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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BBFOBB THB 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEAEL HAEBOB ATTACK 

CONGBESS OF THE UNITED STATES^ 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS *-^_7^7 

FEBST SESSION 



,92 



FUBSUANT TO / /7^ 

S. Con. Res. 27 ^^^^ 

(79th Congress) f^ > *J^ 

A CJONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 4 

DECEMBER 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

ffS^Cp^i^^ BEFORE THE 

^ JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK 
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS '^J)l^y 
FIRST SESSIONS ^y 

PURSUANT TO A JT" 

S. Con. Res. 27 /j^(^ 

(79th Congress) r>/ y / 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN' 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 4 

DECEMBER 14, 15, 17, IS, 19, 20, AND 21, 1945 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON : 194G 






,9?. 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Miclii- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, Oeneral Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate Oeneral Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov, 


. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


Nov, 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945, 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946, 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, IS, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 

No. Exliibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5269-5291 

3814-3826 
3450-3519 

""5089-5122 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 t 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
'"471-510" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


I 1 tH I I I ( I I I I I I I I I I I I I I T^* CO 1 
iicDiiiiiiiiifititiiiiOiOl 

11: ; ; : 1 : ; ; ! : : : ! 1 : 1 ; 1 rd. ! 
(^11 1 ; i : 1 1 : 1 : ; I ! i 1 ! i 1 ! "^ ! 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 !! 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1(N 

. 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i-T 

1 1 ; i I ; I 1 1 I 1 i 1 1 I 1 1 i ; ; 1 I I ; 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

""660-688" 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

3105-3120" 

2479-2491" 

4022-4027" 
148-186 

2567-2580" 

3972-3988 

2492-2515 

1575-1643" 

3726-3749" 
1186-1220 

1413-1442' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

""391-398" 
"'115-134' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. IS, 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
203-209 

1127-1138 
1033-1038 

1719-1721" 

1219-1224" 

""886-951" 
1382-1399 

""377-389" 
1224-1229 

"'314-320" 


a 
1 


Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Anstey, Alice 

Arnold, H. H., Gen 

Asher, N. F., Ens 

Ball, N. F., Ens_._ 

BaUard, Emma Jane 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlett, George Francis 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berry, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bicknell. George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to iVIay 31, 

194G 


Pages 
5080-5089 

'"3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

Mav 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

163-181 

"418-423" 
"451-464' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

'8'7'-B" 
205 

'B223~224" 
B6.5-66 
B229-231 
49-51 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


3 i 1 ; i i ; ; ; i ; ; i ; ; ; ; M ;! I 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
495-510 


Joint 

Committee 
Exiiibit No. 

145 
(Array Pearl 
Ilarbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3196^3201' 
1928-1965 

3642-3643 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

"179-184" 
"105-114" 

96-105 

74-85 

"368^378" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dee. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


11 1 _ III, iiii 1 iiii 

coo 1 ■'X lOCOOO 1 1 iC0^05 1 1 1 iC^ lOO 1 1 1 ICO 

OC^ 1 it^ lOCcCOS 1 1 I'^t^O 1 1 1 ICO lO 1 1 1 IIO 

S'^CO 1 1^ i_tc,_i 1 1 lOOiOiO 1 1 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 It- 

Sll ii,-^,,-i,-.|lll|,-l| llll(Nl| llllr-l 

oX-^iij i||(iiii(Nl^iiii iiCiiiil 

(ict^o 1 1—1 locoit^ 1 1 ii-iooo IIII ito 1 1 1 ir^ 

Tf CO 1 1 t^ 1 1^ iC 1— 1 1 1 i00CO»C IIII ICO 1 1 1 1^ 

1 1 1— 1 IT— to 1 1 1 lO IIII 1 III 1 t» 
11-HI,— r^ lllT-H IIII 1 |||,,_> 


S 


Craige, Nclvin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN) 

Croslcy, Paul C, Comdr 

Curloy, J. .1. (Ch/CM) J 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN 

Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen 

Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

Dillingham, Walter F._ 

Dillon, James P 

Dillon, John H., Maj 

Dingeman Ray F,., Col 

Doncgan, William Col 

Doud, Harold,' Col 

Duiilop, Robert H., Col 

Dunning, Mary J 

Dusenbury, Carlisle Clyde, Col 

Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0 

Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






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INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


OiiiiliOiCOiliiiiiiii i_- ,-0 1 1 
OiiliiiOCO iiSl^Oil 

lo C3COI iii£2S^c<iii 

lOllllllrf^| II Z^'SiOil 

Si i-iiiiiiiiiiiiT'T'i II 

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0="O iiiiiKNCO iiSSt^ll 

f^iO GO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 iSSJ'^ 1 ' 

lOi Tf< iiii2"*'»Oil 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

541-553 

182-292 

'140^142' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1915) 


iiiCOiiilMiiiiiiiiiii<lD!N (Ni 
iiiOiii— iiiiiiiiiiiiQOlM 0( 

Mill— 1111— 1 Illll— l(M ,-11 

o> 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

= 1 t- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 C5 1 

0,111 iiiOiiiiiiiiiii-* 1 
111 1 1 1 —1 1 1 1 1 1 (M 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 —1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 
^1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

904^918 

028-643 

"734-746' 

"852-885' 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2665-2695' 
3028-3067 

1161-1185' 

2787-2802' 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374' 

2-54' 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214^225 
363-367 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


II 1 1 111 1 1 1 1 III 1 .. 

iiOir-^iC^iOiiiiOiiii-^iiiiC I(M|0> 
1 110 It- IC0O5 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO iiOOOiO 
«ii— 11— ii|Oiii<NiiiiiOiiiOO ICO-^CD 
^11— 11— iiTti,-iiii— iiiiiliii— 1 ijCD— 1 
a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 c±) 1 1 1 1 1 -H 
R, 1 1 CD 1 CO 1 00 1 1 1 <N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO i(N 
ii-^iiOi COiiit-iiii>-OiiiC3 iCO 
11—11^1 OiiKNiiii iiit^ 1 


1 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Maj 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN . 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George "W-, Lt. Comdr 

MacArthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 



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XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION TEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1915) 


Pages 

"387-388' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clau.sen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

45-46 

"179-181' 

232 

76^77' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ I i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


i is i i i ill is^^fs'^^'s i i^ i i§§ 

2 11^ 111 III Vr^i?<='^^ • '^ ' '^^ 

Si.IlI III III l**^"^-—!—-*— -(Ill III— J 

1 i if: 111 III ^^^i^X 1 li 1 i^J. 

II III III '•^ "-' O ^ ^^ 1 1 1 1 o 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160,' 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
237.5-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

1968^1988' 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


111 III III 1 1 ia> 1 1 1 1 

III III III 1 1 ICD 1 1 1 1 

°0 1 1 1 III III 1 1 1 I— 1 1 1 1 1 

111 1 1 : iti 1 1 1 1 

Q, 1 1 1 III III 1 1 ITt< 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


1 iKJ^t^-* 1 1 «c> 1 ,-j-,_-oo 1 1 ICO-* 1 1 1 1 

1 iC:t»<35 1 1 IC 'SiS*^ ' ' '0000 1 1 1 1 

s 1 ;^7:2 ! ; 2 \^^^ ! ! lC:°f 1 I l 1 

^ 1 :^iJ^ 1 : i ig^ ! ! icifS 1 1 1 1 

1 l?^^S \ \ -^ ]^^ \ 1 l^'^ 1 1 1 1 


o 

a 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, MUlard, Col 

Pine, WiUard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

PoweU, BoUing R., Jr., Maj 

Powell, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Lou ise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, William S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XIV COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15. 1945, 

to May 31, 

1948 


'n Illl IgoS 1 :^ ! igf^'jfg^ ! low 1 1 I 
.17 1 1 1 1 177 1 1^ 1 :^?3loS7 1 ;^^ i 1 i 

Jig i i i i ::i§ i ii i :§^s§g \'M\\\ 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

4-9 
'335-375' 

411-413 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

."'69' 
195-197 

203-204 

185' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarko 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1045) 


1 1 1 1 i(N 1 1 1 1 Ic^ 1 1 111 III 

t \ \ III ! 1 1 I I 11 III III 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lO llllilN ^llll ^-^-0 III III 

it^ 1 1 1 1 it^ 00 1 1 1 iSi^ZS-^ 111 111 

Si(N IlliiiCOiiiiS^^aO III III 
^ lO 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 1 1 J, J, "* 

fti i(N 1 1 1 1 ic^ j^ 1 1 1 I'^Sr- 1 

ic<j iiiiiici^iiiix^t^ 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ^ III 111 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


^"lO icOii II iiO-^iQili 

lO-^-<lfiGOllll IIIIII ll~-C5 III 
jjCDiO'J<iCliii iiOO III 

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'*<(N— I'Oiii ICOCO.III 

CO-Tfii'M iiiii IIOO III 

M -S< 1 CO 1 1 1 1 IIIIII 1 -^ tH III 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

32-65" 
323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

"'37-169,' 
1617-1647 
452-455 

1738^1742 

'1186-1196" 
1805-1808 


B 


Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN_. 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

Stilphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 



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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1915, 

to May 31, 

1940 


Pages 
"""1723-1911 

'""3"2"3"3'-3"2'5"9", 
3303-3354 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

""389^410' 

376^386 
541-553 
597-602 

442-450 


Joint 

Conmiittee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 Ici i 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 

00 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17 i 1 1 1 17 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 

a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 O- 1 1 1 1 1 li^ 

CI, 1 1 1 1 1 1 lOO 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 O^ 1 

2 1 1 1 1 o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

O 1 1 1 1 1 1 T-l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

^ ! ; ; : 1 ; 1 ; : 1 ici 1 : 1 : : ; i i : 

1 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 

'O 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
2722-2744 
3120-3124 

1989^2007" 

2456-2478 

134.5^1381" 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683" 



3750-3773 
3357-3586" 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
""279-288" 

379^382 


Joint 

Comiiiittee 

Exliihit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. IH, 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

1311-1329 

496-499 

1830-1842 

1334-1340 

""247-259" 

1.525-1538 
1083-1705 


Witness 


ells, B. IE, Maj. Gen 

-St, Melbourne H., Lt. Col 

laling, William J., Lt. Col 

lite, William R., Brig. Gen 

chLser, Rea B 

Ike, We.slie T 

Ikinson, T. S., Rear Adm , 

lloughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Isoii, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Ison, Erie M., Col 

mer, Benjamin R., Col 

thers, Ihomas, Rear Adm 

Dng, Ahoon H 

jodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

jodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), XJSN- 

3olley, Ralph E 

right, Wesley A., Comdr 

vman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

rk, Yee Kam 

charias, Ellis M., Capt., USN 

cca, Emil Lawrence 


?:?:i$p££5:^CScScS:sS:sScS:cS^pS {g^^pS^^t^ N 1 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1585 



Uyo\ ' PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee of the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington.^ D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson 
and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, 
Gearhart arid Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

{4196~\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Mr, Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, before General Gerow's examina- 
tion continues I have a statement to present to the committee about the 
situation of the legal staff, if I may do it. 

The Chairman. Yes ; the chair will recognize counsel for that pur- 
pose. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, the point we have reached in the 
hearings makes it evident that a complete replacement of the com- 
mittee's legal staff is necessary. 

The committee began its hearings No^ember 15 and has been sitting 
regularly for a month, including all Saturdays but one. During that 
period only 8 witnesses have been completely examined and we esti- 
mate that as the field of inquiry by committee members has widened 
out and new witnesses have been added to the list, there remain at 
least 60 witnesses to be examined. Many of these witnesses are quite 
as crucial as those Avho have testified. At the rate of progress during 
the past month, it seems certain that several more months of hearings 
will be required. 

When I undertook to serve the committee as chief counsel, I believed 
that my services would not be needed beyond early January. This re- 
sulted from several factors : 

I had and still have a definite conviction that the real piu'pose of 
this committee was to prCvSent facts which [4 ^•9'/] would per- 
mit a final answer to this basic question : Who was responsible for the 
failure of our forces at Hawaii to be on the alert and for the admitted 
failure to use to the best advantage such defense facilities as were avail- 
able at Pearl Harbor? 

The joint resolution of the Congress under which tlie committee is 
acting requires a final report of the committee to be made not later 
than January 3, 1946. I assumed that time limit meant what it said. 

^ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of 
testimony. 

79716— 46— pt. 4 2 



1586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I had every reason to feel that the essential facts bearing on this 
basic question could be presented thoroughly within the time set. 
There had already been six inquiries into this question. As a result 
we had as a starting point the testiinony of most of the principal par- 
ticipants and a substantial amount of documentary material previously 
assembled. At the beginning of my employment, as I then informed 
the committee, I undertook with my staff to spend approximately 6 
weeks in the preparation of evidence and I stated to the committee 
that commencing on or about November 15 we would be in a position 
to present in an organized and orderly fashion the evidence which 
we had assembled. 

I have never had the idea, nor do I have it today, that counsel should 
be the sole judge as to what evidence should be presented to the com- 
mittee or what avenues of inquiry the committee should follow. I 
thought that there are cer- [^7P<§] tain essential facts, as to 
which there could be no doubt as to pertinence or relevance, which 
counsel should present at the outset in order to lay out the basic ground- 
work. I thought and so stated to the committee that at the conclusion 
of this presentation, which we had every reason to feel could be com- 
pleted well within the time limit set, the committee would then be in a 
position to appraise the case as a whole and determine what additional 
evidence was required or whether any other witnesses should be called. 

Since the start of the hearing it has become increasingly apparent 
that some members of the committee have a different view than that 
entertained by counsel, either as to the scope of the inquiry or as to 
what is pertinent evidence. This has been reflected in extensive ex- 
amination by some members of the committee far beyond what the 
legal staff anticipated. 

This unexpected development during the last month has made it 
clear to me and all of my staff that it is not possible to complete the 
hearings within anything approximating the time I originally antici- 
pated, and. accordingly. 1 am certain of my own inability, and that of 
my staff, to see the job through to the end. All of my staff accepted 
their places on my expectation and assurances that they would not be 
held for any considerable time after January 1st. My own obliga- 
tions and responsibilities put me in the same [410.9] position. 

This outcome is a source of deep concern and regret to me and to 
the other members of my staff. I did not want the place as counsel, 
but under the circumstances I felt I could not refuse it. I had hoped 
to perform a useful public service in aiding to present publicly all the 
pertinent facts which would permit the committee, the Congress, and 
the public to answer the questions in their minds. Our entii"e staff 
has worked days, nights, and Sundays for 2 months and a half. We 
have produced, or prepared for introduction, much pertinent evidence 
that has never been produced at any previous inquiry about Pearl 
Harbor. We are all depressed that because of the course of the pro- 
ceedings we have not been able to ])resent it. 

It is necessary for me to ask the committee to arrange for other 
counsel to carry on. If that is done with reasonable promptness there 
should be no serious break in the hearings. We have already done a 
large part of the work in digging out and organizing basic material 
and documents, and arranging for the witnesses. 

I want to make it clear that there has been no restriction placed 
upon counsel by any member of the committee or by any agency 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINt COMMITTEE 1587 

of the Government as far as presenting pertinent evidence i% con- 
cerned. We have had access to all pertinent records and have received 
complete cooperation from [4^00] all Government depart- 
ments concerned. I feel sure that this same condition will continue. 
We will make every effort to aid the new counsel in preparing for 
their work and, during that process, we can, if the committee desires, 
continue, for the rest of December and for a short time in January, 
presenting evidence to the committee so that the new legal staff can 
pick up the case and carry on. 

[4301] The Chairman. The Chair would like to state, in con- 
nection with that statement of our chief counsel, that in his opinion 
the development as outlined there is, as far as this committee is con- 
cerned and the Congress, the country I think, tragic. 

I would like to say for the record that when this committee was 
appointed — I will go back of that, when the reports that were re- 
leased of the War Inquiry Board and Navy Board of Inquiry, I 
think in August, there was a general feeling, in which I shared and so 
stated on the floor of the Senate, that the confusion growing out of 
the various investigations and reports was such that, in my judgment, 
it required a congressional investigation. I felt that it was a responsi- 
bility of the majority party in Congress to make that investigation 
and accept the responsibility and whatever the consequences might 
be, and believing that I introduced the resolution under which we have 
been acting since the 6th of September, I tliink, or since its adoption 
by the House. 

One of the first tasks to be performed was the selection of counsel. 
That was not an easy task. We had a number of applications for ap- 
pointment of chief counsel by able lawyers. I think the committe^e 
felt we would have to draft somebody, some outstanding man whose 
character and whose record for ability, integrity, and experience in 
legal matters, and \_4202'] especially in the Governmental set- 
ups, would insure a thorough and nonpartisan examination into this 
question. 

The first name suggested, or that occurred to me and to other mem- 
bers of the committee, and I think generally, was Hon. William D. 
Mitchell, who had been Solicitor General 4 years in the Coolidge Ad- 
ministration, and had been Attorney General for 4 years in the Hoover 
Administration. 

I called Mr. Mitchell over the telephone in New York and told liim 
that I had been authorized to consult him as to the availability of his 
services, and he said that he had a busy law practice and he was not 
seeking any additional assignments, but if the committee felt that 
he was the man desired to conduct this investigation from a legal 
standpoint, he would accept. 

I asked him to come down to Washington to sit with the commit- 
tee and discuss it, vrhich he did. He was unanimously selected, and 
the press generally, and the country, reacted most favorably to that 
selection, and I think botli Houses of Congress did also. 

The committee authorized him to select his own staff, because if he 
were to be responsible for the conduct of the investigation from the 
standpoint of the counsel, obviously it was necessary for him to select 
men with whom he could work and in whom he had confidence, and so 
he set about to [4^03] make the selection of his assistants. No 



1588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

injunction or suggestion was made to him, as far as I know, certainly 
not in the committee, and if anybody individually made any such 
suggestion 1 am not aware of it, that there should be any politics or 
any partisanship in the selection of counsel. 

The chairman of this committee does not know now and has never 
inquired whether any member of this legal staff were Democrats or 
Republicans. 

Mr. Mitchell came down and began to organize his staff and to look 
into the mass of records involved in this investigation. It was a 
herculean task, involving the State, War and Navy Departments, and 
other agencies of the Government, and. as Mr. Mitchell has said, they 
liave worked day and night and Sundays in making available to the 
committee everything that appeared to be pertinent to the inquiry 
without restriction and immediately. 

I, as chairman of the committee, asked all the departments, from 
the President on down, to make available to the counsel every bit of 
pertinent record or testimony that might bear upon this investigation. 

The chairman of the committee has been, of course, as chairman, in 
touch with counsel. It was necessary to confer with him day by day 
over details that it was unnecessary and impossible for the commit- 
tee to do as a whole. That is one [4^04-] of the functions of 
the chairman. The chairman is able to say, without reservation, that 
Mr. Mitchell, and his entire staff, have devoted themselves conscien- 
tiously, without sparing themselves in any way, in undertaking to 
develop the evidence tliat the connnittee niiglit want or might feel 
that it needed in order to make an investigation available to the public 
and held in public, so that the people themselves would know every 
word of testimony produced here and make up their own minds about 
the responsibility of anybody in the Government for the disaster at 
Pearl Harbor, regardless of the opinion of any member of the com- 
mittee, or of the committee as a whole. 

The chairman feels like saying to Mr. Mitchell, and to his entire 
staff, that in his experience as a legislator covering 33 years, and a 
longer experience in public life and in the practice of law, he does not 
recall a more diligent, earnest, painstaking, unselfish effort made by a 
lawyer or group of lawyers to perform their services as a public duty. 

When Mr. Mitchell was asked to come down here he insisted that 
he did not want to consider any question of compensation, that what 
he did would be a matter of public duty. 

One or two members of his staff have insisted likewise, that they were 
not interested in any compensation that the committee or Congress 
might pay them. They have sacrificed their time and income in order 
to serve this committee and, [4^05] as they felt, serve the 
country and do a constructive job in presenting this case, in present- 
ing the evidence and in digging it out, which the committee could not 
do as a committee. 

Late yesterday afternoon Mr. Mitchell called me, as chairman of this 
committee, into the office where he and his staff had been engaged in 
work and advised me that they would be compelled, under the cir- 
cumstances, to take the step which they have now taken, I attempted 
to dissuade them from that decision and asked them to consider it 
overnight, in the hope that they might reach a different conclusion. 
They have not reached a different conclusion. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1589 

Now it is a tra<>edy that we are to lose the services of these gentlemen. 
To select new counsel at this time, or within the next week or two, 
involves a difHculty the result and solution of which I cannot now 
foresee. I do not know to what extent any lawyer, or any group of 
lawyers, who are engaged in their own practice, who have a rep- 
utation and standing as lawyers and as citizens that would justify 
their selection by tliis comnuttee, would be available. 

The chairman does not know whether it would be possible at all 
under the circumstances to substitute counsel who would be in a posi- 
tion to undertake the onerous task which would devolve upon such 
comisel, notwithstanding the groundw^ork which has been laid by the 
counsel and his assistants. 

[4:^06] The Chair expresses his profound regret that the situ- 
ation, as it has developed up to now, has required the action taken by 
General Mitchell and his assistant counsel. I cannot make any predic- 
tion. I have no idea who might be willing to take over the job. I 
have no idea how much longer these hearings will last. 

When I introduced the resolution and fixed the 3d of January as 
die date for making the report I honestly believed that we could, 
within 4 months from that date, bring about the development of this 
evidence publicly and make our report on the 3d day of January. 
On account of the mass of detailed information and documents that 
had to be gone into by the counsel, it took some time to arrange all 
that and to get it available, and there was a little more delay in the 
beginning of the hearings than I, at the time of the introduction of 
the resolution, anticipated. 

[4^07^ On the whole, I think that was a timesaver in this re- 
spect ; that it gathered and selected and made available the informa- 
tion from the standpoint of the presentation of the case, and that 
that delay which was necessary as it turned out did not in any way 
cause any undue postponement of the beginning of the hearing. 

It is obvious now to all of us that the hearings cannot be concluded 
and the report made by the 3d of January, and that an extension of 
time must be requested of the Senate and House. How much more 
time will be required, the Chair would not even prophesy. 

We have had, as General Mitchell has said, 10 witnesses up to now, 
only 8 of whom have been concluded, as far as the examination is 
concerned, with 2 more still on the stand and unconcluded, and at 
the rate of progress made in the examination of these w^itnesses, it 
would be difficult to prophesy how many months it would require 
to conclude this testimony. 

The chairman wishes to say that he not only did not seek appoint- 
ment to this committee, notwithstanding the fact that he introduced 
the resolution, he did not seek appointment to this committee, but 
protested against his appointment and argued with the President of 
the Senate for days, seeking to persuade him not to appoint the 
[4208'] chairman as a member of the committee. 

As majority leader of the Senate I had all that any ordinary human 
being could be expected to do, and I realized that in order to give 
this position the service and to do the justice to which it was entitled, 
I would have to abandon my duties temporarily as Majority Leader, 
and almost as a Senator. 

I must, in my own mind, decide whether I have any further duty 
in regard to this investigation, and w'hether, if I have any duty, it 



1590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

outweighs my duty on the floor of the Senate in the capacity in which 
I have been chosen by that body, and in which I served for more than 
8 years. 

I must say in good conscience, and say it publicly, and I think the 
committee is entitled to have me say that during the next few days 
I will weigh my relative objections as a member of this committee 
alongside of my obligations as a member of the Senate and as Ma- 
jority Leader, and if I conclude in my own mind that I must make the 
decision that my duties in the Senate over the next 3 or 4 or 6 months, 
whatever the time may be outweigh my duties as a member of this 
committee I shall thereupon surrender my chairmanship of this corn- 
committee and resign as a member of the committee. 

If I conclude in my own mind — and I must again say [4^09] 
I must reach the decision myself — that I can render any additional 
service as a member of this committee over a period of months, and 
that that service and that obligation may outweigh my obligation on 
the floor of the Senate, I shall decide accordingly. But I feel that, 
in view of the whole situation as we all understand it here, I must 
within the next few days reach a conclusion as to what my course 
will be. 

Wliatever my course will be, I want chief counsel and all his assist- 
ants to know that I have appreciated their contribution to this devel- 
opment in this public hearing, and to the evaluation of the testimony, 
and the service which all of us have assumed they would and that they 
have rendered. 

I have never in so brief a time been associated with men in the 
legal profession or in legislation for whom I have a more profound 
respect and in whom I have greater confidence, and I want them to 
know that as far as I am concerned, and I think I speak for the 
committee in that respect. 

That is all I feel like saying. I cannot but feel depressed, immeas- 
urably depressed over this development and I don't think I need say 
anything more at the moment. 

Senator George. Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted to [4^10'] 
make a very brief statement? 

The Chairman. Senator George. 

Senator George. I think the Chairman of the committee knows, and 
I know the President of the Senate well understands, I have remained 
on the committee because I felt we were fortunate in securing the 
assistance and aid of General jNIitchell. 

I have been perfectly willing fr )ni the outset to allow General 
Mitchell and his staff, in whom I have complete confidence, to organize 
and lay out this inquiry. I have believed that there was not but 
one way to ascertain the truth and answer the question, which, under 
the Senate resolution we were called upon to consider, and that was 
to get a complete view of the pertinent, relevant, and material facts 
that could be developed only through the conscientious work and 
skill of counsel. 

Of course, I recognize the right of all members of the connnittee 
to cross-examine witnesses at any length, but I have wondered whether 
or not we were confusing the issue rather than arriving at any answer 
in which the public could have any confidence. I still feel that way 
about it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1591 

I deeply regret (xeiiei-al Mitchell's decision and the decision of the 
other members of his staff. I appreciate [4211] the facts 
stated by (Tcneral Mitchell to this committee this morning, and I 
think it is only fair to say that all members of the committee under- 
stood that General Mitchell hoped to conclude the inquiry by or 
very soon after the turn of the year, as he has alj-eady stated to us. 

1 merely wish to say that I deejily legret the decision which General 
Mitchell and his staff have been forced to make in the circumstances, 
in view of the now clearly indicated length of this inquiry, and I 
know that their separation from service here with this committee 
is a loss to the committer, to the Congress as a whole, and I think 
to the country. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I say just a word? 

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I desire to concur in what the able 
Senator from Georgia, and the able Senator from Kentucky have 
said with respect to this announcement of General Mitchell this 
morning. It is a source of deep regret to me that General Mitchell 
and his staff feel it necessary to leave this extremely important 
national assignment, and I say without fear of contradiction that it 
is a great loss to the American people, in view of the magnificent job 
that they have done up to date. 

I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that General Mitchell [4^12] 
and his staflf will continue through this month, and that these hearings 
ma}^ continue from day to day just as we have planned them. 

It may be that by January 3, we will have a better opportunity to 
assess the time necessary to conclude the hearings. Of course, in the 
meantime we can be arranging for counsel to take over should the con- 
tingency arise that it will be necessary to extend this hearing. 

I want to say in conclusion, as one member of the committee, I had 
never met any of these gentlemen before beginning my service with the 
committee. 

I had frequently read and heard about General Mitchell. The first 
time I ever met him or saw him was when he appeared before our 
committee for the first time. I was deeply impressed with his frank, 
opening statement. I concurred in wdiat he wanted to do. That was 
to bring in every shred of evidence that they could possibly find that 
would throw any light upon this Pearl Harbor clisaster. Counsel 
selected to aid him in this cause have been more than diligent in the 
preparation of this case. 

I again reiterate that it is a tremendous loss to this committee and to 
the country that these fine men feel it necessary to remove themselves 
from their assigimient. 

The Chairman. The Chairman would like to say that [^^IS] 
General Mitchell and his staff have assured him that they will continue 
until the committee takes its recess for the Christmas holidays. It 
has been my thought that we would recess for the Christmas holidays 
probably Saturda3% the 22nd, but it may be more convenient for some 
members to recess the 2lst. Under the circumstances, it doesn't make 
much difference, apparently. So that we will have the services of 
General IMitchell ancl his staff until such time as the committee recesses 
for the holidays, and in the meantime we may be able to assess the 
situation more accurately. 



1592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to detain tlie 
committee longer than to concur with the Chairman, the Senator from 
Georgia and the Senator from Illinois in the remarks they have made. 

It had not been my privilege to know General Mitchell or any of 
the members of his staff prior to the time they Avere selected for work 
with this committee. 

I have been most favorably impressed by all of them. I think they 
have done an outstanding job, and have rendered an outstanding pub- 
lic service. As a member of the committee I regret exceedingly that 
the situation has developed so H2H~] that they feel they must 
not continue longer than the end of this month in the excellent service 
that they have reiidered the committee. 

It is a matter of very great regret that the situation could not have 
developed so that we could have gone on with this investigation as was 
originally planned, outlined, and understood, and under the able guid- 
ance of General Mitchell and his staff. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. I want to state on the record that in my judgment, 
Mr. Mitchell has held positions of great honor in this country; he has 
an outstanding reputation as a lawyer ; he and his staff have been able, 
conscientious, sincere, thorough, and have thus far made a clear pres- 
entation of the facts in this inquiry. 

I regret that it has been necessary for him and his staff, in view of 
tlie developments, to come to the conclusion they have. 

[4^16] The Chairman. General Gerow, I believe, is now here 
and ready to proceed. I have forgotten who was examining. 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel was examining. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

TESTIMONY OF IT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW (Resumed) 

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, I understand you have in mind ask- 
ing for some corrections in the transcript of your testimony? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you like to present them now ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

In reviewing my testimony given before this committee on 5 De- 
cember 194.5, I have found several statements made by me Avhich for 
purposes of the record should be clarified : 

(a) On page 2643, lines 24 and 25, and page 2644, lines 2 and 3, com- 
mittee coimsel stated as follows : 

Go to the third itfiu in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow 
No. n : please look at that and sive us the date of that and briefly just what the 
scope of that plan is, or was? 

The bound folder which was handed me contained two documents, 
i. e., Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 and a 
revision thereof dated November 19, 1941. I apparently read from 
the revision rather than the original [4^16] document. Since 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1593 

the War Depaitineiit Operations Plan, Eainbow No. 5 was based on 
the orio-inal joint phui and not on the revision thereof and since it is 
therefore my belief that I should have identified and quoted from the 
orio:inal plan, my statement as it appears on page 2643, lines 24 and 
25, and page 2644, lines 2 and -1. should have been as follows: 

There are two plans in this folder : Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — 
Rainbow No. 5 and a revision lliereof. Tlie original plan was approved by the 
Secretai-y of the Navy on 28 May 1941 and by the Secretary of War on 2 June 
1^1. It was never approved by tlie I'resident. Tlie revision of the plan was 
approved by the Joint l?o;n-(l on 1') November 1041. 

I can best descril>e tliis plan by quoting the general assumptions as stated in 
the original Rainbow No. "> plan. 

" 'Section III. General Assumptions. That the Associated Powers, comprising 
initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Nether- 
lands East Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the 
"Free French" are at war against the Axis Powers, comprising either : 

" 'a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or 

" 'b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand. 

" 'That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in [^217] accord 
with ABC-1 and ABC-22. 

" 'Tiiat even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility 
of their intervention must be taken into account. 

" 'That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be 
able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical 
materials, from sources in that general region. 

" 'That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive 
elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct 
attack ; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will 
be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.' " 

Again : 

(b) On page 2646, lines 11, 12, and 13 in commenting on the fact 
that the War Department Operations Plan which you handed me bore 
no date, I stated: 

I know it was sent to Hawaii in August, 1941, and the receipt was received 
back from the War Department on September 3, 1941. 

This would have been more accurately stated as follows: 

This plan was approved by the Chief of Staff and sent to the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department in August, 1941. [^SiS] The records of 
the War Department show that a receipt for this document, dated 3 September 
1941, from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was received in the 
War Department on 15 September 1941. 

Again : 

(c) On i^age 2646, lines 14, 15, and 16, the committee counsel stated 
as follows: 

The next item here is extracts from Hawaiian Defense Projects, Revision 1940. 
Will you look at that and tell me the scope and nature of that document and 
the date. 

My answer to that should have been as follows : 

Yes, sir. This document was prepared in Hawaii. It is a local plan or rather 
defense project based on Joint Army and Navy War Plan (Orange) 1938. 

Again: 

(d) On page 2647, lines 14 to 17, the committee Chairman stated : 

May I ask of the General : You say this was in 1940, and based on that previous 
item which you have just discussed which seems to have been approved in 
August, 1941. Is not there some divergence as to dates? 



1594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I see that my answer to that question was not quite clear. It would 
have been better answered as follows : 

This defense project was not based on War Department Ui219] Opera- 
tions Plan — Rainbow No. 5 approved in August, 1941. This document is a com- 
pilation of approved projects for personnel, armament, materiel and funds. It 
was compiled by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as of December 
1, 1940. 

This document was referred to the War Department where the separate proj- 
ects contained therein were reviewed to determine that they were in accordance 
with approved War Department directives. When new separate projects, sub- 
mitted by tlie Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, were approved by 
the War Department the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was noti- 
fied by letter or radio that these projects were then included in the next com- 
pilation of this document. 

The 1940 edition of the Hawaiian Defense Project is based on tlie Army mission 
as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan Orange 1938, which is substantially 
the same as that contained in War Department Operations Plan — Rainbow 
#5, August 1941. 

Again : 

(e) On page 2647, line 25, and page 2G48, line 2. committee counsel 
asked the following question : 

The next item is joint coastal defense plan, Hawaii. What is that? 

My answer would have been more clearly stated as follows : 

[4220] This is a joint plan that was prepared by the local Commanders in 
Hawaii, Army and Navy. It is based on the joint Army and Navy Basic War 
Plans and the Army and Navy plans furnished by the War and Navy Departments. 

(f) On page 2650, lines 23 and 24, committee counsel in questioning 
me regarding the "5 November, 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, 
Hawaiian Department," asked : 

Did you .see that document before December 6, 1941? 

to which I replied : 

I don't recall ever having seen it before December 7. I think the records of 
the War Department show it came in later in 1942. 

I have since had the War Department records checked and find that 
that document was received in the War Department on March 7, 1942. 

The purpose of most of those corrections, sir. is to correct the dates, 
that I did not liave with me at the time, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow. I want to direct your attention to 
the events of December 6 and 7. 1941, and particularly in relation to 
this so-called 14-part message that Avas intercepted, the message from 
the Japanese Government to their Ambassadors in Washington, of 
which 13 parts were translated before midnight and the 14th part 
and the 1 p. m. part on the morninsf of the 7th. 

[4^21] You have that in mind, have you? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell us, if you remember, what your move- 
ments were on the afternoon and the evening of December 6. Have 
you any recollection of that ? 

General Geroav. No, sir ; I have no clear recollection of where I was 
on the afternoon of the 6th. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am more interested in the evening of the 6th, after 
the dinner hour. Do you remember that? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not recall. I believe though, sir, that 
I was at home. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1595 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, if this 13th part of this message had 
been translated, decoded and translated, by the Signal Corps, Signal 
Intelligence Service, it was their custom to deliver the decoded mes- 
sage, or exhibit the decoded message, to you in your office, was that 
the practice ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; that was the practice. 

Mr. Mitchell. In case of your absence from the office, for instance, 
on the evening of the 6th, was there anybody there in War Plans 
Division whose function it was to receive the copy of the decoded 
message or make any effort to reach you ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; there was no one actually in the office. The 
procedure, sir, was to designate what we [4^232] call a duty 
officer for each day. The responsibilit}^ of that duty officer was to 
remain — he could go home- — but he remained at his telephone so he 
could be reached at any time by the Adjutant General or the Office 
of the Chief of Staff. He could get in toucli with me and inform me 
of any important messages that might be intended for me, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. If the Signal Intelligence Service people translated 
a message of that type on the evening of the 6th, what would be the 
practice that they would follow in endeavoring to have copies of it 
delivered to the War Plans Division or to you or to a duty officer, how 
does that work ? 

General Geroav. I think, sir, if they had an important message to 
deliver to me that Colonel Bratton, who usually delivered those mes- 
sages, would have teleplioned me at my home, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. In other words, the message would go from the 
Signal Corps, Signal Intelligence Service, to G-2, would it, and then 
to you, or would it come direct to your office? 

General Gerow. It was delivered to my office bv a representative of 
G-2. 

Mr. Mitchell. G-2. So that in order to reach you personally a 
decoded copy of such a message would pass first through G-2 and then 
to your office or your duty officer? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; that would be the procedure, sir. 

[4£23'\ Mr. Mitchell. So that on the evening of the 6th if G-2 
wanted to ])lace a copy of such message in your hands, their arrange- 
ment would have been that they would have to call your duty officer, 
locate you through him? 

General Gerow. No, sir. My telephone number was on record in 
the War Department and I believe the representative of G-2 would 
have called me directly rather than calling the duty officer. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you on the night of the 6th receive any copy or 
learn of any such message as the 13-part message? 

General Gerow, To the best of my knowledge and belief I did not, 
sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. There was a pilot message which came in earlier and 
which was an announcement by the Japs to their Ambassadors to look 
o'lt for the long message which was to follow. It is found on page 
238 of exhibit 1. 

Will you look at it and see whether you ever on the 6th were informed 
of the receipt of that message, or if you have any recollection about it? 

General Gerow. I do not recall having received that message, sir. 

Mv MrrcHELL. What is your recollection about going to your office 
or to the War Department on the morning of Sunday, December 7, 



1596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1941? Do you remember your movements on that [-^^4] 
morning ? 

General Geeow. I remember, sir, that I went to the office that morn- 
ing. I believe I arrived there shortly before 10 o'clock. There was 
some unfinished business that I had to take care of with some of my 
senior officers and we met there on Sunday morning and were there. 
I think, prior to 10 o'clock, sir. 

[.f'?,^.5l Mr. Mitchell. Did you see or learn of this fourteenth 
])art and 1 p. m. decoded series of messages on the morning of the 7th 
at any time? 

General Gerow. The first time I saw them, sir, was in the office of 
the Chief of Staff about 11 : 30, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you state what occurred there? 

General Gerow. May I refresh my memory? I submitted a memo- 
randum on that shortly after the event. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you produce that memorandum? It is in evi- 
dence as exhibit 39, and it has already been read to the committee, but 
will you please look at it? 

General Gerow. Sliall I read it, sir? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I think it would be well to do so. and bring 
out the contents again. 

General Geuow. It would be much more accurate than my memory, 
sir, at the present time. 

This is a memorandum for record, dated December 15. 1941 : 

On Sunday, December 7, 1941. about 11 : 30 a. m., e. s. t., General Marshall 
called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. Gen- 
eral Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been 
directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941. 
He felt that the Japanese Govern- [4226] ment instructions to deliver 
the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The penciled 
draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East ; 
CG, Caribbean Defense Command ; CG, Hawaiian Department ; and CG Fourth 
Army was read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. 
Colonel Bratton was directed to take the penciled draft of the message to the 
Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. 
Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes, and informed General INLarshall that 
the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach 
destinations in about 30 minutes. The penciled draft was typed later during 
the day and formally made of record. 

Signed, "L. T. Gerow. Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief 
of Staff." 

Mr. INIi tchell. Do you remember anything more about that incident 
than is stated in your memorandum? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I cannot recall anything that is not stated 
in this memorandum, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Before you went to General Marshall's office at his 
request, had you heard from anyone of the receipt :iiid decoding of 
that message? 

General Gerow. I had not, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Had you seen or talked witli C\)lonel [42£7] 
Bratton about it? 

General Gerow. To tlie best of my know ledge and belief I had not, 
sir. 

Mr, Mitchell. Had General Miles had any conversations with you 
about it before vou went to General Marshall's office? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1597 

General Gerow. 1 do not recall having seen General Miles that 
morning until I saw him in the office of the Chief of Staft' at 11 : 30, sir.- 

Mr. Mitchell. Referring back to the period from November 27 on, 
after the so-called alert messages were sent out to the commanders of 
the overseas stations, do you recall that after that warning of the 27th, 
which you sent over General Marshall's signature to the commander 
at Hawaii, and to others, any discussion took place that you partici- 
pated in, or knew about as to sending any additional warnings? 

.General Gerow. No, sir. I do not recall any discussions on that 
point. 

Mr. Mitchell. 1 think, if the committee please, that that is all I 
have at the present from General Gerow. I suggest the committee 
inquire from him. 

The Vice Chairman. General Gerow, you were head of War Plans 
Division at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, [42£8] as 
you have testified ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You participated in the drafting of the mes- 
sage of November 27 to the commanding general of the Hawaiian 
department, and the other commanders to whom that message was 
sent? 

General Gerow. I did, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you regard that message to the command- 
ing general of the Hawaiian department as adequate and sufficient as 
an alert message ? 

General Gerow. I did, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator George. 

Senator George. I have no questions at this time. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr, Clark. 

Mr. Clark. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that someone else will ask 
every question that I could possibly think of, so 1 defer any 
questioning. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas. ^ 

Senator Lucas. I have no questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire. 

Mr. Murphy. General Gerow, there has been some testimony in 
the several hearings, by Colonel Bratton, about some attempt to get in 
touch with someone in your office, as I [4229] recall it,^ to 
deliver the 13-part message. Have you made any inquiry as to 
whether or not any attempt was made to deliver that by actually 
making contact with someone on your staff on the night of December 
6,1941? 

General Gerow. I have made no such inquiry, sir. I think if any 
of my officei's had been contacted on that impoi'tant message, they 
would have informed me, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you did not. as you presently recollect 
have any notice wdiatsoever of the 13-part message until you arrived 
in General Marshall's office on the morning of the 7th ? 

General Gerow. That is the first time I recall having seen that 
message. 

jMr. Murphy. There has been some testimony in the previous hear- 
ings about a pouch that was delivered on the night of the 6th. There 
has been some doubt as to what actual papers were in that pouch. 



1598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Avlielhor it was the 13-part message or the so-called pilot message, and 
' other papers of the aftei'noon of the 6th. Do you know whether you 
ever received the pilot message prior to your going to General Mar- 
shall's office? 

General Gerow. I do not recall having seen this message, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you know what the pilot message as [4'2'30] 
I'eferi'ed to here, is? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mv. Murphy. Now, then, do you recall having been in General 
Marshall's office when Colonel Bratton was sent to the Signal Corps 
end of the War Department to inquire as to how long it would take 
to dispatch the message of December 7 to the Pacific theaters? 

General Geeoav. Yes, sir; I was in his office at the time and I recall 
that, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. After Colonel Bratton was sent, or directed by Gen- 
eral Marshall to make that inquiry, do you recall his returning to 
General Marshall's office ? 

General Geroav. I can recall that he came back and reported that 
it would take about 30 minutes. 

Mr. Murphy. Was that to send it to all of the Pacific theaters, the 
Panama Canal, the IJawaiian Department, the Philippine Depart- 
ment, and possibly Alaska ? 

General Gerow. I don't recall that that question came up at the 
time, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the message had been directed to be sent 
to the several Pacific theaters? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, after the message of the 27th was sent, 
you said tlie other day that it was your impression [4^S1] 
when the Short reply arrived that it was in answer to the other mes- 
sages sent as to sabotage, rather than in answer to the command for 
an alert from General Marshall. At that time the gentleman from 
Wisconsin suggested that you be asked about the fact that it was 
signed "Marshall," that is, the message going out. And the answer 
was directed to "Marshall." Do you recall that? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ISIuRPHY. Of course, the Short message did say that it was in 
reply to 472. You would not know then what 472 was; is that right? 

General Gerow. I would not know at that time; no, sir, because 
that is a number put on to the message by the Signal Corps, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, the war plans, in effect at Hawaii between 
General Short and Admiral Kimmel, called for cooperation and 
liaison in regard to reconnaissance, and in regard to the use of the 
equipment there in the event of an emergency, did it not? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. It was the standing rule over the yeai-s for the War 
Department at Hawaii, and the Navy Department to have liaison, 
was it not? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

[4£S2] Mr. Murphy. So that when General Short sent the mes- 
sage in reply to General Marshall's message of the 27th, and said 
"Liaison with Navy," did you think that General Short would send a 
message in answer to a war direction or an alert message that would 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1599 

merely say they had been doing what they had been doing over the 
years, having ordinary liaison with the Navy? Do you understand 
my question ? 

General Gerow. I don't quite understand it, sir. 

Mr. MuKPTiY. Well, for years, and always, as I understand it, there 
was supposed to be liaison at any outlying theater between the Army 
and the Navy. That is a fact, is it not ? 

Gr^neral Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the message of the 27th was a war alert, 
as I understand it, and then the reply of General Short was to the 
effect, "Liaison with the Navy." 

Would you, as head of the War Plans Division, expect that a lieu- 
tenant general at Hawaii would take the time to send a telegram 
merely saying to General Marshall that he was maintaining the same 
liaison with the Navy that he had been over the months prior to receiv- 
ing an alert message? 

General Gekow. No, sir. I think in that case, that [42S3] 
that phrase would have a different meaning. 

Mr. Murphy. Would it not be fair to assume that in view of the 
message of General Marshall, that the reply of General Short, ""Liai- 
son with the Navy," meant that there had been an actual conference 
with the Navy, a discussion of plans to meet the war warning message 
from the Navy and the war warning message from General Marshall, 
and that the necessary steps had been taken to put into effect the 
plan which they had already prepared to have proper liaison, proper 
cooperation, and an all-out alert, or the necessary alert to meet the 
impending clanger ? 

General Gerow. The message was susceptible of the interpretation 
that you have outlined, sir. 

[4^34] Mr. Murphy. At any rate Colonel Bundy saw the mes- 
sage, did he not ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Murphy. And Colonel Bundy was the man on your staff whose 
duty it was to follow up on messages of that kind and to see whether 
or not they were responsive to the Marshall message of the 27th; 
is that right ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Then, as I understand it, Colonel Bundy unfortu- 
nately met his death on the way to Hawaii immediately after Pearl 
Harbor? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. v 

Mr. Murphy. Did Colonel Bundy leave any kind of a memorandum 
in the War Department files which would explain his reaction to 
the General Short telegram of the 28th ? 

General Gerow. I have had the records searched very carefully 
and I can find no such record and I don't recall of my own knowledge 
having talked to Colonel Bundy about that after December 7. 

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster is still absent. Therefore Con- 
gressman Gearhart may inquire. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I just clarify the record on one 
point? 



1600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[4^35] Will you give Colonel Bundy's initials, will you furnish 
them?i 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I know his first initial was "C," but I don't 
know what his middle initial was. 

Mr. Murphy. There has been reference by General Marshall to a 
Mr. Bundy who was an assistant, as I understand it, a civilian assistant 
to Secretary of War Stimson. 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Was he a separate and distinctly different person 
from the Colonel Bundy in the War Plans Division i 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. Mr. Bundy in the Secretary's office was a 
civilian. Colonel Bundy was an officer of the Re^rular Army. His 
first name was Charles. I don't recall his middle initial. 

Mr. Murphy. If there had been liaison with the Navy in accordance 
with the war plan already drafted and ready for execution at Hawaii, 
in your judgment would we have had the same result on December 
7 which we actually had? 

General Gerow. No, sir. I think if the means on hand had been 
properly alerted and properly used that the damage that the Japs 
did at Pearl Harbor would have been considerably less. 

Mr. INIuRPHY. Admiral Kimmel had a message commencing with 
the words, "This is a war warning." General Short had [4^36] 
a message putting him on warning that hostilities might commence at 
any moment. If there had been a conference between Admiral Kim- 
mel and General Short and a discussion of the plans necessary to meet 
that situation and a putting into effect the kind of plan they already 
had, you say there would have been a different resuk on December 7 i 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I believe the damage would not have been 
so great. 

Mr. Murphy. That is all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart is now recognized. 

Mr. Gearhart, General Gerow, you have been present in the hearing 
room during the examination of General Marshall, have you not i 

General Gerow. Only one afternoon, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Were you here when I, on two different occasions, 
referred to the seven intercepted Japanese messages, messages which 
either asked for information or supplied information with reference 
to ship movements in the Hawaian area? 

General Gerow. I don't believe, sir, I was present when you asked 
tliose questions. May I see the messages, sir? 

Mr. Gesell. You are/ referring to the ones in exhibit 2, are you? 

The Chairman. May the Chair ask the photographers not to inter- 
fere with the examination of the witness. 

[4^o7] Mr. Gearhart. I am referring to the intercepted mes 
sages which appear on pages 12, 13, 14, and 15, seven messages in all. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I have those; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, those messages, each one of them, refer 
specifically, do thej" not, to the Hawaiian area? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. They are from Tokyo to Honolulu and Honolulu 
to Tokyo. Now, the first of these messages divides the Hawaiian area, 
the island with the name of Oahu, they divide this island into seven 
areas for purposes of subsequent exchanges of intelligence between 
Honolulu and Tokyo, do they not ? 

' Col. Charles W. Bundy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMAtEE 1601 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then the other messages either called for reports 
of ship movements in that area, or render reports on ship movements 
in that area, do they not? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

INIr. Gearhart. And there is one of the messages which reveals a 
little impatience on the part of Tokyo in respect to the information 
they were getting, asking for reports not only when ship movements 
occur but when they do not occur, is that not correct? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

[4^SS] Mr. Gearhart. Now, in your opinion, after reviewing 
those seven messages will you not say that they reveal an inordinate 
interest in our Navy's operations in the Hawaiian area on the part 
of the Japanese? 

General Gerow. They certainly indicate interest in those movements, 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, none of those messages were called to the 
attention of General Short or Admiral Kimmel so far as you know? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; not so far as I know. 

Mr. GEAiRHART. AVliy were they not called to their attention? - 

General Gerow. I believe, sir, that G-2 can testify to that better 
than I can, sir. They are not messages on v^^hich the War Plans Di- 
vision would normally be called upon to direct special operations. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, the War Plans Division of which you were 
the head makes plans for warfare and for defense, doesn't it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then aren't j^ou charged Avith an interest in plans 
I have described that are being made 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). By a nation that might be [4239] 
an enemy of ours? 

General Gerow. I had a very decided interest in it, yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, do not these seven messages react on yoiir 
mind as possible evidence of war plans that were being perfected by 
Japan ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; they do so react but at the moment, sir, 
these messages were brought to me in a locked despatch case. I cannot 
recall now whether they all came together or not. I cannot recall 
whether I saw all of them or not. They were taken out of the despatch 
case and read by me and handed back to the officer. I did not attempt 
to evaluate the magic messages that came to me, sir. If there were any 
that struck me at the moment that they were especially important I 
would usually contact G-2 and discuss those particular messages 
with him. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if it is not your precise' duty to read the in- 
tercepts that ai-e brought to you and very material, to read, to under- 
stand, to evaluate and to recommend action, what was your function 
in reading them ? Why were they submitted to you ? 

General Gerow. They were submitted to me, sir, as a matter of 
information, to keep me informed as to the general situation. As I 
stated before, if there had been a message [4^40] in the in- 
tercepts that conveyed to me the idea that Japan was probably going 
to attack any place in the globe I would consider that it required 
action on our part, sir, and to draft a warning message and take it 

79716 — 46 — i)t. 4 3 



1602 CONGRESSIOI#AL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

up to tlie Chief of Stuff. I did not so interpret those messages at 
that time, sir, as I now recall. 

Mr. Gearhart. You knew that relations with Japan were very 
rapidly deteriorating, did you not? 

General Gerow. 1 did, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. You were being advised of that by other Army and 
Navy high responsible officers, weren't you, from time to time? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And even though you knew our relations with Japan 
were rapidly deteriorating, knowing also that, I believe, the American 
Navy was, ship for ship, very much inferior to the Japanese Navy in 
the Pacific, the fact that Japan was asking for definite information 
concerning our Navy over and over again and dividing the Island of 
Oahu into areas diet not impress you as important information? 

General Gerow. I do not recall, sir, having seen these particular 
messages. I presume that I did, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. It was your duty not only to see them but to read 
them, to understand them, to evaluate them and [4^-4-?] rec- 

ommend action upon them, wasn't it? 

General Gerow. No, sir; it was not my duty to evaluate all the 
magic tliat came to my office, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. It ceased to be jowr duty to evaluate them in 
August of 1941, did it not? 

General Gerow\ I did not understand the question, sir. 

Ml'. Geakhart. It was your duty to evaluate them, prepare action 
upon them with recommendations to the Chief of Staff prior to August 
of 1941, was it? 

General Gekow. No, sir. 

]\Ir. Gearhart. Didn't you receive a directive from General Marshall 
in August of 1941 to thereafter not merely evahiate and send your 
recommendations in but to send the original material itself to his 
desk, is that not correct? 

General GEROw^ No, sir; I had no such directive. 

Mr. Gearhart. That was not issued to you? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Geauhart. Did General Miles ever tell you that he had such 
a messajje or dii-ective from General Marsliall affectine: his 
department? 

General Gerow. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Mr. Gearhakt. Well, did you not as a matter of practice evaluate 
interce])ts (hat came to you and to send those intercepts to General 
Marshall? 

[If2.!t,2\ General Gei:ow. No, sir; I had nothing to do with the 
distribution of inteivepts. sir. He received the same intercepts I did, 
sir. 

Mr. Geariiakt. Well, when you read an intercept that struck you 
as important and calling for action, didn't you take that intercept be- 
fore you returned it to the courier and discuss it with General 
Marshall? 

General Gerow. No, sir. If I thought that an intei'cept required 
action I would prepare a draft of a message, sir, for General Marshall's 
signature and take it up and suggest that he send it. I did not take 
the intercepts up to him. sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1603 

Mr. Gearhart. You did not take it because you knew General 
Marshall had the same intercepts which you read as he was on the 
list of persons to wlioni the intercei)ts were to be delivered, is that 
correct ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Gearhakt. Now, I will ask you as a military expert, asking 
you for the moment to put yourself in the position of Admiral Kimmel 
;md General Short, I will ask you if you think that the tragic hap- 
pening of December 7, 1941, Avould have occurred just as it did if 
Admiral Kimmel and General Short had been warned of those seven 
messages to which I have just called your attention? 

[4^4^] General Gerow, Sir, I do not believe I can put myself in 
the position of the connnanders in Hawaii. There was so much back- 
ground, so many things happening. The mental attitude of those 
commanders, I cannot translate now, sir, in an expression of opinion. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if you were the commander of either the Army 
or the Navy over there and you received seven definite intercepts called 
to your attention that the Japanese have divided the area into seven 
areas and were calling impatiently for reports upon the ship disposi- 
tions there, do you think that in the face of the message of November 
27, in the face of other circular ( ircular messages that were being sent 
around the world, one of which was delivered in Haw^aii, do you think 
that eight of our battleships should be lined up like sitting ducks in- 
side of that harbor, with voids open, with ammunition boxed, in a 
condition in which they could fight very, very inefficiently if they were 
called upon to fight at all, do you think that would be the situation in 
the face of those messages being before the eyes and upon the desks 
and in the minds of those commanders ? 

General Gerow. Again, sir, I do not believe that I can state what I 
would have done under those circumstances without having been in 
command over there, sir, at the time. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, in justice to them don't you [4344] 

think now as you look back that they should have had that informa- 
tion then? 

General Gerow. I think when the War Department took the re- 
sponsibility of sending the message of November 27 and stated that 
hostile action was possible at any moment, that these messages would 
not have added anything to the strength of the directive that was 
contained in the November 27 message. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did any of those messages, those circular letters 
that were sent around, contain any information as to where hostile 
action was expected ^ 

General Gerow. I did not understand the "circular letter," sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, these messages are circular, aren't they, in 
nature ? They are sent to Hawaii, they are sent to Panama, they are 
sent to San Francisco, they are sent to San Diego, they are sent to all 
of the commandants in all of the naval districts. Now, did any of 
them say w^here the war was expected to break out ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. The one of November 27, as I recall, dis- 
tinctly stated that Japanese action was unpredictable but hostile 
action 

Mr. Gearhart. There were other messages circulated around that 
an attack was expected in the Philippines, in the [4^4-5] Kra 



1604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Peninsula, in Indochina and possibly at Gnam and Borneo, menacing 
Singapore. That was what was contained in the messages that were 
being circulated by the Chief of Staff, is that not correct? 

General Gerow. I should like to look over those messages, sir, to 
see specifically what they stated. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know of the memorandum that General 
Marshall and Admiral Stark sent to the President on the 27th ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. They discussed that very subject? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Named those very places that I have picked out? 

General Gerow. Some of them, yes, sir, I recall. 

Mr. Gearhart. And in that message there is not even the slightest 
suggestion or intimation that any trouble is expected in the Hawaiian 
area. 

General Gerow. No, sir. I think the reason for that was that that 
memorandum was directed specifically to the Far Eastern area, to a 
special area, not to the whole area of the Pacific. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, as a matter of fact all you big [4M6\ 
ranking Army and Navy officers considered Hawaii as an impregnable 
fortress, did you not? 

General Gerow. No, sir. No- fortress is impregnable, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you have seen the characterization of Pearl 
Harbor that was made by General Herron, didn't you, in his some- 
thing from memory ? It is a French word. 

Mr. Murphy. Aid de memoir. 

Mr. Gearhart. I have got to apply to my learned friend Murphy 
for my French. 

You have the document in hand, don't you ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Read the first paragraph. 

General Gerow [reading] : 

The Island of Oahu, due to its fortifi'^atious, its garrison and its physical 
characteristics is believed to be tiie strongest fortress in the world. 

Mr. Gearhart. And j^ou know that General Herron when he was 
commander of the Hawaiian area issued a similar statement to the 
press that was given wide circulation everywhere, don't you? 

General Gerow. I do not recall that message. 

Mr. Gearhart. Have you got the volume of that book on Hawaii ? 

The Chairman. Which book is it ? 

[4^4'n Mr. Gearhart. The young lady sitting there has it. 

Senator Fp:rguson. Which is it? 

Mr. Gearhakt. It is a novel. 

The Chairman. A novel ? 

Mr, Gearhart. Well, I don't know. It was a book about Hawaii 
and it had a large circulation. However, I will pass it. 

I will ask you do you know of any message of any kind that was 
ever sent to General Short or Admiral Kimmel in which they were 
told that Hawaii itself would probably be attacked? 

General Gerow. I do not recall such a message. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, how do you acc( unt for the fact that there 
is a warnino; in that warnin<r notice of November 27 which was not 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1605 

contained in the one sent to the Philippine Islands, an affirmative 
direction not to do anything which would alarm the people or reveal 
intent? Why was that specially put in the Hawaiian and the San 
Francisco versions and left out of the one sent to Manila ? 

General Gerow. Well, the conditions in Hawaii and in the Philip- 
pines were quite different at that time. In Hawaii we had a big 
Japanese population. We felt that the installations there were very 
close to the population; that if the civilian population happened to 
be alarmed there would prob- [WS] ably be headlines in the 
press. Those headlines would be quickly transmitted to Japan and 
would probably precipitate the very thing we were trying to avoid. 

Mr. Gearhart. And everything you have said, every reason that 
you have given is equally true of the Philippines, isn't it ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not believe so, sir. The Philippines 
did not have the large Japanese population. The Philippines at that 
time had been more or less, I will not say alerted but we were or- 
ganizing and training a Philippine army at that time and there was 
a great deal of military activity going on in the Philippines that was 
not going on in Hawaii, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, as a matter of fact you do not want to stand 
on the assertion that there wasn't a large Japanese population in the 
Philippine Islands prior to December 7, 1941 ? As a matter of fact, 
the island was full of Japanese and most of them were Japanese 
agents, were they not? 

General Gerow. I do not know that. 

Mr. Gearhart. They had probably more observers in percentage 
to the population of the Philippines than they had in all the rest of 
the world put together, is that not correct? 

General Gerow. I do not know, sir. 

[4249] Mr. Gearhart. And if they only had one Japanese spy 
there an alert in the Philippines would cause the same alarm to be 
reported to Japanese headquarters in Tokyo as if there were 50,000 
there, wouldn't it ? 

General Gerow\ I do not know, sir, how the Japanese would have 
reacted to it. 

I should like to invite the attention, sir, in that message to which 
you have just referred, however, that it contains this statement : "That 
this policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of 
action that might jeopardize your defense." 

Mr. Gearhart. That is correct, but after a message which from 
beginning to end warns specifically against doing certain things that 
was put in the message for the purpose of conveying the idea to the 
commanders in Hawaii, wasn't it? 

General Gerow\ Which sentence now are you referring to, sir ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Directing them to avoid the doing of anything 
which miglit create alarm among the people or reveal intent. 

General Gerow. Sir, I do not understand your question. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, when you put a specific direction in a 
letter not to do certain things and then say you can do something else 
if you have to, you are going to expect [^^,5(9] the recipient 
of that notice to try to avoid doing the things which you say you do 
not want done, is that not correct? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 



1606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Geakiiart. Now, you would ex])ect the commanders in Hawaii 
to avoid the doing:; of anythinji; which would alarm the people or 
reveal an intent to them, wouldn t you '? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, so long as it did not jeopardize his 
defense. 

Mr. Gearhart. I have the book which I designated a novel to the 
inquiry of the chairman. 

The Chairman. Did it end all right ? 

Mr. Gearhart. The volume is entitled, "Hawaii — Restless Ram- 
part," and the book was written by Joseph Barber. Jr. I will read 
you from page 213. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield ? 

Mr. Gearhart. What did you say ? 

The Chairman. Will you yi^ld to the Senator from Illinois? 

Senator Lucas. Who did you say wrote this book? 

Mr. Gearhart. Joseph Barber, Jr. I don't know anything about 
him, about who he is. It is a book which has had quite a large sale, 
it is a popular edition, but what I am going to read there is in quota- 
tion marks so that it will not [4251] rest on the responsibility 
of Mr. Barber but, rather, on the responsibility of General Herron. 
This is the author's introduction. (Reading:) 

Prior to the maneuvers, however, Major General (now Lieutenant General) 
Charles D. Herron, commanding the Hawaiian Department, issued this statement, 
intended to reassure nervous residents : "Oahu will never be exposed to a blitz- 
krieg attack. This is why : We are more than 2,000 miles away fi-om land which- 
ever way you look, which is a long way for an enemy force to steam, and besides 
it would have to smash through our navy. 

"But we plan for the worst possible situation, which means we assume that the 
navy might be too busy elsewhere to help us. 

"So we have developed a potent air defense. Our reconnaissance bombers are 
going farther and farther to sea. Our air bases here could be reinforced overnight 
from California bases. The potency of this striking power which would engage 
an enemy long before he sighted Oahu means that to land on Oahu the enemy must 
first win mastery of the air aliove it. 

"Assuming that happened, enemy transports tlien would have to anchor off- 
shore, making' them fine targets for our coastal artillery. High speed, mobile 
forces can [^252] be rushed within an hour to any point on Oahu. They 
pack devastating power. 

"As international tensions increase in the Pacific, the war of nerves comes 
closer to Hawaii. So we double our vigilance, our intensive training. We don't 
let up until the future is perfectly safe." 

The 1040 war problem assumed that Hawaii was tlireatened with a sudden 
thrust by an invading enemy. The enemy fleet had a well-balanced force, with 
adequate aviation and highly trained personnel. In addition, its merchant ma- 
rine was capable of transporting an extremely large army for initial overseas 
operations. 

The "war situation" at this point was outlined by headquarters as follows: 
"It is assumed that an outside enemy has succeeded, by stealth, in landing from 
boats and dropping by parachutes numerous well-armed nationals at night on the 
island of Oahu." 

Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me? 

Mr. Gearhart. I would rather wait and yield at the c(mclusion 
of this quotation. 

Mr. Clark. I was wondering when it was going to conclude. That 
is what is troubling me. 

Mr. Gearhart, Don't you find it interesting? Every- [4^63] 

body else does. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1607 

Mr. Gkariiart. You are not very helpful, Mr. ('hirk. 
The Chairman. That is not a matter ujjou which the conunittee 
has to pass. 

Mr. Gearhart. I will proceed [reading] : 

"The enemies have mixed with the population as stran.aiers, but are be- 
lieved to be secretly assembling at various points on tbe island with the in- 
tentions, it is feared, of disrupting both civil and military life by destroying 
or contaminating water supplies, food, communications, electric power, and 
other necessities, and democratic institutions with the object of liqaidating the 
present population to eventually make room for their own people. 

"These activities are believed to be in preparation for reducing our strength 
and our military resistance against a hostile landing force assumed to be 
■approaching the island. 

"All civil police, national guard, other civil organizations, and the entire civil 
population, in accordance with a proclamation that it is assumed was issued 
by the governor, are closely working with the military to apprehend the in- 
vaders and to protect our ifamlies, homes, and institutions from destruction." 

[4^54'] The Chairman. Would the Congressman let the Chair- 
man, ask him: What does this book show as to where this statement 
was made, whether it was a newspaper interview or an official state- 
ment? What does it say about that? 

Mr. Gearhart. That was the document, as I understand, that was 
issued by General Herron, just prior to the alert of 1940. 

The Chairman. I suppose the General can testify about it, if he 
did it. 

Mr. Gearhart. That clearly evidences, does it not, that the high- 
est ranking army officers in the Hawaiijan Islands had the same 
opinion in 1940 that General Marshall had, that he reflected in his 
paper? You had just read the first paragraph of it. Is that not 
correct ? 

General Gerow. I think everyone of us in the War Department felt 
that Oahu was our best prepared outpost. 

Mr. Gearhart. Aiid they both, in these two great statements, 
issued to the people, stated that they considered it in eflfect an 
impregnable fortress ? 

General Gerow. The two statments, sir? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, in each of them. 

General Gerow. I did not understand that this Aide Memoire 

Mr. Gearhart. I will read the first paragraph again. 

[4-^55] General Gerow. I did not understand, sir, that that 
was a public statement to the people, sir. I think that is a paper 
that I understood he took to the White House with him, or some- 
where else, on which he would talk. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then it is still more important, isn't it? It is a 
paper circulated for the eyes of military experts only? 

General Gerow. I am not so sure, sir, that this paper was ever 
circulated. I do not know what General Marshall's testimony was, 
as. to why it was prepared. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you admit, do you not, that it represents 
General Marshall's viewpoint at that time? He would not put his 
signature to something he did not believe, for the purpose of deceiv- 
ing anyone, would he? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; but he did not sign this paper. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, he admitted that he wrote it. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? That is not so. 



1608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Would that make any difference, that he did not 
sign it ? 

Mr, Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? 

The Chairman. Will the gentleman yield to his colleague? 

Mr. Gearhart. I yield. 

INIr. Murphy. General Marshall said he was called to [4^S6] 

the White House, he was going over there immediately, and someone 
in the Department prepared that memorandum. He did not prepare 
it, and did not sign it. 

Mr. Gearhart. He read it and presented it, with all of the influence 
and high position behind it of the Chief of Staff of the Armies of 
the United States. If he did not believe it. he would not have pre- 
sented it, would he, in your opinion ? 

General Gerow. General Marshall will have to testify to that, sir. 
I do not know whether he used this paper or not. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the testimony will speak for itself. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Will the Congressman yield to Senator Fergulon ? 

Senator Ferguson. Will the Congressman yield? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Senator FV.rguson. We would like to find out from counsel where 
this paper was obtained. 

Mr. Gesell. The paper was obtained, as we stated when we intro- 
duced it, from the files of President Roosevelt. 

Mr. Gearhart. So it was left with President RoosevoH. the Com- 
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the ITnited f j~-5?'] 
States, by the Chief of Staff of the Army of the United States. That 
is correct, isn't it? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, hoAv could this g-^- tlemnn knoAv 
anything of that kind ? I do not understand that. 

The Chairman. If the witness does not know it, he may sav so. 

General Gerow. I am a bit confused. 

Mr. Gearhart. I have more interrn])tions than anybody else has 
had on my line of questions up to now. 

The Chairman. If the Congressman does not want to yield, he cer- 
tainly does not have to. 

Mr. Gearhart. I would like to proceed a little more orderly and 
with greater continuity of thought, if I am not constantly interrupted. 
I am developing a condition of mind that was existing in the high 
ranking military of the United States as an explanation plainly of 
why no specific warnings were sent to Hawaii. 

You admit that no specific warnings were sent to Hawaii during 
this long period, during which our relations with Japan were de- 
teriorating, don't you ? 

General Gerow. No specific warnings were sent to Hawaii, spe- 
cifically designating'- that Hawaii was the place that the Japanese 
Avere going to attack; no, sir. 

Mr. Gearhvrt. Whenever a specific place was discussed, \4^^-58] 
it was alwavs an attack on the Kra Peninsula, the Pliilippines, Siam, 
possibly Guam, and possibly Borneo: is that correct, •that permeated 
all of the military literature to the commanders of the United States? 

General Gerow. I believe it was a belief at that time, sir. that the 
Japanese would make their main effort in that area, and I believe the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1609 

belief was boi-iie out by subsequent events tliat tlie.v did, that their 
attack on Hawaii was in the nature of a diversionary attack, and put 
on our flank to lay us back on our heels so tliey could <>i:o ahead with 
their main effort. 

Mr. Gkarhart. I will ask you, General Gerow. if vou had thou<;ht 
durine: those days prior to December 7, 1941. that there was a pos- 
sibility of attackinof Hawaii, and if that were the p;e!\eral opinion 
of the hio:h rankino; military and naval people with whom you were 
in daily association, would you not have interpreted those seven 
messages, those seven intercepted Japanese messag'es, were important, 
would you not have attached to tliem greater significance than you did? 

General Gerow. I think we all realized, sir, that there was a pos- 
sibility of an attack on Hawaii. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then why did not you send co])ies of those inter- 
cepts to the two commanders that were charged with the | ,f ?a'?] 
defense of those islands? 

General Gerow. Sir, I cannot answer that question. As I say, these 
messages came to me maybe one at a time, or maybe in a group of 15 
or 20, and I had no opportunity to sit down and analyze them. They 
came in along with other messages from Panama and the Philippines, 
and many of the messages from Panama were quite significant. They 
indicated an intense interest in where our air forces were, where the 
fields were, which would be the very thing that an enemy would want 
to do, information that he w^ould want in case he intended to attack 
Panama, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did yon send any special warning messages to 
Panama when you saw the Japs were making definite inquiries with 
reference to the defenses there ? 

General Gerow. I do not know whether G-2 sent any informational 
messages to Panama with regard to those particular intercepts or not, 
sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Will you not say, as the head of War Plans that the 
commanders of Panama were entitled to that information in the event 
that any such information had reached Washington authorities? 

General Gerow. Sir, that is a question of opinion, as to how much 
information you give commanders in the field. 

[4-2601 Mr. Gearhart. Isn't it the rule that when high author- 
ity in Washington obtains information that is important to any 
particular commander in the field, that Washington should transmit 
that information, or if reasons of security did not permit it, that they 
shall issue directives in the light of that information ? 

General Gerow. If the intercept is one that the War Department 
feels is important that the commander have, I think it should send it 
to him. The War Department, in the case of the November 27 mes- 
sage, interpreted all of the facts it had before it, and decided that the 
Japanese were going to take some action, hostile action, and assumed 
responsibility for telling the commander that there was a great pos- 
sibility of an attack. 

[4^61] Mr. Gearhart. Again directing your attention to the 
somewhat protracted or extended statement of General Herron that 
I just read, that statement manifestly was issued to allay any fear 
that might be aroused because of the alert of 1940 by the activities of 
the Army and Navy, was it not? 



1610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. Sir, I do not know whether the statement was 
made prior to or after that alert. I was not present in Washington 
at the time the alert was put on, sir. 

Mr. Ge^\riiart. Now it would be necessary, if you were going to 
take steps not to alarm the people, to issue a warning well in advance 
of the event, is that not correct ? 

General Gerow. No, sir, that would not be necessary. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you think that it would have been possible to 
have alerted Hawaii, both its Naval activities and its Army activities, 
to a No. 3 Army alert and No. 1 Naval Operations alert, overnight 
without alarming the people ? 

General Gerow. A lot would depend on how the commander did it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the order that he was to alert his island was 
put up instantly upon the receipt of the November 27 notice, wasn't 
it? If he was to do anything at all under that order it was to do it 
right then? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sii-. 

Mr. Gearhart. And because you could not do it right now 
.[^^fW] without alarming the people and revealing the intent 
General Short reached the right decision which he reported on the 
28th day of November, did he not ? 

General Gerow. That is your conclusion, sir. 

Mr. Mtjrpht. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I am not drawing any conclusion at all, I am asking 
you questions. I want your conclusions; mine are unimportant. 

General Gerow. May I have the question, sir? 

Mr. MuRPHT. Will the gentleman yield? 

The Chairman. The member asked not to be interrupted and 
the Chair feels like protecting him in that request. Go ahead. 

General Gerow. May I have the question again? 

Mr. Gearhart. Will you read the question, Mr. Reporter? 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not think he reached the right con- 
clusion. 

Mr. Gearhart. In order to reach the conclusion that you have just 
reached you have to delete then from the November 27 message the 
positive directive not to alarm the pople and not to reveal the intent? 

General Gerow. I believe thnt is correct, sir. He was told he was 
authorized to take any course of action he might [4^6S] neces- 
sarilv have to take to prevent jeopardizing his defense. 

Mr. Gearhart. The record speaks for itself. Now yesterday the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania opened the report of General Hap 
Arnold and read to us that the Air Forces in the Philippines had 
been alerted prior to December 7, 1941. Were you here when he read 
that from his report? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Has the gentleman from Pennsylvania that report? 

Mr. Murphy. Do you have that report from General Arnold? 

Senator Litcas. I do not know where it is. 

Mr. Gearhart. Assuming that General Arnold's report does con- 
tain that information, can a^ou give us any information about the 
alerting of the Air Force in the Philippines? 

General Gerow. At what period of time? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1611 

Mr. Gearhart. Just prior to December 7, 1941. 

General Gerow. May I refer to the message from General Mac- 
Arthur, sir ? 

Mr. Gearhart, Yes. 

General Gerow. This is a message from General MacArthur to 
General Marshall, dated November 28 : 

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnais- 
sance has beeu extended and intensified in conjunction witli tlie navy stop 
ground security measures [Ji2GJf] have been talien stop within the limita- 
tions imposed by present state of development of this this theatre of operations 
everything is in i-eadiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop intimate 
liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between army and navy. 

( Signed ) MacArthur. 

Mr. Gearhart. Does that report indicate to your mind an all-out 
air alert ? 

General Gerow. He states, "Reconnaissance has been extended and 
intensified." I do not know just what he was doing prior to the 
extending of it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Were you in the conference that they had with 
General Arnold just about the time the November 27 warning mes- 
sages were sent out, a conference in which General Arnold said that 
he had information that there was sabotage going on at certain air 
stations and he wanted a special warning sent to all of his outlying 
commands ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I was present at one conference on a 
sabotage message of that kind, I think on the 28th of November, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. General Arnold wanted to send a special message 
over his own signature to his commands, did he not ? 

General Gerow. I do not recall that conference, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was not that one of the main things [4^65] 
discussed ? 

General Gerow. I do not remember, sir, whether that was discussed 
at that particular conference or not. I remember General Arnold's 
insistence, or at least the insistence of his G-2, General Scanlon, that 
warning messages go to all the air stations. 

Mr. Gearhart. And wasn't it finally decided in that conference 
that General Arnold should not send it out over his signature, but 
that it would go out over General Marshall's signature, with a 
special reference in the notice to the air services ? 

General Gerow. I do not recall such a decision, sir. 

]Mr. Gearhart. Well, you have no special information to convey 
to the committee now as to why the Air Command in the Philippines 
went on an all-out alert in the Philippine Islands ? 

General Gerow. The only information I have, sir, as to why they 
went on the alert is because they received this message from General 
Marshall directing the alert which was sent out on the 27th of 
November. 

Mr. Gearhart. Have you any information as to what the Air 
Command did in Hawaii, after receipt in Hawaii of the warning 
message of November 27, 1941? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I have no such information. [4^66] 

Mr. Gearhart. And if the Air Command in Hawaii went on an 
all-out alert on December 1 and remained on it until December 6, you 
know of no special reason from Washington for their having done it, 



1612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

other than the information that was contained in the warning mes- 
sage of November 27 ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. I believe that is all. 

The Chairman. Twelve o'clock having arrived, the committee will 
recess to 2 o'clock p. m. 

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 
o'clock p. m. of the same day.) 

[4^67] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 : 00 P. M. 

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW (Resumed) 

The Chairman, The committee will come to order. 

I believe that Congressman Gearhart had concluded his examina- 
tion of General Gerow and Senator Ferguson will now be recognized. 

Senator Ferguson. General Gerow, you were in what is known as 
the War Plans Section. Now, at the time was that the operational 
section ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about prior to the 7th of December. 

General Gerow. No, sir. The G-3 section was normally known as 
the operational section, but the section that I was in was known as the 
War Plans Division, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now. we had an exhibit here that gave your 
duties. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I have a copy of that ? Does counsel have 
it? Do you have your copy? 

Mr. Mitcheij.. It is the War Department order of the General 
Staff setup. 

General Gerow. I think I have it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 42. 

General Gerow. I think I have a copy of the Army regu- \ 4^681 
lations here that cover that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I have it; it is Exhibit 42. 

Your duties are in paragraph 12 ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. ^ 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you give me the specific section in 
that, during peacetime, that would have you function in writing 
messages ? 

General Gerow. I think the first paragraph, sir, paragraph "a" 
would cover that. I shall read it. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it? 

General Gerow (reading) : 

The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of tlie War 
Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for use in 
the theater of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the 
naval forces, in the national defense. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't that only the formulation of tlie 
plans, the actual drafting of the plans, the war plans? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1613 

General Gekow. It includes that, sir, but it also states : 

is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department Gi'neral Staff 
which relate to the formulation of plans. 

The Avritin^ of an oi)erational order, the ()})erational orders such 
as was written on November the 2Tth I think, sir, [4:?0f)\ would 
be included in that wording;. 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to that had you ever taken any part in 
the Avriting of messages'^ 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The writing of alerts? 

General Gerow. Some of the warning messages that were sent, sir, 
I participated in their preparation. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you participate m the one on the 24th, the 
joint one? 

General Gerow. May I refer to that, sir? Either myself, sir, or 
some of my officers in War Plans Division I believe did participate in 
this apparently joint message. We worked with the Navy in the 
preparation of that message. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew General Bryden? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He was Deputy Chief of Staff? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Under this he was to act, was he not, when the 
Chief of Staff was absent ? 

General Gerow. I believe it so states. 

Senator Ferguson (reading). 

The Deputy Chief of Staff, 

on page 2 — 

will assist the Chief of Staff and will act for him in the War Department in his 
absence. 

Would you say that you had been specifically designated [42701 
to act for the Chief of Staff during his absence in the sending of the 
message of the 27th ? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I had not been specifically designated but 
as the staff officer concerned with the preparation of plans and the 
issuance of operational orders in connection therewith I believe, 
sir, I would have assumed that responsibility if necessary in General 
Marshall's absence. 

Senator Ferguson. Did General Bryden, who was the duly author- 
ized officer to act in the absence of the General, did he act in relation 
to that message? 

General Gerow. I believe he did, sir. If I recall correctly, the mes- 
sage was taken in to him and he O. iK.'d it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, can you show us on the original message 
thai we have here, his O. K. ? 

General Gerow. I will try to find it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you try to find that? 

General Gerow. I have, sir, here is a photostatic copy of the message 
of November the 27th. It shows on the bottom, sir, "Noted : Deputy 
Chief of Staff," with the initial "B". 

Senator Ferguson. That was for Bryden? 

General Gerow. I think it must have been for Bryden ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did he go into this with you and help 
draft it, or did he just approve it after it A\as drafted? 



1614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[4^71] General Gerow. As I recall, sir, he went in with me to 
the office of the Secretary of War on my first visit in the Secretary 
of War's office on the morning of the 27th. I clo not believe that he 
was in there at the second conference and I do not believe, sir, that 
he actually participated in the drafting of the message. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever attend the Army Staff College? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, How long a time did you spend in the college? 

General Gerow. I spent the usual 9 months as a student, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there any course or any information as to 
how to draft plans taken up b}^ you — or I mean messages ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; but that was normally taught at the Com- 
manding General Staff School at Leavenworth. I thought you had 
reference, sir, to the War College. 

Senator Ferguson. Where was that taught ^ 

General Gerow. That was taught at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., sir, 
and also at the infantry school. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you take that course? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

[4^7'd] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, tell me the elements, the 
things to be clone in the writing of a message as far as the War De- 
partment or Army was concerned ? 

General Gerow. We had a system of writing what we called the 
tive paragraph operational order. The first paragraph contained 
information of the enemy and information regarding your own forces. 
The second paragraph contained a general mission. 

Senator Ferguson. Wait until I get this first one. First was what 
information ? The first was all the information that you had about 
the enemy ? 

General Gerow. It contained enemy information and information 
about our own troops. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Gerow. Paragraph 2 contained a general statement of the 
mission, to attack or defend. 

Senator Ferguson. The mission, yes. 

General Gerow. The third paragraph was broken down into a 
number of subparagraphs and gave specific missions and the major 
units involved. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Gerow. Paragraph 4 — I have been awa,y from that school 
so long I cannot remember definitely paragraph 4. Paragraph 5 I 
think prescribed the command post and I believe [4^73] per- 
tained to communications. I liave forgotten now definitely what 
paragraph 4 included, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You wouldn't say that tiie first paragraph was 
your mission ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That the proper way to draft an order was to 
put the mission in the first paragra])h ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. Your first paragraph would contain 
enemy information and the information regarding your own troops. 

Senator Ferguson. And that the second one was to give full in- 
formation as to the enemy, its strength, its capacity and its intentions ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1615 

General Gerow. I am afraid I did not make myself clear, Senator, 
In the first paragraph it contains the enemy information and in- 
formation of our own troops. That is oi-dinarily broken down into 
two paragraphs, paragraph A and paragraph B. 

Paragraph A contains the information concerning the enemy. Para- 
graph B contains the information concerning our own troops that 
are pertinent to that particular order. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, should that information, whether it is 
one or two, should tlie information be full as to the enemy, that is, as 
to its strength, its intention, and its [4^74] capacity ? 

General Gerow. No, sir; that is normally included in an entirely 
separate document which is known as an estimate of the situation, 
Mdiich is prepared sometimes by G-2, and sometimes by G-3. 

There are two types of estimates: One is a G-2, which arrives at 
some conclusions as to what the enemy is going to do. There is a sec- 
ond type of estimate of the situation which covers not only what 
the enemy's capabilities are and his probable intentions but also in- 
cludes your own capabilities and the plans that are open to you and 
from that you decide what the enemy, you think the enemy is going to 
do and decide what you shall do to counter that action. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, have you got with you any booklet or 
paper or information that would tell us what should be in an order 
and how it should be written, or could you get that for us? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I will be glad to get that for you, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. When I take up the message of the 27th I will 
refer further to that and you may have it by that time. 
General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any aide here w^ith you that could 
go and get it for you ? 

General Gerow. I think so, sir. 

[4^275] Senator Ferguson. Normally in peacetime is the War 
Plans concerned with the diplomatic messages of the United States? 
General Gerow. We are interested in them, yes, sir. Anything that 
might possibly affect military operations we are interested in, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And how do they come to you ? How does that 
information come to your Department? 

General Geroav. It comes through various sources, sir. As far as 
the War Plans Division is concerned, I would get information from the 
Chief of Staff, very occasionally from the Secretary of War, and also 
from the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, and from some of my officers 
who had contacted their opposite members in the State Department, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was your opposite in the State Department 
that you would get your inf oi-mation from ? 

General Gerow. That depended on the type of information you were 
after, sir. If it happened to be the far eastern situation you would go 
to the Far Eastern Division. If it was Latin American, you would go 
to the Latin American section, and if it was European, you w^ould go 
to the European section. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first get the messages that were 
delivered by the President on the I7th of August, 1941 ? 

[4276] General Gerow. I do not recall, sir, that I ever had copies 
of those messages, sir. 



1616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. I will describe tlieni as they were described in 
1943 by l*eace and War, on page 129. It may refresh your memory : 

During the August 1941 conference between President Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Churchill of Great Britain the situation in the Far East was discussed, 
and it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel 
action in warning Japan against lu'w moves of aj;gression. It was agreed also 
that the United States should continue its con\ersations with the Japanese 
Government and by such means offer Japan a reasonable and just alternative 
to the course upon which that country was embarked. 

Does that i"ef resh yonr memory ? 

General Gerow. I do not remember, sir, seeing that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I will read the part of the message 
that gave that, or that gave, as far as America was concerned, its 
parallel action. 

On the bottom of page 556, volume II, Foreign Relations, this was 
handed to the Jap Ambassador, among others : 

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the 
Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes anjH further 
steps in pursuance of a policy [^277] or program of military domination 
by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the 
United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it 
may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests 
of the United States and American Nationals and toward insuring the safety 
and security of the United States. 

Now does that refresh your memory as to whether or not you ever 
saw that or heard of it? 

General Gerow. I do not recall having seen it, sir. I believe if the 
Chief of Staff had known about it he would have informed me, sir, 
that such a declaration had been made. 

Senator Ferguson. Now was that of concern to the War Plans 
Department ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; it would have been of concern to the War 
Plans Division. 

Senator Ferguson. In fact it was vital information to the War 
Plans Department, was it not ? 

(xeneral (terow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now Iioav do you account for never having 
heard of that ? 

General (xerow. Sir, I cannot testify at this late date that I never 
heard of it, sir. I do not believe that I ever actually saw the docu- 
ment. I believe if the Chief of Staff knew about it, sir, that he did 
inform me of such a declaration. 

[4278~] Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know of that before 
you heard of it here in this caucus room? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you hear about it? 

General Gerow. Since I have been back here, sir, in A^'ashington, 
to appear before this committee, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So since you have been back and after 
the Tth of December, you heard about it ? 

General Gerow. I cannot recall, sir, whether I heard it before oi- 
not, sir. I definitely remember since I have been here this time to 
appear before the committee, of reading that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. AVas that kind of information of value to you. 
and if so, did you act upon it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1617 

General Gerow. It was of value, yes, sir. My instructions to act 
upon it would probably have come, sir, from the Chief of Staff. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have any information or orders 
upon which you did act upon that information, and if so what action 
did you take ? 

General Gerow. Sir, I cannot recall at this time, my conversations 
with the Chief of Staff, if I had such conversations on that subject, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember receiving word at [4270] 
all that came from Ambassador Winant on the morning of the 6th, 
about the movement of troops, that went into the State Depart- 
ment at 10:40 on the 6th of December 1941? 

General Gerow. May I see that message, sir, to refresh my memory ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

(The document was handed to General Gerow.) 

General Gerow. I do not believe, sir, that I ever saw that message. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you had known what I read to you 
here, what I read from these two books, and you would have seen 
that message, what would that message have meant to you ? 

General Gerow. It would have only meant to me, sir, reading this 
message now that certain troop movements were being made by the 
Japanese, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would it have meant anything more than that? 

General Gerow. Not that I know of now, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Where is that troop movement to, according to 
that message ? 

General Gerow. That states "sailing slowly westward toward Kra." 

Senator Ferguson. How many hours distant ? 

[^.^SOI General Gerow. Fourteen hours distant in time. 

Senator Ferguson. Where would they have struck? 

General Gerow. The Kra Peninsula, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That 14 hours distant, they would have struck 
in 14 hours, would they not ? 

General Gerow\ In 14 hours, yes, sir; if they had continued on 
that course to Kra. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would that mean anything in relation to 
this parallel action that we had taken about any further aggressive 
movement ? Here is what the message said : 

The Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan, 
that if the Japanese Government talies any further steps in pursuance of a 
policy or program of military domination or force or threat of force of neighbor- 
ing counti-ies, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take 
immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary towards safe- 
guarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American 
nationals toward insuring the safety and security of the United States. 

Would that not have been a violation of this order, or of this rule ? 

General Gerow. I do not believe, taking this message [4£S'1'\ 
by itself, it says enough to definitely state what the Japs were plan- 
ning to do, sir, from my interpretation of the message. 

Senator Ferguson. So, if you had received that, it w^ould not 
have meant a thing to you^ 

General Gerow. Well, I would like to plot this on a map, sir, and 
see. There were, in those staff conversations in the Singapore 

Senator Ferguson. I have got a map here. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 4 4 



1618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. I think I have got a copy of that same one, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. You have got a copy of it ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. This map has no scale on it, Senator, 
so it is rather difficult for me to say exactly where they would be 
in 14 hours, but it would indicate 

Senator Ferguson. It would indicate that they were 14 hours 
from Kra? 

General Gerow. Yes, but as to where that would place them on 
the map, I do not know where their position would be actually on 
this map. It would indicate, sir, that they were proceeding to go 
south of the line 10° north, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. They would go south of 10° north, and they 
would also be east of 100° east, [4^82] wouldn't they? 

General Gerow. They would be east of 100° east, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familar with the fact that on 
the 2d of December, the President made a directive in that the 
President directed three men-of-war to be established in the Pacific. 
Were you familiar with that? 

General Gerow. Not at the time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear of that? 

General Gerow. Not until I heard it brought out before this com- 
mittee, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I have tried to mark on my map with 
ink there where these ships would be, or the area. It may help you 
some, because the name are small and hard to see. The first one 
is between Hainan and Hue. Do you see that one ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the next one is between Camranh Bay 
and Cape St. Jacques; and the next one is off Ponte de Camau. Do 
you see those three? 

General Gerow. I have those located, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you think those three men-of-war, 
would be out in a position so they could execute and [4^83] 
see whether or not the Japs were violating what I read to you from 
the message of the l7th of August — not the message, but the note? 

General Gerow. You refer now, sir, to this Admiralty note? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir, and the note from the President. Will 
you let him see page 39 of exhibit 37 ? 

(The document was handed to General Gerow.) 

Senator Ferguson. Have you looked at it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would they not be in a position to execute, 
to see whether or not there were violations of the note of the I7th of 
August 1941? 

General Gerow. I would say tlie one, sir, around Camranh Bay and 
Cape St. Jacques, and the one on Pointe de Camau, yes, sir, they would 
be in a position. 

Senator Ferguson. They would be ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would not it be material to you, being in 
the War Plans Division where you were going to give, and it was your 
duty, as you say, to give orders of action to our troops, if you were 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1619 

going to put the position of the enemy Avhich you said a message should 
contain, would not it be essential to have the information [4^84-] 
in the note of the 17th and also the message of the President to the 
Asiatic Fleet? Would not it be essential for you to have them? 
General Gerow. It Avould be helpful to me to have them. 
Senator Ferguson. Not only helpful ; it would be essential, would it 
not? 

General Gerow. Only in the failure of G-2 to keep me posted, sir, 
as to any information. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you posted as to that information? 
General Gerow\ I was not, sir. 

KSenator Ferguson. How could you have acted on the 6th of Decem- 
ber 1941, then, without that information? 
General Gerow. With regard to these ships? 
Senator Ferguson. Yes, with regard to these ships. 
General Gerow. Or with regard to the movements ? 
Senator Ferguson. The movement of the troops, movement of those 
ships ; how could you give orders if you did not have the information ? 
General Gerow. Well, it depended, sir, on whom I wanted to give 
orders to. There was nothing that the Army could do to stop that 
movement south. That was a naval matter and only ships or aircraft 
posted down there could do anything about that, sir. 

[4^86] Senator Ferguson. Did it indicate to you, or would it 
have indicated to you that such a movement meant war with the 
United States? 

General Gerow. Not unless our Government decided to go to war, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What about if they struck the first overt act? 

Would not it be necessary that you give an order to defend yourself ? 

General Gerow. Well, sir, if the Japs had attacked some of our 

positions, then they would automatically defend themselves under 

the existing war plans, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not I understand you to say, sir, the reason 
they struck at Hawaii was that that was our strongest fortification 
and it was on their flank ? 

General Gerow. I stated, sir, that it was on our flank. 
Senator Ferguson. On whose flank ? 
General Gerow. On the flank of the Japanese, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Gerow. On the advance to the south. 

Senator Ferguson. But if they struck and it meant war, because 
of this message and our stand, and let us say that it was a correct 
stand, was not it then the duty of your department to know those 
things so that you could give orders, so that we could have a defense 
to any action they may take [4^86'] on their flank? 

General Gerow. Sir, I believe we would have known very quickly 
had the Japanese attacked any of our positions. 

Senator Ferguson. They did on tht Tth, so what is the use of know- 
ing afterward. That is why we are here today, because in Washington 
they did not know and did not anticipate. Isn't that true ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. I think when we sent that message of 
November 27 out we distinctly stated that we anticipated hostile action 
against each of our possessions that bordered on the Pacific. We did 



1620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

not loiow which one. The Japanese action was unpredictable, and I 
saw no information that indicated to me at any time at which partic- 
ular place they woud attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand this, that no matter what 
information you received after the 27th you would not have sent it 
to the theater in Hawaii ? 

General Gebow. No, sir. Senator ; I do not think I stated that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, isn't that a fair answer ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. I would like to elaborate a bit on that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Can we get a recess long enough for me to vote ? 

[4287] The Vice Chairman. If you desire it, Senator. We will 
naturally conform to your wishes. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like, if we could take that long. 

Mr. Murphy. Why not let Mr. Keefe take it up and then have you 
continue later ? 

Senator Ferguson. It will only take me 5 minutes, and then we 
will not have to break the continuity here. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, we will take a recess 

Mr. Clark. I do not object. Senator, but I am calling attention to 
the fact that the House Members do not get an opportunity to vote. 
I am not objecting 

Senator Ferguson. I will continue. 

General Gerow. Shall I proceed. Senator? 

Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to finish my statement. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Clark. I was going on to say if we are going to be here a good 
long while I thought we would have to have a definite policy in that 
respect. 

Senator Ferguson. That is perfectly all right. 

Mr. Murphy. May I state for the record that there is a resolution 
that was adopted by both Houses excusing the members [4^88] 
of the Pearl Harbor committee from voting during the sessions of the 
committee. 

Senator Ferguson. Has the interruption taken you from the question 
that I have given ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not think so, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Gerow. This is an operational message. It contains certain 
sentences in it that I would like to read : 

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. 
Prior to hostile .Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance 
and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried 
out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Should hostilities 
occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow 5. 

Those are all directives. There was nothing that occurred, sub- 
sequent to the sending of that message, no information that I received, 
that would have influenced me to change the actions directed in that 
message. 

[4^891 Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, as a matter 
of fact really no information came to you between that date on the 
27th and at 11 : 25 when you walked into General Marshall's office on 
the day of the 7th at noon. You had not had the pilot message, you 
had not had the destruction of the codes message, you had not had 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1621 

the 14-part, or the 13th part of the message, you had not had the 
destruction of the Japanese code messages, you did not have the 
message coming from Winant, you did not have the President's direc- 
tive to CINCAF which was the Asiatic Fleet ; isn't that correct ? 

General Gerow. The information that came in with regard to 
magic between the 27th and the 6th and that was distributed by G-2 
I did see and that contained certain information. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you what information you received 
out of magic between the 27th and the 6th and the 7th ? 

General Gerow. Sir, I would have to check the documents showing 
the messages that were received during that time, and I may be able 
to identify that I saw some of them. I must presume I saw all of 
these messages that were distributed by G-2, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Let's take the Winant message. You didn't see 
that? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

[4^90] Senator Ferguson. The President's message to CINCAF 
to put out the three men of war, you didn't see that ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The President's message to the High Commis- 
sioner, did you see that one? 

General Gerow. I believe I saw that one, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When ? 

General Gerow. I am reasonably certain, sir, that I saw it on the 
morning of the 27th. I think my memorandum to the Chief of 
Staff states that I saw that. 

Senator Ferguson. That was on the 26th, so you saw it on the 
27th? 

General Gerow. I saw it on the 27th. 

Senator Ferguson. You didn't see the pilot message? 

General Gerow. I don't recall having seen it. 

Senator Ferguson. You didn't see the 1 o'clock message, that is, 
giving the day of delivery, and the destruction of the last code ? 

General Gerow. That is the 1 o'clock message that indicated they 
were going to deliver something at 1 o'clock. No, sir; I didn't see 
that until 11 : 30 on the morning of the 7th. 

Senator Ferguson. You didn't see any part of the 13-part 
message ? 

[4^91] General Gerow. Not to the best of my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Until you went in there. 

General Gerow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you heard, read, or saw the whole message, 
you saw it laying on General Marshall's desk ? 

General Gerow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for that information 
not being given to you as a general in War Plans who had the duty to 
act on it ? 

General Gerow. Sir, I cannot recall whether General Marshall dis- 
cussed any of those messages with me or not. If he was informed of 
them I believe he would have. I don't know what his testimony was 
with respect to them. I cannot account for why they were not de- 
livered to me, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. General Gerow, on the 15th you drew up a state- 
ment, did you — didn't you have a statement here, exhibit 39 ? 



1622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Drawn up on the 15th of December. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that that 
doesn't consider any facts except what took place really in the gen- 
eral's office at 11 : 25, and didn't consider anything that happened on 
the day of the 6th or up until that time ? 

[4-292] General Gerow. I don't recall the instructions that re- 
quired me to prepare this memorandum. I rather imagine that the 
Chief of Staff was not clear in his own mind as to what happened 
during that period in his office and asked those present to give him our 
views as to what had happened, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was the crucial thing what happened in his 
office or was it what happened prior? You were only in there a half 
hour, were you not, between 11 : 25 and when tEe message went out, 
at the latest, 12:17? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that the crucial part of this occasion, that 
short period ? 

General Gerow. I think that was a very crucial period, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it as crucial as Saturday and early Sunday 
morning ? 

General Gerow. Sir, I am not certain how you use "crucial." It 
was vital, the distribution of magic on the 6th was of vital importance, 
if that is the point, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of a more serious time in the his- 
tory of this Nation than between early morning on the 6th and 1 
o'clock on the 7th ? Have you ever heard, in history, of a more crucial 
period than that ? 

General Gerow. Well, sir, I don't know whether I can [^^PS] 
compare that period with some of the other cracial highlights in our 
history and say whether one was more crucial than the other. 

I think such things that happened at Gettysburg, I think certain 
things that happened at Valley Forge, certainly certain things that 
happened in Germany in the last war, and certain things that hap- 
pened in the Pacific, probably would be just as crucial in the history 
of this Nation. 

[If29Ji\ Senator Ferguson. Now, General Gerow, as I under- 
stand it you prepared a memorandum, and it would be for history's 
sake, and out of that entire period you took 52 minutes and that was 
the period between 11 : 25 and 12 : 17. 

Now, you have no recollection, as I understand it 

Mr. Murphy. I think that the witness should be allowed to answer. 
This man is a general who fought in France, on the beaches of Nor- 
mandy, and he ought to be shown every courtesy. He ought to be 
given an opportunity to answer. 

Senator Ferguson. I haven't finished the question. 

Will you read it ? 

(The question referred to, as recorded above, was read by the 
reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson (continuing). Of what took place in the other 
part of the period from Saturday morning. Can you tell us anything 
as to the other part of the period from Saturday morning up until 
11:25? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1623 

General Gerow. Senator, I think I stated before, this memorandum 
was prepared, I believe, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, to cover 
the period that we were assembled in his office. He did not direct me, 
as I recall, to prepare a statement covering the period of the days of 
the 6th and the 7th. I did not prepare such a memorandum, so, con- 
sequently, my memory is not as clear as to what [4^96] hap- 
pened on the 6th as it is as to what happened that particular morning 
in General Marshall's office. I do not recall anything eventful, as far 
as I am personally concerned that occurred to me on December 6. 

Senator Ferguson. And on the 7th? 

General Gerow. On the morning of the 7th, no, sir, until I was called 
to General Marshall's office, and after that the news of the Pearl 
Harbor attack came in and other things happened. 

Senator Ferguson. General, do you know, or did you know, Major 
Clausen ? 

General Gerow. I met Major Clausen when I appeared before the 
Army Pearl Harbor board, and I saw him later on, sir, in Europe. 

Senator Ferguson. He was making an investigation, was he not? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. He approached me with a letter, as I 
recall, signed by the Secretary of War, directing him to make an 
investigation concerning certain matters in connection with Pearl 
Harbor, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you give your full testimony before the 
Pearl Harbor board ? 

General Gerow. I tried to answer all the questions they asked me, 
sir. I don't believe that the magic phase [4296] came into it. 
And after I appeared before the Pearl Harbor committee, I under- 
stand that a number of other witnesses appeared and made certain 
statements regarding deliveries of certain papers to me, and I had 
no opportunity to answer those statements. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any instructions when you went to 
the Army Pearl Harbor board not to bring magic in ? 

General Gerow. I am under the impression that I did receive some 
such instructions, because in giving my testimony after reading it, I 
find I hesitated in the middle of a statement, and I said that I might be 
disclosing something of ultra secrecy and I said I did not want to 
state that without the approval of the War Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who you got that instruction from ? 

General Gerow. I cannot recall definitely at this time sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Who would have authority to give it to you ? 

General Gerow. Any of the officers in the War Department would 
have the authority to pass it on to me as an order from the Chief of 
Staff, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It would have to be an order of the [4^97] 

Chief of Staff or his deputy because — you were a Deputy Chief of 
Staff? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I was not. When I appeared before the 
Board I was not. I came back from Europe to appear before that 
board. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

General Gerow. I had no status in the War Department at that 
time. 

Senator Ferguson. You were not in the Chief of Staff at that time ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I was not on duty there. 



1624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I just want to have the record correct. 

Who would have authority to give you that order ? 

General Gerow. I should say the Secretary of War, the Chief of 
Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, or any officer designated by the Chief 
of Staff to transmit such an order to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you recall it at all now ? 

General Gerow. I am very uncertain in my mind, sir. I think, and 
this, Senator, is — I cannot testify to this, my memory is not clear on 
it — I believe it was either Colonel Clarke or General Noyes, and I 
am not positive as to which one or whether it was either one. 

[^298] Senator Ferguson. Both of those gentlemen would be 
in a position to have given you that message; as I understand it, you 
carried it out and didn't give secret magic before the Pearl Harbor 
board ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When Lieutenant Colonel Clausen came to you 
did he ask you to make certain statements to contradict other wit- 
nesses ? 

General Gerow. I submitted an affidavit, sir, and I think that affi- 
davit is of record. I believe I have a copy with me. I would prefer 
to answer from that, if I may. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Let's take your affidavit then. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I have a copy of it. Do you wish me to 
read it ? 

Senator Ferguson. No, I will ask you some questions about it — 
unless you want to read it first. 

General Gerow. I think that gives the whole story, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Suppose you read it into the record and that 
will save time. 

Mr. Murphy. May I have a copy of the Clausen report. Do you 
have it, Counsel ? May I have it, Mr. Greaves, please. 

(The document referred to was handed to Mr. Murphy.) 

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, General. 

[42991 General Gerow (reading) : 

Affidavit of Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow. 

Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow, presently Commanding General, 15th Ai'my, 
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel 
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceed- 
ings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes 
and says : 

During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, as Chief, 
War Plans Division, War Department, I received and reviewed at Washington, 
D. C, some of the highly secret intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages 
which had been decrypted and translated, then known as "Magic." These 
were delivered in the "raw" (unevaluated form) to me or to my Executive Officer 
by representatives of G-2, War Department. Copies were not retained by me. 
Those which I received were returned the same day to representatives of G-2. 
No receipts were given by or requested of me. When these messages were 
handed me, no evaluations were made of them by G-2, other than occasional 
comments by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I placed the highest degree of reliance 
on this form of intelligence. 

Colonel Clausen has shown me the file of some intercepts of this type, desig- 
nated Top Secret Exhibit "B." I recall the general substance of some of these 
messages and presume that they were all presented to me on the approximate 
dates 1^300] of the translations. I specifically recall the two numbered 
23570 and 23859. I knew that the intercepts in the exhibit mentioned, which 
pertain to reports to Tokyo on ship movements in Pearl Harbor, were going also 
to and coming from the Navy Department. Since these related especially to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1625 

the Navy, I assumed that the Navy vras fully cognizant, and would interpret 
this information in connection with Navy studies and estimates, and in coor- 
dination with other information available to the Navy and not given to me. 
My recollection is that there were reports similar in nature which had also 
been intercepted and disseminated, which showed that Japanese consuls at 
ports such as Manila and Seattle were giving Tokio information as to ship 
movements at these places. 

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been 
testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect : 

(1) On 4 December 1941, Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's 
attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese consuls to destroy their 
codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokio, and then asked 
General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. General 
Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent. Following this, Colonel Bratton 
conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent on [J/SOl] 5 
December 1941 a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Com- 
mander Rochefort, USN, concerning the Japanese "Winds Code." 

(2) On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, informed General 
Gerow that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal breach 
of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked that the Com- 
manding General Hawaiian Department, be notified. General Gerow replied 
that he thought plenty of notification had been sent. 

(3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered 
to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843. 
My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows : 
(i) I do not recall the incident. In this connection I wish to state that if a 
representative of G-2 thought my action inadequate he could quite properly 
report the facts to his superior. General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff, 
G-2, who had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a matter of such 
importance. The proper and usual manner was to confer and if the matter still 
remained unsettled, to present the problem to the Chief of Staff. I believe the 
Chief of Staff was [Jf302] then available for that purpose. 

(2) I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. 
It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer 
and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of 
"Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave mo- 
ment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of 
Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To 
the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notifica- 
tion from any soui'ce of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." 
If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall 
the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me 
of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information 
which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written 
evidence availaljle in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, 
which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, 
especially since so many major events have intervened. 

(3) I did not receive or see any parts of the [4303] message men- 
tioned until the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with 
the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 
December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders 
and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes 
was always open to me. 

In the months immediately before 7 December 1941, I did not receive any 
written or oral estimates from G-2, properly vouched for, which pointed to 
Pearl Harbor specifically as the attack target at the opening of hostilities with 
Japan or the other axis powers. During this period, however, I did on 
several occasions receive estimates from G-2, some of which were not borne out 
by subsequent events, and which were to the effect that hostilities with one 
or more of the Axis powers would open with attacks on almost any of many 
strategic points of United States or British territory in the Pacific areas. My- 
self and the members of my staff were constantly concerned with global prob- 
lems and considerations, involving possibilities of hostile land, sea and air 
action against the United States by the Axis powers. 



1626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I wish to state that in my opinion the War Department had sent ample 
warnings to the overseas commanders, including General Short, to alert their 
respective commands for war. General Short did not send at any time any 
notice to the War [^SOJ/] Department which would indicate that he was 
not fully prepared for an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means 
available to him. The War Department had given him estimates and basic war 
plans which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as 
primary threats in the event of war with Japan. These pre-battle and battle 
plans and estimates with which I was very much concerned, were prepared, 
reduced to writing and given to General Short and other officers involved after 
a great deal of mature consideration by the best military brains available to 
us for that purpose. They represented the concensus of the belief and expert 
military opinions of the War and Navy Departments and the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. Since I was aware of this and knew that General Short similarly was 
fully cognizant thereof, I assumed that these fundamental concepts of primary 
threats from a surprise attack by Japan would govern General Short in his 
thinking and preparations in light of the warnings of imminent war. No 
notice ever reached me that he would disregard these estimates, or that he 
would omit preparations against an outside threat. General Short at no time 
informed the War Department that he was not in full agreement with War 
Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu. If he was not in 
accord with these estimates and plans, then it would have been quite reasonable 
to assume that he would have informed the War Department, in accordance 
with established military practice. [4305] I assumed also that General 
Short's liaison with the Navy was such that he received all information of use 
to him and available to the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It was inadvisable for 
the War and Navy Departments to send identical or nearly identical messages 
to the respective commanders at Hawaii, for fear of compromising our codes. 
Hence, it was understood that information sent by either Department which 
would be of use to the other service would be exchanged between the two 
commanders at Hawaii. 

So far as General Short is concerned, the message to him on 27 November 
3941, signed "Marshall", should be considered in the light of all the Army and 
Navy messages which were sent to Hawaii before and after that date, as well 
as with whatever other information was available to him. It was my under- 
standing that G-2, War Department, in carrying out his normal responsibilities, 
was transmitting periodically to the overseas commanders, information, reports 
and estimates bearing on the current situation. For this purpose, G-2 had avail- 
able all the intercepts mentioned, as well as many others which are not included 
in Top Secret Exhibit "B." 

Concerning the "Magic" messages, it was necessary to guard most carefully 
against compromising the source of this extremely valuable intelligence. Only 
a very few persons knew the details. For example, I did not know fully how it 
was obtained. Under this necessity, therefore, it was not [^306] the policy 
of the War Department to send these messages to overseas connuanders. The 
wisdom of this policy has been proved by our recent victories. If more detailed 
information, or if the actual intercepts, had been sent to Hawaii, then the same 
procedure would have been followed with respect to the other overseas com- 
manders, some of whom were at places of greater vulnerability than Hawaii. 
This would have led to great danger of compromise. The spreading of this 
highly secret information at that time into so many hands might have lost us 
tor the present war the source of this form of the best evidence of the enemy's 
intentions. This loss would have been a great disaster, resulting in prolongation 
of the war, increased bloodshed, uncertainty and expense, and possible defeats. 

(Signed) L. T. Gerow, 
Lieut. Gen. U. S. Army. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June, 1945. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
(Signed) Henry C. Clausen, 

Lieut. Colonel, JAGD. 
at Cannes, France 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1627 

[4^07] Senator Ferguson. Now, General, do you know what — 
put it this way: Did Major Clausen at this time, or Lieutenant Col- 
onel — was he Lieutenant Colonel? 

General Gerow. Lieutenant Colonel. 

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Clausen, at that time, did he ask you 
these questions so that you would write out this 3-page affidavit? 
How did you know at that time what you wanted to put in the affi- 
davit — what he wanted? 

General Gerow. He visited me first at my headquarters at Bad 
Nauheim. We had a short conversation at that time and he told me 
what the scope of his investigation was going to be. He left, and, as 
T recall, went up to interview other officers on this Pearl Harbor affair. 
I then left, I think the day after he was at my headquarters, and went 
to the Riviera, for the first leave I had had in four years. He followed 
me down there and came out to my house and questioned me in a very 
full and very formal w^ay. 

I drafted notes. I had no typist or stenographer. He took them to 
his hotel and typed it and brought it back, the substance of what I 
told him, and I didn't agree with some of the things he had written, 
and so I scratched them out and rewrote them myself, and he finally 
typed them. 

Does that cover your question, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[4^308] Now, what did he tell you he was trying to prove; did 
he tell you he was trying to prove something? 

General Gerow. No, sir. He merely came to me and presented 
this letter from the Secretary of War authorizing him to make this 
investigation and he stated, as I recall now, that testimony had been 
submitted before the Pearl Harbor Board after my testimony and 
he was trying to clear up that testimony, to see whether the state- 
ments made concerning certain acts that I was involved in were 
correct, what my testimony would be in answer to it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, first : 

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been 
testimonj' before the Pearl Harbor Board to the following effect: * * * 

Did he tell you that it was testimony that had been sworn to? 

General Gerow. He has it here "on what is stated to have been 
testimony." 

Senator Ferguson. Was there some doubt about this being testi- 
mony ? 

General Gerow. Well, there wasn't in my mind, sir. I interpreted 
the statement he made to me that it was testimony given before the 
Pearl Harbor Board. 

Senator Ferguson. Apparently he told you Bratton had [4309] 
testified to this : 

On 4 December 1941 Colonel Bratton of Gr-2 called General Gerow's atten- 
tion to an intercept indicating action by Japanese Consuls to destroy their 
codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokyo, and then asked 
General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. 

Up to there it would indicate that Bratton wanted to send more 
warnings to the overseas commanders. The warning then in effect 
was that of the 27th, was it not? This is on the 4th of December. 



1628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. The operational message was sent on 
November 27, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be the one he was talking about. 
He asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. 

You would be the man he would come to, would you not? You 
have told us you were the authorized officer outside of the Chief of 
Staff to send this. 

General Gerow. That is right. If it was an operational message. 
If it was an informational message it would be sent out by G-2. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that kind of a message, to send more 
warnings to the overseas commanders, that would be [4^10^ 
operational, would it not ? 

General Gerow. Not, sir, if you take it in connection with the sen- 
tence above, "called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indi- 
cating action by Japanese Consuls to destroy their codes and papers 
in accordance with instructions from Tokyo." That would only bear 
out what the Operational message already said. 

Senator Ferguson. What did the destruction of codes mean to 
you? 

General Gerow. It means that the people destroying were antici- 
pating war, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And then you didn't disturb or want to dis- 
turb, if you got that information you didn't want to disturb your 
warning of the 27th ; is that correct ? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I don't think the statement in the Op- 
erational message, the instructions to the commander out there, needed 
any changing because of the fact that the Japanese were destroying 
their codes. We had already stated, the War Department had taken 
the position that war was imminent, hostilities might occur at any 
moment. The mere fact that they had destroyed their codes wouldn't 
change it. 

Senator Ferguson. Then the fact that you had received information 
about the destruction of the Japanese codes subsequent to the 27th 
wouldn't cause you, would not have [4311] caused you to act? 

General Gerow. Would not have caused me to send another Opera- 
tional action message, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then 

General Gerow. I would like to elaborate, if I may. I think my 
response to that one should also be read. 

Senator Ferguson. I want you to answer fully. I don't want you 
to feel that you are not given an opportunity to answer fully. 

General Gerow. I would like to, since part of that paragraph 1 has 
been brought into the picture, I think the answer should be given at 
the same time. 

I do not recall the incident. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what you said, "I do not recall the in- 
cident," but I am trying to ask you questions to see whether or not it 
would be your duty if you did get the information to act. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

[4^12] Senator Ferguson. That is what I am trying to say. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1629 

Senator Ferguson. And, as you remember now, if you had received 
that information knowing that the warning of the 27th went out, that 
you would not have thought that the information about breaking the 
codes would not have led you to give them more warning. Now go 
ahead and make any further explanation that you want. 

Mr. Mitchell. He did not say that. He said it would not require 
an operational order. He said it two or three times. This man had 
operational orders to give and G-2 had warnings to give and I think 
there ought to be a distinction made between an operational order and 
information in every question that is asked him. 

Senator Feeguson. Now, on the statement by counsel does that help 
refresh your memory ? Has he enlightened you ? 

General Gerow. Will you ask your question again, sir, and I will 
reply to it again, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Here is the language in the affidavit : "And then 
asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas 
commanders." 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, we are talking about warning of action, 
that is, a directive of action not such as G-2 would [4313] send 
but such as you would send. 

Now, to get this straight, the warning on the 27th was a message 
that you could send but not G-2, isn't that correct ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Gerow. And I would only send it in the name of General 
Marshall if he would approve it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. Now, you answered my ques- 
tion when I asked you that, that you did not think that the destruc- 
tion of codes would have caused you to send any further message of 
action or warning. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I said that destruction of codes was 
not — the information was not of such a nature that would have 
caused me to change the operational instructions, the directives that 
were contained in the message of November the 27th. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand. 

General Gerow. And, sir, the use of that word "warnings" in here 
I think is a bit confusing. If Colonel Bratton did what he said that 
he did he was merely telling me that he wanted me to send a message 
to Hawaii to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes. 
Now, that is apparently what the paragraph means, sir, and that was 
a message that was purely informational that could have been sent by 
G-2 [431.f] and not by me, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, if he had in mind the other 
kind of a message, "General Gerow to send more warnings to the over- 
seas commanders," not information, warnings — and we have been 
talking here with the other officers that the message of the 27th was 
a warning, the one of the 24th was even called a war warning right 
in it. 

General Gerow. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, if he had in mind that kind of a message, 
"General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent." Now, you are 



1630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

still of the opinion that that would be a correct answer to Bratton, 
are you not, if you were of the opinion then that sufficient had been 
sent? 

General Gerow. I was of the opinion that a very positive and clear- 
cut directive had been sent to the Commanding General of the Hawai- 
ian Department for definite action and that the fact that the Japanese 
were destroying their code did not indicate to me that I should change 
that directive that was still in effect on December the 7th. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; all right. Now, on the 5th of December, 
the next thing : "Colonel Otis E. Sadtler, S. C."— what does the ''S. C." 
mean after that? 

General Gerow. Signal Corps. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Informed General Gei'ow [4-315] that the Japanese wind code had been 
implemented to signal breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain 
and asked that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department be notified. 
General Gerow replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent. 

Now, at that time, General, taking as of December the 5th, did you 
know that Batavia, Netherlands East Indies, had notified General 
Miles by a message that there was a wind code, not an activating of 
a wind code, but a wind code which it interpreted as a war decision 
would be sent by weather broadcast? Did you know that? 

General Gerow. I would like to see that message, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would counsel show him the Batavian message ? 

Mr. Gesell. You have got it, Senator. It is in volume 5 of the 
Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. Volume 5 of the Navy. 

Mr. Gesell. It is the one you had yesterday. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the original. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. May I ask counsel whether or not the Clausen 
report has been introduced in evidence as yet ? 

Mr. Gesell. No ; it has not been introduced in evidence [4^^^] 
as vet. 

Senator Lucas. How many reports are there, may I ask. Clausen 
reports ? Just one ? 

Mr. Gesell. Well, the Clausen report is a series of affidavits pri- 
marily. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you mean how many copies? 

Senator Lucas. Yes ; how many copies. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. We have 2 copies. 

Mr. Gesell. There are 2 copies available to us. 

Senator Lucas. When could the Senator from Illinois get ahold 
of the Clausen report ? 

Mr. Gesell. I will be glad to let you have our copy tonight. 

Senator Lucas. No; I am not going to take the copy aAvay from 
counsel because he needs it. I am asking about the other one. "VMio 
has it now ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not clear whether it is Senator Brewster or 
who it is. 

Mr. Gesell. Congressman Murphy I think has the other. Both 
of them are out of our hands now. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1631 

Senator Ferguson. I will undertake, Senator, to give you Senator 
Brewster's copy. 

Senator Lucas. I will be delighted to have it. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, sir. 

\_Jf317'\ Senator Lucas. Overnight, at least. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not find it. Does counsel recall the page? 
I have it now. It is on page 726, so the record will show. 

Mr. MrrciiELL. Of volume 5. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, General. 

General Gerow, I think, Senator, when you asked me the question 
you read what Colonel Sadtler was reported to have said. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Gerow. And I would like to go back to my answer on that 
for the purpose of the record and state that I have no such recollection 
and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. 

In answer to your question, sir, I have never seen this message. 

Senator Ferguson. You had never seen the Batavia message? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Which indicated it would not be a message on 
breaking up relations ; it would be a war decision message. You see 
that language in there ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I do not recall ever seeing that message. 

[JfSlS'] Senator Ferguson. And that is quite an important mes- 
sage, is it not, and you would recall it now ? 

General Gerow. I think I would ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it you say that you do not 
remember that incident. It could have happened but you do not 
remember. 

General Gerow. It could have happened, sir, but I do not recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I am trying to get what your mental atti- 
tude would have been at that time. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. If Sadtler had come to you telling you this, 
were you of the opinion that they had sufficient information, and, 
therefore, you would not have sent it ? 

General Gerow. I think that is a little different message, Senator. 
If I had been sure that the Japs had announced that war with the 
United States was going to occur at a certain time, I would have 
most certainly written a message as quickly as possible and sent it 
on my own responsibility if General Marshall had not been there. 
That would have been an operational message. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, an operational message. 

General Gerow. And warning them that a certain thing would hap- 
pen at a certain time. 

[4^J9] Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, as I understand it, 
if 3^ou had seen the Batavia message and knew it was activating, then 
you would have felt that it was your duty to send a new action message 
to Hawaii? 

General Gerow. Not necessarily a new action message, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what would it be ? 

General Gerow. One quite similar to the one General Marshall sent 
on the morning of December the 7th. There was something that rather 



1632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

fixed a date as immediate, that something was going to happen. If 
they had said, "We have definitely decided to go to war with tlie United 
States," I think we most certainly — that is, if I may correct that, that 
if Japan had decided and had stated that she was going to go to war 
with the United States definitely on a certain day — would inform our 
commanders all over the world to that effect. 
Senator Ferguson. Now, the next one : 

On the night of the 6th of December 1941 Colonel Bratton or another delivered 
to General Gerow thirteen parts of the fourteen part Japanese intercept 25843. 

That is the 13 parts of the so-called l4-part message. Now, did he 
give you that information on the 6th, that is, on Saturday ? 

General Gekow. I do not recall, sir, that he did. I have seen testi- 
mony somewhere that he stated that it was given [4^20] to my 
executive officer, Colonel Gailey, and I haven't talked to Colonel Gailey, 
sir, and I do not know what his answer would be. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have an executive officer by the name 
of Colonel Gately or Gailey ? 

General Gerow. Gailey; yes, sir. I had such an executive officer, 
C. K. Gailey, a colonel. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, at that time on Saturday was your office, 
the War Plans, alerted to war? 

General Gerow. That depends. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. To expect war that day ? 

General Gerow. It just depends. Senator, on what you mean by the 
term "alerted." I was, and most of my officers were, working down 
there quite late every night and practically all day Sunday and on 
holidays. As I stated, I believe, this morning, we had an arrange- 
ment whereby a duty officer was designated each day for a 24-hour 
period. That duty officer after the office was closed up was permitted 
to go to his home. He remained within calling distance of a telephone 
during his entire period of duty, except when he was at the office. He 
knew where to reach me, sir, and the Adjutant General and the Secre- 
tary of the General Staff knew where to reach him. sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would your records show — should [4S£1] 
they show what officers were on duty after 6 o'clock Saturday night 
in your department 'i 

General Gerow. Senator, I have had a search made in the War 
Department to try to find that duty roster, sir, and I have been unable 
to locate it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. There was one at that time, there was a roster? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you have made a search and you have been 
unable to locate it ? 

General Gerow. I have asked the Operations Division, w^hich took 
over and superseded the War Plans Division, to make a search of their 
records and to search the Adjutant General's records and they have 
been unable, sir, to find the record or the roster for that period, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you are unable to tell us who was on duty 
that night? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I regret to say I am, sir. I think that I 
was down at the office myself until G or 7 or 8 o'clock. Of course, that 
was a very busy time and we had a lot of unfinished business. As a 
matter of fact, we went down the next morning, a number of us. Sun- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1633 

day morning, in order to clean up some of this business that had ac- 
cumulated and we could do it better on Sunday morning because 
[4S22] you did not have a lot of people bothering you. 

Senator Ferguson. But you were not going down Sunday — or you 
were not down Saturday night, I mean your force, because your office 
was closed. All right. 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you say here : 

I do not recall the incident. 

You were replying back to one. And then you said that — 

General Sherman Miles, Assistant of G-2, had direct access to me and to the 
Chief of Staff in a matter of such importance. 

You meant there that if it was only information he could have given 
it alone, but if he wanted to get any action message then he would have 
to come to you or General Marshall ? 

General Gerow. Yes. If he wanted to give out information he 
could send it without consulting me. He normally did consult me, 
however, but he had no authority, sir, to direct operations without 
consulting me, sir. If he felt that operations should be conducted, he 
was absolutely free to come to me and suggest that such a message 
be sent and if we did not agree I think the custom would have been for 
General Miles and myself both to go to the Chief of Staff and express 
our differing views and have him make the decision. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to go to paragraph 3 on the next 
page [reading] : 

[4323] I did not receive or see any part of the message mentioned until the 
morning of the 7th of December 1941 when a conference was held with the Chief 
of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of the 6th 

Now, I assume there that you are talking about the 13 parts that 
were in. 

General Gerow. I think probably I was covering the whole message, 
sir, at that time because 

Senator Ferguson. You do not say that in your affidavit do you ? 

General Gerow. No, sir; but I did not have these messages in front 
of me at that time, sir, to show when they came into the War Depart- 
ment and the time they were translated. 

Senator Ferguson. But he must have told you that 13 were in 
because you say, "If I had received parts of the message on the 6th 
of December 1941." Now, here is what you say in your affidavit that 
you would have done : 

I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the 
Chief of Staff. 

In other words, you thought that the 13 parts of the message, plus 
the pilot message, which I understand you did not see 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

[iS^^-l Senator Ferguson (continuing) . Would have been suffi- 
cient for you to immediately have realerted or to at least have alerted 
the commanders across the sea ? 

General Gerow. I think possibly. Senator, there may not have been 
a meeting of minds with regard to that particular sentence between 
myself and Colonel Clausen. I did not have those messages with me, 
I did not recall all their contents. As a matter of fact, as I have testi- 

79716 — 46 — pt. 4 5 



1634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

fied, I saw them first on the morning in the office of the Chief of Staff 
at 11 : 30 and I think I read it very casually that morning, sir, and 
had not seen them since. I did not see them when I testified before 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you through ? 

General Gerow, I am sure what I meant in that was if they necessi- 
tated operational orders to the commanders overseas I would have 
sent such orders. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, that is not what it says, is it ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; and I say now I feel that there must not 
have been a meeting of minds because I would not have acted on an 
order that was unimportant, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand that you feel that 
up until the night of the 6th, which includes the 13 parts, that they 
were not important ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

[4^'25] Senator Ferguson. The Winant message, the pilot 
message, the breaking of the codes message and the 13-part message, 
the various other messages that were in here that I reviewed with 
General Marshall the other day, that they were not of such importance 
that you would have given an alert ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I did not mean, sir, to convey that answer. 
The sentence reads : "If I had received parts of the message." I might 
have received maybe the first part of 14 parts and there may not have 
been anything in that one part of that message that would have caused 
me to send an operational message. Do I make myself clear, Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Did you read the 13 parts of that message? 
Have you ever read it ? 

General Gerow. I read it, sir, I think on the morning or the after- 
noon of December the 7th, sir, rather casually. That was something 
which happened, that was in the past. We were trying to see that 
nothing like that happened in the future. 

Senator Ferguson. Then as far as you were concerned, General, 
you really never read those 13 parts or heard it read prior to the 7th, 
the time of the attack on the 7th? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I saw it first at 11:30 in the Chief of 
Staff's office. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did not read it and he did [4^26] 
not read it aloud ? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not believe that he did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore you hadn't any knowledge of it, I 
mean what was in it? 

General Gerow. Well, sir, the Chief of Staff told me in general 
what was in it when I went in there, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, had he already read it when you got in 
there ? 

General Gerow. I think he did, sir. He had the papers on his desk 
in front of him. 

Senator Ferguson. General, how did you get to the General's 
office? Did you drive there or were you in the same building? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; we were in the same building, on the same 
floor just a very short distance away. 

Senator Ferguson, Did you go there by a telephone call ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1635 

General Gerow. As I recall, sir, the Chief of Staff had a buzzer 
oil his desk, a telephone buzzer and he buzzed that and said, "Come 
up to my office at once." 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, how long had you been in your 
office prior to the buzz from the Chief of Staff to come to his office ? 

General Gerow. To the best of my recollection and belief I arrived 
in my office some time before 10 o'clock, sir. 

[4327] Senator Ferguson. Well, have you any nearer idea? 
9:30? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I cannot testify as to the exact time. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you would be an hour 
and twenty-some minutes in your office. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to going to General Marshall's office. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And during that period you had no idea that 
there was a pilot message, that there was an Admiralty message about 
the movement of ships, the Winant message, the 13-part message, the 
14th part, or the 1 o'clock delivery, and the destruction of the code. 
You were in your office an hour and twenty-one minutes, and that 
never came to your attention ? 

General Gerow. I do not believe, sir, it was ever brought to my 
office. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I asked you. 

General Gerow. Sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I asked you. 

General Gerow. No, sir. I do not recall ever seeing that message 
until I went to General Marshall's office at 11 : 30. 

[4328] Mr. MncHELL. He is talking about several messages, 
not only the 13 parts or 14th part, but the one from Winant. 

General Gerow. I think I testified I did not 

Mr. Mitchell. Your answer only relates to one of them? 

General Gerow. I do not recall, as I think I stated before, having 
seen the Winant message at all, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I say. You never saw it at all. 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not see the pilot message prior to being 
with General Marshall in his office on the morning of the 7th? 

General Gerow. To the best of my recollection I believe I did not, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You had not seen the 13th part of the message, 
or the 14th part, is that right? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You had not seen the 1 o'clock delivery message 
and the destruction of their code machine, had you, prior to 11 : 25 ? 

General Gekow. The destruction of the code machine, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It is in the 1 o'clock delivery message. 
Would you just let him see that message? 

(The document was handed to General Gerow.) 

[4S29] Mr. Mitchell. What is the message you asked him 
about ? 

Senator Ferguson. It is the 1 o'clock delivery message. Is not 
there in that same message a provision about destroying the code? 



1636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. No; it is a separate message. That is on the other 
page, right across from it. 

Senator Ferguson. It is across on the other page, the one as to the 
destruction of the code. 

General Gerow. That is the one, sir, No. 910, that you refer to, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Wait until I get my copy. 

General Gerow. Page 249, sir. 

Senator Ferg.uson. On page 218, the one at the top. General, first. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "Will the Ambassador please submit to the 
United States Government, if possible to the Secretary of State, our 
reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on the 7th your time." That 
would be on Sunday at 1 o'clock, would it not? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. As I recall now, sir, I did not see that 
message until I went into the office of General Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I understand. Now, on page 
[4^30] 249, at the top of the page : 

After deciphering part 14 of my 902, also my 907, 908 and 909, please destroy 
at once the remaining deciphering machine and all machine codes. Dispose in 
like manner also secret documents. 

General Gerow. I do not recall having seen that message until I 
went into the office of the Chief of Staff at 11 : 30 on December 7, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand. And you do not recall anyone 
calling you at your home to give you any of those messages or infor- 
mation on those messages ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not recall any telephone calls, sir, with 
regard to that. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Colonel Gailey was in 
your office on Sunday morning ? 

General Gerow. I do not recall, sir, specifically that he was there, 
Senator. I remember the names of several other officers who were 
there at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, was there any officer other than you below 
General Marshall that could have acted on Saturday, or Sunday up 
until the time you saw General Marshall in his office, on this informa- 
tion and given another alert to Hawaii? Did you understand my 
question? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I am not quite clear, sir, 

[43S1] Senator Ferguson. Were you the only officer with au- 
thority to act under General Marshall — I think he was the Chief of 
Staff 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you the only officer that had authority to 
act, to give a further alert or action message similar — I say "similar" 
only because it would have an effect — as the one of the 27th, an action 
message? Were you the only one under General Marshall capable 
of doing that ? 

General Gerow. Senator, I had no specific authority to act for Gen- 
eral Marshall; I would have assumed that authority if I thought the 
situation demanded it. 

Senator Ferguson. But, as I understand it then you did not have 
that authority, but you now say that you would have assumed it; is 
that correct ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1637 

General Geeow. That is correct, sir. I had no specific authority to 
act in General Marshall's name. I had authority to si<^ papers with 
his name, sir, but in a matter of that kind, I would have, if the situa- 
tion warranted, I would have assumed the responsibility for sending 
the message. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, suppose, General, that you had known at 
10 o'clock in your oflfice all that you knew [4S3^] at 12 o'clock 
after being in General Marshall's office would you have sent a message 
to Short? 

General Geroav. I would have certainly drafted such a message, and 
if I could have gotten in touch quickly with General Marshall, I would 
have put the question up to him. If I could not have gotten in touch 
with him, sir, I would have probably gotten in touch with the Secre- 
tary of War and told him what I was doing, and gotten the message 
on the line as quickly as possible, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, you figure that that information was 
such that it should have had action on it? 

General Gergw. You mean the document that I saw at 11 : 30 in the 
Chief of Staff's office the next morning? 

Senator Fei?guson. That is right. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; they did warrant action. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, down at the bottom of the page in your 
affidavit, "General Short," — so we are talking about the same thing. 

General Short did not send at any time any notice to the "War Department 
which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack of the kind 
that occurred with the means available to him. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want you to look at Exhibit 32, page 
10, and ask you when you made that affidavit with [4333'] 
Clausen, whether you are familiar with the message on page 10? 

General Gerow. The message on page 10 ? 

Senator Ferguson. Page 10 of Exhibit 32. 

General Gerow. May I read that message to see if we have the 
same one ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Gerow (reading) : 

Japanese negotiations have come to a practical stalemate. 

Senator Ferguson. That is wrong. 

General Gerow. That is the one on page 10, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 12. The question is when you 
made the affidavit in Paris — no, in Cannes, France, the 20th of June, 
1915, were you familiar with the message on page 12 of Exhibit 32, 
reading : 

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy 
REURAD four seven two twenty-seventh," and signed "Short." 

General Gerow. I did not have the message in front of me. sir, at 
the time I testified. I did know about it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How could you make that affidavit, the Clausen 
affidavit and put that sentence in it, and have in mind at the same 
time Short's reply? 

{Ji33Ji\ General Gerow. Well, sir, I think the reply from the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is subject to sev- 



1638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

eral interpretations, sir. I think the phrase "liaison with the Navy" 
could be interpreted to mean that he was taking steps to conduct recon- 
naissance, and carry out other defensive measures. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there any reason why you would misinterpret 
the first part, "Report Department alerted"? That was in reply to 
the 27th, wasn't it ? Let me get the language of the one of the 27th. 

Report measures taken. 

Then his message came in on the 28th : 

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period. 

That is the end of the sentence ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, could that be misconstrued? 

General Gerow. It could be construed that he was taking steps to 
prevent sabotage and also these other things. The entire message 
could be construed that way. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first see the message on page 12? 

General Gerow. I think I saw it first, sir, on the morning of the 
28th of November, 1941. I have testified, I believe, sir, to that effect. 

[4335] Senator Ferguson. And the interpretation that you now 
get from it is to the effect that that sentence "Eeport Department 
alerted to prevent sabotage" meant to you that he was alerted to the 
other, and he was also alerted to sabotage? 

General Gerow. Senator, I did not testify to that, sir, on my pre- 
vious testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. I am asking you now. 

General Gerow. I say now, that the message could be interpreted 
to mean that he was alerted to prevent sabotage and that he was also 
prepared to conduct reconnaissance and other defensive missions. 

Senator Ferguson. It could be ? 

General Gerow. It could be. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you interpret it on the 28th when you 
got it? 

General Gerow. Well, sir 

Senator Ferguson. You acted on it ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; that is the trouble. I did not act on it. 

Senator Ferguson. Even filing it away is acting on it, or passing 
it off is acting on it. 

General Gerow. I testified. Senator, at considerable length to my 
part in the affair. I will repeat the testi- [4336] niony, if 
necessary. 

Senator Ferguson. I want you to answer my question first. 

General Gerow. Will you repeat the question, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. What interpretation, what evaluation did you 
give it on the 28th ? 

General Gerow, I stated, sir, that I testified before the Roberts 
board to the effect that when that message passed over my desk, I 
thought it was an answer to the G-2 message sent out by General Miles. 
Consequently if I did have that thought on the morning of the 28th 
when the message passed over my desk — and I cannot recall now what 
my thoughts were at that time, but if I did have that thought, then 
there was no occasion for me to make any interpretation of the rest 
of the message, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1639 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you want to say that that was your 
thought, to the best of your knowledge now ? 

General Gerow. Senator, 1 would like my testimony to stand, sir, 
as I have stated it, that I testified before the Roberts Commission, 
or Committee, that when that message passed over my desk I assumed 
it to be an answer to the G-2 message sent by General Miles, and the 
reason for that assumption was that the G-2 message was discussed 
greatly at length the evening before. 

[4337] Senator Ferguson. I want to get down to what you said 
in the affidavit: 

General Short did not send at any notice to the War Department which would 
indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack at the time it occurred 
with the means available to him. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I ask you again, did you have in mind this 
reply to Short's on page 12 when you made that affidavit? 

General Gerow. I told you, sir, that I did not have that message in 
front of me. I did know, and was familiar with the message, sir, 
and I did have it in mind at the time I made that affidavit, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not think that at least that message 
would indicate that he was not fully alerted ? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I submit the witness has answered 
that question at least a half dozen times in the examination. I just 
cannot understand the repetition of these questions over and over 
again. I may be wrong, and I certainly am not attempting to fore- 
close any member of the committee from asking any questions, but 
I cannot for the life of me understand the repetitious questions. I 
may be wrong. 

[4-338] The Chairman. The Chair would suggest that the mem- 
bers of the committee avoid repetition as much as possible, in order to 
expedite the hearing, but we will let General Gerow answer this ques- 
tion once more. 

Senator Lucas. I do not object, but I should like to ask this 
question : 

Should I be permitted, and every member of this committee be 
permitted to go through the same kind of examination and ask the 
same type and character of questions over and over again ? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I did not yield. 

The Chairman. Let the Chair answer that question, or that inter- 
rogatory, which he thinks is a proper one. This is not a court proce- 
dure in which the presiding judge, or the presiding officer, has any 
control over the inquiries made by members of the committee. 

The Chair does not understand that he can, arbitrarily, or without 
arbitrary action, control the interrogatories propounded by members 
of the committee. Even though they repeat over and over again, the 
Chair, however, cannot control that. If any member of the commit- 
tee desires to ask the same question or a similar question over and 
over again, the Chair does not know how he can control that process 
of inquiry by any member of the committee. But the [4339] 
Chair would like to caution the members, as far as possible, that 
there be no repetition of the same question, in view of similar answers 
that may have been given by the witness in any case. 

So the Senator will proceed. 



1640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, this affidavit was not covered, 
as I recall it, by the General, in his testimony. These questions 
are new. They were not covered. This sentence that I was reading 
and trying to get an answer to had not been covered. 

I want to know how it is possible to have that sentence in the 
affidavit, having in mind page 12. Now, do you understand my 
question ? 

The Chairman. The Chair does not recall whether General Gerow 
was asked about that matter when he was on the stand before. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you cover that before. General? 

The Chairman. The Chair may say also 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. 

The Chairman. The Chair might also as far as the Chair is 
concerned, as a member of the committee, he understands the Gen- 
eral's answer, and if other members do not, then they can pursue 
that matter, I suppose, until they do understand it. 

[4^4^] General Gerow. My only desire sir, is to explain all 
I know about the Pearl Harbor affair to the committee. I am 
willing to answer any questions freely. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all I am trying to find out, is what 
you do know. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, can you answer the question? 
I wish you would look at that sentence. I want to know how it is 
possible to write that sentence in an affidavit and at the same time 
have in mind General Short's reply on page 12 of exhibit 32. 

General Gerow. Well, Senator, as I stated before, this affidavit 
was made, as I believe, in June 1945. That was when this affidavit 
was made. This message was received on November 28, 1941. A lot 
had happened between 1941 and 1945. I stated that I had not 
attempted to interpret this message when it passed over my desk 
on the morning on November 28, because of the incorrect assumption 
1 had made that it was a reply to the sabotabe message sent by 
General Miles. 

If you ask me now, sir, to interpret whether this message could 
be interpreted as meaning that General Short did not send at any 
time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that 
he was not fully prepared for an [4^4^] attack of the kind 
which occurred with the means available to him, I think I can state 
now, sir, that this message could be interpreted as meaning that the 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had prepared for an 
attack of the kind that was actually made. 

Senator Ferguson. That is your answer to the question? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It is now 4 o'clock. 

It is obvious we cannot finish with General Gerow, so we will 
recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 10 
o'clock a. m., of the following day, Saturday, December 15, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1641 



Wm PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C. 

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a, m., 
in the Caucus Koom (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator 
Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, and Ferguson, and 
Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, 
and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

\_Jf3If3'\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, if we may do so, there are one or two 
matters that have come up that may be of aid to the committee in 
connection with the further examination of General Gerow, and if 
we could intervene for a moment, with Senator Ferguson's permis- 
sion. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield. 

The Chairman. All right, go ahead. 

Mr. Gesell. The first has to do with Exhibit 21, the Winant dis- 
patch of December 6 concerning the movement of Japanese vessels 
towards the Kra Peninsula. We wish to call the committee's atten- 
tion to two additional messages on that subject. 

The first is a message dated December 6, 1941, from the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, signed by R. E. Schuirmann — a 
memorandum for the State Department, dated December 6, 1941. 
This memorandum reads as follows : 

Following report has been received from the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic 
Fleet dated December 6 : 

"British Commander in Chief China reports a 25-ship convoy escorted by 6 
cruisers and 10 destroyers in latitude 08-00 North longitude 106-00 East at 
0316 Greenwich time today. A convoy of 10 ships with 2 cruisers and 10 
destroyers were in latitude 07-40 North longitude 106-20 East 2 hours Vt^W 
later. All on course West. Three additional ships in latitude 07-51 North 
longitude 105-00 East at 0442 course 310°. This indicates all forces will make 
for Kohtron in latitude 10-01 North longitude 104 East. 

"Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Admiral Hart's scouting force has sighted 30 
ships and 1 large cruiser anchored in Camranh Bay." 

There is also attached to this memorandum wliich I have just read 
the text of the message from the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic forces 
dated December 6, 1941, addressed to the Cliief of Naval Operations, 



1642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

which forms the basis of the Schuirmann note to the State Department. 
This is dated December 6, 1941, and contains the same information and 
shows on its face that the dispatch was also sent for the information 
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Com. 16 and 
Com. 14. The time group on the dispatch indicates that it was sent 
December 6th Greenwich time, at 12 : 55 p. m.j which would be 7 : 55 
a. m. Eastern Standard time, or 2 : 55 p. m. Philippine time. 

I would like to have these two documents designated Exhibit 66. 

The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 66.") 

Mr. Gesell. Now the question also arose I believe in [4^4^] 
connection with the examination of General Miles, but it is pertinent 
perhaps to the examination of General Gerow as well, at page 4190 
of the transcript, as to whether the so-called' parallel action messages 
which were delivered to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941 
by President Roosevelt were contained in magic. 

We have obtained the magic messages which show that the texts 
of those notes were in magic, as well as the message from Tokyo 
to Washington dated August 17, 1941, transmitting the messages, 
and I think that should be marked as an exhibit. I suggest that the 
next exhibit number be Exhil)it 67. 

The Chairman. It is so ordered. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 67.") 

[4S46] Senator Ferguson. Could I just see them? 

Mr. Gesell. Certainly. 

(Exhibits Nos. 66 and 67 were handed to Senator Ferguson.) 

Mr. Gesell. We have not reproduced the latter because it is the 
text of notes which are already in volume 2 of Foreign Eelations. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire from counsel whether or not we 
have all of the intercepts now between the 16th and the 28th of August 
1941, in relation to this instrument both ways? 

Mr. Gesell. I cannot answer that question. We will inquire and 
see. I thought the question in the transcript was for the texts of these 
specific messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat I would like to have now in relation to 
these is all of the messages in relation to them both ways. This is 
the one transmitted 

Mr. Gesell. Between what dates. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Between the 16th of August and 29th.^ The 
28th is when the reply came in. 

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel whether or 
not we will receive the material which I requested of General Mar- 
shall, namely the reasons for the 1940 alert? 

[434'^] Mr. Gesell. No, Congressman Keefe, we have not 
received that information. We understand it is expected either later 
today or Monday. 

Mr. 'Keefe. Have you received the action report on the log of the 
U. S. S. {Enterprise which I asked for some time ago? 

Mr. Gesell. The situation with respect to the ship logs is as follows, 
according to my understanding: A large number of ship logs were 
requested by the different members of the committee at different times. 

* Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 124. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1643 

The Navy Department has set aside a large room, and filled it with 
these various logs that had been requested. It is a rather difficult 
matter to reproduce them all, and the Navy has suggested that those 
logs will be there for the inspection of anyone authorized by the com- 
mittee to examine them. We wrote a letter in that connection for 
Senator Brewster, who had asked for quite a number. We have gotten 
the log of the Boise^ which the committee had expressed a special 
interest in, and we were going to make a report on that, and some of 
the other requests later on today. 

Mr. Keefe. I was especially interested in the log of the Enterprise. 

Mr. Gesell. I am sure that will be in the room along [4H^] 
with the other material. 

Mr. Keefe. If I am permitted to go down to this room and see it, 
in company with somebody, if the committee would authorize me to, I 
will be glad to go down there and look at it. 

Mr. Gesell. We will try to get the Enterprise log for you, Mr. 
Congressman. I am sure it can be made available. I think so many 
logs were requested, however, that unless there is a special interest in 
a particular log, it might be more convenient to leave them in this 
room, which has been especially supplied with them. 

The Vice Chaikman. I recall a special interest has been indicated 
in the Enterprise and Boise. 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. I was wondering if those two could be 
brought up here, and if any special ones are needed, they can be ex- 
amined in the room. 

Mr, Murphy. If any members of the committee are going to look 
at the logs, I want to see them, too. I want to know what they are 
looking at. 

Mr, Gesell. They are being used by the Navy, also. We will get 
the Enterprise and the Boise logs. 

Mr. Keefe. Does that also include the action report ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes ; we will get that also. 

[4349] Mr. Keefe. Now, I also ask for the series of memoranda 
written by Hornbeck. I have been furnished with Avhat purport to 
be two. I understand there are quite a series. 

Mr. Gesell. We were advised this morning, Congressman Keefe, 
that the Navy had just located the file of the Hornbeck memoranda, 
and we expect to be able to meet your request completely, and more, 
by next week. I think I reported to the committee earlier that the 
Navy had not been able to find the memoranda, but they reported 
this morning that they at last were located. We will have them re- 
produced and make them available to the members of the committee. 

The Chairman. Is that all ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Proceed with the examination of the General. 

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONAED TOWNSEND GEEOW (Eesumed) 

Senator Fergtjson. General Gerow, you heard read this message 
from Commander Schuirmann to the Secretary of State, a memoran- 
dum for the State Department, December 6, 1941, based upon the 
message from Admiral Hart to the Chief of Naval Operations. 



1644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Had you ever heard of that before ? Had that been called to your 
attention ? 

General Gerow. I do not recall now, sir, if the Navy [4S50'] 
sent a copy over to the War Department, as they usually do, and if 
they had sent some document of that nature I would have seen it, or 
one of my subordinates in the War Plans Division would have seen it. 

Mr. Gesell. I should have stated the Navy record indicated that 
the Navy message was sent to the War Department. The War Depart- 
ment, however, has been unable to locate the message as yet, and is still 
searching for it. 

General Gerow. I do not know. Senator, whether it would have come 
directly to War Plans or to G-2, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that come to G-2 or would it come to you, 
your department ? 

General Gerow. I do not know, sir, how that message was sent. 
It may come directly to War Plans Division, or it may go to G-2 first, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That was very important information if it came 
in on the morning of the 6th ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that now? 

General Gerow. I do not recall that particular message, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that information around the 6th ? 

General Gerow. I have a hazy recollection. Senator, of [43^11 
a number of troop movements being made by the Japs around the 
Camranh Bay area, but I do not remember the details of where I 
received that information, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You stated yesterday that there was some infor- 
mation put in the original affidavit by Colonel Clausen that you re- 
fused to sign and had him take it out and prepare a new affidavit ; do 
you recall that? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what was the information that he put in 
that you had him strike out ? 

General Gerow. I don't recall that it was information, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was it? 

General Gerow. He misunderstood, I think, some of the statements. 
There was no stenographer there and he tried to take it down in long- 
hand and he misunderstood, I believe, some of the statements that I 
made. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't recall what that information was ? 

General Gerow. I cannot recall now ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you get the regulations, over the evening, as 
to the drafting of messages ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I have searched two or three regulations 
and in that connection, sir, I would like to state [4362] that — 
T believe you asked me about what they taught at our schools with 
regard to certain operational messages and my reply was directed to 
the 5-paragraph order which is normally an order issued to, you 
might say, subordinate units, such as a division. 

The type of order that may be issued to a theater commander in one 
of the larger units does not necessarily follow that detailed form. 
It may be included in a letter of instructions. It may be a telegram 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1645 

sent out by the Chief of Staff. It may be very brief or it may be very 
long, depending on the person that 'is writing it and the desire or 
instruction he wishes to convey. 

Senator Ferguson. Does the rule itself, in the book, give an excep- 
tion when it goes to a theater commander ? 

General Gerow. I would like to read the Field Service Regulations 
regarding larger units. 

Senator Ferguson. What are you reading from ? 

General Gerow. I am reading 

Senator Ferguson. War Department Staff OflScers Field Manual? 

General Gerow. No, sir. That is a book that pertains primarily 
to the details of these subordinate orders rather than to the orders 
issued to the large units. I shall be very glad to have you look at this 
or I will read the paragraph. 

[4^53] Senator Ferguson. Suppose you read the paragraph. 

General Gerow. This document is entitled "Field Manual 100-15, 
War Department, Field Service Regulations," dated June 29, 1942. 

On page 6, paragraph 15 reads : 

The mission of tlie theater commander may be prescribed in an approved war 
plan or it may be stated in a letter of instructions or other orders from the 
President or the War Department. The mission assigned will usually be general 
in character and leave great discretion to the theater commander. Ordinarily, 
he is consulted prior to the promulgation of the plans. He may be called upon 
to prepare such plans. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you claim that your order of the 27th 
followed that? 

General Gerow. I don't believe, sir, that it was necessary that it 
should follow that manual. 

Senator F erguson. As I understand it, you don't claim it did follow 
that manual ? 

General Gerow. No, sir, I didn't make that statement. I would 
have to analyze the message to see whether it followed it exactly or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Are there any other memoranda in that book? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, the book 

[4354-1 Senator Ferguson. I mean in relation to the order. 

General Gerow. That is the pertinent paragraph, I believe, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with the Staff Officers' Field 
Manual? For instance, on page 31, "Command Responsibility": 

a. The commander alone is responsible to his superior for all that his unit 
does or fails to do. He cannot shift this responsibility to his staff or to subordi- 
nate commanders. 

Then under "Liaison" : 

Liaison is the connection between units or other elements, established by a 
representative — usually an oflBcer — of one unit who visits or remains with another 
unit. Its purpose is to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal 
contact. 

General Gerow. May I have a reference to the page you are reading 
from, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. I didn't know you had the same book. 
General Gerow. I think I have the same book, yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Page 31, paragraph 47. 
General Gerow. Yes, sir. 



1646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when General Short used in his message 
the word "liaison," with the Navy, wouldn't that be what he meant in 
Army language ? 

General Gerow. No, sir, I don't think so, sir. The [4^55'\ 
liaison referred to is when a commander, such as an Army commander, 
sends an officer from his staff down to a corps commander's head- 
quarters. That officer is his particular representative there at the 
moment. He keeps him advised of the operations of that corps. He 
reports back periodically to his higher commander. 

This liaison with the Navy, as it is used in, I think in Hawaii, was 
meant the close association between the two commanders themselves, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what is this definition that I read, where 
is the definition that you are giving ? 

General Gerow. May I read the paragraph again, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, read it aloud. 

General Gerow (reading) : 

Liaison is the connection between units or other elements, established by a 
representative — usually an officer — of one unit who visits or remains with another 
unit. Its purpose is to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal 
contact. 

Now, as I understand General Short's relations to Admiral Kimmel, 
he did not visit at headquarters and remain with that headquarters, 
but he was in constant touch with that particular command head- 
quarters and exchanged views, they exchanged views between them- 
selves. 

[4^56] Senator Ferguson. Does this liaison definition apply 
only in the Army itself? Have you any definition in any of the 
books that would show what liaison with another branch, the Navy, 
would mean ? 

General Gerow. There may be a definition in some field manual, 
I don't recall, but it would be customary, and it was customary in 
my operations, when operating with the Navy, I would send one of 
my staff officers to the admiral commanding the fleet operating with 
me. He was my personal representative with that Navy commander, 
and he reported back to me the information he thought I should 
have. 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to get what the manuals or regula- 
tions show. Will you look at page 30, at the bottom of the page, 
under paragraph 46, "Reports." 

General Gerow. Subparagraph b. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Gerow. Do you wish me to read that ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Gerow (reading) : 

The merit of a report is not measured by its length. A concise presentation 
of important points usually is all that is required. 

Senator Ferguson. Would General Short's reply comply with that 
regulation ? 

[4357] General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 39, number 63, will you read 
that? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1647 

General Gerow. What is the number of the paragraph ? 
Senator Ferguson. Number 63, page 39. 
General Gerow. (reading) : 

Supervision of Execution. The responsibilities of the commander and his 
staff do not end with the issue of the necessary orders. They must insure 
receipt of the orders by the proper commanders, make certain they are under- 
stood, and enforce their effective execution. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't there a special provision in there that 
when the message of the 27th was sent — it says they must "insure," 
that would be the General Staff, "receipt of the orders," that is the 
first thing, "by the proper commanders, make certain they are under- 
stood" — so when they report back isn't the burden on the one giving 
the order to ascertain if the order was understood by the one that 
it was sent to ? 

Isn't that what that provision says ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, that is what it states. 

Senator Ferguson. Then : 

* * ♦ and enforce their effective execution. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

[4S58] Senator Ferguson. That is a clear understanding. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would the man in the field then be able 
to rely upon that, that having sent back his order, that it was under- 
stood here in Washington, because the burden was, under the rule, on 
the people in Washington to know what was being done there, how 
it was understood ; isn't that the way the order reads ? 

General Gerow. Senator, may I have that question again? 

Senator Ferguson. I will reframe it. Strike the last question. 

Under this rule, where the burden is on the one who sends the order 
to make certain that it is understood, wouldn't the field officer. General 
Short, have a right to rely upon the fact, having sent what he had, 
that the interpretation was proper, having sent the order ? 

General Gerow. I think that is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct, isn't it ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Not having heard anything for the number of 
days between the 28th and the 7th, he would have a right to rely upon 
that fact, that they had understood his order, and that he had properly 
interpreted the order of the 27tli ? 

[43591 General Gerow. I think that is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean understood his report. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Let's go to page 

General Gerow. But, of course — I haven't studied these books — ^but 
I think you will find in some of these pamphlets that the commander 
on the ground that is responsible, if there is any doubt in his mind 
as to what the commander wants him to do, it is perfectly proper for 
him to come back to that commander and ask for a clarification of 
those instructions. If he is in doubt as to whether the action he has 
taken is proper he is perfectly within his rights to come back and re- 
quest confirmation on his action. 



1648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. I am going to ask you, General, when we get 
through with the ones that I have, if you look over this and find some- 
thing else that you want to bring to our attention, you may do so. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. On page 49, under paragraph 71, I wish you 
would read "a", and "b", under that. 

General Gerow. "a" and ''b" under paragraph 71 ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, on page 49. 

eGneral Gerow [reading] : 

Technique of Orders, a. Purpose. The purpose of a [4360] unifoi-in 
technique throughout the service in the preparation of orders is to promote clarity 
and to prevent misunderstanding. The points of technique discussed iu the 
following subparagraphs have been found helpful. 

b. Amount of Detail. Orders should be concise. Those giving missions for 
subordinate units should prescribe only such details or methods of execution as 
are necessary to insure that the actions of the subordinate unit concerned will 
conform to the plan of operation for the force as a whole. In many cases, brevity 
is governed by the state of training of the troops for whom the order is intended ; 
for a newly organized or poorly trained unit, the orders of necessity must be more 
detailed than for the well-trained organization. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that in effect at the time, on the 7th? 

General Gerow. I will have to check up to see what date this docu- 
ment is, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. August 19, mine is dated. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. It shows the date of August 19, 1940. 

Senator Ferguson. It would be in effect? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 51, number i on that page, "Af- 
firmative." Will you read that? 

14361] General Gerow. (reading): Paragraph i: 

Affirmative. In the interests of simplicity and clarity, the affirmative form 
of expression should be used. Such an order as "The trains will not accompany 
the regiment" is defective because the gist of the order depends upon the single 
word "not." A ttetter form is "The trains will remain at Leavenworth." No 
doubt arises in the latter case. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, down under "k", I think you might read 
it all. 

General Gerow. (reading) : 

k. Avoidance of Highly Technical Language. The military profession like all 
other professions has developed a technical vocabulary. This vocabulary is con- 
venient and aids in the clear and rapid transference of ideas between military 
persons. The use of this vocabulary in texts and instructions is natural. In 
combat orders it is essential that there be no opportunity for misunderstanding 
by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used. With par- 
tially trained troops and staffs the use of technical military language may afford 
opportunities for such misunderstandings. Therefore the use in combat orders 
of technical expressions should be avoided if there is any danger of misunderstand- 
ing. In such cases, words of common understanding should be substituted, even at 
the sacrifice of brevity. 

[4^362] Senator Ferguson. Were you here when General Mar- 
shall spoke about the meaning of the first overt act ? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I was not present at the hearing, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that that was an expression 
that could be easily interpreted ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1649 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when you only gave the message to — the 
message of the 27th, it is on page 7 of exhibit 32 — to "minimum 
essential officers" — who would you say should have gotten that infor- 
mation about the first overt act? 

General Gekow. I would have given it to every officer that I 
thought should have that information in order to carry out his 
mission. I may have given that information to some second lieutenant 
if I thought it was necessary. That is left to the commander's dis- 
cretion, as to the people that he should disseminate that information 
to. 

Senator Ferguson. It says : 

In combat orders it is essential tliat there be no opportunity for misunder- 
staudinj? by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

General Ferguson. Now, have you got FM-100-5, May 22, 1941, 
Field Service Eegulations, War Department, Operations? 

[4363'\ General Gerow. No, sir ; I failed to bring that document 
with me, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I am going to pass it to you and ask you 
to read: On page 30, number 149; on page 31, 149 and 150; on 
page 31, 154; on page 32, 156; and the first two sentences of 157. 
I will indicate them for you. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I didn't get all those numbers. 

Senator Ferguson. They are marked. 

(The pamphlet referred to was handed to General Gerow.) 

[4^J64\ General Gerow. Paragraph 156. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Gerow (reading) : 

As a I'ule it is desirable to keep contemplated operations secret as long as 
possible and to confine knowledge thereof to a few staff officers and senior 
commanders. However, upon entry into action noi unit should be in doubt 
as to what the commander wants it to do. Whenever knowledge of his inten- 
tions is necessary to insure the cooperation of tlie units engaged, a commander 
does not hesitate to disclose them to all concerned. Ignorance of his inten- 
tions may often lead to inactivity on the part of subordinates. 

Paragraph 157. (Reading:) 

It is impossible to prescribe detailed forms of orders to fit every tactical 
situation. To attempt to do so would result in a rigid form and a routine style 
of expression which would not be in accord with the tactical requirements 
sented by the diverse situations that arise in war. To the extent practicable, 
however, it has been found efficient and convenient to classify combat orders 
accorrling to their purpose and scope and, for some of these, to adopt a 
standard sequence of composition. This makes for ease of understanding, 
the [/f365] avoidance of omissions, and ready reference. Moreover, ex- 
perience has shown that an order which can be misunderstood will be misunder- 
stood and that, to obviate this danger, it is necessary to follow certain rules 
relating to the designations of boundaries, details of time and place, military 
terminology, abbreviations, designations of units, and the like. For details 
relating to these matters, see FM 101-5. 

Did you have something- 



Senator Ferguson. I gave you a sheet there with the page numbers 
on it. Then I drew a line down to the paragraph. 
General Gerow. Oh, yes. 
Senator Ff.rguson. Can you make it out? 



79716 — 46 — i)t. 4 6 



1650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. I am trying to find it now. Paragraph 149 on 
page 30. [Reading:] 

The authority to issue orders is an inherent function of command. Orders are 
normally issued to next subordinate commanders. Bypassing the normal chan- 
nels of command is resorted to only in urgent situations ; in such cases both the 
commander issuing and the commander receiving the order should notify inter- 
mediate commanders of its purport as soon as possible. 

kSenator Ferguson. Is that on page 31 ? 
General Gerow. That is page 30, sir. 
[4366] Senator Ferguson. Page 30? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I am reading now paragraph 150 on page 
30, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. That is right. 
General Gerow. (reading) : 

Orders may be either complete or fragmentary. 

The order is complete when it coves all essential aspects and phases of the 
operation. Complete orders include missions to all subordinate units charged with 
the execution of tactical operations in carrying out the commander's plan. 

Fragmentary orders are used when speed in delivery and execution is impera- 
tive. Fragmentary orders are issued successively as the situation develops and 
decisions are made, and consist of separate instructions to one or more subordinate 
units prescribing the part each is to play in the operation or in the separate phases 
thereof. This procedure will be usual in divisions and smaller units. Frag- 
mentary orders may be either oral or written. They are concise but not at the 
expense of clarity and omission of essential information. Instructions issued 
in fragmentary orders may be repeated in a complete field order or in an annex 
if considered desirable. 

[4-367] Senator Ferguson. Now page 31, paragraph 154. 
General Gerow (reading) : 

Orders must be clear and explicit and as brief as is consistent with clarity; 
short sentences are easily understood. Clarity is more important than tech- 
nique. The more urgent the situation, the greater the need for conciseness in 
the order. Any statement of reasons for measui*es adopted should be limited 
to what is necessary to obtain intelligent cooperation from subordinates. De- 
tailed instructions for a variety of contingencies, or prescriptions that are a 
matter of training, do not inspire confidence and have no place in an order. 
Trivial and meaningless expressions divide responsibility and lead to the adop- 
tion of half measures by subordinates. Exaggerated and bombastic phrases 
invite ridicule and weaken the force of an order. Expressions such as "attack 
vigorously," if used in orders, are not only verbose and meaningless, but tend 
to weaken the force of subsequent orders in which such expressions do not 
appear. 

[4368] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Army Board 
classified or described the order of November 27 from General Mar- 
shall to General Short, on page 7 of Exhibit 32, as a "do-don't" order? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I know they classified it as such, but I do 
not know the reasons therefor. 

Senator Ferguson. But under the instructions that you have just 
read would you classify it as a "do-don 't" order? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I would not, sir. I do not think we find 
\n this message any definite don'ts. May I- 



Senator Ferguson. Well, what about the 

Mr. Murphy. May the witness finish his answer? 

The Vice Chairman. Let the General finish his answer. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. Go ahead, General. 



^ PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1651 

General Gerow. The first sentence I would like to read with refer- 
ence to that is as follows (reading from page 7 of Exhibit 32) : 

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit 
the first overt act. 

That is a desire. 

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course 
of action that might jeopardize your defense. 

That sentence gives him the right to do anything that he [4369'] 
considers necessary in his discretion to safeguard the Island of Oahu 
and carry out his mission. 

There is another sentence, sir, which I would also like to read, if I 
may, sir: 

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you 
deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, 
to alarm civil population or disclose intent. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't that a do-don't, do something at first 
but don't do the other? Don't you think they were correct when they 
described it that way ? 

General Gerow. The message does not state, sir, that "you "will 
definitely not alarm the civil population." 

Senator Ferguson. Under the first one that you read you have got 
this word "unpredictable." That is not a very definite term, is it? 

General Gerow. I did not read that sentence. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. No. I want you to read it. 

General Gerow. All right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I will read it and pick out the word that I want 
and ask you about the word. 

General Gerow. All right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated. 

[4S70] You helped to draft this order, did you not. General ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get the word "appear" from? 
You had already sent a message on the 24th, the joint message that 
they were broken off. 

General Gerow. What date is that message you refer, to, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. I think it is the 24th. 

Mr. Mitchell. Page 5 of Exhibit 32. 

General Gerow. Page 5 ? 

Senator Ferguson. That does not use the language I had in mind. 
It was another message. "Chances of favorable outcome" is the lan- 
guage of that. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. 
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements 
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggnssive 
movement * * *. 

Do you know whether or not this language of "appear" 

General Gerow. I did not understand you. 



1652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK , 

Senator Ferguson (continuing). Was used because the Secretary of 
War had talked with the Secretary of State ? 

[4^371] General Gerow. Yes, sir. I think I testified previously, 
as I recall my testimony, I was called to the office of the Secretary of 
War about 9 : 30 on the morning of November the 27th. I went up 
there for a second conference with him later on in the morning. Dur- 
ing that conference it is my recollection now that the Secretary of 
War talked to the Secretary of State on the telephone with regard 
to the question as to whether or not negotiations with Japan had ac- 
tually terminated. As a result of that conversation the Secretary of 
War directed that the sentence as written in this message cover the 
statement as to the status of negotiations with Japan at that time, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it was in your first draft of this message 
that you had a definite term that they were broken off? 

General Gerow. I cannot recall exactly that message, sir, but it is 
my impression now that I took a message in, sir, which stated "nego- 
tiations are terminated." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Instead of doing it — or instead of being 
in the joint message — it was in your original message? 

General Gerow. I believe it was, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Gerow. I have tried to find a copy of that [Ji372'] 
message, sir, and I cannot locate it and I am relying now on memory 4 
years old. 

Senator Ferguson. That is a long time. 

General Gerow. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then the next words are, "barest possibilities." 
That is pretty indefinite, isn't it ? 

General Gerow. Well, sir, I would not say it was pretty indefinite. 
I think it means exactly what it says, that there is the barest pos- 
sibility of it being resumed. It is perfectly clear to me, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then the words "Japanese Government might 
come back," 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And then this "unpredictable, but hostile ac- 
tion possible." 

General Gerow. But, sir, "Japanese future action unpredictable 
but hostile action possible at any moment." 

Just what that action would be and where it would be was not 
clear to any of us at that time, sir, but we felt that hostile action was 
possible at any moment and particularly against our possessions in the 
Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlien did you first think or come to the con- 
clusion that hostile action would" be directed against Hawaii? 

[4373] General Gerow. Senator, I participated in the prepara- 
tion of this message and I state in that message, sir, or it is stated 
in the Chief of Staff's message, that "Japanese future action is un- 
predictable but hostile action possible at any moment." 

I do not think I ever came to the conclusion, sir, that the Japs 
were going to attack Hawaii and no other place. I felt that they 
would attack any one of our possessions bordering on the Pacific. 
That was a possibility, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1653 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever have a mental conclusion, 
then, prior to actual notice of the attack that Japan would attack 
Hawaii ? Did you ever think that they would attack Hawaii ? Was 
that within your thoughts ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I considered it as one of the possibilities 
in the event war occurred with Japan. • 

Senator Ferguson. Now, "possibility" is a very weak expression, 
isn't it, in the possibilities ? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not think it is weak under the cir- 
cumstances, Senator. There were several possibilities there. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not even say it was a probability. You 
say it was only a possibility. 

General Gerow\ Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that what I understand ? 

[4r?/'4] General Gerow. It was a possibility that they might 
attack any one of our possessions in the Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. But it did not get the dignity of a probability 
in your opinion ? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

General Gerow. Well, I think. Senator, I would say it was probable 
that they might attack any one of our four major areas bordering on 
the Pacific, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. General, one of your duties, as I understand 
you, was to send out messages for action, keeping the field informed. 

General Gerow. No, sir; Senator. I think I stated, sir; that my 
responsibility was to prepare messages and submit them to the Chief 
of Staff and the Secretary of War for their approval. In any emer- 
gency, if the Chief of Staff was not there, I would assume the re- 
sponsibility for sending them and accept the consequences if I made 
a mistake. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, one of your duties, then, was 
to prepare messages and submit them to the Chief of Staff? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And those messages would be what is known as 
action messages, not information but action? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

[4^75] Senator Ferguson. Therefore, it would be necessary 
for you to determine the time when such a message ought to go ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't that correct? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you at any time make up your mind 
that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor so that you could 
have determined to prepare a message? 

General Gerow. Senator, I think I testified here before, sir, that I 
never made up my mind that Hawaii was the only place that the Japs 
might attack. My thinking was that we had certain possessions in 
the Pacific ; that if war with Japan occurred that Japan might attack 
any one or all of those possessions. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I am not including the words "or others." 
I want to know just about Hawaii, that, Pearl Harbor. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I concluded that an attack on Pearl 
Harbor, among others, was possible or probable. 



1654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now, can you answer it without "and others" '^ 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to know just whether or not 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I cannot. 

[4S76] Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Gerow. I tried to be as positive as I can on it. 

^r. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

General Gerow. I tried to picture my thoughts at the time, which 
was that Japan might attack any one of our possession in the Pacific, 
I did not pick out any one of them and give it first priority. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. The next question is 

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. No, not at this time. 

The Chairman. All right, proceed. 

Senator Ferguson. The next question is, General Bryden, did he 
confer with you on any of these messages ? 

General Gerow. General Bryden accompanied me when I went in 
to the office of the Secretary of War on the morning of November the 
27th. Later on the messages that had been prepared were presented 
to him for his approval and I think he initialed them, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Where is General Bryden now ? Is he in Wash- 
ington ? 

General Gerow. I believe he is retired, sir. I do not know where he 
is living. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you help to prepare the memo to [4'?77] 
the President of the 5th of November? I think it is exhibit 16. 

General Gerow. As I recall now, sir; the War Plans Division of 
the Army and the War Plans Division of the Navy cooperated in the 
preparation of that message, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you personally help to prepare it? , 

General Gerow. The original drafts were perhaps prepared by the 
committees that worked under my supervision and these were then 
presented to me for my approval or change. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there was an ABCD, the 
basic military policies on strategy agreed to in the United States- 
British staff conversations, did you know about that ? 

General Gerow. You are referring now, sir, to the ADB Singapore 
conference? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; I knew about that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you know that there was a certain 
line fixed as indicated on pages 4 and 5 (reading from Exhibit 16). 

Until such time as .Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose secu- 
rity to tlie United States is of very great importance. Military action against 
Japan should be undertaken only in one or more [^378] of the following 
contingencies. 

General Gerow. May I ask, Senator, where you are reading from, 
sir? 

Senator Ferguson. On the bottom of page 4. 
General Gerow. And the paragraph? 
Senator Ferguson, (b) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1655 

General Gerow. Paragraph (b). May T take a moment to read 
that? 

Senator Ferguson, Yes, I want you to take a moment. 

General Gerow. May I have the question again, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to know v,hether you were familiar 
with the terms of that agreement. It says : 

Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of 
the following contingencies, 

not in that agreement, but under those contingencies. Were you 
familiar with that? 

General Gerow. I was familiar, yes, sir; with the staff conversa- 
tions in Singapore and the recommendations of the members who 
participated in that conference, as to what they considered should be 
done in the event the Japanese did certain things, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were they in effect on the 5th of November 
1941? 

[4-379] General Gerow. In effect, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Gerow. They could not be put into 

Senator Ferguson. So far as you knew. 

General Gerow. They could not be put into effect without the 
approval of our respective governments. They were purely staff con- 
versations between military personnel. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. As far as you knew, then, they were 
not in effect, is that correct ? 

General Gerow. They had never been approved by our Government, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted to find out. 

General Gerow. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what you knew. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you at the meeting — in the minutes of the 
meeting of November 3, 1941, that were attached to that? I do not 
see your name on it. 

General Gerow. I do not know what the document is, what meeting 
you refer to, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you show him the first page ? 

General Gerow, What date is that, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. This is on November 3, 1941. 

General Gerow, Yes, sir; my name is on the list as be- [43801 
ing present, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it ? Oh, yes, it is, "Acting Chief of Staff, War 
Plans Division," 

General Gerow, Yes, sir. I think you stated, Senator, that this 
document was attached to the memorandum that went to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you straighten it out? 

General Gerow, As far as I know it was not attached, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You know it was not ? 

General Gerow, Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. On the bottom of page 2, then, did you hear 
Captain Schuirmann give that statement to the board meeting? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 



1656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now, at that time he pointed out that on August 
17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. 
Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it 
would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of 
further Japanese aggression. You heard that ? 

General Gerow. Oh, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you understand it ? 

[4SS1] General Gerow. Yes, sir; I think I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you agree with it? 

General Gerow. I was not asked to agree with it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon? 

General Gerow. I was not asked to agree with it. 

Senator Ferguson. I ask you now did you agree to it? 

General Gerow. I cannot recall now that I agreed to it at the time 
or made any statement regarding it. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it a fact or not a fact ? 

General Gerow. I cannot testify as to whether it was a fact or not 
a fact. Captain Schuirmann is, as I understand, presenting his views 
as to what happened at a State Department meeting at which I was 
not present. 

Senator Ferguson. No, I am asking you whether or not you were 
of the same opinion at that time ? 

Mr. MuKPHY. Mr. Chairman, I submit that question is not a fair 
question. 

General Gerow. I do not quite understand 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to state my reasons for it. 

General Gerow. I cannot quite understand the question, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I will put it this way: Were you of the opinion 
that when the President returned from a meeting at sea with Mr. 
Churchill the President had issued an ulti- \43S2'] matum to 
Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action 
in case of further Japanese aggression? Now, I have read what 
Schuirmann said. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you of that opinion ? 

General Gerow. I have no first-hand knowledge, sir, if the President 
issued such a statement, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you did not even know at that 
time that the President had issued such a statement? 

General Gerow. No. sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or any statement? 

General Gf.how. No. sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Gerow. I do not say that. I stated I had no first-hand 
knowledge that came to my memory that the President had issued it. 
I had seen, I believe, information concerning it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what was your mental reaction on what 
you had seen? "Wliat conclusion did you draw? Schuirmann tells us 
here what he drew. What did you draw ? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering. Will the 
Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. I decline to yield. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1657 

[p83] The Chairman. I think there is a parliamentary question 
here and the Chair onglit to hear it. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I withdraw it. 

The Chairman. All right. Go ahead, if you please. 

General Gerow. Will you repeat that question again, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read the question, please? 

Senator Lucas. You are trying to trap a great General in these 
inconsistencies. 

(Whereupon the question was read by the reporter as follows: 
"Well, what was your mental reaction on what you had seen ? What 
conclusion did you draw? Schuirmann tells us here what he drew. 
What did you draw?") 

Senator Ferguson. Do j'Ou understand my question? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; but a conclusion as to what, sir — as to 
whether the President had issued an ultimatum or as to whether we 
should go to war in case of further aggression ? 

Senator Ferguson. Whether or not he had issued an ultimatum. 

General Gerow. Well, I have stated. Senator, that to my own 
knowledge, to my own personal knowledge, I do not know that he 
issued an ultimatum. 

[iSS^] Senator Ferguson. All right, that is all I wanted to 
know. Now, the next question : On the 27th — that is Exhibit 17 — did 
you help to prepare that? 

General Gerow. I believe this document was prepared, sir, by the 
War Plans Division of the Army and the War Plans Division of the 
Navy working together. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with it ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversations in relation to 
the modus vivendi ? 

General Gerow. As I recall, sir, I attended a conference in the 
State Department on November the 21st in which a paper setting out 
tentative proposals to Japan were discussed. I do not know whether 
that was known as a modus vivendi or what name the State Depart- 
ment gave it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether when the State Depart- 
ment had decided to send their message, which changea iiis meaninj;" 
of the message to try to get Jap consent, whether you remember that 
term "modus vivendi" in it ? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not recall definitely where I received 
that information or if I did. If the Chief of Staff had it he probably 
informed me of that fact, sir, but I cannot recall at this time just 
when he did or if he did. 

['4'385] Senator Ferguson. You do not have that in mind? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know upon whose orders the words were 
put in the message of the 27th about the first overt act? Did you 
have any knowledge of that? 

General Gerow. I think I received instructions from General Mar- 
shall to include a statement of that sort in the message. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he advise you where he had received any- 
thing about it ? 



1658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. I do not recall definitely at this time, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Senator Fekciuson. Now, will you take Exhibit 45 ? That is a letter 
or memorandum to General Marshall on the 27th, your memorandum. 

General (tergw. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You say there that : "The Secretary of War sent 
for me at 9 : 30" on that morning and "he wanted to know" — the Secre- 
tary wanted to know — "what warning messages have been sent to 
General MacArthur and what were proposed." 

Do you remember that conversation? 

14^386] General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there at that time anything said about 
sending one to General Short ? 

General Gerow. Not at that particular time. I think later on in 
my second conference with the Secretary of War that sending mes- 
sages to all of our overseas possessions in the Pacific were discussed. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, isn't this a memo of your conversation, 
with the Secretary of War? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; and may I go on to paragraph 2 ? There 
is a statement in paragraph 2 which reads : "The various messages to 
the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed." 

Senator Ferguson. You recall those? , 

General Gerow. I wrote this, sir, on the day that it happened. I 
think this is more accurate than my memory, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And does that refresh your memory, though, as 
to whether or not any message to General Short was discussed, the 
fact that a warning message for General MacArthur — no : "The various 
messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre were 
discussed." 

General Gerow. Yes, that indicated to me that they were discussed. 

Senator Ferguson. It indicates definitely that there 14387'\ 
was something said about sending one to General Short. 

Genera] Gerow. To all of our Pacific commanders. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I will come down to the language: "The 
Secretary of War" — in the same exhibit — "wanted to be sure that the 
memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the 
President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations." 

Do you remember that,? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Where didyou get that language? Did the Sec- 
retary of War actually tell you that? 

General Gerow. I imagine he did, sir, because I wrote it. 

Senator Ferguson. You wrote it right in here? 

General Gerow. I wrote it on the 27th and that is the only place I 
could have gotten it was to have the_ Secretary tell me, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did vou discuss it with the Secretary of War 
as to why that was in there? 

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not recall any such discussion. I 
might have, sin 

Senator Ferguson. Do vou know what your conversation with Gen- 
eral Marshall on that point was? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1659 

General Gerow. I do not believe I had a conversation with General 
Marshall on that. This memorandum went in to him [J/.-iSS] on 
the evening of the 27th and I believe that he read it when he returned 
to the oHice on the morning of the 28th. I can not recall whether he 
sent for me on that morning and discussed it with me or not. I was in 
and out of his office daily, sometimes once, sometimes four or five times 
during the day, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You prepared the statement on the 27th for 
General Marshall or did someone else prepare it? 

General Gerow. Which statement now are you referring to? 

Senator Ferguson. The one of November 27. It is Exhibit 17. Is 
that the instrument that they were talking about that was not to con- 
tain a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen 
the conversations? 

General Gerow. I think I stated, sir, that this document was pre- 

Earecl by the War Plans Division of the Army and the War Plans 
'ivision of the Navy working together, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you check it for that item, do you 
know, as to whether or not it did contain or did not contain any request 
to Japan? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You checked it for that? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Gerow. And I think the statement in my memo- [4389] 
randum is to the effect that I reassured the Secretary on that point, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You reassured him later? 

General Gerow. That is in the memorandum, sir. There is a 
sentence which I would like to re^id from that memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

General Gerow. That said: "He" — meaning the Secretary — "was 
reassured on that point." 

Senator Ferguson. You reassured him? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

.Senator Ferguson. After you had checked the memorandum? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I had the memorandum with me, sir, 
I believe, at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there were Jap scouting 
planes over the Philippines, over Clark Field and the other fields, 
prior to the time of the attack at Pearl Harbor? Did you get any 
word on that? 

General Gerow. I have a very hazy recollection of hearing some- 
one state that the Japanese had sent planes over some of our areas. 
I cannot recall definitely, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you of the opinion that if a proper 
alerted condition existed at Pearl Harbor that the Japanese should 
have been defeated in their attack ? 

[4390] General Gerow. I think our losses out there, sir, would 
have been much less had the command been completely alerted. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the only answer you want to make? 

General Gerow. I cannot quite interpret what you mean, sir, by 
"defeated." There are all degrees of defeat, sir. 



1660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Well, how much of a defeat, or what qualifica- 
tion? 

General Gerow. Well, they would have lost some planes. They 
may have lost some carriers, they may have lost some of their other 
major vessels. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you hear what General Marshall had said 
on that same question ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or similar question? 

General Gerow. Sir? 

Senator Ferguson. A question along that same line? 

General Gerow. No, sir. I was not here when he testified, only 
one afternoon, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You never came to any conclusion as to what 
would have happened there if we had been properly alerted? 

General Gerow. You say I never came to any conclusion ? 

Senator Ferguson. I say, have you ? 

[4-'^91] General Gerow. Yes, sir. I just stated if we had been 
properly alerted that our losses there would probably have been much 
less. 

Senator Ferguson. What about their losses ? 

General Gerow. Their losses would have been much greater, the 
Japanese losses. 

Senator Ferguson. But you would not want to classify it as to 
whether or not they would be defeated in that encounter or not ? 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I submit that question has been 
answered twice in the last five minutes. 

General Gerow. Well, sir, I 

The Chairman. The Chair sustains the point of order. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you claim. General, that you have answered 
that question ? 

Mr. Murphy. All right, go ahead. 

General Gerow. I think I answered it, Senator. I will be very glad, 
sir, to have the question repeated and attempt to answer it again, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. No, I just want to know whether or not you feel 
that you did answer it ? 

General Gerow. I thought I did, sir, but if I did not make myself 
clear I would Hke to have the opportunity of making myself clear, sir. 

[4S92] Senator Ferguson. It was not clear to me. General, or 
I would not be asking the question again. 

General Gerow. All right. I am here, sir, to clear up any points 
that I can. I have no desire to be vague on anything that I am cer- 
tain of. 

Senator Ferguson. I realize that. It has been a long time since 
this happened. 

General Gerow. Yes. sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is tlie reason I have asked you the 
number of questions that I have, to let you have time to think about 
them and to see whether or not we could get what was known at that 
time. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And what was not known, that is all. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1661 

General Gerow. If I can clarify anything, Senator, if you will ask 
me the question I will do my best to, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. No, that is all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe? 

Mr. Keefe. General Gerow, I shall not detain you very long. 

General Gerow. Thank you, sir. I am very grateful. 

Mr. Keefe. I think you are a great officer, that is all I can say. 

General Gerow. Thank you again, sir. 

[4S9o] Mr. Keefe, There are just one or two things that I am 
not clear on. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You testified before the Army board under oath? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you told them what you knew about this whole 
situation ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then Major Clausen came over to France some time in 
1945, as I recall, where you were stationed ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And talked to you about the testimony you had given 
before the Army Board ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that right ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And I presume before the affidavit that you signed 
finally was drawn, you had considerable discussions with Major 
Clausen about your testimony? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And the testimony of others that had testified before that 
Board? 

General Gerow. Primarily directed toward two or three 14'^94] 
people. I think Colonel Bratton's testimony and Colonel Sadtler's 
testimony. 

I don't think we went into the details of the others, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And I presume you had a considerable talk with Colonel 
Clausen before an affidavit was finally drawn ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. He made some longhand notes, did he, and then went 
some place and prepared an affidavit? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe, And asked you to sign it ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. He took down the penciled notes. I gave 
him my testimony rather formally. He made the notes and I had 
no office facilities there, I was living in a sort of villa place and I had 
no typist or anything, so he took the notes of the testimony, sir, and 
typed them himself. 

Mr, Keefe. And then when he brought the typed affidavit back you 
read it over? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe, You found some things in it that you did not think you 
had stated, or that he had misunderstood ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 



1662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. And you decided that you would draw your own 
[4J05] affidavit? 

General Gerow. Yes. I went over it fully, sir, and revised it 
and cut out thin<Ts and added things. 

Mv. Keefe. Did you draw the new affidavit yourself or did Colonel 
Clausen re-draft it under your instructions? 

General Geijow. No, sir. I sat there and took the draft that he 
liad there and went through it and changed it and scratched things 
cait and put in in pencil the things that I thought should go in 
there as presenting the facts. 

Mr. Keefe. And then it was re-drawn? 

General Gerow. It was re-typed. 

Mr. Keefe. And you signed it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

INI r. Keefe. And he swore you to it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

ISIr. Keefe. Did you know the purpose for which he was asking 
you to make this affidavit? Did he disclose that to you? 

General Gerow. I think he stated sir, that after I had made my 
testimony there was other testimony which I did not have an oppor- 
tunity to reply to and that involved me and that he was trying to 
get my testimony on those particular points, particularly, as I say, 
iliat had reference to Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler's testi- 
mony. 

[4^00] Mr. Keefe. Did he call your attention to the testimony 
that Colonel Bratton had given before the Army board? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, I think he gave it to me in a brief sum- 
mary form. I do not believe, sir, that he had a transcript of the 
testimony. I do not believe I have ever seen that, sir. 

INIr. Keefe. Did he tell you also what Sadtler testified to before the 
Army Board? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. • 

Mr, Keefe. And did he indicate that theii^ testimony was in 
conllict with the testimony that you had given before the Board? 

General Gerow. No, sir, he did not indicate that. As I recall now, 
i*- was testimony that had come out subsequently that was not in 
conflict, as 1 now understand, with anything I had stated but I did 
not cover magic. 

Mr. Keefe. I see. 

Genertd Gekow. In my first statement before the Army board, 
or in my only statement before the Army board, because I never 
iiad an opportunity to appear before it again. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, when you were in before the Army board, or 
after you testified, were you furnished a copy of the transcript of 
your testimony and given an opportunity to correct it? 

[4S!^7\ General Gerow. 1 es, sir; 1 was furnished a transcript 
and 1 read it o\er and turned it in to the board, sir. 

Mv. Keefe. And whatever corrections you had to make in your 
testimony that you gave before the Army board were made before 
it was finally accepted by the board? 

General Gerow. I imagine they were, sir. I never saw a copy of 
that board's i-eport until I came back here for this committee hear- 
ing, sir. I was never furnished a copy and I never saw it until I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1663 

Mr. Keefe. Pardon me, but in your testimony before the Army 
board, of course, you made no reference whatever to magic? 

General Gekow. No, sir. In my testimony, I think I stated yes- 
terday, that I began to get on magic and I realized that I should not 
talk about it and I stopped myself and they allowed me to para- 
phrase. That is the only time we got into it at all, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, one other thing I would like to get clear in my 
mind. I will admit some confusion still exists in the face of all you 
said about his message of the 27tli. 

General Gekow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. General Marshall testified that he left at 1 o'clock on 
the 26th and went down to the maneuvers. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Iveefe. And did you not come back until the evening of the 
[4-308] 27th? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Isn't that correct, he was not here on the afternoon 
of the 26th nor all day of the 27th ? 

Ganeral Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. I^EFE. Now, any conversations that you had with Geiieral 
Marshall in respect to this message of the 27th, therefore, must have 
been had before 1 o'clock on the 26th ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is true? 

General Geroav. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And any instructions that General Marshall had given 
you as to the language in the proposed alert message to go to the 
Pacific outposts must have been had on the morning of the 26th ? 

General Gerow. Either on the 25th or the 26th, the morning of 
the 26th. 

Mr. Keefe. The 25th or the 26th? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

[4399] Mr. Keefe. So when it came to actually drafting the 
message, when was it actually drafted, the first drafting, the after- 
noon of the 26th or morning of the 27th, or when ? 

General Gerow. Sir, I tried to remember exactly what happened 
on that morning. I notice in my memorandum here it stated — I 
state here, sir, "I then showed him a copy of the draft message 
discussed at the Joint Board meeting." 

This is a memorandum of November 27, sir,"* that I sent in to tlie 
chief of staff. I think, in making that statement, I was trying to 
fix in General Marshall's mind he place that he had discussed this 
message with me. I did not intend to state positively that that 
message was actually discussed formally at the Joint Board meeting. 
I have a very hazy recollection, sir, that General Marshall was in a 
hurry to get away, that the Joint Board meeting had been quite a 
long one, that he had told me earlier on the morning of the 26th 
about the message prepared for him, and perhaps to finish up this 
memorandum that was to go to the President. 

I had, I believe. Colonel Bundy and one or two of my best officers 
working on it. I think when the Joint Board meeting was over, had 
been formally concluded. General Marshall turned to me and said 



1664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

with respect to this message and memorandum, we went from the 
Joint Board room into my office, which was quite close there, and 
Colonel Bundy came to the door [4400] of the Joint Board 
room with this message, and General Marshall scanned it very quickly 
and either told me it was all right, or all wrong, or to do something 
else with it. 

I walked down the hall, as I recall now, and he was in quite a con- 
siderable hurry, and I believe he read either the memorandum or the 
message as I walked down the hall with him to his office and finished 
it before he got there. That was on the morning of the 26th, sir, 
before he left at 1 o'clock. 

Mr. Keefe. In that conversation, as he walked down the hall, did 
he suggest some changes in the message? 

General Gerow. I cannot recall that, sir. 

Mr. Kj:ErE. Did the original draft of the message contain the 
provision as to Japan committing the first overt act ? 

General Gerow. I have tried to find that message, Mr. Congress- 
man. I cannot locate it, and I cannot say positively that it did. I 
believe that General Marshall had told me to prepare that message 
and I think he probably told me about including the overt act at the 
same time, and that I had prepared with those instructions in that 
first draft of the message, which I cannot locate, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now on the afternoon of the 26th was it discussed 
with anybody else, or was it redrafted ? 

General Gerow. Not to mj^ recollection. I imagine I sat down 
with Colonel Bundy and these other officers and between [4401] 
us we worked out the message, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. It was dated the 27th, the next day? 

General Gerow. The next morning, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. It was sent on the 27th ? 

(xeneral Gerow. It was sent on the 27th, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keet-e. When you sat down with Colonel Bundy, or any of these 
other people, did you have the Navy message before you as to what 
they proposed to send ? 

General Gerow. I tried to remember that, sir. From my memory 
I cannot definitely say I did, but Admiral Turner, whom I haven't had 
a chance to talk to, can state whether we did or not. I just cannot say 
when the Navy message was prepared. 

I regret I cannot remember more than that, sir, but I just simply 
cannot. 

Mr. Keefe. General Gerow, may I say to you, sir, for anybody that 
has been through the service that you have and rendered the magnifi- 
cent service that you have during the war, I, for one, can well ap- 
preciate that there are a lot of these details that you cannot remember. 

I thank you, sir. 

[4402] The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask one ques- 
tion. In regard to your statement a while ago. General, that it is your 
opinion that if the forces had been alerted in Hawaii, or at Pearl 
Harbor, that the degree of success by the Japanese would have been 
lessened. That is the effect of what you have stated ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You could not, of course, tell what Japanese ship or 
plane might have been destroyed, if our forces had been alerted, nor 
what ship or plane we might have saved. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1665 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

The Chairman. But taking the whole situation into consideration, 
your opinion is that if that had happened, if that had been the status 
of affairs, the degree of Japanese success against our materiel, our 
forces and men, would have been considerably less; is that correct? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, that is correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. General Gerow, as the head of the War Plans Di- 
vision, I take it you were familiar with the plans for the defense of 
the Philippine Islands. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

[44OS] Senator Lucas. Do you know at what time the Japs 
struck the Philippine Islands ? 

General Gerow. I should think it was probably 10 or 12 hours after 
they struck Hawaii. I state that because I telephoned to the Phil- 
ippines shortly after the attack on Hawaii, and the Philippines had 
not been attacked at that time, sir. 

Senator Lucas. To whom did you talk in the Philippines? 

General Gekow. I talked to General MacArthur, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall what time it was on Sunday, Decem- 
ber 7, that you talked to General MacArthur ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. I think probably the telephone log will 
show that, sir. It was in the afternoon, sir, and I recall the conversa- 
tion quite distinctly, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Just briefly, what did you tell General MacArthur. 

General Gerow. I told General MacArthur, sir, that Hawaii had 
been attacked by the Japs, and he asked me what damage had been 
done, and told him, sir, that the telephone was not secret, and I could 
not divulge that information to him, and I asked him if anything had 
happened out in his area, and he said "no," but there were a group of 
planes approaching the Philippines at that time that had not been 
identified, and he was sending up his planes [4404-1 to meet 

them. Then he asked me to convey to General Marshall the statement 
that they were on the alert out there, and ready to meet any emer- 
gency. That is in substance the conversation as I now recall it, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Plow many air fields did they have in the Phil- 
ippines, do you recall? 

General Geroav. Sir, I remember Clark Field, and Nichols Field, 
and I think there was one at a place called Eba. I do not remember 
how many more they had, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Can you give to the committee the number of air- 
planes that were in the Philippines at that time? 

General Gerow. I do not have those figures with me, sir. The 
War Department, I am sure, will be very glad to give that to you, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Will you get that for us ? ^ 
General Gerow. I will see that they are given to the committee. 
Senator Lucas. Do you recall getting any information from the 
Philippines as to what happened to our bombers on Clark Field the 
following day, after the war started? 

General Gerow. I do not know, sir, whether we ever received an 
operations report from the Philippines or not, with regard to that, 
sir. I cannot recall at this time. 

* See footnote on following page. 
79716 — 46 — pt. 4 7 



1666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[4405] Senator Lucas. Will you look for that also for me and 
see whether or not any report was made from the Philippines with 
respect to the number of bombers that were lost on Clark Field the 
following day, after the Japs struck, or that afternoon? ^ 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. General Gerow, a lot of information has come to 
this committee during this hearing about the messages that were 
intercepted and decoded and translated. You are, of course, familiar 
with all that. 

You were one of the high officers in the military branch of the Gov- 
ernment who saw these magic messages from day to day? 

General Gekow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. General Marshall testified that it was through magic 
that we really won the Battle of Midway, and the Coral Sea, and he 
also testified it was magic that caused the damage to Yamamoto, I 
believe. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Those are just a few examples that he gave to ug 
of what magic had done in the way of security and information to 
this nation. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You are familiar with all of those, [4406] 
of course. 

General Gerow. I was not in Washington at that time. I left, you 
see, in February of 1942. I have heard that statement made, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, I take it that you agree that the keeping of 
magic secret was a high and top military secret all through that war. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I think it was vital that we preserve that 
secrecy, sir. 

Senator Lucas. There were only a few men in Washington that 
knew anything about magic at that time, isn't that true? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. For the sake of the record, can you give to this 
committee now, the number of officers in Washington w^ho knew the 
secret of magic, who knew of the breaking of this Japanese code? 

General Gerow. No, sir. I think I can speak only for the War De- 
partment, sir, at the time I was here, and G-2 will know better than I 
know whom they delivered them to, but my recollection is they were 
given to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief 
of Staff G-2, and Assistant Chief of Staff", War Plans Division, and I 
got })ermission at some time during 1941 from General Marshall 
[440/] to show it to my No. 1 assistant, Colonel Bundy, so in the 
event that anything happened to me there would be continuity in the 
War Department in the War Plans Division, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Was Colonel Bundy the only officer in the War 
Plans Division outside of yourself wdio knew the secret of magic? 

General Gerow. He was the only one, sir, to whom magic was shown. 
Now, some of the others may have guessed that we were doing some- 
thing of the kind, sir, but I do not know that fact. 

Senator Lucas. He was the only officer that possessed actual knowl- 
edge of it ? 

General Gerow. Who actually saw the magic ; yes, sir. 

^ See information furnished by the War Department, Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2073-2074. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1667 

Senator Lucas. Now, General Gerow, there was quite a little specu- 
lation in the autumn of 1944 about a leak in magic from somewhere. 
Do you recall at that time — Oh, you were not here at that time? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I was overseas in 1944, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, what would have been the military course that 
would have been pursued against an individual who knew the secret 
of magic, had that individual given that secrecy to the public — what 
would have been the course pursued by the military under those cir- 
cumstances ? 

[H08] General Gerow. I think he would have been court mar- 
tialed, sir, and if the evidence was sufficient, if they found him guilty, 
he would probably — I do not know what the penalty would have 
been — dismissal or confinement. 

Senator Lucas. Here is one of the top secrets that involved our 
national defense and our security. Just assuming now that one of 
these officers would have given me, for instance, that top secret, and 
it would have become thereafter a matter of public property, every- 
body would have known it, do you care to hazard a guess as to the 
penalty that might have been attached to the officer that had given 
away tlie highest top military secret in the Nation ? 

General Gerow. AVell, sir, of course I do not know what the officers 
of a court would decide. I can give you my own personal opinion, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That is what I want, sir. I would like to ask you, 
before you give your personal opinion, one more question. Can you 
give to the committee, from your knowledge of military life, wliat the 
officer would have been charged with in the first instance had he given 
away a top secret of that character? Maybe that is a legal question. 

[iiOO] General Gerow. There are quite a lot of articles of 
war that we operate under, and there are general articles, such as 
conduct prejudicial to the good order and interest of the United 
States. 

If he deliberately gave it away, he might be tried for treason. 
There are probably any number of articles of war under which he 
could be tried, sir. There would be no question about an article of 
war that would fit it, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You started to answer another question, that was 
as to what was your opinion. 

General Gerow. Well, sir, if the evidence showed that that officer 
had deliberately given out that information, with full knowledge of 
what it meant and its effect, I, as a member of the court, would have 
voted the death penalt}^, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I think that is all. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one question. 

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. General Gerow, in the message of the 27th, there 
is the language, "Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile 
action possible at any moment." 

As I understand you, when you sent that to the Pacific theaters, 
you wanted to put all of the Pacific theaters on [44^0] the 
alert, because the action of the Japanese was unpredictable. That is 
correct, isn't it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 



1668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. As far as General Short at Hawaii was concerned, 
when he got that message, he did not have to concern himself with 
other matters but only with the defense of Hawaii ? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. Does counsel have any further questions? 

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, I would like to clear up one thing, 
and that has to do with the responsibilities and powers of the Com- 
mander in the field. 

The record shows here that in W-ashington, on the basis of all of 
the accumulated information they had, the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, 
and in part, the President, along with officers like yourself, had evalu- 
ated the information they had, and their conclusion was that war 
might come at any moment, that action was unpredictable, but hostile 
action in any direction might be expected. That was the conclusion. 

Then, they put that evaluation in the form of a dispatch to a field 
commander. Now, there has been a great deal of [44^-? J in- 
quiry as to whether this and that bit of information was or was not 
sent out to the commanders in Hawaii to make their own evaluation, 
and the inference I get from it is the commanders in the field were 
in a position and were entitled, when they got an evaluation like that 
from Washington by their superiors, before they accepted it and 
acted on it, they had a right to demand that the original source of 
material which had been acted on here, should be given to them, 
so that they could form their own judgment as to whether the people 
in Washington knew what they were doing. 

Now, is that a permissible practice in the Army ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. The commanders did not have that right 
to demand the information on which the Chief of Staff based a de- 
cision. I think if the officer insisted on demanding that information, 
he would have probably been relieved from that command. 

Mr. Mitchell. At the time this warning message was sent on No- 
vember 27, 1941, did you have any Army posts in areas other than 
the F'acific ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir; we had garrisons on some of our Atlantic 
bases, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What were they? 

General Gerow. I think we had troops in Iceland at [44^^] 
the time. We had some, probably, on Bermuda, and some on the 
other Caribbean Islands. I do not remember the exact bases we had 
in the Atlantic at that time. 

Mr. Mitchell. When you formed the judgment about the im- 
minence of war with Japan, did you send warning messages to Ice- 
land and these other posts in tlie Atlantic that you mentioned? 

General Gerow. No, sir ; I do not believe such messages were sent. 
Our thinking was about Japan at the time and we did not anticipate 
that Japan would operate in the Atlantic Ocean right away, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then you did come to the conclusion that Iceland 
was not a possibility for an attack ? 

General Gerow. Not for an attack by Japan. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is what I mean. 

General Gerow. No, sir ; that was not a possibility. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1669 

Mr. Mitchell. Then do I understand you to say, in sendinp; the 
message, your state of mind was to send a warning to any post that 
was Avithin the possibility of an attack from Japan? 

General Gerow. That was the purpose, sir, to send warning mes- 
sages to those areas that Japan would be in a position to attack. 

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose you had been convinced at that [44^3] 
time that there was not a shade of possibility of any Japanese attack 
on Panama, or call it the Pacific coast command, at Seattle, or wherever 
it was, if you had been in that state of mind and felt there was no 
possible chance of anything being done on the Pacific coast, to the 
bases there, would you have sent them a warning message? 

General Gerow. I do not believe, sir, I could quite get in that frame 
of mind. 

Mr. Mitchell. I know it was something you did not do, but I am 
trying to get your distinction, your state of mind as to your judg-' 
ment at the time, as to whether there was a chance or a possibility 
of an attack, and you told me you did not think there was, in 
Iceland. 

General Gerow. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am asking you if — that is not the case, of course — 
but if you had supposed that the Pacific coast was totally out of 
reach of Japan, that it was a waste of time to put them on the alert, 
would you have sent them a message ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then, the gist of it is, as I understand it, that you 
picked out the spots that you thought Japan might reach? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

[44-^^] Mr. Mitchell. Now, I notice that the alert that you 
sent to Hawaii was in identical terms with the one you sent to the 
commander of the Pacific coast. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Not a word of difference. The Pacific coast was 
2,000 miles or more further away from Japan than Hawaii ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then I notice that your message to MacArthur, who 
was right under the main islands of Japan, differs in no respect from 
the one you sent to Hawaii, except in one or two immaterial respects, 
about disturbing the population. 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You did not make any distinction in the nature of 
your warning to any one of them ; did you ? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitcheix.. That was deliberate on your part ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, because we did not know which one of 
them would be attacked. 

Mr. Mitchell. There has been something said here and you have 
been asked about impregnable fortresses, and whether Pearl Harbor 
was the greatest fortress in the world. 

In forming your judgment as to whether a fortress was [44^^] 
supposed to iDe immune to attack, or completely capable of defense, 
or impregnable, whatever you want to call it, is that judgment formed 
on the assumption that the fortress will be attacked when she is 
asleep, and her command is not alert? 



1670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow. No, sir ; it could still be alerted and would not be 
impregnable, I do not believe, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You haven't got my question. What I meant was, 
in judging whether a fortress is safe from attack, do you assume, 
in judging her safety, that her garrison is going to be prepared and 
ready, alerted to meet an attack that comes to it? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is any fort impregnable, or safe from attack, how- 
ever powerful it is, if the garrison is asleep at the switch? 

General Gerow. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think Fort Ticonderoga in the American Revolu- 
tion was considered the next largest or strongest fortress in the 
country. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. She was captured in the nighttime by a crowd of 
ragged militiamen without firing a shot. 

General GER'nv. Yes, sir. 

[441G] Mr. Mitchell. The commander, as I remember it, was 
caught in bed. Is that an illustration of a case where an impregnable 
fortress is captured because the garrison is not prepared? 

General Gerow. I think that is a very good illustration, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think he even had his trousers in his hands. 

The Chairman. Was he about to put them on, or take them off? 
[Laughter.] 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, on this question of judgment as to the likeli- 
hood of an attack on Pearl Harbor, you have been asked a good deal 
about tliat, as to wiiether your judgment was that it was possible 
or likely, and so forth. 

Now, there was great risk to the Japs in that expedition. It had 
considerable hazards, did it not? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And the hazards had to be measured against the 
importance of the objective? 

General Gerow. TJiat is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I assume in measuring the hazards and chances of 
success, the fact that the Japs knew our state of alertness, or lack of 
it, would be an important factor, [44^7] would it not? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; that would greatly lessen the hazard. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is a matter of record here that the Japs knew 
from day to day everything we were doing and not doing in Pearl 
Harbor and that information was transmitted from day to day by 
their spies in Honolulu to the Government in Japan, so if we had 
been on the alert on November 27 to the 7th of December, the Japs 
would have known it, would they not ? 

General Gerow. I belive they Avould have known.it, sir. 

IM^S] Mr. Mitchell. And although it was an impregnable 
fortress, if we were not on the alert in that period and the Japs knew 
that, it would be a great factor in their decision as to whether the 
attack was worth while? 

General Gerow. I think that is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You knew here in Washington — I think the record 
fairly shows — that they did have a spy system, that these reports 
were going out almost daily from their spies. You Avere intercepting 
them, you knew that the Japs had every means open to the public 
to communicate with their Government, so you were aware here, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1671 

at least, that the Japs knew everything that was going on in Hawaii? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. The next question is whether you had a clear idea 
as to whether we were alterted out there. The people on the ground 
had this advantage over you, did they not, that they knew whether 
they were alerted or not ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. It never occurred to me that they were 
not on the alert, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. The commander in the field, under those circum- 
stances, at that place, had at least this advantage over the Washing- 
ton end, that is, they knew the same things you did, but that the Japs 
knew everything they were doing and not doing — both ends knew 
that? 

[44^9] General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell, The people in Hawaii were in a better position to 
know the extent of their preparations, to know whether or not the 
Japs knew that they were not taking any steps against an air attack. 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. So the judgment of the people here, and it seems 
rather clear that there is a great deal of evidence here, that at least 
officers in Washington did not expect an attack, their judgment was 
necessarily formed with a less and certainly a hazier picture of 
whether there w^as a different alert necessary out there than the local 
commanders had? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, there has been a good deal of discussion about 
the order in your command of November 27 to Hawaii and other 
points as to an overt act. It may be irrelevant because nobody was 
ever called upon to make a decision as to what an overt act was 
until the Japs appeared over Pearl Harbor and commenced to drop 
bombs. But as a matter of discussion of the sufficiency of the order, 
when it says we want the Japs to commit the first overt act but do 
not let this induce you to fail to take measures or jeopardize your 
defense, let me ask you, if the Jap carrier fleet had been spotted at 
sea the night of the 6th or the morning of [44^0] the 7th 
driving toward Honolulu with six carriers in the fleet, and the ques- 
tion had arisen whether that was an overt act under your message 
or whether it would jeopardize the defense to wait until they got 
to Pearl Harbor and commenced to drop bombs, what was your idea 
about that? 

General Gerow. I think the commander would have attacked that 
Japanese force and I think he should have done so, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. If he had seen the Jap carriers 300 miles at sea and 
had done nothing but sail around in the air until they commenced 
to drop bombs, what would have happened to him under this order ? 

General Gerow. It would have jeopardized his defense to permit 
that outfit to approach any closer. 

Mr. Mitchell. That would amount to a disobeyance of the ordet, 
would it not? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir ; or a failure to obey the order. 

Mr. Mitchell. You draw a distinction there ? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. Direct disobedience of an order is some- 
thing that is intentional. Failure to obey may be due to any number 
of causes, error of judgment, or absence, or something else. 



1672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell,. I have' just one more question. It is submitted by 
counsel, Captain Ford, for General Short. I am asked to put this 
question to you : 

[44^1] How should General Short have worded his reply on the 
27tli of November 1941, his reply to your message of the 27th, to 
make clear to you and to your staff that his alert was to prevent 
sabotage only? 

General Gerow;. Well, I think, sir, if the message had read simply 
"alerted against sabotage only," it would have been perfectly clear. 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice that in these war plans, exhibit 44, the 
operational order of November 5 which you have testified did not 
arrive in the War Department 

General Gerow. May I get the page of that, sir ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is tab 9. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. General Short on November 5 put into effect an 
operational order out there which had these three alerts. No. 1 
alert was this : 

This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the 
Islands with no threat from without. 

Now, you never say that in fact until after the 1st of Janipary 
1942, you testified? 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. But you did see this preliminary draft he had 
sent in the previous year, did you not ? 

General Gerow. I don't recall having seen that preliminary 
[44^2] draft either. 

Mr. Mitchell. That had substantially the same alert, the alert is a 
defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands 
with no particular threat from without, the way that read that 
was alert No. 3, according to his then system. This later became 
alert No. 1. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, if General Short had this on file in the 
War Department on November 27, this operational order of November 
5, so that you could have known what alert No. 1 was, and he reported 
alerted against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands with 
no threat from without, that would have made it clear to you what 
he was doing? 

General Gerow. Yes, it would have made it quite clear. 

Mr. Mitchell. And if he hadn't this on file, as he didn't, and 
couldn't use the specific reference to alert No. 1, which would have 
meant nothing to you at that time, if he had used the same ex- 
pression in his report that he did in phrasing his alert, defense 
against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands with no 
threat from without, that would have been clear? 

Generf^l Gerow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Take the message as he put it, if he had said alerted 
against sabotage and left out the words ''liaison [44^^] with 
the Navy," do 3^ou think that would liave made you aAvare of his being 
alerted for sabotage only? It is asking a good deal of you, but it 
would certainly be likely. 

General Gerow. Yes, sir, it would be likely. I didn't have to 
make the decision, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1673 

Mr. Mitchell. I know you (li(ln''t. It's, and's, ami hut's aren't 
worth much. 

I think that is alL 

The Chairman. General, is there any further information within 
your knowledoe which is pertinent to this inquiry which you have 
that you could submit to the committee that has not been drawn out 
by the interrogation of you as a witness? 

General Gerow. No, sir, I have nothing. 

The Chairman. Well, the committee thanks you, General, for your 
forthright cooperation in trying to develop the facts in this inquiry. 
You have demeaned yourself before this committee in a manner be- 
fiitting 3^our record in the Army. You have the grateful appreciation 
of this committee for your services in that connection. 

Thank you very much. 

General Gerow. Thank you, sir, and I wish to thank the committee. 

The Chairman. You may be excused. 

(The witness was excused.) 

[44^4'\ The Chairman. The Chair understands counsel have 
some documents that they wish at this time to put in which have been, 
received in response to request of various members of the committee. 

Mr. Gesell, Yes, Mr. Chairman. If the committee will indulge us 
for a few minutes past 12 o'clock I think we can put into the record 
with some dispatch the material in response to certain requests and 
that would permit us to avoid any session this afternoon. 

The Chairman. The Chair might announce that Admiral Wilkinson 
is the next witness, but he will not be before us until 10 o'clock on 
Monday. 

Mr. Gesell. The first item that we wish to present has to do with 
the United States ship Boise. 

The committee will recall that Congressman Gearhart at pages 
274 and 560 of the record asked for the log of the Boise and indicated 
that he had Imowledge or information to the effect that the cruiser 
had sighted the Japanese task force on its way to attack Pearl Harbor. 

I have here in my hand a photostatic copy of the entries in the log 
of the United States ship Boise for the period November 25, 1941 to 
December 7, 1941, inclusive. 
^ This log shows that on two occasion during that period the Boise 
sighted a strange ship. The first occasion was on [44^-5'\ No- 
vember 27 and I will read into the record the brief entry concerning 
that. On November 27, 1941, during the 18 to 20 watch, according to 
an entry of F. G. Dierman, lieutenant ( jg) , United States Navy, there 
was the following that occured : 

Steaming as before. 1840 sighted darkened ship, bearing 240° T. estimated 
range 16,000 yards. Went to general quarters. 1845 set material condition afirm. 
1851 challenged ship. Received no reply. 1852 changed speed to 20 knots. 1854 
changed speed to 14 knots. 

[44^6] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. May I inquire what time of day that was ? 

Mr. Gesell. 18 to 20. That would be between 6 and 8 p. m., I take it, 
and 1840 was when they sighted the ship. That would be 6 : 40 p. m. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire whether the log shows where the 
Boise was at that time ? 



1674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr, Gesell. I am coming to that, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. 

Mr, Gesell. I wanted to develop this so that the committee has all 
of the information. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. On the 28th of November 1941, there is an entry by 
D. S. Edwards, lieutenant. United States Navy, in the 16 to 20 watch, 
that is Friday, November 28, 1941 : 

Steaming as before, on various courses at various speeds. * * * 1733 
darkened siiip. 1743 sigtited ship bearing 325 t. hull down. Changed course 
to 260 degrees t, changed speed to 15 knots. Manned battle stations. 1750 cut 
in boilers No. 3 and No. 4 on main steam sine. 1752 [-'t427] set condition 

affirm. On various courses at various speeds keeping between ship sighted at 
1743 and convoy. Ship appeared to be H. I. J. N. S. "ATAGO" type, steaming 
darkened at 14 knots on various courses toward convoy. ISOO ship turned to 
course about 090 degrees t. 1804 on various courses closing convoy. 1S35 unset 
condition affirm. 

Now, from the information presented by Admiral English, it ap- 
pears that there were no cruisers of the Atago type in the Japanese 
striking force. 

The Navy has plotted on the basis of the log, the positions of the 
U. ^. S. Boise at the various times mentioned in the log. 

With respect to the entries on November 27, 1941, the Boise at 1840 
was at latitude 16°46'0.5" N., longitude 153°55' E. 1851 on Novem- 
ber 27, 1941, latitude 16°45'0.5'' N., longitude 153°52'0.5'' E 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel kiiow where that would be on the 
map? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir, I am coming to that, if I may present this, 
please, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. 

[44^5] Mr. Gesell. (continuing) On November 27, 1941 at 
1927, it was latitude 16°43' N., longitude 143°44'0.5" E. 1743 28 
November 1941, latitude 14°56'0.5'' N., longitude 148°48' E., 1920, 28 
November 1941, latitude 14°49' N., longitude 148°26' E. 

We asked the Navy to state in simple terms what that meant in 
terms of the position of the Boise in relation to the Japanese force, 
and were advised as follows : 

The position of the U. S. S. Boise with relation to the track of the Japanese 
striking force on the 27th and 28tb of November, 1941, from the best informa- 
tion available appears, that the U. S. S. Boise on those dates was not less than 
1,400 miles from the Japanese striking force. 

Now, in this connection the committee has also asked to have the 
log of the S. S. A me.rican Leader 

Senator Lucas. Before you proceed, the S. S. American Leader 
was in the convoy with the Boise? 

Mr. Gesell. The Navy reports as follows with respect to the ATner- 
ican Leader: 

With further reference to your request dated 17 November 1945 for the log of 
S. S. American Leader, the S. S. American [}//29] Leader was one of the 
ships in the convoy which the U. S. S. Boise escorted to the Philippines November 7, 
1941. 

The log of the S. S. American Leader is not immediately available to the 
Navy Department since this ship was in the U. S. Maritime Service. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1675 

[J/.JfSO'] I think, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, to conclude this matter 
on the Boise we should ask to have the log for the periods indicated 
designated as an exhibit. It would be Exhibit 68. 

We also would like to accompany it, as part of the same exhibit, 
a map on which the plot of the Japanese task force appears and the 
position of the Boise on the dates when it sighted the darkened ships 
also appears. 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement about the 
Boise and the American Leader? 

Mr. Geseli.. That concludes the matter on the Boise. 

The Vice Chairman. Exhibit 68 will be received. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 68") 

The Vice Chairman. Are there any questions about the Boise and 
American Leader? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one question. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas.) Does the plot show just about how far the Boise 
was from the Hawaiian Islands when this first ship was sighted? 

Mr. Geseij:., It was near Guam. It appears on the map just where 
it was. 

Senator Lucas. I see. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairmati 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

[4^5i] Senator Ferguson. Does counsel know where this con- 
voy had been picked up by the Boise? That is not shown on the log. 

Mr. Gesell. I don't think on these days, but I believe that was cov- 
ered by the testimony of Admiral Inglis. My recollection is it was 
a convoy proceeding to the Philippines. Where it started I don't 
know. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't know whether it was from Hawaii or 
not. What I am trying to find out is whether or not the commanders 
at Hawaii knew they were convoying. 

Mr. Gesell. I guess there is no question about that. My recol- 
lection is that Admiral Inglis said this convoy did start in the 
Hawaiian area, but I am not certain of that. 

The Vice Chairman. You are referring to a United States convoy ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you start to say something, General 
Mitchell? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry ? 

The Vice Chairman. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Do the records with respect to the Boise show the action 
orders or the action report of what orders they were sailing under? 
I notice that that says that the ship was cleared for action and battle 
stations manned, and {H32^ so on. Does it disclose what the 
orders were to this ship escorting this convoy to the Philippines on 
the 27th of November ? 

Mr. Gesell. No, sir. The request was based upon a statement by 
Congressman Gearhart that he had information that the Boise had 
sighted the Japanese task force. We were attempting to answer that 
question. It appears now that the Boise was 1400 miles from the 
task force. So I guess it didn't sight it. 

Now, if the Congressman wants information as to the orders under 
which the convoy was proceeding, where it started from and where it 



1676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



was o'oing, that would be a separate request and we would have to 
get that information separately. 

Mr. Keefe. Could you get that information ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir. We will ask the Navy Department for it. 

Mr. IMuRPHY. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. MuRPTiY. At the time the request was made for the log of the 
Boise, in order to be prepared to discuss the matter in the event that 
it were j^ertinent, I requested that we have present the commanding 
officer of the Boise. I now cancel that request in view of the informa- 
tion supplied. 

The Vice Chairman. Are there any other questions about the Boise? 

[44-^3] All right, you may proceed, Mr. Gesell. 

Mr. Gesell.- A request was made to show the dates of arrival of 
the vessels that were in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack on 
the 7th of December 1941. 

I have in my hand a schedule showing the arrival of all the vessels, 
the dates they came in, and I think the most appropriate means of 
handling this would be to ask the reporter to spread this two-page 
schedule on the daily transcript. 

The Vice Chairman. That may be done. Do you desire to read it? 

Mr. Gesell. I don't see any need of that. It shows they came in 
at different times. 

The Vice Chairman. Is there any request that it be read? If not, 
it will be spread in full in the record at this point. 

(The schedule above referred to follows:) 

Arrivals of vessels in port {Pearl Harbor) just prior to 7 December 1941 



Battleships : 

Pennsylvania -- 

Arizonn 

Oklahoma 

Nevada 

California 

West Virginia^ 

Maryland 

Tennessee 

[4434] Heavy Cr 
San Francisco^ 



New Orleans 

Light Cruisers : 

Honolulu 

Detroit 

Raleiyh 

Phoenix 

Helena 

St. Louis 

Destroyers : 

Patterson 

Helm 

Blue 

Bagley 

Jarvis 

Mugford 

Ramsay 



Orydock 
1941. 
5 Dec. 1941. 
Do. 
Do. 
28 Nov. 1941. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
uisers : 
Prior to 1 
1941, exact 
not Ijnown. 
Do. 

28 Nov. 1941. 
o Dec. 1941. 
28 Nov. 1941. 
28 Nov. 1941. 
28 Nov. 1941. 
28 Nov. 1941. 

5 Dec. 1941. 

Do. 

Do. 
4 Dec. 1941. 

Do. 

Do. 

Do. 



1, Dec. 



Dec. 

tme 



D .^s t r oy er s — con . 

Breesr 4 Dec. 1941. 

Conyngliam Do. 

Phelps Prior 1 Dec. 1941. 

Far ra gut Do. 

Monoghan Do. 

Alwin Do. 

Hull Do. 

{4'tm 

Dewey Do. 

Warden Do. 

McDonongh Do. 

Tucker Do. 

Cmnmings Do. 

Zane 6 Dec. 1941. 

Selfridge Do. 

Reid Prior 1 Dec. 1941. 

Case Do. 

Montgomerii 4 Dec. 1941, 

Henley 5 Dec. 1941. 



(r(lllll)le^ 

Ralph Talbot. 

Dale 

Wasmuth 

Trever 

Auxiliaries : 



Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 



\(»xho 6 Dec. 1941. 

Ramapo 5 Dec. 1941. 

Curtiss Do. 



Note. — Tenders remained in harbor to carry out repair schedules. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1677 

[44^6] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman, Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. In connection with that, I understand that in the two 
documents we have been furnished of the Navy story that there is a 
discussion as to how the fleet got into Pearl Harbor and how the 
ships got there, and the periodic orders from time to time covering 
matters of that nature. 

Mr. Gesell. This is in response only to the request as to the dates 
when they entered the Harbor. 

The Vice Chairman. Are there any other questions on that point? 
If not, you may proceed, Mr. Gesell. 

Mr. Gesell. We have been asked also to furnish information con- 
cerning the condition of watertight integrity of the major vessels 
that were in the Harbor.^ Under date of December 11, we received 
from the Navy a table showing scheduled inspection of ships at Pearl 
Harbor during October, November, and December, and I am going 
to ask that that schedule be inserted in the record. 

It will be noted from the table that it does not contain all the ships 
which were in Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December. The explanation 
for that is that ships which are not shown on this schedule, the Navy 
advises, were not scheduled for inspection during the period October- 
December, [44J7] 1941. 

The Vice Chairman. That will be admitted, and spread on the 
record. 

Mr. Gesell. I think that should be made an exhibit, and perhaps 
the reporter can arrange to have photostats accompany the transcript 
for the information of the members of the committee. That will be 
Exhibit 69. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 69" and follows 
herewith.) 



1 See also Hearings, Part 11, p. 5347 et seq., for correspondence concerning this subject. 



1678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1679 

[44S9] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. In that connection, I would like to inquire whether or 
not the exhibit in question shows if voids were open on the ships? 
The gentleman from California had referred to the voids apparently 
being open on all the ships. Does the exhibit show whether they were 
or were not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think the exhibit is not complete enough to satisfy 
counsel and I called upon the Navy — and Mr. Gesell didn't know that — 
to supplement this, to give direct information as to each vessel, and if 
they didn't have it on an inspection record to have officers from the 
vessels who were on them to give testimony. 

We have called for, really, additional material on that. 

Mr. Murphy. I see. 

Mr. Gesell. This document goes solely to the limited question as to 
whether or not there was some major inspection of all vessels scheduled 
for that week end. It does not describe the condition of the various 
vessels which were subject to inspection. 

The Vice Chairman. You may proceed. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, a request was also made by one of the [^^4^] 
members of the committee for a report of the recall of United States 
merchant ships on the west coast, after the attack on Pearl Harbor.^ 

The Navy has submitted the order issued recalling the merchant 
vessels after the Pearl Harbor attack, the names of the ships, the 
dates they sailed, and the dates they returned. I suggest that that 
information be spread upon the record. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

Senator Ferguson. Just one question, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Michigan. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you going to furnish each member of the 
committe with copies of these exhibits? 

Mr. Gesell. In saying "spread" on the record. Senator Ferguson, it 
was my thought that in that fashion it would come to all members 
of the committee. 

The Vice Chairman. That brings it to us in the daily blue covered 
copy of the transcript. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. 

Mr. Gesell. This is a memorandum from the Navy to us, and we 
thought if it were copied into the transcript that would be enough. We 
can get the actual record. 

Senator Ferguson. No. Does that report show whether those ships 
were in convoy or not? 

[444^] Mr. Gesell. It doesn't relate to the question of convoy. 
It relates to when merchant ships were recalled. 

Senator Ferguson. It doesn't designate when they were in convoy ? 

Mr. (tesell. No ; it does not. 



1 Hearings, Part 1, p. 78. 



1680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(The memorandum and accompanying copy of dispatch follow:) 

Department of the Navy, 

Office of the Seceetaey, 
Washington, 13 December 1945. 
Memorandum 
To : Mr. William D. Mitchell 

1. In regard to your request for report of the recall of U. S. Merchant ships to 
the West Coast after the attack on Pearl Harbor, we have the following table: 



Name of ship 


Sailed from— 


Date 


Date returned 


USAT Tasker U. Bliss 


San Francisco 

do 


6 Dec 


10 Dec. 


Coast Miller 


...do 


8 Dec. 


Etolin _ 


do 


5Dec 


10 Dee. 


Henry D. Whiton 


Balboa, C. Z. 

do-. 


Sand 17 Dec 

7 and 16 Dec 

5 Dec 


(7). 


J. A. Moffett 


(?). 


PaulM.Gresrg 


San Francisco 

do 


10 Dec. 


President Garfield 


6 Dec 


8 Dec. 


President Johnson 


... do 


do 


9 Dec. 




Portland, Oreg 

Balboa, C. Z 


-..-do 

Sand 17 Dec 


(?). 


West Portal . 


(?). 







2. These ships apparently put back in compliance with the attached dispatch 
instructions issued by CinCPac on 7 December 1941. No evidence has been 
found that other ships in addition to those listed put back to West Coast ports 
after the Pearl Harbor attack. 

(Signed) John Foed Baechee, 

Lieut. Comdr. USNR. 



Naval Message 



Navy Department 



Phone Extension Number Addressees 






Message 
Precedence 


From Radio Honolulu 

Released by . .. 


n 

_o 

o 

< 

o 


Radio SanFran 
Radio Washn 


Urgent 

Priority Routine 


Date 7 December 1941 


Deferred 


For Coderoom 


c 
9 

a 




Priority Routine 


Decoded by .. .. -. . 


Deferred 











1444^^ Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory. 

072202 0538 

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred 
precedence. 

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: 
Date Time GCT 

Text 

War exists between United' States and Japan XX Proceed closest U. S. or 
friendly port immediately. 
Distribution : 

380 . (*) .ACTION 

10A11 . (*) . 38S . (*) . 38W (*) OPDC (*) FILE . . 
(•) Initials illegible. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1681 

TOP SECRET 
CONFIDENTIAL 

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See 
article 76 (4) Nav Res. 

[4444-] Mr. Gesell. Congressman Keefe requested various Ex- 
ecutive Orders establishing defensive sea areas around Pearl Harbor, 
and other areas. We have the text of these orders and suggest that 
they be spread upon the record. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

(The Executive orders referred to follow :) 

General Order No. 118 Navy Department, 

Washington, D. C, June H, 1939. 

Establishing a Defensive Sea Area in and About Peabl Habbob, Hawaii 

1. The following Executive Order is quoted : 

Executive Obdee 

establishing a defensive sea area in and about PEABL harbor, HAWAII 

By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of 
section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C, title 18, Sec. 96), the area 
of water in Pearl Harbor, Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, lying between 
extreme high-water mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel to 
said harbor, within an area bounded by the extreme high-water mark, a line 
bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the Puuloa Naval Reserva- 
tion, a line bearing south true from Ahua Point Lighthouse, and a line bearing 
west true from a point three nautical miles due south true from Ahua Point Light- 
house, is hereby established as a [W5] defensive sea area for purposes 
of national defense. 

At no time shall any person (other than persons on public vessels of the 
United States) enter the defensive sea area above defined, nor shall any vessels 
or other craft (other than public vessels of the United States) be navigated 
within said defensive sea area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy. 

Any person violating the provisions of this order shall be subject to the pen- 
alties provided by law. 

FEANKUif D. Roosevelt. 

The White House, 

May 26, 19S9. 

William D. Leahy, 
Acting Secretary of the Navy. 



General Order No. 144 Navy Department, 

Washington, D. C, March 29, 1941. 

Establishing Kodiak Island and Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea Abeas and 
SuBic Bay Naval Aiespace Resevation 

1. The following Executive orders are quoted : 

Executive Order 

establishing kodiak island naval DEFEFSI\TD BB1&. ABEA ALASKA 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the 
Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C, title 18, sec. 96), the territorial waters 
between extreme high-water [4446] mark and the three-mile marine 
boundary adjacent to the easeern portion of Kodiak Island, Alaska, in and about 
Women's Bay to the westward within a line bearing true north and south tan- 
gent to the eastern extremity of High Island, are hereby set apart and reserved 
79716 — 46 — pt. 4 8 



1682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

as a naval defensive sea area for purposes of the national defense, such area to 
to known as "Kodiak Island Naval Defensive Sea Area." 

At no time shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the 
United States, he navigated into Kodiak Island Naval Defensive Sea Area, 
unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy. 

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be enforced by the Secretary 
of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the 
United States and of the Territory of Alaska; and the Secretary of the Navy 
is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry 
out such provisions. 

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order shall be subject to 
the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C, 
title 18, sec. 96). 

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof. 

Fkanklin D. Roosevelt. 

The White House, 

March 22, 1941. 



[4447] Executive Order 

establishing subic bay naval defensive sea area and subic bay naval airspace 
reservation, philippine islands 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the 
Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C, title IS, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air 
Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 568, 570; U. S. C, title 49, sec. 174), 
the territorial waters within Subic Bay, Philippine Islands, between extreme 
high-water mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel within a 
line bearing true southwest extending three nautical miles from Panibatujan 
Point, a line bearing true southwest extending three nautical miles from Sanpaloc 
Point, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the above two bearing lines, 
are hereby set apart and reserved as a naval defensive sea area -for jjui-poses of 
the national defense, such area to be known as "Subic Ray Naval Defensive Sea 
Area"; and the airspace over the snid territorial waters and over the Subic Bay 
Naval Reservation, Olongapo, Philippine Islands, is hereby set apart and reserved 
as a naval airspace reservation to be known as "Subic Bay Naval Airspace 
Reservation." 

At no time shall any ves.sel or other craft, other than public vessels of the 
United States, be navigated into Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area, unless 
author^z 'd by the Secretary of the Navy. 

[>{^.^8] At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the 
United States, be navigated into Subic Bay Naval Airspace Reservation, unless 
authorized by the Secretary of the Navy. 

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary 
of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local Inw enforcement officers of the 
United Sfates ; and the Secretary of the Navy i.<; hereby authorized to prescribe 
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such i)n)visi()ns. 

Any per.son violating any of tlie provisions of this order relating to Subic Bay 
Naval Defensive Sea Area shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 
of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, .'^ec. 06), and any person 
violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Subic Ray Naval Airspace 
lieserv'tion shnll be subject to the penalties prescribed by The Civil Aeronautics 
Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 97.3). 

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof. 

Fr^vnki.in D. Roose\-ei-t. 

The White House. 

March 22, 1941. 

(No. 8718) 

( F. R. Doc. 41-2165 ; Filed, March 24, 1941 ; 1 : 14 p. m.) 

/ James ForreStal. 

Acting Secretary of the Navy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1683 

[4'i'i9] General Order No. 14G Navy Department, 

Washington, D. C, April 1,.10J,1. 

Naval Deff:nsive Sea Areas and Airspace Reservations 

1. The President, on February 14, 1941, signed ExecuKve Orders Nos. ^80, 
8681, 8683, and 86S4. They are quoted : 

Executive Order 

Establishing Naval DefensiA'e Sea Areas Around and Naval Airspace lleser- 
vations Over the Islands of Kiska and Unalaska, Alaska. 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the 
Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C. title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air 
Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C. title 49, sec. 174), 
the territorial waters between tlie extreme high-water marks and the three-mile 
marine boundaries surrounding the islands of Kiska and Unalaska, are hei'eby 
establislied and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national 
defense, such areas to be known, respectively, as "Kiska Island Naval Defensive 
Sea Area", and ''Unalaska Island Naval Defensive Area" ; and the airspaces 
over the said territorial waters and islands are hereby set apart and reserved" 
as naval airspace reservations for purposes of national defense, such reservations' 
to be known, respectively, as "Kiska Island Naval Airspace Reservation", and 
'Unalaska Island Naval Airspace Reservation.' 

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public [^^-50] ves- 
sels of the United States, enter either of the naval defensive sea areas herein set 
apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels 
of the United States, be navigated into either of said areas, unless authorized by 
the Secretary of the Navy. 

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, 
be navigated into either of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and 
reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy. 

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary 
of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the 
United States and of the Territory of Alaska ; and the Secretary of the Navy is 
hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out 
such provisions. 

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above- 
named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided hy 
section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C. title 18, sec. 96), and any 
person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named 
naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed bv the 
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973). ' 

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof. 

Franklin D. Roosevelt. 



{IfJiSl] The White House, 

February IJt, 1941.. 

(No. 8680) 

(F. R. Doc. 41-1136 ; Filed, February 15, 1941 ; 11 : 50 a. m.) 

Executive Order 

Establishing Kan^ohe Bay Navax Defenslve Sea Area and Kaneohe Bay- 
Naval Airspace Reservation, Hawaii 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of 
the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C title 18, sec. 96). and section 4 of the 
Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U- S. C, title 49, sec. 
174), the territorial waters within Kaneohe Bay between extreme high-water 
mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel within a line bearing 
northeast true extending four nautical miles from Kapoho Point, and a line joining 
the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines, are hereliy estab- 
lished and reserved as a naval defensive sea area for purposes of national defense, 
such area to be known as "Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area" ; and the air- 
space over the said territorial waters is hereby set apart and reserved as a navali 



1684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

airspace reservation for purposes of national defense, such reservation to be known 
as "Kaneohe Bay Naval Airspace [4452] Reservation." 

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United 
States, enter Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area, nor shall any vessel 
or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into 
said area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy. 

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, 
be navigated into Kaneohe Bay Naral Airspace Reservation, unless authorized 
by the Secretary of the Navy. 

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Sec- 
retary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement oflScers 
of the United States and of the Territory of Hawaii ; and the Secretary of 
the Navy is hereby authorized to presecribe such regulations as may be necessary 
to carry out such provisions. 

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Kaneohe 
Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area shall be subject to the penalties provided by 
.section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C, title 18, sec. 96), and any 
person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Kaneohe Bay 
Naval Airspace Reservation shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the 
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973). 

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof. 



U45S] 

Fbanklin D. Roosevixt 
The White House, 

Fel)ruary 14, 1941- 

(No. 8681) 

(F. R. Doc. 41-1137 ; Filed, February 15, 1941 ; 11 : 50 a. ni.) 



ExEctrnvE Order 

ESTABLISHING NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS AROUND AND NAVAL AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS 
OVER THE ISLANDS OF PALMYRA, .TOHNSTON, MIDWAT. WAKE. AND KINGMAN REET, 
PACIFIC OCEAN 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the 
Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C. title 18, sec. 96). and section 4 of the Air 
Commerce Act approved May 20. 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C. title 49, sec. 174), 
the territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and the three-mile 
marine boundaries surrounding the islands of Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake, 
and Kingman Reef, in the Pacific Ocean, are hereby established and reserved as 
naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such areas to be 
known, respectively, as "Palmyra Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," "Johnston 
Island Naval Defensive Sea Area." "Midway Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," 
"Wake Island Naval Defensive Sea Area." and "Kingman Reef Naval Defensive 
Sea [4454] Area"; and the airspaces over the said territorial waters 
and islands are hereby set apart and re.served as naval airspace reservations for 
purposes of national defense, such reservations to be known, repectively. as 
"Palmyra Island Naval Airspace Reservation," ".Johnston Island Naval Airspace 
Reservation." "Midwav Island Naval Airspnce Reservation," "Wake Island Naval 
Airspace Reservation." and "Kingman Reef Naval Airspace Reservation." 

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the 
United States, enter any of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and 
reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the 
United States, be navigated into any of said areas, unless authorized by the 
Secretary of the Navy. 

At no time .shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, 
be navigated into any of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and 
reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy. 

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary 
of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement oflBcers of the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1685 

United States and of the Territory of Hawaii ; and the Secretary of the Navy 
is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry 
out such provisions. 

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order [4455] relating 
to the above-named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties 
provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C, title 18, 
sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating 
to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties 
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973). 

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof. 

Franklin D. Roose:velt 

The White House, 

February I4, 1941. 

(No. 8682) 

(F. R. Doc. 41-1139; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:51 a. m.) 



Executive Order 

establishing naval defensive sea areas around and naval airspace reserva- 
tions over the islands of eose, tutuila, and guam, pacific ocean 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of 
the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C, title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of 
the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C, title 49, sec. 
174), the territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and the 
three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of 14456] Rose, 
Tutuila, and Guam, in the Pacific Ocean, are hereby established and reserved 
as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such areas to be 
known, respectively, as "Rose Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," "Tutuila Island 
Naval Defensive Sea Area," and "Guam Island Naval Defensive Sea Area" ; 
and the airspaces over the said territorial waters and islands are hereby set 
apart and reserved as naval airspace reservations for purposes of national 
defense, such reservations to be known, respectively, as "Rose Island Naval 
Airspace Reservation," "Tutuila Island Naval Airspace Reservation," and "Guam 
Island Naval Airspace Reservation." 

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the 
United States, enter any of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and 
reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the 
United States, be navigated into any of said areas, unless authorized by the 
Secretary of the Navy. 

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the) United States, 
be navisrated into any of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and 
reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy. 

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary 
of the Navy, vrith the cooperation of the local law enforcement oflBcers of the 
United States ; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe 
[445^] such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions. 

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above- 
named naval defensive .sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by 
section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C, title 18, sec. 96), and any 
person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named 
naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the 
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (.52 Stat. 973). 

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof. 

Franklin D. Roosevelt 

The White House. 

February I4, 1941. 

(No. 8683) 

(F. R. Doc. 41-1140 : Filed, February 15. 1941 : 11 : 51 a. m.) 



1686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Genekal Order 1 Navy Department, 

No. 153 / Washington, D. C, September 8, 19^t. 

Establishing Manila Bat Defensive Sea Area 

1. The President, on August 16, 1941, signed Executive Order No. 8S53, quoted 
below : 

Executive Order 

establishing MANILA BAY DEFENSIVE SEA AREA, [-i-}58] PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is 
hereby ordered as follovps : 

Tlie following-described area is hereby established and reserved, for purposes 
of national defense, as a naval defensive sea area, to be known as "Manila Bay 
Defensive Sea Area" : 

All territorial waters of Manila Bay, Philippine Islands, and its approaches 
and tributaries from the contour line of extreme high water as shown on the 
latest U. S. C. and G. S. charts, to : 

A line running southwest true from Luzon Point, in approximate position. 
Latitude 14°27'40" North, Longitude 120°23'13" East to the seaward limit of 
territorial waters, thence southeasterly along the seaward limit of territorial 
waters, to the parallel of Latitude M'lO'lS" North, thence east along that 
parallel of Latitude to meet the shore at Hamilo Point in approximate Latitude 
14°10'15" North, Longitude 120°34'24" East. 

A vessel not proceeding under United States Naval or other United States 
authorized supervision, shall not enter or navigate the waters of Manila Bay 
Defensive Sea Area except during daylight, when good visibility conditions 
prevail, and then only after specific permission has been obtained. Advance 
arrangements for entry into or navigation through or within the Manila Bay 
Defensive Sea Area must be made, preferably by [4^59] application at 
a United States Naval District Headquarters in advance of sailing, or by radio 
or visual communication on approaching the seaward limits of the area. If 
radio telegraphy is used, the call "NQO"' shall be made on a frequency of 500 kcs. 
and. permission to enter the port shall be requested. The name of the vessel, 
purpose of entry, and name of the master must be given in the request. If visual 
communications are used, the procedure shall be essentially the same. 

A vessel entering or navigating the waters of Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area 
does so at its own risk. 

Even though permission has been obtained, it is incumbent upon a vessel 
entering the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area to obey any further instructions 
received from the United States Navy, or other United States authority. 

A vessel may expect supervision of its movements within the Manila Bay 
Defensive Sea Area, either through surface craft or aircraft. Such controlling 
surface craft and aircraft will be identified by a prominent display of the Union 
Jack. 

These regulations are subject to amplification by the local United States Naval 
authority as necessary to meet local circumstances and conditions. 

When a United States Maritime Control Area is established adjacent to or 
abutting upon the above-established defensive sea ai'ea, it shall be assumed 
that pei'mission to enter, and [-i'/'jO] other instructions issued by proper 
authority, shall apply to any one continuous passage through or within both areas. 

Any master of a vessel or other person within the Manila Bay Defensive Sea 
Area who shall disregard these regulations, or shall fail to obey an order of 
United States Naval authority to stop or heave to, or shall perform any act 
threatening the efficiency of mine (»r other defenses or the safety of navigation, or 
shall take any action inimical to the interests of the United States, may be 
detained therein by force of arms and shall be liable to attack by United States 
armed forces, and liable to prosecution as provided for in section 44 of the 
Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C, title 18, sec. 90). 

All United States Government authorities shall place at the disposal of the 
Naval authorities their facilities for aiding in the enforcement of these regula- 
tions. 

The Secretary of the Navy will be charged with the publication and enforce- 
ment of these regulations. 

Frankijn D. Roosevbxt 

The White House, 

August 16, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1687 



(No. 8853) 
(F. R. Doc. 41-6114; Filed, August 18, 1941; 2:31 p. m.) 

FOBRESTAL, 

The Acting Secretary of War. 

[44^i] Mr. Gesell. Senator Lucas made a request for detailed 
information concerning the different types of planes which the Navy 
had at Pearl Harbor on January 6, 1940, and on February 1, 1941, 
the period when Admiral Richardson was in command, and infor- 
mation as to the extent and nature of the reconnaissance conducted 
by those planes during that period.^ 

This has been furnished in a memorandum to Mr. Mitchell dated 
December 13, 1945, to which is attached a detailed breakdown of 
the number of planes present, the sectors covered by the reconnais- 
sance, and is responsive to that request. 

I again suggest that the memorandum and the attached schedules 
be spread upon the daily transcript. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

(The memorandum referred to follows:) 

Depaktment of the Navy, 

Office of the Secretary, 
Washington, IS December 1945. 
MEMORANDUM: 
To : Mr. William D. Mitchell. 

1. In response to the questions asked on the record by Senator Lucas, I am 
forwarding as you requested the necessary information in compliance therewith, 

2. Exhibits A and B outline in detail the information \.H62'\ concerning 
the number of Naval planes, and their types, attached to the Pacific Fleet when 
Admiral Richardson assumed command on 6 January 1940 and when he was 
relieved of command on 1 February 1941. 

3. The number of Naval planes attached to the Pacific Fleet during the period 
6 January 1940 and 1 February 1941 that were capable of running a long distance 
reconnaissance over the sea are indicated on Exhibits A and B as "VPB" planes 
of "Patwing 2 (Pearl Harbor)" or a total of 67 on 1 January 1940 and 63 on 1 
February 1941. It is also possible that some "VJ" planes were capable of .such 
use in case of necessity and in fact such planes were so used on 7 December 1941 
after the attack. 

4. The number of Naval planes that were assigned and performed daily recon- 
naissance duty, in pursuance of the order issued by Admiral Richardson on 
approximately 17 June 1940, is indicated in the attachments to the "Search 
Plan", (Exhibit E). 

5. The exact sectors and distances from Oahu covered in the reconnaissance 
ordered by Admiral Richardson are also indicated in detail on the "Search 
Plan" (Exhibit E). 

(S) John Ford Baecher, 
John Foed Baecher, 

Lt. Comdr., NSNR. 
Ends: (HW) Exhibits A, B, and E. 

> Hearings, Part 1, p. 66. 



1688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[U63] 



Enclosure (A) 
Naval aircraft assigned to the V. S. Fleet (Pacific) on J January 1940 





Type 


Num- 
ber 


Sub- 
total 


Total 


BATTLE FORCE 


VOS 

vs 
vso 

VF 
VSB 

VB 
VTB 

VJ 

VN 

VB 
VSO 
VPB 

VJ 
VJR 

VN 

VR 
VTB 

VSO 

VSO 

VSB 
VSO 

VSO 
VPB 

VSO 

VPB 

VJ 

VPB 


10 
8 
112 
95 
175 
47 
96 
13 
3 




























































BASE FORCE 


559 
1 
2 
8 
32 
14 
5 
1 
3 


55t 


















































CRUISER SCOUTING FORCE . 


66 

78 


66 








SUBMARINE FORCE.. 


78 
2 


78 








AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE: 

COMAIRSCOUTFOR ... I. .. .. 


2 

1 
2 


2 










3 




PATWING 1 (San Diego) 


3 

1 
34 












35 




PATWING 2 (Pearl Harbor) 


35 
2 

67 
1 


















70 




PATWING 4 (Seattle) 


70 
24 






24 






24 




Enclosure (A) 


132 


132 
837 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1689 



umi 



Enclosure (B) 
Naval aircraft assigned to the Pacific Fleet 1 February 1941 





Type 


Num- 
ber 


Sub- 
total 


Total 


BATTLE FORCE 


VS 
VSO 

VF 
VSB 

VB 
VTB 

VJ 

VN 

VSO 
VJ 

VJR 
VB 

VSO 

VSO 

VSO 

VN 

VSO 
VPB 

VSO 

VPB 

VJ 

VPB 

VPB 


4 
137 
88 
142 
40 
90 
11 
5 






















































BASE FORCE . 


517 
17 
30 
12 
1 


517 




















CRUISER SCOUTING FORCE . 


60 
60 


60 








SUBMARINE FORCE - 


60 
2 


60 








AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE: 

COMAIRSCOUTFOR ' . . . 


2 

2 

1 

3 

1 

34 

35 

4 

63 

1 


3 








PATWING 1 (San Diego). 


3 










PATWINO 2 (Pearl Harbor) 


35 


















68 




PATWING 4 (Seattle) 


68 
19 

19 

7 




PATWING 6 (Alameda) 


19 






7 






7 






132 


""132 




771 



1690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Enclosure (E) 
SEARCH PLAN 
Seciirlty Patrol from Barbers Pt . 
(as of 30 June 19^0) 



360° 




Barbers 
Point 



20 ttlle Visibility 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1691 



[U66] 



Fleet security patrol from Barbers Point, Oahu 
Plane "A" 



Course T. 


Distance to Lat.N. 


Long. W. 


345° . 


75 
226 

37 

123 

1(23) ? 

37 
226 

75 


22-31 
26-15 
26-12 
24-14 
26-01 
25-47 
22-31 
21-18 


58-27 


000 . . - 


58-27 


265H - - 


59-08 


175 


58-55 


336— 


59-52 


248-. . . 


60-30 


150- 


58-27 


165 - 


58-07 







Plane "B' 



315° . 


75 
226 

38 
123 
123 

37 
226 

75 


22-n 

25-21 
25-04 
23-23 
24-35 
24-04 
22-11 
21-18 


59-0. 


330 _.. 


61-0' 


232.. 


61-3t 


144... - 


60-21 


306 


62-l( 


218 - .- - - 


62-3( 


120 


59-o: 


135-... 


58-0" 







Plane "C" 



Plane "D" 



PLANE "F' 



285° 


75 
226 

37 
123 
123 

37 
226 

75 


21-37 
23-29 
22-55 
22-05 
22-16 
21-38 
21-37 
21-18 


59-23 


2WA . - . . 


62-57 


202 


63-10 


115-. 


61-10 


277 


63-22 


187 . . 


63-27 


90}^ 


59-23 


105... 


58-07 







255H 


75 
226 

37 
123 
123 

37 
226 

75 


20-58 
20-58 
20-19 
20-32 
19-41 
19-03 
20-58 
21-lS 


59-23 


270 .. 


63-23 


172 


63-18 


084-.. 


61-07 


246 


63-07 


157 


62-52 


060 


59-23 


074H --- 


38-07 







lUS7[ PLANE "E" 








224° 


75 
226 

37 
123 
123 

37 
226 

75 


20-25 
18-30 
18-91 
19-13 
17-32 
17-09 
20 -'25 
21-18 


59-02 


239 . . 


62-27 


142J'^ . 


62-^4 


054 


60-12 


215 .. , .. 


61-33 


127 


61-01 


030 


59-02 


044 


58-07 







194H 
2091^ 
113-.. 
024}^ 
185- - 
0973^2 
000... 
015--. 



75 


20-05 


226 


16-50 


37 


16-35 


123 


18-27 


123 


16-25 


37 


16-20 


226 


20-05 


75 


21-18 



Total distance for each plane 922 miles. 



{_.U(^8^ Mr. Gesell, Congressman Gearhart made a request for 
a copy of the order fixing the time of operation of the radar stations 
in tlie period immediately before the attack on Pearl Harbor. 



1692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Pursuant to that request the Army eommunicatcHljvilh the Com- 
mandiiw General in Hawaii and a search was made ot the tiles there 
to fi ouV if here was any written record estabhshmg those times 
A ne^ai^e report has confe back stating that an exhaustive search 
of the files does not disclose the publication of official orders of any 
kind in connection with the time schedule for training or the opera- 
ao 1 of he radar stations on Oahu during the period m question. 
Th^t answer suggests that those orders were orally established and 
of con se we wfll have the responsible officers who wei-e not only in 
conimaiid bTit particularly concerned with radar before the committee 
'ind thev can ffive the information at that time. , 

The Vice Chairman. Do you want to put anything m the record on 

^^lli- Gesell. I think there is no need of simply documenting this neg- 
ative fact We will have to get the information by witnesses. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. You may proceed. 

Mr Ges^ We have a substantial number of requests relating to 

the Department o^^ before the con^ittee this mormi^ 

two mimeo^^raphed documents. These are submitted by counsel. The 
fiTsts dated November 25, 1941, and represents the p.^^tch Govern- 
ment's views on the matter of the type of reply which should be 
ffiven to the Japanese. • ^^^,.a 

^ This is offered for the purpose of completing tl^e i^co d 

I micrht say that we had requested it earlier. We ^^ele unab e to 
subm "it to the committee because we were awaiting the approval of 
the Dutch Go ernment for its release, which has now been obtained 

I would hke to have the text of that document as -^11 as the text 
of the other document, the document of November 2< ^^^^^^^^^g 
ino- Secretarv Hull's negotiations, discussions with the iNetiieiianas 
Sfnister on Ihat, date, concerning the threatened Japanese invasion 
of French Indochina, spread upon the record. 

Thp Vtce Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

Sector LccAS. May I ask one question of eounsel on that point? 

The Vice Chaibman. Senator Lucas. ii „f tv,a 

Senator LtJCAS. Does the record contain at this point now all ol he 
so cXd tentative proposals by the various governments on this 

"Tlr! gLu.. Yes, I think we have now had released all of the docu- 
ments which we requested be released. 

Um Senator Lucas. Tliat was my understanding. 
The documents referred to above, dated November 25, 1941 and 
November 27, 1941, respectively, follow herewith:) 

WASHINGTON, 25th November 19U- 

■SXfp.%l.ro?M,"Ku.^,™ ;S?.>rwere kind enough to oommunloate 

to me last Saturday. 

Believe me, my dear Mr. Secretary, 

Yours sincerely, ^^^ ^ Loudon 

The Honorable 

The Secretary of State, 
Washington, D. C. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE X693 

Memorandum 

As it seems impossible to discuss at present a final and ceneral -jCTPPmpnf a^ 
is necessary tliat for tlie reasons expressed by the Secretafv nf int? T l ' .J 
be endeavored to arrive at a limited^nd temporary Sement ' ' '^^"'^ 

..lorl'^''' "^ '^''^ ^;i'' "'^'^ '^^^'^'•^ *h^ occupation ot- Indochina bv Janan no 
sanctions were applied against the iatter, it seems reasonahlp fw i^^io 
gradually withdraws from Indochir.a proponiSely sanetlois may be Hf tS 

SpU: Sa?;S^l1h^^5S-S^.- - ^.erl^r kdiefSS.?^ 
But even in that event, according to the opinion of the Netherland., Cnvprr, 

niw?fi,w-!f '1''°t' CJ^^^^n^ient will be glad to follow the same policy concerning 
oil deliveries to Japan as applied by the United States Tf trLcTTfy.^^ -^ 
that the license system will remain in operation ^°^^ '^'^^''"^ "^^^"^ 

1. If it is the intention of Japan to militarily withdraw fmm nhj^o v-i, 

are no objections ; if Japan is not wi Lg t^do so Then t^e nLhfVn^^ ^""'^ 
to give assistance to China, should be rest rved ^^ ^'^ continue 

2. It should be proposed that North East Asia (Russia) be atso includeri in «m 

oblir^™'l„n/°"" ^ "' ""^ •'''P''"'^'^ ■"•"'X'^'" •="« ''<^« aosweredTilhe above 

abrrobse'rvati'ons '^' '''^"°''" ^^'P°'^^^ ^^^'^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^aU with in the 

lea"srror^t^^dgcSor^tfl^L;rwV?u^ll^t^^^^^^ ^Vf at 

especially now that we have been so fuHv informprt hv m ^^7^ ^''^ of State 
been given the opportunity to inform him'o'ourToInf of' We^"' "°^^ "^ ^^^^ 

As far as the possible reduction of economic nressnrP on tT;.^,. -. 
consultations with Governor General SfaXnwlh!.? i P"^" '^ concerned, 
will be necessary in view of the fact th«7^ro1f -^ l"""^- Economic Warfare 
were originally lestin^d'or'jfpan'arVn^w bSn^^^^^^^^^^ ?he Un't'j .T'f '^ 

In general it will not be possible to go furthir than thp fin«i^ 1^^ ^\''^^^^ 
the Batavia Conference as pronosed hefnrp tho M.fi7 V , ^^^ proposals of 

sions had been broken ol Xeover as a resi^^^n^^^^ '^^''"'- 

Durchn<5ps r//7/i Vi,^ luuieuver as a lesult of Russian and American 

purcnases, [U'4i the amounts of tin and rubber offerPd in fh« «^oi 
posals are no more available. ^uuuer omerea m the final pro- 

NovEMBER 25th, 1941. 

'■■^-^'^^^ Depaetment of State 

jfemorandum of conversation 

Subject: Threatened Japanese Invasion of French In?o;:Wna?rir''" ''' ""' 
Par„c,pants: Sec^retar. of State Hul, .n/?h1 '^eX'rZdT^Min.ster, Dr. A. 
Copies to: 



1694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Saigon and other localities in the French Indochina area indicating that tens 
of thousands of Japanese troops with equipment, vessels, transports, et cetera, 
were proceeding to that area from the north. He examined the cables care- 
fully and appeared much disturbed about the Japanese troop movements. The 
Minister stated that this presented a very serious situation. 

The Minister wanted to make clear that he had supported me unequivocally 
in connection with the proposed modus vivendi arrangement which I abandoned 
on Tuesday evening, November twenty-fifth, or practically abandoned when the 
Chinese had exploded without knowing half the true facts or waiting to ascer- 
tain them. I said that I had determined early Wednesday morning, November 
twenty- [-^^76] sixth, to present to the Japanese later in the day the 
document containing a proposed draft of an agreement which set forth all of 
the. basic principles for which this Government stands and has stood for, for 
many years, especially including the maintenance of the territorial integrity 
of China. I reminded the Minister that the central point in our plan was the 
continuance of the conversations with Japan looking toward the working out 
of a general agreement for a complete peaceful settlement in the Pacific area 
and that the so-called modus vivendi was really a part and parcel of these 
conversations and their objectives, intended to facilitate and keep them alive 
and that, of course, there was nothing that in any way could be construed as 
a departure from the basic principles which were intended to go into the general 
peace agreement. The Minister said he understood the situation. 

C H 
S CH:MA 

- {If..!f77^ The Vice Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Gesell. 

Mr. Gesell. At page 1265 Senator Ferguson requested the notes 
made by Mr. Welles regarding conferences with President Roosevelt 
in connection with the Atlantic Conference, discussions concerning a 
parallel declaration to Japan. 

The State Department advises that to date it has not found any 
such notes. The State Department has, however, found a draft dated 
August 16, 1941, which appears to be a revision of a draft dated 
August 15, 1941. The committee will recall that the August 15 draft 
was part of .Exhibit 22 and was submitted by us in the presentation. 

The State Department now has a draft dated August 16, which we 
are glad to furnish for the record. It has to be photostated and is not 
yet here. 

Senator Ferguson. Could you make that Exhibit 22-A so it will be 
with Exhibit 22? 

Mr. Gesell. We will make it 22-A. ^ 

Thut draft, which is a day later than August 15, I understand 
already shows the watering down of the crucial paragraph at the end. 

[Ji47S~\ Mr. Gesell. We have also obtained a message dated 
August 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Chur- 
chill advising Prime Minister Churchill of the statement made to the 
Japs on August 17, 1941. I would like to read that into the record. 
This is dated August 18, 1941 (reading) : 

Amembassy, 
London (England). 
Triple Priority. 

Secret from the President for Churchill 

Quote. With reference to our discussions in regard to the situation in the Far 
Bast, upon my return to Washington I learned tliat the Japanese Ambassador 
had on-August 16 approached the Secretary of State with a request for a resump- 
tion of the informal conversations which the Ambassjulor and tlie Secretary of 
State had been holding directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a 



» See Hearings, Tart 5, p. 2065. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1695 

basis for negotiations in regard to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and 
that the Secretary of State had in reply confined himself to repeating what he 
had previously said in regard to the developments in Japan's course of conquest 
which had led to the cessation of those conversations. 

On August 17 I sent for the Japanese Ambassador, and the Secretary of State 
and I received him. I made to him a statement covering the position of this Gov- 
ernment with [4479] respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in 
the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed state- 
ment such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less 
vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed. 

The Ambassador renewed the request made by him to the Secretary of Stale 
in regard to the resumption of convei'sations. I replied by reviewing the 
Japanese Government's action in actively pursuing a course of conquest and in 
inspiring the Japanese press to attack this Government. I dwelt on the prin- 
ciples of peaceful, lawful and just international relations which this Govern- 
ment has emphasized and I suggested that if the Japanese Government is pre- 
pared to readjust its position and embark upon a peaceful program this 
Government would be prepared to resume the exploratory conversations and 
that before undertaking the resumption of those conversations we felt that 
it would be helpful to have a clear ^statement of the Japaese Government's 
attitude and plans. 

The Japanese Ambassador said that he would communicate what I had told 
him to his Government. 

Roosevelt. 

I would like to have this marked as Exhibit 70. 

The Vice Ch.mkman. It will be so ordered. 

[M^O] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 
70.") 

Mr. Gesell. At page 127 of the transcript a request was made by 
Senator Ferguson for any record that Great Britain took parallel 
action in accordance with the Atlantic Conference agreement. That 
request was also made at page 1804 of the transcript. 

No record of any such action has been found by the State Depart- 
ment in its files. However, on August 25, 1941, the State Department 
telegraphed to Ambassador Grew for his information an extract from 
Prime Minister Churchill's radio address on August 24, 1941. We 
have that telegram as No. 535 to Tokyo and I would like to read it 
into the record since it does indicate information, perhaps, of a kind 
that Senator Ferguson was inquiring about as to whether it is avail- 
able. 

The Vice Chairman. Proceed. 

Mr. Gesell. It is dated August 25, 1941. It is addressed to the 
Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, via Shanghai, China, and Naval Radio, and 
it reads as follows [reading] : 

There follows for your information extract from the Associated Press text 
from London of Prime Minister Churchill's radio address of August 24. 

This is the quote, I take it, from the press : 

But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented [P/Sl] and deva- 
stated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, r,eek- 
ing to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as 
if it w^re a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the 
500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about 
that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carn;ige, ruin and cor- 
ruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now they stretch a grasping hand 
into the southern seas of China. They snatch Indochina fntm the wretched 
Vichy French. They menace by their movements Siam, menace Sintiapore, the 
Britisli link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine Islands under the 
protection of the United States. 



1696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It is certain that tliis has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a 
peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience 
to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost 
reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations- 
will succeed. But this I must say : That if these hopes should fail we shall, 
of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States. 

I would like to have that telegram marked as Exhibit 71. 

The Chairman. So ordered, 

[44^2] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 
71.") 

The Vice Chairman. Now, that is a quotation from Mr. Churchill's 
speech in London ? 

Mr. Gesell. Right, sent by Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. May I just inquire as to where counsel obtained 
exhibits 70 and 71, whether they were both in the State Department 
files? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes; we obtained them from the State Department 
files. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I mean, the State Department 
files. 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Proceed. 

Mr. Gesell. At transcript page 1285 there is a request by Senator 
Ferguson for any messages to Ambassador Grew regarding alleged 
parallel action taken by him in Japan on August 12, 1941, with Sir 
Robert Craigie relating Thailand. 

We would like to point out that at page 1649-1652 of the transcript 
Ambassador Grew testified that he took no such parallel action.^ 

We have some documents from the files of the Department [-^4<5<^] 
of State which bear on this subject and I will designate them all as 
the next exhibit and describe them. That will be Exhibit 72, 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 72.") 

Mr, Gesell, The first is a telegram. No, 452, from the State Depart- 
ment to Ambassador Grew, reporting statements made by Sumner 
Welles to the Japanese Ambassador August 1, 1941, and requested 
Grew to report these statements to the Japanese Foreign Minister. 

Second, telegram No. 1153, from Ambassador Grew to the State 
Department, reporting that he has taken action in accordance with the 
instructions. 

And, third, a State Department radio bulletin pf August 6, 1941, 
reporting a press conference of Secretary Hull on that date at which 
Secretary Hull commented on Thailand. 

We believe this whole document would in the normal course of the 
State Department procedure have been sent to Ambassador Grew. 
Perhaps all three of these documents should be spread on the record 
so that the committee will have it for their information. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman, Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson, Do I understand that the last one, [44'^4] 
there is no knowledge that it was sent to the Ambassador? 



1 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 488-489, 627-629, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1697 

Mr. Gesell. Well, it is a Department radio bulletin, which we 
understand were sent generally to all ot our ambassadors and repre- 
sentatives and, therefore, the presumption is very strong that it went 
to Ambassador Grew. 

Senator Ferguson. That is wdiat I want to know. 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. He had the facilities to receive it and he was 
one of the logical people to be looking for it. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

(The documents comprising Exhibit 72 follow herewith:) 

mS5] Telegram sent 

Department of State 
Washington, August 1, 2941. Noon 
AmEmbassy, 
Tokyo (Japan) PRIOKITY 

CONFIDENTIAL TO THE AMBASSADOR 

Reference my 793 94 451 August 1, 11 a, m. 

One. After the Japanese Ambassador had delivered his Government's mes- 
sage in regard to the bombing incident at Chungking and I had expressed 
appreciation, I took occasion to say to the Ambassador that we have heard from 
authoritative sources that the Japanese are bringing or are about to bring 
pressure on the Government of Thailand similar to that which they have 
recently exerted against the French Government and the Indochina author- 
ities ; that we, of course, regard such reports with very serious apprehension ; 
end that, speaking under instructions from the President, I wished to state 
that the proposal which the President made recently in relation to Japan's 
contemplated procedure in and regarding Indochina would also extend to 
and cover any such contemplated procedure in and regarding Thailand. 
I requested that the Ambassador immediately inform his Government of this. 
The Ambassador replied that he would do so. 

Two. The President and I desire that you at the earliest possible moment 
inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the above. 

Acting (Signed) Welles 



14486] Telegram received 

Tokyo. 
From : EJ 

Dated August 2, 1941 
Rec'd 7 : 47 a. m. 
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to 
anyone. (SC) 

[Stamped :] Secretary of State, Aug. 5, 1941. Noted 
The Secketary of State, 

Washington. 
Rush 

1153, August 2. 3 p. m. (Section One) 
Confidential for the Acting Secretary. 
Department's 452, August 1, noon. 

One. In the absence from the Foreign Office today of the Foreign Minister, 
who is leaving tonight to worship at the Ise Shrines, counselor called this 
afternoon on the Acting Vice Minister and communicated to him the substance 
of the first paragraph of the Department's telegram under reference, at the 
same time conveying my request that the information be transmitted promptly 
to the Minister. Mr. Yamamoto replied that a report along precisely similar 
lines had already been received from Ambassador Nomura, but that lie would 
immediately inform the Minister of the information received through us. 



79716 — 46— pt. 4- 



1698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
ipjjg [Telegram received] 

[4//S7] From: Dated August 2, 1941 
Rec' d 7 : 48 a. m. 
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to 
anyone. (SC) 
Secretary of State, 

Washington. 

Rush. 

1153, August 2, 3 p. m. ( Section Two) . 

Two. In reply to my request for an interview with the Foreign Minister on 
Monday afternoon after his return from Ise, Mr. Yamamoto said that he would 
of course arrange for the interview if I desired to communicate further views 
or information with regard to the American Government's proposition, but 
that if the purpose of the interview were to receive some indication of the 
Japanese Government's considered views with regard to the proposition he be- 
lieved that the interview might be usefully deferred for a few days. He said 
that the proposition was being carefully studied by the Japanese Government 
with every desire to find a solution. He added that a telegram in the sense of 
the preceding sentence had already been sent to Ambassador Nomura. 

(Signed) Grew. 
HPD 



[4488] Department of State, 

Division of Current Information. 
Radio Bulletin No. 186 August 6, W',1. 

Note. This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in 
no v/ay an expression of official opinion. 

state department 

Press Conference. Questioned again today whetlier any credence could be 
placed in reports of a possible meeting between the President and Prime Min- 
ister Churchill, the Secretary said that he had nothing more to say than he had 
said yesterday morning. 

A correspondent asked whether the Secretary could say what Mr. Duff-Cooper's 
mission to the United States was about. The Secretary replied that as far as 
he knew Mr. Duff-Cooper had not as yet landed. He added that be had heard 
a report, which he could not vouch for, that during the next few days Mr. Duff- 
Cooper might pass through this country on his way to the Far East. Asked if 
he expected to see him, the Secretary said that if he came by and proposed to 
call, he supposed he would see him as he did other important and prominent 
people who come to this country. 

A correspondent mentioned that there were increasing indications that Japan 
was making demands on Thailand and he referred to Mr. Eden's speech in the 
House of Commons to the effect that anything that threatened the security and 
integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Britain, and he wondered 
whether the [-'i^/89] Secretary would care to say anything on the situation 
in regard to our own policy. The Secretary said that he thought that we had 
many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the part of certain 
countries, and that it included the Pacific area. He said that we liad made 
very clear our concern and our interest in respect to steps carrying out that sort 
of policy. He pointed out that Mr. Welles just a few days ago had occasion 
to give the correspondents a statement on that general question as it related 
to the Pacific area. 

Asked if he could say whether this Government had had occasion to express 
any views to the Govenmient of Thailand concerning the present crisis out 
there, Mr. Hull said he could not go into details now bpcause it was not at a 
stage wliere he could be very definite. A correspondent pointed out that certain 
steps followed the occupation by Japan of Indorhina and he inquired whether 
it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follow the occupation or 
attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. Thf Secretary replied that it 
was fair to have increasing concern about a movement that would include the 
step to which the correspondent referred. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1699 

Asked if the correspondents could int'ci- that this Gov<M-iinieiit has increasing 
concern about events over there, the Secretary said tliat that was what he was 
trying to say. He added that anything that JMr. Welles l>ad said regarding 
the Pacific area and Indochina would have especial application to Tliailand 
and the present situation. ■ 

[4^/90] A correspondent mentioned that the Japanese had also madd some 
demands upon the Ecuadorans, ancl he asked whetlier we were going to do any- 
thing about that. The Secretary said that we had notlung on that subject 
except what appeared in the newspapers. He added that he had not heard from 
Ecuador nor from our representatives. 

A correspondent asked whether there had been some indications that Thailand 
had been ottered what amounted to a protectorate over Malaya as well as 
Indochina, so that the Japanese would have a protectorate similar to that of 
the British Commonwealth of Nations over Canada, of which Canada is a 
part. The Secretary said that he had not been advised on that subject. He 
mentioned the multiplicity of rumors and reports coming from that area lately 
and said that we were observing all of these as closely as possible. 

A correspondent, with reference to an article in a Netherlands Indies paper 
that there was no ciuestion tiiat the United States was behind the Netherlands 
Indies but the question was how far behind, asked whether we had any indica- 
tions of a weakening of their attitude towards Japan out there. The Secretary 
said that he had nothing new on that .subject. 

To a question of whether the United States had had any change in relations 
with Finland, the Secretary said thnt there had been nothing especially new 
on that recently. 

Asked whether he had any report or definite assurance from [-'hi91] 
Vichy on Admiral Leahy's conversations, the Secretary said that he had not 
yet heard from him. 

A correspondent asked whether there was any development on the question 
of evacuating Americans out of Japan. The Secretary said that there was 
nothing especially new. He said that we had not had any communications yet 
from any of the persons who were refugees if we might call them that or 
fi'om our consuls. He added that at the same time we are giving every 
attention to the whole problem. 

A correspondent mentioned that there was a private group, including several 
Republican leaders, who issued an appeal last night to Congress (see below) 
to put a stop to the step-by-step projection of the United States toward an 
undeclared war and he asked for the Secretary's comment on that. Mr. Hull 
said that he would repeat his statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
in the House of Representatives in January in support of the Lend-Lease Bill 
in which he sought to state the issues confronting us in the international 
situation. 

Paraguay. The Department of State today made public a translation of a 
letter dated July 28 to the Acting Secretary of State from the Minister oif 
Paraguay expressing the appreciation of the President of Paraguay and Sonora 
de Morinigo for the courtesies shown in the United States to Senora de Morinigo 
and their son. The letter said that the general health of the child has improved 
notably and that the difficulties have begun to give way with the ['{492] 
treatment applied. (See Radio Bulletin No. 172 of July 21.) 

Chile. Senorita Magdalena Petit, distinguished authoress and musician from 
Chile, will arrive in New York on August 11 on an invitation extended by the 
Department of State to visit the United States. 

Max W. Thornhurg. The Department has announced the appointment of Max 
W. Thornburg as a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, to act 
as consultant to the State Department on international petroleum matters. 
Mr. Thornburg has been assigned to the Office of the Adviser on International 
Economic Affairs. 

CONGRESS 

Defense Seizure. The House yesterday voted 241 to 136 to adopt the Property 
Requisitioning Bill. The House added three amendments to the measure as 
passed by the Senate, thus necessitating its going to conference to iron out the 
differences. (See Radio Bulletin No. 373 of July 22.) 

Highway Defense Program. The Senate todav over-rode by 57 to 19 the Presi- 
dent's veto of the $320,000,000 highway defen.se bill. 

The measure will now go to the House for consideration. (See Radio Bulletin 
No. 185 of July 5. ) 



1700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

DEFENSE 

Naval Bases. The Navy Department will establish six additional section bases 
for refueling and minor repairs for small ships at Key West, Fla. ; Mobile, Ala. ; 
Corpus Christi, Tex. ; [4'i93~[ Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico ; Monterey, 
Calif. ; and Neah Bay, Wash., as soon as funds are available. The Department 
said that additional section bases would also be established in Alaska. 

Airplne Deliveries. The OPM reported that its Director General Knudsen, 
Rear Admiral John H. Towers, and Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal 
would leave tomorrow on a three-day tour to inspect East Coast Airplane fac- 
tories with a view to possible speeding up of deliveries to the Army, Navy 
and the British. ' 

Naval and Aircraft Equipment. Federal Loan Administrator Jones announced 
that the Defense Plant Corp.. at the request of the Navy Department, had 
authorized a lease agreement with Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., N. Y. C, to 
construct and equip a plant at Baltimore, Md., costing $3,100,000, to be used for 
naval equipment production. 

The Defen.se Plant Corporation also authorized a lease agreement with Bell 
Aircraft Corporation, Buffalo, to construct and equip a plant at Niagara Falls 
Airport. 

[W4] Mr. Gesell. At transcript pages 1300, 1305, and 1316 a 
request was made by Senator Ferguson for messages transmitted by 
Sumner "Welles to Lord Halifax referred to in Ambassador Winant's 
telegram dated December 6, 1941. 

We cannot find any further record and call attention to the testi- 
mony of Secretary Welles at transcript pages 1337 and 1338 where he 
gave his explanation of what he thought that information was.^ We 
are unable to find any further record. 

At transcript page 1399 a request by Congressman Keefe for drafts 
prior to October 17, 1941, of messages to Emperor Hirohito: There 
are two State Department drafts of October 16, 1941, prior to the 
receipt of what is referred to as a draft from the T\^ite House, and 
one State Department draft of October 16, apparently following the 
receipt of the White House draft. We are not clear. Those drafts 
we have marked as Exhibit 73 and if the Congressman wishes we can 
have them spread upon the record. 

The so-called White House draft which came between these two 
drafts has not yet been found. Further search is being conducted 
for the "White House draft. 

The "\^iCE Chairman. The exhibit will be received. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 73.") 

[4495] Draft Telegram 

October 16, 1941. 
(Draft No. 2) 

His Imperial Majesty Hirohito, 

Emperor of Japan. 
I have just been informed that the Cabinet of Prince Konoye has tendered its 
resignation. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions have been carried 
on during the past few weeks between high officials of the Government of the 
United States and high officials of the Government of Japan directed toward 
working out a basis in principle for a meeting between the Premier of Japan 
and myself which we both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and 
preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages I 
received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were very gratifying. Un- 
fortunately, the concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese 
Government seemed to present a narrower concept tlian I had anticipated. The 
Secretary of State therefore on October 2 suggested to the Japanese Ambassador 
here that we return to the original concepts and endeavor through re-examination 



1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 508. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1701 

* of those concepts to evolve general lines of action which would be clear mani- 
festations of the high purposes we have in mind and thus might be expected to 
establish a durable [4^9G] and fundamental peace in the Pacific area. 

The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government 
of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the 
results hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of your Government 
have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest to Your Imperial Majesty that 
there be a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself and the Chairman 
of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of China, General Chiang 
Kai-shek. I believe that such a meeting, to be held as soon as arrangements 
therefor can~be completed, furnishes in present circumstances the best hope of 
maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area. 

I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek in regard to this, but I 
shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply. 

FE : MMH : HES 



(Handwritten note: Tentative draft which was discarded upon receipt of a 
draft from the White House.) 

Draft Telegram 

October 16, 1941. 
His Imperial Majesty Hirohito, 

Emperor of Japan. 

I have just been informed through news reports that [^-^97] the Cabinet 
of Prince Konoye has tendered its resignation to you. As Your Imperial Majesty 
is aware, discussions have been carried on during the past few weeks between 
liigh officials of the Government of the United States and high officials of the 
Government of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle for a 
meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself which we had both hoped 
would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the 
Pacific area. The original messages I received from the Premier of Japan on 
this subject were very gratifying. Unfortunately, it seems to me that the con- 
crete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese Government seemed to 
present a more narrow concept than I had anticipated (than that conveyed by 
the Premier's message). The Secretary of State therefore on October 2 suggested 
to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to the original concept and 
endeavor through reexamination of that concept to evolve general lines of 
action which would be clear manifestations (of the lofty concepts) of our 
original concepts and thus might be expected to establish a durable and funda- 
mental peace in the Pacific area. 

The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government 
of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the 
results [-i-'fdS] hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of 
your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest that Your Im- 
perial Majesty signify approval of a meeting between the Premier of .Japan and 
myself and the Premier of China. I believe that such a meeting to be held as 
soon as arrangements therefore can be completed furnishes in present circum- 
stances the best hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area. 

I have not as yet consulted General Chiank Kai-shek, the Premier of China, in 
regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you 
of a favorable reply. 
FE :MMH : HES 



, October 16, 1941. 

Draft of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan — 
superseded by a later draft dated October 17, 1941. 
This draft was not used. 

Department of State, 
Adviser on Political Rklations, 

Octoler 16, Wlft. 
Mr. Secretary: 

Mr. Hamilton does not recommend taking the proposed [4-'/5.9] action. 
Mr. Ballantine feels that it is premature to come to any decision on the matter. I 
feel strongly that this proposed message in the form in which it stands should not 
at this time be sent. 



1702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A redraft is submitted here attached. The important paragraphs are, of 
course, the last two. We all feel that great care should be exercised to avoid 
making any too broad commitment or any too emphatic threat. I myself feel 
that we should avoid anything that implies countenancing of the Japanese oper- 
ations in China. 
PA/H : SKH : BGT 

Proposed Message From the President to the Emperor of Japan 

Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your 
Imperial Majesty. I feel I should again address Your Imperial Majesty because 
of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency in the process of formation. As 
Your Imperial Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between 
representatives of our two governments for many months for the purpose of 
keeping armed conflict from any extension in the Pacific area. That has been 
our great purpose as I think it has equally been the real purpose of Your Imperial 
Majesty. 

I personally would have been happy even to travel [Jf500] thousands of 
miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic accords 
could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been 
assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached. The first related to the 
integrity of China and the second related to an assurance that neither Japan 
or the United States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area. 

If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering 
armed attacks against Russia or against France or Great Britain or the Dutch 
or independent territory in the South, the obvious result would, of necessity, be 
an extension of the Atlantic and European and Near East theatres of war to 
the whole of the Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve Ameiican 
interests. 

The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to see 
peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of the seas and 
trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to preserve peace 
in the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume normal commercial relations, 
with the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our 
own defense and that of all of the Americas against possible aggression from 
abroad. 

If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the United 
States, in accordance with her policy ['i-^"!] of peace, would be very seri- 
ously concerned. 



Mr. Gesell. At pages 1419 and 1420 of the transcript a question was 
raised by Congressman Keefe as to the time when President Roosevelt's 
message of December 6, 1941, to Emperor Hirohito was released to the 
press.^ 

The State Department has advised us as follows : That at 7 : 40 p. m., 
December 6. correspondents were informed orally at the State Depart- 
ment that the President had sent a personal message direct to Emperor 
Hirohito of Japan. It is my understanding 

Mr. Keefe. Was that, do t understand you, at 7 : 40 p. m. ? 

Mr. Gesell. At 7 : 40 p. m., Decem})er G. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. It is my understanding that the text of the message was 
not released at that time. 

We have a release of the State De])artmont dated December 7, 19tl, 
for the press — or rather from the White House, but it comes from the 
State Dei^artment files — releasing the text of the message to the Em- 
peror. We haven't yet been able to ascertain whether this release was 
handed to the press before the Pearl Harbor attack or after and we 
are continuing on that matter, but it looks as though the text of the 
message was released on December 7. 



1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 538. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1703 

At page 1410 of the transcript a question by Congressman Kecfe 
was raised as to the issuance by the State Department [4S02\ 
of official notices advising American nationals to leave the Orient/ 

Now there are quite a number of those warnings, as the Congress- 
man himself indicated. 

The major warnings to Tokyo are three : 

No. 381, to Tokyo, dated October 6, 1940 ; 

No. 100 to Tokyo, dated February 11, 1941 ; and 

No. 765 to Tokyo, dated November 19, 1941. 

We feel that these, particularly because they refer to prior orders 
and because they show they also went to other embassies in the Pacific 
area, will give the Congressman the information he wants and per- 
ha])s the three of them should be designated as the next exhibit, No. 74 

The Vice Cii.\irmax. They will be received and made an exhibit. 

Mr. Gesell. I do not suppose you want those in the record, do you, 
Congressman, or do you ? 

Mr. Keefe. Can the}^ be put into the record some way ? 

Mr. Gesell. All right, we will have them copied into the transcript. 

The Vice Chairman. It is so ordered. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 74" and 
follow herewith :) 

[4503] Telegram Sent 

AC October 0, 1940—2 p. m. 

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to 
anyone. (Br) 
Amembassy, 

Tokyo (Japan) via ^hayxghai (China). 
Info: Amembassy, Chungking (China) 
Amembassy, Peiping (China) 
American Consul, Hong Kong 

381. 

The continuance of an abnormal situation in the Far East which has in wide- 
spread areas disturbed and interfered with the legitimate commercial, cultui'al,* 
and philanthropic activities of American citizens and which has adversely af- 
fected conditions of order and general living conditions has impelled the Depai't- 
ment to the conclusion that the time has come for it to adopt with reference to 
China (including Manchuria), to Japan (including Kwantung Leased Territory, 
Korea, and Formosa), to Hong Kong, and to French Indochina an attitude to- 
ward passport control and withdrawal of American citizens therefrom similar 
to that which has been adopted for some time toward these questions with ref- 
erence to disturbed areas of Europe. The Department accordingly desires that 
its diplomatic and consular officers in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in 
French [/f505] Indochina quietly repeat quietly infoi'm American citizens 
in their respective districts of the substance of the preceding sentence and suggest 
withdrawals insofar as is practicable from the areas in question to the United 
States. This applies especially in regard to women and children and to men 
whose continued presence in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French 
Indochina is not repeat not considered urgently or essentially needed. There 
should be pointed out to American citizens the advisability of their taking ad- 
vantage of transportation facilities while such facilities are available, as it 
goes without saying that no one can guarantee that such facilities will remain 
available indefinitely. 

In order that this instruction be not repeat not misconstrued in any quarter, it 
is desired that effort be made to avoid publicity in regard thereto and that 
endeavor i^e made to preclude the reading into it of sensational implications. 

The Department would appreciate receiving fj'om you and from Peiping, Shang- 
hai, Hong Kong, Saigon, and other interested offices an estimate of the number of 
Americans who will be inclined to heed these suggestions. Tokyo should instruct 
consuls in Japanese territory and Peiping should instruct those in China. 



1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 534. 



1704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Depai'tment will expect shortly to issue further [^506] instructions 
embodying various administrative considerations. 

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, and Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong repeat to Saigon. 

Hull 
S 
FE : GA : HES FE PA/H 



Telegram Sent 

Department of State, 
Washington, February 11, Idlfl — 7 p. m. 

This cable vpas sent in confidential Code. It should be carefully paraphrased 
before being communicated to anyone. (Br) 
Amembassy, 

Toyko {Japan). 
100 
URGENT. 

Department's 381, October 6, 2 p. m., withdrawal of American citizens. 

It is desired that the Embassy at once instruct American consulates in Japanese 
territory to renew, immediately and quietly and with effort to avoid any sensa- 
tional publicity, to American citizens, especially to women and children and to 
men whose continued presence in Japan is not highly essential, this Government's 
suggestions that they withdraw to the United States. In so doing, the [4507] 
Embassy and the consulates are to understand and should explain to American 
inquirers that this Govei'nment is making no repeat no assumption that a situation 
of acute physical danger to American nationals is imminent, but that this Govern- 
ment, in the light of obvious trends in the Far Eastern situation, desires to reduce 
the risks to which American nationals and their interests are exposed by virtue 
of uncertainties and, through the process of withdrawal of unessential personnel, 
to improve its position in relation to problems which may at any time be presented 
of affording maximum appropriate protection to those persons who are not in 
position to withdraw, those interests which cannot be abandoned, and those prin- 
ciples and those rights to which it is the duty of the American Government to give 
all appropriate support at all times. This instruction and the advice to be given 
under it is not repeat not meant to be alarmist, but is a further and necessary 
precautionary measure. We do not repeat not wish to impose unnecessary hard- 
ships upon any American nationals, but we ask that those whom you address shall 
realize that there are real risks, that we wish to reduce these risks, and that this 
advice is being given in the interest both of the safety and convenience of the 
American nationals addressed and in the interest of national security. 

The Department is sending similar instructions [^508] to Peiping, Hong 
Kong, and Indochina. 

The Department does not repeat not contemplate sending a special vessel or 
special vessels to assist in the withdrawal and American nationals who make 
inquiry in this particular connection should be advised to take advantage of such 
transportation facilities as may be currently available. 

(Hull) 
PA/H : SKH : ZMK/HNS FE PA/H 



Telegram Sent 

Department of State "Br" 

Naval Radio, 
Washington, November 19, 1941 — 'S p. m. 
Amembassy, 

Tokyo (Japan) via Shanghai (China). 
Info: Amembassy, Chungking (China). 
Amembassy, Peiping (China). 
American Consul, Hong Kong. 
Reference Department's 100, February 11, 7 p. m. and previous telegrams in re- 
gard to withdrawal of American citizens. 

The Department desires that the American diplo- [4509] matic and 
consular officers concenied call to the attention of American citisens in the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1705 

Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and 
French Indochina the advice previously given in regard to withdrawal and in so 
doing emphasize that the shipping problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that 
because of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance that it will be possible 
to retain in the Pacific even the present facilities. 

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Hong Kong. 
Tokyo please repeat to all consular offices in the Japanese Empire and to Dairen. 
Peiping please repeat to all consular offices in .Japanese-occupied areas of China, 
and in Manchuria. Hong Kong please repeat to Saigon and Hanoi. 

(Hull) 
FE : WAA : NHS/MHP FE PA/H SD A-L S 

[4510] Mr. Gesell. On transcript page 1436 a question was 
raised by Senator Ferguson as to whether the State Department has a 
record of a statement by Senator Pepper on November 24, 1941, which 
he made in Boston in a speech. The answer from the State Depart- 
ment is that there is no record of any such statement found in the 
State Department files. 

On transcript page 1437 a question was asked by Senator Ferguson 
as to whether the declaration suggested by Prime Minister Churchill 
in the message to President Roosevelt on November 30, 1941, was ever 
made. You will recall that was a message from Prime Minister 
Churchill in which he asked for a warning to be made by the United 
State and referred to his appreciation of President Roosevelt's con- 
stitutional difficulties. The answer is that no record was found by 
the State Department in its file that any warning or declaration was 
ever issued to Japan pursuant to that suggestion. We would like to 
call attention to volume 2 of the Foreign Relations papers which is 
in evidence here, to page 771, an inquiry by President Roosevelt which 
was handed by Sumner Welles to the Japanese Ambassadors, as to 
their intentions with respect to going into Indochina. 

Now, here is a question raised by myself at page 1499 of the trans- 
cript, as to whether the Japanese Government gave [4511] 
any publicity to their proposal of November 20, 1941, which has been 
referred to as the Japanese ultimatum. The answer was that no answer 
was found by the State Department in its files that the Japanese ever 
gave publicity to their note. The further information is furnished 
that the Japanese proposal was published in the United States on 
December 15, 1941, as annex 11 to House Document No. 458 of the 
Seventy-seventh Congress, first session, which was President Roose- 
velt's message to Congress of December 15, 1941. 

At page 1505 of the transcript a question by Senator Barkley as to 
when Ambassador Grew received word of the delivery of the United 
States note of November 26. I believe that question was also raised 
by Senator Ferguson at transcript 1820 and 1821. We have here a 
series of dispatches to Ambassador Grew from the Department of 
State, Numbers 783, 784 and 787; the first is dated 8 p. m., November 
26, 1941 ; the second dated 9 p. m., November 26, 1941 ; and the third 
.dated November 27, 1941. These dispatches show that Ambassador 
Grew was immediately advised that a proposal had been received 
and subsequently the actual text of the note was sent there, a summary 
of it, at 9 p. m. I think all three of those documents should be spread 
upon the record and designated Exhibit No. 75. 

[4S12] The Vice Chairman. It is so ordered. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 75" and 
follow herewith.) 



1706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[■iSlS] 

[Telegram sent] 

Department of State "8C" 

NO distribution 

Washington, November 26, 19^1, 8 p. m. 

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, 783 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the 

Counselor only 

I called in the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in the afternoon of 
November 26 and gave them two documents — an oral statement and draft outline 
of a proposed basis for a broad agreement covering the entire Pacific area. 

A summary of these documents follows in a subsequent telegram. 

(Hull.) 

FE : MWS : M JF . FE 



mm 

[Telegram sent] 
Department of State "SC" 

no DIS.TRIBUTI0N 

This cable was sent in confidential code. It should be carefully paraphrased 
before being communicated to anyone. (SC) 

Washington, November 26, WJfl, 9 p. m. 

AmEmbassy, Tokyo. 784 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and Counselor 

only 

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at my request November 26. 
I handed the Japanese Ambassador an oral statement substantially as follows : 
It is believed that some progress has been made in reference to the general 
principles which we have been discussing for the past several months in informal 
and exploratory conversations in an effort to reach a settlement of problems of 
the entire Pacific area. Included among those principles are the principles of 
reliance upon international coox)eration and conciliation to improve world condi- 
tions through peaceful ways and means and to prevent and solve controversies, 
inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty, no interference in internal 
[IfSlS] affairs of other nations and the principle of equality. Mention is made 
of the proposals of the Japanese Government received on November 20 and recent 
statements of the Japanese Ambassador that his Government desires to continue 
these conversations and that a modus vivendi would be helpful toward creating 
a propitious atmosphere. 

This Government most earnestly desires to further the promotion and main- 
tenance of peace in the Pacific area and to provide full opportunity to continue 
discussions with the Japanese Government looking to the working out of a 
broad program of peace. In the opinion of this Government the Jajianese pro- 
posals of November 20 in some ways conflict with the fimdaniental principles to 
which each Government has committeed itself and would not hp likely to furtlier 
our ultimate ob.1ectives. It is suggested that further efforts toward resolving 
divergences of views on the practical application of those principles be made. 
There is therefore offered the Japanese Government a draft plan as one prac- 
tical manifestation of the sort of program this Government has in mind to be 
worked out during further discussions. The hope is expressed that there thus 
may be expidited progress toward a meeting of minds. 
The draft proposal for a broad-gage settlement was substantially as follows : 
[//5/6] "The first section contained a draft mutual declaration in which 
there was embodied an afl^rmation by both Governments that their national 
xwlicies have as their objectives extensive and enduring peace throughout the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1707 

Pacific area, that both Governments' are without territorial designs, that both 
have no intention to threaten other nations or to use aggressively military force 
and that accordingly they will give active support and practical application to 
certain fundamental principles." (There are then listed the four principles 
which are mentioned above in the oral statement.) 

Both Governments agree practically to apply actively support five economic 
principles in a program to eliminate'and to prevent recurrent political instability, 
economic collapse and to provide a basis for peace. Those principles call for (a) 
the establishment of international tinancial institutions and arrangements de- 
signed to aid essential enterprises and continuous development of all nations and 
to utilize processes of trade to permit payments consonant with the welfare of 
all nations; (&) nondiscrimination in commercial relations between nations; (c) 
nondiscriminatory access to raw materials; (d) abolition of expressions of ex- 
treme nationalism such as excessive trade restrictions and promotion of inter- 
national economic cooperation; (c) full protection of consuming countries' and 
populations' interests as regards the operation of international commodity agree- 
ments. 

[45i7] The second section of the draft proposal calls for ten steps to be 
taken : 

1. Both Governments to exert their influence t^ewaf^ bring about other gov- 
ernments' adherence to and practical application of the basic political and 
economic principles set forth. 

2. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression 
pact among Thailand, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Japan, the 
Soviet Union and United States. 

3. Both Governments to agree that no agreement already concluded by either 
with any third power or powers will be interpreted so as to conflict with this 
agreement's fundamental purpose — establishment and preservation of peace in 
the entire Pacific. 

4. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of an agreement among the Neth- 
erland. Thai, American, British, Chinese, and Japanese Governments calling 
for pledges on the part of each Government to respect Indochina's territorial 
integrity and should a threat to that integrity develop to embark upon im- 
mediate consulation with regard to that threat; i« eyde? that moaaurco fteees- 
oary ft«d a- dvi s o bte mee d -wtrt* ^' eat *»fty fee ^ftteeft? such agreement to pro- 
vide also that each eigttflrtof fy)- signatory would not repeat not accept or seek 
preferential economic or commercial treatment in Indochina and each [43i8] 
signatory would exert its influence toward obtaining for all signatories equality of 
treatment in those matters. 

5. Japan to withdraw from China and Indochina all police, air, naval, and 
miltary forces. 

6. Both Governments to give up all extraterritjjrial rights in China and rights 
and interests in and with regard to concessions, international settlements and 
rights under the Boxer Protocol ; both Governments to seek to obtain from 
other governments, including the British, an agreement to give up all similar 
rights in China. 

7. Both Governments to undertake negotiations toward conclusion of an 
American-Japanese trade agreement on the basis of mutual reductions of 
tariffs, including an American undertaking to bind raw silk on the free list, 
and of reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment. 

8. Roth Governments to remove their freezing restrictions on each other's 
funds. 

9. Both Governments to agree upon a dollar yen rate stabilization plan, each 
allocating one-half of the funds adequate for that purpose. 

10. Both Governments not repeat not to support^economically, politically, 
militarily — any government or regime in China except the National Government 
located temporarily at Chungking. 

An account of the conversation will be sent you in a [J/SIO] later 
telegram. 

Huix. 
FE : MWS : MBW FE 



1708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

U520] 

[Telegram sentl 

Department of State "SC" 

no distribution 

Washington, 'November 27, Idifl, 7 p. m. 

AmEmbassy Tokyo (Japan). 787 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and 

the Counselor only. 

Reference Department's 784, November 26, 9 p. m. 

After reading the documents summarized in the Department's telegram under 
reference Mr. Kurusu asked whether those documents represented the reply of 
this Government to the Japanese proposals. The Secretary said that just as 
Japan had to deal with a domestic political situativon this Government also had 
its internal political problems and that the suggestion contained in the docu- 
ments he had given the Ambassador represented all that we could do at this 
time in the light of the Japanese proposals. The Secretary went on to mention 
that the proposal he had just given the Japanese would make possible certain 
international financial arrangements which were not actually outlined in the 
documents. 

Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the arrange- 
ment suggested in the documents which he had just [452i] received. He 
mentioned Japan's bitter expei-ience with international organizations as the 
basis for his objection tjo the proposed multilateral nonaggression pacts. He 
added that China had received the wrong impression from the Washington 
treaties , and had used them advantageously to flaunt Japan's rights. He said 
that if this proposal represented the ideas of the American Government he 
did not see the possibility of any agreement and added that he did not see how 
the Japanese Government could consider the proposal that Japan withdraw all 
military, naval, air and police forces from China and withdraw all support 
from regimes or governments in China except that of Chiang Kai-shek. 

The Secretary inquired whether we could not work out these questions. 

Mr. Kurusu suggested that as his Government would be likely to throw up 
its hands at our proposal and as the document was marked tentative and with- 
out commitment, it might be the wiser course further to discuss it informally 
before sending it to the Japanese Government. 

The Secretary suggested the Japanese might want carefully to study the docu- 
ments before further discussion. The Secretary said that with the public having 
lost its persepective it was necessary to present a complete picture of our posi- 
tion. He mentioned the actite public feeling on the oil question and reminded 
the Japanese of the great injury being [li522'\ done to us by Japan's 
immobilizing large forces of democratic countries in territories near Indochina 
and indicated that should Japan pour troops into Indochina the American people 
would have misgivings as to the possible menace in countries south and west of 
Indochina and to our direct interests. 

Mr. Kurusu offered specious and unconvincing -arguments on Japan's difficulty 
in renouncing support of Wang Ching-wei and observed that the standing of 
the Nanking regime was a matter of opinion. 

The Japanese clearly indicated their disappointment over our response to their 
proposal and their feeling that we had reached an end. They asked whether we 
were not interested in a modus vivendi, whether any other arrangement was not 
possible and whether they could see the President. 

The Secretary replied that we had explored the question of a modus vicendi 
and, in response to a further inquiry as to whether our inability to consider a 
modus vicendi was because of the attitude of other powers, he added that he had 
done his best. He said that the President would undoubtedly be glad to see the 
Japanese (an appointment for such a meeting has been arranged for Novem- 
ber 27). 
FE : MWS : HNS/HE S FE PA/H HULL 

{Jf,523'] Mr. Gesfll. At pa;2;e 1510 of the trail sci-int a request 
was made by Conp;ressman Miirphv for a copy of tlio official Gorinaii 
report on discussions between Adolf Hitler and tlio Japanese Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on April 4. 1041. as inti'odnced at the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1709 

Nuernberg trial on November 23, 1945.^ We have the complete text, 
which we will simply keep in our files, and the full translation of the 
document relating to this subject, which was introduced in the Nuern- 
berg trial, I suggest be spread on the record at this point. 

Perhaps we should also desimate that as Exhibit 76. 

The Vice Chairman. So ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 76," and fol- 
lows herewith) 

Translation of Document 1S81-PS, Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel 

Notes Fueh 20/41 

Notes regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER and the Japanese 
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister 
and of the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin on the 4th of April 1941. 

[4524] Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those 
endeavours for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal 
CASAPARI. 

Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the POPE, that the United 
States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe 
and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President 
were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. 
Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact, 
that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China he 
tried to convince the Pope, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China 
herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and 
in the entire Far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with 
Bolshevism. 

The FUEHRER interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bol- 
shevism. 

MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, and the FUEHRER should in- 
struct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-minded as possible 
the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German 
help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by mak- 
ing available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest 
technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid 
a war with the United States. [4525] In case that the country should 
decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared 
for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would 
side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United 
States couldl be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at 
the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst 
situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that 
such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form 
of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. 
For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the 
greatest value to Japan. It was a 'question how such a war would best) be 
conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details 
such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan. 

To sum up. Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the 
proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those 
developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by 
the Japanese. 

The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a con- 
fiict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances 
for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's 
contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that [4526] 
this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against 
tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but 
also against America. Germany has made her preparations so, that no American 
could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America 
with her U-boats and her Luftwafl'e, and due to her superior experience, which 
would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, 
and that qnite nnnrt from the fact, that the German soldiers naturally ranks 
high above the American. 



* Hearings, Part 2, p. 573. 



1710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany 
on lier part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved 
with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would 
first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to 
eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the 
otlier country suhsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore 
Germany wold sU-ike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict 
between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies 
in their joined iiction, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be 
beaten individually. 

Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the 
necessary instructions, in order that the proper Ui527] German authorities 
would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inven- 
tions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare 
Immediately for a conflict with the United States. 

As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that 
he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the 
United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at 
present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. 
His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike 
at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? 
Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she 
gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many 
who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in 
those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, 
that, if Japan continued to walk along per present path, one day she would 
have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circum- 
stances than at present. 

The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, 
brciuse he himself was hi similar situations (the clearning of the Rhineland, 
declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that 
he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an [-i528\ 
anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full 
of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now 
was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening 
of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Pi'ovidence favored those who 
will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them. 

Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had 
recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that 
America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided 
that Japan gave free passage to the consignments rubber and tin to America to 
their place of destination. However. America would war against Japan the 
moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the 
destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss 
its efi'ect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines 
which many had received. 

The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean 
a'\vthing but that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British 
World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with 
Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would 
be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan. 

[//,T2.of The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans pre- 
cisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of Eng- 
land in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to 
what extent, she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany. 

Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer 
an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he 
also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity 
as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a 
single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich 
Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage 
In political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, 
before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend 
something about his intentions. It .seems that the latter had spread the.se things 
and thus brouglit about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1711 

oppose eiRTj^etically. thou5;h as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these 
circumstaiK-es he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the 
questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to tiie Emperor. He would 
have to study exactly and carefully in tlie first place the development in Jaiwin 
so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his 
proper plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then [Ji530] 
the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would 
otherwise be spoiled by talk. 

Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that 
he is lacking- in inlluence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. 
However, sliould he succeed, it would pi-ove that he had great influence in Japan. 
He himself felt confident that he would succeed. 

On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the 
Premier and the Rl^nisters for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been 
discussed ; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis. 

Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter 
of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might 
leak out. If necessary he would send a courier. 

The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured 
of German reticence. 

Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately 
could not say the same of Japan. 

The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal narting 
words. 

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941. 

Signed: Schmidt. 



Certificate of Translation of Document No. 1881-PS 
[4531] 

4 April 1941. 

I, Ehnst M. Cohn, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly con- 
versant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true 
and correct translation of Document 1881-PS. 

Ernst Cohn, 

Pfc. 
[4SS2] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. At that point, the papers in this country this week 
contained a notation to the effect that an entry was made in the trial 
at Nuernberg of a conversation between Von Ribbentrop and the 
Japanese representative, asking them in February 1941 to have a sur- 
prise attack on tlie United States. I will get the specific reference 

Mr. Gesell. I am famaliar with that. We have asked for those 
documents.^ • 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Mr Gesell. I might say to the committee we have also been work- 
ing this process in reverse and making available to Justice Jackson 
and Mr. Keenan the intercepted Jap messages, which have proved to 
be ot great interest to them, and we think they will be of value in 
both ot those trials. 

On transcript pages 1537, 1586, and 1908 questions were raised bv 
Senator Brewster as to whether Ambassador Grew was consulted 
when the fleet was based at Pearl Harbor in 1940. No record c^n be 
found by the Stafe Department, in its files, that such was the case, 
in other words, there is no documentary evidence found that he was 
consulted one way or the other, which appears to confirm his own 
testimony concerning it. 

1 Siibspouently admitted to the record a.s Exhibit No. 165. 



1712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[4^33] At transcript pages 1544 and 1586 are questions by 
Senator Brewster as to whether Ambassador Grew ever expressed an 
opinion regarding the effect of basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor. The 
answer is again the same, that there is no record which can be fomid 
in the Statfe Department files, except the statement on page 69 of 
volume II of Foreign Relations, that the presence of the fleet at Pearl 
Harbor did not constitute a threat to Japan.^ 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think that has already been 
read into the record. 

Mr. Gesell. That has already been read so we will not pursue that 
further. 

At transcript 1641, a request by Senator Ferguson for Ambassador 
Grew's so-called green light telegram dated September 12, 1940, to 
the State Department. 

We simply want to note that that was offered as Exhibit 26 and 
read into the record by Mr. Grew at pages 1668 to 1679 of the tran- 
script.^ 

[4^34] At transcript 1652, a request by Senator Ferguson for 
information received by Ambassador Grew from the State Depart- 
ment in August 1941, as to the United States attitude regarding the 
independence of Thailand. That is covered by the previous discus- 
sion of the Thailand documents at transcript page 1285. 

At transcript 1669, a request by Senator Ferguson for telegram No. 
300 from Peiping to the State Department referred to in Ambassa- 
dor Grew's so-called green light telegram. We have this, and I will 
not bother to read it. It is a rather lengthy document. We will offer 
it as the next exhibit. No. 77, and have it spread on the transcript. 

The Vice Chairman. So ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 77" and fol- 
lows herewith:) 

[4535] Telegram Received 

MG 

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any- 
one. (BR) 

From : Peiping via N. R. 
Dated : August 31, 1940. 
Rec'd 9 :35 p. m. ^ 

Secretary of State, 

Washington. 

300, August 31, 3 p. m. 

Mr. A. T. Steel, Far Eastern correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, re- 
turned last week from home leave in the United States spending some days in 
Japan and Manchuria before coming here. As Mr. Steel is an experienced and 
able observer the Embassy asked him to prepare a statement of his impressions 
and a summary thereof is respectfully submitted below as of interest to the 
Department. 

(Begin summary) Returning to Japan and Manchuria after an absence of 
four months I noticed many striking changes. Japan is moving toward totali- 
tarianism at a faster pace than at any time since the commencement of the China 
hostilities. The Yonai Government which was a neatly balanced arrangement of 
pro-Anglo-American and pro-Nazi influences has been followed by a regime 
based on the expectation and hope of an early German victory over Great Britain. 

(End of Section One) Smyth. 



1 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 586 and 603. 
* Ibid., p. 634 et seq. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1713 

[4536] Telegram Received 

MG 

This telegram uiust be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any- 
one. (BR) 

From : Pciping via N. R. 
Dated : August 31, 1940. 
Rec'd 11 :o9 p. m. 

Secretary of Statk. 

Washington. 

300, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section Two) 

This ♦ has made no secret of its intentions to profit in every possible way from 
that victory, if it comes. Four months ago Japanese agricultural interests, busi- 
nessmen and liberals were still acting as a brake against precipitate acts of 
aggression and opportunism, but these elements have been momentarily sub- 
merged under the current wave of pro- Axis enthusiasm. Japan has gone frankly 
and starkly "realistic". 

Germans in Tokyo, and they are numerous, are nevertheless not entirely satis- 
fied with the pace at which Japan is turning toward the Axis, rapid though it 
seems to outsiders. German newspaper men with whom I have talked complain 
that the Japanese seem prone to delay decision until they are quite certain of 
ultimate German success. They claim that German diplomats have pointed out 
to the Japanese that the quicker they make some kind of a deal, the more generous 
the Germans will be Vi5Sl] in the final reckoning. 

I was not able to learn whether the Germans want the Japanese as active allies 
in the European conflict or whether they are simply seeking some kind of a diplo- 
matic alignment which would give the Japanese a free but independent hand 
against the British in the Far East. 

(End Section Two) 

Smyth. 
* Apparent omission. 
EMB 



[Telegram received] 
MG 

This telegram nnist be closely paraphrased before being communicated to 
anyone. (BR) 

From : Peiping via N. R. 
Dated August 31, 1940. 
Rec'd 1 : 45 a. m. Sep. 1. 
Secketaby of State. 

Washington. 

300, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section Three) 

In any case German newspaper men told me that the most important factors in 
any possible arrangement between Germany and Japan would be: (one) defii- 
nite assurances concerning the future German stake in the China market 
which Germany regards as of great importance; (two) some satisfactory solu- 
tion of the East Indies and other South Sea problems in which Germany has a 
deep interest especially economically; and (three) utilization \_J^5S8] of 
the Japanese as a means of keeping the United States constantly worried and 
preoccupied with Pacific problems so that Germany would have a freer hand 
in Europe. 

Very few of the Germans with whom I have talked are pro-Japanese at heart 
and some are doubtful of the extent to wliich the Japanese could help them. 
Most of them however, recognize that at worst the Japanese would have a 
certain nuisance value and Germany would therefore like to make allies of 
them. The Germans foresee of course that Japan's exclusionist policy in the 
Orient will be applied to all white people including themselves in the long run 

[End Section Three) 
EMB 

Smyth 

79716 — 46 — pt. 4 10 



1714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Telegram received] 

MN 

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to 
anyone. (BR) 

From : Peiping via N. R. 
Dated August 31, 1940. 
Rec'd 5 : 30 a. m. Sept. 1. 
Seceetaey of State, 

Washington. 

300, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section Four.) 

I believe that a considerable part of the Japanese army including War 
Minister Tojo is in favor of a closer [4539] alignment with Germany. 
They are being stalled off for the moment by other pro- Axis but cautious elements 
in the Government who wish to be sure that they are on the winning side. The 
reasons why Japan is hesitant to plunge boldly forward on her policy of south- 
ward expansion are in order of importance: (one) she wants to be sure which 
way the war in Europe will go; (two) she wants to be sure that the United 
States has no intention of taking up arms against her; (three) she wants to 
be sure of at least a temporary respite along the Soviet Manchurian frontier 
which is the Achilles Heel of the Japanese Empire; and (four) failure to wind 
up the China incident. 

Meanwhile as Japan struggles to make up her mind she may be expected to 
continue the nibbling policy she has pursued ever since the Manchurian out- 
break. She has learned from experience that aggression by easy stages is the 
easier way. She has discovered that many little bites add up to the same 
thing as one big one and that the victims seem to make much less noise 
about it. 

(End of Section Four) 

Smyth 
EMB 



[45 40] [Telegram received] 

MG 

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any- 
one. (BR) 

From : Peiping via N. R. 
Dated August 31, 1940. 
Rec'd 5 : 50 a. m. Sept. 1 
Seceetaey of State, 

Washington. 

300, August 31, 3 p. m. ( Section five) 

In view of Japan's extremely diflBcult position I believe that she is in no posi- 
tion at the present time to wage a successful war alone against the United States 
or Russian although with allies her position would be of course changed. I feel 
sure, however, that the majority in Japan are extremely desirous of avoiding a con- 
flict with the United States. I might add that on my recent visit to the United 
States I was struck with the number of people who mistakenly believe that any 
strong show of strength by the United States would automatically plunge the 
United States into war. The trouble is that the Japanese know we feel this way 
and are making the most of it by flourishing the war scare in our faces. Actually I 
believe the Japanese have no intention of fighting us except as a last resort ; in the 
face of this attitude I believe that firmness is the soundest and safest American 
Naval policy. The risks involved much less than is commonly supposed in the 
United States. Of [4541] course if Great Britain is defeated then we can 
expect the Japanese to become more belligerent. 

(End section five) 

Smyth 
EMB 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1715 

MG [Telegram received] 

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any- 
one. (BR) 

From : Peiping via N. R. 
Dated August 31, l'J40. 
Rec'd 5 :45 a. m. Sept. 1 
Secretary of State, 

Washington. 

300, August 31. 3 p. m. (Section Six) 

The Japanese appear to be so confident of a German victory and are so hopeful 
that such a victory would permit them to realize their ambitions in Asia that it 
appears quite useless for the United States at the present time to suggest any 
halfway measures of appeasement or friendship. In fact the reception that 
has been accorded such ideas recently by the Japanese press shows that the 
tendency is to interpret them as signs of fear and weakness. No form of appease- 
ment short of American recognition of the Japanese created new order in the 
Far East would satisfy the Japanese at this time. It is obviously^ pointless to 
attempt to reason with the Japanese until [4542] the course of events 
in Europe becomes clear. If Great Britain holds out against Germany contrary 
to present Japanese expectations Japan will then have to reconsider her whole 
policy for Japan today is a nation whose policy is dictated solely to expediency. 
(End Summary) 

(End of message). 

Sent to Department. Repeated to Chungking, Shanghai. Code text by air mail 
to Tokyo. 

Smyth 
EMB 

\_45If3'] Mr. Gesell. At transcript pages 1750 and 1751, a request 
by Senator Ferguson for any information sent by the State Depart- 
ment to Ambassador Grew regarding parallel action with Britain in 
August 1941. This information was handed to Senator Ferguson at 
page 1883 of the transcript. At transcript 1752, a request by Senator 
Ferguson for any information received by Ambassador Grew from 
the State Department regarding the American Volunteer Group. No 
record has been found in the State Department files that any such 
information was ever received from Ambassador Grew, or sent to 
him. 

At transcript 1781, a request by Senator Ferguson for any answer 
Ambassador Grew may have received from the State Department 
in reply to Grew's telegram on page 143 of volume II of Foreign 
Relations. No record of any reply found by the State Department in 
its files. 

Now, the committee understands that this is only a partial report 
on some of the requests. We have held this group up so that General 
Marshall could finish his testimony. We did not want to interrupt 
at that time. 

We are just making this interim report, and we will do the best we 
can in any remaining time on any other [45441 requests pend- 
ing, so the transcript will tie togetner. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand counsel has gone through the tran- 
script and got all these requests, and he is now just taking up a part 
of these requests, and he will reply sometime later on any others. 

Mr. Gesell. We are replying to the ones we have ready, and as the 
other ones come in we will take care of them, yes, sir. 



1716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. These only apply to the transcript, so the tran- 
script will be tied together, to see what happens to a request ? 

Mr. Gesell. That is right. 

We felt we should not have a number of loose ends in the transcript 
on the various questions. 

There is one further request that has just been brought to my 
attention. 

Senator Ferguson, on page 2510 of the transcript,^ requested any 
Japanese intercepts between the numbers 836 at page 178 of Exhibit 
1, and 841 at page 185 of Exhibit 1. 

We have the reply of the War Department giving the additional 
intercepts that fall in those numbers to the extent that they are avail- 
able, and I would like to ask [4^-^] that the memorandum 
from the War Department, and the intercepts be spread upon the 
record, and with the permission of the committee we will strike from 
the intercepts the code information, which we have been striking in 
the past. 

The Vice Chairman. So ordered. 

(The matter refererd to follows:) 

10 Decembee 1945. 
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell. 

At p. 2510 of the transcript Senator Ferguson requested the four Japanese 
messages from Tokyo to Washington between No. 836 (p. 178 of Exhibit 1) and 
No. 841 (p. 185 of Exhibit 1). 
- Copies of Nos. 837 and 838 are inclosed herewith. 

No. 840 was not intercepted. 

The records of Signal Intelligence Service indicate that No. 839, dated 26 
November 1941, was not decoded until about 13 December 1941. When it was 
decoded, the following summary of the message was prepared : 

"Representations made to American Embassy here. Your instructions follow. 
Evacuation from Panama according to #322 from Panama. Please negotiate 
for assistance from Canal Officials as well as for supplies, water, fuel, oil, and 
wharf facilities at Balboa. Negotiate for granting of funds to return to Japan 
as quiclily [4546] as possible. Transmit to each office concerned. Sent 
to U. S. and Panama." 



SECRET 



From: Panama (Akiyama). 
To: Havana. 

November 26, 1941. 
Circular #34. Message from Tokyo to Washington #837. 
Re my message #819". 

The schedule for the Tatsuta Maru, as given in my #838 ^ is to leave Balboa 
on the 26th arriving in Yokohama January 15th. On the basis of conditions at 
the time, it may stop at Los Angele^ again on the way home, but try to have the 
passengers from the United States board it on the outward trip. As far as 
possible, have all those who wish to sail from South America also come on the 
Tatsuta. 

Transmit this message and my caption telegram to all offices in the United 
States, as well as Canada, Vancouver and Panama. From Panama send it to 
all Central and South American ministers and 

•■■ See S. I. S. #26217. 

^ See S. I. S. #26216. 
Army 26218 (Japanese) Trans. 12/13/41 (BR). 



1 Honrings, Part 2, p. 952. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1717 



usm 



From: Tokyo (Togo). 
To : Washington. 

November 26, 1941. 
#838 
Tatsuta Maru Schedule: 
Yokohama December 2. 

Los Angeles arrive December 14. Leave December 16. 
Balboa arrive December 24. 
Army 26216 (Japanese) Trans. 12/13/41 (S). 



The Vice Chairman. Anything further from counsel? 

Mr. Gesell. That is all we have today, Mr. Congressman. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until 
10 o'clock Monday morning, at which time Admiral Wilkinson will 
appear as a witness. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 40 o'clock p. m., December 16, 1945, the commit- 
tee recessed until 10 o'clock a. m., Monday, December 17, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1719 



[4^48] PEARL HARBOE ATTACK 



MONDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. G. 

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Koom (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster 
and Ferguson, Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[4649^ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. 

The Chairman was called to the White House this morning and 
is detained for a few moments. We will proceed. 

Will counsel announce the first witness. 

Mr. Gesell. Admiral Wilkinson. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. I would like to make a brief statement about a 
matter that came up during my absence in connection with my assist- 
ant here, Mr. Greaves. 

1 am sorry I had to be absent, and am very sorry there was any- 
thing which seemed disturbing to the committee. It was not a matter 
about which there need be any mystery. 

Some weeks ago, at what I thought was a full press conference — 
certainly a dozen or 15 were in my office — I stated that I had secured 
Mr. Greaves as my assistant and thought it would be very necessary, 
as far as I was concerned, to have an assistant of this character. 

I was sorry that the committee hadn't found it practicable to allow 
the minority some assistance, but thought that under the circumstances 
I would do the best I could. 

I secured Mr. Greaves. I want to make it clear that he has not had 
for many months any connection whatsoever with [4SS0] the 
Republican National Committee. I think he is a very competent man. 

In connection with the episode concerned with Senator Lucas, I 
have here a memorandum from Mr. Greaves which I would like to 
put in the record. Mr. Greaves is my assistant and is being paid by 
me. 



1720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Being paid by you, did you say, Senator? 

Senator Brewster. Yes, sir ; being paid by me. 

I have this memorandum which I would like to put in the record, 
in justice to everybody concerned. It is signed by Percy L. Greaves, 
Jr.: 

Regarding the recent unpleasantry during youj absence (pp. 3605-3608), 
I should like to say that there never was any intention on my part to insult 
or reflect on any Members of the United States Senate by thought, word, or 
action. I have great respect for Members of both Houses of Congress. I an^ 
sure that the Senator from Illinois misconstrued an unconscious and which I 
thought was a silent smile that went unnoticed by anyone else. 

I am a registered Republican, but as you know I receive no compensation 
from Republican Party sources and had not for many months before I entered 
your service. My activities with you have not been of a partisan or a political 
nature. 

[4551] I sincerely hope that my conduct has not caused you any em- 
barrassment and that my services meet with your satisfaction. 

I want to add my personal word, that if there had been any ground 
for any feeling, I very much regret it. 

I thought the position of Mr. Greaves had been very clear through- 
out. He has been here as my assistant. I hope he may continue. 

I certainly do not want him, or myself to do anything which would 
in any way impair the proper conduct of this very important investi- 
gation. 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement >? 

Senator Brewster. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Illinois. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, at the proper time, in executive 
committee meeting I propose again to raise this question. I am not 
going to take the valuable time of the committee now to argue this 
question here this morning. 

Not only do I propose in executive session to find out more about 
Mr. Greaves than has beeii told by the Senator from Maine, but 
there are two other gentlemen that I propose to find out something 
about also, who have sat here constantly at these hearings, and have. 
according to my [4S52'\ best information, given considerable 
information to members of this committee. 

I think this committee is entitled to know who every individual 
is, what his background is, what his motives and purposes are, how 
much he is being paid, and by whom. 

If I had two or three people working for me, I would have told 
the committee all of these things long before this. 

This is all that I care to say at this time. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. In connection with that comment, if the usual 
consideration accorded by other committees, particularly by some of 
the standing committees of the Senate, and the committee which more 
than any other has established a record for investigation in the past 
4 years, if the practice prevailing in those committees has been 
followed, I am sure the occasion for the comment of the Senator 
from Illinois would not have occurred. 

Under the circumstances, other steps have been necessary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1721 

If there is to be an investigation, as he suggests, there may also be 
an investigation of the associations and connections of those more 
actively identified with the committee, but I am sure we will be 
embarking on something that will carry us a rather long way. 

[4^53] Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. There are a good many things that have oc- 
curred which have not impressed the minority. They are matters 
of record. If we are going to start on that we will make a complete 
job of it. 

Senator Ltjoas. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Illinois. 

Senator Lucas. One more word. There is no precedent from any 
special committee such as the Senator from Maine suggests. There 
is precedent on standing committees and those committees are pre- 
sumed to be composed of Republicans and Democrats who look after 
partisan matters and look after the principles on which the parties 
operate. 

This was presumed to be a nonpartisan investigation. 

Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Lucas. Just a moment. 

This was presumed to be a nonpartisan investigation and there is 
no precedent, according to my informants, where a special committee 
of this kind has had any minority representation, and that is especi- 
ally true in view of the fact that everyone in the first instance agreed 
that General Mitchell should act as counsel here in this case for us all. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield ? 

[^SS^] Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. I hope we can proceed soon, Senator. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

I will be a little more specific in the comment which I made. Aside 
from the standing committees I did have reference to the special 
committee investigating the defense establishment which has been 
functioning throughout the past 4 years and which I thought had 
accumulated considerable reputation, and which has always had 
minority assistants as members of its staff. 

And, I might add, that it is a very significant, and I think of a very 
nonpartisan character, in the whole 4 years of its history it has never 
had a minority report of any character or a divided report, and it 
never had any such difficulties as tliis cornmittee has faced. That 
is what has reinforced my impression that if well-established prac- 
tices of the Truman Committee had been followed much of the dif- 
ficulty here would have been avoided. I say that in all kindliness. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, we have an admiral of the Navy 
waiting, have had for 10 minutes, while we have been discussing 
Mr. Greaves. I hope that we can proceed. 

[4^6S] The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe, did you want recogni- 
tion? 

Mr. Keefe. I was going to make the same suggestion that Mr. 
Murphy has made, but in view of the statement of the Senator from 
Illinois as to the purposes of his investigation, I simply wanted to say 



1722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that I was very much impressed with the long newspaper account in the 
newspapers yesterday where the Senator from Illinois proposed to 
investigate the Dewey incident to its ultimate conclusion. 

I wonder if that is prompted by a nonpartisan attitude. I wonder 
whether we are investigating Pearl Harbor or Mr. Dewey. Are we 
going to go off on a lot of other matters ? 

The Vice Chairman. I hope that we don't get into a discussion 
of every newspaper article. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. The Dewey letters were placed in the record here 
by General Marshall and they were thought to be pertinent and ma- 
terial to this investigation by counsel, at least certain portions of 
them were thought to be material and pertinent, and the thing that 
I want to find out in connection with Mr. Dewey, and the only thing 
I want to find out, if it can be found out, is who gave him this top 
secret, if it was given to him, and I think the country and this 
committee is entitled to know. 

[4^56] Mr. Keefe, What has that to do with Pearl Harbor? 

Senator Lucas. It has plenty to do with Pearl Harbor, if somebody 
is giving away top secrets that are the highest ever considered by 
this Nation; much more than about 90 percent of the questions 
that have been asked by the Congressman from Wisconsin have to 
do with Pearl Harbor. 

The Vice Chairman. Obviously that would not be a proper matter 
to go into at this time. The Chair hopes that we may proceed with 
the witness before us. 

Anyone else? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman — 

The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Michigan. 

Senator Ferguson. I just want to place on the record the com- 
ment that my silence does not mean that I agree with what has 
been said here by Senator Lucas this morning ; and I think it would 
be of interest to go into the past employment of each of the em- 

Eloyees of the committee and their present salary on the committee ; 
ut that we may proceed with Pearl Harbor I am not going into 
that this morning. 

The Vice Chairman. Of course, the Chair feels constrained to 
make this statement in connection with the remarks of the Senator 
from Michigan. Every employee of this committee, so far as the 
Chair knows, was selected by unanimous action of the committee. 

[4S57] Senator Brfwster. Mr. Chairman, I am sure you do 
not mean to put that in the record as a fact. The facts are that 
Senator Barkley and the Congressman now presiding and myself 
were members of a subcommittee which did have certain alleged 
powers, but aside from Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell, the selection 
of the other two members of the counsellor staff was not known even 
to me as a member of the subcommittee. 

I do not mean to be intimating a challenge of their capacity but 
I never knew anything directly regarding their terms of employment, 
their salary and, as a matter of fact, I know even little at the 
present time. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I think the statement I made is accurate 
and correct and certainly in no executive session of this committee has 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1723 

any member of the committee raised any question or intimated any 
objection to any member of the staff. I am confident that statement 
is absohitely and technically accurate. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, it was conceded that there was a 
subcommittee named consisting of Senator Barkley, Congressman 
Cooper and the Senator from Maine, and the Senator from Maine 
had the responsibility as one member of that committee with regard 
to hiring our staff. 

I hope we will go on with Pearl Harbor now. There is an Admiral 
waiting. 

The Vice Chairman. Of course, it was the purpose of [4558] 
the committee to try to conduct a non-partisan, non-political in- 
vestigation and all employes of the committee are employes of the 
whole committee and, as far as the Chair is advised and knows, every 
employe of the committee has endeavored to fully cooperate with 
every member of the committee. 

It is my privilege to be a member of several joint committees. I 
am a member of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. 
There is no minority or majority employes. The staff is for the whole 
Joint Committee. 

I am a member of the Joint Committee of the Reduction of non- 
essential Federal expenditures headed by Senator Byrd. So far as I 
know there has never been any minority or majority employes. They 
are employes of the Joint Committee. 

I am a member of the committee on Post- War Economic Policy and 
Planning of the House and there has never been any minority or 
majority employes. All employes serve the full committee. 

Now, Admiral, will you please be sworn ? 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON, 
UNITED STATES NAVY ^ 

Mr. Gesell. At the outset I think perhaps we can direct attention to 
the principal exhibits which will be covered in Admiral Wilkinson's 
testimony. 

The first, of course, is Exhibit 37, which is already [4559] in 
evidence, the basic exhibit of Navy dispatches. 

I would like to call attention to two matters in connection with that 
exhibit at this time. When the exhibit was prepared, for reasons of 
security as to which the committee is fully informed the word "purple" 
was eliminated from two dispatches. In view of developments since 
that date the word "purple" no longer has any security significance and 
for that reason we would like to amend the dispatches merely to put 
that word in at the appropriate place. It first appears at page 12 of 
the exhibit. 

The Vice Chairman. This is exhibit number what ? 

Mr. Gesell. 37, basic Navy dispatches. At page 12, the first line of 
the dispatch should read, "Tokyo to Vichy No. 295." Insert "purple" 
before "of 19th." So the word "purple" will appear in that dispatch. 

More important, perhaps, from the point of view of the hearing is the 
insertion of the word "purple" in two places on the dispatch which 
appears at page 41. That is the dispatch of December 2nd from 
OPNAV to CINCAF and others concerning code destruction. The 

' See p. 2485, Infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Admiral 
Wilkinson. 



1724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

word "purple" should appear after the word "destroy" in the second 
line and again after the word "destroy" in the fourth line. 

Also at paoje 10 the first word of the dispatch should be "purple." 

[4^60] We would like to introduce other exhibits at this time 
which have been in the hands of the committee now for several weeks. 

The first, as Exliibit Ts, a folder designated "Dispatches on Kra 
Peninsula alert." 

As Exhibit 79, a folder designated, "Dispatches on Dutch alert." 

As Exhibit 80, a series of photostated documents designated "Fort- 
nightly Summaries on Current National Situations." 

And as Exhibit 81, a folder containing various special estimates made 
by the Office of Naval Intelligence on the Far Eastern situation in 
the period preceding Pearl Harbor attack, commencing with a special 
estimate dated February 15, 1941, and going up to December 6, 1941. 

I might say these latter two exhibits, 80 and 81, comprise data com- 
parable to that contained in the basic exhibit of estimates which was 
introduced in connection witli General Miles' testimony as Exhibit 33. 

Senator Brewster. Do I understand whether we have been given 
copies of these yet? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes, I think several weeks ago, Senator. 

The Vice Chairman. The exhibits will be admitted as indicated by 
counsel. 

14S61] (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 
78, 79, 80 and 81", respectively) 

Mr. Gesell. Admiral, will you please state your name, your rank 
and present duty for the record, please, sir ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Theodore Stark Wilkinson, Vice-Admiral U. 
S. Navy, recently commander of the Third Amphibious Force of the 
Pacific Fleet and now awaiting the pleasure of the committee, sub- 
sequently to join the Navy Department for duty. 

Mr. Gesell. During what period of time were you Chief of the ONI * 

Admiral Wilkinson. From October the 15th, 1941, until, as I recall, 
July the 20th, 1942. I will, of course, however, be glad to speak of 
anything within my knowledge of events before October 15th. 

Mr. Gesell. What had been your duty immediately prior to your 
connection with ONI ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I had been commanding officer of the battle- 
ship Mississippi for some 9 months and before that a year and a half 
Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral Andrews, commander of the scouting 
force and of the Hawaiian detachment. 

Mr. Gesell. How long have you been in the Navy, Admiral? 

145^'3] Admiral Wilkinson. Forty years and a half. 

Mr. Gesell. During that time you have had duty at Hawaii, have 
you not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Intermittently. My last and only tour of 
some length was with Admiral Andrews for about a year and a half in 
Hawaii and then subsequently on the Mississippi for 6 months addi- 
tional. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, that would leave you at Hawaii during what 
period of time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. From October 1939 until May 1941. 

Mr. Gesell. Were you stationed at Hawaii your whole time from 
October 1939 on, or did you go out there when the fleet went (Mit there? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1725 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was with the so-called Hawaiian detach- 
ment, which was a force of vessels, and my duties were entirely at sea. 
We operated off Hawaii and from time to time went in port. At no 
time was I on shore duty there, nor have been. 

Mr. Gesell. Prior to joining the ONI on October 15, 1941 had you 
had any experience in the field of naval intelligence? 

Admiral Wilkinson. None other than attendance at two inter* 
national conferences for limitation of armaments in 1933 and 1934. 

[4S63] Mr. Gesell. Had you ever had any experience in the 
Navy's field of activities comparable to what the Army calls their War 
Plans Division? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. At sea, as Chief of Staff to Admiral 
Andrews and again as gunnery officer and assistant officer to Admiral 
Willard some 10 years before, but not on shore. 

Mr. Gesell. The precise title which you held in ONI was Director of 
Naval Intelligence, is that correct? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gessell. Do I understand that that was in the nature of a 
position comparable to that occupied by General Miles of the Army ? 
That is to say, that you were a member of the immediate staff of tlie 
Chief of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Comparable but not entirely similar in that 
the Chief of Naval Operations had under him not a general staff but an 
office composed of a number of divisions. His responsibilities were 
somewhat different from the Chief of Staff of the Army and the 
responsibilities of his several divisions were quite different from those 
of the General Staff of the Army. 

Mr. Gesell. But the immediate advisers to the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations would be the various directors of the principal divisions? 

[4S64] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, can you indicate for us what the other principal 
divisions of the Navy organization are in addition to the Office of 
Naval Intelligence? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The Chief of Operations was by law charged 
with the operations of the fleet and the preparation and readiness of 
plans for use in w«,r. By regulations he was charged with the coor- 
dination of efforts of all bureaus of the Department to maintain and 
make ready the fleet. He had to assist him in these duties several 
divisions, as you asked : The War Plans Division, the Central Divi- 
sion, the Communications Division, Ship Movements, Fleet Mainte- 
nance, Fleet Training, Naval Intelligence, and possibly one or two 
others. 

Mr. Gesell. Can you tell us who were during the period immedi- 
ately preceeding Pearl Harbor responsible as directors of those respec- 
tive divisions? 

Admiral Wilkinson. War Plans, Rear Admiral Turner; Central 
Division, Captain Schuirman; Communications, Rear Admiral 
Noyes; Ship Movements, Rear Admiral Brainard ; Fleet Maintenance, 
I believe Rear Admiral Farber; Fleet Training I forget at the mo- 
ment; and Naval Intelligence myself. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, will you give us some idea of what the re- 
sponsibilities and functions and organization of [4S6\5] Naval 
Intelligence were? 



1726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. Naval Intelligence had three principal 
branches, the administrative, Domestic Intelligence, and Foreign 
Intelligence. 

The Administrative carried out its routine duties with regard to 
personnel, and procurement and assignment of duty of personnel, 
finances, mail, the issue and forwarding of all reports, reproduction, 
printing, and general files, a normal administrative office. 

The Domestic division carried on the investigation of espionage 
and conspiratorial organizations and individuals, looked after coastal 
intelligence along the coast of the United States with respect to in- 
formation that could be picked up from boats and otherwise, plant 
inspections to make sure that the plants in which the Navy was in- 
volved were safe both from a mechanical viewpoint as to fire and 
other hazards and safe from a security viewpoint as to national se- 
crets; that is the plants, I am speaking of, in which confidential ,work 
was going on. This Domestic branch also investigated candidates 
for confidential Navy Department employment and candidates for 
employment with the Naval Intelligence Service itself. It organized 
and conducted, in general, schools for officers and men to be assigned 
to intelligence. Its principal duties were those I first mentioned, 
the investigation of [4^66] espionage and conspiratorial or 
subversive organizations and individuals. They conducted a survey 
of the country in connection with FBI and Military Intelligence and 
marked down such suspects as were known by the contacts, by the 
large number of contacts we had. It was this work that enabled us 
to run in, as you might say, to get taken into custody immediately 
after the war, some 8,000 suspects of various Axis nations and I think 
in large part contributed to the fact that at no time during the last 
war was there any serious sabotage in this country. 

The Foreign Intelligence comprised a number of geographic sec- 
tions, such as the British Empire, the Far East, Western Europe, Cen- 
tral Europe, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Near East, American 
Republics, and then certain other sections such as foreign trade in 
merchant vessels, statistics in connection with foreign navies and 
matters of trade and two sections known as Special Intelligence and 
Strategic Information. 

The duties of the office as a hole and of the foreign branch in par- 
ticular and of each geographic section was to collect, evaluate and 
forward to interested agencies intelligence received from abroad or 
picked up from newspapers or otherwise with relation to the several 
foreign countries under each geographic section. The evaluation 
would consist of considering the source, considering the reliability of 
the information which we had obtained and its consistency with other 
proven information that we had. 

[4^67] In addition to those main sections there was a small 
section of Records and Library, Historical Section, and one of Cen- 
sorship, which was held in the nucleus, ready to go into action when the 
national censorship was declared. That, of course, could not be de- 
clared before the war situation and there was no censorship in the 
United States prior to that time. That was the main office. 

Mr. Gesell. Before you leave the main office, was there also a 
branch known as Fleet Intelligence? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1727 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. Upon the institution of Admiral King's 
Commander in Chief Office, he set up a Fleet Intelligence which was 
directly under his office and was related to the Office of Naval Intelli- 
gence, but at the time that we were operating before Admiral King 
came in — in I believe January or February of 1942 — there was no 
specific office of Fleet Intelligence, as I recall. 

Mr. Gesell. Did the Office of Naval Intelligence do the work with 
respect to keeping track of the movements of the Japanese and other 
potential enemy nation vessels? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Very definitely. 

Mr. Gesell. Where was that work done in this organizational 
scheme ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. In each of the foreign sections. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, the Far Eastern branch of [4-568] 
the Foreign Intelligence Section would keep track of the movements 
of the Japanese vessels? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. May I continue with the field ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Wilkinson. That was the office. The personnel at the 
time of December 1 were 230 officers and 175 enlisted men and 300 
civilians in the main office, including the branches I have spoken of, 
and the school which took a number. In the naval districts there were 
about 1,000. I have the figures for November 15 and December 15, 
and I am interpolating between the two. There were about 135 agents 
who were civilian employees of considerable detective and analytical 
skill; 900 enlisted men and 100 civilians. These were the naval dis- 
tricts throughout the . country and in Hawaii, Panama, and. the 
Philippines. 

In the foreign posts there were 133 officers and 200 enlisted men, 
and no civilians. In the foreign posts there were naval attaches and 
naval observers throughout the world. The naval attaches were at 
the capitals, and naval observers, a naval equivalent of a consul, at 
a number of ports. We were obtaining our information in large part 
from these naval attaches in the foreign nations, from the naval at- 
taches and observers in these ports, and in part from the State De- 
partment [4S69] officials and in part radio intercepts which 
we received from the Radio Communications Office. 

Mr. Gesell. Going back to your organization for a moment more, 
there was an assistant director of the division, was there not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. There was an assistant director who at the 
time was awaiting relief, as the Director of the Domestic Branch. He 
was doubling at the time and subsequently became relieved, and be- 
came full-time assistant director. 

Mr. Gesell. What was his name? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That was Captain, now Eear Admiral How- 
ard Kingman. 

Mr. Gesell. Who was in charge of the Foreign Intelligence 
Branch ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Capt. W. A. Heard. 

Mr. Gesell. Who was specifically responsible for the Far Eastern 
section of that branch? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Commander, now Captain McCollum. 



1728 CONGRESSIONAL 'INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[4570] Mr. Gesell. Admiral, I have in. my hand a three-sheet 
mimeographed document entitled "Intelligence Division (OP 16). 
Duties:" 

Does that document correctly summarize the duties of the Intel- 
ligence Division as it was set up and operating immediately prior to 
Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes. You will note on page 2, 
subparagraph (c), they speak of duties of the public relations branch. 
That had been a part of the Office of Naval Intelligence, but in the 
middle of the year 1941, 1 believe, it was detached and placed directly 
under the Secretary's office, and in consequence that entire subpara- 
graph was no longer effective. 

Mr. Gesell. Does that document correctly state the duties of the 
Foreign Intelligence Branch? 

Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes. In item (a) (2), thereof, 
''Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable," 
the definition of "evaluation" which has been advanced in connection 
with General Miles' testimony is somewhat in conflict with that in 
the Navy in that in G-2 evaluation of information included the de- 
termination of the probable or prospective intentions of the enemy. 

That, however, was not one of the duties of the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. 

[4^71] Mr. Gesell. I want to return to that in a moment. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. I would like to offer this three-page statement of the 
duties of the Intelligeiice Division as the next exhibit, Exhibit 82. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 82.") 

Mr. Gesell. I ask you. Admiral, to read the duties of the Foreign 
Intelligence Branch. 

Admiral Wilkinson (reading) : 

The Foreign Intelligence Branch will : 

(1) Secure all classes of pertinent information concerning foreign countries, 
especially that affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention 
to the strength, disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces. 

(2) Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable. 

(3) Direct the activities of U. S. Naval Attaches. 

(4) Maintain liaison with naval missions. 

Naval missions were special bodies sent to various countries on 
their request in order to train their navy. 

[4572] (5) Maintain liaison with foreign naval attaches accredited to the 
United States. 

(6) Maintain liaison with other Government departments for the exch:mce of 
foreign information. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, under item (a) (1), it is clear that one of the 
duties of the ONI was to secure or collect information concerning the 
disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces, was it not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. We were to secure everything we 
could which was factual, and which would be of value in determining 
those intentions. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, is it also clear that under item (2) ONI had the 
responsibility of disseminating such information to all concerned? 

Admiral Wilkinson. You will note that term "as advisable," which 
means as may have been directed from time to time. There were 
directions which we had received in that connection. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1729 

Mr. Geselxi. I want to be sure I understaiul you. I understand you 
to testify on that point thus far, as follows, that it was the respon- 
sibility of ONI to assemble the information as to the disposition and 
probable intentions of foreign naval forces. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Entirely. 

[4.673] Mr. Gesell. That the responsibility of evaluating sucli 
information was not the responsibility of ONI. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. With respect to its accuracy, very 
definitely. With respect to the determination of probable intentions 
of itself, it was not. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, ONI simply indicated, when it had 
collected the information, whether it considered it reliable or not, 
and! if so, what degree of reliability it attached to the information. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and to the best of our guess we would 
advise the Office of Chief of Naval Operations what we thought it 
meant. 

Mr. Gesell. But you did not have, as one of your functions, the 
responsibility of determining what the probable intentions of the 
foreign naval forces would be ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. I was advised by my predecessor that 
he had been told by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant 
Chief, and Director of War Plans, that the Office of Naval Intelligence 
would not prepare the estimate or probable intentions of the enemy, 
as had been done in the War Department, but that War Plans would 
assume that duty. 

I have subsequently consulted Admiral Ingersoll on that same sub- 
ject, and I stated that I felt we had considerable [4S74] talent 
in the office that might be prepared to do that, but that I understood 
this from my predecessor, and Admiral Ingersoll confirmed it. 

Mr. Gesell. These duties that I have just introduced as Exhibit 82, 
were established by the order of the Chief of Naval Operations on 
October 23, 1940, were they not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe so. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you know of any formal written amendment of 
those duties. Admiral? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. For instance, I know of no amend- 
ment that removed the Public Relations Branch from that office, but 
perhaps that has been overlooked in the general corrections. 

^ Mr. Gesell. So that by word of mouth, and discussion, the responsi- 
bilities of ONI under this general statement of its duties were quali- 
fied and amended ; is that correct ? 

Admirajl Wilkinson. I would not say amended. I would say, 
qualified, because there is nothing in the specific text that would 
require us to disseminate the probable intentions of the enemy, as I 
read it. 

Mr. Gesell. Are we clear thus far, that it was your duty to assemble 
the information ; it was your duty to determine its degree of reliability ; 
and it was the duty of someone else to determine what the probable 
intentions of [^575] the enemy would be? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That was my understanding, except, of course, 
I was willing and anxious that the efforts and abilities of our office 
should contribute our view of the enemy intention to the Office of 
Naval Operations. 

79716— 46— pt. 4 11 



1730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. I am talking, you understand, though. Admiral, as to 
your duties, as to your responsibilities. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Quite right. 

Mr. Gesell. It was not your responsibility or duty to determine the 
probable intentions of the enemy ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not so understand, and I have the in- 
formation, as I said, from my predecessor, my discussion with Admiral 
IngersoU, the Assistant Chief of Operations, and just this morning 
from Admiral Kirk, also my predecessor. 

Mr. Gesell. You recall a conversation with Admiral Kirk to that 
effect? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. I understand he talked about the matter with Admiral 
IngersoU and he also advised you. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you ever discuss the matter. with Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

[4^76] Mr. Gesell. Now^, wnth respect to the responsibility for 
dissemination, I understood you to testify that your responsibility for 
dissemination was qualified by the words "as advisable," and that you 
had orders instructing you as to what type of information should be 
disseminated. Is that correct? 

Admiral Wilkinson.^ I said that the text of the regulations which 
you introduced read "Evaluate the information collected and dissemi- 
nate as advisable." 

I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate 
and spread abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles 
had termed static information, such as the defenses of the country, 
its economics, the diplomatic relations, the characters and activities 
and previous careers of its military and naval men, the location of its 
fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other than the 
enemy probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself 
might give rise or might require action by our fleet, or by our naval 
forces. 

In the latter case before dissemination I would consult higher 
authority, either the Assistant Cliief, the Chief of Nfival 0]ierations, 
or my colleague, Chief of War Plans, in order that this information 
which I sent out would not be in conflict with his understanding of 
the naval situa- [4^77] tion, and the operations for which he 
was responsible. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, you had the responsibility to dissemi- 
nate, but where you reached a situation which led you to feel that 
the information disseminated might approach the area of a directive, 
or an order to take some specific action to the recipient, then you felt 
you were required to consult War Plans, or the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly. 

[4578] Mr. Gesell. I have just been handed, at the opening of 
this hearing. Admiral Wilkinson, a memorandum which I wanted 
to read to you and ask you if you are familiar with this memorandum 
or have ever seen it. It is: 



• See HearinKS, Part 11, p. 5.'^61 et seq. for material in connection with the te-'tlmony 
of Admiral Wilkinson, now deceased, included in the record at the request of Mrs. Wilkinson. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1731 

Confidential Memorandum, December 12, 1940. 

From the Chief of Naval Operations. 

To : The Director, Naval Intelligence Division. 

Subject : Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations, 

Enclosure: (A) Distribution List. 

1. In view of present world conditions, the Chief of Naval Operations believes 
that there is a need for keeping responsible Fleet and Force Commanders, and 
important Navy Department executive agencies, in closer touch with important 
aspects of the situation which may affect decisions on the nature and direction 
of initial war operations of the Naval Forces. It is, therefore, requested, that 
the Director of Naval Intelligence prepare fortnightly for limited distribution 
a contidential and condensed summary of the current situation under headings as 
follows : 

A. The diplomatic situation. 

Japanese, German, Italian, French, Russian, Latin American. 

B. The Japanese military situation. 
[^57.9] C. The Japanese naval situation. 

D. The Chinese military situation. 

E. The German military, naval, and air situations. 

F. The Italian naval and air situations. 

2. Under each general heading a condensed and broad view of the situation 
should be summarized, with paragraphs following in necessary detail to give 
recent diplomatic, military, or naval trends. 

3. It is desired that no information be included pertaining to the United States, 
British or Dutch military or naval disposition and strengths; nor should refer- 
ence be made to United States war plans or secret diplomatic conversations. 

Signed, "H. R. Stark." 

The distribution list shows substantial distribution both in the field 
and within the Navy Department, including the Commander in Chief, 
U. S. Fleet, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. 

Do you remember having seen that memorandum of December 12, 
1940? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not see it until this morning, but I was 
fully aware of its terms as conveyed to me, and I was issuing, or my 
office was issuing such a fortnightly bulletin throughout my tenure of 
office. 

As you will note, the operations of the anti-Axis nations [4680] 
were not to be included in it, and when Russia came into the war that 
was also added to the list of operations we should not discuss, and 
also our own operations were not included. 

The distribution was materially expanded. The original sheet there 
shows distribution of something less than 20, I believe. Eventually, 
at the time of the first of December, that distribution list was up 
around 120, going to all flag officers, or the commands of all flag 
officers in the field, in the naval districts and in the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. 

Mr. Gesell. Now we have introduced some of these fortnightly 
summaries, the ones immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, and they 
are contained in Exhibit 80. 

What I am particularly concerned with now, Admiral, is the in- 
struction from Admiral Stark that these fortnightly summaries should 
not contain information concerning secret diplomatic conversations. 

Did you understand that you were, under orders from Admiral 
Stark, not authorized to send to the field information concerning 
secret diplomatic conversations? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, because of the general security attached 
to the code-breaking activities. 



1732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mv. Gesell. Do you know whether the recipients of these fort- 
nightly summaries had ever been apprised or advised that you were 
not going to submit to them information concerning [4^81] 
secret diplomatic conversations? 

Admiral Wilkjnson. I do not know. Of course in each bulletin 
there was a diplomatic section, and everything that could be obtained 
outside of the secret material was in there, and possibly some re- 
flection, in guarded terms, on the secret material and its bearing in 
the diplomatic sections of this bulletin. 

Mr. Gesell. That is just what concerns me. You have a diplomatic 
section in your fortnightly summary and you have instructions limit- 
ing the nature of the information you can place in that section. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell, Just what is secret diplomatic information or what 
are secret diplomatic conversations? What did you understand that 
to exclude. 

Admiral Wilkinson, As I say, I had not seen the text of that 
bulletin, but I found it a going concern and my general instructions 
were I was not to put anything in there, anything derived from what 
was known as "ultra" or "magic.'' We thought the general trend 
of the diplomatic conversations which might be indicated in magic 
as being adverse would be so indicated in the bulletin, but speciric 
quotations, or specific facts known only to the diplomatic magic were 
not to be placed in there. 

[4S82] Mr. Gesell. In other words, it referred to conversations 
ut least in which our Government was participating, did it not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Information which we might obtain from our 
naval attaches or other sources, so long as it was not the product of 
code-breaking activity. We got a great deal of information from 
State Department dispatches which we were privileged to examine, 
and we got quit€ a little from our attaches and naval observers from 
abroad. 

Mr. Gesell. Your functions with respect to the dissemination of in- 
formation, which w^e have been discussing here, remained the same 
under the various war plans, did they not? That is, the Naval In- 
telligence had, under the different war plans, the similar responsibility 
of collecting and disseminating information, if advisable? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I should say so, I do not recall any mention 
of Naval Intelligence specifically in any of the war plans. 

Mr. Gesell, I notice in War JPlan 46, and in War Plan 52, in each 
instance a chapter and section under the Assignment of Tasks, which 
specifies that the Office of Naval Intelligence, either alone or in co- 
operation with the other participating governments, would secure and 
disseminate as advisable whatever information was necessary in carry- 
ing out the plan. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that specifically. [4S8rl\ 
but I take it as a routine entry, 

Mr. Gesell, I want to turn to a discussion of Japanese intercepts 
with you at this point. Admiral, and see if we can get a clear under- 
standing of what the functions of O. N, I. were in respect of the 
Japanese intercepts. 

Who, or what department in the Navy, was responsible for inter- 
cepting the Japanese messages? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1733 

Admiral Whkinson. The Division of Naval Communications ar- 
rano;ed for interception and for decryption. 

Mr. Gesell. Now the Division of Naval Communications you staled 
-was under Admiral Noyes, did you not ? 

Admiral Wh-kinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. That was not a division which went through your chain 
of command ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, it was a parallel division in our opera- 
tions. 

Mr. Gesell. Did that division also have the responsibility for de- 
coding and translating messages? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, except we furnished them, as best we 
could, translators whom we had scoured the country for, and in find- 
ing an inadequate number we had actually started, on the first of 
October, two schools for Japanese translators, one in California and 
one in Harvard. 

Mr. Gesell. But the responsibility for interception, re- [4'584.] 
sponsibility for decoding and responsibility for translation all rested 
in the Division of Communications? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly intercepting and certainly decod- 
ing. I am not quite clear in my mind about translation. I think the 
translation was done under that same central office by translators 
who were assigned to that duty and who had been found by us and 
in part were paid by us but were told to report to that office. 

Mr. Gesell. You understand I am again talking now in terms of 
chain of command 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Rather than whether or not you had cooperated by 
lielping them through the loan of personnel, and so forth. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think the translation itself was in that 
chain of command, but of course the cooperation between Admiral 
Noyes and myself and our officers was, I think, quite complete, and 
certainly very friendly. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you then receive the message for the first time, any 
particular message, after it had been intercepted, decoded and trans- 
lated and was in an English text form ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Now who in the Navy received the intercepted Japa- 
nese messages during the period that you were director of [.^586] 
O. N. E. preceding Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. In the finished form that you just mentioned { 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. They were sent according to their applica- 
tion to the foreign section to which attributable. Speaking specifi- 
cally of the Far Eastern matters which we are now concerned with, 
they went to the Far Eastern section, Captain McCollum. 

Mr. Gesell. Now was it his responsibility to distribute them to 
certain officers in the Navy Department? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, it was his responsibility only to arrange 
for such distribution, but it was my over-all responsibility to see 
that it was done, and we had Commander, now Captain Kramer, who 
was charged with the distribution. 

[4586] Mr. Gesell. With the physical distribution? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The physical distribution. 



1734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. Now who, in the Navy Department, was on the dis- 
tribution list? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Director of War 
Plans, and myself. 

Mr. Gesell. Can you give us the names of those officers at that 
time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, Rear Ad- 
miral Ingersoll, Rear Admiral Turner, and myself. 

Mr. Gesell. Did Admiral Noyes, the Chief of the Division which 
was intercepting, decoding, and translating them, get them? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He got them before they came to me, or to 
my secretary. • 

Mr. Gesell. Then he was on the list, was he not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He was not on the formal distribution list, 
but he passed on them before they were sent to me. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, he passed on them as part of his ad- 
ministrative responsibilities? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. He may or may not have actually seen 
each one. He may have delegated that [4^S7] authority at 
times when he was not in his office, but in general he sighted them 
all, I believe. 

Mr. Gesell. Did the Navy make any distribution outside of the 
Navy Department of the texts of these intercepted messages? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, to the White House. 

Mr. Gesell. To any place else? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge. Some months before 
it had gone to the State Department intermittently with the Army, 
but more recently the Navy took the White House direct and the 
Army took the State Department direct. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, as I understand it, the interception and trans- 
lation and decoding of these messages was worked out between the 
Army and Navy, so if the Navy intercepted and translated and de- 
coded, it gave a copy to the Army, and if the Army intercepted and 
translated and decoded, it gave a copy to the Navy? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Both services were supposed to have a full 
file of the intercepts made by either or both together. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you personally see all of the messages intercepted ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. A number of them were excluded in the 
Office of Communications from further transmission, [4588] if 
they were purely trivial, such as ordering a dozen pair of trousers, 
or something of that sort, for instance, but those which were of any 
importance were sent to the Naval Intelligence, and were then placed 
in a book, and I saw all of those. 

I might not have read those to which my attention was not called, 
because sometimes they were very bulky, but they were available there 
for me to see. 

Mr. Gesell. Did anyone in the Office of Naval Intelligence make 
any selection from that complete file of the messages which were 
to be sent to the other officers on the distribution list ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Captain Kramer, who was primarily in our 
chain of command, but had additional duties with Communications, 
usually I believe saw them all, even those of the trivial nature which 
he excluded. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1735 

Those which were then placed in the book and brought to us, he 
usually marked them as more important, with clips or otherwise. 
That marking was checked afterwards by Captain McCullom and 
myself, and we both scanned through the book. 

Mr. Gesell. By the time it had gotten to you, the book had on 
it, by a clip or other designation, some means of calling particular 
attention to the more important messages ? 

[4SS9] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Furthermore, when matters 
were particularly interesting, or the messages were particularly inter- 
esting. Captain Kramer would point out to the recipient by his finger, 
or by turning to the page, particularly what he thought they would 
be interested in. 

Mr. Gesell. I gather you used a system of a book rather than a 
locked pouch, such as they had in the Army, is that correct? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Will you explain just how that was done ? Was there 
one book which contained these messages which went to the various 
people on the list, or did each receive a list of the messages that he 
should examine? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure which went to the White House. 
I am sure they had a separate copy which went to the naval aide, 
and he used that, and prepared his own brief of that for the President, 
but as to the addressees in the Navy Department, it was all in the 
same book. 

Mr. Gesell. And when that book had been distributed around 
through the various Navy Department recipients, it went back to the 
officers who originally initiated and prepared the book, did it not? 

[4590] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, except one copy, I believe, 
was retained in the geographical section concerned, and in this case 
it was the Far Eastern section. In fact, the book would have in there 
matters concerning the German or whatever foreign intercept was 
broken down, and proved to be interesting. 

Upon its return those appertaining to those other geographic sec- 
tions would be taken out and filed in their respective sections, and the 
Far Eastern intercepts filed in the Far Eastern section. 

Mr. Gesell. But you, or Admiral Stark, or Admiral Ingersoll, and 
the other recipients did not have any means of keeping your own files 
of those intercepts ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. You examined the book and returned it ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. What opportunity was given to those officers to study 
and appraise, and read over more than once, if you will, the various 
messages in the book? 

Admiral Wilkinson. They might hold the book as long as they 
wished, or send for it to come back again, but in the interest of security, 
we did not like to send out individual copies for retention. 

Mr. Gesell. Under your system, if one of the officers [4S91] 
chose to hold the book he delayed the other officers from receiving this 
important information? 

Admiral Wilkinson. They did, but the bearer of the book was wait- 
ing outside and might remind them to return it. 



1736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. So as a matter of general practice, I take it, the book 
went rapidly to the officers permitted to read it, who then leafed 
through the pages, reading matters of particular interest? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would not say so. I know Captain Kramer 
often said he was busy pretty nearly all day long carrying the book 
around at times. So they took time to read the messages, they did 
not scan them too hastily. 

[4S9^] Mr. Gesell. Are you familiar with Exhibit 1 and Ex- 
hibit 2 in this proceeding, the diplomatic and military Japanese 
intercepts? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Can you tell us whether or not you personally saw all 
of the messages contained in those two exhibits? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I naturally cannot, of my own recollection, 
speak for all of them and of course those sent just before October 15 
I had on opportunity to see, but I should say roughly that presumably 
I did see them all. 

Mr. Gesell. All translated subsequent to the 15th of October? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. I was going to ask you whether you made any effort 
to examine any intercepts which were in the file for the period prior 
to your becoming Director of Naval Intelligence ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not, except as occasion to refer to them 
might come up, in which case I would ask Captain Kramer to please 
give me the references. 

Mr. Gesell. Of course, as the evidence here shows, the situation 
was becoming quite tense by October 15, 1941, when you took over the 
job, and I was wondering what means were taken to acquaint you 
with what had been taking place? 

[4S9o] Admiral Wilkinson. I spent several hours, perhaps a 
whole day, in the Far Eastern section before I took over the office, 
getting the picture from their point of view, and talking to the officers 
tJiere, and Captain McCullom particularly, and then Admiral Kirk 
as well told me something of it. So I was informed by word of mouth 
rather than the examination of many documents. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, when you became Director of Naval Intelligence 
did you give instructions to send the texts of these messages, or the 
i-'ist of the messages to the various commanders in the field? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge. I carried out the ex- 
isting system, and I know there was every emphasis on the importance 
of security because of the value of this method of intelligence. 

Mr. Gesell. What do you mean by the "existing system" ? In this 
Exhibit 37, which the committee has before it, there are a substantial 
number of dispatches sent to Hawaii prior to October 15. 1941, which 
are directly based upon magic, and in tact some of the dispatches actu- 
ally quote the text of the intercepted message verbatim, and as I think 
we pointed out in the beginning this morning, some of them refer even 
to the purple code. I have in mind particularly the messages on pages 
4 to 12 whicli were sent out almost [4->^4] in the month of July 
1941 to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Forces, and to the 
Commander in Chief of the Pacific forces. 

Now what do you mean by "practice" ? It looks as though there had 
been a practice of sending out these messages to the theaters con- 
cerned. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1737 

Admiral Wilicinson. I was told, and understood, that such messages 
were not to be sent. I believe, although I am not at all sure, that the 
messages you speak of as examples were in July and none subsequent 
until we come to that critical message with respect to burning the codes. 

Mr. Gesell. I think that is a fair statement, Admiral, that most of 
them were in July, until the code burning messages which you sent out 
in the very last days. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think it is a question, too, of the overlapping 
responsibilities of Naval Intelligence and Communications. If I may 
dwell on that a moment, the Navy had established in Pearl Harbor and 
in Corregidor subunits for the collection of radio information and for 
the breaking of such codes as, with the limited personnel and limited 
facilities they had, they might be able to do. 

In connection with the work back and forth between those agencies 
and the Washington Office of Communications there were certain mes- 
sages sometimes interchanged with relation [4^95] to codes, 
and I believe, although this again is information that was told me, that 
these messages of July were more or less of that nature. They had a 
trick name known as "Jonab." I think that those were more a discus- 
sion of that, in a way, and then again they were messages or informa- 
tion of what they had learned from the codes. 

Mr. Gesell. You say that you were told not to send such messages 
to the field. Who told you that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall the specific informant. I 
think it was my predecessor. It may have been Captain McCullom. 

Mr. Gesell. Either Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Either Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom. 

Mr. Gesell. Now I have been talking about the actual texts of the 
intercepted messages. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. What was the situation with respect to sending out a 
gist or summary of the intercepted messages ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. There was always the danger that the action 
that we took might have come from no other source than code-breaking, 
and in consequence — if I might diverge a little, in the South Pacific we 
received one time, when Admiral Halsey was in Australia and I was 
his deputy commander, we received a message from Admiral 
[4^96] Nimitz that Admiral Yamamoto would be coming down to 
Buin and would be following a very definite schedule, and in Admiral 
Halsey's stead I arranged for an interception. Of course that story is 
now well-known. There being 2 days to spare, I sent word back to 
Admiral Nimitz that we were doing this, but I invited attention to the 
fact that this would give suspicion that we had broken the code and we 
knew what the schedule was. In this instance Admiral Nimitz sent 
down his best wishes and said, "Go to it," that he would take a chance 
on the inferences to be drawn from that. That is an example of acting 
upon a code-breaking activity even without repeating the text of the 
message. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, then, from what you have said so far, you were 
concerned about the question of security, which we have discussed 
in the hearings. My question was, however, first, whether or not 
you were under any instructions which in any way limited your send- 
ing out to the commanders in the field gists or summaries of the 
messages ; not why you didn't do it. 



1738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, I don't recall any specific instructions 
to that effect. 

Mr. Gesell, When you took over you didn't get from Admiral 
Kirk or Captain McCullom, or from the Chief of Naval [4^97] 
Operations, or anybody else, instructions that you were not to sum- 
marize this information from the intercepts and send it to the 
theater commanders? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall any specific instructions except 
the general preservation of security. 

Mr. Gesell. You came to the conclusion, I gather, that you would 
not do so for reasons of security ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I either cam© to that conclusion myself or 
found that that was the practice in other divisions of operation. 

Mr. Gesell. You see, I am anxious to know which it was. Was 
it because you found there were some orders in effect and you com- 
plied with them, or because you yourself made the decision, for the 
reasons you have indicated, not to do it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, I think it was, as I think I earlier 
said, an existing practice, and that I continued it in the interest of 
security. I do not know that I had any specific instructions. I 
would have acted similarly with or without instructions. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you know these messages had gone out in July, 
for example? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you ever discuss this matter with any other ofii- 
cers. Admiral Stark or the chiefs of other divisions [4^98'] 
concerned, as to whether you should or should not send out sum- 
maries or gists of intercepted messages? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, I don't recall specifically any instances. 

Mr. Gesell. You don't recall any discussion of that matter with 
anyone ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Not with respect to my own send- 
ing out. I may have had, and I think I did have from time to time, 
discussions as to information we had, as to whether that information 
should be further sent out. I remember a discussion on the first of 
December with respect to the evident Japanese moves in the South 
China Sea. I do not believe, however, that that was concerned 
largely with code breaking activities. 

Mr. Gesell. I am limiting my questions now to the sending out 
of information obtained from the intercepted messages. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell, I understand you to say that you don't recall any dis- 
cussions with any officers concerning whether or not summaries or 
gists of the messages should be sent out ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not so recall, no. 

Mr. Gesell. Had you ever heard that any particular commander 
in the field, at Hawaii or any other place, had requested such informa- 
tion be sent him ? 

[4599] Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I now know, but I did 
not know then. 

Mr. Gesell. What do you mean you now know ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I have seen a transcript of a letter 
from the commanding chief, Pacific Fleet, requesting that he be kept 
advised of diplomatic activities. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1739 

Mr. Gesell. You are referring to Admiral Kimmel's request to 
Admiral Stark that he be advised concerning diplomatic matters ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I did not know of it then and only 
recently in connection with this hearing have I seen it. 

Mr. Gesell. You recall no discussion concerning that letter with 
anyone 'i 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall ever having discussed the matter with 
Admiral Kirk at the time you took over your duties ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I am not sure he was aware of it. 

Mr. Gesell. I have in my hand, Admiral, a memorandum by Ad- 
miral Kirk dated March 11, 1941, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval 
Operations, written on the stationary of the Office of Naval Intelli- 
gence, referring to Admiral Kimmel's [4600'] letter, which 
contains this paragraph, paragraph 4: 

The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of 
this division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately informed 
concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements 
within the United States. 

I want to show you that memorandum and ask you if you have ever 
seen it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Very recently I have seen it, but I think that 
is a general statement of the duties of the Naval Intelligence and it 
does not refer specifically to the inquiry which you asked me, which 
was diplomatic activities, as I recall. 

[4601] Mr. Gesell. So far as you were aware, you had no 
specific responsibilities toward Admiral Kimmel or any or any other 
commander in the field to apprise him or them of diplomatic material 
obtained from interceped Japanese messages? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, and my understanding was that the ma- 
terial from intercepted messages would in general be kept highly 
secret. 

Mr. Gesell. Well now, whose responsibility was it in the Navy 
Department to advise Admiral Kimmel or other commanders of infor- 
mation which came from the intercepted messages? 

Admiral Wilkinson. If it was purely a question of diplomatic 
activities, I am not sure that there was any responsibility to so 
advise him. 

Mr. Gesell. On the part of anyone, you mean ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. On the part of anyone. When it came to 
the question of enemy intentions, derived from diplomatic activities, 
I would say that it was that of the Office of War Plans, but I do not ' 
know whose responsibility it was to keep him advised of diplomatic 
negotiations of themselves. 

Mr. Gesell. I understand you to say that as far as sending out 
such information as a matter of information, to Admiral Kimmell 
and others, you recall no discussion of [4602] it, you recall no 
instructions concerning it, and you recall no requests from him 
concerning it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know of the requests. I don't re- 
call as to the discussion. I do know that in our foreign fortnightly 
summary that we had a section on diplomatic activities, and we en- 
deavored to place in there everything that we could without com- 
prortiising the intercepted messages, and to that exten it was the 



1740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the responsibility of my office to place in there everything with regard 
to diplomatic activities. 

" With regard to the intercepted messages, there was a conflict of 
security versus the dissemination and I would say that there was no 
responsibility to furnish the intercepted messages unless they were 
directly related, or from them could be derived intentions of the 
enemy with respect to activities prejudicial to our fleet. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, if the intercepted messages reached the 
point that it was apparent that some directive or order was necessary, 
then there was a responsibility, and you say that responsibility, in 
your opinion, rested in the War Plans Division under Admiral 
Turner ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It was my responsibility to call his attention 
to it, but his responsibility to send it out because of the directive 
phase of it as you mention. 

[4603] I am not attempting to say I had no interest, but I 
didn't have the authority to do it. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you ever have any discussions with the Army con- 
cerning their practice in sending out summaries or gists of those 
intercepted messages ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was in very close touch with General Miles, 
and had frequent conferences and meetings with him informally in 
his office and mine ; we had weekly meetings with the FBI, Mr. Hoover, 
and General Miles and myself, on the Presidentially inspired com- 
mittee set up by the President, we talked over secret matters of this 
sort, and both General Miles and I, I believe, were very anxious td 
guard the code-breaking activities to the greatest degree. 

I do not recall specifically any conversation with him specifically on 
the question of sending out messages, except that we, from time to time 
discussed the matters that had turned up in magic. 

Mr. Gesell. You mean as to what the information meant, but not 
what should be done with it ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, I would like to take up with you the ques- 
tion of what the commanders in the field may have known concerning 
the interception of those messages. 

[4'604] Let's take first of all Admiral Hart at Manila. 

General Miles testified, and I believe there has been some other 
reference to it, perhaps in your testimony, that there were certain 
facilities at some point in the Philippines, under naval command and 
direction, which permitted the interception, translation, and the de- 
coding of those Japanese messages ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. There were two radio intelligence stations, 
one at Pearl Harbor and one at Corregidor. They were primarily 
set up to intercept all of the information they could get and to study 
out from the ship calls that were used by the Japanese, and the types 
of messages and the frequency of the traffic, and so on, to figure out 
what they could from those rather than the code breaking proper. 

It became desirable, however, that Admiral Hart — it apparently 
became desirable — I am speaking from hearsay — that Admiral Hart 
be able to do his own breaking down without the necessity of referring 
back to Washington and so on, and his section was enlarged somewhat 
and some of the facilities, which I would prefer not to describe, with 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1741 

relation to code breaking, were sent to him. So that he had out there 
facilities for breaking some codes, including, I believe, the diplomatic 
code. 

[4G05] Mr. Gesell. If I may interrupt 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr, Gesell. That meant that Admiral Hart had at Corregidor 
facilities for intercepting, translating, and decoding messages of the 
type which appear in exhibit 1, and exliibit 2 here? 

Admiral Wlkinson. I would say partial facilities. I don't think he 
was as well equipped as we were here. 

Mr. Gesell. You mean he wasn't as well equipped in terms of man- 
power ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and experienced manpower. 

Mr. Gesell. Experienced manpower, or, I suppose, the ability to 
intercept as many messages, because he hadn't so many intercepting- 
stations under his control, fewer of these stations? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He had a very limited number. 

Mr. Gesell. But he was in a position to translate and decode any 
messages which he himself intercepted ; is that correct? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. In many codes, he couldn't touch them, 
but in the so-called purple code he was to a degree enabled to translate. 
In fact, there were many codes we never got into ourselves here in 
Washington. 

Mr. Gesell. But the purple code was the code in which [4606] 
many of these messages which we have in exhibits 1 and 2 were sent? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think practically all of exhibit 1 and some 
few in exhibit 2. I am not certain. 

Mr. Gesell. Was he in a position to decode messages sent in other 
codes of the type contained in exhibit 2 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson, I am not sure. Again, I have been speaking 
entirely from hearsay and would prefer that the specific degree of 
his ability be answered by a communications officer. 

Mr. Gesell. You were about to discuss the situation at Hawaii? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. I am sorry I interrupted. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Similarly in May of 1941, an agency of the 
same type was set up in Hawaii. Captain Rochefort, then Com- 
mander, was sent out, and half a dozen former language students who 
had recently been evacuated from Japan because of the growing crisis 
were sent to join him, and he head perhaps 20 or 30 enlisted men. 
They were working mainly on the radio intelligence proper. That 
is, the calls and the traffic analysis that I have just described. 

Mr. Gesell. Ship locations? 

[4607] Admiral Wilkinson. Ship locations, and so on. And 
he did not have the facilities for the purple code, nor originally 
facilities for any code. Later he was asked by the department to 
specialize on one or two codes, and what success he had, I am not sure. 

Mr, Gesell, He was in a position at Hawaii to intercept but he was 
not in a position to decode and hence to translate messages that were 
sent in the purple code ? 

Admiral Wilkinson, Correct, There was a certain amount of inter- 
change between Corregidor, Hawaii, and Washington, particularly on 
ship movements. In fact Corregidor become our control and authority 



1742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

on ship movements, but there was not much, as I understand, and I 
again defer to the Communications witness, there was not much 
transfer through Hawaii of the purple code messages translated in 
Washington and at Manila. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, as far as you were aware, they had not then 
facilities at Hawaii for intercepting, translating, and decoding those 
messages there through which Admiral Kimmel or any other officer 
could have gotten the information ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Were summaries prepared in the Navy Department of 
the intercepted messages, daily summaries of [Ji,608'] [that] 

kind? 

Admiral Wilkinson. In the morning, I forget whether it was 9 or 
9 : 30, the Secretary of the Navy had a conference at which the Director 
of Naval Intelligence would discuss the news from all over the world, 
chiejfly, of course, the naval activity, the progress of the war. At 
that time special items in connection with it which might have been dug 
out of a code word were sometimes mentioned. But in view of the 
size of that conference, there were about 20 officers in it, the references 
to the intercepted messages were rather few and far between. 

Mr. Baecher has just invited my attention to this 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, while we are waiting, I might direct 
counsel's attention to the fact that on page 31 of the volume 1, of the 
Naval Narrative, there is a difference between that and the admiral's 
testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. I can't hear the Congressman. 

Mr. Murphy. I might direct counsel's attention that on page 31 of 
the Naval Narrative, there is a difference. It may be that it could 
be cleared up now and we would save time later. 

[4009'\ Mr. Gesell. I don't even have a copy of that narrative. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Here you are. 

(Document handed to counsel.) 

Admiral Wilkinson. My attention has been invited to a summary 
as of the 10th of October listing the number of approximately 12 
dispatches which are briefed, but I don't recall ever having made any 
of those in my time or seeing them, and I am not sure who made this 
particular one. I did have, initially, a little summary, daily sum- 
mary of the Japanese situation, which contained information as to 
what activities were apparent as to Japan, from all sources, includ- 
ing intercepts, and I thought that was continued through Pearl 
Harbor Day, but I have since been informed that it was discontinued 
on the 24th of October, 9 days after I came in. I don't recall why it 
was discontinued. In fact, my recollection was that I had con- 
tinued it. 

Mr. Gesell. We had been addressing our inquiries to those sum- 
maries and the dailj' analysis to the Navy Department, Admiral, par- 
ticularly from the point of view of seeing whether either the daily 
summary or the daily situation reports, as they were sometimes called, 
were continued after you became Director of Naval Intelligence, and 
we could find none beyond October 24. 

Admiral Wilkinson. The 24th is what I have been informed. 
[4^10] I don't recall having stopped them or why they were 
stopped. In fact, my recollection, when I was at sea and somebody 
asked about it, was that we had continued to use them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1743 

Mr. Gesell. Is it your present information that those summaries 
were not used beyond October ? 

Admiral Wilkinson, Yes, sir, and Captain McCullom so advises 
me, as well as the information you have. 

Mr. Gesell. Those summaries did contain information from Jap- 
anese intercepts, as I understand it. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not in the form of quoting the intercept, I 
don't think, but just mentioning the fact that the negotiations are 
continuing, and that some objection, apparently, was made by Tokyo 
to some terms, or something of that sort. 

Mr. Gesell, Were those daily summaries prior to October sent out 
to the field at all, to the theater commanders? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe not. They were purely for internal 
consumption. Very small. Only two or three paragraphs a day. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you feel that the information that was available 
to Commander Eochefort and others concerned with Naval Intelli- 
gence at Hawaii was sufficient for them to know at least in a general 
way that we were in a position not only to intercept but to translate 
and decode these Japanese 14^11] messages in the purple and 
other high codes? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say so, particularly as Captain Roche- 
fort was an expert in that line, and was familiar with the latest de- 
velopments up to the time that he left in May. Then also we had 
three intelligence agencies out there — we had two. Captain Roche- 
fort, who belonged to the Communications Division of operations, and 
was assigned to duty witl:| the 14th Naval District, but was available 
to the Commander in Chief, and we had directly under Naval Intel- 
ligence the District Intelligence Officer at Honolulu, and he was given 
information at times with respect to individuals that might have ap- 
peared in codes intercepted in South America, or even in these codes 
here, but it was carefully guarded at the time. 

Mr. Gesell. Was either the District Intelligence" Officer or Com- 
mander Rochefort under any restriction or inhibition which would 
have prevented them from advising Admiral Kimmel that these 
messages in these high codes were in fact being decoded and trans- 
lated in Washington ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't think so. They were in close con- 
tact with his Intelligence Officer, which was the third agency I spoke 
of. Captain Layton, who was Intelligence Officer on his staff. He 
was in full contact continually with Captain Rochefort and fre- 
quently, I believe, with Captain Mayfield of the District Intelligence 
Office, 

[4(^1^] Mr. Gesell, Did Captain Layton himself have the in- 
formation that we were decoding and translating these messages? 

Admiral Wilkinson, I don't know, I think probably he did, 

Mr. Gesell, What precisely was the relationship that existed be- 
tween the Office of Naval Intelligence here in Washington and these 
various Naval Intelligence agencies in Hawaii? Could you describe 
the organization to us so we understand? 

[4613] Admiral Wilkinson, The Navy Department does not 
deal in general with any subordinate forces in the fleet or a unit. 
In other words, there was no relation between the fleet intelligence 
officer and the Office of Naval Intelligence. The matters went direct 



1744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet and were handled there or 
he could handle it with his intelligence officer or his gunnery officer 
or whoever he saw fit, but we did not have the direct chain between 
fleet and office that was existent in the Arm}' between the head of 
G-2 and the G-2 of the division. So much for the fleet. 

Mr. Gesell. That means that ONI communicated directly with 
the commander of the fleet on all intelligence matters? 

Adimiral Wilkinson. Either with our division of communications 
or in more important matters either directly with Admiral Stark 
or Admiral Ingersoll, his assistant. 

Mr. Gesell. And always directly to the commander of the fleet? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. With respect to all of the other 
agencies the intelligence officer 'was under the command of the 
<.listrict officer, Admiral Bloch. Administratively he checked in with 
us, or we would send him such information as we had and such 
lequests that we might have to make, but we had [4^1 -f] no 
authority to order him to do anything and he was directly on the 
staff of the commandant of the district. 

The same thing I would say would apply to Captain Rochefort 
except that his administrative parent in Washington was not our- 
selves, ONI, but rather the Communications Division, but he like- 
wise was on the staff of Admiral Bloch and primarily his officer 
and under his command and only related to communications, as 
Mayfield was to use for matters of administration, finance, general 
technique; technical matters largely. 

Mr. Gesell. But matters of intelligence and information of im- 
portance to Admiral Bloch in his command, that went in through 
fither Mayfield or Eochefort through to Admiral Bloch himself? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Most any 

Mr, Gesell. I say from you or from Admiral Stark. I am talking 
about nonadministrative matters. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I was just thinking. The District 
Intelligence Officer, as you recall, was a member of the Domestic 
Intelligence side, which had to do with suspects and there was an 
unending chain of information being exchanged about Jim Smith 
or Hashihaha Tadikama or whatever you like. That sort of in- 
formation, that intelligence went directly from the District Intel- 
ligence Officer to our domestic branch. [4^1S] For any major 
matters we would be likely to communicate direct to the fleet rather 
than to the district fellow, because the district fellow's activities 
were on the domestic side and not on the foreign side. He had 
nothing to do with Japan as a nation or with the Japanese Fleet. 

Mr. Gesell. So that means, in effect, to wind it all up, that all 
communications concerning diplomatic matters or major Japanese 
developments would be communicated to Hawaii directly through 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, you referred a moment ago to this question of 
the translation of the intercepted messages. I understood you to 
testify that you made available certain of the personnel and may 
have paid part of their salaries, to assist in the translation. 

You were aware, were you not, that there was a very substantial 
delay, sometimes as much as 28 days, sometimes quite a bit less than 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1745 

that, between the date of interception and the date of translation of 
these Japanese messages? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall the specific delays but I knew 
that for various reasons there were at times delays of some periods. 
Those reasons might,' of course, be [46J6] transmission times, 
they might be due to the necessity of breaking a new code, they might 
be the difficulties in breaking the cipher. I am not too familiar with 
the mechanics, but I think most of us understand that you have to 
have certain material, a certain amount of material in the code before 
you can begin to break it. Now, if somebody sends in a ten-word 
message, that might lay aside for some time before a longer message 
and two or three others would come in to give you enough material 
to attack it, but — coming back to your question — ^yes, I was aware 
that there were delays. 

Mr. Gesell. Precisely. Looking at these messages, just as any of 
us from day to day, you can see that the translation date was fre- 
quently later than the date the message was sent. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I just wanted to mention what I did 
because I think General Miles has emphasized the delays in trans- 
lation and transmission of the intercept to the head office, but he has 
not mentioned the mechanical delays which were inherent there even 
if there had been as much personnel as we would have liked. There 
wasn't much we could do about it. Both Admiral Noyes and I were 
concerned about it because I think we were trying to pick up all the 
Japanese- and English-speaking people we could find in the country. 

Mr. Gesell. That is what I wanted to get at. Conscious [1^617'] 
as you must have been, of some of these delays, some of which might 
have been of a nature which you could cure by manpower and steps of 
that nature, what did you do to encourage or speed up translation, 
if anything? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Admiral Noyes and I were both concerned 
about it. His primary difficulty was in getting people actually to work 
on the mechanics of it, and I endeavored to assist him by procuring 
translators, and we found, I think, some half a dozen translators 
that we could produce and we scoured the country for more and finally 
started a school to make more, because there were none in the country 
that either could or would take the job with us. 

Then, also, we endeavored to expedite and speed our investigations 
of the personnel that Admiral Noyes wanted to have employed be- 
cause, obviously, we could not go blind and have somebody in there 
without knowledge of who he was because the whole thing might be 
blown sky-high, so we investigated all the applicants for the code- 
breaking work and part of my efforts, as you asked, was to expedite 
those investigations. That was done through the domestic branch. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, there is one question that was asked of the Army 
side in that connection and perhaps we ought to have the correspond- 
ing Navy figure if we can. How many people, if you know, were 
actually engaged at this time in the [4^i<§] business of inter- 
cepting and translating and decoding these messages and messages 
of a similar type ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I have no real knowledge about that. I know 
it grew into very large numbers and I would say offliand at that time 
it was somewhere between three and five hundred, but I would defer 
to I he testimony of the communicator. 

Ti'TlC — 4ti — I't. 4 12 



1746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. Well, perhaps before you leave the stand you can get 
some check made and get that figure for us, Admiral. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Surely. 

Mr. Gesell. I am sure, also, I did not ask you one other question 
concerning the transmission of these intercepted messages or their 
text to the theaters. I have been discussing with you Hawaii. Did 
you send information concerning the intercepted messages to Ad- 
miral Hart, or to any other commander overseas, which was more de- 
tailed in any respect than the information you sent Admiral Kimmel ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge. There may have 
been some interchange between the communication officers in attempt- 
ing to straighten out their respective translations of certain inter- 
cepts, but there was nothing from my office. 

Mr. Gesell. You did not undertake, for example, to supply Ad- 
miral Hart with the text of intercepted messages which he had not 
himself intercepted but which you had picked {4619^ up here 
through your facilities in Washington ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not from my office. That might have been 
done in the communications office in an endeavor to straighten out 
their code work. 

Mr. Gesell. Would you know whether or not that was done? Do 
you have any information on that ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not. 

Mr. Gesell. Admiral, we have had a great deal of discussion here 
concerning some of these messages which are contained in exhibit 2. 
They are the so-called military installations and ship movement inter- 
cepts. I first want to get straight concerning the message that ap- 
pears at page 12, which sometimes has been referred to here as the 
bombing plot message, or something of that sort. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, that was sent prior to your becoming Director 
of Naval Intelligence, since it is dated September 24, 1941 and it was 
translated October 9, 1941. I understood you to testify that you 
assumed your post on October 15, 1941. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. But I gather that you had been at least around the 
Division a bit beforehand before you formally took over the job to 
find out what it was all about? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

[4j6BO] Mr Gesell. I want to ask you when this message first 
came to your attention ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall whether it came to my atten- 
tion before or on my taking over, or when a later message may have 
come in referring back to it, but I was aware of it at some time during 
the fall. 

Mr. Gesell. You were aware of it prior to the attack? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. And were you similarly aware of various messages 
which other witnesses have had called specifically to their attention, 
I think sometimes when you have been sitting here in the room, you 
might say implementing this message, i. e., giving reports of ships 
broken down by areas and asking for later detailed reports or asking 
for reports when ships were not moving, were not making any move- 
ments and other messages of that concern ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1747 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was aware of most but not all of them. 
I couldn't say positively all. 

Mr. Gesell. What evaluation did you give to those messages at 
the time as far as their tending to indicate in any way the possibility 
of an attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The Japanese for many years had the repu- 
tation, and the facts bore out that reputation, of being meticulous 
seekers for every scrap of information, whether by [4621] 
photography or by written report or otherwise. 

We had recently, as reported to me, apprehended two and I think 
three Japanese naval officers on the west coast making investigations 
of Seattle, Bremerton, Long Beach, and San Diego. In the reports 
that we had gotten from them there had been indications of move- 
ments and locations of ships ; in the papers that they had there were 
instructions for them to find out the movements and locations of 
ships except in Hawaii and the Philippines, the inference being that 
these fellows that were planted in America, these naval officers, 
were not to be responsible for movements in Hawaii and the Philip- 
pines because there were agencies finding that information there. 

My general impression of adding all this reputation and this fact 
and these data together was that these dispatches were part of the 
general information system established by the Japanese. We knew 
also that certain information had been sought in Panama and again 
in Manila. I did not, I regret now, of course attribute to them the 
bombing target significance which now appears. 

Mr. Gesell. These officers of the Japanese Navy who were appre- 
hended on the west coast you said were getting information concern- 
ing the movement and location of ships ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

[4j62£] Mr. Gesell. Do you mean to tell us that those officers 
had instructions to break down the harbors at Seattle and other points 
on the coast by areas and to designate the location of ships iii those 
areas with particular reference to which were at wharves and which 
were tied to buoys ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No ; because there are no wharves, as I recall, 
in San Pedro except for one or two used by naval vessels, at San Diego, 
and Bremerton to a limited extent. I do recall, or have been informed, 
that one of the reports of Lieutenant Commander Kacarda with ref- 
erence to Bremerton specified what ships were at anchor and which 
ships were alongside of a dock. 

Mr. Gesell. Could we see that report ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I will endeavor to find it. 

Mr. Gesell. Generally, those fellows were simply getting ship 
movement reports, weren't they, what ships came into the harbor and 
which ones went out and what their destination was and whether or 
not they were moving in convoy and the type of general ship move- 
ment information that is spread throughout this exhibit 2 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes, but the location of the ship, 
whether it was alongside of a dock or elsewhere, did give an inference 
of work going on aboard her which would be of value to the question 
of when she might be moved, what [^Jp623'] her state of readiness 
was and the inference that we drew from this was that they wanted 



1748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to know everything they could not only about the movement of the 
ships and those that were present and, therefore, accounted for and 
not a threat to them in some other waters, but also with reference to 
those that were present where they were located with reference to 
state of repair. For instance, the ships that were particularly in 
Pearl Harbor might be in repair and not ready to go to sea, whereas 
those at anchor in the stream would be ready, or would be so on short 
notice. Those at double-banked piers might not be, particularly the 
inside one might take some time to go out. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, you recognize, don't you, that that is not the 
type of information that this message was designed to get. Looking 
at the message now in the cold light of the hearing room it is apparent 
that they were trying tO' spot the vessels there so as to determine their 
state of repair or readiness for battle at sea. 

Admiral Wilkinson. It would seem so now since the locations 
might be of value not only as a bombing target but also for submarine 
attack or midget submarine attack. 

Mr. Gesell. In an attack made from either above or under the water. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. And it is quite apparent that this message L^^^-^] 
was not designed to get information concerning the likelihood of cer- 
tain vessels departing from the harbor or the state of their repair or 
ordinary ship movement information. It is just what we have been 
calling it, is it not, Admiral? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. A bombing plot message. 

Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes. There are other things of 
conceivable technical matters and interest. The ships that are in 
various harbors at the time might be an indication of what the capac- 
ity of this section of the harbor was with respect to taking a large 
fleet in, but those are technical interpretations which are hardly ger- 
mane to the purposes as we now see it. 

Mr. Geseli>. Well, they are not the technical interpretations that 
you gave the message at the time either, are they ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know that we did. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall discussing this message with anyone 
in the Navy Department at the time prior to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; I think I mentioned to one or more 
officers that the Japs seemed quite curious as to the lay-out in Pearl 
Harbor and at the time I thought that that was an evidence of their 
nicety of intelligence. 

[-^(J'25] Mr. Gesell. Now, who do vou recall discussing that 
with? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McCoUum particularly, possibly 
with Admiral IngersoU or Admiral Turner. I cannot say specifically 
who. 

The Chairman. It is now 12 o'clock and the committee will recess 
until 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 
p. m. of the same day.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1749 

[4626] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 V. M. 

The Chairman. Counsel will proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON 

(Resumed) 

Mr. (iESELr>. Just as we were recessing, Admiral Wilkinson, you said 
you had talked to Admiral Turner, you thought, and to Captain 
McCullom, concerning this plat dispatch of September 24 we have 
been discussing. Do you recall your conversation with them? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Only, as I think I said, that I mentioned it 
showed as an illustration of the nicety of detail of intelligence the 
Japanese were capable of seeking and getting. 

Mr. Gesell. What did they say to you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall 

Mr. Gessell. Did they agree with you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall an agreement of that sort. Of 
course, it must be remembered that all during this year, 1941, there was 
some exchange of letters to and from Pearl Harbor and Hawaii on 
both the Army and Navy side emphasizing the fact that the first 
priority of risk or hazard to Pearl Harbor was a bombing attack, 
next an air torpedo attack and third a submarine attack. This infor- 
mation they were getting there, while substantiating that fear, was 
being obtained, in some degree at least, everywhere that we [4627] 
knew of — Panama, the West Coast, Manila. 

Mr. Gesell. You are in agreement with General Miles that there 
is not another message like this one that appears in this document 
or which was intercepted prior to Pearl Harbor, is there ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection. I explained that the 
other harbors were, perhaps, smaller and need not have so much of a 
differentiation. 

Mr. Gesell. When you pointed this out to Admiral Turner and 
Captain McCullom as an example of the nicety of Japanese espionage, 
you don't recall what they said ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall except, perhaps, to agree with 
me. I am not even sure in recollection that I pointed it out to Admiral 
Turner. 

Mr. Gesell. What evaluation did you place upon the document? 
Did you tliink it had some significance that required your bringing 
it to their attention ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not particularly. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you recommend that it be sent to the field ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Was there a discussion of whether it should or should 
not be sent to the field ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection. 

[4628] Mr. Gesell. So that your testimony amounts to, if I 
understand it, a statement that you somewhat casually pointed this 
out and said this was an example of the nicety of their espionage? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly. 

Mr. Gesell. I would like to discuss with you now. Admiral, for 
a few moments some of the alert or warning messages which were 
sent by the Navy Department, at the first at page 18 of Exhibit o7, the 
basic dispatch, dated October 16, 1941. 



1750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. What page? 
Mr. Gesell. Page 18. 
I will read it : 

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a 
new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic aind anti-Ameri- 
can. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under 
a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. 
In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. 
Since the United States and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present 
desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two 
powers. In view of these possibilities you wjll take due precautions including 
such preparatory deployments [4629] as will not disclose strategic in- 
tentions nor constitute provxocative actions against Japan. Second and third 
adees inform appropriate Army and Naval district authorities. Acknowledge. 

That is addressed to the Commander in Chief in the Atlantic and 
the Pacific and the Asiatic Fleet. That appears to have been sent 
the day after you took over as Director of Intelligence. 

Were you. consulted concerning it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. Purely an operational matter. 

Mr. Gesell. You do not recall having participated in any discus- 
sions concerning it ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you have knowledge that it was sent? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not until after it was sent. 

Mr. Gesell. How soon after? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall. Perhaps the next day. 

Mr. Gesell. Was it the practice for messages, when you were not 
in on their drafting and transmission, for them to be sent to you 
afterwards for your information? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not as a frequent practice. Occasionally, 
yes. Occasionally I would hear of them in conversation and look 
them up. 

Mr. Gesell. If they weren't sent to you, how would you [4030^ 
be in a position to know whether the information you had been ob- 
taining as Director of Naval Intelligence was being properly evalu- 
ated? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I had confidence in the officers comprising 
the War Plans Divisions. But there was no back check in their con- 
sultation with me to see if I thought it was properly evaluated. 

Mr. Gesell. That confidence, I can see, might give you a degree of 
personal assurance, but it didn't give you any information, did it, 
as to precisely what evaluation was being made. Without having 
that information, how could you properly conduct your office? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know that it affected the conduct of 
my office, because I would give the information that we collected, and 
frequently advised on what my own inferences were from it, but 
what action was taken as a result, I do not think was necessarily in- 
volved in the conduct of my office. 

Mr. Gesell. I understand your testimony to be that you recom- 
mended evaluations from time to time in transmitting this infor- 
mation to War Plans and to the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Wilkinson. In discussion, yes. Sometimes in writing, 
but seldom. 

Mr. Gesell. But they didn't inform you of what action they took? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not as a matter of routine, no. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1751 

Mr. Gesell. You might find it out from talking to somebody, and 
then you would look it up ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. They might tell me, as a matter of interest, 
but I was not an information addressee, as it [4^32] were. 
It was not a matter of established routine. 

Mr. Gesell. How did you know what information to send out to 
the theater commanders if you didn't know what evaluation had 
been placed upon the information you. had already transmitted? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The information I sent to the theater com- 
manders was of a static nature. There was a fortnightly summary, 
of which you speak, which was partly action, partly static. There 
were in the course of the year 1941, for instance, some 62 or 70 
so-called Far Eastern serials, two- and three-page discussions of 
specific items, which might range from a new type of torpedo to 
Japanese aircraft production, things of that matter. 

We also supplied to the fleet a so-called Japanese monograph, 
O. N. I. 49, a full description of all the information we had been 
able to obtain concerning Japan. 

Mr. Gesell. My question was whether it would not have aided 
you in pointing up the information to know what evaluation was 
being placed on the information you were sending. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am mentioning the types of information 
I sent which, of itself, was not the type that was involved with the 
evaluation of the current situation. As I have earlier mentioned, the 
matters concerning operations [4633] I did not send to the 
fleet except on reference to the Operations Office or War Plans of 
themselves. 

The Chairman. Will counsel suspend for a moment? 

I am compelled to leave because since last Saturday I have been 
suffering with a very high temperature, and with what looks like 
a severe case of the flu, and I am out against the advice of the 
doctor, and am compelled to leave now and do what he told me to do. 

I had intended to have an executive session this afternoon, but 
that is impossible. Therefore, I ask to be excused for the rest of 
the day. I hope to be back tomorrow. 

Mr. Gesell. We are sorry you are ill, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Vice Chairman will preside. 

Mr. Gesell. The next warning message which I wish to inquire 
concerning is that appearing at page 32, the message of November 24, 
1941, addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic, Pacific and 
certain other districts, 11, 12, 13, and 15, reading as follows: 

CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN 
VERY DOUBTFUL. THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF 
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS OF THEIR NAVAL AND 
MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT A SURPRISE AG- 
GRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON 
U634] PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY. CHIEF OF STAFF 
HAS SEEN THIS DISPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION. AD- 
DRESSES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UT- 
MOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN AL- 
READY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION. GUAM 
WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY. 

Did you have anything to do with the sending of that message? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. What pagfe is that ? 



1752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. Page 32. Did you know it was sent at the time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not until after it was sent. 

[4SS5] Mr. Gesell. How long after did you know about it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure ; a day or two. 

Mr. Geseli-. You were not consulted concerning this, concerning 
its wording or whether or not it should be sent ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. The next message of a warning nature appears on page 
36 and is the message of November 27, 1941. It is the message sent 
at the same time as the Army warning message of that date, from the 
Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific 
and Asiatic Fleets, reading as follows : 

This despatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan 
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased on an 
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number 
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces 
indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra 
Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment 
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46. Inform District and 
Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Spenavo 
inform British. Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate 
measures [^656] against sabotage. 

Were you consulted in connection with the sending of that message ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. When did you first know it had been sent ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think two days later, perhaps three. I 
might explain, of course, that these were highly secret messages and 
the Chief of Naval Operations was anxious to confine the knowledge 
of them to the minimum and since I was not directly concerned in 
them, once I had prof erred the information upon which they were 
based, that he thought that neither he nor his instructions carried the 
necessity of advising me about it. I do not feel, in other words, that I 
was neglected by not being consulted because I liad proferred the 
giving of the information and I am sure that it was well used. 

Mr. Gesell. And when you say you learned of these messages you 
meant that you learned it informally by hearing of them rather than 
hearing of them in a direct way as a matter of office organization ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. As I recall them. 

Mr. Gesell. Is that your testimony with respect to the message on 
page 38 transmitting the Army warning message of November 27 and 
containing instructions concerning overt [4^37] acts? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. That takes us up to November 27, Admiral. Now, 
from the period from November 27, 1941 to December 7, 1941 the only 
other messages of a warning nature that one finds here directed to 
Hawaii were the messages concerning the destruction of codes. Did 
you have anything to do with those messages ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, we initiated those after a conference with 
the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Mr, Gesell. You are referring to the messages that appear at 40 
and 41 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Forty particularly. Forty-one I believe was 
initiated by the communications officer. 

Mr. Gesell. You initiated the message on page 40 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1753 

Mr. Gesell. Will you read that, please, sir? 
Admiral Wilkinson (reading) : 

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in- 
structions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at 
Hong Kong Singapore Batavia Manila Washington and London to destroy most 
of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential 
and secret documents. 

[4638] Mr. Gesell. That was addressed to the Commander in 
Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleet, to Com 14 and to Com 16 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. You say you initiated that dispatch. Will you tell 
us 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is, to my recollection. Let me check one 
moment, sir. Yes, I believe that to be the case. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, will you stat« for the committee, please, what 
the circumstances were as you recall them under which that message 
was sent ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think Captain McCollum advised me that 
intelligence had been received through the magic source as to this and 
I think there had been other confirmatory evidences by reports by 
cable as to signs of burning. I am not sure of that last. I know 
there were such reports but whether they occurred before this dispatch 
was sent or not I do not know, but the primary basis I think was the 
magic. Captain McCollum recommended its being sent and I agreed, 
of course, and after consultation with either the Chief or the Assist- 
ant Chief of Operations it was so sent. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you approve the dispatch then ? I mean did you 
draft the plan then? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe Captain McCollum drafted 
[4639] it. 

Mr. Gesell. And then after it was drafted you approved it or 
initialed it before it went out I 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I probably presented that in person 
to Admiral Ingersoll. I may have actually released it. The record 
may show. 

Mr. Gesell. I have here what purports to be a photostatic copy of 
the original message, which shows it was released by you and an 
initial which appears to be Admiral Ingersoll's initials after your 
name. 

Admiral Wilkinson. That would seem to bear out my statement. 

Mr. Gesell. You have seen that photostatic copy of the dispatch, 
have you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. I want to show it to you and call your attention to 
the following words which appear on the dispatch as stricken follow- 
ing the words at the end of the message, "Secret document" : 

From foregoing infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia. 

Do you recall that ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not but if it occurs in the original dis- 
patch it was doubtless so drafted by Captain [4^40] McCol- 
lum and approved by me. Whether I struck it out or whether 
Admiral Ingersoll struck it out, I cannot recall. 



1754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. You cannot recall which of you struck it out? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I have no recollection which. 

Mr. Gesell. I would like to have this dispatch marked as an 
exhibit. It will be Exhibit 83, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 83.") 

Admiral Wilkinson. I may state that we had every inference and 
evidence for the preceding two weeks that Orange was contemplating 
action in southeast Asia and did in fact so act. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, will you state to us at this time, Admiral, what 
was the considered conclusion and evaluation reached by you and 
your staff in the Office of Naval Intelligence, prior to the receipt of 
the one o'clock message, as to where and when the Japanese would 
attack? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think our conclusion was that every evi- 
dence indicated an attack in the South China Sea on either Siam or 
the Kra Peninsula. Those evidences were almost indisputable. There 
were possibilities of attack elsewhere ranging, in fact, from Panama 
on the Pacific Coast [4^4^] to Hawaii, Guam, Wake and the 
Philippines. The nearer each of these objectives was to Japan, to our 
mind the greater the probability of their attack. As it happened we 
all know that they attacked all of those on the far side of the Pacific 
Coast, Hawaii, Wake, Guam and the Philippines. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, did you have any information, written or oral, 
prior to the actual attack which specified Hawaii as a point of attack ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not the slightest. 

Mr. Gesell. You say there were indications that they might attack 
Hawaii and other points in the Pacific. What were those indications ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't think I said "indications." I said 
possibilities. 

Mr. Gesell. I beg your pardon. 

Admiral Wilkinson. That was within the range of practicability 
that they should so attack. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, my question was directed as to what information 
and evidence you had on that point. Did you have any evidence or 
information to show that Hawaii was a possible point of attack or a 
probable point of attack? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not that it was a probable point. There was 
every possibility that it was a possible point of attack in that the 
Japanese Navy's steaming radius and their [464^] capabilities, 
as the Intelligence people say, and I am learning to say, and their 
probable capabilities indicated that they could come there. It was 
possible. So in fact was Seattle possible. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, I would like to review with you for a 
moment some of the information you had of a naval nature to see 
whether we can get, perhaps, a more specific understanding of what 
you had before you. 

You knew, did you not, for example, on the 25th of September that 
the combined home fleet of the Japanese had undergone extensive 
personnel changes and that that personnel reorganization, which was 
not normal for that time of year, was interpreted by your people to 
mean that preparations were being made for an emergency ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1755 

Mr. Gesell, You also knew, did you not, on the 1st of November that 
the Japanese Navy, according to statements made by its own* people, 
was ready for any immediate eventuality; that mobilization plans 
had been carried out, including not only changes in commands but 
increase in ship crews to full war complement? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; the ships had been docked as well. 

Mr. Keefe. Right there may I ask what was the date of [4^4^} 
the first statement? 

Mr. Murphy. September 25. 

Senator Ferguson. A little louder, please. 

Mr. Murphy. September 25, that was the first and the second one 
was November 1. 

Mr. Gesell. September 25 was the first. The second I have given 
as November 1. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. I wanted to get those dates in mind. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, on November 15 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I could not hear the first part of 
the Congressman's remark. 

The Vice Chairman. He just wanted a repetition of those dates. 
One was September 25 and the other one was November 1. 

Senator Ferguson. Thank you. That is 1941 ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes ; I am talking about 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Gesell. You knew on November 15 that the Japanese had requi- 
sitioned an increasing number of merchant ships and armed those 
ships, many of them, with antiaircraft guns, did you not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I have full knowledge and recollection of these 
various events that you are speaking of. I [4-644] cannot from 
my own recollection check those particular dates. 

Mr. Gesell. This is coming from those exhibits that we have put in 
this morning. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Those were dates that we registered 
that those happened on the preceding 2 weeks because this was a fort- 
nightly review. 

Mr. Gesell. You knew on or about December 1, similarly, that 
Japanese ships had been recalled for quick docking and repair, did you 
not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. You also knew, and this is specifically on December 1, 
that on that date the Japanese had changed all of the service calls 
for their forces afloat at 0000 on December 1, did you not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know that I knew specifically it was 
a change of service calls. I knew that there had been a change in 
certain of their codes which resulted in difficulty in our radio intelli- 
gence analysis at that time. 

Mr. Gesell. On that date? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, I have here a file of ship location reports and on 
page 30-d of that file — and this comes as an intelligence report from 
your office, it states : 

All orange service radio calls for units afloat were [4^45] changed at 
0000, 1 December 1941. 

Does that refresh your recollection on that point ? 
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 



1756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. It is a fact, is it not, that the Japanese had changed 
their service calls previously on the 1st of November ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe so. 

Mr. Gesell. And by changing them again so formally within a 
period of 30 days that was further indication that an emergency situa- 
tion had arisen ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. There was every indication from many of 
those and many others that there was an emergency situation arising. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, when did you first learn that the ship location and 
direction finding people in the Office of Naval Intelligence had lost 
track of the Japanese carriers ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall particularly. I know that 
our ship locations were often incomplete. I know it began to be appar- 
ent toward the end of November that there were a large number 
of ships that we could not locate specifically for both battleships and 
carriers. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, it was specifically notable, was it not, that the car- 
riers could not be located and you knew that at the time ? 

[4^4^] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, you were also aware, were you not, that shipping 
had been routed to the south through Torres Straits ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe I was aware. It was not of my ini- 
tiation but I believe I was aware of it. 

Mr. Gesell. You were aware of the dispatches that directed all 
shipping to proceed through Torres Straits ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I presume so. I do not recall that specifically. 

Mr. Gesell. And you were familiar, were you not, with the general 
term that I think General Miles referred to here, of there being a 
vacant sea to the north and west of Hawaii? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Through which there would be no shipping ? 

Senator Bre^vster. Will you answer that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. While you were at Hawaii I presume you had, engaged 
in war games and other maneuvers in which you had anticipated and 
prepared against an air attack launched against that point from an 
attacking force coming from the north? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall the maneuvers of an air attack 
specifically, but I know that we had a large fleet maneuver there in 
which there were carriers on both sides and the endeavor of the defend- 
ing fleet was to inter- [4^47] cept the attacking fleet before 
it would have got the air attack launched. 

Mr. Gesell. You knew as a naval expeit that the Japanese Navy 
had the striking power and the strength and the fleet to approach 
Hawaii and execute an attack, did you not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. If not protected, yes, or, for that matter, any 
point in the Pacific, including the Canal. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, would the factors which I have just — per- 
haps we should call them facts — which I have just reviewed with you, 
did it ever occur to you prior to the 6th of December that it would be 
appropriate and advisable to send some specific direction to Pearl Har- 
bor warning against a surprise air attack? 

Admiral Wif.kinson. It never occurred to me, first, because from 
uiy service out there and from these letters that had been interchanged 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1757 

throughout the year it was my belief that Hawaii knew the possibility 
of an air attack. Second, it did not occur to me because it was not 
within my province to conclude or derive the enemy functions although 
naturally I was interested in such matters. And, third, it was my 
own belief that an approaching force would be detected before it could 
get into attack range. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, did you have any information as to whether or not 
the Army and Navy at Hawaii were in fact con- [4^4^] ducting 
long-range reconnaissance ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not. They had done so while I had been 
there at intervals. 

Mr. Gesell. But you had no information in the months or weeks 
immediately preceding Pearl Harbor as to whether, in fact, the com- 
manders there were or were not taking action w^hich would permit 
them to pick up the Japanese fleet before it attacked ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I had not. 

Mr. Gesell. You Avere fully aware, were you not, as an Intelligence 
officer that Japan had men and facilities at Hawaii which permitted 
them to know the state of our garrisons and preparations there and the 
steps we were taking ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. All the anchorages at Pearl Harbor and 
Honolulu port and other anchorages in Hawaii were readily susceptible 
of observation by any elements of the large Japanese population ; our 
communications going out of Honolulu were not censored ; and there 
were other possibilities of espionage and that had been recognized by 
the three Intelligence agencies there, the agents of the FBI, the Mili- 
tary Intelligence, and our own. 

1464-9] Mr. Gesell. Had there been any discussion of the fact 
that the fleet, stationed at Hawaii, on the flank of a Japanese movement 
to the south, constituted a threat unless, by some device or means, the 
Japanese could knock it out of action temporarily ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No discussion like that to which I was a party. 

Mr. Gesell. Were you aware of that consideration as a naval 
expert ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and furthermore, I would anticipate 
that any Navy anvious to strike a blow or to win a war would naturally 
be in search of the enemy's navy, irrespective of the stategic con- 
siderations of being on the flank. 

Mr. Gesell. You have said that your division considered it a possi- 
bility, I believe that Pearl Harbor, among other points, might be 
attacked. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Sure. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you, yourself, personally expect that the Japanese 
would attack Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. I thought that the Japanese would pro- 
ceed to the southward, would carry out their campaign, and I felt, 
insofar as my own guess was concerned, which was not a very good 
one, obviously, that they would [46S0] not make a direct 
attack on the Anglo-Saxon nations, but they would attempt to see, 
as they had already for so many years, how far they could go with 
infiltration methods without precipitating a full-scale war. 

Every evidence indicated their movement was down toward those 
areas. The question of whether the Philippines would be attacked 
or not, in my own case, I was not certain about it. 



1758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Turner, I know, was not confident it would be attacked. 
I thought myself, possibly for political reasons, they would avoid the 
Philippines. I did not think they would attack Hawaii, because I 
thought, in so attacking, they would expose themselves to great danger 
to whatever force they brought there, and, furthermore, they would 
be precipitating a war with the United States, which theretofore they 
had given every indication of attempting to avoid. 

Mr. Gesell. Admiral, in the period from November 27 to the time 
of the attack, do you recall discusing with anyone the advisability of 
sending any additional warnings to the theater commanders in the 
Pacific? 

Admiral WiLKiNSoisr. On December 1, Captain McCollum prepared 
a suggested memorandum for me with regard to the situation in the 
Far East. 

[4651'] Mr. Gesell. May I interrupt there? Is that the memo- 
randum dated December 1, captioned "Memorandum for the Director," 
signed by McCollum, which appears toward the front of Exhibt 81, a' 
memorandum of approximately five pages long, with a covering memo- 
randum to you as Director? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; except that the particular memorandum 
is only two and one-half pages long. You are confusing the following 
memorandum with it. 

Mr. Gesell. It goes from page 24 to page 27, does it not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; 24 is the covering page. 

[465£] Mr. Gesell. Right. That is the memorandum you were 
referring to? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. On receipt of that I went with Captain 
McCollum to Admiral Stark's office, to discuss it with him, and he 
called in — if they were not already tliere — Admiral IngersoU and 
Admiral Turner, and I think I read the memorandum, or Captain 
McCollum did. 

Mr. Gesell. Out loud, do you mean? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Out loud. There was some discussion about 
the indications there, and a general agreement that there was a very 
definite advance by Japan into the South China Sea areas, and that the 
extent of that advance was not as yet apparent, as to the geographic 
extent, but the numerical extent of the advance was apparent as a very 
strong movement. 

Mr. Gesell. You say that Captain McCollum brought this memo- 
randum to you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall what your conversation was with him at 
that time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Only that I thought it was very interesting 
and important, and that Admiral Stark and his people should see it. 

Mr. Gesell. Did Captain McCollum give any indication in the 
memorandum as to what should be done? 

[If653] Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection. 

Mr. Gesell. It was you who initiated the proposal of a conversation 
with Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It was Captain McCollum who said that 
Admiral Stark should see it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1759 

Mr. Gesell. Did you think that the memorandum required some 
additional warning message to be sent? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any views one way or the other when you 
went to see Admiral Stark as to whether a warning message should 
be sent ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No warning message had been sent and this 
was information as to the movement of the fleet in the South China 
Sea. There was no indication on the face of this evidence that an 
attack was to be made upon Hawaii, or, for that matter, upon the 
Philippines. 

Mr. Gesell. Captain McCollum concluded, did he not. in his cover- 
ing memorandum, an eventual control or occupation of Thailand, fol- 
lowed almost immediately by an attack against the British posses- 
sions, possibly Burma and Singapore? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. That was his estimate of what the information in the 
memorandum pointed to? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and it was subsequently proved. 

[4GM] Mr. Gesell. You concurred in his recommendation? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and it was subsequently borne out. 

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion by you, in the presence of 
Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, and Ingersoll, as to the desirability 
or appropriateness of sending any further warning message? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall any. 

Mr. Gesell. Your discussion with those gentlemen, then, had some- 
thing to do with the contents of the memorandum ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. This was not the type of memorandum which was sent 
to the field, was it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, except a large part of it, if not all, was 
embodied in the fortnightly summary of that day. 

Mr. Gesell. That summary appears in Exhibit 80, does it not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure. On page 9 of that memoran- 
dum, or page 12, as it has been surcharged in ink later on, you will 
find the discussion on the Japanese military situation and naval situa- 
tion, which is very similar, although it does not exist over the whole 
2 months, as this particular memorandum does. 

Mr. Gesell. I gather from what you have testified that there was no 
discussion of Hawaii at this time between you [4655] and Cap- 
tain McCollum, or between you and Adriral Stark and his associates. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall any other instance where you recom- 
mended, in the period from November 27 to December 7, that a message 
be sent or discussed the possibility of sending a message? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall specifically. Captain Mc- 
Collum has since told me, and it has aided my recollection vaguely, that 
he brought a message in to me, that I was concerned about it, in connec- 
tion with the so-called winds message, and after the discussion with me 
he took it, by my direction, to Admiral Turner and Admiral Turner 
showed him the warning message which had gone out and asked him if 



1760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

he did not think that had covered the situation, and Captain McCollum 
said it did, I believe. 

I have no clear recollection on that. 

Mr. Gesell. I want to ask you, Admiral Wilkinson, whether you 
have any recollection of it yourself ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot say I have. 

Mr. Gesell. You are simply repeating then what Captain McCollum 
told you? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. You yourself have no recollection of that [4^56} 
incident ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot say I do. 

Mr. Gesell. You of course saw the code setting up the winds mes- 
sage, did you not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you at any time ever see or hear any message which 
implemented that code? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is I did after the actual attack, 

Mr. Gesell. After the actual attack? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Gesell. You are referring there to the message that was inter- 
cepted by the Federal Communications Commission stating about war 
tvith Great Britain ? 

Admiral Wilkinson, No, I do not recall specifically which message 
it was, but I understood after the attack, within 24 hours or perhaps 
36, that there was a message that was intercepted and translated. 
You will recall — it is my recollection, at least — in the winds message 
it was not a question of war, it was a question of strained relations, in 
the interpretation of it. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you have any recollection at all of having heard of 
or seen any message prior to the attack that implemented that code in 
any respect? 

14^57] Admiral Wilkinson. No; and we were very keenly on 
the lookout for it, and I do not believe, to the best of my knowledge, 
there was such a message before. 

[4SSS] Mr. Gesell. Was your department or division the one 
responsible for picking up that message, or was that a function of 
communications ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It was a function of communications and such 
outside agencies, outside the Navy, as they had maybe talked with, 
the F. C. C. and others. 

Mr. Gesell. The Office of Naval Intelligence was not the office con- 
cerned with the interception or any implementation that might have 
been seen ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. We were very much interested in the 
receipt of such a message if it were sent, and I know of no such 
implementing message having been sent. 

Mr. Gesell, I next want to turn to or to check up with you the 
question of the events of December 6, and December 7, 

Testimony before the committee appears to establish that on De- 
cember 6 there was available, sometime during the day, a so-called 
pilot message, in which the Japanese advised from Tokyo that a 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1761 

reply in 14 parts, to be delivered at a time later specified, was to 
come in. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. It also appears that 13 parts of that message were 
intercepted, decoded, and translated on the 6th. 

[4^69] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Were you at your office on December 6? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was out in my office, I think, until late 
before dinner, and before I left the office I saw the pilot message, and 
that night at home I saw the other. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you see any message other than the pilot message 
before you left the office ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I did not, none of the 13 parts. 

Mr. Gesell. That is what I refer to. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Under what circumstances did you see the pilot 
message ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think it was brought to me in the normal 
course of events in connection with the magic book. 

Mr, Gesell. Did you have any discussion with anyone concerning 
it, after you saw it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, except I said, "We will be on the lookout 
for the message." I think I told Captain Kramer, "We will be on 
the lookout for the message when it comes through." 

Mr. Gesell. What kind of set-up did you have in your [4660'] 
office at the time that you could keep in touch immediately with de- 
velopments when important messages such as this were coming in? 

Admiral Wilkinson. We had normally a 24-hour watch in the 
domestic branch, and in the foreign branch. Within the last few days 
of the crisis developing, I had set up a 24-hour watch in the Far 
Eastern Section alone. I think the day before, when it appeared that 
the Japanese advance in the China Sea was becoming more and more 
critical, I had set up, I believe, a watch of the senior officers of the 
Department, the heads of the branches, and the Assistant Director, 
to be in the Department. 

Captain Kramer was on call, and I myself was on call. As it hap- 
pened in this particular instance. Captain Kramer received the 13- 
part about 9 o'clock. 

Mr. Gesell. I want to come that in a moment. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. You say you had a 24-hour watch set up in the Far 
Eastern Section ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you mean you had someone in the Navy Depart- 
ment on duty 24 hours a day ? 

Admiral Wilninson. No one person, but in rotation, yes. 

[4-661] Mr. Gesell. Representing the specific interests of the 
Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Precisely. There were three officers in there, 
and they stood watch there in rotation. 

Mr. Gesell. Would you mind indicating who these officers were 
who stood that watch ? 

79716—46 — pt. 4 13 



1762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McCuUom, Colonel Boone, and Lieu- 
tenant Commander Watts. 

Mr. Gesell. They were the three officers standing that watch during 
the specific time we are talking about? 

Admiral Wilkinson. There were three. There may have been two 
or three more. As I recall, there was Lieutenant Siebold. I cannot 
remember whether he was on the watch or not. 

Mr. Gesell. You had no discussion with anyone other than Cap- 
tain Kramer concerning the pilot message before you left your office? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not particularly. 

Mr. Gesell. What do you mean "not particularly" ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. I think 1 told him we would 
be on the lookout for the other. I may have told the watch officer in 
the Far Eastern Section to be sure it did not get away from us when 
it cume. 

I may have told, and probably did tell. Captain Kramer [4662] 
to be sure they saw it in the front office. 

Mr. Gesell. That is what I was getting at. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot say that I recall specifically that I 
did, but I feel sure I did. 

Mr. Gesell. You don't recall about having given instructions to 
Admiral Stark or other key officers? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not at this long range. 

Mr. Gesell. What time did you leave your office on the evening 
of the 6th ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I have no specific recollection. I would say 
about 6 o'clock. 

Mr. Gesell. You were at home and had a dinner party at your 
house that night, did you not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. A small dinner with General Miles, Captain 
Beardall, and two French officers, whom, in my duties as Director of 
Litelligence, and taking care of the attaches, I had asked in. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, at what time during that evening, did you learn 
that the 13 ])arts came in ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say roughly 9 o'clock. Commander, 
or Captain, Kramer called me up and said he was going to take this 
en the rounds and would come out to me later. I told him to go ahead. 

Mr. Gesell. Did he discuss with you what deliveries [4663] 
he was going to make and to whom he was going to deliver the 13 
parts ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He was going to make the normal rounds. I 
will not say "normal" because it was after office hours, but in view of 
the importance of it, he was going to leave a copy at the White House, 
to see the Secretary of the Navy — to see Secretary Knox, and Admiral 
Stark, and Admiral Turner. He subsequently told me he was un- 
able to reach Admiral Turner and Admiral Stark by telephone be- 
cause they were out. 

Mr. Gesell. Did Captain Kramer at that time discuss with you on 
the telephone the contents of the message? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesetx. How did he refer to it, if you recall? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think he said, 'The message we were wait- 
ing for has come in in part." He obviously could not speak of it on 
the telephone in detail. It would have been a gross breach of security. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1763 

Mr. Gesell. Did he subsequently come to your home? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He did. 

Mr. Gesell. What happened at that time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He brought the message in, and General Miles 
and I read it over with him, and I think Captain, or Admiral, Beardall 
read it likewise. 

[4664] Mr. Gesell. Now, what time was that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. About 11 o'clock. 

Mr. Gesell. You had other guests at your home, Admiral Wilkin- 
son. Did y^'i withdraw to another room to read it ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. We did. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you have all 13 parts ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. You did not have the 14th part, or the 1 o'clock 
message ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Now you went to another room with General Miles 
and Admiral Beardall and Captain Kramer, and read through the 
message ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Then what happened? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure of my own recollection. Cap- 
tain Kramer tells me I went to the phone and called up, apparently. 
Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner. I asked Kramer whom he had 
shown it to, and he said he left a copy at the White House, and had 
shown it in person to Secretary Knox, who had gone over it, made 
some telephone calls, and told him to bring it back to the Secretary 
of State the next morning. 

[4665] While Kramer was there, or perhaps after he left — again 
my recollection is stimulated by him, but it is not very clear — he 
said I made some telephone calls. I may have attempted to raise 
Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner again, on the basis of his in- 
formation that they were not there. However, both General Miles 
and myself, and to some extent Captain Kramer, felt that this was a 
diplomatic message; it was a message that indicated, or that re- 
sembled the diplomatic white papers, of which we had often seen 
examples, that it was a justification of the Japanese position. 

The strain was largely in the 14th part which we discussed the 
next morning. 

Mr. Gesell. You are discussing what was said at that time, are 
you, or are you telling what you thought? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am discussing what was said between Gen- 
eral Miles and myself, as I recall. 

Mr. Gesell. In the presence of Captain Kramer? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think so. 

Mr. Gesell. Did Captain Kramer tell you at that time that he had 
been unable to reach Admiral Stark or Admiral Turner 

Admiral Wii-kinson. I believe he did. I do not recall now, but 
he informs me he did, and I accept his statement. 

[4666] Mr. Gesell. I am very anxious. Admiral, not only to 
get the full story, but I am very anxious to get your own recollection 
of what happened. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would like to have it myself, sir, but it, is 
not complete. 



1764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. When you cannot recollect something I wish you would 
just say so, and then give us your best judgment, if you want to, as 
to what you think happened, or from what somebody told you. 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is what I just said, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Right. Did Captain Kramer give yooi any information 
as to what had occurred at Secretary Knox's home? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; he said the Secretary 'had withdrawn 
with him and had gone over it with him carefully, and had then made 
some telephone calls and had directed him to bring the message to 
the State Department the next morning, from which Kramer inferred 
that he had called the Secretary of State, and possibly someone else. 

Mr. Gesell. Did he say to you that Secretary Knox had called the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of War? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it independently. 

Mr. Gesell, He told you that he was instructed to deliver the 
message to the State Department the next morning? 

[4-667 \ Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; and his assumption was that 
the Secretary's telephone calls may have been to those people. He 
did not hear them specifically. 

Mr. Gesell. Did he tell you to whom he had delivered the message 
at the Wliite House? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. Obviously it was not to 
Captain Beardall, who was at my house. 

Mr. Gesell. Did Captain Beardall read the message that evening? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is he did. 

Mr. Gesell. You stated that General Miles and Captain or Admiral 
Beardall discussed the message and referred to it as more or less a 
white paper. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Or a diplomatic communication. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; a justification for the Japanese position. 

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion of this sentence, which 
appears as the last sentence in paragraph 5, which is the first para- 
graph of the thirteenth part, appearing at page 244 of Exhibit 1 : 

Therefore, viewed in its entirety, tlie Japanese Government regrets that it 
cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I do not recall any specific [4668] 
instruction on that one paragraph, or I do not recall any discussion 
of that one paragraph. I believe there had been exchanges in almost 
the same words in the past, however, when a proposal was being made 
and turned down and then brought up again. 

Mr. Gesell. That sentence would indicate that negotiations were 
going to be broken off, would it not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. If taken out of its text, yes. 

Mr. Gesell. You did not think negotiations were going to be broken 
off in the first 13 parts of this message? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was not sure they would be, and I did not 
think diplomatic relations would be broken. It is one thing to break 
off current negotiations and another thing to break off diplomatic rela- 
tions.* The same negotiations, I believe, had been broken off earlier 
and then resumed. 

Mr. Gesell. So I gather the impression that you and the others 
arrived at at your home that evening was that negotiations were going 
to be broken off? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1765 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, not necessarily. That this was a re- 
joinder on the part of Japan that the last message we sent to them 
was not acceptable, which, in fact, we had not expected it to be. 

Mr, Gesell. Now you said you believed on the basis of what Captain 
Kramer has told you that you tried to reach [4669] Admiral 
Stark and Admiral Turner by telephone. Is that correct? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; that would be my natural reaction, when 
he told me had not been able earlier to reach them, that I called them 
then. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you do that, Admiral ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. I do not know, except that I 
would have that natural reaction. 

Mr. Gesell. I take it you are quite clear, however, in your recollec- 
tion that you did not talk to either of those gentlemen on the phone 
that night, is that correct ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall having talked to them, no. 

Mr. Gesell. What time did you go to your office the next morning ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. At about 8 : 30. Between 8 : 30 and 9. 

Mr. Gesell. Had you received any additional information, by tele- 
phone or otherwise, during the night ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. It was Sunday morning, but I came 
down reasonably early in order to be on hand when the 14th part was 
received. 

Mr. Gesell. You had no telephone call concerning it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. You do not recall whether anyone told you [4670] 
to come down ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, I came down anyway. 

Mr. Gesell. You were on call, I understood you to say, in case 
anyone wanted to reach you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Ever since I had taken the job. 

Mr. Gesell. What happened when you got to your office that 
morning ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I sent for Captain McCollum, who had him- 
self relieved the last man on the night watch shortly before 8 o'clock, 
and he came in and we talked over this matter, and my recollection 
is after he came in the fourteenth part was brought up to us. 

Mr. Gesell. To you and McCollum ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. To me and McCollum. It may be he came 
in with it, I am not sure, or that shortly after he arrived the fourteenth 
part came in. 

Mr. Gesell. About what time was that ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. About 9 o'clock. 

Mr. Gesell. At that same time was there brought to your desk 
the 1 o'clock message ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Was there any other message brought to you at that 
time except the fourteenth part ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not believe so. If so, it was [4671] 
of relatively minor importance and I do not recall it. 

Mr. Gesell. So at 9 o'clock on the morning of December 7 you 
had the fourteenth part in your hand, and do I understand the only 
other person in your office at that time was Captain McCollum ? 



1766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe so. There were other people in the 
office; yes; but not in my room. I mean the Office of Naval Intelli- 
gence has a number of people in it. 

Mr. Gesell. I mean the office in the sense of it being in your room. 

Admiral Wilkinson. My room ; yes. 

Mr. Gesell. After having read the fourteenth part your mind was 
clear as to the breaking off of negotiations, was it not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, it was not only clear about that, which 
was the last clause in the last paragraph, "it cannot but consider 
that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotia- 
tions," but what was more striking to me was the language in which 
this last part was couched : 

Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with 
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the estab- 
lishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially 
to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China 
at war. 

[4672] In other words, they were iSghting words, so to speak, and 
I was more impressed by that language than by the breaking off of 
negotiations, which of itself might be only temporary. Those would 
be hard words to eat. The breaking off of negotiations could be 
resumed. 

Mr. Gesell. They were really doing this in a big way, so you thought 
it was very serious? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I tliought it was very serious. 

Mr. Gesell. What did you do ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I talked to McCollum and we went to see 
Admiral Stark. 

Mr. Gesell. Where was Admiral Stark when you saw him? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He was in his office. I think we arrived there 
about 9 : 15. 

Mr. Gesell. You think you arrived there at 9 : 15 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection. 

Mr. Gesell. Using "his office" in the sense of "room" ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. His room. 

Mr. Gesell. Who else was in his room with him at that time ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. Ultimately Admiral Inger- 
soll and Admiral Turner were there, but at that moment I do not recall 
who was there besides himself. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you show Admiral Stark the 14th part? 

[4673] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. That would be about 9 : 15 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Somewhere around there, to the best of my 
recollection. 

Mr. Gesell. What discussions did you have with him concerning 
the fourteenth part at that time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I pointed out to him the seriousness 
of that language that I just mentioned, and I believe that I advised that 
the Fleet should be notified, not with any question of an attack on 
Hawaii in mind, but with the question of imminence of hostilities in 
the South China Sea. My recollection is that Admiral Stark at that 
time attempted to call General Marshall on the phone. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1767 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, did Admiral Stark have in front of him 
the 13 parts? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure whether he had them there or 
whether I brought them all down to him. Either as the result of my 
coming in or of the earlier receipt, he did have the fourteenth part, 
I am sure. 

[4674] Mr. Gesell. So by 9 : 15 or 9 : 30, you are quite clear that 
Admiral Stark had read the 14-part message? 

Admiral Wilkinson. To my recollection. 

Mr. Gesell. In its entirety ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, when you discussed with him the sending of thjs 
message to the fleet, do I understand correctly that you still did not 
have the 1 o'clock message? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. You say that you believe Admiral Stark tried to call 
General Marshall at that time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is that he did, to consult with 
him about a message of warning. 

Mr. Gesell. The telephone calls made from the outside through the 
White House switchboard on those dates, as set forth in exhibit 58, 
show that Secretary Knox called Admiral Stark at 10 : 44 a. m. Do 
you remember that call ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. They show no calls by Admiral Stark to General Mar- 
shall until 12:10. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr, Gesell. They show but two calls by General Marshall to Ad- 
miral Stark, one at 11 : 30 and one at 11 : 40. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

[4675] Mr. Gesell. Do you believe that sometime around 
9:30-— 

Admiral Wilkinson. It is my impression that Admiral Stark either 
called General Marshall, or told me he would talk with General Mar- 
shall on the subject, and I had thought he actually tried to make the 
call while I was there. 

Mr. Gesell. You think he picked up the phone and tried to make 
the call? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think so. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember his talking to General Marshall? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No ; I am quite sure he did not. 

Mr. Gesell. When did the 1 o'clock message turn up ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say roughly about 10 : 30 or 10 : 40. 

Mr. Gesell. There had been no decision up to 10 : 30 or 10 : 40 to 
send any message to the fleet ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. I had not been in there all 
the time. 

Mr. Gesell. I want you to straighten me out on that. When did 
you leave the office? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I suppose after Admiral Stark had [4^76] 
read the message. 

Mr. Gesell. And you had made your recommendation to him? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 



1768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. When did you go back to his office ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. An hour later. 

Mr. Gesell. And what was the occasion of your going back to his 
office? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I may have gone back — I am not sure — I 
may have gone back to give him the 1 o'clock message, or I may have 
gone back to receive any further information. 

Mr. Gesell. The best you can now recall is you went back? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. When, to the best of your recollection, was it that you 
received the 1 o'clock message ? 

, Admiral Wilkinson. About that time, 10 : 30 or 10 : 40. Of course, 
these intervals of time are just relative. I had no intention of checking 
the clock at each moment. It was well after the fourteenth part, in 
other words. 

Mr. Gesell. You think it was an hour later ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Or an hour and 15 minutes later? 

[4>677] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, nearly two hours later from 
the time I first saw the fourteenth part. 

Mr. Gesell. You had seen that at 8 : 30 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Between 8 : 30 and 9 : 00, yes. 

[4^78] Mr. Gesell. You are aware that there is quite a conflict 
of testimony, are you not. Admiral Wilkinson, as to when the 1 o'clock 
message was delivered to Admiral Stark ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I did not know there was a conflict in 
when it was delivered to Admiral Stark. I knew there was a conflict 
as to when it was received in the Department. 

Mr. Gesell. Your recollection as to when it was delivered to Ad- 
miral Stark is that it was about 10 : 30 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Or 10 : 40, yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Either you brought it there or you arrived at the time 
it got there? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection. 

Mr. Gesell. At that same time was there available the message 
concerning the destruction of codes, which appears in exhibit 1 at 
page 249, the first message at the top of the page, which gave the 
instructions to destroy the remaining cipher machine, the machine 
codes, immediately after deciphering the fourteenth part? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not believe so. I do not recall its being 
available at that time. 

Mr, Gesell. What discussions took place in Admiral Stark's office 
when you arrived there about 10 : 30 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not remember a discussion [^6791 
particularly. I think it was noted that this was the presentation 
period that we were looking for. It was 1 : 00 o'clock on that day. It 
was a little sooner than we had expected, because the pilot message said 
it would be several days, perhaps. That 1 : 00 o'clock in Washington 
represented varying times throughout the Pacific and the Philippines. 

I do not recall, as I have stated, that any special mention was made 
that it was daylight, or shortly after daylight, in Hawaii. 

Mr. Gesell. You knew that it was, did you not ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1769 

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, yes. It was about two hours after actual 
daylight. I think you will get the first daylight about 5 : 30 there this 
time of the year. 

Mr. Gesell. It was 7 : 30? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It was 7 : 30 actual time, about two hours after 
daylight. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember the various times that were discussed 
throughout the testimony ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think some mention was made, as often 
occurs among naval officers who are familiar with geographic time 
figures. 

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion had as to the fact that the 
Japanese had been directed to present, on a Sunday, to the Secretary of 
State, at 1 : 00 o'clock, this [4-6S0] message ? That was unusual 
as to time and unusual as to the day, was it not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I do not recall any discussion except 
that it was sooner than we had expected from the pilot.' 

Mr. Gesell. Who else was in Admiral Stark's office at that time ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe Admiral IngersoU, Admiral Turner, 
and I believe Captain McCollum. 

Mr. Gesell. Anybody else? 

Admiral Wilkinson. There may have been. I do not recall. 

Mr. Gesell. And what happened after that ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I have no recollection. I think I left the- 
office. 

Mr. Gesell. When do you think you left the office ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Within 10 or 15 minutes. 

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion of sending any warning 
message to the various outposts in the Pacific ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it at the moment. 

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion of the fact that the Secretary 
of State, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of War were meeting at 
the State Department at that time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall any conversations that [4681] 
Admiral Stark or anyone else in the room had by telephone with any 
of those Cabinet officers at that meeting ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Or any calls that they received from those Cabinet 
officers ? 

Admiral Wilkinson.. I do not recall. 

[46S2] Mr. Gesell. Or whether there was any call from the 
Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Stark ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that specifically. 

Mr. Gesell. Were there any telephone conversations had either way 
between Admiral Stark and anyone else in the office and the White 
House, President Roosevelt, or anyone else there ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. There were several of us in 
the room. Admiral Stark may have picked up the phone and talked 
with someone. At any rate, I do not recall it now. 

Mr. Gesell. When you left the office you had no indication that any 
warning message of any kind was going to be sent; is that correct? 



1770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, except that in my earlier discussion with 
Admiral Stark, I had the definite impression that after discussion 
with General Marshall, he was going to advise the fleet that the crisis 
was about to break. That was my impression. Just what caused that, 
I cannot tell you, except, as I say, I thought I recalled our mentioning 
it, that he picked upon the phone to call General Marshall, or at least 
he told me he was going to call General Marshall. 

Mr. Gesell. When you saw him the second time, and [4^83] 
he had the 1 o'clock message, he had much more specific information 
than when you saw him the first time, as to when things were going to 
happen, did he not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He had the specific information about when 
the message was to be delivered. He had no indication that anything 
else was going to happen. It would be inference. 

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion that it was likely that the 
Japanese would time some action with the delivery of that note ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall any. It would be possible that 
they would strike before or after, and at the very moment of delivery 
it was not too significant. It really looked as though they wanted the 
thing delivered as soon as they could. They sent it over the wire one 
day and the next day said, "Turn it over at 1 o'clock." 

Mr. Gesell. I understand your testimony to be : when you left, after 
you had been there the second time, you had no specific statement from 
Admiral Stark that he was going to send a message to the fleet. 

Admiral AVilkinson. I recall an impression. Whether that im- 
pression was born in a specific statement, or born because of the atmos- 
phere of the room, or recommendations of other officers, I do not know. 
I just have an impression [4(^S4] he was going to consult with 
General Marshall, and advise the fleet, not that an attack was coming 
on Hawaii, but that something was about to break in the Japanese 
situation, and that the fleet should be prepared to steam, or whatever 
would be brought out by the action which, in fact, did result. 

[468S] Mr. Gesell. There Avas no drafting of any message at 
that time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; not in my sight. 

Mr. Gesell. On the second occasion was there any mention made 
of Hawaii? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, except that it might have been men- 
tioned, and J am not sure that it was, that 1 o'clock here was 7:30 
there, or something of that sort. 

Mr. Gesell. What was your reference to the fleet being prepared 
to steam ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, what I meant was that if there was 
an indication that something was going to break it would be the 
natural desire of the Chief of Operations to advise the fleet it was 
about to break so that if there was any immediate departure from 
port necessary to fend off an attack, to start for some distant position, 
either to defend it or to intercept some attacking force — at any rate, 
he should beforwarned so that he could complete any last-needed 
stores in order to have the fleet immediately ready instead of generally 
ready. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, it is your recollection that you did not have at 
that time the message telling the Japanese to destroy their codes upon 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1771 

the completion of the translation of the fourteenth part ? When did 
you get that message ? 

[46S6] Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall. I imagine I got 
it subsequently because it brings no recollection to me; and, ob- 
viously, after the attack became known we wouldn't be interested in 
the destruction of the machine. 

Mr. Gesell. When did you next go back to the office of Admiral 
Stark ?^ 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I was at my office until some time 
past noon, went to lunch at home, and while at lunch got a telephone 
call and hurried back. 

Mr. Gesell. After you left, that second occasion you were there, 
you had no further conversations with him by telephone or otherwise ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not until after the attack. 

Admiral Gesell. You had no information then that a message was 
being sent by the Army or what the terms of it were ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. The officers were to be advised. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Never heard of it for hours if not days. 

Mr. Gesell. During this period that we have been talking about, 
the last month or 6 weeks or 2 months before the attack, Admiral, 
did you have any means in the Office of Naval Intelligence of keeping 
posted on diplomatic developments? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. There were several channels by 
[4687] which we had contact with the State Department. I, my- 
self, rarely, if ever, was called to the State Department for a con- 
ference, but the Director of the Central Division, Captain Schuir- 
mann, was the Chief of Naval Operations' direct representative with 
the State Department and he advised me usually of what transpired 
on the occasions that he was called in conference. 

Mr. Gesell. He was not attached to your office ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, he was on the same level, as the head of 
the Central Division. 

Also we had a lieutenant commander, Delaney Hunter, of the Naval 
Reserve, who was our liaison officer on the lower level, so to speak, 
and he went over to the State Department daily and searched through 
the dispatches there, and was shown dispatches from all parts of the 
world, and made copies of a number of them and extracts of them 
which because of code security could not be copied direct, and brought 
those back and gave me every day a list of State Department dis- 
patches which were of interest to us. 

Those dispatches, that little paper, usually a dozen pages, was cir- 
culated daily within the office of Naval Intelligence and within the 
office of the Chief of Operations. 

Mr. Gesell. Those were diplomatic dispatches? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

[4688] Mr. Gesell. Well, now, did you have any means of 
knowing what was taking place in the discussions between Secretary 
Hull and President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassadors? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, in the first place, I saw the incoming 
magic, and usually I saw the outgoing magic, wherein the Ambassador 
was telling Tokyo what he had been doing. If something, on the 
other hand, was sent from the State Department to Mr. Grew to pre- 



1772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sent over there. I would not see it unless I was told it by Captain 
Schuirmann. 

Mr, Gesell. Or your man went over and read the dispatches ? 

Admiral Wilkinson, He read only the incoming dispatches. I 
don't think he read the outgoing dispatches. 

Mr. Gesell. So you knew what Ambassador Grew was reporting? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; in general, yes. 

Mr. Gesell. You also knew in a general way what progress was 
being made and what recommendations were being made in the nego- 
tiations with the Japanese Ambassadors here ? 

Admiral Wilkinson, Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. By the way, did you know that Ambassador Grew in 
February, 1941 had said that he picked up a rumor that there was a 
likelihood of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Senator Brewster. Wasn't it January? 

Mr. Gesell. I see the press nodding their heads, so I am sure you 
are riglit, Senator. 

[46S&] Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure whether I knew that 
at that time or not. I have heard it since, of course. 

Mr. Gesell. Of course, that was 

Admiral Wilkinson. It w^as in line with the fears, the apprehen- 
sions of the whole Island, that the primary thing was an air attack. 

Mr. Gesell. Of course, that was a message prior to your becoming 
Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted with respect to the placing of 
embargoes and freezing orders on the Japanese? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was not consulted and I don't think Admiral 
Kirk was. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you have anything to do. Admiral, with the joint 
memoranda which General Marshall and Admiral Stark presented to 
the President, of November 5 and November 27 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No; I wasn't aware of their existence until 
quite recently. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you receive information from Admiral Stark and 
Captain Schuirmann, and others who were dealing with the Secretary 
of State and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, as to 
what was taking place at the War Council meetings and at meetings 
in Secretary Hull's office ? 

[4690] Admiral Wilkinson. Occasionally from Captain Schuir- 
mann. Not as a matter of routine. 

Mr. Gesell. There was no regular way of your being briefed on 
what was taking place in those, you might call, policy conferences? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. You see, that links up with that other 
question, whether I was consulted on the warning messages and so 
on. Our office was an incoming and receiving office of information 
from abroad and from the domestic areas. We were not concerned 
with the outgoing directives for the Fleet nor in fact told of the 
movements and operations of our own forces. When we got into the 
war I arranged for the setting up of a war room and thereupon we 
did to a large degree get the movements of our forces laid out so that 
we might have a better understanding and interpretation of the infor- 
mation from abroad. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1773 

But prior to getting into the war we did not know the United States 
side of an argument that was going on. 

Mr, Gesell. I asked you whether you had anything to do with the 
joint memorandum to the President of November 5. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. There is attached to that document some supporting 
papers, it is exhibit 16 here, a memorandum dated November 1 from 
Captain Boone of the Far Eastern Section. Have [iOQl] you 
ever seen that dispatch ? I will show it to j^ou. 

AdmiraHViLKiNSON. I am sure I did. 

Mr. Gesell. That would suggest that perhaps you had some con- 
tact with that joint memorandum of the 5th. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, only that this is part of the information 
that they had at hand. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, that w^ould be written to estimate the 
specific situation but without regard to the basic matters being dis- 
cussed in the memorandum ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. This was some of the data upon 
which they based their decision. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any detailed knowledge of the Singa- 
pore staff conferences and other conferences which had been taking 
place between the Americans, the British and the Dutch? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, only that they had been held. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you know that the Army — rather, did you know 
that a reconnaissance had been ordered by the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, an air reconnaissance, for the purpose of picking up movements 
around the Kra Peninsula? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I think I was aware of that. 

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted in connection with the ordering of 
that reconnaissance? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

[4-692] Mr. Gesell. Did you see the various reports that came 
in, as are included in Exhibit 78 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think so. 

Mr. Gesell. But you had nothing to do with the decision to make 
the reconnaissance? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. That was a recomiaissance to confirm the 
evidences which we were getting of a movement south and to deter- 
mine the precise locations of the Japanese ships and the degree and 
intensity of the movement. It confirmed the reports which we had 
received from our various coastal observers. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you see a disj^atch of December 2 sent by the Chief 
of Naval Operations to Admiral Hart expressing the President's de- 
sire to set up a so-called defensive information patrol by stationing 
three vessels in that area for reconnaissance purposes? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall having seen it. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you know whether or not any such patrol was ever 
in fact established. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, I don't know. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you ever recall seeing the dispatch from Admiral 
Hart to the Chief of Naval Operations dated December 6 concerning 
the movement of Japanese vessels toward the Kra Peninsula, which 
is part of Exhibit 66, which I now [4003] show vou ? 



1774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I think I saw that. I note that it has 
been signed for in my office. Although it does not bear my initials, 
I presume it was called to my attention. 

[4-694-] Mr. Gesell. Do you recall a discussion of that piece of 
information on the 6th with anyone ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall the discussion. It had been 
sent to War Plans and Chief of Operations. So it seems no discussion 
was necessary. It was an indication that the movement was progress- 
ing as anticipated. 

Mr. Gesell. You don't recall having any discussion with anyone 
concerning it ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall having any discussion with anyone con- 
cerning the dispatches contained in exhibit 79 relating to the so-called 
Dutch alert? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I recall some of them. I can't say specifically 
which. 

Mr. Gesell. What is your recollection of the incident covered by 
those dispatches ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection of both the dispatches and 
of the contact with tlie Dutch naval attache at the time was that the 
Dutch were seriously worried about the implied threat to the Dutch 
East Indies possessions by the Japanese movement down through the 
South China Sea, and that these dispatches had to do with such con- 
cern of theirs. It was more confirmatory evidence of the movement 
which eventually took place. 

[4695] Mr. Gesell. That refers to the belief of the Dutch that 
there were fleet dispositions by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands. 
I gather from the dispatches that it was not the view of the Office of 
Naval Intelligence that the forces there were as strong as the Dutch 
had believed? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe that was the case, although we had 
some indications that the Marshall Islands further to the westward 
Palaus, that there was a force building up there, and the Pearl Harbor 
unit and the Corregidor unit were both watching for such radio intel- 
ligence indications as they could get as to the location of the Japanese 
ships, and there was a difference between them. 

Corregidor, which we believed to be slightly more accurate, felt that 
there was no pronounced indications of a strong task force in the 
Marshalls, while the Pearl Harbor unit felt there was, but we didn't 
believe that there was a large force in the Palaus, as I recall. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you ever receive any information from the Dutch, 
British, or any other friendly nation, which indicated that the Japanese 
were moving toward Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. That there was likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

[4^96] Mr. Gesell. Did you know that the Naval Intelligence 
officer at Pearl Harbor had discontinued the tapping of a certain tele- 
phone of the Japanese consul on the 2d of December ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. I think we were getting information in 
the last part of that period prior to the attack by such methods, but I 
didn't know whether it was the district intelligence officer, or the FBI 
that was getting that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1775 

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any information of the discontinuance of 
the tapping of the phones by the Naval Intelligence officer ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you ever receive, prior to the attack, any knowl- 
edge of the so-called Mori telephone tap ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure what that is. If that is the one 
about the flowers 

Mr. Gesell. I will show it to you. 

Admiral Wilkinson. About poinsettias 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. You did not know of that in the Office of Naval 
Intelligence prior to the attack ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. I think perhaps if the committee please, we .might 
designate that conversation Exhibit 84, because [4^97] there 
will be other questions concerning it with other witnesses, and I will 
introduce it at this time. 

The Vice Chairman. Exhibit 84? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 84,") 

Mr. Gesell. One final question, which has to do with these messages 
involving code burning ; I neglected to ask you whether you had had 
any conversations with General Miles concerning the sending of those 
messages, particularly the message to Hawaii ? 

Admiral Wii-kinson. I don't recall any. I think it very probable 
I did. 

Mr. Gesell. He stated, at page 2103, that he had conversations with 
you concerning that. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No doubt we did. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall ever having discussed with him the ques- 
tion of that message sent in such terms that it would also go to the 
Army as well as the Navy ? 

Admiral Wh^kinson. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, I think that is all the questions we have 
at this time. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, I would like to ask you [4698] 
a few questions, if I may please, sir. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You were Chief of the Office of Naval Intel- 
ligence on December 7, 1941 ? 

Admiral Wilkiijson. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you say you became Chief of ONI — 
when was it ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. October 15. 

The Vice Chairman. October 15, 1941 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you continued how long ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Until July 20, 1942. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you ever think an attack would be made 
on Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That was possible, but improbable. 

The Vice Chairman. How is that ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was possible, but improbable. 



1776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Did you ever at any time prior to December 
7, 1941, reach tlie conclusion that an attack on Pearl Harbor was 
jn-obable ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you ever think such an attack would be 
made ? 

[4-699] Admiral Wilkinson. I had been out there, Mr. Chair- 
man, for nearly 2 years, up until the spring of 1941. 

The entire time I was there, I thought it was possible that if any 
war arose, or should any war be in progress, that an attack on Pearl 
Harbor was possible ; but neither then nor on my — after my departure 
in May of 1941 — nor when I was in Naval Intelligence, did I think it 
v.as probable. I always thought it was possible. Almost anything is 
l)ossible in war, given the tools that can reach the objective. 

The Japanese had those tools. 

The Vice Chairman. But on up until December 1941, you did not 
think such an attack would be made ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not think it was probable. 

The Vice Chairman. Even though you had examined and were fa- 
miliar with the 14-part message, the so-called pilot message, or the 1 
o'clock message, you still did not think an attack on Pearl Harbor was 
probable ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. All of those indicated, Mr. Chairman, that 
Japan was breaking off the negotiations for the adjustment of affairs 
in the Pacific. 

On the evidences indicated, that she was expanding down through 
tlie South China Sea, going into Indochina, Siam, possibly the Kra 
Peninsula, on the basis of the phj'sical [4700] evidences before 
us and on the basis of the breaking off of the negotiations — and those 
negotiations, you will remember, were designed to stop the infiltration 
or the movement of the Japs into Indochina and into those southern 
areas — on the basis of that, I figured that they were going to stop the 
negotiations and go on with their nefarious designs down there. 

None of those messages gave me any cause to guess — and it would 
have been a guess only, and I am sorry I didn't guess it — but none 
of them gave me any suspicion or cause to guess that an attack would 
be made on Pearl Harbor any more than on any other United States 
objective. In fact, I did not think an attack would be made on any 
United States objective, but I though that the Japanese would pursue 
a course of successive movements, infiltration, trying the patience and 
temper of the Anglo-Saxon nations without actually urging them 
into war. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you, during that time. Admiral, think 
that an attack on any other point of the United States positions was 
more probable than the attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I though that as one went westward of Pearl 
Harbor, the probabilities increased. In other words, the Philippines 
was the most probable, Guam the next, [4701] Wake the next, 
Midway the last, the last before Hawaii. 

I did not think an attack on any of those was probable because I 
did not think there was a probability of an attack on any United States 
possession to thrust us, invite us, as it were, into war. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1777 

I, perhaps, gave the Japanese credit for less boldness and more 
political canniness 

The Vice Chairman. Or common sense ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Than tliey possessed. 

The Vice Cfiairman. Or common sense? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Or common sense, to my mind, yes, sir. 

In other words, I thought an attack on any United States possession 
was not probable but that the degree of probability increased, rather 
decreased, as you went from the Philippines eastward. 

The Vice Chairman. You were familiar and, of course, kept posted 
with the progress of the negotiations that were then being carried on 
by our State Department with the Japanese representatives? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

\4.'^03] The Vice Chairman. And still, in view of all of that, 
and the situation that appeared to be developing, more tense, on reach- 
ing a critical stage, you still did not think that war between the 
United States and Japan was probable? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was probable but not inevitable, 
and I thought that — in my ill advised opinion — that it would come 
by easy stages, and that the Japs would try our patience as far as 
they could to avoid getting into war. They had been successful in 
Manchuria, China, and Indochina. I had heard of this imaginary 
line of 100° east longitude and 10° north latitude and I had some 
doubt as to whether we would be able, in the light of the temper of 
the country, to back that conclusion up. 

As I understand it, the conclusion was, there was actually no promise 
that we would go to war, but that we would think it was a serious' 
matter if they crossed that line. I had some doubt whether the coun- 
try would be seriously concerned as to matters in that part of the 
world, and I thought the Japanese were going to push their luck in 
that part of the world as far as they could. 

[^fOS] The Vice Chairman, Admiral, did you ever at any time 
prior to December 7, 1941, reach the conclusion that war between Japan 
and the United States was inevitable? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I thought that war was becoming 
increasingly probable, but from all the angles that I saw it from, I 
did not think it was inevitable. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, as I understood you to say, you did not 
know that the warning message of November 27, 1941, was sent to the 
commander of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander of the Pacific 
Fleet for some days after it was sent. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure whether it was hours or days. 
I think about 2 days. 

The Vice Chairman. It was about 2 days after the sending of that 
message before you found out that it had been sent? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think so, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to state that it was not a 
part of the responsibility of the position that you held to be familiar 
with messages going from the Chief of Naval Operations to the com- 
manders of the fleets ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, unless I had had some share in the 
initiation of them, myself, when, of course. I would want to know 
whether they had been sent or not. 

79716 — 46— pt. 4 14 



1778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Am I correct in my understanding that 
[j^7^^] you also state that it was not a part of your responsibility 
to even keep up with the various locations of the fleets of the United 
States throughout the world ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. That was another Office of Opera- 
tions, the so-called Ship Movements office, that had care of that, that 
took care of that, and we were privileged to inspect their records and 
their boards but we had no record of that of our own and we were not 
kept informed of it. Our activities were one-sided in that we were 
responsible for the information on the foreign navies and the foreign 
elements but not for our own. 

The Vice Chairman. That is what caused me to wonder how you 
could operate intelligently as the word "intelligence" would imply 
witliout knowing where our Fleet units were ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It did cause some difficulties at times and ulti- 
mately, as I explained, after the war started I got at the information 
and was able to keep our own boards posted with where our own forces 
were. 

The Vice Chairman. But I believe you had stated that it was a part 
of your responsibility to keep informed as to the location and move- 
ments of potential enemy fleets ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Or the fleets of other countries of the world? 

[4.704 A] Admiral Wilkinson. Not only of potential enemies but 
of all countries, yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. The fleets of all other countries ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you state, I believe, that at various times 
you were not prepared to give information as to the location of various 
units of the fleets of some of the other countries of the world? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. There were many ways in which 
we could detect them. First, of course, by actually sighting, whether 
by our own merchant ships or whether by our naval attaches or naval 
ODservers or consuls at the various points. 

Then, second, we could detect them by radio bearings. If we got 
so-called radio direction finders it would indicate that this radio 
message was coming from such and such a spot or if we could obtain 
by the call that the ship was using and the message she was sending, 
whether we could translate it or not, we could identifj^ the call, then 
we knew that ship was there and perhaps we would add up some other 
ships that we knew were usually in company with it, but when the 
actual sightings failed us and when the radio direction finders failed 
us and wnen radio indications were no longer of avail, as when a ship 
went into complete radio silence and they even [4.7'05'\ stopped 
sending messages to her, why, then she disappeared into the void and 
we might not pick her up for some little time, that ship or a number of 
them with her. 

The Vice Chairman. You say there was a part of the Japanese 
fleet that was lost, or not accounted for, for some period of time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, for some 3 weeks prior to the attack. 

The Vice Chairman. For some 3 weeks? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Several battleships and several carriers. 

The Vice Chairman. How is that ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Several battleships and several carriers were 
lost for some 3 weeks prior to the attack. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1779 

The Vice Chairman. Did you receive any information or gain any 
intelligence from any source about the Japanese task force leaving 
Japan on about, I believe, November 25th, which was the task force 
that finally resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Our only indication was that she was 
not in other waters, that they were in home waters either close to Japan 
or somewhere in the sea off Japan where we had no means of detecting 
them. We did not know that they had actually sailed from Japan. 
When we knew that [4706] they were not down to the south 
from all we could pick up, they were either based on or leaving Japaii 
proper. 

The Vice Chairman. As the situation appeared to grow more crit- 
ical did you increase your efforts to locate or ascertain the location of 
the units of the Japanese fleet ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. The Corregidor station, the Pearl 
Harbor station and ourselves were all anxious to get all the informa- 
tion we could. The commander in chief of the fleet in Pearl Harbor 
was aware that they were unlocated and he was trying to find them 
but there were simply no evidences except the negative evidence that 
nothing could be learned. 

We have had similar experiences, of course, in this last war. Ad- 
miral Halsey's fleet has popped up frequently in a very annoying posi- 
tion for the Japanese when they had not been able to locate him. 

The Vice Chairman. I thank you. Senator George would be next 
but he is not able to be present at the moment. Mr. Clark. Mr. Clark 
of North Carolina will inquire. 

Admiral Wilkinson. How do you do, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Admiral, there are just two or three questions in my 
mind that I would like to have your opinions on. I hope you will not 
consider this in the nature of cross-examination and I appreciate the 
difficulty of forming questions [4707] and probable replies 

after the event without being influenced by the event itself. 

I want to go back prior to December the 7th and look at the things 
that are in my mind from that angle, sir, and I want to ask your opin- 
ion as to the strength of our military establishment in Hawaii prior 
to December the 7th, from the standpoint of an attacking force, 
whether it would be possible to take it, what would be the size of that 
undertaking and the likelihood of its success, including landing and 
taking the island ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. To land and take it I would say it would take 
a very large force, a force probably larger than the Japanese could 
muster, of shipping and troops, in view, particularly, of the shipping 
and troops that they were using in the South China Sea. 

Mr. Clark. Well, now, with the expansion going on to the south 
as it was and did, would there be any slight likelihood of such an 
attack on the Hawaiian Islands by the Japanese ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Very slight, if at all, because of the known 
limitations of the Japanese shipping to carry the expeditionary force 
that would be necessary to land and take the island. 

Mr. Clark. Yes. Now, aside from that kind of an attack. 
[4708] how would the Hawaiian area be vulnerable? 

Admiral Wilkinson. How would it be vulnerable? 

Mr. Clark. Yes. 



1780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. It would be vulnerable, of course, to a hit- 
and-run raid, which is precisely what it got. The Japanese were very 
fortunate, I think, that they were able to get in and out without de- 
tection. 

Mr. Clark. But what they did does demonstrate that that kind of 
a raid was possible. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Was possible and without warning, and even 
with warning our carrier task forces have made the same raids on 
the Philippines and on Japan throughout this war. 

Mr. Clark. I assume that is why our forces had from time to 
time gone through what you call war games, in which a surprise attack 
by air was practiced ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I presume so, sir, yes. 

Mr. Clark. Now, what about subversive activities ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. What, sir ? 

Mr. Clark. It would be vulnerable also from the standpoint of sub- 
versive activities? 

Admiral Wilkinson. We had always been apprehensive about that 
because of the large Japanese population. As it happened, that popu- 
lation was in the main very friendly and to the best of my knowledge 
there was no large-scale sabotage at all. 

[4.709] Mr. Clark. Now, did you know of the telegram or radio- 
gram, whatever it was, that General Miles in G-2 sent warning against 
subversive activities? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure that I did. I think I probably 
did, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Did the Navy send any similar communications? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, because it was the Army's responsibility 
to control the civilian population. 

Mr. Clark. I beg your pardon ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, because it was the Army's responsibility 
to control the civilian population. 

Mr. Clark. I think it was General Marshall who first suggested 
here that the Hawaiian Islands and our military establishment there 
was on the Hank of this Japanese movement to the south. What would 
be the importance of that militarily ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Simply this, sir, that if your life line to an 
objective is longer in time or in distance from your home bases than 
the enemy is distant from that life line at any point, then you may 
be subjected to attack and to a severance of that life line. 

Mr. Clark. Yes. Now, if our establishment in Hawaii had not 
been attacked and we had remained in the full control of the whole 
establishment, naval and air and army, would that [^/^O] have 
constituted a serious threat to Japanese movement south? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No doubt they would have been much con- 
cerned. I do not know whether our forces advancing from that line 
would have had to pass through the danger of air attack from the 
mandated islands, the Japanese islands, and it may have been that the 
damage we would receive from those islands might have beaten off 
the attack we might have been in the process of making, in other words, 
defeated the threat, but I can well understand the Japanese might 
be apprehensive about it. 

Mr. Clark. You do not understand the Japanese would be appre- 
hensive about an attack by our entire Hawaiian establishment in this 
long movement they were making south ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1781 

Admiral Wilkinson. I should think they would, yes. 

Mr. Clark. Well, wouldn't that be of very great concern to them 
as a military matter ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I should think so. 

Mr. Clark. Now, did the Hawaiian Islands in that respect occupy 
a position any different from the Philippines or the Canal Zone? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Only as the geographic distances are involved. 
They were much less important, much less threatening than the 
Philippines. 

Mr. Clark. I beg your pardon? 

[4'^IJ] Admiral Wilkinson. They were much less threatening 
to the Japanese than the Philippines. They were more threatening 
to the Japs than the Panama Canal military establishment. The 
Panama Canal was a means of uniting the oceans, of course, but the 
greatest military and naval threat, I think, to the southern advance, 
to the southern extension of the Japanese, was the Philippines. 
Next after that, because the intervening bases of Guam and Wake were 
inconsequential, and Midway, next after that was Hawaii. 
• Mr. Clark. Well, now, am I to understand — and my own ignorance 
of military matters is perfectly complete, sir, so you will have to 
excuse me if I appear not to understand 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not profess to know too much, sir. 

Mr. Clark. But do I understand from the military viewpoint 
the threat of the Hawaiian establishment to this Japanese movement 
south was not serious ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think if the Hawaiian establishment had not 
been largely depleted that the Japanese would in normal military pre- 
cautions have had to feel their way to the southward much less rapidly 
than they did advance. I think they could still have advanced into 
Indochina and the Kra Peninsula. I assume that they could have gone 
much more rapidly into Java and into Borneo. It is a question of 
whether [471£] they could have gone into the Philippines and 
maintained themselves there. It would doubtless have brought on a 
fleet battle and our forces, had they^ advanced across the Pacific, would 
have been subjected to attacks by air from the Japanese air bases on 
the islands and they would have been doubtless subjected to attack 
by the Japanese Fleet. What the outcome of that would have been 
I do not know. Our navy was much smallet then than it was ulti- 
mately, and, in fact, at that time it was smaller than the Japanese Fleet 
in the Pacific. 

Mr. Clark. Well, I am sorry to consume so much time. What is 
rolling over in my mind is whether Hawaii as it stood before the attack 
constituted such a threat to the Japanese movement south that an 
attack or some effort to remove that threat might reasonably have been 
anticipated on our side of the fence ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I see what you mean, sir, and I think that it 
is a very sound presumption. Against it, perhaps, are the two facts: 
First, it would require extreme boldness, which they did actually show, 
because of the risk involved ; and, second, it would be a presumption 
that the Japanese were prepared to attack the United States in a spot 
which would be certain to plunge them immediately into the war. 

[4713] If, as I was mentioning to the chairman, they had deter- 
mined to feel their way to the southward, to gain as much ground as 
possible without antagonizing and bringing on their heads the Anglo- 



1782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Saxon nations, they would not, of course, have been tempted to dispose 
of this threat because the threat would not have been operating against 
them. 

Mr. Clark. An attack in force with an attempt to take the islands 
being pretty inconsistent with their rapid extension south, and they 
having been warned specifically in Hawaii, our people, against sub- 
versive activities, a surprise air attack was the only thing, the only 
possibility left open, was it not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. With respect to Hawaii, yes, sir, and sub- 
marines. 

Mr. Clark. I am talking about with respect to Hawaii. 

Admiral Wilkinson. And submarine attack. 

Mr. Clark. Yes. Now, did you or anybody in all of the discussions 
that you ever heard of this whole situation, ever suggest the likelihood 
or the probability of a surprise air attack on the Hawaiian Islands and 
that there should be a specific warning against that, just as there was 
against subversive activities? 

Admiral Wilkinson, For the entire year, sir, there had been dis- 
cussion in various correspondence and plans laid out \_Ii7HY 
about air attack and I think that was in the mind of everyone there, 
the very possibility of a surprise air attack. 

Mr. Clark. Will you pardon me, sir? I am thoroughly familiar 
with some correspondence which General Marshall, and perhaps oth- 
ers, had back a good many months prior to that and the message from 
the Ambassador to Japan which has been referred to. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. What I had in mind in asking you that question was 
the two or three weeks preceding Pearl Harbor and particularly from 
the 27th of November to the 7th of December. 

Admiral Wilkinson. May I have the concluding part of the ques- 
tion before this interpolation ? 

Mr. Clark. I do not mind just asking the question again, sir. If 
you will allow me, I will repeat the question. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I wish you would, sir. I was a little confused. 

Mr. Clark. As to whether or not, it being pretty generally conceded 
that Hawaii was right impregnable against an all-out assault for the 
purpose of taking the islands, and the command at Hawaii having been 
specifically warned against subversive activities, did anyone in the 
Navy or the Army or any other person in military life to whom you 
talked between H715] the 27th of November and the 7th of 
December ever suggest specifically the possibility of an air attack and 
specific warning against that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think not, sir. The subversive warning, you 
will recall, was to the Army only and there was a general war warning 
sent to the Fleet as a whole, but I heard no specific mention as you 
suggest. 

Mr. Clark. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. It is now 4 o'clock and. Admiral Wilkinson, 
I will ask you to please return at 10 o'clock in the morning and Senator 
Lucas will be recognized. 

The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock in the morning. 
(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., December 17, 1045, an adjournment was 
taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, December 18, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1783 



W16-] PEAKL HAEBOR ATTACK 



TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1945 

Congress of thb United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

or the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., 
in the Caucus Eoom (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator 
Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Fer- 

gison, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, 
earhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D, Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[^/i7] The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. Does counsel have anything at this time ? 

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, one or two small matters. 

From time to time we wish to place in the record evidence that has 
come along that has been gotten in response to requests. We have 
three highly significant documents here which I would simply like 
to have spread on the record. They relate to the meeting at Argentia. 

The State Department has delivered to us three memoranda pre- 
pared by Mr. Sumner Welles covering his conversations with the 
President and Prime Minister Churchill at sea on August 10 and 
August 11. These relate to the so-called parallel action matter and 
I, simply, without taking the time of the committee to read these 
memoranda, would like to suggest that they be spread upon the record. 
They were made available to us yesterday. We had them immedi- 
ately mimeographed and in view of their importance I wish to place 
them in the record immediately. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered. Each 
member of the committee has been furnished a copy ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. And they may, I think for convenience, fol- 
lowing the suggestion of Senator Ferguson made the other day, be 
designated 22-B, so that they will run along with Exhibit 22 which 
contains the other documents relating to this subject. 

{^^718'\ The Vice Chairman. These will be designated exhibit 
22-B, is that correct? 

Senator Brewster. There are several of them. Shouldn't they be 
B,C,D, and so forth? 

Mr. Gesell. Very well. We'll designate the one of August 10, 
22-B, the one covering the morning conference of August 22-C 
and the one covering the afternoon conference of August 11, 22-D. 

The Vice Chairman. Very well. 



1784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(The documents referred to were marked Exhibits Nos. 22-B, 22-C 
and 22-D, and follow:) 

[^7i5] Depaetment of State 

MEMORANDUM OF CXJNVERSATION 

Date : Sunday, August 10, 1941 At Sea. 
Subject : British-American Cooperation. 
Participants : 

Sir Alexander Cadogan. 
The Under Secretary of State. 
Copies to : 

I accompanied the President this morning to attend the religious services and 
the lunch which the Prime Minister was giving for the President on the PRINCE 
OF WALES. Sir Alexander Cadogan told me before lunch that in accordance 
with the conversation which was had between the President, the Prime Minister, 
Sir Alexander and myself at the President's dinner last night he had made two 
tentative drafts covering proposed parallel and simultaneous declarations by the 
United States and British Governments relating to Japanese policy in the Pacific 
and of a proposed joint declaration to be made by the President and the Prime 
Minister when their present meeting was terminated. The two drafts read as 
follows : 

"Draft of Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government. 

14720] "Declaration by the United States Government that : 

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would 
produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled 
to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the United 
States and Japan. 

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japarl in conse- 
quence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would 
have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power." 

"Declaration by His Majesty's Government that: 

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would 
produce a situation in which His Majesty's Government would be compelled to 
take counter measures even though these might lead to war between Great 
Britain and Japan. 

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in conse- 
quence of such counter measures or of their support of them. His Majesty's 
Government would give all possible aid to such Power." 

"Declaration by the Netherlands Government : 

[4721] "1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific 
would produce a situation in which Her Majesty's Government would be com- 
pelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the 
Netherlands and Japan. 

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in conse- 
quence of such counter measures or of their support of them, Her Majesty's 
Government would give all possible aid to such Power." 

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether 
they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration. 

The draft of the proposed joint declaration reads as follows : 

"The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, 
Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, 
being met together to resolve and concert the means of providing for the safety 
of their respective countries in face of Nazi and German aggression and of the 
dangers to all peoples arising therefrom, deem it right to make known certain 
principles which they both accept for guidance in the framing of [4722] 
their policy and on which they base their hopes for a better future for tlie world. 

"First, their counjtries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other ; 

"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with 
the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned ; 

"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government 
under which they will live; they are only concerned to defend the rights of 
freedom of speech and of thought without which such choosing must be illusory; 

"Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1785 

essential produce not only within their territorial jurisdiction but between the 
nations of the world. 

"Fifth, they seek a peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi 
tyranny but by effective international organization will afford to all States and 
peoples the means of dwelling in security within their own bounds and of 
traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or need of getting 
burdensome armaments." 

As I was leaving the ship to accompany the Presi- [4723] dent back 
to his flagship, Mr. Churchill said to me that he had likewise given the President 
copies of these documents. He impressed upon me his belief that some declara- 
tion of the kind he had drafted with respect to Japan was in his opinion in the 
highest degree important, and that he did not think that there was much hope 
left unless the United States made such a clear-cut declaration of preventing 
Japan from expanding further to the south, in which event the prevention of 
war between Great Britain and Japan appeared to be hopeless. He said in the 
most emphatic manner that if war did break out between Great Brit,ain and 
Japan, Japan immediately would be in a position through the use of her large 
number of cruisers to seize or to desti'oy all of the British merchant shipping 
in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, and to cut the lifelines between the British 
Dominions and the British Isles imless the United States herself entered the 
war. He pled with me that a declaration of this character participated in by 
the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions, the Netherlands and possibly 
the Soviet Union would definitely restrain Japan. If this were. not done, the 
blow to the British Government might be almost decisive. 

Sumner Welles. 
U SW. GAM 



['i724] Department OF State 

MEMOEANDUM of CONVB3SSATION 

Date : Mondat, August 11, 1941. At Sea. 

Subject : British-American Cooperation. 
Participants : 

The President. 

The British Prime Minister. 

Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. 

The Honorably Harry Hopkins. 

The Under Secretary of State. 
Copies to : 



The President received Mr. Churchill this morning on the Augusta at 
11 :00 a. m. There were present at the meeting Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry 
Hopkins and myself. 



The conference commenced with the subject of Portugal. The President 
read to Mr. Churchill the letter addressed to the former by the Prime Minister 
of Portugal. It was agreed by both that the contents of the letter were highly 
satisfactory and made possible without any diflSculty the carrying out of arrange- 
ments for the occupation of the Azores as a means of assurance that the islands 
would not be occupied by Germany. 

[Handwritten note:! Card for Atlantic Charter. 

[4725] Mr. Churchill stated that a highly secret operation had been decided 
Tipon by the British Government, namely, the occupation of the Canary Islands 
during the days immediately after the September full moon. This date, as Mr. 
Churchill remembered it, would be about the 15th of September. The British 
Government were undertaking this operation with full knowledge that the islands 
hnd been recently heavily fortified and that a very large number of German oflS- 
cers were engaged there in the training and preparation of the Spanish troops. 
It was undertaken with the further realization that this step would almost inev- 
itably involve a Spanish attack either in conjunction with or upon the instigation 
of German military forces and that such attack would render untenable by the 
British Navy the harbor of Gibraltar. The ^^ritish Government, however, had 
decided upon the step in view of its belief that the situation in Spain from the 



1786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

British standpoint was going from bad to worse and that Hitler almost inevitably 
would undertake the occupation of Spain and Portugal with the subsequent pene- 
tration of North Africa if any collapse took place on the part of the Russian Army 
or even if a winter stalemate resulted. In that event Mr. Churchill stated Gibral- 
tar would be isolated anyway and the occupation by Great Britain of the Canary 
Islands was of the utmost [^726] importance in guarding a southern 
Atlantic convoy route into the British Isles. 

In view of this operation, the British Government would not be in a position 
conveniently to carry out the commitment they had made to the Portuguese Gov- 
ernment to assist in the defense of the Azores. 

In view of the contents of Dr. Salazar's letter to the President, it was therefore 
agreed that the British Government immediately upon the return of Mr. Churchill 
to London would notify Dr. Salazar that the British GoTernment could not con- 
veniently undertake to assist in the defense of the Azores and would further 
inform Dr. Salazar that they therefore desired him to request the United States 
for such assistance. It was agreed on the part of the President that immediately 
upon the receipt of such notification from Dr. Salazar the United States would 
send the necessary forces of occupation to the Azores and that the Brazilian Gov- 
ernment would be simultaneously requested to send at least a token force to take 
part in the expedition. 

The President stated to Mr. Churchill that in view of our present military situ- 
ation if the United States undertook to occupy the Azores it would not be in a 
position in the near future at least to undertake the protection of the Cape Verde 
Islands. Mr. Churchill [4727] stated that the British Government would 
be in a position to occupy the Cape Verde Islands with the understanding that it 
would later turn over the protection of those islands to the United States at such 
time as the United States was in a position to take those measures. Mr. Churchill 
further stated that during the time that the United States was landing the neces- 
sary forces in the Azores, the British Navy would maintain a large force between 
the Azores and the mainland of Portugal in order to render impossible the send- 
ing of any German expeditionary forces should Portugal at that time be already 
occupied by Germany. 

II 

The Prime Minister then said that he desired to discuss the situation in the 
Far East. He had with him a copy of a draft memorandum, of which he had 
already given the President a copy and which suggested that the United States, 
British and Dutch Governments simultaneously warn Japan that further military 
expansion by .Japan in the South Pacific would lead to the taking of counter 
measures by the countries named even though such counter measures might 
result in hostilities between them and Japan, and, second, provided tliat the 
United States declare to Japan that should Great Britain go to the assistance 
of the Netherlands East Indies as a result [4728] of aggression against the 
latter on the part of Japan the President would request from the Congress of 
the United States authority to assist the British and Dutch Governments in their 
defense against Japanese aggression. 

The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statement handed 
to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6. 

The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the implica- 
tion was that .Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that she would move 
no further provided the United States would abandon their economic and financial 
sanctions and take no further military or naval defensive measures and further 
agree to concessions to Japan, including the opportunity for Japan to strangle 
the Chinese Government, all of which were particularly unacceptable. 

The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, that he 
felt very strongly that every effort should be made to prevent the outbreak of war 
with Japan. He stated that what he intended to do was to request Secretary Hull 
by radio to inform the Japanese Ambassador that the President would return to 
Washington next Saturday or Sunday and desired to see tlie Ambassador immedi- 
ately upon his return. The President stated that in that interview he would 
inform [4729] the Japanese Ambassador that provided the Japanese 
Government would give the commitment contained in the first paragraph of the 
proposal of the Japanese Government of August 6, namely, tliat the Japanese 
Government "will not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific 
areas, except French Indochina, and that the Japanese troops now stationed 
in French Indochina will be withdrawn", specifically and not contingently, the 
United States Government, while making it clear that the other conditions 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1787 

set forth by the Japanese Government were in general unacceptable, the United 
States would, nevertheless, in a friendly spirit seek to explore the possibilities 
inherent in the various proposals made by Japan for the reaching of a friendly 
understanding between the two Governments. The President would further state 
that should Japan refuse to consid«;r this procedure and undertake further steps 
in the nature of military expansions, the President desired the Japanese Govern- 
ment to know that in such event in his belief various steps would have to be taken 
by the United States notwithstanding the President's realization that the taking 
of such furtlier measures might result in war between the United S"tates and 
Japan. 

Mr. Churchill immediately declared that the procedure suggested appeared to 
him to cover the situation U7S0] very well. He said it had in it an 
element of "face-saving" for the Japanese and yet at the same time would con- 
stitute a flat United States warning to Japan of the consequences involved in a 
continuation by Japan of her present course. 

There was then discussed the desirability of informing Russia of the steps 
which would be taken as above set forth and of possibly including in the warn- 
ing to Japan a statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan 
against the Soviet Union. 

I stated that in my .judgment the real issue which was involved was the con- 
tinuation by Japan of its present policy of conquest by force in the entire Pacific 
region and regardless whether such policy was directed against China, against 
the Soviet Union or against the British Dominions or British colonies, or the 
colonies of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific area. I said it seemed to 
me that the statement which the President intended to make to the Japanese 
Government might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy 
rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the Southwestern Pacific 
area. 

The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this and it was decided that the 
step to be taken by the President would be taken in that sense. 

14731] The question then arose as to the desirability of the President's mak- 
ing reference in his proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador to British 
policy in the southern Pacific region and specifically with regard to Thailand. 
The iPresident said that he thought it would be advantageous for him to be in a 
position at that time to state that he had been informed by the British Govern- 
ment that Great Britain had no aggressive intentions whatever upon Thailand. 
Mr. Churchill said that in this he heartily concurred. 

I asked whether it would not be lietter for the President to be in a position to 
state not only that Great Britain had no intentions of an aggressive character 
with regard to Thailand, but also that the British Government had informed the 
United States Government that it supported wholeheartedly the President's pro- 
posal for the neutralization of Indochina and of Thailand. 

Mr. Churchill stated that he agreed that it would be well to make an all- 
inclusive statement of that character with respect to British policy, that he 
trusted that the President would, therefore, inform the Japanese Ambassador 
that he had consulted the British Government, and that the British Government 
was in complete accord with the neutralization proposal, and that it had like- 
wise informed the President that it would in no event [4732] undertake 
any initiative in the occupation of Thailand. 

It was agreed that Sir Alexander Cadogan, after further consultation with 
Mr. Churchill, would give me in writing a statement which the British Gov- 
ernment was prepared to make with regard to this issue. 

The President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any further 
move of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in war could be 
held off for at least thirty days. Mr. Churchill felt that if negotiations or con- 
versations actually took place between the United States and Japan on the 
basis which had been formulated, there was a reasonable chance that Japanese 
policy might be modified and that a war in the Pacific might be averted. 

Ill 

Mr. Churchill then said that he desired to bring up for discussion the proposed 
joint declaration by the President and himself. 

The President said that he believed the best solution of this problem was 
for an identic statement to be made in London and in the United States, probably 
on Thursday, August 14, to the effect that the Prime Minister and the President 
had met at sea, accompanied by the various members of their respective staffs ; 



1788 CONGRESSIONAL, INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that these members of the two Governments had discussed the [4733] 
question of aid under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act to nations resisting ag- 
gression, and that these military and naval conversations had in no way in- 
volved any future commitments between the two Governments, except as author- 
ized under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act ; that the Prime Minister and the 
President had between them discussed certain principles relating to a better 
future for the world and had agreed upon a joint declaration which would then 
be quoted verbatim. 

Mr. Churchill dissented very strongly from the form in which the President 
had desired to make it clear that no future commitments had been entered 
into. The President stated that that jwrtion of the proposed statement was of 
extreme importance from his standpoint inasmuch as a statement of that char- 
acter would make it impossible for extreme isolationist leaders in the United 
States to allege that every kind of secret agreement had been entered into during 
the course of these conversations. 

Mr. Churchill said that he understood that side of the question, but that he 
believed that any categorical statement of that character would prove deeply 
discouraging to the populations of the occupied countries and would have a very 
serious effect upon their morale. He likewise made it clear that a similar 
effect would [4'^34] be created by British public opinion. He asked if the 
statement could not be worded in such a way as to make it positive rather than 
negative, namely, that the members of the staffs of the Prime Minister and of 
the President had solely discussed questions relative to the furnishing of aid 
to the countries resisting aggression under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act. 
The President replied that he believed that the statement could be drawn up 
in that way and that if he then were queried in the United States he need 
merely reply that nothing had been discussed or agreed upon other than that 
which had already been indicated in his public statement. 

I then gave the President, Mr. Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan copies of a 
redraft which I had made this morning of the proposed joint declaration before 
Mr. Churchill had arrived and had had an opportunity of going over it with the 
President, and the latter had approved it. Mr. Churchill then commenced to 
read it. He suggested that there be inserted in the text of the third point before 
the word "self-government" the words "sovereign rights and". This was agreed 
npon. 

Mr. Churchill then read the fourth point which read as follows : "Fourth, they 
will endeavor to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without dis- 
crimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to [4755] the raw 
materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity." 

He immediately inquired whether this was meant to apply to the terms of the 
Ottawa agreements. I replied that, of course, it did. since the policy which the 
United States Government had been pursuing for the better part of nine years 
had been addressed primarily towards the removal of all of those artificial 
restrictions and controls upon international trade which had created such tragic 
havoc to world economy during the past generation. I said I understood fully 
the immediate difflculties which this occasioned him, but I pointed out that the 
phraseology was "they will endeavor to further" and that this naturally did not 
imply a formal and immediate contractual obligation on the part of his Govern- 
ment. The President stated that he believed the point was of very great im- 
portance as a measure of assurance to the German and Italian peoples that the 
British and the United States Governments desired to offer them, after the war, 
fair and equal opportunity of an economic character. 

The Prime Minister said that, of course, he was without any power himself to 
agree upon this point. He set forth in considerable detail the position of the 
United Kingdom vis-^-vis the Dominions and emphasized \/i7SG] his in- 
ability, without the agreement of the Dominions, to enter into the proposed 
declaration insofar as this point was concerned. He said that insofar ns he 
himself was concerned the issue was one with which his own personal life history 
was connected. He referred to the days at the outset of the century when Joseph 
Chamberlain first brought up the proy)Osnl for Emiiire preferences and the pre- 
dominant part which this issue had played in the political history of Groat Britain 
during the past forty years. He said that he felt that the proposal as now phrased 
would have the enthusiastic support of all the liberals everywhere. He said that 
he himself was heartily in accord with the proposal and that he himself had always 
been, as was well known, emphatically opposed to the Ottawa agreements. He 
said, however, that it would be at least a week before he could hope to obtain by 
telegraph the opinion of the Dominions with regard to this question. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1789 

Harry Hopkins then suggested that Sir Alexander Cadogan and I be requested 
to draft new phraseology which would take care of these diflSculties and prevent 
the delay of which Mr. Churchill spoke. He said it was inconceivable that the 
issuance of the joint declaration should be held up by a matter of this kind. 

I said that in my own judgment further modification [7/737] of that 
article would destroy completely any value in that portion of the proposed 
declaration. I said that it was not a question of phraseology, that it was a 
question of a vital principle which was involved. I said that if the British 
and the United States Governments could not ag;ree to do everything within 
their power to further, after the termination of the present war, a restoration 
of free and liberal trade policies, they might as well throw in the sponge and 
realize that one of the greatest factors in creating the present tragic situation 
in the world was going to be permitted to continue unchecked in the post-war 
world. I said that the trade policies of the British Empire during the latter 
portion of the nineteenth century had, I felt, contributed enormously to the sane 
and prosperous condition of the .world at that time, and that, of course, ' I 
realized that the tariff policies pursued by the United States and many other 
countries during that period had played an important part in the creation of 
the evils which had sprung up after the last war. I said, however, that it seemed 
to be imperative that we try to agree now upon the policy of constructive 
sanity in world economics as a fundamental factor in the creation of a new 
and better world and that except through an agreement upon such a policy by 
our two governments there would be no hin4rance whatever to a continuation 
later [|73S] to the present German practices of utilizing their trade 
and financial policies in order to achieve political ends. 

Mr. Churchill agreed very emphatically to this policy. He and Sir Alexander 
Cadogan both agreed that it was not a question of phraseology, but that they 
were up against a material obstacle which Mr. Churchill had already indicated. 
The Dominions would have to be consulted. It might well be that an agreement 
could not be had from the Dominions and that consequently the proposed joint 
declaration could only be issued some time after news of the meeting between 
the President and the Prime Minister had been given out. Mr. Churchill sug- 
gested that the inclusion before the phrase "they will endeavor to further" of 
the phrase which would read "with due regard for our present obligations" 
might ease the situation. 

The President suggested, and Mr. Churchill agreed, that the latter would try 
and draft some phraseology which would make that situation easier, and it was 
arranged that I would call later in the afternoon upon the Prime Minister 
and Sir Alexander Cadogan to go over with them such redraft as they might 
have in mind. 

Mr. Churchill was in entire accord with points five and six. 

He then read point seven and after discussion at the [4739] meeting 
of this point it was agreed that the phrase "to use force" be replaced by the 
word "aggression" in the second sentence of the seventh point. 

Mr. Churchill said that, of course, he was heartily and enthusiastically in 
favor of this point seven, which had been initiated by the President. He in- 
quired, however, whether the President would not agree to support some kind 
of "effective international organization" as suggested by the Prime Minister 
in his original draft of the proposed joint declaration. 

The President replied that he did not feel that he could agree to this because 
of the suspicions and opposition that such a statement on his part would create 
in the United States. He said that he himself would not be in favor of the creation 
of a new Assembly of the League of Nations, at least until after a period of time 
had transpired and during which an international police force composed of the 
United States and Great Britain had had an opportunity of functioning. Mr. 
Churchill said that he did not feel that he would be candid if he did not express 
the President his feeling that point seven would create a great deal of opposi- 
tion from the extreme internationalists. The President replied that he realized 
that, but that he felt that the time had come to be realistic and that [//740] 
in his judgment the main factor in the seventh point was complete realism. Mr. 
Churchill then remarked that of course he was wholeheartedly in favor of it and 
shared the President's view. 

T!he meeting then broke up and I arranged with the President that I would 
drop by to see him after my conference later in the afternoon with the Prime 
Minister. The latter stated that he would not be able to leave until at least 
5: 00 p. m., tomorrow, August 12 and that as he felt it of importance to reach a 
■complete meeting of minds with the President upon all of the issues involved, 



1790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that he would be willing to spend an additional twenty-four hours should that 
be necessary. 

SuMNEB Weixs. 
U SW, GAM 

Depaetmb:nt of State 

memorandum of conversation 

Date: Monday, August 11, I94I. At Sea. 
Subject : British-American Cooperation. 
Participants : 

Sir Alexander Cadogan. 
The Under Secretary. 
Copies to : 

[47 4 n I went by arrangement to see Sir Alexander Cadogan on the PRINCE 
OF WALES this afternoon. He gave me to read memoranda which he had 
already completed on the conference between the Prime Minister and the Presi- 
dent this morning and, with a few changes which I indicated, they appeared to 
be a correct presentation of the discussion and of the agreements reached. 

With regard to the draft of the joint declaration. Sir Alexander told me that 
the Prime Minister had already radioed to London the text of the proposed joint 
declaration incorporating therein modifications of points four and seven. Sir 
Alexander gave me the revised text to read. Inasmuch as the Prime Minister's 
draft of point four was far broader and more satisfactory than the minimum 
which the President had instructed me, after our conference of the morning, 
to accept, I raised no objection thereto, and with regard to the proposed change 
in point seven I stated that while it was completely satisfactory to me and 
entirely in accord with my own way of thinking I had no idea what the President's 
decision might be. I said that I would have to submit it to him. 

Sir Alexander stated that the l-*rime Minister felt very strongly — perhaps 
exaggeratedly — the opposition which would be created on the part of a certain 
pro-League-of- [47^2] Nations group in England to the contents of point 
seven declaring for the disarmament of nations which undertook aggression out- 
side of their frontiers. He went on to say that while he believed there would 
not be the amount of opposition which the Prime Minister anticipated he never- 
theless thought that it would be a tragic thing to concentrate solely upon the 
transition period after the war was ended when some kind of joint police power 
would have to be exercised by the British and by the United States Governments 
and omit any reference to the need of the creation of some effective and prac- 
ticable international organization which would function after the transition 
period was concluded. I said that as I had already indicated while I was in 
full agreement with his own views the matter would have to be determined by 
the President. 

We discussed the desirability of informing the Chinese Government of the 
steps which the United States Government in the person of the President was 
taking with regard to Japan. I said that while I felt very definitely that every 
effort should be made to keep China closely informed of what was being done 
in her interests by Great Britain and by the United States I wondered whether 
telling China of what the President intended to state to the .Lapanese Govern- 
ment at this f-^7-^'^] particular moment would not mean that the Govern- 
ment at Chungking for its own interests would make public the information so 
received. If publicity resulted, I stated I feared that the extreme militaristic 
element in Tokio and that portion of the Tokio press which was controlled by 
Germany would immediately take advantage of the situation so created to inflame 
sentiment in Japan to such an extent as to make any possibility remote, as It 
might anyhow be, of achieving any satisfactory result through negotiation 
with Jnpan. Sir Alexander said he was entirely in accord and would be gov- 
erned by those views. He said, of course. I realized how terribly persistent 
the Chinese were and that the present Ambassador in London. Dr. Wellington 
Koo, would undoubtedly press him dny in and day out to know what had trans- 
spired at the meeting between the Prime Mini?^ter and the President with regard 
to China. He said that he felt that the best solution was for him merely to 
say in general terms that the two governments had agreed that every step 
should be taken that was practicable at this time for China and its defense 
and avoid going into any details. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1791 

I subsequently went to see the President. The President said that he was 
entirely in accord with the redraft of point four which was better than he 
had [^f^H] thought Mr. Churchill would be willing to concede. He 

also accepted without question the amendment made by Mr. Churchill to point 
seven and the President said that it seemed to him entirely desirable since 
the amendment made it clear that once the war was over a transition period 
would have to take plnce and that the permanent international organization 
would only be set up after that experimental period had passed. He had jotted 
down certain minor changes in the text of the proposed joint declaration, most of 
which were merely verbal changes for the purpose of clarification. 

I said I felt it necessary for me to ask him whether he did not believe that a 
very considerable opposition on the part of extreme isolationists in the United 
States would result from that portion of point seven which declares in 
the judgment of the United States that it is essential that aggressor nations be 
disarmed. I said that if a great Power like the United States publicly declares 
that something is essential, the inference is that the Power is going to do some- 
thing itself about it. I said it appeared to me more than likely that the isola- 
tionisits will insist that this public statement by the President meant that the 
United States would go to war in order to disarm not only Germany but even 
possibly Japan and theoretically, at [-^7^5] least, even the Soviet Union 
if that country should later once more embark upon aggression on its neighbors. 
The President replied that the whole intent of point seven, as he saw it, 
was to make clear what the objective would be if the war was won and that 
be believed people in the United States would take that point of view. He 
further said he felt the realism inherent in article seven was one which would 
be apparent to the enormous majority of the American people and that they 
would enthusiastically support the need, for the disarmament of aggressor 
nations. 

I said I also had been surprised and somewhat discouraged by a remark that 
the President had casually made in our morning's conference — if I had under- 
stood him correctly — which was that nothing could be more futile than the recon- 
stitution of a body such as the Assembly of the League of Nations. I said to the 
President that it seemed to me that if he conceived of the need for a transition 
period upim the termination of the war during which period Great Britain and 
the United States would undertake the policing of the world, it seemed to me 
that it would be enormously desirable for the smaller Powers to have available 
to them an Assembly in which they would all be represented and in which they 
could make their complaints known and join in l-i'^^fG] recommendations 
as to the policy to be pursued by the major Powers who were doing the police 
Avork. I said it seemed to me that an organization of that kind would be the 
most effective safety valve that could be devised. 

The President said that he agreed fully with what I said and that all that he 
had intended by the remark he made this morning was to make clear his belief 
that a transition period was necessary and that during that transition period no 
organizations such as the Council or the Assembly of the League could undertake 
the powers and pi-erogatives with which they had been entrusted during the 
existence of the League of Nations. 

I further said that while from the practical standpoint I was in agreement 
that the United States and Great Britain were the only Powers which could or 
would exercise the police trusteeship and that it seemed to me that it would be 
impossible if such a trusteeship were set up to exclude therefrom the other 
American republics or for that matter the countries at present occupied such as 
Norway, the Netherlands, and even Belgium. The President said that he felt 
that a solution for this ditficulty could probably be found through the ostensible 
joining with Great Britain and the United States of those Powers, but it would 
have to be recognized that it would be ostensible since none of [-'/6^7] the 
nations mentioned would have the practical means of taking any effective or, at 
least, considerable part in the task involved. 

I said that it seemed to me that now that the text of the joint declaration had 
been agreed upon, since I assumed from what Mr. Churchill had told me that 
the British Government would support his recommendations with regard thereto, 
all that was left to do in the way of drafting was the preparation of the brief 
statement which would be issued simultaneously in London and at Washington 
announcing that the President and the Prime Minister had met, referring to the 
discussions under the Lease-Lend Act and the inclusion at the termination thereof 
of the text of the joint declaration. I said that Mr. Churchill had told me that 



1792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

he had cabled his Gov^ernment that he was not leaving Argentia until Wednesday 
afternoon and said it seemed to me that everything could be definitely agreed 
upon and cleared up by 1 : 00 p. m. tomorrow, and I could see no practical reason 
for waiting another twenty-four hours. The President agreed and said that he 
would try and get a decision reached in that sense when he saw Mr. Churchill 
this evening. 

SUMNEE WEIXES. 

U SW . GAM 

[4-74-S] Mr. Gesell. Also, we would like to have just to make the 
I'ecord complete, designated Exhibit 8-A, three additional reports re- 
ceived from General MacArthur concerning the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor. These simply supplement the information already 
available but we want to furnish to the committee everytliing w^e have 
received. Perhaps, following Senator Brewster's suggestion, these 
should be designated 8-A, 8-B, and 8-C. 

The Vice Citajrmaist. That is, the 4 December 1945, exhibit S-A; 
20 November 15)45, 8-B; and 12 November 1945, 8-C, is that correct'^ 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. That is, the 4 December 1945, Exhibit 8-A; 
8-B, and 8-C.") 

Mr. Gesell. Now, my attention was also called to the fact that w^hile 
in the questioning of Admiral Wilkinson, reference was made to the 
letters from Admiral Kimmel concerning the transmission of infor- 
mation, that I failed to read into the record Admiral Kinnnel's re- 
quest for information and the replies that he received, and with the 
committee's permission, I would like to get those into the record now. 

Some time ago the committee was handed this correspondence 
between Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark and we do not feel it 
should be offered at this time, since it relates to [4749] the 
testimony of those officers when they appear, but I wdll simply read 
the pertinent portions relating to this matter of information. 

The first is a postscript appearing to a letter of February 18, 1941, 
addressed to Admiral Stark by Admiral Kimmel which reads as 
follows : 

P. S. We receive through radio and othor intelligence rather re.liuble reports 
on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite iuformatiou 
on the important Japanese trade routes. Can you send us the latest informa- 
tion you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic. 

I have receaitly been told by an oflicer fresli from Washington that ONI con- 
siders it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with 
information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Oiwrations considers 
the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of 
ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt 
as to whose responsibility it is to keep tlie Conuuander-in-Cliief fully informed 
with pertinent reports on subjects that sliould be of interest to the F.eet, will 
you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no mislnderstanding.' 

To that letter there is a reply of Admiral Stark's [4'^SO] 
dated March 22, 1941, and I will read the jjortion relatiitg to the 
postscript I have just read from Admiral Kimmel's letter. [Reading :] 

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and 
responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINcUS, Kirk informs 
me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately in- 
formed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal ele- 
ments within the United States. He further says that information concern- 
ing the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly 
to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more freipiently. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1793 

or sent by despatch. As you know, ONI-49 contains a section devoted to Jap- 
anese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and 
the volume of shipping which moved over each route. 

There is then a further memorandum or letter of Admiral Kimmel 
dated May 26, 1941, which it is my understanding he delivered to 
Admiral Stark with respect to information. That memorandum under 
paragraph VII reads as follows : 

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He 
is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing 
situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change l^'^Sl] 
of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is 
unable "to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even 
sure of what force will he available to him and has little voice in matters radi- 
cally affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of infor- 
mation is distui'bing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly 
contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of 
action, so necessary to the conduct of military oi^erations. 

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international 
picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge 
of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of 
timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptilile to marked 
improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, 
even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Command-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to con- 
form to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific 
situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet 
must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this train- 
ing by [4752] strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending even- 
tualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Depart- 
ment itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with 
regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it 
even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by 
broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions. 

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be inmiediately informed of all important developments 
as they occur and by the quickest secure means available. 

I am sorry for that long interruption. 

The Vice Chairman. That is alright. Does that complete counsel's 
request ? 

Mr, Gesell. Yes. 

[4-7S3] The Vice Chairman. Just as a matter of information, I 
notice in addition to the six documents which have already been ad- 
mitted for the record under the exhibit numbers given there, is a one- 
sheet statement here, "War Plans Division (OP-12)."' Is that to be 
included now, or just for the information of the committee? 

Mr. Gesell. No, sir; that is in anticipation of the questioning of 
Admiral Turner. It relates to the functions of the War Plans Divi- 
sion. We can insert it now, but we thought perhaps the members of 
the committee wished to see it, for possible use in the examination of 
Admiral Wilkinson. 

The Vice Chairman. Is that all, Counsel ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON 

(Resumed) 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have any statements that you 
desire to make regarding your testimony ? 

79716—46 — pt. 4 15 



1794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. There are one or two questions, Mr. Chairman, 
that were asked me yesterday to which I have, at least, partial infor- 
mation. 

One was the number of personnel engaged in the radio intelligence 
work, including the decrypting, in the fall of 1941. I inquired about 
that. Althou^ the best witnesses, of course, are the communications 
authorities, the information [4'^54] they gave me was that the 
total radio establishment was 700, including about 80 officers. That 
embraced the entire world, as far as our radio intelligence activities 
were concerned. Of this total nearly two-thirds were engaged in 
direction finding or intercept work, or training for that work, and the 
remainder, some over one-third of the 700, and including most of the 
officers, was engaged in the crypt analysis and translation, which was 
the primary question. 

The second question was to locate, if practicable, the incident which 
I spoke of wherein Lieutenant Commander Okada, the Japanese naval 
officer, engaged in espionage on the west coast, and had reported the 
precise location of the ships in the Bremerton Navy Yard. That in- 
formation I have not found. It is not in the local file, apparently. 
We have sent a dispatch to the west coast to find the documents that 
were seized there, and I have an intelligence report from Los Angeles 
to Tokyo, an intercepted, decrypted, and translated code message, 
speaking of the movements of several ships, and included in tliere, that 
a 55-destroyer squadron was moved from San Daigo to presumably San 
Pedro. The translation is inadequate on the 25 and 2 vessels which 
were tied up at the Bethlehem and Los Angeles shipyards and repair 
work was begun. 

Then there are further notes as to the movement and prospective 
movements of other ships. 

[4.755] In checking my testimony with respect to the distribu- 
tion of the intercepts in the locked pouches, and in the bags, I find 
I was in error in my recollection in that the locked pouch was left for 
the Chief of Naval Operations and separately for the Secretary of 
the Nav}', and a sealed pouch was left at the AVhite House. 

I said I thought there was a separate copy there, and one for the 
War Plans officer. The copy that came to the Far Eastern Section 
and myself was a folder, and I had erroneously thought that was the 
same copy that went elsewhere. There were separate copies. 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas from Illinois will inquire. 

Senator Lucas, Admiral Wilkinson, on yesterday you gave to the 
conunittee certain information about the location of the various fleets 
of potential enemies throughout the world during the month of Novem- 
ber and the first week of December, and you advised the committee 
that there were many ways in which the Navy could detect these fleets; 
first by actual sight by our own merchant shijDs, and second by our own 
attaches, or the consuls at the various ])orts. 

[4750] Now, let me ask you, insofar as information coming 
from the Far East is concerned, from whom did you receive such 
information as to the location of the Jap ships during the months 
of November and December, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1795 

Admiral Wilkinson. We had reports from the State Department, 
the consuls, we had reports from our naval attache in Tokyo, and I 
do not know whether he was able to detect anything at that particular 
period. 

We had several very pertinent reports from our assistant naval 
attache at Shanghai, and our observers in the Chinese ports, one or two, 
and they also got further reports. 

Senator Lucas. Now, are you familiar with the memorandum en- 
titled "Japanese Fleet Locations" from November 4 up to December 1, 
inclusive'^ 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I should like to have you. Admiral, look at this 
document. The document is dated December 1, 1941. I would like 
to have you tell the committee what the letters "Op-16-F-2" mean 
at the top there? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Operation 16 is the Office of Naval Intelli- 
gence, and F-2 is the Far Eastern Section. That is the office that 
originated the paper. Captain McCullom's office. 

Senator Lucas. That memorandum purports to advise [4757^ 
Naval Intelligence in Washington as to the Japanese Fleet locations 
as of December 1, 1941 ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. To the best of the knowledge that we could 
deduct and infer, and actually have from our various stations, they 
were not only the sightings, but also radio intelligence analyses, the 
traffic analyses of ship calls, and so on, conducted primarily at Hono- 
lulu and Corregidor, and adjusted between the two. 

On November 24, we had sent out a message saying we would not 
expect many more sightings in the open seas because of the ocean 
traffic falling off, and in consequence w« would be more and more 
reliant on the radio intelligence, and would Com 14, which was 
Honolulu, and Com 16, which was Corregidor, please make complete 
analyses of everything that came, and Com 16 would be the record 
coordinator, because they had more intercepts and larger scouting 
work. 

Senator Lucas. This is the last account received from the Far 
East in answer to that query? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It is the result of what they had had, and 
what we could pick from our other reports as well, although we had 
instructed our naval attaches and observers to send reports also to 
the commander in chief, Asiatic, and commander in chief, Pearl 
Harbor, so those fellows, in addition to ours, had the benefit of the 
naval attaches [4738] and observers report. All three officers 
had the same sources. 

Senator Lucas. In answer to the query you also received from 
Hawaii their best judgment as to the Japanese Fleet location at that 
particular time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; and all three officers were aware 
even before the printing of the data which went into the preparation 
of this paper. 

Senator Lucas. I presume you have made an examination of both 
of these reports, one received from the Far East and one received 
from Hawaii at that time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not quite understand you. 



1796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. I presume you have examined, I presume you 
did examine at the time, the memorandum that came from the Far 
East as well as the memorandum that came from Hawaii, with respect 
to the fleet locations of the Japs? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I understand, sir. There was not a specific 
memorandum as such. There were a series of messages indicating 
factual data, and tliey were compiled in the Far Eastern Section. 

I myself did not examine the memorandum coming it. 

Senator Lucas. Who did examine it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McCollum's section, and I think 
Lieutenant Commander Watts. 

[4759'] Senator Lucas. Were they under your direct super- 
vision ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. It was the duty of those two officers to examine these 
memoranda as they came in, and give to you their evaluation, or their 
best judgment, as to what they meant? 

Admiral Wilkinson. To prepare this paper which we have before 
us, which was not only for me, but after I approved it, was for the 
benefit of all officers who received it. 

Senator Lucas. It is my understanding that the report that came 
from the Hawaiian-Department indicated definitely that they had lost 
the fleet completely as of December 1, 1941, that is the fleet that finally 
struck the Hawaiian Islands, they reported that they knew nothing 
about that fleet from their own intelligence work that they were doing 
at that time : is that correct? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it specifically, but I think it is 
not quite correct, because all of us had lost it. 

[4760] Senator Lucas.- That is the point I wanted to make, in- 
sofar as the memorandum from the Far East is concerned. You will 
notice on the first page it states definitely that the battleship Hiyei was 
located near Sasebo, and the battleship Kit'ishima was located near 
Kure. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Then on the next page, insofar as the carrier fleet 
is concerned, you find that the Akagi was located near Kyushu, and 
the Kaga near Kyushu, the Sori/u near Kure, the Hiryu near Kure, the 
Ryu'jo near Kure, the Zuiknku near Kure and the Shogagu near Kure. 
It is my understanding that those two battleships and those vessels in 
the carrier fleet that I have just mentioned, were in the Pacific force 
that attacked Hawaii on December 7, 1941. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I am just wondering whether or not that was ever 
called to your attention as being in direct conflict with the report that 
was made from Hawaii ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It is obviously an error. That was the last 
indication we had gotten on those ships. We had reported in other 
papers, as I recall, and certainly in conversations to the recipients of 
this memorandum that some battleshi))s and a number of carriers were 
unlocated and were believed to be in home waters. Home waters, of 
course, is an [4761] indefinite term, signifying waters near the^ 
Japanese coast. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1797 

Senator Lucas. Now how would the Intelligence Officer of the Far 
Eastern Division locate, for instance, the battleship Hiyei as being near 
Sasebo ? How would he get that information ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Possibly from radio direction finding on a ship 
which was sending out a radio message and which was identified, cor- 
rectly or wrongly, as that particular battleship ; possibly from the fact 
that the radio station at Sasebo was issuing messages apparently di- 
rected to that ship and hence she would be in the vicinity of Sasebo to 
receive those messages. 

I am not sure of the other features of radio intelligence, because 
that is outside my scope, but that is my general naval knowledge as to 
how one would detect it. 

Senator Lucas. Obviously, though, the battleship we are talking 
about was not near Sasebo at that time. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Quite right, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And the point occurred to me as to how an intelli- 
gence officer could be mistaken about two battleships and a number 
of carriers in the carrier fleet. 

Admiral Wilkinson. They had not been located recently, sir. The 
statement should have been more correctly made, "Unlocat^d" instead 
of which the statement was apparently [4-762] made as of the 
last location in which they had been found and where, pending evi- 
dence to the contrary, they were still presumed to be. 

Senator Lucas. Which report did the Navy follow, if you remember, 
with respect to the Japanese Fleet being lost ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not quite understand, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Which report did the Naval Intelligence in Wash- 
ington follow with respect to these ships being lost or being located ? 
One report says they were located and another report says they were 
lost. 

Admiral Wilkinson. We followed the report that we were not at 
the moment able to locate them, sir. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, you did not give any consideration 
to the Far Eastern report then ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. We should have checked it and corrected it, 
but we checked that by our knowledge of unlocated ships. The two 
are obviously in conflict. 

Senator Lucas. Obviously if these two battleships and this great 
group of ships in the carrier fleet were near Kure on December 1, it 
would be rather difficult for them to get to Hawaii by December 7. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I was just wondering whether that was not taken 
into consideration by those here in the Naval Intelligence [4763] 
Department, insofar as we assumed there was a failure of a proper 
warning at the time in Hawaii. 

Admiral Wilkinson. There might have been, sir ; but I do not think 
so, because the recipients of this material who, you will note, on the 
last page were the Chief of Naval Operations OP-12, which was the 
War Plans, OP-38-W, which was the so-called War Room where the 
tracks of ships were maintained, and all of them were aware that cer- 
tain ships had not been located. So that this report erroneously enter- 
ing the last location where they had been found rather than their 
present location I do not think was deceptive to the Navy Department, 



1798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

nor did it go out as such anywhere excepting those officers that I men- 
tioned, as shown on page 4. 

It is true, of course, that this data from which this was compiled 
was also available at Manila and at Pearl Harbor, and the wrong 
inferences might have been drawn there as to the location of these 
ships, even though this paper itself did not go there, but I think that 
all hands were aware that certain ships had not been located, because 
we have had statements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer that he 
knew that they were not located, and I believe the same thing is true 
in Manila. 

Senator Lucas. Do I understand from your last statement that the 
memorandum of Japanese fleet locations that came [4'^64.] from 
the Far East was also available to the Hawaiian Department on De- 
cember 1, 1941 ? 

Admiral WiLKiNSOisr. No, sir. This memorandum was furnished 
only to those recipients that are listed on page 4, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Director of Naval Intelligence, Chief of War Plans Divi- 
sion, the Chief of the office where the tracking of the fleet was carried 
on, and the head of the Foreign Branch of the Office of Naval Intel- 
ligence. The data, however, from which this was compiled was avail- 
able in both Manila and in Pearl Harbor. It was possible that errone- 
ous deductions might have been made from it, but I do not believe 
such to be the case, since we have evidence indicating that it was known 
that those ships were unlocated at both those stations. 

[4'^65] Senator Lucas. Well, the Hawaiian Department def- 
initely informed the Intelligence Department here in Washington, 
D. C, that they had completely lost the Japanese fleet at that particular 
time and gave no report to your department such as was found in 
the Far Eastern report of December 1, with respect to these particular 
battleships and carriers, the ships in the carrier fleet that I have 
pointed out? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, they made no such report. This is, 
I think, erroneous. This is obviously erroneous. I think it was com- 
piled from the last locations at which they had been sighted, and 
they were by no means certain that they were still there, but that was 
the last one they had. 

Senator Lucas. Was the Japanese fleet ever lost for a period of three 
weeks before, insofar as the Intelligence Department of the Navy was 
concerned ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure that the entire Jap fleet had 
been. I am not sure of any particular large force, but I know that 
it was impossible to keep track of all the ships and all the forces in 
any fleet continuously. 

I think it probable that large elements were lost from time to time 
and subsequently recovered in harmless positions. This time it was 
in a harmful position when it was {4766^ found. 

Senator Lucas. Do you remember ever losing track of a task force 
of the size that struck Pearl Harbor at any time previous to Decem- 
ber 1 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would not know of my own recollection, and 
I do not recall having been so told. 

Senator Lucas. Was there any reason why this task force should go 
into hiding if it was going into the China Sea and was on its way to 
Singapore, we will say, or the Australian section ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1799 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; every nation is always desirous of con- 
cealing its full plans, and although it was obvious that some strength 
was going down to the south China Sea, there would be good reasons to 
hide the iact that their main strength was going there. 

Again, they might have been proceeding into the Marshalls, for an 
attack on New Guinea or on Borneo. They might have been working 
down to the Marshalls for an attack toward Samoa. It would be 
desirous of concealing the movements of its main strength forces 
wherever they were. 

Senator Lucas. The only real reason for the concealing of their 
force was the United States battleships and the fleet at Pearl Harbor ; 
isn't that true? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say no; no, sir. They [4767] 
would not want the British at Singapore to know. They would not 
want the American planes in the Philippines to be ready to attack in 
case there should be a breach. I think they would not want to disclose 
their plans no matter where they were. 

Senator Lucas. Well, they had not been very secretive about their 
movements up to the last three or four weeks before Pearl Harbor, had 
they ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think they were usually pretty secretive, sir. 
They would start out, as I recall, for maneuvers, and, just as we did, 
go into radio silence, and they had sent a lot of amphibious vessels and 
cargo vessels down to the south China Sea, which, since they were 
loaded in China, could not be hidden, but the movement of their com- 
batant vessels had been pretty carefully screened. 

Senator Lucas. England did not have much of a fleet around Singa- 
pore at that time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, not much. She had several ships on the 
way. I think it was the 5th or 6th of December that the Repulse and 
the Prince of Wales, that was subsequently ill-fated, that they arrived 
in Singapore, and, of course, they were on the way. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral, passing from that subject 

Mr. Gesell. Senator, may I interpose? 

[4768] Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. I have not offered these fleet location summaries as an 
exhibit, and in view of your questioning I think perhaps we should 
designate this entire folder as an exhibit, which would be exhibit 85, 
so that it will be easier to follow the examination. 

Senator Lucas. All right. 

The Vice Chairman. It is so ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 85.") 

Senator Lucas. Admiral, on yesterday you were discussing with 
counsel and members of the committee the conversations that you had 
on the morning of December 7, 1941, when you received the l-lth part 
of the message, 13 of which were sent on December 6. You stated you 
immediately went to Admiral Stark. You also stated that as you 
construed the mesage : 

* * * They were fighting words. I was more impressed by that language 
than with the breaking off of negotiations which, of itself, might be only tempo- 
rary. Those would be hard words to eat. The breaking off of negotiations 
could be resumed. 

There seems to be some conflict in the testimony, according to coun- 
sel, as to when this message was delivered [4-769'] to Admiral 



1800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Stark, but according to your testimony, to the best of your recollection, 
it was somewhere around 9 : 15 to 9 : 30? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, did you tell Admiral Stark at the time, that 
you believed that a proper construction of that message was more than 
the breaking off of negotiations and that they were really fighting 
words in your opinion ? Do you recall that ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is that I told him that that 
was a very strong final part to that message and that I thought that 
they were going to press on in the direction of the advance which 
they were then following in the South Sea and that something might 
be expected in that or other directions, but I think particularly I said 
that, and I thought the fleet should be advised of the latest develop- 
ment in the nature of this strong language. 

Senator Lucas. And what was his reply, if you recall? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think he agreed with me at the time, sir, and 
my recollection is that I said he made an effort to reach General 
Marshall, or said that he would make such an effort. 

Senator Lucas. Did you have any further conversation with him, 
with respect to sending a message to Hawaii, to [4-770] the 
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet there ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. When I said the fleet, I meant the Pacific 
Fleet. No further conversation. 

Senator Lucas. No further conversation ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. But he did not send a message immediately after 
that conversation ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. So I understand. He did not while I was 
there, the few minutes I was there. 

Senator Lucas. He had the authority so to do, as Chief of Naval 
Operations ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. If he had seen fit to do so ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. The message that was sent, as I recall, was around 
11 :30 that morning? 

Admiral Wilkinson. So I understand. 

Senator Lucas. So there was at least an hour and a half difference 
between the time the message could have been sent by Admiral Stark, 
and the time that one was actually sent to the War Department ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Now, you have been to Hawaii, Admiral ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I have been where ? 

[4771'\ Senator Lucas. I say, you have served in Hawaii with 
the Fleet in the Pacific, as I understand it. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know how many ships were in Pearl Harbor 
on the morning of December 7th ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not of my own knowledge. 

Senator Lucas. Well, from what you have read, and what you know 
about the situation, do you know the number that were in there? 

It is not so material. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1801 

Admiral Wilkinson. I couldn't say. My recollection is about six 
battleships, six cruisers, and a dozen destroyers, but there may have 
been more. 

Senator Lucas. I was wondering how many battleships and how 
many destroyers could leave the harbor say in an hour and a half ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The usual time of sortie, as I recall, was 10 
minutes for a major ship. In other words, one battleship or cruiser 
per 10 minutes. They would be able to put out one destroyer in 
between each of the larger ships. If they were pressed, they might be 
able to get two destroyers between each of the larger ships, but it would 
not be very desirable as there would be some danger of collision. 

[4-772] Senator Lucas. They would be pressed on the morning 
of December 7, if the message had gone ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. They undoubtedly would have made every 
effort, but if they tried to put too many ships out, they might have 
had a collision with the result of the blocking of everyone which 
would be another story. 

Senator Lucas. Of course, any ship that got out of the harbor 
would be better able to protect itself? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It would have been able to maneuver to avoid 
the bombs or the torpedoes and would have been probably able to man 
the guns with the entire ship's company immediately, but little sooner, 
in fact, than they did in port, because the call to general quarters that 
all battle stations be manned was carried out immediately on every ship, 
I understand. 

Senator Lucas. I think that is correct, Admiral. 

Now, Admiral, how long did you serve in the Navy Intelligence 
after December 6, 1941 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. After December 6? 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Seven months. 

Senator Lucas. From there, where did you go, sir? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I went to command of battleship division 2 
in the Pacific for 5 months, and then to [4773] the South Pacific 
as deputy commander of the South Pacific under Admiral Halsey. A 
vacancy occurred some 6 months later in the Amphibious Forces of the 
South Pacific, and I was made the amphibious commander of the 
Third Amphibious Force, and remained such. 

Senator Lucas. In what sea battles did you participate ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know that I participated in any sea 
battles, as such. 

I ran the amphibious campaign in the South Pacific for a year, and 
then I was in command of the operations against Palau and Yap. 
Yap was substituted for Leyte. I went in command of one of the two 
amphibious forces at Leyte, and then again in command of one of the 
two amphibfous forces at Lingayen and again at the landing on Luzon. 
In the South Pacific campaign I had perhaps a dozen landings. 

[4^774] Senator Lucas. Let me ask you. Admiral, as a matter of 
curiosity, what class did you graduate from at Annapolis? 

Admiral Wilkinson. 1909. 

Senator Lucas. And what State are you from ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Louisiana. 

Senator Lucas. That is all. 



1802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Wilkinson, I have a few questions. 

I notice from a study of the messages forwarded by the Navy and 
received by the Navy, that apparently notice had come into Washing- 
ton that the Japanese had ordered the various offices throughout the 
world to destroy their code, but I see no notice whatever from Tokyo 
to Hawaii to destroy the code there. 

Do you know whether or not there was any such message ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I presume there was, sir. I don't recall the 
message proper, but I know the Hawaiian consul burned his code I 
think the day before the attack. 

Mr. Murphy. There have been questions asked here of witnesses and 
some witnesses have concluded that when word comes about destroying 
a code that that is a very strong indication of war, and I notice in the 
messages here word from Admiral Kimmel on December 6, 1941, that 
the local consul [4-775] at Hawaii had commenced destroying 
his code or was in the actual process of doing so. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. In Navy parlance, what is the significance of that, 
from the standpoint of expectation of war or trouble ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, obviously any nation is desirous of pro- 
tecting its code. Ordinarily, through international courtesy, diplo- 
matic missions and consular missions are proof against search and 
seizure, and any action of that sort would be a grave international 
offense. 

Now, if any country feared that relations would become so strained 
with another that the other country would incur the risk of an inter- 
national offense and would invade the diplomatic mission and seize the 
codes it would be obviously best to burn them up first. 

The significance, in other words, is that they thought relations were 
going to be pretty tricky and sensitive, even though there might not 
be actual war. 

Mr. Murphy. I notice in Exhibit 37 at page 40 there is a message 
from Washington to Pacific commanders in which the following is 
contained : 

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instruc- 
tions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, 
Singapore [4776] Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy 
most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential 
and secret documents period 

Now, Hawaii is not contained in that message, is it ? That is exhibit 
37. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Apparently a separate dispatch was 
sent to Hawaii, which we did not have at hand at that time, 

Mr. Murphy. Then I notice on page 41 there is a message as 
follows : 

"Circular 2444 from Tokyo 1 December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, 
and Manila to destroy machine period Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo 
period December second Washington also directed destroy all but one copy of 
other systems and all secret documents period British Admiralty London today 
reports Embassy London lias complied period" 

Still no message to Hawaii. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, none apparently. 

Mr. Murphy. Apparently. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1803 

Then I notice on page 42 a discussion of some points throughout the 
world from the United States to Tokyo, Bankok, Peiping, Shanghai, 
telling our. agents there to destroy their machines and codes, but no 
message to Hawaii. 

[4777] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think, as I recall, I 
initiated that message. 

Mr. Murphy. I notice on page 43 a message to Peiping and Tientsin. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Those were to the marine detachments there. 

Mr. Murphy. No message to Hawaii. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Both of those last two were our 
messages out to exposed positions to destroy their codes and obviously 
Hawaii was not in danger of capture. 

Mr. Murphy. You felt Hawaii was fairly safe at that time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly not subject to capture. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. 

Now, then I notice 

Admiral Wilkinson. Without sufficient notice to destroy the codes. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. 

I notice on page 44 notice being sent to Guam. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Guam was exposed and they were 
told to destroy everything except what they needed urgently and be 
ready to destroy that. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, going to page 46, down to page 46, there 
is no intercept whatsoever obtained, apparently, by our forces, which 
would indicate that the Japanese had told [4778] Hawaii to 
destroy its code or ciphers ; isn't that right ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, 

Mr. Murphy. Then the message that we do get on December 6th 
comes from Admiral Kimmel himself. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, it comes from Admiral Bloch. Informa- 
tion derived from our district intelligence official and his contacts 
through Japanese personnel, indicate that he was informed by under- 
ground channels that the Consul was burning his stuff. 

Mr. Murphy. In that case there would be no need of Washington 
telling Hawaii because Washington is telling Hawaii about the 
incident ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. ' 

Mr. Murphy. Now, in the Pearl Harbor story as contained in the 
United States News of September 1, 1945 at page 34 I see a statement 
under the heading of : 

The Navy account of the Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor. 
Sources of information are Japanese. 

The statement is as follows : 

The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at Tankan Bay was about 
November 22nd and they awaited word to act before the force moved out on the 
27-28 of November, 1941. 

Where is Tankan Bay ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It is on one of the islands of the [4779] 
southern Kuriles just north of Hokkaiddo. 

Mr. Murphy. That is not connected with the Gulf of Tonkins, it is 
an entirely separate place ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. The Gulf of Tonkin is in the South 
China Sea. 



1804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. In no way connected. 

Mr. Murphy. Tankan Bay is up in the Kuriles ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; southern Kuriles. 

Mr. Murphy. Are you familiar with the testimony of Admiral 
Inglis ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Only roughly. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, the place he testified the fleet left from was 
the southern part of the Kuriles. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; southern Kuriles. 

Mr. Gesell. Etorofu Jima. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Where would that be in connection with Tankan Bay? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Tankan Bay is a bay on the Island of Etorofu 
Jima. Jima means island. 

Mr. Murphy. Would you have any special knowledge as to the 
conflict which apparently existed between the Navy and the Army 
officials at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7 as to whether or not there 
was a Jap force in the Marshalls? 

[4780] Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know that there was a con- 
flict, sir. I know that from radio intelligence, which at the best is 
analytical and scientific guessing, that the Pearl Harbor Kadio Intelli- 
gence Center thought that there was a large force in the Marshalls 
and the Corregidor unit could not confirm that. I understand later 
that there was a force there of reasonable size. 

[4781] Mr. Murphy. I think "conflict" is the wrong word. 
There was some difference of opinion between the Naval Intelligence 
and the Army, as I understand it, as to whether there was a force there 
and as to the size of it. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall a difference of op)inion between 
the Army and the Navy, All I recall is a difference between the radio 
intelligence center of the Navy at Corregidor and at Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Murphy. That may be. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I know there was an airplane reconnaissance 
ordered to go over the Marshalls to try to photograph the situation, 
but I do not believe it was ever carried out. 

Mr. Murphy. You say j^ou learned about the message of the 27th 
from Washington to Pearl Harbor either hours or days afterward. 
Did you ever see a reply from Admiral Kimmel to that message ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Was that unusual ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I wouldn't know, sir ; and if there had been a 
reply there was no reason that I should assuredly have seen it. 

Mr. Murphy. Was it usual naval practice in a case of [4782] 
that kind ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not unless requested to report at once. Often, 
in an important message, the word "acknowledge" is added. I forget 
whether it was on that one or not. And that is simply an indication 
that you have received and understand it. 

Mr. Murphy. In the message of November 27 some of the language 
is as follows : 

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. 

That would be the first part of it. 
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COmImITTEE 1805 

Mr. Mtjrphy (reading) : 

* * * an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. 
The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval 
task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against eitlier the Pliilippines, 
Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive 
deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPLr46X. 

' Now, at this point, an appropriate defensive deployment, what 
would that be in regard to the fleet generally ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Speaking purely as a naval officer and with- 
out connection with this plan, it would be to make such disposition of 
his air forces and his submarines and [47S^] his surface ves- 
sels, as he would consider necessary in carrying out the tasks assigned 
in War Plan 46. I do not recall whether that was the so-called Rain- 
bow Plan or not. I suppose it was Rainbow-5. 

Mr. Murphy. I think it was, but it would mean necessarily a change 
in the status quo until you were prepared to meet that situation, 
wouldn't it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not familiar with the status quo. It 
would require him at least to review his present situation and see 
whether it was consistent with the war plans. He might find it was 
consistent, or he might find that changes were necsesary. 

Mr. Murphy. After that, I find the following : 

Inform district and Army authorities. 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is Admiral Bloch and General Short. 

Mr. Murphy. That would mean that he discussed this message, 
wouldn't it, with Admiral Bloch and General Short ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. If not discussed, at least informed 
them of the message. 

Mr. Murphy. Of the fact that he received it ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. "A similar warning is being sent by War Department. 
SPENAVO inform British. Continental districts [4784-] 
Guam Samoa directed take apropriate measures against sabotage." 

Now, you say you know of no reply from either Admiral Block or 
Admiral Kimmel ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall any, no sir. As I say, there may 
have been a reply which I never saw. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you feel particularly concerned about sabotage 
at Hawaii? Would you consider it one of the major problems out 
there? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I thing so. We had a very large Jap 
population, and we knew from our intelligence reports that there were 
a number of very strongly partiotic Japanese there as well as the 
general run of Japanese of whom we could not be certain. 

Subsequently, a large majority of them were found to be very loyal, 
and an excellent regiment came from there, as I understand. Our 
suspect records showed from 300 to 500 Japanese that we regarded as 
definitely dangerous, and 500 as potentially dangerous. 

Then we knew that there were a number of consular agents in the 
employ of the Japanese Government. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you think that the situation at Hawaii was such 
that the efforts of the authorities there should be concentrated on 
sabotage to the neglect of [4785] avoiding the danger from air 
attack and from submarine attack ? 



1806 congressional'investigation pearl harbor attack 

Admiral Wilkinson. My judgment would be that nothing should 
be neglected, that sabotage should be guarded against, but should 
not beguarded against as the sole objective, although it was the most 
immediately probable one. 

The potential forces were actually present for that. 

Mr. Murphy. I have one last question, Admiral. 

Did you ever, within a year prior to December 7, 1941, ever hear 
anyone in the Navy say that the fleet was insecure at Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That the fleet was what ? 

Mr. Murphy. That the fleet was insecure at Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was there until May. I saw some of the 
maneuvers.^ I myself was not convinced that the antiaircraft defenses 
provided on the islands would stop a large raid. I was not con- 
vinced that they would be adequate. I think there was always the 
possibility in all of our minds that an attack could be made. I do 
not know that we could say definitely the fleet was insecure, but that 
a full and adequate protection, which would, of course, be difficult to 
achieve to 100 percent was not available to the extent that we would 
like, either in air [47861 craft to defend the place by counter- 
attack against air or antiaircraft guns. 

Mr. Murphy. Would the fleet have been more secure at Lahaina 
Roads than it was in the harbor itself ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I would say less secure. 

Mr. Murphy. If the fleet had been taken out of the harbor and 
taken to Lahaina Roads, and we had the same experience in the 
amount of damage that we had at Pearl Harbor, we would have had 
more ships at the bottom of the ocean, wouldn't we? 

Admiral Wilkinson. We would have had that and also we would 
have the exposure to submarine attacks. Pearl Harbor was fairly 
secure against submarines. Quite secure, in fact. 

Mr. Murphy. We would have had the same danger from air attack 
and less danger from submarine attack by being in the harbor as com- 
pared to Lahaina Roads ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say so. The only advantage of 
Lahaina Roads would be that the ships could get under way and 
stand out together, whereas they had to do so separately in Pearl 
Harbor. 

On the other hand there would be more exposure to submarines and 
less protection from antiaircraft guns. 

Mr. MuPtPHY. Assuming that the Japanese had been able [^7^7] 
to have the same number of carriers and other equipment, the same 
number of planes, and that the Fleet were at Puget Sound or at San 
Pedro, and the Japs succeeded in making a sneak attack, would the 
fleet have been any more secure at either of those places than it was 
at Pearl Harbor, assuming a sneak attack? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say rather less so. I don't think the 
antiaircraft protection, assuming it was in action, was as complete 
at either of those places. 

Of course, the Japanese fleet would have further to go to get there, 
and at Long Beach the ships would have moved out more readily. 
Puget Sound, certainly, in Bremerton, they could not. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster of Maine will inquire. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1807 

Senator Brewster. Admiral, how long had Admiral Kirk been in 
the Intelligence Division before you came in, do you recall ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Admiral Kirk? 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think from March 1 to October 15, of 1941. 

Senator Brewster. He was just there for practically [^75<S] 
6 months ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Who was there before him ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Admiral Anderson had been there and left 
about the first of January. Captain James, the former assistant di- 
rector was acting director for 2 months. 

Senator Brewster. How long was Admiral Anderson there ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think about 2 years. 

Senator Brewster. Had there been any established tour of duty 
in that position ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically. Usually officers on a shore 
duty tour will remain in fixed positions from 2 to 3 years. Captain 
Kirk went to sea before the expiration of his tour in order to obtain 
an opportunity for a command which was open at the time, and I did 
not remain similarly. It was wartime, and I had a very promising 
job. 

[4.789] Senator Brewster. You much preferred to get to sea? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think that is what most of us 
would like to do. 

Senator Brewster. Officers do not welcome shore duty ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, I think we are interested in them, but 
we like to practice our profession at sea. 

The Vice Chairman. Would you mind a word, there. Senator? I 
believe while the Senator had to be away General Marshall testified 
that everybody in the War Department wanted to get assigned to duty 
with troops. So I imagine that applied to the Navy, too. 

Senator Brewster. I can quite understand that. 

Admiral, could you give your estimate of the importance of Naval 
Intelligence as a function of the Navy ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think it is quite important, sir. 

Senator Brewster. I think so, too. I think that all events have 
demonstrated it. And what impresses one is the change here in this 
most critical period in our history. Men remained for less than a year 
and had had, as I understand it, no previous experience in this field. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. Do you know whether any steps had been taken 
to see that more trained personnel in the higher echelons were made 
available in this field ? 
^ [4790] Admiral Wilkinson. Usually, Senator, officers with con- 
siderable previous experience in intelligence were placed there. 

Senator Brewster. But that was not true. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot account for my having been ap- 
pointed to it, although I was pleased at the appointment, despite the 
fact that it took me from my battleship, because I considered it a re- 
sponsible position, and felt complimented to be chosen for it. 

But in general the officers who have been there have had duty abroad 
and in intelligence work. Captain Kirk had been naval attache in 



1808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

London, and Admiral Anderson in London and I think somewhere 
else. And other officers in that position have normally had experi- 
ence under that office before they became the head of it. 

Senator Brewster. But you welcomed the release from those duties 
yourself, as you have indicated, in your transfer back to your battle- 
ship assignment. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was interested in both jobs, sir. I was 
very much interested in the work but I wanted to have a command 
at sea. 

Senator Brewster. Do you know what became of Captain 
Zacharias ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He is — I saw him in Washington a [4'^91'\ 
few days ago. 

Senator Brewster. I mean at that time, where was he? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He was in command of a cruiser, I think, in 
the Pacific. 

Senator Brewster. He had had rather extensive experience in ap- 
praising Japanese psychology, did he not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I understand Admiral Kirk made every ef- 
fort to get him back into Xaval Intelligence after Admiral King 
came to Washington, and he was shortly so ordered. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. Had he been at one time Chief of Naval 
Intelligence ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Never had been? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. He had been on duty in the office, 
however. 

Senator Brewster. He spent a great deal of time studying the 
Japanese situation and was a Japanese language student of rather 
extraordinary attainment? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure but I think he had been a lan- 
guage student and became naval attache. 

Senator Brewster. And he was used for the Japanese language 
broadcasts as a result of his familiarity with the language? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I understand quite effectively. 

[479£] Senator Brewster. Now, in the situation at Honolulu 
there was a great deal of construction work going on during 1940 
to 1941, was there not, in the Pearl Harbor base? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Quite a little, sir. The navy yard, building 
of drydocks, and building of quarters. 

Senator Brewster. So there were a good many thousands of civil- 
ian employees in the Pearl Harbor base day by day, were there not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And who was responsible for screening them 
to determine as to their reliability ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure of the precise direct responsi- 
bility. The commandant of the navy yard and his industrial manager 
were interested. Our Naval Intelligence, the district of Capttiyin 
Mayfield, in conjunction with the FBI, were very much interested. 
And, I fancy, it was those two that were consulted or who checked 
on the employment of civilian employees. 

[4'^9S] Senator Brrwster. I would rather not have your fancy, 
but I would rather have what you know as to who was responsible 
and what steps were taken, if any. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1809 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. I do know that the FBI 
and tlie District Intelligence officer were screening everyone out there. 

Senator Brewster. But you do not know who was specifically re- 
sponsible in the naval establishment or the FBI for that screening? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Brewster. I speak of this from personal experience in 
visiting there in December 1940 when I was impressed and somewhat 
amazed at the thousands of Orientals circulating there, particularly 
in the Pearl Harbor naval base, at which time I asked the contractors 
what they knew about these people and they said, "Nothing, except 
that they were supposed to be American citizens." 

It was obvious that unless they had a very considerable staff that 
it would be difficult to know about this considerable number of people 
who had complete access to all the Pearl Harbor facilities so far as 
my observation was concerned. You were serving there during some 
of that period ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was serving there on ships. I was not de- 
tached to shore. It is my recollection that no [4^54] em- 
ployees of Japanese blood were out there in the latter days prior to the 
attack, were allowed to be employed. I think, however, Chinese were. 

Senator Brewster. Well, at what time, if you know, was the ban on 
people of Japanese extraction imposed ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know.- I would recollect it was 6 
months to a year prior to the attack. 

Senator Brewster. Well, you were not there, were you, after May 
of 1941? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And would not know whether or not it was in 
effect then ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think it was in effect before May. 

Senator Brewster. Will you verify that in the records if possible ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. If I can, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And I would like also to have this information 
about who was responsible for that screening. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Now, when did you first see the report of Gen- 
eral Martin regarding the air defenses of Hawaii, and which I think 
was concurred in by Admiral Bellinger, that was issued under date 
of August 20, 1941? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Very recently. 

[4.795] Senator Brewster. You never saw that while you were 
Chief of Naval Intelligence? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Wasn't that rather unusual that it did not come 
to your attention ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. As I said, the activities relating to 
our own war plans and our own movements of forces and preparations 
were not under my division and they were not brought to my atten- 
tion. There was a good deal of insistence in the department upon the 
value of security and the knowledge of war plans was closely held 
and there was no necessity, it was felt, and I agreed, that my division 
in a large number of people or in a small number should laiow, and I 
was sometimes told in conversation, but there was no system set up 
whereby any documents were sent to my office or even to myself. 

79716 — 46— pt. 4 16 



1810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. Well, in a correlation of naval intelligence as 
to a possible attack wouldn't it be rather essential that there should be 
pretty complete collaboration between your agency of Naval Intelli- 
gence and the other preparations for defense ? 

Admiral Wilkinsox. There would be a desirability that we should 
know what they were doing or planning to do but the balance between 
the possible loss of security by extending _ [^796] the knowledge 
as against the necessity of our knowing, was inclined toward not telling 
us. 

You recall Admiral King's favorite maxim that "only those who 
need to know," and while it would have been desirable, I cannot say 
that it was necessary. 

Senator Brewster. Well, the most valuable possession which we had 
in the Pacific was the fleet, was it not ? You perhaps agree with that 
as a naval officer. 

Admiral Wilkinsois^. Yes, sir ; because it was not static. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. Because the military establishments were 
primarily for the purpose of defense of the fleet based in the port for 
security. That is what we got Pearl Harbor for, as a naval defense. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And the defense of Pearl Harbor, it has already 
been pointed out, was in order to make it possible for the fleet effec- 
tively to function in that vast ocean, was it not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say certainly 75 to 90 percent of its 
purpose was that, but it was also, of course, a defensive feature for 
our own territory. It belonged to us and we would naturally defend it. 

Senator Brewster. You knew, in the latter part of November and 
early December, as Chief of Naval Intelligence, that [4'^97'] you 
had lost contact with important elements of the Japanese fleet? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And yet you had no knowledge as to what steps 
were being taken by your reconnaissance in the vicinity of this fleet, 
of the American fleet, to see that these carriers might not be approach- 
ing for a strike ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Well, doesn't that impress — it impresses, per- 
haps I should say, a layman, as a lack of correlation that, here, you 
as Navy Intelligence, knew you had lost some Jap carriers and yet 
you had no knowledge as to whether other parts of our services, mili- 
tary or naval, were taking necessary steps to see that our fleet was not 
exposed to a sneak attack. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. We would have received the infor- 
mation of any discoveries made by searches from any of our operating 
forces but we were not told of the searches wliich of themselves were 
made. In other words, we did not knoAv whether a search was being 
made from Midway or Johnston or Hawaii, but we would have received 
information of any discoveries that such searches had made. 

Senator Brewster. And in your function to protect the security of 
this fleet it was not within your function or scope [479S] to 
recommend to anyone that it might be wise to carry out aerial recon- 
naissance to protect the fleet ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My function was to utilize the material which 
was received. I should have desired to have received more material 
and I might well have been well advised to urge actual operations to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1811 

secure the information although, as a matter of fact, those operations 
would not be within my province to order, but I might well have urged 
their being made. 

Senator Brewster. That is, you could have 

Admiral Wilkinson. It was not my function, however, to do so but 
I might well have done it. 

Senator Breavster. Yes. You could have volunteered the sug- 
gestion but it was not a part of your responsibility or function ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Do you know whether as a result of this experi- 
ence any steps have been taken to change that system of functioning, as 
to w^hether or not Naval Intelligence today would recognize that as 
part of its responsibility ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not believe they have, sir. I do not know 
that siDecifically, I do not know that. 

Senator Brewster. Wouldn't Pearl Harbor argue rather persua- 
sively that it might be a good idea and that when they [47991 
lose track of an enemy fleet that it might be well to be sure that our fleet 
was not going to be approached without warning so far as the aerial 
reconnaissance might disclose? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Surely, yes, sir ; but you see there is a distinc- 
tion between the operations of the forces in the field, that is to say, the 
fleets, and the operations of the officers in Washington. Now, the fleet 
collects and is normally responsible for wdiat we term combat intelli- 
gence ; that is to say, sending out a scouting line or sending out a recon- 
naissance fleet of planes. They collect that information and that is 
sent to Washington. 

Senator Brewster. Let me interrupt you. Would that be true in 
time of peace ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think that would be true in time of peace, 
yes. 

Senator Brewster. Thank you. 

Admiral Wilkinson. And the fleet collects the combat information, 
or in the absence of combat, the operational intelligence we might call 
it, and the office at home would not prescribe to the fleet the precise 
measures to be taken to get that. I think we have sent, not the intelli- 
gence of itself, but operations on the recommendations of intelligence 
have sent information out saying, "Please find out what you can about 
such a thing," and, in fact, you will recall that operations [4800] 
told Admiral Hart to please send the scouting fleets over the South 
China Sea for several days to give us the information. 

Now, that is the operational intelligence which is conducted by 
the forces in the fleet and might be initiated by them or might be 
initiated by the operational side rather than the intelligence side of 
the department proper. In that particular instance of the force of 
planes over the South China Sea, I do not believe I made such a 
recommendation but I would have been prepared to join in it. I 
think Admiral Turner probably initiated that. 

Senator Brewster. Well, then, as I gather, that would be the 
responsibility of someone higher up in correlating your reports as 
to the missing fleet and the protection of our fleet, to see to it that 
these operational surveys were carried out? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say so, yes, sir, except that I might 
say, of course, at any time I was free to recommend. 



1812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. Yes. Now, what about the submarine that it 
has been alleged circulated in Pearl Harbor in the early morning 
before the attack? What knowledge have you regarding that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. None before the attack. I have the informa- 
tion afterward. 

[48OI] Senator Brewster. I am not asking you before. I am 
asking you now. What is your information as to what happened 
there? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It is my understanding that submarine con- 
tact was made several hours before the attack and that it was in the 
restricted waters, and that two of our vessels attacked it, and believed 
that from the absence of subsequent sound indications, believed that 
they sank it. 

Senator Brewster. When you speak of the restricted area, how 
extensive was that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, very limited ; I think 5 or not more than 
10 miles, at least, off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Brewster. I am asking more particularly about another 
submarine beside the one that you speak of which you think was sunk 
off the entrance to Pearl Harbor, about one that was supposed to have 
circulated through Pearl Harbor and gone out, and an officer from 
which submarine they captured near one of the points in Oahu. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I have asked about that, sir, and I think 
the best opinion now is that that map, that was supposed to indicate 
that the submarine had been in and come out, was an indication of 
the chart, of the track that it proposed to follow, and that there was 
no definite confirmation [4^^] in any way that it ever had 
been in. 1 

Senator Brewster. Wliat became of that Jap officer? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not laiow, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Did you ever examine him ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The chart ? 

Senator Brewster. No, the Jap officer who was captured? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not examine him. 

Senator Brewster. The Jap officer, as I understood you, that had 
the chart. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not examine him. 

Senator Brewster. Did anyone from Naval Intelligence? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think he was examined in Hawaii. I am 
not sure. 

Senator Brewster. Did you have a copy of the report on that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. I think we did. 

Senator Brewster. What did you base your opinion on that this 
was not an actual chart of an operation ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, on recent discussion with Captain Mc- 
Collum, who examined the chart carefully and who had been familiar 
with the testimony of the officer, I believe. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Counsel, was there a request ever made for 
a copy of the examination of that Japanese officer? 

Mr. MuiiPiTY. I believe the record 

148031 Mr. Gesell. None has been made. 

Mr. Mitchell. None has been made that I remember. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1813 

Mr. Murphy. I believe the record will show there was a question 
asked as to whether or not he was available and Admiral Inglis said 
he would look into it, into the whole matter. 

Senator Brewster. Did you mention the examining data? 

Mr. Murphy. I don't remember. 

Senator Brewster. I think that would be most significant. I would 
like to have it. I am not prepared to say at this time that we should 
examine the Jap officer and have him testify, but I think the ex- 
amination by the Army and Navy Intelligence would be very perti- 
nent. 

Mr. Murphy. I don't mean to say that there was a request for him 
to testify. I asked if he was still alive or what happened to him and 
I don't know whether I requested the report, but if it is available we 
should have it. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. If you will permit me, I think the Admiral 
stated that his opinion about it came from Captain McCollum, and 
I believe Captain McCollum is listed as a witness. Is that right, 
•counsel? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, hasn't counsel furnished us with 
some information on this point? I have made a request and I think 
they furnished us with information that was very [4^04-^ 
meager. 

Mr. Mitchell. There have been so many discussions that my mem- 
ory fails me. I have no recollection of that at this time. 

Senator Ferguson. I think they reported to me that it was very 
meager, they had no definite information. Isn't that right? 

Mr. Gesell. I think that is correct. Senator. We will check it. 

The Vice Chairman. And isn't it correct that Captain McCollum 
is listed as a witness ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes ; it is. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, if he gave the Admiral that informa- 
tion he might be in a position to help us. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think he can tell you on what he based 
his interpretation that he discussed with me. 

Senator Brewster. Is that a matter in which there is complete 
concurrence between the Army Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and 
the FBI as far as you know ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Do you know who captured this fellow? That 
is, was it the Army, or the Navy, or the FBI? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. My recollection is he landed 
at Bellows Field, and if that is the same one, he was [^5<95] cap- 
tured there by the Army. 

Senator Brewster. Did you have occasion to look into the communi- 
cation from the destroyers who sank the submarine outside of Pearl 
Harbor and communicated this to the shore, did you have occasion to 
look intathat at all to know how long it took ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, I have seen a good many since, sub- 
sequently, but I have no direct knowledge. 

Senator Brewster. Did you have any contract with any of the 
fishing fleets operating off of Pearl Harbor there through your Naval 
Intelligence? Did you have operators in that field? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not understand, sir. 



1814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. The fishing fleets operating off of Pearl Harbor 
were very extensive. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, yes. Our District Intelligence officer 
was very much — was very directly concerned in that fishing fleet 
and we had laid down a number of restrictions which were carried 
out by the local Coast Guard, but inspired by us, as to the removal of 
all Japanese aliens from the boats, the registration of the boats, limit- 
ing them to certain hours and certain areas and the removal of radio 
apparatus. They were under thorough control and restriction for 
some time prior to the attack. 

Senator Brewster. Have you testified as to how many oper- 
[4S0G] ators you had in Naval Intelligence in Hawaii ? Have you 
given us those figures ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not, specifically. I can readily obtain 
it. I gave the figures for the fleet as a whole. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. Will you give us those that were in 
Hawaii? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. And did I make it clear, that I would like that 
report of the examination of the Jap submarine officer, if there were 
any examination, and if it is available. 

Did I understand you to say. Admiral, that the Grew message 
of January 1941, regarding a possible Jap attack on Pearl Harbor, 
did not come to your attention prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it, sir. 

Senator Brewster. That was not a matter of any discussion or con- 
cern in the Intelligence Department during the period that you served 
from October to December? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it. It might have been men- 
tioned. 

Senator Brewster. You spoke about the number of consular agents 
in Hawaii -by the Japanese. There were a rather unusual number, were 
there not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

14S07] Senator Brewster. Do j'^ou remember how many ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. There had been quite a discussion about that. 
There was, of course, a law in effect that all agents in the employ of 
foreign nations should register and they had not been required to reg- 
ister, and the commandant of the District and our Intelligence officer 
were very anxious to get them under control, and there had been some 
correspondence back and forth about it. 

Senator Brewster. Do you remember how man}^ there were ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I would say in the order of about 50, 
perhaps more. 

Senator Brewster. Are you sure it was not 150? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No ; I am not sure ; at least 50 of them. 

Senator Brewster. I think counsel can inform you that it was more. 
T think it ran up to an amazing number for so comparatively small 
an area. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. We were trying to make them comply 
with the law but there was some instruction put in about any rigid 
steps conflicting with the efforts made to assure the loyalty of the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1815 

remaining Japanese. On December the 6th we said we hoped to get 
some decision in a month, I believe. 

Senator Brewster. Did you have any reason to suspect, [48081 
during the period between October and December 7, 1941 when you 
were functioning as Director of Naval Intelligence, that the Japs sus- 
pected that we were breaking any of their codes? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I do not know specifically in that period 
but there had been a message which I recall somewhere around October, 
I think, that the Germans had informed the Japs that there were indi- 
cations that we were breaking some of their codes. Several messages 
that were sent from Japan indicated that they wished their agents to 
be particularly careful in their reports to protect their codes. 

Senator Brewster. Have you located the messages which contained 
those references to the German warning ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I can find one, sir. 

Senator Brewster. I would like to ask counsel whether they have 
located those. 

Mr. Gesell. No ; we have not, the ones I believe the Senator refers to. 

Senator Brewster. What steps have you taken ? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I refresh Mr. Gesell's mem- 
ory ? I had a request in for such information and I am sure that my 
letter states definitely that there were no such codes — I mean no such 
messages. Do you recall that, Mr. Gesell ? 

Mr. Gesell. No: I do not. 

[4809] Mr. Mitchell. I think there were one or two messages 
such as the Admiral speaks of in Exhibit 1. 

Mr. Murphy. And there is also a reference in Matsuoka's message to 
Hitler that might lead to such an inference. 

Mr. Gesetj.. I thought the Senator was referring to ones other than 
in the exhibit. 

Senator Ferguson. I am. The letter maybe might refresh you. 

Senator Brewster. Well, I have a letter from Mr. Mitchell saying 
that there was no evidence that the Japanese had any knowledge that 
we were breaking their codes or suspected it, and that the evidence was 
all to tlie contrary. Do you recall that letter, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. That is based on a report from the department 
of whom we made inquiry. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I did not know it, personally. I forwarded to you 
their report. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. But I think there are one or two messages in exhibit 
1 that makes the same report, that the Japs were at one time fearful 
of certain ones of their codes being broken. 

Senator Brewster. Well, I have one here, and it is [4810] 
dated the 23d day of June 1941, from Tokyo to Mexico. It appears on 
page 122 of the intercepts, concerning military installations, ship move- 
ments, and so forth and it says : 

Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their #62* from Panama to me, 
mentioned the question of a trip, get in touch with them regarding date and time 
of arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There are 
also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to 
exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any telegrams 
exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.) 



1816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, that, of course, is squarely in conflict with the report which 
apparently the Navy Department gave you, is it not, indicating that 
at least the Japanese suspected that we were breaking their code. 

Mr. Mitchell. I assume the Navy kept right on cracking them, so 
we can assume the Japs did not know that. I suppose that is why they 
made that statement. Obviously that one message contains a suspicion 
that we might be. 

Senator Bkewster. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchells But we kept right on breaking them, and I assume 
that, if the Japs had known we had broken them they would have fixed 
them up. 

[4^11] Senator Brewster. I am asking for information. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you asked me if they were not in conflict? 

Senator Brewster. Yes, and you agreed that it is. Now, the inter- 
cepts run from July 1 to December 7 and I asked some time ago for the 
earlier intercepts, after I was refused permission to examine the files, 
as I was reliably informed that tliere were five cablegrams which made 
very specific reference to this matter of which the admiral now speaks, 
that the Germans had apparently discovered something of this kind 
and communicated it to the Japanese in this interchange of messages 
between Berlin and Tokyo regarding tliis and in this matter — I am 
simply citing reports which the adniiral confirms now, or at least 
intimates in his reference to the Germans, I say I am at least surprised 
that the Navy would give you the information that there was nothing 
to indicate this, if there are four or five messages of this character in 
their files. 

Mr. Mitchell. To be specific, do I understand you would like to 
have any intercepts back to January 1, 1941 of tliis type that indicate 
the suspicion, is that what you are interested in? 

[4-SlB] Senator Brewster. Well, I certainly am, but I also call 
attention to my letter of November 15, in which I acknowledge the 
receipt of these intercepts from July 1, to December 8, and added I 
would greatly appreciate if you would send me another copy of this 
material, as well as a copy of all such intercepted messages between 
January 1 and July 1, 1941. 

To that, I, as far as I know, have received no reply. That was a 
month ago. 

I think you will remember, IMr. ISlitchell, 10 days ago, in executive 
session, I spoke of this matter as a matter that I thought was of con- 
siderable interest, in view of the very great emphasis which had been 
placed on the complete ignorance of the Japanese of the fact that we 
were breaking their code. 

Mr. Mitchell. I understand what you are especially interested in 
is tlie messages that have to do with the question of whether the Japs 
suspected our cracking the code. It is so much easier to get results if 
we know what we are after. I am just asking you the question, to get 
an indication as to what you are really interested in. 

Senator Brewster. I think my interest has been made manifest also 
in a letter to you in which I asked specifically whether there was any- 
thing to indicate the Japs had [4^^-^] either Icnowledge or 
suspicion that we were breaking their codes, and your reply, based on 
the Navy Department's information, was that there was nothing to 
indicate either, and your reply was that all the evidence was to the 
contrary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1817 

Mr. MiTCHKLL. That is exactly the report as it was given to us. 
I never asked them what their evidence was, but I assumed it was 
a fact because we kept on breaking the code, indicating that the Japs 
were not aware of it. I will get from the Navy just what the basis 
of that report is. ,^ I do not know. 

Senator Brewster. You just heard Admiral Wilkinson testify that 
he understood there were indications that Berlin had given the Japa- 
nese a tip on this. I think it is unfortunate that the Navy should have 
given you a report of this character, if what Admiral Wilkinson says 
now is correct. 

Mr. MoRrHY. That is two or three times that the statement is in 
the record. 

Senator Brewster. I can quite undea'stand the concern of the 
gentleman over anything which seems in any way to be in conflict 
here, but I think it is a rather important point, on which great 
emphasis has been laid, and I would like to know whether or not 
these messages exist. It is [4S14-] very significant to me that 
the intercepts were given us back to July 1 when these messages 
apparently occurred, in May and June. I have been trying for more 
than a month to get them. I spoke to counsel about this in the execu- 
tive session 10 days ago, and now I am advised that they would like 
to know just what it is I am after. 

Mr. Murphy. You are using that microphone rather loudly. This 
is three times that that statement is in the record now. 

The Vice Chairman. I think counsel understand. Senator. I am 
sure they will continue to cooperate in every Avay possible. 

Are there any other questions of Admiral Wilkinson? 

Senator Brew^ster. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have further questions 
of Admiral Wilkinson. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have a memo that I would like 
to refer to the counsel, and might refresh their memory. It is dated 
the I7th of November, and signed by Mr. Mitchell. It was received 
by me November 17 at 3 p. m. 

(The document referred to was handed to Mr. Mitchell.) 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the same thing, I think, to which Senator 
Brewster just referred. 

Senator Brewster. You gave me the same answer ? 

\ 481-5] Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Senator FercxUson. Has this been put in the record? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, 

Senator Ferguson. I will put this in the record. It is dated 
November 17, 1945. 

Memorandum to Senator Ferguson : 

With reference to your letter of November 16th, requesting "all information 
that any of the Services or the Government had that Japan knew tliat we had 
broken their code"', tliere is no information or indication that Japan ever knew 
it. All information would indicate the contrary. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, that indicates that Mr. Mitchell signed it, 
and the initials in the lower left-hand corner are "WDM/CBN." 

That would indicate, Mr. Chairman, it was answered the day fol- 
lowing the request for that information. I requested it on the 16th, 
and the letter came on the I7th. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have been sitting here wondering just wliat the 
special significance and the importance in this inquiry is the question 



1818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of whether prior to June 1941, or at any time, the Japs suspected that 
we were cracking their code. I confess it would help me a bit to work 
this thing out, if I knew just what bearing it has on the case. 

I am probably dumb about it, but I do not quite grasp it. [4^816] 
I have an idea that maybe that attitude may have had something to do 
with the fact that maybe I did not follow up your request as diligently 
as I otherwise would. 

Senator Brewster. I should be very happy to give you what is in 
my apparently simple mentality. The first thing which has interested 
me a great deal on this particular episode, Mr. Mitchell, is if what 
Admiral Wilkinson now says is correct, then the Navy has not been 
giving you complete or accurate information when they tell you there 
was nothing to indicate that the Japs knew or suspected that we were 
breaking their codes. 

That has been, as you know, a matter in which I had some concern 
about your previous willingness to submit the data. 

As i said to you and others, that was the first point of my interest 
in this episode. 

Mr. Mitchell. You made that request before the Admiral made 
that statement. I am trying to get back to your point of view as to 
the materiality of that in this hearing. 

Senator Brewster. I am coming to that. 

Mr. Mitchell. All right. 

Senator Brewster. The second point, I had thought that one of the 
very outstanding matters that had been [4^^'^] emphasized 
here, and in fact you yourself examined General ISIarshall at great 
length regarding this very matter in connection with the Dewey epi- 
sode, that a great state secret existing here was magic, and that the 
Japs had no knowledge or suspicion that we were breaking their codes, 
and apparently very great importance has been attached to that 
throughout this hearing. 

If there is anything to indicate that is not so, we must all, to some 
extent, revise our estimate of the situation in the light of that possi- 
bility or probability. At least that is my observation in all this evi- 
dence. I cannot otherwise reconcile the whole Dewey episode. 

Now, if, back in May or June 1941, there were messages indicating 
that the Japs suspected that this was happening, if it was of great im- 
portance, I cannot understand why this has not been developed. I 
cannot understand whj^ the Navy will tell you there was nothing to 
indicate it. If it is not of any importance, why do not they just simply 
give us the facts and the messages, and if it is of importance, and 
there is any suggestion of concealment, that is something we must take 
into account. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I might say, the gentleman from Maine 
has been absent for some days. Yesterday we spent 20 minutes on 
tirades in connection with the Republican [4818] National 
Committee, and now we have spent 20 minutes in trying counsel, talk- 
ing about the Dewey episode. I suggest that we talk about Pearl 
Harbor; I suggest that we proceed to inquire as to what happened 
at Pearl Harbor. 

The Vice Chairman. I am sure the counsel understand the gentle- 
man's request now, and I hope we can move along. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1819 

Senator Brewster. I certainly will be most pleased to. I am not 
at all surprised that the gentleman from Pennsylvania is considerably 
concerned over the necessity of my replyins^ to the question of counsel. 
I have been rather patient myself, and perhaps it is just as well, and 
this will clarify it. 

The Vice Chairjiatst. I think it does, Senator. I have heard every 
witness wlio has testified, and my clear impression is that the remark 
just made by Admiral Wilkinson is the first intimation that has come 
out in the course of this hearing that the Japanese had ever suspected 
that their code might have been broken. I know other witnesses have 
been asked the question whether there was anything to indicate that 
Japan had ever suspected that the code had been broken, and their 
testimony was that there was nothing to indicate it, until just at this 
moment when Admiral Wilkinson had made the remark in response 
to the question, and I think that is the first intimation that has come 
to the committee [4S19] that anybody thought Japan might 
have had any knowledge that the code had been broken. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for that 
observation, and I hope you agree with me that this does have a dis- 
tinct relevance in establishing it. 

The Vice Chairman. Of course, if the Senator wants information, 
I am sure counsel will cooperate in every possible way to secure it, and 
to give it to the Senator when it is secured. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I just say I do not think 
we have wasted time this morning on this question as to whether or 
not counsel is able to obtain for us immediately upon our request infor- 
mation material to the matter that we have before us. I think as to 
whether or not the services are obtaining the information for us is 
very vital to this hearing. Now, if we have a request in on the 16th 
day of November for certain material and that is material that is in 
the files, and then the fact that we get a reply immediately on the I7th 
of November, and we wait until the 18th clay of December and do not 
have that information, that question is very vital to the thing that we 
are trying. Are we getting the cooperation of the services or are we 
merely here taking what the services desire to give us ? 

[48'W] That is the question. 

I raised it on the floor and I raise it again here. 

That is very vital to this case. Are we getting what they want to 
give us, when they want to give it to us, or are they going to give it to 
us because it is material to this issue as we request it? 

[4^21] Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose for a mo- 
ment ? 

The Vice Chairman. Does the Senator yield ? 

Senator Brewster. Yes, I will yield. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster yields. 

Mr. Keefe. About the request for information and the speed with 
which it has returned, I have asked time and again for information 
and some of those requests were propounded in the first 2 or 3 days of 
this hearing. 

In one instance it was promised to me in 2 days in respect to one 
request, and to date I have only received one or two responses of any 
kind to any request I have made. 



1820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

You will recall that on the second or third day of these hearings I 
asked Admiral Inglis in respect to the condition of the fleet, in respect 
to her fighting ability, on the 7th day of December when it was in the 
harbor. He told me that the California was practically hors de com- 
bat because of an inspection and because of boxed ammunition. The 
noon hour intervened, and when he came back he said they were investi- 
gating it and he would report to me immediately, and to date I have 
received no report on the ships, except what has come to me from let- 
ters from men on the ships, and who know, who were in a position to 
know, whether their fighting condition was reduced because of open 
voids and the boxing of ammunition, and the type of inspection that 
was carried [4822] on. That is one thing. 

While we were quizzing the Admiral, Admiral Inglis in this room, 
I made a request on Friday and the material was promised me for 
Monday, and that request has not been complied with, 

I can go on and read the list from my notes — I haven't got my notes 
here — but I have made at least 25 requests and I am sure only 2 or 3 
of which have been complied with. I wanted the information for the 
purpose of interrogation of witnesses at the proper time. 

I have been told that they have liaison committees in the State 
Department, in the War Department and Navy Department who are 
standing by all the time to get the information just as rapidly as it 
is humanly possible to get it. Now one month goes by and although 
you have made an important request there is no intimation from coun- 
sel at all as to whether or not that request had been looked into. 

We cannot help but wonder as to what is the cause of this great 
delay. That has caused me great exasperation and I can only say we 
have been receiving spoon-fed evidence. If we have the information 
certainly we will be in a better position to conduct an intelligent cross- 
examination. 

That is all I want to say at this time. 

Mr. Mitchell. May I be permitted to say something? 

[4S2S] The Vice Chatrmax. Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. In regard to your lequest for the condition of the 
ships on Pearl Harbor Day, when they were inspected and open and 
all that sort of thing,. I think we have already brought in some data 
on that. I thhik it was during your absence within the last few days. 

The Vice Chairman. Last Saturday. 

Mr. Geakiiart. I was sick in bed one day. The report came to the 
committee when I was absent one day. I wonder why that was done. 

The Vice Chairman. That was done on Saturday when, unfortu- 
nately, the gentleman from California was unavoidably absent, and 
we regret that. The counsel made a report to the committee, which 
sat for about an hour longer than we had expected, for counsel to 
make a report to the committee on various requests that had been 
made during the hearing by the different members of the committee. 

During the course of that report to the committee I recall that quite 
a number of the things requested by the gentleman from California 
were presented and included in the record. If the gentleman will 
examine the record of last Saturday, the day on which he was unable 
to be here, I think he will find at least responses to many of his re- 
quests, and the counsel made the statement that the information that 
[4834] was not being submitted at that time and that had been 
requested would be submitted as quickly as it could be secured. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1821 

The counsel gave us a rather exhaustive report along that line last 
Saturday. I am sure that many of the requests made by the gentleman 
from California were complied with in the course of that report. 

Mr. Gearhart. May I inquire as to whether or not the chart I re- 
quested showing the numerical readiness of the fleet in the Pacific, 
that I asked of Admiral Inglis, was mentioned ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There are so many of these that I cannot pick from 
memory the generality. We have been engaged in the last week check- 
ing up from the transcript to be sure that everything that was asked 
for orally here in the past will be submitted. 

Mr. Gearhart. I requested a chart showing the number of ships 
that were in the Pacific on May 1 and the transfers from that fleet 
to the Atlantic, and the augmentations from ship construction, and 
then I also asked for that information for the Atlantic Ocean as well, in 
chart form, and Admiral Inglis said he would have it 2 days later. 

I have been told — information has come to me from reliable 
sources — that that report has already been submitted to counsel. Can 
counsel verify it? 

[4825] Mr. Mitchell. I have no recollection of seeing it. I 
will find out during the noon hour if it is in our files. 

The Vice Chairman. I do recall, Mr. Gearhart, you made the re- 
quest about the Boise. That was included in the record last Saturday, 
and I am sure counsel will have the gentleman's request checked and 
every effort will be made to comply with his request. 

Senator Brewster. May I just ask that Admiral Wilkinson will 
check on those cablegrams, the intercepts during the noon hour so 
we can get this thing clarified ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My only recollection was a dispatch from 
Berlin, I think to Tokyo, indicating that the Germans thought we 
might be reading the Japanese codes and warning them about it. 

Senator. Brewster. I understood there were five messages on this 
subject between Tokyo and Washington. I would like to have a 
complete file. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, you understand the Senator's re- 
quest ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. You will make every effort to comply with it ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record 
[482'6] note that not one question was asked the witness in the 
last half hour. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 2 
o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of 
the same day.) 

[4827] afternoon session — 2 p. m. 

TESTIMONY OP REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON 

(Resumed) 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. Senator 
Brewster will resume his inquiry. 

Senator Brewster. Admiral, were you able to secure those wires 
during the recess ? I think they were radiograms. 



1822 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. I have not been able to locate it to date. The 
liaison oflicer for the Navy Department has made the specific inquiry 
for that dispatch. I have talked to my predecessor, Admiral Kirk, 
who says he recalls it as a message from the Japanese Ambassador 
in Berlin to the home office in Tokyo, that the German Foreign 
Minister Von Ribbentrop had advised him that there were indications 
that the Americans were breaking Japanese codes. 

I may state, of course, that there were a number of codes, some of 
which are relatively simple and can be readily broken, others are 
more complex, and the very reading of one code would not be any 
assurance that others or the entire bulk of them were being broken. 
The only indication would be with respect to such a message that 
we were at least attacking their codes. 

I do know that in the late fall, in the early fall and the late fall, we 
had some worries about the Japanese finding [482S~\ that out 
and the Japanese suspicions, although we did not believe from the 
tenor of their dispatches that they were convinced at all that we were 
breaking them, and those worries occasioned our tightening up of 
security concerning intercepts and occasioned our being particularly 
careful about broadening in any degree the text or even knowledge 
obtained from the text of such messages. 

Senator Brewster. When you say there are different codes, how 
frequently are they changed ordinarily ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Again it is a matter for a communicator to 
give expert knowledge, but there is in general, I understand, two types 
of concealed message. One is a code and the other is a cipher appli- 
cable to that code. The code is contained in a book and to change it 
you have to issue another book. The cipher may be changed from 
day to day and often is. 

You must first break the cipher on any message before you can 
tell what the concealed message is and then you must have the code 
to know what the words which have now been derived, or the groups 
which have now been derived, mean under that code. 

Answering your question directly then, the ciphers were very fre- 
quently changed, sometimes from day to day, and the codes would not 
be changed so often, perhaps once a month or even a year or more. 

[4820] Senator Brewster. How many are they likely to have 
in use at any one time? How many would they be likely to have in 
use at any one time, of codes as distinct from the ciphers? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, perhaps 10 or 12: A diplomatic code, a 
naval attache's code, a military, a consular, some very secret codes for 
each of those and some day to day codes. 

Senator Brewster. And the interpretation of any one was de- 
pendent either upon breaking it as you did or upon having the code 
book to enable you to easily translate it ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. And the knowledge that we were at- 
tacking a code would not be particularly significant as it is more or 
less of an international practice. The knowledge that we had suc- 
ceeded in breaking some of the simpler codes would not be particularly 
significant. If they knew definitely we had broken their most secret 
codes it would be a matter of great concern. 

Senator Brewster. It is not considered that there is anything par- 
ticularly reprehensible in this practice, is it? Isn't it a rather well- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1823 

recognized practice in tlie international code of morality that tliat is 
done by all o-overnments in the interest of their national security? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think so. I do not think that governments 
are particularly desirous to admit it, but I think it has been done in 
the past, sir. 

[4^830] Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Whether it is being continued today in all 
countries I do not know. 

Senator Brewster. Wasn't there a rather conspicuous case in our 
own history during and after the last war about certain translations 
that were made in time of peace ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is not authentic at all but I 
know that in the last war we did have a so-called Black Chamber. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. And that sometime after the last war I believe 
the then Secretary of State decided that he would abolish it completely 
and all such activities on our part were then discontinued for a time. 

The Vice Chairman. If you will permit me, Senator, you and the 
Senator were both referring to the last war. You are talking about 
World War I? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, World War I. This one is too recent to 
be known as the last war. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, both of them are last wars now. 

Senator Brewster. Was that discontinued at that time when Henry 
L. Stimson was Secretary of State ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. 

[4.8SI] Senator Brewster. I think it was. 

Now, have counsel been able to secure any further information about 
these messages? Have they made any inquiries from the Navy De- 
partment about it? 

Mr. Mitchell. They are hard at work, and so is the Army. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Mr. Chairmanj maj^ I suggest a change in the 
stenographic record of yesterday at this point ? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes, go ahead. That won't disturb you, will 
it. Senator? , 

Senator Brewster. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead. Admiral. 

Admiral Wilkinson. On page 4575, referring to the responsibility 
of the Office of Naval Intelligence regarding probable intentions of the 
enemy, in the middle of the page, the record shows that my answer to 
a question was : 

I did not so understand, and I have the information, as I said, from my 
predecessor, my discussion with Adn»iral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Opera- 
tions, and just this morning from Admiral Kirk, also my predecessor. 

That last phrase should read, "and just this morning I have received 
a dispatch from Admiral James who was a predecessor in turn of my 
predecessor. Admiral Kirk, to that effect." 

[4832] The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your correc- 
tion ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. In connection with the discussion of the answer- 
ing of the questions, I believe, of Judge Clark, about the threat of 



1824 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the American Navy on the flank of the Japanese operations, in replying 
to that you pointed out on page 4712 of your testimony : 

Our navy was much smaller then than it was ultimately, and, in fact, at that 
time, it was smaller than the Japanese fleet in the Pacific. 

How long had that condition prevailed so far as you know and on 
what were the comparisons made? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Sir, our navy was smaller than the Japanese 
fleet in the Pacific. I meant, of course, our force in the Pacific itself. 

Senator Brewster. Yes, I understand that. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think that had in general prevailed through- 
out the year of 1941 and the disparity had been somewhat increased 
by the necessity of sending ships to the Atlantic, one of which, in fact, 
was my ship, the battleship Missis.^ippi, in May of 1941. 

Senator Brewster. You brought that from Pearl Harbor to New 
York, or thereabouts? 

[4833] Admiral Wilkinson. From Pearl Harbor to the Atlan- 
tic, and then I was operating on the Atlantic patrol until I came ashore 
to the Office of Naval Intelligence. 

Senator Brewster. Were there other battleships moved at that 
time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. What were they? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The Idaho and New Mexico, as I remember 
it, one carrier and three or four cruisers and some eight destroyers. 

Senator Brewster. And what was the relative rank of the two 
navies before that transfer, approximately? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Of the navies as a whole or of the forces in 
the Pacific? 

Senator Brewster. No ; the Pacific Fleet and the Japanese Fleet. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would prefer to refer to Admiral Inglis' 
testimony on that subject. Mj^ impression is that there was a slight 
disparity against the United States force. 

Senator Brewster. Even before that time ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Even before that time. 

[4S34]' Mr. Gesell. May I interpose, Senator? 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. Congressman Gearhart raised before the recess the ques- 
tion of whether we had received a response to his request for a state- 
ment showing the relative strength of naval combatant units of various 
kinds in the Atlantic and Pacific on May 1, 1941, and December 7, 1941, 
including a comparison between the strength of our Navy, and, I 
believe, the Navies of Allied and potential enemy powers. 

We have gotten that material. I handed a copy to Congressman 
Gearhart, and we have one copy for every member of the committee. 

I interpose with it now because it relates directly to your question. 

Senator Brewster. Would you want to put that in the record now 
so it may be available ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I would like to have it included in the record, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Senator Brewster. Will you offer it as an exhibit then ? 

Mr. Geseli.. We will then offer this material as Exhibit 86, and 
perhaps we better have it spread upon the transcript so it will be 
available to every member of the committee. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. So ordered. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 

Senator Brewster. That will appear in the transcript 
tomorrow morning. 
Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 86.") 
(Exhibit 86 follows:) 

Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, May 1, 1941 

AXIS 



1825 

[4SSS] 



Germany 



Italy 



Vichy 
France 



other 
augmen- 
tations 



Total 



Battleships 

Aircraft carriers . 
Heavy cruisers. . 
Light cruisers... 

Destroyers 

Submarines 



«6 



i>6 



4 

4 

1 15 

'150 



04 

dll 



f 77 



e5 
hi 
4 
ig 
152 
58 



k'2 

19 



17 

1 

12 

26 

160 
294 



» Includes 2 over-age battleships, Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein. 

b Includes damaged Duilio and Cavour, heavily damaged, resting on bottom. 

« Includes damaged Bolzano. 

d Includes 5 ineffective light cruisers. 

• Includes 2 ineffective destroyers. 

' Includes 8 ineffective submarines. 

e Includes 4 damaged or incomplete battleships. 

h Interned in Martinique. 

' Includes 2 interned in Martinique. 

1 Includes 4 damaged or incomplete destroyers. 

^ Includes Yugoslavian Dalmacia and Dutch Gelderland. 

' Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 1 Greek, and 5 Norwegian destroyers. 

=> Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 6 Dutch submarines. 

' Estimated. 



[4856] 



Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, May 1, 1941 
ALLIED 



United 


Great 


Free 


other 


States 


Britain 


France 


augmen- 
tations 


6 
3 

5 


•bl6 

M3 


>3 






''3 


kl 


8 


'30 


i>l 


"2 


85 


'191 


' 12 


mil 


53 


'65 


J8 


-15 



Total 



Battleships 

Aircraft carriers 
Heavy cruisers. 
Light cruisers.. 

Destroyers 

Submarines 



25 
10 
22 
41 
299 
141 



• Includes 3 battle cruisers. 

>> Includes 6 battleships damaged and under repair. 

<• Includes 1 escort carrier. 

d Includes 1 large carrier damaged and under repair. 

• Includes 5 heavy cruisers damaged and under repair. 
' Estimated, no accurate figures available at this time. 

• Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria. 
^ Interned at Alexandria. 

' Includes 4 incomplete and 3 interned at Alexandria. 

i Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria. 

k Includes Greek Georgios Averov. 

' Includes Dutch Heemskerck and Sumatra. 

=> Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers. 

» Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish, and 1 Yugoslavian submarine. 



79716—46 — pt. 4- 



-17 



1826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[^837] Naval combatant strength, Pacific Ocean, as of May 1, 1941 

AXIS 



Japan 



Vichy 
France 



Total 



Battleships 

Aircraft carriers 
Heavy cruisers- 
Light cruisers.-. 

Destroyers 

Submarines 



10 
7 
18 
17 
100 
68 



10 
7 
18 
18 
100 
70 



ALLIES 



United States 


Great 
Britain 


Dutch 


Pacific 


Asiatic 


9 
3 
12 
9 

67 
27 




1 

1 

•4 

bl3 

•>6 

(-=) 








1 
2 
13 
28 




3 

7 
15 



Total 



Battleships 

Aircraft carriers 
Heavy criiisers, 
Light cruisers.. 

Destroyers 

Submarines 



• Includes 1 unit damaged and under repair. 
b Estimated, no accurate figures available. 

• Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate. 

[4838] Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, Dec. 7, 1941 

AXIS 



Battleships. 

Aircraft carriers. 
Heavy cruisers.. 
Light cruisers... 

Destroyers 

Submarines 



Germany 



«5 



4 
'20 
1 155 



Italy 



b6 



04 
<J12 
•77 
'67 



Vichy 
France 



«5 
tl 
4 
'9 
i 53 
60 



Other 
augmen- 
tations 



Total 



16 
1 

12 

27 

159 

291 



• Includes 2 over-age battleships Schlesien and Schleswigholstein. 
b Includes Cavour heavily damaged l)ut afloat. 

« Includes damaged Bolzano and Gorizia. 

d Includes damaged JJ'Aosta, Bande Nere, and Montecuccoli. 

• Includes 34 damaged destroyers. 

' Includes 20 damaged submarines. 

e Includes 3 damaged or incomplete battleships. 

b Interned at Martinique. 

' Includes 2 interned at Martinique. 

' Includes 7 damaged or incomplete. 

k Includes Yugoslavian Dalmacia and Dutch Gelderland. 

' Includes 1 Greek, 5 Norwegian, and 3 Yugoslavian destroyers. 

™ Includes 6 Dutch, and 3 Yugoslavian submarines. 

' Estimated. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 
ALLIED 



1827 



United 
States 



Great 
Britain 



Free 
France 



Other 
augmen- 
tations 



Total 



Battleships 

Aircraft carriers 
Heavy cruisers. 
Light cruisers-. 

Destroyers 

Submarines 



«6 
) 04 

5 

d8 

92 
58 



•'12 

' 12 

'28 

'225 

'80 



k3 



13 

'1 

mil 



"1 
P2 
111 

'15 



21 
12 
21 
39 
339 
161 



• Does not include North Carolina and Washington both on trials. 
b Does not include Hornet on trials. 

" Includes Long Island (escort carrier) . 

d Juneau, Atlanta, San Diego and San Juan carried on Atlantic Fleet lists but were not completed or 
commissioned and are not included. 

• Includes 1 battle cruiser. 

' Includes 1 damaged battleship under repair. 

« Includes 2 escort carriers. 

1" Includes 2 damaged aircraft carriers under repair. 

' Includes 5 damaged heavy cruisers under repair. 

1 Estimated. No accurate figures available. 

k Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria. 

' Interned at Alexandria. 

"i Includes 4 incomplete, 2 interned and 1 repairing. 

" Includes 1 incomplete and' 1 interned at Alexandria. 

" Includes Greek Georgios Averor. 

p Includes Dutch Heemskerck and Sumatra. 

Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers. 

' Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish, and 1 Yugoslavian submarine. 



[4840] 



Naval combatant strength, Pacific Ocean, as of Dec. 7, I94I 

AXIS 



Battleships 

Aircraft carriers 
Heavy cruisers.. 
Light cruisers- 
Destroyers 

Submarines 



Japan 



18 

17 

103 

74 



Vichy 
France 



Total 



10 
■9 
18 
18 
103 
75 



ALLIES 





United States 


Great 
Britain 


Free 
France 


Dutch 






Pacific 


Asiatic 


Total 


Battleships 


9 

3 

12 

•10 

be 54 

d25 




.(4 

«1 

4 

hl7 






13 


Aircraft carriers -. 








4 


Heavy cruisers 


1 

1 
13 

28 






17 


Light cruisers 




3 

7 
15 


31 


Destroyers . . . .. .. 


1 


88 
68 


Submarines 









» Includes Boise which at that time was escorting in Asiatic waters. 

•> Includes 4 destroyers assigned Fourteenth Naval District. 

" Does not include destroyers assigned other west coast naval districts. 

d Status of 2 submarines not clear. 

Includes 1 battle cruiser. 

' Includes 1 damaged battleship under repair. 

« This aircraft carrier damaged and under repair. 

h Estimated, no accurate figures available. 

' Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate. 



1828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[^^^i] Senator Brewster. I notice the date is May 1, 1941. 
Was that before or after you were detached ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Immediately before. I left about 2 weeks 
later. 

Senator Brewster. About the middle of May? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. So that as of May 1 it would show the three 
battleships and the other units you mentioned in the Pacific Fleet ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It should so show. 

Senator Brewster. There has been a good deal of discussion about 
the information which was available to Admiral Kimmel. I think it 
has appeared rather clearly that under the limitations under which 
you were operating there was a substantial amount of material bear- 
ing on the diplomatic communications which you did not communicate 
to Admiral Kimmel. 

Is that the way I understood your testimony ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. There was a substantial amount of diplomatic 
interchange of messages that was not sent verbatim, or even in gist of 
themselves outside of Washington, either to Admiral Hart, Admiral 
Kimmel, or to the Atlantic Fleet, for instance. The summary of those 
with respect to the status of the diplomatic negotiations was, however, 
contained in the fortnightly situation wherein it was stated what the 
general [4-^4^1 progress of the negotiations was. 

Senator Brewster. I think in Mr. Gesell's question yesterday, 
which was gone into rather clearly, whether it was not proper to con- 
vey that information, and there was a substantial amount of informa- 
tion bearing on the situation which was not communicated to Admiral 
Kimmel. I think perhaps you answered that "yes," and you agreed 
it was a substantial amount but you kind of qualified it somewhat. 

Admiral Wilkinson. There was certainly a substantial amount that 
was not forwarded in detail. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. With respect to the summary, for instance, of - 
the fortnightly summary of November 15, on the first page we find the 
diplomatic situation, paragraph 1 : 

(1) Japan. 

The approaching crisis in United States-Japanese relations overshadowed all 
developments in the Far East during the period. 

Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, is flying to Washington 
with compromise Japanese proposals. No one apparently expects his mission to 
succeed, the Envoy himself reportedly expressing extreme pessimism. American 
spokesmen, including Secretary Knox, have indicated that the United States will 
not budge from* her position. Prime [4843] Minister Churchill warned 
that if war breaks out between Japan and America, Britain will dechare war on 
Japan "within the hour". The United States is preparing to withdraw the 
Marine detachments from China. The Japanese press continued to rail at 
Britain and the United States. 

Now, on December 1, a similar first paragraph : 

Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese- 
American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government 
and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work 
of building the Greater East Asia coprosperity sphere. The press also is criticis- 
ing Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance 
against Thailand. 

Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a 5-year 
extension of the anticomintern pact with Germany and other Axis nations on 
November 25. 



i 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1829 

Those were the diplomatic advices that were furnished to Admiral 
Kimmel, which are a brief summary of the status of negotiations. 

Senator Brewster. You would recognize, would you not, Admiral, 
that there are very substantial gaps in those summaries, necessarily; 
perhaps, as compared to the information available here in Wash- 
ington ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly. I mean the fact of the [^4-^] 
dispatch of the 10-point note from us and the receipt of the Japanese 
reply was not in it. 

Senator Ferguson. There was the conspicuous incfdent of the 
charting of the waters of Pearl Harbor, which was the dispatch of 
September 24, translated on October 9, and which I believe they indi- 
cated was not communicated to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. 

Is that your recollection ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection. 

Senator Brewsteii. With those things in mind. Admiral, I am some- 
what puzzled by this statement in your report of December 19, 1941, 
which was, of course, very near to the event, and I quote from that 
report — I do not know whether this has been put in evidence as an 
exhibit or not. It is a memorandum for the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions from xidmiral Wilkinson on December 19, 1941. 

Do you know whether that is in evidence ? 

Mr. Gesell. It is not. Senator. I think, if that is the memorandum 
given to us, it summarizes a report or reports on his testimony before 
the Roberts Board. 

Senator Brewster. That is right. 

Mr. Gesell. That is not in evidence. 

Senator Brewster. The subject is the proceedings of the President's 
Investigating Committee, December 19, 1941. 14^^45] This was 
a rej^ort from Admiral Wilkinson, reporting his testimony before the 
so-called Roberts Commission, to whom he stated on page 3, "The 
Commander in Chief, Pacific, had as much information as we had, but 
I myself could not expect that he and his staff Avould infer positively a 
raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same 
information." 

That would not be a correct statement of the situation, would it, 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think if you will read the preceding two 
sentences, sir, it will make it clearer. 

On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1st that the Japanese 
were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed at Thailand, Burma and 
the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had proved this to be true. We 
had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indication 
of a raid on Havpaii. The Commander in Chief Pacific had as much information 
as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would infer posi- 
tively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same 
information. 

Perhaps that is not correct in that the earlier dispatches had not 
been relayed to him specifically. 

Senator Brewster. Would not it be a matter of concern, and a mat- 
ter of considerable interest or significance to the [484.6] entire 
Fleet at Pearl Harbor, to know that the enemy were mapping the loca- 
tion of the fleet day by day, by five sectors in Pearl Harbor? Would 
not it mean more to the commander in Pearl Harbor than to anyone 
here in Washington who was less immediately concerned ? 



1830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly it would be of more immediate 
application to him. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. He was well aware that the fleet was under 
constant observation from the surrounding hills. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. And that the reports were being made as to 
them. Whether the geographical designation of the areas by sectors 
would mean more to him or not I cannot say. Probably it would, yes. 

Senator Brewster. If you had been in command of that fleet you 
would probably lie awake at night trying to figure out just what the 
significance of that was, would you not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Might well have. 

Senator Brew^ster. Now here in Washington you had reports from 
all over, you had the whole world view, you had Manila, you had all 
the other departments coming in here, and while you were naturally 
concerned, you were not immediately responsible for the safety of that 
fleet, so it might well take [4847~\ up less of your thought and 
attention and consideration, I can well understand, than it would in 
the hands of Admiral Kimmel. That is probably a fair statement, is 
it not? ^ 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. So that in the light of what we now know it cer- 
tainly proved unfortunate that it did not prove practical to send in 
some more information regarding the developments that were going 
on? _ 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. That again was a question of the 
security of the code, of which we were becoming increasingly con- 
cerned. 

[4^4^] Senator Brewster. In future situations of this character 
the lessons whicli we have learned from this will undoubtedly have 
a substantial bearing on the conduct of our armed services, our intel- 
ligence, and our entire arrangements, I assume. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I hope so, sir. I hope we profit by all the 
lessons of the war. 

Senator Brewster. I think that is the only justification of this in- 
vestigation, as a matter of fact. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. One other thing which I did not follow quite 
through is. the matter of the fleet. 

Speaking to you now as a naval officer of long experience, when 
you spoke of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, the American Fleet as being 
inferior to the Japanese, you meant in the relative strength of battle- 
ships, destroyers, carriers, the entire component of the fleet? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Including the Naval Air Force ; yes sir. That 
is discounting any superiority of training and materiel, in which we 
hoped we were a little better off. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. Is it not also true that the power of the 
fleet increased proportionately to its moving from its base? ' 

[4349] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. As I remember Admiral Leahy, his testimony 
before us in 1938, when we were considering expanding the Navy, he 
estimated we would need a superiority of approximately 2 to 1 in 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1831 

order to move into the Western Pacific, and take up the Japanese on 
equal terms. 

That involved communication lines and everything else. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think that is more than a fair statement, 
and when we did finally move into the Western Pacific in this war, 
we were more than 2 to 1. 

Senator Brewster. So when you speak of the fleet as being inferior, 
our fleet being inferior, you compared the values side by side, rather 
than the fact that there was four or five thousand miles of water that 
we had to cover. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; a direct comparison. 

Senator Brewster. It is probably useless to contemplate, except as 
it assists us in this lesson, but the price at Pearl Harbor was not only 
the price we paid at Pearl Harbor that day, but all the way on from 
Guadalcanal to Leyte, and even Okinawa, was it not, in the matter of 
the depletion of our naval strength ? 

Perhaps I should confine it now to Guadalcanal, where we went to 
fight on a shoestring, to stop the Japs because we had to stop them 
right then. 

[4860] Admiral Wilkinson. I was thinking. Senator, that, of 
course, we could not say what the course of the war might have been. 
We might have gone out of Pearl Harbor with what we had in an 
attempt to relieve the Philippines, which might well have been disas- 
trous in view of the Japanese islands and air fields, and the challenge 
we would have met from the Japanese Fleet. 

The temporary losses at Pearl Harbor, and, of course, the actually 
complete losses of two battleships, undoubtedly reduced for a time the 
ratio and we had to wait until that ratio was restored and increased 
before we could successfully conduct the campaign in the Western Pa- 
cific. It is possible, if our losses had not been incurred in Pearl Har- 
bor, other losses might have resulted subsequently, and that those 
losse might have been more permanent, not readily restored. 

I cannot say what it may have been in the course of the war. 

Senator Brewster. Well, after this initial upset, we did demon- 
strate a capacity to beat the Japanese on almost any terms from* then 
on. We had no serious surprises, no serious upsets in our procedure, 
from then on. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. The first campaign in the South Pa- 
cific, in the vicinity of Guadalcanal, was [^SSl] pretty tough 
fighting. Our losses were heavy, and so were the Japs' losses, we hope, 
but thereafter we began to have disproportionate losses, comparing the 
Jap losses with ours. 

Senator Brewster. I think it is proper to speak of it now. It is my 
understanding that in the Naval Afl^airs Committee I think Admiral 
Stark, or Admiral King — Admiral King, I think, testified that we had 
to go into Guadalcanal to stop it; we could not let the Japs g)o any 
further, so it was a calculated risk that we felt obliged to take. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Not because we felt it was necessarily easy or 
feasible, but it just had to be done with insufficient forces because of 
the losses at Pearl Darbor. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Is that right ? 



1832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. In part. The ships that were disabled at 
Pearl Harbor, the older battleships, would have been strong units in 
the South Pacific, but they would not have been particularly well 
adapted to some of the fighting there which required faster vessels. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Our greatest difficulty, as I recall, in the 
earlier days of the war, was the lack of [4S5£] carriers, and, 
of course, there were no carriers affected at Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Brewster. The estimated losses — I recall getting this at 
that time from Admiral Stark — the losses incident at Pearl Harbor, 
it was estimated at that time had set us back a year. Did you hear 
such estimates at that time ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I defer to his judgment. I made no such 
estimate. 

Senator Brewster. It would be true that if the fleet had remained 
in being, with the augmentations in the ensuing 12 months, our prog- 
ress both in the South Pacific and in West Pacific could have been 
that much more rapid, because of the strength which we would have 
had if we did not encounter these losses, don't you think so ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I should say so, unless we had undertaken 
an expedition for the relief of the Philippines in the crisis that was 
developing there before we were prepared for it, in which case, of 
course, we might have had heavy losses there, and then been worse off 
than we were to begin with. 

Senator Brewster, I quite appreciate that. That is, if the Japs 
had not sunk these ships at Pearl Harbor, public opinion might have 
been for a relief expedition, although [4853] when I was at 
Pearl Harbor in 1940, the standing joke between the Army and Navy 
at that time was that the fellows in the Philippines were just out of 
luck, that we were not going to relieve them. There seemed to be a 
rather jovial aspect to it. The poor fellows were supposed to hold 
out for 6 months when they knew the fleet, very well, was not coming, 
because it did not have the strength to go into the western Pacific until 
it had the 2 to 1 superiority to the Japs, which it did not have. 
Did -you ever hear such discussions ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Not authoritatively, not in the sense 
that they were definitely doomed, but that it was difficult to relieve 
them. 

Senator Brewster. I refer to the captains, not the top command. I 
refer to the boys down the line who felt they were up against it. 

I think that is all that I have. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire. 

[4^04.] Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Wilkinson, during the course of 
your examination by the gentleman from Pennsylvania you pointed out 
certain advantages that the fleet had in the harbor at the time of the 
surprise attack. One of them was that it was practically protected 
from submarine attack. And, I think you also pointed out, that when 
the ships were sunk tliey were sunk in shallow water and you were 
able to later raise them. 

You did not mean to imply that that was a good place to have the 
fleet if we had been under any impression that an attack was to occur, 
did you? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I think I was asked in fact whether, 
as to the contrast between Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Roads, whether 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1833 

the fact that the water was shallow in Pearl Harbor, and ships were 
recovered, would not have made Lahaina a worse place to be, if a 
similar attack with similar effects had taken place, and I think my 
answer was "yes." 

I did not, of myself, I believe, say I would prefer the ships stay in 
Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, as they were lashed together in 
pairs and in line, that very arrangement of things reduced their fight- 
ing capacity, didn't it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It reduced their ability to get out and reduced 
the arc of fire of the guns of the inner [48S5] ship. 

Mr. Gearhart. Prevented all maneuverability? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The single ship would be unmaneuverable 
as long as it was tied up. The effect of tying them together was to 
delay the exit from the harbor in case of necessity of the inner ship and 
also it massed the guns, the inboard guns, the guns toward each other 
of the two ships lying side by side. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

In event that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had received in- 
formation that an attack was imminent, within the range of possibility, 
those ships wouldn't have been in the harbor at all, would they ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Depending on the time of advance notice he 
got. 

Mr. Gearhart. If he had gotten advance notice he would have gotten 
them out of the harbor as fast as he could? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My impression is that he would. I can't speak 
for his mind. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact they presented a very, very 
enticing target to the Japanese in the position in which they were 
moored, did they not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Very much so. That, of course, was a char- 
acteristic of the limited mooring in the harbor for [4856^ deep- 
draft vessels. There were not many places we could put them. 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, you were a witness before the Hewitt 
inquiry ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. That occurred in Washington sometime subsequent 
to the 2d of May of 1945 and the month of August 1945, did it not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It occurred, I think, in June, early June 1945. 

Mr. Gearhart. I will ask you if in that hearing, during the course 
of that hearing, the following questions were not asked you and to 
which you gave the following answers — question by Mr. Sonnett : 

As to the dissemination of information, Admiral, outside of tlie Navy Depart- 
ment and to the Pacific Fleet, do I take it then, that it was the responsibility 
of the ONI to disseminate information on the Japanese situation to the Pacific 
Fleet? 

Answer by Vice Admiral Wilkinson : 

That point was never fully determined. We issued the reports and the bi-weekly 
summary of the situation but I was told that the deductions of future move- 
ments were the function of the War Plans, rather than of Intelligence, and this 
understanding was confirmed by the Assistant Chief of [4856a'] Opera- 
tions, Admiral Ingersoll, when, at one time, I said that I thought it was our 
responsibility. He told me at tha,t time that the Army system was for Intelligence 
to prepare the analyses of the enemy's prospective movements, but in the Navy 
system the War Plans did that. 



1834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I told him then that I would prepare that anlysis myself, in my office, in order 
that War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations might use it as they saw fit, 
and in consequence, such analyses as I made weren't transmitted to the Fleet but 
were given to the Chief of Operations and to the War Plans. 

The same with respect to spot news of the enemy movements. My under- 
standing at the time was, and still is, that I would report to the War Plans 
and the Chief of Naval Operations the latest operational information deduced 
from all sources and that they would forward to the Fleet such items as they 
felt should be forwarded. 

Mr. Sonnet. Would it be an accurate summary then. Admiral, to state that 
information in the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning the 
Japanese movements, for example, would be disseminated by ONI but the 
evaluation of the Japanese plans or deductions to be drawn from these move- 
ments would be the function of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Answer by Vice Admiral Wilkinson : 

[^857] The latter part of your question, yes. The first part, the day by day 
information of Japanese movements would not, according to my then and present 
understanding, be sent out by Intelligence, but rather by Operations after their 
evaluation. 

I will ask you if those questions were asked and if those answers con- 
stituted the answers you gave to those questions at that time ? 

Admiral Wilkixson. To my recollection, yes. 

Mr. Geariiart. At the time you gave those answers in 19-15, in June 
1945, did you recall or did you have in mind the provisions of Schedule 
of Organizations, a schedule which bears the date of 23 October 1910, 
a schedule which I understand was in effect in 1941? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I had those in mind as modified by the instruc- 
tions that had been turned over to me by my predecessor and that had 
been confirmed by my conversation with Admiral Ingersoll to which 
I testified, I believe, yesterday. 

Mr. Geariiart. The document, Schedule of Organizations, is in the 
nature of a regulational order, is it not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, your understanding is quite contrary to what 
the schedule of Organizations required and [4858] recited; 
is that not correct? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The Schedule of Organizations was prepared 
and issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. It was subject to change 
by him orally or otherwise. It had been changed orally by him to 
Admiral Kirk. It had been changed orally by Admiral Ingersoll, his 
assistant, and speaking for him, to me. 

I considered that the change had been made orally and did not re- 
quire the textual change in writing. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, are you giving hearsay evidence in reference 
to verbal changes by Admiral Stark, or are you reciting your own 
information received from the lips of Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am giving the hearsay information received 
officially from my predecessor, and I am giving you information re- 
ceived from Admiral Stark's first assistant, Admiral Ingersoll, who 
spoke for him. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, regardless of that, the Schedule of Organiza- 
tions provides that, in respect to both foreign and domestic intelli- 
gence, that the ONI should "evaluate the information collected and 
disseminate as advisable" ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

[4859] Mr. Gearhaet. All right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1835 

I find in the correspondence a letter dated February 18, 1941 from 
Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, to which there is appended a 
postscript, which I will read : 

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI con- 
siders it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander in Chief with the 
information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considei's it 
responsible for furnishing the same type of information to that of ONI. I do 
not know that we have missed anything but if there is any doubt as to whose 
responsibility it is to keep the Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent 
reports on subjects that should be of interest to the fleet, will you kindly fix that 
responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding? 

I also find Admiral Stark's answer to Admiral Kimmel, dated 
March 22, 1941, in which he says : 

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and 
responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to the Commander in Chief 
of the Pacific, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in 
keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these 
nations, and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that 
[4860] information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant ships 
is forwarded by air mail weekly to you, and that if you wish this information 
can be issued more directly or sent by dispatch. 

I also find a memorandmn for the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 
March 11, 1941, signed A. G. Kirk, from the Office of Naval Intelli- 
gence, which is apparently the basis for Admiral Stark's answer to 
the postscript of Admiral Kimmel's letter in which it is stated : 

4. The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsi- 
bility of this division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately 
informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal 
elements within the United States. 

Now, with those letters in mind, I will ask you, first, the A. G. Kirk 
that signed the memorandum of March 11, 1941, to the Chief of- Naval 
Operations, was then Director of Naval Intelligence ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearh.\rt. That is the position you later held? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I relieved him directly. 

Mr. Gearhart. When you became Chief of Naval Operations, did 
Admiral Kirk inform you of that correspondence between Admiral 
Hart and Admiral Kimmel and of his memorandum 14S61'\ 
which was sent around ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically. 

Mr. Gearhart. Wlien you talked with Admiral Ingersoll, the As- 
sistant Chief of Naval Operations, as you testified in the Hewitt in- 
quiry, and told Admiral Ingersoll in effect that you thought it was 
your function to evaluate and disseminate the intelligence, did you 
find and give him these precedents to support your position 2 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you every discuss the subject with your senior 
subordinates in the office ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Frequently. 

Mr. Gearhart. Some of them had been on duty much longer than 
you had ; had they not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did any of them recall to you the memorandum of 
Admiral Kirk ? 



1836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admircal Wilkinson. I do not recall tliat they did, and do not 
believe they did, sir. I think it was generally understood that we 
had the responsibility and I accepted it, of keeping the forces afloat, 
including the commander in chief, Pacific, of all information, informed 
of all information except that which through our instructions, was 
specifically excepted, and if I may, I will road my answer [4^^362-31 
of yesterday : 

I said that the text of the regulations which you introduced read "evaluate the 
information collected and disseminate as advisable." 

I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread 
abroad all types of basic Information, vphat General Miles had termed static infor- 
mation, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diijlomatic relations, 
the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and naval men, 
the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other 
than the enemy's probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself 
might give rise or might require action by our fleet or by our naval forces. 

In the latter case, before dissemination, I would consult higher authority, either 
the Assistant Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations, or my colleague, Chief of War 
Plans, in order that this information that I sent out would not be in conflict with 
his understanding of the naval situation, and the operations for which he was 
responsible. 

That is the end of my answer, sir. 

I will explain further that it would obviously be [4^64-'] un- 
desirable for me to send out information which on its receipt would 
cause the commander in chief to take such action as would be in conflict 
with the action which was desired by the responsible officer in the 
Department for War Plans. 

Mr. Gearhart. And still Admiral Kirk issues a memorandum in 
which he says that it is his responsibility, and we have also in the record 
that Admiral Stark says it was the responsibility of ONI. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think that last sentence of Admiral Kirk's 
is not aB all-embracing as you would have it be, if you would mind read- 
ing it again, sir, the last part of Admiral Kirk's letter. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, Admiral Kirk says [reading] : 

The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility 
of this Division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately in- 
formed concerning foreign nations, activitieiS of these nations, and disloyal ele- 
ments within the United States. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is pretty definite, isn't it? 

Let's pursue it a little further. It is an interesting subject. 

Admiral Wilkinson. All right. 

[4^65] Mr. Gearhart. I find among the correspondence a letter 
from Admiral Kimmel, Chief of Naval Operations, dated 26 May, 
1941, entitled "Survey of Conditions in tlie Pacific Fleet." 

In this letter there appears under title VII, "Information :" 

Information. 

(a) The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He 
is far removed from the seat of government in a complex and rapidly changing 
situation. He is as a rule not informed as to the policy or change of policy 
reflected in current events and naval movements, and as a result is unable to 
evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of 
what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically 
affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information 
is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly con- 
travenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in some course of action so 
necessary to the conduct of military operations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1837 

It is realized that on occasion the rapid development in the interniational 
picture, both diplomatic and military, and perhaps even the lack of knowledge 
of the Military authorities themselves, may militate against the 14866] 
furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is suscep- 
tible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knovpledge of current poli- 
cies and objectives even thougli necessarily late at times, would enable the 
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient his pos- 
sible course of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly ap- 
plicable to the current Pacific situation where the necessity for intensive training 
of a partially trained fleet must be carefully balanced against the debility of 
this training by strategic disiwsitions or otherwise to meet impending 
eventualities. 

Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department 
itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard 
to the status of current outlying island developments, thus making it even 
more necessary that the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet be guided by broad 
policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions. 

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principal that the Commander in 
Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments 
as they occur, and by the quickest secure means available. 

Did you see this letter after you arrived and assumed [4S67] 
the duties as Director of Naval Intelligence ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I am not sure that Admiral Kirk 
saw it. 

[4^68] Mr. Gearhart. I find that Admiral Stark testified before 
the naval court of inquiry, and I quote his testimony : 

You considered the letter. Exhibit 33, so good, did you not. Admiral Stark, that 
you caused it to be reproduced and distributed in a restricted area upon its 
receipt among important offices in the Navy Department? 

Answer : 

Yes. It was our general custom to do that and I mimeographed this, sent it 
to all hands who were concerned, followed it up and, as I recall, assembled all 
concerned for Admiral Kimmel to talk to himself in my office. 

Did you see the mimeographed copy that Admiral Stark, according 
to his testimony, had prepared and distributed to the Navy Depart- 
ment ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did Adtodral Stark mention this letter to you after 
you assumed your duties ? * ■ 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. I find that Admiral Stark testified further before 
the naval court of inquiry in respect to this letter, and I quote : 

Have you any comment on the last sentence in the last paragraph of 7? 

Answer : 

[4869] About being guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by 
categorical instructions? I have just covered that. You mean the next para- 
graph? 

Yes. 

Answer : 

(Reading) "It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Com- 
mander in Chief Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important develop- 
ments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available." I was in 
complete concurrence with him on that and that was one of my objectives, yes. 

You agreed with Admiral Kimmel then that the Commander in Chief of the 
Pacific Fleet should be, insofar as you were able, immediately informed of all 
important developments as they occurred, and by the quickest secure means 
available? 

Yes. 



1838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Did Admiral Stark tell you after you became Director of Naval 
Intelligence that one of his objectives was that the commander in chief 
Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments 
as they occurred by the quickest secure means ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection. 

Mr. Gearhart. I find in the correspondence a letter from Admiral 
Kimmel to Admiral Stark dated July 26, 1941— [4870] by 
the way, when did you become Director ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. October 15, 1941. 

Mr. Gearhart. This is a quotation of Admiral Stark — pardon me, 
it is a quotation from Admiral Kimmel's letter to Admiral Stark of 
July 26, 1941 : 

1. The importance of keeping the Commander in Chief advised of depart- 
ment policies and decisions and the changes in policy and decisions to meet 
the changes in the international situation. 

Subparagraph (a) : 

We have as yet received no official information as to the United States atti- 
tude toward Russia's participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of 
operation, if any, in the Pacilic between the United States and Russia, if and 
when we become active participants. Pres-ient plans do not include Russia 
and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communica- 
tions systems, and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us 
which may be fully explored * * * 

(and so on.) 
Then Admiral Kimmel asked a number of questions:. 
Will England declare war on Japan. 

The answer to 1 is in the affirmative — and so on. 

He asked all the questions possible about the situation which might 
develop in tlie Pacific. 

[4871] Did you know anything about that long letter that he 
wrote to Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir. I think normally that 
would be prepared in the Division of War Plans which has cogni- 
zance of the plans you speak of, whether there w^as coordination 
between Russia and America, and so on. Anything with regard to 
our own participation or the participation of other nations in con- 
junction with us. 

Mr, Gearhart. Your answer is interesting in view of Admiral 
Stark's answer to Admiral Kimmel, from which I will quote. His 
letter was dated August 19, 1941. That is getting pretty close up 
to your tenure, is it not? I will quote a portion: 

I can readily understand your wish to be kept informed as to the department 
policies and decisions and tlie changes thereto which must necessarily be made 
to meet the changes in the international situation. This we are trying to do, 
and if you do not get as much information as you think you should get the 
answer probably is that the situation which is uppermost in your mind has just 
not jelled sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative. 

Evidently Admiral Stark though that that responsibility was ONI's, 
didn't he? 

^ Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I should say that a [4S72] 
situation which has not jelled is a matter for iho. State Department, a 
matter of international relations. As I heard you, and I may not have 
understood it, that was a question of a fluid situation, an international 
situation. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1839 

Mr. Gearhart. Then I understand that you still believe that the 
organizational order of ONI didn't mean what it said during your 
tenure as Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It meant, as I interpreted it, and as it had 
been amended to me verbally, and as I mentioned yesterday, there 
was one whole paragraph with regard to the Division of Public Rela- 
tions which viewed as it stood would give us authority and instructions 
as to what to do with public relations, they had been completely lifted 
out of my office, but the order of over a year's standing had not been 
amended, but there was no order, and I don't know that one was 
required to show textual changes in each order every time a directive 
of any sort was issued in modification of it, whether that directive was 
in text or orally. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did Admiral Stark ever call you in and tell you 
that you should disregard the scliedule of organizations in respect to 
the evaluation of information collected and of disseminating it as was 
deemed advisable? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I never asked Admiral Stark that. [4^731 
I had the word from my predecessor, and I confirmed it by instructions 
from Admiral Stark's responsible assistant. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did Admiral Kirk tell you to disregard his memo- 
randum which he had issued just a short time before to the contrary 
effect? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't consider the memorandum is to the 
contrary effect, sir, if you speak of that letter w^iich you read to me, 
because that is a broad and all-embracing program, and what he told 
me was specific orders he had receive4 from Admiral Stark which he 
stated had been received in the presence of Admiral IngersoU and 
Admiral Turner. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well now, to quote his memorandum again — there 
is no use disregarding its import 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, except it is very broad. 

Mr. Gearhart (reading) : 

Naval Intelligence is fully aware it is the responsibility of this Division to 
keep the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet adequately informed concerning 
foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the 
United States. 

Did Admiral Kirk ever tell you to disregard that memorandum ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is a very broad statement. There were 
limitations and modifications to it such as I mentioned. Admiral Kirk 
never told me of the memorandum itself [4^74] and, as I men- 
tioned, I never saw the memorandum, but I do recognize that in the 
broad sense, that is the responsibility of the office, as it may have 
been amended by instructions received from higher authority, which 
I mentioned, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then I will ask you. Admiral Wilkinson, why 
didn't you transmit the information that was contained in the inter- 
cepts to Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, 
when the information pointed directly to Hawaii ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The information contained in those inter- 
cepts pointed to many sources. 

Mr. Gearhart. I am not talking about the ones that pointed to 
Panama or the ones that pointed to any other place, but the ones that 



1840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

pointed directly to Hawaii. Was not it your duty to transmit the in- 
formation contained in intercepts that reached your desk which did 
point directly to Hawaii and did evidence an inordinate interest by 
the Japanese Intelligence. We did not send this to the Commander 

Admiral Wilkinson. We did not, perhaps erroneously, recognize 
that that was an inordinate interest in Hawaii. We had found in- 
quires and reports of similar investigations in many ports. We con- 
sidered that those were part, as I have said, of the degree of nicety of 
the Japanese Intelligence. We did not send this to the Commander- 
in Chief, partly in [4-S751 error, perhaps, we didn't recognize 
it pointed specifically to an attack on Hawaii, and partly also because 
we were very jealoiis at that time of the security of the code and the 
fact that we were breaking the code, as Senator Brewster has men- 
tioned they were already suspicious that we were attacking the code, 
and we continued to discourage that suspicion. 

[4S76] Mr. Gearhart. There were some intercepts which 
reached your desk which indicated on the part of the Japanese an 
inordinate interest in conditions existing in Panama? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you inform the Commanding General and the 
Commanding Admiral at Panama? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Of those messages? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, they were of a special concern to the com- 
manders at Panama ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Why did you not give them that specific informa- 
tion which pointed their way ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It was well known that a great deal of espion- 
age activity was going on throughout all of our coastal areas, and our 
island possessions. That information as to those espionage activ- 
ities was known and sent by the Office of Naval Intelligence to the 
district intelligence officers located in those various ports. That in- 
formation which they received, plus that which we collected on the 
spot, was conveyed to the local commander in every instance. The 
commnnder in chief of Hawaii, the naval commander in Panama, the 
commander in chief of Manila, [4S77] were all aware that 
their forces were under constant espionage. They were so aware 
because of the activities of the intelligence agencies, and our own 
representatives there. 

These messages that you speak of, whicli pointed to the desire for 
information in those various ports, were of themselves but confirma- 
tory of the espionage activities which were already known and which 
were constantly being kept before the commanders. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the situation still remains that you had in- 
formation, very much definite information, which jon did not transmit 
to the commanders in the field, that were in command in the areas, that 
the information you had related to. 

Admiral Wilkinson. That information was little more than what 
they had through their own intelligence agencies, Mr. Congressman. 
They were aware that they were the subject of constant espionage, 
that the result of that espionage was being transmitted back to Japan. 
We knew that photographs were being taken of the fleet in Hawaii. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 1841 

In fact, we endeavored to secure a law to prevent the taking of photo- 
graphs and were unsuccessful, and the commanders of the fleet were 
aware of that, all of that. 

The specific inquiry as to the division of Pearl Harbor [487S] 
into several areas and the location of ships in those areas was another 
refinement on tliat intelligence, a refinement which we perhaps should 
have recognized as indicating a possible attack. 

It would also be indicated similarl3^ elsewhere, but the fact that a 
comprehensive espionage was being carried on was, I think, known 
through the district intelligence ofiicers to the naval commanders in 
all of these ports, and I know that the time I was in Hawaii, that we 
were cognizant of that fact, and we were helpless to stop it. 

We could not censor the mails. We could not censor the dispatches. 
We could not prevent the taking of photographs. We could not arrest 
Japanese suspects. There was nothing we could do to stop it, and all 
hands knew that espionage was going on all along, and reports were 
going back to Japan. 

Mr. Gearhart. My dear sir, don't you think that you were assum- 
ing a tremendous responsibility in deciding in your mind what Ad- 
miral Kimmel knew, and what the Admiral in command at Panama 
knew ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I think that from the reports that we 
had sent to our district intelligence officers and those returned by them, 
we knew they were acquainted with the espionage. But these particu- 
lar messages, indicating [4879] as it has been said, a bombing 
plan, were not sent out in view of the attempts at security of the code 
breaking apparatus, code breaking process that we were then main- 
taining. 

Mr. Gearhaet. In view of the fact that Admiral Kimmel was writ- 
ing to Admiral Stark for information, begging for information almost 
monthly or weekly, don't you think he was entitled to know that a 
Japanese intercept had disclosed that the Japanese had divided Oahu 
into five areas, and that the Japanese were demanding, and their con- 
federates on that island were reporting day by day, on the movements 
of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor — don't you think that that was 
information Admiral Kimmel was entitled to have? 

Admiral Wilkinson. With the exception of a division of Pearl 
Harbor into these areas, I think Admiral Kimmel was aware that some 
such process of survey, espionage, and reports was under way; I think 
he was aware of that by virtue of his contacts with the district intelli- 
gence officer. 

Mr. Gearhart. But the point remains you had definite information 
to the effect that I have just described, and you thought you were ful- 
filling your full responsibility when you left Admiral Kimmel to guess 
that they were exercising espionage over his command ? 

[4880] Admiral Wilkinson. I did not leave him to guess. Our 
district intelligence officer and his fleet intelligence officer was aware 
of the espionage. The only thing he was not aware of was the message 
dividing the harbor into five parts, which might have been for con- 
venience in locating it on a map, and which probably was. as we now 
appreciate, information convenient in establishing an attack. 

70716—46 — pt. 4 18 



1842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes ; and that would indicate to any man that they 
were dividing that harbor into parts for the purpose of making more 
convenient a possible attack? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Very possible. 

Mr. Gearhart. Wouldn't that have been mighty important informa- 
tion for Admiral Kimmel to have ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It would have been useful. He had been 
writing himself of the dangers of an air attack. He had been drawing 
up plans for protection against an air attack. He was convinced that 
there was a possibility and a threat of an air attack. It would have 
been a confirmation of his suspicions. 

Mr. Gearkart. And being a confirmation of his suspicions, he prob- 
ably would have acted, would he not, in the light of that confirmation ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure. The message that arrived 
was translated on October 9. If he had had the [4^81] mes- 
sage on October 10, what action he would have taken, I don't know. 
He couldn't keep the fleet at sea for 2 or 8 months. 

Mr. Gearhart. He didn't have to bring them all in at one time, 
did he? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, he didn't. Ordinarily he had them 
operating in three sections, as I recall, of which two were at sea at 
one time. 

Mr. Gearhart. Two, less three battleships. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, that was a particular incident, as you 
recall, in that period, but the normal schedule called for their operat- 
ing in three sections, of dividing the battleships, I believe, among 
two, if not three, and having them at sea, only one in port at any time. 

[4S82] Mr. Gearhart. Now, that information of the division 
of Hawaii into five areas, supported by six other intercepts, each one 
reporting in respect to those areas and with respect to the set-up in 
the harbor, taken all together probably wouM have a very decided 
effect upon the mind of the commander in Hawaii, the commander 
charged with the defense of the fleet and of our military and naval 
establishments there, would it not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I should think so. What effect it would have 
I do not know, sir, in view of the relatively protracted length of time 
that was affected, nearly 2 months, whether he would have kept the 
fleet at sea continually or would have pursued a rotational plan he 
had in effect. 

Mr. Gearhart. If Admiral Kimmel had been informed by fur- 
nishing him either copies of the intercepts or the substance thereof, 
that the Japanese were constantly calling for further information 
with respect to ship movements, that would probably have had an 
effect upon the commander of the island, would it not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; further information with respect 
to the ship movements might well have been desirable for him to know, 
but I do not think it would have affected the status of the fleet if he 
had known of these things. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, vou are giving us an expression of [4S8S] 
your thoughts now, aren't you ? 

Admiral Wilkin«;on. Yes, sir; that is what you asked _me. 

Mr. Gearhart. Have you a right to nssume that Admiral Kimmel 
would have thought the same way you do now, or then? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not at all, except as a naval officer, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1843 

Mr. GEARriART. As commanding officer he had a r\<i,ht to make those 
decisions and make whatever conchisions he pleased from the informa- 
tion that yon should have supplied him with, is that not correct? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He had a right to make any conclusion which 
he pleased. I am not quite, as yet, in agr-eement with the fact I should 
have supplied it to him. 

Mr. Geakhart. And by withholding from him that information 

ou withheld from him the right to decide what importance should 

e attached to those messages, you denied to him the right to evaluate 

those messages in that way, didn't you, and you denied him the right to 

act in the light of what information those messages conveyed, didn't 

you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I denied — in the first place, I am not con- 
vinced that it was I who was withholding them. In the second place, 
whoever withheld them was not denying him these facilities, but not 
furnishing him the opportunity to work upon them. 

[^(954] Mr. Gkariiart. Yes; now, I have been referring specifi- 
cally to the messages which appear 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield at 
this point because I wanted to complete what I had which bears on 
this particular point you are discussing, which you just concluded. 
Are you through with that phase of it? 

Mr. Geariiart. I was just going to conclude that phase of it by 
calling attention to him that I am referring to the messages that 
appear on pages 12, 13, 14, and 15 of exhibit 2 in this proceeding. 
Now do you want me to yield ? 

Senator Brew\ster. If you will, at that point. 

I did not perhaps make it clear. Admiral, as to the purport of my 
questioning on your testimony before the Roberts Commission which 
bears, I think, very directly on this point that Mr. Gearhart has been 
stressing, and I think that in justice to you it ought to be clear. 

As I understand now, I did not realize that your testimony was 
not taken down before the Roberts Commission; that you appeared 
before them and testified off the record. 

Admiral Wilkinson. My testimony was not intentionally off the 
record, but it was not recorded and reduced except as a summary of 
the statement, I believe. 

Senator Brewster. Yes; so that this record which you made im- 
mediately thereafter for Admiral Stark was the only \488S] 
record, apparently, of your testimony? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Apparently and which, of course, was my 
recollection after the fact. 

Senator Brewster. Now, the Roberts Commission, after the pre- 
liminaries on the first page, apparently thought it was important — 
they apparently did attach great importance to this question of 
information that Admiral Kimmel had received, because at the bottom 
of the first page you state [reading] : 

They then asked me what informntion and communications had been sent 
during the months preceding the attack. 

And you turned in a full page there of information you furnished 
and then you say at the bottom of page 2 : 

Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had assured ourselves that all 
of this information had either passed through the CINCS Asiatig and Pacifle 
Fleets or, if not, had been furnished them from the Department. 



1844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Then came the next paragraph which I have quoted. 

The Commander in Chief Pacific had as much information as we had. 

I think you have now agreed in both the colloquies with Congress- 
man Gearhart and myself th-at that was not strictly accurate, that 
they did not have all of the information which you had here, either 
in connection with this particular inter- [J/.S86'\ cept and some 
of those that followed it and also as to the broader diplomatic phases 
of it, which might be more arguable, but, at any rate, was information 
which you had which he did not have. 

Now, the point which I was bringing out was this, that the Roberts 
committee, which made the reports bearing on the responsibility of 
Admiral Kimmel, apparently did that on the basis of your stateitient 
that Kimmel had all of the "information which we had" ; that is, the 
Department here had. If that is not so it would be possible that 
their conclusions might have been very different as to the responsibility 
of Admiral Kimmel and any others concerned, if they had had a 
more accurate picture of what had been furnished to Kimmel ; would 
that not be so ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, and thank you for the suggestion. I 
had not appreciated that when I was answering Mr. Gearhart, and in 
the middle of page you will find, just above that, this statement 
[reading] : 

We had, on the first of December, drafted a summary of information available 
to us at that time, reciting the details of the concentration of Japanese land 
forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa, and the several naval preparations, 
including: 

(a) Reorganization of Japanese Fleets; 

14887] (b) Readying for war of Japanese ships by docking, etc. ; 

(c) Additional naval aircraft to the Mandated Island area; 

(d) Establishment of patrol between Marshalls and Gilberts; 

(e) The activity of the combined Air Force (patrol planes and tenders) in South 
China and the Mandates ; 

(f) The taking over of many merchant vesels by the Japanese Navy and the 
equipment of several antiaircraft ships ; 

(g) The radio intelligence with respect to the two task groups under the 
Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet — Group One operating in the South China area, 
and Group Two in the Mandated Islands area. (I stated, however, that nothing 
in this item made us forecast a movement as far east of the Mandated area as 
Hawaii — whereupon Mr. Roberts asked the distance from Hawaii to the Mandates, 
and I told him the easternmost — Jaluit — was about 2,300 miles, and the remainder 
extended to the westward about 2,700 miles. Actually the figures are 2,100 and 
2,400. ) 

Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had [4888] assured our- 
selves that all of this information — 

this information I just mentioned — 

had either passed through the CINCS Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had 
been furnished them from the Department. In addition, on December 3rd we had 
ascertained that Japanese diplomatic and consular agencies had been ordered to 
burn all their confidential codes and papers immediately, and we had relayed this 
information to CINCS Asiatic and Pacific and to the Commandants of the 14th and 
16th Naval Districts, and had also directed our representatives in the Far East 
(attaches and observers) to burn their codes and papers. 

On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1st that the Japanese 
were contemplating an early attack, primarily dii'ected at Thailand, Burma and 
the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had pi'oved this to be true. 
We had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indica- 
tion of a raid on Hawaii. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific had as much informa- 
tion as we had. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1845 

I think in speaking of that and bringing it back, I might well have 
been — I think I was, in fact, referring to the fact that he had as much 
information as we had on all of that subject I have just read. 

[4SS9] Senator Bkewstek. Certainly the statement is somewhat 
broader than that. I think it is. We can now see here that it is 
perhaps unfortunate that you did not have a complete transcript of 
your evidence because it might do you more justice than this somewhat 
sweeping summary by yourself would when you perhaps might not 
have been thinking of all that was involved. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Obviously this was prepared by me 
for the private and personal information for Admiral Stark, which 
1 had made, telling him \^hat I and other officers had told the Roberts 
Commission. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. That was entirely dependent on my recol- 
lection, it had nothing to do with the transcript. I thought notes 
had been taken. In fact, I thought there was a recorder or stenog- 
rapher present and I was later to have a record of that but I under- 
stand hone were taken, I understand none appeared in the record 
except a two-paragraph statement. 

Senator Brewster. This does have the value of. having been made 
contemporaneously. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. This was made 

Admiral Wilkinson. It is my recollection immediately after the 
event. 

[4S90] Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. But I know, for instance, I did not tell them 
about magic, I did not let them know — I did not tell them about all 
the diplomatic messages. 

Senator Brewster. So that magic, you say, was freely discussed, 
as you say later on in the memorandum. You mention that on the 
next page. 

Admiral Wilkinson. My hearing was very brief. They were in- 
terested in the actual movements of forces and I did not go at any 
length into the discussion of the diplomatic magic. 

Senator Brewster. On page 4 at the bottom you say : 

The meeting was discussing the Magic freely but stated they would be most 
careful that no mention of it would be made. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. So that was apparently one of the topics that 
was gone into to a material extent. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think the discussion I had with them as to 
the "magic" was simply as to the 14-part message. 

Mr. Gesell. Senator, would it be helpful to put the entire text of 
the memorandum in the record? We have read different portions, at 
different times, and to show the relationship of the excerpts wouldn't 
it be a good idea to put it all in ? 

[48911 Senator Brew^ster. I think it would be helpful to put 
it all in. 

The Vice Chairman. You want it included at this point in the 
record ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. I think it would be a ffood idea. 



1846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. It is so ordered. 

Mr. Gksell. If it is so ordeied I think it would be helpful. 
The Vice Chairman. All right. 

(The meniornndum above referred to is in words and figures as 
follows, to- wit:) 

Op-16 Copy No. 5 of 5. 

Secret 

December 19, 1941 

S-E-C-K-E-T 

]Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Subject: I'roceediiigs of President's Investigating Committee, 1000 to 1200, 
December 10, 1941. 

On notiticafion from Admiral Reeves, received at 0915, I reported to Justice 
Roberts' Comniisision at ten o'clock in the Munitions Building. General Miles 
was also there, accompanied by the chief of his Fav Eastern Division, Colonel 
R. S. Bratton ; Commander McCollum accompanied me. The Commission stated 
they wish(>d tlie Army and Navy Intellisienco to [.}<Sy2] cooperate in 

their answers; that they would hear General Miles first but might ask me any 
questions that might arise during his discussion. 

General Miles was then (]uestioned, and in the main his testimony was not 
interrupted by any side questions to me; so that despite the statement of joint 
questioning the actual effect "was complete testimony by General Miles, followed 
by mine. In fact, General Miles was excused, because of preparations for de- 
partui'e from the city this afternoon on an inspection trip, immediately after 
his testimony, although Colonel Bratton remained. 

They asked General Miles mainly what reports and instructions his office and 
the conunand in Hawaii had e\chat)ged for a period of approximately one 
month prior to the actual attack. He menti(niod conmiunications regarding 
possibilities of sabotage and described at some length the events in General 
Marshall's office, including the sending of the subsequently delayed dispatch 
to General Short on the moi-ning of Sunday. December 7th. He mentioned his 
evperience in service in the Islands and said that in the past the concern of 
G-2 of the Army had been rather in sabotage than in a military raid. He said 
his studieis as war plans officer there had, however, envisaged the possibility of 
a raid and that he had reached the conclusion that a successful raid was possible 
against a garri- {//l^OS] son which had not been warned, but was not 
possible against a garrison which had been warned. 

They then asked me what information and connnunications had been sent dur- 
ing the months preceding the attack. I said that, for an understanding of the 
picture, I would like to de.«!cribe our avenues of intelligence, and then mentioned 
the Naval Attaches we had maintained in the Far East, and the seventeen addi- 
tional observers and consular shipping advisers we had established in the past 
year. These informants reported matters which they ascertained either by 
their own observ:ition or by contacts which they might make. We had in the 
past had secret agents in Japan but we had none recently since those we had had 
had not survived. Aso n source of information was the ra<lio net and the inter- 
cepted dispatches, utilizing the facilities of the 14th and lOth Naval Districts. 
Information dispatches were received by us and the forces in the field kept in- 
formed, and the Chief of Naval Operations had testified as to actual warning dis- 
patches wliich he had sent in the peiMod immediately prior to the attack. As to the 
actual intenhange of messages with reference to intelligence, in general the 
sources reported their information to us via the Connnandei--in-Chief of the Asiatic 
and in forwarding it the Commander-in-Chief Pacific was usually advised. We 
had, on the fli-st of Drember. drafted a summary of information liSO-i] 
available to us at that time, reciting the details of the concentration of Japanese 
land forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa, and the several naval prepara- 
tions, including: 

(a) Reorganization of Japanese Fleets; 

(h) Readying for war of Japanese ships by docking, etc.; 

(c) Additional naval aircraft to the Mandated Island area; 

(d) Establishment of patrol between Marshalls and Gilberts; 

(e) The activity of the combined Air Force (patrol planes and tenders) In 
South China and the Mandates; 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1847 

(f ) The taking over of nmny merchant vessels by the Japanese Navy and the 
equipment of several anti-aircraft ships; 

(g) The radio intelligence with respect to the two task groups vuider the 
Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet — Group One operating in the South China area, 
and Group Two in the Mandated Islamls area. (I stated, however, that nothing 
in this item made us forecast a movement as far east of the Mandated area as 
Hawaii — whereupon Mr. Roberts sked tlie distance from Hawaii to the Mandates, 
and I told him the easternmost — JaUiit — was about 2,SM miles, and the re- 
mainder extended to the west- [^8i)5] ward about 2,7U0 miles. Actually 
the figures are 2,100 and 2,400.) 

Withotit mentioning particular dispatches, we had assured ourselves 
that all of this information had either passed through the CINCS 
Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had been furnished them from the 
Department. In addition, on December 3 we had ascertained that 
Japanese diplomatic and consular agencies had been ordered to burn 
all their conlidential codes and papers immediately, and we had re- 
layed this information to CINCS Asiatic and Pacihc and to the Com- 
mandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts, and had also directed 
our rei^resentatives in the Far East (attaches and observers) to burn 
their codes and papers. 

On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1 that 
the Japanese were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed 
at Thailand, Burma, and the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent devel- 
opments had proved this to be true. We had not been able to obtain 
intelligence or to develop by inference any indication of a raid on 
Hawaii. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific had as much information 
as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would 
infer positively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to 
do from the same information. I believed the raid had been aside 
from the main effort, and to my belief the Japanese striking force 
[4896] had retired to the westward immediately afterwards. We 
had no conclusive evidence of any Japanese surface vessels operating 
thereafter to the eastward of Hawaii, ajthough it was probable that 
some submarines had come into the eastern Pacific and possibly Avere 
still there. 

The Commission asked as to the control of fishing boats in the vicin- 
ity of Hawaii. I said that I knew that even before I left there in May 
there had been measures to effectuate control of these boats — first, by 
denying noncitizens the right to own and use them ; and second, by 
either removing or, in some way I thought, controlling their radio. 
These efforts were made principally by the Coast Guard as their proper 
province, although guided by the advice of the Commandant's office. 
Such measures as have been taken since the Coast Guard was incor- 
porated into the Navy would, of course, be more directly under his 
command. 

Under the Delimitation Agreement, regarding the special investiga- 
tory services, the actual investigations of all civilian population in 
Hawaii were in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but I 
knew the military and naval counterintelligence services were closely 
allied with the FBI, and that I felt sure that with the fishing boats 
Captain Mayfield and Naval Intelligence gave actual assistance where 
possible. Mr. Roberts said that they would find out more of [4897] 
that exact situation when they got out there. 

They asked what arrangements we had in the Intelligence branch of the Navy 
Department as to information during Saturday night (December 6). I said 



1848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that responsible oflBcers were on telephone call, but that in addition there was an 
oflBcer watch in our Foreign Branch, in our Administrative Branch, in our Domes- 
tic Intelligence Branch, and that, beginning on Friday night I had set a watch 
over the week-end in the Far Eastern section itself. I said that Commander 
McCollum had relieved Lt. Comdr. Watts at 0800 Sunday, that I had arrived at 
the office at about 0900, and that only then had the last part of the Magic (the 
meeting was discussing the Magic freely but stated they would be most careful 
that no mention of it would be made) arrived containing the final instructions 
to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington to break off negotiations, whereas 
the previous parts which had been available to us the preceding night had been 
more argumentative in sense and rather of the type of a "White Paper" designed 
subsequently for publication. 

Sometime after 0900 Sunday the information came that the presentation of 
the complete message, which was to be withheld until a later dispatch announc- 
ing the hour, was not directed to be made at 1300, Washington time. I said I 
understood by hearsay that the actual call requesting the appoint- [4898^ 
ment was not made until 1300 and that the appointment was granted for 1345 — 
but that the State Department was, of course, aware of these times. 

I said that we had reported this information to you, and that while we were 
discussing it you had talked over the phone with General Marshall, and that 
I understood you and General Marshall had mentioned (to the Commission) your 
conversation and the dispatch he sent. 

The Commission asked about the RADAR installations on the ships and in 
Hawaii. I understood that the Army had RADAR on shore, and I knew we 
had it installed on a few ships. However, it only works on a direct line such 
as the eye does, and in consequence, the RADAR on the ships so fitted which were 
in Pearl Harbor could not be effective because of the interposition of the moun- 
tains and the hills and the land in general. Some of the ships which were out 
of port were equipped with RADAR but, as far as I knew, they had not picked 
up anything on them — again because of the limitations of the device — the curva- 
ture of the earth limiting its range. 

With regard to the general question of the readiness of the Intelligence Service, 
I said that on the recommendation of my predecessor. Captain Kirk, as early 
as last April the Chief of Naval Operations had sent out a disptach that, because 
of past experience with reference to the Axis beginning activities [^899] on 
Saturdays or Sundays or on national holidays, the personnel of the naval intel- 
ligence service should be particularly careful on those days. Again in March the 
Chief of Naval Operations had directed an advanced state of readiness of the 
District Intelligence organization,. had directed the placing of coastal information 
sections in active status in May, the further expansion of District Intelligence 
organizations in May ; and a complete state of readiness had been directed in .July. 

After my testimony Lieutenant-General C. D. Herron, who relinquished com- 
mand in early February in Hawii, testified mainly about his preparations and his 
general practice as to alert stations. He said that last winter he had had 
them in the field for six weeks on the alert, but had subsequently modified that 
in some degree although he had maintained guns at their field stations. He said 
his primary plan was to use anti-aircraft for the defense of Pearl Harbor, to use 
fighting planes to control the air, and to have infantry support covering landing 
beaches. He said that he considered the most dangerous time to be dawn, 
particularly because of the possibility of approach during the night of enemy 
vessels, whether aircraft carriei-s or an actual raiding expedition. 

Tlie Commission asked if he considered Sunday morning the most lax time 
in the defenses, and consequently the most ad- [4900} vantageons time 
for an attack. He said that with regard to the reserves. Yes, because they were 
more likely to be on leave or other privileges, but with regnrd to the actual 
stations in the field he considered that they should be as efficient and as fully 
manned on Sundays as on any other morning. He personally made many dawn 
inspections on Sundays to check on and insure their readiness. 

T. S. Wilkinson. 



Copies 






No. 


1- 


-CNO 


No. 


2- 


-ACNO 


No. 


3- 


-Op-12 


No. 


4- 


-Op-lG-F-2 


No. 


5— Op-16. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1849 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, did you ever give any attention or con- 
sideration to the possibility of transmitting the substance or the copies 
of those intercepts that I have directed your attention to ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. As I have stated, my responsibility 
was limited to sending out, or included what was a limitation, the 
sending out of all information except that respecting enemy com- 
munications and that which might require or involve operational plans 
and movements. This message Avas [4^01] of that character. 
I am not convinced that I would have been authorized or permitted to 
send that out, or whether I should have given it or suggested to an- 
other agency that it should send it out, but in any respect, answering 
your question, I did not consider sending it out because I did not 
evaluate it, as I had not, as an indication of the detailed intelligence 
they desired. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, did you consider Hawaii to be beyond possi- 
bility of attack ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you think it was beyond probability of attack ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Is that the reason wdiy you did not adequately evalu- 
ate those messages concerning ship movements 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). In and around Hawaii ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; it had nothing to do with the possi- 
bility versus the probability of them. 

. Mr. Gearhart. Did you refrain from transmitting copies of inter- 
cepts for any particular reason ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. If I considered sending them, which I doubt, 
I would have refrained from sending copies of them because of danger 
to tlie code, the code-breaking activities. 

[4902] Mr. Gearhart. What was the practice of your division ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to send copies outside the Navy Depart- 
ment and to limit those very carefully. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you ever send any copies of intercepts ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge and only at the last 
moment did I send the gist of such an intercept, when we said that the 
diplomatic agencies have been told to burn their codes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, by transmitting that information any Japa- 
nese who cracked our code would know that we had cracked theirs, 
wouldn't they ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not only that, but if any widespread conver- 
sation or discussion had come to the ears of any Japanese agents, they 
would have known we had cracked it. I think our code was fairly 
secure. What we were attempting to avoid was the spread of knowl- 
edge that we were engaged in code breaking and had succeeded in 
breaking their code. 

I think I recall that General Marshall testified that he had heard 
rumors that that knowledge was beginning to leak out. 

Mr. Gearhart. You were present when General Marshall wrote out 
the message on the 7th of December, the one that arrived in Hawaii 
too late ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

[4^03] Mr. Gearhart. You were not among those in that group ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 



1850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, in that message he tells them that "Tomorrow 
the Japanese are going to deliver an ultimatum to the State Depart- 
ment" and also that they were going to deliver it at 1 o'clock. He did 
not hesitate to tell what he had learned through reading the intercepts, 
did he? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; nor did we in sending out the message 
about breaking the codes. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, your office had been sending out 
the substance of intercepts all during the year of 1941 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe not, sir. I think those messages you 
spoke of were sent out by the communications office. 

Mr. Gearhart. What does "OPNAV" stand for? 
_ Admiral Wilkinson. OPNAV ? That is Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions office as a whole. Is there any number, small number on it after- 
ward, Op-13, Op-20, something like that ? 

Mr. Gearhart. "OPNAV" is the way this reads. 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is general operations of the Navy ; yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. That means the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Or someone in his office. The actual 
[4^04] office number if it is prepared in a subordinate office would 
be indicated by a number such as OP-20o which would be Communi- 
cations, or Op-16, which would be Intelligence. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you have looked through these messages that 
have been sent them by OPNAV, have you not, during the year of 
1941? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I have seen this book. I am not sure that I 
recall which were sent out by OPNAV and which were otherwise 
indicated. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, here is one that was sent out on the 7th day 
of July 1941 to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and for 
the information of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. This 
reads : 

Tokyo to Washington 1 July 329: 

Japan directs eight Marus on east coast United States rush cargo handling 
and proceed Colon pass through Canal to Pacific between 16 and 22 July on fol- 
lowing schedule: 16th Tokai ; 17th — 

and so forth, naming a lot of dates. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. You hnve that before you, do you? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Page 6 of Exhibit 37. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

[4905'] Mr. Gearhart. That is transmittal of information that 
was received from intercepts, is it not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Turn over to page 7 and you will find another 
message. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is a transmittal by OPNAV or whatever you 
call it of information received from intercepts, isn't it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Likewise the next, on page 8? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1851 

Mr. Gearhart. And page 9? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Page 10? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Those were all sent out by the Com- 
munications Office and all sent out in July. I am informed that that 
practice was discontinued after July. In any event, it was not under 
the Office of Naval Intelligence. 

Mr. Gearhart. That was sent out because someone who then had 
the say-so believed that it was necessary to advise American com- 
manders in the field of information that was received in intercepts? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. There was a balance between the 
information going out and the security of the code- [4906] 
breaking processes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Admiral Wiliunson. As we have heard a few moments ago, sir, 
there were rumors of the suspicions as to code breaking and during the 
summer and fall every attempt was made to tighten up the security. 
This practice was apparently discontinued and we were constantly 
being warned by all hands to be careful about how the code breaking 
was threatened, the knowledge of code breaking was possible of 
suspicion. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right. Now in a lot of those messages that I 
called your attention to, the ones relating to ship movements and in- 
quiries concerning ship movements, did they take on any greater im- 
portance in your mind when the Navy translated this message from 
Tokyo to Washington, November 5, 1941, translated on November 5, 
1941: 

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange- 
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. 
I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoid- 
able one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the 
Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great 
determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. 

[4907] This information is to be liept strictly to yourself only. 

Now, when you read that message of a deadline being fixed by Japan 
for the doing of something, didn't the previous Japanese ship-move- 
ment intercepts take on a new and a more important aspect in your 
estimation ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would not say that it did, sir. That was in 
the character of prospective diplomatic negotiations that they were 
anxious to reach a conclusion on. Our war plans people were fully 
cognizant of it. They were aware of the diplomatic negotiations and, 
in fact, on October 16 they had sent out a warning message, on Novem- 
ber 24 they sent another and on November 27 still another. These 
messages were in a class affecting the operations of the fleet, which 1 
did not feel was in my province to relay. 

Mr. Gearhart. When you read the intercept from Tokyo to Hong 
Kong dated November 14, 1941, translated November 26, 1941, in which 
the following is said : 

Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the 
Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, 
the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it 
pertains to China, is : 

a. We will completely destroy British and American [^908] power in 
China. 



1852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and 
interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China. 

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even 
though they might have connections with the new Chinese government should it 
become necessary. 

When yoit read that warlike intercept didn't the interest in our 
ship movements in Hawaii take on an added importance in your 
estimation? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say the interest in our ship move- 
ments everywhere did. The interest of the enemy espionage in the 
movement of our ships and the information they dispatched in con- 
junction with the messages hitherto were all matters considered by 
the question of how the fleet would operate and what it would do 
and were measures under the jurisdiction of the War Plans Section. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, in the light of these last two intercepts that 
I have called your attention to, intercepts having to do with a dead 
line and Japan's martial intentions, after you read them and you 
say the shipping movement intercepts took on a more important 
aspect and a greater importance, did you at that time give anv con- 
siderations to whether or not you should transmit to Admiral Kimmel 
the substance of the ship- [4:909] movement intercepts or send 
him copies thereof? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Wliether we informed him of the fact that 
these detailed inquiries as to the locations in Pearl Harbor had come 
in in addition to the regular — I mean aside from the regular espionage 
that was going on, is that your question ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I want the question answered. 

Admiral Wilkinson. He knew there was a regular espionage. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, as you have testified that the ship-movement 
intercepts took on greater importance in your mind in the light of 
the dead-line message I have read you, did you at that time give some 
consideration to the proposition that you should send Admiral Kim- 
mel the substance of the ship-movement intercepts, or copies thereof? 

Admiral Wilkinson. May I ask you, sir, if you meant, should I 
tell him than in addition to the regular espionage with which he and 
we were familiar, that there were special messages inquiring as to 
special information desired from the spies? 

Mr. Gearhart, That is right. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, did you give any consideration to 
the question as to whether or not you should give to Admiral Kimmel 
the information that you had? 

[JfDW] Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right. Then wlien you encountered this inter- 
cept, directing your attention to page 165 of Exhibit No. 1 in this 
proceeding from Tokyo to Washington, November 22, 1941. [Read- 
ing:] 

To both you Ambassadors. 

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. 
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our 
fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the 
solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we 
wanted to settle Japanese-American i-elations by the 25th, but if within the 
next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; 
if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you — ' 
twenty ninth) ; if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an under- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1853 

Standing with Great Britain and the Netlierlands ; and in sliort if everything 
can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean 
it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things' are 
automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful considera- 
tion and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the 
infoiiuation of you two Ambassadors alone. 

[4911] Now when you read this intercepted message that the 
Japanese had fixed a positively imaUerable deadline of November 29 
at which things are automatically going to happen, after you i:ead 
that did it not occur to you, Admiral Wilkinson, that you should give 
to Admiral Kimmel the information that you had? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. If that was information of the 
character that would influence the operations of the Fleet, whether 
to move in or out of port, I am not sure that it was within the responsi- 
bility or the authority of my office to send that. If, however, it was 
within that authority and responsibility, I did not consider sending 
it to him. 

Mr. Gearhart. You were charged with evaluating all information 
that came to you, domestic and foreign. You were charged with the 
responsibility of disseminating that information. You had the infor- 
mation. Did you go and talk to Admiral Stark about it, or to any 
other higher officer than yourself? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was charged with evaluating the informa- 
tion, but I had been ordered not to develop the enemy intentions. I 
was charged with the dissemination of this information "as desir- 
able." I had been restricted as to the dissemination of information 
of this character. I should perhaps have talked to Admiral Stark, 
or to Admiral Turner, [4-912] about it. I did not. The infor- 
mation, however, was available to all hands, including myself. 

Mr. Gearhart. So much for that. Now I want to ask you some 
more questions about a few intercepts which were not translated until 
after the 7th. 

I notice, by making a rough count of Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 
2, that on December 6, 36 or 37 Japanese intercepts were decoded. 
Without counting them carefully, I notice in these two exhibits that 
very, very few were decoded on the 5th and very few on the preceding 
day. 

How do you account for the fact that on the 6th day of December 
our decoders were decoding like lightning and on previous days they 
decoded very, very few in comparison ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not account for it, sir. That was being 
done by the War Department Signal Intelligence Service and by the 
Navy Communications Service. It is possible that the completion of 
the transcripts were in part done on the 5th and finished on the 6th. 
It is possible that the key to the code was obtained on the 5th and 
applied on the 6th, but I haven't any information as to why. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you not consider it regrettable that a message 
containing this phrase remained undecoded until the 8th of December, 
a message which was received on December 6, 1941, from Honolulu 
to Tokyo, "I imagine that in all [4^13] probability there is 
considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack 
against these places," referring to Pearl Harbor? That appears on 
page 27 of Exhibit No. 2. 



1854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. You ask me if it was not unfortunate that it 
was not decoded before? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. It was tragic that that was not decoded before? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. How do you account for the fact that was not 
decoded, when the decoders were decoding very rapidly and decoding 
messages in great number on that day, the 6th ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not account for it, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. How do you account for them picking out the 13- 
part message to decode on the 6th and ignore this surprise attack 
message that arrived on the same day? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not account for it. It is possible it came 
in another code which they could not so readily translate; it is possible 
that they were primed to get that 14-part message because the pilot 
message had come before it and they were on the lookout for it and 
wanted to [4^H] tackle it first. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was there any special organization of decoders on 
the 6th day of December 1941 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir. It was not under my 
kn'>wledge of cognizance. That was in the communications office. 

Mr. Gearhart. Have you heard anyone account for the tremendous 
output of decoding that occurred on that day? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Has it been subject to conversational discussion? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I think I heard Captain Kramer 
remark that there was a heavy demand for translators that day, but 
that was, of course, after the decoding work had been done. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson, from Michigan, will 
inquire. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you. Admiral, have any conversation with 
Admiral Kirk about why he had been replaced in a few months? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I feel quite sure I did, sir. I know he was 
not replaced. He went to sea at his own request, in order to take 
advantage of an opportunity for command. 

[4015] Senator Ferguson. Whom would he have to make a 
request to? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The Chief of Naval Operations, I presume, 
would release him, and the Bureau of Personnel would give him the 
orders as to his duty. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you requested the assignment in there? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. It was a surprise to me. I was in 
command of a battleship at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. You were called from the fleet then? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. To come into Intelligence? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you briefed on any subject when you came 
in? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I spent some little time going through the 
Office of Naval Intelligence, spending a few hours in each section and 
division in order to see what subject they handled and how they han- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1855 

died them. I had intermittent converScations with Admiral Kirk 
and finally a fairly complete turn-over personally from him orally. 
I was not briefed by any officer outside of Admiral Kirk and his sub- 
ordinate divisions. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you briefed by Admiral Kirk? 

Admiral Wilkinson. In the sense of the usual turn-over, 
[WW] yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you briefed on the diplomatic messages 
up to that day ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically. I was in the Far Eastern 
Division and discussed the general tenor of them; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now who in the Far Eastern Division did you 
discuss the general tenor with? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McCollum. 

Senator Ferguson. Captain McCollum? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, the head of the Division. He was a 
continuing source of knowledge in there, had been in there some little 
time, and would subsequently find me there as well, and he told me 
the status up to the moment. 

Senator Ferguson. You think you came there the 15th of October? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I took over the duties on the 15th of October. 
This period of briefing I* spoke of, I had gone through the various 
offices, that took perhaps 2 weeks. 

Senator Ferguson. B'^fore that time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Before the 15th of October. 

Senator Ferguson. So you really came into the Department about 
the 1st of October? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I spent a time in the [4917] 
individual offices seeing what they did. I had a fairly complete and 
informative turn-over. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean when you say that the mechanical 
end of the of'ce you were looking over for 2 weeks? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Not the mechanical, I mean each one 
of the sections, I mean the Domestic Branch, the Foreign Branch, 
or the Geographic Section, or the methods of counterespionage, sus- 
pection, and so on, in each one of the several offices, of which there 
were perhaps 20, I spent a few hours. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be the administrative end then, 
thft ' a;t --P =t? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The operating end entirely. Not purely ad- 
ministrativp. the operating end of the office; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. At that time you knew, on the 16th, that there 
was a chanp-p of Cabinet in Japan? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do vou recall that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the Intelligence Branch figure in any way 
that that was a changing point in our negotiations? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and I think we so reported it [4^^<§] 
in our fortnightly situation, or fortnightly summaries, as our general 
understanding of the picture. The Far Eastern Section had con- 
siderable information on the make-up of the new Cabinet, that is on 
the military and naval members of it. We were all cognizant of the 



1856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

fact that this made a more military tenor in the Japanese Govern- 
ment than had existed before. 

[49J9] Senator Ferguson. From a diplomatic viewpoint, when 
ypu went in, effective on the 15th of October, where did we stand in 
relation to the negotiations with Japan, as far as you are concerned; 
what was the diplomatic situation as of that time? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is that the negotiations, which 
had been begun the preceding spring, interrupted in the summer, had 
been resiimed, were now being carried on with Admiral Nomura, the 
Japanese Ambassador, as the senior Japanese representative, Mr. 
Kurusu, had yet to arrive. 

Senator Ferguson. At that time, were you familiar with what had 
taken place about the I7th of August 1941 in relation to our diplo- 
matic situation? 

Admiral Wilkinson. With relation to the Argentina Conference, 
you mean, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, only by newspaper accounts. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell me what the newspaper ac- 
counts were at that time, on that question? Tell me what yoii got 
from the newspapers. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not think I gof very much more than the 
"four freedoms," and I think there was a communique there, I forget 
it now. 

[4-920] Senator Ferguson. Pardon me? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think there was a communique issued, but 
T forget it now, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You say you learned about the "four freedoms" 
from the newspapers? 

Admiral Wilkinson. To my recollection ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that all you knew about that conference? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I knew our naval and military staffs had 
attended, and I knew, in all probability, they had discussed measures 
of supply of England. The lease-lend, I am not sure whether it was 
in effect at that moment, but it soon was, and I knew they had probably 
discussed that and discussed the safety of the xltlantic lanes. I knew 
nothing of any discussions whatsoever regarding the Far East. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn about the discussions 
that had taken place there with relation to the Far East? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know that I ever learned, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you were going to make a summary or 
appraisal of the intelligence that was coming throaigh, isn't that 
correct ? 

[4921] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever learned about the parallel action 
of the two countries ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Only recently. 

Senator Ferguson. Just recently? 

Admiral Wilkinson. As I think I have explained, Senator, our in- 
terest, responsibilities, and authority were confined to the action of 
foreign countries, and particularly prospective enemies. Matters on 
arrangement within our own country and diplomatic, military, and 
naval plans or arrangements or understandings for cooperation were 
not given to us. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1857 

Senator Ferguson. Then the question, us I understand it, as far as 
Intelligence was concerned, of what our diplomatic negotiations were, 
did not concern you ; you did not use that in any way to evaluate what 
the enemy might be going to do? 

Admiral Wilkinson. As I could learn and find out matters of that 
degree, yes, of course, they would be reflected in our interest. There 
was no machinery set up that I w\ns definitely informed of. I learned 
a good deal through the translation of these intercepts as to what 
proposals our State Department had made to Japan which otherwise 
1 would not have known through the machinery [4-922] exist- 
ing. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall getting the Winant message in 
relation to the movement of ships on the 6th of December 1941 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it specifically, sir, but if I did 
see it, and I presume I did because it came through the information 
channels, it was confirmatory of the evidences that we had already had 
of this advance through the South China Sea. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you received Admiralty messages on the 
same point? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I had been informed of them, yes, sir, and I 
think I had seen them. 

Senator Ferguson. What did those two messages mean to you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. They meant an attack was coming in the South 
China Sea area. 

Senator Ferguson. It meant an attack was coming on the south? 
I did not get that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The South China Sea area, if we are speak- 
ing of the same message. You are sj^eaking of the Winant message 
regarding the movement of ships? 
, Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. That is the attack which [4923'] 
we had foreseen. 

Senator Ferguson. What did that mean to the United States ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I have my doubts, sir. It might mean we 
would come into the war in support of Siam, if that country were 
attacked, or Singapore, if that were attacked ; it might mean we would 
not come into the war. 

Senator Ferguson. Why would we possibly come in if Singapore was 
attacked, in your opinion, as of that time? 

Admiral Wn.KiNSON. Only because of two things : First because of 
our possible relations with England, as had been evidenced by the 
arrangements for the transfer of food and ammunition to England, 
the lend-lease, ocean convoys; the second thing, because that was an 
encroachment, a further advance of Japan, and the policy of our 
country apparently was directed toward preventing the aggressive 
moves of Japan extending beyond certain limits. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, I want to get what information you had in relation to the 
United States policy as far as Japan was concerned, if they moved 
beyond certain limits, as you now say in your last answer. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

[4924] Senator Ferguson. What was your information along 
that line ? 

79716 — 46 — pt. 4 — - I'J 



1858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. I had the information — I cannot say whether 
I saw the document, or was told about it — that an advance of the 
Japanese forces to the westward of the one hundredth meridian or the 
southward of the tenth parallel of latitude would be a matter of grave 
concern to both England and America. 

Whether that policy, as so indicated, of our State Department would 
be translated by the Congress and people into not only grave concern, 
but a resistance by war, I did not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you say someone showed it to you, or some- 
one told you about it. Is that true ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure which, sir, whether I had heard 
of it, or I had seen some message to that effect. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you recall what kind of message you may 
have seen along that same line? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I think I have seen some exhibit to 
that effect now. It may be that that I have seen it. 

If the counsel will show me, I can perhaps speak of it. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to try and take you back [^^5] 
as of the date, rather than what you saw here or heard at the hearing. 

Admiral Wilkinson. What I am speaking of now, is what I have 
seen which embodied those same parallels, those same geographical 
limits. 

As to the time I knew of the geographical limits, I cannot remember 
whetlier I knew of them by someone telling me, or whether I knew 
of them by seeing a paper. You ask me what paper I saw. I saw, 
if I saw a paper, it was probably this paper you speak of now. I think 
more probably I was stold that by Captain Schuirmann, who was the 
Director of the Central Division and liaison officer with the State 
Department. 

The Vice Chairman. It is now 4 o'clock. You will require some 
further time, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until 
10 o'clock tomorrow morning. You will return then please, Admiral. 

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., the 
following day, Wednesday, December 19, 1945.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1859 



[Wm PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK 



wednesday, december 19, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Hareor Attack, 

Washington, D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and 
Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Ilannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[4-927] The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. 

Does counsel have anything at this time? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Yesterday we had up an inqury made of counsel by Senator Fergu- 
son, I think, under date of November 16, in which he said, "Please 
obtain for me all information that any of the services or the Govern- 
ment had that Japan knew we had broken their code." 

There was a response from me immediately on the I7th, which said : 

With reference to your letter of November 16 requesting "all information that 
any of the services or the Government had that Japan knew we had broken 
their code," there is no indication that Japan ever knew it. All information would 
indicate the contrary. 

Now, yesterday I made the mistake, without checking up on the 
fact, of saying or thinking that I had submitted that request to the 
Navy or the Army, and they had reported and it was on the basis of 
their report that I made that statement, and as the result of that there 
were some imputations made on the good faith of the Army and Navy 
in not producing what we asked for. 

I want to say that imputation is not justified because I now find 
I never did ask for that material, and that this [4928] answer 
that I made was made based on my own impression of what they were 
asking, and what the evidence was at that time. I am quite willing 
to be open to criticism for not having followed it up, although at 
that time we were pretty busy just getting started, and possibly I 
might be forgiven for that. 

The Vice Chairman. I am sure we all recognize that. 

Mr. Mitchell. At any rate, we had the inquiry made. Bear in 
mind that this inquiry, as I interpret it, I am quit:e sure referred to 
what the Japs knew about our breaking the code prior to Pearl Harbor. 



1860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I was not thinking of any information about that in 1944 when 
Marshall wrote his letter, because we had not asked that they produce 
any of these intercepts at that day, so I was referring to what the 
conditions were prior to Pearl Harbor, and I also feel quite sure, 
although the request is not limited to that 

Senator Ferguson. That is all I was referring to, Mr. Mitchell. 
There is no misunderstanding about that. 

Mr. Mitchell. There is no misunderstanding about that. 

I also want to say at that time this was in the singular, and I was 
thinking of the diplomatic code, the magic or the purple stuff, so I 
wrote and told him I did not know of anj'^ evidence of that kind. I 
should have asked [4.9^5] the Departments for it, but I am 
glad to make it clear or to get straightened out on it. 

Senator Brewster. I think I had some correspondence also. Did 
you check that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Our file clerk was not able to get in from Virginia 
this morning. She has been ill for a week. She went away yester- 
day. We will have to let that go, a little. 

The Vice Chairman. We will take judicial knowledge of the weather 
conditions today. All of us had a hard time getting here. 

Mr. Mitchell. There is a communication from you, I am quite 
certain. 

Senator Brewster. Yes, along the same line. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have not heard from the Navy this morning on 
this, but the Army comes in, having worked hard on this subject with a 
number of intercepts during the months of April and May 1941. inter- 
cepts of Jap messages between Berlin and Tokj'o, Tokyo and Wash- 
ington is one of them, two, three, four of them. They all indicate a 
suspicion on the part of Japan that we were cracking one or more of 
their codes. 

Senator Brewster. Can we have those read into the record? 

[4930] Mr. Mitchell. I will be glad to read them. It is not 
always clear what code they are talking about. Ther^ are a number 
of them. The first one is from Tokyo to Berlin. 

The Vice Chairman. Pardon me a minute. Senator Brewster and 
Senator Ferguson had requested some information about whether 
Japan had suspected or knew we were breaking their code, and had 
requested some information from counsel, and counsel is giving a 
report on that now.^ 

The Chairman. I see. 

Mr. Mitchell. At the request of counsel, a search was made with 
reference to the intercepts prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. We have 
not made any attempt to find out what they suspected later on. It 
was Marshall's letter. They say they were still cracking. I suppose 
that is all I know about that. 

This message is as follows : 

From: Tokyo (Konoe) 

To : Berlin 

April 16, 1941 

Purple 

#329 Secret. 

Ke your #407 " 

We suspect that the several codes P, 80= and [4^31] OITE^ are 
being cryptanalyzed by foreign powers and today we have none too many code 
books to spare. Therefore, when it is necessary to send a message, and at 

1 See also hearings, Part 5, p. 2069 et seq. for additional messages indicating suspicion 
or knowledge by the Japanese that their codes were being broken. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1861 

the same time insure its secrecy, please dispatcli them by machine or by TSU " 
code. In case revelation of the contents are made to foreign powers, take care 
to paraphrase them from beginning to end. I want you to use OITE ** for 
messages of relatively slight importance. 
Relay to Italy and Turkey. 

" — S. I. S. #16312 — Berlin tells Tokyo that intelligence wires emanating from Japanese 
oflaces in the Near East and Egypt to offices in Germany and Italy should be appropriately 
paraphrased before transmitting their contents to the Germans and Italians in order to 
avoid giving them clues in decoding Japanese codes. Berlin recommends use of certain 
codes in this connection. 

'' — An auxiliary code. 

« — P-1. 

"1 — PA-K2. 

® — J series codes (J18-K7 now under study). 

ARMY 16407 Trans 4/19/41 (5) 

The next dispatch is from Berlin to Tokyo, May 3, 1941, marked 
"Purple No. 482". 

From: Berlin (Oshima) 
To: Tokyo (Matsuoka) 
3 May 1941 
(Purple-CA) 
#482 

STAAMAA STAHMER called on me this day (evening?) and stating that this 
request was to be kept strictly secret, he said that Germany maintains a fairly 
reliable intelligence organization abroad (or — "in the U. S."?), and according to 
information obtained from the above mentioned organization it is quite (or — 
"fairly"?) reliably established that the U. S. government is reading Ambassador 
Nomura's code messages, and then asked that drastic steps should be taken 
regarding this matter. 

There are at least two circumstances substantiating the above (suspicion). 
One circumstance is that Germany is reading our code messages * * *. Re- 
garding this, during my previous residency here, they were known to have a 
large scale cryplanalytic organization — 

(unfinished — last two-thirds not available) 
JD-1 2369 (M-A) Navy trans. 6 May 19411 

[49SS^ Senator BrewstW. Mr. Counsel, you spoke of two cir- 
cumstances. Did they give two ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. It is a garbled message and there are some 
dashes after the words "two circumstances," so we don't know what 
it was ; and then the message breaks off entirely. They didn't seem 
to get it all. 

The next one is from Tokyo to Berlin, May 5, 1941 : 

From: Tokyo (Matsuoka) 
To: Berlin (Oshima) 
5 May 1941 
(Purple-CA) 
#370 

Please express our appreciation to S^A MMAA STAHMER for the informa- 
tion in question and ask him if it is not possible to give us the authority for the 
statement that it has been fairly reliably established that the U. S. government 
is reading our code messages, so that we might take appropriate action. 

Reply requested. 
JD-1: 2368 (M*A) Navy trans. 6 May 1941 

The next one is from Tokyo to Washington, May 5, 1941, No. 192: 

From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister). 

To: Washington (Koshi). 

U934] 5 May, 1941 

(Purple) 

#192 

According to a fairly reliable source of information it appears almost certain 
that the United States government is reading your code messages. 

Please let me know whether you have any suspicion of the above. 
.TD-1: 2346 (A) Navy Trans. 5-51-41 (S-TT) 



1862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The next is from Washington to Tokyo, May 5, 1941, No. 267 : 

From: Washington (Nomura). 

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin). 

5 May, 1941 

(Purple) 

#267 

(Most guarded secrecy). 

( Foreign Office secret ) . 

Re your #192*. 

For our part, the most stringent precautions are taken by all custodians of 
codes and ciphers, as well as of other documents. 

On this particular matter I have nothing in mind, but pending investigation 
please wire back any concrete instances or details which may turn up. 
*JD-1: 2346 (M) Navy Trans. 5-6-41 (7) 

JD-1: 2367 

[4935] The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 7, 1941 : 

From: Tokyo (Matsuoka) 

To: Washington (Nomura) 

7 May 1941 

(Purple— CA) 

#198 Regarding your #267 :* 

This matter was told very confidentially to Ambassador Oshima** by the 
Germans as having been reported to them by a fairly reliable intelligence me- 
dium ; but to our inquiry they are said to have refused to divulge the basis on 
which they deemed it to be practically certain. 
JD-1 :2367 Nomura requests further details of the basis for the report that 

his code msgs are being read by the U. S. government. 
**General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin. 
JD*-1:2388 (F) Navy trans. 7 May 1941 (S-TT) 

The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 7, 1941, No. 1015 : 

From : Tokyo. 

To: Washington, Bangkok, Rome. 

7 May, 1941 

(Purple) 

#1015 (Circular) 

Immediately upon receipt of this message, [4936] use 1941 regulations 
for A and B code machines until further notice. 

16974 

JD-1: 2372 (A) Navy Trans. 5-7-41 (S-TT) 

I think that refers expressly to the machine type. 

The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 8, 1941, no number : 

From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) 
To: Washington 
May 8, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
No number. 

From Vice Chief OHASI to IMinister WAKASUGI. 

I want you to leave the custody of the government code in the hands of IGUCHI. 
No matter how long the communications are or how hurriedly the code must be 
used, there should be no occasion to call upon the services of telegraphic clerks. 
Please impress upon all of your secretaries that this is a special regulation. 

In view of the importance of the details of our recent exchange of wires, please 
(burn?) them immediately. 
ARMY 2446 Trans. 5/9/41 (S) 

Then there is one from Washington to Tokyo, May 9, 1941, unnum- 
bered : 

[4937] From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo (Matsuoka) 
9 May 1941 
(Purple-CA) 
Unnumbered 

To the Vice Minister*, from Wakasugi.** 

I respectfully acknowledge receipt of your telegram.*** 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1863 

Because of various duties at this office it requires a long time for a secretary 
alone to handle long messages and the increased volume of traffice in connection 
with this matter.**** 

(My message :j^272***** required 6 men woi-king for 6 hours.) 

With the opening of negotiations, the volume of telegraphic traffic is bound to 
increase tremendously. As time is at a premium in handling these communica- 
tions, you can well appreciate the inadvisability of having only the secretary han- 
dle this work. Furthermore, it goes without saying that the increased traffic 
will interfere greatly with other duties of this office. 

However, fortunately, our communication clerks have been constantly reminded 
of the necessity of maintaining security, and they have faithfully adhered to this 
policy in their work. 

[4938] Although I appreciate the intent of your telegram *** from the 
standpoint of security, I, nevertheless request your authorization to enlist the 
aid of Horiuchi, Hori, and Kazuwara to handle communication duties under 
strict supervision. 

Also please authorize me to have Kawabata of Chicago come here temporarily 
to assist us in our communication work. (Bring all codes and do his work in this 
office), 

*Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ohashi. 

**Japanese Minister to Washington, under Ambassador Nomura. 

***S^e JD-1: 2446, unnumbered, dated 8 May (Purple-CA), in which Tokyo 
issues Washington special regulations for custody of the Chief of Mission private 
code (CA). 

**** Japanese-American negotiations, being conducted in great secrecy. 
JD-1: 2494 (A-M) Navy Trans. 12 May 1941 (7) 

The next one is from Washington to Tokyo, May 20, 1941, No. 327 : 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
May 20, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
No. 327. 

INTELLIGENCE : 

Though I do not know which ones I have [4939] discovered the United 
States is reading some of our codes. 

As for how I got the intelligence, I will inform you by courier or another 
safe way. 
ARMY Trans. 5/21/41 (7)" 

The next is from Tokyo to all Japanese merchant vessels : 

From : Tokyo. 

To : All Japanese Merchant Vessels. 
30 May 1941 
(NL) 
No. 1 

The Navy "S" code was seized from one of our merchant ships in a certain 
foreign port, together with other secret documents in custory of the captain. 

The use of the Navy "S" code shall be discontinued except when absolutely nec- 
essary for training purposes. 

And, as previously instructed, when there is a possibility that official inspec- 
tion may be made, all secret documents should be promptly burned. 
JN-1 : 69 (C) Navy Trans. 5-31-41 (M) 

That is the last one. The Army reports that they are continuing 
their search and the Navy reports that it has found some messages 
which are now being photostated. Whether they are the same or 
others I do not know yet. 

The Vice Chairman. Is that all, Mr. Counsel? 

[W40] Mr. Mitchell. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Very well. 



1864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. THEODORE STARK WILKINSON 

(Resumed) 

The Vice Chairman, Admiral, do you have any statement you want 
to make before you resume your testimony ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. With regard to some of the inquiries made of 
me yesterday to bring information when available : 

Counsel has just read the dispatches which I was requested to look 
up, the second one of which referred particularly to the one I spoke 
of where Berlin had advised Tokyo that they had information as 
to breaking the codes. 

With respect to the personnel in the district intelligence office in 
Honolulu at Pearl Harbor time, the nearest date for which we have 
figures is December 16, at which time there were 41 officers, 60 enlisted 
men, and 3 civilian agents in that office. 

Inquiries are being made as to the surveillance, screening, and gen- 
eral security of the civilian laborers and workmen in the Pearl Harbor 
Navy Yard, as requested by Senator Brewster. I have not the answer 
on that at present. 

Thes Vice Chairman. Is that all ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

[494^] Senator Ferguson. Yesterday, Admiral Wilkinson, I 
was asking you about the knowledge that was given to you at the time 
you went in in relation to diplomatic negotiations with Japan and 
also the military and naval knowledge, because you went into the 
department on the 15th of October. 

Now, can you recall that you were briefed on the military situation 
as far as our forces were concerned, and their forces, so that you would 
be able to take the knowledge that you were getting and analyze it, 
so it would be of value to those that you were to give it to ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I had general information of our own forces 
from my previous work at sea and I had a professional interest in 
where they were acquired before I took over and afterward from the 
ship movements office and from the War Plans as to the disposition of 
our forces. I was not formally briefed nor formally informed as to 
it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. A^Hien Admiral Ingersoll talked to you- — as I 
understand it, he did talk to you — he told you that your duties would 
be varied from those that were in writing? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I asked him to confirm that specific point only, 
sir, that I mentioned. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did he give you any reasons why 
there was to be a change? 

Admiral Wilkinson, No, sir. He said that was a naval [4^4^] 
practice as opposed to the Army practice, that the Army practice 
was that the so-called G-2 office, which was not only the Military 
Intelligence Division but also an Assistant Chief of Staif, that that 
otrice was charged with preparing the enemy side of the Estimate of 
the Situation, so-called, which is to say, what can the enemy do, what 
will he do, and what are his possibilities, that that was assigned to 
the Army G-2, but that that was not a part of the duties or within the 
scope of the activities of the Naval Intelligence, that that estimate of 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1865 

the situation, both the enemy side and our own side was prepared in 
War Plaiis. 

That was the only point I asked him about, sir, and that was how 
he explained it. 

[4^4^] Senator Ferguson. And he explained it in that way ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You asked him because the instructions in the 
manual were direct that you had other duties than what you were 
then performing? 

Admiral Wilkinson," No, sir; I don't think the instructions in the 
manual conflicted directly. They said I should get all the facts and 
information bearing on the enemy's intentions. They did not tell me 
to estimate them, and the instructions in the manual said, "Disseminate 
information as desirable," and "desirable" would be such instructions, 
or otherwise, as I might receive. 

I thought, in other words, that his word to me was consistent with 
the manual. 

Senator Ferguson. And it made a direct limitation ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. A direct limitation and an order from an 
officer, a responsible officer in the chain of command. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know or did you hear after you came in 
that there had been a change in the sending of messages to Admiral 
Kimmel in August of that year? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall that I did, sir. I was informed 
as to the present status and continued that. I don't know that I was 
informed of a prior status [4d4-4] which had been changed. 

Senator Ferguson. You just had the present status? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I didn't go into the history of it. 

[494^] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Admiral Hart had 
his own means on the Philippines of getting his information in the 
CINCAP? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I knew that both Admiral Hart and Ad- 
miral Kimmel had agencies wherein they could get the radio intelli- 
gence with regard to the movement of the enemy ships. I knew both 
of them had agencies which had some facilities, however slight, for 
attacking codes. I do not know that I knew that Admiral Hart was 
able actually to solve the purple code. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that Admiral Hart did have 
means of getting diplomatic messages? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that I did ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that Admiral Kimmel did not have any 
such means at all ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I do not recall that I did. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall that you knew that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. I knew that they both had certain facil- 
ities but the extent of them I did not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Ambassador Grew's messages come to you? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

[4946] Sentor Ferguson. Then you did not know 

Admiral Wilkinson. My error, sir. The messages he sent to the 
State Department during my tenure of office, my liaison officer over 



1866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

there picked those up, but not the — I thought for the moment you were 
speaking of the first message of January. 

Senator Ferguson. No. 

Admiral Wilkinson. The more recent messages did, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with his message on the third 
where he said that the Japanese might strike with dramatic suddenness ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The message of what date, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. November the 3d. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I probably saw it, sir. I think I did 
see it because my liaison officer obtained these messages from the State 
Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Did that change your thinking at that time as to 
whether or not war was near or not near? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes and no, sir. It crecked so closely with 
the movements that they were making into the South China Sea, 
which were already beginning then and were intensified later, that it 
probably directed my attention there rather than the possibility of 
their making a sudden strike against the United States at some other 
place. 

[4-94'^] Senator Ferguson. Now, when you were before the Rob- 
erts committee was there a stenographer present ? 

Admiral Wilkinson, My recollection is there was, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, There was? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is there was, yes, sir; and I 
had expected to see it and, in fact, when I came here I looked for that 
record and found there was no record, only a summary. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he took stenographic notes 
of what you said ? 

Admiral Wilkinson, I thought so. 

Senator Ferguson, You thought so at the time? 

Admiral Wilkinson, Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you do not know why, then, they were not 
transcribed ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, You never heard? 

Admiral Wilkinson, I never heard. 

Senator Ferguson. This paper 

Admiral Wilkinson. I found a precis but not a brief, not a 
transcription. 

Senator Ferguson, You did not prepare this paper then that you 
brought in yesterday? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I prepared that as a memorandum to 
[4'94S] Admiral Stark after the event of what my testimony had 
been according to my recollection, but it was in no sense a stenographic 
record of my testimony. It was just for Admiral Stark's informa- 
tion of what they had nsked me and what I had said. 

Senator Ferguson, Did the Roberts committee draw up an instru- 
ment similar to this? 

Admiral Wilkinson, Not to my knowledge. That was my memo- 
randum to Admiral Stark, It was entirely within the office and had 
no connection with the Commission, Now, the Commission may have 
made, and I thought they did, an actual transcript by a stenographer, 
but when their report came in it was only what they called a precis of 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1867 

testimony of those witnesses they heard before they left Washington 
to go to Pearl Harbor, among them myself, and the precis with respect 
to my testimony was about two paragraphs long as I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Has the comisel got that copy of those two para- 
graphs ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think Senator Brewster has that. I would not be 
able to check it without looking at our files. 

Mr. MuuPHY, Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. MuRi'HY. I think in the Roberts' report itself you will find a 
discussion of the procedure they followed. They \.PJ4^\ did 
not take notes, apparently, in this country on that part of their hear- 
ings and later on they went on into a stenographic record, but there is 
the discussion you want in the report itself. 

Senator t erguson. I just wanted to clear this up this morning as to 
what took place in that hearing. 

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection was that they had a confi- 
dential secretary or ship's clerk or someone present taking notes but 
it may be that he was only taking an abstract rather than taking 
stenographic notes. 

Senator Ferguson. I am going to try and take you back to the morn- 
ing of the 6th. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. About a certain meeting with Admiral Turner 
and there was also a meeting with, as I understand it, McCollum and 
Bratton. Do you recall that meeting? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I have seen some mention of it. I do 
not recall it. I saw McCollum constantly and occasionally Bratton; 
not so often Bratton. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, on page 998 of the Navy Top Secret Ad- 
miral Turner talks about the meeting ; at least it relates to the instru- 
ment that was drawn. 

Do you remember a long document, some 500 words, being drawn up ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. By whom, sir? ^ 

Senator Ferguson. By McCollum. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not as of that date. I remember a December 
the 1st memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. Let me read this. I will change it. It was not 
on the morning of the 6th as I see here. There is another meeting 
that I had in mind on that. 

Question No. 48 on page 998 [reading] : 

There is evidence before this court that Commander McCollum in the Office 
of the Director of Naval Intelligence prepared a summary of information on 
the Japanese-United States i*elatioiiship over a period some time preceding the 
third or fourth of December 1941 which was for the information of the Com- 
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Did you have any knowledge of the preparation 
of such a dispatch? 

Answer. Yes. We had discussed the advisability of making such a summary 
and I had personally discussed with Commander McCollum the details of the 
various points and the detail of the relationship and their negotiations and so on. 
We had spent a great deal of time talking the thing over. Then Commander 
McCollum, I will say we found ourselves in very close agreement, prepared the 
dispatch, I have forgotten its terms, and brought 14^51] it to me to 
check over it, which I did, and found myself in general agreement with it and 
made suggestions on a few comparatively minor changes. Now, I do not re- 
member just what happened with the dispatch. 



1868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Question. Can you recall what happened to the dispatch? Was it ever trans- 
mitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet? 

Answer. I do not know. We do not know at this time. 

Question. To your knowledge did it ever reach the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Answer. I do not know. I think I initialed it and gave it back to McCollum 
so that the dispatch could be presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by 
the OfBce of Naval Intelligence with my own concurrence. That is my memory 
of it. It was presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Director of 
Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Is that Colonel Bratton's testimony or whose, 
sir? 

Senator Ferguson. That is Admiral Turner's testimony in the Top 
Secret of the Navy. I read the direct quote. Have you got it ? 

Mr. Gesell. No ; that is our only copy. 

14^62] Senator Ferguson. Have you seen it ? 

Mr. Gesell. I haven't checked that testimony. You are quite right, 
it is in the Top Secret but I did not recall at this time that that was the 
testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. Extracted testimony of Vice Admiral R. K. 
Turner, U. S. Navy, pages 994 to 1008, inclusive. 

Admiral Wilkinson. And that is reported as of December 6th, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, he has not given the date there but 
he has got in the dates over a period some time preceding the third or 
fourth of December. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Preceding the third or fourth ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, over a period some time preceding the third 
or fourth of December, which was for the information of the Com- 
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall that message? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that as of the morning of the 
6th, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, any other time ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Or the messages there preceding the third or 
the fourth. At one time in that interval between the first and the 
sevent]^ Captain McCollum came to me with a message and I went to 
see Admiral Turner with him. Now, more [4053] recently we 
have discussed that to endeavor to clear our mutual recollections and 
the latest recollection which resulted from that discussion that I recall 
is that Captain McCollum took the message to Admiral Turner and 
Admiral Turner referred back to the war warning message and dis- 
cussed with McCollum whether that of itself was not sufficient or 
whether it was necessary to send any further message, and the result, 
as I now recall, as I say, of their discussion through this mutual recol- 
lection and mutual endeavor to clear our memories, was that Turner 
and McCollum agreed that it was not necessary to send further infor- 
mation of that sort because it had been covered by the war warning 
message, but I would like very much, of course, to have Admiral 
Turner testify to that as well and he, I believe, will be a witness 
shortly, but I do not believe that there was any such message actually 
sent. The message may have been in our thought, the message may 
have been one that we were contemplating with respect to the winds 
message when there was a false interpretation but that was proved to be 
false before anything was sent out. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1869 

Senator Ferguson. Now, whether or not the message was sent — let 
us pass that for the moment 

Admiral AVilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson (continuing) : You recall the dis- [4^54] 
cussion of getting further information to Kimmel. That is what they 
are talking about in this, are they not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you lemember that ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I remember McCollum discussing with me 
whether there was anything further that should be sent out on the 
basis of the information which we had discussed up to the date of 
the 1st of December with regard to the South China Sea incidents. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, it would certainly be after the 27th? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It was after the 27th. 

Senator Ferguson, So it was information received after the 27th 
that you had discussed with McCollum ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you discussed as to whether or not that 
should be sent to the CINCPAC ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. To the fleet as a wliole. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; to the fleet as a whole. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Which would go to the Commander in Chief. 

Admiral Wilkinson. And as I recall that discussion it was factual 
evidence that we had of the further movements in [4^55] the 
South China Sea. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, can you give us, as near as you can, the 
substance of what this message was that you now recall was taken 
up with Admiral Turner, that you say was not sent ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is very hazy but I think it 
was information with respect to the further developments that had 
actually been discovered in the South China Sea which were brought 
up to date by the 1st of December memorandum which is in evidence 
and which may have occurred in the 2 or 3 days since the 1st of Decem- 
ber memorandum and the time we were discussing that message. It 
wasn't anything to do with a threatened attack on Hawaii because 
we had no intimation of that whatsoever. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to Admiral Turner as to 
whether or not he thought of an attack upon Hawaii ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But at least you had no thought of an attack 
upon Hawaii ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that continued on until after the attack ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall a meeting with any- 
14^S6] one, particularly with Colonel Bratton, on Saturday morn- 
ing about further information to be sent to the Army or the Navy at 
Hawaii ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You have no recollection at all of that ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. As I say. Captain McCollum was in 
my office frequently all the time I was on duty there and as the rela- 
tions became strained and the movements of the Japanese forces to the 



1870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

south were more and more apparent, he was in my office I would say 
three and four times a day, sometimes, but rarely. Colonel Bratton 
would be with him and I recall from time to time in that way seeing 
Colonel Bratton but I do not recall specifically seeing him on the 
morning of the 6th. I do recall seeing Captain McCollum several 
times that morning. It may well be he brought Colonel Bratton in 
with him. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any conversation with officers in 
the Army and/or the Navy in relation to trying to get more informa- 
tion to Hawaii? Would that refresh your memory, whether it was 
with Bratton specifically on a specific date or just a general conversa- 
tion with him, or information from him or any of the other officers? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, not specifically, except [4^571 
the 1st of December in Admiral Stark's office we were discussing the 
general movements of the Japanese, the preparation of this message I 
just mentioned. The information as to the movements of the Japanese 
Fleet was being picked up and in fact more or less originated in Pearl 
Harbor and in Corregidor and was known to both of them. Except for 
information of an attack on Pearl Harbor, which I did not have, there 
was nothing particularly for me to send to the fleet. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the message of — if you 
will take Exhibit 37, page 32. Counsel, could you give the Admiral 
Exhibit 37 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I qualify my last reports, of course, Senator, 
with respect to the sending of the code messages. I did confer with 
Admiral Ingersoll about that — first with Captain McCollum and then 
with Admiral Ingersoll and sent the code message. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the code message, were you familiar 
with the message being sent to Tokyo to destroy our code ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I originated, in fact, a message to Tokyo and 
several other naval attaches' offices to destroy our codes, yes, sir. I 
think it was Tokyo as well. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the one that went to 
Tokyo? 

[4958] Admiral Wilkinson. As I recall, it was the same one that 
went to the other agencies. I was familiar with that and, in fact, 
originated it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, can you tell us just what caused you to 
send that message to destroy the code? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Because the Japanese had issued instructions 
to their offices to destroy codes, and we feared that if they anticipated 
that conditions would be such that their offices would be raided, that 
certainly they themselves would not hesitate to raid our offices, war or 
no war, and we did not want to be in a position to have our codes seized 
by a raid. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you believe that war was imminent? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Imminent but not inevitable. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the message on page 32, November 24; do 
you have thnt before you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted at all about the sending of 
that message or its wording? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1871 

Senator Ferguson. Then your only knowledge came after it had 
been sent? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And would you say how long after it [4^59'] 
had been sent? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say a day or two, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And then did you get any instructions on it as 
to its meaning or effect or why it was sent? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, except I was familiar with the negotia- 
tions in process by reason of the broken codes so that I knew the obvious 
reason for it ; similarly with the message of the 2Tth. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you in any way informed that that mes- 
sage was to take care of a surprise attack? For instance, I will read 
you question 40 on page 996 of Admiral Turner's testimony before the 
top secret. It may refresh your iriemory. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I understand that reference now. 
I did not understand before what you were reading from. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

This dispatch, exhibit 15, states "a surprise aggressive movement in any 
direction is indicated." 

And that Exhibit 15 is this same message that I am reading to you. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Except the text of the message reads, "is a 
possibility." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. [Keading :] 

This language is omitted from the dispatch of the [4-960] 27th of No- 
vember, three days later, wherein there is set out certain Japanese objectives in 
the Far East. Was this omission from the dispatch of November 27th done 
intentionally? 

This is the answer of Admiral Turner : 

I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two dispatches. 
In the one of the 24th it says "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction 
is indicated." Now, that "in any direction" could be by naval force, air force, 
amphibious force or anything else. In this other dispatch we said, "an amphib- 
ious expedition is en route." 

That is the one of the 27th. I am inserting that in my own language. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, to quote further : 

It was moving down the China Sea. Now, those two are quite different. They 
do not cover the same kind of a subject and they were intended not to cover it. 
That was information. We knew that the Japanese were on the move in the 
China Sea. That was a fact. Now, the other was deduction as covering gener- 
ally not only the movement of an amphibious force but the movement of any force. 

[4901] Now, does that refresh your memory? 

Admiral Wilkinson. As to what, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. As to these two messages, what you were told 
told about. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, I am familiar with both of the 
messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that your understanding of the messages 
that I just read you, what Admiral Turner said about them? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Why, I do not -know that I developed any 
particular understanding. My understanding of the first message was 
a statement that the negotiations were breaking down and that any- 



1872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

thing might happen anywhere. My understanding of the second mes- 
sage was, so far as I was interested in it — I was not directly affected 
by it, the second message — that it was a war warning sent to both the 
Asiatic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet stating, "Look out; negotiations 
have ceased ; an aggressive movement by Japan is expected and here is 
what has been indicated : We know they are going to do tliat." 

My understanding was, certainly, that that would not be the only 
thing that might have happened, such as Admiral Turner has said, 
but that was certainly the one thing that was very evident and, of 
course, did occur. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have any knowledge that 
[4^62] there was a movement that would cause an amphibious 
landing? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, yes. I think the basic information under 
the conditions that existed had been prepared and received in various 
detail by my office and furnished to him. Ther6 were ships and trans- 
ports and landing boats and men-of-war streaming down the South 
China Sea. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat was the earliest you remember coming to 
the conclusion that there would be an amphibious landing? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say certainly by December 1. 

Senator Ferguson. Now. where would this amphibious landing in 
your opinion be made, would you say ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know, of course. There was a pos- 
sibility tliey might be getting around to make an advance base in 
Indochina, they might be going down to go into Thailand — Siam at 
that time — and from then to expand their influence into that free 
country, or they might be making a direct assault on the British terri- 
tories in the Malay Peninsula. 

It integrated with my conception, as I have said earlier, that I felt 
that they might well be feeling tlieir way southward and by the infil- 
tration method to gain all the ground and solidify their position as far 
as they could before they made any definite act which would antagonize 
the British into [4d6S] the war, including certain nations, just 
as they had done for some years past. If they followed that course 
they would limit their activities to Indochina and perhaps Siam* If 
they wanted to make a direct attack, they would go, as in fact they did 
go, into the Malay Peninsula. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if they went into the ^lalay Peninsula 
how would that involve us in Avar from the Imowledge you had ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I know that if there was an attack on British 
possessions. I knew it would involve England in war. I knew that the 
relations between England and the United States were close, the actual 
details I did not know, but I knew that Ave would be concerned and I 
thought it probable that the Congress Avould be sufficiently concerned 
to consider Avhetlier it was a cause of Avar. As far as I kncAv there Avere 
no binding commitments. I did knoAv that there had been the geo- 
graphical lines set up, the passage of Avhich aa'ouM be a cause for con- 
cern on the part of this country and that the ISIalay Peninsula Avas 
beyond those lines. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall the three men-of-Avar memoran- 
dum here ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I recall it noAv. I did not see it at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not see it prior to the 7th ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1873 

[4964] Admiral Wilkinson. I am quite sure I did not. It was 
quite new to me. 

Senator Fercjuson. Pardon me ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It was quite new to me when I saw it here. I 
am quite sure I did not see it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not you ever got 
any information from those three men-of-war or any one of them ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't think so, sir. I don't think it ever got 
out of the station. I do know with the aerial patrol that was so. That 
was established and we got information from it but I doubt if the 
men-of-war were ever stationed. 

Senator Fer(;uson. Were you getting information from the aerial 
patrol at the Philippines ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, via the commander in chief of the 
Asiatic. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you get any from the aerial patrol at 
Hawaii ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you using the aerial patrol at the Philip- 
pines as a source of information ? 

Admiral Wilkinson, I was not using it. I was looking for it. 

[4^65] Senator Ferguson. Well, that is what I mean. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; I did not order it. 

Senator Ferguson. It was being used by your office ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know when Singapore actually went 
on alert? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know that it had gone on alert 
on the 6th, their 6th ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It would be on our 5th. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I may have seen the dispatches but 
at what precise moment I did I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the purple code 
was used for that wind message or was that a minor code that was 
used on that wind message ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Setting it up? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. To set it up was a code. To implement it 
was in the middle of a weather broadcast as I remember. There is 
no code that set it up. It might be evident on the face of the dispatch. 
I w^ould not ordinarily know particularly what code any message 
came in because they came to me after translation. 

[4966^ Senator Ferguson. And the name on the code as a rule 
was not on the translation ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly. 

Senator Ferguson. When would you say your office was alerted 
to war, for real war ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. My office was alerted to the Far Eastern 
crisis about 10 days or 2 weeks before the 7th of December and my 
office was not alerted to war as war until it actually occurred, but we 
were in a crisis condition and standing watches and 24-hour servince 
and responsible officers on call outside of their own office hours. 

79716 — 46— pt. 4 20 



1874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. How much effort did you put in Saturday eve- 
ning trying to reach Admiral Stark after they delivered those 13 
parts to you at your office, or at the moment ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I called him up, sir, and failed to 
get him. I don't think I put much more effort into it because I thought 
at the time, and I was in agreement with the people I had been dis- 
cussing it with. Captain McCollum, General Miles and Captain Beard- 
all, that it was a diplomatic paper, a justification of the position of 
Japan, a so-called w^iite paper such as governments frequently issue 
in connection with negotiations which they are conducting. I did 
not consider it a military paper and it was not until the fourteenth 
[4^67] part came in that I considered it was a final paper. We had 
sent dispatches of almost that same character, I think, indicating 
that propositions made by the Japanese were not satisfactory to us 
and this was one being made by them that our propositions w^ere not 
satisfactory to them. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you knew about the message of the 
26 th having been sent ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you knew that we had considered their 
message of the 20th of November as an ultimatum? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not know that because one 
does not reply to an ultimatum. I would have considered their message 
of the 20th, and I do consider it, as a step in the negotiations and 
ours of the 26th as a further step, although I did not think that they 
would accept ours of the 26th. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, why did you want to reach Admiral 
Stark then that evening if this was only an ordinary white paper 
diplomatic message? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Just to tell him that we had it. He had seen 
the pilot message. To tell him that we had it and as far as we read it 
there was nothing particularly alarming in those parts and I would 
show it to him in the morning. 

Senator Ferguson. That pilot message said that they were 
[4968] to get another message as to when it was to be delivered. 
Was that very significant to you, the placing of a zero time for 
delivery ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The pilot message said two things, sir. It 
said, ''We are going to give you an answer and it is going to be in 14 
parts. We will tell you when to deliver that note." The second thing 
was, "You are going to receive it and you are to dress it up in good 
language and we will tell you when to deliver it." The fact that there 
was a certain time for the delivery was not significant to me. Per- 
haps it should have been. I was not familiar with diplomatic hm- 
guage, that the time of presentation is characteristic of an ultimatum 
rather than an ordinary note, which would not ordinarily be presented 
at some certain time. I did not appreciate it if that is the case. In 
other words, the time element, the fact that they were to deliver it ;'t 
a certain time, it didn't mean any more to me than as being a time with 
respect to negotiations and here they said to them to "dress it up and 
then we will tell you when to present it." 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that was because of or caused 
by your lack of knowledge of diplomatic procedure ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1875 

Admiral Wilkinson. Or my general lack of intelligence or appre- 
ciation, sir, I don't know which. I certainly did not appreciate it. 

[4901^] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, Admiral Beardall was 
at your office that night ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He was the President's military aide? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Naval aide. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me ; naval aide. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And had been familiar with the magic? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So you could properly discuss and freely discuss 
with Admiral Beardall and General Miles, who was also familiar 
with magic this question ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, and my recollection is we all agreed 
that it was a diplomatic justification of their position. 

Senator Ferguson. Normally Admiral Beardall would have been 
the man to receive it for the President, would he not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And Kramer, who had delivered it to you, he 
delivered it at the White House? 

Admiral Wilkinson. He saw that as he was at the Wliite House — 
he delivered it at the White House. 

Senator Ferguson. He advised you of it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It was not necessary for Beardall to [4^701 
take it there. 

Senator Ferguson. You were advised of that fact? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he had any discussion 
with Kramer about it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Whether Beardall had? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. Kramer was there with all three of us. 
I don't remember any particular discussion between those two. Kra- 
mer was there during our talk and sat in there with us. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he advise you of his conversation with the 
Secretary of the Navy? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. At least that the Secretary of the Navy was 
going to have a meeting with the Secretary of State and War on the 
following morning at ten? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir ; for two reasons : First, because they 
were to discuss this diplomatic message; and, second, on the pre- 
sumption that the fourteenth part would be available by then, as in 
fact it was. In fact, I thought that message was primarily of concern 
to the State Department rather than the Navy and the Army. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you put on any special effort [4'^71] 
to decode the fourteenth message which you were intercepting, which 
would have been the one o'clock message? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not myself because that was under 
Communications but I knew from Kramer that Communications was 
on the lookout for it. 



1876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson, Well, you knew that America was not bluffing 
in this negotiation? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. We were going to adhere to our 
principles. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. But I also knew that we were making an 
effort to delay the break-off of the negotiations and any actual conflict 
until we got our positions in the Philippines sufficiently garrisoned. 

Senator Ferguson. From the intelligence did you think that the 
Japanese were bluffing or not, from the intelligence that came through 
your hands? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not think they were bluffing 
but I did not think they would strike America. I thought, as I have 
said, that they would confine their efforts to working to the south 
and possibly appreciating that we did not want to precipitate anything 
in the temper of our country, that they would try to consolidate their 
position and gain all they could before they did have to risk a 
[4^7£] war. 

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that you believed prior 
to the 7th because of the movement of the troops and the intelligence 
you had that there was going to be war with Britain but you did not 
believe that there was going to be war with the United States? Is 
that a fair summary ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believed there would be war with Britain 
if the Japs went into the Malay Peninsula. I was not sure they would 
go there. If there was in that case a war with Britain, I thought 
there was a possibility that the United States would come into the 
war but I did not think there would be any certainty of it. I did not 
think that the Japs would attack the United States direct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Saturday morning a message came from 
Admiralty that they were going across the Gulf of Siam, 14 hours, 
I think, was the message, from the Kra Peninsula, and the message 
from our Ambassador Winant to the same effect, which came in at 
10 : 40 Saturday morning. Do I understand that j^ou did or did not 
get that information ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I got it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you get it ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. And my recollection, without checking it, is 
that that course that they were on was a westerly course, which would 
be a clear possibility of attacking Siam, [4973] which was one 
of the alternatives I spoke of. I would like to see that dispatch to 
check that course. 

Senator Ferguson. Could you show it to him, both the Winant and 
the Admiralty message? 

While he is looking for it, did you get that Saturday, Admiral, 
on the 6th ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think so, sir. , 

Senator Ferguson. So when you got the 13 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is just long range, I am not certain, but 
I think I did. 

Here is one message, sir, again from Cadogan. 

"Admiralty conference on information just forwarded, Cadogan attending. 
They were uncertain as to whether destination of parties" — which is the Japa- 
nese force — "is Kra or Bangkolt." 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1877 

Bangkok, of course, was Thailand and Kra was the Malay Peninsula. 

The message they referred to was the 3 a. m. this morning and "the 
parties seen off Cambodia Point sailing slowly westward toward Kra 
14 hours distant in time." 

In that same dispatch from the Admiralty — or from Mr. Winant, 
I find that : 

British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand 
fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before 
[4974] British have opportunity to guarantee support. 

In other words, the British also were in doubt as to whether the 
attack were to be made on Thai or the Kra Peninsula or not. 

[4975] Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you did 
not even come to the conclusion Saturday that they would attack in 
such a way that Britain would come into the war ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not come to the firm conclusion, no, sir. 
I thought they might be working their way to Siam, rather than 
challenge England immediately. I thought it probable, and almost 
certain, that Britain would shortly be drawn into the war, but in 
support of Siam rather than as against a direct attack on them. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, would Senator Ferguson yield 
to a question ? 

Senator Ferguson. I will yield to my colleague. 

Senator Brewster. It is in connection with this: You reiterated 
it is your firm opinion that they were likely to move south instead 
of coming to Hawaii, to attack us. Whether or not the fact that the 
United States Fleet m the Pacific even at Hawaii was inferior in 
strength to the Japanese, would not be calculated to incline the Japa- 
nese to the opinion that they could move south without any immediate 
danger of serious interruption from the United States ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not quite understand you. I got the 
fii^gt part. 

Senator Brewster. Will the reporter read it? 

[4976] (The question referred to, as recorded above, was read 
by the reporter. ) 

Senator Brewster. Without any immediate danger of serious inter- 
ruption from the United States, because of the fact that the fleet, as 
presumably they knew, was not sent to the western Pacific or moving 
to the Philippines and striking. 

Admiral Wilkinson. They could move southward without immedi- 
ate danger. There was a risk. The further they extended their lines 
southward, the more possible a threat from Hawaii would be, because 
they were more exposed to us. But they could, and did, move south 
along the China Coast, and into Indochina, with comparative freedom. 

Senator Brewster. I assume that probably was one factor in your 
consideration of the situation, your knowledge of the relative strength 
of the fleet. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know that I went into the strategic 
consideration, so much, sir. The very evident factors were the known 
l^resence of the ships moving down there, and then there was, as a back- 
ground, the knowledge that you have just stated, that the lines of com- 
munication were short; they had air fields and harbors and bases on 
Forrnosa which they could use in the protection of those lines, and it 
was, in fact, a Japanese sea, and it would [4977'] be very diffi- 
cult for us to interfere with it. 



1878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. If the United States Pacific Fleet had been twice 
as powerful as the Japanese Fleet, with adequate supply trains, to move 
promptly to the Philippines, your estimate of the likelihood of the 
Japanese moving south, rather than moving in our direction might have 
been materially altered? Would that be a fair statement? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly they would have been more reluct- 
ant to move in the open sea to the south. They might have moved along 
the coast. Certainly they would have anticipated our fleet would come 
into the Philippines and establish its base there and then it would be 
in a position to cut the water transport, so they would have to work 
overland. 

Senator Brewster. And so they would have materially altered the 
strategic concept on both sides if that situation had prevailed ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly. 

Senator Brewster. You did, of course, take all of those factors into 
account in forming your opinions as to the situation, I assume ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I naturally would, sir, even without 
formally estimating them. They would influence [4^78] me 
by virtue of my familiarity with naval matters. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, that brings up the question about these 
lost Japanese carriers. You were quite sure from the intelligence that 
you received, that these six carriers that were lost could not have been 
used in the movement south, because you had that covered and had the 
information on that ; isn't that correct ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. There could not have been any movement of 
those carriers through the China Sea, or we would have detected it. 
There might well have been a movement south into the Carolines, the 
Palaus, Saipan, and Guam ; there might have been a movement into 
the Marshalls, and in fact we had some information from the radio 
intelligence at Pearl Harbor that they thought there was a force of 
carriers and submarines into the Marshalls, which would have ac- 
counted for them, although Corregidor did not believe it. 

Senator Ferguson. Then we find this situation, that at least these 
six lost carriers could not be used in the movement south in the China 
Sea, and the Kra Peninsula ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. They were not there at that time. They might 
have been home getting ready to start there. 

Senator Ferguson. If they were in the Carolines then there was 
a possibility that they could attack Guam ? 

[4^79] Admiral Wilkinson. If they were where, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. If they were in the Carolines, they could have 
attacked Guam? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator F'erguson. Then were we, from your evidence, anticipat- 
ing an attack, an air attack from these six lost carriers at Guam? 

Admiral Wilkinson. There was a possibility, if Japan was deter- 
mined upon war, that they would attack anywhere, if Japan was 
determined upon opening the war against us. The probabilities, we 
felt, were most probable, the Philippines, next Guam, next Wake, 
next Midway, and last Hawaii, because of the distance and the exten- 
sion of the line, the increased risk of interception by our forces, and 
the greater boldness required. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1879 

Senator Ferguson, When the message was sent on the 27th, the 
war warning message to tlie Navy, that was, as I understand it, because 
of this movement to the south that you knew about ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think everything boiled into that. I did 
not prepare the message or was not consulted in preparing it, but 
my assumption would be not only the movement to the south, but 
also the diplomatic messages and preparation of the fleet. We knew 
the fleet was getting [4^)80] ready for almost anything. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 22 of Exhibit 2, there is a mes- 
sage that I want to speak to you about. Do you have the book before 
you? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The yellow book, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That is the one in relation to the lights 
and want ads and radio. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did that first come to your attention? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Some 3 or 4 days after Pearl Harbor. I 
note it was translated on the 11th. Whether this was intercepted 
or not I do not know. It was, however, picked up in code form on 
the 8th from the cable station in Hawaii, and turned over to the 
Navy then. I am not sure whether it had been earlier intercepted 
by an intercept station or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, or did you ever hear that it was 
intercepted here at Fort Hunt in Virginia ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I would not know it, since that was 
a matter of communications. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by a code being translated 
in the rough, or a message being translated in the rough ? 
■ \4981] Admiral Wilkinson. In the rough? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I suppose it is the first draft before they went 
over it and removed inconsistencies and dug out some of the things that 
might have puzzled them the first time. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know Dorothy Edgers? 

Admiral W lkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know she was a translator in the ONI, 
the Naval Intelligence? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. If this message had been translated in the rough, 
and put on Kramer's desk — was it Commander Kramer at that time, 
or Captain Kramer? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Commander then. 

Senator Ferguson. Commander Kramer's desk on the afternoon of 
the 6th, completed in the early afternoon of the 6th of December 1941, 
and was brought to the attention of Captain Kramer, I would like 
to ask why that would not be called to your attention, if your office 
was alerted on that day? Was it because of this 14-part message? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would have every idea that it would be, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with the Hewitt [498^] 
testimony, Admiral Hewitt's testimony? 

Admiral Wilkinson. His personal testimony, or the testimony he 
collected ? 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon? 



1880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. His personal testimony, or the testimony he 
collected ? 

Senator Ferguson, Not his testimony. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I am only familiar ^Yith my testimony. 
I read none of the others. 

Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with the Dorothy Edgers 
testimony ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir ; I did not know she had testified. 

Senator Ferguson. How was that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know she had testified. 

Senator Ferguson. So, if this was translated in the rough and put 
on Commander Kramer's desk, it should have reached you then on the 
6th, even though it was in the rough ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. If the translation was sufficiently intelligible, 
yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at that message and see whether 
you see any significance to it in relation to an attack on Pearl Harbor? 

[4983] Admiral Wilkinson. I would say certainly it was an 
indication to vessels lying off Pearl Harbor, presumably submarines,, 
as to the movement of the ships within Pearl Harbor. 

I would say probably, without hindsight now, that it would be a 
substitute for more rapid means of communication', such as radio and 
cable, if they had been broken, and that this was a last minute or last 
resort, rather, method of communication where, if they had no other 
means, they would hang a light in the indow, just as we were told 
Paul Revere did, burning a light in the window to show that ships 
had left, or by day they could have made some other signal. 

[4^84] Senator Ferguson. Then this message, even though it 
had been laid on your desk on the 6th, would not have meant any- 
thing to you in relation to an attack, a warning of an attack on Pearl 
Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It would have indicated a further interest 
in the movements in and out of Pearl Harbor, but it would not have 
meant that an attack was imminent, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you would not have seen, as the intelli- 
gence officer, au}^ need, having that message, to send any more informa- 
tion to Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I doubt if I would, except to tell them that 
the last resort signals were being arranged to take the place of the 
radio and cable communications, which they had been having there- 
tofore. You know the meaning of these signals is just an indication 
of what the movements of ships were. It did not give any informa- 
tion as to ships present, only ships that had left. It did not give 
information as to the locations of ships other than whether they had 
left or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I ask counsel whether this has actually 
been put in the record, this exhibit? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That particular one ? 

Mr. Gesell. This whole book is Exhibit 2, 1 think. 
[4<985] Senator Ferguson. It was not printed; it is just an 
exhibit? 

Mr. Gesell. I think that is all. It is not in the transcript. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1881 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Chairman. Is that all, Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Admiral Wilkinson, I understand from your testimony, 
or I want to ask you whether it is a fair assumption on my part from 
your testimony that at no time during your service as Chief of Naval 
Intelligence, from October 15 down to the 7th day of December 1941, 
did you have any idea or form any conclusion yourself that the Japs 
intended to attack Pear Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. It was your impression, from the intelligence that you 
had, that they intended to continue their movement down into the 
South China Sea, but your personal impression was that they would 
not attack what you were pleased to call the Anglo-Saxon nations, is 
that right? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is correct, sir. "Anglo-Saxon" is the 
common term. I thought England and America were generally under- 
stood by that term. 

[4^86] Mr. Keefe, You meant England and America when you 
used that term ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. That was purely a personal im- 
pression, and of course was erroneous. 

Mr. Keefe. It was jonr personal impression ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, personal impression, and obviously er- 
roneous. 

Mr. Keefe. And you came to that conclusion as the result of your 
review of all the naval intelligence that came to your attention as the 
Chief of Naval Intelligence ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, plus the history of the Japanese 
opportunistic moves in China and Manchuria in the past few days, plus 
their negotiations which they had endeavored to stay, that they were 
going into China and they could not get out of China itself, there was 
nothing to force an issue there. 

Mr. Keefe. You of course were familiar with the entire world situa- 
tion and the rapidly moving events that were taking place? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Roughly, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. During that period and that which had taken place 
prior thereto? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So that your personal opinion was arrived at [4^87] 
as the result of a survey of the entire situation ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. When you concluded that they would not attack Britain 
and the United States ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Keefe. That is correct, is it not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now I assume that, as a naval officer of 40 years' stand- 
ing, and having been to sea with the fleet for years, and having served 
in Honolulu, or in Hawaii, as well as in the JFar East, that you thor- 
oughly understood that Pearl Harbor was developed as a bastion for 
defensive and offensive operations in the Pacific area ? 



1882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Primarily as a base for the fleet, and 
secondarily as a means for the protection of our territory in the 
Hawaiian Islands. 

Mr. Keefe. It was the cornerstone of our defenses, was it not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. In the Pacific ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. In the Pacific ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And for years maneuvers had been held and plans had 
been drawn contemplating the possibility that Pearl Harbor might 
be attacked? 

[4^88] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And Japan was the enemy against whom we were pre- 
paring all these years, was it not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you thoroughly understood that ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; in connection with those maneuvers, 
there had, of course, been countermaneuvers by our fleet, wherein they 
had obtained contacts, and so on, of Japanese movements. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you agree with the general sentiment that appeared 
to have been expressed by Mr. Hull and others who have testified 
here, that the possibility of an attack on the Hawaiian area envisioned 
fundamentally and primarily an air attack, secondly a submarine 
attack, as being the most possible means of attack ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes sir ; and probably both. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought perhaps a submarine attack was the 
most probable, because submarines could get there unnoticed and 
without risk. 

Mr. Keefe. So in your thinking in the years before you became 
Chief of Naval Intelligence you never ruled out the possibility of 
attack on Pearl Harbor and Hawaii ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; while I was there, of course, 
[4^89] we were concerned with that possibility and had maneu- 
vers, as you say, to that effect. 

Mr. Keefe. But you did not consider it probable, although it might 
have been possible, in 1941 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, for a double reason. I thought, in the 
first place, that the Japanese would be loath to encounter the hazard 
of sending a sufficient force into such dangerous waters, and, in the 
second place, I anticipated such a force would be detected before it 
arrived at any threatening position. 

Mr. Keefe. Now you were out there with the fleet in 1940, were 
you not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. 1939-41, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then you were there in 1940 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you were familiar with the operations of the fleet 
in 1940? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was in them, in fact. 

Mr. Keefe. And you were familiar with the liaison that existed 
between the fleet and the Army in that period ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall that the Army was alerted at Pearl Har- 
bor on the 17th of June 1940? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1883 

Admiral Wilkinson. I remember it was that summer. I do 
[4990] not remember the date particularly. 

Mr. Keefe. You remember there was an all-out alert in June 1940? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; I was quite close to General Herron, 
because I was the chief of staff of Admiral Andrews, who had been 
his colleague, until the Fleet arrived there in the spring of 1940. 

Mr. Keef*e. You are familiar with the fact that the Army was 
alerted in Panama at that time, are you not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know Panama had been altered 
at that time. I now know. 

Mr. Keeee. Now do you know of any other time prior to that that 
the island garrison at Oahu had ever been alerted ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know specifically, but I know that 
drills and maneuvers were occurring quite frequently, and partial or 
full alerts took place in connection with them, just as on a similar 
occasion, I think, when the fleet came out in 1934, and I believe I came 
there with the fleet, and the Army was alerted at that time as part 
of the maneuvers. 

[4991] Mr. Keefe. I mean other than mere maneuvers. 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I do not know of my own knowledge 
of any time that the Army was alerted against an enemy threat. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, this alert in 1940, in June, was a real alert, 
wasn't it. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So far as the Army was concerned ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. They were alerted against a possible trans-Pacific at- 
tack by air? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That meant Japan, did it not? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So that according to the developments of that particular 
period, the growing tension and strains were such that the chief of 
staff here in Washington, in consultation with his advisors, decided 
that the Army ought to go on an all-out alert against possible attack, 
as early as the 17th of June 1940 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; Japan was, of course, not preoccu- 
pied with any other movements at that time. 

Mr. Keefe. I did not ask you that, Admiral. 

Admiral Wilkinson. It seemed to be a diplomatic situa- [4992'] 
tion that would favor her taking such a step. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman yield at 
that point ? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. In connection with this alert matter, I call your 
attention to your own report to the Chief of Naval Operations that 
you put in the record yesterday, on the testimony of General Herron, 
wherein you make the following statement : 

After my testimony, Lieutenant General C. D. Herron, who relinquished com- 
mand in early Fehruary in Hawaii, testified mainly about his preparations and 
his general practice as to alert stations. He said that last winter — 



1884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I assume that was the winter of 1941 — 

he had had them in the field for six weeks on the alert, but had subsequently 
modified that in some degree, although he had maintained guns at their field 
stations. 

Does that recall to you the matter of the alert during that period? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think it does, sir. Of course, it was not the 
winter alert that Mr. Keefe was speaking of. It was the summer 
alert. I might have misquoted it, or it might have been mistyped, 
or General Herron himself might have misstated his recollection by 
saying winter instead of surmner. I think that is the summer alert. 

Senator Brewster. That is the summer alert ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. I call your attention to the fact that this was 
given within a very few days after General Herron testified, so I think 
your recollection would undoubtedly be accurate. This was on Decem- 
ber 19, 1941, which must have been within 3 or 4 days of the events. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. As I say, it might have been that 
I dictated it wrong, or the stenographer might have written it wrong, 
and General Herron himself might have said it wrong. I left in 
May, 1941, and I do not think that there was any alert in the winter 
there of 1940-41, that I knew of, at least. 

[4^94] Senator Brewster. Was General Herron's testimony 
taken down, or was that off the record ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That was in the same status as mine. I think 
it preceded me. General Herron was relieved, in fact, on the 7th of 
February, I think, so that to have the 6-week alert in the winter, it 
would have been very early in the winter. 

Mr. Keefe. May I suggest that the evidence is already in in the form 
of the order for the alert and all of the reports in reference to it, and 
it is quite conclusively shown that the alert took place on the ITth of 
June, 1941. We have all that proof here. 

Senator Brewster. I am not questioning that. Wliat I am question- 
ing is whether there was another alert during the winter as Admiral 
Wilkinson reported General Herron as testifying. That is why I 
thought it was pertinent in connection with your question. 

Mr. Keefe. I may say I think I have gone into it quite carefully 
and I think the evidence is quite conclusive there was not an all out 
alert during that period, and he must liave been mistaken as to the 
time, and that the actual alert took place in June 1940. 

Admiral, you, as an officer with the Navy at that time, knew that 
so far as the Army was concerned, in June, 1940, [4^05] they 
considered the possibility of an air attack upon Hawaii to the extent 
that an alert was ordered to prepare against it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, we didn't know why it was ordered. 

Mr. Keefe. You mean the Navy didn't know? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I personally didn't know, and I don't think 
Admiral Andrews knew, and I think that some of the evidence I 
have seen indicates that Admiral Richardson was not informed and 
had to ask the Department about it. 

Mr. Keefe. I am not talking about the Navy side. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I though you were. Excuse me. 

Mr. Keefe. You did not know, and you did not know that the Navy 
was even alerted so far as you were concerned, did you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1885 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. The Navy was not alerted. "We 
made a maneuver toward the southeastward for several days, but we 
were not alerted for any defense of Panama. 

Mr. Keefe. But your connections with General Herron were such 
that you knew the Army was alerted ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I knew the Army was alerted, but I didn't 
know why. 

Mr. Keefe. You saw the operations order, did you not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. It might well have been . [4^96'] 
a maneuver alert. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you know that it was a serious alert? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, I did not know. 

Mr. Keefe. Then you didn't know whether it was a real alert or 
a maneuver alert? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, the evidence before us now is that it was a real 
alert. And you so understand that? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do. sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You saw the evidences of it out there, did you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Can you describe what took place under that alert so 
far as the Army was concerned ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Such evidence as came to my notice was 
that they manned the coast defense guns, moved their anti-aircraft 
artillery to prepared positions, they had searchlight battery exercises. 
In fact, I think I went to witness a searchlight battery exercise 
wherein they flew a plane into the searchlight for test purposes, and 
I recall I was interested in the working of the mechanical ears in con- 
nection with it. They had, in other words, [4997] the defense 
stations manned both against air and against landing expeditions. 

Mr. Keefe. At that time did it impress you that in 1940, there must 
have been some situation developed that indicated the possibility of 
an attack on Oahu ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I thought it was an excellent 
maneuver. I thought it was a practice maneuver, and well done. 

Mr. Keefe. Wliat was that answer ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was a practice maneuver. I 
thought it was an excellent maneuver, and well done. 

Mr. Keefe. So that as far as the Navy was concerned and speaking 
for yourself as an individual officer in the Navy, you just thought that 
it was an excellent practice maneuver. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You didn't know that it was a real alert ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, Mr. Chairman, may I say to counsel, you will 
recall that I asked General Marshall when he was on the stand for a 
statement of the reasons for that alert of June 17, 1940, and upon a 
number of occasions he referred to the fact that it would be taken 
up with General Strong, who was Assistant Chief of Staff in the War 
Plans [4£}98] Division at that time, and that General Strong 
was preparing a statement of the reasons for the 1940 alert, and on the 
18th of December, just yesterday, I was furnished with this statement 
from General Strong, and I believe, Mr. Counsel, that it would be a 



1886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

suitable and proper place, in view of the questions asked of the Ad- 
miral, to offer it in evidence, so that it will be a part of the record. 

Mr. Gesell. You have the only copy we have, so we will have to put 
yours in. 

Mr. Keefe. I shall turn it over to you. 

And I would like to read this, if I may, Mr. Chairman, into the 
record, without all the supporting affidavits, because to me it is rather 
illuminating. 

This is dated December 15, 1945 [reading] : 

Memorandum for General Marshall : 

Subject : Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940. 

1. In connection with your testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investi- 
gation of the Pearl Harb9r Attack, you were asked repeatedly for the reasons 
which prompted you to aleVt the Panama and Hawaiian Departments on 17 June, 
1940. As your Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division at that time, I was 
responsible for advising the action you took, and I feel that it may complete the 
[49'99] story (in case it is not self-evident to the committee from a review 
of contemporaneous historical events) if I summarize the situation leading to the 
alert which I recommended and you approved. 

2. You will recall that Axis ascendancy in May and early June of 1940 gave us 
cause for gravest concern. The British had evacuated Dunkirk by 4 June, and 
on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for surrender terms. Germany had a 
good chance of acquiring the French Fleet intact. Russia appeared to be cooper- 
ating with the Axis; on 12 June she moved in on Lithuania; on 16 June she de- 
manded a change of government in Esthonia and Latvia. On 10 June Russia 
and Japan signed a treaty fixing the Manchukuo-Outer-Mongolia border, and the 
inference was that these two had composed their differences with a view to nego- 
tiating a neutrality pact. The Japanese Navy would then be free for any adven- 
ture. Japanese land forces were concentrating in Hainan, Formosa, and Kyushu, 
apparently for further aggressive action. 

3. You may remember a conference held in your office at 0830 on 17 June 1940, 
at which I was present, along with General Andrews and General Moore. We 
believed at that time that German control of the French Fleet would create a 
very serious situation in the South Atlantic [5000] Should Great Britain 
fall, a hostile move toward South America was far from unlikely. Anticipating a 
desperate need for troops in Brazil, and Uruguay, General Andrews and I recom- 
mended at this meeting that the National Guard be ordered into Federal Service. 
That was our frame of mind on 17 June 1940. At the conclusion of the conference, 
you directed us to consider the questions which had been raised. 

4. In looking to our own security I apprehended the most immediate threat 
to be a raid or ma.ior sabotage effort which would effectively close the Panama 
Canal. Evidence of sabotage plans existed ; certain specific evidence is men- 
tioned below. In the event of a raid, a diversionary attack in the Hawaiian 
area could not be ruled out, since a large part of our fleet was based on Pearl 
Harbor. Accordingly on 17 June, 1940, I recommended placing these two depart- 
ments on an alert status. The documents directly bearing on my decision do 
not tell the story nearly so well as does a vivid recollection of Axis capabilities 
and American weakness at that time when the collapse of France was imminent, 
and the fall of Britain by no means impossible. However, I cite and summarize 
below a few significant papers which reflect those times, and give some indica- 
tion of what was in our minds during those late spring days of [5001] 
1940. 

Then follows, which I won't take the time to read, a series of mes- 
sages from Ambassador Grew, two in number, as a matter of fact; 
some information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese 
crew of the Argentina Maru that the Jap ships were to be sabotaged 
in the canal if they went through and sunk; some information taken 
from a drunken German sailor out in Eureka, Calif.; and an unused 
draft of a letter prepared, giving the commanding general of the 
Panama Department, the reasons and the background for the alert. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1887 

iS002] The Vice Chairman. Would you yield for a question ? 
Ir. Keefe, Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. I probably misunderstood you but in the 
first part of your reading there I understood you to read that the 
fall of "Bataan" was evident. Is that right? 

Mr. Gearh.'.rt. Yes, I caught that too. 

Mr. Keefe. The fall of Bataan? No. Petain. 

The Vice Chairman. General Petain. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Maybe I mispronounced it. 

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to read that as "the fall of 
Bataan was evident." 

jNIr. Keefe. No. "The British had evacuated Dunkirk by 4 June, 
and on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for surrender terms." 

The Vice Chairman. I thought if Bataan was about to fall then 
that is something we want to learn about. 

(The balance of the memorandum above read is as follows:) 

a. State Department 793,94119/640, dated 25 May, 1940. Mr. Grew discusses 
"a flurry of oflicial activity" in Tokyo. Although he sees no reason to attack 
on the Netherlands Enst Indies he acknowledges that preparations for such an 
attack "would presumably be guarded with utmost secrecy." (This, to our 
minds, did not exclude, l)ut rather drew our attention to, the possibilities of 
attack or raid? elsewhere.) 

[5003] b. State Department 711. 94/1518, dated 3 June 1940. In surveying 
the Japanese situation Mr. Grew states in diplomatic terms that "a complacent 
view of tlie future would no longer be warranted." He cites the opinion of Jap- 
anese militarists that their fleet had nothing to fear from the use of force and 
expresses his own belief that Japan "may be tempted to resort to desperate 
courses." 

c. State Department 811 F. 812 PROTECTION/165, dated 10 June 1940. The 
Navy furnishes information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese 
crew of Argmtina Mum that all Japanese ships have orders to scuttle if in the 
Panama Canal when the United States "declares mobilization." 

d. War Department WPD 3730-18, undated. Information from a Navy source 
describes how a German sailor, under influence of liquor, revealed to an American 
petty officer on 1 May 1940, at Eureka, California, some specific and detailed plans 
to blow up the Panama C 'nal if our entry into the war "became imminent". 

e. War Department WPD 4326, undated. In an unused draft of a letter pre- 
pared for your signature at your request, the Commanding General, Panama 
Department, was informed that "the background of the instructions (for the alert 
of 17 June) has doubtless been made clear from matters that have appeared in 
the public press", and that "the Increasing [500ff] tension and uncertainty 
in the world situation, as affecting Canal security, emphasized the necessity of a 
continuous and vigilant alert basis for some time to come." (The letter remained 
unsent on my recommendation, largely because I considered the reasons for the 
alert to he obvious, as indeed they were.) 

5. I can think of no more conclusive way to summarize the situation as of 17 
June 1940 than to point out that the factors which guided my decision in recom- 
menf^ing alerting these overseas bases were essentially those which made it neces- 
sary for the President of the United States to issue his Confirmation of 27 June 
IVAO (F. R. Doc. 40-2639), which extended the scope of the national emergency 
proclaimed 8 September 1939 and gave additional and exceptional authority in 
regard to safeguarding the Panama Canal." 

(Signed) George V. Strong, 
Major General, U. S. A. (Retired). 

Mr. Keefe. I have called your attention to this communication, Ad- 
miral Wilkinson, because it summarizes what was in the minds of the 
Army and General Strong, who was Assistant Chief of Staff in the 
War Plans Division at that time. 

Based upon those facts, which involved world conditions, they 
thought that the possibility of an air attack upon Hawaii [6005] 



1888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was SO probable that they ordered an all-out alert on the iTth of June 
1940. 

Now, I ask you again, as Chief of Naval Intelligence, with all of the 
subsequent information which was obtained by you as Chief of Naval 
Intelligence, you, down to the 7th of December 1940, did not believe 
that an attack 

The Vice Chairman. 1941. 

Mr. Keefe. 1941. You did not believe that an attack on the Ha- 
waiian area was probable ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believed it was possible. I did not believe 
it was probable. I don't think that one awaits for an attack to be 
probable before an alert is ordered. An alert is ordered on a pos- 
sibility of an attack. 

You note that General Strong said that a diversionary attack on 
Pearl Harbor could not be ruled out. That is a very slight phraseol- 
ogy but even on such a slight possibility he ordered an alert. 

Now, similarly, on November 27 both the Army and the Navy 
ordered an alert at Pearl Harbor, again on the possibility of an at- 
tack. I contended I was quite convinced there was a possibility of 
an attack, yes, sir, but I did not believe that there was a probability. 
I certainly agreed in the desirability of an alert. I agreed in the 
desirability of full defense measures. But I did not believe from my 
own [-5006] conclusions that there would be — that there was 
a probability of an attack. 

Mr. Keefe. I call your attention to the fact, in view that you have 
quoted part of this communication, to the fact that 

Admiral Wilkinson. As I understood it. 

Mr. Keefe. Wliat Strong released was : 

In the event of a raid, a diversionary attack in the Hawaiian area could not 
be ruled out, since a large part of our Fleet was based on Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I call your attention to the fact that as I recall 
General Marshall's testimony, and that of other witnesses that have 
testified here, it was their opinion that Japan would not go on with 
its movement to the south and leave its flank exposed by the presence 
of our fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

Did you believe that in the summer and fall of 1911 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not believe that they would attack Pearl 
Harbor up to the moment they did. I believed that their preoccupa- 
tion in south China would engage them in a military way and I be- 
lieved that their political progress would be headed toward, be directed 
toward, making the gi'eatest advance, consolidating their positions 
to the greatest degree, [5007] before they were involved in a 
war with England and America. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I say that I have asked for the log 
of the Enterprise and I have not had a chance to see it as yet, but I 
might want to ask Admiral Wilkinson a couple of questions in refer- 
ence to that, and also a couple of questions with reference to the Lex- 
ington, and I understand it will be here at 2 o'clock. 

Mr. Gesell. That is correct. 

May I ask. Congressman Keefe, if it was your intention that all of 
the papers relating to this alert from which _you read be spread upon 
the record? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1889 

Mr. Keefe. No ; just the letter itself from General Strong to General 
Marshall. 

The Vice Chairman. What you read into the record ? 

Mr. Keefe. Well, the whole letter. 

Mr. Gesell. There is part of the letter you didn't read so we will 
spread it all on the record. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. IVIuRPHY. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the rest of the docu- 
ments be made an exhibit. 

Mr. Gesell,. This document can be designated "Exhibit 87." 

Mr. Keefe. May I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania that 
the documents attached are referred to in the letter and that is the 
reason I didn't suggest putting them in. 

[5008] Senator Brewstee. Would that be too extensive to put in 
the record? 

Mr. Keefe. I don't think it is necessary to spread them on the record 
because they have been condensed in General Stroiig's report and he 
simply attaches the photostat copies of the originals. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 87.") 

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to advise the members of the 
committee that immediately upon the recessing of the committee at 4 
o'clock the Chair wishes to have an executive session here for the 
consideration of two or three matters that the committee should con- 
sider. 

Mr. Keefe. Where will that be, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Eight here. We will remain here after the recess 
after the rest of the people leave. > 

We will recess now until 2 o'clock. ' 

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of 
the same day.) 

[5009] AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 : 00 P. M. 

The Vice Chairman, The committee will please be in order. 
Mr. Keefe from Wisconsin will resume his inquiry. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK 
WILKINSON (Resumed) 

Mr. Keefe. I have just one or two questions. Admiral. 

Am I correct in my understanding that prior to your assumption 
of your responsibilities as Chief of Naval Intelligence on the 15th of 
October 1941, you had had no previous experience or tour of duty 
in that particular field? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; only attendance at two sessions of 
the conferences on the limitation of armaments. 

Mr. Keefe. You had no previous experience in the field of intelli- 
gence, had you, prior to that time ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically under the Office of Naval In- 
telligence. As Chief of Staif," and again as fleet gunnery officer in a 
l)receding tour of duty at sea I had been concerned with the intelligence 
at sea, but I had not been under the Office of Naval Intelligence or in 
it before. 

79716— 46— pt. 4 21 



1890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. You had been essentially a line officer at sea? 
. Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe, Most of your experience has been in that connection? 

[5010] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; such shore duties as I 
had done were not connected with intelligence. 

Mr. Keefe. When did you leave your duties as Chief of Naval 
Intelligence ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. The 20th of July 1942. 

Mr. Keefe. So you had an experince in that office which lasted from 
the 15th of October 1941 to the 15th of July, did you say? 

Admiral Wilkinson. 20th of July. 

Mr. Keefe. 20th of July 1942. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; a little over 9 months. 

Mr. Keefe. And you went back to sea ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Went back to sea immediately, and I have 
just returned therefrom. 

Mr. Keefe. That is all. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire? 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, when you did begin as head of Naval In- 
telligence, was there any change in the stait or the subordinates who 
were under you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No general change, sir. There are always 
recurring changes as one officer after another is relieved, but I brought 
no one in with me and no one left. 

[5011] Mr. Murphy. Substantially the same oiganization as 
it existed under your predecessors remained under you, except there 
was a new chief ; isn't that right ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly. 

Mr. Murphy. When you did go there you brought to that office 
a good many years' experience in the Navy — 36, wasn't it i 

Admiral Wilkinson. Thirty-six ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Thirty-six years. Now I would like to direct your 
attention, Admiral, to page 430 of the Narrative Statement of Evi- 
dence at the Pearl Harbor Investigation, Volume 2, and I note there 
the following — do you have a copy of it available for the Admiral ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. As a preliminary to that, Admiral Wilkinson, will 
you state for the record the full name of Admiral Newton? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Admiral John Henry Newton. 

Mr. Murphy. I notice there the following: 

Admiral Newton, as stated infra page 578, left Pearl Harbor on 5 December 
1941 with a powerful task force including the aircraft carrier Lcxiiiyton, two 
cruisers, U. S. S. Chicago and U. S. S. Portland, and five destroyers, on a mis- 
sion to Midway Island where he was to fly off a squadron of airplanes. Even 
up to and at the time of his sailing and thereafter he [50U\ remained 
in ignorance of the existence of the war warning message of 27 Nnvember 1U41, 
as well as the similar warning messages of 24 November and 16 October 1U41. 

That states that it was taken from the Hart Inquiry at paires 316 
and 318. h j' p ^, 

Do you, Admiral, know of any reason in the world why Admiral 
Kimmel would not have told Admiral Newton, who was going in the 
direction of Japan, after he had received a war warning, of the fact 
that such messages had been sent to him ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1891 

Admiral Wilkinson. I know of no reason, sir, but of course I am 
not a judge. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, if you were Admiral Newton and 
you were going in the direction of Japan, you would certainly have 
liked to have had that kind of information, would you not? 

Admiial Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now one question. Admiral. 

In Exhibit 8-A, which was introduced in evidence yesterday, and 
which, for identification, is headed "General Headquarters Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers," and dated 4 December 1945 — 
will you make that available to the witness, please? 

Mr, Gesell. He has it. 

Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to the page numbered 
2, which is actually the third page in the exhibit, [SOIS] under 
the heading "A," and preliminarily, as I understand it, this was a 
statement as explained on page 1 : 

Since the staff officer connected with the document reporting the above facts 
has died and the various records have been burned, the forejj;oing is the conjecture 
of Commander Tachibana Tome vpho worlved in the same department at that 
time. 

Now on page 2- 



Admiral Wilkinson. And who I imagine, Mr. Congressman, is the 
same gentleman we arrested on the west coast a few months before. 
I am not sure, but I think so. 

Mr. Murphy. You think he was the same? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think he was the same. He was in intelli- 
gence work, and of the same name. 

Mr. Murphy. Someone of the same name was arrested on the west 
coast of the United States some months prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, for espionage on the west coast. I 
just know it was Commander Tachibana Tomo. 

Mr. Murphy. I noticed the following : 

American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December 1941) (American 
time). 

Tiie United States broadcasts of the number of battleships, cruisers, destroy- 
ers, and others entering (or anchored) in Pearl Harbor was overheard. 

[■''tOJ^] Admiral, so far as any messages that were sent from 
the United States by the Navy are concerned, they would certainly be 
in code, would they not, if they were sent to Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Unquestionably, sir; I see no reason why they 
would report on the number of battleships, cruisers, and so forth, 
entering Pearl Harbor. Any message back from Pearl Harbor would 
certaiulv be in code. 

Mr. Murphy. So far as naval messages are concerned in and out 
of Pearl Harbor, they would be in code, would they not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. On a subject such as this I should be almost 
certain of it. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you have any idea as to what, if any, kind of 
broadcasts might be referred to there. Admiral Wilkinson? 

Admiral Wh.kinson. Possibly some local news broadcast speaking 
of a unit of the fleet coming in for the benefit of the local Hawaiian 
population. I know there was no censorship going on there. I think 
they had been requested not to comment on the ships, but there was 



1892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

no formal censorship. Possibly some amateur radio people talking 
together. 

[601S] Mr. Murphy. But so far as you know, Admiral, was 
there any official broadcast by the American Government, by the 
United States Army or by the United States Navy that would con- 
tain that kind of information at that particular time ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I suggest that we make an inquiry, 
and if the committee so pleases, I will initiate it, of our district intel- 
ligence officer out there to see if he knows anything about it. 

Mr. Murphy. I would appreciate it if you would take the necessary 
steps to put such action into motion. 

The Chairman. Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I have been provided with the original 
log of the Enterprise, and I not having had a chance to see it before, 
I may have a question of Admiral Wilkinson. 

The Chairman. All right. In the meantime Congressman 
Clark 

Mr. Keefe. I have no questions otherwise until I get a chance to 
go through this. 

The Chairman. All right; Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Clark. Admiral Wilkinson, on yesterday Senator Lucas, I 
think, inquired of you as to when you graduated from the Naval 
Academy. I should like to ask you when you went on active sea duty 
in this last war ? 

[S016] Admiral Wilkinson. I think the 15th of August of 1942. 

Mr. Clark. 1942 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Would you state, please, for the record, briefly, your 
services from then until the close of the war, and also state whether 
you received any recognition of any kind in connection with your 
services ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. From the 15th of August until early Janu- 
ary of the following year, 1943, I was commander of battleship divi- 
sion 2, comprising three battleships, and operating in Hawaiian 
waters, and in the west coast waters of the United States. 

In early January I was detached and directed to proceed by air, 
which, of course, I did, to Noumea to report to Admiral Halsey as his 
deputy commander. I arrived there in late January and remained as 
his deputy commander until the end of June, wlien I reported as un- 
derstudy to Admiral Turner, in command of the amphibious forces 
of the South Pacific. 

I joined him in time to participate in the attack on New Georgia 
and relieved him in the later stages of that campaign on the 15th of 
July, 1943. 

From then until the 15th of November of this year, 1945, I was in 
command of the South Pacific Amphibious [5017] Force 
which subsequently was entitled the Third Amphibious Force, and 
remained in command of the Third Amphibious Force when it shifted 
its operations from the South Pacific into the Western Pacific as a 
whole. 

During this time I was engaged in the South Pacific campaign 
with the amphibious operations in connection witli the later stages 
of the New Georgia campaign, with the seizure of Vella Lavella, the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1893 

capture of the Treasury Islands, and the landing and capture of a 
portion of Bougainville in November of 1943. 

Then in 1944, with the seizure of Green Island and the capture 
and occupation of Emirau Island in, respectively, February and 
March. 

In June the South Pacific campaign was over and I was transferred 
to the Pacific as a whole and operated with Admiral Halsey's Third 
Fleet in the capture of the two islands in the Palau Islands, Peleliu 
and Angaur, in September, 1944, and in the capture and occupation 
of the Ulithi atoll. 

Immediately after that I was transferred to the Seventh Fleet 
under Admiral Kincaid for duty with his fleet and General Mac- 
Arthur's single command as a whole in the Philippine campaign. 

I was in command of one of the two amphibious forces [5018] 
which landed at Leyte on the 20th of October, and was present there, 
although not actively commanding any combat forces, during the 
sea battles for Leyte of October 20. 

Again I was in command of one of the two amphibious forces which 
landed at Luzon in Lingayen Gulf on January 9, and initiated the 
campaign that resulted in the capture of the entire Philippines. 

After leaving there, I was — I wasn't relieved of duty, but most 
of my ships were then assigned to the Fifth Amphibious Force under 
the command of Admiral Turner, who then proceeded with his force 
to the capture of Iwo and Okinawa. I was not concerned in either 
of those operations except for a visit I made to Okinawa, but was 
engaged in the planning for subsequent operations under Admiral 
Halsey. 

During the development of the Okinawa campaign, these partic- 
ular operations which we were planning for were abandoned, and I 
then fell in with the general plan and began to work up the invasion 
of Japan with Admiral Turner in command of all the amphibious 
forces consisting of my own. Vice Admiral Hill's, and Vice Admiral 
Barbey. 

Upon the surrender of Japan my duties in the invasion were, of 
course, automatically canceled, and I become an amphibious com- 
mander to bring in the Eighth Army under General Eichelberger into 
Japan from Tokyo, including Tokyo Bay and a short area to the 
south of it, throughout northern Honshu, and Hokkaaido and all of 
northern Japan, from that line I have spoken of to the southward of 
Tokyo. 

[S019'] I brought i« the first of the major installments of troops 
on surrender day, the 2d of November, some 25,000 troops of the First 
Calvary Division and the One hundred and twelth Calvary Regimental 
Combat Team, and I supervised the arrival of other divisions in north- 
ern Honshu and in Hokkaaido, and remained there in Yokohama in 
general command of reinforcement and supply operations for the 
Eighth Army until I left there on the 8th of November. 

That, I think, sir, is the narrative. 

As to any awards, I have been honored by the Distinguished Service. 
Medal of the Navy for the capture of Bougainville, by a second Dis- 
tinguished Service Medal for the Palau campaign, and by a third for 
the Philippines campaign. 



1894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Clark. Admiral, this committee, as you understand, is sitting 
on this inquiry, the ultimate purpose of which is the finding of the 
facts in regard to the Pearl Harbor incident. Do you know of any 
other fact or circumstance relating to that or bearing upon it that 
you have not related that might be helpful to this committee in that 
connection ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. 

Mr. Clark. That is all. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions ? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman 

[5020] The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I have now before me the memoran- 
dum on your testimony before the Roberts committee. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you got it? 

Admiral TTilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Referring to the bottom of page 12, "Statement 
by Captain T. S. Wilkinson, United States Navy, Director, Naval 
Intelligence Division." 

Admiral Wilkinson. I beg your pardon. I haven't the Roberts 
commission report itself. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you just look at the testimony. 

(Paper handed to Admiral Wilkinson.) 

Senator Ferguson. The other part is in the record and I wanted to 
have you read this in. It is a very short memo. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What you gave to Admiral Stark is already in 
the record. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. This is headed "Precis of 
Testimony". 

The Chairman. For the record, define that word. 

Admiral Wilkinson. It is headed "Precis", — p-r-e-c-i-s. 

The Chairman. What does that mean ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It means a brief, I think, or summary. 

[6021'\ The Chairman. That is not our language? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe it is a French word meaning brief. 

The Chairman. In other words it means a brief or resume? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. A summary of whatever it is dealing with ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Wilkinson. The heading is "Precis of Testimony Given 
Before the President's Investigating Commission." Statements by 
A.dmiral Stark and several others. 

Turning to the part that Senator Ferguson has spoken of: 

Statement by Captain T. S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, Director, Naval Intelli- 
gence Division. 

In replies to questions, the witness described naval avenues of intelligence, 
including naval attaches and additional naval observers and consular shipping 
advisers who had been maintained in the Far East. Frequent reports were 
received from these officers. The witness mentioned other methods through which 
the Navy received secret information. Frequent exchange of dispatches had 
occurred between the Intelligence organization in Washington and in the field. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1895 

In general, the sources reported their information to Washington, at the same 
time informing the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and the [5022] 
Pacific Fleets. Care was taken here to see that these two officers were kept 
fully advised as to deA'elopments. 

From the evidence avaihable the Navy had concluded in November that the 
Japanese were contemplating an early attack. Tlie witness considered that both 
Commanders in Chief had available to them the same information on which this 
conclusion was drawn here. Nevertheless, warning dispatches had been sent out. 

The witness gave information concerning the control of fishing boats in the 
vicinity of Hawaii, and described the delimitation of the spheres of activity 
of the naval and military intelligence services and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 

[5023] In April, 1941, the Chie of Naval Operations sent out a dispatch in- 
dicating from past experience that the Axis could be expected to initiate new 
activities on Saturdays, Sundays, and national holidays. Steps were taken in 
March 1941, placing the Naval District intelligence organizations in an advanced 
state of readiness ; coastal information sections were placed in an active status 
last May. District intelligence organizations were further extended in that 
month, and a complete state of readiness of the intelligence organizations was 
directed last July. 

S3nator Feeguson. Now, Admiral, were those the only questions 
that you had gone into before the Roberts Commission? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I should say so, sir. It was a brief hearing, 
a half-hour only, as I remember. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the only time you testified? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that there was 
a Presidential commission to find all of the facts and that is the only 
question they went into with you ? Was there anything said why they 
were limiting your scope ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know, except that they were in a hurry 
to get out to Hawaii, I think, and you will note that this is a summary 
of the statements of Admiral Stark, [S024-] Admiral Turner 
and myself, and I think on the same day they questioned me, they 
also had General Herron and General Miles. 

Senator Ferguson. When they got back they didn't go into it any 
further, they didn't call you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Didn't call me at all, sir. 

Senator Ffrguson. You were here in the Intelligence Branch? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, reading that, I think it is the second or 
third paragraph, about the knowledge that the Pacific Fleet and the 
Asiatic Fleet had, do you want to let that stand as your testimony, that 
(hey had the same amount as you had here in Washington, or to that 
effect ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think it is too broad a statement, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It is too broad a statement? 

Admiral Wilkinson. They had the same information by reason of 
their radio intelligence centers which they had there as to the move- 
ments of the Japanese vessels, and the position and location of the 
Japanese fl^et ; they had the same information as to those factors that 
we had. They did not have the same information as to the diplomatic 
negotiations, no, sir, nor as to some of the code messages. 

[502-5] Senator Ferguson. And some of the other messages? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So you would say that ought to be corrected ? 



1896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Wilkinson. It should if it is to be narrowed down and 
my own statement, my own draft of memorandum for Admiral Stark, 
mentioned a number of points about the movement of ships, and I 
said they had that information. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the Sundays and Saturdays, that is in 
the last paragraph, I wish you would clear up what they had asked 
you about that. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, that, I think, is in one of our exhibits, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that your own or were you just telling 
what General Herron had said ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was telling what my office had done. It 
was Admiral Kirk's action on the preceding April. Let me have the 
exhibit. 

Senator Ferguson. I notice they questioned both you and General 
Herron on that same subject. 

Admiral Wilkinson. That dispatch is shown on page 1 of exhibit 
37 counsel tells me. 

Senator Ferguson. Page 1 of 37. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

[5026] Senator Ferguson. Will you just read that? 

Admiral Wilkinson (reading) — 

1 April 1941 

From : Chief of Operations 

but I know this dispatch was initiated by Admiral Kirk. 

To: Commandants of all Naval Districts — 

which would, of course, include Manila and Hawaii. 

NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa. 

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because 
of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activi- 
ties in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays 
of the coTuitry concerned they should take steps on such days to see that proper 
watches and precautions are in effect. 

Senator Ferguson. And had that been called to your attention 
when you came in ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And then you had that in mind while you were 
in the office ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be true because of a relaxation on 
that day ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think the British and America, 
both countries, paid a good deal of attention [S0£7] to Satur- 
days and Sundays. 

Senator Ferguson. The same would be true of civilians; the same 
thing would be true of civilians? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. If you were going to send a message on Sunday 
or Saturday, would you say that you would be more apt to get better 
attention from the civilian services or the Army and Navy? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Purely as a matter of personal attention, I 
would say from the Army and Navy because we maintained a regular 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1897 

24-hoiir watch. We don't relax established routines on communications 
on those days. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say then that any Army or Navy 
establishment that had been alerted, should be alerted on Saturdays 
and Sundays even more so than on other days, owing to what you 
stated in your report, or what was stated in this report? 

Admiral Wilkinson. This dispatch, sir, was not as broad as perhaps 
would have been desirable for it to be. It was initiated by Admiral 
Kirk and sent out as applicable to the service over which he had 
authority, which is to say the Intelligence Service. This was not 
warning all the communications services, was not warning all the 
combat field. It was only applicable to Intelligence Service of itself, 
which was Admiral Kirk's service and consequently my service. 

[5028] Senator Ferguson. In other words, you were specially 
alerting the intelligence services— they were — on Saturdays, Sundays 
and holidays? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And I notice that when you gave your resume as 
to what you heard before the Commission you gave the^this is already 
in the record but I want to call it to your attention — the Commission 
asked if he considered Sunday morning the most lax time in the de- 
fenses and, consequently, the most advantageous time for an attack. 
He said that — 

with regards to the reserves, yes, because they were more likely to be on leave 
or other privileges, but with regards to the actual stations in the field he con- 
sidered that they should be as efficient and as fully manned on Sunday as on any 
other morning. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I was quoting General Herron there, 
was I not, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. All right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, he personally made many dawn inspec- 
tions on Sunday to check on and insure their readiness. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I had seen him on his return from 
at least one of those. 

[S029] Senator Ferguson. Now, he was a general in the Army. 
What would you say about that in relation to the Navy at Hawaii ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would not like to express an opinion on 
that. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you had been there Saturdays and Sun- 
days and holidays ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what is your opinion ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, I think stations which were required 
to be manned would be manned very definitely just as much on Sun- 
day morning or Saturday afternoon as on any other weekday or any 
other day. There were established watches on all the ships and those 
watches were maintained regularly regardless of the calendar day 
or the day of the week or the holiday. 

The ships were placed on certain conditions of readiness, of which 
I think you are already aware. Condition 1 was all battle stations 
manned; condition 2. half the batteries manned; and condition 3 was 
a somewhat smaller element of the battery. 



1898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Condition 3, as I recall, was the standard condition in which we 
would be when in port. That would require a certain number of 
guns manned, and I believe from what I have [50301 heard 
that that was the case on Sunday morning, that all the ships were 
manned in that condition. 

Senator Ferguson. That is. No. 3 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say they would be equally manned 
on Sunday morning or Tuesday morning or Monday afternoon, in 
that same rotation I mean, that they would be just as carefully 
manned then as at any other time. 

Senator Ferguson. So, then, you don't think it made any dif- 
ference ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It did make this difference: that in the nor- 
mal work on the ships they would be having a drill for all hands 
and all officers in the forenoon, say, of Thursday or Friday and they 
would be having inspections on Saturday. All officers and all men 
would be required back aboard. 

Now, on a Sunday morning, as a matter of a holiday there would 
not be these drills and inspections and some officers might be allowed 
to return late ; some few others — I think there was a limitation to 
those who might stay away — some few others might be allowed to stay 
away all day Sunday, so there would be that slight difference in that 
instead of probably being aboard for the work of the day some few 
might have been excused because there was no work of that day. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman. 

[5031] The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Wilkinson, despite the schedule of organ- 
izations which is dated October 23, 1940, which requires the Office of 
Naval Intelligence in both Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Intelli- 
fence to evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advis- 
able; despite Admiral Stark's reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of the 
22d of March 1941 which reads as follows : 

With reference to your postscript on tlie subject of Japanese trade routes and 
responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINCUS, Kirk informs 
me that ONI is. fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately 
informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal 
elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning 
the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to 
you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent 
by despatch ; 

and despite Admiral Kirk's memorandum of March 11, 1941, his 
memorandum reading : 

4. The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility 
of this Division to keep the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet adequately 
[5032] informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and 
disloyal elements within the United States. 

you testified in June of 1945 before Admiral Hewitt's special investiga- 
tion on the order of the Secretary of the Navy in response to Mr. 
Sonnet's questions that I will read : 

Would it be an accurate summary then, Admiral, to state that information in 
the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning Japanese move- 
ments, for example, would be disseminated by ONI but the evaluation of Japanese 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1899 

plans or deductions to be drawn from these movements would be the function of 
War Plans or Chief Naval Operations? 

Your answer being : 

The latter part of your question "Yes." The first part, the day by day information 
of Japanese movements would not according to my then and present understand- 
ing be sent out by Intelligence but, rather, by Operations after their evaluation. 

My statement to this point is correct, is it not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhakt. Now, I believe that in the closing portion of my 
examination of you the other day you explained the discrepancies be- 
tween the schedule of organizations of 23 October 1940 and your 
conception of your duties by pointing out that you had received 
verbal orders from someone which [5033] changed your re- 
sponsibility? 

Admiral Wir kinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. I forgot to inquire then as to who gave you those 
verbal orders? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I stated that I was officially informed 
by my predecessor as part of my relieving him that he had been 
orally directed by Admiral Stark to that effect in the presence 
of Admiral IngersoU and Admiral Turner as well, and that I myself 
had received verbal instructions from Admiral IngersoU and the 
authoritative assistant to Admiral IngersoU. 

Mr. Gearhart. Has that schedule of organization order ever been 
changed ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not knoAv, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. So far as you know it is still in effect? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir. I know that frequently 
papers of that sort are drawn up and modified from time to time 
and there is no machinery, perhaps, in existence to make sure that 
each particular modification, such as I said with respect to removing 
the public relations department from the Office of Naval Intelligence, 
that there is no machinery set up to keep up these instructions in 
writing to date. 

Mr. Gearhart. As long as you were the Director in the [5034^ 
Division of Naval Intelligence you never received from any source 
a written order changing the schedule of organization to which I 
have just referred? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I did not feel it was necessary. 

Mr. Gearhart. Who was it that issued the written order "Schedule 
of Organizations"? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure when Admiral Stark assumed 
office. It was either he or his predecessor, whoever was Chief of 
Naval Operations. 

Mr. Gearhart. Could it have been 

Mr. Gesell. I can answer that question for you, Congressman 
Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. I would appreciate it if you would. 

Mr. Geseix. Because I have the original memorandum. It was 
approved by H. R. Stark, October 23, 1940. 

Mr. Gearhart. October 23, 1940? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 



1900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. And did Admiral Stark tell you personally that 
lie had changed that order? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. I was satisfied to receive that informa- 
tion from my official predecessor and to receive it from his authori- 
tative assistant. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, drawing upon your experience as a [5035] 
naval officer, if Admiral Stark desired to change that order he would 
do it himself, naturally, by another and succeeding written order, 
wouldn't he? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not think so, sir. I think he would tell 
the man that had charge of it to act otherwise than as was laid out 
under written order. I do not think Admiral Stark attached perhaps 
very great importance to the existence of this series of long documents 
outlining for their guidance the duties of the respective divisions. I 
think he felt free to add to them or change them orally from time to 
time as he saw fit. 

Mr. Gearhart. Both Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Kirk were of 
lesser rank than that of Admiral Stark, were they not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact. Admiral Stark was their com- 
manding officer, wasn't he? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and mine as well. 

Mr. Gearhart. And yours as well. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. It was not then possible for either Admiral Inger- 
soll or Admiral Kirk to have issued an order contravening an order 
of a higher ranking officer in writing, was it ? 

[5036'] Admiral Wilkinson. For Admiral Kirk, no, sir. For 
Admiral Ingersoll, yes, if he were acting in his stead. 

Mr. Gearhart. But he could only do that while acting in the name 
of Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. When people or other officers, associates of yours, 
come to you and tell you that written orders that are plain on their 
face in respect to import and meaning — tell you that verbal orders have 
been issued setting them to one side, do you not at once feel that you are 
on inquiry that you should make inquiries at the source as to whether 
or not that has ben done ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Not necessarily, sir. If I were relieving an 
officer of rank and responsibility in command of a ship and there were 
general orders extant and he said that he had received certain particu- 
lar orders in variance to those orders, I would acept his statement un- 
less I felt there was something distinctly wrong with them, which I 
did not in this case. 

Mr. Gearhart. And despite the fact that you had before you a writ- 
ten order for your guidance, despite the fact that you had been advised 
orally that you were not supposed to do the evaluating and not sup- 
posed to do the disseminating, you did continue as long as you were the 
head of the ONI to [5037] evaluate and to disseminate didn't 

you? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I had the orders which were applicable ex- 
cept as they were modified. They had been modified in a brief, in a 
limited way. I continued to evaluate and by "evaluation" 1 mean 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1901 

determining the accuracy, the authenticity, and the consistency of 
information, I do not mean by that the deduction of enemy inten- 
tions. I continued to evahiate all information in that sense and for 
my OAvn satisfaction I attempted to figure out what the enemy inten- 
tions were but I did not spread that out because I was ordered not to. 

I continued to disseminate in every respect, including a number of 
papers and articles and publications which I have mentioned, but I 
did not disseminate information which would immediately affect the 
operations of the fleet until I had consulted with the War Plans De- 
partment about it, because those were the limitations that I felt had 
been placed upon me. 

Mr. Gearhart. Insofar as the receipt of these intercepts, you dis- 
seminated them through the agency of your courier. Captain Kramer, 
did you not ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Within the limited distribution that was 
turned ov'er to me to be carried out. 

Mr. Gearhart. And he delivered them in most instances [6038] 
to the White House, to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the 
Navy, and the Secretary of State and to the two Chiefs of Staff? 

Admiral Wilkinson. They were delivered to those officers, sir. He 
did not deliver them himself to them, to all of those you mentioned. 
He delivered them to the Secretary of the Navy, to the White House, 
and to the Chief of Naval Operations, but not to the Secretary of 
War, the Secretary of State, or the Chief of Staff. That was an Army 
distribution on that side. 

Mr. Gearhart. The Army took care of the Army side? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; and to the Secretary of State. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is all. 

Mr. Keeee. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question ? 

Mr. Gearhart. First I would like to make a request, if you will 
yield the floor. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. First I would like to make a request of counsel. 

Counsel will recall that I called to the attention of the committee 
that I had received letters from enlisted men who were serving at 
Hickam Field, who had reported to me that on the 1st day of December 
1941 a formal all-out air alert was ordered, an all-out alert was in- 
voked which required all [6039'] battle stations to be manned, 
all men to be in full battle regalia, the mounting of machine guns 
and the mounting of antiaircraft guns, and I asked you at that time 
to furnish me with the copies of the orders establishing that alert 
and the copies of the orders calling off that alert on the afternoon of 
Saturday, December 6. 

Since that time I have received letters from far separated parts 
of the United States, from other enlisted men advising me that the 
alert was not confined to Hickam Field but that there was a general 
all-out alert at other bases in the island. Is there a Wright Field? 

Mr. Keefe. Wheeler Field. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, it is Wheeler Field, which is the combat airfield, 
or was at that time, in the islands ; that an all-out air alert was called 
on or about December 1 requiring the same activities at Wlieeler Field 
that I have desci-ibed at Hickam Field, and that that air alert was 
called off by an order of the afternoon of December 6, 1941, the sus- 



1902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

pension of the all-out alert, which required the taking down of the 
machine guns and the antiaircraft guns and the packing of them away 
in grease and the return of ammunition to the arsenals; and I would 
like to have copies of the orders establishing the alert at Wheeler and 
a copy of the orders calling off that alert at the same base, together 
with any [504.0] similar orders that were issued at about the 
same times, creating an air alert upon other bases in the islands and 
also any orders, if there be. any, calling off the alert at those other 
bases. 

Mr. Gesell. We will ask the Army to broaden their request. I 
might report, Congressman, that at the time you made that inquiry, 
that initial request, it was necessary for the War Department to direct 
the inquiry to Hawaii where those orders are if there are any, and 
they have not yet received a reply from Hawaii. 

Mr. Geakhart. Yes. 

Mr. Gesell. We are already at work on that subject. 

Mr. Gearhart. I appreciate that. And there is one other thing. 
If these field orders at Wheeler and Hickam were purely field orders, 
I would like to have that fact certified. If those orders were inspired 
from higher authority, I would like to know the history of their 
issuance.^ 

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe, do you want to ask a further question? 

Mr. Keefe. Admiral Wilkinson, I have before me now the original 
log of the aircraft carrier Enterprise and the photostatic copy of the 
log of the aircraft carrier Lexington. 

The log of the Enterprise dates from Monday, November [504.1] 
24, 1941, to December 15, 1941, and the photostatic copy of the Lexing- 
ton log is for the period December 5, 1941, to December 8, 1941. 

Now, purely for information in order to be able to evaluate and 
understand the language appearing in these logs I ask you as an expert 
on naval affairs, a log such as that whicli I liave does not show the 
action or battle action report, does it, normally ? 

Admiral TFilkinson. I think it would noimally, not a full report 
but it would state whether the ship was engaged or when she had 
sighted the enemy and what had happened at once. There would be 
a separate action report in fjreater detail. 

Mr. Keefe. There would be a separate action report ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, I find language in this log which I 
have some difficulty, due to my inexperience in dealing with those 
matters, to understand. 

For instance, on the 30th of November at 12:45 appears the 
language: "Sounded flight quarters." What does that mean? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That on a bugle they sounded call to flight 
quarters, which is to say "stand by the planes, we are ready to launch 
planes" or "get ready to launch planes" [504^] or perhaps "get 
ready to recover planes." That is to stand by for flight operations of 
planes, in other words. 

Mr. Keefe. That would mean the planes were either going to take 
off or land, would it not? 

Admiral Wii kinson. Yes, sir. Calling the men to their stations 
in connection with that operation, that was the purpose. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, I find this : On December 1, 1941, as near as 
I can make out, the Enterprise at this time was proceeding westward. 

» See information submitted by the War Department, Hearings. Tart 5, p. 2490 et seq. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1903 

It left Honolulu a few days before. It was carrying planes to Midway 
or to Wake, counsel, do you recall? I think they were going to Mid- 
way and perhaps the Lexington was going to Wake at this time. Well, 
all it says 

'Admiral Wilkinson. Excuse me one minute. Senator Ferguson, 
do you remember what page that was on, that reference to Admiral 
Newton ? 

Mr. Murphy. 430. 

Admiral Wilkinson. 430? That would give us a clue. 

Mr. lOsEFE. There appears information of this character, Admiral, 
as of December 1. 

Admiral Wilkinson. You are speaking now of the Lexington or 
the Enterprise? 

Mr. Keefe. I am speaking now of the Enterprise. 

[■504-3} Admiral Wilkinson. She had been with Admiral 
Halsey. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Because the Lexington was with Admiral 
Newton. 

Mr. Keefe. With Admiral Newton? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. There appears this : 

17''6 darkened ship: out in the de-Gaussing gear for half hour test. 1746, 
secured the de-Gaussing girdle. • 

What does that mean? 

Admiral Wilkinson. "Darkened ship" means turn out all lights so 
the ship cannot be seen after dark. It is usually done at sunset so 
that there will be ample time to check, probably, before the actual 
dark sets in and lights could be seen. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that a normal operation ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That is a normal operation when cruising 
at sea and at any times — certainly at any times of danger or crisis and 
often just for maneuvers. 

In the degaussing process that you mentioned, magnetic mines were 
used to some extent early in this war and the answer to it was found 
to be putting a magnetic girdle or belt around a ship and when you 
were in mineable waters, that is to say, where you were not too deep 
for mines to be em- [5044] ployed, the ship would normally 
cut in the current on this degaussing girdle so that that w^ould counter- 
act the magnetism of the ship and defeat the magnetic mines which 
otherwise would be affected by the magnetism of the ship. 

Mr. Keefe. I understand that. So that, then, the order to darken 
ship was either a precautionary measure, to be indulged in by the 
commander of the ship in the event they were in waters where there 
m'ght lurk some danger, is that it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think we were doing it regularly for some 
time because of the possibility of an attack from Japanese subma- 
rines and, of course, if we were showing lights it would be an open 
invitation to discovery. 

Mr. Keefe. That is just exactly what I thought. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. That you would darken a ship because you had knowl- 
edge or thought, at least, there might be an attack by Japanese sub- 



1904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

marines and this ship going out there is preparing itself against that 
particular attack by darkening the ship ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I think they had been doing that for some 
time, sir, in fact. 

Mr. Keefe. For some particular time prior to December 1 ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes ; the darkening of ships at night. 

[504S] Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, then, it says : 

Set condition of readiness 3, ship control and fire control. 

What does "set condition No. 3" mean? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 3 is to characterize a condition wherein 
a certain number of guns are manned but a certain number of others 
are not manned, so that the crews in rotation can get some rest; 
roughly about one-third of the guns. 

Mr. Keefe. That means they are manning the guns ? 

"Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; or the guns were manned at all 
times against a surprise submarine attack when at sea. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that the highest condition of readiness? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. The highest condition is all hands 
at the battle stations, which is condition 1. Condition 2 is about 
half the battery and condition 3 is from one-third to one-fourth, 
depending upon the ship. 

Mr. Keefe. So that I am to understand that when the log says, 
"Set condition of readiness No. 3, ship control and fire control," that 
that means that at least a part of the guns of that ship were manned 
and ready for action ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And what does "ship control" mean and "fire control," 
what does that mean? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Fire control is to say — fire control [5046] 
has to do with the guns. Ship control has to do with the readiness 
to counteract any damage incurred to the ship and that would mean 
that they should have certain damage-control parties on at the time, 
nucleus damage controls. Of course, if all hands were at the battle 
stations they would have full damage control. This would be smaller 
and fewer damage-control stations but enough to take action in the 
event of a surprise attack. 

Mr. Keefe. I do not want to appear so naive as my questions might 
appear, Admiral, but I want this for the purpose of the record. 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Well, I admit they are very tech- 
nical terms as well. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. All of these things that you have described are 
conditions of alerting this vessel to prepare it for any possible surprise 
attack that might be made upon it ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kfjefe. Isn't that true ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So that so far as i\\Q Enterprif^e is concerned, in accord- 
ance with the log, this ship as it was proceeding out toward Midway, 
at least in these days for which the record appears in this log, the 
commanding officer of that ship was preparing against the possibility 
of a surprise attack? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1905 

[504.7] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; and doubtless on orders 
from Admiral Halsey, the commander of that detachment, who had 
probably had similar practices in all other ships of that detachment. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I find also that planes were constantly being 
launched into the air for patrol. That would be for the same purpose, 
wouldn't it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. To ascertain if there were any submarines in 
the path of the ship ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. And then I find as they steamed on that Decem- 
ber 3, 1941, appears for the first time this language : 

1015 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 11. 

What does that mean ? What was that plan No. 11 ? 

Admiral AVilkinson. One of several plans. In order to have a 
variety of plans available so that no enemy could determine that we 
had one single method of zigzagging, we would have a number of 
plans wherein at different intervals of time we would make different 
changes of course. Plan No. 11 was just one of those plans. Which 
one that was I do not know. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, in any event if the ship on December 3, 1941, 
adopted plan No. 11 and commenced zigzagging, it would be quite 
safe to assume that that action was prompted by the fact that they 
were in waters where they expected the possibility of submarine attack, 
isn't that true? 

[5048] Admiral Wilkinson. It might, of course — that is very 
true. It might, of course, have been for a drill that morning as well 
but it might well be — if it were a drill only it would be indicated by 
an entry afterward that they ceased zigzagging an hour or two 
later. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, I am glad you said that because right in the 
next entry, 1216, appears this: 

Changed course to 314 degrees T. and commenced zigzagging in accordance 
with plan No. 2. 

Would that indicate that it was a drill or a maneuver ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. That would indicate they intended 
to do it all day. 

Mr. Keefe. I beg 3^our pardon ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It would indicate they intended to do it all 
day. They have to stop every ship to change courses and then all 
ships would resume together and then they would begin zigzagging 
apparently on another plan. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, the next entry contains this language : 

1748 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 

What is plan No. 2? Just another one of these zigzag plans? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Just another one. I think we had about 20 
at that time. 

[5049] Mr. Keefe. That is a different type of zigzag? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Slightly different. 

Mr. Keefe. Then I find on December 4 the same language, "Zig- 
zagging." 

Admiral Wilkinson. The ship's course was west of the Hawaiian 
Islands and we had had reports of strange submarines being sighted, 

79716 — 46— pt. 4 22 



1906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I think, in the past few months and the ship was taking no chiinces, 
obviously. 

Mr. Keefe. Then all of this language that all ships in the task force 
are steaming darkened, maintaining condition of readiness No. 3, in 
ship control, fire control, ships zigzagging according to plan No. 11 
or plan No. 2 or some other plan, indicated that so far as Admiral 
Halsey was concerned in going west from Honolulu in this period be- 
tween, I think, November 26, when he left Honolulu, and the time 
when he got out to Midway, he was taking the precaution that would 
normally be taken by the commander of a task force and the com- 
mander of this aircraft carrier Enterprise against a possibility of sub- 
marine attack, isn't that true ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. It certainly appears so, sir, and I believe he 
is to be here and he can further testify directly, but I would certainly 
say yes. 

Mr. I^EFE. And if they manned the antiaircraft guns and were 
in readiness at their stations at the antiaircraft gims \5050'\ you 
would consider that that was a precaution and a safety measure against 
the possibility of a sudden air attack, wouldn't j^ou ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. What time was that entry about condition 3, 
sir? If it was at night he might be standing off a night submarine 
attack, but the guns could be used, of course, against both submarines 
and airplanes, the antiaircraft guns. Some other guns cannot be 
used against airplanes. 

Mr. Keefe. In your opinion, Admiral, as an expert of 40 years in 
the Navy, with these entries appearing in this log and also similar 
entries in the log of the Lexington, and I shall not burden the record 
with putting them all in at tliis time, it would appear that so far as 
the commanders of those two task forces were concerned, Admiral 
Halsey on the one hand and Admiral Newton on the other, that in 
carrying out the task assigned to them, which was to deliver planes 
to Midway and Wake and return, they were doing it under the princi- 
ple that they might be attacked by Japan either by submarine or by 
air attack? Isn't that a fair conclusion for me to draw ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think that the situation was cer- 
tainly strained and they were not neglecting any precautions. They 
may not have been expecting it but they were taking precautions 
against surprise. 

[S051] Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, you say they may not have been 
expecting it? 

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; but they were taking precautions 
against surprise. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you think they miglit have had the same idea 
which you have expressed so frequently here, that you did not think 
there was any probability of any such attack being made? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. If I was in a similar situation I 
would not have expected a probable attack but I certainly would have 
done the same thing with regard to my ships. 

Mr. KJEEFE. You would be ready for it if it came? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I would. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that right? 

Admiral Wilkinson. And I believe I would have done what they 
did. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Thank you, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1907 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in order to clear the record in con- 
nection with the questions that have been asked, I would like to read 
from page 578 

The Chairman. Is that a question? 

Mr. Murphy. It is an official record and answers the questions of 
the gentleman from Wisconsin. 

[5052] Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I state that the gentle- 
man from Pennsylvania is repeatedly referring to a book that has 
not been offered here, entitled, "Narrative Statement of Evidence of 
Pearl Harbor Investigations,'' which I have a copy of, but which I 
do not understand has been offered in evidence, is not part of the 
record in this case and I understand it has a sort of nebulous char- 
acter from what I have been able to hear about it, and until such 
time as the full character and background of that instrument has been 
produced and it appears as part of the record in this case I do not 
intend to be interrupted, nor do I want to be interrupted by reading 
from something that is not in the record and may or may not state 
the facts as they may ultimately develop. 

So I do not accept anything that appears in this statement as 
being of verity nor do I think it will assist me in clarifying anything 
that I may think in regard to it until it is properly identified. 

The Chairman. I think the Chair explained the other day when 
these documents were furnished that they were prepared by the Navy 
Department at the request of the Committee on Naval Affairs, pos- 
sibly before this hearing, started, I am not certain about that, but 
that upon the completion of this narrative story they turned them 
over to the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs and he 
turned them over to me for [5053] distribution to the mem- 
bers of the committee, for the information of the committee. 

I do not think they were made part of the record or filed as ex- 
hibits, but for whatever they might be worth in giving the committee 
and to the individual members a running story of this Pearl Harbor 
situation. They are not yet officially parts of the record as the Chair 
understands it and were not offered for that purpose; that is, not at 
that time. They might be so made, but have not as y^t been made 
part of the record or filed as exhibits. 

Mr, Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I did not mean to interrupt the 
gentleman. I understood he had concluded. 

I want to read from a part of the Hart report, made by Admiral 
Hart, now Senator Hart, and reported on page 578 of volume 2, 
precisely along the line of the questions put to the witness and if the 
questions are pertinent, this is certainly pertinent. 

The Chairman. The Chair has inquired whether this was a fur- 
ther inquiry of Admiral Wilkinson? If the committee are through 
with the Admiral, unless there are some further questions from him, 
we might excuse him. 

Mr. Murphy. Let me just say this, Mr. Chairman: I was about to 
read into the record the explanation by Admiral Newton as to why 
he zigzagged, in answer to the question of [5054] the gentle- 
man from Wisconsin. It is at page 578 of the record and there are 
further references at 430 and 578 and 562 of volume 2, for those who 
are interested. 

The Chair. All right. Are there any further questions of Admiral 
Wilkinson ? 



1908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. I had one or two I wanted to ask him. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. Admiral, on the general questions of your re- 
sponsibilities and the preparedness to meet it at the time, what, if any, 
opinion have you formed about the psychological effect of the repeated 
warnings which had gone out over the course of the past 2 years, in 
1940 and 1941? We have seen these warning messages and one of 
those, at least, if not the two — we do not seem to be clear about the 
second one — as to the state of mind of conmianders in evaluating these 
warnings in view of the recognized inadequacy of the forces at their 
command to carry on a continuing state of reconnaissance and alert- 
ness ; that is, they did not have actual control ; as to whether or not 
it had sort of the effect of hearing a cry of "wolf, wolf" from them 
every 2 or 3 months or every month or so, with the result that they 
did not take it as seriously as they would have taken it if they were 
in the position that you were at Washington, where you knew this 
time it meant business ? 

[50S5] Certainly the state of tension in Washington and the 
knowledge of the situation indicated that this was very different from 
any of the preceding crises that had arisen. 

What would be your comment as to the lessons which we all might 
derive from that experience, looking to the future? 

[50S6] Admiral Wii>kinson. I do not recall, sir, that there we're 
very many alarms sent out there. Up to the time I left in May there 
had not been an excessive number. We kne.w that Japan was restless 
on the other side of the ocean, we knew that difficulties might ensue, 
and from then on until the actual attack I do not know that very 
many were sent. I think perhaps the Department refrained from 
sending an excessive number for that very reason, that they did not 
want to add up, to produce a wolf -wolf situation. 

In answer to your question, I do not believe that there was an 
allayment or subsidence, you might say, of apprehension because of 
having received too many warnings. 

Senator Brewster. You do not think that the alert they had sent 
out in June of 1940, when they really put them on the alert — was 
that about the date? 

Admiral Wilkinson. That was the date, I understand. 

Senator Brewster. And the earlier episode in keeping the fleet there 
that Admiral Richardson testified about, his visits and his concern, 
and then in the winter and spring, 1941, when certain indications were 
given and the situation was very tense, you felt all of those were not 
sufficient to in any sense put them to sleep ? ' 

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not think so, sir. The Navy, for in- 
stance, was not disturbed or concerned in the summer [5057] 
alert of 1940. The fleet remained out there in the eyes of most of 
the officers, and it was an idea that it was a good operating ground, 
good climate, and of course it had the supposed effect upon the 
Japanese. 

Senator Brewster. I think you are not familiar with the testimony 
on that point. Admiral Richardson testified he was very much con- 
cerned about that alert, and he came on to find out whether it was 
simply an exercise. At first he was told it was an exercise and later 
he was told it was really a war warning. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1909 

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought you were speaking about the effect 
on the fleet as a whole. Concerning the effect on the commanders, 1 
could not say. Admiral Richnidson was concerned in that, but the 
general effect on the fleet was little, if anything. 

Senator Brewster. I am thinking ]iow in terms of the command 
and what their appraisal would be of these warnings, I think that 
is one of the questions which demands most consideration, concerning 
the effect upon these men. 

One other question. I think you testified about wanting certain 
additional legislation to take care of espionage in Hawaii. Did you 
speak about that yesterday? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I said, I think, that the Depart- 
ment had asked for legislation to prohibit the [5058] photo- 
graphing of a naval reservation at Pearl Harbor, and that that legis- 
lation, I believe, was introduced by the Navy Department but was not 
enacted. I mean it was requested by the Navy Department. 

Senator Brewster. Question has also been raised about these some- 
thing over 200 — I now have the figure before me — 200 consular agents 
of the Japanese there. I quote now from the Roberts Eeport as it 
seems to have pertinence : 

In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents acting under 
the Japanese Consul, who was stationed in Honolulu, territory of Hawaii. The 
Naval District Intelligence Office raised a (Question with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and with the IntelliKeiu-e Officer of the Hawaiian Department of 
the Army, whether these agents shoulil not be arrested for failing to register 
as agents of a foreign principal as retiuired by statutes of the United States. 
In conferences respecting this question, the Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, objected to the arrest of any such persons at least until they had 
been given notice and an opportunity to register, asserting that their arrest 
would tend to thwart the effort which the Army had made to create friendly 
sentiment toward the United States on the part of Japanese aliens resident 
in Hawaii and American citizens of Japanese descent resident in Hawaii and 
create unnecessary bad feeling. No action was [5059] taken against the 
agents. 

It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii was the 
Japanese Consulate at Honolulu. 

You were familiar with that, were you ? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Very. We discussed it. General Miles, iMr, 
Hoover and myself, in one or more of our weekly conferences and we 
were all concerned about it, and the Department was endeavoring to 
secure authority or action on that subject. But the Army, the War 
Department, on the recommendation of the commanding general out 
there, took the action, or requested the action that he had set, that it 
would be delayed and they would be given an opportunity to register, 
in order not to disturb the feeling of loyalty which they were trying 
to build up among the Japanese. 

Senator Brewster. That is as far as that phase of it was concerned, 
but there was no need for additional legislation, was there ? You had 
all the legal authority that was needed? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, indeed. 

Senator Brewster. That is all. 
_ Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in rela- 
tion to the one Senator Brewster just asked? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 



1910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. I want to read to you, Admiral from page 127 
some questions and answers from the Army Pearl Harbor [6060'\ 
Board record. Your opposite in the Army was General Miles? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to read from his testimony : 

General Grunert : Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side" 
might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of satura- 
tion tlmt they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting? 
In other words, "crying wolf! wolf!" so that they became confused, or "fed up"? 

General Miles. That could have been, sir. 

General Gruneet. Do you think that the G-2 message — we call it "the G-2 
message" of November 27 — and the sabotage message — we call that the "Arnold 
message", of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General's signa- 
ture — did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the command "down 
below" as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of November 
27? 

. General Mixes. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of St^iff's message of November 
27 was a war warning message, in my mind, all inclusive so far as different 
forms of attack or dangers might be considered, and my message of the same 
date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who 
was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas department, 
to that particular form of danger, 

[5061] General Grunert. There was no report from the recipients required? 

General Miles. There was no report required. 

Were you familiar with those messages that went out to the Army? 

Admiral Wilkinson. I was not familiar with the Army message. 1 
think I knew General Miles' message as to sabotage, and I knew that 
the Army had sent a parallel message to our war-warning message, 
although T was not familiar with its language. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you agree with General ]\Iiles there on 
that one question, No. 135, asked by General Grunert: 

Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side" might have considered 
themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation that they did not 
pay much attention to the information they were getting? In other words, "crying 
wolf, wolf." so that they became confused, or "fed up"? 

General Miles. That could have been, sir. 

Admiral Wilkinson. I could not say as to the Army. sir. I do not 
think that situation arose in the Navy. I think the Chief of Operations 
Office was careful not to send too many for that reason. 

The Chairman. In other words, taking the alert in the summer of 
1940 and the other alerts along in the winter of [5062'] 1941, 
even in the summer of 1941, up to the 27th of August, 1941, they did 
not constitute a sufficient number of aler