he exercised proper judgment in
deciding that he would not allocate the reconnaissance planes which he
had available for aerial patrol.
What is your view as to balancing those two responsibilities?
79716— 46— pt. 4 30
2034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner. I do not consider the dispatch of October 16 —
you said October 24. I think you are referring to the one about the
fall of the cabinet, and to take proper deployment measures.
Senator Brewster. I think there was a letter of Admiral Stark on
the 24t]i. Perhaps that was what I was confused with.
Mr. Murphy. Translated on the 23d.
Senator Brewster. What is that?
Mr. Murphy. Translated on the 23rd.
Admiral Turner. The first dispatch of that series [5381]
that is the fall of the Konoye Cabinet was dated on October 16.
Neither that, in my opinion, nor the dispatch of November 24 re-
quired any immediate action of a tactical nature in general.
The one of October 16 was to get his forces put out in the islands,
and so on. It was only the war warning of the 27th.
Now as regards an effective patrol, he had 82 planes, I believe, some
of which, of course, were under overhaul. Over a long period of
time, under more severe conditions than he had there in Pearl Harbor
or Kaneohe, I operated patrol planes directly against the enemy, from
the open sea, sheltered, and have been able to get up daily from
between one-third and one-fourth of the planes. That is as good as
you can do.
Now I say he could have, from the 27th on, could have had in the
air for an all-day flight, at least one-fourth of the planes and con-
tinued on indefinitely for months.
Senator Brewster. Yes. Now how much of a sector could that have
covered ?
Admiral Turner. Assuming that he would have available 60 planes,
that would be 15 planes which, 50 miles apart, would cover a front at
the north 750 miles long.
Senator Brewster. At a 700-mile quadrant, how many degrees
would that cover ?
[S3S2] Admiral Turner. I do not know. You take the length
of the arc.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Turner. 50 miles apart — and you could have them a little
farther apart — 50 miles apart with 15 planes in the air is a total arc
750 miles in length.
Senator Brewster. Yes, but that is not the way they conduct it, is
it? Don't they have each plane go out from the base and they cover
so many degrees of the arc ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct. I will have to do a little figuring.
Senator Brewster. Was not it about 4° to the 700-mile limit that
they covered ? Are you familiar with the August 24 report of Admiral
Bellinger?
Admiral Turner. I saw it. I never had a copy of it.
Mr. MrrciiEiL. That is Exhi])it 13. Do you want to look at it?
Admiral Turner. That is roughly pretty closely 60° of arc, is a
700-mile radius for 15 planes.
Senator Brewster. That is 4°.
Admiral Turner. 700 miles.
Senator BpvEwster, That is a 700-mile radius. Admiral Richardson
had considered the southwest sector the most dangerous, and he con-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2035
ducted his patrol in that area. That [S383] was, I take it, the
Mandated Ishmds.
Admiral Turner. Southwest?
Senator Brkwster. Soutliwest; yes.
Admiral Turner. Well, there was a different situation then, than
there was under Admiral Kimmel, because when I was originally
there the naval air stations at Johnston Island and at Midway were
not activated.
Now a smaller number of planes at those radii, you see, could cover
a far greater arc. I always considered, and have expressed at various
times, much the more dangerous sector was directly to the north \Vhere
there were no outlying islands.
Senator Brewster. Then your estimate would have been, if you
could only patrol a certain area, you would have gone into the north-
western sector, north and northwest, covering 60°, with possibly a
variation from day to day ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and I would have taken some of those
planes — probably not covered the 60° — I would have taken a few of
those planes and sent them to Midway and possibly Johnston Island,
possibly some at Palmyra, although I doubt it.
Senator Brewster. On the Winds message, I wanted to clear up a
little of your testimony from your former statement.
At that time you said in your examination. Admiral Turner, if I
may quote from the questions which were asked [5284-^ you on
page 1006 :
In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes as to the receipt
of the execute signal of the Winds code system, was it your understanding it
referred to United States-Japanese relations?
Your answer at that time was, "Yes".
As I understand now, you feel you got it somewhat clearer.
Admiral Turner. Was that before the Navy Court of Inquiry,
Senator?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Turner, That is correct, because, up until the time I re-
turned to San Francisco about 2 months ago, I thought the entire thing
in that Wind message was authentic and that they had merely made
a mistake about that "North Wind so-and-so".
On talking to some of the officers who had gone into it in San
Francisco, why, they said it had been found out later that that was
a false broadcast picked out of the ordinary news, but it was news to
me at that time.
Senator Brewster. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire.
Mr. Gesell. May I interpose a moment, Mr. Chairman ?
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. A question* was raised by Senator Brewster having
[5285] to do with the submarines being bombed by Admiral
Kimmel, and I wanted to call attention to a letter of Admiral Stark
to Admiral Kimmel which appears in that folder of correspondence
dated September 23, 1941, in which Admiral Stark states, among
other things, "The existing orders were not to bomb suspected sub-
marines except in the defense of sea areas."
2036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I thought perhaps those were the orders you referred to, that he
subsequently viohited. I believe you will find in Admiral Kimmel's
letter, or Admiral Kimmel's correspondence, a letter to Admiral
Stark saying he had decided to bomb.
I just wanted to call attention to that. I do not know what the
significance of it is.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Turner, when I heard you state that you
believed the conflict, with Japan was inevitable and that you had
believed it for a long time, I said to myself, "Spoken like a true
Calif ornian." It is because that belief has been shared for many years
in the West that nearly all of us are big Navy men and efficient Army
advocates. That is why I voted for more money for national defense
ever since I have been in Congress, when the President asked for it.
While you believed that war was inevitable for a great many years,
our relations with Japan began to deteriorate rapidly about the mid-
dle of 1941, is that not correct ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. They had been deteriorating [53861
ever since Matsuoka came in there and had the Axis enter the Tri-
partite Pact. Beginning in the middle of 1941 it went down much
more rapidly. •
Mr. Gearhart. And because it was apparent from the information
that you were receiving that there was an increasing rapidity in that
deterioration you began to give closer attention to the activities of the
Japanese and to the intercept messages that were coming over your
desk?
Admiral Turner. Yes. We put in an organization in War Plans
that would follow the affairs much more closely than they had before.
I personally continued to follow them in about the same way as I
previously had.
Mr. Gearhart. When you began to see messages like this one that
appears on page 100 of Exhibit 1, reading, "Because of various cir-
cumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the
signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month,"
when the idea of the deadline began to appear over and over again
in the dispatches that were being intercepted, you began to think there
was some probability of imminent action by the Japanese, did you not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And that was further intensified when you received
the message, which is reported on pages 137 and [5S87] 138 of
the same exhibit, containing this phrase, "I set the deadline for the
solution of these negotiations in my No. 736, and there will be no
change." That, too, had its effect upon your mind ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Then when the message came through that is re-
corded on page 105 of the same exhibit containing this phrase, "This
time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed.
After that things are automatically going to happen," that further had
an effect upon your mind ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; I saw those.
Mr. Gearhart. With respect to the imminency of war?
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. Then I find one occurring at page 173 of the same
exhibit, reading as follows, "That time limit set in my message No.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2037
812 is in Tokyo time," that and all the other messages I have just ad-
verted to served to impress upon your mind that the Japs, for one
reason or another, were determined upon a course which was going
to go one way or another depending upon what happened in their rela-
tions with the United States?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; that is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. Now you knew from those messages, you knew from
conferences in regard to negotiations between the [5388] Jap-
anese and the Americans, the outcome of which the Japs hoped would
be an agreement which would be acceptable to them, you linew about
that, did you?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you hear about the offer of an agreement which
the Japanese made to our Government on the 20th of November, 1941,
and which appears in Foreign Relations, volume II, at page 755 ?
Admiral Turner. Yes. x es ; I knew that they had made an offer.
I have forgotten whether I had seen it in these intercepts or I saw a
draft which was brought back from the State Department by Captain
Schuirmann, but sometime about that time I saw this offer, which I
felt would certainly never be accepted by the United States.
Mr. Gearhart. That is the message wiiich Mr. Hull in his testi-
many has referred to as an ultimatum by the Japanese to the United
States. You recall that, don't you ?
Admiral Turner. I do not recall that he had referred to it as an
ultimatum, but I recall having seen the message. I do not recall all
the terms of it at the moment.
Mr. Gearhart. In view of the fact that the acceptance of the Jap-
anese tender of agreement would have required the United States to
have scrapped the so-called Nine Power Treaty and torn up the Kel-
logg Peace Pact, abandoned the John Hay [535.9] Open-Door
Policy, the very fact that it would have been necessary for the United
States to have done those things made the acceptance of their agree-
ment utterly impossible, unless we were willing to abandon all the
principles for which we had stood for years and years; is that not
correct ?
Admiral Turner. I believed so.
Mr. Gearhart. In other words, the acceptance of the Japanese
program would have been a complete humiliation to the United States,
would it not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now with the Japanese deadline messages and
agreements in mind, what was the reaction within your mind when
you heard of this tender of agreement by the Japanese, in the light
of all of these deadlines ?
Admiral Turner. Well, I though the deadline meant definitely
war. that we were going to be attacked by Japan either on that date
or within a very short time after that.
Mr. Gearhart. But the problem which you had, a problem which
was shared by the Army, was one of gaining time, is that not correct?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. Our defenses were beginning to come
in. The Army was beginning to get some things, some troops. If we
could put it off for even 3 months, why, we would have gained
a decided advantage. In addition, the [5390] British Fleet,
2038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
which they had agreed to send to the Far Eastern area, part of that
fleet was en route, but it would take time to get them ready.
We felt 3 or 4 months would be of immense advantage to the United
States.
[5391] Mr. Gearhart. Now that you had learned that the Jap-
anese had served upon us an ultimatum, what did you do about it or
what was done in which you participated to obtain that very much
needed time ?
Admiral Turner. The memorandum from the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations and the Chief of Staff to the President, of date, I think, Novem-
ber 26, was a last attempt to gain time. I don't believe we had much
hope that it would be effective. We had said and advised right along,
that is, Admiral Stark and General Marshall, had advised Mr. Hull
and the President, that we wanted time in the Pacific.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, that message
Admiral Turner. And there wasn't very much more that we could
do about it.
Mr. Gearhart. That message, which is dated November 27, was
prepared a day before that, was it not ; or do you know ?
Admiral Turner. The preparation of that started, as I recall, im-
mediately after the Joint Board meeting on November 24, and it took
a day or two to get that up and to get an agreement and perfect it in
that form.
Mr. Gearhart. Who were x^resent at that Joint Board meeting?
I am referring to Exhibit 17.
Admiral Turner. Which is Exhibit 17, sir?
Mr. Gearhart. The document to which we are now referring
[5392] is Exhibit 17 in this proceeding. That is the letter of
November 27, 1941.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I have the joint board minutes. No;
there was no meeting on November 24.
I suppose it probably was drawn up with relation to the dispatch
of November 24 and to our knowledge of the proposed modus vivendi
and the ultimate terms of settlement which were being considered by
the State Department.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you attend any meetings between — say the 23d,
24th, 2r)th or 26th — at which the Secretary of State was present?
Admiral Turner. No, sir,
Mr. Gearhart. Did you have any discussions with Admiral Stark
or General Marshall after they had had conferences with the Secretary
of State, in reference to his intended action toward the Japanese?
Admiral Turner. I think every time Admiral Stark attended one
of those meetings he would call me in and acquaint me with the perti-
nent facts, and every day I would talk to Captain Schuirmann as to
the latest development in the situation. He would go over there once
a day or twice a day.
Mr. Gearhart. Did vou have anything to do with the preparation of
the letter of November 27, 1941, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff ?_
[5393] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; that was jointly written by
General Gerow and myself. That was typed in my office. I think
there is a stenographer's initials up there that I recognize.
Mr. Gearhart. Did the fact that Secretary Hull had delivered the
Japanese a notice or tendered agreement on the 26th day of November
have anything to do with inspiring this message, Exhibit 17 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2039
Admiral Turner. No, sir, because we didn't know at the Navy De-
partment until we got it through magic on the 28th.
Mr. Geauiiart. On the 28th you learned that Mr. Hull had deliv-
ered a strong note to the Japanese?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, tluit note was practically the opposite of what
the Japanese had tendered as an agreement, was it not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. It would have required the Japanese to reaffirm their
allegiance to the Nine Power Treaty ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And would have required the Japanese to again
acknowledge the Kellogg Peace Pact which they had disregarded
when they started the trouble in the East?
Admiral Turner. That is corerct.
Mr. Gearhart. It would have required the Japanese to [^5^]
recognize the Nationalist Government of China?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. And it would have required the Japanese to with-
draw their armies from China, from Indochina, from Manchuria,
and cease to use force and violence as a means of achieving national-
istic ends, would it not ?
Admiral Turner, In general terms ; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, those are principles to which the United States
was firmly committed, are they not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Those are principles from which the United States
could not withdraw without humiliation; is that not correct?
Admiral Turner. I agree.
Mr. Gearhart. What was your opinion in reference to the propriety
of serving upon the Japanese such a drastic memorandum at that
particular time, or was that discussed among the higher ranking
officers of the Army and Navy ?
Admiral Turner. I didn't hear the question as to propriety dis-
cussed. I think we, all of us closely connected with the on-coming
operations, were convinced that our note would have no possible chance
of acceptance by the Japanese.
Mr. Gearhart. Then the handing of that note in effect and in your
opinion marked the end of negotiations, actual [S39S] nego-
tiations, between the two countries?
Admiral Turner. Well, they had stopped, they had practically
stopped ; there was no progress being made.
I personally think that that note had no effect whatsoever on the
situation.
[5396] Mr. Gearhart. In other words, the situation had jelled
before the note was handed to the Japanese ?
Admiral Turner. I believe so ; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. The Japanese war fleet left the Japanese islands on
their fateful mission on the 2Tth and 28th of November, did they not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And they were under steam and on their way before
the Japanese could have possibly analyzed what the Hull message was
of November 26 ?
Admiral Turner. I think so.
2040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. It probabl}^ had one effect, did it not, Admiral? It
convinced the Japanese that there would be no occasion for sending
a note to their fleet to return to their home ports ?
Admiral Turner. It might have had that effect.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, I am one that doesn't deprecate that November
26th message. I think it is one of the glorious diplomatic documents
of American history, and it is going to be so regarded, despite the
Secretary's inclination to treat it lightly. It is America's declaration
to the world that we stand, still, for principle. Kegardless of whether
the war was inevitable, and whether the Japanese force was on its
way to strike us down, it is very, very [5397] fortunate that
that great message to the world, and to the Japanese in particular,
was given before the strike at Pearl Harbor.
I believe that is all.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire,
Admiral.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, what time did you get the information
from Admiral Noyes for Admiral Stark that Kimmel was getting all
magic and decoding it there ?
Admiral Turner. Senator, I can't remember definitely. I have a
vague recollection that I discussed it first with Admiral Noyes about
January 1941. Then in the summer, July or August, about the time of
the embargo or freezing of assets, and then sometime in the early part
of November.
Those are only approximate.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account then, for these letters that
were put in the record the other day where Admiral Kimmel wrote
to Admiral Stark on February 18, 1941 :
I have recently been toUl by an officer fresh from Washinj-ton that ONI con-
siders it the function of Operations to furnisli tlie Commander in Chief with
information of secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the
responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI.
I do not know that we have missed any- [559S] thing, but if there is any
doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep Commander in Chief fully informed
with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet will
you kindly fix the responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding.
Then a letter back on March 22 :
With reference to your postscript on the subject of trade routes and respon-
sibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINCAF, Kirk informs me
that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed
concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements
within the United States.
How do you account for that letter if you had told Stark in January
that they had the means of getting all of this secret information?
\S300] Admiral Turner. I do not believe that that word "secret"
refers or relates exclusively to this magic at all. I think that it relates
to secret information, of which we were getting a great deal from
other sources. The totality of the information that we got was several
times as great from all sources as from the magic. That implication
never occurred to me until you bring it up now, that that related to the
ultra.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now. Admiral, did you approve the mes-
sage sending the information that the codes were being destroyed?
Did you send that?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2041
Admiral Turner. No, sir, I did not send it. I saw one of tliem.
Senator Ferguson. You approved it?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Why would you send that if you thought that
they had a code there and were netting the same messages that you
were sending them? If you thought they were getting the informa-
tion, why would you send that information that came to you by virtue
of magic? The}' would ali'eady have seen it and had it.
Admiral Turner. That is true, but this was for the purpose of
centering attention on that particular thing and I did not know — I
do not believe I knew — whether that in- ['^4-00~] formation had
come — just exactl}' how that information had come. I had seen some
dispatches, it is true, from Tokyo ordering the destruction of codes.
I cannot explain to you how the mistake about — the misunderstand-
ing— on the code occurred. It is just a mystery to me.
Senator Ferguson. Those two things seem to be contradictory to
that idea that was in the first message and the fact that you sent these
other out, isn't that true ?
Admiral Turner. They seem to be, yes.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Admiral, you had a conversation with*
the Japanese Ambassador on July 21, 1941, at your home. Do you
recall that?
Admiral Turner. I recall several conversations I had with Mr.
Nomura, Ambassador Nomura.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why you were speaking on these
subjects that you were talking to him on ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Whj'^ ?
Admiral Turner. I knew his — it is a rather long story — I had
known his naval attache when I went to Japan in 1939. He came
here about the same time I did and I became aware very shortly after
1 arrived that this attache was trying to make contact with me for
the sake of pumping me and so I permitted him to do it and informed
the Director of Naval [5401] Intelligence and Admiral Stark.
Shortly after Admiral Nomura came in February he asked me to
come to his house and have a talk with him. Tliat talk, I think,
occurred about the 1st of March, and he wanted to discuss the whole
general situation. I went back and wrote a memorandum to the Chief
of Naval Operations covering this matter and said it put me in a
rather embarrassing position but I felt that I ought to continue the
talks for what I could get from it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, on the one that I am talking about,
July 21, 1941, your memoranda was transmitted to President Roose-
velt and to the Secretary of State by Admiral Stark?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You knew that ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get any reactions from those two
sources or from Admiral Stark that they did not believe, or did not
want to back up, what you were saying?
Admiral Turner. They never gave me any such indication at all.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I want you" to read, if you will, the
last sentence of 12 on page 519 of Foreign Relations, Volume 2.
2042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[5^02] Admiral Turner (reading) :
Furthermore, anything that affects the future security of the United Kingdom,
in any part of the world, also is of interest to the United States from the defen-
sive viewpoint.
13. The occupation of Indochina by Japan is particularly important for the
defense of the United States since is mieht threaten the British position in
Singapore and the Dutch position in the Netherlands East Indies. Were they
to pass out of their present control, a very severe blow would be struck at the
integrity of the defense of the British Isles, and these Isles might well then be
overcome by the Germans. It can thus be seen what a very close interest, from
a military viewpoint, the United States has in sustaining the status quo in the
southern portion of the Far East."
That was e:^pressed to him as a personal opinion of my own.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, that was your personal opinion.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But you also transmitted it to the President
after you told it to the Ambassador, is that true?
Admiral Turner. I gave it to Admiral Stark.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
[64-03] Admiral Turner. And I believe he sent it to the Presi-
dent.
Senator Ferguson. Well, that is what it says in the book.
Now, you were of the opinion at that time that if the Japanese
took Singapore or Burma it was self-defense as far as we were con-
cerned— that is the word you used, isn't it — and therefore we would
go to war?
Admiral Turner. I was of the opinion
Senator Ferguson. You made it clear to the Ambassador.
Admiral Turner. I told the Ambassador that I believed that Con-
gress would declare war if they attacked either the Dutch or the
British in Malaya.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did you know about the parallel
action to be taken by the President and Mr. Churchill ? You were at
the — no, you were not at the
Admiral Turner. Yes, I was at the Argentina conference.
Senator Ferguson. You were?
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Then did you know about the parallel action?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; I knew nothing about it at all until
about a month or 2 months later, when it was brought up before the
Joint Board by Captain Schuirmann. Now, others here in the Depart-
ment knew about that at the [-5404] time. I did not because I
stopped in Connecticut for about a week or 10 days leave on the way
back from Argentina, so I was not here when the thing occurred.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, on the 17th of August 1941,
page 556 Foreign Relations, volume 2, this, among other statements,
was told to the Japanese Ambassador [reading] :
Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the
Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in
pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of
force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be com-
pelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and
American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United
States.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2043
Now, how much different is that than what you told the Ambassador
on the 20th of July?
Admiral Turner. I told him as a personal opinion that I believed
that the United States would declare war against Japan if they went
against the British in Singapore, as a matter of opinion.
Senator P>.rguson. Now, how much does yours differ from
[5405] that? In what way does your statement differ from what
the President said?
Admiral Turnkr. I expressed an opinion and that is an expression
of policy of the Executive.
Senator Ferguson. But do they amount to practically the same in
effect ? That is what I am trying to get at.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I think so.
Senator Ferouson. Very close.
Admiral Turner. Very close I agree.
Senator Ferguson. And you referred in this Exhibit 16 to some
information from Captain Schuirmann. You say that is the first
that vou knew about it. He used this language :
"He pointed out that on August I7th" — I will read back what this
is so that you will know it. It is not in that book. [Reading:]
Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China.
At the request of Admiral Starlv, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of
the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, Novem-
ber the 1st, at wliicli a discussion was held of the Far Eastern section.
Do you recall that?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
[5406] Senator Ferguson. And then he said among other
things :
He pointed out that on August 17th, following the President's return from the
meeting at sea with Mr.Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to
Japan tliat it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of
further Japanese aggression.
Admiral Turner. I remember the occasion and that statement.
Senator Ferguson. Was that discussed? Was that your under-
standing or
Admiral Turner. It was not my understanding that it was an ulti-
matum.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to Admiral Stark about it?
Admiral Titiner. I do not believe I ever discussed that note of
August 17 with anyone, except very shortly with Captain Shuirmann.
Senator Ferguson. And when you discussed it with Schuirmami,
did you and he disagree on it?
Admiral Turner. I did not consider it an ultimatum.
Senator Ferguson. Did he?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know where he said he got his informa-
tion or idea that it was an ultimatum ?
[6407'] Admiral Turner. I think that he got that — he used that
word himself. I have talked to him recently about it and he says
that that is his word, as I recall it, and he still thinks it is an ulti-
matum.
Senator Ferguson. He still thinks so?
Admiral Turner. Yes.
2044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, with that in mind, on the
27th — well, this is on the 5th of November you heard this discussed
and then knew that the President had sent this note. Now, did it
mean anything to you when you discovered that the ships were going
down to attack the Malay Peninsula? Wliat did that mean to you
after having this knowledge?
Admiral Turner. Well, it meant that Japan was on the move and
going to attack the Dutch and British and also, because they had
not obtained an agreement with us, that they were going to attack
us in the Philippines ; that is what it meant.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did it mean war ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And then on the 6th, the morning of the 6th
at 10 : 40, a note came from Winant confirming what you had had
other information on, that the Japanese were moving in violation
of what you had told them back in July would mean [6^08'\
war, that was your opinion to the Ambassador?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you had the idea then on the 5th that the
President had given them official notice to the same effect ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then as far as you were concerned this meant
war on the 6th? You had confirmation that we were in war. going
to War?
Admiral Turner. No — well, I believed that we would- be attacked,
definitely
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Turner (continuing). In the Philippines and if we were
attacked in the Philippines I knew it would be war. I though it
would be war if we were not attacked, I thought it would be war if
they attacked the British and the Dutch, but there would have been
some delays possibly.
Senator Ferguson. All right. In other words, if they attacked
the British and the Dutch alone you thought it meant war and you
make a distinction that if they attacked the Dutch, the British, and
the Americans at the Philippines it did mean war?
Admiral Turner. Definitely; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That was the distinction you made?
[5409] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. •
Senator Ferguson. In other words, there would have had to have
been a Congressional act, a declaration of war, if they would have
only attacked the two places?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, then, were you familiar with the so-called
men-of-war, the three small ships being sent out there ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, I knew about that.
Senator Ferguson. Did you draft that message?
Admiral Turner. I did not. That was drafted by Admiral Brainard
and was at the direction of the President.
Senator Ferguson. A special direction of the President?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted on that matter ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2045
Senator Ferguson. Well, how did you account — liow do you now
account for those three ships going out to get information of the
movement south, but no specific orders to go out to get information
around Hawaii? How do you account for that? Here were these
three men-of-war sent out to go over to Camranh Bay to see whether
these ships were going across into the Kra Peninsula, and not one
sent out specifically around Hawaii. How do you account for that?
[S^O] Admiral Turner. We informed — the Chief of Naval
Operations informed — the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
in at least three official communications during 1941 that it would be
desirable to use ships to the northward and on one occasion to the
southward of Hawaii for detecting approaching raiders, in addition to
the use of airplanes, and we had endeavored to get small craft to send
out and be on look-outs. One of these letters suggests the use of five
sampans that had just been condemned by a court out there and the
use of yachts which we were trying to get to them.
Senator Ferguson. Why didn't we use those then ?
Admiral Turner. I do not know, sir.
Senator Feeguson. Why didn't you give special notice, just like the
President did, about sending these three men-of-war out if you thought
war was coming as close as you thought it was and you were the man
in War Plans to execute this action? Wliy didn't you send some out
around Hawaii ?
Admiral Turner. I never would have sent or requested that those
three craft would go up in the China Sea.
Senator Ferguson. I understand that.
Admiral Turner. We had never suggested to Admiral Hart that
he send any out previously. We had suggested to Admiral Kimmel
that he employ, when necessary employ, small craft out there as look-
outs on three different occasions.
[54-11] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, in your message of the
27th you say this :
"Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory" — not
actual, but preparatory — "to carrying out the task assigned in
WPL 46."
Now, there was nothing in WPL 46^ about sending small boats out
around Hawaii, was there?
Admiral Turner. No, not at all, but there were around in the —
-certain small craft in the — 14th Naval District which were patrol
craft and the Commander-in-Chief had been informed or directed
in two letters at least during the latter part of 1941 that he would
have to supply any patrol craft to the 14th Naval District and this
deployment meant that he would have certainly put his ships out
in such a manner as best designed to effect the defense of Hawaii.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now. Admiral, you have told me that you
did not have really anything to do with the President's message
about the three craft.
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. But you knew it went out and it went out
about the third?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, knowing that, that the President had
personally intervened to send that out to ascertain if [5Jf.l2']
2046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
there was goin<? to be an attack to the south, didn't you think it
would be essential, you realizing that they were going to attack
the Philippines and we had a fleet on their flank, that something
ought to be done specifically to look out around Hawaii ?
Admiral Turner. I never would have sent that dispatch, if left
to my own initiative, to Admiral Hart; I though it was unnecessary,
that he was competent to take care of the situation with the forces
lit his disposal.
Senator Ferguson. But when the President of the United States
thought otherwise and sent the message, didn't it make you feel that
you should do something specifically about this fleet that was on the
flank? _
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It did not occur to you?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, was there any other way to put Rainbow
6 into effect than the wording on page 6, "Execute Navy basic war
plan Rainbow No. 5?" Would there have been any other message
to put that into effect?
Admiral Turner. Nothing except giving words that meant the
same general thing.
Senator Ferguson, The same thing, yes. So when you sent these
other messages, the one to the Army being described [5^75]
as a do-don't message, you were not attempting to put this plan
into effect?
Admiral Turner. Not at all. We were out there until an overt
act was committed against us and then automatically we would de-
fend ourselves and then the matter would go into effect, but is was
important to prevent any damage from it.
Senator Ferguson. But now do you say that first there had to
be an overt act? I understand you to say that the Navy was not
concerned with the overt act idea.
Admiral Turner. No, that was a misunderstanding I think, Sen-
'ator. I said, what I intended, that if the Japanese fleet came within
somewhere around 500 miles of Hawaii that we were justified in
considering that an overt act and attack them.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, I want to know whether you
ever sent a message to Admiral Kimmel defining to him that if they
came within 500 miles that would be an overt act and we would attack
them?
Admiral Turner. We did not because, as I said in my testimony
yesterday, we considered that trying to define in specific details a
situation that might be so varied in so many ways would have ham-
pered him rather than to help him and that the best way, and that
is the usual way that the Navy has performed, is to give the greatest
possible leeway to the sub- [54-H] ordinate that has the job
to do and we gave him a general order and everything that we had and
it was up to him.
Senator Ferguson. Now, on the .SOth of November in a message from
the — it is : "Subject : Threat of Japanese attack in South Pacific area,"
from the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador, on pace —
the pages are not numbered. It is on page 6 of Exhibit 21 [reading] :
R. A. F. are reconnoitering on arc of 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for three
days commencing November 29th and our Commander in Chief, Far East has
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2047
requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air recon-
naissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days.
Did you know about that?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did the Asiatic commander in chief do that?
Admiral Turner. He did, on the order of the Chief of Naval
Operations.
Senator Ferguson. Had you been requested by the British to do
that?
Admiral Turner. We liad.
Senator Ferguson. Do we have that request, counsel, where the
British requested us to have the commander in chief [_5Ifl5\ of
the Asiatic put this reconnaissance out?
Mr. Gesell. I do not believe we do, Senator.
Mr. IMiTciiELL. We never heard of it.
Admiral Turner. If it was not, it might have been oral, Senator.
Sometimes we would get a w^ritten request from the Joint Staff mis-
sion over liere, and sometimes they would bring down a paper such
as they had there from their authorities and show it to us, and ask for
action, but we definitely got a request to perform that scouting.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, as I understand it we had a
working plan with the British. They could do it very easily either
orally or in writing prior to the 7th and we would put an action on,
such as we did here, a reconnaissance.
Admiral Turner. That is not a war action.
Senator Fergusox. No. It is a reconnaissance action, is that true?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, what was that recomiaissance action for,
that specific action?
Admiral Turner. That was to detect the movement south of the
amphibious expeditions for attack.
Senator Ferguson. Now, having lost sight of, here, of six carriers
and another part of the fleet, can you tell me why '[5Ji.l6'\ spe-
cific orders were not sent out to Kimmel to make a reconnaissance such
as you sent out to Hart here about the 30tli ?
Admiral Turner. We would not have sent those orders to Admiral
Hart except at the request of the British, because we would have left it
exclusively to his own judgment, and he sent reconnaissance planes out.
As a matter of fact, we have gotten into trouble for going over For-
mosa. He had planes going out, they were performing their scouting,
and we assumed that that was occurring also in Plawaii.
Wlien you give a major order for a subordinate to carry out, it is
considered very bad practice, not only then, but now, to go and put a
lot of details that state how that officer is going to carry out his duty.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, here is a question on November
30, 1941, put to Mr. Hull by Lord Halifax. Here is the question :
He was desirous of ascertaining what the United States Government would do
if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the
Kra Isthmus. (Exhibit 21, p. 4)
Did you ever as the head of War Plans have an answer to that ? Do
you understand the question?
2048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I understand and I remember the occasion
and I do not remember that the British were ever given [5^i7]
a definite answer on that.
Senator Ferguson. Well, were you given a definite answer? What
would you have done? What was Hart to do? What was America
to do?
Admiral Turner. The recommendation had been made to the Presi-
dent about that time that he issue a warning, with such backing as he
believed politically necessary, that crossing that line would mean war
with the United States, but that recommendation was made with the
full understanding that it would be necessary to get the support of
Congress for any such warning.
Senator Ferguson. Well, was any such warning ever sent ?
Admiral Turner. Not to my knowledge. I know it was not.
Senator Ferguson. Whom did you discuss that with?
Admiral Turner. That particular warning?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Turner. I discussed it with the Army. The British asked
us to join in that tripartite affair and to give them definite assurance
that we would. Our reply was that we couid not give them any
such definite assurance but that w^e would take the matter up with the
President and make a recommendation to see if the Government was
willing to make that a cause of war.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, was that the reason [6418]
that you sent the recommendation, Exhibit 17, the letter of November
the 27th? Are you familiar with that ?
Admiral Turner. Yes. That ]»art containing crossing that line was
that occasion ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That was the occasion?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
[-5419] Senator Ferguson. That was the occasion. So it came
from the British to you and you made this recommendation to the
President ?
Admiral Turner. That a warning be issued ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, that a warning be issued in relation to
Thailand. I want to call to your attention the last paragraph. It
does not relate to the line that was drawn about the notice. Have
you got your copy?
Aclmiral Turner. I think so.
Senator Ferguson. Have you got it now. Admiral ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; I am afraid not.
(Exhibit 17 was handed to Admiral Turnei'.)
Admiral Turner. The first one of those three subparagraphs. Sen-
ator, covers United States, British and Dutch territory. Then, be-
cause Thailand is not one of the three, that is put in as a separate
matter. But it covers the whole thing. It is the entire line.
Senator Ferguson. Let me go up a paragraph :
After consultation with each other, United States, British and Dutch military
authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counter-action against
Japan shoud be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens
the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Common-
wealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or [5420] should the Japanese
move forces into Thailand west of 10()° east or south of 10° north, Portuguese
Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2049
In other words, they are saying that we had agreed, and you rec-
ommended, that in case they moved into Thailand west of 100° east
or south of lO"" north, that we were to take action.
Now down in the next to the hist paragraph you say this :
In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand —
that is not west of 100° East, but just in Thailand —
Japan be warned by the United States, the British and the Dutch Governments
that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning
no joint military opposition be undertaken.
Now am I clear in this, that this recommendation has two parts'^
In the one case you reconnnend that if they cross this line that you
set up, 100° east or south of 10° north, Portugese Timor, New Cale-
donia or the Loyalty Islands, that action is to be taken, but in case
they go into any other part of Thailand you want a notice given, is
that correct?
Admiral Turner. That is correct, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct.
Admiral Turner. But wnth regard to that second paragraph it
sa3'^s, you see, "after consultation with each other. United States,
British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East [o4^I]
agreed" on certain things.
Now, that was never approved by either the Chief of Staff or
Chief of Naval Operations, or anybody in Washington, nor by the
British Chiefs of Staff, but that was taken as a basis for this paper
here, wdiich was a new thing to fit the exact situation here.
Senator Ferguson. But then when the Ambassador of Britain was
asking the United States Secretary of State for an answer to this
question he was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States
Govermnent would do if the British should resist any Japanese un-
dertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus ? That is a specific
question.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson, Now would not that have been a violation of
the thing that you had in mind here, moving across this line 100°
west?
Admiral Turner. It certainly would have been a violation if the
British had gone in there.
Senator Ferguson. If the British had gone in ?
Admiral Turner. Yes. They had a proposition that they wanted
to go in. That was opposed. We refused to support it, either the
State Department or the military.
Senator Ferguson. You oppose that?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; because that would have taken \_5Jt22]
out the whole basis of our nonaggression.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, if they would have gone in first
to protect that, that would have been against nonaggression, is that
right?
Admiral Turner, Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That would have been a violation of the first
overt act proposition, would it not?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
79716— 46— pt. 4 31
2050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. And we were doing everything we could to
avoid the first overt act?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Fekguson. In other words, we were watching the Jap ships
going in and as soon as they crossed the line that was the overt act
on their part ?
Admiral Turner. That is right. We wished to define it as that.
Senator Ferguson. That is why we had scouts out and patrols, and
so forth, to see whether or not they were going over that line and
committing that overt act, is that right?
Admiral Turner. That was way south of any place our people were
in. We were over there merely to look and see the size of the forces,
and to see how much they could undertake at one time.
Senator Ferguson. You said one of our scouting planes [54.^3]
was in trouble over Formosa. When was that?
Admiral Turner. That was about the 2nd or 3rd of December, or
even a few days before that. Planes had gone up in that general
direction and apparently one of our planes had gotten over or close to
Formosa, because it got a protest from the Japanese about it.
Senator Ferguson. Got a protest ?
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. On the 30th of November, 1941, from OPNAV,
action : CINCAF, and information : CINCPAC, I want to read this to
you:
Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas ex-
pedition. In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our
position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila-Camranh Bay
on three days commencing upon receipt this despatch. Instruct planes to observe
only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend
themselves if attacked.
In other words, they were armed, is that true ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct, they were armed with machine
guns and ammunition.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
Understand British Air Forces will search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu
and will move troops [5^2//] to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora.
If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur. British mission here
informed.
Now is that the message that was sent out, that the British had
asked for, here where I read the Commander-in-Chief Far East has
requested the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet at Manila to under-
take air reconnaissance on the line Manila and Camranh Bay on the
same days?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, that is the message.
Senator Ferguson. That is the message sent out. Now here is the
wording, "Understand British Air Forces will search arc 180 miles
from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus".
How do you account for that in line with what you told me before, that
that would be an act of aggression by the British?
Admiral Turner. My recollection of the position of Singora is, it
is just outside the nearest town to the northern border of the British
territory, and that they were going to move troops to that northern
border.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2051
Senator Ferguson. They were not going to cross the line, in other
words ?
Admiral Turner. I believe so. I believe that is correct.
Senator Fkrguson. Did you believe that the Tanaka memorial was
an actual insti-unient, or did you have any ideas [54^5] on that?
Admiral Turner. Well, I do not believe I ever formed any definite
opinion as to whether it was authentic or not. I always felt that it
expressed generally the Japanese militaristic viewpoint.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert in the rec-
ord, where I read the statement that the Admiral had made to the
Japanese Ambassador, I would like to put into the record the whole
statement, because I think it will make better sense in the record and
explain what we were talking about.
The Vice Chairman. So ordered.
Mr. Mitchell. Would j^ou mind identifying that for the reporter
by volume, book and page ?
Senator Ferguson. It is Foreign Relations of the United States-
Japan, 1931^1, volume II, page 516.
(The document referred to is as follows:)
[5426] The Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department
(Rear Admiral Turner) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark)
(Transmitted to President Roosevelt and to the Secretary of State by Admiral
Stark).
Op-12-CTB
(SC)EF
Serial 083412
Memorandum
Washington, July 21, 19!fl.
1. On July 20, 1941, about 3 p. m.. Ambassador Nomura called on me at my
residence. After some general conversation, he informed me that on Friday
or Saturday (.July 18-19. 1941) he had gone to Virginia Hot Springs [White
Sulphur Springs! to call on Mr. Hull, but the lattei-'s physician had not permitted
an interview. Subsequently, as I understand. Ambassador Nomura had a con-
versation with Mr. Welles. Prior to coming to my residence, he had called at
Admiral Stark's house, but he had not found him in. He did not say whether
be had then tried to get in touch with Admiral Ingersoll (Rear Admiral Royal
E. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations). I understand the latter was
not at home at that hour.
2. Ambassador Nomura indicated that he desired to have a conversation with
Admiral Stark as soon as convenient ; he intended to go to New York the 21st
or 22d but will return shortly. I informed the Ambassador that I would convey
his request to Admiral Stark, and assured him that the latter [5^27] would
be glad to talk with him.
3. The Ambassador then explained at considerable length what he proposed
to discuss with Admiral Stark. He said that he is not a professional diplomat,
and is occupying his present position because none of the trained diplomats in
whom the government had confidence had been willing to accept the Washington
Mission : he had demurred for a considerable period, and had accepted the duty
only after great insistence by his friends, particularly high i-anking naval
officers and the more conservative groups of Army officers. He noted that Ad-
miral Toyoda. now Foreign Minister, had been more than insistent that he
accept the mission; it was evident that he felt he had a greater measure of
To.yoda's confidence than of Matsuoka's. He stated that he particularlv wished
to discuss the international situation with Admiral Stark because, if the United
States and Japan could not remain at peace, it was obvious that a devastating
naval war would ensue.
4. Ambassador Nomura stated that for some weeks he had had frequent con-
ferences with Mr. Hull, in an endeavor to seek a formula through which the
United States and Japan could remain at peace. He no longer hoped for 100
percent agreement on all points, but would be content if a partial agreement
2052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
could be reached which would prevent war between the two countries. Such an
agreement would necessarily be informal, since Japan is now committed by
treaty to Germany, and this treaty could [542S] not be denounced at
this time. However, he noted that the decision as to when the military clauses
of the treaty would come into effect lies entirely in Japan's hands, and that
these would be invoked only if Germany were to be the object of aggression
by another power. He stated that Japan entered the Axis solely because it
seemed to be to Japan's interest to do so. Japan's future acts will be dom-
inated solely by Japan, and not by any other power. Whatever military action
Japan takes will be for her own ultimate purposes.
5. He then talked at length on the points which Japan considered essential
for an agreement between the United States and Japan. The fundamental basis
of such an agreement necessarily would be that either Power would be free
to take such steps as seem to be required by its own responsibility for self-
defense. He mentioned that, owing to export restrictions against Japan by
the United States and the Philippines, and owing to a reduction in shipping
tonnage available for trade, Japan's present economic position is bad and
steadily getting worse. It is essential that Japan had uninternipted access to
necessary raw materials, particularly iron ore and iron products, oil, rubber,
cotton and food. There are other important items as well.
6. The second f)oint is that the United States is constantly providing greater
support to China. If China is left without industrial and military support, it
will not be long before the [5429] Chungking regime will be unable to
continue the present "China incident" ; Japan will then be able to withdraw
from the greater part of China. However, Ambassador Nomura noted that the
United States is improving the Burma Road, and is supplying airplanes and
pilots to be sent to Chungking. He understands that there are over a hundred
American pilots now en route, who have been supplied from the armed forces
of the United States. Japan must make some arrangement through which sup-
port of this nature will be reduced, rather than increased. The British are also
contributing more and more to measures designed to sustain the Chungking
regime.
7. The third point which the Ambassador mentioned as essential for Japan's
security is the more or less permanent stationing of Japanese troops in Inner
Mongolia in order to break the connection between Russia and China, and in
order to suppress the extensive Chinese Communist elements in that general
region. Japan has an agreement with Wang Chiug Wei which will permit
Japanese forces to remain in Inner Mongolia ; how long such measures will
continue necessary can not be foretold. I inferred that, were this agreed to,
Japanese troops would be withdrawn from the greater part of China.
8. He then informed me that within the next few days Japan expects to occupy
French Indochina. How the occupation would be made he is not informed;
presumably, it would be chiefly by an over-land march from Hanoi southward, but
on [SJfSO] this he is not yet informed. In any case, for the immediate
future security of Japan, both against a possible attack from the south and for a
better control over the activities of Chungking, this occupation has become essen-
tial.
9. It was evident that Ambassador Nomura had some apprehension that the
United States would take further action against Japan, either economically or
militarily, as soon as Japanese troops were known to be occupying French Indo-
China. He anticipates an intensification of the present press campaign against
Japan in the United States. It seems, though he did not so state categorically,
tiiat Japan contemplates no further move to the south for the time being. He
made no mention of possible activity against Siberia.
10. Ambassador Nomura indicated that these points were essential to any
informal agreements which might be made between the United States and Japan.
Rather cautiously he conveyed the impression that were the United States to
accept these conditions, any action it might take in the Atlantic would not be a
matter of great concern to Japan. The one great point on which agreement might
be readied, he again emphasized as the inherent right of .self defense.
11. The Ambassador set forth all the foregoing without interruption on my part.
I informed him that I would present these points to Admiral Stark's attention.
However, I desired to point out one important thing to him, speaking solely
\_543i] from a personal viewpoint, and as one naval officer to another, on a
certain broad strategic aspect of the situation which I envisaged. I agreed that
there would be a decidedly adverse reaction in the United States to Japanese
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2053
occupation of Indocbina. Entirely aside from matters of policy, it would be
evident to liim tliat this move had an important bearing on the strategic position
of the United States.
12. I pointed out that, speaking from the standpoint of self defense, the great-
est danger to the United States in the future lies in the continued military success
of Germany. The United States has been able to live in peace because powerful
military nations in Europe have checked each other and prevented a military
penetration by any of them in the Western Hemisphere. If Great Britain were
to collapse, German military povi^er might very well be directed against South
America, and such moves would cause great difficulties for the United States. So
long as the United Kingdom continues to exist as a military and naval power, the
problems of the United States as regards its security will not be very great.
Therefore, aside from racial and social ideals, it is decidedly against the military
interests of the United States to permit the United Kingdom to be overcome by
Germany. For this reason any action which the United States could take against
Germany is necessarily one of self defense and could never be considered as
aggression. Furthermore, anything that affects the future [5^32] secur-
ity of the United Kingdom, in any part of the world, also is of interest to the
United States from the defensive viewpoint.
13. The occupation of Indo-China by Japan is particularly important for the
defense of the United States since it might threaten the British position in
Singapore and the Dutch position in the Netherlands East Indies. Wei-e they
to pass out of their present control, a very severe blow would be struck at
the integrity of the defense of the British Isles, and these Isles might well
then be overcome by the Germans. It can thus be seen what a very close
interest, from a military viewpoint, the United States has in sustaining the status
quo in the southern portion of the Far East.
14. I suggested that Japan really has very little to fear from American, Brit-
ish or Dutch activities in the Far East. It might well be, were these Powers
to be displaced, Japan, would find Germany facing her in that region, which
would put an entirely different complexion on the military situation there.
15. Ambassador Nomura stated that, regardless of his own personal opinions
in the matter (which were clearly sympathetic to the above point of view) he
was bound to support the policies of his government, which at present include
collaboration with the Axis.
16. The interview then closed after the Ambassador again [5Jf33] reit-
erated his desire to discuss these matters with Admiral Stark.
R. K. TUBNEE.
[S434] Senator Ferguson. At that time, as I recall it, he was
telling you that they were going into Indochina.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir;
Senator Ferguson. And you were attempting to tell him, and I
think in no uncertain language, just how you felt about it.
Admiral Turner. It was on that occasion that I became convinced,
after discussing the matter with him, that the future diplomatic
effort they would make with us would be to keep us out while they
attacked Britain and the Netherlands East Indies.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, did you have, after the con-
versation that you had, any definite ideas that we were going to
get into a war with Japan ? Could that have changed your thinking,
that conversation?
Admiral Turner. I think that had a very decided effect. My recol-
lection of that conversation is that it was the latter part of Jtme.
Now this was, as you have it there, in July, but I remember it as the
latter part of June.
Senator Ferguson. This is dated July. It says he was over to
Hot Springs to see the Secretary of State and could not see him
on the 20th of July 1941, and he apparently came back to see you.
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Now does that refresh your memory ?
2054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[S4S5] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I thought it was June, when
I said I might have been influenced in June or July, because that had
a very decided influence.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I want to call your attention to pages
200 and 202 of exhibit 1. Do you have exhibit 1 there?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is a message intercepted from Berlin, dated
November 29, 1941, translated by the Navy on December 1, 1941, in
which the Ambasador of Japan was telling Von Ribbentrop that he had
no official word on the status of the American-Japanese negotiations
and that he could make no definite statement, since he was not aware
of any concrete intentions of Japan.
Now on the next day, on the 30th — and I want to call your attention
to the fact that they had extended the time from the 25th to the 29th,
and you are familiar with those deadlines, are you not ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That on the next day, on pages 204 and 206,
another message from Tokyo to Berlin, on just the following day,
November 30, 1941, in which the Japanese Government instructed its
Ambassador in Germany to tell Hitler and Von Ribbentrop
that American-Japanese negotiations [S4^6] stood ruptured,
broken, and that an American-Japanese war "may come quicker than
anyone dreams."
Now did those facts mean anything to you ? Here on the one day
they are telling the Germans they do not know a thing, on the day
following the 29th, which was the deadline — and, by the way, that
is exactly the deadline, because there is a message on that in here
saying that it was Japanese time — they tell them that the negotiations
are ruptured and that "war may come quicker than anj/one dreams."
Did that mean anything to you?
Admiral Turner. The dispatch of the 29th of November is from
Berlin, from the Ambassador.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
Admiral Turner. The dispatch of the 30th is from Tokyo. It is
evident that the Berlin Ambassador had not received news as to the
intentions of the government and he was just giving them some double
talk on this matter, and then he was instructed in the matter on the
30th.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, he gave them some double talk
on the 29th and then they instructed him on the 30th, which was the
very day of the deadline,' and the troops were going south, that they
were ruptured and war may come quicker than anyone thought.
Did not that mean something to your intelligence brains ? 15/(371
If they had evaluated that would not they have found that the Japs
were making a move, nnd that that meant war ?
Admiral Turner. That was the conclusion I drew from it.
Senator Ferguson. You did draw that conclusion from it?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then I am wondering — the question that Con-
gressman Murphy asked — you had sent a message on the 27th, your
plans were in flux, and here you had new information which really
meant war at that time, why did not you give them more information?
Admiral Turner. I do not understand, Senator, what you mean
when you say "your plans were in flux."
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2055
Senator Ferguson. Well, the Congressman read to you, and he will
be able to find that part in that report. Do you remember the part
where it was a live subject? You read it out of the United States
News. I wish you would read that again.
Mr. Murphy [reading] :
The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge
that an attack was to be expected witliiu narrow limits of time and the plans
were drawn with this as a premise.
I was reading from column 1, paragraph 2, page 64 of the full
text of the official report, United States News, Naval Court of In-
quiry.
[5438] Admiral Turner. These dispatches tha you have just
referred to, of the 29th and 30th of November, relate to the over-all
picture of the war. They added nothing to the warning that ,we
had given on the 27th, just 3 days before. There was no develop-
ment here with respect to Hawaii any more than with respect to the
Far East.
Senator Ferguson. Now you have a ship movement plan, do you
not? Did you not send out on the 30th, did I not read this message
that 3"0u sent out for the 70 scouting planes when you said one got
into trouble over Formosa ?
Admiral Turner. Oh, yes.
Senator Fef.guson. So j^ou did take action in the Asiatic?
Admiral Turner. At the request of the British, in order to co-
ordinate for 3 days the scouting that they were doing in those 3 days,
to find out the movement of a definite force some place, that we knew
something about. '
Senator Ferguson. But here, Admiral, we have many carriers that
were out of our sight, out of our hearing, we did not know where
they were. We knew at least they were not down in the Kra Penin-
sula because we had that one sighted, and the British come along
and ask us to make a specific reconnaissance at a specific time, which
is after the 27th, and we do that and find this fleet going into the
Kra [54S9] Peninsula, but no specific orders to see if they
were taken out to Hawaii. How do you account for that?
Admiral Turner. I account for that by what I said previously,
that the commanders in chief had been given a large definite order,
and giving them specific orders as to how they were going to do it,
or take details of how they were going to do it, is very bad military
command practice.
[54-40] Senator Ferguson. Well, it could not have turned out
any worse than it did, could it?
Admiral Turner. Not very well.
Senator Ferguson. Not very well, but it was the duty of your
office, as I understand you to saj^, to alert any and all naval posts of
the Government of the United States in the event that a war involving
the United States was imminent. That was your job and duty, was
it not ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And when you received this information after
the 27th, you did not so alert Hawaii, did you?
Admiral Turnejr. We had already alerted Hawaii. We reviewed
the matter daily. We felt that nothing further was necessary, and I
2056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
still hold to the same opinion, up to the point where the matter of the
1 p. m. deadline came up, which was very unfortunate.
Senator Ferguson. I am not trj^ing to change your opinion. I am
just trying to get what the facts were, and what you had in mind at
that time.
Now, Admiral, when did you first hear there was a pilot message in
relation to the 13 parts message?
Admiral Turner. I think the same time that I got the 13 parts. I
have no recollection of seeing it at any other time.
[S44'l] Senator Ferguson. And at that time you thought that
was so important that a new information bulletin should go to Hawaii ;
is that right ?
Admiral Turner. I did not think it important enough without the
14th part to have interceded in the matter.
I knew Admiral Wilkinson knew about it. and Admiral IngersoU
did.
Senator Ferguson. But, Admiral, at that time, you thought that
Admiral Kimmel was getting the 13 parts?
Admiral Turner. That is correct, and the 14th part.
Senator Ferguson. And the pilot message as quickly as you did?
Admiral Turner. Well, I do not know about "as quickly." Of
course, those things are delayed, and you do not know just how long
it is, how long it might be. There might be some of those things that
would be delayed somewhat. Something urgent, why, it might be sent,
or a dispatch sent "Have you seen such and such series?"
Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, you and Admiral
Wilkinson differed on one point, as to whether or not they were going
to attack the United States.
Admiral Turner. We differed on that point.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether you and Admiral Kimmel
disagreed on that point?
[5442] Admiral Turner. No, sir; I do not. I saw Admiral
Kimmel when he was in Washington sometime during the summer
and discussed with him and other staff officers, his situation in case
of war with Japan.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, you have mentioned the so-called
reply of General Short, a very short message.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with the wording of it?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And, as I understand it now, all the officers in
Washington misunderstood it.
Admiral Turner, All that saw it.
Senator Ferguson. All that saw it. You saw it ; General Marshall
saw it ; General Gerow saw it ; General Miles, and who else ?
Admiral Turner. Bundy.
Senator Ferguson. Bundy. Who else in your department?
Admiral Turner. I think that Captain Hill, who was my first as-
sistant, saw it, customarily. There may have been somebody else. I
think probably Captain Glover saw it, because I showed him all those
things.
Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of War saw it ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2057
[5443] Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the Secretary
of the Navy saw it ?
Admiral Turner. I think not.
Senator Ferguson. Now, all you gentlemen not understanding his
message, my question is, how do you account for the fact that none
of you can see, at least you do not see, how he could have misunder-
stood your message ?
Admiral Turner. If you are comparing the two messages as to
clarity and meaning
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Turner. Why, then I will say it does not follow that the
two points of view are analogous.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, your message is perfectly clear?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And his message is fuzzy and cloudy ?
Admiral Turner. That is correct.
[S444] Senator Ferguson. That is what you want to tell us?
Admiral Turner. Exactly.
Senator Ferguson. So that is the reason you can say that reason-
able men can differ on his message but reasonable officers would not
differ on your message, is that what I understand ?
Admiral Turner. Those words are not my words. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. I do not want you to let me put any words in
your mouth. What is your answer to that?
Adn.iiral Turner. My answer is that the Short message can be in-
terpreted and was interpreted by a number of persons as applying to
a partial situation and did not apply at all to the general situation in
which General Short found himself. I have no idea that he meant
he was only taking sabotage precautions, in view of the specific orders
in the War Department dispatch, which is perfectly clear to do certain
things.
Senator Ferguson. You had an operational room in the Munitions
Building, did you not, a ship board ?
Admiral Turner. In the Navy Department?
Senator Ferguson. In the Navy Department.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How far was that from your office?
Admiral Turner. I had one of strategic movements; there
[544^] was one of general information and all foreign merchant
ship movement in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and I know there
was a big one in two rooms, in Ship Movements, that showed the move-
ments of all our forces and all shipping of the United States and
Great Britain.
Senator Ferguson. Well, Admiral, you had access to a ship move-
ment board that showed all the ships in F'earl Harbor daily? When
a shin went out you could see, if you looked at your board, isn't that
true?' .
Admiral Turner. I think not. I do not know whether they kept
the information as to whether the ship was in Pearl Harbor or outside
of Pearl Harbor. They did keep information showing what ships
were in that vicinity.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Then after the 27th there were two
orders issued to Admiral Kimmel, were there not, sending two carriers
in two different deployments, one to Midway and the other to Wake?
2058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner. That is correct, tliey issued those orders.
Senator Ferguson. And that would appear on your board?
Admiral Turner. I do not know whether that movement would
appear or not. Presumably it would. It would not appear on my
board.
Senator Ferguson. Did not the orders come from your [544^]
office to do that?
Admiral Turner. No.
Senator Ferguson. Whom did they come from?
Admiral Turner. I beg your pardon. No ; I think the orders actu-
ally went from Ship Movements to do that. We had an arrangement
for them to take those planes out there, and there was some delay, and
there was a longer delay oupt there, due to uncontrollable factors,
than we expected.
[5447] Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, these two move-
ments were after the 27th, were they not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, what effect do you think that had upon
the commanding officers at Pearl Harbor, after the 27th, the so-called
warnings I am talking about, as far as an attack is concerned, at
Pearl Harbor, of sending two carriers with planes, taking them from
the Pearl Harbor district, as to whether or not there was going to be
an attack at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Turner. I think it would have had no effect whatsoever,
because we also had to defend these other places, and the attacks
would, if they were made on Pearl Harbor, would probably be made
on the other places too, which they were, except not by airplanes at
Midway.
Senator Ferguson. Did I understand you to say some time in your
testimony that we didn't intend to defend Guam ?
Admiral Turner. Correct. Midway and Wake.
Senator Ferguson. Midway and Wake we did intend to defend?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did we have an attack on the 7th at Midway and
Wake?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
[5445'] Senator Ferguson. The same day?
Admiral Turner. By night, by two destroyers at Midway and, I
believe, the next day by destroyers on Wake, and I think on the 7th
by airplanes at Wake.
* Senator Ferguson. Now, if we expected an attack on the 27th, up to
the 30th, and we were routing our ships, how do you account for
sending these two carriers with planes to Wake and Midway, if we
actually expected an attack?
Admiral Turner. I haven't those dispatches ordering that move-
ment. My impression is that the orders from the Department were
issued prior to the 27th. However, even so, it was necessary to in-
crease the defenses on those two islands, and we — I agree that it was
proper to go ahead with the plan up until the time it was pretty defi-
nite that an attack was imminent and that ships ought not to go
out.
I call your attention to the fact that, with most of the planes on
those two carriers, they left few back at Pearl, and their western
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2059
position put them actually in quite a good position from which to
counterattack from the north on Oahu.
Senator Ferguson. Is this true; that left no carriers at Pearl Har-
bor, so that Admiral Kimmel could take his battleships out and have
air protection if he wanted to take them out?
Admiral Turner. That is correct. If he had taken them out, in
order to get fighter protection, he would have had to keep pretty
close to land.
Senator Ferguson. Then, when you said this morning that if you
had been in his place, you would have taken your planes out when you
got the warning message — let's say he had the orders to take carriers
and go to Wake and Midway. That left him without any air support
at all for eight or nine battleships that he had and the cruiser.
Admiral Turner. That is correct — No. The cruiser, that is a some-
what difl'ereni matts'r. But by moving the eight or nine battleships
down to the southeastward, 200 or 300 miles, why, they wouldn't need
any protection, off down there.
Carriers act on the offensive.
Senator Ferguson. Did he know which way the attack would come
from ? You say go south that many miles.
Admiral Turner. Southeast.
Senator Ferguson. Southeast. How did he know the attack
wouldn't come from there?
Admiral Turner. The probability of its coming from that direction,
Senator, was, I think, extremel}^ small.
Senator Ferguson. But there was a probability from the [5450']
north in the vacant sea.
Admiral Turner. That was the much more likely place ; that is well
recognized.
Senator Ferguson. What is the difference between an alert mes-
sage and a war warning?
Admiral Turner. We don't use the term, ordinarily, alert; at least
we didn't at that time. The only time we use the teim "alert" in the
Navy is referring to, ordinarily", to an air attack, and the orders were
never issued in those terms anyway. That is, we have conditions of
readiness which mean alert 1, 2, or 3, and various subsequent ones.
Senator Ferguson. On the 24th is that an alert, or a war warning?
Admiral Turner. Neither. An estimate of the major strategic
situation. And it doesn't give, and is not intended to give, to put
them on the alert, except to start getting ready for it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, the war warning message of the 27th, I
just want to ask you a few questions in relation to that.
Do you, in the Navj'', in drawing an instrument such as this, when
you use specific terms and then have a general term, does it relate to
specific terms of the same nature? I am trying to put this in a lay-
man's language and not in a \5Jf51] lawyer's language.
Admiral Turner. Could you illustrate that, please. Senator ?
Senator Ferguson, Yes.
You say here :
An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few clays. The
number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval task
forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines —
you expressly name them —
Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.
2060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
You have got three definite places, either the Philippines, Thai, or
Kra Peninsula, and then one possibility, Borneo.
Now, doesn't that exclude others ?
Admiral Turner. It excludes others against which an amphibious
expedition will be launched within the next few days.
Senator Ferguson. Doesn't the fact that you mention an amphibious
expedition reject other kinds of expeditions, because you specify
amphibious and do not say anything about the others? Wouldn't an
ordinarily prudent naval officer read it that way ?
Admiral Turner. We said in the dispatch of the 24th [54'52']
that a surprise aggressive movement might be expected in any direc-
tion. In this case, the amphibious expedition is the major effort by
the Japanese war machine, and it does not mention the many, many
other types of activities.
For example, it doesn't mention submarines, but it is obvious that
submarines will go out and raid our trade as they did, and it doesn't
mention raids against our trade by surface vessels which we expected.
It doesn't mention expansion of the area occupied by Japan in the
Mandates, down in the little islands, which is certainly to be expected.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, we had all our merchant ships in con-
voys and had battleships with them ?
Admiral Turner. No. I beg your pardon, we did not.
Senator Ferguson. We did not ?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. Many of them were entirely single.
There were only one or two convoys. Most of them were alone.
Senator Ferguson. You didn't expect Admiral Kimmel to take care
of these single ships on the ocean, did you ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir ; by covering the patrol areas and general
covering operations.
Senator FEra;usoN. But you knew he wasn't doing -any of that, if
you looked at the ship board you could have told he had the ships still
in the Pearl Harbor district. You {olfBS^ said you knew he
wasn't doing that ; is that true ?
Admiral Turner. I don't know wliether he would have made the
reports as to the movements of those ships or not.
Senator Ferguson. On page 996 of the record of the Navy top
secret, I want to read this question and this answer :
Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 15, states "a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction is indicated."
That is the one of the 24th, is it not ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
This language is omitted from the dispatch of 27 November, three days later,
wherein there is set out certain Japanese objectives in the Far East. Was this
omission from the dispatch of 27 November done intentionally?
Here is your answei* :
A. I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two dis->
patches. In the one of the 24th, it says, "a surprise, aggressive movement in any
direction is indicated." Now, that movement in any direction could be by naval
forces, air forces, amphibious forces, or anything else. In this other dispatch,
we said "an amphibious expedition is enroute." It was moving down the China
Sea.
Now, those two are quite different. They don't cover [5//54] the same
kind of a subject, and they were intended not to cover it. That was information.
We knew that the Japanese were on the move in the China Sea. That was a fact.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2061
Now the other was deduction as covering generally not only the movement of
aniphibions forces, but tlie movement of any forces.
Do you stand by tliat answer now?
Admiral Tuhneu. Yes, sir, I do; and also I stand by the answer I
gave previously, that all of these dispatches that were sent by the Chief
of Naval Operations, certainly as far back as October 16, should be
considered as a whole, as forming a single series, and they related to
the same subject, and the ground covered in any one is not intended to
be the entire ground.
Senator Ferguson. All right, but on the 24th, you sent the message.
Now, what happens between the 24th and the 27th to send this other
message?
Admiral Tuener. It is getting closer to the deadline of the 29th.
We waited as long as possible. We also find out the final breakdown,
practical breakdown of negotiations.
Senator Ferguson. Then, if we could have drawn here in Washing-
ton the conclusions from the 13 parts and the \64-55] pilot
message that there was another deadline of the delivery of that mes-
sage, that would have made a change so that another message should
have been sent ?
Admiral Turner. I agi^ee that a message should have been sent
about the 1 o'clock note.
Senator Ferguson. Can you account for why you didn't send it,
whose province it was to send it ?
Admiral Turner. Because when I first saw it, I was informed that
the War Department was already sending it and that Admiral Stark
had taken action.
Senator Ferguson. Then the delay was in getting the action to you,
t he message to you ?
Admiral Turner. I think there was very little delay in getting it
tome.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, su])pose it is 2 hours.
Admiral Turner. I was in my office from about 11 : 15.
Senator Ferguson. Was your office alerted for war on the 6th and
the 7th?
Admiral Turner, I had an officer on watch and a stenographer in
there that day.
Senator Ferguson. Was it alerted for war on the 6th and the 7th ?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; it was alerted so far as anything that
we had to do. There was an officer in there [B^^d] and I could
always be gotten.
Senator Ferguson. Was there anybody there to take action ?
Admiral Turner. There were officers there who could get me on
the phone at once, and there was an officer there, a duty officer, who
could take it up with me, or with the Chief of Naval Operations.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever made an investigation to see why
the messages didn't get to you quicker than they did ?
Admiral Turner. I have not, because I believe that they got to me
as fast as they customarily did.
Senator Ferguson. That is all. I want to thank the committee for
staying on. And if my voice was loud. Admiral, it was because I was
iiurrying to get through.
The Vice Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
2062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I have just one concluding question.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, in Exhibit 1, on page 72, in a message from
Nomura at Washington to Tokyo on October 16, 1941, in subparagraph
C, is the following :
It is urgent that a formula be drawn up on the basis of a 50-50 compromise
between Tokyo and Washington (Turner [5-^57] does not think that we
are compromising).
Did you at any time leave any inference that you thought there
should be a 50-50 compromise with Japan?
Admiral Turner. No, I did not.
I thought that was the only possible basis for continued negotiations.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. I would like to make a request. I was wondering
if during the interim I would be permitted to inspect all of the original
intercepts which bear the date of December 6, regardless of the date
upon which they were decoded. I would like to make a comparison.
\ 54^58] Mr. Mitchell. What is the request?
Mr. Gearhart. I wanted to be permitted to inspect all of the origi-
nal intercepts that bear the date of December 6, regardless of when
they were decoded, that appear in Exhibit 1 and the first 30 pages of
Exhibit 2.
Mr. jMitchell. Do you want the photostats or the originals?
Mr. Gearhart. The photostats would do but I want all of the mark-
ings upon them.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't see any reason why we can't get those into
your hands.
Mr. Gearhart. During the interim.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, there is one other question that I
want to ask the Admiral.
Admiral, I would like to have you look at page 22 of Exhibit 2.
That is a message of the 3d of December 1941 and it shows it was
translated on the 11th of December.
Are you familiar with that message?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, if that message was translated by 1 : 30 or
2 o'clock on the day of the 6th as shown by the record of Admiral
Hewitt, and in the Navy Department, on Kramer's de'^k, in the rough,
would that have made any difference in your planning to send notices,
and so forth, [54^9] so far as Hawaii was concerned?
Admiral Turner. I think I would certainly have taken it up with
the Office of Naval Intelligence to" find out what had been done about
it, to send a check — at least a check — message out there to see if they
were familiar with that.
Senator Ferguson. That would have meant that there could be
an attack on Pearl Harbor and they wanted this information for
that purpose ?
Aclmiral Turner. It could be, but it also could easily be what
actually occurred at a later time when Japanese submarines piade
contact with the people on shore and exchanged signals with them
both by day and night.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2063
Senator Ferguson. But it was an important message ?
Admiral Turner. Quite.
Senator Ferguson. And normally would have come to you?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral Turner, is there any other state-
ment or any further information that you desire to give to this com-
mittee on the subject here under investigation?
Admiral Turner. No,sir, there is not.
The Vice Chairman. Is there anything else you think the com-
mittee ought to know about this that you are prepared to tell us?
[^bJfSO'] Admiral Turner. No, sir; there is not.
The Vice Chairman. We desire to thank you for your appearance,
for the information you have given to the committee, your coopera-
tion at this hearing, and to assure you that we feel that you have en-
deavored to cooperate fully, and we appreciate the assistance you
have given us in the testimony presented.
Admiral Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I
thank the members of the committee and counsel for their courtesy
and kindness to me in this hearing.
(The witness was excused.)
The Vice Chairman. The Committee wishes the press and all
others who have worked with us a Merry Christmas and a Happy New
Year, and the committee now stands adjourned until December 31,
at 10 a. m.
(Whereupon, at 5:40 p. m., December 21, 1945, a recess was taken
until 10 a. m., Monday, December 31, 1945.)
Part 5— December 31, 1945, and January 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946—
follows.
X
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